

CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL

Vol. 21, No. 1, Winter 2020



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Défence

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Cover

Distinguished, diversified
Maritime artist and long-time
Canadian Armed Forces veteran
Peter Robichaud's evocative
tribute to Canada's armoured
forces during the Afghanistan
war is embodied in the issue's
cover image, "Desert Cat,
Leopard 1 C2, Afghanistan 2007."
Studio Robichaud



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ISSN 1492-465X



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The Value of Intelligence Sharing for Canada: The 'Five Eyes' Case



Is Your Organization Truly Innovative?



Back to the Future? The Tale of Two Trudeau's and Their Defence Policies

CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL

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NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for "translation of original quote", indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.

Welcome to the Winter 2020 edition of the *Canadian Military Journal*. And as those chilly yet predictable seasonal winds start to blow up here in the Great White North, my stellar and indispensable Publication Manager Claire and I hope we have cobbled together some interesting and timely thoughts on matters offered to pique the interest of you, our very diverse and truly international readership.

Lots of variety this time out... Taking the point, infantryman-turned- intelligence analyst Ismaël Fournier tackles the very timely subject of counterinsurgency operations (COIN), both from an historic viewpoint, such as COIN operations conducted in Algeria, Vietnam and Malaya, while homing in on present-day COIN operations against violent extremist organisations (VEOs) in the central African country of Mali. Herein, Dr. Fournier's aim is "...to demonstrate that VEOs' ability to remain combat effective in Mali is a direct consequence of the absence of truly defined COIN operations in the country's rural areas."

Next, Defence Scientist Dr. Krystal Hachey, and former 'blue water sailor' – turned Personnel Selection Officer, Lieutenant-Commander Carrie Topping, team up to explore the rich and varied culture, customs and traditions of Canada's senior service, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN). While noting that the RCN "...has a rich culture of customs and traditions far different from the other two environments," they also maintain that these customs and traditions are captured within the Canadian Armed Forces Identity System. The intent of that umbrella system is to embody "...visible and audible attributes of the Canadian Armed Forces," and that specifically, the RCN's customs and traditions are intended "... to provide members meaning and cohesion as a naval family during their service." This team then goes on to examine the specific perceptions of serving sailors, both positive and negative, with respect to various aspects of naval culture, including customs and traditions, and how the march of technology, and possible concerns regarding gender and rank exclusivity may affect these traditions.

Moving right along, and on an entirely different subject, Intelligence Officer Major Sylvain Rouleau explores the so-called 'Five Eyes' intelligence sharing agreement established from consultations reached with the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Specifically, he explores both the benefits and the costs/drawbacks to Canada as a considered junior partner in this particular security arrangement, ending with a proposal for a way forward "...for Canada's intelligence sharing with its Five Eyes partners."

Exploring a broader concept than just its specific applications to national defence and its related industrial partners, logistician Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Bennett assesses where organizations, including our own, stand with respect to innovation. To that end,

Bennett believes that "...innovation is a mindset and part of an organization's culture that strives to advance and develop new or improved processes, strategies, practices and equipment. It also provides "...flexibility to ever-increasing demands," and the optimal use of resources, stressing that: "Innovation is not the same as change." While military applications would at first appear obvious, the author opines that both the military and the government, including the public service *writ large*, have significant room for improvement with respect to innovation, and he proposes a solution for consideration.

Part of the *Canadian Military Journal's* mandate is to promote exposure to gifted submitters from outside the traditional defence sphere, but who have a demonstrated interest in national defence matters. To that end, undergraduate student in Political Science from the University of Manitoba, Myles Erickson, offers a very interesting comparison of the promulgated defence policies of two 'father and son' Prime Ministers, Pierre Trudeau, and Justin Trudeau. In Erickson's words: "I argue that their defence policy positions on the United States, on adversaries, and upon international organizations bear a striking resemblance, due more to geopolitical context and Canada's position within the world, rather than upon political ideology or familial connection."


Two opinion pieces this time out, and again, on very different subjects. First, the Canadian journalist, infantry reserve officer and specialist in Information Operations, Chris Wattie, explores the challenges associated with Canadian Strategic Communications and Information Operations in Latvia, as part of NATO's protective presence there. He is followed by artillery officer Major Jordan Beatty, who maintains that while the Canadian Armed Forces does an excellent job overall of training physical-body awareness through drill instruction and other applications, "...improvements can be made to training the mind to 'stand at attention' as well." To that end, he introduces the concept of 'mindfulness,' which "...equates to a mental state where one brings their attention to present moment feelings and sensations, acknowledging them in a non-judgmental manner."

Then, in a rather unusual but very interesting direction for him, our esteemed resident commentator, Martin Shadwick, takes a reflective look at the manner in which Canadians *writ large* tend to view the nation's participation in the Second World War.

Finally, we close with two book reviews on very different subjects, which we recommend for consideration by our readers.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal



Map of Mali and neighbouring countries.

Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Dynamics in Mali

by Ismaël Fournier

Ismaël Fournier is a former infantryman with the 3rd Battalion of the Royal 22nd Regiment, who deployed with them to Bosnia in 2001, and then to Kabul and Kandahar in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2007 respectively. Severely wounded in an IED explosion during the latter deployment, and after multiple restorative surgeries, Ismaël made a professional change to the military intelligence branch. Since then, he completed a baccalaureate, a master's degree, and a PH. D from Laval University in history. Leaving the armed forces in 2019, he is currently employed by the Department of National Defence as an analyst specializing in strategy and tactics related to insurgencies and counter-insurgencies.

Introduction

Since the launch of the Tuareg rebellion in 2012, violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have been increasingly active in Mali and the rest of the Sahel region. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), which is composed of multiple insurgent groups, is currently conducting insurgency operations in most of the Malian State. Moreover, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) is operating in the vicinity of the tri-border region of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. To increase control of rural areas, these VEOs employ irregular warfare (guerrilla) tactics. In other words, they will minimise conventional and overt warfare and maximise hit and run tactics, ambushes with small arms and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), complex attacks with vehicle borne IEDs (VBIEDs), as well as subversive

operations. Key to these groups' freedom of movement and freedom of action is their access to geographical lines of communication and to the civilian population. The former allows insurgents to move from their bases of operation to their objectives, the latter will provide intelligence, recruits, food, and, in some cases, safe havens for the insurgents. VEO leaders will frequently deploy overseers in the villages to control the population and impose their will on the villagers. In other instances, insurgents will come and go as they please in undefended villages to preach radical Islam, impose Sharia law and collect whatever they require.

Part of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations will aim to deny insurgents access to villages via the deployment of static security forces that will remain in the populated areas to protect the civilians. Without access to villages, insurgents lose their ability to blend in with the population, lack support, manpower (recruitment) and the intelligence required to conduct their operations. VEOs will find themselves in an even more precarious situation if their bases of operation are targeted as well. Another COIN related initiative is to deny VEOs' access to their lines of communication by conducting intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) operations as well as ambushes on insurgents. COIN also implies that the insurgent's supply lines and border access are cut off through interdiction operations. Once confronted to these security measures, insurgents are tactically disadvantaged and forced toward two options: be caught in the open and be subjected to the security forces overwhelming firepower, or disengage in order to find



Growing Islamist terror tactics in the Burkina Faso region, February 2013.

shelter in isolated areas. If rural villages, key lines of communication and border areas are secured by counterinsurgents, insurgents will be trapped and forced to remain hidden with no supply, recruits and intelligence which, eventually, leads to the insurgency's demise. This is exactly the situation in which the Islamic State's insurgents in Afghanistan found themselves in shortly before their complete surrender to security forces in November 2019.¹ These COIN tactics have also been conducted in the past in several operational theatres such as in Algeria against the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN), in Malaya against the Malayan National Liberation Army, in Vietnam against the Viet Cong, in Iraq against Al Qaeda, and in Colombia against the FARC guerillas. While still the subject of many debates, these COIN doctrines have ultimately proven to be, at different levels, highly efficient in each of the aforementioned conflicts.

While the fight for the French colony of Algeria was doomed to a political failure between 1954 and 1962, the FLN was tactically defeated by French COIN. The communist insurgency launched in 1948 in Malaya was militarily and politically defeated by a robust and efficient British COIN campaign in 1960. In Vietnam, the once powerful Viet Cong insurgency was eliminated as an effective fighting force in the years following the Tet offensive in 1968. The US and South Vietnamese

"While the fight for the French colony of Algeria was doomed to a political failure between 1954 and 1962, the FLN was tactically defeated by French COIN."

COIN campaign, which was under the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), severely degraded the Viet Cong. From 1972, regular forces of the North Vietnamese Army took over most communist military operations, which were concentrated not on guerilla, but on conventional warfare with tanks, infantry and artillery. In Iraq, between 2007 and 2011, Al-Qaeda was severely crippled following the Surge campaign led by General David Petraeus, as well as by the Joint Special

Operation Command's targeting operations. Finally, the most proficient military initiatives against the FARC guerillas in Colombia were related to COIN initiatives.² Each conflict is characterized by different political, social, military and geographical dynamics. A COIN initiative that proved to be efficient in one theatre will not necessarily apply to another theater. However, security operations related to COIN are universal and paramount to attain success, regardless of the theater in question. This article aims to demonstrate that VEOs' ability to remain combat effective in Mali is a direct consequence of the absence of truly defined COIN operations in the country's rural areas. While COIN involves political, military,

economic, civic and social lines of operation, this article will focus on security issues related to COIN. Thus, the emphasis will be centered on VEOs' access to the civilian population and insurgent access to borders and lines of communication in rural Mali.

VEOs and the Civilian Population

JNIM unites five VEO organisations: Ansar al-Din, Al Murabitoun, Macina Liberation Front, Almansour Ag Alkassoum, and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These groups operate in different areas of Mali and the Sahel. ISGS, a DAESH affiliated group, operates in the tri-border area of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Finally, Ansaroul Islam, an independent group that cooperates with JNIM and ISGS, operates in northern Burkina Faso. While autonomous, each of the JNIM groups work together. Even though



General David Petraeus (right), commanding general of the Multi-National Force Iraq, 14 June 2007.



An anti-government protester in Burkina Faso, 30 October 2014.



Reuters/Alamy Stock Photo 2D02EYB

French soldiers and United Nations peacekeepers from Burkina Faso patrol in Timbuktu, 5 November 2014.

they are rivals from two separate umbrella groups, JNIM and ISGS are also known to cooperate to some degree.³ These VEO groups were able to expand their area of operation due to easy access to the civilian population and to their geographical lines of communication. Mali's rural population remains one of the core center of gravity of the VEOs. If the latter manages to dissociate the population from the security forces, control it physically, and gain its active or passive support through fear, VEOs will have an immense tactical advantage over government military forces. As underlined by Lieutenant-Colonel David Galula, a highly respected French COIN tactician who fought in Algeria:

*"[For insurgencies], the exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worst, on its submissiveness."*⁴

Galula elaborated upon his COIN theory in his manifesto: *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice*. He underlined that as an insurgent group gains support, its capabilities grow. New capabilities will enable VEOs to gain additional support. In terms of popular support, what is a gain for the insurgency is a loss for the government, and vice versa. Mali's VEOs' current ability to operate with such effectiveness is contingent on the absence of "clear-hold-build" (CHB) operations. CHB is executed in a specific, high-priority area experiencing overt insurgent

activities. CHB is thoroughly described in the US military FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual. The latter's revision was under the supervision of General David Petraeus, who needs no introduction, and who was inspired by Galula's theories when he had the FM 3-24 written. The manual states that CHB has the following objectives:

- Create a secure physical and psychological environment;
- Establish firm government control of the populace and area;
- Gain the populace's support.⁵

COIN efforts should begin by controlling key inhabited geographical zones. The objectives are to CHB one village, area, or city, and then reinforce operational successes by expanding the CHB ops to other areas. This process is often referred to as "the oil spot" theory. This approach aims to develop a long-term, effective local government framework that secures the people while meeting its basic needs. Success reinforces the local government's legitimacy in the eyes of the population. In many ways, the overall operational plan of VEOs is very similar to those of counterinsurgents. In Mali, insurgent groups gradually expanded their area of influence by spreading their forces and their influence from one region to the other. They progressively enhanced their control of rural areas

and enforced their laws in the villages, gaining the support or submissiveness of the civilians in their areas of operation. This is why CHB operations are so important in order to degrade an insurgency. The primary tasks specifically required to accomplish CHB are:

- Provide continuous security for the local populace;
- Eliminate insurgent presence;
- Reinforce political primacy;
- Enforce the rule of law;
- Rebuild local government institutions.⁶

Such initiatives will require civil authorities, intelligence agencies, and security forces (foreign and domestic) to work hand in hand. The main reason why such a small insurgency (approximately 1,300-1,800 insurgents in total) remains capable of sustaining its current level of activity in Mali is because security forces are not conducting proper CHB operations. Securing an area through conventional warfare tactics is a crucial phase to accomplish when conducting a COIN campaign in a given area. In that regard, VEOs have shown much vulnerability once they were confronted by French Operations *Serval* and *Barkhane* clearing missions. However, with very few troops deployed to provide continuous security for the local populace (first step of CHB), the VEOs will, at some point, be able to regain some influence and infiltrate the

cleared area once again. While French military operations currently represent the greatest threat to VEOs, Operation *Barkhane* is more a “macro-COIN” initiative than a thorough COIN military campaign. French troops are too few and too dispersed to execute a concrete COIN mission which aside from military operations, must include political, civic and social initiatives as well. As for UN

forces, the mandate of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) does not allow its troops to conduct such COIN and security operations in Mali.

The second step of CHB (eliminate insurgent presence) will only have long term effects if troops remain in the area of operations alongside the civilian population. As soon as security forces vacate an area, VEOs will unavoidably return and resume their insurgency in the region. Multiple reports have shown that several areas of Mali are not protected by the Forces armées maliennes (FAMA) units, which explains why insurgents are still able to operate in previously secured rural areas. The situation is so dire that several tribes are forming their own militias to ensure their own protection. For instance, members of the Dozo tribe created brigades in several towns in Mopti to counter VEOs. The chief of the Dozo in a village near Djenné explained to a National Geographic reporter that “the government’s

“do-nothing army” failed to protect his people from Islamist

“As for UN forces, the mandate of the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) does not allow its troops to conduct such COIN and security operations in Mali.”



Peacekeepers from Senegal serving with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) patrol sensitive areas in central Mali, Mopti, 5 July 2019.

UN photo 795107



MINUSMA investigates human rights violations in Koulogon, in the Mopti region in Mali, 8 January 2019.

fighters, so they've taken on the responsibility themselves".⁷ This exacerbated the problem as these militia groups reportedly targeted Fulani people who are widely believed to be associated with VEOs. For instance, Dozos belonging to the Dan Na Ambassagou tribe were accused of having killed nearly 150 people in March 2019, in the village of Ogossogou.⁸ Moreover, armed groups such as the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA), the Imghad Tuareg Self-defense Group and Allies (GATIA) and the Ganda Izo (a Fulani group) have joined forces to compensate for the shortcomings of the FAMA in the Menaka region to confront VEOs since 03 Apr 18.⁹ Such drastic initiatives are fueled by the absence of security forces deployed in the villages to protect the people and ensure that law and order are respected.

The third step of CHB (reinforce political primacy) can only be done if local government officials are able to work in the rural communities without fear of being harassed or killed by the insurgents. The VEOs' control of multiple areas, due to the security forces' lack of proactivity, impedes the government representatives', village elders' and town mayors' ability to safely govern in their areas of responsibility. In such conditions, accomplishing the last two steps of CHB (enforce the rule of law and rebuild local government institutions) is unachievable. In consequence, VEOs are free to control the villagers. As specified in FM 3-24:

[I]n almost every case, counterinsurgents face a populace containing an active minority supporting the government and an equally small militant faction opposing it. Success requires the government to be accepted as legitimate by most of that uncommitted middle, which also includes

*passive supporters of both sides. Because of the ease of sowing disorder, it is usually not enough for counterinsurgents to get 51 percent of popular support; a solid majority is often essential. However, a passive populace may be all that is necessary for a well-supported insurgency to seize political power.*¹⁰

A passive populace will allow VEOs to gain "passive support" from local villagers. Developing passive support early in an insurgency is often critical to a VEO group's survival and growth. Such support is "tacitly" given to the insurgents by the population, which has a great effect on the VEO's long-term effectiveness. Passive supporters do not provide material support. However, they do allow insurgents to operate and do not provide information to counterinsurgents. This form of support is often referred to as "tolerance" or "acquiescence."¹¹ Another main form of popular support for insurgencies is termed as "active internal support" which includes the following:

- Civilians or groups joining the VEOs;
- Providing logistics and financial support;
- Providing intelligence;
- Providing safe havens;
- Providing medical assistance;
- Providing transportation;
- Carrying out actions on the behalf of the VEOs.¹²

VEOs in Mali have benefited from both passive and active internal support. For instance, AQIMs' stranglehold on the north-western part of the country in Timbuktu is largely the result of its contacts with locals in the countryside. AQIM is reported to have enjoyed a significant degree of active internal support in this area. AQIM allegedly received logistical and information support from several individuals in the Western Sahel. These individuals allegedly provided recruits, supplies and basic necessities to AQIM members. In addition, locals are known to have provided AQIM with intelligence on activities in their area. This is largely due to AQIM's attempt to establish tribal connections with key individuals in their area of operation through marriage and business.¹³ In other cases, villagers with no ties or who are not necessarily sympathetic to VEOs will simply tolerate them given the absence of security forces to protect them. Local support to VEOs is also often generated by using violent coercion and intimidation techniques on the population. Coercion is often highly effective in the short term, particularly at the community level. However, violent actions against the general populace, or attacks that negatively affect people's way of life, will also undermine the insurgent's image in the long term, especially if the latter wishes the population to openly support the insurgency. Coercion can be very counterproductive for insurgent groups, especially if the targeted population can be relied on to support the VEOs and if counterinsurgents are proactive in the area.

“In other instances, VEOs destroyed public buildings and denounced the presence of State authorities in the region.”

Insurgents can occupy villages permanently or periodically. Villages occupied permanently will see a small or medium group of insurgents operate inside the village, or in its vicinity, on a daily basis. Their goal is to control the population, enforce Sharia law, tax the inhabitants, collect food, intelligence, and recruit new insurgents. Villages can also act as safe havens for insurgents who will blend in to deceive security forces operating in the area. Villages occupied periodically will see VEO insurgents infiltrate the villages, harass and threaten the population, preach radical Islam and collect whatever basic necessities they require. After a short period of time (which ranges from hours to a couple of days), insurgents will leave the village which will unavoidably be targeted again by the VEOs in the near future. For instance, in the Mopti region of Mali, inhabitants of the village of Sofara lived under the control of insurgents belonging to the Macina Liberation Front. Villagers were deprived of their right to organize festivities, such as weddings, baptisms, etc. Numerous testimonies collected in several localities in the central region of Mali show constant cases of intimidation, torture and other forms of violence. Insurgents came and went as they pleased on a periodic basis to control and intimidate Sofara's inhabitants.¹⁴ The village of Nou-Bozo, also in Mopti, has been under the control of multiple VEO insurgents as well. People were constantly monitored by the insurgents who forbade the villagers from moving in or out of the village. The inhabitants were subjected to beatings and threats when they refused to comply with the directives given to them.¹⁵



UN photo 814841

MINUSMA increases patrols in central Mali, Mopti, 4 July 2019.



UN photo 795042

UN police patrol the Menaka region in northeast Mali, 9 January 2019.

In other instances, VEOs destroyed public buildings and denounced the presence of State authorities in the region. Villagers were threatened not to report the VEOs' presence to the security forces and were warned that the insurgents would be back.¹⁶ The Malian Government's preoccupation with securing southern Mali and returning stability to northern regions has resulted in the limited presence of the FAMA in central regions. When present, FAMA soldiers' violent behaviour towards the Fulani population often exacerbates the situation. Such behavior has facilitated VEO propaganda and recruitment operations among the Fulani people. This is a typical "good insurgency" facilitated through "bad counterinsurgency" dynamic. The credibility of security forces must remain untarnished if civilians are to fully trust and support them. Otherwise, VEOs will fill the void and increase their grip and influence over the population. Even if local security forces were courteous toward the villagers and conducted COIN initiatives to sever the insurgents' contact with the civilian population, it would only be practical if larger VEO formations are cleared from the targeted area. While Operation *Barkhane* had damaging effects upon VEOs in that regard, the problem remains: how do we keep an area cleared of insurgents once conventional forces are re-deployed to secure another insurgent infested area? Again, this can only be achieved through CHB which is contingent on the support of the population. Although it is feasible to disperse and expel large insurgent groups from a given area through a military clearing operation, it remains impossible to prevent the return of small groups of insurgents that will attempt to re-establish their influence and political network. Aside from elements of the US

Marine Corps, US forces committed the same mistakes in the first four years of their combat engagement in Vietnam: they cleared an area of communist forces and left, leaving no static forces behind to rebuild, protect the villagers and stop the insurgency's resurgence. They were thus required to clear the area once again, sometimes twice, because insurgents were free to re-infiltrate the area and the villages following US troops' departure.¹⁷

The only way to reverse this pattern is through a supportive population protected by permanently deployed counterinsurgent platoons in the area of operation. Accordingly, villages and their inhabitants' security must constitute the central objective of security forces. However, in Mali, military and constabulary forces are inactive in several areas and are regularly overmatched by VEOs in combat. For instance, over 50 Malian soldiers were killed on November 1st 2019 when their fortified base was overrun in full daylight by several dozen ISGS insurgents in the region of Menaka.¹⁸ Devastating attacks such as these critically affects FAMA's credibility to the eyes of the local population. To overrun a fortified defended position in an open field in full daylight requires, at the very least, a 3 to 1 ratio of force in favor of the attackers. Given the location and the nature of ISGS's objective, the attack should have resulted in severe casualties for the insurgents. However, multiple reporting shows that no insurgent were confirmed killed in action during the attack. Malian soldiers truly underperformed during this incident, which is a consistent tendency for all of Mali's security forces when confronted by VEOs. In contexts such as these, civilians are less prone to fully

support their military for they perceive it as weak, unreliable and untrustworthy. Malian locals have often stated that FAMa troops have “abandoned” them to the insurgents and asked themselves how they could ever trust the Malian military.¹⁹ There is a lot of psychology in COIN: if counterinsurgents are able to convince the population that they are stronger than the insurgents and that they have the intent as well as the means to protect the villages, civilians will be naturally predisposed to fully support the security forces and the government. However, VEOs’ tactical edge over FAMa units and the sporadic proactivity of Malian security forces in most of the villages completely invalidate this COIN rule in Mali. When the population feels safe, it usually willingly provides intelligence to security forces. Most villagers will support the party which is more likely to offer them stability and security. Even if villagers are hostile toward VEOs, the former will be driven by fear, especially if security forces are absent or inactive in the vicinity of their village. In such cases, the inhabitants will not dare to commit themselves against the VEOs unless long term protection is guaranteed to them. This tendency was observed during past insurgencies that were much more severe than Mali.

