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Cover: Candidates on the DP1 Gunner Course conduct anti-tank drills as part of their final evaluation before ‘getting badged’ and welcomed into the Royal Regiment of Artillery family at Canadian Forces Base Gagetown, Oromocto, New Brunswick, 25 July 2019.

DND photo GN04-2019-0721-061 by Corporal Geneviève Lapointe

The 21st Century Wright Flyer: The Military Implications of Affordable Access to Space

e-Thinking: Pre-Empting Global Instability in the 21st Century
NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Welcome to the Spring 2020 edition of the Canadian Military Journal. As I pen these words, (27 January), and while we are still very much in the throes of winter, my dear wife photographed three robins in one of the maple trees in our deep snow-covered back yard this morning. Good luck finding some worms this early, fellas!

Again, we have cobbled together quite a varied selection of articles in this edition. Taking the point, infantry officer Major Cole Petersen chronicles the rapid development of relatively-cheap, reusable rockets for use in space, and how this recent initiative, generated by commercial industry, “…will lead to the rapid expansion of military presence in space, establishing the economic feasibility of space-based military operations for state and non-state actors.” Next, Professor Eric Dion advances the opinion that contemporary or innovative thinking, which he refers to as e-Thinking, is absolutely imperative in order to pre-empt global instability in the 21st Century. “The Allies, as we refer to the 20 percent of the world’s population living in the Occident, have essentially been avoiding major wars at all cost, preventatively engaging in our world. Our interest fundamentally rests in stable socio-economic conditions for our way of life. In the 21st Century, National Security and Global Defence is really about pre-empting instability.”

Moving right along, Colonel (ret’d) Wolfgang Riedel, who had a rich and varied 44-year career in both the Regular Force and the Reserve Force as an artillery officer, infantry officer, and ultimately, as a legal officer, firmly believes that the Canadian Army is definitely not ready for the next major conflict, nor does it project a credible deterrence. Therefore, he believes, “Canada must re-assess what the Canadian Army’s structure ought to be, and, in particular, critically examine the role and organization of the Army’s Primary Reserve component.” He is followed by career intelligence officer Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau explores the world of cultural property, and more specifically, the conventions adopted by the international community with respect to Cultural Property Protection. These are enshrined in the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and its two subsequent Protocols. These Conventions, to which Canada acceded in 1998, which were borne out of the experiences of the Second World War (The Monuments Men), and built upon more than a century of preceding treaty and Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) instruments, clearly articulates the ethical foundation “…that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.” Blondeau believes: “This ethical foundation resonates profoundly with a multi-cultural and globally-engaged Canada – it gels squarely with our liberal democratic ideals enshrined in such institutions as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), and the much-vaunted image of the Canadian ‘Pearsonian’ diplomatic and peacekeeping legacy.” To that end, the author then examines the opportunities and responsibilities associated with Cultural Property Protection for Canada, and offers a potential policy model for the Canadian Armed Forces.

Finally, in our major article section, Defence Policy Advisor Nicholas Dunning within the Domains and Technology Policy Directorate at National Defence, reviews Canada’s service and experience as the Chair of NATO’s Military Intelligence Committee (MIC) in 2018. The author maintains: “Chairing the MIC provided Canada an elevated international profile in the intelligence community. Through this platform, Canada demonstrated multinational leadership within NATO by leading intelligence reforms that improved the Alliance’s ability to achieve accelerated decision-making in support of planning, operations, and political decision-making.”

Two very different opinion pieces in this issue… In the first, Michel Litalien, the manager of the Canadian Armed Forces Museums Network at the Directorate of History and Heritage, and a doctoral student in military history at Paul-Valéry University in Montpellier, France, conducts an exploratory review of a brief but uncertain period in the history of Canada’s fabled Royal 22nd Regiment, the Van Doos, pride of French-speaking Canada, from its demobilization in Montréal in May 1919, until its integration into Canada’s Permanent Force in April 1920. Litalien is followed by a very candid and courageous recounting by Combat Engineer Major Nathan Packer of his own personal experiences with PTSD, including the excellent help and support he received from many supportive entities, and an entreaty to other members not to suffer in silence, to get the help that is available and non-judgemental, because Nathan believes it can “…make all of the difference in the world.”

Next, our dedicated defence commentator, Martin Shadwick, examines Canada’s historical position with respect to Arctic sovereignty and security, and how the incumbent Trudeau government intends to deal with it. Many issues abound. However, in Martin’s words, “In the final analysis, North Warning System replacement, a revamped NORAD, and the future shape of Arctic search and rescue are very different policy topics, but make no mistake – Arctic sovereignty and security issues, concerns, and controversies are about to return to the Canadian political, media, and public landscape.”

Finally, we close with a clutch of four very different book reviews, which we hope will pique the interest of our readers.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal
The 21st Century Wright Flier: The Military Implications of Affordable Access to Space

by Cole F. Petersen

Major Cole F. Petersen is an infantry officer with the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). He has served in 1 PPCLI, 3 PPCLI, and HQ 1 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG), and is a graduate of the United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College and the School of Advanced Warfighting. He is currently the Executive Assistant to the Commander of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM).

Introduction

The 15 years between the first successful flight of an aircraft and the end of the First World War (1903-1918) featured the development of most facets of modern air power, and the establishment of the world’s first independent air force, Great Britain’s Royal Air Force. The Wright Flier was a clear harbinger of, among many things, change to the way wars are fought. The space age began shortly after the Second World War, but it is only now, with recent developments by civilian industry, that the costs of access to space will be reduced to the point where rapid advances in space power will occur on a scale similar to the experience of airpower advancement between 1903 and 1918. Over the next 15 years, the development of cheaper, reusable rockets by commercial industry will lead to the rapid expansion of military presence in space, establishing the economic feasibility of space-based military operations for state and non-state actors.

This rapid expansion will inevitably draw in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), which currently possess only a relatively-modest military space capability. The Directorate of Space, established in 2011, conducts force generation of astronauts for service with the US, manages force development and policy, and conducts force employment for Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) through the Canadian Space Operations Centre. Canadian military operations in space generally work through those of its allies, and consist largely of satellite support to the joint force. But with the 21st Century Wright Flier – cheap, reusable rockets currently making trips to space – the near-future demand will exist for the CAF to expand its capability and capacity to operate in space to be capable of meeting future security challenges.

Background

This expansion of capability and capacity in space for Canada portended by cheap, reusable rockets represents what the American theorist, space journalist, and historian Jim Oberg describes as the fourth and final phase of a maturation process for technology, namely ubiquitous use. In this phase,
the technology becomes so pervasive that it is regarded as simple and routine. In that regard, Oberg contends that space power went through its first phase, *discovery*, in the late-19th and early-20th centuries embodied in the work of rocket pioneers, such as the Russian rocket scientist and pioneer of astronautic theory, Konstantin Tsiaolkovsky, and the distinguished American physicist Robert H. Goddard, who is credited with creating the world’s first liquid-fueled rocket. The second stage, *application*, was ushered in with the development of rockets as military tools during the 1930s through the 1950s. The current stage, *acceptance*, has been the norm since the 1960s, with the establishment of satellites and Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) as not merely a novelty, but as an integral part of the superpower military arsenal.

The dawn of the acceptance stage followed shortly after the Soviet Union, in attempting to overcome the U.S advantage in long-range bombers, succeeded in developing rocket technology and placed the *Sputnik 1* satellite into space.\(^4\) Subsumed by Cold War politics, space technology was quickly developed by both the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy an array of satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles to support their strategic approaches and operational capabilities. Today, space operations in the form of satellite support to surveillance and communications are considered so essential that a former US Air Force Chief of Staff claimed their loss would mean, “…you go back to the Industrial Age.”\(^5\) Space operations are therefore accepted as the norm for those states that can afford to both generate and sustain them.

This norm is restricted and limited by what Oberg terms the “…impediments to the exercise of space power,” which he sees as launch costs, launch bottlenecks (physical facilities from which to launch), hazards of the space environment, and socio-political attitudes towards the use of space for military purposes.\(^6\) Of these, launch costs are the “primary inhibitor of expanded commercial, private, and even governmental activities in space.”\(^7\) The Space Shuttle program, designed to make travel to and from space a routine affair, cost some $500 million dollars (all costs in USD) per launch, or a cost-to-weight ratio of about $500,000 dollars per pound. With the retirement of the Space Shuttle program, however, both government and civilian organizations now rely upon large commercial firms for rocket services, with costs remaining high at $42,000 dollars per pound.\(^8\)

That said, in the next 15 years, emerging technological developments have the potential to undercut this high cost-to-weight ratio, changing the concept of the norm for movement from Earth to space, and transitioning military space technology into the fourth phase of ubiquitous use. SpaceX, the current industry leader, founded in 2002, has achieved numerous milestones in its efforts to revolutionize rocket technology. Indeed, it is the first commercial enterprise to send a rocket into orbit (2008), the first to return a spacecraft from low-earth orbit (2010), the first to service the International Space Station (2012), and the first manufacturer – civilian or government – to produce a rocket capable of returning to earth and being relaunched into space (2015-2016).\(^9\) Other companies in the civilian sector are following the lead of SpaceX, including Rocket Lab and Vector Space Systems, and are in the midst of developing lightweight rockets capable of sending smaller payloads into orbit with higher frequency, and at a reduced cost.\(^10\) These and others are developing technologies that will push the weight-to-cost ratio for travel into space to about $10,000 per pound, and perhaps lower, or 10% of the cost of the Space Shuttle program, and about 20-25% less than the current market’s space service corporations, such as United Launch Alliance or Orbital ATK.\(^11\)

In the next 15 years, general availability of rockets that move material into space at a cost 10% or lower than current prices will eliminate a barrier and create the effect described by Oberg as “…easy access to space by second and third-tier players, whether governmental or non-governmental, whose presence would at the very least complicate, and at worst endanger, current activities.”\(^12\) The high cost of space access has generally restricted the scale of military activities in space to those states with fairly predictable policies and agendas. As costs go down, however, and launch facilities on Earth proliferate, the conditions for ubiquitous military use of space by state and possibly non-state actors will flourish. Canada will inevitably need to join this rush of new actors in space.

The projected future state of expanded military use of space creates security issues for states, in particular, for those states that rely on the stability of the current paradigm of how space is used (and by whom) to support terrestrial military operations. For example, this future state will greatly expand the ability of actors to neutralize or defeat their adversary’s space-based satellites networks by putting anti-satellite systems into space with ease. Moreover, this future state will promote greater use of space, due to the proliferation of cheap delivery systems. What takes sealift *days* and airlift *hours* to do will be economically possible in minutes by cheap, reusable rockets. The future state will also create increased competition for dominance of key areas of the Earth-Moon system to provide assured access for space systems. If this future state becomes a reality in 15 years, what will a future conflict scenario look like, and how can countries such as Canada prepare to deal with it?

**The Future State**

Any discussion of the future state of the military use of space must begin with an understanding of the space environment, how it is currently used, and how changing technology will affect future use. For military purposes, the area of space that the Earth-Moon system occupies can be divided into four regions.
Within these regions, satellite operations, the principal form of space operation, currently occur almost exclusively in the second, circumterrestrial region, which can be subdivided into four orbital zones (see Diagram 2). Low Earth Orbit lies between the end of the Earth’s atmosphere (100 kilometres) and the inner edge of the Van Allen radiation belts (480 kilometres). Medium Earth orbit stretches from the start of the Van Allen radiation belts to Geosynchronous Orbit (480 kilometres to 35,700 kilometres). Geosynchronous Orbit fills a very small area where orbiting satellites can match the rotation of the Earth’s axis, making it possible to lock them into a geostationary orbit, that is, passing the same location at the same time each day, or a geostationary orbit, remaining over the same location. Anything beyond Geosynchronous Orbit is considered High Earth Orbit, which extends to limit of circumterrestrial space (80,000 kilometres).
Satellite operations primarily occur in the Low Earth and Geosynchronous Orbits, and these regions are already quite cluttered. The Union of Concerned Scientists tracks commercial and military activity, and has identified 2,062 active satellites orbiting the Earth as of early-2019. Of these, just under half (43%) are American owned, with 304 of these being military or government satellites. China operates 299 active satellites, while Russia has 153. Along with these operational satellites, there are over 20,000 other pieces of space debris larger than a softball, such as inoperative satellites or pieces of used rockets, that further clutter circumterrestrial space and threaten to damage or destroy operational systems currently in orbit.

Satellite operations in this cluttered environment are critical to terrestrial military operations for their ability to enhance reconnaissance, early warning, communications, and remotely-piloted vehicle operations. Consequently, militaries are conceiving of ways to degrade adversary satellite networks as part of war planning. In response to what former American Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work called a “…big, expensive, enormously capable, but enormously vulnerable” American satellite network, the U.S. has recently undertaken efforts to strengthen its defences against potential anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks. Nevertheless, there is nowhere to hide objects in space from observation, and with ASAT capabilities proliferating, protecting military satellite networks may prove to be a serious challenge.

While militaries must consider how to work around degraded satellite capability, civilian satellite operations are equally vulnerable, and perhaps, less resilient. Many civilian functions are dependent upon the American Global Positioning System (GPS), the world’s principal Global Navigational Satellite System (GNSS) network, for its precise time tracking ability to drive commerce, traffic control, and communications on a global scale. A loss of GPS/GNSS timing could affect stock markets, automatic bank machines, cellular phone towers, traffic light systems, air traffic control, and power distribution, potentially grinding critical civilian infrastructure and financial transactions to a halt.

Cheaper, reusable rockets will expand access to the circumterrestrial region to more actors, making civilian and military satellite networks more vulnerable to intentional or unintentional interference. While ASAT operations are traditionally envisioned as the launch of missiles to physically destroy satellites, there are other ways to attack satellite networks, such as using space vehicles to interfere, subtly damage, or jam adversary satellites. Interference does not even need to be intentional, or require the use of purpose-built ASAT platforms. Increased activity in orbit creates increased chances of mishaps and the creation of space debris, which, travelling at high velocities, can damage satellites and create a cascading effect of debris. With the lowering cost of space access, the capability to interfere with satellite networks can conceivably proliferate to second- and third-tier space powers, or even to non-state actors.

While cheap, reusable rockets will open circumterrestrial space to more actors, thus increasing the vulnerability of satellite networks that operate therein, it will also reduce the costs and difficulty of maintaining satellites, providing resiliency to networks. Along with low cost rockets, miniaturization, and cheaper access to space will reduce the costs of satellites. For example, the newest Iridium Next communication satellites weigh almost 1,900 pounds each, and cost over $27 million per satellite. Satellites of this size and cost are gradually being replaced by what are termed small satellites, weighing under 400 pounds, which are increasing in capability, and constitute the fastest growing share of the satellite market.

In a future state where circumterrestrial space is more cluttered, and the prospect for satellite network interference is greater, small satellites launched from cheaper, reusable rockets offer users a cheaper, easier way to sustain operational capability and capacity. The big, expensive, and vulnerable networks described by Robert Work will become small, inexpensive, and easy to replace. In the future, states will possess, or contract, ready reserves of small satellites to be launched into space by military or corporate rockets to maintain critical, vulnerable satellite networks. Cheap, reusable rockets will enable states to “regenerate” their satellites as fast as adversaries could take them out.

While rocket technology will mean increased flights of cargo from Earth to space to sustain satellite networks, the same technology also provides for the possibility for using Low Earth Orbit as a highway for orbital mobility. Cheaper rockets that can land and be reused can become rockets which can be loaded with supplies, equipment, or personnel, launched through Low Earth Orbit, and accurately and safely landed, all in a more cost-effective manner. Low Earth Orbit will become a new orbital line of communication, to be used by military forces in conjunction with the traditional ground, air, and sea lines of communication, and will take only minutes to move large amounts of materiel around the globe.

Surface-to-surface rocket transit through Low Earth Orbit is being pioneered by SpaceX and its Mars Rocket program, now designated as the “Starship” (and previously designated the “BFR”). The Starship is the follow-on development to the Falcon Heavy rocket, which conducted its maiden flight in February 2018. The Falcon Heavy rocket, capable of lifting 64 metric tons (just over 140,000 pounds) into space, will be the most powerful rocket in operation by a factor of two. The Starship’s capability will dwarf the Falcon Heavy, and SpaceX owner Elon Musk announced in September 2017 that he intends to land a BFR-supported spacecraft with human explorers on Mars by the year 2022. The Starship will dwarf any rocket ever built, with the potential ability to be continuously refueled and reused to move up to 150 metric tons or over 330,000 pounds into orbit for each launch.
Musk also advertised the ability of the Starship to conduct surface-to-surface transit on Earth. By moving through Low Earth Orbit at a speed of 27,000 kilometres per hour, the Starship could deliver cargo or passengers anywhere on the Earth in less than one hour. Space pioneer and commentator Sam Dinkin conducted a cost analysis of Musk’s concept of moving almost 900 passengers and crew, a number similar to the Airbus A380 that Musk claimed his Starship-powered shuttle could hold. While reduced costs for the proposed BFR would not materialize until a mature industry can develop over the next 10-20 years (the timeframe of the future state being examined), Dinkin estimated that a BFR could be procured at costs similar to a A380, and could move passengers for just over one million dollars per trip, or $1,200 per customer. Use of an orbital line of communication with maturing rocket technology will enable terrestrial movement that takes days by ship and hours by aircraft to be completed in minutes by a rocket.

The military implications of this technological development are self-evident. As SpaceX’s pioneering work matures, military forces will be able to conduct logistics through Low Earth Orbit. The Starship is planned to be capable of moving from 100+ metric tons, to possibly 150 metric tons (330,000 pounds), of cargo. 150 metric tons is the equivalent to just under two C-177 Globemaster loads, or one-and-a-half C-5 Galaxy loads. A RAND study looking at airlift requirements to deploy a US Army Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) estimated that 239 C-17 equivalents would be required to deploy an SBCT, three days of supplies, and debarkation sustainment. In the future state, rocket replenishment could deploy a similar sized formation anywhere on the planet with 108 flights, each with a flight time of 30-45 minutes. While 108 flights are likely an excessive demand, the movement of a medium-weight armoured brigade provides a useful reference point for movement capacity. Using the previous example of 900 personnel, deployment of the personnel of an infantry battalion to its prepositioned equipment stocks can be accomplished in a single lift. This illustrates how reusable rockets such as the SpaceX Starship can transform surface-to-surface movement of materiel through Low Earth Orbit.

While using rockets for administrative movement of personnel and material is one possible avenue of development, the tactical deployment of combat forces is another possibility.

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*“While using rockets for administrative movement of personnel and material is one possible avenue of development, the tactical deployment of combat forces is another possibility.”*
of orbital deployment of soldiers has long existed, not only in science fiction, but in military concept organizations. The US Marine Corps launched the Small Unit Space Transport and Insertion (SUSTAIN) project in 2003, which aimed to move a 13-Marine squad with equipment anywhere on the Earth on a small tactical landing craft. It conceptualizes the launch of a landing craft from another vehicle, moving through sub-orbital space to get to its objective, and by-passing national airspace issues to get to its objective area. Although conceptually different than the orbital travel enabled by reusable rockets, it is conceivable that a tactical landing vehicle could be designed for mounting on a rocket, to be deployed from space, and landing dozens, if not hundreds, of soldiers or marines in a form of “orbital assault.” Orbital quick reaction or special operations deployments could be made around the globe in thirty minutes.

In a future state where there is utility in orbital lines of communication for surface-to-surface travel and an increasing density of traffic in circumterrestrial space for satellite operations and maintenance, space control will become an essential element in military planning, just as air control is at present. Like areas on the Earth, the Earth-Moon system has some ‘key terrain,’ or areas that give the force occupying them a marked advantage in a confrontation. While space has no cardinal directions or terrain, there are key points in the Earth-Moon system that could be considered distinctive, if not decisive, due the impact of gravity. These are known as the liberation points, or the points at which the gravitational forces of two bodies balances out to create a stable orbit, of which there are five for any two celestial bodies.

Among these five points, the fourth and fifth points of liberation (L4 and L5) which exist at a 60 degree angle ahead of and behind the moon in its orbit, are considered to be potentially key terrain. Their decisive impact stems from the fact that objects located at these points can maintain a stable orbit with minimal energy, observe the obverse sides of both the Earth and the Moon, and occupy the exit of the gravity wells for both these bodies. By ‘looking down’ the gravity well of both bodies of the Earth-Moon system, a weaponized satellite or station theoretically ‘holds the high ground’ of that system, for it expends less energy and can gain greater acceleration with equal input than an adversary approaching from the some place within the gravity well.

Control of this ‘high ground’ in exo-atmospheric space could be exerted by denying access to the Earth-Moon system by ‘attacking from above’ any space vehicle trying to move up from the surface of Earth (or, conceivably, the Moon). Weapon systems located in the L4 and L5 positions have the advantage of detecting movement and launching some sort of attack with, as opposed to against, gravity’s pull. They are also above the most useful orbits, Low Earth and Geosynchronous, for satellite networks. To date, the pursuit of space weapons has been relatively latent: the concepts exist, but the desire to execute them has not. A recent study by space, security, and defence experts Wilson Wong and James Ferguson determined that, so far, “…the great cost involved with turning the orbit-to-surface concept into a credible deterrent,” and “…the ease at which a low orbiting satellite may be found (and attacked)” has meant that most weapons are better off (and cheaper) if maintained on Earth. Anticipation of an increasingly-busier circumterrestrial region of space could lead to a change in outlook on space weapons, with the L4 and L5 points representing the ideal location to overlook activity in the Earth-Moon system.

Space weapons to secure gravitationally-key ‘terrain,’ along with traffic along orbital lines of communication and an increase in satellite operations, represent aspects of a projected future state caused by expanded military and civilian use of space. This change in potential future warfare is driven by lower-cost, reusable rockets currently being pioneered by companies such as SpaceX, and have serious potential to create new security issues and changes to the paradigm of how space is used, and who uses it. Countries such as Canada, currently operating on the periphery of space operating nations, will soon find itself required to
maintain a permanent and expanded presence in low-Earth orbit to maintain adequate defensive capabilities.

