

Studies of the
Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and
Biculturalism

Dynamic of
Acculturation
in the Federal
Indian Service



LIBR-01011

Michel Chevalier

and

James R. Taylor

Dynamics of Adaption
in the Federal
Public Service

PROPERTY OF
PRINCE GEORGE COUNCIL OFFICE
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION CENTRE

**Studies of the
Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and
Biculturalism**

-
- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 Kenneth D. McRae
Editor | <i>The Federal Capital: Government Institutions</i> |
| 2 John C. Johnstone | <i>Young People's Images of Canadian Society: An Opinion Survey of Canadian Youth 13 to 20 Years of Age</i> |
| 3 Gilles Lalande | <i>The Department of External Affairs and Biculturalism: Diplomatic Personnel (1945-1965) and Language Use (1964-1965)</i> |
| 4 Ramsay Cook | <i>Provincial Autonomy, Minority Rights, and the Compact Theory, 1867-1921</i> |
| 5 Marcel Trudel and
Geneviève Jain | <i>Canadian History Textbooks: A Comparative Study</i> |
| 6 Frederick W. Gibson
Editor | <i>Cabinet Formation and Bicultural Relations: Seven Case Studies</i> |
| 7 Jeremy Boissevain | <i>The Italians of Montreal: Social Adjustment in a Plural Society</i> |
| 8 Ronald L. Watts | <i>Multicultural Societies and Federalism</i> |
| 9 Michel Chevalier and
James R. Taylor | <i>Dynamics of Adaptation in the Federal Public Service</i> |

To be published

-
- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| George A. Rawlyk and
Ruth Hafter | <i>Acadian Education in Nova Scotia</i> |
| Claude-Armand Sheppard | <i>The Law of Languages in Canada</i> |

Acw

Studies of the
Royal Commission on
Bilingualism and
Biculturalism

9

Dynamics of Adaptation in the Federal Public Service

Michel Chevalier

Professor of Urbanism
Université de Montréal
Professor of Environmental Studies
York University

and

James R. Taylor

Professor of Communications
Université de Montréal

This study has been prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Although published under the auspices of the Commission, it does not necessarily express the Commission's views.

© Crown Copyrights reserved

Available by mail from
Information Canada, Ottawa,
and at the following
Information Canada bookshops:

HALIFAX
1735 Barrington Street

MONTREAL
1182 St. Catherine Street West

OTTAWA
171 Slater Street

TORONTO
221 Yonge Street

WINNIPEG
Mall Center Building, 499 Portage Avenue

VANCOUVER
657 Granville Street

or through your bookseller

Price \$1.50 (subject to change without notice)

Catalogue No. Z1-1963/1-1/9

Information Canada
Ottawa, 1971

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to express their appreciation to those who contributed to the Public Service Action Research Study of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, on which our study is based. Timothy J. Cartwright, Peter F. Lyman, Peter G. White were major participants, and Pierre E. Coulombe, Jean David, Peter C. Findlay, Donald C. MacNaught and Fred E. Walden also made substantial contributions.

M.C. and J.R.T.

Chapter I	Introduction	1
	A	The Historical Roots of the Situation under Study 2
	B	A General Systems Framework of Analysis 5
	C	A Strategy of Interest-based Planning 6
	D	Action Research 7
		Setting up the meetings 8
		The departments and agencies observed 9
		Conduct of the meetings 9
		Evaluating the results of the study 10
		Additional products of the research 11
Chapter II	Results	13
	A	The Areas of Concern 13
		Environment 13
		Recruitment 14
		Language use and translation 14
		Language training 15
	B	Departmental Courses of Action 15
		Department 1 16
		Department 2 19

Department 3	21
Department 4	24
Department 5	24
Department 6	26
Department 7	28
Department 8	31
Department 9	34
The prevailing mood: a summary of trends in the meetings	34

C Some Preliminary Conclusions 36

Chapter III Interpretation of the Results 37

A Planning for Change 37	
"Functional planning"	38
"Priority planning"	39
"Democratic planning"	41
B Governmental Structure — The Relationship between the Political and Administrative Areas of Government 43	
The implications for bilingualism and biculturalism	44
C Obstacles to Change — The Total Field of Pressures 45	
D The Public Service as a Sub-System of the Canadian System 48	
One social system—or two?	48
Two social systems	49
French Canada's reorganization of its institutions	50
A Sub-system of the English-Canadian system	51
A bicultural Public Service	52
The Public Service, the environment, the dynamics of adaptation	53
E Summary 54	

Chapter IV The Dynamics of Adaptation 57

A Types of Structural Change — Some Alternatives 57	
Redeployment	58
French-language units	61

	B	New Perspectives in Planning for Bilingualism and Biculturalism – the Inter-organization Task Force Mechanism	63
		Utilizing the task force mechanism in relation to bilingualism and biculturalism	64
		A proposed Privy Council task force	65
		Supporting strategies	66
	C	Other Programmes	68
	D	Conclusion	68
Appendix	A	A Strategy of Interest-based Planning	71
		What is interest-based planning?	71
		Organizations as interest groups	72
		The stages of interest-based planning	73
		The stages of IBP as related to the present programme	74
Appendix	B	Departmental Courses of Action	76
		Appointment of a bicultural projects officer (B.P.O.)	76
		Appointment of an executive linguist	76
		Review of printing policies	77
		Broadening of the basis of recruitment	77
		Personal recruitment efforts by senior officers	77
		Establishment of a student internship programme	77
		Changes in Public Service Commission recruitment advertising	78
		Development of sensitivity-training programmes	78
		Development of orientation programmes for Francophone recruits	78
		Institution of Ottawa-Quebec exchanges	78
		Acceleration of language-training programmes	78
		Encouragement of integral bilingualism	79
Appendix	C	Statement of the Right Hon. Lester B. Pearson Regarding Policy Respecting Bilingualism in the Public Service	80
Notes to Chapters			85

The research described here represents an attempt to study the Canadian government administrative service as an interrelated, intercommunicating system and to evaluate the capacity of the system to adapt to new demands impinging on it from the larger Canadian environment.

The reader should bear in mind both the experimental character of the research and its place in the overall research plan of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. The design of this study was influenced by the climate in which the Commission's research programme was established, a climate exemplified by the following quotation from the President of the Privy Council, the Hon. Maurice Lamontagne, in the House of Commons on June 12, 1963:

The government has already announced its intention of taking steps to ensure that the federal administration, including crown corporations, will be bilingual in character. That objective has already been set forth in the terms of reference to be given to the royal commission on bilingualism and biculturalism. However, the government does not intend to wait for the recommendations of that Commission before taking concrete steps in that field. We are now preparing a comprehensive plan, to be put into force by stages as soon as it is completed. . . . A special cabinet committee has already been formed to prepare that comprehensive plan as well as the necessary reforms in government organization.¹

The government thus served notice that the Public Service would be undergoing continuous change during the projected period of research. The Commission therefore approved as part of its total research plan a modest programme aimed at evaluating the *overall capacity* of the federal Public Service to become "bilingual and basically bicultural" in character. The researchers were instructed to focus not on *whether* changes were needed, nor on *how many* but rather on *how* to bring them about, and the *capacity and willingness of the Public Service itself* to effect changes.

Perhaps the first point to be understood is that the situation to be changed was deeply rooted in history, while the sense of urgency expressed by the government was of recent origin.

A. *The Historical Roots of the Situation under Study*

In 1962, the *Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization* (the *Glassco Report*) described the prevailing situation in the federal administration as it related to bilingualism:

A distinctive feature of the Canadian setting is the existence within the country of two language groups, with a long history of political union but so little intermingling that bilingualism is rare in most parts of the country. This has posed a perennial dilemma for the public service: it must serve English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians alike but has been staffed, for the greater part, with public servants trained to speak only one tongue.

... the more obstinate difficulty lies not in the local offices but at the centre of government. The language of central administration is, for the greater part, exclusively English, and the French-speaking citizen whose affairs bring him to the central offices may well experience difficulty in trying to discuss those affairs in his mother tongue. ... The need for effective service to both language groups is the essence of the problem.

... it is clear where attention might best be concentrated: in the central machinery of administration and especially among those officers responsible for the central direction of administrative services throughout the country. Being drawn, as they are and should be, from all parts of the country, in most cases these officers are apt to know only English. If the ideal is to be approached, the first step must clearly be a programme designed to make this key group progressively more bilingual. Special circumstances may require similar programmes for other central groups whose work makes a direct impact on the public, or for those who must represent Canada abroad.

... As matters now stand, appointment to the centre of federal administration seems to French-speaking Canadians to involve abandoning their language and severing their cultural roots. This sense may be dispelled if the central public service can be made more bilingual—to the point, ideally, where the two languages can be used interchangeably for internal communication. More may indeed be necessary ... to modify prevailing attitudes within the public service.²

The problem of developing and maintaining a public service in Canada which would satisfy the needs of both Francophone and Anglophone Canadians has of course existed ever since the fall of Quebec and Montreal in 1759 and 1760. The British military governors, Mason Wade reports, "were supplemented by Swiss Protestant or Huguenot secretaries ... and so the strangeness of British rule was modified for the *habitant* by the fact that it was carried on in French."³ And further: "The laws of the country were taken over and applied as they had existed under the French regime, and of necessity many Canadians found posts as clerks and assistants in the courts. In September 1761 an Englishman who was sued by a Canadian in the Quebec court had to get a copy of the charge against him translated into English. Furthermore, he was ordered to reply to it in French, for 'such was the language of the country.'"⁴

The early British leniency was an unspoken admission that a public service situated in an environment of one language but conducting its public business in another language is unlikely to function at maximum efficiency. However, the

matter of language, while basic, may only be indicative of the total problem. Wade notes: "The cherished laws, institutions and customs of the French Canadians were thus early given toleration and a chance to survive. . . . The great mass of the population, the *habitants*, were little disturbed by the change of rule."⁵ Laws, institutions, and customs connote more than language, and pose for a government service difficult problems related to culture, as we shall see.

In the years following the cession of New France, the arrival of large numbers of English-speaking immigrants began to change the demographic make-up of the country. The new immigrants naturally required a complete range of government services, and in this period the service was marked "by the cleft which separated the French-speaking and English-speaking members of the Canadian community."⁶ During the pre-Confederation period, in fact, the service was divided into two parts, one for Canada East and one for Canada West, each working in its own language, with two sets of corresponding officials, an English Canadian in the Canada West service, a French Canadian in the Canada East branch. Appointments were generally made by patronage. Thus the service, whatever its other faults, continued to mirror quite directly the existing Canadian environment.

The situation was further complicated after 1840 by the practice of moving the seat of government about between cities in Upper and Lower Canada. A distinction came to be made between the so-called "working-departments" and the patronage departments.⁷ The former were chiefly staffed by Anglophones, while the latter contained both Anglophones and Francophones. In 1864, Jean-Charles Bonenfant complained that of the 441 government employees, 249 were Anglophones and 142 were Francophones, and only 78 Francophones, compared with 213 Anglophones, were permanent employees. Furthermore, no Francophone received a salary of \$2,000 or more, while eight Anglophones did so.⁸

The effects of the social and political environment on the development of the service during these early years are easy to trace. Already the Anglophones were in an increasingly dominant position within Canadian political, social, and economic growth sectors, in both public and private life. This was particularly evident in the growing tendency for managerial positions to be held by Anglophones. The move of the government to Ottawa at Confederation merely served to reinforce this tendency; it brought about conditions of greater stability within which the service could grow uniformly, and at the same time removed the service as a whole from the immediate centres of Canadian economic and cultural life. At this time, the English-speaking commercial circles of Montreal, Quebec City, and Trois-Rivières exerted increasing influence on the development of the province of Quebec through their control of capital and of the expanding sectors of the economic life there; this resulted in an increasing anglicization of the provincial administration and of many civic bureaucracies. Apart from that, of course, Anglophones formed a significant part of the province's population.

The Civil Service Act of 1918 enshrined the "merit principle" in the Canadian Public Service, and the percentage of positions filled through patronage accordingly continued to diminish. So apparently did the role of Francophones. The papers of

the great French-Canadian leader, Ernest Lapointe, for the years leading up to the Second World War, record a persistent (and frustrating) struggle to achieve parity for French Canadians in the Service. This even included a lengthy battle to introduce bilingual telephone directories for Quebec offices of government departments, and to obtain a telephone for the office of the French assistant in the Civil Service Commission. In 1938 the Lacroix Bill revised Civil Service requirements in certain respects: in particular, it established the principle of service in local offices in the language of the majority of the people in the area. However, there is little evidence that sweeping changes ensued, and in any case the intention was to *supplement* the use of English by French where necessary, not in any sense to replace it.

About the only official recognition of this state of affairs previous to the *Glassco Report* quoted earlier is recorded in the *Report of the Royal Commission on Administrative Classification in the Public Service* of 1946 (the Gordon Commission): "It was represented to us that the number of French-speaking Canadians in administrative and other senior positions is comparatively small. This situation, which is obviously undesirable, is due in large measure to the existing system of classification and recruitment. . . ."⁹

It seems symptomatic that MacGregor Dawson's standard work, *The Canadian Government*, which appeared in 1946, contained almost no direct reference to problems of bilingualism and biculturalism; this omission was rectified in the revised edition of 1963.¹⁰

Norman Ward has summarized the overall pattern of development of a fully professional federal Public Service as it related to French Canada during the first half of this century:

It is no accident that the French-Canadian complainant correlated the decline of the French with the reform of the civil service beginning in 1918, for the expansion of the Dominion Government in the last few decades was at first characterized, as was the entire civil service after Confederation, by exclusively English-Canadian thinking. . . .

. . . in 1918, before the creation of the Civil Service Commission under the federal administration, the proportion of French-Canadian civil servants amounted to 21.5%, while in 1946 the proportion was down to 12.5%. What is worse, with respect to salaries of \$6,000 or more a year, the proportion of French Canadians fell from 25% in 1918 to 9.52% in 1946. . . .

. . . as the technical requirements of the service have grown, and as English Canadians staff most of the higher ranks, the senior departmental officers have not unnaturally sought more English Canadians to work with, and until after the Second World War, the proportion of French Canadians in the total service was dropping steadily. As recently as the war, a French-Canadian cabinet minister could find himself marooned at the head of a predominantly English-Canadian organization in which English was the only departmental language and only English-Canadian ideas influenced the formation of policy and the organization of the department itself.¹¹

The consistency in the direction of evolution of the present Service clearly indicates the effect of the social, cultural, and political ties of Canada with the United Kingdom

and the United States. In all important respects, the Canadian Public Service is based on the same model as the British and American systems (as well as many European systems). Problems of culture and language are not explicitly comprehended within that model; the view of "merit" which is enshrined therein is unsympathetic to considerations of culture. It is not entirely surprising, therefore, that those most interested in reform of the Public Service have often been among the least susceptible to pleas for cultural rights. As late as the 1960's, the Glassco Commission clearly had not broken out of the frame of reference of linguistic competence. In this respect, of course, their report appears to have spoken for the prevailing views of the English-speaking managerial group in Canada.

The development of a coherent administrative system was only achieved by imposing constraints on the influence of French-Canadian spokesmen on policy-making. Within these limits—which represented an impoverishment of relations with the French environment—it was possible to erect a Service capable of administering complex functional responsibilities, while evolving standard practices of recruitment, treatment of employees, and requirements of task-performance. As in the services of other complex modern bureaucracies in the western world, standard patterns of selecting incoming officers and stable ways of relating the service to its principal client, the government, have led to the evolution of a broad common outlook among members of the Service and a complex hierarchical web of relationships which marks the entire Service. These are exactly some of the criteria customarily employed to characterize a *system*.

B. A General Systems Framework of Analysis

The premise on which this research project was based is that the federal Public Service can be studied as a single coherent system. In our study we have assumed that (1) a system is the product of interaction among some stable set of elements, occurring over a period of time; (2) the organization of a system is a complex function of numerous levels of interrelationship among the elements; (3) the internal organization of an open system distinguishes it from its environment; (4) a dynamic system may be adaptive to disturbances in the environment; and (5) an adaptive system tends to maintain and elaborate its own structure.

In distinguishing the Public Service as a system, we do not mean that it is to be treated as a closed or complete system, in isolation from the whole Canadian environment. The fact that there is an internal systemic organization should not blind us to the important stabilizing functions resulting from the system's relationships to some environment;¹² the system is a part or component of a larger system, within which it in turn *functions as a sub-system*, and to which it is integrated to a greater or lesser degree.¹³ The Public Service should be seen as a sub-system of a larger system—Canadian society as a whole; much of our analysis begins from this perspective. The analysis has been broken down into three parts: (1) one section in which only the internal dynamics of the administrative service are considered; (2) one transitional section in which the evidence is reconsidered in the light of what

has been discovered concerning the total field of environmental pressures on the Public Service; and (3) finally, a section in which the role of the Public Service is evaluated as a factor in the larger Canadian pattern of events and an attempt is made to relate the evidence of the study to the larger historical and structural realities of the Canadian polity.

The adoption of a general systems framework of analysis is, of course, only preliminary to a discussion of the actual research programmes. The planning/research strategy which we selected was an outgrowth of some recent re-evaluations of the nature of bureaucratic institutions and in particular the long-neglected area of the role of interest-group formation in those bureaucracies.¹⁴

C. A Strategy of Interest-based Planning¹⁵

In general, problems tend to be dealt with by the Public Service as functional responsibilities. Departmental lines thus determine how problems are broken down and attacked. However, there is increasingly a class of problems—such as those connected with bilingualism and biculturalism—requiring co-ordinated effort by several departments.¹⁶ Attempts to deal with such problems sometimes reveal very clearly the difficulty of co-ordinating departmental responsibilities.

Recently, approaches to problem solving which were implicit have begun to be formalized. Interest-based planning is a strategy designed to aggregate choices and commitments by organized and unorganized interest groups for the solution of problems. Desirable policy is developed from what is, or can be made, acceptable, given the nature of the interest involved and the nature of the relationships existing among them. The role of the planner is to develop an overall perspective of the problem and to establish through collaboration with the interest groups an incremental (or step-by-step) approach to problem solving. The essence of interest-based planning is the progressive linking of the interests through the discovery of common or complementary goals among the interests involved.

For the purposes of this study, the interest-based approach has two main advantages. First, it is consistent with the concept of system as developed here, and, second, it leads to the development of a clear research strategy.

Because an interest-based planning approach requires an incremental, multi-interest action base, it necessitated the encouragement of direct participation in planning for future change by public servants themselves, principally participation by senior officers. Depending on the readiness of administrators to follow through, we hoped to set in motion a multi-centred, long-term planning process. This process would in turn allow us to observe at close hand, over a period of time, the internal dynamics of the Public Service. If the highest level of Public Service decision-makers agreed to the plan in principle, its initiation and subsequent progress would be easier. Thus, theoretical and practical considerations pointed in the same direction.

Accordingly, overtures were made to the Interdepartmental Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, which had been established specifically to advise the government on its policy development in this area. We originally envisaged that the

Committee would initiate its own research programme into the problems of adaptation, with the Commission team acting as advisers and observers. A committee made up of public servants and our group would then evaluate the results jointly. The principal advantage of such a course would be to provide a long-term mechanism to support change after the research phase was completed.

Initially, we forwarded proposals for two pilot programmes to the Committee for their consideration. We suggested the formation of a bicultural institute, devoted to developing greater knowledge and understanding of the problem. Our second proposal was a series of experimental language-training projects. For reasons of its own, however, the Committee declined to participate.¹⁷

An alternative approach was then developed, still following the lines of interest-based planning. A basic requirement of the type of research envisaged was to observe as fully and over as long a period as possible the internal planning processes of a large sample of government departments—their response to the pressures for greater bilingualism and biculturalism (implied by official government pronouncements, the publicity given the Royal Commission, and apparent widespread concern over the problem in the country at large). Close-range observation of this kind required the co-operation of those observed, as well as something to observe! Lacking the assistance of the Inter-departmental Committee, we decided to approach a number of individual departments directly to request their co-operation and to offer the services of some of the Commission staff in formulating policy alternatives which they might consider. The first aim of this approach was to initiate a commitment to action on the planning level by department heads; the second was to have researchers accepted as participant-observers to that process.

It also appeared possible that parallel planning steps initiated by several departments could have a “snowball” effect: the researchers might incidentally serve a liaison function between departments. At the same time, departmental activity on a large scale would command the attention of such central bodies as the Civil Service Commission and the Treasury Board. As far as possible, the researchers would also encourage the development of progressive incremental linkages among departments, and the emergence of programmes of action which had inter-departmental support.

To summarize, the central aim of the interest-based planning programme was to study the actual policy-making processes and operations of the administration of government departments insofar as they concerned bilingualism and biculturalism during a period of adaptation, by deliberately fostering an atmosphere of change and, finally, to draw conclusions concerning the ultimate capacity for adaptation of the existing organizational structure.

D. Action Research

Policy-making and operations of administration in a real-life situation are a complex web of social processes; they are not simply a function of the abstract configurations of roles and statuses contained in organization charts, nor of the sum of individual attitudes and behaviour. Looking directly at the processes of human interaction which occur in a

social setting such as the Public Service makes demands of a particular kind on the researcher.

There is a special technique in studying the informal organization of a factory. . . . In the first place, it must be remembered that no amount of study of individual people will be likely to give much information; *the unit of observation is the social relationship rather than the individual*. . . . The behaviour and opinions of the members as isolated individuals may be different from their behaviour and opinions when they come to be integrated into a group. . . . This is a fundamental axiom of social psychology.¹⁸

The method which appeared appropriate to this purpose, one which was consistent with the considerations imposed by the choice of the interest-based planning strategy, was a type of "Action Research."¹⁹ The idea for this technique was originally developed in one particular field of social psychology:

Partly in response to the challenge of dealing with complex heterogeneous groups, and partly to transcend this artificial dichotomy of "two types" of social scientist, there has developed a new field in social psychology . . . appropriately designated as Action Research. Action Research simply is the application of scientific procedures to real social problems. More specifically, it concerns itself not merely with discovering the causes of these problems but also with finding the means for dealing with them and applying these means as the most effective method of bringing about change.²⁰

Some form of this research approach appeared to be most appropriate to the present project, though the hazards were also known:

The research program of the action researcher set up within the framework of a group desiring significant social action must be guided closely by the needs and interests of the group in order to bring about this change. Thus from the moment he enters the community the action researcher must focus his attention upon what the community regards as significant. His role in the community is a subordinate one.²¹

The danger of this approach is that research will become the slave of action, specifically that as the observer becomes more involved in the process, his research judgement will become increasingly suspect. We hope that we have avoided or minimized these hazards, by basing conclusions only on behavioural data.