For instance, when strategic hamlets (reinforced villages) were erected in South Vietnam with South Vietnamese security forces deployed permanently with the population, villagers willingly gave intelligence on the insurgents and denounced Viet Cong activities in the area of operation. The situation repeated itself later during

the war when US Marines deployed Combined Action Platoons (CAPs) in South Vietnamese hamlets: joint Marine and government security forces teams were deployed permanently inside the villages, which ensured the inhabitants’ protection and enabled counterinsurgents to deny Viet Cong access to the villages. Human intelligence provided by the villagers enabled the Marines and South Vietnamese forces to locate and ambush the Viet Cong and sever their lines of communication. Villagers willingly informed the Marines on insurgent activities such as troop movements, weapon caches, incoming ambushes and booby traps. Viet Cong defectors and prisoners of war admitted they were unable to use CAP villages as a base and could no longer exploit the civilian population living in those hamlets. They were directed to avoid these sectors entirely by their chain of command.²⁰ This occurred because the population was provided with safety and stability on 24/7 basis. These positive effects were not unique to Vietnam; the British obtained similar results with their strategic hamlet program in Malaya. Communist insurgents were completely isolated and cut off from Malaya’s rural villages and local population. The latter was protected 24/7 by static security forces deployed permanently into the villages, denying hostiles access to the premises. Mobile forces constantly ambushed

the guerillas on their lines of communications, insurgents were isolated in their bases of operation, unable to resupply, deprived of food, intelligence, shelter, and recruits. Combined with a succession of political and civic initiatives, this led to the

“These positive effects were not unique to Vietnam; the British insurgents obtained similar results with their strategic hamlet program in Malaya.”



US Marines move into an airstrip near the Rock Pile in the northernmost corner of Vietnam, 16 January 1960.

Trinity Mirror/Mirrorpix/Alamy Stock Photo EKKP6R



Speed of movement was essential in combating the communist insurgents in the Malayan jungle, and helicopters played an essential part, 29 October 1959.

insurgency's downfall.²¹ In COIN, the population is as much a center of gravity for the counterinsurgents as it is for the VEOs. Mali's VEOs are in no way an exception and are as vulnerable as any other insurgency when subjected to such tactics, techniques and procedures. Globally, poor government and military control over rural areas facilitates VEO recruitment ops. Villages are central hubs for insurgent recruiting activities. For instance, in central Mali, VEOs have concentrated their recruitment efforts on the Fulani by exploiting the community's frustrations over rising banditry, government corruption, and competition over land and water. The recruitment of Fulani has inflamed tensions within the Bambara and Dogon tribes which, with the limited presence of Malian security forces, contributed to the formation of more ethnically aligned self-defence groups.²²

Dozens of Fulani community leaders interviewed by Human Rights Watch have expressed concern about the Islamists' infiltration into their villages and their ability to recruit scores of young Fulani men. Some of these men were volunteers, others were forcefully recruited. This tactic has two purposes: first, it increases the VEOs manpower. Second, it secures the secrecy of their operations (if a villager's child is recruited by the VEOs, the parent will not speak of the insurgent's activities in order to avoid any risk or insurgent retaliation against the child).²³ Such

VEO recruitment capabilities, as well as access to villages, will set the stage for ambushes and attacks like the one conducted by ISGS insurgents against a joint US-Nigerien convoy in Tongo Tongo village in Niger on the 4th of October 2017. Intelligence given to insurgents on US Forces' presence in the area came from VEO agents or sympathisers that operated in the vicinity of Tongo Tongo village.²⁴ With insurgents and VEO supporters operating with impunity inside the villages, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering operations are easily conducted, which facilitates the execution of ambushes on security forces. However, if the latter are imbedded inside the villages, the insurgent's freedom of action, recruitment operations and intelligence access will be degraded. The VEOs' inefficiency will be drastically compounded if security forces deny the insurgents access to their lines of communication.

VEO Lines of Communication and Freedom of Movement

As much as controlling the civilian population is paramount to the success of VEOs, their operational gains will be highly limited if they do not have access to their geographical line of communications. Freedom of movement is essential to any insurgency in order for it to operate freely in its area of operation. When in static mode, VEOs will usually remain



A French soldier on patrol in Timbuktu as part of Operation *Barkhane*, 21 November 2014.

in two key areas: in the vicinity of the villages they control and/or in bases of operation in isolated areas (usually forested areas). These key hubs are interconnected through lines of communication that stretch to key border areas where smuggling and trafficking activities will occur. Logistics, reinforcements and illicit goods transit through these borders. Lines of communication also enable insurgents to move their fighters from point A to point B, which allows them to access other villages and initiate attacks against security forces patrol groups or army bases. Lines of communication are nothing less than vital arteries for the insurgents. In order to succeed against VEOs, counterinsurgents must sever these arteries. AQIM is reported to have access to sizeable financial and logistical resources in Mali. This is partly due to the group's involvement in various facilitation and illicit trafficking businesses which require access to lines of communication and tribal connections. It is access to such transit routes and supply lines that allowed AQIM to grow its insurgent network and area of influence. AQIM also generates revenue from narcotics trafficking, forging loose alliances with trafficking networks and then either taxing goods in transit or charging protection fees.²⁵ Access to lines of communication may also enable VEOs to gain access to very basic supplies. For instance, the Sahel is dotted with several AQIM caches of reserve petrol supplies, water reservoirs, car tires and spare parts. Moreover, lines of communication in northern Mali gives AQIM insurgents access to safe havens. During COIN operations, counterinsurgents' activities will normally include

"area saturation patrolling," an initiative that enables security forces to degrade insurgents through interdiction operations, ambushes and targeted raids.²⁶ Currently, the main military force that uses area saturation patrolling tactics with consistency is the French military via Operation *Barkhane*. The latter have shown the positive effects of area saturation patrolling on the VEOs' capacity to exploit their lines of communication and safe havens. For example, AQIM insurgents developed a mountainous redoubt in the Ametetai valley, an area of about 25km² full of caves, crevices and valleys in the Ardar des Ifoghas. AQIM chose this specific location because it was the only sector that provided natural water sources. From there, they were able to plan, move their fighters, and launch their operations. The insurgent group also held their hostages in such locations. That specific base was eventually destroyed by French and Chadian forces.²⁷

However, safe havens such as these are numerous in the Sahel. COIN would require that lines of communication giving access to safe havens or attack positions be severed through multiple checkpoints and small unit ambush operations supported with ISR capabilities. This would result in insurgents being isolated and targeted by security forces already deployed in a cordon and search mode in the vicinity of their bases of operation and/or lines of communication. In such a situation, these key areas would be deemed far too dangerous for VEOs to exploit. For example, when AQIM insurgents were decimated by the French and Chadian

forces in the Ardar des Ifoghas, constant ISR with drones was subsequently conducted in that area, which dissuaded insurgents from returning to this safe haven.²⁸ Absence of consistent COIN initiatives such as these explains why VEOs are able to move, resupply themselves and remain combat effective in most of the Sahel. COIN also requires that key border areas be secured and inaccessible to insurgent groups. One of the best instances of such an initiative occurred during the Algerian War: the French military ultimately denied the insurgents' access to Algeria's border by building a gigantic electrical fence (the Morice Line) that blocked the Algerian-Morocco border to the west and the Algerian-Tunisia border to the east. Any infiltration attempt through the fence triggered signals at monitoring stations to which French forces responded with artillery, aircraft and mobile ground units numbering 80,000 soldiers. The FLN insurgency casualty rate became so high that its members stopped any major attempt to cross the Morice Line.²⁹ While a costly and challenging endeavour, as troop coordination and infrastructure goes, the Morice Line demonstrates that efficient COIN requires a major level of initiative and commitment. In recent years, getting across the border of Morocco and Algeria has become quite difficult for the VEOs as both countries have tightened their control of smuggling routes and goods. Algeria started digging trenches along its border with Morocco to deter fuel smuggling in 2013. A year later, Morocco built a 150 km long security fence to strengthen its defenses against the flow of human smuggling and possible infiltration of VEOs. This proactive security approach has made it harder for AQIM and other groups to establish a foothold in Morocco.³⁰

Algeria has beefed up its borders and sent more troops to monitor its borders with Libya, Mali, and Niger. By 2014, Algeria had closed all of its borders except the one with Tunisia, and made them into military zones accessible only to individuals with special security clearance. Accordingly, Algeria has been relatively successful in securing its borders against the flow of fighters from outside the country, and the Algerian military periodically arrests drug and arms traffickers and jihadists, especially in the south and east of the country.³¹ Currently, for Mali and the remainder of the Sahel, border denial operations is an assignment given to the G5 Sahel (FC-G5S). The latter is a military force composed of soldiers from Mauritania, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali. Their specific mission is to deny VEOs and criminal groups' access to the main border areas around these five countries. However, only seven FC-G5S battalions were deployed, which is insufficient to impede the VEOs' ability to move and execute cross-border operations in such a huge territory. With FC-G5S forces spread so thin in the Sahel, several gaps will remain accessible for VEOs to exploit. Consequently, unless a major shift of strategy is initiated, insurgents will remain able to bypass FC-G5S battalions and resume their insurgent operations in Mali and the rest of the Sahel.

Conclusion

Rural stability is the cornerstone of any successful COIN campaign. While COIN encompasses political, military, economic, cultural, civic and social lines of operation, security remains key to any long term success. However competent local politicians will be, and however efficient and beneficial economic and civic actions will be, they will fail without a proper security apparatus based on COIN. Rural security will only be achievable if VEOs are denied access to the rural villages and to their lines of communication. In other words, without the security provided by military elements, every other COIN initiative will have very short term effects. VEOs' ability to have such an amount of influence in Mali's rural areas, as well as their ability to control large amounts of territory in the Sahel, are the consequence of the deficiencies in COIN security operations. While VEOs have shown great vulnerability when confronted by large conventional clearing operations launched by Operation *Barkhane*, insurgents still remained able to retain some degree of influence and "re-operate" at some point in the "secured area". COIN is a "clear, hold and build" concept. The fact that no static military forces remain in newly secured areas ("clear") to protect the civilians from the insurgents ("hold") and that no concrete civic actions ("build") are initiated jointly to security operations explains why the current operational situation has turned to a stalemate in Mali. In many ways, this so called "stalemate" is turning to the advantage of the VEOs who are increasingly spreading their operations

and area of influence to southern Burkina Faso and to the northern part of the littoral countries of West Africa.

In the past, mightier insurgencies than JNIM and ISGS have been severely degraded, and in several cases, completely defeated when confronted to CHB COIN tactics. Mali's VEOs are no exception: they are vulnerable to these tactics as any other insurgency is. Operations *Serval* and *Barkhane* were very successful when the time came to secure an area. However, such efforts will only have temporary results if only the "clearing" phase is applied. Moreover, Mali's VEOs have continuous access to their lines of communication and to most of the border areas of Mali. Denying VEOs' access to these key geographical sectors is paramount if any COIN is to succeed in terms of rural security. The fact that insurgents are able to move from village to village to impose their will on the civilian population without any interference is a clear indication that VEOs' freedom of movement is, in no way, properly targeted by local and foreign security forces. In such conditions, insurgents are able to resupply, move men and logistics from one point to the other and collect intelligence and potential recruits in multiple villages. Such liberty of action is what enables VEOs to fully exploit groups of fighters capable of conducting hit and

"By 2014, Algeria had closed all of its borders except the one with Tunisia, and made them into military zones accessible only to individuals with special security clearances."

run attacks, as well as ambushes and complex attacks against the FAMA, MINUSMA and Operation *Barkhane*. The latter is currently the most efficient military force in the fight against VEOs. However, *Barkhane*'s operations cannot be considered as a concrete and thorough COIN military campaign as it lacks CHB initiatives. As for MINUSMA, its mission parameters forbid its soldier from conducting COIN operations. The latter should normally be assigned to FAMA and constabulary elements supported by French forces. Moreover, to be degraded on a permanent basis, VEOs must be subjected to the other COIN lines of operation (political, economic, civic actions, etc.), otherwise, the insurgency will always remain a potent threat. Given the current situation,

we can't expect that VEOs will be subjected to such a large scale COIN campaign in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, any COIN in Mali is rendered even more complicated when taking into account the tribal factors, intercommunal tensions and the armed group's omnipresence in every province. Consequently, it is highly improbable that we will see any major downshift in the VEOs' current ability to conduct its insurgency operation in Mali in the medium and long terms. Unless a new overall political and military strategy is elaborated, we can expect VEOs to spread their area of influence even further into the Sahel and West Africa.



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DND photo by Corporal David Veldman



HMCS *Harry de Wolf*, accompanied by a hovering CH-48 *Cyclone* helicopter, photographed during sea trials off the coast of Halifax, Nova Scotia, 15 October 2020.

Naval Culture, Customs, and Traditions: Perspectives from Members of the Royal Canadian Navy

by Krystal K. Hachey and Carrie N. Topping

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Introduction

Culture has been defined as “a shared and relatively stable pattern of behaviours, values, and assumptions.”¹ Military culture, as identified by the subject matter scholar J. Burke,² includes the foundational values of discipline, professional ethos, ceremonies, etiquette, esprit de corps and cohesion. Imbedded within military culture are the customs, traditions, rituals, and visible artifacts valued by its members.³ As the senior service in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has a rich culture of customs

and traditions far different from the other two environments,⁴ such as naval specific salutes, rank nomenclature and everyday language (i.e., “Avast, anchor’s away and the buoy’s abaft the beam, Oscar’s been hoisted aboard” and “The stoker’s on scullery duty because he was skiving on the mids and went for duff”). Additionally, the Navy has customs and traditions associated with signalling, marks of respect, music, flags and pennants, and naval ceremonies, such as those conducted when launching a ship, changing command, and crossing-the-line.⁵ These RCN customs and traditions are captured under the CAF Identity System, which “embodies visible and audible attributes of the CAF,”⁶ and are meant to provide members meaning and cohesion as a naval family during their service.⁷

The RCN has been shaped by changes in society, the institution, and as a result of increasing diversity, such as the employment of women in hard sea going occupations and a focus upon greater minority group representation.⁸ External reviews into sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the CAF⁹ and into personal conduct within the RCN¹⁰ have impacted total force and naval policies governing personal conduct (Operation Honour, Naval Order 1001-0; Naval Order 1601-1; Naval General Message (NAVGEN)).¹¹ Moreover, the RCN has been further moulded by guiding strategic documents released by the organization¹² including, but not limited to, *The Naval Vision: Charting the Course for Canada’s Forces into the Next Century*,¹³

LEADMARK: The Navy's Strategy for 2020,¹⁴ and *Strong Secure Engaged (SSE): Canada's Defence Policy*.¹⁵ The evolution of the future fleet has been outlined in recent strategies, which provide detail with respect to future capability requirements and the changing nature of the Navy, including the introduction of new platforms, organizational structures, and occupations.¹⁶ These documents also describe the potential challenges associated with transitioning an organization that is deeply rooted in tradition,¹⁷ and how increasing developments in technology will have a strain on the RCN¹⁸ if they fail to be adaptable and agile.¹⁹ With all of the potential changes occurring in the RCN as it moves towards the future fleet, adapting the culture, including associated customs and traditions, becomes an important facet to consider.²⁰

"Data was collected for this study as part of a larger project examining CAF members"

Methods

Data was collected for this study as part of a larger project examining CAF members' perspectives of customs and traditions in the organization. In order to understand the diverse experiences of men and women in the RCN, the project was developed using a constructivist paradigm²¹ and the gender-based analysis plus (GBA+) process.²² While constructivism assumes that there are many social realities based upon the experiences of individuals,²³ the goal of the GBA+ process is to identify the differential impacts of research, policy, and practices on diverse groups of women and men.²⁴ Ultimately, the following questions were used to guide the development of the methodology:²⁵

• Does the methodology address the gaps identified in the literature review?

• Does the sampling strategy reinforce traditional notions of representation that focus on most commonly shared experiences, thus minimizing significance of unique experiences?

• Does the data collection strategy provide opportunity for expression of diverse experiences and perspectives, within different cultural and sub-cultural contexts?


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Procedure

After Department of National Defence (DND) ethics approval,²⁶ participants were targeted using a parallel subgroup²⁷ and a 'snowball' sampling scheme,²⁸ by group (i.e., sex), occupation (i.e., divers), and geographic location (i.e., West Coast: Victoria). The sampling also targeted rank (i.e., junior non-commissioned members [NCMs], senior NCMs, and junior and senior officers), component (i.e., Regular Force and Primary Reserve),²⁹ age (i.e., 18–50+), designated group member (DGM)³⁰ status (i.e., visible minorities, people with disabilities, and Indigenous people), and positions with a low representation of men or women, such as in the naval engineering occupations.³¹ Targeted sampling was conducted to ensure that diverse groups of men and women in the CAF had the opportunity to participate.³² Individuals were invited to participate through an email, between October 2016 and January 2017, and were offered the options of an in-person interview, in-person focus group, or telephone interview. Participants first signed a consent form, followed by the research protocol, and finally, they were given a debriefing where they were given the chance to provide any additional information.

Participants

The sample consisted of 65 RCN members who participated in either interviews or focus groups. As Table 1 shows, the majority of participants were older than 35 (85.5%), Regular Force (47.7%), male (60.0%), Anglophone (72.3%),



Aim

This project was initiated by the RCN to examine the perceptions of sailors regarding aspects of naval culture, including customs and traditions. The following research questions were proposed:

- What are the prevalent RCN customs and traditions (both positive and negative)?
- To what extent are current RCN customs and traditions exclusionary, either *inadvertently* to some groups

and senior officers (32.3%). Participants were from several geographic locations, including Victoria ($n = 18$; 27.7%), Halifax ($n = 13$; 18.8%), Ottawa ($n = 12$; 18.5%), the city of Québec ($n = 11$; 16.9%), and Vancouver ($n = 9$; 13.8%). Additionally, as presented in Table 2, roughly one-fourth of the sample identified as a DGM, with higher proportion identifying as part of a visible minority ($n = 6$; 9.2%). There was only one case that overlapped, such that they identified in more than one group (i.e., a person with a disability and member of a visible minority).

Protocol

The larger CAF-wide study focussed up on broad topics related to military culture, professionalism, and customs and traditions across the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In contrast, the current study focussed upon issues specific to Naval culture (i.e., “Based on your experiences, how would you describe the culture of the Royal Canadian Navy?”), customs, and traditions (i.e., “Over your career, how did you learn about customs and traditions?”), as well as perceptions related to the transition to the future fleet (i.e., “In your experience, how do you think the advancement of technology will impact customs and traditions? The culture of the Navy?”). The interviews and focus groups ranged from 30 to 90 minutes.³³

“The larger CAF-wide study focussed upon broad topics related to military culture, professionalism, and customs and traditions across the Army, Navy, and Air Force.”

Demographic Characteristic	Frequency	Percentage
Age		
Youth (18–24)	1	1.6
Young Adults (25–35)	8	12.9
Middle Age (36–49)	33	53.2
Older Adulthood	20	32.3
Class of Service		
Regular Force	31	47.7
Class A Reserve Force	12	18.5
Class B Reserve Force	20	30.8
Class C Reserve Force	2	3.1
Sex		
Female	26	40.0
Male	39	60.0
First Official language		
French	14	21.5
English	47	72.3
Other	4	6.2
Rank		
Junior NCM	10	15.4
Senior NCM	16	24.6
Junior Officer	18	27.7
Senior Officer	21	32.3

Table 1 – Demographic Characteristics of the Royal Canadian Navy.

Employment Equity (EE) Group	Frequency	Percentage
Indigenous Person		
Yes	3	4.7
No	61*	95.3
Person with a Disability		
Yes	3	4.6
No	62*	95.4
Member of a Visible Minority		
Yes	6	9.2
No	59*	90.8

*Note: Not everyone responded to the EE question.

Table 2 – Employment Equity Group Membership.

Data Analysis

The data were coded in two cycles.³⁴ The first cycle coded the data in chunks using several coding approaches (i.e., descriptive, process) and mainly focused upon the data as they related to the different questions, while the second cycle involved deeper investigation into the patterns, categories, and themes of the codes.³⁵ NVivo qualitative data analysis software³⁶ was used to organize the data and provide the first round of coding, and Microsoft OneNote and Excel were employed to summarize the main themes and to provide the second round of coding.

Results³⁷

Three major themes resulted from the qualitative data analysis: (1) the culture of the RCN, (2) the customs and traditions in the RCN, and (3) the impact of the move to the future fleet. Each is detailed in the following section.

RCN Culture

As depicted in Figure 1, participants expressed opinions that the culture of the RCN was impacted by prominent events in CAF history including: (1) unification in 1968,³⁸ in which the Navy, Army, and Air Force were combined as one force; (2) the Somalia incident,³⁹ named after the murder of a civilian during a peacekeeping mission; (3) recent deployments to Afghanistan, resulting in the Regular Force’s growing respect of the competencies of the Naval Reserves; (4) the internal review of personal conduct in the RCN, specifically, alcohol consumption;⁴⁰ and, (5) the external review of sexual misconduct in the CAF.⁴¹ In addition, participants recognized the origins of the RCN, and perceived the British system as having an ongoing cultural impact. They also suggested the organization was shaped by the attitudes of white older males, was rule-abiding, slow to change, had a strong divisional system, and was traditional in nature. Participants noted that the “Navy is still very much mired in our British History [focus group, Regular Force, English, officer, female],” is primarily made up of “white males / macho [interview, Regular Force, French, officer, male],” and there were opinions that the Naval familial nature was being lost. However, some participants noted that the culture




Figure 1 – Culture of the RCN from a Sample of CAF Forces Members.

had changed over the years for the better, especially regarding diversity. As one participant noted: “With women coming onboard the behaviour started to change positively. We used to be ‘work hard, play hard’, and now it’s more ‘work hard, play smart’ [interview, Regular Force, French, officer, male].”

The strong divisional system frequently mentioned by participants, refers to the upward and downward communication and interaction between officers and NCMs, which is clearly defined for naval personnel.⁴² One participant stated that, “Obviously it’s a very structured environment in terms of rank, in terms of customs [Interview, Regular Force, other official language, female, officer, DGM]” while another felt that “the Navy seems to be a little bit stricter and harsher, especially in how the officers deal with their sailors [interview, Naval Reserves, English, male, officer, DGM].” An additional participant felt that the Navy was “pretty pedantic about following the divisional system [focus group, English, female, officer],” while another expressed opinions regarding “a caste-type system between NCMs and officers, and then within the NCM group [interview, Regular Force, English, male, officer].”

Several participants expressed concerns that the Canadian public lacked awareness of the RCN and what it contributes to the CAF. One participant stated: “I think Canadians as a culture are blind to our Navy [interview, Naval Reserves, English, male, NCM, DGM],” while another indicated that “There’s a lot of people I find when I travel across Canada that had no clue that we had a Navy [focus group, English, NCM].”

“The strong divisional system frequently mentioned by participants, refers to the upward and downward communication and interaction between officers and NCMs, which is clearly defined for naval personnel.”

Differences in Culture across the RCN

The existence of subcultures within the RCN was another re-occurring theme identified by the participants. As depicted in Figure 1, these subcultures were concentrated around the geographic centres of the major RCN locations: the National Capitol Region, Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT), Maritime Forces Pacific (MARPA), and Naval Reserve Headquarters (NAVRESHQ), which is located in a Francophone city (i.e., Québec) and reports to MARPA. These groups are represented by grey circles, whereas the smaller green circles that intersect them symbolize significant cultural populations that are imbedded within the larger subcultures (i.e., French and Naval Reserves). Participants articulated the

differences between the geographical subcultures noting that the formations on the coasts were distinct from both the National Capital Region (i.e., the area surrounding Ottawa, the capital of Canada), and the Naval Reserves Headquarters. Significant differences were also noted between the Regular Force and Naval Reserves and between Anglophone and Francophone populations. One participant remarked:

I would think that in Ottawa versus the East Coast—I would think that they are way ahead of the game. The diversity here [in Ottawa] is huge and mirrors and mimics more of what we would like to see [interview, Regular Force, English, female, NCM].

