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Cover

“Bound for Sea” The Kingston class coastal forces – (by pennant numbers) 706 is HMCS Yellowknife, 702 is HMCS Nanaimo and 709 is HMCS Saskatoon, and another ship of the class is in the background. This painting was inspired by the 12 new Kingston class coastal defence vessels built and launched from the mid-to-late 1990s.

Credit: Painting by Bo Hermanson, a West Coast Artist who spent many years on board HMC ships and a proud member of the Canadian Society of Marine Artists.



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NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for "translation of original quote", indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.

Every year brings new challenges, but 2021 was especially difficult.

First, allegations of professional misconduct have shaken trust in and by those who serve.

Apparent issues of leadership and accountability in the CAF that many thought had been dealt with in the aftermath of the Somalia inquiry continue to persist.

Second, Afghanistan was the centrepiece of Canadian foreign policy for the better part of a decade. Yet, the 40,000 CAF members who had served in Afghanistan over the years and the many civilians who worked alongside them watched in disbelief the chaotic drawdown and efforts to extract locals who had put their lives on the line for the CAF and its members, and whose own lives were now on the line, along with their families.

Third, thousands of CAF members and civilians in DND responded to a pandemic in ways that only two years ago seemed unimaginable: protecting the force by protecting its people, assuring continuity in its deterrence and defence posture and missions, and shoring up the performative legitimacy of democratic institutions by supporting civil authorities with planning, logistics and lift capacity to enable the equitable rollout of vaccines from remote indigenous communities to long-term care homes.

This development is telling how the way politicians use the military has changed, in Canada and abroad: during the Cold War, the military prepared for large kinetic confrontation, in its aftermath the military prepared for smaller kinetic conflicts, now militaries are being used to assist with the consequences of migration, to build walls and fences to secure borders and deter migration, to backfill for administrative and political failures in health care systems, and to support the delivery of vaccines. The ramification for military posture and preparedness are consequential.

These developments call for critical reflection. The inception of the Canadian Military Journal came out of the Somalia inquiry, based on recognition of the need for a trusted yet autonomous publication to give voice to the members of the profession of arms. CMJ will be devoting space to all three aforementioned topics in future issues. CMJ offers an open invitation for you to contribute to this conversation. In its capacity as a professional journal and the journal of the profession, it gives voice to the members of the profession of arms and informs the profession.

The Somalia affair was really two separate scandals: first, the atrocities committed by some soldiers of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and the CAF culture that enabled them, along with the subsequent cover-up of this unethical military conduct. Senior officials obfuscated and obscured. It was a failure of leadership in general, and a culture of entitlement among some in senior leadership in particular. In the aftermath of Somalia, the general impression was that these issues had been resolved; 2021 was a stark reminder that, a quarter century on, institutional culture and

professional conduct remain very much a work in progress. The Canadian Armed Forces are about to overhaul their manual on the profession of arms. It is aptly titled *Trusted to Serve*.

To ensure that the CMJ remains fit for purpose for the twenty-first century, I am working towards innovating CMJ's governance processes. To this end, two eminent scholars of the profession have accepted my invitation to chair a reinvigorated editorial board: Dr. Irina Goldenberg, is a psychologist and director in the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis in the Military Personnel Command, and Dr. Peter Kasurak, a military historian whose many years working on the defence file at the Office of the Auditor General afford him a privileged perspective on the organization. His insightful article in this issue testifies to his expertise.

One of the clear mandates I have been given as editor-in-chief is to ensure rigorous peer review of submissions received by the journal. Peter and Irina will help me lead that effort, along with broader renewal of the editorial board where I am in the process of building out particular subject matter expertise. Peer review reinforces CMJ's professionalism, independence and legitimacy by ensuring that published material is of highest quality and utmost rigour. This is meant to reassure any prospective authors who are looking to submit to CMJ: whether you are writing an article, an opinion piece, a commentary or a book review, the editorial team looks forward to working with you on your submission.

Now in its 22nd year, this issue manifests the diverse set of contributions CMJ makes to professional and public discourse on the armed forces and defence in Canada. The issue opens with Major-General Lise Bourgon, Deputy Commander of Military Personnel Command. The article offers key insights into the CAF's goal of achieving its equity goals in remedying the underrepresentation of women, and associated challenges of attraction and retention. The article stems from her year as Visiting Defence Fellow at Queen's University's Centre for International and Defence Policy, and is exemplary of the scholar-soldier that CMJ is meant to foster.

Peter Kasurak's article takes up the infantry's long struggle to reconcile competing priorities of mechanization that prevail in Canada and elsewhere, and the inherent difficulty the infantry has in optimizing for the force and missions instead of serving its own interests. The article reminds us that procurement, research and development are not just about acquiring kit, but ensuring that kit is actually fit for purpose.

Former defence attaché Hughes Canuel details the military relationship between Canada and Japan. Given rapid changes and challenges in the region's security theatre, the gradual expansion of relations over the decades is a useful harbinger of emerging trans-pacific priorities with Canada's largest ally in an increasingly volatile region.

