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ARTICLES

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Lieutenant-General Burns, Innovative Leader or Analytical Staff Officer?

Operation MEDUSA

Canada and South Sudan: Coming to Grips with "Juba Good"

The Defence of Lavonia: The War We Don't Want

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CANADIAN ARMY JOURNAL – PATRON'S LETTER

Lieutenant-General Wayne D. Eyre, CMM, MSC, CD

Since assuming command, I have had the energizing and rewarding opportunity of visiting our soldiers both within Canada and on operations abroad. These encounters have affirmed my faith in the exceptional quality of our soldiers, Rangers and civilians and have renewed my confidence in our Army's solid foundation. However, maintaining this quality requires concerted effort, and we must always strive to make the Army a better organization than it was when we found it. I would like to take the opportunity to use this forum to highlight some thoughts on leadership and professional development, two pillars I believe are central to the growth and future success of the Canadian Army.

It is a privilege to be given the opportunity and the challenge to lead the Canadian Army. Indeed, at whatever level of command it is undertaken, leading our soldiers is a privilege. I expect leaders at all levels to know and look after their teams, set the example, make the hard decisions, seize the initiative and create opportunities. Leaders must instil a climate of respect, trust and healthy debate and provide forthright yet tactful feedback up and down the chain of command.

How do we ensure that we create leaders who can meet this expectation? History has shown that one of the most important activities any Army undertakes is developing junior leaders. In order to set the conditions for successful leadership, I expect all commanders to execute leader development programs, including reading, debating, writing and publishing to contribute to our body of professional knowledge.

It is incumbent on all leaders, junior and senior alike, to strive for continual learning and professional growth. The tempo of the Army today demands that every opportunity to learn and improve is exploited; a day in the Army where we do not learn something new is a day wasted.

Continual learning and professional development requires continual and deep analytic reading and listening. We must arm ourselves with the lessons and insights of others and this can only be accomplished by reading from the widest array of material. It is our duty as professional leaders to understand everything we can about ourselves, our allies, our potential adversaries, and the environment. The cost of not doing so will be borne by the blood of our soldiers.

Success depends on the preparations and the knowledge of our leaders and soldiers. It demands a solid grounding in the fundamentals of our profession, many of which are timeless. Mastery of fundamentals is a sign of true professionalism and requires deliberate effort and allocated time. However, mastery of fundamentals does not mean that we should be wedded to outdated structures or to certain ways of doing business. Continual learning remains key to ensuring that the Army retains the agility to quickly adapt to and assimilate new ideas and concepts, both at the individual level and across the institution.

This publication, the *Canadian Army Journal*, must remain one of the key vehicles for publishing military thought, stimulating new ideas, challenging old ones, and provoking serious discussion about the profession of arms. Such healthy and vigorous debate has great potential to significantly influence the quality of our individual professional development and the future development of the Army. I highly encourage everyone to read this journal, reflect on its contents, challenge them, and share your own ideas by writing an article for publication. We are all responsible for contributing to our body of professional knowledge.

I very much look forward to soldiering with you, and together we will be stewards of our Army's success.

Lieutenant-General Wayne D. Eyre, CMM, MSC, CD
Commander Canadian Army

EDITORIAL

Major Chris J. Young, CD, M.A.
Editor-in-Chief

I've refrained from penning editorials largely because I don't enjoy writing them, and I'm not sure they're really required. But, of course, I'm breaking from that position to write this one, now that I'm relinquishing my editorship of the *Canadian Army Journal*. The Journal has been an interesting duty for me, and I'd like to thank Major Andrew Godefroy not only for recommending me as his replacement, but more so for setting me up for success during my tenure as editor-in-chief.

Key to the success of the Journal is its outreach program, which entails publicizing the Journal as a worthy platform for lengthy academic articles dealing with matters of interest to the Army. We have been well served by writers not only from the Army, but also from the Joint community, as well as from academics and the public at large. Indeed, one of the more interesting articles of late was written by Ms. Ruth Ward and appeared in Journal Issue 17.3, which was recently published. I heartily recommend it!

The purpose of the Journal is to sponsor a pulpit, if you will, from which varied and diverse voices can make their arguments known. Our intent here at the Journal is to challenge the status quo by giving a voice to alternative thought, within reason and in a respectful manner. Check out the upcoming short opinion piece by Sean Maloney for an excellent example.

The hope is that such challenges will stimulate a conversation about the future of the Army. That conversation has been somewhat more muted than I would have liked, but has nonetheless been present and can be extremely interesting.

I'm deploying this summer and am turning over sole editorship of the Journal to LCol Ron Bell, who has been in the chair since my deployment to South Sudan in 2016. Please continue to send in articles, book reviews and opinion pieces and keep that all too important discussion about the Army alive. Remember that we will work with anyone to help craft your submission to ensure your voice can be heard in a reasoned and respectful way.

I'd like to close by thanking those of you who have assisted me or provided valuable advice on being the Journal's editor. I'd especially like to thank the outstanding staff at the Army Publishing Office with whom I've worked: Susan Russell, PO 2 Steve Bouchier, Francine Lefebvre, Rebecca Abrams, Brandon Denard and Bob Steedman.

Perseverance!

Major Chris J. Young, CD, M.A.
Editor-in-Chief

This volume was compiled in 2018; however, resource constraints resulted in delayed publication. The publication of Volume 18.1 marks the start of a reinvigoration of the *Canadian Army Journal* that will see much more timely publications.

Canadian soldiers of the Operational Liaison and Mentoring Team [left] and soldiers of the Afghan National Army walk through a poppy field during an operation in the Panjwayi district, Afghanistan.

Source: Combat Camera

THE INFLUENCE OF THE OPIUM TRADE ON CONFLICT WITHIN AFGHANISTAN

Captain Thomas L. Nelson, B.A., M.A.

INTRODUCTION

When the United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, many observers commented on the historical difficulties faced by foreign powers engaged in operations within that country. It had been stated frequently that Afghanistan was a "Graveyard of Empires."[1] Explanations for that reputation include the long-standing divisions among the various tribal and ethnic groups that make up Afghan society; the mountainous, inhospitable terrain; the lack of infrastructure; weak governmental institutions and little history of centralized authority; the destructive effects of many years of warfare; endemic corruption; traditional hostility to foreign occupation; and more.[2] However, in the context of the current war in Afghanistan there is another factor that, while relatively well known, is not necessarily recognized for the crucial role it has played in the conflicts of recent decades. That factor is the traffic in narcotics—specifically, in opiates—and the disruptive role they have played as an illicit resource.

DRUGS AS A NATURAL RESOURCE AND A FACTOR IN CONFLICT

Natural resources are often defined as the common materials used in industry, such as oil, gas, minerals and timber. There are, however, other types of natural resources, such as water or agricultural products, which frequently receive less consideration than their industrial counterparts. One such resource is narcotics. Many of the most common types of narcotics (marijuana, cocaine and heroin) begin as crops, like any

Source: David Gill / Development Pictures

Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Qadir of the Afghan Counter Narcotics Police shows the contents of a bag of heroin seized in Lashkar Gah, Helmand. Each bag contains heroin rocks with an approximate street value of over $122,500.

other agricultural product. They are cultivated in rural regions and then go through a process of refinement and packaging, generally nearby, before being shipped to and consumed in downstream black-market economies. Growing conditions in some countries allow them to enjoy tremendous agricultural success in the production of legal crops, while those of other countries are perfectly suited to the plants which become narcotics. The possession of natural resources, whether grown or dug up from the ground, can be a tremendous boon—or sometimes, a tremendous burden—to a state's economy and well-being. One of the potential drawbacks to the possession of natural resources is their link to patterns of violent conflict.[3]

Narcotics, due to their size, concealability and ease of transport, are considered to be a lootable commodity: something of value that can be taken, transported and sold easily. Such commodities are of great value to rebel groups and insurgents, who often face financial insecurity and lack consistent access to an urban manufacturing sector for income. Depending on local growing conditions, narcotics production can also be very flexible. Illicit crops can be grown and processed in remote locations far from the influence of state institutions or rival factions ("distant production"), and the crops themselves can be spread throughout a geographic area in order to reduce vulnerability ("diffuse production").[4]

Whether a commodity can be produced distantly or diffusely may play an important role in determining the form of an armed conflict. Intra-national armed conflicts are likely to take the form of coup d'état, mass rebellion, secession or warlordism, depending on the characteristics of the local industries.[5] These forms reflect the level of centralization and control that a central government can exert over its resources, and therefore the likelihood that one party to a conflict can seize control of the production and trade of such commodities. Because narcotics tend to be both produced far from central control and diffusely cultivated and manufactured, areas with large amounts of such production are predicted to experience warlordism,[6] a situation in which multiple power centres can be formed and pursue their own ends in opposition to central authority.

In addition to shaping a conflict, narcotics can also influence the motivations of the groups that take advantage of them. Movements and insurgencies that were initially ideologically based may become corrupted as they focus energy on securing the criminal profits of their activities rather than on their original causes.[7] Consequently, although drugs may at first be purely a means to an end for a group, as time passes, the organization may become so dependent on the funds generated by these activities that it begins to compromise its ideological stance. As a result, the incentives and dynamics of the conflict itself may change.[8]

Despite the important role played by lootable goods such as narcotics in financing insurgent groups, studies have found that their production and trade are not linked to the initiation of conflict. They are, however, linked to the duration of armed conflicts.[9] It has been shown that the trade in contraband, including narcotics, has prolonged many of the modern world's longest-running civil wars.[10] In the case of narcotics specifically, the magnitude of their production is positively correlated with the length of the conflict.[11]

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE AFGHAN OPIATE TRADE PRIOR TO 2001

Opiates have been in use for thousands of years, and the large-scale trade in opiates has been underway, both legally and illegally, for centuries.[12] However, significant Afghan participation in the global market began only after the Soviet occupation in 1979, even though much of the country possesses the appropriate climate and soil conditions for cultivating opium poppies.[13] The conditions for the boom in opiate production were created through the destruction, dislocation and disorder resulting from the Afghan–Soviet war and were enormously magnified following the Soviet withdrawal and subsequent civil wars.[14] Prior to the Soviet invasion, the Afghan economy depended heavily on agriculture and support from the international community in the forms of both military and economic aid.[15] Throughout the conflict against the Soviets, mujahedeen groups frequently resorted to using funds from the sale of narcotics to bankroll their activities.[16] Those tactics mirrored developments in Pakistan, where large-scale opium production had begun earlier with the support of the Pakistani Inter-services Intelligence.[17] In addition to the mujahedeen, active throughout both the Soviet–Afghan conflict and the ensuing civil war, Afghan warlords emerged who also utilized the drug trade to support their personal ambitions.[18] During that period, opium production increased from approximately 200 metric tonnes in 1980 to approximately 4,500 metric tonnes in 1999.[19]

As the Taliban emerged in southern Afghanistan, they formed a coalition with trucking interests and the local merchant class that allowed them to consolidate power within newly seized territories.[20] As their territory grew, they embraced the opiate trade and went out of their way to ensure its security[21]—a surprising policy considering that the group followed a conservative interpretation of Islam and actively prosecuted any drug users within its own territories.

Taliban leadership, however, had a pragmatic view of opium and heroin production, reflected in the statement that "Opium is permissible because it is consumed by kafirs in the west and not by Muslims or Afghans."[22] That support for the opium trade was met with a positive reaction from many of the small farmers within their territory[23] and served to further stabilize and secure their expansion.[24] The policy of acceptance changed in 2000 when the Taliban banned the production of opium poppies, and 2001 saw the greatest reduction of illicit drug production ever achieved by any nation in a single year.[25] The reasons for the ban are unclear; some claim that it was aimed at gaining international recognition,[26] while others posit that it was intended to increase the value of existing stocks of Taliban-held opium.[27] As a result, the quantity of raw opium produced in Afghanistan fell to its lowest level since 1984.[28]

REMOVAL OF THE TALIBAN: THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH

To overthrow the Taliban, the United States made extensive use of alliances with local warlords and the Taliban's former rival, the Northern Alliance. After the Taliban had been removed from power, a new government was established: the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), centred on Kabul and led by the ostensibly American-friendly Hamid Karzai. Despite the new government, many of the former warlords retained power within their respective regions.[29] By allowing warlords to effectively remain in power in the outer regions of Afghanistan, the American-led coalition undermined the authority of the newly established central government. That decentralization of power was worsened when the United States switched its focus from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2003. Due to the lack of support, the government of Afghanistan was not in full control within the country, and the peripheral regions began to experience a revival of internal conflict and disruption as warlords manoeuvred for more power[30] and the Taliban, along with other insurgent groups such as Shura-i-Nazar and Hezb-e-Islami, began to reassert themselves, including within the narcotics trade.[31]

Shortly after their defeat, the Taliban took advantage of the initial disorder and lack of effective opposition at the periphery to gradually rebuild their influence.[32] Much of their immediate effort following removal from power was focused on regaining control of the southern region of the country,[33] where, due to tribal connections and proximity to the Pakistan border, there was the greatest overlap between the insurgency and the drug trade.[34] As they re-established their authority, the Taliban returned to the practice of taxing the production and transportation of opium and heroin.[35] The International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and GIRoA eventually took action to break the Taliban's open hold on the south, but the insurgency remained a constant threat to the government and continued to derive considerable support from an expanding opiate trade.

RESURGENCE OF THE OPIATE TRADE

In the years immediately following the overthrow of the Taliban, opiate production rose dramatically, returning to the pre-ban levels of 2000.[36] By 2007, it reached a peak of over 8,000 metric tonnes and accounted for at least 90% of global production,[37] and in 2017, as of this writing, it still dominates the world market with a 75% share.[38] The increased drug production entailed serious negative consequences for GIRoA and its ISAF allies.

Source: Jordi Bernabeu Farrús

A view of Pul-e Sukhta Bridge from the banks of the dried up Kabul River, 26 August 2014. While hundreds, often thousands, of addicts swarm below in a self-fueling network of drugs, crime and despair, life seems to continue unaffected above. Government corruption plays a role in undercutting efforts to tackle the opium trade, as do the Taliban, who profit from taxing the crop in areas under their control.

Increased production and export of opiates not only provided financial support for opponents of the government, but also led to increased real-estate speculation and localized inflation, undermined Afghan currency stability and displaced legitimate production.[39] Perhaps the most destructive impact was on GIRoA's credibility. As a result of rampant corruption, much of which was linked to narcotics (e.g. the half-brother of President Hamid Karzai was widely thought to be engaged in the drug trade), Afghans perceived the country to be deeply corrupt, and it ranked third-worst in the world according to a Transparency International survey.[40]

The problems created by the surge in opiate production were not limited to Afghanistan. As production rose, global availability increased and prices decreased, undermining international efforts to eliminate the use of narcotics. The increased production and trade of opiates spurred development and expansion of smuggling routes throughout Central Asia, leading to higher crime rates and the erosion of government control within neighbouring states.[41] Unsurprisingly, rates of addiction and of human immunodeficiency virus infection among the populations of Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia also increased.[42]

Source: U.S. Army, Combined Task Force Arrowhead Public Affairs

Afghan National Army soldiers, from the 1st Kandak, 2nd Brigade, 205th Corps, Shinkai district, destroy a field of opium poppies discovered during a routine patrol outside the village of Samogay, Afghanistan, 7 May 2012. Throughout Afghanistan, efforts are under way by the Afghan National Security Forces to eradicate the illicit drug trade, which is prohibited by Sharia law.

FAILURE OF THE COUNTER-NARCOTICS APPROACH

In addition to the post–11 September 2001 United States "War on Terror," which led to North Atlantic Treaty Organization involvement in Afghanistan, the American government has simultaneously continued its "War on Drugs," which was declared in 1971 by President Nixon[43] as a statement of the American goal to eliminate the trade and consumption of illegal narcotics. That policy has enjoyed considerable international support, including United Nations declarations opposing the use and trafficking of narcotics.[44] It put significant pressure on the post-Taliban GIRoA and on ISAF forces to take action against the drug trade. Their actions primarily took the form of eradication, interdiction, amnesty and alternative development. Despite considerable effort, those actions proved largely ineffective.[45]

Eradication efforts were focused on the active destruction of opium crops at the farm level and placed those doing the eradicating—ISAF and GIRoA forces—in the position of acting directly against the interests of the local communities that derived much of their income from opium.[46] Additionally, eradication efforts were perceived to have been applied in a selective and partisan manner to the benefit of those with ties to the government and international forces, which was unpopular with the Afghan public.[47] Consequently, popular support for both the Afghan government and ISAF was undermined and support for the Taliban increased.[48] Interdiction—the direct interception and disruption of narcotics production and transportation—was less damaging to public support than eradication but proved ineffective due to the adaptability of smugglers and the enormous size of the area to be covered by interdiction teams.[49]

Added difficulties arose during interdiction and eradication operations due to conflicts of interest between counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics operations. Because of the significant corruption within GIRoA, as well as ISAF forces' reliance on friendly warlords, aggressive counter-narcotics interdiction frequently threatened essential allies in the fight against the insurgency.[50] Afghan and ISAF forces were left to choose between endangering support for counter-insurgency operations by pursuing counter-narcotics goals, or undermining government authority by ignoring friendly traffickers. Similarly, attempts at drug amnesty further contributed to the appearance of corruption and impunity within the government and among the elites.[51] Alternative development opportunities, primarily support for growing other crops,[52] also proved largely ineffective, as poppy crops still offered the best overall returns[53] and were less reliant on built infrastructure.[54] The unattractiveness of less profitable crops was magnified by the fact that many Afghan farmers were in a constant state of debt in which any default would result in the loss of their land. Thus, even for those who wanted to do so, it was nearly impossible to switch to a legally sanctioned crop.[55]

Ironically, not only were most counter-narcotics efforts ineffective, but there was also evidence that the disruption caused by counter-insurgency operations and aggressive counter-narcotics interdiction and eradication actually boosted poppy production and local violence. According to one study:

> Opium production is less hurt than other activities by the local destructions that conflicts cause; it is less dependent on infrastructure such as roads and irrigation systems and it becomes more socially feasible as conflicts alter local power and moral norms.[56]

The same study found that poppy cultivation was not linked to future violence; however, a high correlation was found between the incidence of violence within a region and a subsequent increase in the growth of poppies the following season.[57] A similar study found that opiates played no clear role in exacerbating the violence and that, instead, there was a potential conflict-induced opiate production cycle.[58] Results such as these, in which anti-narcotics operations appear to actually worsen the situations they aim to address, are in line with studies of domestic crime which show that aggressive drug enforcement fails to reduce the drug supply and may increase drug-market violence.[59]

The effects of GIRoA's and ISAF's anti-narcotics measures on state stability and governmental control contrast with those produced by the Taliban's methods, employed during their rise and throughout most of their rule of Afghanistan. Since their overthrow in 2001, we can only guess at the Taliban's long-term agenda for the opium trade, but certain elements of their past policies stand out. By embracing the narcotics trade early in their conquest of Afghanistan, and by maintaining that policy until shortly before their overthrow, the Taliban may have simply become another ideological group that grew dependent on drug revenue and compromised its moral position (or were there deeper reasons for its actions?)—in which case, the open fostering of narcotics production, and the networks associated with it, may have actually contributed to state building during the rise of the Taliban.[60] The Taliban's relationship with the drug economy was more than just a source of funds; it also gave them a certain amount of central control over the process that supported their institutional relationships and authority. That contrasts with the post-Taliban GIRoA, which maintained an openly anti-narcotics stance while being seen as weak and deeply corrupt due to senior figures' contradictory conduct.[61] Ironically, by supporting opium production during its initial rule, instead of completely opposing it as its successor did, the Taliban could be seen as more attuned to the concerns of Afghanistan's rural population.

A comparison of the post-Taliban ISAF-backed anti-narcotics policies with the Taliban's initial embrace of narcotics production and export leads to the conclusion that the anti-narcotics model employed by ISAF and GIRoA, combined with their efforts to concurrently combat an insurgency, was ineffective. The Taliban's acceptance of the drug trade allowed it to gain the support of merchants and farmers as well as a lucrative tax stream and economic influence, but the post-Taliban GIRoA, along with its Western supporters, alienated those same communities and proved unable to manage a resource sector of the economy which was alleged to be worth 27% of the country's total gross domestic product[62] and provided a livelihood to millions of Afghans.[63]

THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH

Afghanistan is not unique in being engaged in a conflict involving a large illicit narcotics sector (compare the cocaine trade throughout the Andes region and Central America). Therefore, it would be wise for local governments, as well as the broader international community, to consider new ways of addressing such conflicts. One possibility would be the creation of a licit opiate industry in which poppies would be grown and processed into morphine, as proposed by the International Council on Security and Development (formerly the Senlis Council) in 2005.[64] Ideally, that would allow Afghan farmers to profit from poppy crops while creating a new domestic industry similar to those in India and Turkey. Unfortunately, in a perverse catch-22, that type of policy is unlikely to work well and may even exacerbate problems because of Afghanistan's current lack of governance and transportation infrastructure, as well as the intractable violence that already exists within many of the areas where opium poppies are cultivated.[65] Likewise, it is uncertain that the contemporary market in legal opiates is big enough to accommodate the entrance of a player as large as Afghanistan would likely be.

A more extreme option would be for the state government—or, in the case of an international intervention, the international community—to regulate the narcotics market, something which would require some form of legalization in order to be effective. By doing so, the government could attempt to regulate the production of narcotics and apply certification and reviewing processes like those used for lumber in Liberia[66] and for conflict diamonds globally.[67] Those policies could weaken rebel groups by taking production out of the hands of criminals and by identifying and halting the exportation of non-certified narcotics. That approach, however, would constitute an extreme policy reversal from the current norm and would likely face opposition from both the domestic and international communities. Additionally, in terms of practical application, narcotics certification and regulation would likely be much more difficult to apply than the certification regimes used for other less portable and more physically distinct commodities such as wood or diamonds.

If sufficiently large licit opiate markets are not created or widespread legalization is not introduced, then governments and international organizations must better recognize the role of the narcotics trade in support of insurgencies and develop improved operating procedures, state-building practices and economic alternatives to counter its effects. Some militaries have begun to take steps in that direction: the United States Army / Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency* field manual[68] and the Canadian Army *Counter-Insurgency Operations* doctrine manual[69]

Source: Jordi Bernabeu Farrús

Afghan National Police officers from the Anti-Narcotics Quick Reaction Force carry out an anti-drug trafficking raid scenario exercise at a training centre in Kabul

Source: Jordi Bernabeu Farrús

Afghan National Police officers from the Anti-Narcotics Quick Reaction Force carry out an anti-drug trafficking stop-and-search scenario exercise at a training centre in Kabul

both refer to narcotics smuggling as a criminal means of financing an insurgency, although neither publication provides anything close to a comprehensive consideration of the role that narcotics production and smuggling can play. Likewise, neither the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*[70] nor the United Nations *Planning Toolkit*[71] includes references to the role of narcotics as a factor in armed conflict. However, some academics are putting thought into how peacekeepers can devise and adopt strategies for controlling conflict resources, something which could be applied to the control of illegal narcotics and related activities as well.[72]

If counter-narcotics policies are to be applied, the party applying them must be aware of the inherent difficulties of doing so and the risks of creating conflicts of interest between the various ongoing counter-insurgency operations. Ultimately, any state wishing to conduct simultaneous counter-insurgency and counter-narcotics campaigns must understand the enormous risks engendered by perceptions of corruption, and the resulting loss of public support, if it attempts to cut corners and favour one goal to the detriment of the other. States should also favour state-building measures that support the creation of effective institutions and the provision of economic alternatives, paired with subsidies, to ensure that alternative options are at least as attractive as the illegal commodity being relinquished.

Afghanistan gained a reputation as a graveyard of empires due to the many socio-cultural and geographic challenges it poses. However, far too little attention has been paid to the unique contributions of narcotics as a conflict resource in that country's situation. Such errors must be avoided in the future. States and international organizations need to recognize the impact of the narcotics trade and specifically tailor their operations and policies to counter its effects. If that is not done, the legacy of contradictory and ineffective actions will continue.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Captain Thomas L. Nelson joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 2004 and was commissioned as an infantry officer into the Royal 22e Régiment (R22eR) after graduating from Royal Military College (RMC) Kingston in 2009. He served overseas and domestically with the 3rd Battalion R22eR, was an instructor and the Standards Officer at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS), and is currently the Captain-Adjutant of the Régiment de Maisonneuve in Montreal, Quebec. His operational experience includes commanding platoons during the 2010 humanitarian response mission in Haiti and during the domestic response to the 2011 floods in Montérégie, Quebec, and command of a mentor team during the 2012 training mission in Afghanistan. From 2013 to 2017 he served at CFLRS in a variety of training-related positions, and in 2017 he was posted to the Régiment de Maisonneuve. He holds a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Honours Economics from RMC and a Master of Arts in Conflict Analysis and Management from Royal Roads University.

ENDNOTES

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Private Farah of 1 Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry keeps watch as the rest of his platoon prepares to move out during Exercise ALLIED SPIRIT V in the Hohenfels Training Area in Germany on 7 October 2016, during Operation REASSURANCE.

Source: Combat Camera

THE BENEFITS OF TARGETING ETHNO-CULTURES IN CANADIAN ARMED FORCES RECRUITMENT STRATEGY

Major (Retired) Rev. Dr. Harold Ristau

INTRODUCTION

The lack of new recruits into the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is an obvious concern for the future of the Canadian military. Extending the age of retirement for certain trades on a conditional basis or assuring greater financial benefits for members are not long-term solutions. The problem is not unique to Canada but is a phenomenon shared by many other Western nations according to a recent joint study conducted by the defence forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Canada on the attractiveness of the armed forces as a career among young people.[1] The studies were wisely designed to control for ethno-cultures (i.e. ethnic minorities) that not only offer a new resource pool, especially with regard to new immigrants who are seeking meaningful employment, but are also increasingly more representative of Canadian populations and outnumber historical Caucasian majorities in some urban regions. The purpose of this article is not to assess or evaluate the statistical details of those studies, but rather, to highlight a few trends which may help guide, justify and inform the proposition that recruitment strategies ought to be developed or refined in ways that target, and even favour, young people from various ethno-cultures. This means emphasizing service in the CAF in terms of a vocation, and not simply as *a job*—one that focuses on altruistic Canadian values, morals and spirituality as a means of understanding human and national identity, and has the potential of increasing the attractiveness of service and the maintenance of a healthy self-identification among members. In short, instead of ignoring or minimizing cultural differences, we are wiser to utilize and harness them to common societal advantage.[2]

THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION FOR NEW RECRUITS

In our increasingly individualistic societies, the results of recruitment surveys are not surprising, although they should be disturbing. The surveys indicate that most people join the military for reasons of self-advancement. Unfortunately, many elements of most of the surveys in question presuppose that reality as well. Except in the case of Canada—for reasons explained below—the surveys also show that the idea of joining the military to serve one's country carries little value for the respondents.[3] This is problematic for a healthy society because when one examines the history of modern militaries as extensions of a nation's ethos and an expression of its identity, a military consisting of personnel that are primarily enrolled for reasons of self-interest (i.e. financial stability, career opportunities, etc.) can begin to easily resemble an army of mercenaries. After the development of nation-states, to varying degrees and certainly with much unfortunate prejudice, militaries attempted to reflect the demographics of the populations of the country from which they arise in terms of ethnicity, language and religion in order to minimize the consequences of the mercenary mindset (since, presumably, those that fight for a cause in which they personally believe are more committed to those that do not) but also for nationalistic reasons and to rally public support for militaristic endeavours. Despite some well-founded criticism, mandatory conscription was justified when society assumed it was an expression, and even *an extension,* of the ethos of the greater community.

When that common ethos was lost, conscription certainly began to look barbaric.[4] Yet mercenaries or *hired hands* are no adequate substitutes. Mercenaries are not as effective or resilient,[5] since they do not have the same incentive toward the mission. Simply put, they often lack the longer-term passion, vision and conviction to fulfill the task. They are also less likely to willingly risk their lives for it. Arguably, the deterioration of the military strength of the Roman Empire was a result of the decline of soldiers' faith in the system, leadership and *telos* (goal) of the empire. Without having meaning and purpose rooted in a principle outside of themselves, these citizens, as could be expected, turned inwards. They wanted better wages, longer vacations and more benefits. Being a soldier was redefined in terms of serving the self as opposed to serving the nation. Yet, patriotism plays a key role in the health of a military.

One noticeable trend in the studies in question was that people tend to join because of individualistic goals and for reasons of self-fulfillment over patriotic ones. The age of nationalism—when people enrolled mainly to serve God and country—may have ended during the final years of the Cold War coupled with voters and media that were justifiably more critical and skeptical of political goals and their consequent propaganda in pursuit of nationalistic ends. But, at the same time, with the lack of any kind of noticeable moral motivation for new recruits today, what fills the vacuum? Where self-interest is the driving force, one may wonder whether the Canadian government is employing, and deploying, an army of mercenaries. As stated above, Canada fared better than most of the other nations on the question of joining the CAF for reasons of national pride and service. However, it is hard to tell to what degree this was the case since candidates were asked to rate their motivating factors according to "institutional motivations" and then "self-motivations," and the objective of the survey was not to make comparisons between them. However, if recent CAF advertising provides any clues as to the motivations for joining, it appears that attractiveness is presumed to be driven more by reasons of self-motivation instead of patriotic factors. The advertisements normally focus on job excitement and fulfillment, and images of the Canadian flag are included but are clearly not the focus. The recruitment web page does begin by emphasizing service to country, but then mentions it virtually nowhere else but continues with self-motivation and benefits. This is not to advocate for some sort of Captain Canada or medieval knight figure,[6] but simply suggests a return to the expectation that new recruits truly and sincerely embrace basic values and virtues consistent with a language of *service,* in contrast with one of *entitlement.* Yet, whether or not Canadians are patriotic, how does one instill or maintain a mentality aligned with the *profession of arms* concept based on altruistic morals while opposing principles are the prime motivator for joining? How can we expect self-sacrifice to be the guiding principle tactically while self-fulfillment is assumed as one of the main motivators for enrollment?[7] In short, due to the military's unique function of conducting violence on behalf of society, it is always dangerous to recruit newcomers without any consideration of the pitfalls inherent to members' personal motivations.[8] Proactively inculcating altruistic values and the kind of soft patriotic motivators where allegiance towards a communal value or good larger than oneself supersedes self-interest (i.e. a bias towards self-sacrifice)[9] as reasons to join or continue serving can certainly help circumvent the temptation to perceive the military as *work* instead of *service.*

Source: Combat Camera

Captain Suzan Seo, an Engineering Advisor with the Disaster Assistance Response Team, discusses the team's possible role in establishing a camp for displaced persons with a district official in Tirrukkovil, Sri Lanka, in January 2005.

