Defence Research and Development Canada | Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada

CAN UNCLASSIFIED

Gender-Based Counter-Radicalization Messaging

Michael Thomson
Barbara Martins
David Harmes
Human System

Prepared by:
HumanSystem Incorporated
111 Farquar Street
Guelph, ON, H1H 3N4
Canada

PSPC Contract Number:W7719-185416/001/TOR
Technical Authority: Angela Febbraro
Contractor's date of publication: March 2018

Defence Research and Development Canada

Contract Report

DRDC-RDDC-2018-C133
July 2018

Canada

IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS

This document was reviewed for Controlled Goods by Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) using the Schedule to the *Defence Production Act*.

GENDER-BASED COUNTER-RADICALIZATION MESSAGING

by:

Michael H. Thomson, Barbara Martins, and David Harmes

Human*Systems*® Incorporated
111 Farquhar Street
Guelph, ON N1H 3N4

HSI® Project Manager: Michael Thomson
(519) 836-5911

PWGSC Contract No. W7719-185416/001/TOR

On Behalf of

Department of National Defence

As represented by

Defence Research and Development Canada Toronto
1133 Sheppard Avenue West
Toronto, ON, M3K 2C9

Project Scientific Authority:

Angela Febbraro
416-635-2000 x3120

March, 2018

HUMANSYSTEMS® INCORPORATED

Author

Michael H. Thomson
Human*Systems*® Incorporated

Approved by

Angela Febbraro
Scientific Authority

Approved for release by

Name of Document Review Chair
Chair, Document Review and Library Committee

Abstract

The following report is in support of Defence Research and Development Canada's multi-year research activity on "The Role of Women and Gender in the Radicalization Process and the Maintenance of Extremist Groups," which seeks to address the involvement of women in both promoting and countering extremist activities and to better understand the gender dimensions of radicalization and extremism. Despite the importance of this topic, little research attention has been paid to the roles and perspectives of women in the context of radicalization and extremism. Thus, this work seeks to contribute towards a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms that draw women, in particular, towards extremist ideologies, as well as the methods that can prevent their involvement. This research activity considers the current state of women's participation in radicalization and violent extremism, elaborates on existing counter-radicalization and counter-violent extremism (CVE) programs, and adopts best practices from the influence and persuasion literature to generate a series of prototype gender-based counter-radicalization messages. Such messages are intended to counter extremist narratives and to offer alternatives to radicalization. Messages are designed for social media, for radio/TV, or for in-person settings within the expeditionary environment.

Résumé

Le rapport suivant soutient une recherche pluriannuelle de Recherche et Développement pour la Défense Canada sur « Le rôle des femmes et du genre dans le processus de radicalisation et le maintien des groupes extrémistes », qui vise à aborder la participation des femmes dans la promotion et la lutte contre activités extrémistes et de mieux comprendre les dimensions du genre de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme. Malgré l'importance de ce sujet, peu de recherches ont été consacrées aux rôles et perspectives des femmes dans le contexte de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme. Ainsi, ce travail contribue à une compréhension plus globale des mécanismes qui attirent les femmes, en particulier, vers des idéologies extrémistes, ainsi que des méthodes qui peuvent empêcher leur implication. Cette activité de recherche examine l'état actuel de la participation des femmes à la radicalisation et à l'extrémisme violent, élabore des programmes existants de lutte contre la radicalisation et contre l'extrémisme violent et adopte les meilleures pratiques de la littérature sur l'influence et la persuasion pour générer des messages de contre-radicalisation basés sur le genre. Ces messages ont pour but de contrer les discours extrémistes et d'offrir des alternatives à la radicalisation. Des messages sont conçus pour les médias sociaux, pour la radio/la télé, ou pour les paramètres en personne dans l'environnement expéditionnaire.

Executive Summary

Gender-Based Counter-Radicalization Messaging

M. H. Thomson, B. Martins, D. Harmes, Human*Systems*® Incorporated; DRDC-RDDC-2018-C133; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto Research Centre; March, 2018

The following report is in support of Defence Research and Development Canada's multi-year research activity on "The Role of Women and Gender in the Radicalization Process and the Maintenance of Extremist Groups", which seeks to address the involvement of women in promoting and countering extremist activities and to better understand the gender dimensions of radicalization and extremism more generally. Women's participation in extremist operations is a pervasive feature of recent and current conflicts. Their contributions range from providing supportive networks and building sympathetic communities to roles involving more direct violence such as engaging in fighting or suicide bombings (Griset & Mahan, 2003; as cited in Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2013). Extremist groups use a variety of methods to attract women to their cause and to persuade them to remain loyal to their ideologies. With the advent of social media, recruitment may occur globally and attracts a variety of demographics (Mitts, 2016). Typically, messaging campaigns that incorporate narratives and persuasion tactics are used to win the hearts and minds of potential converts.

Radicalization is a complex phenomenon that does not tend to follow a linear trajectory. There are many reasons why an individual may endorse extremist ideologies, including (Bloom, 2011; as cited in Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2013, p. 37):

1. Revenge [for the death or mistreatment of a family member]
2. Redemption [for past sins that have damaged their self-image]
3. Relationship [with insurgents, such as a father or husband]
4. Respect [from community for their dedication to the cause]

These factors are powerful motivators to seek out and adhere to extremist ideologies. Women are also motivated by grievances (i.e., economic marginalization and discrimination, poor socioeconomic status, cultural alienation); unmet needs for belonging within like-minded community networks; enabling environments and support structures (such as the internet/social media); and the opportunity to embrace a particular vision for society (Thomson, Davis, Martins, Evans, & Morton, 2017). These factors create fertile ground into which extremist organizations sow their narratives, and consequently harvest the interest and commitment of new recruits.

Combatting extremist narratives requires a thorough understanding and consideration of the factors and motives involved in radicalization and extremism. Attempts at combatting violent extremism must be evidence-based and contextually relevant in order to be effective (Ndung'u, Salifu, & Sigsworth, 2017). Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a preventative effort that involves the "use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives" (Khan, 2015). Previous and existing CVE activities have included messaging, engagement and outreach, and capacity building, and must be administered in a variety of sectors. There are a number of best practices for designing and developing CVE campaigns and counter-radicalization messages, which include understanding the context; knowing the target audience; developing compelling content that invokes critical thinking; considering the medium; using credible messengers; and evaluating the campaign.

For this report, 28 prototype gender-based counter-radicalization messages were developed. These messages were developed to suit their context (i.e., social media, in-theatre, etc.) and medium. Within the domain of social media, two platforms take precedence (i.e., Facebook and Twitter) due to their ubiquity and global presence. Social media has a vast reach and is relatively inexpensive to deploy. It is best suited for disseminating a high volume of CVE or counter-radicalization messages, intended to gradually influence the audience via repeated exposure. Within an in-theatre context, radio and television provide two potential counter-radicalization messaging methods. Unlike social media messages, which are general enough to be distributed to a large number of people at once, in-theatre messages are concentrated and meant for target audiences that have greater exposure to radicalization. In-theatre messaging, therefore, requires more resources to produce, but may command more attention and/or involvement from the audience, potentially having a weightier impact.

The report concludes with next steps and recommendations for CAF involvement in CVE and counter-radicalization messaging campaigns.

HSI HUMANSYSTEMS INCORPORATED

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Figures

Tables

1. Background

In November 2005, Muriel Degaugue became the first European female to detonate a bomb killing 5 people. A Belgium-born Islamic convert, she was well educated and well mannered, and reportedly came from a supportive family and community (Von Knop, 2007; as cited in Jacques & Taylor, 2009). As Jacques and Taylor (2009) reported, her actions and the resulting outcry made it clear that little was known regarding women and extremism. More recently, on May 13, 2018, an Indonesian woman equipped herself and her two daughters, ages 12 and 9, with explosives and proceeded to set them off in a Surabaya church (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2018). Other members of their family performed the same act in two other locations, resulting in at least 11 deaths and 40 injuries. This was the first time that an Indonesian woman or child had taken part in an ISIS[1]-motivated attack, and it is a potentially ominous sign of increased female involvement in violent extremism.

It would seem then that any comprehensive understanding of radicalization and violent extremism requires greater attention to the unique role that women and girls play in this domain, as well as an understanding of the broader gender dimensions of radicalization and extremism. In fact, women have been involved in extremist activities throughout history, and their roles are diverse, including as lookouts, drivers, suppliers, spies, decoys, messengers, hijackers, and combatants, including suicide bombers (Griset & Mahan, 2003; as cited in Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2013). Women who join extremist groups also come from a variety of demographic backgrounds (Mitts, 2016), making it difficult to identify a profile of women extremists, or to determine why women participate in violent extremism.

Bloom (2011; as cited in Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2013, p. 37, emphasis added) identified four core reasons why women participate in violent extremism, stating that they "tend to be motivated by…*revenge* [for the death of a family member], *redemption* [for past sins that have damaged their self-image], *relationship* [with insurgents, such as a father or husband], and [desired] *respect* [from their community for their dedication to the cause]." Women also join terrorist groups because of adherence to *ideological or cultural goals of the group* as well as a desire for *emancipation* and *social reform* (Cragin & Daly, 2009, & Morgan, 2002; as cited in Poloni-Staudinger & Ortbals, 2013). Examining Islamic radicalization and violent extremism, for instance, Thomson et al. (2017) noted that women may be motivated by *grievances* (economic marginalization and discrimination, poor socioeconomic status, cultural alienation); *unmet needs for belonging and community networks*; strong and significant interpersonal bonds within *enabling environments and support structures* (such as social media); *the embracing of a new vision for society*; and the becoming of a *Jihadi bride*.

Given the potential role for women in violent extremism, there is a need to consider approaches for preventing radicalization and violent extremism. Ndung'u, Salifu, and Sigsworth (2017) explain that efforts at countering violent extremism (CVE) directed towards women need to be evidence-based, nuanced and, importantly, context-driven. They state that "[t]he gap between policy and practice in responding to women's involvement in violent extremism is becoming increasingly manifest and there is a realisation that this gap can only be filled by identifying the overarching dynamics behind, and specific drivers of, radicalisation in the *contexts* in which they occur" (p. 2, emphasis added). They further explain, "this will help provide a better fit between preventing and countering violent extremism [P/CVE] strategies and the communities where they will be implemented and where their effects will be felt…moving beyond simplistic understandings and narratives of women's roles in

[1] ISIS refers to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.

both policy development and in P/CVE strategy implementation" (p. 2). In short, conditions leading to radicalization and violent extremism will vary according to context.

For example, in Kenya and al-Shabaab, women's participation in violent extremism includes "recruiting, gathering intelligence, facilitating funding, radicalizing their children, and providing an invisible support structure for violent extremists, such as supplying food, shelter and medical care for fighters" (Ndung'u, Salifu, & Sigsworth, 2017, p. iii). Ndung'u, Salifu, and Sigsworth report that drivers that lead women to participate in violent extremism in Kenya include poverty and a lack of employment opportunities and socio-political marginalization; perceived oppression of the [local] Muslim community, coupled with extremist teachings; and a connection with extremism through their husband or partner.

So there are a number of potential factors or conditions that may drive women to radicalize and participate in violent extremism, and these may vary according to the particular context. Once there is an understanding of the underlying conditions for radicalization, this understanding will position practitioners well to establish an effective CVE program that will have a greater probability of success.

In the following chapter, we discuss CVE programs in general, their recent history, and recent advancements. Chapter 3 then highlights best practices for CVE programs, considers how those best practices align with scientific evidence, emanating from the persuasion and social influence literature when possible, and considers the potential implications for the CAF. In Chapter 4, we develop a set of 28 prototype gender-based counter-radicalization and CVE messages and narratives, primarily targeted to women. And finally, in Chapter 5, we consider methodologies for validating a CVE program, specifically through a Theory of Change.

2. CVE Programs

Countering violent extremism is a growing field, and like any new field, it is not without its challenges. Emerging in the context of counter terror policy and practice in the 2000s, it neither received an adequate nor consistent definition, leaving communities uncertain and weary of CVE interventions and their implications (Romaniuk, 2015). Initial CVE efforts were simply confused with counterterrorism agendas. As such, "[n]egative perceptions of other aspects of counterterrorism policy or negative experiences of state authority in general…affect[ed] the inclination of individuals and communities to engage in CVE" (Romaniuk, p. 19). Romaniuk explained that with security being high on the agenda, some communities felt like they were being spied on, and worried about the negative consequence they would face from security forces in the context of counter-terrorism efforts.

Today, there is greater consensus on what CVE is and what it is trying to accomplish. According to Khan (2015, p. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2015-02-18/why-countering-extremism-fails), CVE is the "use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives." According to Davies, Neudecker, Ouellet, Bouchard, and Ducol (2016), CVE should not be confused with *de*radicalization efforts. Where CVE tries to prevent radicalization from occurring in the first place, deradicalization is characterized by the active denunciation of violence, the rejection of a radical worldview, and a departure from an extremist movement (Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, & Boucek, 2010). CVE is preventative, whereas deradicalization is reactive (i.e., it is conducted after an individual has already been radicalized). CVE efforts seek to ensure that individuals do not radicalize in the first place.