1. Setting up the meetings

We first spoke to the deputy minister of each department with which we intended to deal, and tried to get some idea of what his department had done to date in the field of bilingualism and biculturalism, and its future plans and priorities; we asked each deputy minister if he would agree to a discussion meeting of the senior officials of his department. Full confidentiality as to the specific content of discussions in the proposed meetings was assured.

From these unstructured interviews we could judge whether departmental attitudes would permit the project. On the whole, the Action Research plan was apparently received favourably, although there were many delays. The members of the research team

had the impression that there was considerable anxiety about the situation among senior people in the departments, but of an unfocussed kind. There was some concern expressed that the Commission might be pressured into radical, "half-baked" recommendations which might do more harm than good. Some said they appreciated the kind of approach outlined by the researchers, and one Francophone deputy minister told researchers that one of the main benefits of the approach from his point of view was the opportunity for him to find out about the attitudes of senior officials without having to ask them directly himself. A particularly striking finding was that, in most departments, these discussion groups were to be the first systematic formalized approach to planning in the area of bilingualism and biculturalism, or even to discussion of the problem.

2. The department and agencies observed

There are well over 100 federal departments and agencies in the city of Ottawa alone. Given the resources of personnel and time, not all agencies would be contacted. Criteria for selection of the sample were the following:

1. size of agency;
2. nature of its function (eg. "line," "service," or research);
3. percentage of French Canadians presently employed;
4. prestige of department (rated by informed observers);
5. centralization of operation (eg. all in Ottawa, partly in Ottawa, only head office in Ottawa);
6. representativeness of operations (extent to which English and French Canadians were served as determined by geographic extent of operations);
7. existence of overseas operations (included in sample were four departments with overseas responsibilities);
8. role of French Canadians in senior administration;
9. date of department's establishment;
10. a category termed "power" of department which was based on evaluations of (a) the centrality of the department in the government's total operations, and (b) the apparent personal power of senior officials in the "establishment" of departments.

During the summer of 1965, 12 departments or agencies were approached.²² In November, three more were added.²³ The sample actually chosen was broadly representative of the ten dimensions outlined above.

3. Conduct of the meetings

Relations with no two departments evolved in exactly the same way: in some cases there were numerous meetings, interviews, discussions, telephone conversations, and correspondence over a period of many months; in others the contacts were brief.

In each case, the first meeting was largely unstructured, consisting of an explanation of why the Commission team was there and what it expected of the officials. Certain

discussion techniques were tried out at the early meetings. For example, a set of four "images" describing two stereotyped English attitudes and two French was prepared for discussion. After trials in two or three departments, however, this technique was found unnecessary, since "images" became apparent of their own accord in the departmental setting, without additional stimulation. The original concern had been to arouse interest; it very rapidly became how to keep the discussion focussed on realizable goals.

If possible, the first meeting with a department was adjourned with some sort of agreement that one or two lines of thought showed enough promise to warrant a second meeting. Position papers were prepared for consideration at future meetings. Every effort was made to sustain the impetus and keep the department's attention focussed on the problem.

It soon became apparent that the various departments had different styles of planning and discussion (see Chapter III), which naturally affected the course of each meeting. In addition, the group-discussion technique presented special problems of role definition for the researchers. Generally, two of them attended each meeting, one as a participant in the discussion, the other as observer. The necessity of maintaining a balance between research aims and action aims was uppermost in the minds of the researchers.²⁴

The project continued over a span of slightly more than ten months, from late June, 1965 until early May, 1966. More than 150 contacts, interviews, discussion groups, and other sessions were recorded where the team members sat in as observers.

4. Evaluating the results of the study

Two types of data were generated by the research study. The first consists of reports of the meetings as recorded by the observers. It would be tempting to base conclusions on these reports, since they provide a rich source of information about how this large group of public servants first perceived the nature of the challenge, how they identified and evaluated their departmental interests in relation to that challenge, and how they proceeded in a decision-making situation. Unfortunately, the nature of the relationship between the Commission researchers and public servants precluded the verbatim recording or subsequent publication of proceedings. The observer took notes throughout each meeting and at the conclusion immediately recorded as much as he could recall of all discussion. Since meetings frequently lasted several hours, obviously a very great deal was lost.

In any case, the primary purpose of these reports was to assist in the planning process; members of the project team were able to make evaluations of departmental interests and perceptions, and thus could develop further initiatives to help maintain the impetus of the planning processes in the departments. A general description of themes which emerged during these meetings will be found in Chapter II. This description includes a number of quotes from observers' notes and reflects something of the range of opinions expressed in the meetings. The reports of the meetings have been used in the section of Chapter III dealing with planning styles, which is based on a detailed analysis of the reports conducted under the supervision of one of the authors.

A careful examination of the discussion reports failed to disclose any clear relationship between the attitudes or opinions about the problem expressed by officials (either within

the discussion setting or privately to members of the research group) and subsequent activities within the departments. As we will show later, an analysis of planning styles proves to be a better (but not entirely reliable) indicator.

The second form of data—the one which is used more fully in this study—consists of accounts of the activities undertaken by departments after our initial contact with them. A simple five-category classification scheme was developed and reports of meetings became raw data for the coding. A simplified time-series analysis was employed.

The principal advantage of basing conclusions on the more restricted data source was that the results of the study are set within a behavioural context; we did not use reports of the content of discussions as a primary source of support for the interpretative sections of this study.

The study may be thought of as a series of “field experiments.” At the time of the project, the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism were receiving a great deal of attention in the mass media and in the House of Commons. The activities of the Royal Commission had been widely reported. Many public servants had personal experience with the problem. There was widespread concern in Ottawa about bilingualism and biculturalism; this concern was obvious in the initial conversations of researchers with officials. At the same time, there seemed to be little specific planning activity, apart from usual practice. However, in several of the agencies with which the research group was in touch over the ten-month period, very considerable departmental activity occurred and was directly observed. In this sense, the approach of the Royal Commission staff served as an effective stimulus. The best explanation for the very positive response was that most senior officials were truly concerned about the problem, were prepared to try to do something about it, and regarded the approach of the Commission staff as a good starting-point for adaptation.

Following the initial impetus, the project remained in existence long enough for senior administrators to receive feedback to their primary initiatives. The exact nature of the feedback received by each individual official could not be ascertained, but subsequent behaviour could be observed. The consistency of the long-term response was great enough to encourage a more general interpretation, which makes up the latter part of this study.

5. Additional products of the research

One of the byproducts of the discussion process was the isolation of a number of possible detailed courses of action which, if given executive approval, might do something towards resolution of the problem at the practical level. These courses of action are listed in Chapter II and reported in greater detail in Appendix II. Some of them were effected at the departmental level and were to some degree operationally tested. Most have been merely discussed, but many merit further consideration. To the general reader, they offer an indication of the kind of programme which Public Service administrators were prepared to consider as a step towards the solution of the general problem.

The study was done in 1965-6. Much has happened since then; perhaps the research programme contributed to the changes in the situation. The political climate has evolved in many ways during this period. The reader will have to judge for himself whether such changes are likely to have fundamentally altered the situation to the point where

different results would now be obtained if the study were to be replicated. In a later chapter, in an attempt to throw light on that question, we will consider some of the permanent structural realities of Canadian life which should be considered before arriving at a final judgement concerning the interpretation to be given to the results of this study. We will try to consider the system of the Public Service, in turn, as an element (or sub-system) of the greater systems of Canada and of North America in general. Every interpretation of observed phenomena remains open to question; the one presented here appears to us to be the most consistent with the evidence obtained. It remains, however, an interpretation and should be so evaluated.

A. The Areas of Concern

The topics of discussion at meetings with the departments fell within four broad problem areas:¹ environment, recruitment, translation and language use, and language training. Most departments discussed all these areas, though they concentrated their attention on one particular concern at a time. The quotations in this chapter reflect some of the opinions which were expressed.

1. Environment

The question of the overall socio-political environment in which agencies of government function may seem to have been too broad or vague a subject for individual departments to broach in their discussion of bilingualism and biculturalism. Nevertheless, most raised it as a matter of great importance. The problem was brought up in several ways, but all groups mentioned the unfortunate effects of the Capital environment on recruitment and retention of personnel because of the general unattractiveness of Ottawa for Francophones. As one discussion group put it, "... there is always the problem of enticing people to move away from what they consider to be interesting centres to a dull one."² Francophones in the groups commented on the lack of educational facilities for their children.

The atmosphere of the departments themselves was cited. Interest was expressed in sensitivity-training and orientation programmes for employees as a means of exposing public servants to each other's points of view and language. One person felt "... that the changing English attitude toward French Canadians is both essential and encouraging. On the other hand, French Canadians must not expect that even in two decades will the Public Service be bilingual ... but [it] must be prepared to accept French unilingualism as well as English unilingualism."

The weak representation of high-ranking Francophone officials in the overall departmental picture was noted: "The crucial problem in the federal government Service

is to attract French Canadians at a young age . . . the future senior personnel will be drawn from those who work up through the Public Service after being hired at a young age."

2. Recruitment

Most federal departments and agencies agreed that recruitment of good personnel of either language group raises a particularly serious problem, and that the added difficulty of attracting *competent* Francophone personnel effectively presents a further complication. "He was willing to hire top-flight French Canadians at salary levels above what they could expect from their ability alone. This, he felt, was necessary in light of the present situation."

The members of the discussion groups felt that their departments had insufficient contacts among prospective high-level Francophone candidates, yet as senior officers they were unable to spare the time to work at personnel recruitment themselves. Furthermore, they considered it very difficult to attract top-level officials away from other industries, universities, or provincial governments. "In the short run, the French Canadian economist is needed more in Quebec City. Is it therefore ethical to entice good French Canadians to the federal government, when they are needed so badly in Quebec?"

The question of standards was raised as an important issue as well: "... he was convinced that French Canadians can make a contribution, but to recruit them, the dilemma remains of how to reconcile merit with bilingual ability. Lowering (for example) scientific standards to acquire French Canadians is just not acceptable." And, "What is more important is to prevent any English Canadian backlash. This backlash will arise if preferential treatment is given to any French Canadian whose qualities do not warrant it; that is, if he is promoted because he is a French Canadian and not because he is capable of fulfilling the duties required of him."

3. Language use and translation

Much of the discussion in each of the departments dealt with these two closely related questions.

a) Language Use: A bilingual department in which either language could be used would present problems: "... they were convinced that the technical nature of their work made the limits of feasible action very narrow. English is the language of science. Scientific expertise is taught and learned in English." Or, "... most documents have to be available to interdepartmental as well as internal (departmental) consideration, which would be unilingual, that is, English." "They had not seen a French document sent to Cabinet in twenty-five years." In fact, one person wondered "... frankly, how many areas are there in a department where someone can originate his reports in French without feeling eccentric?" "The basic problem is that the system is not geared for bilingualism."

Yet, despite the objections to internal changes in this sphere, most realized at the same time that service to the public in English only can affect the Public Service image in Quebec and other French-speaking areas. "The main problem is one of poor communication between this department and its public." Recruitment was also seen as being

affected: "... the department was facing the problem of having to change its image to attract and hold French Canadians."

b) Translation: Departments tried to establish which of their documents for public consumption should be translated. "... It is a simple fact of life that articles written in a language other than English do not attain the readership they deserve." "As for publications destined for broad public consumption, the low government salaries to translators mean very poor translations."

Cost is a big factor: "The extra cost and delay in preparation of publications in both languages in technical subjects, for example, is not warranted by the demand. This is particularly true if the English version is released prior to the French. Most of the people who are technically capable of making use of it would sooner buy the English edition than wait for the French, particularly if the lag in translation would make it out of date. And when the issue in a department is one of allocating scarce resources between research and translation, research will take priority."

4. Language training

Discussions of language use led naturally to questions of language training, which appeared to sustain more interest than any other topic. If enough people cannot be recruited to provide bilingual capacity in a department, the second most effective policy is to retrain the existing staff. Reactions to language-training experiences, particularly with regard to the government training programme, were recorded: "... at the moment, most department officials feel that learning French is like taking medicine, and the value in cultural enrichment is not appreciable." Others said that "... we are prepared to take the total immersion course, whatever the effect on our careers." Yet another "... is now taking French one-half days and in doing so feels he is putting his career in jeopardy because he will be expected to function as usual in his department." "The real problem is whether English Canadians at middle age can learn French."

The long-range outlook was by far the most common: "We must arrange for language training for younger employees who will gradually infiltrate the departments and change the character of the Public Service."

The organization of the government courses, selection of students, and follow-up as they now stood were criticized as leading to "frustration and disappointment." The training methodology was discussed in terms of how departmental needs were being met in both language usage and time spent on training.

B. Departmental Courses of Action³

Each department made judgements about the relative importance of these four problem areas and the best solutions within their respective organizations. In some cases problems were identified but no action followed. In others, various mechanisms were introduced to continue the process of evaluation and solution and to try to fit bilingualism and biculturalism into overall departmental planning.

Some of the programmes which were developed have been tested in operational settings. Most of them have never gone beyond the idea stage, and some may indeed not be feasible. The first two suggestions listed below, and described more fully in Appendix B, consist of hiring new personnel or creating new positions within the departmental structure; the rest represent changes in administrative practice or departmental policy:

1. Appointment of a bicultural projects officer (B.P.O.)⁴—a full-time officer responsible for co-ordinating a department's activities in the field of bilingualism and biculturalism.
2. Appointment of an executive linguist—a supervisory position for the co-ordination of translation and language usage in general in a department.
3. Review of printing policies—concerning departmental decisions as to whether to publish official documents in French as well as English, especially if there is a higher cost per unit of the French version because of lower circulation.
4. Broadening of the basis of recruitment—expansion of criteria for selection, and the broadening of recruitment drives into hitherto untapped areas of the Quebec population in order to exploit the supply of Francophone talent to the fullest.
5. Personal recruitment efforts by senior officers—the personal involvement of senior officers in the recruitment of Francophones for top-level positions.
6. Establishment of a student internship programme—more bilingual and bicultural emphasis in this already established summer programme for students.
7. Changes in Public Service Commission recruitment advertising—development and expanded use of advertising campaigns more suited to Francophone views.
8. Development of sensitivity-training programmes—orientation sessions for employees on the differences between the two cultures.
9. Development of orientation programmes for Francophone recruits—planned initiation to the Ottawa environment.
10. Institution of Ottawa-Quebec exchanges—exchanges between federal and provincial public servants.
11. Acceleration of language-training programmes—suggestions for greater experimentation in the existing language courses, changed selection procedures, and post-course usage.
12. Encouragement of integral bilingualism—written use of both languages by departments in all official communications.

The section which follows is intended to show the stages of the project in the nine departments where maximum response was evident and contact was maintained longest. Each verbal description of the activities of a department is accompanied by a chart which illustrates the sequence of behaviour which followed the initiation of the discussion process concerning bilingualism and biculturalism in a department.

1. Department 1

In the initial meeting, officials of the department felt that a good starting point for discussion would be possible departmental goals. Primary goals, they felt, should be to strengthen their service to the Francophone public and to increase the use of the French

Department 1

Time period: 10 months

Number of contacts: 20

Summary – effective change: new officer appointed with limited power and ambiguous function

Levels of commitment
to action

Time Sequence


Stage of significant
change

Stage of
implementation of
courses of action

Stage of definition
of courses of action

Stage of specification
of objectives

Stage of outlining
general ideas, goals,
needs



► Research period begins

- Discussion meeting with senior officers

A Proposed: increase bilingual capacity
– in service to public
– in internal language use

B Proposed: – follow-up programme to supplement standard language-training
– inter-regional personnel exchanges
– encourage Quebec offices to submit reports in French
– hold cocktail parties to encourage informal contact between Anglophones and Francophones
– orientation and awareness programmes for senior officers

- Subcommittee formed to continue discussions and proceed to planning details

C Proposed: – improve language-training programmes to replace standard training and meet department's special needs
– issue manuals in both official languages

- Secretarial help, staff provided to subcommittee

D Proposed: – appoint bilingual projects officer (BPO) – recommendation and job specification forwarded to DM

E BPO position approved by DM: acting officer named and attached to committee
– linguist engaged as part time consultant

- B&B budget under consideration
– interview schedule prepared by BPO in order to define further courses of action
- Committee reluctant to proceed in view of forthcoming reorganization
- Committee disbanded, BPO left in limbo
– attempts to form new task force
– awaits new directives

- New DM appointed: new cycle of discussions begins

F Proposed: create more bilingual, bicultural environment
– recruit more Francophones (by means of more person-to-person contact)

G Proposed: advisory group to aid in recruitment of Francophones

◄ Research period ends

language within their internal operations. The following suggestions were brought forward to achieve this objective: the establishment of a follow-up language-training programme to supplement the official central programme, and exchanges of personnel between regional offices (both of these suggestions were seen as strategies to encourage the continued use of French following completion of the official language-training programme); the encouragement of employees in regional offices in Quebec to submit reports in French language; the institution of cocktail parties to develop better informal exchanges between Francophones and Anglophones in the department; and the presentation of orientation programmes for all senior executive officers of the department, in order to develop an awareness among them of the need for bilingualism and biculturalism.

This department, although undergoing a major restructuring during the research period, established a sub-committee to formulate clearly defined policy objectives. The committee included very senior officers and was instructed to come up with specific recommendations. Two areas the committee considered important at this point were improved language-training methods and the provision of departmental manuals in both languages. The deputy minister expressed his interest and emphasized the need for realistic short-term goals. The committee was given secretarial assistance and staff to carry out research and co-ordination of its activities.

Subsequently, the committee prepared a working paper which spelled out the need for a full-time person within the department to have primary responsibility for matters related to bilingualism and biculturalism. Their recommendation and job specification were forwarded to the deputy minister for his approval.

A Bilingual Projects Officer was appointed and attached to the committee. In addition, a linguistic consultant was employed on a part-time contractual basis. The committee began to formulate a budget for bilingual and bicultural projects.

The Bilingual Projects Officer wanted to begin interviews within the department in order to develop a realistic basis for policy formation, but at this point the committee became increasingly reluctant to proceed with specific courses of action, because of the pending reorganization of the department. Shortly afterwards, in fact, the committee was disbanded. A new deputy minister was appointed and the role of the Bilingual Projects Officer became ambiguous. The new deputy minister had a different set of priorities: he was convinced of the need to recruit personnel in Quebec. He was initially more concerned with the environment of Ottawa and the department, which he thought made it difficult to attract persons from Quebec. He felt there was a strong need to develop personal contacts with individuals in Quebec. A proposal was made to establish an advisory group to consider questions of recruiting procedure. Meanwhile, the Bilingual Projects Officer still lacked clear directives and was attempting to set up a new task force. "We must start all over again," he said.

Positive and negative pressures: This department rather quickly developed a response following the approach of Commission researchers. Reasons given included the nature of the department's functions, public support for the idea of a bilingual and bicultural Public Service, and the number of Francophones in the department. Some barriers they saw were the views of central organizations such as the Civil Service Commission and

the Treasury Board, potential conflicts between the goals of efficiency and those of bilingualism, fears of individuals within the department, the high costs of bilingualism, and the lack of clear government direction. The reorganization of the department was seen as a reason for shelving activities in the area of bilingualism and biculturalism. Other factors were a considerable scepticism on the part of some assistant deputy ministers and other senior officers, the preoccupation with other priorities, and fear of opposition from within the department, particularly at the lower levels.

Although this department contained a relatively high percentage of Francophones, its orientation was essentially Anglophone. The original discussions focussed in the problems of learning a second language and making Francophones feel "at home." Questions of language of schooling and working conditions, which might have reflected a stronger Francophone orientation, were not raised. The department's previous lack of concern with the bicultural question made it difficult for the committee to define the problem.

2. Department 2

In the initial meeting, this department's committee identified the problem areas as being translation, internal language use, and use of French as a language of service. To meet these needs, they felt that translators within each division of the department should supervise changes in language use; these new translators should have more complex responsibilities than those assigned to the department at that time. The committee proposed the establishment of permanent editorial boards for both languages, to supervise publications and other language-related matters. They also suggested the establishment of orientation procedures for senior executive officers, to make them fully aware of the need for bilingualism and biculturalism. Finally, they asked for a new type of language training.