FROM THE EDITOR

One of the ways the military prepares future officers for precisely these types of challenging environments is by educating officer cadets. Chantel Lavoie, a professor of English at the Royal Military College, offers first-hand insights into the way teaching a particular piece of literature to RMC cadets helps them reflect on themselves, their own identity, and equips them with the capacity for dialectical reasoning and critical thinking that is indispensable for the modern military officer in a democratic society.

Canada's adversaries have been employing hybrid warfare to great effect – at least since the interwar period. Tyler Wentzell's analysis of the way Russia has been generating asymmetric effects as of late is an important contribution insofar as Canada and allies have yet to develop effective means to deter and contain hybrid methods while minimizing their effects. To the contrary, hybrid warfare compensates for relative weakness in an adversary's resources, and given the capabilities Russia has built up since its aggression in Georgia, Canada, allies and partners need the insights generated in this essay to be better prepared to confront Russia's highly committed and innovative revisionist ambitions.

The following section offers personal reflections on a particular aspect of the Joint Command and Staff Program: the value of planning for complex military operations; and on the implementation of a particular diversity initiative at the unit level. These reflections resonate with the readership by valuing the lived experiences of those in uniform when wrestling with contentious issues that bedevil the organization.

The issue closes with a prescient commentary on implications of the recent federal election for defence, and a book review on the relative (in)effectiveness of Arab militaries, which strikes me as particularly important given the CAF's many contributions to stability throughout the Middle East.

The articles showcase a diversity of talent and topics, and the breadth of challenges and opportunities for the CAF and DND.

Christian Leuprecht
Editor-in-Chief, *Canadian Military Journal*
Class of 1965 Professor in Leadership, Royal Military College



DND photo by Cpl Kenneth Galbraith/RE2014-0048-015



A Canadian Armed Forces Imagery Technician captures video at Šiauliai Air Base, Lithuania during Operation REASSURANCE, in support of NATO Baltic Air Policing Block 36, 27 August 2014.

The CAF Path Towards its 25.1% Employment Equity Objective: A Look Through the Lenses of Attraction and Recruitment

by Lise Bourgon

Major-General Lise Bourgon, OMM, MSC, CD is currently assigned as the Deputy Commander of Military Personnel Command. She is also the Women, Peace, and Security Champion for the CAF. MGen Bourgon joined the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in 1987 and received her pilot wings following graduation from College Militaire Royal de St-Jean in 1992. As a helicopter pilot, she was assigned to 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron in Shearwater, Nova Scotia where she deployed on numerous Royal Canadian Navy deployments. She also served as an instructor with 406 Maritime Operational Training Squadron (OTS). Operational tours included Detachment Commander on HMCS Montreal during a 6 month tour and the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander for Op IMPACT, the first Canadian female to serve in that position. Leadership opportunities included the command of 406 Maritime OTS, the Maritime Helicopter Wing in Shearwater and the Canadian Task Force assigned to Op INHERENT RESOLVE. MGen Bourgon is a graduate of the Air Warfare College, holds a Master Certificate in Project Management from George Washington University and a Master in Public Administration from Royal Military College of Canada.

She has also completed a one-year Defence Fellowship assignment with the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen's University.

In June 2017, the Government of Canada released its new defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE)* where the Department of National Defence (DND) was directed to grow the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to 101,500 by 2025. The growth is to be comprised of all ranks, Regular and Reserve Forces and directs further advance in CAF diversity in order to meet Employment Equity (EE) goals, including 25.1% women by 2026.¹ In response to that direct task, a 2018 CDS Directive initiated Op GENERATION, a standing domestic operation directing recruiting modernization and further establishing clear recruiting goals and EE objectives. Since then, Military Personnel Generation Group (MPGG), under the leadership of Military Personnel Command (MPC) and supported by the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPRA), have worked diligently, striving to meet the objectives prescribed in

Op GENERATION. Although improving steadily, the progress has been slow, irrespective of the significant efforts being invested. In 2016, there were 15.0% women in the CAF. Almost five years later, the women representation rate in October 2020 is 16.1%; foretelling that the road to 25.1% by 2026 will be extremely challenging, if not impossible. Looking specifically through the lens of gender, this paper will examine the current condition, the actions taken to date, the steps required to reach the EE goal and will conclude with recommendations. However given the importance of the 25.1% EE objective, it is essential to examine first its provenance and intent.

The Demystification of the 25.1% Employment Equity Goal

Although royal assent on *The Employment Equity Act* was granted on December 15 1995, CAF officially came under *The Act* only in 2002 following an Order in Council. Under *The Act*, the CAF are obligated to correct historical disadvantages in the workforce of designated group members (DGMs); women, visible minorities, Aboriginal People and persons with disabilities.² As such, the CAF is required to maintain internal representation proportionate with Canadian labour market among similar occupations; therefore, ensuring that DGMs are not underrepresented in the CAF and that barriers for employment are removed.