CVE, and developing counter-radicalization messages or narratives, involves a wide range of activities intended to lessen the effects of extremist narratives and to stop violent extremism (Davies et al., 2016). Activities range from messaging to engagement and outreach to capacity building to education and training (Romaniuk, 2015). Because radicalization tends to emerge in "places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge" (British Government's *Prevent* Strategy, 2011, p. 63), CVE must be administered across a variety of sectors, including education, the justice system, faith (e.g., churches, mosques), health (including mental health services) and charities. There is also a range of players who develop and implement CVE campaigns, including the government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), youth, and grassroots civil-society (Tuck & Silverman, 2016). CVE interventions are conducted online or offline and centre on altering the belief systems or worldviews of potential radicalized individuals.

Briggs and Feve (2013) identify three types of counter-narrative activities – government strategic communications, alternative narratives, and counter-narratives (Figure 1).

What	Why	How	Who
Government Strategic Communications	Action to get the message out about what government is doing, including public awareness activities	Raise awareness, forge relationships with key constituencies and audiences and correct misinformation	Government
Alternative Narratives	Undercut violent extremist narratives by focusing on what we are 'for' rather than 'against'	Positive story about social values, tolerance, openess, freedom and democracy	Civil society or government
Counter-Narratives	Directly deconstruct, discredit and demystify violent extremist messaging	Challenge through ideology, logic, fact or humour	Civil society

Figure 1: Counter-narratives (Briggs & Feve, 2013)

The first type of counter-narrative activity, government strategic communications, is aimed at increasing awareness of radicalization among the general public, building relationships with relevant stakeholders, and addressing misinformation. The second type of counter-narrative activity, alternative narratives, is meant to inform people who are particularly vulnerable to radicalization about the merits of social values, such as tolerance or openness, which may provide alternatives to extremist narratives. This type of counter-narrative activity may be conducted by either government or civil society.

Counter-narratives, the third type, are aimed at individuals who are further down the path to radicalization and who are considered at the highest risk for violent extremism. Such counter-narratives are primarily driven by civil society, and are characterized by intentional and direct efforts to deconstruct, discredit, and demystify violent extremist messaging, using ideology, logic, fact, or humour. A counter-narrative will identify what is wrong or problematic with an extremist position by challenging its assumptions (Schmid, 2014; as cited in Davies et. al, 2016). Counter-narratives can also be understood as strategic communications with a particular, fixed, objective within a political, policy or military context (Ferguson, 2016). Moreover, a singular narrative that provides a clear representation of the world and one's role in it is both alluring to the audience (Schmid, 2014; as cited in Davies et al., 2016) and legitimizing, if the audience shares similar experiences (Allan, Glazzard, Jesperson, Reddy-Tumu, & Winterbotham, 2015). A counter-narrative should ultimately "rob the terrorists of their narrative and symbolic power" (Leuprecht et al., 2009; as cited in Joosse, Bucerius, & Thompson, 2015, p. 814).

It is important to consider the level of government involvement in CVE interventions, including the role of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), because there has been some past skepticism, especially from "targeted" audiences, about the political agendas that may be associated with government involvement. At the White House Summit on CVE in 2015, ministers from over 60 countries agreed that governments cannot deliver this wide-ranging agenda alone, but rather need the involvement of civil society and, in the case of countering ISIS's narratives specifically, honest and trusted local religious leaders (Romaniuk, 2015). According to Romaniuk's evaluations of early CVE programs,

early attempts at engaging community members was challenging for government agencies. For example, they were incapable of accurately identifying representative individuals and organizations. Civil society groups, on the other hand, are often more equipped at engaging the community. Research has shown, for instance, that universities and colleges in the United Kingdom are more willing to implement CVE programs if such programs are kept at a safe distance from government agencies (Romaniuk, 2015).

Romaniuk (2015) states that government agencies and civil society groups need to have clearly defined roles when it comes to CVE communication. He explains that governments should avoid "direct engagement in a 'battle of ideas' with extremists because civil society is better suited to that task" (p. 24). Using a Danish CVE program as an example, he explains that "broadly stated objectives provided insufficient guidance in developing programs and yielded stigmatization. In response, the objectives were altered midstream; and one specific goal – 'to maintain and further develop Denmark as a democratic society with freedom, responsibility, equality and opportunities for all' – was tacitly dropped" (p. 24). This change, Romaniuk continues, reduced unintended negative consequences and shifted the programming from *cognitive* radicalization to those at risk of *behavioural* radicalization. Romaniuk also includes Public Safety Canada[2] initiatives that have leveraged partnering with non-governmental organizations and first-person narratives of radicalized individuals as a means of outreach, demonstrating the use of civil society groups. And the Royal Canadian Mounted Police[3] has worked with Muslim communities in Canada to develop a handbook for communities on extremism and ways to prevent it, reflecting "an innovative attempt at partnership" (Romaniuk, p. 26).

Any CVE initiative needs to have clear and transparent roles for stakeholders to maximize acceptance and support, and based on previous efforts, should have limited, direct government involvement. Program designs need to reflect the context and be inclusive of communities. In fact, targeted communities often have developed CVE messaging and narratives meant to persuade at-risk community members away from radicalization and violent extremism. As Joosse and colleagues (2015, p. 814) report, "frames and counter-frames develop as a matter of course within the dialectic of movement-counter-movement interaction." As such, some targeted community members will have counter-narrative tools[4] already in place (Joosse et al., 2015). Leveraging these is an effective way to design and develop not only workable CVE programs, but also programs that are relevant to the target audience, which will likely increase both the reach and impact of the initiative. And as will be shown in the next chapter, this is consistent with CVE program best practices.

[2] Public Safety Canada is a Canadian governmental agency.
[3] Royal Canadian Mounted Police is a Canadian governmental agency.
[4] One example is the Somali-Canadian community and al-Shabaab. Joosse et al. (2015) explain that as a result of a dialectic movement-counter-movement, there are already well-developed narratives that render the Somali-Canadian community largely resistant to al-Shabaab radicalization efforts. They point out that the efficacy of resistance arises, for instance, from positioning those resisting as "knowledgeable storytellers who can forewarn others against recruitment to al-Shabaab" (p. 811).

This page intentionally left blank.

3. Creating a CVE program

There are many elements for constructing CVE messages and narratives, and this chapter highlights those, identifying best practices. These best practices will then be used to inform our development of generic CVE messages and narratives primarily targeted at women and girls in both digital and overseas operational contexts.

Drawing on the work of previous CVE practitioners and scholars (e.g., from USAID, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue/ISD, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence), Davies and colleagues (2016) created a CVE program structure, as shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2: CVE Program Structure (Davies et al., 2016)[5]

Zeiger (2016) has a similar counter-narrative campaign process to the program structure outlined above.

[5] The author received authorization to reproduce this figure from the Journal for Deradicalization.



Figure 3: Steps for developing a counter-narrative campaign (Zeiger, 2016)[6]

The following sections highlight the most critical components of these program structures.

3.1 Context matters

Both Davies et al. (2016) and Zeiger (2016) highlight the importance of the context before moving to the development and dissemination of the counter-narratives. For Davies et al., identifying the "at risk" population and the social processes leading to radicalization are vital in counter-narrative programs. Zeiger shows that it is necessary to determine what "pushes" (e.g., discrimination and marginalization, Islamophobia, etc.) and "pulls" (e.g., identity, sense of adventure, sense of belonging, etc.) individuals to radicalize and endorse violent extremism. Identifying these external and internal factors, Zeiger argues, will not only prevent biased assumptions about the motivations for radicalization, but also help steer the CVE campaign to the target audience. Zeiger also highlights the importance of identifying the explicit or implicit violent extremist narrative (e.g., religious or ideological, political, etc.) to develop an effective counter-narrative.

[6] The author received authorization to reproduce this figure from the publisher (Heydayah).

Citing research from Jenkins (2014), Finley and Templer (2017) point out that violent extremism has a long history and as such is driven in part by historical and political conditions that are continuously evolving. That changing historical and political context makes understanding motives much more challenging, requiring a comprehensive assessment of the conflict and the changes over time. Second, because radicalization and violence is grounded in local contexts (e.g., Ndung'u, Salifu, & Sigsworth, 2017), understanding the factors that foster vulnerability to extremist narratives and building resilience against violent extremism needs "a nuanced understanding of local factors" (Comerford, 2017, p. 71). CVE interventions must be informed by local issues. Third, there is no clear set of factors for predicting radicalization (Schonveld, 2017). For example, some men simply discover violent extremism only to use religion as a means to justify and legitimize their past actions. Fourth, though grievance is a condition of radicalization, Festermacher (2015; as cited in Finley & Templer, 2017), grievances will vary according to local contexts, and attempts at isolating the exact one is reductionist and fails to appreciate the complexity of the phenomenon.

With respect to context, it is also important to include an understanding of the military organization (i.e., the CAF) within the mission area. Knowledge of the mandate, strategic aims, and capabilities of the force will set the conditions for developing an effective CVE message strategy. A basic SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis can be used to identify the factors necessary for content development (see Ideal Content Checklist below). As part of this analysis, public perceptions of the military (or specific military unit/task force) should be considered in the development of a message strategy.

A useful tool for understanding the audience-related contextual factors is the Basic PSYOPs[7] Study used in Psychological Operations program development (DND, *Psychological Operations*, 2004). As a comprehensive background planning document, the Psychological Study will outline a number of audience-related conditions, including basic needs, the psychological disposition of different groups, and the effectiveness of communication channels used by different target audiences. The Psychological Study is useful in the early stages of strategy development, where target audiences are first defined and segmented.

On the question of audience segmentation, it is useful to first ask: Who are the audiences relevant to a solution, before defining the maximum population within your mandated target group (i.e., women in Iraq). From there, it is necessary to segment this group into more meaningful categories than "woman and girls" (i.e., students, teens, sisters, mothers, young professionals, etc.) that can be targeted more specifically with programming (i.e., benefit statements) and communications. Once the population has been segmented into workable categories, a more detailed audience analysis can begin.

3.2 Know your audience

Davies et al. (2016), Zeiger (2016), and Tuck and Silverman (2016) all emphasize the importance of identifying and understanding the audience of a message, as this will determine what content will be included, how the message will be delivered, and who will be the messenger. Customizing the message to particular audiences is critical, and, as Geller (2016) points out, Western governments regrettably have used a "one size fits all" approach to counter-narrative campaigns in the past, which has proven unsuccessful. Determining how the audience behaves online (e.g., what platforms they use – Facebook, Twitter, etc.) and offline will reveal their behaviour patterns and how best to reach them (Tuck & Silverman, 2016). Women may also have different profiles from men and will be further differentiated based on their age group (e.g., 14-18 vs. 18-25) (see Tuck & Silverman, 2016).

[7] PSYOPs refers to Psychological Operations.

However, Comerford (2017) believes that there is a commonalty that can be leveraged in CVE programs. He explains that the new "militant" is well educated and young. So given the young age of radicalized individuals, governments, he suggests, need to be proactive in launching CVE programs that cultivate critical thinking skills to empower young people, so that they can "counter prejudicial and destructive ideologies" (p. 72).

CAF Gender Field Advisors (GFAs) might be the best suited group to conduct outreach to understand the unique female audiences in varying theatres (but this could also include Cultural Advisors and CIMIC[8] Teams, as well as Influence Activities analysts or operators, and Female Engagement Teams; see Thomson et al., 2017). GFAs operate mostly on a tactical level (although are also involved at the operational level) and support the Commander's and Gender Advisor's responsibility to implement gender perspectives into military operations (NATO JTF HQ SOP 106, 2013). Specifically, the GFA is "tasked to conduct an introductory analysis of specific gender dimensions on identified target audiences in the Area of Responsibility" (NATO JTF HQ SOP 106, 2013 p. 5). This gives the GFAs an opportunity to build relationships, identify various stakeholder groups, and learn about the specific needs of the target audience. CVE programs can then be focused on actual needs and how those can be met in ways that do not include violence.

The Target Audience Analysis (TAA) process is a critical tool for understanding the specific characteristics of targeted audiences. As outlined in CAF Joint Forces Doctrine, TAA aims to define, segment, and analyze the critical characteristics of a specific group (or individual), in relation to the deployed force mission objectives. This descriptive analysis product will include a wide variety of demographic and psychographic characteristics, including specific lifestyle information that will assist with targeting priority, message development, and dissemination.

The end result of the TAA process should be detailed personas, representing each sub-group being targeted, that work to "humanize" different groups for message/program development, and assist tactical operators with identification in the field. In terms of messaging, TAA Worksheets can help to assist operational organizations to develop specific "benefit statements" that help to tailor messages to each group (i.e., What Task Force X can do for you. What ISIS cannot do for you).