In subsequent meetings, it was proposed that all publications be issued simultaneously in French and English. The committee discussed the possibilities of having an executive linguist (following up the previous discussion) and of establishing a programme of sensitivity training. It was proposed that after taking language-training courses, members of the department be required to use the second language. Very shortly after, the department sent an official to New York to explore the functions of executive linguist at the United Nations. Other officials discussed the techniques of sensitivity training with corporate executives in Montreal who had had experience with it. At this point, interest in the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism began to cool off; the deputy minister expressed the opinion that these problems were "important, but not urgent." However, the departmental committee met with officials of the Civil Service Commission to discuss policy with regard to language training and the recruitment of Francophones to the department; it was agreed that the department would undertake an experimental programme in language training, specifically tailored to its needs. Interest in recruiting Francophones was stimulated by the discovery of a team of experts in Quebec who were shortly to become available because a provincial programme was being closed down. Officials in the department made personal approaches to this group; they were unable to bring the complete working team to Ottawa, but some members of the group were recruited. At the same time, a group of Francophone students was brought to Ottawa

Department 2

Time period: 10 months

Number of contacts: 14

Summary – effective change: none

– one orientation seminar for potential student officer candidates

Levels of commitment
to action

Time Sequence

Stage of significant
changeStage of
implementation of
courses of actionStage of definition
of courses of actionStage of specification
of objectivesStage of outlining
general ideas, goals,
needs

► Research period begins

- Discussion meeting with senior officers

A Proposed: improve translation of departmental publications
 – promote more use of French in internal operations
 – develop greater capacity to serve Francophone Public in French

B Proposed: develop new type of translator position
 – create bilingual editorial boards
 – establish orientation sessions for senior executives
 – develop new types of language training

C Agreed in principle: establish “executive-linguist” post to replace translator
 – issue all publications simultaneously in both languages
 – inaugurate sensitivity-training sessions
 – develop language-training programme in order to increase use of French in department

- Department official travels to UN to investigate “executive-linguist” position

- DM meets executives from private industry in Montreal to discuss their experience with sensitivity training

- Meeting with Public Service Commission (PSC) to discuss Francophone recruitment and possibility of developing special language-training programme for department

D Department attempts to recruit entire team of specialists from Quebec
 – group of students brought to Ottawa for orientation seminar conducted by senior Francophone officers, to demonstrate attractive employment opportunities in the department

- Discussions held with linguistic consultants to explore specifics of language-training programme for department

- Further discussions with DM who is unwilling to proceed with establishment of executive-linguist position until approved by PSC

- Meeting with PSC to discuss recruitment, language-training programme: no definite outcome

◄ Research period ends

to be introduced to the department and the opportunities within it; senior Francophone officers in the department were made responsible for organizing a seminar for the students. The Civil Service Commission was reluctant to support the project.

Shortly after, officials of the department discussed with linguistic consultants the development of a language-training programme which might be suited to the needs of the department. No definite targets were established, but the department and the deputy minister continued to keep the subject of language training before them. One definite objective was the employment of a professionally skilled linguist; however, the deputy minister felt he must await the approval of the Civil Service Commission. At the point of last contact, the department and the Civil Service Commission were again discussing recruiting procedures and the development of a language-training programme—both areas of responsibility of the latter body. No definite progress had been achieved.

Positive and negative pressures: Among the factors favouring activities in the department in the realm of bilingualism and biculturalism were the interest of the deputy minister, the commitment of senior officers, and the general feeling that the department must do something towards maintaining the “unity of the country.” The forces working against a greater degree of effort were seen to be the lack of leadership in the Public Service as a whole, the fear of staff “backlash,” limited resources of money and personnel, the traditional pre-eminence of English in scientific work, the effects of centralized institutions such as the Civil Service Commission and the Treasury Board, the general concern with immediate rather than longer-term problems, the inertial effect of historical unilingualism, the lack of demand for service in French, and the absence of a clear sense of government priority.

Although the senior officials of this department showed strong leadership in encouraging the development of bilingual, bicultural policy, there was ultimately little real progress.

3. Department 3

This agency's concern with increasing its bilingual and bicultural capability never progressed beyond the stage of discussing general ideas and objectives. Officials pointed out that the functions of this department relate to the world of business and that English is the language of commerce. They maintained that Francophones in the department were always promoted in the basis of merit; there were no Francophones at the top because none were qualified, although some regional offices were headed by Francophones, and French was used in dealing with Francophones. However, because of the “national” scope of the agency's functions, English was used exclusively at the higher levels. Officials felt that they were already doing everything possible in the realm of bilingualism and biculturalism.; they pointed out that all of the department's forms were bilingual. They felt that in business one tends to lose one's ethnicity and that, in any case, efficiency has the first priority in business.

Positive and negative pressures: Although this department does business with the public and therefore deals with Francophones—factors which might be expected to encourage a positive attitude towards bilingualism—only English is used at the senior

Department 3

Time period: 7 months

Number of contacts: 6

Summary – effective change: none

– overt hostility to concept of biculturalism

Levels of commitment
to action

Time Sequence

Stage of significant
changeStage of
implementation of
courses of actionStage of definition
of courses of actionStage of specification
of objectivesStage of outlining
general ideas, goals,
needs

► Research period begins

- Discussion meeting with senior officers


A Proposed: promotion on merit and competence
 –bilingual forms for ordinary business practice
 –use of French language in some regional offices
 (These represent only goals which had already been met; no new targets were developed)

- Further meeting with senior officers (strong indications of resistance to change – “no ethnicity in business,” “Francophones lack broad experience,” etc.)

◄ Research period ends

Department 4 Time period: 10 months Number of contacts: 8

Summary – effective change: none



- Research period begins
 - Preliminary meeting with DM (who expressed skepticism about need for greater B&B)
 - Working paper submitted to some senior officers for analysis by DM; further discussion with DM
 - A Translation and percentage of Francophones in department already adequate, but language training inadequate
 - B Proposed: increased participation in PSC language-training courses
 - development of a more extensive translation policy
 - extension of summer training programme for Francophone students, which had already been successful
 - Existing personnel officer with special responsibilities for B&B assigned to investigate potential of language-training programme to follow up PSC programme
 - Meeting of this officer with BPO's from other departments: discussion very general; most are junior officers without policy-making powers
- ◄ Research period ends

levels. The department's image as a "national" concern was seen to be a barrier to Francophone recruitment; another difficulty was the need for geographic mobility. The lack of a strong policy statement from the higher levels of the Public Service reinforced the department's reluctance to come to grips with the question.

4. Department 4

In the first meeting with this department, the deputy minister showed himself to be very reluctant to take initiative within his department, arguing that the government must set policy. However, he did express interest in a working paper presented by Commission researchers and undertook to have the paper circulated among senior officers, and to solicit comments. The discussion continued on the level of generalities. The deputy minister pointed out that the department contained numerous Francophones in senior positions. Officials felt that the department had no translation problems, although they did concede that there were some problems in the area of language training. They felt that language training should be increased and should be made available to greater numbers of employees.

At this point, further discussion elicited the opinion that the existing translation policy tended to lead to inefficient use of human resources. Officials felt that a summer internship programme in which the department had participated the previous year had had useful results and it was decided that this programme should be extended.

The department had already appointed an official to be concerned specifically with bilingual, bicultural matters; his position was considerably junior to that of the Bilingual Projects Officer as envisaged by our researchers, but his functions were similar. He had been placed in the personnel operation and his responsibilities were directly related to language training. This officer met with other officers holding similar posts in other departments to exchange views. No further activity occurred within this department.

Positive and negative pressures: Senior officers of this department attributed the general lack of interest in dealing with the practical problems of bilingualism and biculturalism to several factors: the lack of government direction in the field, the heavy workload of the department and the great pressure under which it functions, the cost of bilingualism and biculturalism, the difficulty of seeing the relevance of need in an "operating" department, and the many other concerns which preoccupied senior officials.

5. Department 5

During the first meeting, officials in this department asserted that the roots of the problem of bilingualism and biculturalism were emotional rather than rational. They felt that bilingualism was uneconomic and anachronistic, particularly in domains of science, and they pointed out that English is the universal language of science and technology. Nevertheless, some specific areas of concern were identified. These included the effects of unilingualism (particularly Francophone unilingualism) on personal opportunity, and some technical problems related to the department's operations in Quebec. Department officials felt that delays in translation created further difficulties; in some cases, useful scientific information was not reaching those who were most in need of it. In the

Department 5 Time period: 7 months Number of contacts: 7

Summary – effective change: none

Levels of commitment
to action

Time Sequence


Stage of significant
change

Stage of
implementation of
courses of action

Stage of definition
of courses of action

Stage of specification
of objectives

Stage of outlining
general ideas, goals,
needs



► Research period begins

- Discussion meeting with senior officers

A Limitations: B&B is an emotional not a rational problem; English is the language of the technical world

Problem areas: "opportunity" costs for the unilingual Francophone

- provision of service to two linguistic groups in areas of technical need
- translation – small demand for French does not warrant extra costs

B Proposed: bilingual technical editor and translator positions (collaboration with other technical positions)
–bilingual information officer

C Constraints: increased staff (budget strain) caused by publication in French
–danger of lowering other standards in the interest of bilingual competence

D Proposed: formation of policy group
–executive assistance office with B&B responsibilities
–inclusion of specific B&B item in budget

- Two month interim: meetings continue

E Proposed: continue exploration of potential value of bilingual information officer position
–review general B&B policy with new minister

◄ Research period ends

discussion which followed, some reasons for not becoming excessively concerned with the problem of bilingualism were raised; officials felt that it would be difficult to conduct research in French since scientific skills are acquired in English; they also cited the small demand in French for specialized publications and the difficulty of gearing the system to bilingualism. However, there were some practical suggestions. Officials recommended the development of a group of technical editors and translators, somewhat similar to journalists specializing in scientific matters; they felt that such individuals might be expected to treat problems of translation in a more than mechanical fashion. They also suggested that technical departments co-operate with each other in dealing with translation problems. The officials discussed the high cost of an expanded programme of publication in French. They agreed that a bilingual information officer should be employed, but that such a policy should not result in lower standards of hiring. Later, they proposed to set up a policy group to consider matters related to bilingualism and biculturalism, and they discussed the possibility of employing a fulltime executive officer to be concerned with these questions. They also suggested that provision for bilingualism should be included in the departmental budget.

Ultimately, no definite action was taken in the department. At the time of last contact, the question of a special editorial officer was still under consideration. A new minister was soon to be appointed and it was expected that he would assign a higher priority to questions of bilingualism and biculturalism; further steps would depend on his views.

Positive and negative pressures: There was in this department little initial enthusiasm for bilingualism and biculturalism; when asked if they had experienced any pressures to provide expanded service in French, officials indicated that the conversations with the Commission researchers were the first impetus they could recall. Later, consideration of national unity and their duty as public servants were suggested as positive influences. Reasons for not according greater priority to questions of bilingualism were more easily found: among the negative factors mentioned were the pre-eminence of English in the world, the cost of bilingualism in relation to the limited resources of the department, the lack of demand for French, the lack of clear government policy, the absence of competent Francophones in the particular area of specialization, and the Anglophone flavour of the Ottawa environment.

In spite of these views, department officials were quite willing to discuss questions of bilingualism and biculturalism; they even carried out a limited cost-benefit type of analysis. However, the end result was the same as in other departments: no essential change in the status quo.

6. Department 6

In this department, the discussion began with more specific goal-statements than in many other departments. Officials saw the need for better specialized translation services and for supplementary language training for entire working groups, to reinforce progress made in the Public Service language school. The importance of personal contact in recruiting of Francophones was noted. Department officials felt that there should be a

Department 6


Time period: 10 months

Number of contacts: 16

Summary — effective change: executive approval of a bilingual projects officer position, but position not filled
 — language-training proposals stalled

Levels of commitment
to action

Time Sequence

Stage of significant
changeStage of
implementation of
courses of actionStage of definition
of courses of actionStage of specification
of objectivesStage of outlining
general ideas, goals,
needs

► Research period begins

- Discussion meeting with senior officers

A Proposed: better and more specialized translation
 — post-language-training programmes (working environment orientation to language training)
 — use of person-to-person techniques to recruit better Francophones
 — Privy Council officer for B&B

B Constraints: Ottawa environment makes recruiting difficult
 — artificiality of existing language-training programmes (not relevant to working life of employee)

C Proposed: orientation courses for new employees
 — “passive” language training for senior officers
 — establishment of planning committees
 — visit to UN to investigate use of specialist translators (executive linguists)
 — further consideration of sensitivity-training and orientation seminars

- Officer appointed with specific responsibility for B&B; working committee created; interviews conducted to explore B&B needs

D Recommend (to DM): creation of BPO position
 — inauguration of new type of language training

- DM approves recommendations; language-training proposal forwarded to PSC

- Discussion process enlarged to include second major division of department

- BPO job specifications developed for presentation to Treasury Board

- BPO prospectus forwarded to Treasury Board: no reply received

◄ Research period ends

Privy Council officer concerned solely with matters of bilingualism and biculturalism. In a later discussion, some officials mentioned the negative effect of the Ottawa environment on language training and Francophone recruitment. They felt that language training should be evaluated in the light of the existing environment. Orientation courses for new recruits and "passive language training" for executives were proposed. It was suggested that the department set up committees to deal with the questions of bilingualism and biculturalism. Among the ideas proposed at the next meeting were a visit to the United Nations to investigate the use of specialist translators, sensitivity-training programmes for senior officers, and seminars to discuss the effects of cultural differences.

An officer was appointed to preside over a working committee established to deal with problems of bilingualism and biculturalism. Interviews were conducted within the department to gather ideas for effective courses of action. The Bilingual Projects Officer concept was explored.

As a result of these discussions, the committee submitted two recommendations to the deputy minister: the department should have a Bilingual Projects Officer and a new type of language training which would incorporate the aims discussed earlier. This department contained two semi-autonomous divisions with quite distinct functional responsibilities. At this point, the committee was expanded to include representatives of the second wing of the department.

The deputy minister approved the committee's recommendations; the proposals concerning language training were sent to the Civil Service Commission and that concerning the Bilingual Projects Officer position was forwarded to the Treasury Board. There was further discussion of the language-training programme, but neither proposal was finalized during the period of research.

Positive and negative pressures: The leadership of this department was sympathetic to consideration of bilingual, bicultural problems, and this positive attitude was reinforced by the speeches of the Prime Minister and the chairman of the Civil Service Commission. However, other forces militated against a greater degree of bilingualism and biculturalism: the caution of central institutions such as the Civil Service Commission and the Treasury Board, the negative feeling of Francophones towards the federal government, the insufficiency of senior Francophone officers in creating an influence on the setting of policy in critical areas, the influence of the Ottawa environment, the lack of government direction, the negative feelings of Francophones within the department, the fear of Anglophone "backlash," and the necessity to allay the fears of those in the lower ranks of the Public Service.

In general, this department attacked the planning process with vigour, following initial approaches from Commission researchers. The slowness of their progress illustrates clearly some of the barriers which have to be overcome in order to develop new policy within the Public Service.

7. Department 7

The initial meeting was with an assistant deputy minister, who felt that bilingualism made little sense in a decentralized department such as his. His views were reflected in his

comment that bilingual stamps (a rather recent event in the news at the time) were "silly and uneconomical." He explained that the department had sufficient bilingual staff to deal with any problems in language which might arise. He criticized the existing language-training programme as being too non-technical to be valuable in day-to-day operations.

In further discussions, it was proposed that a glossary of technical terms relevant to the department's operations be developed, and that the existing language-training programme be reinforced by post-course training; an outside linguist was consulted about such a programme. However, the assistant deputy minister felt that participation in any kind of language-training programme was difficult because it involved too much time away from work.

A meeting was arranged between the deputy minister and the linguistic consultant. The former was impressed with the potential of a receptive language-training approach, since he felt it minimized time away from work and could be tailored to the department's needs. They discussed the details of such a programme.

Subsequently, the department began to backtrack on its earlier enthusiasm. The lack of direction in government policy and the danger of opposition from Treasury Board and the Civil Service Commission were seen as serious barriers. The department now took the position that it would be prepared to approach Treasury Board for funds to initiate a receptive language-training programme if the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism endorsed such a programme. Otherwise, they felt, the Treasury Board would simply refer the matter to the Civil Service Commission. In fact, at a later meeting, the Civil Service Commission proved to be unenthusiastic concerning deviations from the existing programme. The department became increasingly reluctant to approach Treasury Board for funds, and the matter lapsed.

Positive and negative pressures: The department's initial concern centred around the fact that its operations involved dealing with the public. Many field officers were Francophones, and others needed a receptive knowledge of French from time to time. Furthermore, relations between Francophone field officers and Anglophone administrative superiors would be facilitated if the latter could at least understand the written and verbal reports of the former. (The deputy minister of this department was himself a Francophone.) Difficulties in introducing a greater degree of bilingualism were attributed to the sprawling nature of the department's operations, the time required to learn a language, the loss of efficiency which bilingualism would entail, the dampening effect of the role of the central agencies (the Treasury Board and the Civil Service Commission), and the technical nature of the department's activities.

From the beginning, this department eschewed discussions of the larger issues of bilingualism and biculturalism in favour of a more down-to-earth, practical approach. There were, for example, no general discussions involving several senior officers, such as occurred in some other departments. In one sense, this initially seemed to be an advantage because the conversation rather quickly got down to the nuts and bolts of an actual programme. Ultimately, however, when the department lost interest in the one specific programme which had been proposed, there was little further basis for discussion and virtually nothing was achieved, in spite of the interest of the deputy minister.

Department 7


Time period: 8 months

Number of contacts: 7

Summary – effective change: none

Levels of commitment
to action

Time Sequence

Stage of significant
changeStage of
implementation of
courses of actionStage of definition
of courses of actionStage of specification
of objectivesStage of outlining
general ideas, goals,
needs

► Research period begins

● Meeting with ADM

- [A] General ideas: bilingual stamps “silly and uneconomic”
 –department has sufficient staff to take care of Francophone demands
 –present (PSC) language-training programme not suited to department’s needs (in technical areas)

- [B] Proposed: bilingual glossary of technical terms for department’s use
 –post-course language training to supplement present capability

● Consultation with linguistic specialist

- [C] Complaints about time lost from work for language training

- Meeting of DM with linguistic consultant; DM favours “receptive” or “passive” language training (to minimize time lost from work); linguist outlines necessary steps

- [D] Constraints: doubts re value of receptive language training
 –lack of government direction
 –probable opposition from PSC and Treasury Board

- [E] Proposed: formal PSC endorsement of receptive language training; then, recommendation to Treasury Board

- Meeting with PSC board re receptive language training; PSC unenthusiastic

◄ Research period ends

8. Department 8

Officials in this department seemed to feel no strong pressure to become more bilingual and bicultural. The interests of this department were oriented toward business and they pointed out English is the language used in the economic sectors. They felt that the only pressing language problems were in the area of translation (from English to French). On the other hand, they acknowledged a need for competent Francophone officers to deal with their Francophone clientele, even though they felt that the department was fortunate in its present complement of Francophone officers. It was also agreed that the atmosphere of the department was Anglophone.

In later discussions, some specific objectives were developed: officials suggested that more competent Francophones might be recruited for senior positions if salary enticements were offered; they felt that the department should have more Francophones at the policy-making level, and that it should develop a better "feel" for the concerns of French Canada. Subsequently they proposed that the best means of ensuring an adequate supply of suitable Francophone candidates for senior positions was to bring them up through the ranks of the department. A more sympathetic orientation of Anglophones to the concerns of French Canada was seen to be a further objective. Specific proposals centred around the creation of a Crown corporation to handle language training and the use of private translation agencies. Other proposals included exchanges of government officers between federal and provincial departments, the use of informal discussion groups to develop a better appreciation of the issues of bilingualism and biculturalism, and the introduction of a Bilingual Projects Officer position.

The department was in the process of developing a new orientation programme for new officers. Perhaps as a result of the discussions, some attention was given in this programme to the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism. In addition, officials decided to hire a staff-training supervisor, who could also serve as a Bilingual Projects Officer. A fulltime committee was formed to deal with questions of bilingualism and biculturalism; however, this committee proved also to have wider terms of reference and appeared to spend relatively little time dealing with these particular concerns.

Positive and negative pressures: Officials in this department saw two main reasons for becoming more interested in greater bilingualism in the operation of the department: the department was increasingly becoming involved in dealings and negotiations with Quebec, and they felt that universities in Quebec were now producing the kind of graduates who could function within the department. However, the officials also saw influences which discouraged greater bilingualism: the tremendous workload of the department, the overall dearth of qualified Francophones (as a result of earlier imperfections in the Quebec educational system), the low Ottawa salary scales which made it difficult to compete in the market for the supply of scarce well-prepared Francophones, the "Anglophone environment" of Ottawa, and the overly centralized approach to planning of the Ottawa bureaucracy.

Department 8


Time period: 4 months

Number of contacts: 4

Summary — effective change: none (committee was formed, but its courses of action were only secondarily related to B&B)

Levels of commitment
to action

Time Sequence

Stage of significant
changeStage of
implementation of
courses of actionStage of definition
of courses of actionStage of specification
of objectivesStage of outlining
general ideas, goals,
needs

► Research period begins

- Discussion meeting with senior officers

A General ideas: language of economic activities is English

- no perceived language problems in department except translation
- PS professional tradition: “too old to worry about problems of French”

B Proposed: Francophone officers to deal with Francophone clients

- better translation
- more sensitivity to Francophone needs in Anglophone environment of department

C Proposed: salary incentives to Francophones to aid recruitment

- more Francophone influence at policy-making level
- development of a “feel” for French Canada

D Proposed: development programme to promote Francophones from within

- orientation programmes for Anglophones
- creation of Crown corporations to improve language-training programmes
- use of private translation agencies
- exchanges of federal and provincial officers
- informal discussion groups
- establishment of BPO position

- Department policy document in drafting phase includes reference to B&B priorities


E Proposed: B&B responsibilities to be included in duties of proposed new training officer position

- Permanent committee formed to include study of B&B problems

◄ Research period ends

Department 9 Time period: 10 months Number of contacts: 7

Summary – effective change: none



- Research period begins
- Discussion meeting with senior officers
- [A] Proposed: more adequate recruitment of Francophone officers
 - better integration of Francophone officers into Anglophone environment
 - scientific planning process to study B&B programmes
 - language training should be directed at young officers
- [B] Constraints: previous frustration by Treasury Board of attempts to develop language-training programme
 - danger of “tokenism” in recruitment of Francophones, unrelated to department’s needs
- [C] Proposed: department to take more active part in recruitment than previously
 - creation of permanent position with B&B responsibility
 - co-operation with private organizations in Quebec to develop recruitment of highly qualified Francophones
 - services to be adapted to “special” needs of Quebec
- [D] Constraints: appointments (e.g. BPO) cannot be made without government leadership
- ◄ Research period ends

9. Department 9

Officials of this department acknowledged immediately that they were having great difficulty recruiting Francophones and integrating them into the Anglophone environment once they had been recruited. The deputy minister was in favour of a more scientific approach to planning in the area of bilingualism and biculturalism. Officials felt that language training should be concentrated on younger members of the department, and they expressed irritation about the negative attitude of the Treasury Board towards an earlier attempt by the department to set up its own language-training programme.