Customs and Traditions

Participants offered many examples of how information related to naval customs and traditions was acquired: basic training, RCN courses, mentors, mess dinners, “osmosis” and word-of-mouth, specific events (i.e., Remembrance Day), and the chain of command. An overarching theme arose with the belief that customs and traditions were not being disseminated in a common and consistent way. As one participant noted, “It takes decades, if not centuries, to build traditions and a heartbeat to lose



DND photo by Leading Seaman Valerie LeClair

Lieutenant-Commander Paul Smith (right, the CO of HMCS *Summerside*), shares a laugh with Lieutenant (N) James Eilers of the United States Navy during Exercise *Cutlass Fury* conducted off the coast of Nova Scotia, 21 September 2016.

There were perceptions that methods and attitudes differed between the two RCN components. One member stated, “there’s a difference of mentality, of approach between the Naval Reserves and the Regular Force [interview, Regular Force, French, male, officer].” Another explained his related perspective, suggesting that the Naval Reserves have “a bit less of a warrior attitude [interview, Regular Force, English, male, officer].” However, positive change towards the “One Navy” vision⁴³ was acknowledged by many. One focus group participant recounted that, “...we’ve tried so many different ways to integrate and make it an inclusive club, and it’s vastly different from what it was 35 years ago [focus group, English, female, officer].” Additionally, members in general suggested that the Regular Force was beginning to have a more favourable view of the Primary Reserve, a change perceived to be instigated through integration of Forces during recent deployments to Afghanistan. As one participant noted, “It’s taken a long time for the permanent force Navy to recognize the value of the Primary Reserve [Naval Reserves] Navy [focus group, English, female, officer].”

them [focus group, English, female, officer].” Members attributed this inconsistency to the recent reduction in time dedicated to teaching these cultural aspects. Cuts to training days on courses have led to necessary shifts in priorities to more operational and societal requirements (i.e., harassment prevention training).



DND photo ET2016-0462-02 by Cpl Carbe Orellana

HMCS *Chicoutimi* awaits Peoples Liberation Army (Navy) ships visiting Victoria on behalf of the Chinese military, 13 December 2016.

Regarding specific customs and traditions, participants identified particular events either at the CAF level (i.e., Remembrance Day), at their unit (i.e., soup at morning stand easy), during mess dinners (i.e., naval toasts), or onboard a ship (i.e., saluting when crossing the brow and crossing-the-line ceremonies) as occasions when naval customs and traditions are emphasised. When asked about exclusionary customs and traditions, many participants were unable to identify any, but felt that several were in the midst of change. Those who suggested examples of exclusionary customs and traditions perceived a strong relationship between the RCN and Christianity. One member expressed the following opinion: “A lot of our traditions reflect male Christian beliefs. Even though we don’t really follow them, they’re still there and there’s still an undercurrent [interview, Regular Force, English, male, officer].” Several participants also felt that events could have the unintended potential of excluding some groups (i.e., atheists or other religions), due to the reliance on Christian traditions. One participant suggested the following with respect to swearing in ceremonies or other events that call for members to make attestations:

There are some events that use the King James Version of the Bible... Expanding the scope of what choices are available to swear or strictly adhering to the Affirmation may be more appropriate [interview, Naval Reserves, English, male, officer].

Given the recentness of the internal review of personal conduct in the Navy⁴⁴ at the time of data collection, multiple participants had the resulting changes at the forefront of their minds and discussed the impact of alcohol on RCN culture. The removal of alcohol onboard ships was a drastic change driven by a renewed RCN policy⁴⁵ that followed the example of other allied navies (i.e., the United States Navy). Participants associated the shift with less time spent socializing with work colleagues and more time spent with family. Difficulty adjusting to the transformation of this deep-rooted cultural aspect was evident. One participant noted that “the esprit de corps as a whole is significantly less than it used to be [interview, Regular Force, English, male, officer],” while another remarked that “the social aspect has definitely changed [interview, Naval Reserves, English, male, NCM, DGM].” Several participants described perceptions of unintended consequences that they attributed to the enforcement of the drinking policy, which, in addition to making the naval platforms “dry,” stipulates more stringent guidelines for the consumption of alcohol.⁴⁶ Using this policy as an example, participants expressed the need to feel valued by the chain of command. One participant felt that “morale on a lot of the ships has really plummeted because they’re not given respect for what they do [focus

“The removal of alcohol onboard ships was a drastic change driven by a renewed RCN policy that followed the example of other allied navies (i.e., the United States Navy).”

group, English, NCM].” Another participant acknowledged that “there was some abuse of that at sea, but there were a lot of people that didn’t abuse it [focus group, Regular Force, male, NCM].”

Impact of the Move to the Future Fleet

The opinion that new technologies, which have been identified as operationally imperative for the future fleet, would have no impact on RCN customs and traditions was uncommon among participants. In fact, many expressed concerns that their incorporation would cause a reduced reliance on individuals and, therefore, result in less socialization and practice of customs and traditions, which would in turn effect member identity. The common opinion, as expressed by one participant, was that “it

will definitely impact our traditions and culture moving forward [interview, Regular Force, other first language, female, officer, DGM].” Some reported having already experienced change, such as the amalgamation of occupations with common skill sets (i.e., the Marine Technician occupation resulted from the incorporation of Marine Engineers, Electrical Technicians, and Hull Technicians).⁴⁷ As one participant stated:

That’s a huge hit to morale in the engineering world with the Navy, for sure. At this point especially, we’re going into the development of new occupations now of marine technician, and that’s big on the mind [focus group, English, officer].

Discussion

The goal of the current study was to examine perceptions of the culture, customs, and traditions of the RCN from a diverse group of members at a pivotal point in the evolution



Able Seaman Xissy Wang responds to a man overboard drill aboard HMCS Ville de Québec outside Halifax harbour, 12 May 2020.

DND photo by Master Corporal Anthony Lavolette

DND photo PR01-2019-0021-1871 by Corporal David Veldman



HMCS *Shawinigan* sails alongside HMCS *Kingston* and the French Navy Ship *Lieutenant de vaisseau Le Henaff* for a manoeuvring exercise during Exercise *Obangame Express 2019* in West Africa, 18 March 2019.

of RCN culture. The following section provides a review of the results in light of the research questions concerning RCN culture and takes into consideration the organizational change that has occurred in the three years since data collection.

In order to understand the elements that bind a particular group, it is important to be cognisant of the cultural setting,⁴⁸ which is, in the case of the current study, military culture.⁴⁹ Deeper investigation uncovered cultural aspects specific to the RCN, which participants felt were influenced by unification,⁵⁰ the Somalia incident,⁵¹ recent deployments to Afghanistan and the reviews on personal conduct in the RCN⁵² and sexual misconduct in the CAF.⁵³ Results also revealed members' perceptions of the cultural foundations of the RCN; for example, descending from the British system, rule-abiding, slow to change, and structured through a strong divisional system. The need for the RCN to "Canadianize" has been identified by naval personnel for decades,⁵⁴ indicating that many of the concerns identified by participants in this study are not new. In addition to the ongoing prevalence of British tradition in the RCN, the influence of Francophone Canadians and bilingualism on the organization was also apparent.⁵⁵ Strong examples, made evident through participants' remarks included the differences between the Formations on the coasts and National Capital Region, where bilingualism is more widespread, and the main Naval Reserves Headquarters, which is located in a Francophone city. In addition to the differences in language ability between RCN geographical areas, members also indicated differences between Anglophone and Francophone individuals posted within the regions.

The RCN has a well-established culture,⁵⁶ as demonstrated by participants' ability to consistently identify customs and traditions unique to the naval environment, such as the crossing-the-line ceremony. Historically, many of these customs and traditions were rites of passage or hazing rituals passed down through generations. Crossing-the-line ceremonies are not distinctively an RCN tradition; they are conducted by other navies as well.⁵⁷ These shared experiences, often accomplished through the observation of customs and traditions, help members to bond with their peers, their leaders, and to their unit and organization as a whole.⁵⁸ Given the nature of naval employment, these bonds are essential to ensure the ship's company is a cohesive unit and operationally effective.

Despite the evidence of a strong RCN culture, results revealed that the opportunities to learn about the customs and traditions was inconsistent, ranging from word-of-mouth to basic training courses and, in some cases, participants mentioned that previously scheduled lessons on these topics were cut to shorten the length of courses due to financial restrictions, which suggested to participants that the history of the RCN was not prioritized by leadership. In a hierarchical organization such as the military,⁵⁹ leadership plays an important role in transmitting customs and traditions. While the competencies required of naval leaders is changing,⁶⁰ keeping members apprised of the historical culture that binds them is an important aspect in maintaining cohesion.

While the RCN is perceived to have historical roots tied to Christianity⁶¹ and traditional military culture (i.e., combat masculine-warrior),⁶² a diverse workforce continues to be a strategic goal for the Canadian government, the CAF (i.e., *Strong*

Secure Engaged [SSE]),⁶³ and the RCN.⁶⁴ For example, there have been efforts made to be more inclusive in the CAF to other religions and cultural backgrounds such as accommodations for dress and religious practices (i.e., the option to wear a turban as a part of the uniform if prescribed by a member's religion, or for Indigenous members to wear their hair in a traditional braid)⁶⁵ and Padres being hired from a wide range of faiths, and so on. However, despite these efforts, some participants felt there was still a close relationship between Christianity and some of the historical practices still observed within the RCN; suggesting that there is more to be done to foster a culture of inclusion. The challenge, recognized by leadership within the RCN, is in identifying methods of change that will preserve the important link to the evolution of the Navy and strengthen the bond among its sailors, while becoming more inclusive to the diverse group of RCN members that it strives to attain.

At the time of data collection, the amalgamation of the naval technical occupations, driven by the move to the future fleet, was fresh in the minds of those impacted. Participants struggled with their ability to identify with their new occupation and perceived a wider impact of the ongoing transition to the future fleet, resulting in less opportunities for socialization and fewer occasions to practice their customs and traditions. The RCN has a rich history, but, according to participants, little is being done to propagate it or to address the effects of recent initiatives (such as amalgamation) on members. Since the initial data collection, research has been

“Many of the aspects of naval culture identified in the current study have been recognized in the past.”

sponsored by the RCN to identify the impact of the amalgamation on the individuals from the original technical trades. The intent is to discover common issues that can be rectified for this group and to inform the smooth transition of any future amalgamations that result from the staffing requirements of the new platforms. In addition, a group of four occupations currently under review for potential amalgamation is also being surveyed to discover their immediate concerns so that they can be addressed appropriately prior to the implementation of any change.⁶⁶ Most importantly, outcomes such as job satisfaction, retention, and performance are often linked to the relationship between group cohesion and military identity.⁶⁷ Further research is ongoing that targets specific occupations, in addition to the RCN as a whole, to discover their unique motivations for release from the military in an effort to aid retention efforts.⁶⁸ Job satisfaction, along with many other well-being factors is also being studied through a solution-focussed qualitative project that incorporates the perspectives of both military members and their families.⁶⁹ These studies currently being conducted by the RCN are meant to discover how to preserve the culture of a close-knit naval family through a period of great change.

Many of the aspects of naval culture identified in the current study have been recognized in the past. For example, a research study using an auto-ethnography approach to explore naval culture in the RCN found similar observations concerning the perspective that the Navy is based on white males, the shared sense of belonging (i.e., cohesion), additional subcultures (i.e., other branches), as well as differences between the Naval Reserves and the Regular Force.⁷⁰ Many of the aspects identified in Figure 1, were also part of earlier observations of naval culture reaching back decades.⁷¹ Identifying, developing, and evaluating culture change initiatives (i.e., how customs and traditions are disseminated) as currently being done by the RCN, can be used as a key performance measure to monitor the impact of changes within the RCN. As already indicated, these themes have been identified before, but are still prominent.⁷²



Lieutenant (Navy) Ann Lee from HMCS *Regina* relays orders to the helm on the bridge during a replenishment at sea exercise with a Royal Australian Navy ship during Exercise *Rimpac 2020*, 20 August 2020.

However, what is evident from the current climate within the RCN is that leadership is motivated to effect change.⁷³ This is being accomplished through evidence-based research,⁷⁴ and by implementing the GBA+ process when developing or reviewing any RCN policies, programs, and services.⁷⁵

Consistency of Results with Previous Quantitative Data

Although this was a qualitative study with a small sample size, these results are consistent with other large-scale RCN sponsored research. For example, when comparing the overall CAF population, outcome variables related to group cohesion and military identity⁷⁶ tended to be higher for individuals in the RCN.⁷⁷ In addition, the results from the administration of the Defence Workplace Well-being Survey (DWWS), which collected responses from May to August of 2018 and had a total CAF sample of 41,387 personnel, suggested through individual analysis of the three elements that there is still work to be done to ensure a fully inclusive RCN.⁷⁸

Diverse Perspectives

The current study implemented a constructivist paradigm⁷⁹ and the GBA+ process.⁸⁰ In particular, the study targeted participants using a parallel subgroup⁸¹ and snowball sampling scheme,⁸² and provided different ways in which individuals could participate (i.e., face-to-face interview and focus group, and phone interviews) to ensure diverse perspectives were included.⁸³ There are significant initiatives that champion the importance of diversity and strive towards increasing representation and inclusion of minority groups in the CAF (i.e., SSE).⁸⁴ It is more essential than ever to discover and understand the experiences of these men and women, since they still represent a small portion of the CAF population.⁸⁵ The fact that one-fourth of the sample who participated in this study identified themselves as a DGM demonstrates the research potential for using a targeted sampling approach for qualitative research in the CAF.

Limitations

This research has several limitations, including the gender diversity of the participants and generalizability of results. While many efforts were made in the sampling design to ensure participation from a diverse group of men and women, only binary information was collected for gender, thereby excluding other gender identities. Given the recent passing of Bill C-16, which adds gender identity and expression to a list of prohibited grounds of discrimination,⁸⁶ it is even more important to ensure that the experiences and opinions of diverse persons are heard. Future research should therefore explore how culture and customs and traditions impact various gender identities. Additionally, although the goal of a qualitative study is not

to generalize across a population, the size and distribution of the sample prevents this. However, the primary benefit is the provision of insight into the experiences of a diverse group of RCN members, which can be used to provide context to quantitative studies already completed and formulate future research considerations in order to guide leadership towards continued positive change.

Important Considerations and Future Research

In light of the results concerning the customs and traditions in the Navy and the move to the future fleet, there are several important factors for RCN consideration, in addition to recommendations for future research.

Increase the Quality and Quantity of Information about RCN Customs and Traditions.

Results suggested that there is no standard approach to communicating customs and traditions in the Navy. As well, over the years and due to operational priorities, the formal instruction on RCN culture has been reduced or eliminated. While there are manuals dedicated to these customs and traditions,⁸⁷ alternate instructional methods or forms of communication are likely to be more effective (i.e., exposure to ceremonies during initial occupational training or the use of multimedia formats). In addition, the perception of leadership support for RCN customs and traditions can be changed through visible participation and outward communication (i.e., social media or RCN wide newsletters.). This should help to grow the bond between members and the feeling that the RCN is in fact “One Navy;”⁸⁸ one enormous ship’s company.

“Naval customs and traditions are founded upon those of the British Navy, and many are perceived to have roots in the Christian religion.”

Investigate How to Disentangle RCN Customs and Traditions from Religion.

Naval customs and traditions are founded upon those of the British Navy, and many are perceived to have roots in the Christian religion.⁸⁹ With the changing nature of the CAF, the increase in diversity and drive towards a culture of inclusion,⁹⁰ there needs to be a concerted effort to examine how the current customs and traditions may or may not be inclusive of all RCN members.

Investigate the Positive and Negative Impacts of RCN Subcultures.

It is suggested that the consequences to sub-cultural differences that impact cohesion within the RCN be examined, both negative and positive, especially given the unique contribution of Francophones and bilingualism to the CAF.⁹¹ Any positive impacts of sub-cultures should have that specific influence encouraged and any negativity can be addressed before becoming detrimental to the desired RCN culture.



Lieutenant (Navy) Olivia Clarke navigates HMCS *Moncton* as it transits the St. Lawrence Seaway, 14 July 2018.

Investigate Culture and Customs and Traditions in the RCN at Regular Intervals.

Creating a method of measurement for culture-change initiatives is critical to ensure success.⁹² Consistent with the RCN's focus on performance measurement for other initiatives (i.e., RCN Ethics training, fitness testing rates, etc.), research should be initiated to create a measurement tool that evaluates the progress of culture-change initiatives and allows for adjustment when necessary. Since the cultural aspects of cohesion and military identity are tied to a number of work outcomes,⁹³ future research to disentangle the cultural variables into items that can be measured would allow for a subsequent study to confirm the consistency of their relationship with relevant work outcomes within a larger RCN population. This could allow for measurement of work outcome variables at regular time intervals as a form of periodic progress assessment of culture change.


Conclusion

This study used data collected in 2016 to examine the culture of the RCN, including customs and traditions, at a critical point in time during the move to the future fleet. Using interviews and focus groups with members of the RCN, results revealed salient aspects of RCN culture. Central themes included opinions regarding subcultures, the perceived decrease in opportunities to learn about historical aspects of the RCN, the importance of leadership, and the uncertainty concerning socialization and member identity felt by participants during a period of great change that is expected to impact the daily life of its sailors. Since data collection, the RCN has been proactive in making positive change and continues to do so. The results of this study allowed for the proposal of future research considerations to assist the RCN in continued progression towards its goals.



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The Value of Intelligence Sharing for Canada: The 'Five Eyes' Case

by Sylvain Rouleau

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Introduction

The intelligence world, by its very nature, remains relatively secretive, and limited studies exist with regard to the value of intelligence sharing for a nation like Canada. That said, the fact that Canada is actively involved in the exchange of classified information with multiple international partners is now in the public domain. The latest Canadian defence policy states: "Canada will continue to foster and strengthen intelligence sharing relationships in a spirit of reciprocity [with the Five Eyes network of partners and other allies]."¹ In this context, what are the costs and benefits of Canada's reciprocal intelligence sharing with the Five Eyes community comprised of Canada, the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and New Zealand?² Answering this question will help identify the way forward with regard to this unique alliance, as well as the challenges and value it brings to Canadians.

Generally speaking, within the Five Eyes context, Canada is deemed to be a junior partner and a net recipient of intelligence products.³ From a rational perspective, this suggests that the overall

benefits of the sharing agreement exceed the costs. Therefore, Canada should aim at maintaining and reinforcing the arrangements that currently exist with the Five Eyes partners. However, by following this path, Canada will face enduring cooperation challenges and will remain mostly dependent upon the US intelligence apparatus and overarching policies in order to build its own, comprehensive global situation awareness.⁴ There is a cost associated with that in terms of national autonomy, but this course of action, as it will be demonstrated, is rooted in deep historical ties and should be understood as a deliberate national decision based on alignment with the US and other like-minded nations in a competitive, multipolar world. Consequently, this article suggests that it is in the strategic interest of Canada to maximize its national security through a continued and enhanced participation in the Five Eyes network. Meanwhile, Canada and its partners should address existing intelligence collaboration challenges with innovative policies based on transparency and best practices.

To answer the overarching question of the costs and benefits of the Canadian participation in the Five Eyes community, the core of this article will be divided into three sections. The first section will trace the history of intelligence collaboration between Western nations during the 20th Century, and will explore the challenges of intelligence sharing today with respect to security, privacy and accountability. The second section, based up on available unclassified sources, will further elaborate upon the genesis of the Five Eyes network and describe the current state of affairs within this community of interest in order to evaluate the pros and cons of the alliance for Canada. Finally, the third section will propose a way forward for Canada's intelligence sharing with its Five Eyes partners.

The Challenges of Intelligence Sharing

Intelligence dissemination questions are nothing new. Rose Mary Sheldon, Roman Empire specialist and Professor at the Virginia Military Institute, mentions: “Targeting an enemy and collecting intelligence must go hand in hand with the ability to transmit the information to those who need it most. One of the Roman Army’s basic needs, therefore, was the ability to transmit intelligence.”⁵ She further demonstrates that the Romans were involved in quite a variety of intelligence activities covering both the political and military realms.⁶ She concludes that the ability to access intelligence was already instrumental to the political decision-making process in

“... during the Second World War, not much had changed with regard to the strategic value of intelligence, but the imperative to share it among specialists and funnel it to decision-makers was no longer limited to single empires or nation-states.”

ancient Rome.⁷ One thousand years later, the Byzantine Empire, which had been the world’s greatest power for centuries at that point, proved with the Battle of Manzikert that even the most powerful nation of an era can be permanently defeated if leaders misread their strategic circumstances and miss or ignore imminent dangers.⁸ Another thousand years later, during the Second World War, not much had changed with regard to the strategic value of intelligence, but the imperative to share it among specialists and funnel it to decision-makers was no longer limited to single empires or nation-states.

In 1976, after Second World War documents started to be declassified, journalist William Stevenson published a captivating book on the covert war that took place during the conflict. In *A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War 1939-1945*, Stevenson tells the story of a very successful intelligence hub known as British Security Coordination (BSC).⁹ BSC, as early as 1940, was involved in intelligence collaboration between Britain and America in response to the threats posed by Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan and Fascist Italy.¹⁰ The secret entity headquartered in New York was headed by Canadian Sir William Stephenson – also known as Intrepid – who was tasked with the establishment of intelligence liaison between Churchill and Roosevelt months before the US was officially at war.¹¹ Ultimately, through the exchange of Top Secret signals intelligence (SIGINT) derived from the decryption of enemy messages, such intelligence cooperation critically enabled the Allied victory by making, among many other things, the D-Day deception plan possible and credible.¹²

In hindsight, by uniting the key players of the Anglosphere through high-level intelligence sharing in a time of unprecedented global uncertainty, the collaboration effort between BSC and its US counterpart (eventually known as the Office of Strategic Services, the wartime predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency created in 1947) appears to be the linchpin behind what would later become the Five Eyes network.¹³ This collaboration effort also marked the beginning of a wider trend of intelligence sharing between nations of the Western world throughout the Cold War and beyond. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and the European Union (EU), for example, all developed intelligence sharing frameworks between their members over the years, and so too has the US with numerous bilateral or multilateral partners across the world.¹⁴



Classic Image/Alamy Stock Photo MB09EA

Artist's impression of the Battle of Manzikert, 1071.

DVIDS photo 4390625 by Lewis Carlyle



NORAD and USNORTHCOM Headquarters building, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

Paul Delisle for supplying Top Secret intelligence to Russia were difficult to assess at the time by media commentators and the Canadian public.¹⁸ Nonetheless, with this event, it became more obvious for Canadians in general that cases of espionage, such as this one, have the potential to damage both the reputation of Canada and its ability to collaborate with international intelligence partners. Therefore, Cox concludes: “Canada must work to restore the trust and confidence of its Five Eyes partners”¹⁹ This leads to our first conclusion pertaining to information and intelligence security: a single breach by a partner within an alliance can potentially compromise years of successful

collaboration and put the pre-existing level of trust between members of the partnership to the test.