As standard procedures, EE availability estimates or workforce availability are developed through direct comparison between an organization's internal representation of DGMs and the availability of these same DGMs in the external labour market. The development of the workforce analysis model for CAF was an iterative process of methodological proposals and consultations between the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC), Treasury Board (TB), Human Resources Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) and senior CAF leadership. National Occupation Code (NOC) were used at the occupational level to compared labour market availability (LMA). These LMAs were generated by Statistics Canada through the Canadian census of 2006.³ As an

example, CAF air traffic controller (NOC 2272) internal DGM representation rates would be compared against the corresponding LMAs rates for civilian air traffic controller (ATC) (NOC 2272). The delta between the internal representation and the LMA for each designated group would constitute CAF's EE gap amongst ATC. As an example, out of 668 CAF ATC, 110 were female, resulting in a 16.5% ratio. However, the civilian ratio of ATC was 25.6%, which would correspond to 171 CAF female ATC; therefore, a delta of 61 women was observed.

Of course, this only functioned for CAF Military Occupational Structure Identification Code (MOSID) that have an equivalency NOC on the civilian side; therefore, a two-pronged approach had to be developed for the occupations without civilian's equivalency such as infantry, armored, artillery, diverse weapons technicians and various sensors operators. For unique CAF professions, numerous methodologies were developed and proposed; however the tripling approach was agreed as the most acceptable by everyone. Current representation of each occupation at the time was taken, and tripled to obtain the external comparator.⁴ As an example, out of 619 artillery officers, 41 were female, which was a 6.6% ratio. By tripling the 6.6%, the new external comparator was set at 19.8%, identifying that 123 female artillery officers were the objective, a gap identified of 82 female artillery officers.⁵ As a ceiling check, the interest and propensity survey data was used to ensure that external comparator did not exceed the ratio of women who had indicated definite or some level of interest at joining the CAF. Conducted in 2000, survey results found that 22% of respondents indicated *they were at least somewhat interested* in joining the CAF.⁶

“out of 619 artillery officers, 41 were female, which was a 6.6% ratio.”



Master-Corporal Veronique Lussier, a Task Force Libeccio Traffic Technician, receives freight from a CC-177 Globemaster III during Operation MOBILE in Trapani, Italy, 2 June 2011.

DND photo by Cpl Jackson Yee/RE2011-M032-003

By adding all the gaps amongst each MOSID, a total gender representation rate for CAF was identified. Table 1 illustrates the final results of the CAF NOC-Comparable MOSIDs and the Unique MOSIDS. The final result indicates the LMA of 25.1%, which

was accepted as CAF EE goal in 2010. These results include the Regular Force (Reg F) and the Primary Reserve (PRes) officers and Non-commissioned officers only.⁷

Overall	Current CAF Representation 2010			Workforce Availability	
	Total	Female	%	Female	%
NOC-Comparable MOSIDs	59,285	12,888	21.7	18,815	31.7 ⁸
Unique CAF MOSIDs	41,771	2,310	5.5	6,527	15.6 ⁹
Totals	101,056	15,198	15.0	25,342	25.1

Table 1: Labour Market Analysis – Workforce 2010

However, setting EE workforce availability estimates using a direct comparison to civilian LMA data can be problematic given the unique nature of military service. As the saying goes, “there is no life like it”, which needs to be taken into consideration. This “Military Factor” (MF) includes to name only a few, the Unlimited Liability, the Code of Service Discipline, Universality of Service, deployments, separation from family and personal limitations. These MF factors are part of everyday life for military personnel, which makes working in the CAF much different than working on the civilian sector of the Canadian labour market.¹⁰ In reality, military nurses are first and foremost soldiers, and will be expected to do much more than their civilian counterpart. Although DGMPRA had proposed numerous methods of including a MF to the Workforce

Availability methodology without success,¹¹ in 2016, the Labour Program and the CHRC implicitly acknowledged that CAF is indeed a unique employer and agreed for CAF to adopt a two NOCs (0433 Commissioned Officer/4313 Non-Commissioned Member) approach for future EE goal setting. This change recognizes the uniqueness of the CAF; therefore, granting it its own LMA distinct from the civilian Labour Market Availability. The current computed CAF LMA for the 2 NOCs reflects the 2016 census and establishes objectives of 16.4% female commissioned officers and 14.3% female for non-commissioned member.

As directed by the *Employment Equity Act* (1995), legally CAF must strive to maintain DGM employment rates above the



Sub-Lieutenant Dain Whang, a nurse from 1 Field Ambulance, receives a radio message at the Role 1 Plus medical support unit in Wainwright, Alberta during Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE 16, 30 May 2016.

calculated LMA, therefore 16.4% for Officers and 14.3% for NCOs; however long-term EE goals are determined by leadership. In 2018, the Deputy Minister and the CDS, in discussion with the Minister of National Defence agreed to maintain the 25.1% EE for continued progress in diversity as directed by SSE.¹² Having explained the provenance of the 25.1% EE goal, the next step will be to examine the path required to achieve it, focusing mainly on attraction and recruitment.