Although the surveys were basically reflective of the present military ethos, the survey methods themselves may have contributed to the problem. Questions of national pride were included in the surveys, but in many cases they were overshadowed by the large number of other questions revolving around personal development factors. Given the principle that there is no neutral medium,[10] understating factors such as patriotism and serving fellow citizens as reasons to join only reaffirms the normalcy of the phenomenon. The architects of the surveys may operate under the presumption that it is common knowledge that patriotism is not a serious reason to join. For many new recruits this may very well be the case. However, presuming it does not help; rather, it normalizes that bias and it does so at the expense of those individuals who may indeed have had more altruistic reasons to join but who now wonder if they are at odds with the cultural norm. In other words, those that join mainly to serve their country wonder if they are out of touch and adapt their worldview accordingly. This would seemingly be most applicable in the case of minority ethnic groups or newer immigrants who are constantly challenged to *fit in*. On the other hand, by incorporating more patriotic-specific reasons for enrollment, one potentially creates the desire for it as well. In short, the surveys not only reflect, but help create the contingent expectations[11] for enrolling by limiting the spectrum of possibilities for thinking about the subject matter. In other words, if the presumption is that self-interest is the prime motivating factor in the survey, those who take the survey will adjust their prejudice accordingly. In terms of *realpolitik* one could argue that one needs to sell the CAF as a patriotic organization in order to help it remain one or improve as one.

Corporal Ric Mosquito, 1 Service Battalion, talks with one of the children climbing on military vehicles at the Capital Exhibition in Edmonton, AB, in July 2012.

Source: Combat Camera

THE VALUE IN RECRUITING YOUNG PEOPLE FROM ETHNO-CULTURES

On the positive side, the surveys indicate that the motivating factors for enrollment among young people from ethno-cultures had less to do with career opportunities. For all ethnocultural groups, wanting a job where they could make a difference (through humanitarian efforts, peacekeeping, defending Canada, etc.) was one of the most influential reasons for contacting the CAF.[12] Clearly, these are healthy qualities for potential soldiers and military members. It is unsurprising, since immigrants from non-Western English-speaking countries—although still somewhat individualistic due to the impact of global culture—often tend to be more communitarian,[13] communicating those values (which are conducive to the military environment and objectives) to their offspring. Furthermore, exposure to environments of intense suffering tends to make some individuals more resilient[14] and those who have not recovered well are not tempted to join.[15] Due to living in complex ethical zones, they tend to be more ethically decisive.[16] In short, recruiting from ethno-cultures is not simply a second option to recruiting from the pool of traditional Caucasian Canadians. Instead, new recruits from ethno-cultures bring added value to the operation, with still unexplored positive potential for playing key roles in diplomacy and mission-specific objectives, particularly in missions conducted in their countries of origin. In addition, it makes for a more multicultural CAF that is reflective of a multicultural Canada.

METHODS OF RECRUITING YOUNG PEOPLE FROM ETHNO-CULTURES

How does one refocus recruitment strategies to target ethnocultural groups? According to studies by the American Psychological Association, immigrants from non-Western nations tend to join organizations in which they do not just see their employment as a job, but instead, view it as a vocation[17] carrying greater purpose and meaning. The answer to making the military more attractive among ethno-cultures may be a return to emphasizing the importance of ethics and morality[18] to CAF personnel, as they encapsulate and represent the Canadian identity.[19] It may also involve highlighting our obligations as Canadians to serve in such honourable governmental institutions. Some[20] have suggested that a reconsidered recruitment strategy could include targeting minority groups by taking into account *their expectations and demands* through relevant advertisement. In the case of ethno-cultures, this would include content around patriotic values. What the average Caucasian Canadian reader may not realize, however (and with which they may be uncomfortable at first, but at further thought will hopefully embrace by the end of this article), is that such efforts inevitably involve spirituality. Spiritual convictions underpin patriotic or nationalistic ones. For instance, ethical behaviour is founded upon a person's core beliefs and moral convictions, both of which are inevitably driven by spirituality and questions of faith.[21] Many ethnocultural groups embrace the relationship between spirituality, morality and ethics. Incidentally, labour organizations are realizing the importance of religion to these groups as an essential factor in the organization's future growth because religion represents a core component of how new immigrant workers cope with stressful occupational realities[22] and find deeper meaning in their work. In other words, people from ethnocultural groups are not as allergic to the language of spirituality in the secular workplace as Caucasian Canadians. Furthermore, the language of spirituality resonates not only with younger people from ethnocultural groups, but also more generally with the younger generation of today. Approximately three quarters of millennials consider themselves "spiritual."[23] Their openness to the notion of spirituality alleviates the fear that such a recruitment shift to target ethno-cultures would exclude them.

Although this new generation of millennials are often deemed to be self-entitled, selfish narcissists, they are often more open-minded and flexible, with the potential of being goal- or ideal-oriented. This open-mindedness coupled with a new curiosity, means they do not have the same religious hang-ups as their Generation X parents and baby boomer grand-parents before them. They are capable of more objectively approaching questions surrounding the notion of serving God and country without the same level of cynicism or prejudice towards religion and morality. Questions of maintaining a neutral public space without any semblance of objective truth at play is not an issue with which they struggle. If they are persuaded of what is right, they are more likely to fully commit themselves to that value, although it would more than likely need to occur on their terms, as opposed to those of any given authority—a *glitch* that would need to be worked out in basic training!

Still a responsible Canadian would naturally ask the question, "Is such a suggested refocus of recruitment efforts celebrating the spiritual components of many ethnocultural groups morally justifiable in a 'secular' Canada?" I would argue that, yes, it is entirely in line with the Canadian ethos, which is more sympathetic toward and inclusive of spirituality than is often believed (in spite of remaining critical or indifferent toward traditional religious expressions). This claim is reaffirmed by a fascinating presupposed anthropology underlying the definition of a person, one which rejects a simply materialist view in favour of a spiritually sensitive one, from a surprising government institution—the Canadian military!

SPIRITUALITY AND MORALITY IMPORTANT TO CANADIANS DESPITE POPULAR PERCEPTIONS

Recently in *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy*, the Army Commander recognized how spirituality is not simply a helpful resource for some members and their families, but an essential one for the institution, in order to insure that

> …they are prepared to the highest level necessary for the demands of operations at home and abroad. A key factor in this preparedness involves the promotion of psychological, physical and spiritual resilience among soldiers, their families and the Army community.[24]

The implications of naming spirituality as an essential component of military members' identity are immense and long overdue. Since chaplains have traditionally been considered subject matter experts with regard to spirituality, it offers a new essentiality and importance to their role. For years, chaplains have found themselves operating between shrinking arcs of fire, as other specialists have incorporated many of their tasks into their own. Historically, helping professionals were limited to medical doctors and chaplains. The medical community oversaw the physical needs, while the chaplaincy looked after everything else pertaining to mental, psychological and spiritual health. With the specialization of mental health services in the decades following WWII, coupled, perhaps, with an increasing suspicion towards religious institutions, the expectations and roles of the chaplain became limited to religious responsibilities. That was unfortunate however, because of the overlap between the spiritual and psychological well-being of members. But now, part and parcel with holistic movements in mental health that recognize the interrelationship between the mind, body and spirit (as does the *Army Strategy*), chaplaincy and spirituality are regaining their rightful place.

Source: Combat Camera

Captain Bill Hodson, Task Force Chaplain, gives his sermon at a church service during Exercise SARMIS in Cincu, Romania, on 17 May 2015, during Operation REASSURANCE.

A decade in Afghanistan also helped in this shift in vision as the CAF leadership can honestly say that, with respect to individual counselling and soldier resilience, they know that spirituality is an indispensable resource or element of human existence and meaning, even though they have great difficulty defining it with precision. Spirituality, psychological resilience, and behaving ethically are decreasingly compartmentalized from one another. And this anthropological shift in a military member's identity has not occurred in isolation from the populace at large and their underlying metaphysical view of what it means to be human.

HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR A HEIGHTENED APPRECIATION OF SPIRITUALITY IN CANADIAN IDENTITY

In light of the popular presumption that Canadians remain neutral with regard to the importance of spirituality to the human identity, it may seem somewhat new and radical that a government institution such as the military would so boldly proclaim its essentiality. Yet, advocating for an increasing role for spirituality in fostering a member's overall mental resilience and personal maturity is actually in line with a new openness among Canadians towards spirituality, however cynical most Anglo-Saxon Canadians remain towards organized religions.[25] We even see this materializing in a surprising place: the historic Supreme Court decision on prayer in public places, Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City) in 2015. The concern to "neither favour nor hinder any particular belief, and the same holds true for non-belief"[26] amounts to agreeing that non-belief is, in fact, a belief. Those who confess a belief of unbelief are entitled to the same attention in the public sphere as those who confess beliefs derived from traditional faith groups. In other words, a truly secular agenda would have great difficulty applying the logic of religious freedom to expressions of non-belief. The equal treatment of "beliefs" (even when they are not in a traditional religious sense) is aligned with the data that asserts an increasing or steady support of spirituality among Canadians, even if it is not reflected in traditional religious affiliations.[27]

Furthermore, what may appears to be a new anthropology—a new understanding of the relationship between body and soul—is perhaps not that new after all. The increasingly open and generally warm discussion of spirituality, faith and religion in the civil realm may be due to the influence of the multicultural/multireligious make-up of Canada. It appears that Caucasian Canadians are seeming to increasingly realize that being human cannot simply be reduced to principles of positivistic materialism that reduces mental processes to biological ones without any consideration for a spiritual element. It is not surprising that, in contrast with neo-gnostic dualism, the idea that the body and soul are somewhat inseparable from one another arises from the traditional Judaeo-Christian worldview which is, after all, Canada's historic philosophical roots. And because ethics and morality belong to the sphere of conscience and spirit, any anthropological understanding of the self has significant implications for the ways in which a society explains, promotes, justifies and enables ethics and moral behaviour among its citizens. As stated earlier, ethics are always, in some sense, spiritual, because they involve questions of metaphysics. Ethics are always, in some sense, religious because they involve teleological (goal-oriented) questions of the common good. In other words, ethics are rooted in values, and values always carry moral weight. Those values are, in turn, rooted in core beliefs and self-understanding of how the self and the Transcendent (i.e. "God/god" being whatever principles are higher than oneself) relate.[28] In the military, the values of self-sacrifice, honour, respect and courage, although not specifically religious, are based in notions of God and faith.[29] For example, self-sacrifice does not fit with the atheistic Darwinian principle of brute self-survival. The foundation for military values, and even the importance they play in any society, demonstrate that they are founded upon moral convictions, which are, again, inevitably religious.

In light of that, one could argue that the absence of spirituality intensifies the pursuit of self-interest. Christian theologian Paul Tillich in *Morality and Beyond* suggested that employment is complemented by spirituality because it fosters concern for family, colleagues and the broader community[30] and adds divine meaning to what people do, how people work, and the way in which people function as citizens.[31] One may lament that such an anthropological view contradicts the North American axiom: separation of church and state. However, unless human beings, who operate in the realm of "state," possess no soul/spirituality, there is inevitably an overlap between those two spheres. In fact, the first to express the concept of the distinction between state and church, while not by any means advocating for a theocracy, found it inconceivable and undesirable for such a juxtaposition between the two, since, if that were the case, ethics and morality would have no place in steering our society and guarding it from poor and dangerous behaviour in terms of Western civilization. In the third century, St Augustine of Hippo was the first to articulate the separation between the two spheres or what he called the two cities of heavenly realities and earthly ones, yet never without an overlap.[32] The "cities" of "heaven" and "earth" both share a common moral/spiritual foundation. Applied to the military, one imagines he would have argued that soldiers were best at what they did when they were in touch with God and spirituality. In the fifteenth century, Martin Luther resurrected this thought as a consequence of determining the balance of power between the Pope and the Prince. He defended the vocation of soldier and executioner in the aftermath of the Protestant Reformation when puritanical groups believed the purely secular occupations were less holy than others.[33] Luther reiterated the idea that all people had equal value before God, and, thus all legal vocations were godly ones. Each person was an instrument of God in serving society and neighbour.[34] Stephen T. Carrol explains in his work, "Addressing Religion and Spirituality in the Workplace":

> Starting with the reformation and continuing with the growth of capitalism, concept of work in the modern western world evolved from representing a mere means for daily survival to an activity with complex meaning and significance.... [B]ecause many people spend the majority of the week working, the intersection of faith and work provide critical insights about psychosocial and organizational functioning.[35]

The Reformation's influence over religious, cultural and economic values significantly changed how many Christians viewed the relationship between personal holiness and their daily and ordinary vocations.[36] The natural consequences of a healthy spiritual relationship with God through religious acts were good deeds shown towards one's neighbour. These included "dirty jobs" and the "necessary evils" such as soldiering. God's presence was hidden in these places since, if they were necessary for the good of society, they were God's instruments on earth. Even atheists and those unaware of the presence of God remained His instruments in serving creation. But Luther believed those who were prayerful believers in God to be more moral and ethical instruments in carrying out their function. Many of these presuppositions continue to be tightly embedded in the Canadian worldview. According to the *Army Strategy*, I would hold that those who foster their spirituality are better enabled at behaving ethically and with positive moral conviction, as well as being more mentally and physically fit, than those who do not.

CONCLUSION

The idea that people are spiritual is not something to be philosophically avoided (due to a fear of theocracy), or politically tolerated (to patronize religious groups), but ought to be celebrated in a society which seeks to foster a public space shaped by universal ethics and general morality. This is especially important in multicultural societies that have the potential of quickly becoming fragmented in order to secure a common and unified national identity. Ethics are good. Morals are good. Spirituality is good. These claims are not new, even though, during the secularizing and borderline anti-religious climates since WWII, they were underplayed, and had an impact on the values of subsequent generations. On the contrary, those values are not shared among ethno-cultures and millennials, who may find the CAF more attractive if they encounter warmth towards their ethics and values. They do not share the previous generations' criticism. New ethnic immigrants and their children, who share a different history and context, tend to be more open-minded, and theoretically, would be more open to joining the CAF, if they had reasons that resonated with the worldview they already hold. Where their worldviews tend to be more traditionally religious, and morally based, recruitment themes underscoring ethics rooted in values of self-sacrifice and patriotism, may reveal to be more fruitful than ones simply involving the benefits of personal success, self-fulfillment, etc. Even civilian firms increasingly cultivate spirituality and ethics through advertising, and innovative approaches cultivate a shared sense of mission and membership among managers and employees while enhancing productivity and loyalty to the organization.[37] The benefits of spirituality may have been presumed or overlooked for years, but now are being seriously considered by Canadians.

In light of serious recruitment concerns, a refocusing on these issues that are already, in some sense, intuitive to the Canadian identity, will potentially result in a CAF which is more attractive to younger people from ethnocultural communities. The present climate is ripe for the further exploration of some of those possibilities. After all, a preoccupation with attracting the best candidates into the CAF is also founded in religious values and a spiritual worldview. So why is it that when the Canadian populace is behind us, we shy away from saying it clearly and using it to our common advantage, which is to serve and protect our fellow brothers and sisters?

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Padre Harold Ristau was born in Waterloo, Ontario. He completed a B.A. with Honours from the University of Waterloo in Political Science and Economics with a specialization in Administrative Studies (1995), followed by an M.A. in Political Science (1996) and his MDiv from Concordia Lutheran Theological Seminary and Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario (2000). Ordained in 2001, Padre Ristau was called to an inner-city congregation in Montréal, Quebec, and was a pastor to two congregations, one Slovak and one multicultural, working closely with Muslim refugees from Pakistan and India. Padre Ristau also began his Ph.D. in Religious Studies at McGill University part-time, completing it four years later. In 2006, Padre Ristau began chaplaincy work in the Reserve Force of the Canadian Forces in Laval, Quebec, and shortly thereafter enrolled in the Regular Forces. During his first posting to CFB Valcartier, from 2006–2011, Padre Ristau served as chaplain to 3 R22eR, 5 ASG, 430 Tac Hel Sqn and 5 Svc Bn; as Chapel Life Coordinator to both the French and English congregations at St. Alban's Protestant chapel; and served a vacant Malagasy Lutheran community.

During that period he deployed twice to Afghanistan and successfully completed his parachutist course. In 2011, Padre Ristau was employed as the CFChSC Course Director at CFB Borden, and in 2012 became the Standards Officer. In 2015, he was posted to CANSOFCOM.

Padre Ristau is the author of various religious, spiritual and theological articles and three books. One, entitled *At Peace with War: A Chaplain's Meditations from Afghanistan* (Wipf & Stock, 2012), received a CDS commendation and is a journal dedicated to the honourable work of chaplains and the members of NATO forces.

ENDNOTES

1. A series of presentations offered at the 2015 International Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS), Chicago, Ill.
2. For a sophisticated study of this proposition as it applies to businesses and professional organizations, see Susan C. Schneider and Jean-Louis Barsoux, *Managing Across Cultures* (London: Prentice Hall, 1997). See also Nancy Otis and Phyllis Browne, *The Attractiveness of the Canadian Armed Forces among Ethnocultural Minorities* (Department of National Defence, 2015). The study by Nancy Otis and Phyllis Browne is an excellent step in the right direction in its assertion of the importance and necessity of attracting ethnocultural minorities.
3. Switzerland was one exception. Those asked gave some importance to serving country (50%) and defending Switzerland (60%), assuming "defending Switzerland" for nationalistic reasons and not self-preservation. This may be explained by a strong Swiss national identity and pride (Canada may have fared better for some of the same reasons). Yet still, self-interest in terms of finances and career opportunities remains of utmost importance. See Tibor Szvircsev Tresch and Tiffany Graf, *Job Expectations among Young Swiss Men and Women with Particular Regard to the Swiss Military* (Zurich: Swiss Military Academy at the ETH, 2015).
4. Especially true in a situation like in Quebec where conscription debates were driven (at least partially) by a conflict between two different cultural ethos.
5. See Paul T. Bartone and the Hardiness Scale as a measure of resilience (where "resilience" is the ability to bounce back after trauma and live healthily with the new reality) at *www.kbmetrics.com*. Resilience can be reduced to *control* (the belief you can control or influence events), *commitment* (tendency to see life as interesting and meaningful) and *challenge* (preference to explore and try new things). The foundation of all three components revolve around questions of faith, belief and perception and are more easily fostered in environments where soldiers believe in what they do and have a strong sense of identity and vocation.
6. Incidentally, and despite their characterization as being unconditionally loyal to their lords, knights were also known for choosing personal motivations and career advancement over service.
7. Some of this happens by successful indoctrination and occurs simply through military culture and training, but people do not enter as blank slates.
8. Many successful coups have been carried out by military leaders who lost sight of their vocation and responsibility, confusing self with politician, and convincing their subordinates that it was in their best personal interests to follow along.
9. See Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 39, 507, where he contrasts the cultural atomism and political-cultural individualism of English-speaking Western societies with the communitarian values of others nations that are more committed to goods and values larger than those pertaining to their own personal development. Such citizens would be more inclined to self-sacrifice in the "line of duty" than those who do not prioritize communal values in their personal hierarchy of goods.
10. Canadian communication theory philosopher Marshall McLuhan demonstrated how there is no such thing as a neutral media and is best known for his axiomatic observation, "The medium is the message." See Neil Postman, *Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985) for a more in-depth study on the greater societal and pedagogical implications.
11. Linguist Noam Chomsky is well known and respected for his argument that news reporters are news makers (i.e. gathering information is never a neutral activity because of the selection of what is most important). Furthermore, often implicit judgments and assessments are made in the presentation of material, despite all efforts at remaining objective.
12. Otis and Browne.
13. Charles Taylor, *Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), 68–109.
14. Steve Taylor refers to this as "growth through suffering" in *Out of the Darkness: From Turmoil to Transformation* (Carlsbad: Hay House, 2011); Harold Ristau, *At Peace with War* (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2012), 30.
15. In the study by Otis and Browne immigrants from Asia's disinterest in a career in the CAF is partially attributed to negative experiences with militaries in their countries of origin.
16. Harold Ristau, "Canadian Armed Forces' Chaplains as a Primary Source of Spiritual Resiliency," *Canadian Military Journal* 14.2 (Spring 2014), 47.
17. Stephen T. Carroll, "Addressing Religion and Spirituality in the Workplace," in *APA Handbook of Psychology, Religion and Spirituality,* Vol. 2, ed. Kenneth I Pargament (Washington: American Psychological Association, 2013), 608.
18. Although there is a distinction between ethics and morality, they are both rooted in conscience and a belief in a common good. For the purpose of this article, the notions are used somewhat interchangeably, with that shared conceptual commonality in mind.
19. Officer vows already do this by virtue of receiving the Queen's commission.
20. From Philippe Manigart and Valerian Lecoq of the Belgian Royal Military Academy in Brussels, "The Attractiveness of the Belgian Defense," presented at the IUS seminary, 2015, 18.
21. Yagil Levy, "The Theocratization of the Israeli Military," *Armed Forces and Society* 40.2 (2014), 20
22. Carroll, 607.
23. According to a LifeWay Christian Resources Study, "72% of Millennials are more 'spiritual than religious,'" Cathy Lynn Grossman, *USA Today,* December 14, 2010.
24. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Advancing with Purpose: The Army Strategy,* 3rd ed. (2014), 12.
25. See Marilyn Baetz, Ron Griffin, Rudy Bowen and Gene Marcoux, "Spirituality and Psychiatry in Canada: Psychiatric Practice Compared With Patient Expectations," *Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 49.4 (April 2004), 265–271; Kathryn Blaze Carlson, "Is Organized Religion on the Decline? Growing Number of Canadians 'Spiritual but Not Religious,'" National Post, 21 December 2012.*
26. Mouvement laïque québécois *v.* Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16.
27. Win-Gallop International Global Index of Religiosity and Atheism 2005–2012 (survey conducted Nov 2011–Jan 2012); Carlson; Nathan Battams, "Religion and Spirituality in Canada" factsheet (Ottawa: Vanier Institute of the Family, 2013).
28. If we did not believe that there was some sort of a spiritual conviction underlying one's morals and values, we would never permit and trust the testimony in a courtroom of someone who chooses to swear, not to sacred text, but to nothing other than him or herself as a higher religious principle (i.e. God). The assumption is that the individual is claiming accountability to an authority external and higher than self, which is why a testimony, in which a promise is not made, is not accepted by our courts.
29. Levy, 20.
30. Carroll, 597.
31. Which leads one to believe it can also be equally dangerous if guided by radical religious extremes, which would be screened out in selection and training environments.
32. See Augustine of Hippo, *City of God,* translated by Marcus Dods (New York: Random House Inc., 1950), books XI-XIV.
33. See Martin Luther, "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can be Saved," translated by Charles Jacobs, in *Luther's Works,* Vol. 46, ed. Robert C. Schultz. (St Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955–1986), 93–137.
34. In theological terms, this is referred to as the universal priesthood or "priesthood of all believers." Although there remains differences in function and role between priests and laity, their moral and spiritual value before God as His instruments of serving humankind on earth, is equal.
35. Carroll, 595.
36. Ibid., 596.
37. Ibid., 605.

The Lieutenant-General Peter Devlin Writing Award for Command and Leadership

The article by

Captain A. A. Snow

(***Lieutenant-General Burns, Innovative Leader or Analytical Staff Officer?***)

is the winner of the LGen Peter Devlin Writing Award.

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LIEUTENANT-GENERAL BURNS, INNOVATIVE LEADER OR ANALYTICAL STAFF OFFICER?

Captain A. A. Snow (Army Operations Course 34)

Source: Public Domain

Lieutenant-General Eedson L. M. Burns is a name that has been etched forever into Canadian military history. He did not receive this level of recognition through a single valiant act or his leadership through periods of adversity but, rather, through the controversy that surrounded his removal from command of 1 Canadian Corps after achieving significant victories during the Italian campaign in the Second World War. During the inter-war period, Burns quickly distinguished himself as an academic and intellectual officer, continuously challenging the status quo and proposing ideas for the application and integration of new and emerging technologies that were revolutionary for the time. Those intellectual qualities accompanied him throughout his appointments into positions of command during the Second World War, as he effectively applied the appreciation and staff studies to tactical problems to best understand them and systematically develop courses of action. Even with that sound and systematic approach, Burns still had to overcome the hurdles in his relationships with his subordinate commanders—applying what could be loosely described as modern-day mission command—in order to achieve the level of success that he did. This paper will show that Lieutenant-General Burns placed emphasis on staff processes and a collaborative approach towards operational planning; however, as a result of his introverted personality and his lack of experience as a wartime leader, he was unable to inspire the confidence of subordinates and superiors, which ultimately led to his removal from command. Despite Burns' significant military victories and the fact that he was an efficient military planner and academic, he lacked the human dimensions required to be seen as a true military leader.

An initial glance of General Burns' résumé reveals the obvious reasons for which he was selected to be Commander 1 Canadian Corps during the Italian campaign. Among other things, he was a decorated First World War veteran. Having served as a platoon commander, he was wounded twice in combat and was awarded the Military Cross for his actions during the Battle of the Somme.[1] During the same conflict, he was employed as a brigade staff officer, exposed to the rigorous planning and coordination of a headquarters supporting the units under its command during wartime operations. He was later posted to the 9th Brigade, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, as a "staff learner"[2] to hone his already advanced planning capabilities under the mentorship

of senior staff officers. During the inter-war period, he was employed in a variety of staff positions at various headquarters and distinguished himself as an intellectual officer. His papers and essays were frequently published in *Canadian Defence Quarterly* and *The American Mercury*, where he presented on new and revolutionary ideas for military operations and emerging technologies and would often go toe to toe with the best military minds of the time.[3] He was a student of staff colleges in both England and India[4] and was a part of the Canadian Military Headquarters, commanded by Brigadier Crerar during the early years of the Second World War; Crerar would later play an important part in Burns' appointments to command.[5] He was later appointed as Commander 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade and subsequently served as Commander 2nd Canadian Division during the Second World War. Those accomplishments alone were quite an admirable feat to have achieved in a military career.

So, with that record of achievements, would it not make perfect sense for him to have been employed as Commander 1 Canadian Corps? Looking a little deeper into those accolades—not intending to detract from his notable career—we see that, at face value, it all looks impressive and presents well in writing, but the reality of those accomplishments does not definitively mean he was the best choice to assume command. During his time spent in combat during the First World War, he was employed as a signals officer, ensuring that communications were maintained between the higher headquarters and the front-line units. Although he was employed in an important function and had been exposed to wartime operations, Burns was not afforded the frontline combat experience that was expected by the British commanders of the time for their subordinate formation leaders, nor did it match up against the vast combat experience of his subordinate division commanders.[6] That would at times create friction between Burns and his subordinates, as they had clear differences in opinion with respect to the conduct of operations.[7] As Burns said himself, "It is not by coincidence that the most distinguished and able British commanders of higher formations in World War Two—Alexander, Montgomery, Slim—were graduates from the cruel school of the infantry in World War One."[8] That statement reflected on his own perceptions of his lack of combat experience throughout his career leading to his appointments to command during the Second World War. Burns' time spent working in a staff role at an early period in his military career afforded him an excellent opportunity to expand his planning abilities and greatly develop his understanding of the staff work and functions behind formation operations. Although it provided him with a great advantage for professional development as a well-rounded staff officer, it detracted significantly from his time spent directly leading soldiers, developing his understanding of the art of command, and forming his own command philosophy. As it was noted later in his career, he was viewed by his immediate subordinates as "deadly serious about everything"[9] and that his "manners and personality ill-fitted him for the Eighth Army club,"[10] which fortifies the concept that he lacked the traditional leadership qualities and the natural charisma desired of a leader. That would be the catalyst for the absence of confidence that both his superiors and subordinates would develop as he rose into higher positions of command. His reputation as an academic and intellectual officer cannot be disputed,[11] as it established the framework for his success and rise through the ranks during the inter-war period and created the foundation for his operational techniques and command styles once he assumed higher positions of command. As for his tenures as the Commander 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade and subsequently 2nd Canadian Division, it can be argued that, as those formations were in training and reconstitution, he did not develop the credibility of having commanded at the formation level during wartime combat operations. Through better refined lenses, it would appear evident that Burns' selection for command at the corps level was not based on his natural or charismatic skills as a leader or on a vast accumulation of past combat experience, but rather on his reputation as an intelligent and skilled staff officer and on the fact that "powerful patrons [and] senior officers such as Harry Crerar"[12] admired those traits.

When examining Burns' operational technique during combat operations, there is a limited field of view in which researchers can focus their sights, primarily as the two key operations that he contributed to as Commander 1 Canadian Corps were the penetrations of the Hitler Line and, subsequently, the Gothic Line, both of which were operational successes, but not without justified criticisms. There would need to be a more robust look into the former trajectory of his career in order to understand where he developed his operational technique and upon what that foundation was based. Burns had established himself promptly as an academic officer during the inter-war period, as the majority of the positions that he held were in various staff appointments and at numerous military training establishments. It was during his time in those positions that he further refined the ability to thoroughly and diagnostically approach a problem for which he would create a sound solution, almost inevitably to great success. Concerns begin to arise with those attributes because, when he was required to develop solutions during those times, he did not have the same demands that an operational unit or formation commander would have in terms of time, battlefield stress and pressures from superior and subordinate commanders. Therefore, he usually had the time available to rigorously gather information and methodically develop his solutions. During Granatstein and Suedfeld's study, they saw him as being a highly complex commander during that timeframe in that he was someone who would "seek out and process much more information, develop and monitor plans more flexibly and creatively, and be better able to anticipate the reactions of his opponent."[13] That statement's validity becomes apparent when looking at his time spent as the Commander 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade during training prior to their deployment to England. Burns was afforded the time and opportunity to test his proposed doctrine for the integration of tanks at the unit and formation level,[14] demonstrating that he had a thorough level of innovative thinking and a solid understanding of the application of field tactics upon which he could rely when given the time to meticulously plan and execute.

Fast-forward to his appointment as Commander 1 Canadian Corps and it is apparent that Burns' operational technique became settled in his comfort zone, which involved staff planning and the use of various staff tools and processes to deliberately develop plans, rather than the use of intuition and traditional leadership traits to instinctively make command decisions. The attacks on both the Hitler and Gothic Lines are excellent examples of how Burns focused his effort on planning and the use of staff tools rather than on commanding and leading from the front to inspire his subordinates to achieve mission success. Prior to their current operation's completion, and preceding any firm direction from his higher headquarters, Burns issued a staff study to focus his headquarters and key planners on the break-through aspect of the foreseeable operation along the Hitler Line.[15] By pre-emptively issuing that staff study, with specific and detailed parameters, he enabled his headquarters to conduct collaborative planning

Source: Public Domain / Israel GPO Photographer

December 16, 1956, Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan and Eedson L. M. Burns end their meeting at Lod Airport set to discuss further withdrawal of Israeli troops from Sinai

Source: Public Domain / Israel GPO Photographer

Moshe Dayan with Eedson L. M. Burns (1957)

and provided them with the time to develop more detailed and innovative ideas on how to approach that specific problem, highlighting his focus on the planning process and his desire to have the staff share the same characteristics. Further, it can be deduced from his use of the appreciation prior to his operations[16] and the orders that he issued[17] that he desired to possess the most information he possibly could in order to enable him to make a well-informed decision and plan for contingencies within the operations. Although a well-developed understanding of the situation is crucial to formulating a decision, the period of time that it took him to develop his decisions were viewed by Burns' superiors as him being "indecisive, and appear[ing] to lack that grasp of the whole situation which is essential in battle."[18] That falls in line with where Granatstein and Suedfeld place Burns' complexity as, at the higher complexity levels, one would possess an "unwillingness to stop searching for information and to make a decision" and have the "appearance of being unsure of his own mind."[19] Those criticisms also came in light of Burns publishing a report highlighting the lessons learned from the attack on the Hitler Line in which he criticized his higher formation on certain aspects of the operation,[20] which would impact their relationship and result in the first request to remove Burns from command. That attracts attention to the fact that Burns' operational technique was one of the instigating factors that contributed to his superiors' and subordinates' lack of confidence in his command.