Despite this trend, however, intelligence sharing beyond one’s own national enterprise, either through a bilateral or a multilateral agreement, can be challenging for different reasons. The heightened collaboration between states and organizations has, in fact, accentuated the perils and difficulties of intelligence cooperation. The obvious precondition of collaboration is trust between partners. Political Science Professor Andrew O’Neil from Griffith University captures this reality with the following statement: “The formation of alliances, how they operate over time and whether they can sustained over the long term are all contingent on a range of factors. In particular, the perceived reliability of security guarantees and assurances is central to alliances. . . .”¹⁵ That said, trust between allies is not immutable. The appetite for sharing and the national policies of partners involved in transnational intelligence collaboration can be challenged, as demonstrated through a growing body of literature, with concerns over security, privacy and accountability.¹⁶ Through the lens of recent history, our focus will now turn to these three aspects of intelligence sharing in order to inform the forthcoming analysis of the Five Eyes membership value for Canada.

The ‘flip side’ of this conclusion is that member nations of an intelligence sharing alliance can also be confronted with the consequences of security breaches or leaks occurring elsewhere within the network. From a governmental perspective, the revelation, by any actor within a collaborative secret network, of sensitive information that was not originally intended for public disclosure can compromise existing or prospective programs and policies, expose sources, operations or vulnerabilities, and may even lead to national embarrassment.²⁰ As of 2020, the names of Julian Assange, Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden, all



Jeffrey Paul Delisle leaves the courtroom after his bail hearing at the provincial court, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 30 March 2012.

REUTERS/Alamy Stock Photo 2D0TD9K

According to retired Canadian brigadier-general and national security expert James Cox, “Canadians remain generally unaware of the extent to which Canada’s national security relies on Five Eyes intelligence.”¹⁷ As such, the true consequences of the arrest, in January 2012, of Canadian Sub-Lieutenant Jeffrey

associated with the voluntary release of US and Five Eyes classified documents through outlets such as WikiLeaks, are well-known in the public sphere.²¹ While the specific content and accuracy of the revelations is beyond the scope of this paper, assessing their impact still appears relevant. For example, CBC journalist Peter Zimonjic highlights how WikiLeaks documents exposed the fact that Canada allegedly offered help to invade Iraq in 2003 while publicly defending a diametrically opposed position.²²

From the foregoing example, we can draw a second conclusion pertaining to information and intelligence security in the context of a multinational collaboration framework: security breaches, leaks and other forms of unplanned disclosures can occur and most likely will at some point. When such is the case, no matter how and where within the network the disclosure takes place, the consequences from a national perspective can be significant in terms of intelligence operational effectiveness and overall credibility.²³ It follows that the risk of unintended classified information disclosure, which can potentially be damaging to the national interest of one or more of the countries participating in the cooperation effort, must be carefully weighed against the perceived benefits of the alliance. Arguably, from a statistical point of view, the larger the alliance, the greater the risk of leakage, but the qualitative nature of a leak appears to be more important than the quantity of occurrences in the grand scheme of things.

In any case, the consequences of unplanned disclosures can be far-reaching, sometimes leading to policy or public debates, as in the cases where privacy and accountability questions are raised.

According to former intelligence analyst Patrick Walsh and professorial research fellow Seumas Miller, “The tension between the legitimate collection of information for national security and the rights to privacy of the individual in liberal democratic states has increased markedly since 9/11.”²⁴ In the years following this attack on US soil, the Five Eyes members all implemented reform measures giving their respective intelligence agencies “far greater surveillance and collection capabilities to proactively detect, disrupt and arrest difficult to get at non-state threats like terrorism and transnational criminals that they had pre-9/11.”²⁵ While such an approach can be justified by governments to promote national and transnational security interests, it also has the potential to erode aspects of domestic sovereignty, the concept referring to the ability of states to control and regulate activities within their territories.²⁶ Specifically, junior partners within an alliance may be



Julian Assange

“In any case, the consequences of unplanned disclosures can be far-reaching, sometimes leading to policy or public debates, as in the cases where privacy and accountability questions are raised.”


limited in their ability to protect the privacy of their own citizens if the information flows that are of interest to the alliance are transnational in nature or if the group’s policy orientations are dictated, or at least heavily influenced, by its most powerful stakeholder.

Craig Forcese, Professor of Law at the University of Ottawa, states the following with regard to the privacy considerations linked to intelligence collaboration activities: “Intelligence sharing engages ... two important dimensions of privacy protection: the impact of global intercept capacity in a world in which privacy is regulated nationally and the... consequences of migration of private information across international borders.”²⁷ If we juxtapose these privacy considerations with the

conclusions by Walsh and Miller that (1) the post-9/11 reforms within the non-US Five Eyes nations were basically a reflection of those of the US in order to ensure continued collaboration, and (2) the Snowden revelations about the Five Eyes agencies’ global collection capabilities (i.e., wiretaps, metadata, social media, etc.) represent, by definition, an infringement of the right to privacy, then we can draw a new conclusion.²⁸ This conclusion is that intelligence sharing between nations can lead, either by design or indirectly, to a limitation of the privacy rights of citizens within the member nations, especially junior members with limited agenda-setting privileges. Once again, being part of the club has a cost in terms of autonomy, and the utility of this national sovereignty ‘sacrifice’ should be assessed against the overall benefits produced by the alliance.

Finally, a third aspect of transnational intelligence sharing that raises concerns is the question of accountability. As with the privacy issue, these concerns are the result of an apparent disconnect between national and international responsibilities and

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NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium.

obligations. Professor of Law Ian Leigh from Durham University explains that, since 9/11, "...certain manifestations of intelligence cooperation have led to high-profile controversies, such as the revelations about the extraordinary rendition, interrogation and secret detention of suspected terrorists."²⁹ However, he adds, "International cooperation has in general evaded the scrutiny of national oversight and review structures, which were designed for a different era and in response to a very different set of abuses."³⁰ In other words, there is a perceived accountability gap at the national level with regard to intelligence activities occurring at the international level. Furthermore, the increasing trend of intelligence cooperation between nations in the last few decades has not been matched by a similar level of collaboration between national oversight and review bodies, which means that the accountability gap also has a transnational component.³¹

Within the Canadian context, the topic of accountability in matters pertaining to national security has been studied for some time now. Professors Reg Whitaker and Stuart Farson, respectively from York and Simon Fraser University, were already exploring this subject over 10 years ago and proposing different avenues in order to increase the level of accountability imposed on security and intelligence agencies in Canada.³² One of their primary recommendations, the creation of a committee of Parliament for national security, was eventually implemented by the Government

of Canada with the establishment of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians in 2017. This committee, which is comprised of members from both chambers holding Top Secret security clearances, has an extensive review mandate with respect to any matter relating to national security and intelligence in terms of policy, finance, administration or operations.³³

That being said, even proponents of a robust national intelligence accountability framework, such as Whitaker and Farson, recognize the necessity for secrecy in dealing with national security questions. "The various organizations making up Canada's security and intelligence community have special and necessary requirements for secrecy that exceed the requirements for secrecy in other areas of government operations."³⁴ A major reason for such a level of concealment is the reliance by Canada on information received in confidence from foreign governments and vice-versa.³⁵ Therefore, even with a strong national accountability framework, the two-way imperative for secrecy that is implicit to any intelligence sharing agreement may lead to some forms of accountability deficits at the supranational level. As such, the conclusion drawn from the accountability problem developed above is that intelligence sharing between international partners offers limited control over the use, by the other partners, of the information provided in confidence to the network, and thus no real assurance of accountability above the national level.

The Five Eyes Intelligence Network

Having traced the modern history of intelligence collaboration between Western nations back to the middle of the last century and framed the current problematic of intelligence sharing around security, privacy and accountability issues, we will now focus upon the specificities of the Five Eyes network. Many terms and expressions have been employed over the years to describe this exclusive club, which relies upon a series of agreements and procedures between its members for its operations, but which is not a formal treaty organization, such as NATO.³⁶ While Miller and Walsh describe the Five Eyes as an espionage and cyber-espionage alliance, others evoke, with a more critical tone, a system of secret and pervasive surveillance inflicted upon the world by the US government and its ‘client states.’³⁷ Noting the difference in connotation by different authors in describing the Five Eyes partnership, a factual recollection of the network’s genesis and a comprehensive description of its functions and features appear essential to the discussion at this stage.

According to O’Neil, “The Five Eyes network is the world’s oldest formalized intelligence network, and has its origins in the significant expansion of Allied intelligence cooperation and exchange during World War II.”³⁸ This cooperation has been particularly evident in the SIGINT domain.³⁹ Also, based upon its endurance

over time, the Five Eyes network has become central in shaping the conceptualization of intelligence cooperation in academia over the past decades.⁴⁰ Yet, public knowledge about the arrangements behind this partnership and the nature of the collaboration between its partners remains limited. This can be explained by the fact that the current level of transparency among governments with respect to the Five Eyes is a relatively new phenomenon.⁴¹ Based upon the research conducted by University of Sydney scholars Felicity Ruby, Gerard Goggin and John Keane, the first-ever open acknowledgment

of the existence of the Five Eyes came from Australia in 1999 when Martin Brady, then-director of the Defence Signals Directorate, stated on television that his organization was cooperating with SIGINT counterparts overseas under the UKUSA relationship.⁴²

This so-called UKUSA relationship is key to understand the Five Eyes connection that exists today. Jeffrey Richelson, a senior fellow at the National Security Archive in Washington, explains the genesis of the UKUSA Agreement as a series of wartime SIGINT cooperation initiatives that were successively developed from 1940 onward between the US and the

UK (including the British Dominions) and which were ultimately formalized under a unique umbrella in 1954.⁴³ “The Primary emphasis of the agreement was to provide a division of SIGINT collection responsibilities between the First Party (the United States) and the Second Parties (Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand).”⁴⁴ Under this enduring division of responsibilities

“This can be explained by the fact that the current level of transparency among governments with respect to the Five Eyes is a relatively new phenomenon.”



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The new Defence House in Wellington, New Zealand.



The Department of Defence building in Canberra, Australia.

resulting from the agreement, the Five Eyes partners each have their respective SIGINT mandates to cover a portion of the world for the benefit of the entire community. The US is responsible for Russia, northern China, most of Asia and Latin America. Australia covers southern China, the nations of Indochina and its close neighbors, such as Indonesia. The UK is in charge of SIGINT collection in Africa and west of the Urals within the former Soviet Union. And, finally, New Zealand is responsible for the Western Pacific while Canada is responsible for the polar regions of Russia.⁴⁵

Throughout its existence, however, the Five Eyes relationship has become "...more than an agreement to coordinate separately conducted intelligence activities and share the intelligence collected."⁴⁶ The relationship has been cemented by the presence of US facilities in the UK, Australia and Canada, by joint operations across the world and by staff exchanges. Furthermore, over the years, the agreement has led to the creation of common indoctrination procedures for intelligence producers and users, strict information access protocols, and comprehensive data handling security arrangements which all exemplify professional best practices in the field of intelligence.⁴⁷ In addition to that, through a series of collaborative endeavors over the past 60 years, and to this day, the Five Eyes partners have become collectively involved in ocean and maritime surveillance, scientific and defence intelligence analysis, medical intelligence, geospatial intelligence, counterintelligence, counterterrorism, and, last but not least, the continuous sharing of intelligence products via a collective database at the top secret level known as STONE GHOST.⁴⁸

The last point from the list above is quite important. It is assessing the value of the Five Eyes for Canada. The existence of such a system where members of the intelligence community can execute searches within a highly classified setting and access products derived from the collection and processing capabilities of

the entire network represents an extremely valuable asset in itself. The database also highlights the fact that the Five Eyes partners have achieved a very high level of interoperability over time. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence offers this perspective on intelligence collaboration: "A considerable hurdle in information sharing is establishing trust and interoperability among the two or more organizations that want to share information."⁴⁹ Prior to sharing intelligence, orga-

nizations look for assurances that all the partners with whom they wish to share are implementing policies and standards in a manner worthy of trust.⁵⁰

Therefore, the continued access to the Five Eyes systems and database (which is *assumed*, based upon the 2017 Canadian defence policy) suggests that Canada, despite the Delisle case, has remained trustworthy among the Five Eyes and can thus access a vast amount of intelligence products, more than it could ever realistically produce nationally.

In terms of burden sharing, the Five Eyes network is undeniably asymmetric. From a transactional perspective, both the collection capacity and production throughput ratios between the First Party and the Second Parties, also known as junior partners, clearly favor the latter.⁵¹ As Political Science Professor Loch Johnson points out, "...the US continues to have the largest and most expensive intelligence apparatus in the world, indeed in the history of humankind."⁵² As a consequence, the US inputs much more data into the network than any other counterpart. Therefore, if we consider the claim by Cox that the Five Eyes network is instrumental in feeding and shaping the Canadian national assessments produced by the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat of the Privy Council Office and by the Chief of Defence Intelligence, then we have to conclude that, under the current circumstances, Canada is to a great extent dependent upon the US intelligence apparatus in order to build its own national situational awareness and inform decision-makers on global intelligence matters.⁵³

Such an imbalance between intelligence sharing partners is not unusual. Political Science Professor James Walsh from Charlotte explains that this is often happening by design as governments seeking to share intelligence create hierarchical relationships to manage risks, monitor compliance and facilitate the overall decision-making process within the alliance.⁵⁴ "Governments

agree to create and to enter such hierarchies, even when they infringe on national decision making autonomy, because they are a reliable way to mitigate concerns about defection and to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation.”⁵⁵ For recipients such as Canada, the principal benefit is the acquisition of intelligence that is valuable to decision-makers but impossible to obtain otherwise at an acceptable cost.⁵⁶ The dominant player, the US in this case, also benefits from the partnership by selecting its partners, determining the policy orientations of the coalition, extending its global reach, and accessing a wider pool of intelligence specialists and analysts.⁵⁷ In summary, while asymmetric in nature, the Five Eyes network represents a long-standing and very beneficial partnership for Canada and the other junior partners as it contributes greatly to their respective national security enterprises. However, this relationship implies a partial relinquishment of national autonomy.

The Way Forward for Canada

Within the security studies liberalist paradigm, the idea of parting with elements of sovereignty can sometimes be justified. If a form of cooperation between states is deemed important enough, the national interest may transcend autonomy and sovereignty, leading nations to redefine their interests in order to embrace the necessary reduction in independence required by the cooperation effort.⁵⁸ Concerning Canada’s Five Eyes membership, this model explains the continued resolve of the government to engage in collaboration with the like-minded nations that form the Anglosphere. After all, this relationship dates back to the 1940s, and it has been very successful over time, starting with the Allied victory during the Second World War, which was

partly enabled by collaborative SIGINT work, and continuing to this day with uninterrupted trends of intelligence cooperation in multiple areas of expertise.⁵⁹ Put differently, the Five Eyes relationship brings tremendous benefits to Canada in comparison to the small cost paid in terms of reduced national autonomy. It is therefore in Canada’s strategic interest to maintain and reinforce the Five Eyes partnership. Nevertheless, the challenges of intelligence collaboration previously highlighted concerning security, privacy and accountability must be addressed in order to inform the way forward for Canada and its Five Eyes partners.

“For recipients such as Canada, the principal benefit is the acquisition of intelligence that is valuable to decision-makers but impossible to obtain otherwise at an acceptable cost.”

The security question could very well represent the first obstacle for Canada on the road to enhanced collaboration with the other Five Eyes nations. As demonstrated previously, a single security breach emanating from Canada can jeopardize the level of trust granted by partners. Fortunately, the Delisle case from 2012 has had minimal impact over time, but another case, arguably much more problematic, has recently surfaced in the media. In September 2019, Cameron Otis, the director general of the national intelligence co-ordination centre of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), was arrested under charges pertaining to the communication or confirmation of special operational information to unauthorized parties.⁶⁰ CBC journalist Catharine Tunney reports having accessed the following damage assessment originating from the Communications Security Establishment (CSE): “CSE’s preliminary assessment is that damage caused by the release of these reports and intelligence is HIGH and potentially devastating in that it would cause grave injury to Canada’s national interests.”⁶¹

As the demarcation lines between criminal and security investigations, as well as between foreign and domestic intelligence, got blurred since 9/11, more Canadian agencies have become regularly involved in intelligence sharing with the Five Eyes, including the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).⁶² This is consistent with the widening of the Five Eyes mandate over time, from a defence-focused, SIGINT-only organization, to a

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Canada’s National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa.



The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Headquarters in Ottawa.

comprehensive, all-source intelligence sharing network. As a consequence, many agencies could be affected by a restriction on information exchange imposed on Canada by partner nations. As such, the Canadian government must thoroughly investigate the Otis case, find mitigation measures to ensure security breaches at such a high level do not occur again, and provide assurances to the Five Eyes partners that the security procedures and security clearance measures in place remain adequate. Failure to do so will compromise the long-term Canadian access to the Five Eyes network and negatively affect national security interests.

Regarding the second collaboration security challenge identified previously, the risk of unintended information disclosure occurring elsewhere in the network with a detrimental effect on Canada, transparency appears to be the most viable strategy considering that leaks will likely continue to occur from time to time. In order to avoid credibility deficits, conspiracy theories or even national embarrassment, Canada and the other Five Eyes governments must continue to engage in open practices with respect to the divulgence of their collaborative intelligence arrangements and programs. This is not to say that the secrecy surrounding the work of intelligence professionals must be abandoned altogether, not at all... Rather, this is a recognition of the reasonable expectations by citizens of democratic states to be informed about the machinery behind the collective good of national security.⁶³ Actually, the open acknowledgment of the Five Eyes network's existence over the past 20 years by the different governments of the participating nations definitely represents a step in the right direction. This manner of initiatives that balance security imperatives with open disclosure practices must continue through *measured*, but *significant* transparency efforts.

The challenge of privacy is more difficult to resolve. Striking the perfect balance between privacy and security is a recurring problem in democratic societies and a wicked one too as there is no easy solution to satisfy both imperatives at the same time. The reality is that the continued involvement of Canada with the

Five Eyes has the potential, in certain circumstances, to affect the privacy rights of Canadian citizens. This is especially true since Canada has limited influence on the policy orientations of the alliance and must sometimes accept certain practices dictated by the US in order to ensure interoperability and maintain the relationship.⁶⁴ Having said that, a 'pre-emptive disclosure' approach based on transparency could, once again, mitigate the negative consequences of the privacy limitations imposed on Canadians by the Five Eyes membership. At least, it would inform the population about the collective price to pay in order to be a member of the most successful intelligence partnership in history.

Concerning intelligence accountability, all the Five Eyes partners are subjected to oversight and review bodies at the national level. As noted in a research paper produced by the Library of Parliament, each of the five countries has developed "a framework

that includes a system of checks and balances that spans the various branches of government, and which aims to ensure that agencies are accountable for both their administration and expenditure and the legality and propriety of their activities."⁶⁵ Now, in order to tackle the transnational accountability gap previously underlined, the next step forward to achieve a more complete form of accountability would be the formal networking of the different Five Eyes review bodies. To that effect, Leigh suggests: "...oversight bodies may attempt to mirror the behavior of the agency they oversee and engage in networking. . . . This could take place through joint committees, sharing of information or the creation of supranational bodies."⁶⁶ While the specific approach to follow should be discussed by governments, such an idea demonstrates that the transnational accountability challenge pertaining to intelligence collaboration is not insurmountable.

Conclusion

From the intelligence liaison work of BSC and its Canadian director during the Second World War to the current shared exploitation of the STONE GHOST database, the Five Eyes partners have demonstrated, over multiple decades, their ability and willingness to work jointly towards collective security for the benefit of their populations and the Western world in general. While Canada contributes to the overall intelligence production of the organization with niche capabilities, such as SIGINT collection in the Arctic, it remains a junior partner and a net recipient of intelligence within the alliance. As such, the benefits of the partnership clearly surpass the costs. Without its membership with the Five Eyes, Canada would have to expend an extensive amount of resources on intelligence gathering to maintain something similar to the current capabilities the nation enjoys. For this reason, this article suggests that it is in the strategic interest of Canada to maximize its national security through a sustained or even enhanced participation in the Five Eyes network.

"Concerning intelligence accountability, all the Five Eyes partners are subjected to oversight and review bodies at the national level."

By following this path, however, Canada will continue to depend on the US intelligence apparatus in order to produce its own national assessments for domestic decision-makers. This dependence on foreign capabilities certainly has cost in terms of national autonomy, but this cost is deemed acceptable when compared to the benefits produced by the alliance such as a wide access to all-source intelligence products. A renewed commitment to the Five Eyes network also has consequence to trigger the enduring necessity of addressing challenges pertaining to

intelligence sharing. Issues of security, privacy and accountability will remain prevalent as Canada maintains a high level of intelligence cooperation with its allies. However, as demonstrated, these issues can be mitigated with best practices, such as review and oversight, and innovative policies based on transparency and open disclosure.



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Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates (L), CEO John Conner, and CEO Steve Ballmer discussing the corporation's future plans for growth and innovation with their employees at their corporate headquarters, Redford, Washington, in July 2004.

Is Your Organization Truly Innovative?

by Gordon Bennett

Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon Bennett is the Commanding Officer of the Canadian Forces Logistic Training Centre. He has served in various positions across the country, including 1 Service Battalion, Technical Services Branch Gagetown, the Canadian Joint Operations Command, and 1st Canadian Division. Lieutenant-Colonel Bennett holds a Doctorate of Business Administration, and is a graduate of the Joint Command and Staff Programme in Toronto. His most recent academic works centre upon innovation and design thinking.

Introduction

The world is full of buzzwords that get used without understanding or meaning. Innovation is often one of these buzzwords. It is frequently used, but must less frequently understood or practiced. The real question is: “How do we know if we are buzzword champions or are truly innovative?” To determine the answer to this question, innovation needs to be defined, and then an assessment made to determine where our organizations stand.

The definitions of innovation are wide and varied. Famed management guru and writer Peter Drucker states: “Innovation can be defined as the task of endowing humans and material resources with new and greater wealth-producing capacity.”¹ Wealth-producing capacity in a military sense can mean improved efficiency in materiel usage, more effective warfighting, improved personnel training and management, and ultimately, the optimization of available resources under given limitations. Bringing a closer definition to how government innovation should work, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines innovation as significant improvements in production, processes, techniques, equipment, design, promotion, or practices.² This definition is broad, fitting most situations.

Innovation is more than simply advancing technology or an arms race. It is far more than attempting to do more with less. Innovation is a mindset and part of an organization's culture that strives to advance and develop new or improved processes, strategies, practices, and equipment. Above all, it provides flexibility to respond to ever-increasing demands and to optimize the use of resources. Innovation is not the same as change. Change can readily be present and not be innovative. Change can be



US President George W. Bush presents Peter Drucker with the Presidential Medal of Freedom at the White House, 9 July 2002.



The logo of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

administrative, change for the sake of change, change for career advancement, or change in response to the environment. It is important to make this distinction from the outset, as innovation is not based upon career desires or personalities, but upon a desired end state.