The department had decided views on recruiting. Hiring Francophones simply to have them on staff was seen to be an unfortunate approach; they should be hired on the basis of need. Department officials also wished to handle their own recruiting; they found the normal approaches inadequate, and they felt that a specialized approach could result in an increase in the department's ability to conduct its business in both languages. They expressed interest in the notion of a permanent position similar to that of the Bilingual Projects Officer. They also showed interest in recruiting in areas not normally tapped by the Public Service.

Upon reflection, officials of the department took the view that the notion of a Bilingual Projects Officer should be shelved until the position of the government became clear. Discussion continued concerning means to improve the department's service to Quebec. They felt that, at the time, Quebec was getting similar treatment to the rest of the country, but they were aware that "Quebec does operate differently."

Positive and negative pressures: The officials took the view from the beginning that the department has a responsibility to serve both the Anglophone and the Francophone communities, and they were concerned with its deficiencies in dealing with the latter. They also indicated that the department was responsive to indications on the part of the government that the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism were to be taken seriously within the Public Service (particularly the statement of the Prime Minister). Against this, they saw discouraging forces: the previous lack of a clear government direction, the disrupting effect of language-training programmes, the influence of the Treasury Board, Francophone dislike of the atmosphere of the department, and the diversified needs of the country within which perspective the particular needs of Quebec represented one of a large set of particular needs.

10. The prevailing mood: a summary of trends in the meetings

The researchers observed an initial openness to change in department discussions. Ideas seemed to flow freely and most participants seemed to be willing to think about problems in a fresh way. For example, "He considers it essential that the federal Public Service be bilingual and would like to see the government establish high priority on bilingualism. He sees a five- to ten-year solution." "He said that there had been some considerable discussion of the whole problem as a result of our visit and that the general conclusion had been one of 'give us the tools and we will do the job.' He emphasized the universal irritation at the piecemeal efforts that were presently thought to be the only way of

attacking the problem. He said that the department would give serious consideration to including in their October estimates an item for bilingualism."

But as the departments began to look into the questions more closely, they became less and less enthusiastic about taking bold steps, and actual programmes of action seemed slow to develop. A number of reasons were given for this increasing caution.

Although they expressed concern and set up certain planning mechanisms, officials seemed to place a lower priority on bilingualism and biculturalism than on current departmental activities, such as the 1965 reorganization and day-to-day government business. "The department could not make any changes that would impair its operational criteria of competence and efficiency"; "he agreed that discussions about bilingualism and biculturalism would take up the valuable time of the department, but that as part of government policy the question must be given some degree of priority"; "... he did not believe that the department could attack the bilingual and bicultural problem in a grandiose manner. What is needed are solutions that are short-run, cheap and practical"; "... when efforts were made to introduce bicultural changes at the same time as reorganization changes, the department was advised by its consultants that this could only be done at the cost of delaying the reorganization. Rather than do this they decided to keep the problem separate"; "daily problems always seem to over-ride the long-range ones such as bilingualism and biculturalism."

Follow-up on the suggestions from the initial meetings was haphazard and little real activity was evident. There was some feeling expressed at this stage that the bilingual and bicultural adjustment should not be forced, but must be voluntary: "a policy statement might create a backlash. It might hit the morale of the employees ... a statement to the lower levels would be a fairly innocuous one dealing with language training and the value of learning French"; "... maybe the muddling-through method was inefficient, but it was action in the right direction and the mistakes would not be without lessons for the future"; "... I am not in favour of a permanent bilingual committee (in the department) and will not be the source of imposition for bilingualism. Any efforts in this direction must be voluntary and not forced"; "I am in favour of acting on developments as they come up, rather than creating new problems."

Some departments were extremely reluctant to approach central agencies such as the Treasury Board and the Civil Service Commission for reclassification or appointments of special bilingual programme officers: "... the central aspect of the problem was the unwillingness to act on the part of the central control agencies. This lack of co-operation ... has had a strong demoralizing effect ... [and] has led many officials to feel that any further concern with the problem is not justified." "[A deputy minister] found that all his proposals were thwarted on the initiative of the Interdepartmental Committee on bilingualism ... presumably until the expert recommendations of the [Royal] Commission were made."

Certain officials felt there was nothing they could do until the government provided the direction: "... the fundamental difficulty in furthering bilingualism [is] the lack of clear direction from the government"; "a general feeling [exists] that a strong government policy statement is needed to activate any improvement measures in the department"; "if government policy is to expand into providing new services in a certain new area, then the

public servant is, and must be, prepared to implement it; but he will expect additional money and resources to be put at his disposal. He cannot be expected to willingly jeopardize his chief responsibility for providing certain services at certain times to the public in order to achieve other extraneous goals"; "since he feels he is not responsible for establishing policy on bilingualism and biculturalism, he will only act in a large way when a policy comes from above"; "he wanted to go for broke, if only the government was willing."

C. Some Preliminary Conclusions

The evidence is unequivocal: even in departments where there were initial indications of high motivation, no sustained drive was evident. Many steps were initiated but, after a period of activity, the tendency was to drift back toward the status quo.

Assuming that the nine departments shown here were representative of the Public Service in Ottawa as a whole,⁵ the conclusion seems inescapable that, during the period of observation, the Public Service was not moving in the direction of bilingualism and biculturalism.

Secondly, the evidence demonstrates clearly that the total environmental pressure—taking into account both the posture of the government and other societal pressures—was not likely to encourage the Public Service to undertake the necessary steps to become bilingual and bicultural. While there were references to the Prime Minister's policy statement in 1963, on the whole there was very little evidence of consciousness of strong government direction at that time, and in fact there were complaints of lack of government leadership.

The central control agencies—the Civil Service Commission and the Treasury Board—were identified as sources of obstruction rather than points of support, and while one may suspect some "scapegoating," the absence of positive stimuli from these agencies is significant. Public Service norms such as efficiency and professionalism were identified as conflicting with bilingual and bicultural priorities, and complaints about budgetary strait jackets were adduced as reasons for hesitating to proceed with reforms.

Rather than being supported by pressure from Quebec to plan changes, it seemed that strong effort was required to persuade French Canadians even to consider coming to work in the Public Service. Although in some departments there was evidence of demands for services in French, generally speaking, far from being subjected to daily pressure from French Canada for major changes, public servants often sensed a wall of indifference.

The greatest single positive pressure towards change was, apparently, a moral one represented by the feeling that the Public Service had a duty to do something to help national unity. Where these feelings were present, they appeared to reflect certain currents of thought in English Canada rather than French Canada. We do not intend to minimize the importance of moral pressure, but it appeared mainly to result in a willingness to sit down to talk over the situation, and to *begin* to think of ways to resolve certain problems. In the absence of other positive reinforcements, such feelings were ineffectual in carrying through major changes.

It seems clear that, under existing circumstances, there were no major changes occurring, and that environmental influences from English and French Canada did not encourage change.

In this chapter we will attempt to interpret the reasons for the consistency of departmental response reported in the last chapter. We must ask why so few developments actually occurred in departments, and why the initial planning impetus was not sustained in spite of the generally positive attitude expressed by the government and senior public servants toward the problem of bilingualism and biculturalism.

There appear to be three possible levels of explanation for the lack of major change which, despite interest in the problem, was evident during the period of research. These include the effect of internal planning and administrative processes of the Public Service; the nature of relations between the executive realm of government and the administrative; and the total effect of the integration of the Public Service in Canadian life, including the influence of pressures from that overall environment on the day-to-day functioning of the Public Service.

A. Planning for Change

Since bilingualism and biculturalism have widespread implications for departmental operations, senior officials emphasized throughout the discussions that each department would have its own way of dealing with these issues, depending on its particular functions. The question, then, is whether the manner of departmental planning may inhibit innovation. Are innovative approaches throttled by a repressive or non-responsive form of administration?

Outlined below are three approaches to planning abstracted from the record of the discussions of nine departments whose experiences were presented in the charts of the preceding chapter. They reflect the researchers' perceptions of the Public Service planning postures they encountered. Although necessarily somewhat impressionistic, they are based on extensive observation and provide some indication of what could be interpreted as bilingual and bicultural planning and action.

1. "Functional planning"

Every organization is "... deliberately constructed or reconstructed to seek specific goals."¹ In the Public Service, every department has been organized to perform specific functions which in principle it attempts to achieve with a maximum of efficiency and a minimum of resource expenditure. These purposes are important for the public servants at the administrative level, because they must assume the responsibility for the department's success or failure to attain its objectives. Generally then, this responsibility is a critical factor in every planning process, regardless of how the department plans or what it is planning for.

Five of the nine departments studied used the functional approach to planning. Functional planning to improve bilingual and bicultural conditions implies that the desirability or feasibility of any suggested course of action is considered primarily in terms of the department's operations, which in all five cases were rather technical in nature.

For example, one deputy minister was initially interested in the receptive language-training approach because he believed it would be "operationally useful." The department actually prepared a glossary of technical terms which could be used at the operational level to serve the public better. In several meetings, the idea of receptive language training was developed to the point where participants felt that a linguist should be hired to effect the programme. But the department was unwilling to confront the Civil Service Commission, or to budget for the linguist in its own estimates, so the whole idea was shelved. At that time the deputy minister confessed that "the direct value of making the department bilingual was more limited than I originally thought."

Similarly, in another department, one official remarked that the inadequacy of the present language-training programme, which he attributed to the scarcity of resources, limited its operational value in spite of the large demand for language training. When asked what could be done, this officer replied that his heavy work-load allowed him no time "to sit back and think about [such] long-range administrative problems." He did not want to get into the discussion of administrative feasibility, but only to raise ideas to forward to the deputy minister.

Functional planning was described by two deputy ministers as being *ad hoc*—that is, a problem had to "exist" before it was tackled. They tended to plan in terms of their experience; in the context of "existing" departmental conditions as they perceived them, they never saw bilingualism and biculturalism as a problem.

Along with the conception of a department's special functions and operations as ends in themselves, there was a tendency towards a hierarchical view of departmental organization. In one such department, all the meetings were chaired by the deputy minister, who directed the proceedings strictly according to an agenda he had prepared. After all the items on the agenda had been dealt with in order, he adjourned the meetings, announcing that he would draft a set of guidelines consolidating the deliberations. His outline, he wrote in a letter to the Commission, would take into account: "the existing situation in the department, the proposals that had commended consensus in the discussions, and areas where differences of opinion remained to be resolved." He then

planned to relate these guidelines to the position taken by the government. This not only illustrated how the department planned in terms of its existing operations, but also how it relied on the policy decisions coming from the higher authority of government. This same deputy minister had at one point summarily dismissed a current speech of the chairman of the Civil Service Commission on bilingual and bicultural matters by saying that the department "could only march on orders from the Prime Minister."

In two other departments, the meetings were attended by the deputy ministers' management committees—small groups of senior officers who do the planning for the departments under the guidance of the deputy ministers. One group, consisting of assistant deputy ministers and the personnel officer, decided after several months of deliberation that they should form a permanent committee to discuss the problems of bilingualism and biculturalism. Before so doing, however, these very senior officers felt it necessary to send a request to the deputy minister. They also felt that the appointment of a bilingual projects officer would have to have Cabinet approval.

All of these departments commented on the absence of government policy. There was an evident unwillingness on the part of officials "to go too far until the government gave more indication of its intentions." One deputy minister felt that if a government agency such as the Privy Council or the Treasury Board were to carry on the work of Action Research, a lot more could be gained. In another department, an executive assistant suggested that some public servants did not regard the Civil Service Commission chairman's speech as being particularly authoritative because of the lack of direction from the policy levels.

Aside from their expressed idea that authority comes from the top, officials in these departments were unwilling to work and plan outside "the system." Some offered as explanation their past experiences with the control agencies, which on occasion have thwarted their efforts with language training and recruiting. Consequently, they were reluctant to experiment or plan in any area where they might be usurping the functions of these agencies. They thought of bilingualism and biculturalism as long-range administrative problems which they preferred to leave to some other body.

In summary, the departments that plan primarily on the basis of their own functions tend to rely on the government to direct their efforts towards greater bilingualism and biculturalism. Although they are content to work within the system, they probably could subscribe to strong dictates requiring adaptation and change, as long as they carried some authoritative weight.

2. "Priority planning"

Like functional planning, priority planning must concern itself first with the operational objectives of the organization. Unlike functional planning, however, priority planning also considers a hierarchy of values and structures them into the operational framework on the basis of accepted criteria such as efficiency and desirability. For example, one official put it this way: "We must not let imaginary difficulties of administering practical solutions obscure the overall question. . . . Present unilingualism [may] serve the department very well as far as its operations are concerned, [but we must measure] this efficiency against the cohesiveness of the country."

There were clear examples of priority planning in three departments. In spite of what they felt was lack of government direction, all three thought that some progress was necessary, although it might exceed their statutory functions. They considered bilingualism and efficiency to be antithetical and thought that more emphasis therefore should first be placed on developing a Public Service-wide plan of attack, rather than dwelling on specific problems.

Having accepted this premise, one departmental discussion group embarked on an examination of the organization's operations, each participant contributing his ideas, criticisms, and comments towards the developing of an overall strategy. The planning problem, they generally conceded, was "the proper allocation of dollars, time, and resources," which subsequently led them to consider these questions: Do the resources exist? Could they be better used for another job? Can a country the size of Canada afford to use them for such and such? Since resources are limited and since the objectives of bilingualism and biculturalism are only some of the many needs of the department, priorities must be established.

If the broad basic objectives of bilingualism and biculturalism in the Public Service are accepted as government policy, then the department can, through development and experimentation, set up the means for diverting resources towards bilingual and bicultural ends. At this point, priority planning reaches an impasse: it appears that bilingualism and biculturalism do not command high government priority, and since department officials are unwilling and perhaps unauthorized by themselves to establish these priorities, the planning comes to a halt. The essential question, as one officer put it to us, "is still whether the government is prepared to pay the extra costs involved in bilingualism and biculturalism."

In one of the three departments, the deputy minister—almost as if to keep the meeting alive—asserted that bilingualism and biculturalism were "important though not urgent" priorities of the government, which in effect left the planners with one possible course of action. They could, after thorough discussion, formulate concrete proposals to be submitted to the control agencies for approval. But, in diverting resources towards bilingual and bicultural ends, the department felt that it had to rationalize the diversion in practical terms of efficiency and applicability to existing operations. After some encouragement the department confronted the Civil Service Commission with demands for a language-training programme better suited to its operational needs. They found it very difficult to influence the Civil Service Commission policy of centralized language training, since the rationale is to "make it possible to absorb people in groups much more homogeneous in respect of competence in the second language."

In the other two departments, it was felt that there was "too little consensus to make specific demands" on the Civil Service Commission and Treasury Board. Consequently, they left unresolved problems to the central agencies and awaited further developments in government policy. The reaction of one of these departments to the speech of the Civil Service Commission chairman, previously referred to, was to include bilingualism and biculturalism as one of many priorities. Unfortunately, time prevented the researchers from following through further with this particular department. It is interesting to note, however, that this department, as opposed to the five that plan in terms of their functions, regarded the speech as government policy.

Like functional planning, the priority planning style displays a tendency to "look up" to some higher authority, be it the government or the control agencies. Rather than looking for specific direction as functional planning must, however, priority planning looks for some higher authority to establish priorities and lay down guidelines for action which could then be put into operation on the departmental level.

Moreover, the participation of officers from the lower levels in the Action Research discussion groups gave the impression that priority planning tended to make greater attempts than functional planning to bring the opinions and points of view of the lower echelons into the planning process. Officials of these departments also tended to exhibit more concern than those of the "functional" departments for the needs of their clientele and national needs in general.

In the end, it appeared that the departments devoted to priority planning executed a complete circle. The officers started out by disregarding the absence of government policy. They tried to set priorities, but found that this involved basic policy-making—a role which they were unprepared to assume. If, however, a strong government stand were made, it is conceivable that the priority type of planning would, to the limit of the resources allocated for bilingualism and biculturalism, put that policy into operation. For whatever reason, these public servants did not consider that the government statements made to date permitted them to take any significant action. It is of course possible that interpretations of government policy reflected prevailing departmental attitudes as much as they reflected the views of the government.

3. *"Democratic planning"*

Because of its split responsibilities, one department afforded the opportunity of observing two conflicting planning styles in action together. Initially, the researchers were observing the planning style of only one of two branches, but at about the mid-point of the investigation the other wing of the department was brought in for the express purpose of establishing policies to cover the whole department. Because both the nature of its functions and its planning style were different, this second wing had a mediating effect on the planning already under way in the original branch.

In the first branch, the approach to planning was one in which the officials tried to ignore the constraints of the present situation and to look instead to the needs of the future. By so doing the deputy minister felt that the planners could intellectually and morally commit themselves to necessary changes without hesitation. For example, although it could not commit itself financially to immediate changes, the branch could "tool-up" an estimate of costs which ignored present-day restraints, on the assumption that these restraints would not be operative in the future. They thought of this as preparing themselves "for the time when [the branch] achieves whatever level of bilingualism and biculturalism it decides to aim for."

One officer felt that objectives would have to be set for the country as well as the branch before it could begin its planning. It was pointed out that general policy objectives had been articulated by the Interdepartmental Committee and by the Prime Minister, but that the departments themselves—through their "trial-and-error" experience and their special relations with the central agencies—could formulate their own specific objectives.

This approach seemed to satisfy those present and they subsequently went about setting up the appropriate working committee to study the problems in the branch in the hope that they could determine some specific departmental objectives. They eventually established two: "to provide internally for the attraction of French Canadian recruits and to educationally equip the senior officers to deal with bilingualism and biculturalism."

The working committee undertook a series of interviews throughout the department and began to look for ways to achieve these objectives. It was here that the planners began to feel the constraints which they had attempted to ignore in the first place. Apparently their interviews generated a somewhat negative reaction in the department, particularly among Francophone officers who were reluctant to upset the status quo and perhaps jeopardize their special roles.

At any rate, the planning process went on. Committee meetings continued to define broad departmental objectives, raising far-ranging possibilities and generally increasing the level of awareness. But, as one officer said, the emphasis was on ideas rather than action, and for the amount of time involved very little was achieved.

At this point the other wing of the department which, as one of its officials put it, "was used to having problems dumped in its lap rather than having to define them," entered the planning process. The official termed the evolutionary approach of the first wing unusual, but realized that some of the resolutions coming from the meetings involved serious administrative implications about which he saw a need for expert advice. He also felt justified in complaining about the lack of general policy direction from the government. Although he was aware that problems in dealing with a bilingual population involved more than simple matters of efficiency, he claimed to feel somewhat at a loss to conceptualize what the overall goal of the department should be. He felt that a basic departmental policy had to be hammered out before dealing with specific objectives; he suggested a small working group who would make recommendations to the deputy minister and then implement his decisions.

This officer's dilemma appeared to exemplify conflicts between attention to functional responsibilities and the desire to set the problem in a broader perspective. He felt the departmental aim should be to strive for an ideal organizational model in which there would be a unilingual Anglophone at the head with at least one bilingual Francophone at every other level. This set-up, he thought, would serve the department's operational needs and would be most practical, most efficient, and best for co-ordination.

The contrast between the "functional" and "democratic" planning styles exemplified in this department was striking. First, the functional planning appeared to operate on the principle that the employee, be he Francophone or Anglophone, should first and foremost serve the purposes of the department. Democratic planning accepted the premise that the department must give first consideration to the employee. To illustrate: as we have seen, the original departmental objectives read: "to provide internally for the attraction of French Canadian recruits and to educationally equip the senior officers to deal with bilingualism and biculturalism." After the second half of the department had been added to the process, the objectives were reformulated: "the primary need of the department in bilingualism is to be able to conduct business in the language of the local inhabitants, and a secondary need is to make the head-office environment more congenial

for French Canadians." Here the basis is operational and implies that the department itself should not be expected to adapt in any great degree to the presence of Francophones.

A second contrast was evident in the mechanics of the two planning styles. Democratic planning involved a large number of people whereas functional planning tended to rely on a much smaller group. In fact, the original meetings in the first wing were the largest of any in the whole Action Research programme.

The tendency of functional planning to look to some higher authority for direction seemed to limit thinking and ideas. In another way, the two styles complemented each other since one emphasized many of the operational obstacles that the other style ignored. On the other hand, democratic planning clearly generated more innovative responses. It was in this department that the most imaginative appreciation of the problem was achieved. It is of course open to question whether the planning style reflected group characteristics, or by itself led to different processes. Functional planning contributed to an understanding of the administrative problems of a bilingual and bicultural Public Service, while democratic planning brought to light some of the social problems experienced by Francophones working in the existing environment.

Of the three planning styles isolated here, priority planning and democratic planning appear to have responded more positively to the problem of bilingualism and biculturalism. But all three seem, for a variety of reasons, incapable of incorporating mechanisms for dealing with a problem of this sort in the planning process. As the results show, few major changes were attempted, and it would appear that the way in which departmental planning is organized at the present time may inhibit change.

B. Governmental Structure – The Relationship between the Political and Administrative Arms of Government

It was evident from the Action Research discussions that many of the departments were looking to the central agencies and government for more explicit direction before they would proceed further with their own planning. Thus, for a second possible explanation of the results in Chapter II, we turn to the role of the Interdepartmental Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

Inevitably all of us carry in our heads certain images of reality, some of which may more or less accurately reflect it, and some of which may just as successfully distort or hide it. One commonly held image of the relationship of the government bureaucracy to its "masters," the Cabinet and, ultimately, Parliament, is described something like this: "At the apex stands the minister."² Under him is his deputy minister who supervises the work of a group of officials, each of whom in turn supervises the work of another larger group of officials, and so on until "the most humble member of the department is affected."³ "Instructions and orders flow from the supreme head down through subordinates until they culminate in action at the appropriate level."⁴ Stated so rawly, such a model of government administration would no longer find many adherents among social scientists, though the image may persist in other quarters. How then may the relationship between the Cabinet and the Public Service be described?