Now having developed a better insight into Burns' previous experiences and his operational technique, along with having an understanding of the strained relationships between him and his subordinate commanders and staff, the focus needs to be shifted to the command technique that he did employ to enable him and his subordinates to achieve the levels of success that they did—comparing it to the contemporary concept of mission command. Within *Command in Land Operations*, mission command is defined as "the philosophy of command that promotes unity of effort, the duty and authority to act, and initiative to subordinate commanders,"[21] which, in short, allows subordinates to make decisions on behalf of commanders within the commander's intent in order to achieve mission success. In order for mission command to be successful, there needs to be a level of trust present between the commander and the subordinate that the commander's intent will be achieved in a fashion acceptable to the commander. Although it was evident that Burns' subordinates lacked confidence in his command, Burns maintained the trust that they would accomplish their missions based on their reputations as professional and credible combat leaders. In light of that, Burns would provide his subordinates with his intent for the operation and allow them the freedom to select objectives[22] and develop their own plans in order to achieve mission success, enabling them to make decisions on his behalf. That in itself can be seen as a preliminary form of mission command.

While those actions loosely resemble mission command, they do not fall within the true meaning of the concept. The tenants of mission command promote timely decision-making, the importance of understanding a superior commander's intent, and a clear responsibility to fulfil that intent.[23] While Burns allowed his subordinates the freedom to select their own objectives and devise their own plans and operations, the purpose was for him to achieve their "buy-in" to his operation rather than promote timely decision-making. As he stated in his letter to Lieutenant-General Crerar, he "allowed divisional commanders as much liberty of action as possible" and he "considered that they would execute a plan they had made themselves and believed in with more vigour than a potentially better plan, imposed from above."[24] It can be countered that Burns' command methodology, although loosely resembling mission command at face value, was verging on a laissez-faire approach in order to limit the friction that was already present between Burns and his subordinate commanders based on the gap in experience. As identified in Brigadier G. A. McCarter's correspondences with Brigadier G. W. L. Nicholson,[25] Burns did not correct the shortcomings of 5 Division Headquarters as they failed to maintain fluid communications on the progress of an operation. That infers that Burns either chose not to interfere with his subordinate in order to mitigate any future frictions or that he failed to understand the importance of maintaining control of his subordinate elements. Regardless of the true reason, the point that emerges is that Burns' approach to command was not based on a nascent concept of mission command but rather was chosen to ensure that his division commanders would continue to follow and support him during the campaign.

A true military leader must promote a strong balance between the technical dimension, consisting of strong tactical acumen along with intellectual and innovative thinking, and the human dimension, which promotes and influences subordinates to want to follow. Although Lieutenant-General Burns had a highly decorated career and possessed the intellectual and tactical mind that ought to be desired of every great leader, his military brilliance was lost on his superiors and subordinates because of his inability to grasp the fundamentals of the human dimension of leadership. That in turn led to his inevitable removal from command. This paper has shown that Burns' focus on in-depth planning as his operational technique and his standoffish command technique did not present itself as the desired attributes at the corps command level. Despite Burns playing a significant role in the successes during the Hitler and Gothic Lines, and despite being an outstanding staff officer, he lacked the human leadership attributes required to be seen as a true military leader.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Captain Andrew Snow joined the Canadian Armed Forces in 2008 as an artillery officer. Upon completion of occupational training, he completed his first regimental tour with 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, in Petawawa from 2010 to 2015. During his tenure, he filled multiple roles, serving among other things as troop commander within the Surveillance and Target Acquisition Battery, as forward observation officer, and as battery captain (2IC) for a gun battery. Captain Snow is currently serving on extra-regimental employment as part of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Group. He has two operational deployments and is currently completing his bachelor's degree through the Royal Military College of Canada.

ENDNOTES

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2. Major J. P. Johnston, "E. L. M. Burns – A Crisis of Command," *Canadian Military Journal* 7, No. 1 (Spring 2006): 49–56.
3. Major E. L. M. Burns, "Protection of the Rearward Services and Headquarters in Modern War," *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 10, No. 3 (April 1933): 295–311.
4. J. L. Granatstein, *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 116–118.
5. Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns: Letter to Lieutenant-General H. D. G. Crerar – Confidential Report, 12 November 1944.
6. Letter from Lieutenant-General Sir Richard L. McCreery to General the Hon Harold R. L. G. Alexander, 24 October 1944.
7. Brigadier G. A. McCarter to G.W.L. Nicholson, 3 April 1951 (Extracts).
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15. Lieutenant-General E. L. M. Burns, Staff Study 1 Cdn Corps: The Breakthrough Operation, 22 March 1944.
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17. Brigadier J. D. B. Smith, 1 Canadian Corps Operation Instruction No. 22, 22 May 1944.
18. McCreery to Alexander, 24 October 1944.
19. Granatstein and Suedfeld, "Tommy Burns," 64.
20. E. L. M. Burns, "The Pursuit from the Melfa to Anagni: Lessons from H.Q. 1 CDN Corps," 12 June 1944.
21. B-GL-300-003-FP-001, *Command in Land Operations*, Chapter 2, Section 204 (Kingston: National Defence, 2007).
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The Lieutenant-General Michael Jeffery Writing Award for Battle Studies

The article by

Captain M. B. Gilbride

(*Operation MEDUSA*)

is the winner of the LGen Michael Jeffery Writing Award.

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OPERATION MEDUSA

Captain M. B. Gilbride (Army Operations Course 34)

It is rare that a battle is fought without the support or involvement of military engineers. Their role to assist friendly forces to fight, move and live while denying the same to the enemy is one that cannot be ignored during the planning and execution of operations. Because of the broad scope of engineer responsibilities and limited resources (personnel, equipment and available time), it is vital for commanders to understand the doctrinal characteristics of engineers and respect the principles of their employment to the greatest extent possible. The 3 September 2006 battle of Operation MEDUSA was no exception. This paper will show that, while the engineers were able to overcome the challenges posed by the terrain, the resourcing of engineers and the decision to advance H-hour was in contradiction to the doctrinal characteristics of engineers and their principles of employment and severely limited their ability to influence the outcome of the battle. It will examine how the resourcing and employment of engineers diverged from Canadian Army doctrine and the challenges that that subsequently imposed. First, a brief background will be given of the events that occurred on 3 September 2006, then the terrain in which the engineers were operating will be examined in order to demonstrate how the resourcing of engineers was in contradiction to their doctrinal characteristics. Finally, the advancement of H-hour will be examined in order to demonstrate its impact on the doctrinal principles of employment of engineers and on the ability of the engineers to affect the outcome of the battle.

Operation MEDUSA was an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) major offensive operation to defeat Taliban forces in the stronghold of Pashmul in order to set the conditions for the establishment of the Kandahar Afghan Development Zone.[1] Conducted by the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group (1 RCR BG) as part of the Multinational Brigade (MNB), it was "NATO's first-ever ground combat assault and the biggest Canadian-led battle in more than half a century."[2] As a result, the operation from 1 to 17 September 2006 became both ISAF's and NATO's main effort.[3]

As part of Operation MEDUSA, Charles "C" Company seized the high feature of Ma'sum Ghar on 2 September 2006 and established battle positions centred on the enemy objective across the Arghandab River, Objective RUGBY. The intent was to "continue to engage the enemy for the next three days with primarily offensive air support, as well as artillery and direct fire"[4] in order to determine where the enemy was and to degrade its ability to fight before conducting an attack at H-hour. With no observation of enemy activity within the objective and additional reports reinforcing that assessment, Commander MNB ordered 1 RCR BG to conduct its crossing towards Objective RUGBY that night. The Commanding Officer 1 RCR BG pushed off the actual assault closer to the morning in order to buy time for battle procedure and for the engineers to clear lanes down to the south bank of the Arghandab River.[5] However, nearly two days of preparation and preparatory fires were lost with the advancement of H-hour.

Troops wait near the Arghandab River during Operation MEDUSA to take Objective Rugby on 3 September 2006

On the morning of 3 September 2006, C Company set off towards Objective RUGBY. They had attached the engineers of 2 Troop, 23 Field Squadron, who breached lanes onto the objective in order to provide close mobility support. The crossings were unopposed and 7 Platoon of C Company was able to advance directly on to the objective. They were suddenly ambushed in what appeared to be an enemy kill zone from a fortified defensive position centred on the white schoolhouse. The engineer light armoured vehicle (LAV) and the warrant officer's G-Wagon were hit, resulting in the deaths of Sergeant Shane Stachnik and Warrant Officer Rick Nolan among a number of other casualties. With the entire company under heavy engagement and an off-course 1,000-pound guided bomb landing (undetonated) several feet from their position, Officer Commanding C Company ordered their withdrawal off of the objective.[6]

During the conduct of the withdrawal, one of the LAVs missed a breach and slammed into an eight-to-ten-foot-deep irrigation ditch.[7] Despite attempts to recover the vehicle with the engineer's dozer, the LAV remained stuck in the ditch and was ordered to be abandoned.[8] Meanwhile, a hasty casualty collection point was formed near the cover of the engineer's Zettelmeyer front-end loader. The Zettelmeyer was subsequently hit by either a rocket-propelled grenade or an 82 MM recoilless rifle, killing Private William Cushley and Warrant Officer Frank Mellish.[9] Eventually, the entire company withdrew back across the Arghandab River and back onto Ma'sum Ghar to regroup and prepare for the remainder of the operation.

The scene looking ahead toward the main objective on 3 September 2006

CHARACTERISTICS OF ENGINEERS: LIMITED RESOURCES AGAINST DIFFICULT TERRAIN

> *If we had had a Badger on the day of Op MEDUSA, I think things would have been totally different.*
>
> —Corporal Clinton John Orr, *In Their Own Words*

The characteristics inherent in the ability of engineers to complete a wide array of tasks include *flexibility*, *mobility*, *reliance on equipment*, *skill*, *vulnerability*, and *limitations*.[10] 2 Troop's engineer resources and equipment during Operation MEDUSA were inappropriate to combat the terrain encountered on Objective RUGBY. The poor match of its resources to the terrain clearly demonstrated how respecting the doctrinal characteristics of engineers could have played an important role during the planning and execution of the operation.

To better understand how the characteristics mentioned above were evident during Operation MEDUSA, the challenges of the terrain must be understood first. The terrain defined the engineer problem, while the resources and equipment to provide mobility support were the tools to apply a solution to that problem. The central terrain feature that characterized the Pashmul region was the Arghandab River, which flowed to the southwest and bordered Panjwai district to the north and northwest. The river was bordered by steep banks and was nearly 1,000 metres wide in some locations. While a large water feature such as the Arghandab River would usually pose considerable challenges to mobility for a military force, it was mostly a dried riverbed with some canalizing fording sites during Operation MEDUSA.

Source: Combat Camera

Overlooking a field of eight-foot-tall marijuana plants, two Canadian soldiers from Alpha Company occupy a temporary observation post and watch for any sign of attack from Taliban insurgents.

Source: Combat Camera

At first light, soldiers from Alpha Company conduct operations in the Panjwaii District of Kandahar Province as part of Operation MEDUSA

The Arghandab River itself was not the sole threat to mobility; it did, however, contribute to many other terrain features within the region. The river supported agricultural fields of marijuana, corn, wheat and grapes, which created a lush green belt of vegetation along its banks. Those fields towered between six and eight feet in height, which obstructed visibility and provided concealment for the Taliban.[11] The "foliage from the vines provid[ed] excellent cover from overhead observation"[12] as well as from the ground where forces mounted in LAVs had difficulty seeing over the height of the vegetation.

In addition to the Arghandab River and the dense foliage, there were thick mud walls and vineyards that challenged mobility. Irrigation ditches and mounds of earth lay integrated into the structure of the vineyards and were obscured by the vines. The ditches essentially "provided the Taliban with successive trench lines"[13] that they could easily defend.

Overall, Objective RUGBY "posed significant mobility concerns"[14] to the forces operating within the area. The challenging combination of "irrigation canals, walls, dense foliage and multiple built-up areas [gave] the defenders areas to fight from and covered avenues of approach and withdrawal."[15] Prior to Operation MEDUSA, it was clear that "the restrictive nature of the terrain [would force] units to dismount and separate from their vehicles."[16] For the engineers, it was obvious that forces would be relying on them to ensure mobility onto the objective. With the clear necessity of engineer support for Operation MEDUSA, the possible mobility tasks included a gap-crossing operation, clearing fields of fire and observation, and breaching walls and trenches. For each impediment to mobility, the engineers had to consider the method required to breach or defeat each obstacle with the integral resources available to do so.

An assault-crossing in intimate support of a manoeuvre force would most often require special equipment in order to breach or cross an obstacle under threat of direct or indirect fire. While a bypass or use of existing infrastructure and terrain features would be the first and primary option to maintain momentum, the engineers would ensure mobility by employing the means they had at hand. Doctrinally, the engineers would rely primarily on an armoured-vehicle-launched bridge—Beaver—and fascines launched from an armoured engineer vehicle (AEV)—Badger. During Operation MEDUSA, 2 Troop had neither.

23 Field Squadron had few resources to support the 1 RCR BG as a whole, which resulted in 2 Troop having even less to support C Company. The squadron was "incapable of offering any meaningful mobility support to the Battle Group, as large quantities of… heavy equipment remained unserviceable."[17] Despite preparations for the operation and attempts to obtain additional engineering equipment, 2 Troop only had a borrowed D6 armoured dozer from the United Kingdom and a Zettelmeyer front-end loader to provide mobility support.[18] The equipment was effective at breaching some obstacles and conducting basic equipment tasks, but it was civilian equipment designed for finesse and deliberate work.

A key characteristic of engineers is *reliance on equipment and stores*. There is little work that engineers are able to do without the use of specialized equipment and resources. With some ingenuity, 23 Field Squadron constructed "LAV transportable/supportable and solider-portable ramps"[19] that could support an 18-tonne combat-loaded LAV across a 2.4-metre gap. While clever and resourceful, the ramps were never used during Operation MEDUSA. The squadron's equipment serviceability rate remained at 20 per cent, and no Canadian doctrinal breaching or gap-crossing assets were in theatre.

Concealed among grape vines in the area, soldiers from Alpha Company prepare for a push-off at first light during operations in the Panjwaii District of Kandahar Province as part of Operation MEDUSA.

Not having any doctrinal breaching assets, specifically the AEV, did not respect the engineer characteristic of *vulnerability*. The nature of engineer work precluded them from being able to work and fight at the same time. Specialized equipment with high silhouettes and noise generally drew enemy attention, and most engineer work involved dismounted work at critical locations. The AEV had protection that was "essentially equivalent to that of the gun tank."[20] Instead, 2 Troop had civilian heavy equipment that had to be up-armoured, or "Mad Maxed,"[21] which was described as ridiculous and homemade by one heavy equipment operator.[22] Unfortunately, the vulnerability of the equipment was demonstrated when the Zettelmeyer was hit, causing two fatalities.

Another key characteristic of engineers that was not respected during Operation MEDUSA was *mobility*. In order to provide close engineer support to a manoeuvre element, engineers, according to doctrine, should have had the same cross-country mobility as the supported element. In the case of Operation MEDUSA, the two pieces of heavy equipment that were employed were required to be low-bedded and scheduled for delivery to Ma'sum Ghar in preparation for the operation.[23] During the actual assault, the dozer was "the slowest vehicle out there"[24] and could barely manage five kilometres an hour. The engineers clearly did not have the mobility to match the LAV, and it could be argued that they were a burden to the momentum of the assault and subsequent withdrawal.

Many of those engineer characteristics could have been appropriately considered and addressed had the engineers been deployed with their doctrinal assets. The role of the AEV is "not to support only the tank squadrons, but the battle groups and infantry battalions."[25]

Soldiers of Alpha Company conduct operations in the Panjwaii District of Kandahar Province as part of Operation MEDUSA.

That would have respected the inherent *reliance on equipment* and *stores*, *vulnerability*, and *mobility* of engineers. By not equipping the engineers with their doctrinal breaching and gap-crossing assets, the doctrinal engineer characteristics were not respected. However, despite the challenges of the terrain and limited equipment capability, 2 Troop was successful in its breaches and in allowing C Company to move onto Objective RUGBY during Operation MEDUSA. While certain events may have been different had they had an AEV, ultimately, the engineers fulfilled their role to assist friendly forces to fight, move and live.

PRINCIPLES OF ENGINEER EMPLOYMENT: ADVANCING H-HOUR

> *Engineer operations require the assembly of heavy equipment, equipment, explosives, mines and other materials, as well as manpower. This may take considerable time. Foresight and forward planning are, therefore, of the greatest importance and commanders and staffs should ensure that engineers are given maximum possible warning of future operations and likely tasks.*
>
> — *Land Force Engineer Operations*, Volume 1

In addition to the inherent characteristics of engineers, the engineers also have doctrinal principles of employment that guide their suitable employment. Those principles include *integration with other combat functions*; *centralized coordination, decentralized execution*; *allocation of priorities*; *early warning and reconnaissance*; *continuity*; and *communications*. During Operation MEDUSA, those principles were not sufficiently considered or followed for

Source: DND

The aftermath of a deadly friendly fire incident on 4 September 2006

multiple reasons. While many of the reasons remain unknown, it is clear that the advancement of H-hour had the greatest impact on how the engineers were employed in contrary fashion to their principles and how that may have had an impact on the outcome of the operation.

The primary principle of employment that was not followed in the employment of engineers during Operation MEDUSA was *early warning and reconnaissance*. It is important to note that this principle was originally followed during the planning and preparation phases of the operation. The formal orders from Commander MNB to Commanding Officer 1 RCR BG were issued on or around 21 August with a warning order issued to 23 Field Squadron on 24 August. Formal orders to 23 Field Squadron were issued on 30 August but they were only confirmatory in nature.[26] That gave the squadron nearly two weeks of preparation time. Despite the early warning, "there were still substantial gaps in the engineer portion of the plan,"[27] particularly with the resourcing challenges already described.

2 Troop was detached to C Company for Operation MEDUSA and assisted in the planning of a deliberate breach towards Objective RUGBY. The initial intent was to create a "bridgehead further south and then come at [Objective] Rugby from the north to the south." [28] That would allow the company to take advantage of dead ground west of the objective and to be out of observation during the approach. As a result of the advanced H-hour, there was not enough time to prepare appropriately and the company was forced to attack along the existing approaches right into the enemy kill zone. [29] The original time that was provided for the engineers to prepare and conduct reconnaissance for the attack was suddenly reduced with the advance of H-hour. Those timings had a significant impact on not only the engineer employment, but also the conduct of the entire attack by C Company. All time for recce was lost. "The operation went from being a deliberate attack to a hasty attack," [30] and, subsequently, a hasty crossing operation. The time expected to conduct a detailed recce and to plan a deliberate crossing to gain a foothold on the far side of the Arghandab River was lost.[31]

Another principle of employment that could have been significantly improved during the execution of Operation MEDUSA was *communications*. The advancement of H-hour resulted in the attack order being given as "combat team orders on the fly over the radio."[32] That in itself had its own challenges within the company; however, it had an even greater impact on the engineers. The heavy equipment operators were only issued personal radios with communications with their section commanders, in the rear, to relay information from the main radio net.[33] That lack of direct communication with the operators created confusion, particularly during the failed attempt to recover the LAV stuck in the ditch. A more careful employment of communications would have enabled greater control of widely dispersed assets, improved situational awareness, and led to the prompt, accurate response of engineer support.

The challenges of decentralizing engineer assets during the attack were further compounded by the advancement of H-hour, in addition to the indirect communications link to the engineer elements. The principle of *centralized coordination, decentralized execution* was not entirely followed when 2 Troop detached its two sections, each with a piece of heavy equipment, to 7 and 8 Platoon respectively.[34] The strict movement control required over an obstacle could not be executed as a result of the grouping of engineer assets and limited communications. "Rehearsals are an essential part of a crossing operation."[35] Had H-hour not been advanced and had this particular grouping been rehearsed extensively with the company in the time available, it is possible that this grouping could have worked more effectively. Nevertheless, control of the crossing sites was insufficient. The company "could not easily locate the breach lane and opening markers after crossing,"[36] which may have been a contributing factor to one LAV "missing the single breach [and slamming] heavily into the irrigation ditch."[37]

By respecting the doctrinal characteristics and principles of employment of engineers at all levels of command, manoeuvre commanders can fully capitalize on the immense support that engineers can provide in the operating environment. Understanding that operations cannot always conform entirely to doctrine, it should still be used to guide military actions where possible. While the engineers were able to overcome the challenges posed by the terrain, the resourcing of engineers and the decision to advance H-hour was contradictory to the doctrinal characteristics of engineers and their principles of employment, and it severely limited their ability to influence the outcome of the battle. Had more consideration been given to the impact that advancing H-hour would have on the ability of the engineers to provide close mobility support on 3 September 2006, some of the challenges faced by C Company might not have arisen. It is not certain whether the outcome of the battle would have differed if doctrine had been respected; however, it is very plausible that appropriate resourcing and greater time to prepare would have had a positive influence on the battle.

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Source: Combat Camera

A Rwandan United Nations soldier stands sentry as the vehicle patrol stops for a short brake while conducting a patrol during Operation SOPRANO.

Source: Combat Camera

CANADA AND SOUTH SUDAN: COMING TO GRIPS WITH "JUBA GOOD"[1]

Major Chris Young, CD, M.A.

AIM

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is a mission with many problems, a number of which have allowed a level of dysfunctionality to emerge that threatens to become permanent. Not surprisingly, many of those who deploy on UNMISS end up frustrated and demoralized, unable to bring about change to a mission that has, in the minds of many, passed its best-before date, if indeed it ever had one. Why this has happened is quite simple: UNMISS has lost the initiative in South Sudan and, as an organization, has embraced a reactive, non-proactive approach to peacemaking.

My aim in this paper is to explore, based on my experiences, why the United Nations (UN) lost the initiative in South Sudan and how the dysfunctional mindset developed. I will then reflect on how UNMISS could work to regain the initiative and its credibility based on my own experiences as a military liaison officer (MLO) operating from the capital Juba, during the period November 2016 to May 2017. Included in that reflection will be my thoughts on Canada's role in UNMISS going forward.

By way of background, my previous UN experience was with the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia for the period from July 1993 to July 1994.[2] I was fortunate enough to redeploy back into Bosnia in 1996 as part of the NATO Stabilization Force as the Strathcona Battle Group faction operations officer, and I was able to see what can be accomplished when a mission has the will and means to force change. In my opinion, both the will and the means to effect change in South Sudan are missing from UNMISS.

BACKGROUND

Mornings in South Sudan are quite calming. The temperature is comfortable, the nightly burnings of trash and excrement are mostly complete and the smoke and smell largely dissipated. The birdlife is extraordinary before most people are up and about. Yet mornings in South Sudan also hit one in the pit of the stomach. Waking in South Sudan is weirdly reminiscent of the movie *Groundhog Day.* Conflict remains the order of the day, and the UN remains as impotent as it was the day before.

Unrelenting poverty, the inability of the country's leadership to make any headway in the peace process, and the lack of any meaningful progress towards improving the country's situation make each day much like the one that precedes it.

It wasn't always like this. Indeed, on 9 July 2011, South Sudan appeared full of promise and was receiving good support from the international community and the UN when it became the 54th independent state in Africa following 20 years of civil war. That civil war had taken an estimated three million lives before it was ended by means of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) concluded with Sudan. However, as is too often the case, that initial optimism would quickly be dashed; governance and economic issues coupled to tribal divisions within the new state led to an unravelling of the coalition that had proven successful in the drive to independence. By 2013, a scant two years after independence, South Sudan was being ripped apart by civil strife, a civil war considered inevitable—at least by those Canadians who had been in theatre at the time.

Foreign intervention in the new country continued initially via the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an African Union (AU) organization; it was involved in the Sudanese conflict as early as the 1990s and its activities included the successful mediation leading to the 2005 CPA that ultimately resulted in South Sudan's declaration of independence. IGAD has remained involved in mediation and monitoring activity through to today. The UN became involved in the Sudanese conflict in June 2004 with the establishment of a specialized UN mission, the UN Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS), which was essentially designed to negotiate for the introduction of a UN peace support mission.

Following the success of IGAD and UNAMIS in facilitating the passage of the CPA, the UN created the UN Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) in March 2005 with a mandate of supporting the implementation of the CPA.[3] The mission was 10,000-person strong and included some 700 civilian police officers plus a civilian mission component. UNMIS was not able to deploy into Darfur as a result of resistance from the government of Sudan and, in July 2006, the UN was able to convince the Sudanese to accept a hybrid AU-UN mission instead—the AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).[4] UNAMID was established as a Chapter VII mission and given the responsibility of supporting the implementation of the 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement.[5] The hybrid mission was intended to showcase African capabilities in resolving regional conflict: the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) specifically stated that "the Hybrid operation should have a predominantly African character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries."[6]

With the independence of South Sudan in 2011 came the introduction of a follow-on mission to UNMIS—UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)—established as a Chapter VII mission with a mandate "to consolidate peace and security, and to help establish the conditions for development with a view to strengthening the capacity of the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoSS) to govern effectively and democratically and establish good relations with its neighbours."[7] In 2013, civil war in South Sudan broke out, leading to the breakdown of the independence coalition. In December, in response to fighting in the Juba area, UNMISS troop

Source: Combat Camera

A sign displays the flags from Rwanda, the United Nations, and South Sudan. The sign is located within the United Nation camp in the town of Yambio South Sudan. Operation SOPRANO is the Canadian Forces' participation in the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan.

levels were increased to 12,500 with a police component of 1,323.[8] Those increases, however, were largely achieved by transfers from existing regional missions like UNAMID.

In 2014, the UNMISS mandate was expanded to include protection of civilians (POC) as a priority. In January 2014, to support the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement between the government and the opposition Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/SPLA-IO), the UN authorized the IGAD to deploy a monitoring and verification mechanism team to ensure compliance. Unfortunately, UNMISS has suffered through the frequent practice of Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) massacres occurring in areas ostensibly under UN control. The most recent, in July 2016, saw the two parties to the conflict, the SPLA and SPLA-IO, initiate fighting in the capital Juba that included a government troop-led assault on the internally displaced persons (IDP) camp adjacent to the UNMISS UN House camp. The response by UNMISS troops in that attack has been termed "disgraceful"—the Chinese battalion at the time, for example, was found to have abandoned its defensive positions on the perimeter of the UN camp on two occasions, and the Nepalese Formed Police Unit was accused of failing to respond to calls for assistance from UN workers outside the main UN camps and under threat from government troops.

Note that because the Abyei region remains in dispute vis-à-vis Sudan and South Sudan, a separate mission—the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)—was created to deal with that contentious area. However, that mission is outside the scope of this paper.

UNDERSTANDING UNMISS DYSFUNCTION

I use the term *dysfunction*, rather than the harsher term *failure*, largely because I believe that the international community, if it shows the will and provides the means, can turn UNMISS around and make it work properly within the peacebuilding framework. My intent within this section is to identify those elements of UNMISS which are contributing to the dysfunctional nature of the mission and provide some ideas on changing them.

The primary issue with UNMISS is that it is a Chapter VII mission that is being run as if it were a Chapter VI mission.[9] By this, I mean that the mindset of UNMISS leadership is to compel compliance without resorting to force. Indeed, the use of force was actively discouraged even in instances in which it would have made sense. While it makes sense to advocate mediation and negotiation in order to defuse tensions and avoid conflict, there is a need to back it up with the use of force when the other side becomes intransigent. As will be discussed later in this paper, GoSS forces would regularly restrict and deny UNMISS freedom of movement throughout the theatre.

UNMISS' centre of gravity is freedom of movement; without it, the mission is unable to influence events, either through reporting, investigation, deterrent deployments or via its humanitarian operations. However, because of the institutionalization of what I term "good-faith" processes, UNMISS operations were seriously compromised. The two processes were known as the Sharing of Information (SOI) process and the Joint Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JVMM) process.

The SOI process began from a simple enough premise; the UN believes it needs to maintain transparency in all its operations. That concept of transparency was intended to serve security and safety imperatives, as well as to support UNMISS' public relations campaign by demonstrating, tangibly, UN operational support of the people of South Sudan. In practice, however, transparency became a weapon used against the UN. By providing documentation of its intended operations, including the numbers of troops involved, their vehicles and their weaponry, the UNMISS was handing the GoSS and the SPLA the tools they needed to exploit the Status of Forces Agreement or SOFA.[10]

Specifically, the SOFA included paragraph 48, which stated that:

> the Government [of South Sudan] shall take all appropriate measures to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of UNMISS, its members and associated personnel and their property and assets. It shall take all appropriate steps to protect members of UNMISS and its associated personnel and their equipment and premises from attack or any action which prevents them from discharging their mandate.

Quite skillfully, the GoSS argued that the SOFA provided them with the duty of ensuring the safety and security of UNMISS personnel and operations. This in turn allowed them to dictate when and where UNMISS movement was allowed. When UNMISS proposed operations into areas designated by the GoSS as "zones of operations," the GoSS would, essentially, deny UNMISS movement into the area based on the argument that it was dangerous in those areas and therefore not safe or secure for UNMISS. It quickly became clear to me during my time with UNMISS that the zones of operations were more or less any area the GoSS felt was sensitive, particularly those areas where it was engaging in either mass murder or genocidal activities in opposition-held territory.

The other process ostensibly instituted in good faith, this one by the GoSS, was the JVMM. Created by the GoSS as a bureaucratic link—or filter—the JVMM was carefully inserted between UNMISS and the SPLA as the means by which all SOI documentation was handled. The JVMM dealt with UNMISS at the tactical, operational and strategic levels; contacting the SPLA chain of command directly usually resulted in being directed to the appropriate JVMM contact. At the tactical level, the local MLO cell would deal with the local JVMM office, usually with JVMM members ranging from lieutenant to lieutenant-colonel: most of those at the major or lieutenant-colonel level were senior members in terms of service. The Senior MLO (SMLO, a colonel) in charge of the local MLO cell would, when required, deal with the head of the local JVMM office. The UNMISS Deputy Chief MLO (DCMLO) at Force HQ would coordinate all MLO activities in theatre and would deal with the head of the overall JVMM office. Direct contact with the SPLA HQ would only be effected by the Chief MLO (CMLO), who was also the Deputy Force Commander (DFC).

In effect, the JVMM became an arm's length organization through which UNMISS was expected to communicate with the SPLA, making it, in reality, an information operations mechanism that allowed the SPLA to mask and shield its command structure. Staffed by SPLA officers, the JVMM became the means by which the SPLA precluded direct UNMISS contact with key SPLA leaders. Coupled to the SOI process, the JVMM perfected its ability to effectively interfere with or restrict UNMISS operations almost at will on a regular basis.