The Road Towards the 25.1%: Focus on Attraction and Recruitment

In 2016, General Jonathan Vance publicly announced that CAF were increasing the number of women in uniform by 1 per cent per year, with the goal to reach 25.1% by 2026.¹³ This initiative was part of the ten recommendations made by former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps to change the “sexualized culture” within the military, which she found was conducive to sexual harassment and misconduct. “Increasing the representation of women in the CAF, including in the highest positions of senior leadership, is therefore key to changing the culture of the organization”, she wrote.¹⁴

This announcement, further enshrined in *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, initiated a flurry of work on diversity within the CAF. The first CAF Diversity Strategy document was released in 2016, followed by the creation of Op GENERATION, a standing domestic operation directing recruiting modernization and establishing clear recruiting and EE objectives. Military Personnel Generation

Group, under the leadership of Military Personnel Command and supported by the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis, are working diligently, striving to meet the objectives prescribed in Op GENERATION.

However, for the CAF to achieve progress in gender diversity,

a better understanding of Canadian culture and societal landscape are essential. As of the 2016 census, 48% of the Canadian workforce are women; yet despite some progress, 56.1% of women are still employed in industries and occupations that align with women’s traditional gender roles such as teaching, social work, sales and services, nursing and related health occupations, or clerical and other administrative positions, compared with 17.1% of men. This gender distribution across occupations barely changed from 1987, when 59.2% of women and 15.7% of men were employed in traditionally-female occupations.¹⁵ As of September 2020, this affiliation with gender roles is similarly reflected in the CAF as 50% of women in the Reg F are employed in eight military occupations: Human Resources Administrator, Supply Technician, Logistics

Officer, Financial Services Administrator, Medical Technician, Nursing Officer, Mobile Support Equipment Operator, Cook, and Dental Technician. Although the 2016 Statistics Canada survey indicated some growth in Canadian women’s representation in scientific and technical occupations, women continue to be underrepresented at 24.4%. Furthermore, in 2017, Earncliffe Strategy Group conducted a survey across more than 2000 female participants which showed that the military is not an occupation of interest for women. Out of twenty occupational fields, the military

was second only to the mining sector as field of least interest to enter and out of the 2017 participants, only three selected the military as their primary interest. These studies clearly identified that gender roles and cultural identities are still powerful for Canadian women. Furthermore, the negative perceptions held by Canadian women that being a CAF member requires frequent separation from family and friends, concerns about risks and physical dangers in operations, being harassed or victim of sexual violence and apprehensions about maintaining work-life balance indicate that CAF may have an image problem, and that positive cultural changes needs to be better demonstrated to the average Canadian women.¹⁶

To work on the diversity problem-set, specials teams were created, amalgamating members

“Out of twenty occupational fields, the military was second only to the mining sector as field of least interest to enter and out of the 2017 participants, only three selected the military as their primary interest.”



In support of Task Force Afghanistan, Cpl Sue Hartley (left), a supply Technician and Cpl Laura Mills, a Mobile Support Equipment Operator both out of CFB Petawawa scan the horizon from an Observation Post looking for any sign of a possible attack from Taliban Insurgents in the Panjwii District west of Kandahar City during Operation ATHENA, 13 October 2006.

DND photo by Sgt Lou Penney/AR2006-P021 0005

DND photo by Corporal Ken Bellwicz/TM01-2018-0022-020



Captain Chris Ware and Captain Jackie Ruis, CH-147F Chinook helicopter pilots, prepare to fly during Operation PRESENCE-Mali at Camp Castor in Gao, Mali, 2 August 2018.

from various workforces, both military and civilians, such as human resources specialist, researchers, and various operators, to look at the challenge and find creative ways to attract, recruit and retain women in greater number. Outside the box thinking was paramount, and a panoply of new initiatives were conceived and implemented. From a recruitment perspective, attraction programs were created specifically to target women's pre-conceived views and opinions about CAF garnered during research. Videos were specifically developed targeting women, focusing on various employment fields, humanitarians' service, work-life balance and inclusivity. Furthermore, Canadian Force Recruiting Group began projecting outreach and attraction teams to diverse community activities and events, such as the Canadian Women in Aviation conference, specifically focusing on gender recruiting. By definition, outreach are all activities designed to inform and educate the Canadian public about the CAF while attraction is about the activities used to inform potential applicants that the CAF is actively hiring, providing them with necessary information to make informed decisions about pursuing service in the CAF.

Additionally, a critical initiative, the Women in Force (WFP) program, was developed and four pilot courses were delivered in 2017. WFP is a realistic job preview for prospective

female recruits aiming to promote awareness about CAF job opportunities, including the challenges and benefits associated with a military career by providing participants with "hands-on" experience to gain confidence in their ability and determine if they are well-suited to the CAF.¹⁷ To date, 26% of the original candidates joined the CAF,¹⁸ Other than actual recruitment, the most interesting benefit observed was in the change in perception from the women who participated in the WFP as 76.2% of Anglophone and 90.0% of the Francophone participants indicated strong agreement that the WFP had improved their attitude toward the CAF.¹⁹ An excellent opportunity for the CAF's to change the Canadian female population perception of military service and at relatively low cost both in human resources and people.