One might begin with another image—that of a somewhat unequal partnership in which the government has the responsibility for operations in the political field, while the Public Service is responsible for co-ordinating administrative policy to accord with political requirements. On the one hand, the public servants defer to their political partners, although deference is not the same thing as obedience. On the other hand, the government consults with, and often depends on, the administrative arm for advice, support, and help in developing policy. Public servants usually do not attempt to usurp their partner's political functions; they may nevertheless be extraordinarily sensitive to the possible political implications of proposed courses of action. They thus become useful not only for the professional advice they may give ministers, but often for the depth of political judgement they may bring. Neither ministers nor deputies, when they are candid, are likely to deny this political function of deputies as advisers.

For their part, wise ministers are restrained in the advice they give to deputies in the administrative conduct of their departments. Again, consultation may be frequent, and public servants must always be conscious of the political realities which move ministers at times in relation to administrative matters. As a general principle, however, it is safe to say that our Public Service is extraordinarily free in its day-to-day operations of overt political interference.

1. The implications for bilingualism and biculturalism

A study of what the government had *said* and what it had *done* about bilingualism and biculturalism in relation to the Public Service at the time of the study supports the above analysis. Since as early as 1962, the statements of responsible government politicians, including the Prime Minister, clearly pointed to a desire for a fully bilingual Public Service. The tone of the pronouncements was, from the beginning, one of urgency, recognizing the deep-seated changes that such a policy would dictate. What the government actually did to give administrative reality to its concern was to turn the matter over to an Interdepartmental Committee of senior public servants for study.

The Committee considered the problem for a period of just under three years and then made certain recommendations to the Cabinet. Following further consultations with Civil Service staff associations, the government made these recommendations the basis of a public policy declaration, which was presented by Prime Minister Pearson in the House of Commons on April 6, 1966.⁵

Although the Interdepartmental Committee on Bilingualism and Biculturalism faced the usual constraints to action of all such committees, it was not necessarily typical in other respects. Among its members were some of the most powerful and respected of Canada's public servants. Its mandate was sweeping and urgent. Its members individually and collectively could communicate with the Cabinet and the Prime Minister on short notice. Furthermore, these men had power within their respective departments and some of them at least possessed a unique power as the senior policy advisers to the government. Yet, despite its key membership, the Committee met sporadically. It had no supporting research staff in its small secretariat. Some of its members stated that it did not even have the authority to engage supporting staff.

The Committee's investigation proceeded along traditional lines. It established operational goals which would permit it to state precise, limited objectives and proposed a centrally directed plan to meet these objectives. It also, by implication, accepted the hierarchical, functionally autonomous departmental structure as the vehicle through which its plan would be implemented. In other words, it treated the problem of bilingualism and biculturalism as a conventional problem, of moderate urgency.

In all this, the Interdepartmental Committee appears to have reflected most of the planning trends which have been described as exemplifying the individual departments, though it may have been more conservative than some.

The essential relationship of government and Public Service is well illustrated by this case. Each moves with great care in relation to the other. Such care, exemplified also in the essentially cautious approach to change illustrated by departmental approaches to planning, could be expected from the elements of a system which has high "entitativity" or "wholeness." This finding is also consistent with the expectations derived from an examination of the history of development of the Canadian Public Service, as seen in Chapter I of this study.

Another way of stating this is to say that in a highly stable, richly interconnected system, all parties are likely to be reluctant to change the status quo of relationships in any fundamental way. That is, the high degree of "systemness" contributes to inertia in the face of demands to self-generated change. However, in treating the Public Service in isolation, or merely linked to the Cabinet, as we have done, no account has been taken of the fact that governments exist in a field of pressures generated by their environment; accordingly, one may argue that the picture given is incomplete. In the next two sections, we shall attempt to discuss, first, the effect of that environment on the Public Service, as it was observed in our research and, second, the functional role of the Service relative to the overall Canadian system.

C. Obstacles to Change—The Total Field of Pressures

A further explanation for the findings of our study may lie in the total field of pressures which affect the government and, in turn, the Public Service.

In the first place, the government is itself not a completely free agent. For one thing, as we have seen, no government willingly chooses to alienate the Public Service on whose goodwill it ultimately depends for effective administration of its policies. The government is therefore bound to move with caution where the internal operations of the Service could be affected.

Secondly, the government, like the Public Service itself, is at the centre of a web of environmental pressures. The opting-out of federal programmes (and institutions) by the Province of Quebec seems to have paralleled the reluctance of individual Francophones to work for the Public Service. The pressure on government to institutionalize bilingualism and biculturalism may therefore have been of the same kind which the Public Service experienced—that is to say, a general moral commitment not strongly reinforced by direct daily demands. The threat to withdraw from a coalition is a form of pressure, it is true, but of quite a different character from the insistence on being let in, or given greater service.

In addition, even more than the Public Service, the government must balance conflicting interests and pressures. For every pressure to give special recognition to French, there appeared to have been countervailing pressures from, for example, the West, to restrict "special" favours to French Canada. Furthermore, all governments, and consequently all Cabinets, are always more or less in a state of crisis—threats to peace, to the economy, a scandal, or an impending election. A campaign to introduce bilingualism and biculturalism, which is inevitably a long-range enterprise, must take on a somewhat theoretical character in relation to these more immediate concerns. Thus, there are constraints on the government's freedom of action, even when it already appears to have committed itself fully to the principle of bilingualism and biculturalism.

The converse of the weakness of the government's position is the great institutional strength of the Public Service. There is no doubt that the Service is a coherent, smoothly functioning social system, with everything which that implies in values, traditions, and cultural strength. At the individual level, the existence of such a powerful social structure means patterned behaviour and expectations which provide stability and emotional security. At the institutional level it means the presence of well-established mechanisms (and agencies embodying them) of resolving conflicting interests within the structure.

Such a social system can be highly resistant to change; for one thing, it exemplifies a prevailing philosophy of government and behaviour with deep historico-cultural roots.

Apparently, to public servants nurtured in that tradition, the problem of bilingualism and biculturalism is at once ill-defined and threatening. It is threatening because of its potential career consequences and in this it differs radically from other problems which the government service faces. Most public servants have managed up to now without any knowledge of a second language, and for the government to intimate that further progress up the ladder of promotion may be blocked because of lack of understanding of another language is likely to strike the individual as unfair, as "changing the rules in the middle of the game." As an indication of the pervasive concern that the great publicity concerning bilingualism and biculturalism aroused among public servants at all levels of the hierarchy in the early sixties, there is the evidence of the very lively response to the introduction of centralized language training. It could be hypothesized that attempting to learn French was one way to allay fears of insecurity instigated by the image of a newly bilingual and bicultural Service. Unfortunately, if learning French was thought to be one way to reduce feelings of insecurity, the language courses proved to be a disillusionment. Reports indicate that most public servants came away without having remotely mastered the language.

Nearly every individual in the Service has, then, some stake in bilingualism and biculturalism, since government policy changes could affect his own personal career adversely.

The problem is also apparently hard to define in terms of Public Service norms. To advance ideas of "efficiency" and "merit" in defense of bilingualism and biculturalism proves not to be an easy way to justify them. It could be argued that the Public Service cannot be considered properly efficient unless it is able to service the whole country, or that in a country with two official languages, the ability to do business in both ought to be considered an element of merit. But such arguments do in fact stretch these notions

out of their ordinary context, and do not appear to be very convincing. "Getting the job done" in the Public Service seemingly is not a notion with linguistic connotations.

Government-sponsored bilingual and bicultural reforms thus are threatening to the Public Service because they imply changes in its normative structure, and because adults evidently find it hard to learn a second language. When a coherent, highly structured body such as the Public Service is threatened, it has available to it very powerful mechanisms of self-defence. Organizations have a life of their own, and often the presence of threats from outside only serves to unify them. Furthermore, in this case the Public Service is both the *object* of policy ("reforms in the Public Service") and *subject* (the agency constitutionally responsible for executing government policy). It thus has the means to influence or alter the execution of programmes which, at another level, it finds iniquitous.

The Public Service is also affected by the society around it. Many public servants have extensive dealings with opposite numbers either in the privately-owned corporate bureaucracies or public administrations of the United States and the United Kingdom, and they must to some extent find themselves, possibly unconsciously, comparing their own standards and performances with those (often larger and more powerful) institutions, or clusters of organizations. It would be surprising if the total absence of bilingualism and biculturalism in those other organizations did not make it more difficult to justify to themselves the absolute necessity of forging ahead with the implementation of the bilingual and bicultural programme. In other words, what is the public servant's image of "normal" practice in an organization?

This is related to another factor which has to do with "normalcy." To some extent, the Public Service must take its cues from its general environment and its judgement of how urgent the problem is will be affected by feedback from its society. As public servants tended to view the situation, English Canada was in part antagonistic or antipathetic to the ideal of full bilingualism and biculturalism. French Canada, which might have been expected to be the strongest advocate of reform, was preoccupied with its own attempts to construct an autonomous substitute for the federal system, and appeared to be suspicious of, if not actually hostile to, Ottawa to the point of discouraging contacts of every sort with the federal agencies. These considerations were reinforced in the minds of the senior administrators by considerations of values and ideology which further separated the two communities of English and French Canada.

Karl Mannheim, in his *Ideology and Utopia*, described what he considered to be a common tendency of the bureaucratic mind: "When faced with the play of hitherto unharnessed forces, as for example, the eruption of collective energies in a revolution, it can conceive of them only as momentary disturbances. It regards revolution as an untoward event within an otherwise ordered system and not as the living expression of fundamental social forces on which the existence, the preservation and the development of society depends."⁶ One may think Mannheim's views to be too sweeping and categorical. The following quotation from an editorial in the *Toronto Globe and Mail* (whose influence in Ottawa is well known) of August 20, 1966 seems, however, to suggest something of the same kind.

The Quebec Fervor Slackens

'Revolutions begin with infatuation and end with incredulity.' As the government of Daniel Johnson gropes its way along the path of caution and consolidation, its erstwhile intransigents seem to mirror in both word and deed the people's deepening disinterest in the once enthralling revolutionary mythology. Likewise the mandarins who but weeks ago declaimed their historic mission to lead the race to grandeur abroad have grown strangely silent. Now the masses, the backward rural masses the intellectuals used to revile, have shown by their votes that they prefer to follow less ambitious, more traditional elites. No longer do the newspapers of French Canada throb with headlines of nationalist ultimatums: they tell of burgeoning, seemingly uncontrollable demands for better wages, for better conditions of work. *The crisis of two nations is dissolving, for the average man, into a crisis of two economic classes*; the collective struggle to secure freedom for a people is turning into a series of skirmishes to secure justice for each individual. It may mean that a Quebec less obsessed with its cultural affirmation is ready to recognize its fundamental problems as those of all Canada.

Or, as one public servant remarked to the researchers: "The worst seems to be over, and French Canadians will soon be flowing back into the federal government service."

D. The Public Service as a Sub-system of the Canadian System

There is one further explanation which might account for the results presented in Chapter II. This explanation would begin by accepting the Public Service as a fully adaptive system, whose total behaviour is affected not only by the goals it is set (or sets itself) but also by its reading of how best to assure its own continued existence within the real constraints of its environment. Such an explanation would incorporate the notion of *feedback*, in the sense that some line of behaviour having been tentatively projected (perhaps through processes of discussion or preliminary experiment), the system is then guided in its subsequent behaviour by the nature of the response it receives in that part of its environment which is most able to affect it strongly (for example through control over relevant rewards and/or deprivations). The data of Chapter II could then be read as indices of cumulative "feedback." If this form of explanation is accepted provisionally, it will then have to be shown that there is something in the way the total Canadian social reality is structured—or more accurately, in the way the federal administration is structurally related to that social reality—which leads the Public Service to the (behavioural) conclusion, whatever the publicly (or even privately) expressed attitudes of individual officers, that optimal adaptation to that reality is inconsistent with any great effort towards bilingualism and biculturalism.

1. One social system – or two?

The Commission's *Preliminary Report* of 1965 in some respects had the character of a "systems analysis" of Canada: it raised the question as to whether it is more useful to consider Canada as one social system, or two; for example, the "society" of Quebec was described in this way:

"Overwhelming majority," "society," "nation": what do they mean? They are used to describe the types of organization and the institutions that a rather large population, inspired by a common culture, has created for itself or has received and which it freely manages over quite a vast territory where it lives as a homogeneous group according to common standards and rules of conduct. This population has aspirations which are its alone, and its institutions enable it to fulfill them to a greater or lesser degree. . . .

In short, the French-speaking Canadians of Quebec who appeared before us belong—and they showed that they know it—to a society which expresses itself freely in its own language, and which in various important fields is already master of its own activities, to which it gives the tone and pace it chooses.⁷

2. *Two social systems*

Considered in global terms, the social system of French Canada, in relation to that of English Canada, is outweighed in numbers nearly three to one—or more, if one considers the percentage of French Canadians who are partly assimilated into the English-Canadian community compared with the reverse.⁸ French Canadians are underrepresented proportionately in the higher echelons of the "power institutions" of the country, except in the political and other non-economic spheres of the Province of Quebec. There is no indication that the numbers of French Canadians in the country will become relatively more predominant; population forecasts suggest rather that they are more likely to be a declining proportion of the total. Furthermore, one of the effects of improved means of communication over the past generation has been to permit rapid inroads of American-English-Canadian cultural influences into French Canadian society (although, it is true, permitting extensions of French-Canadian culture into new fields of activity as well). English Canada's systemic linkages with the United States are increasingly evident, thus intensifying the already great cultural and economic pressure on French Canada.

It is not an exaggeration to say that there is a persistent long-term threat to the continued existence of French Canada as a distinct cultural entity. "When two states interact over a sufficiently prolonged period of time, perhaps centuries, they tend to behave like a single system with respect to their transactions."⁹

Whether Canada is considered as one system made up of two major sub-systems, or as two systems—which because of continued proximity and interaction tend to behave like a single system—is not crucial. More important is another proposition implied by either formulation: both systems (or sub-systems) will tend to be motivated, not necessarily at the same time, by two contradictory drives: first, to interact with each other and come to a closer integration of the two systems, and second, to pull back from the other system and redefine the boundaries, wherever they have become blurred.

The present crisis in Canada appears to have arisen from French Canada's attempt to redefine boundaries. The historical drift in Canada for some considerable time had appeared to be towards greater integration of the two systems. The traditional social system which had supported French Canada for so long exhibited diminished vigour under the pressure of altered conditions. For example, there is some indication that the rate of assimilation of French Canadians to the English system was on the upswing. The language of popular use was becoming increasingly corrupted by the infiltration of

numerous English words. The pull of American technology was potent. These indicators pointed to the relative weakening of the structure of the French-Canadian social system, or the diminishing of the bonds of organization.

The Quiet Revolution appears to have been an effort to rebuild the system, to extend and restore the social bases or foundations, in order to protect the super-structure—in other words, to *consolidate*.

Consolidation, in this context, seems to have been an evidence of the attempt of at least some elements of the French-Canadian system in Canada to adapt in the face of environmental threats. Consolidation is characterized by an intensification of patterns of interaction among elements of the social system, and withdrawal from interaction across boundaries.¹⁰ In practice, this has meant concentration on the Province of Quebec. It has meant the attempted development of stronger leadership and discouragement of indiscriminate intermingling of individuals from the two systems.

3. French Canada's reorganization of its institutions

The great sociologist, Max Weber, once wrote: "When those subject to bureaucratic control seek to escape the influence of the existing bureaucratic apparatus, this is normally possible only by creating an organization of their own which is equally subject to the pressure of bureaucratization."¹¹

A second part of Quebec's efforts at consolidation, in addition to boundary definition through the attempted withdrawal of its citizens from common activities in the social system of the country as a whole, has been the self-conscious attempt at the erection of new institutions in the economic and bureaucratic spheres—or more broadly, in the sphere of corporate institutions.

Corporate life in the twentieth century requires certain specific regularities of behaviour which are unique to it, and which have given rise to such popular typifications as "the organization man," "the man in the grey flannel suit," or the "other-directed man." The great increase in systematization exemplified by large organizations, private and public, has vastly extended man's control over his environment in this century; it has, at the same time, introduced great social changes.

Corporate life (by which we mean to include organizations such as are to be found in public service as well as private enterprises) has become so much a feature of ordinary life that it is easy to forget how recently its distinctively modern form developed. It was not the prevalent mode in Canada at the time of Confederation, for example. One of the critical facts of Canadian history is that the acceptance of modern corporate life by the two parts of Canada was out of phase, with consequences which are not even yet fully understood, though the effects are evident around us.¹²

It is true that societies such as ours cannot be simply characterized. English Canada, like French Canada, is a complex blend of tendencies, traditional and modern, but it seems nevertheless safe to say that the growth of corporate norms (North American version) occurred in English Canada considerably before it occurred in French Canada, and found a more receptive bed of inherited values in which to flourish than the traditional values of French Canada could provide.

Quebec has become more and more "modern," yet its "allure," or rhythm of development, is not the same as English Canada's. The present drive to modernization of institutions in Quebec is designed, not to effect a rapprochement, but to strengthen French Canada's resistance to assimilation. The evidence for the attempt to erect bureaucratic institutional barriers to incursions of outside influence is clear. We cannot report here on the effectiveness of this effort, nor on the limits to which this type of activity can be carried, given the realities of modern economic life. Each of the attempts is, however, an index of the French-Canadian system's "will to survive."

How does the Public Service fit into this picture?

4. *A sub-system of the English-Canadian system*

The evidence shows French Canadians to be underrepresented in numbers and power in the Public Service centred in Ottawa. French Canadians employed there work in English, and many of them are to a greater or lesser degree already assimilated into the English-Canadian system. As matters stand, it is not an exaggeration to say that the Public Service of Canada is a rather effective agent for the assimilation of individual French Canadians into the English-Canadian system.

One may think in terms of hierarchies of systems. "Each system, at any level, must be susceptible to analysis into a set of systems at the next subordinate level. . . . A system, at any level, may be characterized as having some degree of organization, that is, some degree of specialization in functions of its sub-systems. . . . The greater the degree of organization on each system level, the stronger will be the tendency toward analogy of function up and down the hierarchy."¹³

The federal Public Service is in essence a sub-system of English Canada. It is a powerful institution which contributes to the vitality of English-Canadian life, and English Canadians are justly proud of it.

Obviously, the central government service contributes to French Canada as well. Stable monetary policy benefits everyone in the country, French or English. A healthy economy is the necessary base for both systems. The problem is that the kind of contribution which the Public Service makes to French Canada is also consistent with the disappearance of its "Frenchness," and the erosion of the unique features which mark off its boundaries from English Canada. In macrocosm as well as microcosm, then, the Public Service acts as an agent of assimilation. It does not presently contribute to the vitality of French-Canadian life as such.

We suggest that a careful comparison of this systemic analysis of the society, or societies, of Canada as a whole provides a more adequate explanation of the pattern of pressures on the Public Service reported earlier in this study. Much of what occurs *within* the administration can only be properly evaluated by also taking into account events and trends which reflect the *outside* environment of the Service. This perspective is equally relevant to the consideration of the dynamics of adaptation of the Public Service.

Will, in fact, the creation of a bilingual, bicultural Public Service change the basic fact of the unequal contribution made by this Service to the two social systems? This is of course the question of greatest importance, since as long as the French-Canadian system maintains its vitality, and the federal Public Service is inimical to that system, then the

situation is permanently dysfunctional and must inevitably lead to periodic societal instability in Canada (and resentment among French Canadians).

5. *A bicultural Public Service.*

In the first place, the present Service, structured and concentrated in Ottawa, is now in composition fundamentally English Canadian and, in the future, 75 per cent or more of its personnel will under any circumstances remain so. This 75 per cent majority is drawn from a country which is already predominantly English-speaking, and likely to become more so. Further, this majority must be fully conscious that, in North America, English is the language of all the most powerful institutions which incorporate the vital development of new knowledge that sustains our technological civilization. For this majority, which inherits a complex of attitudes, motivations, and links with the larger North American reality, a Public Service career is only one of many possible careers in North America in institutions where English Canadians can work and feel "at home." Will this personnel subject itself to the rigorous process of becoming "bicultural?"

Secondly, the proportionate *effects* of the two systems on the Public Service mean that the personnel will remain overwhelmingly Anglophone and, further, that three-quarters or more of all the business of the Public Service—the contacts, requests, rewards, the total environmental stimuli—will continue to come from the Anglophone world. This will of course apply to French Canadians in the Service as well, if they are conscientious and ambitious, and if they wish to participate fully in the departments' work. For if Francophone public servants spend three-quarters or more of their time dealing with clients from English Canada, they are very much open to acculturating influences. Some agency heads explained to the researchers that they could not promote French Canadians to top positions because their experience had been limited to Quebec, and they therefore lacked the necessary "breadth."

Thirdly, it has been shown that efficient operations depend on a healthy system of primary-group relationships, which normally occur naturally as the result of human interactions on the job. "Individuals who are members of larger social structures make their decisions and concert their actions within those structures, not by the direct focus of attention on the central authority and the agents who bear the symbols of that authority, but rather by identification with some individual with whom they have primary-group relationships and who serves to transmit to them ideas from and concerning the larger structure."¹⁴

A substructure of shared perceptions, of "seeing" things in the same way, is necessary to easy communication. Studies of the American army during the Second World War¹⁵ found, for example, that the normal system of command completely breaks down only when, for one reason or another, primary groups cannot be formed. One factor which may hinder primary-group formation is a linguistic barrier, as the army studies demonstrated. Studies by E.C. Hughes in Chicago also found a relationship between immigrant linguistic groups and primary-group formation.¹⁶ Such considerations lend theoretical force to the observed difficulties experienced in situations where English Canadians and French Canadians are required to work together in the same office. One

may ask whether it is possible to maintain a stable, efficient, overall organization in which there is permanent friction at the working-group level because of language difficulties. As part of the present study, an attempt was made to evaluate staff relations within the Commission itself and it was found that linguistic barriers had effectively shut off primary-group formation across linguistic lines to a very considerable degree. The results of this dichotomization were also clearly evident in their effects on work efficiency.