The two processes worked as follows. UNMISS would decide to conduct activities in a specific area and would task its MLO cell responsible for that area with drafting the necessary SOI documentation. The documents would outline the time and nature of the activity planned, identify the UN forces (including civilian agencies), troop numbers and weapons involved, and show the routes that would be taken to enter and exit the area in question. The SOI would then be submitted to the local JVMM office and was, in theory, furthered to the SPLA Force COS responsible for operations. Once the SPLA had reviewed the operations and decided whether the area was sensitive or not, the SOI documentation would be returned via the local JVMM office to the MLOs. The documents would include either the statement that the operation in question was approved, or that it was not approved (but allowed to proceed, understanding the risk of proceeding was assumed by the UN). In effect, the SPLA would wash their hands of operations they did not wish the UN to undertake, since they were unable to actually deny UNMISS operations without triggering a SOFA violation. In practice, the MLO team accompanying the UN operation being undertaken would usually discover that the SOI paperwork was never sent down to the tactical levels. Local checkpoints would routinely be unaware of planned UN operations and would regularly have to contact their higher HQ to confirm the paperwork was valid and that the operation could continue its movement.[11]

For the SPLA, the SOI documents became a means by which they could exert control by allowing or denying UNMISS movement. Because the GoSS/SPLA could not directly deny UNMISS movement (as such a denial would amount to a SOFA violation and in theory dictate a UN response, likely in the form of sanctions or legal action against specific individuals), they would instead issue a response to the SOI stating either that they approved the activity in question, or that they did not approve the activity but allowed it to be undertaken by UNMISS at its own risk. In other words, despite the obligations of paragraph 48 of the SOFA, the GoSS/SPLA would decline to take responsibility for UNMISS activities when so indicated on the SOI documentation. That refusal to take responsibility for UNMISS safety and security was backed up by denials at each of the local checkpoints along the route. Seeking to reverse such a denial of movement was extremely cumbersome and time-consuming, and it was heavily weighted in favour of the SPLA delaying tactics.

For example, moving from Juba to Kajo Keji during the dry season meant a trip of about ten hours, there being only one main road. If the trip was delayed by any more than a few hours, the UNMISS operation would either be forced to arrive in Kajo Keji after dusk, which required movement at night and therefore Force Commander approval, or the patrol would be forced to find a leaguer location along the route to spend the night. When we were delayed, we would usually seek to have the UNMISS Sector Commander reschedule the operation for a later time. UNMISS leaders on the Force HQ side of the house were not always amenable to that course of action. Indeed, rescheduling of my March 2017 patrol was not supported and we ended up arriving in Kajo Keji after dark, only to find an armed militia in the area on high alert and quite jumpy after a daylight attack on their local jail by the local SPLA-IO forces!

Perhaps the most shameful example of UNMISS having lost the initiative and freedom of movement, at the strategic level, involved the ongoing struggle to deploy the Regional Protection Force (RPF) into South Sudan. The RPF was developed in response to the July 2016 crisis and was intended to provide the UNMISS Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) through the Force Commander with a dedicated reserve force that could and would respond to security threats in the Juba area. The intent was to deploy the RPF quickly, stabilize the security situation and complete its mission by December 2016, allowing for it to be withdrawn. However, despite being ostensibly agreed upon by the GoSS, the deployment has run into numerous issues and delays. Some of the delays were due to issues related to the rainy season and the lack of suitable space for the force, but most were due to GoSS intransigence on the issue.

Because the mission has been run as if it were a Chapter VI mission, the GoSS has had authority over the type and national identity of those military contingents deployed into the country. This allows the GoSS to refuse to allow combat units from Western nations to be part of the RPF and instead insist upon troops from regional African nations only. The GoSS has been pushing for the troops to be heavily weighted towards engineering units, the intent being to have them perform development work. Because UNMISS has insisted upon combat-oriented units, the GoSS has thrown up roadblocks concerning the type of heavy equipment allowed as part of the RPF.

As a result, as of August 2017, only 350 soldiers (two infantry companies and one engineer company) had deployed into Juba out of the 4,000-person strength authorized by UNSCR 2304 (2016). Worse, the negotiated deployment of the RPF saw it restricted to operations within the city limits of Juba. Granted, the deployment of RPF troops into Juba meant other Juba-based troop-contributing contingents were then freed up to move elsewhere in theatre, but the RPF was, for all intents and purposes, designed to become the UNMISS reserve. Instead of having the flexibility to relocate UNMISS troops where and when desired, UNMISS leaders instead, once again, allowed UNMISS initiative (and with it, strategic freedom of movement) to be negotiated away.

As an aside, there are a number of issues with the RPF besides those related to the deployment delays. Many of the regional nations involved and inclined to provide forces for the RPF are already heavily committed to other regional missions. The quality of troops available does not lend itself to operations as the mission reserve.[12] More of a concern is that the GoSS has also dictated the level of offensive capability of those forces committed to UNMISS, which in turn ensures that the SPLA retains an offensive overmatch against the UN. Heavy weapons are typically not allowed to be deployed, in accordance with direction from the GoSS. Finally, it remains unclear whether RPF operations within Juba include the vital ability to deploy to protect and secure the international airport, the UNMISS vital ground.[13]

Another problem area for UNMISS was the expansion of its mandate to include the nebulous POC mission.[14] The adoption of UNSCR 2252 (2015) meant, from a practical point of view, that anywhere UNMISS established an armed camp with peacekeeping troops, IDP and refugees would congregate to seek protection, forcing the UN to establish, staff and police permanent IDP/refugee camps. That significant and large addition to the mandate was made without a concomitant increase in contingent strength.

The lack of coordination between military and civilian agencies is not new, but it has been taken to new heights on the UNMISS mission. During my tour, we would regularly have aid agencies moving through the Central Equatoria region without protection and without notifying the UNMISS sector commander of their activities. In at least one instance, nine aid workers operating without reference to UNMISS were ambushed and killed along a road known and frequented by bandits (rumoured to have local military support). UNMISS was left with the task of recovering the bodies and conducting a post-mortem investigation to determine responsibility for their deaths.

That lack of coordination was not limited to NGOs. On my first patrol to Kajo Keji in December 2016, my meeting with the local elders was interrupted by a UN flight arriving at the local garrison bringing members of the World Food Programme (WFP) into the area for discussions with the local authorities. This would not have been so surprising except that my patrol had originally been tasked in support of a request from WFP. They subsequently decided to cancel their participation and claimed they would reschedule for a different date. However, the Sector South Commander, our boss, decided the patrol would continue without aid agency involvement as a military-only patrol. So there I was explaining why this patrol was military-only just as a flight with aid workers was landing! This, unfortunately, was not an isolated incident.

In another instance—one having serious implications—aid agencies were working to improve road conditions along the route from Juba to Kajo Keji. On what was formerly a dirt road with barely enough room for two vehicles to pass in many spots, the aid agencies began to improve the bridge works along the route. While this work appeared at first to be in support of aid being moved along the route to Kajo Keji from Juba, it actually posed a major strategic issue. First, the route in question was not the main route for aid flowing into Kajo Keji. The majority of the inhabitants of the Kajo Keji area, having been ethnically cleansed from the region in December 2016, were either across the border in Uganda or living in IDP camps close to the Ugandan border in SPLA-IO held areas. Movement of aid from Juba to Kajo Keji was no longer required. Surprisingly, though, route improvement continued even after the ethnic cleansing had been committed and UNMISS had investigated.

More critically, though, the lack of proper bridges along the route had meant it was limited to small cars and trucks as larger trucks and armoured vehicles were not able to use it. The SPLA armoured forces in particular had been largely precluded from moving along the route because of the time required and the likelihood of their tanks breaking down on the extremely rough terrain. The improvement of the route, and that of the bridges in particular, meant that it was now opened up to their movement, if they so desired. Without consideration of the consequences, disjointed aid work now risked changing the balance-of-power dynamic in that area for the worse, particularly in light of GoSS' recent genocidal behaviour in the region. Similar ignorance of tactical and operational awareness was evident throughout my tour in other areas of South Sudan.

OTHER OPERATIONAL ISSUES

Operationally, UNMISS had some very quirky arrangements in place, particularly on the military command and control side of the house as it related to MLO. While there are other UNMISS activities including, for example, human rights investigations and some developmental work, I should note that I am drawing upon my experience within the JUBA MLO cell in support of three specific types of UNMISS patrols within Central Equatoria: UNMISS resupply patrols on land or by barge along the Nile; presence patrols designed to show the UN flag; and investigative patrols to determine the security situation within specific areas of conflict (the latter two were often combined). Presence and investigative patrols were further sub-divided into either military-only or integrated mission teams (IMT), the latter including a military component and a civilian component from various UN agencies such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Patrols were generally understood to have three constituent parts: the force protection element, which was typically a company-sized element provided by a specific nation and under command of a junior captain or major equivalent; the MLO team of two (*usually* senior majors or lieutenant-colonels); and the civilian component (either UN and contracted drivers mainly for UN resupply missions, or an IMT as above, if a presence or investigative patrol). The force protection element would typically be an understrength truck-mounted infantry company with its heavy firepower based on one or two wheeled and lightly armoured cars mounting a heavy machine gun.

It immediately became clear to me that the command and control relationship between the MLO and the force protection element commander specifically would be problematic. Despite the MLO team almost without exception being senior in rank and experience to the force protection element commander, the latter would be put in command of the mission. The MLO team members would more or less become advisors, and their advice was often disregarded. Often, but not always, the force protection element commander would realize it was in his best interest to defer to the more experienced MLO for advice and direction. However, there were all too frequently a number of force protection element commanders who would seek to take complete control of the conduct of the patrol and refuse to heed the advice offered by the MLO or, indeed, in some cases, by the civilian agency members. I should note that, officially, MLO are identified by the UN as being military expert members based on the requirement for them to be better trained and better informed about the mission and its aims than their peers within the troop-contributing contingents. Despite that, MLO were never, during my tenure, placed in command of any missions.

The civilians on the team were also problematic from a control perspective. UN and civilian drivers on resupply missions specifically would routinely ignore convoy protocols and place convoy members at risk. I witnessed at least one instance of a civilian-driven resupply truck deciding to leave our convoy and attempt to pass me on a blind corner on a busy road going uphill during Easter weekend traffic. As an MLO, the only remedy available, after getting him under control and lecturing him on the need to maintain convoy discipline, was to lodge a complaint and recommendation with his employer that he not be considered for duties as a UN driver again.

Other issues with resupply missions revolved around frequent and lengthy truck breakdowns, mainly when dealing with the civilian-hired trucks (less so with the UN vehicles). A blown tire, for example, would consume at least an hour and a half. The patrol would be forced to wait to ensure that the trucks were not targeted for looting. Rarely were any of our resupply patrols provided with anything approaching a proper recovery vehicle; the usual protocol was to have a one-tonne truck with ropes and chains that doubled as the spare truck. Ironically, on one patrol, that was the vehicle that broke down twice while en route, causing about four hours of delay in total. The only recourse as an MLO was to conduct pre-patrol inspections of all trucks and refuse to allow those in obvious disrepair to accompany the patrol. It was not clear whether we as MLO had that right of refusal, but a number of us did exercise it on occasion.[15]

Civilians from other UN agencies were also an issue. Often, they would venture off by themselves and hold meetings without informing the rest of the patrol, or they would venture away from the very necessary patrol security perimeter. I was fortunate in one regard in that most of my patrols were only military. Others were not so lucky. In one instance during my tour (not my patrol), the civilians accompanying the patrol decided that the accommodations offered and used by the force protection elements were not good enough and decided to shift accommodations to a local UNHCR camp down the road two kilometres away. The local UNHCR leader refused to allow military into his camp, so when the UNHCR compound came under fire later that night, the MLO team mobilized the rescue of the patrol's civilian members and brought them back inside their armoured personnel carrier to the force

Source: Combat Camera

A United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan vehicle patrol drives through the dusty red roads of Yambio on its way to the village of Sakure near the Congo border during Operation SOPRANO.

protection element camp. Other issues with civilians involved concerns over safety, with a number of UN agencies refusing to allow their personnel to move outside the Juba area unless inside armoured vehicles. While I, as an MLO, would operate in an unarmoured carrier routinely, civilian movement into conflict areas was almost always via slower, up-armoured patrol trucks.

That is not to say that MLO were without fault. On at least one occasion, an MLO team from Juba decided that the patrol was too slow and, rather than bed down for the night 15 kilometres from the main Juba camp, they decided to leave the patrol and return to Juba on their own. A number of the civilian truck drivers, returning empty, likewise wanted to bed down at home and ended up also abandoning the convoy. Both MLO were junior captains and both were admonished about their conduct by the acting SMLO at the time.[16] Yet, at the same time, the MLO office also wrote up a memo defending their action to avoid tarnishing the office's reputation with their desertion. That was not our proudest moment!

THOUGHTS ON REGAINING INITIATIVE AND REBUILDING CREDIBILITY

As should be painfully obvious, there are a number of substantive problems that need to be addressed to regain the initiative for UNMISS and reassert UN credibility within the region. The obvious first place to start, in my opinion, would be to dismantle the SOI process and shift away from the JVMM. Both allow the GoSS and the SPLA to *de facto* authorize UN movement, something the UNMISS leadership has allowed. They are also responsible for inhibiting UN freedom of action, and regaining that should be the first step UNMISS takes to reasserting respectability and credibility. End the SOI process—transparency be damned—and insist upon UNMISS movement where and when it wants—period!

This leads to the second issue, which is that the UNMISS mission has been, at least in part, about showcasing the capabilities of the AU as a regional agency engaged in peace and stability operations. Unfortunately, it is not up to the task. Not only are its forces limited in their operational capabilities, there are also serious regional biases and national conflicts of interest that have come into play with regard to UNMISS. What is required, following the model of IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia, is a force which has the capabilities necessary to overmatch the SPLA and SPLA-IO. That overmatch is essential for compelling compliance—reluctant compliance maybe, but compliance nonetheless. The reality is that the West needs to engage in South Sudan if it wants this mission to succeed. There is a requirement for the operational warfighting capabilities resident in Western armies that are not available within the AU.

There is also a need to clarify the POC mission so that it is not only understood by all, but is also a mission that UNMISS is capable of fulfilling. The current demands of POC sites is over-taxing the mission. It has also precluded the establishment of permanent UN camps in problem areas (e.g. Yei or Kajo Keji) because of the operational requirements associated with the POC camps which inevitably follow. The policy needs to be supported with the right forces and right resources for success—otherwise, UNMISS credibility will continue to be undermined.

Aid work in South Sudan requires more supervision and coordination. UN agencies that work with NGO are not doing enough coordination. During the SFOR mission, at the battle group (BG) level, coordination cells were established with the mission of reaching out to NGO in the BG area of operations and working to coordinate activities to avoid undermining the overall vision for the area. That type of coordination is either absent from UNMISS or is ineffective. There are too many examples of poor or no coordination of activities that have had operational impact.

UNMISS, CANADA AND THE FUTURE?

Canada currently provides ten military personnel to the UN mission, with a number employed as staff officers and the rest as MLO. The Task Force Commander currently fills a Mission Support Centre function in the rank of lieutenant-colonel. From a strategic point of view, the Canadian positions are, in my opinion, mid-level influence vis-à-vis UNMISS. No Canadians occupy positions of major influence, save perhaps that of the Task Force Commander, and even that position is mid-level. Reportedly, Canada was offered at least one high-level position on UNMISS (the position of political advisor to the UNMISS SRSG), but turned it down. Canada has no SMLO positions and no positions of influence within the various UNMISS commands. Without straying too far into policy, UNMISS is one mission that could be quite easily reinvigorated with more Canadian attention; the amount of our foreign aid flowing into the country certainly should provide us with leverage to push for more senior and influential positions on this mission.

One potential area to examine, from a practical and operational point of view, is the MLO training provided by the UN in theatre. What is currently provided is dismal and disjointed. It is currently split between Uganda for the pre-deployment portion, and Juba for the in-theatre parts. Practically, there is a high degree of overlap as well as discrepancies in instructor quality.

This is an area that needs a better and more comprehensive programme developed and implemented, an area in which the Canadian Army has a great deal of experience. By taking on this type of tasking, Canada could reorient its contribution to UNMISS onto a specific and potentially influential area. The Indian Army has done something similar, moving into ownership of the UNMISS signals complete. Ownership of that niche activity has provided them a great deal of influence on the mission.

Without correction of many of the clear structural defects in the mission, the current UNMISS mission is doomed to remain dysfunctional and subject to GoSS influence activities. Without that course correction, UNMISS will remain marginal and reactive and will continue to experience regular, periodic massacres. Canada has the potential to shift its small contribution into other areas of influence and help change this mission around—if the national will and interest exist.

Finally, and from a tactical perspective, I believe that we as Canadians are having more of an immediate effect on the UNMISS organization than on either the SPLA/SPLA-IO, SPLM-IO or GoSS. Where I believe that effect is happening is within the arena of challenging dated cultural and social norms. Without straying into the issues related to so-called neocolonialism, I believe that introducing gender-based considerations into operational planning, for example, is an example of a progressive and long overdue change to UN operations. That one change sparked a great deal of discussion during my tour, and Canada, with its deployment of female MLO, is able to stand at the vanguard of that type of change.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Major Young, CD, M.A., is a member of Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) Regiment, an armoured regiment located in western Canada. His duty assignments have included regimental time both in Canada and on tours overseas in Bosnia and South Sudan, as well as service in 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, Land Force Western Area (LFWA) Headquarters, Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTS) Headquarters, and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ). He also had the pleasure of serving as the last Canadian Forces liaison officer (armoured) accredited to Fort Knox. His most current position is within the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre (CALWC) as part of the Concepts team.

ENDNOTES

1. 'Juba good' was one of those ubiquitous expressions that crops up on missions: in this case, it denoted something that was not good, but given the conditions in the mission area (and Juba specifically), it was 'Juba good.' It was also used to denote surprise at something (often food-related) that turned out to be better than expected.

2. As with UNMISS, UNPROFOR was also a problematic mission and likewise required considerable improvement. That notwithstanding, recent academic studies have made the claim that the UNPROFOR mission kept a lid on the worst of the violence that took place during the long and bloody Bosnian civil war. Whether that is true or not, I do not believe that any such claim could be made about UNMISS and its work in South Sudan.

3. The full UNMIS mandate, per UNSCR 1590 (2005) was "1. To support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement by performing the following tasks: to monitor and verify the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and to investigate violations; to liaise with bilateral donors on the formation of Joint Integrated Units; to observe and monitor movement of armed groups and redeployment of forces in the areas of UNMIS deployment in accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement; to assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program as called for in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, with particular attention to the special needs of women and child combatants, and its implementation through voluntary disarmament and weapons collection and destruction; to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting understanding of the peace process and the role of UNMIS by means of an effective public information campaign, targeted at all sectors of society, in coordination with the African Union; to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in addressing the need for a national inclusive approach, including the role of women, towards reconciliation and peace-building; to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in coordination with bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, in restructuring the police service in Sudan, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a police training and evaluation program, and to otherwise assist in the training of police; to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in promoting the rule of law, including an independent judiciary, and the protection of human rights of all people of Sudan through a comprehensive and coordinated strategy with the aim of combating impunity and contributing to long-term peace and stability and to assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to develop and consolidate the national legal framework; to ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity, and expertise within UNMIS to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities; and to provide guidance and technical assistance to the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in cooperation with other international actors, to support the preparations for and conduct of elections and referenda provided for by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; 2. To facilitate and coordinate, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and humanitarian assistance, inter alia, by helping to establish the necessary security conditions; 3. To assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in cooperation with other international partners in the mine action sector, by providing humanitarian demining assistance, technical advice, and coordination; and 4. To contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Sudan, as well as to coordinate international efforts towards the protection of civilians, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including internally displaced persons, returning refugees, and women and children, within UNMIS's capabilities and in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, and non-governmental organizations."

4. While the Sudan government did eventually accept the mission presence, it nonetheless did everything in its power to stop any Western nations from deploying troops as part of the mission. The eventual hybrid mission would prove to be weak, ineffectual and disorganized, presaging the ineffectiveness of the UNMISS as well.

5. UNAMID was intended to field some 19,555 military personnel (360 as military observers and liaison officers), 3,772 police observers, a civilian component and 19 special police units of up to 2,660 officers.

6. UNSCR 1769 (2007).

7. UNSCR 1996 (2011).

8. The troop increases were authorized under UNSCR 2132 (2013) and were intended to be temporary. The resolution also shifted the mission mandate into the area of protection of civilians (POC) which led to the creation of POC camps and the requirement for significant infrastructure to maintain and protect. As of early 2017 and in spite of the enlarged mandate, the augmented troop levels had still not been fully implemented.

9. A Chapter VI UN mission is one based on the "pacific settlement of disputes" through negotiation, mediation and similar peaceful means. Chapter VII on the other hand involves disputes that have gone beyond pacific resolution and instead now require a firmer hand, including the use of force to maintain or restore international peace and security.

10. The SOFA is a negotiated agreement between the UN and the host country that outlines the obligations, rights and terms of conduct for both sides. In theory, the SOFA affords UN members safety and security through international legal protection.

11. As an MLO on point, attempting to negotiate passage with two young soldiers at a remote checkpoint was typically fruitless. It was almost as bad was attempting to do so with an anonymous superior contacted via unreliable cell phone.

12. Ironically, the largest contributor of troops to UNMISS in terms of contingent sizes are Asian nations, including India in first place, Nepal in third place, Bangladesh in fourth place and China rounding out the top six. Rwanda (second) and Ethiopia (fifth) are the only two African nations among the six largest contributors.

13. Conversations I had with senior JVMM officers indicated that they did not believe that would ever be allowed to come to pass.

14. I have used the term "nebulous" with the phrase "protection of civilians" to denote the lack of clarity applied to this expansion of the mission mandate. Civilian agencies, for example, seemed to understand this mandate as applying to all civilians within South Sudan, whereas others, including a number of senior military leaders I spoke to, consider the term to apply only to those civilians within the POC camps (e.g. Malakal, Bentiu and Juba camps). Further complicating matters was that there were clearly economic refugees (those fleeing starvation or poverty) who used the camps to obtain food, education and/or health care. There was no way to identify those fleeing persecution and those fleeing poverty/economic conditions, nor was it clear that such a distinction should have been made. Regardless, the numbers in the POC camps were considerable and overloaded the capabilities of the UN and UNMISS. The various attacks on the POC camps showed this firsthand.

15. Indeed, it was a Canadian, Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Ouellet (signals), who began the practice in the Juba MLO office during my tour. There were no indications that such refusals had been employed prior to our tour in any of the sparse patrol reporting, at least in our MLO office.

16. I am still unclear as to why UNMISS accepted junior captains as MLO when the UN doctrine was clear on the requirement for at least majors. On the plus side, as the main operations manager in the Juba cell at the time, I was able to provide a lecture and lead a discussion on why deserting your force protection element is a very bad idea. We had no repeats of this conduct, although other cells did from time to time.

Source: Combat Camera

Source: Facebook/Canadian Army

THE DEFENCE OF LAVONIA: THE WAR WE DON'T WANT

Sean M. Maloney, Ph.D.

27 Battlegroup had just finished rotating with its predecessor in Lavonia as the crisis with Russia ramped up again. Without warning, the three light armoured vehicle (LAV) infantry companies, the Strathcona tank troop and X Battery deployed to a tactical assembly area (TAA) east of their bases at Camp Hillier-Leslie.[1] This did not go as planned: the incoming Battlegroup commander was ordered home immediately on landing, as the *Grope and Flail* website was awash with leaked imagery from a failed relationship on hir HyperTwit account and zie was now under investigation by the permanent Operation HONOUR tribunal. The Operations Officer and the Intelligence Officer, both of whom had extensive experience in Afghanistan and Venezuela and in fighting Islamic State, were also ordered home on the return flight when it was revealed that both had opposed the removal of Sir John A. Macdonald statues during their time as cadets at Royal Military College years ago and their Macebook posts mocking the antifascist (Antifa) movement somehow wound up as part of a Parliamentary investigation into extremism in the Canadian Armed Forces. The Antifa Members of Parliament (MP) were calling for blood, and the two officers were served up to offset any political damage. Only a small group of paranoids at Canadian Forces Information Operations Group (CFIOG) considered the possibility of deliberate opposition interference.

The road move out of Camp Hillier-Leslie was problematic: a crowd of screaming demonstrators of indeterminate ethnic origin spray-painted swastikas on the LAVs when they were held up at an impromptu roadblock manned by a motorcycle gang waving AK assault rifles, but the deputy commanding officer (DCO) refused to authorize the use of force. She was unable to communicate with Canadian Forces Peacekeeping Command in Ottawa and get a legal ruling: almost all military communications were down and it was only through low-power very high frequency that the battlegroup elements could spottily contact each other, let alone Canada. The senior Signals non-commissioned officer joked about teaching semaphore. A young trooper asked what that was.

The graffiti and produce-covered LAVs finally broke through the obstructions. The "B" Company Officer Commanding (OC) was able to cut through the static: "Shouldn't we pull over and get this shit off the vehicles?" the Regimental Sergeant-Major (RSM) inquired. The DCO shook her head and knife-handed the way forward. At an administrative halt twenty minutes later when they reached open country, the Social Media Officer (Social Media O) started freaking out: "Look at this!" He shoved his InstaFaceFone at the DCO. *The Grope and Flail* already had the incident as a front-page story. Antifa MPs were now calling for the firing of the Chief of Peace Staff for permitting her troops to paint fascist symbols on their vehicles.

On arrival at the TAA, 27 Battlegroup pulled into straight lines by company and the troops disembarked. "Where are the Blue Rockets?" some asked, squeezing their legs together. "The contractor hasn't delivered them," the Logistics Officer (Log O) muttered as he stomped through the woods. "Well, can we take a shit here or not?" an exasperated sergeant asked. "Ask the Envir O! How the hell should I know?"[2] The Envir O emerged from the bush. "Uhh, there's a stream over there. People might use it for drinking water. We really shouldn't. I should call the Lavonian Ministry of the Interior and ask first." But to no avail: his InstaFaceFone was not working either. Eventually the troops ignored this discussion and relieved themselves anyway. The newer ones weren't smart enough to unplug their Personal Surveillance Systems and would be charged later for the infraction.

They had been sitting in the woods for most of the day when a motorcycle with its electric motor whining came whipping down the road and braked near the command team. The man wore Canadian Disruptive Pattern (CADPAT) camouflage and Signals insignia. "Where do I find the CO?"[3]

"Back in Ottawa!"
"I'm from Brigade. I have orders for 27 Battlegroup to deploy immediately to their Collective Protection Positions and prepare to defend Highway 14."
"What's the situation?" the DCO called down.
"I don't know. That's all I have! And it's an hour old!"

"Battlegroup, this is Recce!"[4]
"Go."
"We've got movement on the radars."
"What is it?"
"Looks like five UAVs. Check, no, ten."[5]
"Type?"
"Not sure. Can't access the database. Wait… My SSM says it's like an Eleron 3SV but it's a lot larger. Can we engage?"[6]
"With what? You're a TAP-V!"[7]
"We have a machine gun!"
"Hang on, gotta check with the TacLegad. Wait out."[8]

The DCO motioned from the turret to the LAV armoured personnel carrier (APC) and the TacLegad ran over.
"Can we engage?"
"What markings are on them?"
The DCO checked. "None."
"Are they armed?" They were not.
"Then we can't." This was relayed forward.

The UAVs broke up into groups of three and flew into dispersed triangular formations. One group overflew the battlegroup command group vehicles and commenced spraying a substance onto them.

"It's Chem! Gas! Gas! Gas!" the DCO screamed as the troops re-entered and buttoned up the LAVs, scrambling to put on their gas masks. After about fifteen minutes, the driver checked his chem sensors.

"I'm not showing anything!" he shouted.
The DCO got on the command net.
"Anything?" Negative.

Gingerly, the troops emerged in their protective clothing. There was no evidence of a chemical agent on any of the sensors or patches. The three 27th infantry companies reported what the TacLegad and the Social Media O insisted they call "alleged spray events."

Recce was on the air again.
"Radar is picking up more UAVs, but we can see more visually than the radar is reporting. They're all over the place at several altitudes."
"Niner, this is EW. Our analysis indicates they are operating on at least five different frequencies. Do you want us to jam?"[9]
The DCO pondered this with the TacLegad. "Are we allowed to offensively jam? We aren't in a state of war yet, are we?"
"Technically, no, we aren't."
"Hold off, EW. Recce, what are they doing?"
"Well, it looks like they are moving as a … cloud or swarm. They're passing over the RCR now and headed for X Battery's location."[10]
"Continue to monitor."
"Roger, out."
"EW, stop using 'Roger.' It's sexist. Over."
"Acknowledged. Out."

"This is Recce. We've identified several types: Granat 1's and 2's, at least three Forposts and a bunch of Orlans."

The DCO was in a bind. Not only were there legal strictures, but also the 27th lacked anti-air defences that could destroy small UAVs, let alone engage helicopters and fixed-wing threats. The 27th was supposed to operate as part of a multinational formation, but nothing was heard or seen from them. The complete loss of Canadian air defence capability limited her ability to respond to the situation.

The swarm moved towards X Battery. At this point X Battery's towed M-777's were deployed in expedient positions. As there was no heavy engineering capability integral to the 27th, they couldn't dig in. The DCO had a bad feeling.

"Guns, pack up and get out of there now!"
The battery commander ordered a crash harbour as the UAV cloud observed dispassionately.

"Niner, this is Guns! You won't believe this!"
"Go, Guns!"
"We tried to move the M-77's and the gun tractors, but the tires disintegrate when we move!"
"Did you get sprayed?" the DCO asked with alarm in her voice.
"Affirmative!"

Suddenly, there was a hurricane of sound and all contact was lost.

"Niner, Recce!" he screamed into the mic.
"Go, Recce!"
"One of my callsigns has eyes on X Battery! There's nothing left!"
"Say again, Recce?"

There was another hurricane of sound.

"I'm sending you the feed now!"

The DCO turned on the monitor to see airburst detonations over X Battery's positions. One troop was hit with dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) scatterable munitions and another with what looked like thermobaric rockets. The DPICM had a scattered shotgun explosive effect as the munitions hit more or less simultaneously, detonating the troop's prepared rounds, killing all of the personnel in the open, and detonating the ammo and fuel in the gun tractors. The thermobarics exploded with a sickening "Wuuump!" and crushed everything below them with massive overpressure, generating secondary explosions and fires. In less than five minutes, X Battery ceased to exist. Casualties were 100 percent. The RSM, watching the screen beside the DCO, turned his head away and shook with rage. He was young enough to have seen the M-109A3 put into the Shilo museum as his dad, an ex-gunner, despaired at the arguments made at the time to employ towed artillery instead of self-propelled guns.