Implications

Nothing in the changes in how space is used and who uses it described herein is based upon new-or-novel concepts. Commercial rocket services, satellite miniaturization, space stations, civilian space travel, space weapons, and the belief of a progressively-greater presence of humanity outside the confines of Earth are all ideas that have been present in the literature of space for decades. What is new is SpaceX’s achievement of a reusable space vehicle atop a rocket with the potential to vastly reduce the costs of accessing space. This advance essentially serves as the platform for future space development, as the practicality of ubiquitous use, in both engineering and financial terms, now exists for the near-future. SpaceX’s lower-cost, reusable rockets are the hub around which other concepts and technologies can be realized, exploited, and further developed. As humanity moves towards a greater presence in space, the effects upon future war and military theory and practice will be as profound, as will effects upon all other aspects of the human endeavor.

If cheap, reusable rockets as the hub to enable future space development represents the future state 15 years out, three critical implications and their effects upon military space operations must be considered now. First and foremost, the ‘ genie is out of the bottle,’ and the Earth-Moon system will lose its 70-year status as the preserve of governments and a few large corporations. Just as the Spanish claim to the Caribbean as a sort of ‘Spanish Lake’ was broken by the official and unofficial seafarers of rival nations during the 16th and 17th Centuries, SpaceX has created the conditions where smaller states and companies can access, compete, and develop their potential in space. Without a doubt, Canada is in this group. Countries and corporations that currently operate in space must start considering now how they will handle new actors in the region while those that do not must consider how they can best unlock the potential of their emerging access. For militaries, planning considerations concerning the concept of control of space or space superiority, and the possibility of being forced to win it or not being able to exercise it, will become as essential as those who have been concerned with airpower superiority.

New actors in space leads to the second implication for states to consider: tension, both interstate and intrastate, with respect to what the Executive Secretary of the American Space Council, Scott Pace, has termed the cultures of the merchants (focused upon competition and profit) and guardians (focused upon order and protection). A busier, more crowded Earth-Moon system will mean that the clash of merchant and guardian interests will occur at the state and global levels, increasing the requirement for accommodation and coordination regarding space policy. Traditional political, defence, and economic alliances need to start considering today how to coordinate their affairs on the orbital highways of circumterrestrial space. New methods of cooperation between states and alliances can build the necessary redundancy of essential capabilities to respond to cases of satellite network failure, due to intentional attack or inadvertent mishap. New forms of traffic control will require implementation as the volume of traffic into and around

Diagram 5 – Low-Cost, Reusable Rockets as the Hub for Future Space Development.
the circumterrestrial region overwhelms current Earth-based monitoring systems. Much like the oceans today, the tension tomorrow between space as an economic development concern and space as a national security factor will affect how all these coordination issues are addressed.

Further complicating coordination is the final implication concerning military operations in the future state: the change in infrastructure requirements for space operations in the face of evolving rocket technology. Under the current paradigm, military operations are conducted through large, fixed installations with established government agencies and contracted companies. These are easy to monitor, and they act as bottlenecks for access, due to throughput of launches. Smaller, lighter rockets and smaller payloads require less infrastructure. This is already occurring, with launches from rocket Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) vehicles and submarines putting small satellites into low Earth orbit. The reduction of logistics required to support a launch will mean that rocket support facilities or vehicles could devolve from national assets to theatre or even tactical assets. Military planners must take this into account as they organize to support and defeat future space operations.

The implications for the CAF are evident. Over the next 15 years, space, and more specifically, the Earth-Moon system, will become a key domain for competition between terrestrial actors. The CAF, as part of its future capability horizon planning, should consider the following questions:

- How will the CAF operate from space in 15 years?
- How will the increase in space operations affect CAF principles for command and control relationships, mechanisms, and infrastructure for military operations?
- How will the CAF access space in 15 years? Through military procured rockets, civilian rockets, or a public-private venture?
- What sort of Earth-based infrastructure will the CAF require to operate successfully in space in 15 years?
- How will the CAF generate the specialist personnel to manage and execute operations in space in 15 years?

Over the next 15 years, the development of cheaper, reusable rockets by commercial industry will lead to rapid expansion of military presence in space, establishing the economic feasibility
of space-based military operations for state and non-state actors. Low cost, reusable rockets being pioneered by SpaceX will serve as the hub for a host of other existing technologies and concepts to be developed and employed in space.

Conclusion

In order to remain relevant in 15 years, Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces must start working now to determine how best to manage the implications. Planning for Canadian operations in the 2030s now must take access to space and low-earth orbit as a given, and a failure to address the questions listed earlier means the CAF will be ‘playing catch-up,’ and will be ‘on the outside looking in’ towards a potentially decisive domain for military operations. As we observe SpaceX and other companies continue their drive to improve their creations, we are watching the 21st Century’s Wright Flyer take off, and like that modest flight in 1903, the potential of cost-effective, reusable rocket technology offers to change the parameters of space power within a generation.

NOTES


6 Oberg, pp. 67-68.

7 Ibid., p. 89.


9 Information found on SpaceX company website at: http://www.spacex.com/about.


12 Oberg, p. 69.


14 Ibid., pp. 6-22.


27 The C-17 can carry a load of 77 metric tons (170,900 pounds), while the C-5 can haul 122 metric tons (270,000 pounds). Statistics obtained at the US Air Force webpage, at: http://www.af.mil.


29 The C-17 can carry a load of 77 metric tons (170,900 pounds), while the C-5 can haul 122 metric tons (270,000 pounds). Statistics obtained at the US Air Force webpage, at: http://www.af.mil.


32 Ibid., pp. 21-25.


e-Thinking: Pre-Empting Global Instability in the 21st Century

by Eric Dion

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Authorship Note

This article is reflexive, and thus contains facts and opinions, which the author alone considered appropriate and correct for the subject. It does not necessarily reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, including the Government of Canada and the Department of National Defence.

Introduction

The advent of Cognitive Warfare within so-called Gray Zones is already upon our Allies.1 New thinking is no longer innovative, it is imperative to pre-empt global instability in the 21st Century. This article thus proposes to venture into our contemporary (or e-) thinking. Indeed, global events do not happen by accident; human designs have a great part to play. As we invented the ‘World,’ ‘Time,’ and ‘Money,’ naturally, we can deconstruct these ideas as Lego® blocks that can be melted down intellectually, and then philosophically redesigned. Taking an original comprehensive e-Thinking perspective, this article aims to deconstruct our most complex problems and cognitive dissonances in order to more fundamentally reflect upon our epistemologies and way of thinking. Indeed, Einstein famously once said:

“We can’t solve problems using the same logic we used when we created them”

~ Einstein

Moreover, we will purport that e-Thinking is quintessential to pre-empt global instability. The Allies, as we refer to 20 percent of the world’s population living in the Occident, have essentially been avoiding major wars at all cost, preventatively engaging in our world. Our interest fundamentally rests in stable socio-economic conditions for our way of life. In the 21st Century,
National Security & Global Defence is really about pre-empting instability.

In a comprehensive perspective, six dimensions support major human decision-making: The situational-context, socioculture, organisational structure, strategic policies, systemic processes and synergistic dynamics. Each dimension can be thought of independently, and it is what most theories of our world do, placing the locus of thinking within one-or-two dimensions idiosyncratically. However, this meta-theoretical model really adds value when all dimensions are considered interdependently, as complex and ‘wicked’ problems in the ‘real world.’ Moreover, accepting that most of humanity is well intended, it is an important philosophical underpinning to contemporary war theory, which manages by exception and less by example. Therefore, engaging constructively and proactively in the world are key premises.

**Situational Context**

It may appear global instability is at our doorstep, and moreover, in our ‘Internet of Things.’ Since the Allies have been wholly unable to manage the Middle-East conflicts with some intellectual wherewithal, it seems we are now facing an era of ‘unending warfare.’ Indeed, and from the start, the plan appears to have been to bog down the Allies in ‘civilisation wars.’ What is worse, Russia plays Hybrid Warfare, China plays Unrestricted Warfare, and non-state actors play Asymmetric Warfare. This global context thus creates a perception that we are in for a ‘long war’ in this century, and perhaps even in for a Fourth Generation War, as it materializes and develops. From this viewpoint, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria can be thought of as a contemporary litmus test.

What is much less apparent and more ambiguous is the fact that the vast majority of today’s humanity lives much longer and livelier than any of their predecessors in modern times. Hence, major wars and conflicts the scale of world wars are avoided at all possible cost. Plausible war scenarios remain, but the potential of global contemporary war is much more unconventional in this perspective. However, they are still involving all crucial elements of power. Thus, new emerging approaches are not so much interesting as they are truly required because the global context has changed, at least, in our own perception of this environment.

As we are building the World, we are creating our own military chaos, if only by accident. Thus: “[…] they came to realize that what to think and how to think are integral parts of the making and unmaking of contemporary conflicts.” Indeed, more people die in suicides annually than in all conflicts around the world, although population displacement from these conflicts remains a major unaddressed issue, which impacts more the living than the dead. Thus, different from the popular view, terror is not a strategic issue: It is more of a globally-recurring annoying wart, but not debilitating. Hence, the global contemporary context is intrinsically tied to our own perception of it, as much as it still has to do with the cold hard facts, both of which we must therefore balance. As such, the situation is not dire.

**Socio-Culture**

As the rational-comprehensive perspective has dominated through the industrial era, in the information era, alternative perspectives to this paradigm have emerged, specifically from the lens of social-constructivism. Often conflated within context, the socio-cultural dimension now requires an analysis of its own system, within the system of six dimensions previously identified.
Indeed, war is a social construct, as the ‘war of peoples’ are waged by proxy through their militaries for governments. Sometimes literally contracted out, warfare officially remains the prerogative of nation-states, but socially constructed challenges to this Westphalian view have emerged through the ideas of indirect warfare, such as terrorism and insurgency. No longer are Occidental peoples seemingly satisfied with their international engagements, and this social-political pressure out-maneuvers contemporary warfare in their name’s sake.

The soldier-citizen disconnect is more obvious, as the military social contract is outdated. Our enemies include civilians within their arcs of fire, but civilians are part of the solution. Citizens are ‘fighters’ in their everyday lives because warfare is now social and economic.

“[Thus, terror] can be successfully challenged over the long run by prudent policies that maintain the fundamental tenets of society” – Raheel Raza, Their Jihad … Not My Jihad! Warfare, if legitimised by the people for the people, must maintain this moral high ground. As such, our Allied militaries, carrying out the people’s wars, must be highly intelligence-aware, understanding intelligence not simply as a military function for example, but as a human function. “Thus, NCMs’ should be educated and empowered to think.” Therefore, our current military structures of thought must be opened and rapidly transformed.

Organisational Structure

In order to ‘think outside of the box,’ there first must be an acknowledgement of the box itself. Thus, we are not proposing to burn the box that has served us well, but rather that we think from the box and particularly for the box, beyond the box. Without a box to start with, a box in which we are all educated and experienced, an entire endeavour is fundamentally devoid of intellectual structure. However, this is not the sole dimension to consider, as we have argued herein. The military alone is unable to solve the root causes of contemporary and human conflicts, so even the false dichotomy between civilian and military, similar to many others, needs revision.

We should promote Operations & Intelligence fusion structures akin to brawns with brains, and also integrate organisations within the whole of National Security & Global Defence teams. By design, we can prepare a military offer of services while we do not control the demand, which is both structural in terms of physical and virtual organisation, and intellectual. The current regimen of military silos does not provide a structurally-sound organisation in time and space and thought, when deconstruction of Regiments and reconstruction of Task Forces happens in the midst of battles. The main challenge that frustrates military planners is mostly organisational issues, and not so much strategic issues, akin to ‘rearranging the chairs’…
As such, our naval, land, aerospace and special forces are organisational silos created in an era of industrial mass-production, not for the matrixed and networked threats characterised by asymmetric, hybrid, unconventional, unrestricted and irregular warfare.10

“Staff colleges need to create a learning environment where students have the opportunity to think hard about messy complex problems.”11 But is the very idea of staff colleges still valid, when so-called ‘out of the box’ thinking is quintessential? A balance of experiential and educational learning is required to foster creative knowledge, thus unstructured and structured learning are crucial, combining our intuition with intelligence. As e-Thinking vital force, constructive education and pragmatic experience are required in order to shape the next generation of General Officers to lead our militaries’ reflexive turn.

**Strategic Policies**

“‘For [military philosopher Ben] Zweibelson, the promises of reflexive turn are too important to wait for organizational change as armed forces are becoming more and more irrelevant.’”12 This perception is becoming more common in military circles because of the failures to achieve strategic success yet in such forbidden places as Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Strategic success is dependent upon our own measures, and the Allies did disrupt Al’Qaeda in its international terror capacity the same way the Allies did disrupt Islamists from creating a state in the Levant. But if the measure of success is global peace and stability, we are setting ourselves up for failure by attacking this utopia and neo-liberal idealist dream. Constructive pragmatists do understand peace to be a measure of relative global instability, a gray zone. Allied militaries must focus upon enabling strategic success and not simply operational success.

The world has been preventing major wars at all cost since the ‘new world disorder’ and the end of the Cold-War. Conventional warfare has become special for the foreseeable future. Unconventional is the new conventional, and conversely, so-called conventional warfare has become a strategic exception delegitimised as it is by the people in the world in general.

Everyone is special, relatively speaking; so-called Special Forces are actually military elite, conducting Secret Operations, and not so much ‘special,’ since special is our new normal. Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Clausewitz, Jomini, Galula and other thinkers may have been right with respect to the conduct of war in their time, but the nature of war remains. These nuances are not semantic as warfare’s leadership must emerge from our governments, and global instability can be strategically pre-empted, engaging the World through its peoples.

Through the predominance of indirect approaches, war and conflict remain the expression of chaos, so whatever strategy is used to conduct war, it will be countered through adaptation. Specifically: “Hybrid warfare in its purest sense is the integration, exploitation, and leveraging of diverse networks, to accomplish strategic goals.”13 And furthermore: “We have traditionally approached National Security in terms of Defence. [It] is quite obvious that Defence alone does not offer a comprehensive integrated response to our Nation[s], to serve [their] overall security concerns and interests.”14 Moreover, because the nature of war is multidimensional, and not solely a military concern, a more holistic and synergistic approach is required to tackle conflicts in all their complexity. Call it an integrated or comprehensive approach, and its idea is to unleash and to synergistically leverage e-Thinking.

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”

~ Sun Tzu

**Systemic Processes**

From a systemic military & defence perspective, efficiency trumps efficacy because resources are limited, at least on Earth, so ensuring that ‘each buck has a bang’ is quintessential for effect. “Managers must make sense of factors contributing to the problem and how to manipulate resources to nudge the system […] in different directions.”15 As such: “Design is not, strictly speaking, a defined methodology, but rather a collection of approaches and loosely connected ideas. Design is more of an art form rather than a process: it cannot be ‘taught,’ but learners can be ‘coached’ through design problems, just as artists, sportsmen and trades are developed in terms of practice.16 Nonetheless, there needs to be a method to madness, since Hope is not a method.”17 The “design-planning bridge”18 must be built upon the divide, but if pushed or rushed, design may indeed be a ‘bridge too far’ for many militaries.

Far from advocating new Operational Planning Processes (OPP) or Military Decision Making Processes (MDMP), integration of Arts and Sciences seems to be the more fruitful avenue, so design elements in planning should be integral to e-Thinking about conflicts and wars. Thinking of the box, from the box and for the box, we should challenge these ideas from outside and from beyond the proverbial box and incorporate these views within. As net effect, this will increase the systemic scope and scale and strength of our thoughts. The incorporation of Systemic Operational Design along an Operational Planning Process for example, can provide not only for unstructured and structured frames of references for operations, but should also allow for deconstruction and reconstruction of critical ideas.
What is more, the systematic application of innovative knowledge should be fostered within doctrine, as a way to challenge our assumptions, both at the operational and strategic levels. In a ‘system of systems’ perspective, we must address root causes, not simply symptoms, and thus, a ‘reflexive turn’ should only be the start of the process in a spiral development scheme.

**Synergy Dynamics**

Several defence professionals often portray the design thinking movement as an “insurgency” sustained by “subversion.” As these are generally used figuratively [...] they nonetheless reflect well on this ‘reflexive turn.’ Part of the challenge is that this reflexive turn is emerging in military circles, but not within the larger public service and government, which has ‘defence’ for a primary responsibility. To pre-empt global instability is to answer why we need a synergistic and comprehensive approach. Our public service needs to step up to the global instability challenge, while we can still use the ‘hammer’ on occasion. At the end of the day, fire preventing is generally better than fire fighting, but this view trumps our militaries’ very sense of accomplishment. As adventurers caught in the branches of trees, it precludes us from seeing the global forest and it prevents us from actually seeing the entire nature of war, and its intrinsic instability.

Moreover, limiting our thinking to the military domain is preventing service opportunities; “[All] contributors […] have argued that the challenges of contemporary conflicts demand radically new thinking, at odds with rationalism.” For our part, our argument is more constructive, pragmatic: All epistemologies are welcomed. We need smarter e-Thinking to challenge our own dichotomies and cognitive dissonances, while acknowledging such a dynamic metaphysical perspective will create yet other issues. Some academics may argue that such intellectual integration is incommensurate, that is, only in our own mental frames. If we accept that our antagonists are not bound by such thinking, so must we also adapt. Training trainers, but moreover, educating educators in e-Thinking are thus quintessential, leveraging and integrating the fundamental dimensions of Synergy – A theoretical model (Figure 1).

Since through asymmetric, hybrid, unconventional, unrestricted and/or irregular & fourth generation warfare (4GW), military theorists are referring to various combinations of warfare, or the conduct of war and its various degrees of conflict, we tend to miss a fundamental point about war’s chaotic nature. In a global perspective, this dynamic will always exist, hence the need for applied Synergy leveraging a multidimensional understanding and comprehensive approach to the issue. If we apply a constructive pragmatic epistemology, a vast majority of humankind is already at peace and even contributing each in their own way to a better quality of living. Hence, managing the exception must not become the norm, while setting an example is key. Warts do not require amputation nor hospitalisation, but they do require attention.21 For the present and foreseeable future, instability is relatively manageable on a global scale by deliberately creating clusters of Synergy that in sum, will foster positive dynamics. Not discussing artificial intelligence (AI) per se: The wars of the future are those of the mind.

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**Figure 1: Synergy – A theoretical model.**

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Conclusion

We are facing epistemic warfare of our own creation. War remains the expression of chaos by nature, but for the foreseeable future, the conduct of warfare has clearly become indirect. Whether we call it ‘out-of-the-box,’ reflexive, unconventional, strategic, systemic or holistic e-Thinking, the fundamental point remains: Our cognitive dissonances are complex. While we think we may have found solutions to some of our most complicated issues, like water on Mars, complexity remains critical for humans on Earth, because of our thinking. For example, if we somehow keep on imagining our elite military forces as: “‘Masters of Mayhem,’ capable of mastering the dynamic of change itself,”22 which is cliché from Masters of Chaos,23 even our ‘best and brightest’ are missing the point: Chaos happens within our minds first and foremost, through human intellectual existence. Mayhem and chaos are what we get if it is what we look for, regardless of our perspective. Thus, a small revolution in thinking, an ‘insurgency sustained by subversion,’ is truly urgently required.

It is through collaborative intelligence that human endeavours progress in every dimension. By physically and virtually going faster and farther, we are only accelerating and expanding the scope and scale of warfare, which as a counter probably requires more focused thinking.

However: “As some of our allies have seen, incorporation of design is not without its challenges, nor is design a panacea that will solve every problem we confront.”24 And so, like Time and Money, we created the “World” and the economy, which the vast majority is destined to manage in their lifetime. Until the time comes, our allied militaries must think beyond the proverbial box, and if design25 is such an e-Thinking approach, all the best to it! In concluding, perhaps our design community needs to take a common sense constructive pragmatic approach to its clusters of ideas, and integrate in Synergy26 to support our Allies.

NOTES

7 Non-Commissioned Members in the Canadian Armed Forces or Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs).
9 In Canada. Special Forces are part of Canada’s Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM).
12 Beaulieu-Brossard & Dufort, p. 18.
19 Beaulieu-Brossard & Dufort, p.18.
22 William Mitchell.
The Canadian Army Needs a Paradigm Shift

by Wolfgang W. Riedel

The Canadian Army Needs a Paradigm Shift

Colonel (ret’d) Wolfgang W. Riedel, OMM, CD, QC has served for forty-four years in the ranks and as an artillery, infantry and legal officer in the Regular Force and the Reserve Force. As Deputy Judge Advocate General – Reserves he was Canada’s Senior Reserve Force Legal Officer and was a member of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council.

“Our defence policy is predicated on the kind of asymmetric warfare we have faced since the end of the Cold War and it really ignores the looming strategic threats that Russia, China and maybe some others pose as well.”

~ Richard Cohen

Introduction

“Paradigm Shift – a radical change in personal beliefs, complex systems or organizations, replacing the former way of thinking or organizing with a radically different way of thinking or organizing.”

Is the Canadian Army ready for the next conflict? Does it project a credible deterrence? This article argues that the answer is, clearly, no. As a consequence, Canada must re-assess what the Canadian Army’s structure ought to be, and, in particular, critically examine the role and organization of the Army’s Primary Reserve component (ARes).

The United States Has Recognized the Threat and Is Doing Something about It

The most recent US National Defence Strategy (NDS), issued in January of 2018, recognizes that the US is “…emerging from a period of strategic atrophy, aware that our competitive military advantage has been eroding.” It identifies China as a “strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while militarizing features in the South China Sea,” and states: “Russia has violated the borders of nearby nations and pursues veto power over the economic, diplomatic, and security decisions of its neighbors.”