Thus, it would seem almost inevitable that French Canadians who come to Ottawa to work in the Public Service will continue to be assimilated, side-tracked, or sufficiently discouraged to return home, as they have been in the past. The concept of a bicultural Public Service, where bicultural is taken to mean homogeneous intermingling of people from the two cultures at the individual level—assuming a certain level of bilingual skills—therefore appears to be impractical, given the present structure of government organization and its relationships to Canadian society as a whole.

This prognostication of future problems, based on the nature of the structural relationships characterizing the Public Service integration into Canadian society, provides the strongest interpretation for the existing lack of bilingualism and biculturalism in the Service, *and* for the ambiguous results unearthed by the research programme we have presented earlier in this study.

6. The Public Service, the environment, the dynamics of adaptation

In summary, the environment of the Public Service has been considered as a coupled (or integrated) system comprised of two semi-isolated social systems (or two clearly differentiated sub-systems: for analytical purposes, the terms used in the description are not critical), one of which has been historically dominant over the other, although each has had direct effects on the other in numerous ways over a period of two centuries. The intensive efforts to strengthen the internal organization of the subordinate system, which have characterized the so-called Quiet Revolution, have led to an attempted consolidation of French Canada, marked by some redefinition of boundaries. Redefinition of boundaries may be achieved in two ways: through withdrawal by individual French Canadians from participation in common activities with English Canadians, and by the erection of forms of institutional organization which in part replicate similar institutions in the country presently dominated by English Canadians.

The federal Public Service has historically been closely linked to English Canada, through individual membership, type of favoured institutional development, intensity of environmental interaction, and common interests and values. French-Canadian influences have been weak, often absent. In addition, during a period of consolidation in Quebec, the power of the federal Public Service may appear threatening to that society from two points of view: first, as an agent of assimilation of individual French Canadians, and second, as a principal source of organizational strength in the dominant system (and therefore a potential threat to the subordinate system).

The evidence which emerged from the study reported in Chapter II fully supports this analysis. Government officials made clear that: (1) interaction of public servants with English Canada is strong; (2) interaction with French Canada is weak; (3) French

Canadians from Quebec have become increasingly difficult to recruit; (4) many responsibilities previously exercised by the federal Service have recently devolved to Quebec; (5) efforts to accommodate a French-Canadian presence in Ottawa are of recent origin and reflect more a response to general public concern over questions of national unity and survival than they do pressures of necessity engendered by the nature of departments' activities in bilingual areas.

E. Summary

With this background in mind, it becomes possible to interpret the results of the present study more precisely. First, at the initiation of the period of research, the preponderant majority of individual public servants who were contacted indicated their feeling that the administration was morally bound, as well as practically committed, to introduce a greater measure of bilingualism into their departments' operations and generally to reflect more fully the bicultural nature of the country as a whole. While there were exceptions to this attitude (and indications of the "iceberg" phenomenon), it cannot fairly be said that any clear evidence was directly obtained that the departments' failure to adapt could be traced uniquely to antagonistic attitudes. But, even where attitudes were quite non-antagonistic, a true sense of the urgency of the situation—which would be necessary to generate self-starting programmes—was not widely discovered. Second, observation of the planning styles of several departments indicates this area to be one clear source of failure to adapt. Achievement of a solid, well-grounded bilingual potential—especially in view of the short supply of bilingual Anglophones—and even more, achievement of some degree of biculturalism, requires the effective integration at the working level in Ottawa—the centre of departmental activities—of a rather large number of bilingual Francophones. Unfortunately, our research indicated that employee-oriented management techniques of the kind which would most favour such an integration are not commonly found in the present administration. The prevailing planning emphasis is rather on fulfilling departmental functions adequately, and in some cases on developing sets of long-range and overall priorities for the department. The relative lack of concern for planning in the area of employee relations may well reflect the large role of the Public Service Commission which has developed standardized policies of employee selection and promotion that remove some of these questions from departmental concern. There may be other reasons, for example, in the conservatism of senior executives. In any case, the effect of the prevailing planning styles has been to inhibit planning in the area of bilingualism. A number of public servants simply seemed to find it difficult to conceptualize or formalize the problem meaningfully within the cognitive frame of reference which guides them in their perceptions of the Public Service and its problems. All too often, they fell back on easily calculable problems of translation and similar questions without ever successfully addressing the main issue. It appears therefore that new approaches to planning are one necessary step to adaptation. A third observation is that the nature of the relationship between that part of the government which determines policy (broadly, the Cabinet) and the administrative wing was not found to be conducive to adaptation in this area. In general the government appeared to

deal with the working areas of the Public Service through central agencies such as the Civil Service Commission or the Treasury Board, which are accustomed to holding the responsibility for *administering a policy*. The government usually introduces an overall programme with more or less clear objectives, which is then operationalized in detail through the agency of these or other similar bodies working closely with the office of the Privy Council. In the present case it was clear that the traditional Public Service mechanisms were incapable of effecting change, and the government—to the extent that it adhered to conventional means of influencing Public Service development—was hamstrung. Innovations of a more radical kind which would link the government with the public administration seem to be required in order to give the executive wing the leverage it needs to effect change. Without such mechanisms, the influence of the Cabinet collectively and individually is inevitably diluted. The possible nature of such administrative innovations will be discussed in our final chapter.

Another factor is that the “total field of pressures” within which the administration carried on its work reflected the new and urgent concern of Canadian public opinion with the problems of Confederation and the widespread felt need to find a more workable integration of French Canada, within the national framework. Echoes of this current of opinion were evident within the Public Service in the expressions of attitudes of individuals. Nevertheless, however vocal and urgent these expressions of opinion were, they were only part of the whole picture. The voices of the many clients of the Public Service in its day-by-day operations must also be taken into consideration and here it clearly seemed to be *business as usual*. The so-called opting-out process affected relatively few departments, and not the largest or most prestigious. This may possibly be no more than a reflection of the fact that few departments had any depth of relations with French Canada to begin with, or it may possibly indicate that some of the reported opting-out trends were spurious, but the consequences in terms of the chances for the desired pattern of adaptation were unfortunate. The perceived trends reinforced internal expectations: there was a belief in the abstract “rightness” of change, unsupported by any real sense of urgency. Finally, what we have sometimes called the “structural” facts of life in Canada militate against sustained adaptation. Without fundamental changes in this area, every programme of adaptation undertaken by the Public Service to upgrade its bilingual/bicultural capacity, no matter how well motivated, is in danger of foundering, since there will always be a tendency to return to the same non-bilingual equilibrium, unless and until the structure of the Public Service’s environment also changes. Language skills acquired in “crash” programmes deteriorate in the absence of daily use. Francophones recruited in intensive drives become assimilated or disillusioned without a “live” French environment to support them in their total life in Ottawa. And so on.

The “dynamics of adaptation” thus appear to point to fundamental changes on several levels at once. There are unlikely to be easy solutions or shortcuts, since the existing blocks to bilingualism and biculturalism are a product of sustained systemic evolution occurring over many decades. In asking for a reversal of a long-term trend, we will necessarily have to attack the issue first as a planning problem, second as a problem in departmental co-ordination, and third as a system problem. The dimensions may properly be described as incalculable. When we manipulate a complex system, there can be no way

to predict all the consequences of our manipulation without understanding also all of the higher-order relationships; no one today pretends to be able to deal even conceptually with this level of system organization.¹⁷ What will be required is an incremental, step-by-step approach, with scanning mechanisms to permit a continuing process of evaluation. It will be necessary to take into account the inputs from, and effects on, the various interest groups to whom the problem is salient. A full development of the scope of such a programme exceeds the limits of the present study, but in our last section we offer some fragmentary examples of the type of fundamental changes which could underpin the dynamics of adaptation.

A. Types of Structural Change—Some Alternatives

Assimilation or separation—these are the two horns of the dilemma which confront the English- and French-speaking peoples of Canada. One problem which needs to be resolved in order to make possible less drastic solutions is the development of a Public Service which can continue to serve English Canada efficiently, and Canada as a whole, while at the same time contributing to the strengthening of the foundations—the consolidation—of French-Canadian society. Can one administration serve two social systems and also contribute to the general advance of the country? The government is faced with the necessity of finding new and more complex social devices to take Canadians out of their cyclical crisis pattern, and of discovering organisms which link the two systems, permitting efficient planning and operations overall. At the same time these devices must allow for a certain free play in the working out of individual systemic differences, and must eliminate the dysfunctional consequences of a unilingual Public Service in a bilingual nation.

Simplistic solutions have been advocated: first, a uniformly bilingual, bicultural Public Service in which the two languages have equal status, posts are shared equitably, and both language groups, while intermingling freely, are also linked in natural ways to their respective cultural bases; and second, the “associate states” concept in which there are two quite separate administrations, one for English Canada, one for French Canada, related only at the highest political level. The first alternative, we have seen, is impractical as matters stand since it leads in Canada to assimilation; the second is apparently impractical on other grounds: it is unacceptable to critical sectors of the country and almost certainly merely the prelude to total separation. In this final section, therefore, we explore some other alternatives for integration of elements of the two systems within the overall framework of the federal government.

1. Redeployment

Probably the most sweeping programme which has been suggested is that of redeployment.¹

By redeployment we mean the actual physical relocation outside the city of Ottawa of major Public Service functions—some or all of the principal working divisions of central government departments (not, as at present, branch offices). Such redeployment would affect all regions of the country; within the present context our main concern will be for the effects on bicultural developments. The impact as a whole should be judged in the larger perspective, since beneficial results in other areas of the country's life are important to its general acceptability.

There are prototypes in existence. Public broadcasting, for example, was deployed nationally from its inception. Major centres of broadcasting are found in Montreal and Toronto, as well as in Vancouver, Winnipeg, Quebec, Halifax, and elsewhere. As a result, it can be argued, there are now many Francophone broadcasters working in French in a French environment, making a lively contribution to the French social system, while remaining at least officially federal public servants. Programmes produced in Montreal are available to the Maritimes, Toronto, and Winnipeg—in French. The French radio and television networks thereby become an actual and potential national resource, with both real and symbolic significance, since they contribute to the vitality of the French presence throughout the country. A conference between a group of programme-makers from Radio Canada and a similar group from CBC Toronto is a real systemic link between French Canada and English Canada, and occurs entirely within the Public Service. The Francophone programme head at Radio-Canada in Montreal considers himself a legitimate spokesman for French-Canadian society, yet he is a federal public servant, paid out of federal funds, and might be expected to owe an important part of his loyalty to the central government.

Two other arguments can be made for the redeployment proposal. First, a new "live" environment would thereby be created, in which the federal administration would be more sensitized to Canadian realities generally. Part of the Service would be located in a fully French environment and could attract highly qualified candidates, since they would be able to make a contribution, working in French, to the administration of federal government business at the most senior level. Also, more stringent bilingual requirements could be demanded of the most senior employees remaining in Ottawa. This assumes, of course, that redeployment would result in the relocation of a number of senior decision-making functions in different parts of the country. For example, perhaps the department of fisheries could go to both coasts, parts of Industry, Trade and Commerce to Vancouver, Windsor, and Montreal, Agriculture to Winnipeg and Quebec, Finance to Toronto and Montreal, Northern Affairs to Edmonton and Quebec.

Throughout the present discussion, we will necessarily have to touch only lightly on the overall impact of such programmes, to the extent that they have repercussions outside the sphere of bilingual/bicultural relations. This is perhaps unfortunate, since one of the best arguments in favour of redeployment is that it has a potentially broad appeal to the country at large. The problems of bilingualism and biculturalism are in part the problems of a federally constituted society which is geographically, economically, and

culturally complex. Canada has from the beginning existed as such a complex of elements which had to be welded together in one fashion or another. Thus the problem of bilingualism and biculturalism is one issue which troubles the imaginative capacity to provide good and representative government for the country. There are, however, other such federal issues. One permanent problem for the central government is to maintain adequate communication channels with all regions and with all the elements of the population who need to be served. Redeployment could help bring the day-to-day activities of government departments into closer contact with vital segments of the society in a number of ways. From the point of view of local communities, this would mean an infusion of new enterprises to provide a stimulus to associated local enterprises, plus the opportunity to contact directly some of the vital functions of the central government. There is thus the possibility of an associated increase in local feelings of participation, pride, and communication.

The "environment" argument does appear to be a powerful one. There is a wealth of evidence available that the Ottawa setting appears highly oppressive to many Francophones (and even, it has been suggested, to some Anglophones: it is alleged that recruitment from Toronto, as well as that from Montreal, is much below expectation).

In our research we encountered one government organization where the effects of environment may have been evident. This was an agency which until something more than ten years ago had been located in Ottawa but is now centred in Montreal. In Ottawa, it had been very much an Anglophone organization. Following the move to Montreal, Francophone participation increased—although Anglophones continued to fill senior positions—until eventually, following a period of some tension, the agency reorganized into two parallel sections. It may be merely a coincidence that the agency has exhibited increased vitality since its move, but although problems remain, the changes within it appear to illustrate the potent effects of environment.

Such single case histories are, of course, inconclusive. Even the most convinced advocate of redeployment stops short of suggesting the wholesale uprooting of administrative functions. Rather, gradual change is proposed, using staging procedures, department by department, avoiding as far as possible disruptive effects. Given this caution, one can argue that it may be practical to redeploy a greater part of the government's activities that might first seem apparent. Far from being disruptive, a gradual, planned redeployment might actually prove a healthy stimulation. New contacts between public servants and businessmen, labour leaders, the intellectual community, and other groups would encourage fresh creative thinking in many departments. If recruitment were also facilitated, the move could have the effect of bringing new blood and ideas into the Public Service.

One considerable problem which can be foreseen is communication between departments and between elements of departments. This difficulty can be exaggerated: present-day communications make possible the integration of a network of geographically dispersed structures. In any case, inter-agency liaison is all too frequently virtually non-existent, even now. The rethinking of communication problems which would have to accompany such a geographic restructuring of administration could actually result in new national linkages, improved inter-agency co-ordination, and more flexible dynamic patterns of interaction.

Within North American corporate life generally, the potential for the establishment of geographically dispersed but fully inter-communicating organizations is now being explored at an accelerating pace. Physical contiguity was vital to organizational coherence at a time when our images of modern organization first took clear form. Today, however, a rapidly increasing number of organizations are incorporating the use of a multitude of technological innovations into their planning for day-to-day operations. Head office is increasingly becoming recognized not as a place but as a function. There is in principle no apparent reason why the Canadian government cannot take advantage of this communications revolution.

Furthermore, it should not necessarily be more difficult to achieve a reasonable overall bilingual competence in Toronto, Halifax, or Victoria than it is presently in Ottawa. Indeed, such a move would serve to underline to both Francophones and Anglophones the need for some bilingual competence coast to coast, rather than limiting requirements to the Ottawa enclave. In the event of redeployment, more stringent bilingualism could be demanded in Ottawa (e.g., full bilingualism) as against less exacting requirements in other cities (partial bilingualism). The overall picture would reflect the greater proportion of primarily French-language operations which redeployment would encourage, taking into account the fact that the evolution of the present Service artificially reduced the impact of French Canada on the federal administration, a condition which redeployment might help to rectify.

Presentation of these arguments should not be construed to mean that the authors of this study unreservedly favour the adoption of the redeployment strategy. Such a proposal appears to have certain features to recommend it, the most striking of which—so far as bilingualism and biculturalism is concerned—would be the encouragement of greater Francophone participation in the more complex processes of the federal government through the location of certain critical functions in a French environment. However, it would be most unfortunate to judge the concept only in relation to its importance to the bilingual/bicultural question; the merits of the proposal are of more general relevance. Indeed, sensitivity to the total Canadian environment, not just French Canada, might be developed; the value of the concept is in its potential to bring very senior officers into a different relation to Canadian life. The distinction between redeployment and regionalization needs to be kept clear. Redeployment should make a genuine contribution to the vitality of French-Canadian society and to the *consolidation* of French Canada. At the same time, elements of the technique of redeployment should recommend it to the Public Service and to the country as a whole.

The proposal may nevertheless appear suspect on grounds of practicality. Such fundamental changes affect the vital interests of many groups, and the presence of these interests becomes a part of the problem. The provinces and major cities would be affected, as would business, universities, primary producers, and others, as well as the Public Service itself. If ineffectively handled, the move could resolve some problems only to produce other new ones. Thus, when examined closely, it appears that the grounds of practicality resolve themselves in part into questions of the interests of the various groups involved. In a later part of this chapter, we will consider some of the problems of interest-based planning which will inevitably be associated with changes such as redeployment.

2. *French-language units*²

A less radical proposal is to create French-language units within the departments and agencies of government, principally in Ottawa. Here, Francophone employees of varying seniority would be clustered into teams which would undertake the administration of specific functional areas of responsibility, up to and including higher-level responsibilities. For example, a number of Francophone economists might be grouped together to develop a specific area of economic policy. In other cases, responsibilities would be divided between Francophone and Anglophone teams which would then function in parallel units. All communication, verbal and written, within the units would be conducted in the language of the employees' choice, presumably French for the French-language units. Areas of functional responsibility which directly involved the interests of French Canada might tend to devolve to these units, but it is not proposed that such units be in any sense limited to such concerns. In fact, proponents of the plan emphasize that it should result in greater involvement of Francophones in broad departmental concerns by strengthening their presence and effective working participation in Ottawa. Within the unit, it is proposed, a French "environment" can be maintained, comparable to that achieved by redeployment. The cumulative effect of such units, scattered throughout the Service, would be to affect gradually the prevailing unilingual atmosphere, partly by creating for Anglophone public servants the necessity of interacting with their Francophone colleagues, through exchange of reports in departmental meetings and correspondence.

Clearly, the introduction of French-language units would require a range of supporting elements, more intensive recruiting, and the provision of French-language typewriters, secretarial assistance, signs, telephonists, etc. Senior government officials might then be expected to have reasonable competence in the second language made a condition of employment, since such competence would be needed to make full use of the unilingual units.

The unit proposal, like that of redeployment, serves to illustrate the depth of change in the very structure of administrative operations which will be required to reverse the present trends towards English-language unilingualism. This proposal joins the twin notions of language and culture, in the sense that the vital supportive nature of primary group activity, with its associated cultural values, is recognized, particularly within a task-oriented situation. The weakness of the concept, by contrast with that of redeployment, is that it may be not radical enough. The danger of French-language units is that assimilation of individuals will be replaced by assimilation of units. Individuals in these units will find it difficult not to erect barriers to outside influence, becoming tight little enclaves of outsiders within the ongoing departmental processes. On the other hand, realizing that communication in English is ultimately easier in a predominantly English environment when there is a job to be done, they may feel pressured to abandon their single-minded Frenchness, in which case the main purpose of the programme is defeated. The greater part of the interesting work of departments is always going to be the product of contacts with English Canada and the pressure towards gradual anglicization will be real. This is the risk for French-language units, a risk which is accentuated within the Ottawa milieu by the "Englishness" of the city itself.

The question of practicality also comes up in relation to the introduction of French-language units in another way. The effective integration of these units into whole departments depends on departmental practice and in particular on the goodwill and positive efforts of senior departmental officials. Should units be isolated by being cut off from critical information flows—which are often the off-shoot of informal processes—there is the danger that they could literally be “starved” out. Information flows in this case become an index of the degree of participation. If Francophones working in separate units discover that information deprivation is the consequence of belonging to such a unit, the impulse will be to find ways to circumvent the unit. The attitude and behaviour of senior officials take on critical importance in relation to the success of the units.

These are not necessarily insuperable obstacles, of course (the influence of Francophone deputies and assistant deputies has not been discussed, for example), but they do serve to indicate some of the potential hazards.

The ideas of redeployment and French-language units are both illustrations of *structural* change. They actually envisage the restructuring, at the organizational level, of Public Service activities, in order to open up new channels from the Service into the main currents of the French-Canadian community (and other avenues of Canadian life, in the case of redeployment). This will enable the Public Service to become more easily and naturally susceptible to influences from that community in essentially the same way as it now is susceptible to influences from English-Canadian society. By opening up to the most vigorous members of the French-Canadian community some of the avenues of personal career advancement—in the sense of interesting jobs which are in touch with the mainstream of North American development—and by increasing the diversity of tasks which can be undertaken without abandoning the French language and culture, the Public Service will thereby make a positive contribution to the richness of French-Canadian life. This desirable contribution already exists fully in relation to English Canada, but hardly at all, or minimally, for French Canada. The achievement of both aims has the further important objective of assisting processes of national stability.

Any type of government programme for bilingualism and biculturalism which is not accompanied by structural change is unlikely to effect a lasting improvement in the present situation. But even our cursory examination of possible programmes emphasizes some of the difficulties inherent in the courses of action open to the government. Probably every programme involving structural change would be susceptible to the same type of hazards. One principal reason for the difficulty is that drastic structural change potentially affects numbers of interest groups which are often systemically inter-linked. Introducing programmes whose success depends very much on the establishment of new interest-linkages within some on-going system demands a type of planning which is incremental and interest based—exactly the area of planning, in fact, where our research indicated the federal administration is weakest. New planning mechanisms will therefore be required; in the next section we consider a possible approach consistent with the interest-based type of problem areas.