Summing up these definitions, innovation in DND could be defined as follows: The discovery, implementation, or development of new methods, processes, or tools that maximize the department's societal, economic, and

“The definition of innovation needs to be separated from three concepts, namely: Technology, evolution, and adaptation.”

warfighting contributions. Defining innovation using this definition focuses innovation in a departmental context while encompassing the basic definitions of innovation found in industry. This creates a dynamic combination of innovation attributes that can centre upon how DND should strive to innovate—something that is already inherent to innovative organizations, so not defined by them in these terms.

In a military context, innovative thinking applies from the tactical level through the strategic-political level. At the tactical level, innovative thinking can provide unique solutions across a spectrum from how to effectively and ethically fight insurgents all the way to how a logistic chain is laid out for maximum effectiveness in situations that are not addressed by doctrine. At the operational level, innovative design thinking will help drive plan formation, from orders given from the strategic level while balancing operational assets, such as logistics hubs, to support multiple theatres of operations. At the strategic level, programs such as renewable fuels for training fleets, equipment design for arctic operations, partnerships with industry and academia, licencing R&D discoveries to industry, recruiting, support to industry, and capability specialization are just a few areas for innovation.

Retired US Navy Admiral William McRaven suggests innovation as a contributing element to special forces operations. He states, “Innovation simplifies a plan by helping to avoid or eliminate obstacles...it is also the application of unconventional tactics.”³ Such comments are supported by additional

US special operations doctrine that notes that special operations are conducted by “...units who apply special skills with adaptability, improvisation, and innovation.”⁴ Canada's small military requires its members to be adaptable, develop skills to improvise, and be innovative.

The definition of innovation needs to be separated from three concepts, namely: Technology, evolution, and adaptation. Technological development is based in innovation




DVIDS photo 517854 by Airman 1st Class Christophe Williams

Admiral William McRaven

and scientific discovery. However, the adoption of technology does not necessarily indicate that an organization is innovative. It may mean that the organization is simply evolving with the use of technology. Evolution is a change within the organization, but also does not signal that an organization is innovative. Most businesses today operate using computers, as opposed to carbon paper. The adoption of computers is an evolutionary change, not an innovation creation for the business that now uses computers even though efficiency and effectiveness are improved.

Adaptation and being adaptable can be seen in two different lights. Adaptation to a new environment, process, technology, or situation does not necessarily mean the organization is innovative. Adaptation may be simply a survival mechanism or common response to a changing situation. A store may change its sales tactics to adapt to a competitor. The change should not be considered innovative unless it is something either unheard of or is at least new for the industry. Dropping prices or changing from commissioned to salaried employees is simply an adaptation, not an innovation. The differentiation between being adaptable and accepting adaptations is that adaptability is predicated upon flexibility and adaptation to the conditions is a forced response.



dpa Picture Alliance archive/Alamy Stock Photo DB0REK

Steve Jobs

Innovation distinguishes between a leader and a follower.

~Steve Jobs

Disinnovation

‘Disinnovation’ is not simply doing the reverse of innovation or failing to innovate; it is fighting against innovation. Contemporary bureaucracies, by their current nature, are disinnovators. Disinnovation is driven by ‘stove-piping,’ myopic viewpoints, a lack of diversity, careerism, an unsuitable definition of risk, apathy, a lack of professional education, poor communication, bureaucracy, inappropriate hiring practices, poor innovation culture, and failure to make timely decisions.

Business writer Patricia Schaeffer suggests five actions that kill innovation.⁵ The first innovation killer is punishment for initiative when problems arise. Punishing initiative and failure is anathema to design and consulting firm IDEO’s practices, both in literature and seen through a site visit. Punishing failure when in experimental stages eliminates initiative, grows distrust, and creates fear. In a military context, punishing failure for initiatives, or when plans do not materialize due to unforeseen events, is far different from punishing a soldier for failure to uphold a legal or lawful command or requirement. Creating a culture of trust and confidence is required to build innovation and to advance the organization. To do so may require reasonable risk, not punishing failure, and using failure as an opportunity to grow. Some may

argue that accepting failure could result in battlefield losses or a failure in acceptance to take responsibly for domestic procurement problems, or could be used as an excuse for underperformance. There is merit to these arguments, but when taken in a leadership context, it is leadership's responsibility to make the correct balance. Furthermore, failure from incompetence, apathy, or neglect are simply not acceptable at any point.

Schaeffer's second killer is 'micromanaging' projects or assignments. Part of the developmental process of leadership permits the assigned person the freedoms they require to do their tasks. Arguably, micromanagement also redirects failure and responsibility towards the supervisor while killing innovation. To kill micromanagement, she recommends leaders not second-guess or overrule staff.⁶ Exceptions to this would be in extreme circumstances, or when the leader's intent is not being met.

Her third innovation killer is a lack of a continuous improvement mentality. She argues that too many people hide behind policies and procedures, using them as a scapegoat for failing to innovate. Encouraging people to regularly assess their practices and seek novel ways to improve should be part of the culture.

Finally, Schaeffer suggests "...the organization [that] favors aggressive internal competition" will undermine the objectives of innovation. Competition must be balanced against a sense of community in the workplace. Opponents would argue that competition in the military is an existing cultural trait that is highly desirable in warfighting. This is true, but is it required for corporate operations? Competition can be used in developing innovation if the competition is centered upon improving the institution, and not for personal gain such as career progression. Career progression can be a benefit, but not the end state, in developing innovation.

Professors Bernd Kriegesmann, Thomas Kley, and Markus Schwering from the FH Munster University of Applied Sciences and the Institute for Innovation Research and Management suggest that a current zero-error culture exists in industry that is adversely affecting how organizations encourage innovation.⁷ They highlight that most businesses do not sanction deviations from established protocols.⁸ They further declare that organizations that are rigid in error prevention too often pay lip service to innovation as the incentive structures create risk aversion. They state:

He who leaves the herd of lemmings and deliberately undertakes an innovation process with a calculated risk, should, in the event of failure, not be mocked and derided, but rather encouraged to undertake further, sensible risks in a spirit of optimism.

Why Public Service Institutions Lack Innovation

Peter Drucker cites three reasons why public service institutions are not innovative.⁹ DND with the CAF can be included in his analysis, even though he does not specifically state 'military' as a public service institution. His declarations are based upon his observations and practice in industry.

First, he suggests that public institutions see themselves as budget driven as opposed to monetary driven. The higher the budget, the more prestige the manager has. The more innovative the organization, the less funding the organization needs and the lower the prestige of the manager. In a monetary organization, profits would drive prestige, as opposed to expending money as is found in government.

His second rationale is that of the veto power of constituents. The concept of the government is to serve everyone. Business serves the most profitable clients. Failing to provide a service to a small minority would be viewed as having an ineffectual government organization—so even the small groups could be seen as having veto-type power. However, this also spells out the

argument as to why governments need to be innovative—to ensure they can cost effectively or efficiently serve these minority markets. He argues that the public services exist to 'do good' and see themselves on a moral absolute mission, rather than an economic mission. In this case, the cost-benefit is discounted in favour of perceived higher morals. He states, "The optimal level for most organizations is 75-80%" in reference to serving profitable clients.¹⁰ In other words, to serve 100% of clients, as the government does, it costs significantly more money with vastly diminishing returns. He continues, "The problem with satisfying the desire to do good to all is that the costs rise

exponentially while the benefits drop exponentially. The harder it works to achieve its objectives by doing what it currently does the more frustrated it becomes while concurrently consuming increasingly higher amounts of resources."¹¹

The moral plane view sees significant effort with diminishing returns. This actually argues the need for innovation in government. If the government seeks to serve all people on a moral plane, then it needs to be innovative in order to reduce the resources needed to serve the most consuming 20% of society.

Fountains of Innovation

The basis of organizational innovation is currently under debate.¹² Andrea Ovens, a senior editor at the *Harvard Business Review*, highlights the debate that rages between three parallel fields of thought: People, Processes, and Culture. She notes that Ed Catmull, former president of Pixar and Walt Disney Animation studios, polled his staff to determine their thoughts regarding the source of Pixar's creativity—hiring great talent or processes to find creative ideas. His polls show a 50/50 split even for this highly-innovative organization. James (Jim) Collins, former Stanford business professor and 2017 Forbes top 100 Greatest Living Business Minds, suggests that the right people with good leadership will produce stellar results, regardless of the path.¹³ Sean Atkins, a USAF officer and innovator, refers to this as leadership with a vision for innovative energy.¹⁴ In his example, he defines the right people, not so much in terms of talent, although that is part of it, but rather, people that are driven to succeed in a team based environment that want the firm and the team to succeed.

"The moral plane view sees significant effort with diminishing returns. This actually argues the need for innovation in government."

The Role of Culture

Australian professor from Charles Sturt University, Ramudu Bhanugopan, and industry practitioner Roy Shanker, state "...employee's perception of climate affects the extent to which creative solutions are encouraged, supported and implemented."¹⁵ Their work suggests that creating a climate for innovation is closely tied to employees being innovative. Research from industry practices and first-hand observation when visiting innovative firms confirmed these findings, in that culture is the preeminent success factor in developing an innovative organization. Looking at DND, military/government culture and innovative culture are not mutually exclusive.

In conversations with IDEO staff, the number one reason it is so innovative is due to a constant redeeming culture of innovation. Its employees are driven to design better products, better services, and improved processes. The books written by IDEO staffers and the IDEO principles (the Kelley brothers) support what the employees stated during a site visit. Management consultants with Booz & Company (now a subsidiary of PricewaterhouseCoopers) Barry Jaruzelski, John Loehr, and Richard Holman state, "More important than any of the individual elements, however, is the role played by corporate culture."¹⁶ Hiring at IDEO plays a major role in forming culture. Culture is then created by the passion of the hires within the framework of mission accomplishment, processes developed by the founders, and an attitude of exploration and experimentation. Motivation comes from within the individual in their drive to create.

The Innovation Pyramid Model

We can determine the level of innovation in an organization using the innovation pyramid. This model is based upon the research for this project, and includes first-hand experience, observation of current practices in DND, and comparisons with observations made first-hand at IDEO and other organizations

with innovative industry practices. The model will show managers where they need to go, and what signs they should expect to see as they develop innovation within their organizations. The model can be used for small organizations, such as platoons or it can be applied to larger organizations, such as an Assistant Deputy Minister's office or the entire department. It is highly feasible that smaller organizations could be innovators while larger ones within DND may not be innovative at all. It is also feasible to have a low-level unit, such as a subunit, be innovative within its realm, but its higher headquarters may be far from innovative.

The heart of the pyramid is culture. A culture of innovation will drive innovation upwards, while a culture of disinnovation and 'same as last year,' 'not invented here,' 'I can't,' or 'it's not my job' attitudes will prevent upward progression. It is important to recognize that culture is a driver towards Strategic Engagement. The model starts with the lowest level of innovation—essentially none or at the very most limited innovation on a small scale by some individuals, but not as an organization. *Innovation* starts when individuals start looking to use innovation as a tool. *Learning* begins by researching what lessons others have learned in a particular domain. Using the example of alternative fuels for commercial military fleets, inquisitive innovators start by searching out what other organizations have developed or used. At this stage, there is simply an interest in researching basic information regarding a specific topic. There is likely no research question to answer and significant resistance to innovation in the culture.

Finding lessons learned is important, but there needs to come with it a three-part acceptance solution. The first is to have a system to capture corporate innovation practices and lessons learned. This could be a DND innovation library, bulletin, or other method to capture, disseminate, and champion internal and external learning. How often have staff had to create briefing notes on subjects that were previously briefed a year or two prior or corporate knowledge lost due to postings or retirements? An innovation information




Figure 1 – Innovation Levels

Author



repository that is regularly reviewed as part of education and training, and championed through the DND media (i.e., the *Maple Leaf*, regional papers, technical bulletins, DND-wide emails, a portal site with alerts to a subscriber list, and so on.) is required to facilitate best practices and then adoption.

At the ‘best practices’ stage, the innovator—that may or may not be a formal leader within his or her organization—branches out to find out what best practices are available internally to the organization. These practices at their base level may be practices that should have been accepted, but *are not* or *are* practices that are being used without significant fanfare. Best practices should consider both short-term and long-term elements concurrently, as confirmed by consulting firm Deloitte.¹⁷ Best practices can be developed through two means. The first is exposure to innovation training. The second is sharing innovation successes within DND.

Adoption includes the implementation of best practices including lessons learned across DND. Adoption is accompanied by changing cultural attitudes towards innovation, and by advancing the level of innovation in the organization. Adopting innovation means accepting and applying principles and practices from other sectors, including from outside the department. Adoption sees concepts taken from others and modified to suit the organization’s needs. An excellent example of the adoption stage from industry is Jack Ma of Alibaba. He followed the same innovative principles as eBay, only he used it for business-to-business sales, rather than between consumers or businesses. Ma’s adoption of essentially an eBay for business occurred four years after the start of eBay and two years after eBay officially become ‘eBay.’ By the time



Alibaba was founded, eBay had already sold over one million items and had gone public.¹⁸

Combined Development starts when the organization is beginning to adopt a regular practice of innovation culture well into product or service development. Combined development is well-manifested in the medical community, with the US military in joint ventures with medical collaborators. Collaborations with industry and the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency develops technologies with outside partners—many of these partnerships have improved medical advancements for both the military and the private sector.

“Adoption is accompanied by changing cultural attitudes towards innovation, and by advancing the level of innovation in the organization.”

Lead development in the model is the sub-pinnacle of innovation. Leading innovation means that the culture has been transformed from one of little-or-no innovation, to an organization that leads in a particular sector. Just a few examples of what DND could lead in, based upon current successes or present areas of development, could include: Arctic sustainment, biofuels, human centric combat

clothing, combat feeding, and humanitarian support, to name but a few. Lead development means the organization is recognized as an innovation leader at a minimum within the same industry or sector. It is not necessary for lead development to be only strategic. Identifying opportunities at the unit or formation level can also initiate a lead development project. Lead development on a consistent basis, however, requires a culture change. When consistent projects are sustained and results garnered, or innovative lessons learned and applied from failures, development flows with multiple organizations, and new development happens—only then can the organization be considered to have achieved a lead development status.

Finally, the pinnacle of innovation is the Strategic Engagement Level. At this level, the organization has embraced an innovation culture even if the projects and solutions are low cost, low key, and are not centred upon technology. The vast majority of members within the organization are in an innovative mindset, and are thinking about how to improve their individual and collective realms of responsibility. The strategic engagement level then takes these collective thoughts and practices, engages and leads other entities outside the normal partnerships. Strategic engagement may result

in high-level innovations, including: Patent filings; revamping of policies and procedures for the department, nation, and allies; mentoring other organizations on how to become innovative; and demonstrating high levels of efficiency and effectiveness. At this level, failures are accepted and overcome in training and development. Examples of firms in this category include 3M, IDEO, Apple, Salesforce.com, and Pixar. At this level, innovative leaders connect with others outside their organizations and develop innovative leadership internally.



Conclusion

Understanding innovation comes from having a clear definition of what is innovation. True innovation is tied to culture, and as culture improves, so does innovation. The Innovation Pyramid can be used to determine from where we have come and where we need to go to be truly innovative. By following the innovation pyramid, organizations can formulate a roadmap for true innovation.



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Back to the Future? The Tale of Two Trudeaus and Their Defence Policies

by Myles Erickson

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Introduction

The election of Justin Trudeau as Prime Minister of Canada in 2015 presented Canada's first case in which a father and son have both assumed the position of Prime Minister. Despite a nearly 50-year time difference between the two 'prime ministerships,' their first terms were strikingly similar in several ways. Each Prime Minister took office with a majority Liberal Party government. For Pierre Trudeau, 58.7% of the vote;¹ for Justin Trudeau, 54.4%.² As well, for each Prime Minister, their respective election victories came after two Prime Ministers – Lester B Pearson and Stephen Harper

respectively – from whom each Trudeau sought to distinguish themselves. Both Trudeaus had to manage outspoken, charismatic, and domestically- divisive Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon and Donald Trump. Additionally, both men led at a time when the geopolitical climate was evolving. For 'Trudeau Senior,' Cold War détente had ended. Canada was wedged between two superpowers that seemed determined to destroy the other. Proxy wars were the norm, political unrest was rife, and world economies were shaky. In 2015, Canada and 'Trudeau Junior' found themselves in an increasingly-multipolar world, with Russia and China growing as 'near-peer' competitors to the United States, adversary states like North Korea becoming increasingly emboldened, and with regional powers in Asia and South America playing an increased role in global politics. Both Prime Ministers released defence policies within the first two years of being in office: 1971's *White Paper Defence in the '70s, (D70s)*, and 2017's *Strong, Secure, Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy (SSE)*. This article intends to compare and contrast these two defence policies.

I argue that their defence policy positions on the United States, on adversaries, and upon international organizations bear a striking resemblance, due more to geopolitical context and Canada's position within the world, rather than upon political ideology or familial connection.

The front cover of each policy gives a hint as to priorities of the day. The *D70s* cover portrays three Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) members, seen walking in Arctic gear, away from a transport aircraft. Where *SSE* establishes a human-centered model, *D70s* instead establishes a state-centered model of defence. It begins with an overview of the geopolitical context, and orients Canada within that context. The 'Protection of Canada' is the first substantive chapter, followed by the Defence of North America, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.³ This organization is relatively traditional – orientating defence and security, centered upon the protection of the state and state interests. Focusing upon the defence of Canada, North America and beyond, *Defence in the '70s* discusses very little of how to better provide for its service members beyond better equipping them for defence and security.

By contrast, *Strong, Secure, Engaged's* cover shows service members in various settings, regions, and circumstances. Whether providing humanitarian aid, in armed conflict, or at home with friends and family, *SSE* seeks to improve conditions for Canada and its armed forces. *SSE* is a human-centered policy, one that orientates itself around the well-being of its members and of

those it intends to protect. The first chapter, "Well-Supported, Diverse, Resilient People and Families," sets guidelines on reintegrating retired service members into the work force and civilian life, promoting a culture of diversity and inclusivity (including guidelines to better investigate the issues of sexual violence within the Canadian Armed Forces), and better supporting the families of service members.⁴ This is the first published instance of service members coming first in a defence policy. Generally, as in *Defence in the 70s*, threats are first addressed in terms of adversaries, changing geopolitics, and so on. In *SSE*, the concept of potential threats has evolved to include the well-being of the Armed Forces itself. *SSE* also establishes defence and security around the defence of people. It states: "...people are at the core of Canada's new vision for defence." This is a relatively new development, as defence policy in the past, such as *Defence in the 70s*, orientated itself around the state.

Prime Ministers and Their Presidents

While the defence relationship between Canada and the United States (CANUS) has been relatively stable since the 1940 signing of the Ogdensburg Agreement, which created the Permanent Joint Board on Defense (PJBD), to guide and advise both capitals on the defence of North America, the relationship has experienced its highs and lows. Allies in the two global wars of the 20th Century, both were original parties to NATO and partners in NORAD, the CANUS defence relationship has been the envy of many states. And yet, there have been serious disagreements, especially between certain Prime Ministers and Presidents. Both Trudeaus have had to manage mercurial, Republican Presidents whose views on many topics are ideologically juxtaposed to their Liberal views.



Tim Graham/Alamy Stock Photo BWNKD2

Prime Minister of Canada Pierre Trudeau.



Stocktrek Images, Inc./Alamy Stock Photo HGB2GG

US President Richard Nixon.

Despite the ideological divide, Pierre Trudeau and Richard Nixon found mutual respect for one another. Despite Nixon claiming Trudeau was an “ass****,” recorded on one of the famous ‘Nixon Tapes,’⁵ Nixon viewed Trudeau with a certain sense of admiration. Distinguished Canadian historians Robert Bothwell and Jack Granatstein note that Nixon’s crude comment likely had less to do with his view of Trudeau and more with his style: “...profane when he wanted to make a point.”⁶ American appreciation of Pierre Trudeau extended beyond the President, as many American diplomats viewed Trudeau as brilliant despite being “... impatient with his advice at times, sermonizing, and his needles.”⁷ Henry Kissinger notes in his book *White House Years* that the two leaders were not “...ideally suited for each other... Trudeau was bound to evoke all of Nixon’s resentments against ‘swells,’ who in his view, had always looked down on him.”⁸ Despite this, Kissinger states, “...when they worked together, Trudeau treated Nixon without any hint of condescension and Nixon accorded Trudeau both respect and attention. They worked together without visible strain.” In his memoirs, Pierre Trudeau states: “In our dealings, I can’t say there was any warmth of feeling on either side. We did business together. I felt I could have empathy for his problems in governing one of the world’s superpowers, though I didn’t feel warmly towards him as a person.” Despite this inability to connect on a personal basis, the two were able to develop a working relationship based upon mutual respect.

“Despite the ideological divide, Pierre Trudeau and Richard Nixon found mutual respect for one another.”

Defence in the 70s needed to respond to the 1971 Nixon ‘shocks,’ which dramatically impacted the Canadian economy, Trudeau’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1971 which enraged Nixon, and Canada’s reluctance to provide direct troop support to the Vietnam War (both in terms of military and diplomatic support) placed considerable strain on the relationship. While the leaders’ relationship was cordial, the policy within *Defence in the 70s* reflects these tensions, with the document suggesting Canada’s desire to begin defending itself on its terms, without the then considerable influence of American military interests.

Nuclear war was a distinct possibility in the 1970s. *D70s* noted that Canada is “...inevitably closely associated with the United States. Even if no warheads landed on Canada in the event of general nuclear war, a strategic attack on the US... would have cataclysmic consequences for this country.” Therefore, it concluded, “...co-operation with the United States in North American defence will remain essential so long as our joint security depends on stability in the strategic military balance.”

This language of affirmation in *D70s* is far different from *SSE*, mainly because the threat of nuclear war was more muted in 2017. For instance, priorities in *D70s* emphasize “co-operation” with the United States, as opposed to the *SSE*, which highlights a “renewed defence partnership” with the United States. The relationship with the United States by 1971 is reluctant at best – one in which Canada would rather not have to deal with the US, but knows that it must do so. *D70s* states that the central national aim of the policy

was to ensure “... that Canada will continue secure as an independent political entity.” This overriding aim ensured that Canada would see itself distinct from the United States and any international defence organization. However, *Defence in the 70s* states that Canada’s involvement in nuclear war would be due to “consequence of geography.” With this, economic restraints and the “present state of weapons technology” placed Canada into a necessary partnership with the United States. 1971’s subtle reluctance in language can be due to several possible reasons. For one,



Richard Nixon and Pierre Trudeau in a 1972 meeting.

while the policy states that deterrence is essential in the prevention of nuclear war between the global superpowers, it is always equally likely that, due to the nuclear balance of power, the likelihood of global nuclear annihilation was slim. Because of this, Canada did not need the United States as much as it may have ten years previously, when the balance of power was more precarious. Thus, because the Canadian government did not feel it needed the United States as it much as in the past, its cynicism towards the relationship was shining through clearer in a time of reduced existential threat.

Defence in the 70s envisioned Canada's relationship with the United States entirely different from the 2017 Defence policy. Today, the relationship between Justin Trudeau and Donald Trump has experienced its peaks and valleys. Conflict regarding trade (the renegotiations and resigning of the Canada-US-Mexico Trade Agreement (CUSMA)) and military spending (Donald Trump's insistence on NATO allies spending near 2% of GDP on defence) have led to a difficult relationship. It has indeed led to statements by Donald Trump calling Justin Trudeau "dishonest and weak" as well as "meek and mild."⁹ These statements perhaps reflect less a struggling relationship between the two leaders and instead reflect

"After discussing the people-first platform in the first chapter, SSE follows the standard form of defence policies (as does D70s), starting by defence of Canadian borders."

the up-to-the-minute cycle of information, as well as the brash and theatrical nature of Donald Trump's social media strategy. Despite this, Trudeau has sought to deepen ties with Trump, with the resigning of CUSMA signifying that the relationship was not 'dead in the water.' The 2017 Defence policy reflects this desire to deepen ties with the United States, evidenced by Canada's investments into the NORAD binational and other US-led collective defence organizations.