In response to this threat, the Department of Defense (DoD), in its progress report of 26 September 2018, stressed the adoption of three lines of effort: Lethality—Build a more lethal force; Alliances—Strengthen alliances and attract new partners; and Reform—Reform the Department for greater performance and affordability.

Congress’s Commission for the independent review of the NDS (NDSC) found, on 13 November 2018, that the “…security and well-being of the United States are at greater risk than at any time in decades. America’s military superiority … has eroded to a dangerous degree … (it) might struggle to win, or perhaps lose, a war against China or Russia. The United States would be...
A military parade in Red Square, Moscow, celebrating the annual anniversary of victory over Germany in the Second World War, the Great Patriotic War.

Chinese forces on parade during a review of the troops near Chita in Eastern Siberia, Russia, while deployed on the massive Vostok-2018 multi-national war games at the Telemba training grounds, 13 September 2018.
particularly at risk of being overwhelmed should its military be forced to fight on two or more fronts simultaneously.”

According to RAND, “...the US keeps losing, hard, in simulated wars with Russia and China” notwithstanding that the US has a 2019 defense budget of US$716 billion against China’s US$228 billion, and Russia’s US$66.3 billion in 2017. The problem is that the current US Full Spectrum Operations strategy is vulnerable to its adversaries’ Hybrid War and Anti-Access Denial strategies. In response, the US is developing new strategies under the rubric of Multi-Domain Operations.

Canada Has Recognized the Threat but Has Done Little to Respond to It

Canada’s current defence policy—Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE), issued in 2017—concedes: “The re-emergence of major power competition has reminded Canadian Army and its allies of the importance of deterrence. ... A credible military deterrence serves as a diplomatic tool to prevent conflict and should be accompanied by dialogue. NATO allies ... have been re-examining how to deter a wide spectrum of challenges to the international order by maintaining advanced conventional military capabilities that could be used in the event of a conflict with a “near-peer.”” (Emphasis added). Canada, however, has done little since 2017 to confront the situation. It neither maintains credible “advanced conventional military capabilities,” nor is it a “near-peer” to Russia or China. While the SSE requires the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to be prepared to provide, simultaneously, several small sustained and time-limited deployments, there are no requirements to provide any one contingent larger than 1,500 personnel; basically a single battle group.

Is that enough? The answer has to be, “no.” “The gold standard of deterrence and assurance is a defensive posture that confronts the adversary with the prospect of operational failure as the likely consequence of aggression.” “At the end of the day, 450 Canadian troops and their assorted brothers-in-arms in Latvia are not going to deter Vladimir Putin’s newly-equipped armoured divisions and missiles unless they are backed up by substantial and immediately available combat forces. Canada’s ambition of ‘two sustained deployments of 500-1500 personnel’ and ‘one time-limited deployment of 500-1500 personnel’ will probably not impress Mr. Putin.” (Emphasis added). According to RAND, NATO needs at least seven brigades—three of them heavy—to keep Russia from overrunning the Baltic states in sixty hours.
The Canadian Army’s transformation to light and medium-weight forces has made it an army with few teeth. The force has numerous, critical, capability gaps, the most significant of which is the absence of heavy-weight armoured formations. In the NATO and rejuvenated Russia context, our commitment is, at best, a trip wire—but a trip wire with nothing behind it is merely cannon fodder.

The Current Canadian Army ‘in a Nutshell’

What then is the state of the Canadian Army?

There are currently 21,600 full-time soldiers in the Canadian Army’s Regular Force component (Army Regular Force), and approximately 19,000 part-time soldiers in the Army Primary Reserve.

The bulk of Army Regular Force personnel are found within three Combat Mechanized Brigade Groups (CMBGs). The balance is employed in a nascent Combat Support Brigade (CCSB), a deployable divisional headquarters, and various other headquarters, schools, and tasks. Its manoeuvre elements consist of six LAV3/6.0 equipped infantry battalions, three light infantry battalions, two reconnaissance regiments, and one tank-equipped armoured regiment. Separate from the Canadian Army itself is one ‘battalion plus-sized’ special operations force.

While the light-to-medium-weight Army Regular Force component of the CAF meets some of the limited objectives of the SSE, it cannot be called a credible deterrent to either Russia or China. Does the Army Primary Reserve component add any lethality or credibility?

The Canadian Army Reserve Is Neither a Lethal nor Credible Force

The majority of the Army Primary Reserve consists of 138 units in ten brigade groups. A fluctuating, but significant minority is employed full-time on a variety of primarily administrative, call-out positions throughout the CAF.

According to a recent Auditor General’s Report, the current Army Primary Reserve lacks guidance on preparing for major overseas missions; is undermanned; is underfunded for even the limited objectives that are currently assigned to it; and is under-trained. Not mentioned in the report, but critical to any consideration of the Army Primary Reserve as either a deterrent or a fighting force, is that it is a non-deployable, administrative entity with establishments at a small fraction of their Army Regular Force counterparts. It is totally unequipped to go into combat, having merely limited numbers of personal weapons and a smattering of administrative and training equipment.

How Did We Get Here?

Historically, Canada was dependent upon a part-time citizen army made up of volunteers, and a very small full-time force whose purpose was to train the part-time force. This structure enabled Canada’s contributions in the two world wars where the country mobilized—at times augmented by conscription—upon the base of its citizen army. During the Second
World War, Canada had the fourth-largest allied active military, consisting of more than 1.1 million personnel.

After the Second World War, the Canadian Army part-time force was authorized at some 180,000 personnel in six divisions, four armoured brigades, and attachments. The Canadian Army full-time force was authorized at 27,000 personnel, including an airborne, brigade-sized Mobile Striking Force (MSF). By 1949, both components were under strength.

In 1950, Canada raised a brigade for Korea, largely recruited from Second World War veterans, and in 1951, committed to contributing new forces to NATO to oppose the Soviet threat. By 1954, the Canadian Army’s part-timers had dwindled to 46,506 members, while the full-time component had grown to 49,978 personnel, including a division with four combat mechanized brigade groups, one of which was deployed to Europe. The then-Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, articulated the proviso that if Canadian soldiers were to fight there, they would have to be there at the start of hostilities. Shipping a large force from Canada to Europe was not an available option.

In 1963, the Regular Force—as it was now known—reached its peak of 120,871 personnel, (without any increase in combat mechanized brigade groups), while Primary Reserve membership numbers and equipment declined. Thereafter, numbers for both components slid as salaries climbed, budgets became tighter, and senior military leadership unsuccessfully wrestled with an escalating bloat in headquarters staffing. Notwithstanding funding issues, the 1950s/1960s mentality of a large, costly Regular Force—as forces-in-being—with a Primary Reserve—as individual augmentees—continued unchallenged. These consequential compromises have resulted in today’s dysfunctional 100-person Army Primary Reserve battalions, commanded by lieutenant-colonels that have neither the trained personnel, nor the equipment to make it possible to activate them.

“In 1950, Canada raised a brigade for Korea, largely recruited from Second World War veterans, and in 1951, committed to contributing new forces to NATO to oppose the Soviet threat.”
Lessons from Afghanistan

Canadian operations in Afghanistan have been both a boon and a detriment for the Army Primary Reserve. Canadian contingents there were made up of 15-to-25% reservists. In total, 4,642 reservists deployed, suffering 16 fatalities and 75 wounded. While on one hand, this provided much needed combat experience to bring back to Army Primary Reserve units, it also reinforced the concept that the Army Primary Reserve solely fulfills an individual volunteer augmentee role, rather than a capability to compulsorily deploy formed units or sub-units.

Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, a former Canadian Army commander, said: “The Army could not have done what it did in Afghanistan without the Reserve. We would have crashed and burned. The country owes them a huge debt of gratitude.” Assuming that this is not merely hyperbole, it gives rise to the sobering conclusion that the entire Army Regular Force establishment, including its three brigade groups, could not maintain, for an extended period of time, a single battle group-sized task force in an operational theatre without undergoing severe stress. While much of this may well have been due to the short personnel tours (six months), the extensive pre-deployment training cycle, the necessity for providing individuals with mid-tour leave and post-deployment reconstitution cycles, Canadians must wonder if our financial investment in the Army Regular Force and Army Primary Reserve establishments, as currently configured and administered, is value for money.

A second and equally-significant lesson is that reservists, properly trained, equipped and led, can carry out combat operations.

A Transformation of the Canadian Army Primary Reserve Can Help Us Meet the Threat

How—in the words of the US DoD lines of effort—can Canada reform the CAF for greater performance and affordability, build a more lethal force, and strengthen our alliances? Currently half of Canada’s defence budget goes to personnel costs. Our headquarters continue to add General and Flag Officers at an alarming rate, creating ever-expanding bureaucracies at the expense of war-fighting elements. Canada’s military and associated civil servant salaries are among the highest paid in NATO, while the percentage of its expenditures on equipment are a fraction of that of its allies. Canada must change that ratio, and one of the more obvious choices for change is through the use of the Army Primary Reserve. Year-to-year, part-time reservists cost a fraction of their Regular Force counterparts.
Fundamentally, a military reserve force exists to allow a country to reduce its defence expenditures in peacetime by keeping on stand-by those forces needed only in emergencies up to and including war. Reserve forces should exist, not only as individuals who augment the full-time units, but also as organized, equipped, and deployable units and formations in order to create an affordable, larger, more lethal army.

Canada must leverage its Army Primary Reserve into credible, effective, deployable entities capable of meeting the recognized threats.

There Are Alternative Models

While there are numerous reserve force models to examine, we can limit the examination to just two: Those of the United Kingdom and the United States.

UK Model:

For nearly a century, Canada structured its armed forces upon the British system, which facilitated Canadian troops fitting into Commonwealth military formations and logistics chains. More recently, the UK deployed reservists to Iraq and Afghanistan, and is currently in the midst of an initiative to increase its reliance upon the reserves by increasing their numbers under a program called Future Reserves 2020 (FR2020), which accompanies the Army 2020 restructuring.

FR2020 recognizes that reservists will be needed for almost every future military operation. The plan includes initiatives to clarify the reserves’ purpose and role, to establish integration of reserve and regular training and utilization, as well as legislative reforms. Much of the program concentrates upon enticements to recruiting, pay and benefits, employee protection, employer relations, transfer enticements for retiring Regular Force personnel, and so on.

The introduction of FR2020 had much to do with removing from the full-time payroll many individuals who are not required to either hone their skills, or to be available for immediate deployment on a day-to-day basis. It was envisioned to replace them with a larger number of part-timers. The UK government concurrently instituted a reduction in Regular Force strength which led to much criticism, debate, and even resistance. A revised restructure called Army 2020 Refine has changed various initial concepts and created some uncertainties for FR2020.

Unfortunately, projected roles are, at best, limited to short-term operations, longer-term stabilization operations, selected standing commitments, and overseas deployments aimed at specific engagements in no greater than formed sub-units. There does not seem to be a role for the provision of major units or formations for general war. This contradicts the fundamental concept of a stand-by reserve force available for major operations.

US Model:

The US model is more relevant to Canada because we share a continent, and thereby, many of the same challenges in projecting forces overseas. Additionally, one cannot foresee Canada taking...
part in any major military effort in which the United States is not
the senior participant.

The key reserve force category in the US is the Ready Reserve,
which includes Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard
(ARNG) formations, units, and individuals liable to be called to
active duty in time of war or other emergency. The United States
Army Reserve is directly subordinate to the federal government,
while the Army National Guard is subordinate to each state, and
reports to its governor for local emergencies, except when called
into federal service.37

In general, Active Army, Army National Guard, and United
States Army Reserve units and formations are equipped and
manned to the same tables of organization and equipment (TOE)
in a modular concept. The intent is that the Army can use any
given brigade or unit in a 'plug-and-play' manner.

Under the most recent reorganization plan, the US Army has
31 manoeuvre and 75 support brigades in its Active component,
27 manoeuvre and 78 support brigades in the Army National
Guard, and 59 support brigades in the United States Army Reserve.

US Army manoeuvre brigades are one of three types
designated: Armored, Stryker, or Infantry Brigade Combat
Teams (ABCT, SBCT, IBCT). BCTs are the US Army’s primary
combined arms, close combat force, and they contain a mix of
manoeuvre battalions, field artillery, intelligence, signal, engineer,
chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear (CBRN) and
sustainment capabilities similar to Canadian Combat Mechanized
Brigade Groups. They can deploy either independently or as part
of a larger force. IBCTs are light-weight formations equipped
primarily with wheeled vehicles, designed for rapid deployment
dismounted operations. SBCTs are medium-weight formations
based on the Stryker group of wheeled armoured vehicles—simi-
lar to Canada’s LAVs—designed for mounted and dismounted
operations with greater mobility and protection, but more difficult
to deploy into a theatre of operations. ABCTs are heavy-weight
formations based around M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley
Infantry Fighting Vehicles, designed to provide overwhelming
concentrated combat power, but difficult to deploy into theatre
and then to supply once there.38

Currently, the US Active Army has ten ABCTs, seven SBCTs,
and fourteen IBCTs (of which five are airborne and three are air
assault), while the Army National Guard has five ABCTs, two
SBCTs and twenty IBCTs.39 There are eleven divisional headquar-
ters in the Active Army, and eight in the Army National Guard.40

Support brigades include such capabilities as tube, rocket,
and air defence artillery, manoeuvre enhancement, combat
aviation, sustainment, and military intelligence.

While numbers fluctuate depending upon budgets and need,
it is clear that the US Army keeps a significant percentage of its
manoeuvre strength within the Army National Guard, and the
majority of its support elements within the Army National Guard and the United States Army Reserve.\(^4\)

**Considerations for Restructure**

In any discussion about the future of Canada’s Army Primary Reserve, we must ask the following questions:

1) What purpose does the force fulfill in the national interest?
2) What purpose does the force fulfill in the interest of the individual reservist?

It is essential that both questions be answered in a positive manner. If there is no national interest being fulfilled by an entity, then there is no incentive for the country to invest treasure in its existence. If there is no individual interest being fulfilled, then people will not join or will leave the force very quickly, and the country will have wasted resources on them.

Canada’s military leadership has, for more than a half-century, failed to recognize that the greatest national interest the Army Primary Reserve can fulfill is to increase the lethality of the force by providing additional deployable formations and units at an affordable cost. It has shied away from any attempts for radical, or even serious reform, leaving the Army Primary Reserve to ‘coast on remote control,’ using a model that only garners minimal value for money, and leaves many reservists unfulfilled. Instead, from-time-to-time, attempts are made to ‘fine tune’ a system that is patently broken. Initiatives such as those enumerated in WayPoint 2018\(^4\) are cosmetic at best, and do nothing to correct the underlying fundamental flaws in the system.

Much of this status quo psyche is driven by risk aversion. There is a reluctance to entrust serious responsibility to the Army Primary Reserve —largely driven by its current low level of capability—coupled with a fear that any meaningful changes to the Army Primary Reserve —so as to raise competence and increase employability—would inevitably require resource reallocation from the Regular Force.

There is a critical need for radical reform. If Russia is one of Canada’s acknowledged adversaries, then logic demands that the Canadian Army be capable of fielding heavy manoeuvre and support brigades with sufficient lethality, which, in conjunction with its allies, can engage Russian forces successfully in Multi-Domain Operations. The issue of affordability and the nature of this being primarily a stand-by role make it a suitable role for the Army Primary Reserve.

**Prerequisites for a More Credible Army Reserve**

The following is a list of some initiatives that are essential in order to develop a more lethal and more affordable force.
Obligation to Serve:

Reservists, like their Regular Force counterparts, voluntarily enlist in the CAF, and serve until they are released. There is a generally-held attitude/misconception that only personnel in the Regular Force can be ordered to perform various duties, while a reservist has a choice as to whether to be deployed, or even to attend training. In fact, reservists, by law, can compulsory be: placed on active service by an order of the Governor in Council (GiC),43 can be called out to perform any duty other than training;44—including by the Minister of National Defence in an emergency;45—can be called out in aid of the civil power;46 and also ordered to attend training.47 Practically speaking, however, Canada does not do any training. This makes it impossible to achieve and maintain effective, deployable Army Primary Reserve units. The legislative provisions respecting active duty, call out on service, and aid to the civil power, are generally adequate, although not beyond improvement.48 On the other hand, the existing legislation dramatically undermines training within the Army Primary Reserve in that while there is clear statutory provision for ordering a reservist to train, the consequences of disobeying such an order are virtually nonexistent.

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Two provisions in the National Defence Act (NDA) require that a reservist who fails to attend ordered training has to be charged and tried before a civilian court rather than under the Code of Service Discipline (CSD)—a process which is not followed because of its impracticality and almost meaningless punishment.49 This is a fundamental and fatal flaw. The result is that the chain-of-command accepts most reservists attending unit training in a haphazard manner. Without appropriate legislation and regulations by which compulsory training can internally under the CSD, essential collective training is impossible. Battalions which may have a hundred soldiers on strength typically turn out fewer than thirty members for any given exercise. This makes it impossible to achieve and maintain effective, deployable Army Primary Reserve sub-units, units, and formations. The CAF needs to instil and enforce a habit of attendance in its reservists.

Terms of Service – Release:

Current policies allow individuals to request a voluntary release prior to the end of their period of service.50 In the Regular Force, this is usually granted on six months’ notice to those who are not on obligatory service for subsidized training, and so on. In the Primary Reserve it is usually granted immediately. Regular Force individuals who have not reached compulsory retirement age are not required—and sometimes not even encouraged—to component transfer to the Primary Reserve.

Both the Army Regular Force and Army Primary Reserve have significant turnover in personnel—with consequential unit instability—by virtue of voluntary releases. In order to reduce attrition, Primary Reserve personnel should be enrolled for fixed-term contracts and be obliged to serve out their terms. Similarly, Regular Force personnel who are enrolled for fixed-term contracts should—after an initial minimum Regular Force service period—be obliged to serve out their remaining contracts in either the Regular Force or the Primary Reserve. This would bring more experienced personnel into the Primary Reserve, and would retain an individual who would otherwise be lost to service.

A system of varying contract lengths with re-enlistment bonuses would allow individuals to initially select short terms to try out the military, and would also incentivize re-enlistment. Regular Force personnel whose fixed terms have been completed or who are on indefinite engagements should be offered component transfer bonuses, based upon fixed term commitments to the Primary Reserve.

Employer/Employee Relations:

Current Canadian job protection legislation for reservists is a mixture of inadequate federal and provincial laws that provide a bare minimum of protection for reservists deploying on operations and with respect to similar circumstances.51 There is no comprehensive overarching legislation that protects reservists for all purposes, including training, and none that provides effective representation—such as ombudsmen or legal assistance—for reservists whose employers breach the law.

In the US, federal legislation52 provides protection for reservists in most circumstances ranging from guaranteed time-off for weekend training sessions, annual training sessions, and attendance at training courses, to operational deployments, and to temporary transfers to active duty. The legislation applies equally to employers subject to state legislation as well as those to federal legislation. UK legislation to implement FR2020 also expands employee protection and adds financial incentives to employers to make hiring reservists an attractive option.

Developmental Period 1 (DP1) Training:

Like their Army Regular Force counterparts, Army Primary Reserve units should concentrate upon team and collective training. Individuals undergoing DP1 training and their staff—Army Regular Force and Army Primary Reserve—should be held against separate regional depot establishments.

Much of the undervaluation of Army Primary Reserve soldiers is based upon the fact that they are currently not trained to the same standard as their Army Regular Force counterparts.

A key source of Army Primary Reserve recruits are students whose available training time is limited to approximately seven weeks in the summer, and weekends during the fall/winter/spring. It would be a desirable objective to have recruits complete their DP1 training during the first fourteen months of service, which could include two summer blocks of seven weeks each, selected...
weeks during the winter (the equivalent of three weeks), and also through distance learning programs. This would allow fully-trained soldiers to join their units the following September in time to participate at the start of the unit’s annual training cycle. Unemployed reservists should have the opportunity to take the entire DP1 training in a single continuous package at a national facility.

Army Primary Reserve DP1 officer training should be designed to be spread over twenty-six months, or three summer blocks and weekends over two winters, and it should be essentially identical in content to Regular Force basic officer training. Some accommodation may be necessary for selected specialist officers and members who have already achieved professional standing.

**Career Progression:**

If Army Primary Reserve units are to be effective, Army Primary Reserve officers and non-commissioned members (NCMs) will require greater training and experience. Some of this may be facilitated by fewer overall numbers of units, and an influx of transferring Regular Force members, either serving out enlistment terms, or through other component transfers. Regardless, in order to keep parity of standards between Army Primary Reserve and Army Regular Force leadership, there needs to be a review of what essential skills are required by officers and NCMs as they relate to purely military leadership and operational skills which apply to both components, and those broad defence management skills and other knowledge that relates solely to the Regular Force. Career progression courses should be restructured accordingly.

**Annual Training Cycles:**

Currently, Army Primary Reserve units are authorized to train for 60 ‘Class A’ days and 15 ‘Class B’ days, but are limited to a fraction of that, based upon budgetary concerns. Many units train two weekends per month and one evening per week. This is undoubtedly onerous if training is to become obligatory. Army National Guard units train 39 days annually (including one weekend per month), but as of 2019, ABCT and SBCT units will be training in four-year cycles which will include one National Training Center rotation. Training days will vary from 39 in the first year to 45 in the second year, and to 60 days in the third and fourth years. This direction appears reasonable.

Training programs should be centrally developed and directed to ensure a national standard, and to reduce administrative efforts by individual units.

**Veterans’ Benefits:**

In the wake of Afghanistan, there has been much criticism respecting the current veterans’ benefits regime. In addition, there have been calls for creating parity as to benefits for Regular Force and Primary Reserve members, such as those made by the Office of the Ombudsman.