B. New Perspectives in Planning for Bilingualism and Biculturalism—the Inter-organizational Task Force Mechanism

We have seen earlier that both intradepartmental and interdepartmental planning processes and planning mechanisms have proved inappropriate to the problem of bilingualism and biculturalism. Actually, problems involving inter-agency communication have proven most difficult to resolve for public administrations other than the Canadian Public Service and in relation to other global problems of the dimensions of bilingualism and biculturalism. One proposal now receiving wide consideration among administrators and planners is the inter-organization task force mechanism. In this section we will first consider the task force idea abstractly in generalized terms, and then take up its applications within a possible government-sponsored programme.

Warren Bennis has made the following prediction about the expanded role of the task force in the organization of tomorrow: "The social structure of organizations of the future will have some unique characteristics. The key word will be "temporary"; there will be adaptive, rapidly changing *temporary systems*. These will be 'task forces' organized around problems-to-be-solved."³

In the future, Bennis argues, problems are likely to be solved by groups of relative strangers (in the sense of not being members of the same organization) who represent a set of diverse professional skills. The groups will be arranged on organic rather than mechanical models; that is, they will evolve in response to a problem rather than in response to deliberately programmed role expectations.

While one may not agree entirely with the radical evolution of the bureaucratic structure which Bennis predicts, there is perhaps some utility in his prophetic statements regarding the extension of the task force.⁴ Wilensky expresses a similar view when he advocates the use of the task force device to incorporate specialist knowledge into the decision-making apparatus.⁵ He praises it for being flexible and informal as well as for enhancing the performance of individual participants. Furthermore, the task force mechanism is useful for communicating information among participants and to organizations.

The inter-organizational task force, depending on various factors such as its scope and purpose, recruits participants from different professional and scientific areas and from different organizations. This is to stimulate linkages among the various knowledge areas and organizations relevant to a problem. Ideally, the task force becomes an entity or actor in its own right, but one with a broad, inter-organizational perspective.

The permanent organization is preoccupied by the practical constraints of a particular problem area facing it. These include determining priorities between the demands of the problem on its interests and resources and the other demands stemming from its role and objectives.

The task force, too, is preoccupied with the problem as a result of the broad and temporary nature of its make-up, but it takes a more comprehensive view. Its perception is not constrained by individual organizational goals. It tends, rather, to reflect the general goals and operating requirements of organizations connected with the problem.

The composition of the task force is important. Does one bring together a group of organization executives and professionals? To what extent should social scientists be represented? How big should the group be? What organizations should members of the task force come from? And so on.

There are no absolutely established ways of getting a task force under way, and of assessing the resulting process. Size is important, to assure that the task force encompasses the required knowledge areas and organizational interests, and also that its members achieve a sense of identity with it.

Small group research gives some guidelines.⁶ The various networks established by the actors (members) will provide various kinds and intensities of feed-in to and feed-back from the central actor(s) or co-ordinator. The communication network idea corresponds to the kind of relationship a task force co-ordinator might develop with the other participants in a task force. Will they be encouraged to interact, and if so, how? Will sub-groups be established? And so on.

There are various other ideas in small group research which may be able to provide insights into the setting up and operation of a task force: the notion of guidance and initiative and its relation to being liked (the task leader as opposed to the social-emotional leader);⁷ the effects of cohesiveness on influence and productivity;⁸ and styles of leadership (authoritarian versus democratic).⁹ These are but a few examples.

Such hypotheses are in the main drawn from specific experiments. They do not provide any hard and fast rules for practical application. They do, however, give insights or guidelines to help set up and operate a task force.

1. Utilizing the task force mechanism in relation to bilingualism and biculturalism

The initiative for federal administrative service adaptation will have to come first from the government. Without leadership from the Cabinet, the Public Service cannot be expected to give more than lip-service to the principle of bilingualism and biculturalism. The Prime Minister's office, more than any other group, has the power to force the pace by example and by precept. However, the administrative arm through which government policy is to be effected cannot be of the type conventionally employed by the Privy Council office. It is necessary to create momentum for a policy, without the support of spontaneous environmental pressure and against the grain of the normal departmental organization of activities. Change must be induced without arousing alarm among potentially antagonistic interests while at the same time making a real impact. The government's policy arm will have to work without a clear, unambiguous specification of the problem in the usual operational terms; its focus will therefore have to be on continued experimentation, requiring an adaptive, open-ended style and a readiness to take risks. These are extraordinary requirements for the usual type of governmental body; the task force mechanism, however, may be an instrument capable of meeting the need. For the sake of illustration, an attempt will be made to detail how such a task force might be set up, within the Privy Council area of operation, providing the government with a direct lever to force the pace in bilingual/bicultural adaptation.

2. *A proposed Privy Council task force*

We propose the creation of a temporary task force, focussed on the problem of bilingualism and biculturalism and located in the office of the Privy Council. The task force might contain a core of four permanent members—staff drawn from the Privy Council or seconded to it from other areas in the Public Service. The core would provide continuity, as this would be an open-ended rather than an *ad hoc* task force, focussed on a large and continuing problem.

Another class of members would be temporary but full-time, some seven in number, and would be seconded for periods of from three months to a year from various representative national organizations. These members might come from key administrator and specialist ranks of government departments, provincial administrations, business corporations, labour groups, universities, and other private organizations. They should be seconded full-time so they could participate fully in the planning and field activities of the group and identify with it. These rotating members would contribute two perspectives to the force—that of their own organizations and that of their particular fields of competence. The many kinds of public and private organizations relevant to the area of bilingualism and biculturalism would be represented in terms of broad categories.

The total number of full-time members might be eleven at the outset, with a mix of four permanent and seven temporary members. One permanent member (the task force co-ordinator) and two temporary members would be assigned primarily to the linking, general assessment, and co-ordination of the field work and project promotion activities of the other eight. Each of the latter would be responsible for maintaining contact with approximately a dozen departments and agencies to cover the range of government activities. Other organizations outside government might be involved as necessary. This would permit the field officers to spend approximately half their time in planning, gathering data, and making secondary contacts, and the other half in making contact with organizations in their primary group (two calls a month average per department or agency on their primary list, at a rate of approximately four calls a day). The total number of members of the task force, and the balance between permanent and temporary members, between field and co-ordination officers, as well as the number of organizations assigned to each field officer, would be continually assessed to achieve an optimum balance within the constraints of the project's size and scope.

In addition to the temporary and full time members of the Privy Council task force, consultants might be assigned to it from time to time as required, and a team of university student interns in social science professions could be involved on a part-time basis.

Examples of the areas of skill valuable to the task force include operations research, social psychology, economics, law, sociology, linguistics, political science, anthropology, public administration, and business administration. Of equal importance would be the personal characteristics and experience of participants, and the kind of organization from which they were seconded.

Group interaction of task force members would be encouraged to provide a broad and critical assessment of field contact reports and the relationship of actual and potential

initiatives. It is in this manner that innovative linkages of organizational interest and capability around specific projects would be sought.

To conclude, the Privy Council task force would have many characteristics of the inter-organizational task force, but also some characteristics of its own. Its organization would be flexible so that adjustments could be made as a result of experience.

The objectives of such a task force—apart from its function of stimulating a diversity of departmental initiatives in response to particular problems related to the special areas of responsibility of those departments—should be to begin the step-by-step clarification of long-term policy objectives. Such a force should begin with a general understanding of the problem, and in particular should be encouraged to become well aware that structural changes will be necessary. A set of strategies such as redeployment, French-language units, and others with promise could then serve as guidelines to further investigation, rather than as policy objectives per se. The development of policy upon which the government may subsequently base whatever lines of action it deems advisable is thus conceived in evolutionary rather than synoptic terms.

3. Supporting strategies

The Privy Council task force on bilingualism and biculturalism should be conceived as the most central of a set of related strategies. First, full-time departmental advisory panels, similar in composition to the Privy Council task force but conceived with the whole range of the department's affairs and reporting directly to the deputy minister, might be situated initially in a few key departments, such as Finance, the Treasury Board, Industry, Trade and Commerce, and Manpower and Immigration, because of their size or the importance of their function. The utility of such panels is to provide departmental heads with expanded planning and programme development capacity in all areas, but their existence would also provide a further means of strengthening the Privy Council task force on bilingualism and biculturalism. They could be established only in three or four departments at the beginning and their use could naturally be extended. Their primary role as far as bilingualism and biculturalism are concerned would be to assist in the co-ordination of programmes, evaluation, long-range planning, and other areas related to problems of adaptation. Part of their function—probably quite a small part—would be to serve as liaison, on occasion, with other departments and particularly with the central task force, thus easing problems of inter-agency co-ordination. Their facilitative role in relation to French-language units could well be critical.

Departmental advisory panels might range in size between five and 15 members, depending on the needs and functions of the department and the leadership style of the deputy minister. They would be inherently flexible in operation: individuals within the group should be expected to enjoy a considerable amount of latitude in planning their activities. The availability of this resource should free department heads to undertake research and planning, and to develop a more experimental, innovative set of activities in all areas of concern to them, without cutting into other activities, although there is no reason that activities of the panels should be narrowly bounded. In fact, part of the *raison d'être* for the panels should be to develop new lines of planning, on both the theoretical and practical levels.

Although the advisory panel concept is not directly related to bilingualism and biculturalism, it has two benefits. The first, as noted above, is to back up the Privy Council task force. A second principal advantage of this device is the opportunity it provides to get a number of French Canadians into decision-making chambers quickly. Its special nature should facilitate the recruitment of talent otherwise unavailable to the Public Service because of usual standardized practices, departmental inertia, and so on. It would provide a reserve pool of talented individuals with an experience of government acquired through the process—thus constituting a means of testing, training, and recruiting potential senior staff. It would allow for the development of useful links with provincial departments and the private sector through continued contact with individuals who, having served a term, have returned to their previous activity. Finally, it might prove a means of broadening the insights and decision-making ability of senior public officials.

The device of full-time departmental advisory panels is consistent with other broad departmental concerns; however, its principal advantage for our present purposes will be its utility in opening up the planning process within departments, and backing up the Privy Council task force.

Second, a central communications research agency should be formed to take an in-depth look at the total problem of communication within a bilingual administration. Questions of communication far transcend the matter of bilingualism and biculturalism and are taking on increased importance in modern government. The research agency proposed here should be broadly based, although problems related to bilingualism and biculturalism should figure largely in its concerns. In particular, this agency might be asked to take over the administration of the language-training programme which is now controlled by the Public Service Commission. The latter body is rigidly conventional in its planning approach and is not an appropriate agency for this role. The type of research conducted by a communications research agency should be concerned not only with narrow problems of translation and language use, but should also consider some of the implications for the Public Service of the technological revolution in the means of communication which has occurred over the past few decades. The relevance of such research to the earlier discussion of redeployment should be quite clear. An appropriate roof for the proposed agency could conceivably be the newly formed Communications department. However, the role of this agency would not overlap present functions; what is proposed is rather a departure in research into an expanded concept of the communications area.

A third possibility is a Public Service institute, perhaps undertaken in co-operation with some university or universities, which might be established to consider in depth the problems of administration in a bilingual, bicultural Public Service over a period of years. Among the problems to which such an institute could address itself would be primary-group formation in a bicultural Service; the development of flexible instruments of administration such as federal-provincial planning secretariats; training and retraining of senior and middle-level executives for changing conditions; mechanisms for bridging inter-agency interests to resolve complex problems; and the building of models of a bilingual, bicultural organization. It would be preferable for such an institute to be a joint federal-provincial initiative, though it need not be. Many of its programmes could parallel

some of those of the communications research agency, and could usefully be linked. In addition, liaison with related programmes in Canadian universities should prove helpful.

C. Other Programmes

A sample of other programmes of less scope is to be found in Appendix B.

D. Conclusion

In this final section we have argued that radical changes are required at both the structural level and at the level of government planning style if a greater measure of bilingualism and biculturalism is to be permanently achieved. We have attempted to spell out the type of change which will be required. We wish to emphasize that the proposals contained here, while they deserve consideration on their own merits, are also illustrations of the kind of new approaches needed for the development of a bilingual Public Service. The present state of affairs results from a process of on-going interaction among a diverse but finite set of interests within the framework of a system; the only kind of planning which can effectively change the direction of that evolutionary process is one which has built-in mechanisms for reading back from the interests involved the effects of whatever experiments are made. While the final goal—however imprecisely stated—must constantly be borne in mind, since it provides the criterion against which to judge the progress of day-to-day developments, the actual growth of policy must be both adaptive and evolutionary, and must attempt to take into account as far as possible the changing patterns of interest linkages. In this sense, attempts at rigid comprehensive plans are likely to be more harmful than useful. What is more likely to prove effective in the end is the continued pursuit of more flexible ways of relating the public administration to its community of interests.

The extent of bilingualism and biculturalism needed in Canada is a political question, although the absence of a genuine French presence in the government of Canada is certain to be dysfunctional. We have reached the conclusion that any depth of bilingualism and biculturalism cannot be anticipated within the present structural limitations. Fundamental changes can be achieved—though there is a cost—if the systemic linkages of interests within Canada are taken into account in the planning process.

Appendices

1. What is interest-based planning?

Interest-based planning (IBP) is a practical approach to problem-solving: it is designed to solve more and more complex operational problems which cross organizational lines. The IBP strategy aims to assemble the separate choices and commitments of organized and unorganized interests into a single comprehensive programme.

Interest-based planning differs from both comprehensive (or synoptic) planning and disjointed incrementalism in that it aims to build incrementally toward a comprehensive solution. Thus it is a formalization and modification of some earlier approaches to planning.

a) Comprehensive planning: A common approach to planning is the comprehensive (synoptic) approach. It starts with the projection of probable future developments within a given area and the identification of objectionable or undesirable features of this development.² It then proceeds from the definition of the problem area to the identification of desirable alternative patterns of development and the invention of policies to influence development in the desired direction. Next, tentative plans are made reflecting various combinations of these policies, and these are *only then* tested for effectiveness, feasibility, and cost.³ It is only *after* sketch plans are put together, for example, that interest groups are systematically consulted. They are not centrally involved in the plan-making itself, even if they are given the opportunity to revise it later.

Where there is only a single interest involved in the problem, or where there is a working consensus among interests, the comprehensive-synoptic approach to plan-making may be appropriate. But where there are multiple and conflicting interests involved, interest-based planning shows some promise of being more effective. For the initial definition of the problem, the two approaches do not differ in principle, but interest-based planning in practice is less rigorous in its definition of the problem. It is in the plan-making phase that the interest-based approach is fundamentally different from the comprehensive-synoptic approach, because it depends in the first instance on the

engagement and mobilization of interests. Interest-based planning does not act initially to construct alternative policies to follow: desirable policy is developed from what is, or can be made, acceptable, given the nature of the interests involved.

b) Disjointed incrementalism: The second traditional approach to planning related to IBP is in many respects the opposite of the synoptic approach. The process of disjointed incrementalism defines an immediate, usually short-run, goal together with an implementing course of action, but does not relate the probable consequences in any systematic way with other courses of action or to larger goals. After the plan has been carried out, disjointed incrementalism evaluates the consequences preparatory to making further decisions and carrying *them* out.

Braybrooke and Lindblom describe disjointed incrementalism as "a strategy of multiple adjustments."⁴

Interest-based planning is also a strategy of multiple adjustments, but it has an additional aspect. In interest-based planning, a set of proposed courses of action are incrementally built up and successively reformulated and related into a programme *before* action is taken. The actual effect of the course of action is not evaluated, because it has not taken place. Rather, the effect of its presentation as a proposal on the constituency of interests (or some portion hereof) and the related effect on the articulation of further courses of action are evaluated. Indeed, the purpose of interest-based planning is the aggregation of decisions in order to achieve comprehensive solutions.

2. Organizations as interest groups

The planner will in most cases identify organizations rather than unorganized groups as members of his interest-group constituency, despite the fact that there may be societal interests salient to the problem but not embodied in the interests of an organization. He will do this because organizations can be formally defined as to interest, role, and makeup. Organizations are important decision centres in the sense that they can make or withhold commitments of support and resources of various kinds. And they can formally nominate spokesmen to represent them, which unorganized groups cannot do.

For IBP purposes, three kinds of organization are important to explore: those which represent unorganized interest groups in a surrogate or fragmented way; the more highly organized private groups; and public service agencies.

First we will deal with organizations which represent unorganized groups such as the poor, the elderly, and school children. Such groups may on occasion be made to communicate choices as to what they want through interviews and opinion sampling, or through surrogate organizations which purport to speak for them, such as welfare agencies, school boards, and parents' groups. Some organizations have a direct membership drawn from unorganized groups, but they are fragmented and unrepresentative although they may put forward the genuine interests of their overall group; neighbourhood or district organizations of the poor are examples. The unorganized groups—or their surrogate or fragmented representative organizations—may give the planner an idea as to their desires and choices, but they have only a limited ability to commit resources to the problem or withhold them from being applied to it. When indicating their choices, however, they may influence the general political climate in their favour. For example,

action by a comparatively small group of the poor can have a noticeable effect on the response of a community to its poverty group as a whole. Voluntary organized groups thus often have a potential of magnifying the breadth of their constituency in the eyes of the community; this gives them an enhanced bargaining potential to press their choices. To conclude on this point, an interest-based planning process may have as one of its aims the stimulation of better organization among unorganized groups.

It is the second category, the more highly organized private groups of society, which can make clear commitments. Examples are private corporations, labour unions, trade associations, and cultural and religious organizations. They have comparatively well articulated interests, better cohesion, and a more defined leadership than the first category. They can in principle be more easily mobilized than unorganized groups to participate with the planner in an IBP process to deal with problems which affect them.

The third category, the public service agency, can also be comparatively easily identified. Such an agency can often bring to bear a critical element of strength which most private organizations do not possess: it is a legitimate arm of society in the areas of its functional responsibility. It has formal interests based on the public laws and functions it administers, as well as various informal interests which derive from these. The public service bureaucracy as a whole is obviously not by any means monolithic as to interest, and the planner recognizes the particular interests of each agency and of divisions of that agency where applicable. In that connection, Robert Merton echoes many students of public administration when he notes the tendency toward a "defensive informal organization" along public agency or sub-agency lines whenever "there is an apparent threat to the integrity of the group."⁵

One must not forget the interests which cannot have any organizations to represent them. In addition to bringing to bear the formal laws of society, planners have to stimulate the sense of solidarity around societal values of all organizations participating in a planning process of this nature, so as to provide consideration for those interests which cannot be directly represented.

To sum up, the planner will generally select organized groups to make up his constituency of interests. To the extent that they are representative and well-organized, they will be able to make or withhold commitments, a key requirement for their contribution to the interest-based planning process.

3. The stages of interest-based planning

The several stages of IBP have not as yet been applied to a problem as a total process. Rather, limited experience with various stages has contributed to its development. The stages are outlined briefly below.

a) Identification of the problem: The problem and its elements are defined in such a way as to stimulate a response from the salient interest groups.

b) Identification of interest groups salient to the problem: The constituency of interests and the image or perspective which each interest holds about the loosely defined problem are identified. The constituency is made up primarily of organizations rather than unorganized groups, to meet the operational requirement that the constituency and

its elements be able to both make and withhold commitments. Unorganized interests can be organized, or failing that, taken into account by the planner in some other way. The relationship between the planner and the interest group is analogous to the deliberate and collaborative process between the "change-agent" and "client system" in "planning change" as described by Bennis, *et al.*⁶

c) *Successive definition of the problem and its constituency of interests:*⁷ A process of successive definition of the problem is stimulated by the planner interacting with the interest groups. A change in the operational definition of the problem may result in a change in the constituency of interests.

d) *Progressive linking of the interests of salient groups:* The scanning⁸ of elements of the problem by planner and interest groups is designed to stimulate the perception and development of various perspectives of the problem—of images of means and ends. Where there are common or complementary aspects between the images of different interest groups, the planner encourages linkages among them that will lead toward some form of agreement on how to respond to the problem. A continued application of successive definition and scanning is designed to enhance the possibility of a creative linking of interests at a higher level than a simple trade-off.

e) *Achievement of a consensus among interest groups in response to the problem:* The progressive linkage of images of ends and means is guided by the planner toward some level of working consensus about how to respond to the problem as a whole. The response can be one of commitment to a comprehensive solution for a "calculable" problem, to an incremental solution for a partly calculable problem, or to no solution, or to disjointed incrementalism.

The above outline of the five stages of IBP is by no means absolute. The division could have been made differently, but it has been done in this way to give as clear a description as possible of the process. In practice one can find a number of aspects operating at any one time, and the sequence may change as well.

4. *The stages of IBP as related to the present programme*

The first stage—identification of the problem—corresponds to what has been called the "structural change" (Chapter IV).

The second stage—identification of interest groups—corresponds to the search among organizations for those whose interests and capabilities relate or can be related to a project.

The third stage—successive definition of problem and interests—corresponds to the continuing field work and planning and assessment within the Privy Council task force of possible consortia or clusters of agencies and departments able to plan and execute a project. At the same time the project may be undergoing changes and elaborations to bring it into operational focus.

The fourth stage—progressive linking of interests—corresponds to the provision of data, planning counsel, and general initiative by members of the Privy Council task force to set up a planning consortium of departments and agencies around a project.

The fifth stage—achievement of consensus—corresponds to the development of a plan agreement among departments and agencies—commitment—to carry it out, formalized, in all probability, as government policy.

1. Appointment of a bicultural projects officer (B.P.O.)

This is a full-time employee responsible for co-ordinating and carrying out research into feasible courses of action in the field of bilingualism and biculturalism, for defining operational goals and procedures, and for maintaining an active but informal liaison with other departments. The work of the B.P.O. is likely to be effective only if he commands the support of senior officials. If the factor of bilingualism and biculturalism is to be considered whenever an important departmental decision is taken, the B.P.O. should be included in the executive committee.

2. Appointment of an executive linguist

This is a role designed to improve translation within the government service by appointing qualified people from a department, the Translation Bureau, or from outside, to supervise specialized work, primarily in the technical areas. The linguist would not be hired to do translation work, although he might revise material, but would co-ordinate translation and language usage in general.