Already the infantry companies were cannibalizing their LAVs so that at least some could move. The rotting agent had apparently not spread over all of them, but less than 40% of the LAVs were capable of movement. The Leopard 2's were okay: their rubber track pads and the rubber rims on the wheels had deteriorated but the vehicles could still move. The DCO was able to get through the jamming to the Logistics Company (Log Company) deployed in its survival area near Camp Hillier-Leslie and immediately requested replacement LAV tires. Log Company promptly loaded up with everyone on hand and headed east.

The Gray Elves Motorized Company (MC) promptly harassed Log Company's Armoured Heavy Support Vehicle System (AHSVS) vehicles as they proceeded east. It was only through the efforts of the Company Sergeant-Major (CSM), who had been a driver on combat logistics patrols in Afghanistan as a private, that part of the convoy got through to the TAA. There were no Canadian Military Police (MP) available (they were manning a detainee facility somewhere in the rear area in Lavonia), and thus no liaison with Lavonian police to provide security for the convoy as it moved through ethnically Russian villages. Rear area combat operations doctrinal documents that should have been gathering dust in the archives might have helped, but the archives had been shut down to save money and nobody had bothered to scan the material, so they couldn't be uploaded by the command LAV computers anyway.

The DCO was shouting back and forth with Recce. There was a lot of "Say agains" and "All afters" as the bagpipe jamming faded in and out.
"Get your small UAV's up!" The DCO was trying to get Recce to acknowledge.
"I did. The feed should be coming through."
"What's that?"
"A BMP 3? Can't tell. No, I see T-72's. What are we looking at?"
"I'll ask the Int O. Hang on."

Just then the Int O's InstaFaceFone rang.

"That's weird—my daughter's trying to call me." He turned on the phone and saw several masked men gang-raping a screaming teenaged girl. The Int O turned ashen.
"Yes, Rashid, we have her and we're going to enjoy her every minute you fight for the Lavonian fascists!" The camera on the phone swung to portray the action.
"Int O! Snap out of it!" The DCO slapped the phone away.
"But …but … MY DAUGHTER!"

"Niner, this is Recce!"
"Go, Recce."
"We think it's the forward elements of a BTG, but we're not sure."[11]

The distraught Int O vomited in the command LAV, forcing the DCO to wipe off the Blue Force Tracker screen.

"Recce, I don't see it on the map."
"Niner, we're having problems … wait."

The DCO drummed her finger impatiently while the driver subdued the Int O and threw him out of the vehicle.

"Niner, I can't find the right icon. Is the BTG a battalion-sized unit or a brigade-sized unit?"
The DCO fumed. "It's a BATTALION Tactical Group, Recce! What do YOU think?"
"Niner, sure, but it has ten companies: four tank and mech infantry, one anti-tank, two tubed artillery, one rocket artillery, and an air defence battery. It can reach out to 15–29 klicks. It's like a mini-brigade!"
"I DO NOT CARE! Pick a fucking icon and put it up!"
Recce complied and put up a mech infantry battalion icon.

Back in Canada, inside Canadian Peacekeeping Command HQ, that icon error was missed. Briefings to politicians and media led to gleeful experts writing on Snitter that attacking forces required at least a three-to-one ratio versus the defence to win. And of course, those Canadians were descendants of the glorious heritage of Vimy Ridge: how could they fail in a one-on-one fight?

By this time, the dispersed Recce Squadron troops had unfolded their tiny UAVs and prepped them for launch from their hides. The Recce OC checked in with the DCO while the launches were taking place. Then an unrecognized callsign reported in.

"This is CAT BACK 23, authenticate Alpha Uniform, over."

"Go, CAT BACK 23. I authenticate."

"Inbound with two Griffon for observation and surveillance, over."

"Acknowledged. Cutting you to Recce, out."

Recce and the two helicopters were communicating about where he wanted the sensors pointed when suddenly there was dead air. One recce vehicle crew watched in horror as the Griffon stalled, autorotated and crash-landed. The camera feeds from the TUAVs all went to snow simultaneously as the UAVs dropped out of the sky. The Recce commander looked at his radar screen and saw nothing. One of his gunners, using binoculars, spotted a large, silent grey UAV orbiting at 10,000 feet. They had no means of engaging it.

Recce Squadron reported seeing another UAV swarm, but once again little could be done. EW tried to jam the links and succeeded in knocking out some of the smaller ones, but the swarm consisted of several types of UAVs all operating on different frequencies and at different altitudes. After twenty minutes of operations, a single precision-guided munition found the EW LAV and it brewed up, killing the crew.

The hurricane of sound started again, this time directed towards the area held by the RCR. Despite valiant attempts to dig vehicles in or otherwise conceal them, the rotted tires prevented optimal positioning, leaving many of the vehicles exposed. The company was in the process of digging defensive works but, without dedicated engineering equipment, progress was slow. When the thermobarics and DPICM hit, the only survivors were those in vehicles with their hatches closed. In fifteen minutes the company was reduced to less than a platoon and all survivors were wounded, many of them grievously. As the LAV ambulances moved forward from the rear area, paparazzi on motorcycles escorted by the Gray Elves MC followed them in a swarm. The body recovery operations were photographed and filmed and on the net instantly, to the consternation of the Social Media O. The TacLegad forbade lethal engagement of the pseudo-media, and there were no non-lethal capabilities inherent to the battlegroup. In minutes, the images of burnt LAVs and fragmented Canadian soldiers were all over the Snitterverse. One was nominated for a Canadian media award: it depicted a severed arm in green CADPAT with the Canadian flag still velcroed to it lying on the burnt ground. An unmarked UAV recorded the proceedings and they were on the Russian network RT within the hour, after some editing.[12]

No A-10's came in at low level. No F-16's were in evidence providing top cover. Not a single AH-64 was present. The cavalry was not coming. 27 Battlegroup was completely isolated and nearly immobilized. The DCO and the RSM conferred.

"What the hell do we do?" she said in exasperation.

"If we had a long-range capability we could hit them while they're reloading, but we don't even know where it's coming from!"

The DCO looked at the map with Highway 14 running east to west, leading to the Baltic. Despite all of the preparatory enemy activity, the only hint of an assault was Recce's fleeting spot of what looked like a combat recce patrol. 27 Battlegroup was some distance away from the Collective Protection Positions and would never occupy them. The only chance of slowing any advance down was to turn one of the towns straddling the highway into a strongpoint and then use the Leopard 2 troop to interfere with any attempt to flank it. There were still too many disabled LAVs in the Royal 22e Régiment (Van Doos) and Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (Patricias) infantry companies, so the DCO had the tanks tow as many as possible to the town and situate them where they could act as pillboxes. The priority was the LAV tube-launched optically-tracked wire-guided (TOW) missile vehicles, which were dragged into position and then camouflaged. Not that this mattered; the omnipresent UAVs had them all under observation anyway. Even when small arms took some down, other UAVs arrived to replace them.

The DCO was in a huddle with the RSM and the company commanders.
"There HAS to be some way of slowing them down, canalizing them. Obstacles?"
"There's an ELAV, but it's not heavy enough to create a substantial obstacle."[13]
"Any civilian construction equipment?"
"Nope."
"If only we had the ability to … to … use explosives to force them into kill zones."
"What have we got? C-4?"[14]
"Not enough of it."

Just then several rockets roared over the town and airburst symmetrically across the road, heading to the west. They jettisoned small can-like devices with fabric streamers, but the devices did not detonate when they landed. The RSM looked grim.

"Scatterable mines. We're not going anywhere."

One of the troopers looked at the minefield, then at the RSM.

"Why don't we have *that*, sir? That'd be perfect!"

"We aren't allowed to."

"Says who?"

"The powers-that-be declared mines unfair. How do you like fighting fair, kid?"

The RSM walked away, shaking his head.

The enemy still had not attacked and it was getting late in the day. There was still no physical contact with any other allied unit, formation, or personnel. A complete EW bubble now existed over 27 Battlegroup. The DCO could not spare any more dispatch riders. The troops settled in for the night but didn't get much sleep. The DCO's driver sat bolt upright as his phone rang and a Snitter message arrived:

"We're coming to kill you, Jenkins. We know who you are. Maybe we'll have our people in your country castrate your brother in Windsor and mail us his balls! Give up and go home! You don't belong here!" The driver flung the phone at the wall and smashed it. Personalized texts threatening all kinds of mayhem against loved ones back in Canada flowed in all night. Some contained imagery that looked as if it was sampled from *Saw 15: The Evisceration*. The Int O was still sedated in the ambulance LAV.

Meanwhile, Recce Squadron established dismounted hides on the approaches to the town and on the low ridge to the north. The crews were happy to get away from their TAP-Vs once they saw what had happened to the RCR company. Using low-power radio and binoculars, the teams were able to observe and track the enemy advance unhindered.

Another UAV swarm appeared in the morning. 27 Battlegroup was lucky that the enemy's smaller UAV system was not yet fully capable of night operation. As the small machines buzzed along the eastern edge of the town, single thermobaric rockets flew in and destroyed anything that looked like a prepared position. The DCO and the RSM smiled quietly, as almost all of the positions hit were unoccupied dummy positions. None of the concealed Leopard 2's from the Strathcona troop were hit, as they were hidden in larger structures like warehouses and barns. The swarm departed and several dismounted TOW teams carefully moved to the flanks into previously concealed firing positions.

Then a flurry of Recce reports came over the radio.

"Looks like … two troops of three T-72's. And a troop of T-90's behind them. Wait. We can also see four … looks like 2S1's. Why do they have self-propelled arty right behind the tanks?"[15]

Another recce callsign reported in:

"We see at least two companies of mech infantry farther back. Not sure what the vehicle type is. There's also a troop of what looks like an anti-aircraft tank on a T-72 hull."

The T-72's started spec firing at the buildings on the east side of the town, and the DCO ordered the TOW crews into action. After the first two T-72's were destroyed, a flurry of artillery rounds blanketed the TOW teams, taking them out.

"I guess that's why the 2S1's are forward," the RSM said, almost to himself.

"I wish we had more Leopards. Damn manpower cap!"

A LAV TOW vehicle sans tires that had been stuffed into a corner store opened up on one of the overwatch T-90s. The DCO and the RSM tracked the shot through their binoculars. Right before the missile was about to strike, it suddenly swerved upwards and spun away from the tank. A second TOW shot went in and the RSM saw a small flash from the T-90 turret. The TOW missile detonated before it could strike the T-90. The tank returned fire, destroying the TOW vehicle and collapsing the store in a cloud of dust.

The DCO committed the Leopard 2's, which manoeuvred using the buildings for protection. Several thermobaric and DPICM rockets were brought to bear, but the buildings blocked the arc of the incoming rounds and absorbed most of the energy. The tanks were buttoned up and shrugged off the overpressure. Once in position, they made short work of the remaining T-72's and started to engage the T-90's. The 2S1's joined in the action, depressing their barrels and trying to damage the Leopards' optics with direct fire.

Then two mechanized companies slammed into the left flank positions in the town. The Van Doos had done what they could to create a lattice of strongpoints in depth in the town and were able to take out several infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). However, the enemy IFVs were accompanied by 2S1's and what Recce thought was an anti-aircraft tank. Working in combination, the 2S1's employed direct fire (like Second World War–era assault guns) while the twin 30-mm mount on the unidentified vehicle poured automatic fire and antitank guided missiles (ATGM) from its armoured box launcher at any identified position. Dismounting infantry used shoulder-fired thermobaric launchers prodigiously against any prepared position. The Van Doos company was combat-ineffective after this assault.

The DCO and RSM considered the situation. The Patricias company was dispersed and in reserve but was essentially light infantry with no heavy anti-armour capability. The tank troop was giving a good account of itself, but the command post logistics computer systems indicated that the tanks would soon run out of ammo. There was no hope of resupply, and no air support. There was no way out of the town, with the scatterable minefields on the routes west. There were few options left, none of them good.

"RSM, link up with the Patricias. Wait until dark and exfiltrate. See if you can hook up with the Brothers of the Forest and continue the fight their way. Recce: you're going to have to pull back and make contact with any friendly forces. Tanks: keep jockeying around the town. Once you're out of ammo, destroy your vehicles and deny them to the enemy."

The DCO, the remaining command staff and the Strathcona tank crews, all in their tattered, dirty CADPAT uniforms, were paraded in front of an iron-haired, heavily scarred Russian colonel who was backed up by four black-masked bodyguards toting exotic assault rifles. The colonel was jovial in the face of his defeated enemies. He walked up and used his index finger to force the DCO's chin up so that she had to look him in the eyes.

"You know what we did to the Ukrainian fascist criminals before we sent them back in exchange for our valiant Donbas fighters?"

The DCO was expressionless.

"We had them all castrated and sent them back to their mothers! But what do I do with you?" His bodyguards roared with laughter. This had a spillover effect on the Russian guard force, and laughter rippled around and surrounded the captured Canadians.

The DCO looked at him evenly.

"You can do what you want with me," the DCO said defiantly, "But we accept transgendered personnel in *our* army!" She gave the finger to the camera recording the affair.

The stunned Russian colonel pondered these words and whispered to an aide.

"We will provide you with transport and you will be released."

The DCO and the troops looked at each other in disbelief and then smiled.

The next day the remains of 27 Battlegroup mounted up in captured Lavonian army trucks and were escorted to a road junction. The Russian recce forces withdrew.

"Well, I'm glad we made it out of that!" one of the troops said to the DCO during the administrative halt.

Then the hurricane of sound started.

This scenario is written to provoke, both emotionally and intellectually. 75% of the situations described in it are based on actual events; the other 25% are extrapolations. Simply put, the capabilities of our most likely potential adversary, as demonstrated in the Donbas War (2014–2016), are not counterable with our current equipment, training and state of mind. Let's leave aside, for the time being, a detailed discussion of political and social conditions and focus on the technical, tactical, doctrinal and operational. Is our equipment suited to a Donbas-like environment? Can our tactics and our operational outlook withstand a similar assault? Will we be forced to rely on the cunning of our tactical-level leadership to offset material deficiencies? Are our officers and non-commissioned members (NCM) educated in the imprecise and reactive arts of improvisation on the field of ambiguity? And, given the compressed timelines that we have seen in the Donbas War, will they have time to adapt?

I am not suggesting that we withdraw from our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments in eastern Europe. On the contrary, we must maintain them. But for those deployments to be credible and effective as deterrents, they must be able to offset adversary advantages in as many ways as possible. This has occurred before. In 1951, 27 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group deployed to West Germany. Its deficiencies were profound: lack of mobility, lack of combined arms training (at first) and reduced scale of combat engineer resources. As time went on and the deterrent system evolved, its successor organization, 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, grew into a larger, more agile, much more capable force that was coincidentally available during the two most serious crises of the Cold War in the 1960s. We have the ability to adapt, but we need the resources and the will to do so. Understanding what we may face is crucial to getting us there. But we are not there, and we need to be. Soon.

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convoluted Hybrid Warfare debate. The flipside is Pavel Baev's *Ukraine: A Test for Russian Military Reforms* (Paris: Russia/NIS Center, May 2015) which included hybrid warfare as part of the analysis. For a human rights perspective and a useful chronology, see James Miller et al., *An Invasion by Any Other Name: The Kremlin's Dirty War in Ukraine* (New York: Institute for Modern Russia, 2015).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

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ENDNOTES

1. LAV = light armoured vehicles. TAA = tactical assembly area.
2. Envir O = Environmental Officer.
3. CO = Commanding Officer.
4. Recce = Recconnaissance.
5. UAV = Unamanned aerial vehicles (aka drones).
6. SSM = Squadron Sergeant-Major.
7. TAP-V = Tactical armoured patrol vehicle.
8. TacLegad = Tactical Legal Advisor.
9. EW = Electronic warfare.
10. RCR = Royal Canadian Regiment.
11. BTG = Battalion tactical group.
12. Per Wikipedia, "**RT** (formerly **Russia Today**) is a Russian international television network funded by the Russian government." See *https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RT_(TV_network)*.
13. ELAV = Engineer light armoured vehicle.
14. C-4 is a plastic or putty explosive known as Composition 4.
15. Arty = artillery.

Source: Facebook/Canadian Army

A Bison armoured vehicle patrols the village of Ramici, in Bosnia-Herzegovina while providing humanitarian aid in the area, September 2000.

Source: Combat Camera

THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE 1990s: A BRUSH WITH ENLIGHTENED SOVEREIGNTY?

Lieutenant-Colonel Michael A. Rostek, CD, Ph.D., APF

> Our government is committed to ensuring that Canada not only has an opinion, but that Canada is heard, that Canada is protected, and that Canada is a *force for good*, for positive change in the world.
>
> —Canadian Prime Minster Stephen Harper, 2008

INTRODUCTION

The international security environment is increasingly multi-dimensional and dynamic, and as recent events have shown, we appear to be in the midst of shift, a shift away from the post-Cold War era. This shift is characterized by a resurgence in great power competition between the United States, China and Russia, a renewed discussion on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, and the emergence of hybrid warfare and grey-zone tactics, among others features.[1] From the Russia-Ukraine conflict and China's assertive position in the South China Sea, to the rise of the Taliban and Daesh, and conflicts in Syria, Libya, Somalia, Chad, Sudan and the Central African Republic, states and armed forces around the world are considering this shift amid an already complex and uncertain environment. Indeed, it has been argued that American leadership with a mixed approach to a new global order, one that includes liberal and realist approaches and the attendant compromises, may very well be the best approach to preventing war and encouraging cooperation in this new era.[2] While there is little doubt of the requirement to develop comprehensive strategies, plans and programmes to adequately respond to this new environment, it is equally prudent to recall the character and nature of the previous shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era in order to perhaps better understand the current transition and the insecurity it fosters.

The end of the Cold War and the uneven effects of globalization—political, economic, cultural and military interconnectedness—created turbulence in both interstate and intrastate affairs. At that time, policy-makers were confronted with security challenges in a more complex and multifaceted security environment exemplified by the broadening (wider range of potential threats to the state, such as human rights or environmental issues) and deepening (moving beyond state-centric focus down to individual or up to international focus)[3] of the concept of security. One of the security challenges represented by this deepening and broadening of security was the emergence of what Mary Kaldor has labeled "new wars"—conflicts that arose in the context of an eroding concept of territorially based authority of the states, in particular, of eroding state monopoly, legitimate violence and state sovereignty.[4] New wars dominated the international landscape during the 1990s. Somalia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Chechnya and Kosovo are only the most prominent. Moreover, they exposed clan, ethnic and religious cleavages that in turn generated identity and ethnic conflict resulting in one humanitarian crisis after another.

The security challenge posed by new wars emerged from the shadows of the 20th century and potentially foreshadowed one of the most significant normative debates of our time—the use of military force to protect human beings.[5] Indeed, it ignited an academic and policy debate on whether the state, with its narrow focus on military power, was the appropriate referent for security. As S. Neil MacFarlane noted, "[b]ecause most of these internal wars were sparked off by the unraveling of the state, the notion of the state as the protector and guarantor of security has been severely undermined."[6] Several contenders were established alongside the state as providers for individual security. These extended from the individual to the world community of humankind. However, it was human security which provided the "most comprehensive and multidimensional concept available."[7] To be sure, the notion of the individual as a referent for security was not without its detractors. Yet, the idea generated considerable resonance. Lloyd Axworthy, Canadian statesman, academic and human security entrepreneur, noted that human security "has become a central organizing principle of international relations and a major catalyst for finding a new approach to conducting diplomacy."[8]

How did the Canadian Forces respond to the end of the Cold War? This paper will attempt to demonstrate that during the 1990s, it emerged as a cosmopolitan-minded military, one that undertook missions based, at least in part, on human security. The paper begins with an outline of the broad contours and origins of the idea of human security and its requirements. It then moves to an examination of Canadian foreign and defence policy, and the ideas and debates which took place over how the international community should respond to the humanitarian crises that emerged during the 1990s. Such an examination makes clear that the cosmopolitan rhetoric employed by politicians and statesmen at that time, that is, proclamations that their states and their militaries are *forces for good*, stemmed from the trials and tribulations of the 1990s and the gradual emergence of support for a more cosmopolitan outlook on the part of militaries.

NEW WARS, HUMAN SECURITY AND THE RISE OF COSMOPOLITAN MILITARIES

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bi-polar political framework that had characterized the international system for decades, a new security environment began to emerge. Uncertainty became the hallmark of this new era, and the support and stability which the superpower rivalry once provided to clients in many regions of the globe disappeared. Not surprisingly, failed and failing states, and the threats they engendered, became an increasingly prominent feature of international life.

The phenomenon of new wars became particularly salient. Arising from "the erosion of the autonomy of the state and in some extreme cases [its] disintegration,"[9] such wars were particularly brutal, as civilians and non-combatants increasingly became key targets of struggle.[10] The fact that they were often steeped in identity politics exacerbated such carnage, as warring groups tended "to ignore generally accepted international norms governing the use of force in pursuit of their goals (e.g. ethnic cleansing)."[11] Add to this a range of associated problems accompanying such conflicts (e.g. environmental destruction, refugee flows, terrorism, weapons proliferation, disease and transnational crime) and the challenges posed were particularly troubling.

The rising frequency of such wars in fact signaled a growing need for a broader concept of security, a concept more all-encompassing than the largely state-centric view holding sway throughout the decades of the Cold War. It also demanded a new outlook on the part of militaries in order to meet the challenges they posed. Indeed, such conflicts required militaries to be employed in cosmopolitan law-enforcement roles, ones that gave greater priority to human rather than state security, and to seek to "defend and save lives rather than to vanquish the enemy or destroy infrastructure."[12] What was required was the enforcement of cosmopolitan norms (i.e. the enforcement of international humanitarian and human rights law), a task falling somewhere between soldiering and policing which included uses of force closer to peacekeeping than warfighting. Put simply, interest in and support for the idea of militaries—and their soldiers—which focused more heavily on saving the lives of civilians increased.

The clarion call for such new developments in the application of military force was ultimately encompassed in the notion of the cosmopolitan military. Central here was a "need to limit transnational harm, control and overcome political and other forms of violence, and reconstruct democratic legitimacy."[13] While the military's primary role, defence of the state, was not contested, proponents of the cosmopolitan military argued that state militaries could be used to "defend the moral community of humankind."[14] Drawing on Kantian roots[15] and extended through cosmopolitan democracy,[16] cosmopolitan law and cosmopolitan law enforcement,[17] scholars postulated that it was now possible to at least conceptualize a cosmopolitan military, in effect, a military exclusively employed as a *force for good*.

Cosmopolitanism postulated a "'new military model,' replacing the negative aim of containment with a positive one: the promotion of democracy, regional stability and economic prosperity."[18] Such militaries required three ethical criteria: a focus on "'individual human persons as the ultimate units of concern; they must attach that status 'to every human being equally' and they must regard persons as the ultimate unit of concern."[19] These criteria were important as cosmopolitan forces aimed to "defend the 'other' rather than defend *against* the 'other.'"[20] Central was the goal of saving the lives of others rather than destroying the enemy, minimizing casualties on both sides and employing only "demonstrably reasonable, proportionate and appropriate"[21] levels of force. While acknowledging that cosmopolitan force would be used only as a last resort, cosmopolitan authors argued that cosmopolitan law and the pursuit of cosmopolitan peace (*pax cosmopolitica*) nonetheless required the backing of coercive force.[22] Yet it was essential that cosmopolitan forces be seen as acting in the interests of the victims and not in those of the interested parties (both external and internal).

Such notions amounted to a paradigm shift in thinking about how militaries were to be conceived and designed. In fact, cosmopolitan theories of humanitarian military intervention were reflected within the United Nations' doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P).[23] That doctrine postulated a normative approach to humanitarian intervention based on human security where military action is being considered as a last resort. The use of military force, in effect, rests within the responsibility to react, one of the three responsibilities which the doctrine outlines. According to R2P, the international community of states is duty bound to

respond to "situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention."[24] It is here that the intersection of cosmopolitan militaries and R2P is most clearly evident. As Elliott and Cheeseman argue, the cosmopolitan ethic, "underpins the responsibility to protect proclaimed in the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty."[25] Both represented new thinking about militaries and the use of force, and increasingly, such thinking emerged in the defence policies and practices of states, Canada and the Canadian Forces included.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1990s: PURSUING HUMAN SECURITY IN A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT[26]

The Canadian government's 1995 foreign policy review, entitled *Canada in the World*, acknowledged that the security threats to Canada had changed to become more complex and multi-faceted.[27] International as well as domestic economic and trade policies were identified as key drivers of Canada's future prosperity. Since Canadian well-being was also directly related to the maintenance of international security, a global approach to security policy was argued to be not only prudent but necessary. The Canadian defence establishment contributed to this global security approach through continued commitments to such international organizations as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum. Closer to home, its collective agreements within the North American Aerospace Defence (NORAD), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continue as the guarantors of continental security.

Yet *Canada in the World* also argued that the protection of Canadian security must go beyond economic and military preparedness. New approaches, new instruments, new institutional roles, and new political responsibilities in the maintenance of international security must also be developed.[28] During the mid to late 1990s, the then minister of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Lloyd Axworthy, defined human security and "soft power"[29] as key elements in any new approach to Canada's foreign policy. In this regard, soft power was defined as the "art of disseminating information in such a way that desirable outcomes are achieved through persuasion rather than coercion."[30] Human security, meanwhile, focused on the needs of the individual and was seen to involve more than an absence of a military threat:

> At a minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met, but it also acknowledges that sustained economic development, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, good governance, sustainable development and social equity are as important to global peace as arms control and disarmament.[31]

The human security and, to a lesser extent, soft power legacy continued to figure prominently in Canada's foreign policy considerations beyond Axworthy's tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This was confirmed in a discussion paper prepared for the process of reviewing Canada's foreign policy. That paper states that "our human security approach to foreign policy recognizes that the security of states is essential but not sufficient to ensure the safety of their citizens."[32]

In line with this view, the Government of Canada, and in particular DFAIT, also took the lead role in establishing the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). With Canadian support, the ICISS produced a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*, which argues, *inter alia*, that "sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe—from mass murder and rape, from starvation—but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must [then] be borne by the broader community of states."[33]

Meanwhile, and on a similar note, DFAIT stated that Canada's defence policy must adapt to this new human security or cosmopolitan-minded approach to world affairs.

> Canada now faces difficult choices about its military commitments. Since a nation's ability to influence international security decisions depends in part on its capacity to shoulder responsibilities, the kinds and level of military capacity that Canada has will affect our future role in the world. Increasingly, international forces are being called upon for a wide range of commitments: engaging in combat, restoring order, enforcing peace agreements, and protecting civilians. The coming years are likely to see high demand for military forces with varied capabilities. Canadians need to consider how our military can best support our foreign policy.[34]

Lloyd Axworthy, as **Minister of Foreign Affairs**, commented that: "The world had no idea what sovereignty and the security infrastructure would look like immediately following the signing of the treaty of Westphalia. Norms evolved through decades of debate, thought, action, conflict and compromise."[35] What was being suggested at the turn of the century from a Canadian foreign policy perspective was that the concept of human security contained much promise as well as peril and the fact that this conception of security based on human beings garnered substantial attention from academics, policymakers and states alike perhaps signaled the emergence of new international security norm.

DEFENCE POLICY IN THE 1990s: THE CANADIAN FORCES AS A MULTIPURPOSE, COMBAT-CAPABLE FORCE

Canada's only white paper on defence in the 1990s was crafted with extensive input from both DFAIT and concurrent reviews of defence and foreign policy conducted by the Special Joint Committee of Parliament. The Committee was a sixteen-member team of politicians from the House of Commons and the Senate whose mandate, for its report on defence policy, was to determine what Canadians wanted from their defence forces.[36] The Committee's research and subsequent report were extensive and, as the authors of the 1994 white paper acknowledged, its findings "played an integral role in shaping Canada's new defence policy. Virtually all its recommendations are reflected in this White Paper."[37]

MULTIPURPOSE, COMBAT-CAPABLE FORCE. The crafting of defence policy in the 1990s was not without its debates and controversies. Of particular relevance to the issues of the emerging international security paradigm was the division of opinion over how the Canadian Forces should be structured in the future. The debate before the Committee essentially produced two camps.

The first camp, mostly from within the defence establishment, proposed the retention of traditional general-purpose forces capable of engaging in old-style wars. The second camp, mostly from outside the defence establishment, proposed the development of military capabilities mainly suited to a world characterized by regional conflicts and low-level peacekeeping and other military operations. One of the more vocal groups espousing this latter approach to defence was the Canada 21 Council, which favoured restructuring the Canadian Forces in ways that "would have a negligible effect upon Canada's ability to withstand a conventional military attack, but would allow the Canadian Forces to play a larger role in enhancing common security."[38] Any decision to involve the Canadian Forces more in the pursuit of common security (which incorporates concepts of human security) was likely to lead it towards a more extensive peacekeeping and humanitarian role.

While the government accepted the worldview of those proposing more radical changes to the Canadian Forces, it balanced this with the need to take a more traditional approach to structuring Canada's defence force and its capabilities.[39] As a result, the concept of a multipurpose, combat capable force emerged as one of the main tenets of the 1994 Defence White Paper. What this meant in practice was not made clear and so the term has been a source of some debate. However, upon closer examination of the White Paper itself, one can derive a sense of what a multipurpose, combat-capable force meant.

Close examination of the 1994 White Paper commitments reveals that the government was quite clear about the size of the commitment it was prepared to deploy internationally. Articulated as main contingency forces[40] (MCF), these forces comprised approximately 10,000 soldiers with a focus on warfighting. The MCF were also considered capable of being deployed for peacekeeping and low-intensity operations, yet only sustainable for a matter of months.[41] Further, 4,000 personnel of the MCF were also earmarked as vanguard[42] forces that could be sustained indefinitely in a low-threat environment. While not explicitly stated, one might reasonably conclude that the MCF and integral vanguard forces, capable of warfighting or peacekeeping and low-intensity operations, represented what the government meant by multipurpose, combat-capable forces. However, while the term multipurpose, combat-capable forces seemed to satisfy both traditional and non-traditional approaches to defence, it was quite clear that the government was focused on a more minimalist approach due to impending budget cuts. As noted in the 1994 White Paper:

> The Report of the Special Joint Committee played an integral role in shaping Canada's new defence policy. Virtually all its recommendations are reflected in this White Paper. In a few cases, after further examination, the Government has preferred to adopt an alternate approach, but the intent of the Committee is met. The Committee's recommendation concerning the size of the Regular Forces was judged to be inconsistent with the financial parameters within which the Department of National Defence must operate. Cuts to the defence budget deeper than those envisioned by the Committee will be required to meet the Government's deficit reduction targets.[43]

What is clear, however, is that the 1994 defence white paper signaled a change in direction for Canadian defence, one that was seen "as a bold attempt to rescue defence policy from the dictates of the Cold War and officers and officials conditioned by that singular event"[44] and arguably one that was to better position the Canadian Forces to undertake operations within the emerging international security environment.