Numerous initiatives have also been implemented on the intake process, which refers to the activities relating to the processing, selection and enrolment of applicants in the CAF. Female applicant files are being prioritized to accelerate the intake process, such as priority bookings for aptitude testing, medicals and interviews. Special measures are carried out during the selection process to ensure that all qualified women applicants are selected. As example, qualified female applicants are selected prior to



Petty Officer 2nd Class Stewart carries the Eagle Staff at the unveiling of a monument dedicated to the Canadians who fought and died during World War II, during the commemoration of the 75th anniversary of D-Day and the Battle of Normandy at Chambois, France, 4 June 2019.

DND photo by MCpl P.J. Letourneau/IS06-2019-0020-002

DGMPRA Intake of Women – Regular Force + Primary Reserve




Table 2: Intake of Women – Regular Force and Primary Reserve

any other male applicant, and if required, the Strategic Intake Plan (SIP)²⁰ is modified in order to enrol women in their desired field, or alternate choice. Furthermore, early offers standards for EE groups and varsity individuals applying to Military Colleges are lower. However, each applicant must have met the minimum entry requirements for the CAF and the Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs). Illustrating this approach, every female applicant to the 20/21 Regular Officer Training Program (ROTP) who had successfully met the CMR/RMC standards was enrolled in the CAF, resulting in 23% (77 women) of the Officer-Cadet intake to the RMC/CMR class of 2020.²¹ Although it is not the 25% goal. However, the gap is decreasing.

Research continues on many initiatives, such as CAF branding and culture, focusing specifically on women, visible minorities, Indigenous, LGBTQ2+, and the new generations of recruits such as The Millennial and Generation Z.²² In addition to DGMPRA, collaboration with academia and other defence and security experts as part of the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security (MINDS) and the Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) program continues.

Following all the efforts and new initiatives mentioned above, Fiscal Year (FY) 2019-2020 saw the recruitment of 1907 new women (Reg F/Pres) out of 10 271 new recruits, meaning that 18.6% of new recruits were women, an increase of 1.8% from the

To allocate the desired intake objective amongst each CAF occupation, allowing better definition and clear measurement and performance towards the EE goal, an EE External Intake Goal Calculator was developed. The model is based on the concept that all occupations should contribute to the overall goal in an equitable way.²⁵ By entering the specific intake percentage of women

“Taking into consideration the cultural identity of Canada’s workforce, the propensity for sustained gender roles and women’s existing low level of interest in joining the CAF, reaching 25.1% by 2026 is realistically unachievable.”

desired, the calculator allocates the number of women required amongst each occupation staying below the 75% saturation point. The saturation point refers to the maximum representation of women in a specific occupation. Trades such as dental technicians and nurses both have very high female representation; therefore a limit of 75% is set to ensure some gender balance. For the first time this year, the FY 20/21 Reg F SIP has clear gender objectives by occupation. To meet the 31.4% required this year, Table 3 illustrates the objectives per samples occupations.²⁶ The full SIP annex provides the gender goals per MOSID which CFRG and the Recruitment Centres across the country are responsible for filling with applicants. Of course, these numbers are also subject to change as a result of the impact of COVID-19. For comparison, the number of women recruited in 2019-2020 is included in parentheses as comparison.²⁷ It will be revealing to compare next year’s recruitment results with the planned SIP as many MOSIDs may not be appealing to women, especially in context with the traditional gender roles and cultural identities described earlier.

previous year.²³ Of note, 1 325 women were released from the military the same year for various reasons.²⁴ To reach the 25.1% EE goal by 2026, the roadmap below was developed by DGMPRA in August 2020. It is important to note that this graph is subject to significant change as a result of the impact of COVID-19.

As it can be observed in Table 2, in order to meet the CAF EE objective, the annual intake of women from FYs 20/21 to 25/26 will need to be approximately 3650, which corresponds to an average representation rate at intake of 36%. If specific goals are not attained in a particular year, they will need to be increased in each subsequent year if 25.1% by 2026 is still to be attained.

Intake Goals for Women FY 2020/2021

Occupation	% Women	External SIP	# Women	Occupation	% Women	External SIP	# Women
BOSN	37.80%	65	25 (13)	INF	3.00%	600	18 (12)
IMAGE TECH	75.00%	6	5 (4)	COMM RSCH	52.30%	75	39 (8)
MP	38.90%	110	43 (24)	POST CLK	75.00%	12	9 (3)
MSE OPS	50.30%	98	49 (24)	ARMD	13.50%	32	4 (6)
ARTY	18.00%	45	8 (6)	MS ENG	42.50%	27	11 (2)
PLT	9.80%	65	6 (5)	CHAP	44.90%	3	1 (8)
NURSE	75%	31	23 (23)	ACISS	17.10%	150	26 (16)
NWO	46.20%	116	54 (19)	HRA	75.00%	150	113 (95)
CELE	32.00%	40	13 (9)	CYBER OP	23.10%	7	2 (0)

Table 3: This table illustrates the Reg F SIP gender recruiting objectives by MOSID (excluding component transfers from P Res). Number in bracket is the actual recruiting from FY 2019/2020.