Keeping the question of career in mind, the executive linguist post could be held by a person interested in an administrative career. After his tenure as executive linguist, he could then be promoted to an administrative position within the department, the attraction being the experience he would receive as a result of his wide-ranging functions. He would have acquired a knowledge of the department's operations as a whole, and would also have had intimate contact with senior officers. The executive linguist conceived in these terms has the added advantage of providing French Canadians with an excellent point of entry into the senior level of the more technical departments of the Public Service.

3. Review of printing policies

One aspect of the French publications problem is the printing expense for such material, especially in the scientific areas, where the circulation of French copies of publications is far below that of the English equivalents. In this case, the unit cost for the French version is naturally above the unit cost for the English version. A department making a decision to publish or not to publish a document in French as well as English would take into consideration the high unit cost of the French version, and in some cases might make a choice between devoting a certain amount of money to further research or to publishing some completed material in French. To minimize the tendency to place a low priority on French publication, a special budgetary estimate or other accounting arrangement might be established to ensure that more material is published in French. This suggestion was brought up by several departments.

4. Broadening of the basis of recruitment

Except for a few well-defined university graduate categories, it could be argued that departments are not exploiting the supply of French-Canadian talent to the fullest extent. The criteria for selection should be expanded to increase the potential number of Francophone recruits, criteria which would take into account the social structure of Quebec. Vigorous recruitment operations would of course be carried on in the traditional supply areas, but this crucial source would not be neglected.

The Public Service could look for French Canadians in hitherto untapped areas, particularly small businesses, the professions, labour, agriculture, and municipal government. Some worthwhile candidates in these areas will not have a university degree, and in these cases in-service training, perhaps terminating in a degree, might be considered.

The main advantage of this course of action would be to recruit French Canadians who have not been conditioned to the basically Anglo-American mentality of the federal bureaucracy. The objective would not be to encourage such conditioning; rather, they would be encouraged to maintain their French-Canadian outlook and way of doing things, while operating effectively as public servants.

5. Personal recruitment efforts by senior officers

The personal involvement of senior officers in the recruitment of Francophones for senior level positions would make the candidates realize that they were being sought after because of a need for qualified men and not as a political gesture. Senior Ottawa public servants could establish contacts with influential Francophones in the milieux where candidates for such positions would be sought. A departmental list of competent Francophones who might be potential recruits for the higher levels of the Public Service could be maintained.

6. Establishment of a student internship programme

This is an already established programme whereby French- and English-language universities select some of their top students for a summer internship in a federal agency

in Ottawa. It is recommended that this increased attention to student summer employment include bilingual and bicultural orientation.

7. Changes in Public Service Commission recruitment advertising

This would involve development of advertising techniques more suited to Francophone views and a greater concentration on the French-speaking areas of the country than is now practised.

8. Development of sensitivity-training programmes

The notion of applying this type of programme to bilingualism and biculturalism in the Public Service first arose in the proposal to hold "orientation sessions" on the differences between the two cultures. Sensitivity training, which attempts to alert the individual to the nature of his environment and his relation to it, has been used by major business firms for some years for purposes of management development.

A milder form of sensitivity training could be a cultural relations programme involving films, discussion groups, and exchange visit programmes.

9. Development of orientation programmes for Francophone recruits

An initiation to the Ottawa environment orienting recruits to the working habits of the federal bureaucracy should not be left to chance.

10. Institution of Ottawa-Quebec exchanges

This would involve exchanges between the personnel of the two bureaucracies.

11. Acceleration of language-training programmes

It was felt that greater experimentation should be taking place in the field of language training. A flexible portfolio of courses should be developed to suit the expressed needs of individuals and departments, including cost and time factors. Departmental initiatives that complement the Public Service Commission programme could increase effectiveness here. For example, receptive language training in which the emphasis is placed on developing the passive skills of written and oral comprehension might prove to be the more realistic in many cases.

The selection of students for language training presents a procedural problem. Clearly, a mechanism should be developed in departments to make selections on the basis of natural ability, potential for promotion, and opportunity to use the second language. In the case of new recruits, for example, it would be useful to plan their careers to include language training at some early point and then to arrange post-course positions that would necessitate use of the language learned.

To carry out a full programme of bilingualism and biculturalism while meeting the ongoing demands of departmental business, it was felt that the government must establish a policy of increasing personnel to offset the time lost in language training and other such activities, if it is really serious about its policy.

Senior personnel could set the pace to encourage the learning of French among middle and lower echelons in the Public Service by using French at work as much as possible and participating in departmental activities designed to increase the use of French.

12. Encouragement of integral bilingualism

Integral bilingualism is the simultaneous written use of both languages in all official communications. To be effective, this should be government policy, but it could be organized on an individual basis by departments.

A mechanism such as a co-ordinating officer in each department could be created to establish a priority list to accomplish this goal over a specific time period.

It would appear that most agencies would profit from having more translators in close proximity to their operations. The Translation Bureau would maintain its functions intact, but departments could have the option of engaging outside translators for certain work, and could have some translation done by their own staff.

As correspondence with the Francophone public and greater use of French in directives and correspondence with regional offices are putting increased pressure on translation services, there appears to be a need for a position somewhere between a translator and a stenographer. This could enable, for example, an Anglophone officer to give his written material to a Francophone writer in his office who would then compose a French communication for immediate despatch. At another level, a suitable mechanism might be established within departments for editorial review of French-language publications. An interdepartmental exchange of terminology and special vocabulary could also be investigated.

Within departments themselves, an "author's language" policy, where each person employs the language with which he is most familiar, could be useful.

Mr. Speaker, I should like also at this time to make a statement on the government's policy on bilingualism in the public service. I hope the house will agree that the importance of this subject justifies the fact that the statement is a little longer than would normally be acceptable.

It is the objective of the government to make the public service of maximum benefit to the people of Canada by attracting to it the most competent and qualified Canadians available in all parts of Canada. To this end, and having regard to the character of our country, the government for several years has been taking practical steps to encourage bilingualism in the federal public service as part of its fundamental objective of promoting and strengthening national unity on the basis of the equality of rights and opportunities for both English speaking and French speaking Canadians.

In a diverse federal state such as Canada it is important that all citizens should have a fair and equal opportunity to participate in the national administration and to identify themselves with, and feel at home in, their own national capital. The government hopes and expects that, within a reasonable period of years, a state of affairs in the public service will be reached whereby

(a) it will be normal practice for oral or written communications within the service to be made in either official language at the option of the person making them, in the knowledge that they will be understood by those directly concerned;

(b) communications with the public will normally be in either official language having regard to the person being served;

(c) the linguistic and cultural values of both English speaking and French speaking Canadians will be reflected through civil service recruitment and training; and

(d) a climate will be created in which public servants from both language groups will work together toward common goals, using their own language and applying their respective cultural values, but each fully understanding and appreciating those of the other.

In developing measures to assist those now in the public service more effectively to achieve a reasonable proficiency in both official languages and to improve the recruitment of civil servants with this proficiency, the government has been guided by the following principles:

(a) The achievement of bilingualism is in itself a desirable objective for any Canadian citizen. Where the need for bilingualism clearly exists in practice, above all in the national capital, it should be recognized as an element of merit in selection for civil service positions.

(b) In conformity with the merit system, which must remain unimpaired, the requirement for bilingualism should relate to positions, and not only to individuals.

(c) Bilingualism must be introduced gradually over a period of years in a manner which will not lead to injustice or misunderstanding. The various measures should be integrated into a well defined, long term program.

(d) It must therefore be a requirement of any program that, in areas where a need for bilingualism exists, civil servants and prospective recruits must be provided with adequate time and opportunity to adapt themselves to new conditions in the service in a way that will increase their own possibilities for a successful and satisfying career.

(e) For similar reasons of equity, the careers of civil servants who are not bilingual and who have devoted many years of their lives to the service of their country must not be prejudiced in any way by measures to develop bilingualism.

(f) The government will consult from time to time with civil service associations concerning its policy on bilingualism in order to obtain their point of view, and to provide them with all reasonable assurances and remove any possible misunderstandings in regard to measures being proposed.

On the basis of the above objectives of policy and principles of action the government has approved the following measures:

I. In respect of civil service positions requiring prior university training

1. (a) Beginning in 1967, reasonable proficiency in the two official languages or willingness to acquire it within a prescribed period of time through appropriate training at public expense will be an element of merit in the selection of university graduates recruited for administrative trainee positions where the need for bilingualism exists, as is already being done in the case of candidates for foreign service positions.

(b) In those centres where a need exists for reasonable proficiency in both languages, procedures will progressively be established for the filling of executive and administrative positions, so that by about 1970 in the case of appointments from outside the service and by about 1975 in the case of promotions from within, bilingual proficiency or willingness to acquire it will normally be a requirement for the positions in such centres; that is, where a need exists for reasonable proficiency in both languages.

(c) These procedures will not cover at this time the technical, professional and scientific positions in the civil service, the armed forces or federal crown agencies as these categories present special problems. The appropriate departmental and agency authorities are therefore being asked to submit a long term program of effective action in their respective areas of responsibility which takes these special problems and particular difficulties into account.

2. A special pool of positions will be established in the national capital to be used to facilitate the recruitment and to accelerate the development of candidates of high potential who are proficient in both languages.

II. In respect of senior executive officers

A special program for improving bilingualism among senior executive officers serving in the national capital will be undertaken. It is envisaged that each year some 20 English speaking civil servants from the most senior categories, plus their families, will spend a 12 month period in a mainly French speaking city, while some 10 French speaking civil servants and their families will spend a similar period in a mainly English speaking city, to study the other official language and gain an understanding of the cultural values of the group they are visiting.

In respect of bilingual clerical and secretarial positions, it has been agreed in principle that a higher rate of pay will be paid in future in respect of clerical and secretarial positions in which there is the requirement for a knowledge of both languages and where both are used in the performance of duties, providing the incumbents of such positions meet standards of competence established by the Civil Service Commission.

The present program of language training will be strengthened and expanded to make the most effective contribution to the development of proficiency in both languages in the public service in those centres where the need for such proficiency exists.

The federal government will undertake discussions with the Ontario and Quebec governments concerning the early establishment of a secondary school in the Ottawa area in which the language of instruction will be French, in order to meet the requirements of those who wish to provide their children with secondary education in French, and concerning other joint measures that would directly or indirectly contribute to the improvement of the bicultural character of the civil service in the national capital.

A special secretariat on bilingualism is being established within the privy council office under my direction. Working in close consultation and co-operation with the Civil Service Commission, the Treasury Board and all deputy ministers and heads of agencies, it will be responsible for ensuring the co-ordinated and progressive implementation of the government's policy and program regarding bilingualism in the public service.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I should like to express the sincere hope that on the eve of our centennial, all Canadians will share my deep conviction that the policy

and program of the government on bilingualism in the public service will be to make a very important, indeed an essential, contribution to the promotion of national unity and to a great and stronger Canada.

Chapter I

1. Canada, House of Commons, *Debates*, June 12, 1963, 1st session, 925.
2. *Report of the Royal Commission on Government Organization*, I (Ottawa, 1962), 28-9.
3. Wade, Mason, *The French Canadians, 1760-1967*, I (Toronto, 1968), 49.
4. *Ibid.*, 51.
5. *Ibid.*, 51, 50.
6. Hodgetts, J.E., *Pioneer Public Service: An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841-1867* (Toronto, 1956), 53.
7. Heward, Judith, "History of Bilingualism and Biculturalism in the Canadian Public Service," internal research report of the R.C.B.&B. Much of the material for our brief historical survey is taken from Mrs. Heward's paper.
8. *Ibid.*, 7.
9. *Report of the Royal Commission on Administrative Classifications in the Public Service* (Ottawa, 1946), 18.
10. Dawson, McGregor, *The Government of Canada*, 4th ed. revised by Norman Ward (Canadian Government Series, No. 2) (Toronto, 1963).
11. Norman Ward in *ibid.*, 286.
12. Cf. Ashby, Ross, *Design for a Brain* (2nd ed.) (London, 1960), 56: "Two systems may be joined so that they interact on one another to form a single system: to know that the two systems when separate were both stable is to know nothing about the stability of the system formed by their junction: it may be stable or unstable."
13. The level-of-analysis problem is considered by J. David Singer with respect to international relations in Knorr, Klaus and Verba, S. (eds.), *The International System: Theoretical Essays* (Princeton, N.J., 1961), 77-92. Much of Singer's discussion is relevant here. See also the opening chapter of North, Robert C., Holsti, Ole R., Soninavitch, M. George, and Zinnes, Dina A., *Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis* (Evanston, Ill., 1963).
14. See, for example, Bennis, Warren, Benne, K.D., and Chin, R. (eds.) *The Planning of Change: Readings in the Applied Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1961).
15. A fuller explanation of interest-based planning is given in Appendix A. In addition to the theoretical consideration motivating the choice of an interest-based strategy, there were other practical considerations. Aside from the obvious advantages of having a co-operative, non-hostile interest in the project on the part of public servants, and obtaining access to the experience and common sense of practical administrators, we felt that the nature of the problem dictated a service-wide approach

requiring commitment over a long period of time, if expectations of significant progress were to be realized. In order to initiate a long-term multi-centred planning process, support from the senior echelons of administration would be essential.

16. This is discussed more fully in Chevalier, M. "A Strategy of Interest-based Planning," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1968.

17. The following comments were recorded by one of the present authors in an Internal Action Research Working Paper of June 18, 1965: "From the tenor of recent meetings, the attitude of the senior public servant to bilingualism and biculturalism begins to take a clearer shape. The remark about waiting for things to 'distil out' is revealing. . . . In a sense, the senior public servant tends to deal with many large and live issues by holding them at arm's length, giving them an occasional educated prod, watching others prod them, and observing them ripen and develop, or wither away. Almost all of his problems can be (indeed, have to be) treated this way. Because he is conditioned to this kind of response, it takes more than a merely efficient senior public servant to recognize the truly urgent problem, the one which must be attended to right away. In this respect, the pressure for fast action usually comes from outside, logically from the political level."

18. Brown, J.A.C., *The Social Psychology of Industry* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1956), 130.

19. "... One may note also in the social sciences a general shift in emphasis toward the study of the dynamics rather than the statics of society. . . . The sociologist and social anthropologist likewise are less preoccupied with a description of the functioning of societies at a particular point in time and more concerned with discovering processes of change. The political scientist has tended to abandon the study of political institutions as static entities and 'human nature' as a given quantity in favour of the study of political processes and the responses and interactions in terms of human personalities and their environment." Dike, K.O., "The social sciences and humanities in an era of change," *International Social Science Journal*, XVI, No. 4 (UNESCO, Paris, 1964), 509.

20. Proshansky, H.M., "Projective techniques in action research: disguised diagnosis and measurement," in *Projective Psychology*, eds. Lawrence Abt and Leopold Bellak (New York, 1950), 463.

21. *Ibid.*, 464-5.

22. Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Economic Council of Canada, Department of Forestry, Industrial Development Bank, Department of Industry, Department of Mines and Technical Surveys, National Harbours Board, National Film Board, Department of National Health and Welfare, Department of National Revenue (Customs & Excise), Saint Lawrence Seaway Authority.

23. Departments of Trade and Commerce, Finance, Northern Affairs. In addition, discussions were conducted with officials of the Treasury Board and the Civil Service Commission.

24. One example from an Internal Action Research Working Paper from 1965 gives the flavour: "Not enough attention was paid to the thinking they had done, the paper they had prepared, the paper they proposed to prepare, and the various proposals they put forth. Instead of picking up the kind of thing they proposed and building on it, too many attempts were made to introduce other and distinct lines of action. This may well emerge in similar discussions, but the pace cannot be forced. Commission participants must be prepared to start where the department officials are and build viable courses of action. . . . Overall the meeting was exceedingly fruitful. . . . The clear identification of the control agencies as a source of tension (debilitating in this instance) was a most useful finding. . . ."

Chapter II

1. To be comprehensive, a further category might be added to include those problems of administration in a bilingual service which fall outside these four areas, which so predominated in discussions that it has seemed more practical here to eliminate a catch-all "administration" category. To some extent we have rectified this omission in the section on planning styles in Chapter III.

2. This and subsequent quotations are drawn from observers' notes and reports of the context of discussion in meetings.

3. See Appendix B for a fuller description of suggested courses of action.

4. The title "Bicultural Projects Officer" was an arbitrary name chosen early in the life of the Action Research project. No department has necessarily adopted it, and B.P.O. is only used as a matter of convenience to label this concept.

5. The nature of the sample observed, and additional evidence obtained concerning activity (or absence of activity) in non-observed departments, allows considerable confidence that it was representative.

Chapter III

1. Parsons, Talcott, *Structures and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe, III., 1960), 17.

2. Dawson, McGregor, *The Government of Canada*, 4th ed. revised by Norman Ward (Canadian Government Series, No. 2) (Toronto, 1963), 260.

3. *Ibid.*, 260.

4. *Ibid.*, 221.

5. The government's policy was characterized by the *Montreal Gazette* as "a carefully worded statement," by *Le Devoir* as "prudent gradualism." See Appendix C for the text.

6. Mannheim, Karl, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1936).

7. *Preliminary Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, § 104. Note also the analytical distinction between "class" and "society" which the *Preliminary Report* introduces but does not elaborate upon:

"It was as though the entire community were regarded as one single social class which was pictured, according to the speaker, either as a militant middle class or an exploited proletariat. Sometimes this identification was even made explicitly: for example, when it was stated that, taken as a whole, the French Canadian community finds itself in the position of a proletariat in relation to the English-speaking minority." *Ibid.*, § 108.

Descriptively, the two terms "class" and "system" are co-extensive: that is, one may think of French Canadians as a "class" within Canadian society or as a partly integrated social system. The critical difference is that a "class" is composed of individuals with one or more particular features in common which give them a single interest within the larger society—for example, colour, language, economic status. Their power to influence their environment is exercised within that system. Members of a larger social system which is semi-integrated into another, larger social system, may have a second option, which is to withdraw, to *opt out*. The particular framework of analysis one chooses may seem unimportant, but in fact it has significant consequences.

8. This statement holds true however one defines the boundaries of French Canada—by limiting the case to Quebec or by including some, or all, of the minorities, for example.

9. North, Robert C., Holsti, Ole R., Soninavitch, M. George, and Zinnes, Dina A., *Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis* (Evanston, III., 1963), 150.

10. Coser, Lewis, *The Functions of Social Conflict* (Glencoe, III., 1956).

11. Gerth, H.H. and Mills, C. Wright, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York, 1946).

12. In this we make no attempt to evaluate the impact of the so-called "post-industrial" age on the evolution of corporate norms and behaviour (and by implication on the future of Quebec society in North America), particularly if Quebec should find itself once again out of step with major society changes. To take only one illustration, one might speculate concerning the effect of the diminishing importance of "place" for a considerable class of the most mobile and influential segments of the North American population, when weighed against the value of a geographically defined homeland for French Canada, a continuing preoccupation. For further discussion of the non-place community made possible by technological changes in the means of communication, see, for example, Melvin Webber's two articles: "The Urban Place and the Non-place Urban Realm," in *Explorations into Urban Structure* (Philadelphia, 1963), and "Order in Diversity: Community without Propinquity" in *Cities and Space: The Future Use of Urban Land* (Baltimore, 1963).

13. North *et al*, *Content Analysis*, 5-7.

14. Shils, Edward A., "The Study of the Primary Group," *The Policy Sciences*, eds. Daniel Lerner and Harold Laswell (Stanford, 1951), 67.
15. Stouffer, S.A., *et al*, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Vol. I, The American Soldier: Adjustment during Army Life; Vol. II, The American Soldier: Combat and its Aftermath (Princeton, N.J., 1950).
16. Hughes, E.C., "The Knitting of Ethnic Groups in Industry," *American Sociological Review*, XI (1946), 512-9.
17. The famous power blackout of Eastern America which occurred a few years back revealed that even systems which begin from a strictly rational base may become so complex as their various parts evolve that they defy full explanation and control.

Chapter IV

1. The strategy of redeployment has been developed in a working paper presented to the Commission by the authors of this study in August, 1966.
2. The introduction of French-language units in the Public Service has already been recommended by the Commission. See *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, III, §§ 766-94.
3. Bennis, Warren, Benne, K.D., and Chin, R. (eds.) *The Planning of Change: Readings in The Applied Behavioral Sciences* (New York, 1961), 367.
4. The task force is only one of many mechanisms for harnessing the resources of two or more organizations (or the knowledge of a number of disciplines and professions) to a particular purpose. Advisory committees, agreed procedures, regulations, coercion and bargaining, contractual arrangements, various modes and patterns of communication, norms and societal values, etc., or combinations of these, all play a role.
5. Wilensky, Harold L., *Organizational Intelligence* (New York, 1967), 98.
6. See, for example, Hare on communication sets in small groups. Hare, A.P., *Handbook of Small Group Research* (New York, 1962), chap. 10.
7. *Ibid.*, 115.
8. *Ibid.*, 217.
9. *Ibid.*, 309.

Appendix A

1. Based on Chevalier, Michel, "The Strategy of Interest-based Planning," unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1968.
2. See Harris, Britton, "New Tools for Planning," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, Vol. XXI, No. 2 (May 1965).
3. This is the method set out as steps 3, 4, 5, and 6 in *ibid.*, 91.
4. Braybrooke, David and Lindblom, C.E., *The Strategy of Decision* (New York, 1963), 247.
5. Merton, R.K., *et al.*, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," *Reader in Bureaucracy* (New York, 1952), 367.
6. Bennis, Warren, *et al.* *The Planning of Change* (New York, 1961), 154.
7. Abraham Kaplan discusses the development of perspectives in general and V.F. Lensen's notion of "successive definition" in particular in *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco, 1964), 28, 52-4, and 104.
8. Amitai Etzioni discusses scanning as complementary to the incremental approach in his book review of C.E. Lindblom's "The Intelligence of Democracy," *Science* (May, 1966), 747.

Appendix B

1. The following list includes both programmes of action which have been operationalized and ones which remain in the idea stage.

Appendix C

1. House of Commons, April 6, 1966.