SECURITY TASKS. The opening chapter, entitled "International Environment," which set the tone for the document as a whole, stressed as key security concerns such global pressures as refugees, failed states, and ethnic, religious and political extremism rather than interstate rivalry. It stated that:

> [United Nations] peacekeeping and humanitarian operations are playing a critical role in responding to the immediate consequences, both direct and indirect, of global population and resource pressures. Armed forces are being called upon increasingly to ensure a safe environment for the protection of refugees, the delivery of food and medical supplies, and the provision of essential services in countries where civil society has collapsed.[45]

The chapter further declared that Canadians are internationalist and not isolationist by nature: multilateral security cooperation is an expression of Canadian values in the international sphere; multilateral cooperation is necessary to combat the complex security problems in evidence today; and the government is committed to the full range of multilateral operations (NATO, United Nations and OSCE). A commitment to the idea of collective security closely linked to the United Nations was put forward as one of the three main pillars of Canada's defence policy. Although the White Paper did not dismiss Canada's responsibilities to collective defence and its alliance commitments, NATO (which had traditionally received its own chapter in defence white papers) was grouped in a chapter on collective security. This changing emphasis was also reflected in the chapter entitled "Contributing to International Security," in which it was proclaimed that:

> [B]y choosing to maintain a multi-purpose, combat-capable force, Canada will retain the capability to make a significant and responsible contribution to international peace and stability, within a [United Nations] framework, through NATO, or in coalitions of like-minded countries.[46]

Most commentators agree that these are not only reasonable tasks but essential ones, although the emphasis placed on each of the tasks will vary from time to time. The tasks were similar to the cosmopolitan law enforcement tasks anticipated by Kaldor and others within the new wars, including protecting civilians, enforcing safe-havens and humanitarian corridors, arresting war criminals, implementing ceasefires, controlling weapons, overseeing demilitarization and ensuring public security.[47] The deployment of the Canadian Forces in support of arguably human security missions to such remote locations as Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Haiti seemingly supported this notion.

While prepared to task the Canadian Forces in this way, however, the 1994 Defence White Paper also makes it quite clear that the government will not create a defence force that is specifically designed to operate at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. The white Paper argues that:

> It would be misguided to invest in very specific forces and capabilities, whether at the high end of the scale (aircraft designed for antitank warfare, for example) or at the lower end (forces limited to minimal-risk peacekeeping operations). To opt for either approach would be to forego the capability and flexibility that are inherent in a multi-purpose force.[48]

Thus, while a multipurpose, combat-capable force was never defined in the 1994 Defence White Paper, that document, as well as recent Canadian Forces deployments in Kosovo, Timor and Afghanistan, made clear that the human security agenda embraced by DFAIT influenced defence policy to a much greater degree than in the immediate post-Cold War period. Through multipurpose combat capabilities to collective security closely linked to the United Nations, the Canadian Forces exhibited at least some of the principles common to cosmopolitan law enforcement.

OPERATIONS. Amid mounting pressures from fiscal restraint, the Canadian Forces performed with distinction during the 1990s. Figure 1 table captures graphically the volume of employment both internationally and domestically.

Source: Combat Camera

With his canopy open to the warm Mediterranean sun, the pilot of a CF-18 Hornet fighter aircraft from Task Force Aviano — the "Balkan Rats" — awaits clearance to taxi onto the active runway while two United States Marine Corps EA-6B Prowler fighters take off. This Hornet is armed with the GBU-12, a 500-pound guided bomb unit (lower left), and the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile (centre right). In 1999, Canadian CF-18s deployed in Italy under Operation ECHO participated in the NATO bombing campaign over the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.



Figure 1: Operations 1980–2004[49]

The operations in which the Canadian Forces participated in the 1990s ranged from very small deployments of military observers to combat operations. The Canadian Forces helped to restore order, separate combatants, protect national citizens and international workers, provided assistance to nationals and non-governmental organizations, and assisted with nation-building.

While early in the decade there was a semblance of the familiar peacekeeping under the United Nations (Canada had nearly 5,000 peacekeepers deployed, with more than half in Yugoslavia),[50] reality soon dispelled any notion that the operations of the 1990s were familiar or normal. Despite the fact that Canada sent peacekeepers to both Croatia and Bosnia early in the decade, they were soon to discover that there was little peace to keep. In fact, one Canadian soldier wounded in Croatia quipped, "This is not peace monitoring, (but rather) war monitoring."[51] From Canadian peacekeepers taken hostage to the battle of the Medak Pocket (September 1993), to mechanized forces overrunning lightly armed United Nations forces, there was little regard for the blue berets, and the promise of peacekeeping was far from reality. The failure of the United Nations in Bosnia culminated with the massacre in Srebrenica in July 1995, where United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was likened to an "armour-plated meals-on-wheels service," attempting to hold a humanitarian safety net under ethnic cleansing.[52]

Traditional unarmed United Nations peacekeeping seemed anachronistic, as peace-making and peace enforcement—now considered part of peace support operations—became part of the Canadian Forces lexicon in the emerging era of new wars underpinned by human security. This lesson was also reinforced at the end of the decade, where in Kosovo, peacekeeping was once again insufficient. "The new peace support operations make and enforce the peace, while providing substantial support to the civil mission."[53] What is perhaps most revealing about the Kosovo intervention was that NATO had acted, whereas the United Nations could not, similar to the Bosnia crisis and the establishment of Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) preceding UNPROFOR. For the Canadian Forces, this was an interesting development in that the 1994 white paper looked to reduce NATO commitments and shift the focus to the United Nations and collective security.

Somalia, Rwanda, Zaire, Kosovo and East Timor, among others, resembled to varying degrees a trend that began in Yugoslavia. Missions largely reflected the size and scope of vanguard forces articulated in the 1994 White Paper[54] establishing their reputation as the workhorses of Canada's participation in international security operations during the 1990s.[55] Additionally, these missions now meant that people were to be protected, root causes be determined and justice be done. Aims to missions evolved to include stability, protection, human rights, justice and development.[56] An important lesson that emerged from the 1990s was that highly qualified, well-equipped armed forces were necessary for enforcement and stability.[57] The resource challenges faced by the Canadian Forces during the 1990s were not unlike those that many other states faced during the same period. However, the Canadian Forces "responded to the demands of these new missions with strategies evolved inter alia from doctrine, tactics, and methods developed during the Cold War: small war-fighting operations, United Nations Peacekeeping missions, armed humanitarian assistance, new exposure to non-governmental organizations, and (surprising as it may seem) operations in the aid of the civil powers in Canada . . . ."[58]

INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Cosmopolitan-like thinking and R2P continued to resonate well into the first decade of the 21st century. Human security and R2P entered into the Canadian Forces doctrine manuals "Canadian Forces Operations" and "Peace Support Operations" in 2002, signaling a move toward greater acceptance of the concept. Both were prominent in the International Policy Statement of 2005—perhaps the penultimate articulation and acceptance of human security and R2P doctrine within foreign and defence policy. In fact, within diplomacy (i.e. the foreign policy component of the International Policy Statement), R2P was articulated on no less than ten separate occasions and human security was mentioned 18 times. Also significant was the fact that R2P was, for the first time, explicitly supported within defence policy, with the International Policy Statement clearly stating that:

> [T]he Government has made clear that it intends to engage members of the United Nations in moving forward with the "Responsibility to Protect" initiative, as endorsed by the December 2004 UN Secretary-General High Level Panel Report.[59]

To be sure, subsequent years saw some diminution of both R2P and human security in government policy. Yet recent calls for Canada to assert itself as a *force for good* in the world and the recent articulation of enlightened sovereignty, a concept which places global good ahead of state interest, suggested that a renewal of Canadian support for human security and R2P may well have been underway.

CONCLUSION

Freed from the grips of the bipolar rivalry, the new world order which was to be defined through peace and prosperity failed to emerge. Globalization—unabated—continued to threaten state structures and the global security landscape became dominated by new wars: those based on a claim to power by one's particular identity, whether national, clan, religious or linguistic. These conflicts strongly indicated a need for increasingly cosmopolitan or cosmopolitan-minded response by the international community in which human security considerations were at least as important as those of national security. Within this schema, militaries would exist as much to save lives as to defeat an enemy or destroy its infrastructure. In short, it was argued that we began to witness the emergence of cosmopolitan or cosmopolitan-minded militaries.

The Canadian Forces were no exception to this phenomenon. With Canada's prosperity linked to global stability, foreign policy objectives were premised, at least in part, on the pursuit of human security. Such concerns, in turn, drove Canada's defence policy and signaled the emergence of the Canadian Forces as an increasingly cosmopolitan-minded military. The establishment of a multipurpose, combat-capable force was more suited to a world characterized by regional conflicts and low-level peacekeeping and military operations. This option contrasted sharply with the more conventional general-purpose, combat-capable force designed principally for warfighting, a fact signaling a subtle shift in emphasis for the Canadian Forces.

Defence and security policy also highlighted a changing emphasis for the Canadian Forces. A commitment to the idea of collective security closely linked to the United Nations was established as one of the three main pillars of Canada's defence policy. The Canadian Forces missions during the 1990s—Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti and Kosovo—confirmed that protecting civilians, enforcing safe-havens and humanitarian corridors, arresting war criminals, implementing ceasefires, controlling weapons, overseeing demilitarization, and ensuring public security became a mainstay of operations. At the same time, while the government was ready to deploy the Canadian Forces in this manner, it was clear that they were not designed to operate solely at the lower end of the operations spectrum. Events such as the Medak Pocket, Srebrenica and Rwanda clearly demonstrated that the Canadian Forces' ability to prosecute cosmopolitan-like operations also required the backing of hard power.

The series of humanitarian crises which arose in the 1990s posed a dilemma for the international community. Cosmopolitan theories suggested that reformed state-based cosmopolitan militaries could have been able to carry out such humanitarian interventions. Canada's foreign policy focus on human security and the Canadian Forces' subtle shift away from conventional high intensity warfighting during the 1990s arguably resulted in the Canadian Forces' move

toward becoming a cosmopolitan-minded military. Given that cosmopolitan theory largely underpinned the ICISS work and R2P, the Canadian Forces was well positioned to undertake missions under a R2P mandate. The characterization of Canada as a *force for good*, for positive change in the world and the articulation of enlightened sovereignty, an idea in which the global good was favoured over state interests, reinforced the possibility that Canada and the Canadian Forces could have ostensibly been called upon to undertake missions to "defend the moral community of humankind."[60]

As noted above, the 1990s represented a significant point in the history of the Canadian Forces. At first glance, Canada's focus on human security and R2P doctrine, alongside proclamations of a *force for good*, appears to have little or no connection with the current shift in the international security environment, one marked most noticeably by a resurgence of great power competition between the United States, China and Russia. However, alongside this rivalry and its attendant complications, there remain tension and disputes that resemble the security environment in the 1990s, most noticeably ongoing human security concerns and failed or failing states. A potential strategy by the United States, international order's remaining chief sponsor, to prevent conflicts and encourage continued cooperation within this environment may very well rest with a mixed approach, one which accommodates both liberal and realist thinking. As a result, the liberal policies and programmes that dominated defence and security policy in Canada in the 1990s are worthy of being reconstructed and debated to perhaps highlight missed opportunities, thereby fostering increased trust in overcoming insecurity brought about by the current shift in the international security environment.

ENDNOTES

1. Ronald O'Rourke, "A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense – Issues for Congress", *Congressional Research Service Report* (Washington: Congressional Research Service, 2018), 2–3.
2. Michael J. Mazarr, "The Once and Future Order," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 96 Issue 1, Jan/Feb 2017: 30.
3. Keith Krause, "Theorizing security, state formation and the 'Third World' in the post-Cold War world," *Review of International Studies* (1998) 24: 125–136.
4. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 4.
5. Ramesh Thakur and Thomas G. Weiss, "R2P: From Idea to Norm–and Action?," *Global Responsibility to Protect* 1, (2009): 23.
6. S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong, *Human Security and the UN* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 137.
7. Ian Wing, *Refocusing Concepts of Security: The Convergence of Military and Non-Military Tasks*, Working Paper No. 111, (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000), 58.
8. MacFarlane and Khong, 2.
9. Ibid., 4.
10. Indeed, Münkler notes that "[i]n the wars that were fought up to the early part of the twentieth century, roughly 90 per cent of those killed or wounded would have been defined as combatants under international law. In the new wars at the end of the twentieth century, the profile of victims has been almost the exact opposite: some 80 per cent of the killed and wounded were civilians and only 20 per cent were soldiers on active service." See, Herfried Münkler, *The New Wars*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005): 14.
11. Department of National Defence, *Future Force: Concepts for Future Army Capabilities*, (Kingston: Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, 2003): 13.
12. Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, "Cosmopolitan Theory, Militaries and the Deployment of Force," Working Paper 2002/8 (Canberra: Department of International Relations, Australian National University, November 2002), 37.
13. Elliott and Cheeseman, "Cosmopolitan Militaries Project", Summary, November 2002.
14. Elliott and Cheeseman, eds., *Forces for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-first Century* (Manchester: University Press, 2004), 1.
15. Kantian Roots: Eighteenth century philosopher Immanuel Kant, referred by many as the greatest political philosopher of the Enlightenment, is noted for his exceptional work on cosmopolitanism. In brief, Kant viewed a more civil society beyond national borders but rejected the notion of a world government or a world state. His argument was based on religious and linguistic differences, sovereignty and scale. "[A]s Kant puts it 'laws progressively lose their impact as the government increases its range.'" See Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 33. Kant formalized his world of states in his most famous work, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*. Electronic version of *Perpetual Peace* viewed 7 Nov 04 and available at http://oll.libertyfund.org/Texts/ToC/0075_ToC.html.
16. David Held, a noted cosmopolitan democracy scholar, expressed this view of cosmopolitanism as "the cultural, legal and ethical basis of political order in a world where political communities and states matter, but not only and exclusively." David Held, "From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism," *Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance*, eds. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 167–168.
17. Mary Kaldor articulates a requirement for cosmopolitan law enforcement (i.e. enforcement of international humanitarian and human rights law) as a means of responding to new wars. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
18. Ibid., 25.
19. Elliott and Cheeseman, eds., *Forces for Good*, 24.
20. Ibid., 25.
21. Ibid., 26.
22. Elliott and Cheeseman, "Cosmopolitan Militaries Project."
23. See Gareth Evans, Mohamed Sahnoun, et al, *The Responsibility to Protect, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
24. Evans, Sahnoun, et al, xi.
25. Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, eds., *Forces for Good*: 3.
26. Portions of this work appeared in Lorraine Elliott and Graeme Cheeseman, eds., *Forces for Good: Cosmopolitan Militaries in the Twenty-first Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004).
27. Government of Canada, *Canada in the World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review 1995* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1995).
28. Government of Canada, *Canada in the World*.
29. Soft power was first articulated by Professor Joseph S. Nye, Jr. in the late 1980s and is described in detail in *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004).
30. Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada and human security: The need for leadership," *International Journal* 52:2 (1997): 192.
31. Axworthy, 184.
32. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy: Report to Canadians* (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2003), 9.
33. *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), viii.
34. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *A Dialogue on Foreign Policy*, 8.
35. Taylor Owen, "Human Security–Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a Threshold-Based Definition," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 2004): 373.
36. See Parliament of Canada, *Security in a Changing World*, Report of the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy (Ottawa: Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994); and Parliament of Canada, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and*

Priorities for the Future, Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy (Ottawa: Parliamentary Publications Directorate, 1994).

37. Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group-Publishing, 1994), 2.
38. Ivan Head et al., *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century* (Toronto: Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994), 69.
39. Some have remarked that the position taken in the white paper was closer to the 'Canada 21' approach than perhaps many had realized. See Joseph T. Jockel, *The Canadian Forces: Hard Choices, Soft Power,* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1999), 33.
40. MCF consisted of: naval task group with appropriate air support, brigade group, infantry battalion group, wing of fighter aircraft, squadron of tactical transport aircraft, joint task force headquarters.
41. Jockel, 4.
42. Vanguard consisted of: 2 ships, 1 battle group, 1 infantry battalion group, 1 squadron of fighter aircraft, 1 flight of tactical transport aircraft, a communications element, and a headquarters element.
43. Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*: 2.
44. Douglas Bland, *Canada's National Defence, Volume 1: Defence Policy* (Kingston: School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, 1997): 285.
45. Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*: 5.
46. Ibid., 38.
47. See the discussion in Elliott and Cheeseman, 'Cosmopolitan theory'.
48. Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper*: 14.
49. C. Ross, "Future Security Challenges: A Canadian Perspective," *Sixth Annual Society for Military and Strategic Studies Conference* (Calgary: University of Calgary, 2004).
50. Joel Sokolsky, "The Americanization of Peacekeeping: Implications for Canada," Martello Paper 17, (Kingston: Centre for International Relations, Queen's University, 1997), 41.
51. Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, *Campaigns for International Security: Canada's Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century* (Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), 226.
52. Sam Hanson, "Bosnia Herzegovina," in Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 89.
53. Paul Heinbecker and Rob McRae, "The Kosovo Air Campaign," in McRae and Hubert, 131.
54. Analysis of the missions from 1990 to 2000 reveals that minimum number of troops deployed was 3850 and the maximum was 4656, largely structured around a battle group (1000 or more soldiers: an organization task tailored for operations, based on a unit headquarters, consisting of manoeuvre sub units with combat support and combat service support). Bland and Maloney, 225–266 and National Defence and the Canadian Forces, "Operations" viewed 2 Jul 10, http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/operations/current-ops-courante-eng.asp.
55. Jockel, 4.
56. Patricia Fortier, "The Evolution of Peacekeeping" in McRae and Hubert, 47–48.
57. Ibid., 51.
58. Bland and Maloney, 226.
59. Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement*, "A Role of Pride and Influence in the World–Defence" (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2005), 24.
60. Elliott and Cheeseman, eds., *Forces for Good*, 1.

Photographs of Rwandan Genocide victims at the Genocide Memorial Centre in Kigali, Rwanda

Source: Adam Jones, Ph.D.

Corporal Philippe Lyonnais carries a Carl Gustav recoilless rifle followed by Corporal Emilie Gauthier-Wong carrying the 84 MM rounds for the Carl Gustav during a live fire exercise at Mielno range in the Drawsko-Pomorski training area in Glebokie, Poland on 31 July 2015 during Operation REASSURANCE.

Source: Combat Camera

TRAINING CHAPLAINS FOR THE NEXT WAR

Captain (Padre) Michael Peterson

The changing security environment requires that all occupations within the Canadian Armed Forces evaluate their training and readiness on an ongoing basis. As a course director at the Canadian Forces Chaplain School and Centre, my duties include the delivery of annual courses designed to prepare new chaplains for their first operational deployment. Rising geopolitical tensions, particularly in Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, pose a challenge to the Chaplain School. As the school of the Royal Canadian Chaplain Service, we need to consider how we can best prepare chaplains to be assets to soldiers and commanders in the potential battlespace contested by a near-peer opponent. This article examines that question and offers some suggestions to augment the wider training of chaplains who will be primarily deployed with the land forces of the Canadian Army.

Canadian Armed Forces personnel from all three services have participated in Operation REASSURANCE in Central and Eastern Europe as part of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assurance and deterrence measures.[1] The Canadian military also has an ongoing assistance and training mission in Ukraine as part of Operation UNIFIER.[2]

The training we are doing in Operation REASSURANCE, not to mention our military posture in Eastern Europe, is significantly different from the stability and counterinsurgency operations for which the Canadian Armed Forces commonly trained and practised a decade ago.

During the Afghanistan era the focus was primarily on asymmetric warfare—a notable exception being Operation MEDUSA in 2006, which at the time was the Canadian Army's largest land engagement since the war in Korea and the largest ever fought by NATO.[3] Chaplain training, at that time, assumed a battlespace in which we enjoyed the advantages of asymmetric warfare, including:

- robust and extensive logistics and secure rear-area base networks made possible in large part because of private contractors and local labour;
- complete air-superiority, including the ability to insert, evacuate and rotate soldiers as required;
- significant technological advantages over the enemy including night-vision and thermal capability, precision guided munitions, long range artillery and armour support, uninhabited aerial vehicles and aerial surveillance and close air support;
- uninterrupted command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities;
- a comprehensive commitment to soldier welfare, including regular and dependable home leave allowances at mid-tour and regular communications, including via social media, with loved ones at home;
- the luxury of being able to focus on ministry to a relatively small number of Canadian casualties; and
- an emphasis on civil-military cooperation, perhaps more than on combat operations.

None of these points should be taken as downplaying or minimizing the valuable contributions made by chaplains in Afghanistan or of the price they paid to sustain their ministry. While no Canadian Armed Forces chaplains were killed or wounded in action in Afghanistan, the number of those suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome is proportional to rates in the Canadian Armed Forces as a whole. Many padres who served in the Afghan campaign have since left the service.

Nevertheless, chaplains enjoyed significant advantages and resources in their ministry that their predecessors did not enjoy in Canada's previous wars. Our padres had a high degree of mobility and movement that allowed them to reach soldiers, even in the forward operating bases. Civil-military cooperation operations gave chaplains occasions to connect with local populations and to develop expertise in religious area assessment and religious leader engagement practice.[4] Padres in the theatre of operations had access to support from bases and rear party ministry teams in Canada when arranging repatriations or aiding a deployed soldier's family in times of crisis. Rear party chaplains worked in interdisciplinary teams with civilian helping professionals such as social workers and so did not have to bear the load of maintaining soldier welfare by themselves. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, as the Afghan mission evolved from combat to aid and training, padres were ministering to soldiers with a very

Source: Canadian War Museum

Fighting a peer opponent. Richard Jack's painting of Canadian troops holding the line at Second Ypres.[5]

high probability of coming home alive and physically unharmed. We cannot necessarily expect a future conflict to have those characteristics.

It is a truism that armies train to fight the last war. However, some strategists now believe that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were *sui generis*, one-of-a-kind conflicts, and were poor preparation for the kind of warfighting that a conflict with a near-peer adversary would demand. As the commandant of the United States Army War College, Major General William Rapp recently noted, counterinsurgency operations are "all my students really know," reflecting the College's mandate to return to preparing officers for a broader range of conflicts.[6] While it is entirely possible that the next large-scale Canadian Army deployment could be to a country in Africa or the Middle East, and thus be a continuation of stability and counterinsurgency operations, it is also possible that the Canadian Army could be challenged by a much larger conflict. For example, should "assurance and deterrence" fail in Eastern Europe, and a Baltic country invoke NATO Article 5 after a Russian attack, our recent military experience may be of little use to us.

For the Canadian Armed Forces, the transition to a war with a peer opponent might be historically analogous to the transition from our participation in the South African war, in which Britain's professional army enjoyed significant advantages over their Boer opponents, to 1915, when our small expeditionary force went up against a huge, well equipped and professionally led conventional Germany army. While images of Canadian gallantry at Second Ypres adorn many a Canadian Armed Forces mess today, our first battle of the Great War was a significant shock for a largely inexperienced army whose small professional cadre had hitherto only experienced garrison life and colonial warfare.

Chaplain training for the next war needs to pay attention to strategic leaders like Tom Mahnken, president of the United States Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, who has warned that "Like the European powers at the start of World War I, we could find ourselves tremendously unprepared... surprised, and unpleasantly surprised."[7] Likewise, United States Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley has warned that the battlefield of the near future will be decidedly unpleasant, an environment where being surrounded and constantly on the move will be normal.[8] ""There will [be] no clear front line, no secure supply lines, no big bases like Bagram or Camp Victory with chow halls, air-conditioning, and showers. With enemy drones and sensors constantly on the hunt for targets, there won't even be time for four hours' unbroken sleep.' So, says Milley, 'being seriously miserable every single minute of every day will have to become a way of life.'"[9]

Chaplain training should therefore focus more on the demands of doing ministry in a battlespace with the following characteristics:

- There will be no safe bases from which to minister. Tactical, brigade-level chaplains, normally attached to move with B echelon or headquarters elements, will be frequently on the move. Fighting and support units will all be at some degree of risk from artillery, air attack or possibly even from tactical nuclear weapons.

- Air superiority may be contested or denied by enemy anti-access, area denial weapons systems. Command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities may be degraded by enemy electronic warfare and jamming operations. Chaplains may find themselves part of a force cut off from Canada for long periods.

- Casualty ministry will be the norm. Padres can expect to work closely with medics on or near the battlefield. Repatriation of the dead, including the ornate ramp ceremonies practised in Afghanistan, will often be impossible when airspace is heavily contested or dominated by the enemy. Lost abilities from the mobile battlefields of World War II, including field burial and hasty graves registration, will need to be relearned.

- Battlefield ministry will be the norm. This task will be complicated by the social impact of secularism and pluralism. The twentieth century padre had the advantage of ministering to soldiers from a culture shaped by Christianity. However, the old axiom of no atheists in foxholes could reassert itself along with hasty prayers before and after actions, another chaplain skill from twentieth century conflicts, and will doubtless be valued by soldiers whom we previously thought of as quite secular.

- Self-directed ministry will be the norm. In Afghanistan the Canadian Armed Forces chaplaincy developed elaborate command and communications protocols for events like casualty notification with each step in the process being reported to a host of persons back in Canada. In the event of war with a peer competitor, with communications severely degraded, chaplains may need to function independently for days or weeks at a time. It is doubtful that chaplains will have the assistance of civilian helping professionals such as social workers. Other than their partnerships with Canadian Armed Forces medical personnel, chaplains will be working on their own to support morale, welfare and mental health in the best manner they can.

- Military skills will be paramount. The highest honour troops can give a chaplain, that he or she is a "soldier's padre," must be the norm and not the exception. Chaplains will be as dirty, unfed, cut off, scared and miserable as anyone else. They will need to know how to use a map and compass, conceal their positions, give first aid and drive military vehicles. They will need to do all those things while effectively giving spiritual aid and moral comfort to the soldiers they are supporting.

- Chaplain casualties will be normal. In northwest Europe in 1944–1945, in the British and Canadian armies, chaplain casualties (killed and wounded) were proportionally as high as in the combat arms. If the first stages of a future war go badly, as they did in World War II, chaplains will almost certainly become prisoners and will need to minister in austere conditions.

Source: Library and Archives Canada 3623164

Honorary Captain Robert Seaborn, Chaplain of the 1st Battalion, Canadian Scottish Regiment, giving absolution to an unidentified soldier of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.

Honorary Major John W. Forth, Chaplain of the Cameron Highlanders of Ottawa (M.G.), helping the unit's Regimental Aid Party to treat a wounded soldier near Caen, France, 15 July 1944.[10]

Much of the training that the points above would require will have to be delivered in the field, either on regularly scheduled exercises or in whatever workup training was possible in the event of, or after the start of, hostilities. Training at the Chaplain School, which is predominantly academic in nature, would have to be significantly reimagined in a conflict of any significant duration. By focusing on ministry in an operational war zone, I have not discussed what domestic or rear party ministry would look like. The amount of pastoral work required to notify next of kin in Canada after a significant engagement with large numbers killed, wounded, missing or taken prisoner would be a herculean task in itself and would require significant assistance from local agencies, including churches and other religious communities.

Finally, we need to consider the enormous spiritual and psychological demands that ministry in this type of conflict would make of chaplains. In garrison ministry, or even on some deployments, our chaplains have not always met the mark. Chaplains cannot preach spiritual resiliency or lead by example if they are not themselves prepared. In the battlespace of the near future, chaplains will be conspicuous in their successes and failures at a time when they will be needed more than ever. Success will depend on the cultivation of physical fitness, military skills, fieldcraft and, above all, highly intentional and meaningful spiritual preparation. In all of these respects the chaplain will need to be meaningfully integrated into training from the tactical to the operational level. Unit and brigade command teams should endorse and support this training and should expect a great deal of their chaplains during exercises.

This article has primarily envisioned a near-peer conflict, an especially unpleasant possibility that Canadian Armed Forces members, including chaplains, should be prepared for. Of course, many of these recommendations could apply in other—and probably more likely—lower intensity deployments where a chaplain will need to be able to move confidently and effectively as part of a small team within an austere and potentially dangerous environment. Disaster assistance missions, for example, will pose many of the same logistical, communications and psychological challenges and stresses outlined above. Faced with such challenges, Canadian Army and Canadian Armed Forces members should rightfully expect to deploy with well-trained and ready chaplains, capable of playing their significant role as a much-needed support to the force.

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A member from the 1st Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, loads a 155 MM projectile into the M777 Howitzer during a fire mission.

Source: Flickr

THE INESCAPABLE – TASK FORCE NEMESIS AND TACTICAL DEEP BATTLE

Major J. M. Watson, CD

INTRODUCTION

With the unique road to high readiness for 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in 2014–2016, where the bulk of the task force was force generated, the Canadian Army has been offered an opportunity to capture a number of lessons for formation-level force employment. 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group force generated a three-battle group high readiness element, designated Task Force NEMESIS, leveraging the unique armoured capacity resident in the West. In defining a *way of war* over numerous international and national computer assisted exercises and field training exercises, a number of historical concepts and contemporary doctrines were fused together to fill the void in Canadian doctrine and institutional knowledge of fighting at the task force level. It was noted early on in the high readiness cycle, especially when compared to our NATO and American counterparts, that Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups have a unique set of capabilities, and function as almost *pocket divisions*, allowing them to occupy a unique space in any order of battle—but one that needed to be defined and refined. The aim of this article is to capture the key conclusions that Task Force NEMESIS arrived at in defining the *task force space*, and some of the salient methods that were developed to fight on the 21st century battlefield. Those observations may inform the burgeoning development of Canadian task force-level doctrine and the institutional *rules of thumb* that attend it.

Task Force NEMESIS' way of war was based on the twin models of tactical deep battle and the single battle concept, the latter borrowed from the United States Marine Corps. Tactical deep battle seeks to fight through the enemy's depth in both time and space, and remove its freedom of action so that we could impose our will upon the enemy (the Clausewitzian definition of the aim of combat).[1] The single battle concept is a unifying idea that harmonizes all actions into a unified whole, as opposed to *stove-piped* systems and isolated actions. From those, answers were continually sought to two questions that the Task Force Commander used to define an operational approach: "Where is the task force headquarters' space?" (i.e. where in the battle does it have a role?); and "What is the task force headquarters' fight?" (i.e. what actions should it be taking?). It was through the deep and single battle paradigms, and those core questions, that Task Force NEMESIS developed a warfighting methodology and philosophy designed to maximize the strengths of a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group, while operating realistically within its inherent limitations. At its heart, the task force sought to win the competition for time with the enemy by minimizing our own time devoted to the *observe-orient-decide* sections of the 'OODA' loop, while maximizing our time in the *act* phase; as a corollary, we also sought to cause the inverse for the enemy, forcing it to a culminating point as early as possible.

Over two years of high readiness training, several key practices evolved to facilitate this concept. First, was a focus on decisive points and culminating points to frame the synchronization and apportionment of resources on the main effort in order to dictate tempo. Second, doctrinal templates and baseline documents were developed to streamline command and control and the orders process. Third, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and

reconnaissance (ISTAR), and joint fires were fused into a singular task force weapons system. Fourth, was the investment of combat power and combat support resources in to the rear area, with that zone being treated as a full part of the 360° battle within the tactical design.