Despite a tumultuous relationship between Justin Trudeau and Trump, *SSE* unquestionably considers the United States as Canada's stalwart ally, and consistently works to reaffirm the relationship. *SSE* emphatically declares: "Canada's defence partnership with the United States remains integral to continental security and the United States continues to be Canada's most important military ally." After discussing the people-first platform in the first chapter, *SSE* follows the standard form of defence policies (as does *D70s*), starting by defence of Canadian borders. It follows by discussing the defence of North America broadly, particularly through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); and finally the relationship of Canada and collective defence and collective security organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations. This clear order of importance, Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow Lindsay Rodman argues, signifies Canada's focus upon US-Canada relations to American readers, and any sign of Canada seeking alternative military partners from the United States is doubtful at best.¹⁰



Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau.



US President Donald Trump.

White House Photo/Alamy Stock Photo HXDHR

It is vital to acknowledge that the reinvigoration of Canada's partnership with the United States is also represented by Canada's investment in NORAD, and, within the 2017 Defence policy, the importance of NORAD and concomitant spending is particularly emphasized. The policy re-articulates Canadian interests, centred upon being "...active in a renewed partnership in NORAD and with the United States." In that, the Defence policy states that the defence team will "expand Canada's capacity to meet NORAD commitments by improving aerospace and maritime domain awareness," as well as ensuring NORAD is "fully prepared to confront rapidly evolving threats." However, these promises neglect to state dollar figures in the investment in NORAD, limiting their substantive weight. While these promises are relatively vague, they confirm that Canada's active investment is in its relationship with the United States.

Canada in an Evolving World


SSE suggests that the global strategic environment, while increasingly multi-polar, is dominated presently by a United States hegemony. *SSE* declares: "...the United States is still unquestionably the only superpower." The nuances in U.S. definitions between 1971 and 2017 are noteworthy. 1971 appears to view the United States as a global power, but analyzes it in terms of its position as the regional power. 2017 unequivocally declares the United States the global superpower, and does little to explain it beyond such. 2017 additionally argues: "China is a rising economic power with an increasing ability to project influence globally." Chinese military advancements are considered within the paper as an example of challenges to the "rules-based international order," particularly as China ramped up its military activities in the South China Sea. As well, *SSE* acknowledges that Russia is increasingly willing to test international security, listing its

illegal annexation of Crimea as a prime example. While Great Power politics loomed in the minds of policy analysts at the Department of Defence, the Defence policy also suggests that the imminent future may see regional powers constituting a new evolution in the balance of power.

Defence in the '70s suggests that nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union has diminished as an issue, as "...neither could rationally consider launching a deliberate attack." While the immediate threat was reduced, however, the importance of diplomatic ties growing between the two states remained vital to the Canadian Government. The Paper suggests the Government of Canada can work to further open negotiations on the "Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)," which worked to reduce US and Soviet military presence in Europe. Additionally, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) – which involved formal negotiations between the two superpowers – constituted discussions of "overriding importance" to the Department of Defence. The willingness to "resolve East-West issues by negotiation" was a relatively new development, therefore the Canadian Government saw it as paramount to reducing the capacity and willingness to wage war. This development came at a time when, although nuclear war seemed less likely than previously, the number of nuclear missiles had developed a theory/condition of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), whereby nuclear war would ensure cataclysmic destruction. While a catastrophic war between the two superpowers remained an existential threat to Canada and the world, in the Canadian Governments predictions, another more significant threat to national security existed; the emergence of rising powers possibly establishing a greater multi-polar world.

Defence in the 70s viewed the international system shifting towards greater multipolarity, away from the previous bipolar

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US Secretary of State John Kerry holds a press conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on 16 May 2015, after a clash between the two nations over a territorial dispute in the South China Sea.

Danita Delimont/Alamy Stock Photo R3XEGC



Justin Trudeau and Donald Trump conversing in the rose garden of the White House, 13 February 2017.

system. Change involving “Japan’s phenomenal economic growth;” the substantially increasing Chinese military and economic growth; as well as the return to NATO member countries being able to provide their own military force and “assume a greater share of the collective Alliance defence, particularly with respect to their own continent,” displayed the increasing prospects of a multi-polar world order. It is interesting that both policies are reluctant to accept a multi-polar world, more comfortable with the current U.S. led hegemony. However, both suggest that Canada and its armed forces needs to play a more active role in an increasingly multi-polar world, and must be prepared to defend its borders and national interests/values.

Deterrence: A Matter of Technology

Defence in the 70s insists that the pre-dominant threat to Canadian security is the possibility of nuclear war between the two superpowers. Because of this, Canada’s “overriding defence objective must therefore be the prevention of nuclear war by promoting political reconciliation to ease the underlying causes of tension...” This view of security concerns differs from *SSE* in several ways. First, this perspective of Great Power defence sees its parties in a static form – neither is rising to power. However, the threat of nuclear war permeated as each state sought to manage its power. Therefore, the ability to reduce tensions and create diplomatic ties were more necessary than

stockpiling defence. Alternatively, *SSE* seems to suggest that with the rising powers of China and Russia, steps should be taken to reduce their ability to engage militarily with Canadian space stations and networks.

Non-state actors in *Defence in the 70s* were far different than in *SSE*. Where *SSE* sees non-state actors more as concepts such as climate change or refugee crises, *Defence in the 70s* envisions non-state actors in regards to nationalist extremists in Canada. It was released just two years after the FLQ crisis (which *D70s* refers to subtly as the “recent crisis”). It argues: “...the threat to society posed by violent revolutionaries... merited close consideration in projecting Canadian defence activities in the 1970’s.” The threat from violent nationalists had been realized during the October Crisis; due to this threat, deterrence considerations needed to be evaluated on a national, as well as an international level.

“Alternatively, SSE acknowledges the evolving and rising economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”

Alternatively, *SSE* acknowledges the evolving and rising economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. With that, *SSE* suggests the evolution of a greater multi-polar world requires the Canadian Government to further engage with emerging powers to foster new partnerships and promote peace. *SSE* also acknowledges emerging global threats, including North Korea’s “ongoing efforts to advance its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs,” as well as Syria’s “abhorrent use of weapons of mass destruction against

innocent civilians.” These threats to Canadian and international security, *SSE* posits, requires an increased emphasis on deterrence. Deterrence, to the Department of Defence, constitutes both “...a diplomatic tool to help prevent conflict [which] should be accompanied by dialogue,” as well as a deterrence “...focused on conventional and nuclear capabilities... [and deterrence] relevant to space and cyber domains.” This means that deterrence can constitute either diplomatic and/or economic deterrents; and, if soft power cannot prevail in properly deterring adversarial states, a wide variety of military deterrents should be available to the Department of Defence. This is rather similar to *Defence in the 70s*, which suggests that deterring nuclear war between the two superpowers can best be prevented through diplomatic methods. The two policies differ on deterrence mainly due to their distance in time, and *SSE*’s evolving view of technology and its impact upon national defence and security.

With an evolving global strategic environment, and the increased presence of violent extremism around the world, *SSE* places Canada ideally at the forefront of international security, declaring:

We have the capacity to help those who live under the threat of violence, or have been consigned to protracted refugee status. We can reach out to those who suffer from weak governance. We can be a force for stability in the world.

This statement demonstrates the shift in what can be considered international security. Whereas in the 1971 document, state actors and violent extremists can be considered a threat to national security, *SSE* expands security concerns to the people affected by war and extremism, and their livelihoods must be addressed as well. Additionally, the threats of climate change are discussed in the terms of security concerns. With the possibility of disrupting and threatening the livelihoods of millions of people and communities around the world, there is a need to “work hand-in-hand with like-minded partners around the world to meet this threat and beat it, rather than stand passively by.”

Finally, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, introduces further complications to the branch of national defence: particularly cyber and space domains. *SSE* states the increased need for the Defence Department to invest in cyber defensive infrastructure, preventing actors from being able to steal sensitive information from internal networks, and increasing prevention from terrorist organizations from being able to spread disinformation online and from being able to finance their operations. This best emphasizes how deterrence has evolved from 1971 to 2017 – deterrence is necessarily extending into domains that had not been previously imagined.



DVIDS photo 6236638 courtesy of North American Aerospace Defense

An F-22 *Raptor* assigned to Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson intercepts a Russian Tu-95 *Bear*, 9 June 2020.

Canada, NATO, and the Quiet Growth of NORAD

Strong, Secure, Engaged and the *Defence in the 70s* defence policies differ in small but essential ways regarding which international organizations Canada aligns itself more predominantly. The 2017 Defence policy emphasizes NORAD as the most vital organization to Canada's defence, while also highlighting the role of NATO in broader global defence. Alternatively, *D70s* envisions NORAD as a 'given' for Canada's defence from a nuclear strike. It instead emphasizes the role of NATO in the security of the Western world in an era where the effectiveness of peacekeeping was coming into question.

D70s works to reaffirm Canada's commitment to NATO collective defence at a time when peacekeeping was growing out of favour. At the time of publication, NATO was only 22 years old, a dramatically-short period of time considering the successes and expectations that had been placed upon it. In the section, "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization," NATO's successful history of rebuilding and solidifying Western Europe, and North America's connections to it are mentioned. With Europe's continued rebuilding after the war, and its ability to enjoy freedom from conflict for twenty-five years, *D70s* emphasizes Canada's aims to continue to commit forces in Europe. It states, "...it is in the interest of international peace, and ultimately of Canada's security, that measures be maintained to discourage deliberate aggression in security, and to contain quickly any hostilities which might nevertheless occur." This commitment entailed the continued stationing of forces in Europe, to prevent possible aggression, and to express Canadian support for collective security.

This continued support for NATO's collective defence was expressed at a time when, admittedly for Canada, the role and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping was diminishing. Canada's role in the creation and implementation of peacekeeping within the United Nations was pivotal. However, by 1971, the strategy was being put into question within the Department of Defence. The Defence policy acknowledges Canada's "exceptional insight" in international peacekeeping, but then states that, "...the experience has all too often been frustrating and disillusioning." Additionally, the policy states that Canada will "consider constructively" any request for Canadian participation in any peacekeeping operation. This is a far cry from the 'golden age' of UN Peacekeeping when Canada more actively played a role in keeping the peace, exemplified by the nation's involvement during the Suez Canal Crisis, and perhaps contains Canada's first motioning towards NATO as the predominant international organization for national defence and security.

Within *SSE*, there is a strong emphasis on the role of NORAD for North American defence, placing it ahead of other international organization in terms of investment and importance. Perhaps most tellingly, on Page 82 of the policy, a text box ranking Canada's defence priorities references NORAD second to the top, behind the defence of Canada. Lindsay Rodman states that Canada has remained consistently hesitant towards devoting investment to NORAD modernization; however, throughout the Defence policy

there are references to the need for Canada to "meet its NORAD obligations," and investigate security requirements. Canada's stated obligations to NORAD is uncommon in most eras, where NORAD is seen as the given – the organization which needs no further dedication or investment; the organization in which Canada does not need to continue proving itself to any other state. Furthermore, the notion of "meeting its NORAD obligations" is unusual, as there is no bar for Canada to meet as there is in NATO with the 2% spending rule.

Additionally, throughout the 2017 defence policy, Canada reaffirms its dedication to NATO and its missions. While the defence policy fails to fund the Canadian Armed Forces past the point of NATO's 2% funding threshold, it declares, "...while defence spending is an important part of ensuring appropriate defence capability, it is not the most effective measure of ensuring appropriate defence capability." Furthermore, Canada argues within the Policy that NATO does not correctly weigh defence spending from member states, as NATO does not take into consideration spending relevant to a defence that is found in other federal departments. If NATO took a more accurate analysis of spending, Canada would comfortably meet its spending requirements. While the policy fails to meet spending measures in its current form, the Defence policy does ensure that Canada will pursue a leadership role within NATO, and invests in ensuring cooperation with allies and partners. The emphasis on leadership demonstrates Canada's increased interest in playing a role in international security, and in attempting to reinforce its position on the international stage. Through NORAD and NATO, the 2017 Defence policy most emphasizes itself with respect to national and global security.

While not as strongly emphasized as NORAD and NATO, the 2017 Policy states Canada's plan to increase support to United Nations peace operations. While *D70s* conveys some cynicism towards peacekeeping operations, it does want Canada 'out in the world,'

trying to encourage peace-building, mediation, and stability – with a particular emphasis upon security for women and youth. At the time of its publication in 2017, many were anticipating an announcement by the Canadian government regarding its planned mission in Africa, which would result in Canada committing 250 soldiers to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).¹¹ This optimism for peace suggests that while Canada is not a big player in international politics, nonetheless, it can play an essential role in ensuring security on a case-by-case basis, and the Canadian government should take measures to ensure that the Canadian Armed Forces are well equipped to do so.

Conclusions

Defence in the 70s and *Strong, Secure, Engaged* are similar with respect to their perspectives on the evolving geopolitical climate (both eras shifting into a multipolar world), the relationship with partner states, and the relationships with enemies abroad. However, their differences highlight where Canada finds itself among the geopolitical climate. Specifically, *Defence in the 70s* portrays Canada as a state

"While not as strongly emphasized as NORAD and NATO, the 2017 Policy states Canada's plan to increase support to United Nations peace operations."



A NATO flag flies at Cardiff Castle during the NATO summit, which was held in Newport, 31 August 2014.

with considerable power, one that grounds Canadian forces in Western Europe for NATO, while investments in surveillance and intelligence were being made to protect Canada's sovereignty. On the other hand, the 2017 Defence Policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, situates Canada as being in a weaker position than in 1971. Canada in 2017 feels it needs to prove its worth to its international partners; investments need to be made to meet NORAD requirements; investments need to be made to reach towards the NATO spending threshold with promises to take a leadership role in NATO, not committed by Canada before. Troops are not being stationed to prevent aggression from a global superpower in 2017, as Canada does not have that type of hard power capabilities. While troops are currently deployed to Ukraine to help prevent Russian aggression, there is no mention of their positioning therein to be found within *Strong, Secure, and Engaged*.

The similarities between the two Trudeaus are striking, in terms of both ideological positions, as well as the

organizations and peace-seeking diplomacy with Eastern powers. While Pierre Trudeau was open to international diplomacy, his defence policy reflects a "Canada-first" defence strategy, caused by rising frustration and dissent with the United States. Instead, Justin Trudeau has sought to deepen ties with the United States and invest in infrastructure to defend North America. While there is still an emphasis upon the importance of NATO and the United Nations, the defence of North America is paramount in 2017. This reflects a greater desire to place Canada aside other states to defend Canada's borders – however, the policy aims to put Canada in a stronger place as a player and potential leader within those relationships. Further investigation should be done with respect to the implementation of both defence policies, and into how each Trudeau compares in their subsequent foreign policy decisions. A leader's initial policy plays a significant role in their subsequent decision-making and provides the clearest indication of their ideologies, interests, and values.

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Bringing a Knife to a Gunfight: Canadian Strategic Communications and Information Operations in Latvia, Operation Reassurance 2019-2020

by Chris Wattie

Background

When the first Canadian soldiers arrived in Latvia in 2017 to assume the leadership of NATO's enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battle group, they faced a threat unlike any in our military history. The Canadian-led battle group, along with flanking units in Estonia and Lithuania (led by the United Kingdom and Germany respectively) and an American battle group in Poland, was created to demonstrate NATO's resolve to defend all its members, including the small and geographically-vulnerable Baltic States.

The mission of the Canadian unit – which incorporates troops from Albania, the Czech Republic, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain – is to *deter*, and if necessary, to *defend* Latvia against Russian aggression. However, from the beginning, it has become clear that the threat is not *purely* – or even *mainly* – the kinetic capability represented by the

three massive Russian army groups just across the border. Indeed, virtually all analysts agree that the chances of Russia launching a conventional kinetic attack into the Baltic States are extremely remote. Recent Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and elsewhere indicate that the threat is more nuanced – that is, their much-analyzed use of hybrid and information warfare to disrupt, to weaken, and to create divisions within targeted nations. Russian kinetic actions are shaped by actions in the Information Environment – actions carried

out using far more varied weapons, capabilities, and forces than the traditional Soviet Motor Rifle Division. Conventional military forces are just one of myriad means Russia uses to achieve its desired effects: often the military plays only a supporting role, as in the Russian-sponsored civil war in eastern Ukraine. The forces at the Kremlin's disposal in shaping these actions range from the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, to targeted assassination teams, or its infamous social media troll farms.



Map of the Baltic nations and neighbouring countries.



Flags of the Baltic nations.

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An RCAF CF-18 *Hornet* pilot mounts his jet before a combat training flight during Operation *Reassurance*, Air Task Force Romania, 25 September 2020, at Mihail Kogălniceanu Air Base, Romania.

In the Baltics, these shaping actions take the form of hostile narratives spread through conventional and social media, influence operations carried out by Russian-controlled or funded non-governmental organizations, and cyber attacks by ‘arms-length’ groups, such as ‘patriotic’ hackers or cyber criminals. Their aim is to discredit the eFP battle groups (and by extension, all of NATO), and weaken the Baltic States’ governance and public confidence in the West, to eventually create weakened and economically-dependent nations on their western borders.

The battle in the Baltics is for the support of the Latvian population. In broad terms, Russia is seeking to divide the people of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania from NATO and the European Union. To fight this battle, Canada needs to recognize the importance of the Information Related Capabilities that can enable success in this fight, and invest in developing those capabilities at home and supporting them ‘at the coal face’ in Latvia.

Discussion

Canada needs to act promptly to enable these capabilities, because the information battle in the Baltics is already well underway, and so far, it is not going well for us. The Russians have been steadily ‘turning up the volume’ in the information environment. One indicator of this comes from NATO’s Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, headquartered in Riga, which identifies and reports on Russian or Russian-sponsored hostile narratives across a wide variety

of Web-based and conventional media. In 2018, the Center counted a total of 1,043 social media or Internet posts classified as hostile narratives, all of them Russian-sponsored. In 2019, that number rose by 8% to 1,123, including a significant spike in narratives claiming NATO is provocative and aggressive. This represents only the most visible facet of a growing and increasingly- complex Russian messaging program aimed at fostering hostility towards the NATO presence among Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian and Polish audiences by portraying the battle group as the *cause* of Russian aggression rather than the *cure* for it. More ominously, this emphasis upon NATO “aggression” could very well be used to justify any future hybrid actions executed by Russia as a response to NATO provocation.

To date, these narratives have not been systematically or effectively countered. Indeed, at present, the Canadian Armed Forces does not even have the means to identify these information attacks, their sources, or their potential impact. The only source of data regarding the volume, messages, and potential impact of such hostile narratives are weekly reports by the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Labs (DFR Labs), prepared for the Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, and based upon open source information. While useful, these reports only sample the most high-profile social media platforms - they do not include similar activities on the Dark Web, Deep Web, Internet discussion and chat groups, or the more specialized social media platforms, used by Latvians, and leveraged by Russian and Russian-sponsored disseminators.



DND photo IS06-2017-0004-070 by Master Corporal Jennifer Kusche

Major Caroline Pollock attends an exercise planning brief alongside her American and Latvian counterparts in the Hohenfels Training Area, Germany, on Exercise *Allied Spirit VI* during Operation *Reassurance*, 18 March 2017.

Canada's mission in Latvia has already come under fire from these hostile narratives. Shortly after the first Canadian battle group arrived, for example, Russian-sponsored media began spreading stories referencing serial killer and former RCAF Colonel Russ Williams as an example of Canadian military leadership. As recently as late-2019, stories appeared in Russian media and their proxies ridiculing a Canadian Forces policy that dictated the barbers serving the battle group had to be hired from Canada, rather than locally. And, as the COVID-19 pandemic spread across Europe, Russian-sponsored narratives painted the NATO battle groups as potential sources of infection – a threat to the health of Latvians.

Steps are being taken to identify and address the information threat in the Baltics, and to begin countering this growing tide of hostile messaging. Early in the Canadian mission, Task Force Latvia established a Strategic Communications (StratCom) cell in its headquarters to better understand and counter this threat. This represented an important step for the Canadian Armed Forces – the first operational StratCom capability it has ever fielded, bringing Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Information Operations and Public Affairs specialists into one team of officers and non-commissioned members to work in the Information Environment in Latvia and beyond.

The cell was designed to coordinate the activities from these and other Information Related Capabilities, such as Psychological Operations (Psyops) or Cyber Operations, synchronizing all of these capabilities, focusing and aligning their activities with strategic-level objectives, and achieving tactical effects in the Information Environment with potentially significant strategic implications. In doing this, the StratCom cell acts as the task force commander's 'eyes and ears' in the information environment, both informing and advising with respect to the potential impact of friendly tactical activities. For example, during the planning stages of a public outreach event by the eFP battle group (a display of vehicles and equipment for high school students in a mid-sized Latvian city), the StratCom cell learned that the mayor of the community hosting the event had recently been arrested on corruption charges. The mayor had sponsored the youth festival, and was expected to be present to oversee the arrival of hundreds of young people and their teachers at a local park, where they were to tour military vehicles, and to meet with battle group soldiers, Latvian National Guard troops, and local police officers. The StratCom cell prepared a detailed briefing for the task force commander, which included the relevant background information and an assessment that any public appearances alongside this individual would almost certainly be seized upon by Russian-sponsored media and social media outlets, and used to discredit the NATO mission.



Canadian Armed Forces Clearance Divers with Fleet Diving Unit Atlantic return from mine clearing operations off the coast of Mikeltnoris, Latvia, 27 August 2017, during Operation *Open Spirit* 2017.

The StratCom cell was also instrumental in gaining and maintaining situational awareness of the civilian situation in the Task Force area of operations, and in keeping the commander apprised of ongoing issues that might have tactical, operational or strategic level implications. The cell planned and executed Operation *Saprasana* (Latvian for “understanding”), an ongoing series of CIMIC community assessments of Latvian towns and cities, focussed initially upon communities *along* or *near* the borders with Russia and Belarus. CIMIC teams, and other members of the StratCom cell, accompanied by their colleagues from the Latvian Joint Headquarters and members of the local Zemessardze (National Guard) battalions, met with local civic, business, and other community leaders and developed assessments of each municipality, encompassing their political, military/security, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure situation. These assessments produced a flood of valuable information, captured in a searchable database which – when assessments of all major Latvian communities are completed – will allow the commander, Task Force Latvia and his staff to access detailed data on any area of interest in Latvia. This information could be used to plan battle group exercises, to guide outreach events to maximize their impact on desired target audiences, to facilitate planning for any future domestic operations in support of Latvian authorities (including supporting military response to natural disasters like flooding), or to gauge the impact of Russian-sponsored disinformation campaigns on vulnerable audiences, to name but a few potential applications.