3.3 Careful what you say

When determining the content of a message or narrative, Zeiger (2016) emphasizes the significance of stating clear goals and objectives from the start, because this will guide content development and the evaluation of its effectiveness. She highlights three key goals for counter-narratives, including *disengagement* from violent extremism, *diversion* from extremism, and *undermining the appeal* of joining an extremist group. Briggs and Feve (2013, p.5) recommend that messages should undermine extremist attempts to divide groups into "us" and "them." They suggest promoting values that foster "tolerance, trust, freedom and democracy" (although, as noted earlier, other analysts have cautioned against using such an approach; see Romaniuk, 2015). Davies et al. (2016) think CVE messages and narratives should be focused on common goals rather than what is being opposed.

It is important to distinguish narratives from messages. Generally, narratives can be thought of as stories that present ideas in a linear, structured way – usually following the pattern of beginning, middle and end. Often, narratives centre on characters and their journeys through problems and solutions (Porter, 2014). Messages, on the other hand, are purely the words and sentences used to communicate information (Porter, 2014), and unlike narratives, are not necessarily structured into

[8] CIMIC refers to Civil-Military Cooperation.

story form. In sum, all narratives are messages, but not all messages are narratives, and we maintain this distinction throughout the report.

Schmid (2014; as cited in Davies et al, 2016) offers five core ingredients for an effective narrative. First, narratives need to have a clearly defined purpose specifically related to cultural norms and values and audience interests. Second, the narrative must be legitimate in the eyes of the audience. This will increase the potential for acceptance and buy in. Third, the narrative needs to have a high likelihood of success, which is tangible. Fourth, the narrative has to be consistent and able to endure counter attacks, which maintains its legitimacy. And finally, the narrative must be incorporated into existing communication plans that link major themes to one's identity.

Bradock and Horgan (2015, p. 397) state that there are four necessary criteria for counter-narratives, which include "(1) revealing incongruities and contradictions in the terrorist narratives and how terrorists act, (2) disrupting analogies between the target narrative and real-world events, (3) disrupting binary themes of the group's ideology, and (4) advocating an alternative view of the terrorist narrative's target." The content is important, but it is equally important to understand why specific narratives resonate with certain audiences.

A roundtable discussion convened by Hedayah (International Center of Excellence for CVE) and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) with CVE subject-matter experts (SMEs), identified six types of narratives: 1) *positive/alternative counter-narratives* provide an alternative to violent extremism, but may be reactionary; 2) *strategic counter-narratives* are used by governments or large multi-lateral organizations to condemn violent extremism, but are often very general; 3) *moral counter-narratives* state that violent extremism is both immoral and ineffective in achieving desired ends, and then appeal to the commonalities of human beings and suggest cooperation; 4) *ideological and/or religious counter-narratives* have a religious overtone and need to come from a messenger that has authority and credibility; 5) *tactical counter-narratives* offer peaceful means to attain goals over violence; and 6) *humour and sarcastic counter-narratives* de-legitimize violent extremist positions by reinforcing "the absurdity of terrorism to the general public" (Hedayah, 2014, p. 2). Humour and sarcasm, however, typically appeal to those predisposed to viewing a terrorist organization, such as ISIS, as an object of ridicule, which may not be the desired target audience for the counter-narrative campaign (see discussion on The Redirect Method, on p. 16 of this report).

Tuck and Silverman (2016, p. 4) argue that good counter-narrative campaigns need to generate messages and narratives that offer either "a positive alternative to extremist propaganda, or alternatively aims to deconstruct or delegitimize extremist narratives." To be effective, counter-narratives should incorporate positive stories; highlight how extremist activities hurt those people they claim to represent; demonstrate how extremist actions run counter to the extremists' stated beliefs; reveal factual inaccuracies; and mock or satirize extremist propaganda to diminish credibility (Tuck & Silverman, 2016). To date, the most successful approaches to countering violent extremism have facilitated communication, encouraged awareness, and clarified misinformation (Ferguson, 2016).

Moreover, messages framed as narratives (or stories) are also more likely to be persuasive. Narratives and storytelling lie at the core of human experience. They dominate our lives through culture and media (Green & Brock, 2000). They guide our interactions and behaviour. As a persuasive technique, a well-composed narrative can draw the audience in so that they become immersed, which can feed back into the audience's mind and heart and create attitude change (Green & Brock, 2000). In fact, immersion into a narrative may lead to greater agreement between individuals' beliefs and the story outcome as well as greater liking for the protagonists (Green & Brock, 2000). Importantly, a compelling narrative can bypass an audience's pre-existing beliefs, attitudes and values by gently encouraging the suspension of disbelief. When transported to a story environment, threats to an

individual's identity are not as salient, and as such there is an opportunity for contemplating ideas from different perspectives. The audience can relinquish their prior experience with an attitude object in favour of immersion into the story. By transporting the audience into the story, an effective narrative can serve as a proxy for direct experience, with an added advantage – the creator of the narrative has some control over the framing of the message.

Some of the CVE campaigns today make use of storytelling through the autobiographical accounts of former terrorists. For example, the UN Web TV video *Algeria: The Terrorist Who Came Home* considers why people give up terrorism, as a potential way to influence cognitively extremist individuals away from behavioural extremism. The protagonist, Jamal (a former terrorist) tells the story of joining a radical Islamic group in Algeria in the 1990s to fight against government forces. As the war progressed over 3 years, resources became increasingly scarce, and, as such, fighting no longer was the most effective course of action. As Jamal explains in the video, religion espouses pro-social, good behaviour, not violence and killing. Those that are killed, he continues, are those who reside in his community. The dead are his neighbours. It is argued that this is a deterrent against violent extremism, although this would need to be validated through research.

The International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE) has developed, at the time of this writing, 27 *Breaking the ISIS Brand Counter-Narratives* videos also using formers to tell their stories. Anne Speckhard, the Director of ICSVE, explains that ISIS still maintains a strong, influential presence in the virtual world, despite significant losses to physical territory. She and her colleagues, therefore, have interviewed over 70 ISIS defectors, returnees, and cadres in prison, including some female former ISIS members, video-taped these interviews, and then used the recorded material in the ICSVE counter-narrative videos. In the videos, many of the interviewees denounce the group and tell their stories of life inside ISIS. Video clips are subtitled in the languages in which ISIS recruits, including English, Albanian, Arabic, Danish, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Kyrgyz, Malay, Russian, Somali, Swedish and Uzbek, among many others. Videos are posted on Facebook and Telegram to ISIS endorsers and distributors (ISIS members who distribute ISIS propaganda). In fact, sometimes ISIS cadres distribute or endorse the ICSVE counter-narrative clips, mistaking them for pro-ISIS propaganda. ICSVE videos reach ISIS supporters, sympathizers, endorsers and distributors on the internet as well as reach beyond to the circles that ISIS influences. According to Speckhard, such videos have achieved some success in countering extremism; she relates the case of a 13-year-old boy in the UK who was determined to travel to Raqqa to join ISIS but who was dissuaded from doing so by viewing one of the video clips (A. Speckhard, personal communication, January 16, 2018). Speckhard and her team have also begun to develop counter-narrative videos specifically focused on women and gender (see, e.g., *Justice for our Sisters in the Islamic State*, available at https://youtu.be/zysA3GAusy4).

Autobiographical stories are powerful in countering behavioural extremism. For the purposes of this report, consider some accounts from former female ISIS members, who speak of the pain of separating from their mothers, the failing infrastructure (e.g., intermittent electricity and internet, shortages of clean or hot water), the harsh environment (e.g., the bitter Syrian winter), the poor healthcare, and the security concerns (e.g., airstrikes) (Saltman & Smith, 2015). Beyond this, there are tales of women who were married to a *Jihadi* fighter only to be used as a frontline sex slave for countless ISIS men. Counter-narratives from female "formers" about what it is truly like to live under ISIS or other extremist groups might be an effective strategy to deter radicalization and the adoption of violent extremism.

When thinking about the message content, Tuck and Silverman (2016) hold that the most effective messages provide the recipient with something to reflect on, invoking their critical thinking. Indeed, many CVE interventions in the education sector emphasize the need to build critical thinking skills to

promote resilience against extremist ideology (e.g., Generation Global Dialogue Program). Moreover, persuasion research shows that when message recipients spend greater cognitive resources contemplating a message, they change their attitude in the direction of the desired attitude shift relative to those message recipients who spend less cognitive resources contemplating a message and interpret messages largely by invoking heuristics (Petty, Haugtvedt & Smith, 1995).

But high elaboration of a message occurs under specific conditions, which include having *sufficient time*, *knowledge and exposure* to a message and when the message contains information that is *personally relevant*, implies personal *responsibility for outcomes*, and appeals to an individual's *natural affinity for engaging in thinking* (Briñol, Rucker, & Petty, 2015). Low elaboration conditions, on the other hand, generally entail the opposite. They occur when the target is under time and attentional constraints, and when the messages are inconsequential or superficial in nature (Briñol et al., 2014). Messages must be constructed in a way that takes into account the amount of time a recipient will have to consider the message and importantly whether the recipient will use their cognitive resources extensively when considering the message.

Moreover, Tuck and Silverman (2016) suggest developing the content with the intended audience and testing it, ideally with the intended audience, so that it can be validated prior to launching the campaign. They state that "high quality content aimed at the right people will be the most effective way of getting a good response, as will being involved and engaged yourself" (p. 37). Joosse et al. (2015) also emphasize the importance of community involvement in content development. They emphasize that campaigners' active involvement with the community is essential when generating and disseminating counter-narratives to discourage extremist recruitment. This is in part because not all members of the community will be potential radicals, but rather are also opposed to violent extremism. Building relationships with and utilizing those who are already actively opposed to the violent extremism will likely further the objective of the counter-narrative campaign. It is vital, therefore, to be actively engaged with the target community when developing counter-narrative content. And as will be shown in section 3.6, good developmental program evaluation demands the involvement of stakeholders to ensure program outcomes are achieved. Again, CAF Influence Activities or PSYOPs/CIMIC operators, and GFAs, might be positioned well for outreach in theatre, to help ensure campaign objectives are achieved, and to enable active engagement with a target community in order to develop relevant content.

Finally, the Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC, 2016) developed a checklist for generating message content, which we have put into a table format for application by military practitioners.

Table 1: MCDC (2016) Ideal Content Checklist

	Criteria
	Aligned with military strategy and objectives
	Sensitive to local culture, interests and language
	Effectively uses local distribution channels or messengers
	Communicates message passionately
	Conveys concern, care and empathy from military actor towards target audience
	If appropriate, makes use of humour, wit, intellect, and appeal
	Uses visual and audio content
	Shareable because it is interesting and relevant
	Clear, easy to grasp

	Uses same narratives and messages across different platforms

Using the checklist will help CAF personnel responsible for developing CVE program messages and narratives to ensure that they have considered the relevant content criteria.

Given the limited resources available for developing both proactive and reactive message strategies, CAF personnel must leverage the communication resources available (identified through SWOT analyses and Stakeholder Mapping[9]) in order to maximize the effectiveness of any CVE program. Capitalizing on the communication potential of a charismatic leader or like-minded civil society organization can go a long way to reaching a target audience with credible messaging.

A good starting point for message development is the TAA Worksheet, frequently used in theatre to identify the specific words, phrases, and symbols used by each group in their vernacular form of communication that can be instrumental for the development of messages that resonate with each specific audience.[10]

Moon (2014; as cited in MCDC, 2016) has also generated a social media content checklist that would be useful when developing a CVE campaign that desires a wide distribution across the internet. Of note, however, neither the MCDC Ideal Content Checklist, nor the Shareable Social Media Content Checklist, refer specifically to gender-based criteria.

Table 2: Shareable Social Media Content Checklist (Moon, 2014; as cited in MCDC, 2016)

	Feature
	Content is valuable and entertaining.
	Content helps user communicate their identity to others (who they are and what they care about).
	Content helps user connect with others who share their interests.
	Content helps user feel more connected with the world.
	Content demonstrates their support for a cause or brand.
	Content originates from a trustworthy source.
	Content is not overly complex.
	Content appeals to sense of humour.*
	Content communicates a sense of urgency.

3.4 The medium is the message

[9] Stakeholder Mapping is a process by which Influence Activities (IA) Planners will identify and map out all the stakeholders relevant to mission success. CIMIC-focused Stakeholder Mapping will identify all the civil-sector organizations, whereas PSYOPs focused Stakeholder Mapping will identify specific individuals and social groups that can be influenced/leveraged. This is generally conducted during the Orientation Phase of the Operational Planning Process but can also be done as part of an audience targeting process.