Furthermore, as the required percentage of women at intake increases over time, the occupations that tend to be attractive to women will become “saturated”, forcing a gender proportion rebalance towards the even less attractive occupations such as the combat arms. To exacerbate the situation, the growth stemming from SSE objectives has been concentrated in the combat arms which has increased from 30% to 32% of the total CAF population. Given that the combat arms occupations have the lowest female representation with less than 5.5%, the highest ratio of voluntary transfer and the largest cultural gap, growing the combat arms may be incompatible with the goal of growing the overall representation of women.

As of November 2020, the CAF employs 10 463 women Reg F (15.8%) and 5154 PRes (16.7%), making women 16.1% of the CAF population. By end state in 2026, based on 101 500 CAF Force and EE 25.1%, the CAF will require 25 477 women (Reg F and PRes combined), a growth of 9 860 women through a balance of recruitment and attrition. Taking into consideration the cultural identity of Canada’s workforce, the propensity for sustained gender roles and women’s existing low level of interest in joining the CAF reaching 25.1% by 2026 is realistically unachievable.

The goal of this paper was to demonstrate that achieving 25.1% EE target by 2026 is impossible; nevertheless, CAF must continue its diversity efforts for continued operational success and in order to remain an “Employer of Choice”. The last 30 years have seen great progress towards women’s integration in the CAF; however, the only way to eventually achieve the 25.1% EE objectives will be to change the paradigm from integration to inclusion. For too long women have been allowed in, but kept on the periphery, not allowed to fully participate as who they fundamentally are: women. The CAF “warrior” culture, human resources policies, hateful conduct and sexual harassment, equip-

ment, infrastructure, career progression, performance reviews and promotion, education and training, family support, and health programs will all require fundamental changes in order to be truly inclusive towards women. Without a complete transformation, reaching the employment equity of 25.1% of women will remain an illusion.

Recommendations

Maintain the 25.1% EE long term goal; however, remove the unrealistic 2026 timeline

From a scientific perspective, the underpinning of the EE 25.1% based on the tripling methodology, and without due consideration to the “Military Factor” is problematic. However, as a long-term EE objective it aligns with the critical mass literature where critical mass theory is defined as the critical number of women are required to affect policy, make a change not as a token but as an influential, self-sustaining body. This critical mass number is between 25-30%; therefore 25.1% falls within the range and should be the CAF ultimate objective until Canadian society and workforce evolves.

Inclusion study

In the last 30 years, the CAF has integrated women into the CAF. In order to achieve the 25.1%, the next step is inclusiveness. Further work is required to define the gaps remaining in the CAF to make it an inclusive organisation and an “Employer of Choice” for women. Further research is required on cultural change, CAF branding, harmful conduct, personal support programs, human resources policies such as career progression, performance assessment, education and training, equipment and infrastructure. Once the research have been done, implementation plan must be developed, including required personnel and financial resources.

Communication plan

It is essential to continue to include the importance of diversity and inclusion into all our internal and external communication. CAF must be able to defend its diversity programs, communicating clearly the concept of equitability versus equality. Furthermore, education on the difference between objectives versus quotas is extremely important. Emphasis must be placed on the fact that every applicant joining the CAF is meeting the selection criteria, regardless of the special measures in place.

Maintain the 25% gender objectives for recruiting

CFRG must continue striving for more female recruitment. Based on modeling done in early 2020, increasing intake ratio to 25% could result in 20% representation by 2025/2026. When compared with the other 5 EYES Allies, this number is ahead or at least at par with their efforts. Currently, Australia is at 19.2%, New Zealand at 18.5%, the United Kingdom at 10.9%, and the United States at 16.8%. Although EE long-term objectives would not be achieved for approximately 35-40 years, as the workforce evolves and greater diversity and inclusion programs are implemented into the CAF, the recruiting objective will need to be reviewed and increased.

The following recommendations are also suggested on the recruitment process.

Attraction

- **L1 Engagement in Marketing & Attractions:** L1s need to be *more* involved in partnering with CFRG in generating the desired EE applications for their specific occupations. As an example, the RCAF attractions team developed for the air technician's occupations was highly successful but it is essential for adequate gender representation to be included.
- **Fully implement the Women in Force Program (WFP) across the country as soon as feasible (Post COVID-19):** As mentioned earlier, 26% of the original candidates have joined the CAF to date, with an additional 11% still in the processing stage. Furthermore, the WFP underscores the broader impact that it could have on public perceptions of the Canadian military. As the CAF is working on its branding, this activity is a "gold-mine". Finally, research has shown that women are greater influenced by their social network, notably family and friends,



(from left) Able Seaman Ashtyn Bartlett, Master Seaman Shawn Davis, and Captain Nicolette Legaarden transit through the Maniitsoq Fjord during Operation NANOOK, 14 August 2020.

DND photo by Corporal David Veldman

to pursue a career in the military; therefore, increase participation in the WFP will help the probability of positive feedback.