Despite this, there is still much that needs to be done, such as filling the gap for reservists’ insurance policies that have “war and dangerous occupations” exclusions, and
providing adequate long-term disability compensation for reservists injured on duty, but who have thereby lost civilian employment that compensated them above their service salary. Primary Reserve annuities currently provide benefits based upon an “accrued days of service” basis, but do not provide any compensation for the years spent essentially on “stand-by” to serve. Such a benefit would provide an added incentive for re-enlistment.

Equipment:

In order to build a more lethal, credible, and deployable force, the Army Primary Reserve must own its own equipment upon which to train and with which to deploy. Such equipment, together with a commensurate role, would create a more lethal and credible force, and consequentially, provide a raison d’être for Army Primary Reserve personnel, raising morale and enlistment incentives, and improving retention.

It is obvious that in order to be operationally deployable, the Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) of Army Primary Reserve units and formations should—as with the Army National Guard—be identical to their Army Regular Force counterparts, and suitable for their assigned roles. Using the overriding premise that Army Primary Reserve units should be those that are not used on a day-to-day basis, but are those kept “in reserve” for major crises, it would appear logical that Army Primary Reserve units should be primarily medium-or-heavy manoeuvre or support units.

Army Primary Reserve formations and units must have sufficient full-time maintainers as part of their establishment to ensure that a proper level of maintenance is conducted throughout the year.

Assuming then that DND/CAF is prepared to make a radical change to build a more credible Army Primary Reserve, what could or should it look like?

Towards a More Credible Army Reserve Force

Based upon existing Army Primary Reserve numbers of around 20,000 members, and DND’s ideal size of 29,000 members, it should appear possible and desirable to build four-to-six Army Primary Reserve modular brigade groups and their local training depots. Creation of such formations should include the following actions:

Reallocation:

Much of the required personnel and maintenance budget would come from the existing Army Primary Reserve budget. There will, however, be a need for capital acquisitions or rental of major equipment and its ongoing maintenance, as well as a reallocation of resources.

Reallocation calls for a critical—even ruthless—re-evaluation of which Canadian Army organizations and individual positions are essential for day-to-day operations of the CAF—including rapid-reaction forces—and those that are only required in cases of actual major emergencies, including war. The aim is to ensure that essential full-time positions/organizations are fully staffed by primarily Army Regular Force personnel, and that stand-by positions/organizations are primarily Army Primary Reserve staffed.

For the CAF to remain affordable, it may prove necessary to reallocate a number of full-time positions to part-time positions. Financially, every full-time position reallocated equates to six part-time positions, although the math varies greatly between types of units.

Headquarters Reduction:

DND and the CAF have dabbled in the field of transformation with the aim of reducing the size of their headquarters and to rationalize their business lines. There has been limited success, but sadly, the bureaucracy continues to grow. During the period from 2004 to 2010, civilian personnel in the department grew by 33%, staff at headquarters above the brigade level by 46%, and within the National Capital Region by 38%. In large part,
the expansion has been, and continues to be, fuelled by ever-expanding business lines within the headquarters in response to the plethora of laws, regulations, directives, and perceived needs which necessitate administration.

When Sir Arthur Harris was appointed Deputy Chief of the Air Staff in 1940, he found the Air Staff “fantastically bloated” and inefficient. He instituted an across-the-board 40% reduction in staff, which resulted in the “…essential work not only still being done, but being done with much more efficiency and speed.”

More recently, Ford Motor Company cut 7,000 white collar jobs, 20% of its upper-level managers, reducing its organizational layers from 14 to nine, because “…to succeed in our competitive industry, and position Ford to win in a fast-changing future, we must reduce bureaucracy, empower managers, speed decision making, focus on the most valuable work and cut costs.”

Any future transformation plan must not only address a significant across-the-board reduction of National Defence Headquarters and Canadian Armed Forces Headquarters executives, managers, and workers, but also address the overriding necessity of eliminating numerous processes that do not provide an effective contribution to the defence effort. This will require an extensive review of the legislation and regulations to which the DND/CAF is subject, and how these can be eliminated, streamlined, or automated.

Consolidation:

The current structure of Army Regular Force Combat Mechanized Brigade Groups (CMBGs) of one light and two light armoured vehicle (LAV) battalions makes little tactical sense. Using current equipment and manpower, they could and should be reformed as one brigade with three light infantry battalions assigned as a rapid reaction and northern operations force, one medium brigade with three LAV-equipped battalions for UN-oriented peacekeeping/peacemaking tasks, and one heavy brigade with one tank regiment and two-to-three LAV6.0 or heavier-equipped battalions oriented on Europe. The need to retain four regional/administrative divisional headquarters should be critically re-examined.

The current Army Primary Reserve structure of ten brigade groups and 123 units manned by a small cadre of troops has outlived its usefulness. We have had no ‘mobilization’ plan for over a half a century, and therefore, the organizational structure is an anachronism, save for its historical ties to local communities.

To create a credible, more lethal, deployable Army Primary Reserve, the organization must be based upon full-scale Tables of Organization and Equipment. Of the four-to-six brigades considered above, two should be heavy modular CMBGs with the same number/types of units as the Army Regular Force heavy CMBG. The remaining two-to-four additional brigades should be modular support brigades in order to provide a much greater capacity to support expeditionary forces engaged in Multi-Domain Operations. These could contain three-to-four artillery regiments (tube, rocket, air defence, possibly anti-armour), one-or-two military police battalions, a CBRN battalion, three engineer regiments, an electronic warfare regiment, and five-to-six sustainment battalions. The current Combat Support Brigade (CCSB) should be stood down and its units redistributed to Army Primary Reserve artillery and manoeuvre enhancement brigades. In total, the Army Primary Reserve would be reduced to four-to-six brigade headquarters and between twenty-eight and thirty-six fully manned and equipped battalion-sized units, depending upon the mix chosen. A sample structure for 25,000 Army Primary Reserve personnel appears at Figure 1. [To those uninitiated to army symbology, “XX” represents division strength, and “X” represents brigade strength. For the Regular Force graphics, under Army, that at Numeric “1” represents armour, armour with infantry at Numeric “2.” That at Numeric “5” represents wheeled light armoured vehicles. For the Reserve Force graphics, those brigades at Numeric “3&4” represent armour. The additional graphics represent artillery, manoeuvre enhancement, and sustainment brigades. – Ed.]

Figure 1: Sample Regular Force/Primary Reserve breakdown of restructured major deployable formations.
For the most part, the existing footprint of armouries, support bases and training facilities should remain relevant. In many cases, ‘rebadging’ and even reclassifying existing personnel to other trades will be necessary.

Integration:

In order to establish and maintain a desirable state of readiness, Army Primary Reserve units should have an appropriate level of Army Regular Force /Army Primary Reserve personnel occupying key full-time positions, such as sufficient maintainers, stores personnel, administrators, and a few key leaders to provide command or advice to commanders. Conversely, many Army Regular Force units are currently under-resourced and/or may not need complete full-time staffing. These units could have Army Primary Reserve personnel or sub-units on their establishment.

Business Transformation:

Even modest scale projects require a business transformation plan. A radical change of the nature proposed will clearly require an extensive and comprehensive multi-phase, multi-year transformation plan.

Some Random Closing Thoughts

The preceding has been a brief and summary review of the key issues that Canada faces. There are many more questions, including:

a. Do we forward-deploy a heavy brigade group’s equipment to Europe? Forward deployment has political ramifications, however, Lieutenant-General Simonds caution still rings true. There may not, in time of emergency, be sufficient time to sea-ship equipment while a Reforger-type of fly-over force may be viable. Fly-over exercises could be annual, rotating training events for designated Army Primary Reserve units and formations.

b. In order to foster greater interoperability with our closest ally, should we consider building brigades using US Tables of Organization and Equipment tactics and equipment, so that we can more easily ‘plug-and-play’ with US formations, obtain existing stocks of surplus equipment and documentation, and share their supply and maintenance systems as we once did with the UK?

c. Is there a role for the Navy Primary Reserve in purchasing/renting and manning one-or-two Roll-on / Roll-off cargo ships to facilitate overseas expeditionary operations and training activities?

d. Do we need to increase our aviation resources, and in particular, do we need an attack helicopter capability and if so, is there a role for the Air Reserve in that?

e. What role can specialized Army Regular Force and Army Primary Reserve units bring to the table to confront new systems of warfare—such as cyber, space, and hybrid—all of which are initiated from well off-shore?

f. Are our defence industries and supply lines capable of ramping up so as to ensure that necessary supplies of ammunition and other vital equipment is stocked and maintained for a conflict?
I t is clear is that the Canadian Army is facing a significant challenge that cannot be addressed through the fine-tuning of stressed or broken organizations. Strong, Secure, Engaged identifies the developing threats that need to be faced. Against them, the current Canadian Army is neither a credible combatant nor a deterrent. A more lethal, more allied centric and more affordable force is needed.

Currently, Canada is not getting value for its defence dollars. The Regular Force is prohibitively expensive, hamstrung by its bureaucratic overhead, and incapable of expanding beyond its current size without significant additional expenditures, which will, most probably, never be made available. The Army Primary Reserve is ‘broken,’ and currently incapable of providing anything beyond a small number of individual augmentees to fill gaps in the Army Regular Force. Canada’s senior leaders must utterly reject the existing Army Regular Force /Army Primary Reserve model and conduct a top-to-bottom review to determine how to build a more lethal Canadian Army, and to maximize Canada’s financial investment by leveraging its more affordable reservists.

Will there be risks? Absolutely. But there are more significant risks associated with deploying light/medium-weight Regular Force battle groups against superior, heavy-weight adversaries. There are still roles for some full-time light and medium-weight brigades and special operations forces. However, credible deterrence must include a considerable heavy-weight force which can be called upon, if needed. This entails that all soldiers—regular and reserve—must have assigned roles and be equipped and trained to deploy on Multi-Domain Operations.
Cultural Property Protection and the Canadian Armed Forces

by Mark Blondeau

Introduction

Within treaty law, the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its two subsequent Protocols serve as the legal linchpin of Cultural Property Protection (CPP): the protection of the physical—tangible—elements of cultural heritage. Cultural property is defined in the convention as:

…movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above.²

In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.

~ Sun Tzu¹

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¹ Sun Tzu
² 1954 Hague Convention
Canada acceded to the 1954 Hague Convention on 11 December 1998, with the convention coming into force nationally three months later. This convention, borne out of the experiences of the Second World War, and informed by over a century of preceding treaty and LOAC instruments, clearly lays out the ethical foundation, “…that damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.” This ethical foundation resonates profoundly with a multi-cultural and globally-engaged Canada—it gels squarely with our liberal democratic ideals enshrined in such institutions as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), and the much-vaunted image of the Canadian ‘Pearsonian’ diplomatic and peacekeeping legacy. It is therefore of no surprise that the identification and de-confliction of Cultural Property (CP) sites as part of our kinetic targeting process—whether formal or ad hoc—has been a consistently desired norm, and indeed, an operational imperative. However, there are also other requirements inherent in the clauses of the convention that place additional onuses upon the signatories in both peacetime and conflict. These imperatives also equally introduce new opportunities for the insightful and creative commander to achieve effects throughout the spectrum of conflict—from the strategic through to the tactical. This article will examine some of the opportunities inherent in CPP; it will then look at recent CPP developments among some of our closest allies in NATO, and conclude by offering a potential model for a cost—and policy—efficient CPP capability to be developed for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

**The Strategic Imperatives and Tactical & Operational Advantages of CPP**

This article opened with something of a platitude of military doctrine, a quote from Sun Tzu. However, it is useful to return to this quote’s basic rhetorical question and ask Why? Why is it preferable, indeed absolutely desirable, to “take the enemy’s country whole and intact”? Sun Tzu provides the answer to this in the subtext to his axioms: “…supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting… Thus, the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy’s plans.” Any capability that can help achieve Sun Tzu’s supreme excellence, or at least move toward it, should be investigated for the potential savings it affords in manpower, national treasure, and long-term diplomatic and economic efforts.”

“Any capability that can help achieve Sun Tzu’s supreme excellence, or at least move toward it, should be investigated for the potential savings it affords in manpower, national treasure, and long-term diplomatic and economic efforts.”
the admonishment to mitigate harm during conflict has been the first and foremost consideration for governments and their uniformed services, and can be (and sometimes is) seen as a form of a restraining element. Even in the world of heritage conservation and CPP, for example, the introduction to UNESCO’s Protection of Cultural Property: Military Manual, which couches its strategic imperatives in terms of the negative consequences of not practicing diligent harm reduction strategies, the avoidance of collateral damage by the (responsible state) actor is made paramount. However, it is the opposite side of the coin—the reality that CPP, when properly executed, is a force multiplier—that really should be in the forefront of the operational planner’s mindset.

Directly reflective of Sun Tzu’s rhetoric, we find a clear intent to address this imperative in contemporary western military doctrine—for example, the related concepts of Full-Spectrum Operations (FSO), and Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public (JIMP) enabled forces, both of which envision the integration and coordination of diplomatic, defence, other government agencies, and multinational and commercial resources.

Before. Bamiyan Afghanistan, 1998. The large Buddha in the arch was subsequently destroyed by the Taliban.

After. The same temple after the Buddha statue destruction.
Operations, CPP fits particularly well, doctrinally, into Joint Effects Based Targeting, and specifically, Information Operations (InfoOps) Information Related Capabilities (IRCs), where it is perhaps best considered as a subset of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), albeit, a subset that directly impacts upon many different capabilities, areas, and IRCs.

Before. Nimrud, Iraq: Human-headed winged bulls guarding the entrance from the central court of the palace into the throne room complex.

After. The winged bulls after their destruction.
The ability to factor CPP into Full Spectrum Operations can provide clear operational advantages, which relate to both IRCs within the juncture of InfoOps with Joint Effects Based Targeting, and/or broader operational requirements & processes, namely:

- Improved Campaign Legitimacy (Strategic Communication);
- Demonstration of Canada’s moral leadership and obligation to the communities among which it operates (Strategic Communication);
- Increased Influence and Reputation (Influence Activities);
- Improved Cultural Understanding of a region (Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment—IPOE);
- Prevention of Terrorist Funding (Joint Targeting, directly contributing to stabilization, Force Protection, and domestic/global security);
- Improved Force Protection (through improved Situational Awareness & Increased Influence and Reputation);
- Preservation and Enhancement of Freedom of Maneuvre (Operational objective, met through the combination of the above CPP benefits);
- Preservation and Protection of CP affords an affected community a swifter return to normality post-conflict (long-term stabilisation efforts).

While the avoidance of wide scale collateral damage has been recognised by leading strategists at the state level since at least the fifth century BC, its antithesis—the deliberate or indifferent destruction of non-military targets—has an even longer, and often tactical, history. It is a history that very much continues unabated into the 21st Century, as evidenced by the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan by the Taliban in 2001 and the bulldozing of the site of Nimrud and dynamiting of the Temple of Baalshamin in Palmyra by Daesh, both in 2015. In each case, the deliberate destruction of these sites served to underscore the ideological propaganda of the armed groups that undertook the destruction. In many cases, and even more important than the ideological component, such attacks on CP also serve as a direct psychological weapon against an adversarial or occupied group. As an example of the latter, Daesh utilised a policy of CP destruction as a means of Strategic Communication: the demonstration of their power within controlled territory, which resulted in a pattern of CP destruction following either major or perceived setbacks in their campaign. In a similar vein, Doctor Laurie Rush, a US Army CPP expert, notes that Daesh utilised the intermittent (and publicised) destruction of sites in Palmyra as a means to lure in opposition forces before they were sufficiently prepared for victory. The active and open prevention of such deliberate targeting of group cultural identity, and attempts to professionally stabilise and assist in reconstruction/recovery of sites when prevention has not been possible, is an inherent and logical element of the concept of ‘winning hearts and minds.’ Those who help to reconstruct a people’s ancestral tomb, place of worship or restore a national treasure can engender trust and foster cooperation that may extend to more sensitive areas, such as de-radicalisation efforts and expanded military situational awareness within the local community. Standing with, and in defence of, a targeted group is therefore not only ethically sound, but may be tactically sound as well.
Inevitably, conflicts with significant components of identity politics will see a continuation of the deliberate targeting of CP in the years to come. Equally, and directly related, the rise of non-state actors that can directly challenge nation-state militaries has resulted in an increased unholy alliance of organised crime and insurgents—with looting and antiquities trafficking making an appreciable contribution to terrorist and insurgent funding, although not yet at the levels of narcotic and petro-chemical smuggling (and often perpetrated by the same actors). As Yaya J. Fanusie, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Doctor Alexander Joffe, an archaeologist and historian of the Near East note in their 2015 paper, “Monumental Fight: Countering the Islamic State’s Antiquities Trafficking,” Daesh’s involvement in antiquities looting provided revenue streams “...estimated in the tens of millions of dollars or as high as $100 million annually.”

As an indication of the importance of antiquities smuggling to the finances of Daesh, in late-2014, the jihadist militant and pirate group Abu Sayyaf, which was conducting terrorist attacks in the Philippines, assumed direct responsibility for Daesh’s antiquities—trafficking efforts, at least in part as a compensatory and reliable revenue stream after the success of coalition airstrikes on Daesh oil production and transport infrastructure. Another advantage to terrorist and insurgent groups utilizing antiquities looting as a revenue source, vice higher profile revenue streams such as narcotics or petro-chemical smuggling, or locally invasive tactics such as extortion, kidnapping, seizure of property or taxing, is that it is far less likely to provoke either outside military disruption or local rebellion. Rather looting can represent a more stable and less resource intensive revenue source which is far more difficult for the West (or other state actors) to strike. 

Given the grey market nature of the online transfer and sale of antiquities, it is difficult to achieve a precise estimate for overall revenue from antiquities theft and smuggling for any terrorist organisation, whether that be Daesh at its quasi-state organisational height, or other smaller terrorist organisations in Mali, Somalia, or elsewhere. However, applying a Cultural Capital financial model to CP highlights the short-term gains that are typically exploited by adversary forces in the treatment of cultural property as movable assets (looted, trafficked, and sold on the black-or-grey markets), generating immediate revenue, as well as the opposing long-term advantages of not only preventing this revenue stream, but directly protecting cultural property (see the macro-economic example of Egypt, below). As is explicitly noted in Strong, Secure, Engaged, “Successfully disrupting terrorist networks requires a multi-faceted approach, including efforts to stop the flow of terrorist financing and counter the communication strategies employed by violent extremists.” Just as with counter-narcotics and petro-chemical smuggling, the countering of the illicit trade in stolen and looted antiquities therefore becomes a distinct line of operation with supporting and complimentary functions in intelligence, CIMIC, post-conflict stabilisation, and international law enforcement; a line of operation that is explicitly required in current Canadian defence policy.
Within the post-conflict stabilisation phase, the restoration and continued protection of CP remains imperative, demonstrating once again the utility of applying a Cultural Capital financial model to CPP. Just as CP plays a critical part in national, religious, and ethnic identities across the world through its reflection of a collective past, so too does it afford significant potential, renewable, long-term economic opportunities in the post-conflict phase of reconstruction. Prior to 2011, the Egyptian tourism industry reached $12.5 billion US (2010) in revenue to the country, potentially up to 20% of Egypt’s economy. After 2011, and a significant increase in political and security instability coming after the Arab Spring, including Islamist terrorism attacks on tourist sites, this number fell to an average of $7.77 billion US, with a record low of $3.80 billion US in 2016, a significant loss to the country’s GDP. While Egypt is a particularly-spectacular example of the importance of CP to both national revenue and identity, it none-the-less serves to highlight the long-term economic and social benefits of CP to the general community, beyond the ideological, ethical, or abstract benefits.

Looking at CPP as a force capability within the JIMP & Joint Effects Based Targeting paradigms—as opposed to a force restraint from a traditional peer-on-peer manoeuvre warfare conception—opens up tactical and operational level opportunities to effect immediate tactical and long-term strategic influence. As the US Army’s Doctor Rush notes, “...military planners should be keenly aware that...entrenched attachment to a community’s origins and ancestors is not a quaint or minority view but is the prevailing frame of reference for a majority of people in the world.” Therefore, factoring CPP into OPLANS has the potential to significantly foster coalition cohesion with regional partners.

**CPP Developments in NATO**

Recognising both the nuanced requirements in the 1954 Hague Convention, and the operational opportunities that it brings to both political and military leadership, a number of our key allies—and NATO itself—are actively developing or improving CPP capabilities. At least some of these initiatives are driven by the requirements outlined in Article 7, Paragraph 2 of the 1954 Hague Convention, which states, “[the signatories shall] undertake to plan or establish in peace-time, within their armed forces, services or specialist personnel whose purpose will be to secure respect for cultural property and to co-operate with the civilian authorities responsible for safeguarding it.” The US, UK, and NATO itself are taking rapid developmental steps to incorporate CPP into their Influence Activity (IA), Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), joint targeting and strategic communications efforts, while the Netherlands and Italy (for example) already have mature, deployable capabilities, as do NATO Partners for Peace Austria and Switzerland.

Each of these efforts has a direct historical precedence in the Allied Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives Section(s) (MFAA) of the Second World War (the ‘Monuments Men’), as well as its partner organisation, the Art Looting Investigation Unit (ALIU). This multinational program was formed under the Civil Affairs and Military Government Sections of the Allied armies in 1943, and continued in operation throughout Europe, North Africa and Japan until 1946. The experiences of the MFAA during and immediately after the Second World War directly led to the drafting and signing of the 1954 Hague Convention; however, while the majority of the personnel from the thirteen nations represented in the original MFAA came from the USA and the UK respectively, these two nations did not ratify the Convention until this century.