[10] In addition to specifying a target audience, a TAA Worksheet may include conditions that affect the target audience; vulnerabilities that arise from the conditions of the target audience; lines of persuasion, or arguments used to obtain a desired behavioural response in a target audience; symbols, or visual (graphical or textual), audio, or audiovisual means, used to convey, reinforce, or enhance a line of persuasion; susceptibility (e.g., the degree to which a line of persuasion could be successful in achieving influence in a target audience); accessibility (i.e., the availability of an audience for targeting PSYOPs through various dissemination means); effectiveness (i.e., the ability of the target audience to carry out the desired behaviour change if persuaded to do so); and impact indicators (i.e., the events which should take place after a PSYOPs program has been disseminated in comparison to baseline) (see Psychological Operations, 2010).

As the renowned Canadian communications scholar, Marshal McLuhan (1964), first observed, each medium or channel of communication has its own inherent biases and will produce different effects on both content and audiences. When applying this theory to the development of CVE messaging, the implication is that content must be tailored for each channel of communication used.

Choosing the right medium to suit the message will be critical, given that the outcome of the CVE program is attitude and behaviour change. Obviously, there is a strong online radicalization and recruitment presence, and youth today, in particular, are connected to social media through their mobile phones, making them a target for violent extremist propaganda and recruitment efforts. According to the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NSCCE, 2016), over 90% of Syrian youth (ages 18-25) access the internet using their mobile phones.

Information permeates all cultures and locations via the internet. The use of social media, therefore, goes beyond simply connecting with other people. It has become a source of information and news on local and non-local events, with 62% of adults in the United States sourcing their news directly and intentionally from social media (NSCCE, 2016). People also report preferring to be consumers of content on social media, rather than producers or contributors of content (NSCCE, 2016). When used effectively, then, social media can provides access to eager eyes, ears, hearts and minds.

As a medium for broadcasting strategic messages, social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, and Instagram, present unique advantages and disadvantages. For instance, social media is highly accessible, making it a powerful tool for disseminating information (MCDC, 2016). Knowing this, however, extremist organizations and individuals exploit social media and communication technologies to propagate their message, coordinate activities, and liaise with potential recruits (MCDC, 2016). According to the Multinational Capability Development Campaign, social media increases the reach of violent extremist organizations, allowing them to seamlessly transcend borders to entice foreign audiences. It is essential, therefore, that government agencies, tasked with protecting the nation and countering violent extremist threats, harness the power of social media effectively.

However, in previous attempts to make use of this technology, military and state actors have encountered challenges, in part due to the fast-paced, novel and unstructured nature of digital communications (MCDC, 2016). The use of social media by military and state actors carries unique risks – it increases the visibility of the actor, enables the tracing of online activities, and exposes the actor's reputation to scrutiny (MCDC, 2016). As a result, many military organizations face significant constraints in participating in the social media realm, where targeted audiences and frequently content require pre-approval, limiting the type of timely, dynamic engagement possible on social media platforms. Another obstacle to consider is the time required to produce and monitor online content as well as to guard against cyberattacks (MCDC, 2016). Such monitoring can be very time consuming and resource-intensive.

Another challenge to the implementation of social media strategies is its complexity. Social media platforms include several variables that are outside of a user's control. From algorithms that dictate what content is prioritized to appear on a user's feed, to the activities and preferences of the users themselves, there are innumerable externalities that must be considered when making use of social media. Thus, the development of a sound social media campaign depends on the understanding and appropriate use of its features. For example, social media differs from traditional communication media by virtue of the reciprocal nature of interactions between content producers and the audience (MCDC, 2016). The audience is not only able to respond to content but also actively encouraged to do so. The Multinational Capability Development Campaign suggests adding a psychologist or behavioural scientist to the social media team to scientifically manage interactions between content producers and the target audience.

Because context matters and a good CVE campaign demands knowing your audience, social media must be developed with the local culture and traditions of the target audience in mind to be effective. Not only is it suggested that messages must be localized and incorporate appropriate cultural symbols, colours, persons and languages, messages must also be distributed via the most appropriate medium (MCDC, 2016). According to the Multinational Capability Development Campaign, hiring local personnel to assist in developing and auditing social media content for accuracy and appropriateness is highly recommended.

Moreover, social media is characterized by a unique orientation towards the audience. In other words, it is a platform that facilitates dialogue between the audience and the content. Posts that encourage audience participation, whether it is through liking, sharing or commenting, will gain more visibility. However, when responding to comments, the content creator is advised to respond only to "non-toxic" interactions (i.e., constructive criticism), rather than gratuitous negativity.

Social media content is also subject to a system that increases visibility, according to its relevance to the audience. Essentially, the more the content is tailored to its target audience, the more likely it is to be prioritized and displayed in the user's feed. This effect is augmented by user interaction with the content, which also boosts its visibility. Social media users exist inside "filter bubbles," which is the customized digital environment that exists around each online person, based on their preferences, dislikes and previous interactions. If new content does not align to a user's "bubble," the message or narrative may never enter their content feed. To circumvent this issue, it is possible to inject content into an attention bubble by purchasing sponsored posts or advertisements (MCDC, 2016). Another way to get inside a user's filter bubble is to ensure that content development has an audience's preferences at the fore (MCDC, 2016). In other words, when creating messages, it is necessary to shift the focus to what the audience wants to hear, rather than centring on what one wants to say (MCDC, 2016). Content should reflect the needs and wants of the audience, not the content developer's, if it is going to have a more effective reach.

The source of messages disseminated on social media should also be transparent, generally speaking. The identity of the profile posting content should be within a "2-click" range so that it is easily accessible to users (MCDC, 2016). Frequency and timing of posts must be tailored to the platform being used. Research shows that Facebook posts take 1-2 days to mature to their full audience engagement, whereas tweets on Twitter reach their peak about 18 minutes after posting (MCDC, 2016).

It is important to build a strong follower base on social media. Large numbers of followers increase the credibility of one's social media presence and increase the likelihood that content will be pushed to a larger number of individuals. Reposting content from sympathetic sources, particularly those already boasting a large following, is key to building a strong follower base (MCDC, 2016).

Using relevant images in a social media post may increase engagement. The NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence reported that users tend to spend more time viewing posts that include images, and tend to have better recall of the information contained in such posts, than posts that do not include images. In fact, 65% of information is remembered when accompanied by an image, compared to 10% when the information contains text only (NSCCE, 2016). It is expected that 80% of global internet traffic will include video content by 2019 (NSCCE, 2016). Extremist organizations capitalize on this trend. Their content is predominantly video-based (NSCCE, 2016). Entities opposing extremism, therefore, should strive to have a bigger presence in the video space to counteract extremist organizations. It should be noted that social media users are more likely to watch videos with the sound off (Patel, 2016). Thus, including captions may increase viewership and impact.

It is necessary to be aware of the use of bots in social media. Bots are automated accounts that generate and distribute content according to their instructions. Bots are used by extremist organizations to misdirect by posting interfering or distracting news, hijacking hashtags used by organizations that oppose their message, and changing the topic in discussion threads that do not align with their agenda (NSCCE, 2016). A successful CVE campaign must be aware of these possible attacks and have a plan in place to combat them.

Hashtag hijacking is an especially effective strategy. Sometimes known as "Hashjacking" (Jain, Agarwal, & Pruthi, 2015), hashtag hijacking is the practice of attempting to skew or divert attention given to a particular topic by using the hashtag labels assigned to the original content to promote unrelated, inflammatory, or abusive content (Jain, Agarwal, & Pruthi, 2015; Hadgu, Garimella, & Weber, 2013). In general, hashjacking occurs on "trending" hashtags by virtue of their increased visibility (Jain, Agarwal, & Pruthi, 2015), but it is also used for political reasons. From a CAF perspective, hashtag hijacking is both a technique to guard against, as well as a tactic to be used to disrupt the flow of extremist information.

Jain, Agarwal, and Pruthi, (2015, p. 20) have provided some best practices for preventing unwanted hashjacking:

- Hashtag design should align with the interest of the prospective audience as well as the platform.
- Hashtags should be engaging and provoke interest in relation to the brand it promotes.
- Informative and concise hashtags are less vulnerable to being hijacked.
- Related and meaningful words should be used.

When making use of hashtag hijacking for operational purposes, Helmus and Bodine-Baron (2017) recommend using a data-driven approach to identify what hashtags are popular within a target community as well as the content type that generates the most response (e.g., photo, video, text).

YouTube is another online medium for CVE. For instance, the Redirect Method provides an extensive step-by-step account for running this kind of campaign (https://redirectmethod.org/). Redirect uses Adwords targeting tools and curated YouTube videos uploaded by people all around the world to confront online radicalization. Some of the core steps are as follows: gather content that counters the key narratives you have identified; create a database of your counter-arguments; select the videos you will use and make YouTube playlists; arrange your videos within each playlist to tell a story; set up your YouTube channel and upload your designs; set up your Adwords account; create keywords to attract your desired audience; create your display campaign; create your in-stream video campaign; decide on your key campaign metrics; and publish the playlists.

Beyond social media, it is important to consider the wide array of communication channels available to the target audience, and the relative credibility of each medium. Generally speaking, there is an inverse relationship between the reach of a communication channel and its perceived credibility. Face-to-face communication, for example, has a high level of credibility, but very low reach. Commercial advertising, on the other hand, has a very broad reach, but low level of credibility. With this in mind, there may be an opportunity in theatre to use more traditional channels of communication (e.g., radio, television). For example, radio is a useful medium for communicating messages to a large audience, specifically those of lower socioeconomic status or those who are not readily on social media (Skuse, Butler, Power, & Woods, 2004; UNAIDS, 1999; both as cited in Skuse et al., 2004). One advantage of radio compared to most other forms of communication is that it costs less and requires little infrastructure (Skuse et al., 2004). It is also an accessible medium, not only for audiences but also for broadcasters. Radio communications are accessible to audiences via

their audio format – audiences do not need to be literate or sighted to understand the message being transmitted (Skuse et al., 2004). Radio ownership is common. And in terms of broadcaster accessibility, radio airwaves are deregulated in many developing countries, which facilitates entry into the broadcasting space.

There are different categories of radio broadcasters. Community radio stations generally have a short range of broadcast and are embedded in the local culture and community events (Skuse et al., 2004; AMARC, 2000; as cited in Skuse et al., 2004). Public radio stations tend to broadcast to an entire country and are often government funded. They tend to promote messages that align with state interests. Commercial radio stations are run for profit, feature advertisements, and provide service nationally and locally. International radio stations are characterized by their far-reaching range of broadcasts. Sometimes delivered in multiple languages, these stations often perform public service roles and deliver news and entertainment. They are often used to promote the agenda of their country of origin.

Depending on the nature of the message being broadcast, it may be useful to choose a specific category of radio to deliver CVE messages. Community radio stations are more likely to have direct access to a local population and to be involved in community development (Skuse et al., 2004), which could lend credibility and strength to the message being broadcast. Targeting community radio stations may also decrease resistance to the message since community radio stations are not typically associated with propaganda. Similarly, community radio stations are often less bound by governing forces, elite groups or other motivated powers, relative to national or public radio channels (Linden, 1999; as cited in Skuse et al., 2004). The caveat is that community radio stations tend to have very small operating budgets (Skuse et al., 2004). According to Skuse et al. (2004), other challenges to the use of community radio stations include inefficient organization of internal communications, unrest and resentment between paid and unpaid staff, gender inequality, insufficient staffing, susceptibility to politicisation and polarisation, and susceptibility to being commandeered by interest groups.

International radio stations, on the other hand, have a wide reach and the ability to deliver messaging to thousands of people, across hundreds of regions simultaneously. Specifically, international radio improves access to isolated or low-population areas, such as rural communities (Skuse et al., 2004). International radio can also bypass communication embargoes because of an oppressive governing regime or conflicts, and it is not restricted by cultural taboos or censorship (Skuse et al., 2004). An example of a successful international radio campaign occurred in Afghanistan in the 1990s. After the national media infrastructure collapsed due to conflict, BBC World Service became a major broadcaster of information in the area (Skuse, 2002). Moreover, the internet provides access to most news networks online, so consumers can choose their desired programing.

However, given its foreign nature, the use of international radio may decrease the credibility of the message, depending on the target audience's relationship or opinion of the source of origin. To counteract this perception and increase the credibility of the message, the international broadcaster may choose to direct resources towards building a local capacity for broadcasting (Skuse et al., 2004). Investing in local capacity increases access to information about the target audience and their cultural context, increases messenger credibility and creates a positive, sustainable relationship within the area of operations (Skuse et al., 2004).

Radio broadcasts serve as a starting point for distributing information to a community. While access to radios may be limited and gendered, depending on the culture and socioeconomic status of segments of the population, information broadcast over radio tends to migrate from listeners to non-listeners through conversation, gossip and other social interactions (Skuse et al., 2004). To predict

how this information might spread, and who will serve as the mouthpieces within the community, it is necessary to study the population receiving the information.