NEMESIS was chosen as the talisman of the task force because the Greek goddess' name means "to give what is due," and she was also referred to as *the inescapable*. The task force was built to pay dues across a broad spectrum of operations and dictate terms to an inescapable conclusion, even if outnumbered in complex environments. Through the gauntlet of high readiness training, the following lessons were learned through trial and error—lots of errors—and should be considered as batons to be passed, rather than finish lines in and of themselves.



Figure 1: Task Force NEMESIS Order of Battle

THE CONSTRUCT OF TACTICAL DEEP BATTLE

If there has been a chimera in modern warfare, it has been the concept of the decisive battle—that an enemy can be defeated with a singular blow, and that victory can be purchased in a single payment. A cursory survey of history puts paid to this idea, as short wars are the exception to the rule, and usually were the result a decisive superiority of one side over the other. Conflicts are usually drawn out affairs that became struggles of endurance, as with armies demonstrating a remarkable resilience due to the resources available to both individual powers and coalitions. Hundred Years' War, Thirty Years' Wars, Seven Years' War, two decades of Napoleonic Wars, the four- and six-year respective spans of the First and Second World Wars, and the recent decade-plus wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—none of these was won by that unicorn of *decisive battle*.

We do not normally train like this is the case, and the verbiage of our doctrine glosses over some hard truths that history has taught. The muscle memory of our field forces is conditioned by the culture of the live fire range—a discrete period of live fire application with a definitive start and end—and the five-day computer assisted exercise. The Army basically fights in vignettes during training for a number of good reasons—personnel tempo, funding, competing resource and task demands—but this conditioning has been compounded with a historical skew that studies battles as singularities and a doctrine that is high on buzzwords (e.g. *manoeuvrist*, or *adaptive dispersed operations*), and low on practical content. Even our operational experience in Afghanistan has fed into this, as six-month tours begat episodic affairs, with every battle group starting to fight the war anew biennially, and every year a change of Task Force Kandahar headquarters brought a new campaign plan, offset to the battle group rotations, for good measure.[2] In sum, there has been an institutional weakness in building a series of engagements into a series of battles, which form part of the fabric of a coherent campaign.

Task Force NEMESIS looked to the concept of deep battle to inform its outlook on how to conduct operations; faced with the paradigm of a *hybrid* threat, where irregular forces and a peer enemy would be our erstwhile adversaries, it was understood that the task force would require a framework to conduct sustained operations in this context. Peer forces and irregular adversaries, on their own, have traditionally been ingredients for prolonged conflicts; a combination of them do not lend themselves to an idea that any future conflict would be over swiftly. Therefore, it was fundamentally understood that the task force would have to be prepared to fight a series of battles in order to win, possibly over a prolonged period.

Deep battle, and its larger parent concept, deep operations, are concepts that go beyond the capability to launch fires into the depth of an enemy force. Deep battle postulates that there is a requirement to conduct a series of sequential operations that inflict sufficient damage on an enemy, with corresponding psychological second order effects, to achieve freedom of action.[3] As well, they must be designed to enable the higher and superior commander's operational concept of operations, a common concept at first blush. But since we rarely train within the framework of an operational campaign, we have a tendency towards tactical myopia.[4] It is the notion of depth being a function of *time* as well as *space* that gives the concept so much relevance. It is a practical fact that, in a war, it is highly unlikely that an enemy will collapse after the first contact, just as it is physically impossible for us to fight unceasingly without rest. Therefore, conflicts will be a series of peaks and troughs, as forces cycle through periods of recovery, preparation and execution. Forces will never be fully ready, but rather, are in competition to see who will be *ready enough* before the other.[5] This competition in time is what translates into tempo, which then turns combat potential into combat power, fulfilling Napoleon's dictum that the physics equation *F=ma* applies to warfare.

Within this model is the idea of *simultaneity*. Instead of trying to keep fighting all the time with parts of a force, and never achieving sufficient force ratios for decisive action, deep battle sees the application of maximum force in a defined timeframe against as many enemy elements as possible—the maximum contact area—in a cycle of sequential actions that are linked together.[6]

Source: Flickr

Recognizing that forces cannot fight everywhere all the time, the temporal and spatial underpinnings of deep battle are best colloquially summed up by Stonewall Jackson's apocryphal quip that it's about "getting there firstest with the mostest," and doing that repeatedly. Battles and campaigns are a race of cycles, a contest of *relative* strengths in time.

In the physical realm, deep battle also has a specific effect that it needs to achieve, which is the destruction of the enemy's reserve, that portion of its force that gives it its freedom of action.[7] It is not just the ability to deliver fires or move forces into the enemy's physical depth that gives deep battle its character, but rather, the aim of a battle's design—to destroy the enemy's reserve on terms favorable to us—as opposed to the enemy using its reserve to serve its own ends. Once a reserve has been neutralized, an adversary will be forced to either reposition integral forces to reconstitute a reserve in the middle of a fight, or have the next level of command commit forces forward to support it.[8] Regardless, the removal of the reserve dislocates that enemy's plan and almost automatically passes the initiative to the friendly forces. While most of the writings on deep battle deal with tactics at the divisional and corps level, they are also applicable to task forces, especially ones with the capabilities of a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group.

The obverse of deep battle into the enemy's depth is the fight back through our own depth in order to preserve our freedom of action. Conceptually, it is not enough to view the so-called *rear area* as a passive, economy of effort, zone. Rear area security is more than convoy escort and local security patrols. It is that area where stability operations will most likely be carried out as conventional combat actions move forward, necessitating a concerted security and influence activities effort in order to maintain the infrastructure we require, and to pacify the population among which we operate. Given the numbers of vulnerable nodes—combat service support, radio rebroadcast, headquarters, electronic warfare, medical—and the length of lines of communication, taking a purely defensive mindset and providing incremental force protection is almost prohibitive in terms of resources; and in defending passively everywhere, you run the risk of defending nowhere. Therefore, a more proactive, holistic approach to the fight around where our most vulnerable assets are based needed to be adopted. The area behind the main forces—our depth—cannot be treated as an afterthought, but must be treated as an area of operations, on par with those allocated to fight in the enemy's depth and along the forward edge of the battle area, because it is that zone that provides the stable element of which J. F. C. Fuller spoke, the firm base from which all action derives its strength.[9] Completing the concept of deep battle for Task Force NEMESIS was the adoption of a 360° framework for the battlespace as a manoeuvre area throughout, with the attendant command and control structures and resource allocations.

There must also be a unified effort between the *hard* and *soft* power elements in the task force. We could not count on physical attrition alone to win. Conversely, threatening or cajoling the enemy through psychological operations without backing up threats and keeping promises would mean that actions on that ethereal *moral plane* would be empty. Physical—attritional, or the threat of attrition—and moral actions are symbiotic, and it is usually a physical blow that initially unbalances enemy commanders and unhinges their soldiers;[10] supported by robust psychological operations, fear can escalate to panic, and success can be exploited into a victory. On the other end of the spectrum of operations, when stability is the aim, it is not enough to promise to provide a "safe and secure environment" and some aid; security and amelioration actually have to be delivered in order to win over the support of a population and have that population reject the adversary's model. In keeping with the paradigm of a battlespace from front to rear, the influence activities component of the force was to be a combat support element, integrated into manoeuvre force operations, in order to to compliment the use, or threat, of force to achieve our aims *vis-à-vis* the enemy and non-combatants alike.

Deep battle also requires precision. Achieving a maximum contact area did not mean that every single adversary soldier and piece of equipment was to be engaged at the same time. Rather, sufficient pressure would be applied against sufficient vulnerabilities over a short enough period of time to ensure that the enemy had no freedom of action to resist our will; therefore, targeting would be key to our operations. Targeting is much more than just a process to mitigate the risk of collateral damage, and involved more than long-range fires. It was used as a holistic process to prioritize actions and resources—lethal and non-lethal—allowing the commander to manage the human condition of having unlimited ambition but limited strength,[11] and to help achieve that most elusive principle of war, economy.

Last of all, the fusion of the human elements of command and the technical instruments of control would have to be achieved. In the OODA loop, the *observe-orient-decide* portion is where time can be decisively gained over an enemy, so that we *act* when it is vulnerable. The manoeuvrist doctrine of the Canadian Army calls for a balance between a centralization of intent and main effort, but a decentralized achievement of them. Our combined arms groupings give unit commanders, and echelons below, a great deal of combat power to fight independently, but our limited access to joint fires (integral and external), rationed engineer assets, and inadequate transport and maintenance resources, mean that certain key support and service support functions need to be centrally allocated to weight the main effort. Deep battle requires a great deal of initiative and independence, but also a very strong unity of effort. The war for time and resource allocation means that command and command support functions need to be comprehensive without being cumbersome; they need to be ruthless in selecting and maintaining the aim without sacrificing flexibility—having multiple ways to win. Striking a balance between mission command and directive control can be achieved, through it is an imperfect and chaotic struggle; so instead of trying to tame the storm, Task Force NEMESIS embraced a form of chaos theory—"we're messy, but we like it," summed up the compromises and flexibility that were accepted among commanders and staff to engender a results-oriented mindset.

FIGHTING IN THE TASK FORCE SPACE

In defining what the task force headquarters fight was, it was necessary to distill down to what actions only the task force commander could take, and with what assets. While ascertaining what those might be, the following criteria were established: the assets would be ones most effectively used *en masse*; those assets that required synchronization across the task force battlespace and served task force-level ends; those that were best uniquely controlled by the task force headquarters, primarily in terms of capacity; or those that would be used to affect the commander's main effort. In general then, the task force headquarters regularly controlled the bulk of the limited surveillance and target acquisition assets, including the reconnaissance squadron, most uninhabited aircraft systems, electronic warfare assets, second-line sustainment in the form of the service battalion, divisional and national support element assets pulled

Source: Flickr

Members of 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group participate in Exercise SENECA RAM.

forward, and the task force reserve. It could also call upon divisional-level artillery, close and interdiction air support, and close combat aviation fires. The task force headquarters was also the lowest level at which informational and civil-military aims could be authorized, and where the greatest capacity to gather information and fuse it into intelligence existed via the G2. The delineation of what would be centrally controlled task force assets was key to understanding exactly what the task force deep fight encompassed, and where the battle group close engagement piece fit. That is the essence of the art of synchronizing actions without micromanaging subordinate commanders—of balancing mission orders with directive control.

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The actions the task force headquarters would take fell into four broad categories. First, was defining the operational environment, which included terrain, enemy disposition and intent, civil and informational considerations, friendly force effects and political circumstances. Second, was the shaping of the battlespace, both through physical attrition and perception manipulation (to include deception), setting the conditions for successful decisive tactical actions by battle groups. Third, was to support close engagements by providing flank security, interdiction or reinforcement, primarily through ISTAR, joint fires and the commitment of reserves. Fourth, coordinating sustainment was very much a task force function, as the synchronization and staging of combat service support were tied directly to delaying our culminating point and maintaining tempo. Conceptually, the task force headquarters apportioned the battlespace to provide battle groups *boxes* in which to operate, similar to the German concept of "fighting in zone," with the task force headquarters paving the way to their figurative attack position and allowing them to fight their engagement on favorable terms. The actions of the task force headquarters were aimed at *teeing up* the next fight, both by degrading the enemy's physical, psychological and cognitive capacity to resist, and concomitantly increasing friendly understanding, morale and material ability to operate.

The *shaping–decisive–sustaining* method of battlefield visualization was generally used in place of *deep–close–rear*, because it was found that defining the battlespace in linear or spatial terms could be ephemeral. While preparing for an advance, for example, operations to clear irregulars from the ground lines of communication may actually be a decisive operations while assault battle groups are refitting. It was found to be more important to identify the purpose of actions, and arrange them in time and space, as opposed to defining them strictly in terms of disposition. Battlespaces are not solid, contiguous slabs, but rather, spaces that are largely empty, with pressure points to be manipulated, shielded or exploited. It is the relationship between the nature of these points and the purpose of our actions that defines the design of battles. The task force controlled and fought with the assets that shaped and sustained the decisive actions of battle groups, at the points of decision, which were identified relative to achieving the commander's intent rather than geographically.

As conflicts are intense competitions for time,[12] and are reciprocal in nature, the *space* for the task force to conduct its fight is found in the fourth dimension. It is in setting the tempo of operations that the task force commander and staff influence the battle, by synchronizing the tactical actions and effects of integral and supporting, lethal and non-lethal, elements. As stated above, it is *relative* tempo that is vital to the fight, and in the practical realm, shaping operations are essentially about delaying the enemy's ability to prepare for the next fight while at the same time enhancing our own. Decisive operations hasten the enemy's culminating point so that it cannot resist, and the dual aims of sustaining operations are to delay our culmination and reset ourselves as quickly as possible once it is reached. Figure 2 illustrates how, over time, the role of the task force becomes apparent in winning the fight for minutes, eventually compelling the dissolution of enemy resistance. It is important to remember that wars, large operations and battles are not won in singular strokes at the outset; to believe otherwise is to chase a chimera, and it can be too easy to translate the call in our doctrine for efficient, decisive victories into an assumption that a single blow can defeat an enemy. Unless an adversary is decisively overmatched at the outset, there is a period of *wearing down* that is required to set the conditions for decisive advantage. That includes divesting the enemy of physical resources, disrupting its command and control, denying it knowledge and manipulating its perceptions. The competition for time is the one that is of the greatest import, and it is there that the headquarters staff and the commander have the most impact on outcomes.

Source: Flickr



Figure 2: Time, Competition and the Task Force Space

PLANNING AND ORDERS

At the outset of the road to high readiness, the full operations planning process was used to generate orders, which included courses of action, plan development and multiple wargames. Due to the nature of the initial computer assisted exercises, two bad habits were initially formed; battle group planners were not brought into the planning cycle, and orders tended to be large and cumbersome because task force standing operating procedures had yet to be established, and every scenario was the *first battle* of the synthetic war. In short, orders tended to have a lot of baseline material that would have been covered in a theatre or campaign order. Unit battle procedure was slowed by getting in on the plan late and having to wade through a mountain of information. The argument was made in an after-action review that all that was needed was a *one-pager* for the whole task force to fight from, but this was truly going from the ridiculous to the sublime in terms of the length of orders. The eventual solution was to write a baseline order at the outset of an exercise *war* that laid out the mid-term scheme of manoeuvre (the general outline of battle sequence and intent), and detailed the standing operating procedures and enduring information that would be extant throughout a mission (like rules of engagement, airspace management and intelligence architecture). Subsequent orders were therefore much more streamlined and focused only on the next battle at hand, making them faster to generate and easier to digest.

Ancillary to use of a baseline order to underwrite subsequent planning cycles was the development of a tactical playbook, or doctrinal templates as our sister American task force, 2-2 Stryker Brigade Combat Team, called them. Over two years, it became apparent there were only so many ways to group the sub-units that comprised the task force and array them in time and space. There were also a discrete number of problem sets with which even a *hybrid* foe could present us. Therefore, a doctrinal template book was created and plans were adapted from their baseline, facilitating swifter courses of action development. In fact, it allowed the task force headquarters to hybridize planning by abbreviating courses of action development and move more quickly into plan development. That was the only way the planning cycles could fit into the ideal 24-hour timeframe demanded by the task force operating horizon of approximately 72 hours out. In bridging the gap between purely intuitive planning and dogmatic operations planning process cycles, the task force found a sweet spot where planning could be executed in a time and information starved environment without wholly resorting to rolling the proverbial twelve-sided die.

ISTAR AND JOINT FIRES

The fusion of ISTAR and joint fires into a singular weapons system gave the task force commander a powerful tool to affect the battlespace. While battle groups were enabled with small uninhabited aerial vehicles (SUAV) and apportioned close support fires, the bulk of joint fires and ISTAR assets were centralized under task force headquarters control. Due to the requirement for the ruthless rationalization of targets and allocation of assets, as well as the sheer staff power required to source and control them, it made the most sense to hold the bulk of the sensors and long range strike assets at the task force level. This also served to compensate for the fact that, with only two sabre squadrons available, the task force commander had limited options to constitute a strong reserve; the use of joint fires and ISTAR as formation weapons systems gave the commander a tool to shape and influence a battle at decisive points. The road to operationalizing the concept of ISTAR and wedding it to joint fires was a rocky one, but one that eventually bore great fruit.

ISTAR is a system, not a single staff officer or a sensor. Too often, the term *ISTAR* has become synonymous with *UAV*. Broken down into its component parts, ISTAR is the employment of sensors to gather information in order to create intelligence, plus to prosecute targets through surveillance (watching an already known location or enemy unit), and reconnaissance (to find what is currently undiscovered). The identification of information gaps, or targets to be prosecuted, is cross disciplinary between the intelligence, fires, and plans and operations branches, and requires coordination through the planning process. The task force headquarters had an ISTAR section that worked with the G2, G3, G5 and fires branches to consolidate sensor requirements and allocate them according to priorities, designated through intelligence preparation of the operating environment and the targeting process. There is little practical use in separating *plans* and *operations* when it comes to ISTAR, as it is such an iterative and ongoing process, and the information that is gathered feeds multiple requirements simultaneously. Therefore, the ISTAR section was a quasi-independent entity that served multiple requirements, and bridged the different branches that thrive on information to operate effectively.

Tied to the sensors that extended the commander's sight were the fires that extended the commander's reach. Because a Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group can control its own airspace with its airspace coordination centre, and the range of sensors at its disposal, a task force headquarters has the capabilities of a limited joint headquarters and can therefore prosecute shaping fires, close air support and limited air interdiction. The use of joint fires to influence the battle is the main means that a commander has to fight in the task force space, beyond synchronizing the actions of subordinate battle groups. Because of the complexity of the use of joint fires, and the often time-sensitive nature of targeting, it is not practical to have the employment of fires under the direct control of the commander, though they serve the commander's ends. Once the target lists and priorities have been approved by the commander, and updated regularly as part of the battle rhythm, the actual prosecution of most targets is executed by the G3 and the joint fires control centre without the commander's direct control.

In order to coordinate both ISTAR and joint fires, a staff structure was created within the headquarters, dubbed with the sobriquet *the Triangle of Death*, due to its configuration and function within the headquarters (see Figure 3). The fires, tactical air control party and airspace coordination center were joined into a single joint fires control center to manage airspace, artillery and airpower. They were collocated with the ISTAR duty officer, and the employment of sensors and strike assets was closely coordinated as a *hunter–killer* team. The final point of the triangle was the G2 cell, which advised on where and what to search for, and deduce what target types had been found. Together, in accordance with the commander's priorities, enemy targets were found and struck in synchronization with manoeuvre forces, and with the requisite weight to influence the overall task force fight. The G3 Operations and G3 had the hammer in allocating resources and were empowered to act on the commander's behalf. The integration of the various staff functioned as a single entity to create a weapons system for the commander to employ alongside the manoeuvre forces.

There is a caveat to the above that needs to be realized so headquarters go into fights with their eyes wide open—ISTAR is not omniscient. Even with modern sensors it is a still a big world out there in which enemy forces—regular and irregular—may hide, and weather, foliage and chance all conspire to degrade our situational awareness. Even when supplemented by patrolling and observation posts, ISTAR efforts will never be fully complete, and this is where it is critical to note that the "I" stands for *intelligence* and not *information*; the intelligence process is partially informed guesswork and will always need to be executed in an environment of incomplete information due to the merciless constraints of time. This is why the intelligence preparation of the operating environment and ISTAR processes identify gaps and seek to fill them throughout all phases, and not just during deliberate planning cycles. The ability and will to fight for information and dynamically act on it is what overcomes the inertia of waiting for the myth of the *transparent battlefield* to be realized. Robust ISTAR and joint fires can get you *ready enough* faster than the enemy in the refractory periods—the intermissions between fight rounds—but where they can truly be decisive is in developing the fight to our advantage once battle is joined. There will always be a number of blank spaces on the battlefield, but with sound, flexible plans that account for them, and aggressive execution to *fill them in*, ISTAR and joint warfighting become decisive in developing situational awareness and creating joint effects on the objective. Developing that understanding and aligning resources was the task force space, and prosecuting joint fires in conjunction with directing ground manoeuvre to task force objectives was the main task force kinetic fight.

Source: Flickr



Figure 3: Task Force NEMISIS Command Post Layout (Current Operations)

THE REAR AREA

Securing the rear area was approached as securing any other portion of the battlespace, with forces and postures tailored to the actual nature of the threat and tasks undertaken there. There was also a concerted shift towards combat service support elements providing their own local point and movement protection, taking ownership of their own security within their own means, to create a layered defence. As the service battalion headquarters is neither structured nor manned to control ISTAR resources, joint fires or manoeuvre forces, a manoeuvre battalion headquarters was dedicated to provide command and control over the rear area. Under its command was a mechanized rifle company, the military police platoon, and the bulk of the influence activities company which formed a civil-military operations centre embedded in the battalion headquarters. As enablers, ISTAR, fires and engineer resources were apportioned to them as required.

While the task force F echelon is engaged in conventional combat operations there is little capacity or need for stability operations. However, once major combat operations have ceased in an area, stability operations become the primary military activity there and, as soon as was practicable, the rear area unit took responsibility for it. Those operations then became the Fullerian *base* from which the task force would continue to operate. Wide area defence, limited offensive operations, civil-military engagement, and the facilitation of humanitarian and development work by government departments other than Defence and non-governmental organizations were integrated into the Task Force NEMESIS *way of war*, and not treated as burdensome *operations other than war*—they were an integral part of operations.

While force generation pressures allowed for only a single rifle company to be fielded, experience from computer assisted exercises and various wargames demonstrated that a minimum of two mounted sub-units would be required to provide the requisite combat power in the task force rear area. A great deal of risk was incurred by deploying only the single company.

Future force generation models should account for a battalion-minus in the order of battle because a single force protection company simply lacks the combat power, and command and control capacity, to properly conduct crucial operations in the rear area.

FIGHT FOR INFLUENCE

Influence activities has been an emerging capability area that is considered critical, but the integration of it at the tactical level has been far from smooth. Through the corps-level computer assisted exercises in which Task Force NEMESIS participated, it was evident that part of the problem is that influence activities concepts for psychological operations and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) are nested at division or corps level—but our organizations are tactical in nature (task forces with influence activities companies). CIMIC and psychological operations teams come with limited capabilities and the effects they create are limited to the local scene. It is at the division or corps level where military information support operations, CIMIC and general support engineer battalions reside, and where decisive action in the influence sphere can be gained. Not only is this where the resources reside, it is also where the authorities to approve messages and civil-military action also generally reside.[13] Like most combat support elements that exist in low densities, influence activities elements work best when their efforts are massed and focused on decisive points. It was with this in mind that Task Force NEMESIS sought to shape its influence activity ability in the winter and spring of 2015–2016 after some painful lessons on the previous year's computer assisted exercises where we had failed to deliver a meaningful influence activity effort.

Source: Combat Camera

Master Corporal Pierre-Alexandre Nadeau of the Civilian Military Co-operation team distributing information leaflets to locals near the village of Spin Boldak, where he visited to determine the needs of the local population in 2008.

Source: Combat Camera

The Civilian-Military Cooperation Team is mentoring the Afghan Uniformed Police during a humanitarian aid operation which includes the donation of materiel and food to the population of the village of Deb-E-Bagh, 2008.

First, it is vital to understand that psychological operations and CIMIC are separate functions with specific training and roles, and that there is no such thing as a general-purpose *influence activity soldier*. Understanding the unique roles and capabilities of these two disciplines enables them to be used to their full potential, and also allows clearer direction to be given in their tasks and employment. Generic influence activity tasks invariably lead to ambiguity and a lack of operationalization. The integration of separate CIMIC and psychological operations planners in the task force headquarters was an important step in developing a practical influence activity approach, and helped develop a reciprocal understanding of influence activity's place in task force operations, as well as a common lexicon.

A second key lesson was that of capacities. CIMIC teams do not come with much integral capability, and the lack of task force general support engineer capacity means that there is not a lot of direct action that the task force can take in the civil environment. It was actually this lack of capability that forced us to realize what should have been an evident fact—CIMIC teams are not *direct action* elements, but rather, facilitators. The *civil* in CIMIC is not just about dealing directly with civilians in an area of operations; that is the job of the battlespace owner and all of the soldiers operating there (though CIMIC troops bring an advisement capability). CIMIC is more about coordinating with civilian entities who are also *in the fight*, like international organizations, non-governmental organizations and host nation entities—public and private. Most heavy-hitter programmes, like agriculture development, infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian aid, are owned and run by non-military organizations, and CIMIC is the nexus where military security forces *coordinate* with them. In heavy conflict areas the military may be the first outside organization into an area where there is a humanitarian crisis, and non-military elements may have been forced out for some time. Therefore, our CIMIC teams constitute a *recce party*, and through the civil-military operations centre, larger organizations that represent the soft power community are kept informed as they deploy into the area as follow-on forces in order to become a component of the broader stabilization effort. Understanding and accepting that role is the first step toward weaning ourselves from the false expectation that the military delivers stabilization. That has been a self-inflicted wound, where units and formations have the perception that they have to do it themselves. CIMIC teams' real strength lies in their ability to act as a conduit between the military and other organizations in the civil environment which, through their actions, improve stability.

In the same vein, psychological operations at the task force level finds its greatest strength in its ability to leverage external capabilities, and its ability to understand the methods an audience utilizes to make decisions and how to influence those sensors in a fashion favourable to friendly forces. Due to the centralized control of messaging and the lead time required to produce products, pre-planning and preparation are vital in the execution of psychological operations. Typical products are likely to include posters and pamphlets, videography and radio messaging, and indeed all of these were seen over the course of high readiness training. Since combat is a contest of wills, our messaging should be pretty consistent due to the fact that the base reasons for a conflict, and our war aims, should not change radically. Therefore, once the main messaging themes are decided upon at the outset of a campaign, products can be designed and delivery methods refined so as to deal with a spectrum of *conditions*, not a constant reset of messages and assessment criteria. (This comes back to the idea of writing a baseline order from which you can make adjustments quickly and easily.) For example, if one line of messaging is that "resistance is futile," pre-made product can be stocked enjoining enemy soldiers to surrender because of the "massing" of our forces prior to combat, and then ones speaking of "defeats" can be ready to punch out immediately after our first successes to psychologically reinforce physical effects at the outset. Text messages can be sent out *en masse* to inform civilians of impending danger or undermine the narrative of our adversaries. Radio, television, Twitter and Facebook are all weapons that can be leveraged to set our narrative in place and then reinforce it relentlessly. The trick for the task force is to understand that their psychological operations platoon is not going to do all of this themselves, and that flexibility in execution is created by overkill in planning and preparation.

The psychological operations platoon is very skilled in generating electronic product (the e-versions of handbills, posters, etc.) and videos, but what they lack is dissemination capability. It takes an industrial capability to print off thousands of pamphlets as well as to deliver them. Indeed, hand delivery aside, product delivery mechanisms for airdrops, television broadcasts, mass text messages and social media usually reside at the divisional or corps military information support operations units. The psychological operations specialists are great at gathering information from locals and advising commanders on local methods of getting key messages out. But in the task force space, it is the coordination of the blunderbuss dissemination method of tailored product at higher levels that counts the most. A great deal of this product has to be created ahead of time in order to account for a number of different scenarios (discovery of atrocities, infliction of collateral damage, rapid defeat of enemy units, etc.)

Source: Flickr

so that it can be actioned in a timely manner in order to synchronize with physical actions. While the psychological operations platoon tailors a lot of the product to the needs of the task force, and to match the task force commander's style, the task force G9 psychological operations staff must coordinate the mass production and dissemination of it. Additionally, it is the role of the G9 to ensure that sufficient resources are coordinated on behalf of the influence activity company in order to carry out their tasks. Much like CIMIC, the focus of task force effort cannot be on its psychological operations field teams whose primary job is to support the battle group fight. It is the coordinating function of the G9 branch that pulls the levers of perception manipulation, and we should not have unrealistic expectations of the influence activity company's ability to execute functions for which it was not given the capacity. Underlying all good psychological operations campaigns is iterative target audience analysis, which is the process by which products, messages and concepts are tailored and refined to appeal to the audiences they are attempting to influence. Without dedicated time and resources put into an iterative target audience analysis, the psychological operations campaign will become stale and ineffective.

Finally, it must be noted that the influence activity company does not operate as an independent entity; it lacks the command and control, combat service support and combat power to control terrain, and tasking it to work in another unit's area of operations as a separate line of effort undermines the principle of unity of effort and the single battle concept. The influence activity company is an enabling element and works best when attached to a manoeuvre unit commander to support operations. In the end, it is the battlespace commanders who are responsible for the outcomes in their areas of operation, and having influence activity elements attached to them to support their mission accomplishment is the best means to achieve this. In general, just as the rear area was where the bulk of stability operations were conducted, the influence activity company was primarily attached to that battalion, with smaller elements out with the F echelon as required (and not as a default).

SUSTAINMENT

The integration of combat service support as a manoeuvre component required more than a little mental rewiring among the task force, and the gap between our current lift capabilities and our desire for mobility limited our ambition. Conceptually, the task force B echelon[14] should be wholly mobile, but the sheer volume of supply items (especially spare parts, and petroleum, oils and lubricants) made this a daunting task. Over a number of table top exercises and practice in the field, a battle drill was developed for the movement of the B echelon, and the planning for it became a close cousin to the manoeuvre of the F echelon as part of the task force fight. It was postulated above that the heart of the task force fight is to win in the fourth dimension, and one of the cruxes of speeding up our refractory period is the rapid and timely execution of combat service support operations.

Moving the B echelon and re-establishing second line support took about 24 hours, from the time reconnaissance parties went out to occupy a new brigade (task force) support area, to the time that services were up and running at normal capacity again. In visualizing a battle set, identifying probable culmination points allowed combat service support planners to key in on when the B echelon needed to move in order to be in a position to provide the necessary and

responsive combat service support (i.e. clear the battlefield, repair machines, provide evacuation and health services, and deliver supplies and replacements forward). This meant that windows where reduced services could be accepted (ironically, usually when battle was actually enjoined, as second line services are needed between battles, not during them) needed to be identified a minimum of 48 hours out, and the security and lift resources allocated. In particular, the employment of the task force aviation battalion (composite of 408 and 50 Tactical Helicopter Squadrons) to provide armed overwatch with CH-146 (Griffon) helicopters and lift with CH-147 (Chinook) helicopters was vital to the mobility of the B echelon, and which required sufficient forewarning to plan aviation operations.

In terms of time and space, a few realities set in over time for the task force. One was that keeping the brigade support area out of the range of enemy indirect fire in the modern operating environment was impractical. While field artillery with ranges of around 25 kilometers are easy enough to avoid, modern rocket artillery and joint fires make it almost impossible to have the brigade support area out of their range without having untenable ground lines of communication. Therefore, passive defence measures (camouflage and concealment), repositioning and active suppression of enemy long-range fires were required to keep the brigade support area close enough to be *in the game*. A second point was that there were times when it was necessary to move the B echelon forward, much closer to the F echelon than what would be normal in order to ensure that second line support would be in place as the F echelon surged forward. Whereas this seemed counterintuitive initially, especially to battalions looking over their shoulder to see the service battalion setting up right behind their laagers, it paid dividends as the fight forward continued and culminating points could be delayed due to more responsive second line support. Much like fires and ISTAR assets have to be shifted around the battlespace to support the close fight, the movement, concentration and synchronization of combat service support operations are also part of the task force fight, and the complexity of this needs to be respected. The brigade support area is not a millstone that drags itself in the wake of F echelon, but rather, is a crucial cog in an agile formation fight in the war for time.