The United States ratified the 1954 Hague Convention on 13 March 2009, but had begun efforts to incorporate...
CPP training and activities by 2003, after the inadequacies of then US CPP policy and TTPs became apparent in the occupation of Iraq. These activities have been championed by Doctor Laurie Rush, whose work with the 10th Mountain Division out of Fort Drum, New York, has been at the training and doctrine development vanguard for the US military, as well as Major (ret’d) Corinne Wegener—the first serving U.S. cultural property officer since the Second World War. 24 Within Fort Drum, Doctor Rush leads the Cultural Resources Branch (CRB), and has been a key figure in the US Combatant Command Cultural Action Group, now renamed to the Military Cultural Heritage Action Group (MilCHAG), along with the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative (of which Ms. Wegener is the director). The Fort Drum CRB and 10th Mountain Division’s G9 Branch (Civil-Military Cooperation) have developed a close working relationship, one that has incorporated realistic CPP into pre-deployment field training for the division before deployments. 25 The success of these efforts have led to increased opportunities to further develop and update US military doctrine regarding CPP, which is currently limited to Graphic Training Aid 41-01-002, Civil Affairs Arts, Monuments, and Archives Guide, 26 and regulatory guidance which falls within the DoD Environmental portfolio, while concurrently developing an internationalised consensus on CPP best practices among the Allies and relevant NGOs.

Over the past year, the US has accelerated its development of CPP capability, with the development of a CPP specialty (38G/6V, Cultural Property Protection Officers) that will see reservists with a specialist civilian background in Cultural Property assigned to units across US Army Civil Affairs & Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC). The inaugural five-day CPP Training will be held in conjunction with the Smithsonian Institute in March 2020, with future itineration of the course being of longer duration. It is intended to host not only US Army Civil Affairs (CA) Cultural Property Protection Officers, but also officers with similar civilian backgrounds from the USN, the USMC and the USAF, as well as allied forces. The end strategic intent of the program is to ensure CPP is integrated into both US joint and allied combined forces. 27 The current US model represents a logical progression from the previous one that looked to employing CA officers with relevant civilian academic backgrounds. In 2018, the US had three serving CA officers who were designated as CPP specialists, ranging in rank from captain to lieutenant-colonel, but without formal military CPP training and career specialist recognition. 28

The US is also looking to further incorporate CPP training into Combat Arms team (brigade and division) training. Both the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative and the US National Committee of the Blue Shield have provided CPP training to US emergency responders and deploying military personnel respectively, as well as providing deployed mission-specific training aides. 29 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) holds a second key component of the US CPP initiative, which is its expanding cultural properties inventories. These inventories can, and are, then used to not only feed into the non-lethal target lists, but also to “…offer tremendous insight into cross cultural values and landscape features of great significance.” 30

The United Kingdom ratified the 1954 Hague Convention and both of its additional protocols on 12 September 2017. Due to a confluence of fortune at the time of the ratification, the
UK was availed of both a dedicated reserve staff officer with extensive professional civilian interest in the area of cultural property protection and art theft within its Army HQ Directorate of Capability Development, as well as a Secretary of State for Defence with an academic background in Classics and Archaeology. Having these personalities in place at the right time undoubtedly assisted in the rapid development of a UK Defence CPP capability, with the UK’s CPP unit activated in early-2019, less than two years after the UK’s ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention. The UK CPP unit will be a tri-service unit, but is hosted within the Army’s 77th Brigade for support, and will consist of 15 part-time reserve specialist CPP officers (some recruited from within existing service lines, and some recruited from civilian life), and potentially, one civilian information manager. The first CPP qualification (the CPP ‘Special to Arm’ course) for the CPPU officers—all will be commissioned officers ranging from captain to lieutenant-colonel in rank—was delivered in 2019 to both UK and allied students.

As noted above, there are other extant—and more mature—CPP organisations within NATO; most notably, the Italian Carabinieri Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage created in 1969. In addition, NATO itself is looking to develop a potential CPP Centre of Excellence, and has been developing doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) through experimentation led by its Allied Command Transformation’s (ACT) Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre in Lisbon.

A Possible Structure for CPP in the CAF

While Canada acceded to the 1954 Hague Convention on 11 December 1998, no significant movement towards the establishment of CPP-specialised capabilities has occurred in the subsequent two decades. However, the precedents set by our closest allies, the USA and the UK in this area, provide an achievable roadmap for the CAF. As with all formalised capabilities, a clear policy that underpins the implementation requirements must first be developed. Unlike the recent experience of the UK, the most challenging part of the development of a Canadian CPP capability already occurred twenty years ago, embodied in our accession to the 1954 Hague Convention. Now, all that remains is to transform the legal requirements (particularly those under Article 7(2) of the Convention), into an actionable framework of policy with the required organisational changes and training to make it happen. Such a policy will need to reiterate the requirements for CPP as outlined in International law, and then define the roles and responsibilities with respect to CPP within both a CAF and Whole of Government context, with a particular noting of the interface with IA, CIMIC, and especially, the targeting process. A clear collaborative relationship between DND/CAF and other relevant Government departments will have to be defined: with CBSA, RCMP, Heritage Canada (DHC) and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) all having clear roles to play in CPP. The document will also need to establish the roles and employment of military CPP.
specialists in both peace and wartime, noting both permanent staff functions and temporary deployed roles. Finally, such a policy will need to define the levels of both generalist training (CPP awareness training, general and mission-specific) and specialist training envisioned (for CIMIC CPP specialists, as well as others).

A viable and sustainable CPP capability that not only addresses the treaty requirements of the 1954 Hague Convention, but also has the ability to add significant operational capability can be achieved for the CAF with a relatively-small resource budget. An example of such a construct, which can be realistically seen as a hybridization of the US and UK models tailored to the CAF organisation, is presented below. While the UK has been able to create a specialised Defence CPP Unit resident within the new 77th Brigade, Canada’s even more modest resources—and geographically dispersed realities—recommend an adapted model—an adapted model which in this area harkens to the US model of CPP specialists by civilian qualifications embedded in the CA community. In this proposed model, CPP specialists (number to be yet decided) would be dispersed throughout the CAF in a two-tier structure. Tier 1 would consist of Primary Reservists within CIMIC lines (but not necessarily under the influence of a Task Force (JATF) of the Canadian Combat Support Brigade). This first tier would be the group from which Rotation 0 and Rotation 1 deployments of CPP specialist officers would be drawn; of note, they would also be envisioned to be fully qualified CIMIC operators. Tier 2 would be identified and trained personnel, both Regular and Primary Reserve, who would receive the CPP specialist qualification, but would then return to their home units and career progressions. This tier would be earmarked for follow-on (out of trade) deployments during sustained operations, as an operational reserve for the Tier 1 cadre. In both cases, the prerequisites and CPP specialist training would be identical. CPP specialists would be commissioned officers35 with a relevant academic background in archaeology, anthropology, history, or history in art or museum/heritage studies & conservation (likely at the graduate degree level), who would also then go on to complete a specialist course in CPP with a unique four letter competency code. Although both are still in their initial pilot course stages, the UK’s CPP ‘Special to Arm’ course and the US Army CPP Training being run in conjunction with the Smithsonian Institute provide excellent templates for a future CAF training program. Of note, there is the potential to course load initial CAF CPP specialists onto either the UK or US courses for initial cadre qualification, and to facilitate the development of an eventual CAF CPP course in a ‘train the trainer’ paradigm35—with the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) in Kingston being the most logical training establishment to host an eventual Canadian CPP course. Having the CPP centre of training in Kingston also brings significant synergies with our US partners, given the geographic proximity of Garrison Kingston to Fort Drum in upstate New York.

While during routine operations the majority of CPP qualified officers would either be on Class A part-time employment within CIMIC designated positions (Tier 1), or employed in entirely different functions across the CAF (Tier 2), there would be some requirement for limited full-time CPP specialist support, both in a force planning and employment role, and in a force development, management, and generation role. These two distinct groupings of responsibilities would almost certainly be best managed by two distinct individuals, either Class B employed CPP senior officers, or civilian equivalents, located within two distinct organisations. The first position would be most logically located within CJOC Headquarters, and would be tasked with:

- Being an integral functional authority within the Joint Operational Effects section;
- Advising the Joint Targeting Intelligence Centre on CPP considerations;
- Writing, managing and championing a CPP appendix to the CIMIC Annex to (all/most) Operational Orders. For example, if there is a CIMIC Annex, then there should likely be either a CPP appendix, or at least a devoted paragraph;
- Contributing as required, to background/cultural intelligence documents and the intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE) process produced by Canadian Joint Operations Command’s Joint Intelligence Centre;
- Acting as the Commander CJOC’s overall CPP Advisor.

The second full-time CPP staff officer position would be created either in the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF), or potentially in the notional Joint Force Commander’s staff, to carry out the following (force development, management and generation) staff functions:

- Managing the CPP specialist training, within the reserve CIMIC units and with PSTC and/or allies, including the management of a dedicated CPP training budget;
- Acting as a lead instructor for PSTC on the CPP specialist course;
- Managing the Class A Tier 1 CPP specialist staff list, including deployment cycles, and further (academic/ specialisation) credential lists;
- Managing the overall Tier 2 dispersed CPP specialist qualified list;
- Managing the academic outreach partners list of contacts, and acting as the information manager and communications node for the wider CAF CPP community;
- Acting as a backstop and liaison officer for the CJOC HQ CPP Staff Officer/Advisor.

“Having the CPP centre of training in Kingston also brings significant synergies with our US partners, given the geographic proximity of Garrison Kingston to Fort Drum in upstate New York.”
One further area for an important Canadian contribution to an Allied CPP effort is afforded by the DIA’s cultural property inventories, and leverages our unique ‘Five Eyes’ intelligence sharing and collaborative relationship. In this area, Canadian Forces Intelligence Group broadly, and its subordinate unit the Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre specifically, would be able to contribute meaningfully to a shared CPP inventory. When combined with the use of Commercial Satellite Imagery (CSI) and a collaborative relationship with academic partners, as envisioned in Strong, Secure, Engaged, this would provide a significant complementary CPP capability to that envisioned above for the IATF CIMIC units, as well as the efforts of our closest allies and partners.

The model described above has the policy advantage of directly supporting or enacting four of Strong, Secure, Engaged’s key initiatives, namely:

• Initiative 72: Establish a Canadian Armed Forces targeting capability to better leverage intelligence capabilities to support military operations;

• Initiative 73: Increase investment in academic outreach to $4.5 million per year in a revamped and expanded defence engagement program, including: collaborative networks of experts; a new scholarship program for Masters and Post-Doctoral fellows; and an expansion of the existing expert briefing series and engagement grant program;

• Initiative 76: Enhance existing roles assigned to Reserve Force units and formations, including: Information Operations (including Influence Activities); [and] Combat Support and Combat Service Support;

• Initiative 77: Employ the Reserve Force to deliver select expeditionary missions in a primary role such as Canadian Armed Forces capacity building. 36

Conclusion

The CAF does not currently possess a CPP capability as envisioned by the 1954 Hague Convention to which we are party, and that we tacitly recognised in 1999’s Joint Doctrine on Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis and War. In addition, the force multiplier effects that CPP can bring to both military and political leadership in terms of strategic communications, influence activities, coalition building, cultural intelligence (and hence situational awareness and force protection), as well as post-conflict reconstruction, are significant. It is an undeniable and inherent information related capabilities within the effects-based Joint Targeting Enterprise that is a cornerstone of current Canadian Defence Policy and several of the initiatives in Strong, Secure, Engaged are either directly supportive of or indicate the requirement to create a specialised, even if modest, CPP capability in the CAF.

Developments in the armed forces of our closest allies indicate that such a capability can be developed economically, while both joint experimentation and operational lessons learned in NATO have demonstrated the positive force multiplier effects of CPP in expeditionary, peace support operations, and peacetime engagement activities. Further, the experiences of our closest Allies have indicated that CPP is likely best situated within CIMIC/Civil Affairs constructs, but with clear lines of operation that intersect with Strategic Communications, Influence Activities, Targeting, and Defence Intelligence. Canada has a unique opportunity to systematically develop a CPP capability in a more efficient way than, and building directly upon, the recent experience of our closest allies in the US and UK. In so doing, the CAF can provide a potentially high impact niche capability that does not require significant new resources. While there are multiple means of delivering an active CPP capability to the CAF, the model proposed herein is one possible solution that attempts to balance the ability to deliver clear operational effects, with the economic and personnel exigencies of an expanding and modernising force structure.


5 Giles, p. 8.


8 Indeed, CAF CIMIC doctrine does already recognize the specific subset of CPP within CIMIC. See B-GG-005-004(AF-023), Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace, Emergencies, Crisis And War, (Ottawa: DND, January 1999), particularly p. 2-12, p. 2A-3, & p. 5B-4. However, beyond an acknowledgement of the requirements under the 1954 Hague Convention, and the need to include arts, monuments and archives considerations in CIMIC Operational Estimates and Cooperation Area Assessments, no prescriptive avenue towards achieving this niche specialist capacity has been addressed.

9 Adapted from UK Army Director General Capabilities policy paper, Delivering a Cultural Property Protection Capability, 30 July 2015; para 12, pp. 10-11.


11 Email Doctor Laurie Rush to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 11 December 2018.

12 As an indication of the importance of antiquities smuggling to the finances of Daesh, in late-2014, Abu Sayyaf assumed direct responsibility for Daesh’s antiquities trafficking division, at least in part as a compensatory and reliable revenue stream after the success of coalition airstrikes on Daesh oil production and transport infrastructure. See Hannah D. Willett, “‘Ill-Gotten Gains: A Response to the Islamic State’s Profits from the Illicit Antiquities Market’,” in Arizona Law Review (Vol. 58, 2016), pp. 831-865.


15 Fanusie and Joffe, p. 6.


17 Email Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew Duncan to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 26 November 2018.

18 Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada’s Defence Policy, (Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2017), p. 53.


22 For more details on the history of the MFAA see the website http://www.monumentsmen.com/ maintained by Robert M. Edsel. While Canada was not specifically represented in the original MFAA, one of the two MFAA casualties, Maj Ronald Balfour, was killed while attached to the Canadian First Army as a CPP advisor.


25 Numerous after-action reports dating back to the Second World War have indicated that this job requires commissioned rank in order to have “…traction with a battlegroup commander engaged with combat ops therefore all officer, minimum rank [Captain]”. Email Lieutenant Colonel Tim Purbrick to Lieutenant-Commander Mark Blondeau, 24 August 2018 & 2 October 2018. While the initial troop to task study (Defence Planning Assumptions, Reserve Mobilization Ratios and Harmony Guidelines) suggested a necessary force of 40- to 50 CPP specialists, this number was not seen to be achievable in the UK’s current manning and budgetary restraints.


Leadership within NATO: Canada’s 2018 Chairing of the NATO Military Intelligence Committee

by Nicholas Dunning

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“Timely and relevant intelligence is our single greatest tool in identifying and managing threats to our peace and security. The Military Intelligence Committee is fundamental to NATO’s efforts to promote peace and stability around the world. Canada is proud to be working with NATO countries to increase the speed, effectiveness, and quality of our intelligence to push the boundaries of what we can achieve together for our collective safety and security.”

~ The Honourable Harjit S. Sajjan, Minister of National Defence

The Canadian Minister of National Defence, Harjit Singh Sajjan, speaks during the NATO Summit, 2018.
Introduction

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a cornerstone of Canada’s foreign policy and defence policy to prevent and respond to conflicts and crises abroad. NATO also represents a long-standing institution in the international rules-based order, which Canada seeks to strengthen. The current international landscape facing NATO is dangerous, unpredictable, and fluid. Threats emanate from multiple strategic directions, including state and non-state actors, military forces, terrorists, and within the cyber and hybrid domains. It is against this unpredictable backdrop that “…intelligence is NATO’s first line of defence. The ability to effectively collect, analyze, and distribute relevant intelligence across the Alliance is fundamental to NATO’s success in meeting the challenges of an evolving threat environment.”

Canada led NATO’s efforts to advance NATO defence intelligence to meet modern challenges throughout 2018 as the chair of the Military Intelligence Committee (MIC). Canada officially transferred chair authority of the MIC to Albania on 3 December 2018, marking the end of Canada’s year-long role as MIC Chair.

Chairing the MIC provided Canada an elevated international profile in the intelligence community. Through this platform, Canada demonstrated multinational leadership within NATO by leading intelligence reforms that improved the Alliance’s ability to achieve accelerated decision-making in support of planning, operations, and political decision-making. In order to enhance the learning culture and support leadership of the institution, this article will describe Canada’s 2018 chairing of the NATO MIC, articulate the strategic implications, and note some observations with respect to multinational leadership, as well as overcoming the challenge of various national interests.

Background

The NATO Intelligence Enterprise is a complex network that encompasses the intelligence collection and analytical structures, processes, and hundreds of intelligence professionals within the NATO Command Structure and NATO Headquarters (HQ). The strategic and operational intelligence derived from the NATO Intelligence Enterprise informs decision-makers within the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the Military Committee (MC), Supreme Allied Commander Allied Powers Europe (SACEUR), and NATO’s operations and activities. A critical component of the NATO Intelligence Enterprise is the NATO member nations, since they provide national intelligence and resources to NATO.

In recognition of the evolving global threats, NATO intelligence reform was a significant theme of the 2016 Warsaw Summit, and echoed at the 2018 Brussels Summit. Reinforcing the importance of intelligence to inform NATO planning, operations, and decision-making, a new Joint Intelligence and Security Division (JISD) was created at NATO HQ in 2016. The JISD would be led by the Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security (ASG-I&S). The JISD merged the former military and civilian intelligence silos into an integrated unit, and thereby became the single intelligence body providing intelligence support to the NAC, and the MC, as well as advising the Secretary General regarding intelligence and security matters.

With this web of actors, contributors, and leaders reliant on first-class intelligence, coordination and trust between the nations providing resources and intelligence to NATO is vital to synchronize activities, safeguard sensitive information, and guide the ongoing intelligence reform. Former United States Director of National Intelligence James Clapper once described the ‘sweet spot’ in such efforts as the intersection of safeguarding sensitive information and trust to share for intelligence. The NATO MIC fulfils the important function of coordinating efforts, advancing trust, and leading change.

The MIC is the principal advisory body to the Military Committee with respect to defence intelligence issues. The MIC is also a forum for decision-making regarding intelligence, and it participates in shaping NATO intelligence policy. Each nation typically has the head of their military intelligence agency represent their national interests at the MIC. The MIC is supported by a subordinate committee – the MIC at Working Level (WL), comprised principally of defence intelligence policy leaders. Since 2017, the MIC has been chaired by a nation for a one-year term on a rotational basis, and co-chaired by the ASG-I&S. Belgium served as the first national chair of the MIC in 2017, followed by Canada in 2018. The role of the MIC Chair is three-fold: establish an overall theme and work objectives, convene and facilitate two annual conference meetings of the MIC, and advocate the ‘voice of the nations’ to the MC and other NATO leadership boards and committees.

NATO Intelligence also has a Civilian Intelligence Committee (CIC). It is the body that oversees civilian intelligence issues at NATO. Reporting directly to the North Atlantic Council, the CIC advises on matters of espionage and terrorist-or-related threats that may affect the Alliance. Like the MIC, the CIC is also co-chaired by the ASG-I&S.

Canada’s Role as MIC Chair

On behalf of Canada in 2018, the Commander Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM) and Chief of Defence Intelligence, Rear-Admiral Scott Bishop, served as the MIC Chair. Supporting the chair on a full-time basis was an intelligence liaison office at NATO HQ in Belgium, and a policy team within CFINTCOM. Assistance for hosting the meeting of the MIC in Ottawa in May 2018 required almost four dozen personnel from across the Department of National Defence (DND) and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). NATO HQ also provided full-time secretariat support from within the Joint Intelligence and Security Division to help organize meetings, produce records, and to liaise with NATO staffs.
As the MIC Chair, Canada established a campaign plan along three lines of effort – political/strategic, operational, and force development – with 12 distinct objectives that guided work throughout 2018. The end state of Canada’s campaign plan was “…a relevant, agile, and modern NATO Intelligence Enterprise that is capable of supporting the strategic interests of NATO and enabling operations through organic NATO and Joint CIC/MIC intelligence capabilities.”

Upon conclusion of Canada’s chairing of the MIC, key accomplishments included the following:

- Military-civilian coordination was improved through better military-civilian cooperation, intelligence policy development, governance, and the establishment of a framework for early warning intelligence;
- NATO-Agreed Intelligence was optimized by rationalizing capstone intelligence documents from four-to-two, which will save hundreds of hours of analytical and staff work;
- NATO’s learning culture was enhanced by holding workshops focused upon cyber issues and by supporting operational lessons learned;
- Early warning intelligence to support the NAC, MC, and SACEUR was advanced through a warning and alerting policy;
- NATO intelligence’s governance was improved by changing the MIC WL to be co-chaired by the same nation chairing the MIC, which also enabled further coherence among the nations;
- Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe’s approach and continued implementation of a Joint Effects function within the NATO Command Structure was endorsed;
- The NATO Intelligence deficiencies system was improved through the implementation of a tiered priority approach, which will improve the focus and efficiency of NATO intelligence.

In addition to chairing the MIC, Canada increased its defence intelligence contributions to NATO throughout 2018 in order to reinforce its leadership within the Alliance. For example, Canada assumed the role of Integrated Meteorological and Oceanographic (IMETOC) Lead Nation to provide dedicated meteorological and oceanographic support, data, and products to the NATO Response Force (NRF), which will help the NRF exploit the best window of opportunity to plan, execute, support and sustain military operations. Canada also increased the production and dissemination of intelligence to NATO, and was a significant contributor of geospatial intelligence in support of NATO operations.
These increased capabilities provided Canada’s MIC leadership with additional clout by providing NATO with critical resources.

**Strategic Effects**

**Global Leadership**

Canada exhibited leadership on the international stage by chairing the MIC, which progressed NATO’s continued intelligence reforms. This leadership is consistent with *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, which calls upon the DND/CAF to demonstrate global leadership. Under Canada’s leadership, intelligence reforms improved the Alliance’s ability to achieve accelerated decision-making in support of planning, operations, and political decision-making.