Recruitment

- **Gender representation in CFRC:** L1s and Career Managers must do much better at filling CFRC positions with diverse individuals from EE groups so Canadians can see themselves reflected in the CAF. Less than 18% of recruiters across the country are women. As recruiting centres are often the applicant's first interaction with the CAF and they form their perception and opinion of the organization based on those interactions, which in turn influences whether they will accept a job offer, and whether or not they will recommend the CAF to friends and family.
- **Recruit the Recruiter campaign:** Many volunteers from last year's campaign were not selected due to individual service requirement. Recruiting requires a special talent and drive; therefore volunteers should be prioritized over individual service requirements.
- **"Everyone is a Recruiter" concept:** attracting applicants, including EE applicants, to the CAF requires repeated and multiple touch-points with youth in order to guide them and answer questions. One of the most effective ways to reach the Canadian population is through the organization's internal population i.e. currently serving members who can speak to the job from first-hand experience and with passion. This is especially true for recruitment of women. Greater emphasis on the "Everyone is a recruiter" concept is required. Additionally, potential rewards mechanism (non-monetary) should be investigated to motivate personnel.

- **GBA+ Trg:** Numerous studies indicate that women believed that they do not meet the basic requirement (physical or mental) for a successful career in the CAF and that they do not receive adequate validation and support from staff at the recruiting centres, therefore, they discontinue the intake process. Mandatory training sessions for recruiters, military career counsellors and CFRG staff should be developed and offered on the psychological and psychosocial differences between genders to ensure that women are provided effective support.
- **Early gender withdrawal:** Women discontinue the intake process in much higher proportion than men. Further research is required to identify the causes and explanations.

Intake

- **Maintain EE priority of processing applicants' file:** CFRG must continue to prioritize EE files.
- **Greater use of early offers for the ROTP CMCs:** Recommend that MP factor requirement is removed from EE early offer condition. Increase impetus for the CFRGs to maximize applicants' file processing to meet early offer timeline.



NOTES

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Members of 1st Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light infantry, playing as coalition forces take cover behind a Light Armored Vehicle (LAV) 6.0 during Exercise MAPLE RESOLVE in Wainwright, Alberta, 10 May 2021.

Infantry Fighting Vehicle or Battle Taxi? Canadian Infantry's Struggle with Mechanization

by Peter Kasurak

Peter Kasurak has published two books on the Canadian Army: *A National Force* which explored the Army's development as an institution from 1950 to 2000, and more recently Canada's *Mechanized Infantry: The Evolution of a Combat Arm, 1920-2012*. Peter teaches from time to time in the department of Continuing Education at the Royal Military College of Canada.

The story of army mechanization has revolved largely around the evolution of the tank and armour doctrine. The equally important development of infantry has been largely ignored. A quick check on Amazon.ca produced over 20,000 titles for "tank" but only 58 for "mechanized infantry," including reprints of field manuals. Infantry has been demoted in the popular imagination from "The Queen of Battle" to Cinderella. Yet the fact remains that the core of any fighting army and how it is imagined and structured is one of the fundamental decisions in designing a land force.

Central to the design of mechanized infantry is the selection of the role for the infantry's vehicle. Two major paths of development have appeared: foot infantry with the vehicle intended for transport as a "battle taxi," or infantry re-imagined as a vehicle-centric arm mounted on a fighting vehicle that was integrated with the soldiers inside it. The decision of the role of the infantry vehicle is closely related to how infantry is supposed to relate to the tank. Does the infantry fight its own battle,

supported by tanks, but largely separate from them or are infantry and armour inseparable? Failure to make the right decision at this fundamental level could have dire results.

The Canadian Army has traditionally been a member of the "battle taxi" school of thought even though its combat experience and Cold War wargaming contradicted its chosen doctrine. This article will explore the development of Canada's mechanized infantry and demonstrate the power of tradition over evidence and innovation.

Off to a Bad Start – British Army Doctrine

Prior to and during the Second World War the Canadian Army was part of a British Imperial army and consequently had no doctrine of its own. It had insufficient staff to develop its own doctrine and, in any case, unique Canadian doctrine would have been inconsistent with the objective of being part of an integrated, Imperial force. Unfortunately, the British Army made

consistently poor choices regarding both armoured forces and infantry mechanization. It had a strong bias against integration across combat arms. One German observer noting in 1889 that

The truth is, different arms of the service in the English Army are not sufficiently united. There is too much caste spirit; they fail to perceive that each exists only

"the British Army made consistently poor choices regarding both armoured forces and infantry mechanization."

for the other and that the efficiency of an army is measured by the product, not the sum of the efficiency of each arm.¹

Moreover, the British Army strongly believed that infantry should be foot soldiers. In the words of Richard Simpkin, a Cold War British armour brigadier, "Whether it had marched there or been delivered by parachute, glider or truck, the British infantry assembled, deployed and went into battle on its feet. Likewise it defended in its foxholes."²

Britain began the post First World War period with its most prominent theorists seeing only a minor role for infantry in the mechanized future. J.F.C. Fuller envisioned tanks sortieing out of land fortresses, requiring only a small body of unarmoured men. In his *Lectures on Field Service Regulations III*, published in 1932, Fuller said that "to combine tanks and infantry is tantamount to yoking a tractor to a draft horse." The infantry role would be to occupy areas already conquered by armour. B.H. Liddell Hart similarly reduced the future role of infantry to that of "land marines" who would mop up and police areas seized by armoured forces.³