CONCLUSION

The two year experiment that was Task Force NEMESIS yielded a nascent operating concept that can be applied across the Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups. The actual tactics of battalion-level fights have not been discussed here as the compositions of the fielded Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups will be different year to year based on capabilities and manning. Task Force NEMESIS was a one-off, armour-heavy grouping that cannot be sustained with the current suite of sabre squadrons and armoured engineer squadrons, and the concept that evolved was meant to be neutral in terms of battle group types fielded. Moving forward, the evolution of a tactical deep battle model predicated on winning the fight for time in the *task force space* could pay dividends in optimizing the strengths of Canadian Mechanized Brigade Groups, while mitigating some of our weaknesses.

At the outset, it was stated that wars are not short affairs, and it is unlikely that we will ever achieve the ubiquitous historical promise that the "troops will be home by Christmas." The concept of tactical deep battle is not just about winning tactical engagements by fighting physically through both your own and the enemy's depth—it is about fighting through temporal depth and overtly acknowledging that conflicts are never won in a single fight. As Field Marshal Haig once postulated, there is a period of wearing down that must presage decisive, campaign winning actions,[15] and we need to escape the falsehood of the *attritionist versus manoeuvrist* dichotomy and accept them as a *ying* and *yang* of warfare—indivisible and intertwined to make a whole. In stepping back and seeing the long game, we can stop expending combat power inefficiently on a chimeric knock-out punch and craft a series of far more efficient combinations to eventually subdue our foes.

Complementary to this philosophy is the application of the single battle concept, where all actions geographically, functionally and temporally are yoked together through the framework of *shaping–decisive–sustaining* operations. There is not an ISTAR fight separate from fire and manoeuvre, and the rear area and combat service support operations are not dislocated from combat actions. There is only one battle, with only intent differentiating the nature of actions. When a battlespace is viewed as a single, holistic entity from all points of the compass, we achieve the ability to truly synchronize full spectrum operations, and not fall into the trap of templating our actions based on a *front* and *rear* orientation, or between a *land* and *air* fight.

The task force's space is the space between: between close combat engagements, and between F echelon units manoeuvering in their zones. Shaping the influence environment, divesting the enemy of capability, denying the enemy understanding while improving our own, securing our close operations (combat service support and combat), enabling the soft power actors, and sustaining our forces are all the actions that set the conditions for decisive combat actions and link them in time and space in order to drive toward an end state. The point of operations is to impose our will—to change a set of unacceptable conditions to acceptable ones in the face of opposition—with the coercive threat and use of force. Those are the task force fight—the manipulation of time and space, of perception and correlation of force, and of means to meet ends—and the actions that change conditions for the achievement of our objectives.

In properly fighting the task force in a defined task force space, the idea was to make the outcome of individual battle group engagements foregone conclusions, with a series of them fought according to a unified design. Ideally, the defeat of the enemy becomes an inescapable destiny and victory the inevitable conclusion for us. In the coming years, the Canadian Army and its joint partners have a window to build on the first steps that Task Force NEMESIS took, and evolve and mature this into a fully functioning operating system. We do need to keep in mind, though, that a number of our potential adversaries are in the same race as us, and our window of opportunity will not stay open indefinitely.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR…

Major Jade Watson is currently the Deputy Commanding Officer of 3 PPCLI and recently deployed as the Deputy Commander of Joint Task Force–Ukraine, Roto 2. Throughout the two-year Task Force NEMESIS road to high readiness, he was the task force G5, and was a rifle company and administration company commander during the previous 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group high readiness cycle in 2013–2014. In addition to Operation UNIFIER, Major Watson has deployed on Operation ATHENA, Roto 9 as the battle group S5, and on Operation REASSURANCE as the Canadian Joint Operations Command liaison officer to United States Army Europe Headquarters. He has a Bachelor of Military Arts and Science degree from the Royal Military College of Canada, is a graduate of the Joint Command and Staff Programme, and is currently completing his Masters of Defence Studies.

ENDNOTES

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* (New York: Oxford World's Classics, 2007), 13.
2. For example, in 2009–2010, the 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group-led Task Force Kandahar under Brigadier-General Jonathan Vance issued Operation KANTOLO its campaign plan, while the Task Force 1–09 battle group was in theatre; in the last third of that Task Force Kandahar rotation, Task Force 3–09 battle group deployed and fell into the Operation KANTOLO construct. Then, the 5 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group-led Task Force Kandahar under Brigadier-General Daniel Menard deployed, suspended Operation KANTOLO, and replaced it with Operation WADANA-WAL, which straddled the Task Force 3–09 and Task Force 1–10 battle group rotations.
3. Marvin Hedstrom, *Simultaneity: A Question of Time, Space, Resources and Purpose* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2001), 15.
4. This became apparent in the first year of the high readiness training cycle, as during Exercise CITADEL KLEBER with RRC-FRANCE and the large scale exercise (LSE) 2015 with the USMC, Task Force NEMESIS was directly under a corps-level headquarters both times. Through the planning and execution cycles, the considerations required to nest tactical actions in an operational-level context were relatively new to us. To wit, the second and third order effects politically and militarily had to be considered, and the actions of the brigade had to be cast in the mold of larger schemes and higher levels of intent for headquarters actually training at that level. It was an educational experience with a steep learning curve.
5. Robert Leonhard, *The Principles of War for the Information Age* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998), chapter 8, 20.
6. Hedstrom, 13.
7. Charles Pickar, *Tactical Deep Battle: The Missing Link* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 7.
8. Pickar, 27.
9. J. F. C. Fuller, *The Foundations of the Science of War* (London: Hutchison and Company, 1925), 56.
10. Fuller, 127.
11. Leonhard, chapter 13, 3.
12. Leonard, chapter 11, 8.
13. The scenario operations orders for Exercise CITADEL KLEBER, LSE 15, Exercise UNIFIED RESOLVE 1601, and Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE 1601 all held such authorities at the divisional, and usually the three-star level.
14. Doctrinally, the B echelon is comprised of the second line / level combat service support and second role health services support elements, as well as portions of A2 echelons and orderly rooms that are not required forward to support the F echelon. In a modern brigade, this also includes elements of the UAV troop, electronic warfare squadron, general support engineers, and a myriad of others who have no integral support system. All of these elements were attached to 1 Service Battalion TACON for terrain control and local protection. The area that the B echelon occupies is called the brigade support area, and it is a thing, not a unit. However, the term "BSA" became a shorthand for the B echelon in Task Force NEMESIS, and it was usually nested in the area of operations of the unit tasked to control the rear area.
15. Andrew Simpson, *The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front 1914–18* (London: University College, Ph.D. dissertation, 2001), 24.

Source : Flickr



A DANGEROUS SERVICE...

Memoirs of a Black Watch Officer in the French and Indian War – John Grant, 1741–1828

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

Edited by Earl John Chapman and Ian Macpherson McCulloch.
Montreal: Robin Brass Studio, 2017, 320 pages.
ISBN 978-1-896941-74-5

Reviewed by Officer Cadet Eric Duchesne,
currently a student at the Royal Military College of Canada.

A Dangerous Service, edited by Earl John Chapman and Ian Macpherson McCulloch, is a biographical account portraying the life of Captain John Grant of the Royal 42nd Regiment of Foot, Scotland's Black Watch (Royal Highland) regiment. Grant, who served as an officer during the Seven Years' War on the North American and Caribbean fronts, provides a view of the war that stands apart from others' recollections. In Grant's story, the reader is exposed to a "genuine highland voice covering an important period in the evolution of Highland units in the Georgian king's army."[1]

The book is divided into three sections. The first covers the life of the young Scottish officer from his birth during the Jacobite uprising in 1741 until the 1820s, when he tells his story to his grandson, Dr. John Johnson. Here, while little is said of the Seven Years' War in North America, the stories about the young highland officer's early days and his family are numerous and engaging. The second section reconstructs Johnson's memoirs of his grandfather's deployments during the Seven Years' War in Guadeloupe (1759), the siege of Fort Levis and the capitulation of Montreal (1760) and similar operations in both Martinique and Grenada (1762) and Havana (1762).

Throughout, Grant presents the warfare endured by a highland officer in penetrating detail. He describes soldiering as "a dangerous service" marked by perilous situations, and speaks of widespread death throughout the ranks. We are told of the first *"fait d'armes"* Grant can be proud of, his first contact with Native American people, the successful siege of Fort Levis and his participation in the capitulation of Montreal. Grant also describes how he managed to save 13 out of 70 men in the rapids of the Long Sault and how he and his men caught the fever. The book concludes with a final section offering biographical notes on individuals who had an impact on Grant's life and military career.

A Dangerous Service offers a unique view of the Seven Years' War. The European scene of the conflict is downplayed. What is brought to the foreground are Grant's feelings and his understanding of that war which, for the young officer, occurred largely in North America and the Caribbean. Rather than an account of the broad spectrum of war, this is a rich and compelling tale of a soldier in battle. As the editors note, "Grant speaks to us in close-ups, not in panorama."[2]

The book is based on Grant's memoirs and on narrative elements constructed from intensive research on the people, locations and historical events that Grant encountered during his lifetime. The memoirs, arranged in chronological order, paint a vivid picture of the harsh realities that officers had to endure. Concepts particular to the Highland regiments are clearly defined and explained, aiding understanding of their particular traditions and the character of fighting they practised.

Source: Virtual Museum of Canada

Artist's depiction of the capitulation of Montréal, created in 1800. Artist unknown.

Ultimately, however, *A Dangerous Service* represents more than the recollections of an out-of-the-ordinary Black Watch officer. It is a tribute to the life and accomplishments of a man who fought on the front line of history. During his fifty years in the British Army, John Grant served in "the very first world war," was taken prisoner twice, returned to duty as a pay officer in His Majesty's Army, retired honourably and was able to share his experiences with his grandson. The account is a must-read for anyone interested in the British conquest of North America and the Highland regiments of Scotland.

ENDNOTES

1. Earl John Chapman and Ian Macpherson McCulloch, *A Dangerous Service* (Montreal: Robin Brass Studio, 2017), xv.
2. Ibid.



THEY CALLED IT SHELL SHOCK:
Combat Stress in The First World War

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

LINDEN, Stefanie. Solihull, UK: Helion, 2016,
Wolverhampton Military Studies Number 24, 272 pages.
ISBN 9781911096351

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Bell, CD, M.A., Concepts 3 at the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre

The topic of psychological injury caused by participating in military operations is, by and large, self-evidently relevant to society today. Yet, the issue of World War I soldiers manifesting shell shock one hundred years ago is not necessarily so obviously important. Nonetheless, and in spite of a century of medical advances, there is value in examining the lessons to be learned from the historical investigation of a phenomenon formerly known as shell shock. Incidentally, although this term was a commonly used term officially, it was suppressed, quite unsuccessfully, by the British authorities early in the war. Some basic questions surrounding the causes of these kinds of injuries remain: How much is to be attributed to inherited versus environmental factors? Is there a physiological component that remains as yet unknown? What treatment strategies are best for those experiencing symptoms?

Doctor Stefanie Linden is a psychiatrist and clinical research fellow at the Neurosciences and Mental Health Research Institute of the Cardiff University School of Medicine. She recently completed a Ph.D. on the topic of shell shock during the Great War at King's College London's Centre for Humanities and Health. She was selected to receive the Edmonds Prize for this book's proposal, which was to compare traumatic reactions between different cultures from a medical history perspective.

Linden opens by situating the understanding of mental illness—generally called hysteria—and psychiatry in the *Belle Époque* toward the end of the nineteenth century. With a careful blend of discretion and forthrightness, she then introduces us to a number of World War I soldiers who suffered psychological injury, sometimes in conjunction with a physical injury, and the medical practitioners who treated them. The book gives pertinent and interesting summaries of numerous cases based on detailed research of medical archives at the main treatment centres. The truly novel aspect of this research is that many cases from both British and German centres are examined and compared. This raises the question of how different cultural influences affect how psychological injury presents in individuals. As well, the widely varying treatments, approaches and protocols used by physicians are set in the context of the very large number of subjects suddenly offered by the war.

Source: Imperial War Museum Film Collection, O 79508

A Shell-Shocked British Soldier, First World War

As a psychiatrist and historian, Linden opens up to examination some of the most fundamental aspects of society's reaction to war-induced psychological injury on soldiers. Ideals of masculinity, courage, self-worth and role shape cultural and institutional views of what constitutes legitimate injury. Some in the medical community invested considerable effort to find physiological or organic explanations for symptoms that were not obviously the result of physical trauma. Over time, however, most practitioners, came to view the symptoms as a result of psychological processes. Then, the question became whether psychosis or functional symptoms (e.g. paralysis) were strongly influenced by experiential history or, rather, by genetic (i.e. inheritance) factors. Family histories of "hysteria" sometimes played a large role in diagnosis. Treatments were as varied as the physicians implementing them, ranging from electrical stimulation to talking therapies. Some pertinent questions are raised concerning the ethics of treatments which involved suggestion, deception, coercion, surprise, reward and punishment.

One of the strengths of this book is Linden's ability to place the reader, in a vivid and compelling manner, in the context of a suffering First World War soldier, clinical practitioner or even family member. Her insight is also quite penetrating, as demonstrated by the following analysis of shell shock.

> This initial stress and fear reaction is deeply entrenched in the brain and body, and does not seem to change much with cultural influences; however, the later phase of post-traumatic symptoms, which are then observed and treated by doctors in military hospitals... seem to be shaped by history and culture: how is this possible?... Through the studies... we know that much of the more complex human behaviour is learnt, rather than being totally determined by innate physiological processes.[1]

Source: Library and Archives Canada 3628659

29th Infantry Battalion advancing over No Man's Land through the German barbed wire and heavy fire during the battle of Vimy Ridge.

Source: www.iwm.org.uk

An exhausted, psychologically traumatised British soldier stands, staring vacantly, after being captured by German forces on the Western Front in 1918.

This historical awareness offered by Linden continues to be relevant and valuable. From the "heart disease" of Crimea, the gastro-intestinal maladies of the Second World War, the post-traumatic stress of Vietnam, to the alcohol abuse and depression of today, it is often as much a matter of how the injury manifests itself in a patient's *own complex social context* as it is the original causal mechanisms that must be understood in order to pave the way to effective treatment.

They Called It Shell Shock is a high quality book with excellent construction and layout, high quality paper, an attention-grabbing dust cover, and numerous photographs and diagrams which bring to life the unique cases and, more broadly, the early twentieth century military medical culture. The publishers are to be commended for providing such value in a reasonably priced product.

ENDNOTES

1. Stefanie Linden, *They Called It Shell Shock: Combat Stress in the First World War,* Wolverhampton Military Studies No. 24 (Solihull: Helion, 2016), 240.



A Canadian Tommy soldier covered in mud returning from the front lines of the First World War.

Source : Archives of Ontario, I0004782



JUST WAR RECONSIDERED:

Strategy, Ethics, and Theory

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

DUBIK, James M. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016, 225 pages.
ISBN 9780813168296

Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Bell, CD, M.A., Concepts 3 at the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre

The rich history of thought on the morality of war goes back more than a couple of millennia. Since the dawn of the modern era, thinkers have generally distinguished the idea of the justifiable grounds for a political decision to enter a war (*jus ad bellum*) from that of the ethical conduct of those actually fighting the war (*jus in bello*). The conduct of combatants in war has been regulated for many decades by the body of international humanitarian law—including the Geneva Conventions and Protocols—which has its roots in the 17th-century writings of Hugo Grotius.[1]

Lieutenant General James M. Dubik (Retired) was a United States Army infantry officer who taught at West Point and the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth. He received his Ph.D. from John Hopkins University and is a professor at the Georgetown University Center for Security Studies. The book is endorsed in a foreword by General (Retired) Martin E. Dempsey, 18th Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Dubik has made a unique contribution to the body of thought on exactly what constitutes "just war" in his *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory*. He focuses in on the issue of the accountability of the most senior civilian and military leaders—those responsible for ongoing strategy and resource allocation. He differentiates this higher-level concern from the decidedly "tactical" consideration of the ethics of the combatants' *jus in bello*, as "the strategic, war-waging [as distinct from war-fighting] dimension of war's conduct."[2] He emphasizes the gap in describing and applying the practical morality of just war theory, *jus in bello*, to the political and military leaders responsible for policy and war aims. He does this by considering some of their responsibilities such as, making good decisions based on the best available information, attending to the legitimacy and public support of the war effort, and ensuring that the instruments of government and the nation remain effective in the material support of the campaign.[3] He demonstrates that the "principal-agent framework" (i.e. employer-employee relationship) that normally works well in holding democratically elected leaders to account is incomplete in the context of waging war,[4] and so reverts to Samuel Huntington's objective control theory (unequal dialogue) as a "necessary but insufficient" process.[5] Waging war demands an effective, what he calls, "decision-execution regime" that focuses leaders' attention on the important issues; encourages continual, frank dialogue between the civilian political leadership and its top military advisors; and, ultimately, makes the respective bureaucracies work. Dubik concludes with a set of practical principles recommended for senior leaders to improve their right conduct of war-waging.

Source: www.independent.co.uk

Dominic Ongwen, a senior commander in the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), whose fugitive leader Joseph Kony is one of the world's most-wanted war crimes suspects, is flanked by two security guards as he sits in the court room of the International Court in The Hague. The Court heard how he slaughtered civilians while Dominic Ongwen commanded the LRA's Sinai Brigade. The bloodshed even included cases of cannibalism, prosecutors said.

This book fills a surprisingly neglected and important historical gap in addressing—in the just war theory—the responsibility and accountability of nations' most senior leaders for the way they wage war, in particular, the way they make and implement decisions. While academically credible due to the author's in-depth knowledge of just war theory, it is also very readable in a crisp, to-the-point, military writing style. The book is a must-read for those studying or teaching in the field of war ethics or international humanitarian law as it pertains to violent political conflict. It is also highly recommended for those with an interest in war studies in general.

ENDNOTES

1. Hugonis Grotii, *De jure belli ac pacis: libri tres* [*On the Law of War and Peace: Three Books*] (Paris: Nicolas Buon, 1625).
2. James M. Dubik, *Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 27.
3. Ibid., 48f.
4. Ibid., 88.
5. Ibid., 111. See also, Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957).



THE WINTER FORTRESS:

The Epic Mission to Sabotage Hitler's Atomic Bomb

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

BASCOMB, Neal. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2016, 378 pages.
ISBN 978-0-544-36805-7

Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham, CD, Air Logistics Transport Officer, A5, 1 Canadian Air Division.

Following the invasion and capitulation of Norway in 1940, the region became a sideshow as a theatre of operations, overshadowed by the massive conflagration occurring in mainland Europe, in Russia and in the Far East; however, despite the focus elsewhere, perhaps one of the most important dramas of the war was being played out in the quiet, snow-covered and brutal region of the Norwegian interior. Few people have heard of Kompani Linge and the heavy water production plant at Vemork (the only plant of its kind in the world). Fewer are aware of the multiple efforts of Allied forces and operatives to destroy the plant's capability of providing heavy water (critical to the production of an atomic bomb) to the German scientific and war effort. Scarcer still are those aware of the success of nine Norwegian operatives who parachuted into the inhospitable Vidda region, survived a crushingly hostile environment and succeeded not only in penetrating the plant and destroying critical infrastructure but also in escaping with no loss of life (on either side). Bascomb's book recounts their story.

Source: American Air Museum in Britain

Kjeller, Norway site of the heavy water plant

Source: Hero Film/Ronald Grant Archive

Norwegian saboteurs, in a 1948 dramatization of the 1942 event, cross a mountain plateau on their way to destroy the Vemork heavy water plant, which was under Nazi control

Deeply researched and written in a style that conveys the stress, dangers and profound knowledge and cohesiveness of the men involved, the author removes any sense of the glamour of covert warfare. Rather, his narrative relates the effects of stress, boredom and fear on the human psyche as well as accurately describing the courage and dedication that was required to make this mission a success. It is a vivid depiction of the mental and psychological strength required of those undertaking this style of clandestine warfare and should be used as a case study in special operations.

He does not focus only upon the successful Norwegian-led mission, but also on the numerous efforts of the Royal Air Force (RAF), United States Air Force (USAF) and, most noteworthy, the efforts of the 261st Field Park Company of the Royal Engineers who tried to penetrate the German defences via glider insertion and were lost to a man through accident and execution by the German forces. Bascomb provides a very sobering account of their exertions and sacrifices.

The author paints a vivid picture of life in Norway under occupation: the efforts to continue 'normal' life or at best a moderate co-existence, the impact of collaborators and the challenges of trying to build and maintain an element of resistance to the Axis. Of particular note is the ability of the Norwegian resistance fighters to survive in one of the harshest climates on Earth; their capacity to hunt and live off of the land even at the height of winter (albeit on the edge of starvation) is in itself an epic tale.

This story is an adventure tale for the ages, and the men who undertook to sabotage the German atomic program are heroes as great as those that fought on the front lines in the major theatres of war. Theirs was a silent, unheralded effort, and it is to Bascomb's credit that their names and achievements have not been forgotten. A well written account that should be part of any library dedicated to special operations during the Second World War.



FORWARD WITH PATTON:

The World War II Diary Of Colonel Robert S. Allen

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

RICKARD, John N., ed: University Press of Kentucky, 2017, 317 pages. ISBN: 9780813169125 (Hardcover), 9780813169132 (PDF), 9780813169149 (EPUB)

Reviewed by Major Chris Young, CD, M.A., member of the Concepts Team at the Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre.

John Rickard has taken on and begun, quite admirably, the task of editing the wartime journals of Colonel Robert S Allen, a member of Lieutenant General George S Patton Jr's Third Army Headquarters G-2 Section (Intelligence). Rickard is eminently qualified to undertake this significant project, a task that was long overdue: he is the author of two excellent (and controversial) books on the subject of Patton, *Patton at Bay* (Praeger Publishers: Westport, Conn., 1999) and *Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge* (University of Kentucky Press: Lexington, 2011).

Source: Wikipedia

Colonel Robert S. Allen

Colonel Allen is a controversial and colourful character. As a teen, Colonel Allen joined the U.S. cavalry and saw service in the 1916–1917 Mexican border campaign before he deployed to France for the remainder of the First World War. After the war, he moved into the field of journalism and eventually became one of the most famous investigative journalists of the time, at least in North America. His travels saw him in Germany in time for Adolf Hitler's 1923 Beer Hall Putsch: he covered not only the putsch but the trials which followed.

With the entry of the US into World War II, Allen re-enlisted in the Army and would eventually rise to the rank of Colonel: his work as a member of Patton's intelligence team would give him access to the highly significant and tightly controlled Ultra signals intelligence intercepts. Despite having an Ultra clearance, Allen was allowed to conduct a reconnaissance in April 1945, less than a month from V-E Day: his patrol was ambushed and he was severely wounded, eventually losing his right arm in a German field hospital after being taken prisoner. He would be liberated three days later. Post-war, Allen authored *Lucky Forward: The History of Patton's Third Army* which chronicled Patton and the Third Army's operations through France and into Germany.

Yet, what makes Allen such a fascinating character for study, and his wartime diaries that much more explosive, was the 2009 revelation that Allen had been a paid agent of the Soviet Union since 1933! Amazingly that disclosure did not come about until some 27 years after his death by a self-inflicted gunshot (Allen was suffering from terminal cancer at the time of his death).

Rickard's transcripts of Allen's diary cover the period of February 1944 through to June 1945. His own preface sets out clearly why this is of importance: not only for the insights regarding Patton and his daily operational and command behaviour, but perhaps more so for the brief glimpse into the operations of arguably the most important operational headquarters of World War II.

Allen's diary entries also include other nuggets that add considerable value to this edited book beyond the operational. For example, Allen's 20 January 1945 entry shifts to logistics issues with an entry that points out the failure to heed lessons about winter clothing from Alaska and Northern climes, and questions why the Armour combat suit had been discontinued as an item of issue while the "cheesy, valueless" field jacket that is "neither warm nor rainproof" continued to be issued (Rickard, 156).

Rickard has done a great job of making the diaries readable. Moreover, he has also embedded a number of notes within the edited diaries which either correct or amplify key areas. For example, Allen's entry for 28 December 1944 claims "the separation of FUSA and TUSA is not the only reason [General Omar] Bradley was relieved from command [of 12 Army Group]…possible to deduce that Bradley was removed…because of German breakthrough…" As Rickard points out, Bradley had not been relieved of command (Rickard, 138). The inclusion of these very necessary editorial notes not only corrects those faulty entries within the diary, they also provide a much needed and correct context to the journal entries. Further, they allow some remediation to Allen's own biases which come out very strongly in his writings, something which Rickard notes in his preface. At the same time, Rickard has kept a light touch, clarifying points when necessary but avoiding extraneous editorial comment to keep the diary flow intact.

Overall, this is an extremely well edited addition not only to the 'Patton' field of study but perhaps more importantly to the operational study of command and command staffs. It is strongly supported by meticulous end notes which contain an impressive amount of supplemental detail on key areas within the diaries. The highly readable text is supplemented frequently with various campaign and operational maps to provide additional context to Allen's entries. While a highly recommended read for any student of the Second World War and an essential part of any library of military history, this engaging book also provides fascinating insight into a controversial character during a critical time in world history.

Note that Rickard's *Forward with Patton* is published as part of the Association of the United States Army (AUSA) American Warriors series.



THE HARPER ERA IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY:

Parliament, Politics and Canada's Global Posture

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:
CHAPNICK, Adam & Christopher J. Kukucha, eds.
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press 2016, Paperback,
285 pages. ISBN 978-0-7748-3320-2

Reviewed by Peter Gizewski, Strategic Analyst, Defence Research and Development Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, (DRDC CORA).

The election of the Federal Liberal Party as Canada's government in 2015 after almost ten years of Conservative rule under Prime Minister Stephen Harper ushered forth considerable speculation as to the future course that Canada would pursue in world affairs. Certainly, the character and rhetoric of the newly elected government fueled expectations of marked change. Backed by a strong majority in Parliament and a cabinet boasting considerable experience, a new, charismatic prime minister seemed bent on pursuing a gentler, more cooperative approach to foreign affairs than that followed by his predecessor, one that accorded more comfortably with Canada's traditional self-image and values.

Whether and to what degree the Liberal government's approaches will differ appreciably from those of its predecessor must await the passage of time. Yet, if the recent past is prologue, continuity may trump substantial change. Moreover, majority and minority status in the House is likely to be of little importance in terms of the character of the government's decisions.

Such an assessment gains credence from this excellent study of Canada's foreign policy during the Harper years. Written by a group of leading scholars and analysts of Canadian politics and foreign policy, and covering a range of key topics in Canada's foreign relations, the study first examines the extent to which the Harper government differed from its predecessor on matters of foreign policy, and second, whether the government's standing in the House impacted the character of those policies that followed.

Overall, the evidence presented by the volume's contributors is generally negative on both counts. While the Harper government clearly adopted a more assertive, hard-nosed and realist stance on a number of foreign policy fronts than its predecessor, differences tended to be more rhetorical than substantive, a fact clearly evident in policy areas such as investing in the military, contributing to the allied effort in Afghanistan and managing the US-Canada relationship. Moreover, on these and other policy positions adopted, the impact of the government's standing in parliament was marginal at best. To be sure, the Harper government adopted a somewhat more assertive tone during its majority period, yet policy positions themselves did not appreciably change.

The reasons provided for such findings are numerous, yet structural factors are particularly significant. Canada must generally react to the international system far more than it can shape or have an impact upon it. Thus, key tenets of foreign policy tend to endure regardless of who is in power. Long-standing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, with trusted, often powerful allies, create norms and expectations that must be followed. And the interests and standard operating procedures of large departmental bureaucracies create path dependencies in terms of policy that are difficult to override. Given such realities, it is difficult to contest Norman Hillmer's observation that "[t]he way ahead for Canadian foreign policy is often what has gone before."

As for the relatively minor importance of the government's standing in the House, explanations offered must be more nuanced. As Denis Stairs explains, the fact that the constitutional power to conduct foreign relations lies squarely with the executive, this places parliament at a distinct disadvantage to effectively topple the sitting government on matters of foreign policy. It can thus determine how tightly the limits on the parliamentary role can be drawn.

Still, government strength in the House *has* had some influence if one examines a more distant past. As John English notes, minority status likely had an appreciable impact on both the Pearson and Trudeau governments. Indeed, this was particularly evident in the face of a New Democratic Party whose stance on issues such as the Vietnam War and the "American Empire" generated tendencies toward economic nationalism and criticisms of US policy on the part of the government, which likely would have been avoided had its parliamentary standing been more secure.

Yet times were different then. In contrast to the Pearson-Trudeau years, the New Democrats posed few serious threats and offered no compelling opportunities to the Harper conservatives. Moreover, in the face of an environment marked by new, often transnational security threats, economic crises and new waves of immigration, Canadian society became far more willing to subscribe to conservative views of law and order—at home and abroad—and the need for fiscal austerity. Beyond this lie differences in leadership itself. One point that resonates throughout the volume is the degree to which Harper's own views and personality may have been crucial to the style and substance of the policies adopted. Relatively strident in his beliefs, and well versed in the intricacies of parliamentary procedure, it appeared that both the Prime Minister and his government were far more apt to govern as if they had a majority even if none existed.

The extent to which the future will resemble the past remains to be seen. Yet, if the conclusions reached in this well written and researched study of the Harper years are any indication, broad continuity in the course of Canadian foreign relations would not be particularly surprising. If so, the practical results of Trudeau's approach to foreign policy may, at the end of the day, amount to little more than "Stephen Harper with a smile."

Canadian soldiers with NATO's enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroup Latvia patrol in a simulated contaminated environment during the Certification Exercise.

Source: Combat Camera

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

I read with much interest the article by LGen Jeffery (ret) on movement of the Army toward the future because I wrote one of the reports for the 1978–1979 combat development (CD) study and tried to write a report on the same subject for the 1989–1990 study.

I did not complete the latter report because I resigned. My boss at the time wanted a doctrine manual rather than a CD report; he confused the two objectives. "Doctrine" and "CD" had been clearly defined by Maj John Dendy during the first study round, and I was not prepared to contribute to my boss's confusion.

As Canadian Liaison Officer at Fort Gordon, Georgia, and Fort Huachuca, Arizona, from 1981 to 1984, I observed that the US Army distinctly separated Training and Doctrine from CD. The article reveals that Canada has come to the same organizational conclusion. (Great minds think alike.)

As a retired Signal officer, I was pleased to read that situational awareness (i.e. command and control, communications and intelligence) and information technology are now identified features of future planning. At my retirement I advocated getting rid of old curmudgeons like me in deference to new ideas from young soldiers and officers. The young, unbiased by old experience, need to share their thoughts on new technology with those who write CD if the Army is to progress.

Thank you for an instructive and progressive report, and an excellent *Journal.*

Charles Hooker,
East Garafraxa,
Ontario.