Despite the numerous advantages of employing a radio messaging campaign, some evaluations of previously conducted campaigns indicate that a multi-media approach is necessary for successful message penetration. For instance, a family planning campaign implemented in Tanzania found that, although radio was the most popular of the information broadcast mediums, women who were exposed to multiple mediums (e.g., radio, print, and television, rather than only one medium) were more likely to adopt the attitudes and behaviours promoted by the campaign (Jato, Simbakalia, Tarasevich, Awasum, Kihinga, & Ngirwamungu, 1999). Of note, radio dramas were found to be more memorable than other kinds of radio broadcasts (Jato et al., 1999). A radio drama might, therefore, be a useful CVE campaign directed by the CAF when in theatre (see also Thomson et al., 2017).

Aside from radio dramas (i.e., radio soap operas), other effective radio formats for conveying messages to a community or population include magazine-style broadcasts, radio phone-ins, news, spots (non-commercial advertisements), and slogans. A magazine-style broadcast is composed of interviews, features, competitions, and entertainment, such as music and drama (Skuse et al., 2004). A spot is a short message (under 2 minutes) that communicates a message through dialogue, interview or an announcement (Skuse et al., 2004). These are all useful formats for CVE programs where the use of radio is the chosen medium.

Regardless of the format, radio programs are most effective when they encourage community participation. A common way for a community to get involved is through radio listening clubs, promoted by the radio station itself (Skuse et al., 2004). These clubs encourage individuals to get together, listen to the information being broadcast, discuss the information among themselves, and take action on issues that are relevant to their community. Participation is increased when radio stations include a feature where listening clubs can call in with their opinions, insights and stories or send letters to be broadcast on the air. Radio listening clubs encourage agency, empowerment and social networking within a community. Peer-to-peer education through discussion reinforces the messages and entrenches them in the minds of listeners. Furthermore, radio listening clubs act as an entry point into a community. A Zambian listening club member explained that compared to health workers' unsuccessful attempts to distribute information to a community, "when [information] started coming from their fellow women, from the clubs, a lot of people have got interested" (http://www.comminit.com).

Determining whether a radio broadcast is having an impact in the community can be difficult. There are no easily accessible ways to identify or count the listeners of a radio station, and broadcasted content is often indirectly distributed to non-listeners, who are even less quantifiable. Instead, a broadcasts' effectiveness can be evaluated by measuring social change within the community. Some indicators of social change are listed in Table 3, below.

Table 3: Indicators of Social Change (Skuse et al., 2004)

Indicator	Behaviour
Dialogue	There is increased discussion in both private and public domains after the messaging campaign.
Information	The information being shared is more accurate than before the messaging campaign.
Augmentation	The campaign provides opportunities for participation by individuals and communities.
Advocacy	There is increased engagement in leadership and activities relating to the issue at hand, specifically by disadvantaged individuals directly impacted by the issue.
Connection	Individuals and groups are brought together as a result of the messaging campaign.

3.5 Don't shoot the messenger

The messenger of the counter-narrative is also important to consider. She or he needs to be credible, trustworthy, and someone to whom potential extremists will listen (Briggs & Feve, 2013; Davies et al., 2016; Ferguson, 2016; Geller, 2016; Joosse et al., 2015; Tuck & Silverman, 2016). In the persuasion literature, the credibility of the message source is the most significant point of consideration when evaluating a source. Two core factors that increase the persuasiveness of an argument are the source's expertise and their trustworthiness (Briñol, Rucker, & Petty, 2014). Both factors will also be critical for CVE messaging.

According to Redirect, "[m]edia created by governments or Western news outlets can be rejected on face value for a perception of promoting an anti-Muslim agenda" (p. 7), whereas former extremists may be viewed as credible and trustworthy as they can empathize with the position of potential extremists (Geller, 2016). Formers provide unique insights, their experience in extremist groups carries weight, and their messages are viewed as authentic (Helmus, York, & Chalk, 2013; as cited in Davies et al., 2016). They are, therefore, "well-positioned to unravel the undesirable day-to-day reality of what life is really like as a member of an extremist group and delegitimize narratives that promote violence based on their own experiences" (Tuck & Silverman, p. 12). Military sources also may be rejected on face value as they are, essentially, instruments of governments and states (MCDC, 2016). Caution, therefore, will be required as the CAF considers its role in CVE messaging, including how visible or direct its role should be. For instance, rather than playing a direct role in message dissemination, the CAF could alternatively engage "indigenous proxies" (local credible leaders) as message disseminators in particular local communities (see Thomson et al., 2017).

Other factors of the source that increase persuasiveness are warmth and competence (Aaker, Vohs & Mogilner, 2010). A source that shows compassion through messaging done competently may, therefore, increase the persuasiveness of the counter-narrative. It appears then that the messenger should have some level of expertise and competence, demonstrate their warmth, and be trustworthy, if the message is going to be effective. Outreach to communities will help identify community members who have these characteristics.

It is also important to have a credible source developing and administering the CVE program. Again, governments alone have a poor track record regarding CVE and in fact have had the opposite effect, in strengthening extremist positions (Romaniuk, 2015). Civil society, public figures, and community members appear to be the most credible sources for CVE interventions.[11] And these should consist of persuasive alternative messaging (Davies et al.'s notion of "positive"), in contrast to blocking extremist content ("negative").

3.6 Evaluate, evaluate, evaluate!

Analysis and evaluation of the counter-narrative campaign is as important as the design and implementation phases (Davies et al., 2016; Fink, Barakat, & Romaniuk, 2013; Tuck & Silverman, 2016; Zeiger, 2016), though effort placed in those activities has been lacking (Romaniuk, 2015). According to Schonveld (2017, p. 103), "programme design has often prioritized policy and implementation, often at the expense of research, learning, and monitoring and evaluation." Indeed, systematic evaluation efforts of CVE campaigns have been limited. And because CVE campaigns have become the most significant development against terrorism to date, this poses a serious gap in the efforts to drive evidence-based policy and practice. At the same time, however, there exists

[11] See Thomson et al. (2017) for a further discussion on the importance of community members in the construction and dissemination of CVE messaging.

enough data about CVE campaigns' impact and effectiveness to be compiled and analyzed, and then further used as evidence to shape future policy (Romaniuk, 2015).

Some of the challenges in measuring and evaluating CVE programs are the difficulties in determining the scope of the evaluation, establishing causality where the desired outcome is a non-event (i.e., the absence of a terror attack is not necessarily attributable to a successful counter-narrative), and obtaining the resources and technical expertise necessary to conduct an effective program evaluation (Fink, Barakat, & Romaniuk, 2013). Despite the challenges, it is suggested that evaluation be incorporated into any CVE campaign to determine whether it is having its intended effect (Davies et al., 2016; Romaniuk, 2015; Tuck & Silverman, 2016; Zeiger, 2016).

Romaniuk (2015) provides some methods for evaluating CVE interventions to determine if they are effective. He first explains that the field itself lacks coherence, making it difficult for evaluation purposes. In response, he devises a typology to classify and compare CVE efforts that includes the scope (i.e., level of analysis), causal mechanisms (i.e., how an intervention will lead to desired outcomes), implementing agents (i.e., their identity), and activities undertaken. Setting out the typology, he maintains, helps bring coherence to the evaluation of CVE programs and facilitates an analysis of their effectiveness.

He first identifies three levels of distinction, micro, meso, and macro, as depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Levels of Distinction in CVE Efforts

As shown, the macro level revolves around general CVE communication; the meso level revolves around community outreach and dialogue; and the micro level revolves around specific individuals of interest.

Micro-level counselling and mentoring for vulnerable and at-risk individuals are leading types of CVE programs to address behavioural radicalization. But, according to Romaniuk's (2015) evaluation of several campaigns, this level revealed challenges. For example, there are ways to refer individuals into programs, but a strong infrastructure of relevant social service providers and other community members (e.g., parents, clergy, peers, etc.), with capacity and knowledge around violent extremism, needs to be maintained. Another challenge is determining who should be a mentor. As seen above, mentors need to be credible and have the knowledge and skills for the role as well as have an identity that connects with the would-be violent extremists. Determining the objectives of the mentoring (e.g., behaviour change, cognitive change, etc.) is also a challenge, and evaluations suggested that a case-by-case approach might be most appropriate (Romaniuk, 2015). Finally, the choice of what approach mentors should take, that is, choosing between hard (i.e., confrontational and interventionist) and soft (i.e., empathetic and befriending), is at times difficult to determine. Romaniuk (2015) concludes by pointing out that many CVE counselling and mentoring programs have not been evaluated. As such, an end point (e.g., disengagement from violence, or full-blown reintegration), and observable indicators for these programs, have not been elaborated.

The next part of Romaniuk's (2015) typology is casual mechanisms, for which he introduces a Theory of Change (ToC) and the need to describe the hypothesized causal links between inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and impacts. A ToC strategy helps to draw together key findings and insights from relevant literature, program design, and evaluation data, into a comprehensive best or promising practices framework. A ToC approach allows for the elucidation and articulation of the core assumptions, variables, and activities of an intervention (in our case, gender-based counter-radicalization messaging), as well as how the intervention is expected to create or influence desired outcomes (i.e., a shift in attitudes, beliefs, and behaviour). In articulating the connections between intervention activities and desired outcomes, a ToC also then sets up the foundation for an analytic framework to evaluate the effectiveness and success of an intervention. By producing a systematic and cumulative study of the links between activities in a program, the outcomes of the program, and the context of the initiative, ToC should lead to more effective interventions. In a ToC, the precise link between the activities and the achievement of the desired outcome is more fully articulated or understood, and this leads to effective planning from the start. This is considered good practice for developing program evaluation, such that a CVE practitioner is capable of hypothesizing how a CVE intervention will produce the desired outcome in the target population. Different programs can be compared on the basis of the causal logic.

A third component of Romaniuk's (2015) typology is the implementing agent. As he points out, there has been much discussion as to who may be the best agent (e.g., government, civil-government partnership, civil society, non-governmental organizations, etc.). As we have seen above, non-government, civil-society, and community organizations may be best positioned to implement meso- and micro-level interventions. Notably, such interventions may be especially powerful, as they may be best placed to reach, and include from the start, the intended audience.

Finally, Romaniuk (2015) suggest that activities (i.e., messaging; outreach and dialogue; capacity building; and education and training) undertaken for CVE are a further dimension that can be analyzed and compared. To determine the effectiveness of any CVE intervention, therefore, it is best to understand each intervention according to the specific dimensions of the typology (e.g., scope, causal mechanism, implementing agent, activities), given that interventions vary on the dimensions delineated above.

Romaniuk (2015) further underscores the importance of assessing the particular context of violent extremism for developmental evaluation. He argues that there are a number of qualitative and quantitative methods of assessment, including interviews, focus groups, content analysis of media sources, surveys, and ethnographies. He explains that assessments will shed light on social and cultural factors that provide the canvas for program implementation. Schonveld (2017, p. 103) echoes this, stating that "problem analysis" will help identify "the complexity of drivers of conflict in local contexts to situate the programme response." And Zeiger (2017) too emphasizes analyzing the idiosyncratic external and internal factors associated with radicalization and recruitment within a particular target area for evaluating the effectiveness of counter-narratives. She examined a number of counter-narratives in the South East Asian context and suggests moving beyond religious and ideological themes to address issues of marginalization, lack of economic opportunities, and diminishing themes of warrior heroism. Zeiger (2017) also points out the need to include family members, especially mothers, who have cultural significance in the South East Asian context, to design and develop counter-narratives. Despite the religious and ideological overtones in extremist messaging, there lies beneath political, social and psychological factors that drive at-risk individuals to radicalize their beliefs and potentially participate in violence.

Assessments can also be used as baseline studies to measure the effectiveness of CVE interventions. In fact, the core lesson from what Romaniuk (2015) refers to as the "first wave" of CVE interventions is "know your audience." He states that "[i]n the absence of case-specific data, decision-makers must rely on their general understanding of the problem to be addressed," leading to an undesirable one size fits all approach (p. 16).

Assessments will also help to mitigate the risk of stigmatizing a community. Romaniuk (2015) points out that, in the first wave of CVE interventions, the Muslim community was vilified and viewed as homogenous and unified, and as more susceptible to radicalization, than any other religious or ethnic group, despite the growing white supremacist, right-wing affiliations in Europe and North America. Again, learning about the communities in which a CVE program will be implemented is vital to understand what community members think about extremism and what their core concerns are. Engaging stakeholders in the implementation phase, especially those members of society affected by the measures, helps to gain buy-in, refine the plans, and raise awareness about the intervention. This is in line with a ToC approach to evaluation.

Using developmental evaluation strategies like a ToC is a sound and systematic means to evaluate the effectiveness of CVE programs. CVE programs must include ongoing consultation and reflection to reveal adaptive means to induce positive change in local contexts because they are not linear (Schonveld, 2017). Monitoring and evaluation efforts must be designed with the operating context in mind. As Schonveld explains, contextual information will shed light on the goals and performance of the program and will support conclusions about what, if anything, can be done, and this will in turn establish causal links and relationships between program activities and the desired result, as well as highlight any external factors that influenced the program outcomes.

