

VENEZUELA

AN UNCERTAIN TRANSITION



SENATE | SÉNAT
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Report of the Standing Senate Committee
on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

MAY 2019



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THE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

The Honourable A. Raynell Andreychuk, *Chair*
The Honourable Paul J. Massicotte, *Deputy Chair*

The Honourable Senators

Salma Ataullahjan
Peter Boehm
Patricia Bovey
Jane Cordy
Mary Coyle
Dennis Dawson
Tony Dean
Stephen Greene
Leo Housakos
Thanh Hai Ngo
Raymonde Saint-Germain

Ex-officio members of the committee:

The Honourable Senator Peter Harder, P.C. (or Diane Bellemare)(or Grant Mitchell);
The Honourable Senator Larry Smith (or Yonah Martin);
The Honourable Senator Joseph Day (or Terry Mercer);
The Honourable Senator Yuen Pau Woo (or Raymonde Saint-Germain)

Parliamentary Information and Research Services, Library of Parliament:

Pascal Tremblay and Billy Joe Siekierski, Analysts

Senate Committees Directorate:

Marie-Ève Belzile, Clerk of the Committee
Jacqueline Sirois, Administrative Assistant

Senate Communications Directorate:

Stav Nitka, Communications Officer, Committees

ORDER OF REFERENCE

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Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Wednesday, January 27, 2016:

The Honourable Senator Andreychuk moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Tkachuk:

That the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, in accordance with rule 12-7(4), be authorized to examine such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally; and

That the committee report to the Senate no later than June 30, 2017.

After debate,

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Charles Robert

Interim Clerk of the Senate

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Wednesday, June 21, 2017:

With leave of the Senate,

The Honourable Senator Andreychuk moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Patterson:

That, notwithstanding the order of the Senate adopted on Wednesday, January 27, 2016, the date for the final report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade in relation to its study on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally be extended from June 30, 2017 to June 30, 2018.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Charles Robert

Interim Clerk of the Senate

ORDER OF REFERENCE

Extract from the *Journals of the Senate*, Thursday, June 14, 2018:

The Honourable Senator Andreychuk moved, seconded by the Honourable Senator Tkachuk:

That, notwithstanding the order of the Senate adopted on Wednesday, June 21, 2017, the date for the final report of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade in relation to its study on such issues as may arise from time to time relating to foreign relations and international trade generally be extended from June 30, 2018 to June 30, 2019.

The question being put on the motion, it was adopted.

Richard Denis

Interim Clerk of the Senate

INTRODUCTION

The Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (the committee) held two meetings, on February 21 2019 and February 27 2019, to consider the latest developments in Venezuela's political, economic, and humanitarian crisis. The purpose of the meetings was to keep committee members apprised of significant recent developments in the country and the region, and to build on two reports the committee tabled on Venezuela in [June 2016](#) and [July 2017](#). Witnesses included senior officials from Global Affairs Canada, Canada's former ambassador to Venezuela, and academics.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF VENEZUELA

The Venezuela of the 1970s, as the celebrated Venezuelan authors Moisés Naím and Francisco Toro have written, was one of Latin America's oldest and strongest democracies, with an open political system, a free press, a stronger social safety net than its neighbours, and the best infrastructure in South America. It was also, as of 1970, the richest country in Latin America, with a GDP per capita higher than Spain, Greece, and Israel, and only 13 percent lower than that of the United Kingdom.¹

Though the legacy of the country's populist President Hugo Chávez — who led the country from 1999 until 2013 — is still fiercely debated in and outside the country, the committee heard that the "Chavista experiment," despite its shortcomings, was at least "successful in reducing poverty and inequality" through 2012.²

Since then, however, under the leadership of Chávez's chosen successor, Nicolás Maduro, the country has been in a devastating downward spiral.

AN UNSUSTAINABLE CRISIS

Since 2015, Venezuela's economy has contracted by 50 percent. Hyperinflation has reached 2 million percent and it is estimated that it will reach 10 million percent at some point in 2019. More than 3.3 million Venezuelans have fled, largely to neighbouring countries. For those who have remained, there have been severe shortages of food and medicine as malnourishment levels continue to rise and diseases that had been largely nonexistent, like measles, diphtheria, and tuberculosis, reappear. There are credible

¹ Moisés Naím and Francisco Toro, "[Venezuela's Suicide: Lessons From a Failed State](#)," *Foreign Affairs*, November 2018.

² Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (AEFA), *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Gabriel Hetland, Assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany.)

reports indicating that 90 percent of the country's population is existing below the poverty line.³ Between January 21 and January 25, 2019, as another round of protests erupted, Amnesty International reported 41 deaths from gunshot wounds and more than 900 arbitrary detentions.⁴ In March 2019, large swathes of the country, including the capital city of Caracas, suffered from two multi-day power outages.⁵ In response, the embattled government of Nicolás Maduro announced a 30-day electricity ration.⁶ According to every available measure, the living conditions for the average Venezuelan have deteriorated since the committee began investigating and reporting on the evolving crisis in the country in 2016. Support for the government has fallen in the face of those conditions.

The prospect of an alternative to Nicolás Maduro's increasingly authoritarian regime seemed unlikely when the committee first initiated its work on Venezuela. As it now stands, decreased support in Latin America for the Maduro regime and the recent emergence, pursuant to Venezuela's 1999 Constitution, of a self-declared interim president, Juan Guaidó, has created a volatile and unpredictable dynamic within the country. Michael Camilleri, the director of the Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program at the Inter-American Dialogue, told the committee that Guaidó represents the most significant challenge to Maduro since Maduro succeeded Hugo Chávez in 2013, uniting the opposition and rallying the international community behind him.⁷ Nevertheless, like many of the other witnesses, Mr. Camilleri cast doubt on the prospects for a swift resolution to the crisis, owing in large part to Maduro's control of the armed forces and enjoyment of support from countries such as Cuba, Russia, and China. "A successful democratic transition now seems possible for the first time in recent memory. However, it is by no means a foregone conclusion," Camilleri told the committee.⁸

COMPETING GOVERNMENTS

On 23 January 2019, Juan Guaidó, the President of Venezuela's National Assembly, declared himself Interim President of the country based on Venezuela's 1999 Constitution, and committed to calling new presidential elections. This declaration came only weeks after Nicolás Maduro swore himself in for a second presidential term following elections held in May 2018 that the Government of Canada deemed to be "neither free, nor fair, nor legitimate."⁹ More than 50 countries, including Canada, have recognized Guaidó's interim presidency.

³ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 27 2019.

⁴ Amnesty International, "[Venezuela: Hunger, punishment and fear, the formula for repression used by authorities under Nicolás Maduro](#)," February 20 2019.

⁵ Christopher Torchia, "[Venezuela's Maduro announces power rationing amid outages](#)," *The Associated Press*, April 1 2019.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid. (Michael Camilleri, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue.)

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 27 2019. (Michael Grant, Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas, Global Affairs Canada.)

VENEZUELA: AN UNCERTAIN TRANSITION

Michael Grant, Deputy Minister for the Americas at Global Affairs Canada, told the committee that the Government of Canada views Guaidó's actions as having clear legitimacy under Venezuela's 1999 Constitution, which he said designates the leader of the National Assembly as interim president, when the office of the presidency is vacant, so that new presidential elections may be called.¹⁰ Mr. Grant was referring to Article 233 of the constitution, which lists the events that could result in the president becoming "permanently unavailable to serve."¹¹ One of those events is the "abandonment of his or her position, duly declared by the National Assembly."¹²

However, Sébastien Dubé, a professor in the department of political science and international relations at Universidad del Norte in Barranquilla, Colombia, interpreted that section of the Venezuelan constitution differently. "Constitutionally, the only way the president of the National Assembly can become interim President is if the President becomes permanently unavailable to serve between the election and the inauguration. According to my understanding of the constitution, the president of the National Assembly, Guaidó, does not have the constitutional right to proclaim himself President," Dubé told the committee.¹³ He added, however, that Maduro has not been acting in accordance with the constitution for a number of years.¹⁴ Further complicating matters, Guaidó has invoked two other articles to bolster the legitimacy of his declaration under the constitution — 333 and 350 — which, respectively, do not allow the constitution to be overridden and give the people the power to "disown any regime, legislation or authority that violates democratic values, principles and guarantees or encroaches upon human rights."¹⁵

Regardless of whether Guaidó's declaration is constitutionally legitimate, a November 2018 poll conducted by *Datanalisis*, a public opinion research company Mr. Rowswell, Canada's ambassador to Venezuela from 2014 to 2017, described as the "country's most credible firm," found that 63 percent of Venezuelans want Maduro removed from office.¹⁶ Mr. Rowswell and Mr. Camilleri also noted, however, that the Maduro regime frequently threatens to withdraw benefits, such as housing and food rations, from those who are disloyal to the regime, making it difficult to gauge true levels of support.¹⁷ Even though Maduro's support has been reduced as a result of "mismanagement and the government's authoritarian turn," Gabriel Hetland, assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean Studies and Sociology at the University of Albany, told the committee that Maduro nonetheless retains a "not insignificant" level of support among the working class and the

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ [Venezuela \(Bolivarian Republic of\)'s Constitution of 1999 with Amendments through 2009](#).