Leadership can often be more challenging in multinational settings than national settings due to cultural differences, national sensitivities and objectives, amongst others. Equally, trust is often harder to establish and maintain in multinational environments. Yet, despite the challenges with leading globally, Canada is a strong proponent of multilateral institutions, and benefits from these guarantors of global peace and security. Therefore, it was a natural fit for Canada to seize the opportunity to chair the MIC, which reinforced Canada’s primacy of the rules-based international order.

Canada’s leadership was demonstrated through multiple actions *before and during* the chairing of the MIC. Before assuming the chair, Canada set forth a clear vision and purposeful end state, which was socialized with many NATO intelligence stakeholders. This ensured a unity of approach and common purpose. During Canada’s tenure as the MIC chair, it evolved the purpose of the MIC to a decision-making forum, thereby increasing the relevance of the committee. Canada also practiced an inclusive approach as MIC chair, which resulted in record-high participation of nations during various committee meetings. The benefit of the additional voices was the inclusion of new approaches, innovative suggestions for intelligence reforms, legitimacy of consensus achieved on difficult issues, and reinforced unity of purpose. And, as noted by James Clapper, intelligence reforms begin with leadership.

**Relationships**

Canada’s leadership as MIC Chair also provided the opportunity to develop deep and meaningful relationships with international partners. It developed a close relationship with Romania, as that country served as the chair of the Civilian Intelligence Committee. Cooperation and coordination between Canada and Romania began almost a full year before each country assumed their roles as chairs. With an unofficial motto of ‘no surprises,’ both countries advanced a four-point plan of action, which led to significant improvements in civilian-military intelligence relations, enhanced policy guidance, and advanced the implementation of an inclusive warning system. The very productive CIC-MIC relationship was a strategic win, as traditionally, there is well-noted strain between the committees, which was overcome by Romanian and Canadian leadership in 2018.

Canada and Albania also fostered a close partnership. The chairing of the NATO MIC employs a *troika* system involving the past, current, and future chair to ensure smooth hand-overs, continuity, and the success of the MIC. For much of 2018, Canada and Albania...
met frequently in order to prepare for the transition of MIC chairs. These defence diplomacy-type interactions afforded the opportunity to mutually improve knowledge, understanding and interoperability, as well as allowing for the exchange of best practices.\textsuperscript{27} This initiative ultimately contributed significantly to the success of the MIC.

These meaningful relationships with Romania and Albania will endure beyond chairing the MIC and CIC, since both countries now have experience working bilaterally on intelligence issues of common interest. These partnerships will lead to greater situational awareness through increased intelligence cooperation.

Chairing the MIC also enabled closer cooperation between CFINTCOM and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), as the latter serves as the Canadian representative at the NATO CIC. CSIS delivered on multiple initiatives within the CIC, such as leading various panels, which showcased Canada’s expertise against common adversaries. Within the CIC itself, CSIS helped ensure joint civilian-military initiatives, such as early warning, were advanced in a purposeful manner. Active CSIS participation helped Canada demonstrate leadership within NATO, advanced civilian-military intelligence cooperation, and ultimately helped keep Canadians safe through improved intelligence sharing.

**Anticipation**

Chairing the MIC also afforded Canada improved situational awareness that will provide early warning of threats, challenges, and crises. In turn, this will make Canada and the CAF more secure, and enable the nation to better tailor contributions to international security.\textsuperscript{28} In order to lead by example, Canada invested intelligence resources into delivering cutting-edge analysis of our common adversaries, which directly supported the decision-making of the NAC and the MC. It also increased the production and dissemination of intelligence to NATO, and its geospatial intelligence collection in support of NATO operations. This growth in intelligence collection and production led to bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other NATO countries. The end result was that Canada gained access to greater information and intelligence, which improved strategic anticipation.

The strategic effects garnered from chairing the MIC are consistent with direction to the DND/CAF from Strong, Secure, Engaged. Specifically, Canada’s pursuit of leadership within NATO, ensuring seamless cooperation with allies and partners, while enhancing Canada’s ability to anticipate a wide range of contingencies.\textsuperscript{29}

**Observations on Multinational Leadership**

Canada’s chairing produced important observations with respect to leadership in a multinational environment that are applicable to both defence intelligence and the wider DND/CAF. This section intends to highlight these lessons learned.

The observations are framed using University of Genova professor Dr. Angela Di Febbraro’s research on leadership and command, which, on behalf of the NATO Human Factors and Medicine Research Task Group Multinational Military Operations and Intercultural Factors, examined factors that influence multinational military collaboration in areas including organization, leadership, and command, and teams.\textsuperscript{30} Febbraro’s research is a useful frame, given the multinational and collaborative nature of the MIC as a defence intelligence body. Three of the “Top 10 Tips for Multinational Commanders,” will be leveraged to articulate the Canadian perspective with respect to chairing the MIC.\textsuperscript{31}

**Prioritize relationship building. Mutual respect is key. The goal is to foster a communicative, collaborative, and co-operative relationship.**

Canada was seized with the importance of building and maintaining meaningful relationships as the key determinant for success as MIC Chair. Leveraging the importance of relationships to the intelligence profession, Canada built and executed a deliberate engagement plan with various intelligence stakeholders before assuming the Chair. This engagement plan allowed Canada the opportunity to socialize its plans and objectives as MIC Chair in an honest and clear manner, and also to obtain stakeholder ‘buy-in.’ This engagement happened at all levels – from the MIC Chair to the desk officer – at formal and informal meetings in seven countries. Engagement at this level and scale required the dedication of significant resources in terms of time and international travel. With open communication throughout, stakeholders were able to understand Canada’s plan, felt respected during the development process, saw themselves in the plan, and cooperated for common success.

**Negotiation is commonplace; command by discussion.**

As mentioned, one role of the MIC Chair is to facilitate two annual conference meetings. The Chair is not only involved in setting the agenda, but also facilitates the discussions that occur over multiple days. Given the importance and sensitivity of the defence intelligence issues with which at times the MIC was seized, the Chair needs to act as a referee. Ensuring all nations had a voice at the table was important, and required the Chair to be trusted as being neutral, and not advancing national interests. For Canada to achieve neutrality as the MIC Chair, and still ensure national interests were preserved, a separate Canadian national representative sat in the ‘Canada’ chair, which therefore permitted the MIC Chair to act impartially.\textsuperscript{32} Research has indicated there are occasionally ‘cliques’ within NATO intelligence between nations,\textsuperscript{33} so it was important for Canada as the Chair to facilitate honest dialogue throughout. In order to ensure unity of purpose, negotiations, as well as the ability to have frank and honest conversations, were often as important as the outcome.

“The strategic effects garnered from chairing the MIC are consistent with direction to the DND/CAF from Strong, Secure, Engaged.”
Establish a common sense of purpose.

Canada articulated its role as MIC Chair as a ‘baton race,’ where Canada was able to move common NATO objectives forward before handing the leadership baton to the next chair. As noted by Febbaro, achieving unity of purpose should be a main effort of multinational leadership. This is because leaders must develop mutual confidence among partners to ensure a balance is struck between the group’s interests and competing national interests. Underpinning unity of purpose is trust and mutual confidence. With a team sport approach, Canada sought to instill a common sense of purpose through its campaign plan and associated incremental goals, sensitive to unique national requirements and perspectives, and it used open communication to foster trust.

The lessons learned from Canada’s chairing the MIC transcend the intelligence profession. Canada demonstrated the capacity to inspire others, to direct while being inclusive, and to articulate and instil a common direction and purpose.

Overcoming the Challenge of Various National Interests

NATO recognizes the unique nature of an Alliance, where certain nations may have differing agendas. Research by Febbaro also confirmed the occasional diversity of national interests and political pressures, which occasionally challenge multinational leadership. In a study prepared while a student at the Canadian Forces College in 2000, Canadian Armed Forces Colonel C.J.R. Davis also observed the influence of national interests, and stated that the presence of politics in coalitions challenges multinational leadership. Against this background, Davis noted, “...the willingness to reach a consensus is vital to ensuring the political aspirations of nations are satisfied. A balance between what is acceptable both militarily and politically must be achieved.” While he distinguished between coalitions and alliances, his observation with respect to consensus and the influence of national politics is cross-cutting between coalitions and alliances, and is appropriate to frame Canada’s chairing of the MIC.

While the desire to achieve unity and cohesion dominates NATO, there were nonetheless moments during Canada’s chairing of the MIC that national political views entered the fray. In one instance, it was a challenge to advance a key defence intelligence policy matter related to NATO Agreed Intelligence (NAI). As Brian R. Foster, then attending the United States Army War College, described NAI in 2013, it serves as a strategic baseline for the rest of NATO intelligence and activities. NAI is unique, as it is agreed to by all NATO members, and represents a significant undertaking in consensus building. Despite raising the particular defence intelligence policy issue at the two MIC conferences in 2018, and significant staff work conducted at NATO HQ and within capitals, consensus was not achieved. At its heart, the defence intelligence policy matter is a political issue, with significant national interests involved. As of this writing, the matter is not resolved, and will likely require resolution through the MC and the NAC.

While this particular defence intelligence policy issue represents an ongoing challenge, important lessons can nevertheless be ascertained from the situation. As Colonel Davis noted, “…rapport, respect, knowledge, patience and the appropriate mission for participating nations all contribute to the notion of mutual confidence.” Under Canada’s leadership, there was a full engagement with all nations on the defence intelligence policy issue in order to sustain mutual confidence.

The 28 flags of the countries of NATO.
solved by the MIC. Therefore, through notions of respect and transparency, and allowing nations to save face became important diplomatic tools used by Canada. With the longer-term cohesion of the Alliance in mind, rapport among MIC nations was maintained, despite a differing national perspective.\(^43\)

Canada’s leadership chairing the MIC reflected NATO’s doctrinal approach to multinational leadership that “…demands an attitude that is not only international in outlook, but also willing to understand differing national perspectives and how they relate to the common purpose.”\(^44\) Canada focused upon incremental goals, achieving mutually-beneficial objectives, and elevated those issues that held sensitive national interests to appropriate decision-making bodies. This approach ensured respect among all nations was maintained and that mutually-supporting objectives were achieved. It is recommended this type of approach be used in similar future situations.

Conclusion

NATO’s strength and value lies in the unity of its members. Solidarity is NATO’s greatest asset, despite concerns about political dynamics in certain NATO member countries.\(^35\) NATO remains central to Canada’s foreign policy and defence policy. As a founding member of the Alliance in 1949, Canada has participated in every NATO mission, and is frequently cited as providing valuable leadership and contributions to NATO’s activities and operations.\(^46\)

As the NATO Secretary General noted in a speech in Ottawa, NATO is facing a changing and dynamic security environment, where the line between war and peace is often blurred. It is in the context that NATO relies upon doing more in the way of intelligence as a way to reinforce collective defence.\(^47\)
Canada’s chairing of the MIC reinforced the importance of NATO to Canada, the significance of sound intelligence, and the critical nature of relationships. As noted by Canada’s then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland [now Deputy Prime Minister − Ed.], the current uncertainty about the traditional structures of global leadership has sharpened the need for Canada to strengthen the post-war multilateral order.48

Chairing the MIC was a significant undertaking, and it provided Canada an elevated international profile within the intelligence and defence community. Canada’s leadership led to improving NATO’s decision-making ability in support of planning, operations, and political decision-making, and reinforced Canada’s enduring commitment to NATO.

NOTES

1 The author is very grateful for the valuable input, contributions, and perspectives, from Rear-Admiral Bishop, Mr. Hébert, Lieutenant-Colonel Bland, Major Rouleau, and Mr. Gagné.


6 Canada, NATO Military Intelligence Committee Conference comes to a close.


12 Foster, p. 10, and Ballast.


14 Foster, p. 32.


17 Interview with Canadian defence intelligence official, 4 December 2018.


19 Interview with Canadian defence intelligence official, 4 December 2018.

20 Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged, p. 59.


22 Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged, p. 59.


24 Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged, p. 89.

25 Interview with Canadian defence intelligence official, 4 December 2018.

26 Ballast, p. 10.

27 Canada, Strong, Secure, Engaged, p. 93.


29 Ibid, pp. 61-63.

30 Febbraro.


32 For Canada, the Director General of Intelligence Policy and Partnerships represented Canada at the MIC.

33 Foster, p. 20.

34 Febbraro, p. 3-28.


38 Ibid, p. 17.

39 Given the sensitive nature of the discussions, discretion will be applied in the description of the policy issue.

40 Foster, p. 28.

41 Interview with Canadian defence intelligence official, 4 December 2018.

42 Davis, pp. 17-18.

43 Interview with Canadian defence intelligence official, 4 December 2018.


46 Ibid, p. 100.


48 Freeland.
In Limbo: The 22nd Battalion (French-Canadian), from Demobilization to Integration into the Permanent Force

by Michel Litalien

Introduction

The Royal 22e Régiment is the pride of French-speaking Canada and has been the subject of numerous studies and publications. Although this regiment has been scrutinized from almost every angle, a short but crucial period in its history has never piqued the interest of historians: from its demobilization in Montréal in May 1919 to its integration into the Permanent Force in April 1920. At first glance, this gap could be explained by the fact that, technically, the 22nd Battalion (French-Canadian) had simply ceased to exist. However, this short eleven-month period was probably the most exciting peacetime period in its history. Here is a look back on this period of uncertainty.

An Uncertain Future

In April 1919, while the members of the 22nd Battalion were still languishing in Britain, eagerly awaiting their return home, the Canadian government announced the make-up of its permanent, post-war force. As the only permanent pre-war infantry regiment, the Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR) still belonged to that force, but a new member was being added: Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). Yet the 22nd Battalion, the only Canadian French-speaking unit to have fought during the war, was excluded. When they learned the disappointing news, provincial and municipal authorities in Quebec unsuccessfully lobbied the federal government. One could only speculate about the future of the 22nd Battalion.

A Bone of Contention

On 27 March 1919, Lieutenant-Colonel Léonard G. de Tonnancour, the commanding officer of the 65th Regiment (Carabiniers Mont-Royal), summoned all his officers, former officers and non-commissioned members to the armoury. He announced his retirement and handed over the reins to his successor, Lieutenant-Colonel Émile Peltier.

They also took the opportunity to discuss the memorable reception that they wanted to organize for the 22nd Battalion’s upcoming return. It was expected to be demobilized and sent to the 65th Regiment armoury, where it was formed in 1914. They also wanted to prepare to welcome the 14th Battalion (Royal Montreal Regiment), and the No. 6 Canadian General Hospital (Université Laval à Montréal) and No. 8 Canadian General Hospital (French-Canadian).

A committee was formed under the honorary chairmanship of Sir Charles Fitzpatrick, the province’s lieutenant governor, Sir Lomer Gouin, the premier, and Médéric Martin, the mayor of Montréal, with Lieutenant-Colonel Peltier at the helm. The committee also included several officers from the 65th Regiment and other units, as well as a number of prominent Montrealers. The reception in honour of the triumphant 22nd Battalion was to be the most splendid that Montréal had ever seen.

While discussions were taking place in Montréal, Québec City was taking the lead. On 4 April, members of the public and officials gathered at City Hall to prepare a grand reception in...
honour of the 22nd Battalion, as it was to make a stop in Québec
City for two or three days before continuing on to Montréal.
They wanted to show that Québec City knew how to welcome
its heroes. Ottawa was immediately informed, and they took the
opportunity to request that the triumphant battalion become part
of the permanent post-war force.6

On 16 April, there was a new development: military
authorities announced that the 22nd Battalion would be sent to
Québec City. It appeared to be at the request of the battalion’s mem-
bers, who were consulted on the matter.7 Montrealers, however,
were dismayed. Lieutenant-Colonel Léo Laflèche,8 a former officer
of the 22nd Battalion who was responsible for the demobilization
of units in Military District 4 (MD 4), was indignant and voiced
his dissent in Montréal newspapers.9 Given that Québec City had
never been able to raise and send a unit to the front, why should
it have the privilege of hosting the victorious 22nd Battalion? The
lieutenant-colonel would later add that it was in Montréal that the
22nd Battalion deposited its colours before leaving for England.

In principle, no one objected to the 22nd Battalion stopping
in Québec City for a few days; however, it was crucial that it be
re-established in Montréal. Members of the public, dignitaries,
politicians and newspapers denounced the “injustice” and pro-
tested. Colonel Arthur Mignault, co-founder of the 22nd Battalion
and former surgeon of the 65th Regiment, publicly demanded that
the troops be reinstated in Montréal. A delegation of notables,
including Mayor Médéric Martin and mayors from neighbouring
cities, travelled to Ottawa to complain to the Minister of Militia
and Defence. He was away, and it would take several days to get
a response.

In the House of Commons, the issue divided the members from
Québec. One of them, Jacques Bureau, proposed a compromise
by which the 22nd Battalion would be sent to Trois-Rivières, that
is to say, halfway between the two cities—a proposal that invited
ridicule.10 Every daily in the province, including the English-
language ones, were full of speculation: the government’s decision
was suspicious; they wanted to deprive our heroes of a triumphant
return; as enthusiastic as the reception in Québec City might be, it
could not be as grand as the one in Montréal, and so on. In short, if
Ottawa refused, people would have to demonstrate more loudly.11
On 2 May, military authorities finally agreed that the 22nd Battalion would be reestablished in Montréal, after a short stop in Québec City. On 19 May 1919, more than 200,000 people came to greet the members of the 22nd Battalion and see them triumphantly march through the streets of the city. In the end, the members of the 22nd Battalion were the big winners: the soldiers were welcomed as true heroes.

A Period of Limbo

While waiting to learn the fate of their unit, the veterans of the 22nd Battalion participated in various receptions and celebrations throughout the province. The armoury of the 65th Regiment (Carabiniers Mont-Royal), located on Pine Avenue, was regularly used as a meeting and gathering place for former members of the battalion. It also laid the foundations for “l’Association du 22e,” the 22nd Battalion association.

Many former members of the battalion returned to service in their former militia unit. Some officers, such as Colonel Frédéric Gaudet, first commander of the 22nd Battalion, obtained senior positions in the federal and municipal governments. Other members found themselves in high demand. A few officers tried out new careers in provincial politics. Unfortunately, none were elected on 24 June 1919.

In July 1919, it was thought that the 22nd Battalion could be re-established and garrisoned in Québec City but, a few days later, the newspapers denied the news and announced that it would be stationed in Montréal. An office was opened in the Peel Street barracks to recruit those who wished to return to service or begin a career with the Permanent Force. However, French-speaking volunteers interested in joining the infantry could only enlist in the RCR.
The 22nd Battalion march through the streets of Montréal, 19 May 1919. After much debate, it was decided that this would be where the glorious 22nd would finally be demobilized.

The 65th Regiment armoury, Carabiniers Mont-Royal (now Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal), approximately 1912.
The announcement that the Prince of Wales, ie, the future King Edward VIII, would make a second visit to Montréal in October rekindled hopes for the triumphant battalion. The military authorities asked the veterans to unofficially re-establish the 22nd Battalion. A proud guard of 100 “young” veterans was reviewed by the Prince at a large gathering. Several soldiers received decorations. The 22nd Battalion guard escorted the prince when he departed Montréal, and shortly afterwards the 22nd Battalion fell by the wayside.

An Impugned Marriage

In the aftermath of the Great War, Canada found itself with two distinct military entities: a non-permanent active militia, with “old” regiments that were closely linked to their city or region of origin, and the battalions of the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), which, with a few exceptions, had nothing to do with those of the militia and were not necessarily linked to a particular city. In order to hang on to those two entities, the military authorities decided to merge a large number of them, which was not an easy task.

While the CEF units now had a wealth of glorious battle stories, special traditions and heroic deeds, the same could not be said of the militia units that remained in the country. Because the military authorities did not want to break the militia’s ties to its urban or rural environment or allow the great feats of the CEF units to fade completely from collective memory, the military authorities decided to integrate them into those of the militia. In April 1919, a special committee of distinguished officers was struck to consider demobilizing the units and reorganizing the postwar militia and make recommendations. Since it was chaired by Canadian General Sir William Dillon Otter, the committee became known as the Otter Commission.

The fate of the 22nd Battalion remained uncertain. The commission had made many recommendations regarding its integration into the Permanent Force, but they were shelved. The long silence gave way to rumours, speculation and envy.

In September 1919, for example, the military authorities of MD 4 (Montréal) officially announced that the 22nd Battalion would merge with the 65th Regiment (Carabiniers Mont-Royal) as part of the post-war reorganization of the militia. The new unit might be called the 22nd Regiment (Carabiniers Mont-Royal). The former officers of the 22nd Battalion were disappointed and spoke out, expressing that they wanted their beloved battalion to remain intact in order to preserve its identity and its military accomplishments.

On 7 October, the 22nd Battalion’s name came up for discussion again. During a special meeting at the officers’ mess of the 65th Regiment (Carabiniers Mont-Royal) Armoury, several public figures from the 65th Regiment and the 22nd Battalion decided that the new unit, which would serve in the Permanent Force, would be called the “22nd Regiment (Carabiniers Mont-Royal).” The armoury on Pine Avenue would be handed over to this new Permanent Force unit and would become its headquarters. La Presse described this merger as the fairest and most natural option, since the 65th Regiment was the militia unit that had contributed most to the formation of the 22nd Battalion. The former commanders of the 22nd Battalion approved the endeavour.

The next evening, the commander of the 65th Regiment summoned all his officers to the armoury to consult with them. Everyone approved of the merger. On 9 October, the officers of the 65th Regiment announced with great fanfare in the Montréal newspapers that the merger of the 22nd Battalion with their regiment was now a reality.