In the past, Western researchers designing CVE programs for theatre (e.g., Afghanistan) typically developed questionnaires to assess support for radical groups, constructed the scope and limits for the intervention, and developed indicators to measure the results (Urwin, 2017). Urwin argues that this approach is tends to ignore the local community context, and often t fails to identify indicators that reflect local definitions and understandings of violent extremism. She holds that "[w]e need to understand how they measure key concepts related to peace, violence, and extremism for themselves," and avoid "imposing external experts' perceptions of violence and its rhetoric" (p. 248).

She provides an example of research[12] where indicators were developed based upon the community's own standards as an approach that would be beneficial to CVE. Community members were asked to consider peace within their respective communities and identify the indicators that helped them track changes in their everyday lives. Examples derived from community members included "the ability to sleep at home without the fear of rebel attack" or "the ability to walk safely from a bus stop," whereas top-down research indicators of peace included "observance of peace accords" or "state-building." Such indicators reflect marked differences between community members and researchers in their conceptions of peace. Community-generated indicators may be more responsive than researcher- or externally-generated measures, and can be formally integrated into higher-level programmatic efforts. Understanding how community members identify and define violent extremism will help practitioners design more effective CVE interventions. Urwin explains that the key is "design[ing] a framework for questions that will allow for the emergence of organic indicators, without imposing external assumptions," which will then be used to "develop programs to respond to the communities' self-identified needs" (p. 250-1).

The Multinational Capability Development Campaign (2016) identified five criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of social media interventions:

Table 4: Criteria for Evaluating Social Media Effectiveness (MCDC, 2016)

Criteria	Outcome
Information	The degree to which the target audience is informed about coalition narrative, intentions, or activities.
Disruption	The degree to which the opposing groups' message(s) are disrupted or neutralized.
Exposure	The degree to which the opposing groups' deceptions or crimes are exposed to the target audience.
Mobilization	The degree to which the native users of the social media are positioned to combat the opposing groups' messaging, or to provide assistance to one another during crisis situations.
Discouragement	The degree to which the opposing group is dissuaded from pursuing their objectives.

These criteria can be used by the CAF to support a CVE program.

The key to effective evaluation is ensuring the communication program has specific, measurable information objectives that are relevant to the goals of the campaign. These objectives, and corresponding evaluation, must be done in a timely manner so that feedback can be provided and adjustments to the program can be made before the program ends. Developmental evaluators should be able to identify the halfway point in any information program. If not, it is likely that the objectives are unclear and need to be examined and refined.

[12]The example was Mac Guinty and Firchow's (2014, 2016) Everyday Peace Indicators, piloted in Sub-Sahara Africa and South America. See, for example: https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/38607397/Roger_Mac_Ginty.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1528327609&Signature=zzyuPbs%2Bc113RfGI3c%2FHBGgq4Rc%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DMac_Ginty_Roger_and_Firchow_Pamina._2014.pdf

3.7 Summary

The following graphic (Figure 5) depicts the best practices for designing and developing CVE programs. It summarizes the findings in the previous sections and presents key take-aways. When developing CVE programs, it is important to keep in mind the importance of context; that the audience must be well-understood; that messages must be compelling; that the medium must be carefully chosen, according to intent; that the messenger can make or break a message; and that proper evaluation of the message after deployment leads to more impact with each iteration. The MCDC Ideal Content Checklist and Moon's Shareable Social Media Content Checklist, introduced earlier, can also be used as best practices for designing and developing CVE programs (see Tables 1 and 2).

Figure 5: Best Practices for Designing and Developing a CVE Program

4. Messages

This section presents 28 prototype CVE messages, which were developed by our research team based on the social influence and CVE best practices gathered during the literature review phase of this research activity. We have organized the prototype messages and their accompanying metadata into descriptive tables.

For each message, the table first identifies the *demographic* and *ideology* of the intended target audience. It then provides the *message* itself (or a description of a messaging campaign) and a *link* to a media element, if applicable. The table then categorizes the *type of counter-narrative* strategy and lists the features that are theorized to contribute to its effectiveness, or the *tactics used*.

Tables are grouped according to their context (social media vs. in-theatre) and medium. Within the context of social media, two media are featured: Facebook and Twitter. Within the in-theatre context, radio and television, as well as other media, are highlighted. Based on the findings from the literature review, we chose to focus mostly on social media and in-theatre applications. Social media has a nearly global reach and is relatively inexpensive to deploy. It is best suited for disseminating a high volume of heuristics-based CVE messages, intended to gradually influence the audience via repeated exposure. Unlike social media messages, which are general enough to be distributed to a large number of people at once, in-theatre messages are concentrated and meant for target audiences that have greater exposure to radicalization. In-theatre messaging, therefore, requires more resources to produce, but may command more attention and/or involvement from the audience, potentially having a weightier impact.

4.1 Social Media

4.1.1 Facebook

Messages disseminated through Facebook should encourage audience interaction, inspire critical thinking, and include links to content hosted outside of Facebook to encourage more in-depth processing than what would likely occur within the main content feed, the Facebook timeline, itself.[13] Linking to external sources also increases the credibility of the post by calling up the heuristic that if multiple sources are touting the same message, then it is more likely to be true.

Facebook communication culture involves the use of emojis[14] and gifs.[15] These should be incorporated into posts and replies to comments.

Demographic	Young, female
Ideology	Radical Islam

[13]Along with facilitating the communication of messages between Facebook "friends," Facebook can also deploy messages to a wide audience via powerful advertising tools. These advertising tools can be used to direct a message either broadly (e.g., to anyone living in a particular country) or more narrowly (e.g., to women, between the ages of 25-35, with English not their first language, with no car). See https://www.facebook.com/adsmanager/creation?act=217233099.

[14] "An emoji is a graphic symbol, ideogram, that represents not only facial expressions, but also concepts and ideas, such as celebration, weather, vehicles and buildings, food and drink, animals and plants, or emotions, feelings, and activities" (Kralj Novak, Smailović, Sluban, & Mozetič, 2015).

[15] GIF stands for "Graphics Interchange Format." GIF is an image file format that supports both static and moving images (Christensson, 2016).

Message	
Hardships can be transformed into beautiful stories of hope. How do you embrace your culture and identity while living in Canada? Fowzia Duale Virtue shares her experiences:	
Link	http://extremedialogue.org/fowzia-duale-virtue/
Type of counter-narrative	Counters “push factors”
Tactics used	Encourages critical thinking, requests interaction from the audience, links to external and reputable content to encourage higher levels of information processing, makes use of a credible messenger that mirrors the target audience’s demographics, promotes a message of peace and reconciliation, and provides a proxy for direct experience via narrative transportation. It attempts to counter “push” factors by addressing issues such as discrimination and the establishment of one’s identity, and provides an alternative narrative.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
Looking for something new to watch? The Middle East Broadcasting Center has created a new drama series depicting life under ISIS that may be of special interest to women and girls. Spoiler alert: It's punishing, miserable and filled with sadness. Have you already watched? Let us know in the comments. #BlackCrows #RealLivesofISIS	
Link	https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/16/world/middleeast/isis-ramadan-tv-drama.htm
Type of counter-narrative	Countering “sense of adventure”
Tactics used	Highlights how extremist activities hurt those they claim to represent, requests interaction from audience, links to external and reputable content to encourage higher levels of information processing, provides a proxy for direct experience via narrative transportation, credible messengers.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
Muslim women are powerful and intelligent. Why does ISIS deny the fiery intellect and potential within each one? ISIS is wrong about Islamic teachings on women's education - watch this video to find out why! Tag a smart Muslim woman that inspires you!	
Link	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1N8WIQqK9UI
Type of counter-narrative	Countering “sense of adventure”
Tactics used	Reveals contradictions in ISIS narratives, counters ideological narratives, incorporates positive stories, highlights how extremist activities hurts those they claim to represent, reveals factual inaccuracies, encourages critical thinking, links to external content to encourage higher levels of processing, credible messenger, requests interaction from audience.

Demographic	Any
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
What would happen if someone went around the streets of New York asking total strangers what they thought about Muslims? Does Islamophobia exist on the streets of America? Watch this video to find out! How would you answer the question?	
Link	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xGTL68q049I&list=PL0I4bTGBHIMcPHshgLwpRNoLH-8mSX7Z1&index=3
Type of counter-narrative	Countering “push factors”
Tactics used	Induces feelings of inclusion, disrupts stereotype that Americans dislike Muslims, disrupts themes of “us” vs “them,” positive story, reiterates attitude, messenger is likeable.

Demographic	Young, female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
What have you heard? That life in the Caliphate is about romance, riches or luxury? What if it’s about dust, hunger and fear? This secret footage taken by a Jihadi bride in the city of Raqqa reveals the truth – see for yourself: there is no happiness to be found under ISIS.	
Link	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=V28SDigCLek
Type of counter-narrative	Countering “potential for romance”
Tactics used	Credible messenger, provides proxy for direct experience, reveals factual inaccuracies, presents undesirable consequences.

Demographic	Young, male
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
Labels are for products, not people! Being multi-cultural can be difficult, but it can also be empowering. Watch this video of a young Muslim boy to see how to cope with having many different identities. Share if you have multiple identities and are proud of it!	
Link	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_O8d3ZKfF9k&feature=youtu.be
Type of counter-narrative	Countering “push factors”
Tactics used	Age-appropriate, disrupts binary themes of extremist ideology, advocates alternative positive view, presents a desirable outcome to having a certain attitude, encourages reflection.

Demographic	Young, male
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
Think joining ISIS is about glory and power? What if it's about poverty and disappointment? What price are you willing to pay to find out the truth about ISIS' false promises? This is the story of a young man who	

joined ISIS and lived to regret it deeply. He reports being "promised $50 per month along with a house and a wife." ISIS members also showed him "videos that made it look amazing," he said. But life under the group was not what he hoped. Instead, "They burn your life, they leave nothing," the 24-year-old said from Kurdish-run Syria. Check out the full story below:	
Link	https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/captured-isis-fighter-joining-extremists-syria-ruined-my-life-n398976?cid=sm_tw&hootPostID=d945993e1dbde3ff29ec980fb972581c
Type of counter-narrative	Countering "sense of adventure"
Tactics used	Encourages critical thinking, reveals factual inaccuracies, demonstrates how extremist activities hurt those they claim to represent, presents undesirable consequences.

Demographic	Adult
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
Why is ISIS betraying its own doctrine? Religious Scholar Dr. Ali Jom'a, the Grand mufti of Egypt, explains the truth and justice of true #fatwa here: Who can spot the differences between ISIS fatwa and TRUE fatwa?	
Link	http://www.cn-library.com/item/f-tkg-601/
Type of counter-narrative	Countering ideological narratives
Tactics used	Credible messenger, reveals incongruities between extremist group's actions and expressed beliefs, encourages critical thinking, encourages thorough reflection, increases knowledge of attitude object.

Demographic	Adult
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
Have ISIS leaders even read the Qur'an? Religious Scholar Dr. Ali Jom'a, the Grand mufti of Egypt, reveals the truth about #jihad according to the Qur'an and Prophet Muhhamed: Why has ISIS distorted these noble concepts?	
Link	http://www.cn-library.com/item/a-mhe-808/
Type of counter-narrative	Countering ideological narratives
Tactics used	Credible messenger, reveals incongruities between extremist group's actions and expressed beliefs, encourages critical thinking, encourages thorough reflection, increases knowledge of attitude object.

Demographic	Adult, male
Ideology	White Supremacy
Message	
Could it happen to you? Daniel Gallant shares his incredible story about getting in, and out, of white extremism here:	
Link	http://extremedialogue.org/daniel-gallant/
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative narrative
Tactics used	Credible messenger, presents undesirable consequences, highlights how extremist actions hurt people, encourages thorough reflection,

	elicits emotional response, uses compelling narrative with beginning, middle, and end.

Demographic	Adult, male
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
What does the Caliphate promise you? Could it be that these promises are hooks with no bait? Listen to this ISIS defector give his insider perspective on what really goes on in the Caliphate.	
Link	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sKMgLs6vbw0
Type of counter-narrative	Countering ideological narratives
Tactics used	Encourages critical thinking, reveals factual inaccuracies, credible messenger.

4.1.2 Twitter

Twitter is a social media based on brevity. Posts are limited to 280 characters (as of November 2017). To conform to character restrictions, it is recommended to use a URL shortening service when posting links to external content. Whenever possible, it is recommended to retweet sympathetic content from other sources to increase credibility. Hashtags are frequently used, so special attention should be placed on hashtag selection as they can increase the likelihood that the post will be found via searches, or that followers will reuse the hashtag in their own posts, adding to the reach and impact of the original post. If appropriate, hashtag hijacking can also be applied.