¹² Ibid.

¹³ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 27 2019. (Sébastien Dubé, Professor, Department of Political Science, Universidad del Norte.)

¹⁴ Ibid. (Sébastien Dubé, Professor, Department of Political Science, Universidad del Norte.)

¹⁵ Irwin Cotler and Brandon Silver, "[Recognizing Juan Guaidó as Venezuela's Leader Isn't a Coup. It's an Embrace of Democracy](#)," *Foreign Policy*, February 6 2019.

¹⁶ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Ben Rowswell, President and Research Director, Canadian International Council.)

¹⁷ Ibid.

poor. That observation was echoed by Donald Kingsbury, a lecturer in the department of political science at the University of Toronto. He told the committee that,

the political divisions between the opposition and Chavismo supporters of the government within Venezuela continue by and large to follow racial and class lines. The rich and the white support the opposition, more or less, while the poor and the non-white portions of the populations are more likely to be Chavistas.

Shortages in basic goods and services and frustrations with the government have seen anti-Maduro protests emerge even in traditional Chavista strongholds. I hasten to add that these protests have by and large not as yet translated into blanket support for the opposition or for the self-declared presidency of Juan Guaidó, adding to an already complicated picture.¹⁸

REGIONAL PRESSURE

In August 2017, Canada joined 11 other countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia, in Lima, Peru to create what has become known as the Lima Group.¹⁹ The Lima Group has repeatedly called for a peaceful democratic transition in Venezuela, coordinated pressure on the Maduro regime, endorsed Guaidó's interim presidency declaration, and urged the Venezuela armed forces to recognize his authority.²⁰ The Group met in Bogotá, Colombia on February 25 2019 — a meeting that was attended by both Guaidó and United States Vice-President Mike Pence, though the U.S. is not a member of the Group.

While Mr. Rowswell described the Lima Group as essentially “a coordinating mechanism between foreign ministries,”²¹ Mr. Grant called it a “historical development” and “the first time in modern history that a group of leading countries has come together to take a very clear action against another country in the region.” The decision to form the Lima Group, he added, was borne out of frustration that the main multilateral body in the hemisphere, the Organization of American States (OAS), has “failed to really take a clear stance.”²²

At the same time, the International Contact Group (ICG), comprising the European Union and several Latin American countries (Mexico, Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Ecuador) met in

¹⁸ Ibid. (Donald Kingsbury, Lecturer, University of Toronto.)

¹⁹ Mexico withdrew from the Lima Group following the election of its new president in 2018.

²⁰ Statements made by the Government of Canada and the Lima Group are available [here](#).

²¹ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Ben Rowswell, President and Research Director, Canadian International Council.)

²² AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 27 2019. (Michael Grant, Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas, Global Affairs Canada.)

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Montevideo, Uruguay on February 7 2019, and again on March 28 2019 in Quito, Ecuador, with the view to pressuring Maduro to accept free and fair elections.²³ Some witnesses noted that the ICG has been criticized for being too open-ended and soft on the Maduro regime, but Mr. Hetland suggested that assessment is a function of the contrast between the ICG's approach and the Lima Group's more "aggressive and militaristic" approach.²⁴

With members of the U.S. government having stated on many occasions that all options are on the table for Venezuela — a statement some witnesses interpreted as a threat of U.S.-led military intervention — the ICG, the Canadian government, and the Lima Group have all unequivocally rejected that option. At the same time, however, Canada and other members of the Lima Group have increased pressure on the Maduro regime in other ways. To date, Canada has imposed targeted sanctions against 113 Venezuelan officials and individuals linked with the Maduro regime²⁵ and joined Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru, in September 2018, in referring the situation in Venezuela to the International Criminal Court.²⁶ That referral is based on the possibility that crimes against humanity have been committed in Venezuela.