One early indicator of the value of this operation came during the StratCom’s CIMIC team assessment of the town of Kraslava in southeast Latvia, situated along the Belarus border. Meetings with municipal officials, confirmed by conversations with some local inhabitants, revealed that the general feeling among the community was that NATO had been invisible in their region, and

that the NATO force had been avoiding the area because they were hesitant to come so close to the border. In this case, the absence of any public events by the Latvian or foreign military was having exactly the wrong effect in the community, which has a large ethnic Russian and Polish minority population. Within a few weeks, an event was organized in Kraslava led by the Polish contingent of the NATO battle group, which was warmly greeted by the local population and contributed greatly to achieving the mission’s desired effect of reassuring Latvians that NATO was committed to defending them. This is also an example of how the battle group acts, not only as a deterrent to a potential conventional attack, but also as a force in the information environment. It is arguably more effective as a deterrent through its effects in the Information Environment than through its conventional defensive capability.

The StratCom cell plays a particularly crucial role in tracking hostile narratives in the area of operations, the informational attacks upon the credibility of NATO, the Canadian mission, and upon Latvian support for both. Using the limited means at their disposal (including the StratCom Center of Excellence data mentioned earlier, and some creative use of Latvian-and Russian-language Internet search engines) the cell’s analysts monitored the volume of these Russian informational offensives, and assessed their effectiveness on key target audiences in Latvia by gauging the number of people viewing as ‘liking,’ and then sharing hostile narrative stories or posts. They were also able to identify emerging trends in the information attacks, as well as potential vulnerabilities of the Canadian mission by analyzing trends in the tone and subject matter of the hostile narratives. For instance, the StratCom cell was able to identify one new hostile narrative soon after it appeared: that is, social and conventional media attacks on the economic impact of the Canadian presence in Latvia. Russian-sponsored stories, such as an online article about the hiring of Canadian barbers over local barbers, or social media

DND photo courtesy of S1 Zach Barr, Air Task Force Romania.



An RCAF CF-18 *Hornet* assigned to Air Task Force Romania gets airborne for a combat training flight during Operation *Reassurance* in September 2020.

posts accusing Canadians posted to Latvia of causing a hike in rental or housing prices were a clear attempt to drive a wedge between the Latvian public and the Canadian soldiers deployed there. These narratives also cleverly played on the widely held belief in Latvia that their government was paying millions of euros a year to fund the NATO presence in their country (when in fact, the opposite was true), and were bolstered by a growing number of attacks on defence spending in Latvia as “a waste of money.” The StratCom cell was able to devise effective counter-messaging strategies, and recommend changes on the ground (including revising hiring policies for barbers) to counter these attacks.

In analyzing such hostile narratives, the cell was also able to develop a list of indicators of potential escalation of aggression by the Russians: ‘red flags’ in the information environment that could signal imminent hybrid actions, or even conventional attacks. In cooperation with the Task Force’s J2 cell, and with the assistance of researchers at Defence Research Development Canada, the StratCom cell looked at several Russian actions across the spectrum of hybrid conflict, including the invasion of Georgia (2008), the annexation of Crimea, and Russian sponsoring of rebels in eastern Ukraine (2014), the cyber attacks and fomenting of civil unrest in Estonia (2007), the attempted coup in Montenegro (2016), and others. The cell found broad similarities in certain activities prior to major actions by the Russians or their proxies, such as holding news conferences in the vicinity of targeted areas, particularly in conjunction with major, unplanned troop manoeuvres or exercises. Similarly, the presence of reporters from state-controlled or sponsored media (such as Sputnik, RTS) embedded with Russian formations in regions bordering on targeted nations, was assessed as another potential sign of imminent hybrid or conventional action, along with certain forms of cyber attacks on political, military and economic institutions (particularly Distributed Denial Of Service [DDOS] attacks and defacing of government, political, or military Internet sites), perpetrated by Russian ‘patriotic hacker’ groups or other deniable, ‘arms-length’ actors, such as cyber criminal gangs.

However, the work of the StratCom cell has not been without its challenges. Since its inception, the cell has struggled with inadequate resources and support, both from the task force and from Canada. Although its work to date has been valuable, there is much more that *can* and *should* be accomplished.

Tracking threats in the information environment has been constrained by a lack of resources. Currently, DFR Labs is the task force’s only source for tracking hostile narratives in the area of operations, and while their data is useful, it is able to identify only the ‘tip of a very large iceberg.’ In addition, one of the few additional ways of identifying these attacks, and assessing their effectiveness in influencing the Latvian public, is by monitoring Latvian news media. At present, the only way the StratCom cell can do this is through the good graces of Global Affairs Canada and the overworked staff of Canada’s Embassy to the Baltics, who have the only program for media monitoring in-theatre. Requests for funding to acquire ‘off-the-shelf’ computer programs to monitor these all-important informational attacks – whether on the Internet, social media, or mainstream Latvian media – have been stalled since mid-2019, meaning that the threat from Russian informational attacks may be even greater than what we have already seen. Frankly, we just do not know...

Additionally, the StratCom cell currently has no line item within the Task Force Latvia budget. As a result, members of the team must request funding for every activity they undertake – requests that are often denied for cost-saving reasons. This has resulted in limitations on the frequency and duration of CIMIC teams’ travel outside Riga, curtailing their ability to conduct assessments of Latvian towns and cities. For example, team members have even been forced to ‘pay out of pocket’ for small commemorative gifts for the local Latvian officials they meet.

The StratCom cell has also struggled to integrate their approach to supporting strategic objectives within traditional planning in Task Force Latvia headquarters, which has to date



Canadian Reconnaissance Platoon and Canadian Electronic Warfare Technicians practice platoon level reconnaissance procedures during Exercise *Wendigo Spirit* as part of Operation *Reassurance* in the Camp Adazi Training Area, Latvia, 25 August 2020.

focussed upon conventional, kinetic objectives and effects. The cell has drafted a framework of effects and objectives in the Information Environment, based upon NATO and Canadian Joint Operations Command orders, but it has been a constant challenge to adequately assess success – whether of NATO exercises, task force or eFP battle group events, or in countering hostile messaging from across the Russian border. The cell developed a series of Measures of Performance and Effectiveness to assess their progress towards attaining Canadian and NATO objectives, but indicators of success (or failure) have been collected sporadically, or not at all. Failure to collect these indicators – ranging from the number of positive or negative interactions between Canadian soldiers and the Latvian public, to positive mentions of Canada’s presence in Latvia by political or business leaders – have been largely the result of indifference: the assessment of effects in the Information Environment is simply not a priority for staff in the Task Force or the eFP battle group.

Similarly, support for the cell from higher headquarters in Canada has been limited at best. No Target Audience list has been issued to the task force to identify approved, recommended, or restricted target audiences for information operations, leaving the StratCom cell to ‘puzzle out’ on its own what Latvians would be most receptive to our messages. Furthermore, no analysis support has been forthcoming for the task force’s lone target audience analyst, who produced the theatre’s first Target Audience Analysis (TAA) in 2019, working almost entirely on her own, helped only by other members of the StratCom cell and her colleagues in the Latvian Joint Headquarters Info Ops branch. A TAA is a critical tool for determining which audiences are receptive to our messaging, and – most importantly – how that messaging can be framed and disseminated to have the greatest effect. No bank of approved

messaging or themes has been issued from higher authority (normally these would come from the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC), or the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) for the task force to use for tactical level engagements. Further, Task Force Latvia has not yet been involved in any full-spectrum-targeting processes to identify and counter hostile narratives, even though it is the Canadian military’s key sensor on the ground in Eastern Europe.

Force generation has been another challenge.

The headquarters is slowly but surely transitioning from being staffed by deployed soldiers (serving six- to nine-month tours in Latvia) to one built around posted personnel (on two- to three-year tours in Latvia). One of the consequences of this shift has been a reduction in qualifications and experience in the StratCom cell. On the first rotation in Latvia, all members of the cell were Influence Activities qualified, trained and experienced at Information Operations, Psyops, or through Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). By 2019-2020, only four of the nine officers and NCMs in the cell had Information Activities training, and only two had the all-important CIMIC qualification. This qualification is critical because experienced CIMIC operators are trained, not only to interact with civilian populations in military Areas of Operation (AOs), but also to assess the impact of the mission on civilians in the battle space and – crucially in Latvia – to assess the impact of civilians on the mission.

On a more basic level, there are also no translators or cultural advisors attached to the StratCom cell. Cell members must use Google Translate to search online sources for Latvian- or Russian-language news articles, or simply to gather basic information about Latvian communities or individuals. During outreach events or community assessment visits, they must rely on their Latvian National Forces colleagues to translate for them.

Currently, task force planning and activities are focussed almost exclusively on the conventional, kinetic capabilities, embodied in the eFP battle group – the mission is seen in terms of deterring and if necessary defending Latvia against a conventional Russian attack. Successive rotations of Canadian-led battle groups have done an excellent job of maintaining that conventional capability, building interoperability with other contributing nations

and our Latvian allies to create a credible combat force to meet any conventional attack across the Russian border. And while this conventional credibility can have – and has had – effects in the Information Environment, not enough has been done to capitalize on the informational effects of the battle group's presence.

Our adversaries are not stupid: they realize that any conventional attack on the Baltics would have dire strategic consequences, up to and including nuclear war. Furthermore, there is little for them to gain by an invasion and occupation of the Baltic States, either politically or diplomatically, or in terms of resources or economic benefits. Instead, they are fighting an informational battle to divide the people of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania from NATO and weaken the alliance, as well as the European Union. How successful their flood of hostile narratives has been in achieving this is an open question, but it is clearly their main avenue of approach in attempting to undermine NATO in Eastern Europe.

There has been some progress in meeting this threat. Task Force Latvia has begun to develop contingency plans based around hybrid threat scenarios, a far more likely course of action for our adversary than a conventional attack. Operation *Saprasana* has taken the first steps in long process of building a comprehensive picture of the civilian situation in Latvia, including gaining more information on the impact of Russian propaganda on the ground. But progress has been slow. So far, only a handful of communities have been assessed under Operation *Saprasana*, the staff planning process for meeting potential hybrid threats is proceeding slowly, and work on key analytical tools like the Target Audience Analysis has stalled by budget and personnel constraints.

For the mission in Latvia to more effectively track and counter this growing threat, more needs to be done. Task Force Latvia and the Canadian-led battle group need the following – at a minimum – and they need this support as soon as possible:

- Acquisition of software that can track and prioritize Russian and Russian-sponsored hostile narratives across the information environment, including not just social and online media, but as many means of dissemination as possible: conventional media, Dark and Deep Web sources, text messaging applications, and others.
- A more robust analysis and targeting capability for counter-propaganda and counter messaging, either within Task Force Latvia, as a reach back capability in Canada, or a combination of the two. A Target Audience Analysis is a critical starting point to any information operations. That it took nearly three years to produce one for such an important theatre speaks to a profound 'under-appreciation' of the importance of this document. The current TAA needs to be approved at the highest levels, and follow-up analyses should be started immediately, identifying key demographics in the Latvian population and how to reach them.
- A larger and more capable Influence Activities cell for the Canadian-led battle group which currently has only three officers and NCOs in its S9 cell, who must also handle duties as liaison and visits staff. Given the importance of the battle group's interactions with the Latvian population, and their potential impact as an embodiment of



DND photo by Corporal White-Finkle

Able Seaman Tirell Price, a boatswain, checks a bearing aboard HMCS *Toronto* during Operation *Reassurance*, 10 August 2020.



A Canadian soldier with NATO's enhanced Forward Presence battle group Latvia provides dismounted vehicle security during the Certification Exercise at Camp Adazi, Latvia, 23 August 2017, during Operation *Reassurance*.

NATO's commitment to their country's defence, it desperately needs to include a full platoon of trained and experienced CIMIC operators.

- Adequate support to the task force's StratCom cell to allow its members to do their jobs, including a dedicated budget, their own vehicles, and the addition of Latvian translators and cultural advisors to the cell.

Conclusion

The Latvian mission is in many ways a testing ground for Canada's Influence Activities capability, but the results to date suggest this capability is nascent at best. Canada needs to invest seriously to build on the successes and address the challenges faced by Task Force Latvia's StratCom Cell, in aid of developing a modern, well-financed and innovative capability. And it should be done *sooner*, rather than *later*. The strategic importance of this fight is clear; the credibility of NATO to its member nations and that of Canada as a founding member of the alliance is under persistent attack by Russia.

The national and international stakes are high and our senior leadership (both military and civilian) seem to understand the broader implications of the informational confrontation in the Baltics. But we are not succeeding at operationalizing that understanding, or even recognizing the challenges and how to meet them. To do so will require an active effort to raise the importance of Influence Activities in the Canadian Armed Forces, and translate that strategic importance into tactical capabilities that can fight and win the battle that is already well underway.

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DND photo LF-01-2018-0142-036 by Able Seaman Camden Scott



Mindfulness: Building Resiliency in the Canadian Armed Forces

by Jordan Beatty

Introduction

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is a professional and highly trained military with a deep-rooted culture in combat operations forged from the World Wars to present day conflict. Senior leadership is trusted to command NATO missions and is an ally across G20 nations. The CAF is an expert at training physical-body awareness through drill instruction, where every movement is timed, controlled, and exact. However, improvements can be made to training the mind to “stand at attention” as well. The mind requires just as much training for operations and is a great concern for the modern military. The topic of mindfulness and the practice of self-monitoring one’s present emotional state is emerging within the study of organizational behaviour both at an individual and group level. The CAF needs to keep pace with new practices at the organizational level for the well-being of soldiers, and the institution itself. More specifically, incorporating mindfulness into the military lifestyle will increase soldier resiliency and motivation during daily operations. Through a review of mindfulness literature as it relates to military performance, three major points will be explored throughout the article. First, practicing mindfulness leads to an overall increase in positive emotion and acceptance, an essential leadership quality for CAF personnel. Second,

coping with stress, task performance, and working memory are improved through mindfulness techniques. Lastly, how mindfulness can be trained will be explored, focusing on its adaptability to high intensity schedules and use on operations. These components of mindfulness will show its value and worthwhile investment for the CAF.

Discussion

The origins of mindfulness date back to eastern religious practices, but the study has filtered into the Western business world as a secular practice. The practice itself equates to a mental state where one brings their attention to present moment feelings and sensations, acknowledging them in a non-judgmental manner.¹ Popularity rose from advances in clinical psychology and the mindfulness-based stress reduction (MBSR) program introduced in 1979 by Dr Kabat-Zinn, a professor of medicine at the University of Massachusetts medical school.² Large organizations such as Google, Cisco, and Microsoft are among hundreds that have hired mindfulness coaching firms to teach their leadership about the benefits of mindfulness. The emergence of mindfulness at the organizational level is due to the multitude of benefits reported, including better working memory and decision-making,³ an increase in positive emotions,⁴ reduction in stress and increase



characteristics of leaders and their ability to magnify positive emotion. Their study of leaders and emotion present the fact that leaders must be self-aware of their

in resiliency,⁵ and better work life balance.⁶ In addition, mindfulness training is linked to empirically-validated neuroscience benefits, such as sleep, which is reported to have a large financial effect (millions) on companies due to productivity loss and health care costs.⁷ Although strategically implemented at the organizational level, mindfulness is individually focussed on increasing the well-being of employees.

Company leadership are targeted for mindfulness training to effect culture change within the organization. Charisma, or what renowned transformational leadership scholars Bass and Riggio⁸ defined as idealized influence, is a sought-after quality in many leadership models ever since Max Weber, the father of bureaucracy, defined it as a “god like” characteristic.⁹ These leaders have the ability to recognize potential and inspire others to innovate.¹⁰ Creating positive emotion and an optimistic culture is what mindfulness accomplishes.¹¹ The creation of a positive atmosphere is much more powerful than the simple absence of negative emotion. The overall emotional characteristics of leaders allow them to shape organizational culture. Psychologists within the Swedish Defence University, Ohlsson and Larsson propose an organization emotion shaping theory that is rooted on the emotional

emotions and intelligent enough to recognize the different emotions of followers.¹² Mindfulness training provides a gateway into this type of leadership.

Leadership benefits are of great importance to the military, but further underscoring these benefits are task performance, decision making and resilience. Here, mindfulness training indicates several advantages, even extending to prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Dr. Amishi Jha, a neuroscientist at the University of Miami, conducted extensive studies on the effect of mindfulness training on military members. Focus was placed on building cognitive resilience and assessing the performance of working memory.¹³ Working memory is described as the mind’s ability to recall learned information and use it in the present moment. Failure to do so for soldiers can have dire consequences. A satellite guided bomb being dropped on American soldiers in Afghanistan, 2002 can be used as example. The joint terminal attack controller had just changed the batteries in their GPS system and through their working memory should have recalled that the coordinates were now displaying their own position and not the target.¹⁴ Dr. Jha found that mindfulness training reduced the degradation of soldier’s working memory after being exposed to long stress intervals. Training the mind consistently to focus attention on the present made it more likely to perform correspondingly under stress. Similarly, psychiatrist Dr. Douglas Johnson and his research team from the University of California found that U.S. Marines given mindfulness training reacted and recovered more quickly during sessions of combat-stress training.¹⁵

Treating the effects of traumatizing moments is a challenge the military has struggled with for years. During an investigation into how mindfulness would benefit current clinical treatments of PTSD it was found that the training could aid soldiers in their ability to engage with treatments, reduce effects of triggers, accept symptoms easier, and increase the mind’s flexibility when addressing harmful flashbacks.¹⁶ Further, it was noted that delivering this type of training to soldiers with PTSD through smartphone apps reached a larger base of affected personnel, breaching through the stigma of mental health issues.¹⁷ The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs has developed a mobile application ‘Mindfulness Coach’ aimed at providing this type of training to those suffering from PTSD. It is a user-friendly resource available to veterans and serving soldiers allowing them to conduct two to five minute sessions on their own with virtual instruction. The cognitive resilience benefits of mindfulness training further help prevent developing PTSD.¹⁸

Next to operations, militaries focus on training more than anything else, and the CAF is no different in this respect. Delivering training is an institutional challenge for financial and resource reasons. Mindfulness training offers several different approaches from classroom to smartphone, which should be explored for proper implementation.



Max Weber, the famous German political economist and sociologist.

DND photo HS06-2017-0956-773 by Leading Seaman Dan Bard



The aforementioned MBSR program is delivered as an eight-week package including formal instruction, usually in a group setting, with a one-day retreat, and daily homework. Techniques taught are body scanning and meditation. Another program, mindfulness in motion (MIM), allows for delivery of training during working hours and on-site.¹⁹ U.S. military variants of the program include mindfulness-based mind fitness training (MMFT), Battlemind, and BOOT STRAP. MMFT is an eight-hour variant of MBSR and is contextualized for military personnel.²⁰ Battlemind and BOOT STRAP aim to defeat the conflicting nature of mindfulness training with military culture. The perception of silence and peacefulness is outlandish to most trained soldiers. Battlemind is a short training session (50 minutes) that boasts the topic ‘armor for you mind’ and has been proven effective in soldiers re-deploying from Iraq.²¹ Techniques for practicing mindfulness are included. The BOOT STRAP program contrasts as an early introductory program directly into boot camp training. It consists of 45-minute classes per week and homework including a personnel log of time spent practicing mindfulness techniques.²² The delivery of mindfulness training varies and is flexible which suits the competing demands of personnel and time resources often faced in military training.

The literature suggests that mindfulness is an emerging organizational management technique, particularly aimed at the well-being of employees with a goal to reducing turnover and human resource spending. Publicly, several tests and programs have been applied to the military context and overall show potential. The CAF must consider how mindfulness can be applied to the organization in a manner that is acceptable to soldiers, thus reaping full benefits of the training.

The benefits of mindfulness to CAF leadership are obvious. This stress reducing and attention focusing practice is like physical training for the mind. Military leaders consistently promote both physical and mental training, yet the execution of mental training is not as clear to soldiers as lifting weights at the gym. Mindfulness provides a practical approach to this type of training. In addition, military leadership is burdened with responsibility in and out of operations. The culture of taking on this burden gets heavier and heavier as the leader rises through the ranks, creating senior leaders who may not be operating at peak potential, whether they believe it or not. The avoidance of taking care of oneself is common among military leaders, they put their subordinate’s well-being before their own. Mindfulness offers the mental well-being option for leaders, which in turn benefits followers as the leader’s attention becomes more focussed and decisions more appropriate. Recognizing this cognitive aspect of leadership allows what Ohlsson and Larsson suggested, the ability to increase positive emotions throughout the organization. A more positive unit is therefore more motivated on a daily basis. The necessary requirement of mindfulness training for leadership is to promote and educate its use and make it more normal within the organization. Leading by example through mindfulness will have a strong effect on whether soldiers believe it works or not.

The literature strongly supports that mindfulness reduces stress. Soldiers are subjected to stresses through training, operations and frequent relocation of their families. Mindfulness will provide a low resource tool to help with these stresses. Soldiers exposed to mindfulness training self-assessed as being better able to cope with the stress of deployment and family separation.²³ Overall, work-life balance improved. The CAF has realized through its concerted effort as an organization to promote resiliency that it will benefit from more balanced soldiers in countless ways. Mindfulness adds to this effort and generates more benefit at the grass roots tactical level through better attentiveness to performance in battle, and through better shielding of soldiers from mental injuries. The timing of mindfulness training is critical, as the resiliency advantages serve soldiers better than attempting treatment for PTSD later due to the risk of reawakening trauma during practice.²⁴ Because mindfulness is simple to practice, even in austere conditions, soldiers can use it to cope with stressful events when needed, ‘kick-starting’ the return to normal mental health and remaining in the fight.

Implementing training is always a challenge. Evidence suggests that training models must be seen as legitimate by students for them to fully engage in the training. The CAF tends to create online checklist training items that are likely not absorbed at the level mindfulness should be. Practicing mindfulness will benefit members best if it is understood to be normal procedure like



physical training. Indoctrination of mental training like with the BOOT STRAP model is likely best to achieve this. Until enough generations of soldiers grow through the organization with this training other efforts will need to be in place to educate current ranks and leadership. In delivery of training, the smartphone has become the gateway for information among younger generations. This must be considered as an option for reasons of maintaining legitimacy, ease of access, and minimizing resources. The positive aspect of smartphone delivery is that the literature on mindfulness training through this method supports its use. In fact, this delivery method of training was demonstrated to be just as effective as an eight-week in-class course.²⁵

Implementing mindfulness into the military lifestyle is a good step forward, but it must be taken carefully. There are several complex aspects to applying this practice to everyday military life.

First, the leaders who hold a sense of loneliness due to ignoring their own welfare must be addressed. It is recommended that a training program focussed on senior leadership burn-out and work-life balance be implemented to prove at the highest level that mindfulness training works. This program would create a sense of

“I wish I knew this earlier on!” across the leadership, motivating them to support further programs and education at the lower levels of the organization.

Second, a training model that is low in resources and flexible is best suited for the already training intensive schedule of soldiers in the CAF. A study is recommended to assess the openness of soldiers to receiving mindfulness training including how it is delivered and a review of all popular culture delivery of information through mobile applications. Attention should be paid to the scalability of training programs to support austere and challenging

environments. The specific techniques in practicing mindfulness should be reviewed for suitability, particularly those noted as higher performing for soldiers such as transcendental meditation.²⁶

Finally, part of receiving support from soldiers for the training requires their opinions as well. Focus groups that are comprehensive of all ranks and trades should be held to include all members of the CAF in the development of a program. Simply consulting experts will not suffice, but rather building a program from the bottom up with expert advice and guidance will yield better overall implementation.