Demographic	All
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
Use words, not wars. This Muslim man is waging #jihad on hate – kill them all with… love!	
Link	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7p189OCWpRU
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative narrative
Tactics used	Inducing positive emotions, using comedy, credible and likeable messenger, advocating alternative point of view of extremist narratives, incorporating positive stories, satirizing extremist propaganda, reiterating attitude.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
#Fact: The first University was founded by a Muslim woman – Fatima Al Fihri #MuslimWomen #Inspirational #PillarsofSociety	
Link	http://mvslim.com/inspiring-muslim-women-fatima-al-fihr/
Type of counter-narrative	Countering social narratives, providing alternative narrative
Tactics used	Credible messenger, incorporating positive stories, engage critical thinking, increase knowledge.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
These female religious scholars run a Fatwa hotline to clarify your doubts about faith, life and love #empowered #forwomenbywomen	
Link	http://muslimgirl.com/29738/theres-now-fatwa-hotline-women-run-muslim-sheikhas/
Type of counter-narrative	Countering social/ideological narratives
Tactics used	Credible messengers, incorporate positive stories, present desirable outcomes, increase knowledge.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
“Let us instead adopt compassion and love as our weapon of choice.” Muslim women are #warriors.	
Link	http://muslimgirl.com/46892/art-protest-feminine-power/
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative narrative
Tactics used	Engage emotional response, encourage critical thinking, advocate alternative view to extremist ideology, present desirable outcomes, increase confidence in attitude.

Demographic	Young, Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
#Muslim girls are the leaders of tomorrow. It’s time to break the cycle of toxic double standards in the community #NoExcuses	
Link	http://muslimgirl.com/41622/muslim-men-boys-will-be-boys-mentality/
Type of counter-narrative	Countering social narrative
Tactics used	Encourage reflection, demonstrate how fundamentalist point of view harms those it claims to help, present desirable outcomes, imply that attitudes have moral basis, disrupt binary themes.

Demographic	All
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
What kind of future can there be without education? #LifeUnderISIS	
Link	https://youtu.be/gMQkgPbMOn4
Type of counter-narrative	Countering social narrative
Tactics used	Highlight how extremist activities hurt those they claim to represent, encourage critical thinking, credible messenger, present undesirable consequences, provide proxy for direct experience.

4.2 In-Theatre

4.2.1 Radio and TV

Radio and especially television content often contributes to the popular culture of a given population. Such media require greater resources to produce and distribute than social media, but may be more likely to have a lasting impact on their audience. Most of the messages contained in this section can be adapted to suit either of these two mediums, depending on the context and demographics of the target population, the intended effect, and the resources available. It is highly recommended to perform a thorough target audience analysis prior to developing radio and TV content.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
These radio and TV dramas depict stories of individuals, particularly women, who have joined ISIS and defected. One radio "story hour" presents the compelling and moving narrative of various women considering extremism, and debunks ISIS "mythologies" regarding life in the Caliphate.	
Link	http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p03087nc?ocid=socialflow_facebook
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative narrative
Tactics used	Credible messenger, appeal to emotions, narrative transportation, reveal factual inaccuracies, highlight how extremist activities hurt those they claim to represent, incorporate positive stories, reiterate attitudes, encourage critical thinking and reflection, present consequences to having a certain attitude.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
This radio/TV show demonstrates that there are many ways to make the "Ummah" proud, and shows that people of faith can express their energy and beliefs in constructive, non-violent ways. For instance, this Muslim-American Olympic fencer got her very own Shero Barbie!	
Link	http://mvslim.com/ibtihaj-muhammad-muslim-american-olympic-fencer-got-her-very-own-shero-barbie/
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative narrative
Tactics used	Credible messengers, presenting positive stories, appeal to emotions, advocating alternative views from extremist narratives, encouraging reflection and critical thinking, reiterating attitudes, provide proxy for direct experience.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
This show explores the lives and contributions of Muslim historical figures, including Muslim women, and demonstrates that going down as a jihadist is not the ideal way to make history.	

Link	http://mvslim.com/know-nana-asmau-early-islamic-feminist-icon/
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative narrative
Tactics used	Credible messengers, presenting positive stories, appeal to emotions, advocating alternative views from extremist narratives, encouraging reflection and critical thinking, reiterating attitudes, provide proxy for direct experience.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
This drama explores the life and struggles of women who chose to or were forced to join the Caliphate and then defected. It demonstrates the struggles of living within ISIS territory for Yazidi women – who were used as sex slaves. It also shows that, if you find yourself there, it is possible to get out and rebuild a life afterwards.	
Link	https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-uncovered/once-used-sex-slaves-isis-these-yazidi-women-are-rebuilding-n801226
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative narrative
Tactics used	Credible messengers, presenting positive stories, presenting undesirable consequences, debunking ISIS narratives, appeal to emotions, advocating alternative views from extremist narratives, encouraging reflection and critical thinking, reiterating attitudes, provide proxy for direct experience.

4.2.2 Other

This section contains CVE messages that may be delivered through other means, including community theatre and other community events, comic series, educational curricula, other print media, and other forms of popular culture (e.g., that utilize sports figures or other popular icons).Indeed, any of the CVE messages presented earlier (for social media/radio/TV) could also be disseminated through a variety of platforms/media, including other traditional methods of military influence messaging, such as printed leaflets or posters.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
A community theatre initiative to enable individuals to share their stories and express their identities in constructive ways. Provides a sense of community, solidarity and sympathy. Topics to be represented would include healthy expressions of faith, coping strategies for discrimination or oppression, and stories of hope and reconciliation, leadership and compassion.[16]	
Link	https://www.facebook.com/hijabimonologue/ http://mvslim.com/the-hijabi-monologues-muslim-voices-tell-their-stories-in-theatre/
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative narrative
Tactics used	Credible messengers, community involvement, appeals to emotion, presenting positive stories, engaging critical thinking, reiterating attitudes,

[16] This campaign description could be featured on a website or poster announcement of the community theatre initiative.

	use of humour and satire, providing proxy for direct experience.

Demographic	Female
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
A community-submission comic series that features healthy expressions of faith, coping strategies for discrimination or oppression, and stories of hope and reconciliation, and leadership and compassion	
Link	http://qaherathesuperhero.com
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative narrative
Tactics used	Credible messengers, community involvement, appeals to emotion, presenting positive stories, engaging critical thinking, reiterating attitudes, use of humour and satire, providing proxy for direct experience.

Demographic	Youth, female students
Ideology	Any
Message	
Engaging female leaders in conversation and extracting quotes on the topic of jobs for women, career goals, and education to get there. Making these available via radio, TV commercials, print advertising, and incorporating them into school curricula.	
Link	N/A
Type of counter-narrative	Alternative, positive narrative, individual career goals, countering push/pull factors
Tactics used	Engaging intellect of the audience, credible messengers, presenting positive stories, reiterating attitudes, advocating alternative views from extremist narratives, increase knowledge.

Demographic	Youth
Ideology	Any
Message	
“Everyone Wins” campaign featuring quotes from, sports stars on the importance of rules, teamwork, cooperation and community involvement. Messages would be made available via radio, TV and print. Featured athletes could make appearances at events or community locations. E.g., “Famous Athlete” knows that the greatest victory is when a community comes together. In the game of cooperation, everyone wins!	
Link	N/A
Type of counter-narrative	Respect, tolerance, positive narratives, countering push factors
Tactics used	Credible messengers, presenting positive stories, reiterating attitudes, advocating alternative views from extremist narratives, increase confidence in attitude.

Demographic	Young, female
Ideology	Any

Message	
“Who is making your decisions?” campaign featuring quotes from pop stars and other influencers questioning male authority within extremist groups. E.g., She’s bold, she’s proud, and she speaks for herself. “Pop Star” makes her own decisions – what about you?	
Link	N/A
Type of counter-narrative	Counters social narratives
Tactics used	Credible messengers, engaging critical thinking, empowers target audience, highlights how extremist activities hurt those it claims to represent, presents positive alternative.

Demographic	Female, Mothers
Ideology	Radical Islam
Message	
“Remember Firstname Lastname” campaign to keep past acts of violence top of mind. Presents biographical vignettes on victims of extremist actions with an emphasis on their contributions to the community. E.g., Remember Jane Doe. A pillar of her community, she was a mother, a sister and a loving auntie to dozens of her community’s children. Her story came to an abrupt end at the hands of “Extremist Group X”. While helping the local medical clinic restock their supplies, she was caught in the blast from an IED. Remember Jane Doe.	
Link	N/A
Type of counter-narrative	Countering “sense of adventure,” countering pull factors, undermining appeal of group, moral counter-narrative
Tactics used	Recollection of past violent acts, appeal to emotions, reiterating attitudes, highlighting how extremist activities hurt those they claim to represent.

Demographic	Youth
Ideology	Any
Message	
“Together We Can” campaign led by a youth/civil society organization that encourages collective action that contribute positively to the community. For example, a recruitment poster could feature the following: Together we can _____ - End violence - Spread joy - Improve access to education - Make positive changes - Take political action - Build solutions Join “Youth Group X” to bring our dreams to life!	
Link	For reference, the following is an example of an interactive art piece that uses the “fill in the blank” style of messaging: https://www.wired.com/2011/03/ted-2011-what-do-you-want-to-do-before-you-die/
Type of counter-narrative	Tactical counter-narrative
Tactics used	Encourages community and collective action, appeals to need for belonging, presents positive alternatives, presents desirable

	consequences, provides direct experience with attitude object.

5. Next Steps

We used best CVE and persuasion/social influence best practices to develop draft gender-based prototype messages to counter violent extremism. This included understanding the context; knowing the audience (for our purposes, we focused on women and girls, but includes gender-based groups in general); developing compelling content that invokes critical thinking; considering the medium; using credible messengers; and evaluating (see Figure 5 – Best Practices for Designing and Developing CVE Programs).

The next step in the process then is to evaluate the messages. Specifically, we would seek to determine whether the messages have the intended effect of providing suitable information that helps potentially radicalized individuals, or those who are not yet radicalized but who are sympathetic to extremist groups, make informed decisions away from violent extremism. Ultimately, the messages would require validation in both laboratory and field settings, with a variety of relevant target audiences.

At this stage, we propose evaluating the CVE messages in two ways. First, we suggest presenting the messages to CVE SMEs for comment and input. This would require identifying, contacting, and gaining the consent to participate from approximately 15 SMEs who are actively involved in CVE messaging programs both domestically and internationally. It is important to consider the target audience context and select CVE SMEs that represent a wide variety of locations and populations. This will help determine which messages are more suited to each unique context. An evaluation tool would be developed for the purposes of examining the effectiveness of the gender-specific messages. Core elements to consider are message content and comprehension as well as message reach and proliferation (e.g., shares on Twitter and Facebook). We anticipate that refinement to the draft messages will be required, based on SME input

Second, we suggest reaching out to community members that have an interest in, or are already involved in, CVE programs and possibly know radicalized or potentially radicalized members of the community. A good program should be developed from the recipients' point of view for maximum impact, and it should also identify the ultimate goal (no more than two goals) of the campaign, that is, what is the campaign trying to achieve. Engaging community members in the process will help achieve those objectives.

To accomplish this, we would need to identify, contact, and gain the consent to participate from community members. Community members could come from associations, such as the Muslim Association of Canada – Masjid Toronto (for the purposes of addressing Islamic radicalization), and from social services, such as the Ministry of Children and Youth Services (e.g., for addressing at-risk youth). Sharing the CVE program and messages with community members will help to identify the target audience and access to that audience, further refine the content, consider the best means for distribution given the resources available, develop metrics to measure effectiveness, and determine the intermediate outcomes (all of the changes that occur to the recipients throughout the campaign) and program impact (supported by activities and intermediate outcomes).

Outreach to community members serves two additional functions. First, it will help bring people together to focus them on the results of the program, and second, it will assist in identifying credible messengers in target audience communities. Ideally, the identified credible messengers would go on to participate more closely in the dissemination of messages. Ultimately, community participation will advance the Theory of Change, help to build the logic model, and improve the CVE campaign.

With respect to CVE efforts, we understand that, although CAF has not been directly or explicitly involved in CVE, it has been involved in related influence activities in varying capacities on operations (Thomson et al., 2017).[17] For example, Psychological Operations expend resources countering hostile propaganda while in theatre.[18] In fact, we argue that the CAF could play a vital role in the evaluation of the CVE messaging campaign by becoming a stakeholder in a Theory of Change. Ensuring the involvement of communities of interest in program evaluation is important to building a viable programmatic framework as well as to strengthening relationships among stakeholders and gaining critical insights. Leveraging the CAF's knowledge and experience on influence operations would be valuable for articulating underlying assumptions about the campaign activities and measures of output success. Moreover, the CAF's resources could be utilized to implement action strategies. CAF female soldiers who have acted as Gender Advisors or worked on Female Engagement Teams in theatre may be a useful contribution to CVE messages targeting women and girls, or gender-based counter-radicalization messaging more broadly. Without taking the lead, the CAF could play an important role as a partner in developing and disseminating CVE campaigns across civil society.