That was all it took to set off other infantry regiments in the militia. Many of them felt that they had provided men to the 22nd Battalion, including the 85th Regiment. Since the news came well before the official reorganization of the militia, it took everyone by surprise.
The officers of the 85th Regiment who had fought alongside the 22nd Battalion were outraged and gave the military authorities two options: share the glory of the 22nd Battalion equally among all the regiments that had contributed to organizing and maintaining it at the front rather than assigning it to a single regiment, or keep the 22nd Battalion name and motto as-is in order to prevent it from being merged with any regiment in particular.26

A Settled Matter

The uncertainty and debate ended in February 1920, when the government gave in to political pressure and accepted the Otter Commission’s new recommendations with respect to the 22nd Battalion. Rather than increasing national defence budgets and strengthening the Permanent Force, the military authorities downsized the RCR and the PPCLI. Each of those units lost a company, and those two companies formed the new infantry unit of the Permanent Force.

On 1 April 1920, the 22nd Regiment became part of the Permanent Force, kept its identity,27 and from then on was based in Quebec City.

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NOTES


3 Order général, No. 27, 1 April 1919. The PPCLI had been formed a few months before the 22nd Battalion in 1914.

4 A bilingual unit at the time. Throughout the war, the 14th Battalion always had a French-speaking company in its ranks, whose original members were all from the 65th Regiment (Carabiniers Mont-Royal).


6 Quebec City Archives; Fonds du Conseil de la Ville de Quebec series, microfilm 378: City Council minutes, 4 April 1919.

7 “Choice of the 22e,” The Gazette, 21 April 1919, p. 3. This statement is surprising since Montrealers always made up the majority of the unit’s strength throughout the war. See J-P. Gagnon, Le 22e bataillon (canadien-francais), 1914–1919, p. 354.

8 He is also the founder of the Association des Anciens du 22e Canadiens-Francais.

9 “C’est à Montréal que revient le droit de recevoir le 22e,” La Patrie, 16 April 1919, p. 1.

10 “Montreal or Quebec,” The Gazette, 24 April 1919, p. 4.

11 “Montréal réclame son dû,” La Patrie, 22 April 1919, p. 3.

12 “Pour cultiver le souvenir de l’héroïque 22e Régiment,” La Patrie, 15 September 1919, p. 5. Many small associations, all linked to the 22nd Battalion and its former members, were formed at the 65th Regiment (Carabiniers Mont-Royal) Armoury, including the Association des Anciens du 22e Canadiens-Francais, in January 1917.

13 The case of Brigadier-General Thomas-Louis Tremblay is most interesting. He was the subject of speculation on several occasions. He was appointed chief of police in Montréal (December 1918), then director of public safety (March 1919), superintendent of the Dominion Arsenal in Quebec City (March 1920) and finally commissioner of the Port of Quebec (April 1920).

14 Major Lucien Gauvreau and Captain Léonce Plante.


16 “Le 22ème Bataillon en permanence à Montréal,” La Patrie, 9 July 1919, p. 3.

17 “Un appel aux gars du valiant Vingt-Deuxième,” La Patrie, 7 October 1919, p. 3.


19 From its official name, The Committee to Investigate and Report on the Absorption of Units of the Overseas Military Forces of Canada into the Canadian Militia in Order to Preserve their Identity and Traditions.

20 “Le 22e Régiment sera versé dans le 65e Régiment,” La Patrie, 8 September 1919, p. 3.


22 Among the representatives of the 22nd Battalion were three of its four commanders: Colonel Frédéric Gaudet, Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Dubuc and Lieutenant-Colonel Henri Desrosiers. Brigadier-General Thomas-Louis Tremblay was absent.


24 “Le 22e Bataillon se fusionne avec le 65e Régiment,” La Patrie, 9 October 1919, p. 12.

25 Today, the Régiment de Maisonneuve.

26 LAC, RG 24, C-8, Vol 4463, MD4-6-85-1: Organisation — General — Le Régiment de Maisonneuve, 1914–1940. Except from the minutes of the 85th Regiment meeting held at headquarters, Drill Hall, Craig Street, on 15 October 1919, under the chairmanship of Lt Col R. P. Bissonall.

27 Ordre général, No. 37 from 1920.
Mental Health is Not Just a Challenge for War Heroes: Sometimes Average People Need Help, Too

by Nathan Packer

So far, I have only typed the title for this article and already I can feel the chemicals coursing through my body: my fingers, as I type this, are feeling fatter and more sluggish, yet also jittery and electrified. My vision is narrowing and blurring at the edges and my hearing is elevated. I am getting a headache. What Afghan experiences am I about to relate? Are these the symptoms of PTSD, and is that what this article is about? The short answer is that I did not have any significant traumatic experiences while in command in Kandahar, and this is not an article about PTSD. In fact, it is the exact opposite.

Three years ago, I got more drunk than usual, (which was considerable at the time), and did some things that I regret. Afterwards, I lay on the floor of my hotel room sobbing and trying to think of the most practical way of killing myself, as I assumed that I had just let down everyone that believed in me, destroyed my career, and ruined my life.

In the days following that event, which I have decided was my "rock bottom," I made an appointment with someone at my Care Delivery Unit (CDU), and through her I was referred to both the Addictions Treatment Program (ATP) and General Mental Health. We also did several tests to determine the extent of damage I had done to myself physically through decades of alcohol abuse.

Through a month of intensive therapy, and then a year of weekly group discussions with the wonderful people at ATP, I learned a lot about myself, who I am, and how I came to be that way. Through many discussions with an excellent counsellor at General Mental Health, I learned, in sum, that it is not normal to have to convince yourself every day that you should bother to live through that day and into the next. Through my bloodwork, I discovered that I have thyroid and Vitamin D deficiencies that may be contributing factors with respect to my depression.

I was also tested for PTSD, and while I clearly have some residual effects from my tours overseas, they are not significant enough to warrant the level of intensive support provided by the Operational Trauma Stress Support Centre (OTSSC). As I stated earlier, I did not experience any singular traumatic incidences. If I have any residual effects from those times, they stem more from driving thousands of kilometers on roads that I expected to erupt in a flash of fire and fury that would swallow me whole and leave...
nothing but twisted metal and a grieving family. While I saw the aftermath of these events, I never experienced them personally. Nor do I have to live with whatever emotions some people have after either taking the life of a fellow human being; the closest I ever came to being in an actual firefight was watching one play out from the top of the peak at Forward Operating Base Ma’sum Ghar in Afghanistan.

This, however, is the point of this article: I did not experience massive emotional trauma, yet I still needed help. I did not get help because I did not feel that I had earned the right to help, as I did not have any justifiable reason to take away precious mental health resources from those who truly needed it. While going through treatment, and since, I have met many people who have expressed this same thought: “There is something not right with me, but I can tough it out because I am not as bad off as others.”

The truth is, however, that while we may all know someone whose experiences on operations, or in life in general, have been more difficult than our own, this does not mean that we do not need, or have not earned the right to, a little bit of help ourselves.

The simple fact is that military life is hard, and it is even harder when you are average. We go through our career continually being assessed by our superiors, peers, and subordinates. We are asked to contribute more and more, to perform better and better. We give everything we have, and the only reward we can expect is more responsibility. And even though it is well known that we do not all have what it takes to become generals and chief warrant officers, this is the standard by which we are measured. In sum, during the ‘fighting season.’ My greatest fear as I was preparing my squadron for deployment was that I was not good enough for the job, and that I, by either doing the wrong thing or failing to do the right thing, would directly and personally be responsible for the death of one or more of the soldiers under my command. I was an average person given an extraordinary responsibility, and the weight of that responsibility was soul-crushing. For the eight months leading up to my deployment, I drank myself to sleep every night, as there was no other way to escape the fear, anxiety, and self-doubt.

Looking back, while I have no doubt that there were soldiers under my command that felt I was not a great leader, I can confidently say that I was good enough – I did not directly or indirectly get anyone killed. And while I did lose three soldiers from my squadron, they were, in fact, not under my command at the time, and the circumstances surrounding that incident were well and truly beyond my control.

I now realize that for years I had been dealing with what many refer to as a ‘black cloud’ over their heads, but what I called my ‘emotional cancer.’ This emotional cancer was born of self-doubt and an unrelenting pressure to both fit in and stand out. I could feel it growing in my soul and in my mind, getting bigger, and eating away at me. I wanted to kill it, and I used alcohol as my emotional chemotherapy. Eventually, I lost the battle and had to call in reinforcements – and I am thankful every day that I did so.

When I went to my CO and told him that I needed to take a month off work because I was broken and needed to get fixed,
he was surprised because I had been hiding it so well, but he was also incredibly supportive. The Formation Commander was also incredibly supportive. Everyone in the office was nothing but supportive. And my wife has been my biggest source of support and encouragement. And again, the addictions and mental health people have been amazing. They will help you, they want to help you. In fact, they wanted to help me more than I thought I needed – thankfully they can be very stubborn that way!

Conversely, they will not give you more help than you need. As I said, I did not get referred to OTSSC because I did not need it, so do not worry about over-burdening the mental health system for that which you may think your situation is not bad enough or not a big enough deal. They will get you all and only the help you need – let them worry about the cost.
Remember the CAF Mental Health Continuum: I accept that soldiers want to ‘fight through it’ because that is what we do, but do not wait until you find yourself ill and ‘in the Red’ before you get help. Fighting through and handling your own problems may be appropriate when you are reacting and ‘in the Yellow,’ but once you are injured, once you are ‘in the Orange,’ the smart choice is to get professional help before you ‘crash into the Red.’ It is much more difficult to fix a problem after the damage is done – you cannot close the barn door after the horse has bolted.

Another challenge, especially for our leaders, are the mottos or credos, “Mission, soldiers, equipment, self,” and “Mission first, soldiers always.” In the former, we must put ourselves last, in the latter, there is no room for ourselves at all. While these are important mottos to remember, it is also vital to acknowledge that if we do not take care of ourselves, eventually our physical, mental, or spiritual health could fail – and then we will be unable to command the mission or lead our soldiers to the best of our abilities.

In conclusion, if you feel off; if you wander among the people of the world, wondering why anyone bothers to keep going when everything is so clearly broken; if you drink more than you know you should; if you cannot connect emotionally or physically with your partner or your family; or if you just feel angry, frustrated, or fed up, then get help. No, you are probably not as bad off as some others. In fact, you may actually be able to make it all the way through your life without getting any help at all. But what if just a little bit of help could make things just a little bit easier, or even a lot easier? What if just talking to someone for an hour a week for a few months could make you see that there is another way to think, to feel, to exist?

Take it from me. Get a little bit of help, just lighten the load a little bit, or at least for just a little while. The chain of command will support you – we want you to be healthy, we really do. And sometimes, simply having someone to talk to that is not a loved one, who can listen unemotionally and without judgement, can make all of the difference in the world.

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One of the “most enduring traits” of Canadian foreign and defence policy, as this column has observed on multiple occasions, has been the regular appearance of Arctic sovereignty and security crises or controversies. During the Second World War, the massive influx of American military personnel associated with the Alaska Highway and other projects raised troubling questions about Canadian sovereignty in the far north. So, too, did the commissioning of the US-funded and US-operated radar stations of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line in the mid-to-late 1950s. In 1969-1970, Canadian and American differences over the legal status of the Northwest Passage were pointedly underscored by the Manhattan affair.

Themes of a similar nature—exacerbated by concurrent debates over the controversial American invitation to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and by a lamentably ill-informed parliamentary and media discourse over perceived links between elements of the North American Air Defence Modernization agreement (notably but not exclusively the North Warning System) and the Strategic Defense Initiative—followed the transit of the Northwest Passage by the US Coast Guard icebreaker Polar Sea in 1985.

The post-Mulroney decades have tended to deviate from the long-running pattern of regular, almost clockwork-like, crises and controversies over Arctic sovereignty and security. Why? Perhaps a single event, such as a particularly high-profile transit of the Northwest Passage in the style of the Manhattan or the Polar Sea (in any event, something with more gravitas than a cruise ship) is a necessary precursor or catalyst for igniting sustainable parliamentary, media, and public scrutiny. Perhaps climate change in the Arctic, particularly in the early post-Cold War era, was too abstract or seemingly too distant to animate Canadians and their leaders. Perhaps the broader post-Cold War trials and tribulations of the Canadian Forces and, later, a series of major and painful resource-consuming overseas commitments (most notably but not exclusively the conflict in Afghanistan) diverted the country’s attention. Or, perhaps as Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Toronto Franklyn Griffiths posited in 1999, Canada had simply outgrown the traditional “national-interests” view of the Northwest Passage.
This is not to suggest that Arctic sovereignty and security disappeared from the post-Mulroney radar screen. The Chrétien government, for example, was criticized for the ongoing erosion of the military presence and profile in Canada’s north, and for its perceived failure to meaningfully recognize that climate change would facilitate enhanced commercial and naval access to the Northwest Passage and thereby present the country with a host of security (broadly defined), sovereignty and stewardship challenges. The Harper government, in turn, managed the rare trick of being pilloried for seeking to expand the military presence in the north...to, it was suggested in some quarters, “militarize” the north in keeping with the Harper government’s perceived “warrior nation” ethos and approach to Canadian foreign and defence policy. Since the expansion was built around a comparatively-modest agenda of six-to-eight Arctic and Offshore (emphasis added) Patrol Ships, a northern training centre and a naval refuelling facility—all of which became even more modest as budgetary and other factors intruded—the “militarization” label was, at best, an ill-considered misnomer.

The Trudeau government, for its part, enumerated a variety of northern sovereignty, security, and climate change challenges and a concomitant...
series of “new initiatives” in *Strong, Secure, Engaged*—its 2017 statement on defence policy—and an even broader array of northern issues, including health, sustainable development, and the priorities of Indigenous peoples, as well as security and defence—in its 2019 Arctic and Northern Policy Framework. To “enhance the Canadian Armed Forces’ ability to operate in the Arctic and adapt to a changed security environment,” *Strong, Secure, Engaged* pledged to: (a) “enhance the mobility, reach and footprint of the Canadian Armed Forces in Canada’s North to support operations, exercises, and the Canadian Armed Forces’ ability to project force into the region;” (b) align the “Canadian Air Defence Identification Zone (CADIZ) with our sovereign airspace”; (c) “enhance and expand” the training and effectiveness of the Canadian Rangers; (d) collaborate with the United States “on the development of new technologies to improve Arctic surveillance and control, including the renewal of the North Warning System;” and (e) conduct “joint exercises with Arctic allies and partners and support the strengthening of situational awareness and information sharing in the Arctic, including with NATO.” In a broader sense, not specifically confined to the Arctic, the 2017 policy statement also pledged to “modernize NORAD to meet existing challenges and evolving threats to North America, taking into account the full range of threats.”

In addition, Canada’s armed forces would “introduce a number of new Arctic-focused capabilities, including naval vessels such as the Arctic [and] Offshore Patrol Ships, space-based surveillance assets such as the RADARSAT Constellation Mission, polar satellite communications, Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems, operational support sites such as the Nanisivik Naval Facility, and a family of new ground vehicles capable of navigating the harsh landscape of Canada’s North. We will integrate these capabilities into a ‘system-of-systems’ approach to Arctic surveillance,
comprising air, land, sea, and space assets connected through modern technology.” The military would also “leverage our new capabilities to help build the capacity of whole-of-government partners to help them deliver their mandates in Canada’s North, and support broader Government of Canada priorities in the Arctic region,” and “work to expand and deepen our extensive relationships with [Indigenous] communities, particularly through the Canadian Rangers and Junior Canadian Rangers.”

The more recent Arctic and Northern Policy Framework—in the words of the distinguished Canadian political strategist, writer, and professor Thomas S. Axworthy, a document that “was slipped out a day before the [2019] federal election campaign began with little fanfare and less praise”—had by design a much broader mandate than the 2017 defence policy statement, but included a security and defence component. Informed by Strong, Secure, Engaged, the latter reaffirmed the pledge to “enhance Canada’s military presence” in the north and drew particular attention to the need for strengthened “domain awareness, surveillance and control capabilities in the Arctic and the North.” The Framework as a whole has been roundly criticized in some quarters. Axworthy, for example, has labelled it “a lost opportunity: climate change, melting sea ice, and great power interest in the Arctic should make for a dynamic Arctic policy as an integral part of Canada’s most critical foreign policy priorities. Instead, Canada’s Arctic policy is simply a laundry list of objectives—which is neither a strategy nor even a policy.” Strong, Secure, Engaged and its Arctic sovereignty and security component have fared better, but nevertheless disappointed, albeit with little apparent public notice, those who sought further enhancements to Canada’s military capability in the north, both at the macro level (i.e., an overall expansion of the tiny permanent military presence in the north), and at the micro level (i.e., an enhanced search and rescue [SAR] capability in the north). Others sought additional detail—“the how”—on identified “new initiatives,” such as the renewal of the North Warning System.

The comparatively-lower profile in recent decades of issues related to Arctic sovereignty and security does not mean that all will remain quiet—politically, in the media and in terms of public opinion—on the northern front. Indeed, any number of potential developments—a controversial transit of the Northwest Passage, a serious search and rescue incident that calls into question the adequacy of Canada’s northern SAR capabilities or visible stresses in the continental defence relationship with the United States—could reawaken a latent or residual parliamentary, media, and public interest in the Arctic, stoke the coals of Arctic sovereignty and security, and ignite the types of controversy that became familiar in earlier decades.

Particularly intriguing in the latter context is the Deputy Director of the Centre for Defence and Security at the University of Manitoba, Dr. James Fergusson’s January 2020 Commentary for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Missed Opportunities: Why Canada’s North Warning System is Overdue for an Overhaul. Fergusson builds the technical, military, and operational case for North Warning System (NWS) modernization in some detail, noting the obsolescence (or worse) of the long- and short-range radars strung across the Canadian Arctic and down the coast of Labrador, the need for more northerly surveillance coverage, the challenges posed by “a new generation of Russian [air-launched cruise missiles] with a much longer range and capacity of flying at much higher speeds,” and “a potential long-range ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) threat, which will likely be deployed in the Russian Arctic, and will be capable of reaching major North American targets.” He also notes that “the NWS replacement will likely require a multi-domain—meaning across the ground, air, maritime and space domains—integrated system of sensors.” Technically ambitious, correspondingly expensive (particularly when vital adjuncts are included) and certain to generate highly sensitive issues such as a potential or perceived loss of Canadian sovereignty, NWS replacement, adds Fergusson, will be complicated: “If the tortuous state of pipeline projects is any indication, NWS modernization/replacement will likely entail a lengthy regulatory process with public scrutiny. Environmentalist groups are unlikely to remain silent. Moreover, the government will have to engage Indigenous communities in the Canadian Arctic in meaningful consultations, which will take time and become potentially divisive. The probability and willingness of this or future governments to drive the project forward on strict national security grounds is likely to be extremely low, not least of all in fear of a political backlash that would follow.”

Fergusson posits that “keeping the NWS off the public agenda relative to the complicated issues involved appears to make good short-term political sense. However, eventually it will emerge into the public domain, and when it does, the government will have failed to lay the groundwork for a reasonable debate, and will be immediately vulnerable to the charge of ‘misleading’ the public. If this is the case for the NWS, it is even more pronounced when one starts to examine the meaning behind possible future NORAD missions,” not least because of the potential blurring of the distinctions between air defence and ballistic missile defence.

“One can imagine,” he writes, “the future ill-informed, emotional debate on the NWS, never mind future NORAD missions, beginning with critics questioning the costs and pointing out that the money could be better spend on other more important economic and social programs. This will be attended by misinformed debate around the nature of the threat to North America necessitating billions of dollars of spending on the NWS. Moreover, it is then a small step to arguments that the militarization of the Canadian Arctic is actually undermining Canadian security in posing a threat to Russia and its vital interests in its Arctic. Of course, this debate will also be attended by the argument that this is simply an America-driven initiative, embroiling Canada in aggressive US military plans and clearly indicating that Canada is simply a puppet of the United States. According to this line of argument, Canada has lost its sovereignty and independence.”

“This”, he (optimistically?) suggests, “can be pre-empted by government officials, military, bureaucratic and political leaders getting outside of the Ottawa ‘bubble’ and engaging and informing the public on the importance of NWS replacement not just for the defence of Canada and the defence of North America in cooperation with the US. It is also important to ensure that there is no capability gap in NATO’s overall deterrence posture, which could be politically exploited by Moscow (and in future Beijing). In so doing, officials need to make clear that North American defence cooperation, even with a fully integrated, multi-domain NORAD does not equate to a loss of sovereignty. Laying the groundwork for NWS replacement in this regard also lays the groundwork for the future NORAD.”
Arguably at the opposite end of the Arctic sovereignty and security spectrum in terms of raison d’être, complexity and cost—but equally important in their own right and equally likely to ignite political, media and public controversy (the Martin Hartwell and Burton Winters tragedies of 1972 and 2012, respectively, still spring readily to mind)—are such functions as Arctic search and rescue. Timely and instructive in this regard is an article in the National Post of 17 December 2019,
by University of British Columbia SAR experts Michael Byers and Nicole Covey, and a subsequent and fuller examination of Arctic search and rescue and the “security dilemma” in the pages of International Journal. Byers and Covey argue, correctly I believe, that the “Canadian Arctic is becoming an increasingly busy place” as melting sea ice generates increased commercial shipping, resource development, and tourism. Canada, in response, “will soon need to improve its Arctic SAR capabilities in order to save lives.”

Their research, however, focuses, not on this “humanitarian imperative,” but “on a second reason for improving Arctic SAR capabilities: namely, that SAR personnel and equipment can strengthen Canada’s Arctic security”—more precisely, its non-state or constabulary-style security—“without contributing to a classic ‘security dilemma,’” whereby “a perceived military buildup by one state leads to a responsive buildup by another state, and so on into an arms race. This is because Arctic SAR involves dual-use assets that can fulfill most existing and reasonably foreseeable [non-state] Arctic security roles as a secondary mission.” Avoiding “a security dilemma is key with regards to Canada-Russia relations. In the Arctic arena, Russia sees itself surrounded by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states during a period of considerable tension with those same states elsewhere in the world. Although most of the responsibility for that tension lies with Russia, it is still in Canada’s interest to avoid feeding Russia’s Arctic uncertainties and insecurities, since regional military buildups can cause instability and even conflict.” At the same time, posit Byers and Covey, “all Arctic states have an interest in strengthening their ‘constabulary’ (as opposed to combat) capabilities in the region. An increasingly busy Arctic will see more criminal activity, including illegal fishing, smuggling, and illegal immigration. Arctic SAR equipment, especially long-range helicopters and icebreakers, is well-suited for responding to these challenges. Improving Canada’s Arctic SAR capabilities could thus serve two purposes: saving lives; and addressing readily foreseeable non-state security threats”—both “without creating an Arctic security dilemma.”