As Canada, the U.S., and the Lima Group have continued to ramp up pressure on the Maduro regime, its allies have provided a counterbalance. Mr. Dubé told the committee that he is "convinced" the Maduro regime has withstood sanctions thanks to support from Cuba, China, Russia, and Turkey.²⁷ All four, the committee heard, have different reasons for continuing to support the regime. Mr. Dubé suggested Russia's support is primarily driven by geopolitical considerations, but that China might be susceptible to changing its position if Guaidó and the opposition can convince them they are in a better position than Maduro to respect Venezuela's financial obligations to China.²⁸ Far less flexible is the Cuban government, which Mr. Rowswell suggested sees its survival as "directly linked" to the Maduro government's continued existence.²⁹ Mr. Hetland also reminded the Committee that, by sheer numbers, Maduro is "still recognized as Venezuela's president by a majority of countries throughout the world."³⁰

²³ [Joint Statement](#), International Contact Group, February 7 2019; [Joint Statement](#), International Contact Group, 28 March 2019.

²⁴ AEFA, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Gabriel Hetland, Assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany.)

²⁵ Government of Canada, [Canadian Sanctions Related to Venezuela](#), accessed on May 3 2019.

²⁶ AEFA, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 27 2019. (Michael Grant, Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas, Global Affairs Canada.)

²⁷ AEFA, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 27 2019 (Sébastien Dubé, Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad del Norte - Barranquilla, Colombia.)

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ AEFA, [Evidence](#), 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Ben Rowswell, President and Research Director, Canadian International Council.)

³⁰ Ibid. (Gabriel Hetland, Assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany.)

WHERE TO FROM HERE?

On February 23 2019, exactly one month after the declaration of his interim presidency, Juan Guaidó and his supporters tried to overcome a Maduro regime border blockade in order to allow the entry of humanitarian supplies that had been pre-positioned in Colombia and Brazil. The attempted delivery was met with violent resistance, but the committee was told that the actions were consistent with the regime's fear that humanitarian aid was a Trojan Horse for foreign intervention.³¹

To date, the Government of Canada has committed \$55 million in humanitarian aid and development support to Venezuela. Even so, Mr. Grant informed the committee that it is currently very difficult to find humanitarian organizations in the country with which the Canadian government can work.³² Several witnesses lamented the politicization of aid distribution, but the blame for that politicization was not entirely pinned on the Maduro regime. Mr. Hetland argued that the U.S., which has been leading efforts to get aid into the country, had "openly declared that the aid is a tool for political change, which means that its primary purpose is not to serve the Venezuelan people who very much need it, but to try to get rid of Maduro."³³

On March 29 2019, however, Red Cross President Francesco Rocca told reporters in Caracas that, following negotiations with government institutions, the organization would have the "legal and technical conditions" to deliver humanitarian aid within the month. The organization's goal was to start delivering that aid to 650,000 people within 20 days.³⁴

Despite the deteriorating situation in Venezuela and the mounting external political pressure on the Maduro regime, the armed forces have largely remained loyal to Maduro. Convincing them to defect in favour of the National Assembly, the committee heard, is a *sine qua non* for any peaceful democratic transition. That said, it appears there is a multi-faceted rationale informing the military's reluctance in that regard. Guaidó and the National Assembly passed an amnesty law — though one that does not apply to crimes against humanity — and Guaidó has sent public and private messages to the armed forces that they will not face retribution should a transition occur,³⁵ but Mr. Dubé explained that Guaidó cannot guarantee that subsequent Venezuelan governments will honour that

³¹ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Michael Camilleri, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue.)

³² AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 27 2019. (Michael Grant, Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas, Global Affairs Canada.)

³³ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Gabriel Hetland, Assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany.)

³⁴ Steve Almasy, "[Red Cross to begin aid to Venezuela by mid-April](#)," *CNN*, March 29 2019.