[17] See Thomson et al. (2017) for a review of the role of the CAF in such influence activities.
[18] Psychological Operations are one activity under Influence Activities.

This page intentionally left blank.

6. References

Aaker, J., Vohs, K. D., & Mogilner, C. (2010). Nonprofits are seen as warm and for-profits as competent: Firm stereotypes matter. *Journal of Consumer Research*, *37*(2), 224-237.

Allan, H., Glazzard, A., Jesperson, S., Reddy-Tumu, S., & Winterbotham, E. (2015). *Drivers of violent extremism: Hypothesis and literature review.* Royal United Services Institute.

Bradock, K., & Horgan, J. (2015). Towards a guide for constructing and disseminating counter-narratives to reduce support for terrorism. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 39, 5.

Briggs, R., & Feve, S. (2013). *Review of programs to counter narrative of violent extremism: What works and what are the implications for government?* London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

Briñol, P., Rucker, D. D., & Petty, R. E. (2015). Naïve theories about persuasion: Implications for information processing and consumer attitude change. *International Journal of Advertising*, *34*(1), 85-106.

Christensson, P. (2016, August 20). *GIF Definition*. Retrieved May 15, 2018, from https://techterms.com

Comerford, M. (2017). New dynamics of extremism in South Asia: Case studies from Kashmir, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. In L. Elsayed & J. Barnes. (Eds.), *Contemporary P/CVE research and practice* (p. 244-260). Hedayah and Edith Crown University.

Davies, D., Neudecker, C., Ouellet, M., Bouchard, M., & Ducol, B. (2016). Toward a framework understanding of online programs for countering violent extremism. *Journal for Deradicalization*, (6), 51-86.

Heydayah (2014). *Developing effective counter-narrative frameworks for countering violent extremism.* Hedayah and International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, September, 2014.

Department of National Defence (DND). (2004). B-GJ-005-313/FP-001, *Psychological Operations*.

Department of National Defence (DND). (2010). B-GL-353-002/FP-001, *Psychological Operations Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*.

Ferguson, K. (2016). *Countering violent extremism through media and communication strategies: A review of the evidence.* Partnership for Conflict, Crime, & Security Research, University of East Anglia.

Fink, N. C., Barakat, R., & Romaniuk, P. (2013). *Evaluating countering violent extremism programming.*

Finley, S.A., & Templer, R. (2017). A geographical and temporal overview of violent extremism in Southeast Asia. In L. Elsayed & J. Barnes. (Eds.), *Contemporary P/CVE research and practice* (p. 244-260). Hedayah and Edith Crown University.

Geller, E. (2016). *Why ISIS is winning the online propaganda war*. Downloaded from http://www.dailydot.com/politics/isis-terrorism-social-media-internet-countering-violent-extremism on 04/05/2016.

Green, M. C., & Brock, T. C. (2000). The role of transportation in the persuasiveness of public narratives. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, *79*(5), 701.

Hadgu, A. T., Garimella, K., & Weber, I. (2013, May). Political hashtag hijacking in the US. In *Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference on World Wide Web* (pp. 55-56). ACM.

Helmus, T. C., & Bodine-Baron, E. A. (2017). *Empowering ISIS opponents on Twitter*. RAND Corporation.

Jacques, K., & Taylor, P. J. (2009). Female terrorism: A review. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *21*(3), 499–515. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550902984042

Jain, N., Agarwal, P., & Pruthi, J. (2015). HashJacker-detection and analysis of hashtag hijacking on Twitter. *International Journal of Computer Applications*, *114*(19).

Jato, M. N., Simbakalia, C., Tarasevich, J. M., Awasum, D. N., Kihinga, C. N. B., & Ngirwamungu, E. (1999). The impact of multimedia family planning promotion on the contraceptive behavior of women in tanzania. *International Family Planning Perspectives*, *25*(2), 60–67. https://doi.org/10.2307/2991943

Joosse, P., Bucerius, S. M., & Thompson, S. K. (2015). Narratives and counter-narratives: Somali-Canadians on recruitment as foreign fighters to Al-Shabaab. *British Journal of Criminology, 55*(4), 811-832.

Khan, H. (2015). Why countering extremism fails: Washington's top-down approach to prevention is flawed. *Foreign Affairs,* February.

Kralj Novak, P., Smailović, J., Sluban, B., & Mozetič, I. (2015) *Sentiment of emojis*. PLoS ONE 10(12): e0144296. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0144296

McLuhan, M. (1964). *Understanding media: The extensions of man.* New York: MIT Press.

Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MCDC) (2016). *Analytical Concept for the Use of Social Media as an Effector v1.0*. MCDC.

Mitts, T. (2016). *From isolation to radicalization: The socioeconomic predictors of support for ISIS in the West.* Columbia University.

NATO Joint Task Force Headquarters Standard Operating Procedure (2013). *Gender Advisor*. NATO JTF HQ SOP 106.

NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NSCCE) (2016). *New Trends in Social Media.* NATO StratCom COE.

Ndung'u, I., Salifu, U., & Sigsworth, R. (2017). Violent extremism in Kenya: Why women are a priority. *Institute for Security Studies Monographs*, *2017*(197), 1-124.

Patel, S. (2016). 85 percent of Facebook video is watched without sound. Retrieved June 7, 2018, from https://digiday.com/media/silent-world-facebook-video/.

Petty, R. E., Haugtvedt, C. P., & Smith, S. M. (1995). Elaboration as a determinant of attitude strength: Creating attitudes that are persistent, resistant, and predictive of behavior. *Attitude strength: Antecedents and consequences*, *4*(93-130).

Poloni-Staudinger, L. & Ortbals, C.D. (2013). *Terrorism and violent conflict: women's agency, leadership, and responses*. New York: Springer.

Porter, J. (2014, September 30). *Why you probably don't have a narrative.* Retrieved May 16, 2018, from http://www.jrmyprtr.com/narrative-messaging/

Prevent Strategy (2011). Secretary of State for the Home Department. United Kingdom.

Rabasa, A., Pettyjohn, S. L., Ghez, J. J., & Boucek, C. (2010). *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*. Rand Corp Arlington VA National Security Research Div.

Romaniuk, P. (2015). *Does CVE work? Lessons learned from the global effort to counter violent extremism.* The Global Centre on Cooperative Security, September.

Saltman, E. M., & Smith, M. (2015). *Till Martyrdom do us part: Gender and the ISIS phenomenon*. Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

Schonveld, B. (2017). Critical issues in PVE in South Asia. In L. Elsayed & J. Barnes. (Eds.), *Contemporary P/CVE research and practice* (p. 244-260). Hedayah and Edith Crown University.

Skuse, A. (2002). Radio, politics and trust in Afghanistan: A social history of broadcasting. *Gazette (Leiden, Netherlands)*, *64*(3), 267-279.

Skuse, A. J., Butler, N., Power, F., & Woods, N. (2004). *Radio broadcasting for health: A decision maker's guide.*

Speckhard, A., & Shajkovci, A. (2018) The family that slays together - mother's deadly day: she blew up herself and her two girls to murder Christians. *The Daily Beast* https://www.thedailybeast.com/mothers-deadly-day-she-blew-up-herself-and-her-two-girls-to-murder-christians?ref=author

The Redirect Method. *A Blueprint for Bypassing Extremism*. Downloaded from file:///C:/Users/mthomson/AppData/Local/Packages/Microsoft.MicrosoftEdge_8wekyb3d8bbwe/TempState/Downloads/RedirectMethod-FullMethod-PDF%20(1).pdf

Thomson, M. H., Davis, S., Martins, B., & Evans, J., & Morton, A. (2017). *The role of gender in radicalization and extremism: Implications for military influence activities.* Technical Authority: A. R. Febbraro. DRDC-RDDC-2017-C090.

Tuck, H., & Silverman, T. (2016). *The counter-narrative handbook*. London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue.

Urwin, E. (2017). Everyday countering violent extremism (CVE) indicators: A case study from Afghanistan. In L. Elsayed & J. Barnes. (Eds.), *Contemporary P/CVE research and practice* (p. 244-260). Hedayah and Edith Crown University.

USAID (2011). The development response to violent extremism and insurgency: Putting principles into practice. *USAID Policy,* September.

Zeiger, S. (2016). *Undermining violent extremist narratives in South East Asia: A How-to guide*. UAE: Hedayah and The Global Center on Cooperative Security.

Zeiger, S. (2017). Counter-narratives to violent extremism in Southeast Asia: A preliminary assessment. In L. Elsayed & J. Barnes. (Eds.), *Contemporary P/CVE research and practice* (p. 244-260). Hedayah and Edith Crown University.

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA

*Security markings for the title, authors, abstract and keywords must be entered when the document is sensitive

1. ORIGINATOR (Name and address of the organization preparing the document. A DRDC Centre sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, is entered in Section 8.)

HumanSystem Incorporated
111 Farquhar Street
Guelph, ON, H1H 3N4
Canada

2a. SECURITY MARKING (Overall security marking of the document including special supplemental markings if applicable.)

CAN UNCLASSIFIED

2b. CONTROLLED GOODS

NON-CONTROLLED GOODS
DMC A

3. TITLE (The document title and sub-title as indicated on the title page.)

Gender-Based Counter-Radicalization Messaging

4. AUTHORS (Last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc., not to be used)

Thompson, M.; Martins, B.; Harmes, D.

5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (Month and year of publication of document.)	6a. NO. OF PAGES (Total pages, including Annexes, excluding DCD, covering and verso pages.)	6b. NO. OF REFS (Total references cited.)
July 2018	43	49

7. DOCUMENT CATEGORY (e.g., Scientific Report, Contract Report, Scientific Letter.)

Contract Report

8. SPONSORING CENTRE (The name and address of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development.)

DRDC - Toronto Research Centre
Defence Research and Development Canada
1133 Sheppard Avenue West
Toronto, Ontario M3K 2C9
Canada

9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)	9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written.)
02ca - Land Tactical C4ISR/EW	W7719-185416/001/TOR

10a. DRDC PUBLICATION NUMBER (The official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.)	10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)
DRDC-RDDC-2018-C133	

11a. FUTURE DISTRIBUTION WITHIN CANADA (Approval for further dissemination of the document. Security classification must also be considered.)

Public release

11b. FUTURE DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE CANADA (Approval for further dissemination of the document. Security classification must also be considered.)

12. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Use semi-colon as a delimiter.)

Gender-based analysis; Radicalization; Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)

13. ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ (When available in the document, the French version of the abstract must be included here.)

The following report is in support of Defence Research and Development Canada's multi-year research activity on "The Role of Women and Gender in the Radicalization Process and the Maintenance of Extremist Groups," which seeks to address the involvement of women in both promoting and countering extremist activities and to better understand the gender dimensions of radicalization and extremism. Despite the importance of this topic, little research attention has been paid to the roles and perspectives of women in the context of radicalization and extremism. Thus, this work seeks to contribute towards a more comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms that draw women, in particular, towards extremist ideologies, as well as the methods that can prevent their involvement. This research activity considers the current state of women's participation in radicalization and violent extremism, elaborates on existing counter-radicalization and Counter-Violent Extremism (CVE) programs, and adopts best practices from the influence and persuasion literature to generate a series of prototype gender-based counter-radicalization messages. Such messages are intended to counter extremist narratives and to offer alternatives to radicalization. Messages are designed for social media, for radio/TV, or for in-person settings within the expeditionary environment.

Le rapport suivant soutient une recherche pluriannuelle de Recherche et Développement pour la Défense Canada sur «Le rôle des femmes et du genre dans le processus de radicalisation et le maintien des groupes extrémistes», qui vise à aborder la participation des femmes dans la promotion et la lutte contre activités extrémistes et de mieux comprendre les dimensions du genre de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme. Malgré l'importance de ce sujet, peu de recherches ont été consacrées aux rôles et perspectives des femmes dans le contexte de la radicalisation et de l'extrémisme. Ainsi, ce travail contribue à une compréhension plus globale des mécanismes qui attirent les femmes, en particulier, vers des idéologies extrémistes, ainsi que des méthodes qui peuvent empêcher leur implication. Cette activité de recherche examine l'état actuel de la participation des femmes à la radicalisation et à l'extrémisme violent, élabore des programmes existants de lutte contre la radicalisation et contre l'extrémisme violent et adopte les meilleures pratiques de la littérature sur l'influence et la persuasion pour générer des messages de contre-radicalisation basés sur le genre. Ces messages ont pour but de contrer les discours extrémistes et d'offrir des alternatives à la radicalisation. Des messages sont conçus pour les médias sociaux, pour la radio/la télé, ou pour les paramètres en personne dans l'environnement expéditionnaire.