Conclusion

The *mental* drilling of soldiers is just as important for the CAF as is the discipline taught through *physical* drill. This mental drilling has often been accomplished through challenging and tough training scenarios, including sleep deprivation and unflagging battle rhythms. Mindfulness literature suggests that training the practice of focussing one's attention will achieve the benefits of mental performance under stress, with the added ability to recover quickly in the midst of chaos and shock. Further, evidence shows that those practicing mindfulness enjoy their jobs more and have less strain on the organization with respect to health issues. In summary, leaders learn to better care for themselves, and in turn, provide better care to their subordinates. Soldiers become more attentive while performing critical tasks and better balanced between their work and family. The training of mindfulness has potential to be adaptable to the military schedule and a part of its existing culture. Moreover, the CAF remains in-line with emerging successful organizational practices in the private sector.

Through inclusive research of the implementation of mindfulness training, the CAF can approach this culture change appropriately. As literature continues to expand regarding mindfulness and large organizations begin to report on the paybacks and areas of improvement, the CAF can adapt to best practices and remain on the forward edge of this topic. In an era where retention is difficult, and an employment where the consequences of mistakes are dire, bettering the well-being of soldiers individually must become a top priority.

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NOTES

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A late-war Canadian Handley-page *Halifax* Mark III and its crew from 434 'Bluenose' Squadron.


The Canadian Way of Remembering War: Canada's "Conflicted" and "Contested" Memory of the Second World War

by Martin Shadwick

Considerable civilian and military scholarship has been devoted over the decades to studying, identifying and dissecting the national "ways of war"—including military strategy and military operations—of the United States (anchored, arguably, by such works as Russell F. Weigley's *The American Way of War*), Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany and a host of other nation states. Complementary cross-disciplinary scholarship, meanwhile, has sought to understand how nation states remember, venerate, celebrate and mythologize wartime events and achievements—how, for example, the actions at Pointe du Hoc and Bastogne, and the raising of the Stars and Stripes on Iwo Jima, have become so deeply embedded in the American psyche, popular culture and social memory and how, in the United Kingdom, Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and the exploits of the Dambusters have been elevated to a similar, if not precisely identical, national stature. The perceived value in remembering such events, both as inspirational symbols in the contemporary world and as still-valuable links between

past and present, has reinforced much of this discourse. As a potentially illustrative example, albeit at the risk of overstating the case, one might take note of the astonishing outpouring of affection—and financial support—in the United Kingdom for the COVID-19 inspired fundraising efforts of the 99-year old Second World War veteran, Captain Thomas Moore.

The Canadian understanding of the relationship between the Second World War and the national psyche, popular culture and social memory is far less developed, and consequently, one of the most frustrating and vexing gaps in Canada's Second World War literature. As Canadian War Museum historian Tim Cook, a most prolific author in his own right, has noted, "hundreds of books have now been written about Canada's participation in the war, covering almost every aspect of the conflict," but "the many battles to control the interpretation of Canada's Second World War history" have been "virtually unexplored." Cook's most recent book, *The Fight for History*, attempts to plug that yawning gap by offering a "sustained examination of Canada's conflicted and contested



memory of the Second World War.” In some respects a hybrid, combining military history, diplomatic history, political history and social history in an almost decade-by-decade analysis of social memory and Canada’s Second World War, it seeks “to track the rise, fall, and rise again of the relevance of the Second World War to Canadians,” and reminds us “that if we do not tell our own stories, no one else will.”

In *The Fight for History*, he writes, “Canada had contributed to victory far beyond the Allies’ expectations of the poor and small-minded dominion that had stumbled its way out of the Depression, entirely unready for the war to follow. But having significantly aided the Allied victory, in the war of reputations to follow, Canadians reverted to their colonial ways. The Legion

was focused on gathering veterans into its fold and on fighting for tangible pension and dependants’ rights. The veterans’ organization saw its role as primarily encouraging remembrance and commemoration, and it hoped others would tell the country’s war stories. Most did not. The failure of the Canadian military and civilian high command to write their personal histories, along with the reticence of the million veterans to commit thoughts to paper beyond the first couple of years, meant that Canadians did not have much of an opportunity to read about Canada’s war experience.” This historical “absence would grow and continue through the 1950s and 1960s, as American and British films, television shows, and books took up that space, mapping those national memories onto the history and offering little mention of Canada’s wartime contributions. Canadians had only themselves to blame.” Indeed.

Countless Second World War-themed motion pictures appeared—albeit with some notable exceptions, such as Steven Spielberg’s groundbreaking *Saving Private Ryan* in 1998—from the late 1940s to the mid-to-late 1970s. In Canada, however, the virtual absence of a home-grown film industry (and myriad other factors) ensured that Canadian stories from the Second World War went essentially untold and condemned Canadian—and international—audiences to the briefest of references to Canada in genre-dominating American and British films. Two one-word references to Canada in the *The Longest Day* (1962), some cryptic blink-and-you-miss-it references in 1963’s *The Great Escape* (particularly galling given the substantial Canadian role in escape planning and tunnel construction)

and, in 1968’s *The Devil’s Brigade*, the liberty-taking retelling of the Canadian-American First Special Service Force, the indignity of no Canadian actors and “Canadian” soldiers who overwhelmingly sported British accents. *The Battle of Britain* (1969) was a rare exception, presenting Canadian actor Christopher Plummer as a Canadian—complete with “Canada” shoulder flashes—as a squadron leader. In much more recent Second World War-themed television programming, an inordinate number of “Canadian” military personnel have surfaced as incompetents or ne’er-do-wells in



The Hitler Line, by Major (Ret'd) Charles Comfort, OC, CD.



Canadian Tribal Destroyers in Action, by Commander (Ret'd) C. Anthony Law, DSC, CD.

British productions. To this day, American and British book writers—in some cases because they continue to draw disproportionately upon older and less analytically sophisticated Canadian historical research—usually have little to say, or *little positive* to say, about Canada's military performance in the Second World War. It is small wonder that a 2012 British survey of more than 1000 children aged eleven to eighteen, cited by Cook, found that “not a single child” could identify Canada as a wartime ally of Britain. The Dutch have done rather better.

The Fight for History also draws attention to the cross-border ramifications of the debacle in Vietnam and the excessive myth-making surrounding Canada's extensive participation, largely but not exclusively under the auspices of the United Nations, in international peacekeeping. The vociferous anti-war sentiment that developed in the United States during the war in Vietnam spilled over the border, thereby posing significant challenges for Canada's armed forces—“to wear a military uniform in Canadian society,” notes Cook, “was to risk being verbally abused, even spat upon”—and eroding or hijacking the meaning and significance of Remembrance Day. At the secondary school level, I can well remember sitting through more than one Remembrance Day ceremony in the later years of the Vietnam debacle that was devoid of Canadian content but whose underlying and troubling message to students was that Canadian motives and conduct in the Second World War and American motives and conduct in Vietnam were interchangeable. On the peacekeeping front, the myth-making that enveloped Canada's participation in international peace-

keeping has been widely studied. Often overlooked has been the assertion, advanced by Cook and others, that the long-running and “comforting image of the peacekeeper had prevented many Canadians from engaging meaningfully with the Second World War. Canada revered its peacekeepers, even though, oddly, most Canadians seemed unable to recognize that peacekeepers were soldiers—not separate from them.”

Cook also posits that “the theme of sacrifice,” which so shaped the postwar Canadian response to the carnage of the First World War, “fit less easily a generation later, where the war was regarded as a great crusade against evil, a necessary war that had to be won, no matter what the cost. Furthermore, the act of commemoration tends to focus on grief. This is one important way that Canadians framed the Great War...but it is not how Canadians initially understood the Second World War, which, at its heart, is about a victory.” The “challenge seems to lie in the fact that it is not easy to celebrate victory in war”—or, in some circles, to even remember, acknowledge or reflect upon war—“without appearing militaristic or vainglorious.” The “language of communication is also not well suited to talking about victory in a meaningful way, and we turn to victims, loss, and sacrifice.”

If Canada's experience of the Second World War lacked “some of the emotional resonance of the Great War,” notes Cook, the explanations include “the changing nature of Canada in the [post-1945] years, the haphazard way we told our stories, our fear of dredging up history that divides” (the conscription crisis,



Beaverbrook Collection of War Art/Canadian War Museum/CWM 19710261-5121

Bomb Aimer, Battle of the Ruhr, 1944, by Flight Lieutenant (Ret'd) Carl F. Schaefer.

for example), “the adoption of new identity-shaping symbols, and the many battles by groups over the meaning of the war through redress, apology campaigns, or seeking veterans’ status.” Indeed, for many Canadians, particularly younger Canadians, the internment of Japanese-Canadians constitutes the dominant story of Canada’s Second World War. “While it was only natural,” notes Cook, “that with time the war would drift from the nation’s consciousness, the lack of a centralizing Vimy-like battle in Canada’s global war effort also hurt the means by which memory was constructed throughout the second half of the century. By the early-1990s, the Necessary War was forgotten by many or so badly misinterpreted as a conflict defined by defeat and disgrace” (i.e., Dieppe) that “it was suitable topic for denigration.” That, he suggests, “is why the high-profile commemoration in Normandy in 1994 and the hugely welcoming celebration in the Netherlands” in 1995 “were so surprising, as was the subsequent emergence of

a new desire to tell the Canadian story.” He asserts, too, that Canada’s experience in Afghanistan, also though divisive in “goals and missions,” brought “a greater awareness to Canadians of their own war history and the realization that the country’s contributions during the Second World War had been neglected for too long.”

Despite these and other “encouraging signs of engaging with the past,” Cook identifies a range of “significant” challenges in academia, in the media (“where the CBC continues to ignore the Second World War as a defining event in Canadian history”), in film, and in other domains. In academia, “the history battles continue in the ivory towers of universities, with many professors carrying fierce if misplaced convictions that learning about war is bad, mad, and leads to militarism... It is an absurd prejudice from scholars who are supposed to be even-minded...” There is evidence of similar trends in some departments of political science although, as in some history departments, limited course offerings relevant to Canada’s Second World War (and post-Cold War diplomatic and military) experience may reflect struggles over funding—to, for example, launch new courses in emerging fields and sub-fields of study—as much as they reflect strongly held convictions of perceived ‘militarism’. Nevertheless, some political science departments which once offered an impressive array of courses on Canadian foreign and defence policy now have fewer—in some cases dramatically fewer—offerings in these areas. Some other departments, in contrast, have maintained the status quo or actually increased their course offerings. It could prove most illuminating (and at least somewhat depressing) to compile a rigorous and detailed inventory of current post-secondary courses in Canadian diplomatic, military and related social history and in Canadian foreign, defence and international security policy—mindful, of course, that course titles alone do not always convey an accurate impression of the material being covered.

It is important to add that concern over the teaching of Canada’s Second World War experience—and Canada’s contemporary role in world affairs more broadly—is neither new nor confined to the post-secondary level. In the 1980s, relatively early career-wise, your scribe dispatched a letter to his Member of Provincial Parliament—who, not coincidentally, was also Ontario’s Minister of Education and Minister of Colleges and Universities—to politely suggest that incoming university undergraduates would benefit from additional knowledge of Canada’s role in world affairs and Canadian diplomatic and military history. The less-than-edifying Ministerial response reported that all was well in this area and made it clear that no curriculum changes were required or contemplated at the secondary school level. A thorough contemporary review of this issue could prove instructive although considerable—and sometimes very disappointing—variations by province, by school board, and by individual schools and individual teachers, should be anticipated.



Windy Day in the British Assault Area, by Commander (Ret'd) C. Anthony Law, DSC, CD.



Preparing to Attack, by Major (Ret'd) William A. Ogilvie, CM, MBE.

I also believe Tim Cook is correct when he observes that considerable progress in telling the story of Canada and the Second World War, ‘warts and all,’ has been made in recent decades. He further notes, again, I believe, quite correctly, that “as we move into the twilight time of the Second World War veterans, we must do two things. Collectively, we must listen and we must record.” Still, it is impossible to shake the sad and distressing conviction that we allowed time to run out, that we could have done far more to remember. To be sure, some measures would have been far easier to implement than others. Nor could a variety of inconvenient truths, such as the conscription crisis or the internment of Japanese-Canadians, be tidily expunged or reinterpreted out of existence.

Enhanced attention to the Canadian wartime experience—defined in infinitely more than military terms—should have been achievable, for example, in the educational system (even allowing for potentially awkward jurisdictional issues), as should far earlier and sustained government support for a new Canadian War Museum in Ottawa and such entities as the Juno Beach Centre, the far earlier appearance of official histories and the writing of a much wider array of such histories, efforts to encourage the writing of memoirs by both the rank and file and senior military and civilian decision-makers, greater interest in the wartime legacy

by both the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Film Board, efforts to promote Canadian content in relevant foreign films (admittedly difficult, but the connections of the Canadian High Commission apparently proved useful in the case of the first British film on the Battle of Arnhem) and in a host of other measures, both grand and grassroots. Innovative measures to recognize peacekeeping and acknowledge its casualties without preventing, as Cook notes, “many Canadians from engaging meaningfully with the Second World War,” *could* and *should* have been developed. Earlier and enhanced support by Ottawa for a film industry able to tell Canadian stories—of all types—admittedly would not have guaranteed a *Great Escape*, let alone a *Saving Private Ryan*, but it would not have hurt and might at least have avoided a situation whereby Canada was arguably the only significant participant in the Second World War to have forfeited the telling of its own stories by its own film industry. Too little, too late? Sadly, in far too many instances, yes.

Professor Martin Shadwick *has taught Canadian Defence Policy at York University for many years. He is a former editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly, and he is the resident Defence Commentator for the Canadian Military Journal.*



Dive Bombing V-1 Sites, France, by Flight Lieutenant (Ret'd) Robert S. Hyndman.

The Culture of Military Organizations

Edited by Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2019

473 pages, \$37.99 (softcover)

ISBN 978-1-108-72448-7

Reviewed by Peter J. Williams

Has “culture” become a dirty word when associated with the profession of arms?

Certainly, reading headlines and various reports on various militaries,¹ one might be forgiven for thinking so. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has not been immune from such criticism. Indeed, the 2015 External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces, concluded *inter alia*, that, there was “...an underlying sexualized culture in the CAF that is hostile to women and LGBTQ (lesbian, gay, transgender, bisexual and queer) members, and conducive to more serious incidents of sexual harassment and assault.”²

Williamson Murray is a professor emeritus at Ohio State University. Mr. Mansoor is US Army Colonel Peter Mansoor (Retired), an accomplished scholar in his own right and a former executive officer to General David Petraeus. Together, they have assembled a series of 18 essays (not counting the editors’ introduction and conclusion) by writers from Australia, the United States and Germany. The book resulted from presentations made at the Merishon Centre for International Security Studies at Ohio State University in September 2017.

Military culture means many things to many people, but for the purposes of this study, the editors have defined it as the, “...habitual practices, default programs, hidden assumptions and unreflected cognitive frames that underpin how an organization functions.”³ The editors assert that culture not only creates military identity, but also establishes how its members will act in a given situation. The book is organized into four sections: one dealing with theory and the other three with cases studies of various armies, navies and air forces, from the mid-nineteenth century until 2017. As the foundation for the theoretical analysis presented in the first section, the authors in question used the nine attributes of organizational culture,⁴ as developed by the Global Leadership and Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) Research Program.

What makes the work particularly interesting is that while the case studies include a number of the so-called “usual suspects”: (i.e., the German Army 1871-1945, and the British Army 1914-1945), these were by far and away outnumbered by many with which this reviewer was less familiar (i.e., the Indian Army 1900-1947; the Imperial Japanese Army 1918-1945; the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and the Iraqi Army (1921-2003). And that is just on the army side...


With such a wide variety of studies to choose from, it is not surprising that it can be challenging to bring together some common threads among the examples analysed herein. Still, the various authors are able to step back from the particular subject of their study to offer more. For example in the study of the IDF, the author posits that in terms of exploring the roots of a military culture, it can perhaps be deduced that such cultures take years to form, and in the process, “...a new army will *consciously* (reviewer’s emphasis) attempt to emulate other armed forces in the process.”⁵

Therefore, the further challenge is to pick out a cultural model that like the author of the study on the Victorian British Army references, has, “... a certain something that flickers out across two centuries like an electric current.”⁶ All of this in full knowledge, however, that notwithstanding other metrics such as readiness and effectiveness, culture is often how civilian and military decision makers first assess any military organization. And they will want to like what they see... That, along with the editors highlighting the importance of leadership in establishing organizational culture, are perhaps the greatest lessons of this book.

I found the authors’ varying styles to be highly engaging, which made it a quick, very enjoyable and instructive read. Perhaps future editions of this book will include entries on the culture of the contemporary Russian Armed Forces, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, Special Forces, and eventually, so-called “Space Forces.” Indeed, I wonder if

the CAF merits its own cultural study. I strongly recommended, particularly for General Officer/Flag Officer audiences, and for senior public servants who will work with them.⁷ Those bound for Attaché duty would find it provides useful context.

Colonel (Ret’d) Peter J. Williams’ *final posting prior to retirement in 2016 was as Director Arms Control Verification on the Strategic Joint Staff.*



NOTES

- 1 For example, see (in the US context): *The Turmoil of Identity Crisis: Special Forces Organizational Culture*: <https://warroom-armywarcollege.edu.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/warroom.armywarcollege.edu/podcasts/sfcom-culture/amp/>; (in the British context): “Did UK Special Forces execute unarmed civilians?”: <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-53597137>; and (in the German context): “Germany far right: Elite KSK commando force ‘to be partially disbanded’ ”: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53237685>.
- 2 The full report is available at: <https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/sexual-misbehaviour/external-review-2015.html#sum>
- 3 Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray (eds.), *The Culture of Military Organizations*, (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2019), p. 1.
- 4 The nine attributes are: performance orientation, future orientation, assertiveness, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, power distance, humane orientation, uncertainty avoidance, and gender egalitarianism.
- 5 Gil-li-Vardi, “An Army Like No Other: The Origins of the IDF’s Military Culture”, in Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray (eds.), *The Culture of Military Organizations*, (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 247-271.
- 6 Richard Hart Sinnreich, “An Army Apart: The Influence of Culture on the Victorian British Army”, in Peter R. Mansoor and Williamson Murray (eds.), *The Culture of Military Organizations*, (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2019), pp. 155-184.
- 7 On the flip side, for military leaders who might wish to prepare themselves for working alongside senior public servants and better understand *their culture*, this reviewer recommends a read of “How to Work with the Civil Service” by “Sir Humphrey”, on the British defence blog *The Wavell Room*: <https://wavellroom.com/2019/08/31/working-with-the-civil-service-a-guide-for-the-military/>

The Craft of Wargaming: A Detailed Planning Guide for Defense Planners and Analysts

by Jeff Appleget, Robert Burks and Fred Cameron

Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2020

376 pages, Hard Cover

Reviewed by Bernd Horn


Military operations are a risky proposition. Quite simply, so much can go wrong. Failure has potentially cataclysmic consequences, specifically casualties, loss of scarce resources, potential restrictions on movement and manoeuvre, as well as potential loss of territory, freedom of action and sovereignty. Training, exercises and the study of an opponent’s tactics and strategies can all mitigate against failure. However, a study of history has demonstrated that nations seldom are fully prepared for the conflict they have entered. This reality makes comprehensive preparation so vital. For this reason, wargaming, which allows staff to work through potential courses of actions, potential enemy responses, Black Swans, etc., is so important.

Accordingly, *The Craft of Wargaming* is an outstanding, comprehensive reference source that provides historical, theoretical and practical insight into the art and science of wargaming. The authors are well situated to write this authoritative guide. Jeff Appleget and Robert Burks are both faculty at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School’s (NPS) Operations Research Department.

Fred Cameron is a retired Canadian defence scientist who also taught courses on analytical wargaming at NPS. Combined they represent decades of experience in wargaming and combat modeling. As such, this publication is a combination of both their research and experience.

The book begins by clarifying definitions, terminology and purposes of wargaming. It then proceeds on a very methodical presentation of the entirety of wargaming theory and practice. The volume is divided into three major functional parts. The first part, “Foundations,” provides the reader with valuable background such as the history of wargaming, its characteristics, as well as the basic analytic fundamentals. The proceeding section, “Fundamentals,” examines in detail the aspects of initiating, designing, developing, conducting and analyzing a wargame. In essence, Part II addresses the principles and key tasks required to create an analytical wargame. Finally, the last part, “Planning and Management,” as the title articulates, covers the planning and management of wargaming, including a chapter on best and worst practices. The book also includes six appendices that provide a number of case studies.

The volume is a treasure trove of information. It walks the reader through the history of wargaming, including the rise of computer simulation at the expense of wargaming, to the post 9/11 emphasis from kinetic events to whole of government approaches to operations, to the focus on counterinsurgency. Interestingly, the period after 9/11 placed a greater emphasis on modeling civilian population attitudes and behaviours, which prompted a return to analytic wargaming as opposed to the primary concentration on simulation.



BOOK REVIEWS

Chapter 4, the “History of Wargaming,” is particularly interesting. It includes a short summary of some major events (i.e., Plan Orange, Pearl Harbor, Battle of Midway, Gulf War I) and how wargaming assisted in providing clarity and courses of action for the respective operations. However, the chapter does seem a bit misplaced as it would seem more logical coming earlier as background prior to delving into the specifics of the actual art and science of wargaming. Nonetheless, it is a gem.

Part II on “Fundamentals” is particularly useful for those wishing to optimize their wargaming experience and knowledge. The depth of the authors’ expertise is highlighted as they provide invaluable insight and guidance on how to initiate and conduct a wargame including such aspects as sponsor engagement, parameters, scope, questions / concepts to be examined, essential questions to be asked, structure of the wargame, to data collection and the management plan. Of great value are the nine practical exercises they include to assist the reader. These exercises allow an individual to actually walk through the process of setting up a wargame, thus, providing them with a template / checklist to follow until they attain a level of expertise and confidence.

Significantly, the authors stress the importance of a “free thinking adversary,” as well as including non-military players such as whole of government or non-governmental organization players to better represent the complexity in the current and future security environment. Not surprisingly, the authors note that most military

wargaming is done with solely military players who “compete” against a doctrinal, scripted enemy. They caution that this stifled approach fails to fully account for the dynamic nature of conflict, or the difficulty of accurately capturing enemy intent or action.

The volume is filled with incredible detail. It delivers on its intent to provide the key educational component foundations or best practices, or simply put, build expertise in wargaming, which in turn is designed to build intellectual knowledge about a specific military problem or issue. Aside from the meticulous text, it includes comprehensive endnotes, a six-page bibliography, a detailed index, numerous graphics and charts to facilitate comprehension, and six appendices that include case studies with practical exercises and solutions, as well as a gate-way exam.

In sum, *The Craft of Wargaming* is an excellent book. It is well written and researched. It clearly underlines the critical importance of wargaming for defence planners and analysts and provides an unrivalled comprehensive “handbook” on wargaming. I strongly recommend the book for anyone who is interested in wargaming, combat modelling, as well as the art and science of defence studies.

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DND photo AE2014-19724 by Corporal Arthur Ark.

A CH-147 Chinook helicopter over Hazen Lake, Ellesmere Island, Nunavut, upon returning from CFS Alert.