The authors observe that “most Arctic SAR equipment is well-suited for constabulary duties directed at non-state actors,” and posit that the forthcoming Airbus CC-295s, in addition to SAR, can “fulfill an important secondary function—namely surveillance—and could even insert paratroopers as necessary.” Similarly, “long-range [SAR] helicopters equipped with winches are ideal for interdicting small boats and commercial ships” (although one might wish to ponder various training, doctrinal, and jurisdictional issues). The authors do not broach the permanent or temporary basing of fixed-wing SAR aircraft in the Arctic, but do argue that “it might make sense to base one or more of the [Cormorant] helicopters in the Arctic during the busy summer months”—there is also a reference to Cormorant deployment during “the busy summer and fall months”—in “order to improve response times.” They acknowledge that the modest number of Cormorants, even with Ottawa’s promised (but apparently somewhat fluid SAR helicopter modernization and fleet augmentation initiative), could “preclude” this recommendation. In view of the Cormorant’s advancing age and the sluggishness of defence procurement in Canada, they also conclude that “it is time, now, to begin a procurement of a full fleet of new...SAR helicopters.”
The Byers-Covey call for an increased Arctic SAR capability appears sound, as is the acknowledgement—advanced many times in this column—that modern, well-equipped SAR aircraft can usefully undertake other important roles on a secondary basis. It should not be forgotten, in this context, that the forthcoming CC-295 and new-generation Cormorant/AW101 represent a quantum leap in surveillance capability, and in other respects, over the Buffalo and SAR Hercules and the existing Cormorant, respectively. Byers and Covey envisage a mix of primary SAR and secondary non-state security/constabulary roles, but one could conceivably go somewhat further afield to include a broader mix of non-military (i.e., SAR), quasi-military (i.e., non-state security/constabulary) and some military (i.e., surveillance) roles—albeit carefully selected, since multi-tasking has very real limits. Certain military roles could, admittedly, intrude upon their security dilemma concerns—as, no doubt in much more spectacular fashion, would NWS modernization and a revamped NORAD.

The call for seasonal SAR helicopter deployments in the north is interesting and has a number of historical precedents in southern Canada (i.e., special standby deployments on the east coast to cover drilling operations prior to the introduction of contracted SAR helicopters), but those deployments were comparatively close to the main operating bases and relatively straightforward to support compared to an Arctic forward operating location. Even if the nascent SAR helicopter modernization/augmentation initiative produces a viable number of new/modernized AW101s/Cormorants—one cannot help but be concerned that Ottawa spoke of “up to seven” additional SAR helicopters in 2018 but only “at least two” additional helicopters in 2019—the deployment, however temporary, of aircrew and technicians would impact the SAR mandate in the south. It may, in fact, be time for Canada to break with tradition and budget restraints and establish a permanent RCAF SAR capability at an appropriate location in the Arctic. This would logically be a multi-role squadron or unit, possibly styled “surveillance and rescue,” rather than the traditional “transport and rescue” (although, depending upon the type(s) of aircraft assigned, it could also conceivably incorporate a measure of transport capability).

In the final analysis, North Warning System replacement, a revamped NORAD, and the future shape of Arctic search and rescue are very different public policy topics, but make no mistake—Arctic sovereignty and security issues, concerns, and controversies are about to return to the Canadian political, media, and public landscape. It is not a question of “if”; it is a question of “when.” Let us hope that the ensuing discourse rises above the misinformed, muddled, and frankly embarrassing debates of the mid-1980s.

Martin Shadwick has taught Canadian Defence Policy at York University for many years. He is a former editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly, and he is the resident Defence Commentator for the Canadian Military Journal.
Maloney offers a uniquely-Canadian perspective with respect to Operation Kinetic as part of a NATO-led multinational peace enforcement mission. The importance of this work to the CAF in particular and to Canadians in general is not insignificant. Largely due to the nature of Canada’s contribution-style of warfare, it is not often that its professional military efforts on operations receive such due attention. Kosovo is no exception. Canada’s absence from the Balkans Contact Group and its battle group plus contribution compared to the Contact Group’s multinational brigades (French, Italian, German, British, and American) appeared to relegate the story regarding Canadian influence in Kosovo to the back seat. As prelude, Maloney’s detailed account of Canada’s political manoeuvrings to ensure American commitment to the peace enforcement mission, as well as his follow-on account of Canada’s tactical actions on the ground compared to those of our Allies, sets to re-balance the narrative in this regard.

Maloney has made the effort to ensure his work is written on two levels; one that will appeal to the military community and military historians, and one that will appeal to the wider public. His efforts to succinctly explain military doctrine, organizational structures, and operational functions will grant the wider public a better understanding of how western militaries organize and operate, and it will allow them to better take in the nuances and atmospherics expressed in the extensive primary source anecdotes offered throughout. For military historians and the military community, Maloney’s well-researched Operation Kinetic will bring reminders of how military operations were conducted in Bosnia, although with much better rules of engagement and armour in Kosovo. In fact, the plan and execution of the NATO intervention into Kosovo is considered a political and military blueprint for intervention in 'conflict less than war,' despite the serious and significant obstacles and frictions that are highlighted by Maloney throughout. Canada had its own trials to overcome, including the negative effects of alternate service delivery with respect to strategic deployment and sustainment, as well as the legacy of Somalia.

Maloney’s extensive experience in the Balkans is brought to bear by virtue of his outlining the geo-political arc from 1389, through to the post-Cold War break-up of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, in order to set the scene for Serbian Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing reprisals in Bosnia and Kosovo. This is an absolutely essential requirement for the reader to best understand the complexities and particularities of battle-group operations described later in the text. Maloney has also not missed out on the comparative effectiveness of the Canadians and their new military systems in theatre, such as the eight-wheeled Coyote.

Much has been written upon the crises in the Balkans. These crises are highly relevant today, given Russia’s seizure of the Crimea. The right to self-determination versus territorial integrity is at the heart of both of the Crimea and Kosovo. Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, and in 2019, enjoyed its 20th anniversary under international administration as a de facto UN protectorate. Much has been written about Kosovo’s incredibly-complex geo-political situation. The preponderance of literature to date has focused upon a breadth of perspectives from all sides; among them, self-determination vs. territorial integrity, nationalism, international and humanitarian intervention, insurgency, ethnic cleansing, stabilization, institutional capacity building, and peacemaking. Few, if any, have specifically focused upon the Canadian aspects related to peacemaking in Kosovo.

A look at the Canadian contribution to stabilizing Kosovo in the late-1990s has been long in the coming. The events of 9/11 in 2001, and the West’s focus upon the Middle East distracted the international community’s interest in the Balkans for well over a decade. Much has been written on the Afghanistan campaign generally, and the Canadian involvement in particular. Therefore, it comes as a welcome surprise to finally see the very first comprehensive treatment of Canada’s commitment to NATO’s mission in Kosovo. In effect, Sean Maloney has succeeded in writing a highly-accessible publication. He has chosen a balanced blend of analytical synthesis and anecdote rather than a historically-replete account of the Canadian military in Kosovo, and in so doing, he has avoided the soporific pitfalls of a strictly-scholarly work. Operation Kinetic: Stabilizing Kosovo brings the character and colour of our Canadian Armed Forces soldiers, sailors, and aviators serving on operations to life, and ultimately, makes the book a more memorable read.

Reviewed by Bill Cummings

Maloney’s extensive experience in the Balkans is brought to bear by virtue of his outlining the geo-political arc from 1389, through to the post-Cold War break-up of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, in order to set the scene for Serbian Slobodan Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing reprisals in Bosnia and Kosovo. This is an absolutely essential requirement for the reader to best understand the complexities and particularities of battle-group operations described later in the text. Maloney has also not missed out on the comparative effectiveness of the Canadians and their new military systems in theatre, such as the eight-wheeled Coyote.
**BOOK REVIEWS**

reconnaissance platform, and the Griffon rotary-wing surveillance and utility platform. Specific chapters have been allocated to each, including explanations regarding their development and innovative use by soldiers and aviators towards peace-enforcement in theatre. Strangely enough, we learn that some of these surveillance systems were used to keep our supposed-Allies in line and on mission. What follows are two sections on battle group operations, the first based upon the 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, and the second applicable to the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment. Both chapters are replete with anecdotes related to operations, and Maloney’s assessment of their value to stabilization throughout Kosovo, albeit mostly within the United Kingdom’s Multinational Brigade Group (Centre) area of operations, captures well the evolution of battle group operations over the one-year arc; from forced entry, through peace enforcement, and finally, to stabilization. He then finishes with an account of Canadian forces involved in sustainment operations that should satisfy both professional and armchair logisticians.

**Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead**

by Jim Mattis and Bing West
New York, Random House, 2019
300 pages, $27.75 (hardcover)

Reviewed by Peter J. Williams

In case you were wondering, it doesn’t mean what you might think. It stands for (Does the) Colonel Have Another Outstanding Solution, a sobriquet given him by a staff member when Mattis commanded the 7th Marine Regiment between 1994 and 1996. Admittedly, though the author freely states that over the course of a military career spanning almost 4 ½ decades he did much to inflict bedlam upon his nation’s enemies. He’s also very likely the only Secretary of Defense or four-star general in US history to have done jail time! Retired General Jim Mattis, United States Marine Corps, has teamed up with a long-time colleague (and a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Marine Vietnam veteran) Bing West in the compilation of this chronicle, which serves, “…[to] convey the lessons I learned for those who might benefit, whether in the military or in civilian life.”1 Spoiler alert; the vast majority of the book covers Mattis’ military career, with only a few pages devoted to his tenure as Secretary of Defense (SECDEF, 2017-2019). His life as a young man is also covered, including the youthful indiscretion (it was three-against-one, with Mattis being the loner, and a serving Marine officer at the time…) which saw him awarded a night behind bars before boarding an eastbound freight train the next morning.

The book is divided into three major sections:

- Direct Leadership. This covers Mattis’ career as an officer up to the time when he commanded Naval Task Force 58, as a brigadier-general in Afghanistan in 2001;
- Executive Leadership. This, the longest section in the book, spans his time as Commander 1st Marine Division in Iraq until his appointment as Commander US Joint Forces Command (US JFCOM) with the ‘additional hat’ of being NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT), both of these being four-star appointments; and
- Strategic Leadership. This section describes Mattis as Commander Central Command, during which he was, inter alia, responsible for the conduct of US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Within this Section, he also includes a chapter entitled, “Reflections.”

Ultimately, Sean Maloney delivers an excellent analysis of the Canadian contribution to military intervention in Kosovo, balancing the geo-political and strategic context with tactical operations in theatre. His extensive primary source research and experience reveal some striking insight and detail, and his comparative assessment of Canadian military effectiveness within the multi-national brigade and theatre are significant contributions to our understanding of the Canadian efforts in Kosovo. It is, however, his thorough use of anecdotes to paint a truly-Canadian perspective of Operation Kinetic that makes this publication a worthwhile and refreshing read, one that is uniquely Canadian.

Lieutenant-Colonel W.G. Cummings, CD, a highly-experienced infantry officer, has spent 30 years in The Royal Canadian Regiment, and has completed operational tours in Cyprus, Bosnia, and Afghanistan.

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Relentless Struggle: Saving the Army Reserve 1995-2019
by C.P. Champion
Ottawa: Durnovaria, 2019
494 pages; $29.95
Reviewed by Wolfgang W. Riedel

For most of Canada’s history, its army was one predominantly made up of part-time reservists assisted by a small group of full-time soldiers dedicated to training them. That structure changed in the early-1950s when Canada formed a total of four full-time brigades dedicated to countering the Communist threat in Europe. Then-Chief of Defence Staff, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds insisted that if Canada was to fight in Europe, its soldiers needed to be there at the start of hostilities. As Canada’s full-time force expanded dramatically to its peak in 1963, its part-time force declined both in numbers and in equipment holdings. Thereafter, insufficient funding issues caused decline in both components to the point that by 1995, there were two camps with decidedly-different viewpoints about what the future of the Army Reserve should look like.

This is the point where Champion takes up his narrative. Outraged by unilateral, detrimental initiatives by the then-commander of Central Area effecting his Army Reserve units, a group of retired officers, reserve unit honorary colonels and lieutenant colonels and other influential individuals, banded together to develop a strategic response. This group, located primarily, but not exclusively, in southern Ontario, would quickly become the nucleus of Reserves 2000, an organization that would spend the next two-and-one-half decades seeking to influence the Canadian Forces and the Government with respect to Army Reserve issues.

Champion, a former senior policy advisor to a Minister of National Defence and the current editor of The Dorchester Review, took the unusual step of joining the reserves as a Guardsman, and then completing infantry training while writing this book.

NOTES
2 Ibid., p. 251.
3 Ibid., p. 107.
D-Day, & the Battle of Normandy

2000 and the supporters of those on part-time reserve service—can still be used by the tourists of the second. Copp and Baker’s guide falls clearly in the first category, but of the second. The Pen & Sword

Reviewed by Terry Loveridge

ISBN 9781926804170
191 pages, $C27.00 (softcover)
Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2019

by Terry Copp and Matt Baker

Canadian Battlefields of the Second World War: Dieppe, D-Day, & the Battle of Normandy

A Canadian’s Guide to the Normandy Battlefields

A good battlefield guide has to meet three criteria: it has to provide enough information for the user to find the points of his-or-her interest; it has to provide sufficient historical information on the points of interest, including surprises or anecdotes that increase interest; and it has to be readily portable. For a guide to move from good-to-great, it should meet two other criteria: up-to-date information for travel, and sufficient maps and pictures to orient the reader quickly. Canadian Battlefields of the Second World War: Dieppe. D-Day & the Battle of Normandy qualifies for consideration in the ‘great’ category.

Copp and Baker’s latest guide is aimed at the 75th Anniversary campaign, it is a history of the organization and—as the title indicates—documents their relentless struggle to save the Army Reserve during the period from 1995 to 2019. But, the book is also much more than that. Champion has augmented the very considerable archives that he was provided with numerous interviews and other material from both sides, which delve deep into the issues and personalities that shaped this fight. He ‘names names,’ and he ‘points fingers.’

The ‘struggle’ has two factions: on the one hand is Reserves 2000 and the supporters of those on part-time reserve service—the majority of the Army Reserve; on the other hand, there is the Regular Force leadership and their adjuncts, the reservists on full-time service at administrative headquarters. Funding is at the root of the issue. Funds allocated by the government are controlled by the Regular Force, which leads to inequities as to how those funds are distributed. Full-time reservists, working at Regular Force jobs, are allocated a disproportionate share of those funds; seriously undermining part-time reservists’ numbers and training. Compounding that is that the Regular Army frequently treats Army Reserve funding as a slush fund that it draws from for other projects when desired. Moreover, the Regular Force, in general, spends defence dollars poorly allocating an inordinately-high amount on Regular Force and civilian pay and benefits, as well as for the administration of an ever-expanding bureaucracy, rather than on equipment and training.

The book’s main premise is that for the much of the time, the Army made plans for the Army Reserve’s future without consulting with part-time reservists, and without a larger vision for the Army Reserve’s future. Champion delves into the attitudinal differences between these two groups as they progressed over the years, and how, from time-to-time, Reserve 2000’s intervention at a political level saved the Army Reserve from serious harm from indifferent, or even hostile actions or plans generated by various Regular Force commanders or staff. However, this is not a one-sided view. The author provides explanations for why some of these plans came into existence, and provides due credit to several politicians and Regular Force commanders who, in fact, stabilized and improved matters.

One weakness in this work is that, like Reserves 2000 itself, Champion does not deal with the fact that the Army Reserve, as constituted, is neither a lethal nor a credible military force and cannot be fixed by mere ‘fine tuning.’ Dedicated funding and larger numbers alone will not cure the inherent problems that have plagued it for over a half-a-century. Neither will Regular Force attempts to amalgamate into ‘tactical groupings’ nor will assignments to such make-work capabilities as ‘Light Urban Search and Rescue.’ Those initiatives have failed in the past. A much greater vision for the Army Reserve and the Army as a whole is needed.

Champion’s book stands alone in its field. In large part, he exposes us to how ‘sausages are made’ within the halls of various Canadian military headquarters, and on Parliament Hill. I spent many of the years in question on the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council, and while I could see the end result of the problems we faced, the reality of why much of that happened was hidden behind a bureaucratic curtain. Champion has torn much of that curtain away. More importantly, he exposes us as to how fragile an organization the Army Reserve is and how its well-being is too often dependent upon serendipity, or the vagaries of a single politician, commander, or even a single staff officer. It is an excellent, well researched and well written volume that ought to be mandatory reading for all officers.

Colonel (ret’d) Wolfgang W. Riedel, OMM, CD, QC has served for forty-four years in the ranks and as an officer in the Regular Force and the Reserve Force in the artillery, infantry and as a legal officer with the Office of the Judge Advocate General. As Deputy Judge Advocate General - Reserves he was Canada’s Senior Reserve Force Legal Officer and was a member of the Chief of Reserves and Cadets Council.

Battleground history. The Pen & Sword series are typical of the first type, and Major and Mrs. Holt’s Guides of the second. Copp and Baker’s guide falls clearly in the first category, but can still be used by the tourists of the second.

A Canadian’s Guide to the Normandy Battlefields and his 1980s Maple Leaf Route series, but is pocket-portable (about the same size as its major competitor, the I-Pad) and affordable (if not, it appears, available in e-form).
The guide is well-organized with the traveller in mind. The introduction focuses upon practical travel planning, and the remainder of the book is divided into history and touring sections on Dieppe, the D-Day 6th Airborne Bridgehead, Juno Beach, the American and British Beaches (Point du Hoc, Omaha, and Gold), The Bridgehead Battles, The Battles for Verrières Ridge, and (Operation) “Tractable” and the Falaise Gap.

The introduction provides sound advice regarding tour company selection, what to when starting in London or Paris, and where to stay at Dieppe and in Normandy. It also offers excellent suggestions for where to stay and where to eat (continued throughout the guide). The travel advice and site information are likely as good as it gets for today, but hotels, restaurants, B&Bs, and museums continue to adapt to the increased battlefield traffic. For example, the guide recommends visiting the RAF Museum at Duxford and sitting in a Spitfire, but the RAF Museum at Hendon, which is accessible by London Tube, now provides, not only a Spitfire sitting, but six hangars of warplanes, and a virtual reality ride on Guy Gibson’s Lancaster over the Mohne Dam, and, like all UK public museums, it has no entrance fee.

Baker’s design, maps, and photos are excellent. The guide incorporates familiar historic photos (familiar is a good thing in a guide book) and current colour photographs, some of which are aerial shots. Most of these are excellent for orientation, and more than a few are brilliant. The guide has a decent index and useful annexes of Canadian Army organizations, but it is curious how guides still insist upon incorporating maps within the text rather than placing them as an annex. It is as if the reader is not standing on a windy corner trying to orient him-or-herself to the ground while leafing back and forth between maps.

The battlefield tours sections are organized as brief histories with appropriate historical quotes and anecdotes, followed by descriptions of what to see and how to see them. They contain additional advice on places to stay and handy web sources to consult. Copp knows what his readership wants, but also exhibits strong opinions with respect to what it needs. This part works best for historians and readers with a basic understanding of the operations he describes, but once the tours move into the bridgehead battles, the increasing detail might intimidate the tourist looking for an overview and spots to appreciate.

History students will find most descriptions sufficiently detailed, and some provocative. For example, why does Montgomery receive so much attention in the Dieppe portion? Is it to provoke debate, or because his name is most familiar to tourists? Did the chert (sedimentary quartz crystal) composition of the beach really immobilize some tanks after all? Did anyone on the planning side note that chert is a primary material for crafting arrowheads because it flakes in razor-thin slices?

Sections vary in depth of coverage. The section on the American and British beaches is understandably brief and exist to satisfy the tourist itch to see the Point du Hoc and Omaha Beach, as well as providing a lead-in to the greater bridgehead battles. Canadian connections are made, as appropriate. The contribution of the Royal Canadian Navy’s 31st Minesweeper Flotilla at Omaha, for example, is noted (but sadly no information is provided about its memorial on the beach). As noted, the detail and background become more intensive once the tours enter the bridgehead battles. This is likely because these episodes and sites are less well-known to Canadians, who tend to assume that D-Day constitutes the Battle of Normandy. The inland sections even include tactical scenarios used by students to ‘reverse-engineer’ battlefield decisions. The history student will likely find this particularly interesting, but the tourist will likely be skimming by this point of the book.

Both student and tourist will find the points of interest on the battlefield, for the most part, well indicated with descriptions, maps, photos, websites, and some GPS locations (fast becoming the standard). As noted, the bridgehead battle is particularly well-represented, even if its detail underlines the lighter treatment given the beaches and the Canadian airborne bridgehead. The much-photographed Tiger tank sitting on the D979 is included, but not the vacant and accessible Varaville Gatehouse with its commemorative 1 Can Para plaque and relatively undisturbed battleground.

Despite the nitpicking, Canadian Battlefields of the Second World War: Dieppe, D-Day & the Battle of Normandy is a valuable resource. Balancing history, travel advice, and portability is a matter of choices (and author interest) and this is a sufficiently detailed, well-appointed, and admirably portable guide that does what it sets out to do: provide travellers with a keen interest in Canadian military history a sound guide to the Dieppe and Normandy battlefields. Travellers can only await, with a certain impatience, the next volume anticipated for the 75th anniversary of the final battles.

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