³⁵ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Michael Camilleri, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue.)

commitment.³⁶ To that point, Mr. Kingsbury added that many members of the military have become entangled in corruption connected to illegal mining, the oil sector, contraband goods, and even narcotrafficking, which makes their commitment to the regime a question of self-interest.³⁷ Finally, Mr. Hetland observed that Hugo Chávez served in the military and that “the military has been ideologically trained to support Chavismo for a number of years,” another factor that could be contributing to their enduring loyalty to Maduro.³⁸

WITNESS PERSPECTIVES ON THE LARGER PICTURE

The committee repeatedly heard that the Government of Canada and the international community writ-large need to respect Venezuela’s right to determine its own future — what Mr. Rowswell described as “popular sovereignty”³⁹— and all witnesses were resolutely opposed to a military intervention that could lead to a tremendous loss of life and, potentially, a civil war. At the same time, the committee was told that the primary alternative to an intervention, namely the imposition of additional or tighter sanctions, risks exacerbating an increasingly dire humanitarian situation within Venezuela by further reducing access to food and medicine that are already in short supply. Mr. Hetland even noted that Francisco Rodríguez, a leading Venezuelan economist, has warned that recent oil sanctions by the U.S. government could lead to a “famine.”⁴⁰

In short, the witnesses did not suggest there was an obvious or near-term solution to the crisis that has beset Venezuela, but did offer some recommendations for the committee’s consideration. Mr. Hetland, for example, suggested Canada could play a constructive role in bringing the Lima Group and the ICG together,⁴¹ while Mr. Camilleri suggested that Canada could counsel the U.S. government against escalating the conflict in unproductive ways.⁴²

³⁶AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 27 2019. (Sébastien Dubé, Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad del Norte - Barranquilla, Colombia.)

³⁷ Senate, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Donald Kingsbury, Lecturer, University of Toronto.)

³⁸AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Gabriel Hetland, Assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany)

³⁹ AEFA. *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Ben Rowswell, President and Research Director, Canadian International Council).

⁴⁰AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Gabriel Hetland, Assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany.)

⁴¹AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Gabriel Hetland, Assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany.)

⁴²AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Michael Camilleri, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue.)

Looking ahead to an eventual post-Maduro Venezuela, the International Monetary Fund has estimated that the country could require a bailout in the order of US\$30 billion.⁴³ Mr. Rowswell warned the committee that the reconstruction process would require “extensive negotiations”⁴⁴; the Government of Canada, Mr. Grant added, has already begun those conversations. “Canada has already been engaged in dialogue with the Inter-American Development Bank, the IMF and the World Bank that plans need to be prepared, and we need to be ready to demonstrate with resources our commitment to Venezuela’s reconstruction,” he told the committee.⁴⁵

CONCLUSION

While external actors such as Canada will continue to play a role in responding to the crisis within Venezuela, the committee agrees with the view that a sustainable, peaceful and legitimate political solution to that crisis must be driven by Venezuelans themselves. At the same time, the committee believes that Canada must continue to provide humanitarian aid – both directly to Venezuelans in need and to regional states affected by the refugee crisis – and stand ready to support the country’s reconstruction in the longer term. It is not at all clear when a democratic government – or at least a transition toward it – will be realized in Venezuela. Regardless, given the prominent role that Canada has taken with its partners in calling for such an outcome, the committee is of the firm belief that Canada must be prepared to invest in the arduous work of reconstruction and reconciliation that lies ahead.

Venezuela needs the continued involvement and consideration of the Canadian government, both to address the humanitarian needs of the Venezuelan people and to assist them in their process of democratic transition. There are many compelling reasons for Canada to play such a role, including the fact that the deepening crisis inside Venezuela and the outflow of the country’s citizens has raised security concerns in the region and the spectre of instability in our shared hemisphere.

⁴³ John Paul Rathbone and Shawn Donnan, “[IMF crunches the numbers for possible Venezuela rescue](#),” *Financial Times*, 16 October 2017.

⁴⁴ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 21 2019. (Ben Rowswell, President and Research Director, Canadian International Council.)

⁴⁵ AEFA, *Evidence*, 1st Session, 42nd Parliament, Meeting, February 27 2019. (Michael Grant, Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas, Global Affairs Canada.)

LIST OF WITNESSES

February 21, 2019

Michael Camilleri, Director, Peter D. Bell Rule of Law Program, Inter-American Dialogue

Gabriel Hetland, Assistant professor of Latin American, Caribbean and Latino Studies and Sociology, University at Albany

Donald Kingsbury, Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto

Ben Rowswell, President and Research Director, Canadian International Council

February 27, 2019

Sébastien Dubé, Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Universidad del Norte - Barranquilla, Colombia

Patricia Atkinson, Head, Venezuela Task Force, South America Relations, Global Affairs Canada

Michael Grant, Assistant Deputy Minister for the Americas, Global Affairs Canada

Cheryl Urban, Director General, South America and Inter-American Affairs, Global Affairs Canada



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