By 1931 British doctrine as stated in *Modern Formations* aimed at mechanizing the infantry, but fighting separately alongside the armour. Tanks would be the main offensive arm and would be protected in assaults by light tanks and at rest, by infantry. The infantry would be equipped with the light armoured and tracked *Carden Loyd* carrier, but the carrier's purpose was to carry a .303 machine gun which would be dismounted in combat. The carriers would not belong to infantry battalions, but to the brigade. Infantry transport would be even further removed to the divisional level and the "bus column" would be purely administrative, with no tactical role. The British Army abandoned all thought of developing a tactical infantry carrier by 1936.⁴

In 1939 the British Army had three types of mounted infantry: the carrier-mounted support company which transported the heavy weapons of each infantry battalion; the "motor battalions" of armoured divisions which not only had a carrier-mounted support company, but also two carriers in each infantry company's scout platoon and with all the infantry tactically mounted in trucks or half-tracks owned by their battalion; and finally, the reconnaissance regiment of the armoured divisions (who might object to being considered infantry) who were equipped with scout cars and light tanks and eventually detoured tanks.

The Battle of France misemployed the two motor battalions of the 1st Armoured Division in the defence of Calais where they were lost in a static battle that provided no lessons learned regarding mobile warfare. The carriers of the line infantry battalions, on the other hand, were regarded as surprisingly successful. Lieutenant-General Sir William Bartholomew's lessons learned report declared



English two-man tank called *Carden Loyd* carrier Mark VI. Pre-World War II reconnaissance vehicle and a mobile machine gun.

Lebrecht/Alamy Stock Photo

that the *Bren* gun carrier "was a great success, even when used in the assault role, for which it was never intended" and said that they "proved to be of immense value in every role, mounted, dismounted or when driven across the front without firing to frighten enemy infantry." Some of Bartholomew's enthusiasm carried over into the 1941 *The Infantry (Rifle) Battalion*, a military training pamphlet which supported an aggressive use of carriers in infantry attacks by engaging defensive positions causing delay or by flanking the enemy. In cooperation with infantry and tanks, they could infiltrate gaps and turn enemy positions. They might precede the infantry to look for holes in the defence or work cooperatively with tanks by engaging anti-tank weapons. Carrier crews were to be soldiers who could "think at 20 mph rather than 3 mph" and who were "imbued with dash and the offensive spirit."⁵

This moment of enthusiasm for mounted combat and combined arms was, however, brief. By 1943 the General Staff was again warning that "carriers should not be used as tanks and sent into action with all their guns blazing." The best position for the carriers was *behind* the main effort platoons. When working with tanks they were to be taxis only.⁶

In 1941 the British Army could talk about "all arms" cooperation – but this sometimes included only infantry, machine guns and artillery, not armour. Infantry-armour cooperation was still conceived of as two separate battles. Foot soldiers were to make the best use of ground and to rely their own weapons, not the tanks. Exactly how this was to work was rather mysterious. *The Infantry Division in the Attack* said that "there were a number of solutions, no one of which is completely satisfactory." Infantry would simply have to be "enterprising."⁷

The Western Desert campaign resulted in the innovation of the "Jock Column" by Brigadier L.M. "Jock"



British Bren carrier in North Africa. The Bren was the mainstay of infantry section fire support during World War II and Korea.

Campbell which grouped motor battalion infantry with its anti-tank platoon, a screen of armoured cars and a battery of towed field guns into a mobile force which frequently carried out offensive infantry attacks and which was successful against an inferior enemy, but not against strong opposition. The British Army convened a conference at the School of Infantry in October 1942 to reach a consensus of the use of the carrier in an independent role. The conference delegates concluded that they were only useful as security screens and flank guards.⁸

Canadians preparing for combat were therefore left with little to work with in terms of combined arms doctrine. Infantry and tanks were to fight together – but separately. Infantry owned some vehicles and had used them successfully in combat under certain conditions. The only really definite thing was that a Bren gun carrier “was not a tank.”

Learning from Experience

Having inherited the British Army’s faulty doctrine, once in combat the Canadian Army coped by improvisation. Canadian experimentation would explore both lines of infantry mechanization: foot infantry and battle taxis, and infantry mounted on a fighting vehicle. Both models of development had some success.

The best-known of these innovations was the *Kangaroo* armoured personnel carrier (APC). This vehicle was created by Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds as an expedient to carry infantry through German lines in the assault phase of Operation TOTALIZE. Simonds ordered that 60 APC’s be fashioned from Priest self-propelled guns by removing the guns and adding additional armour. Troops entered and left the vehicle over the side, as the top was open. A full infantry section could be carried in a single

“The best-known of these innovations was the “Kangaroo” armoured personnel carrier.”

directly to the infantry. But while administrative transport might be managed from the divisional level, combat vehicles were different. Issues developed about who was in charge, the APC regiment or the infantry? 79 Armoured Division argued at one point that APC’s were like landing craft and the APC commander was in command until the infantry disembarked. Montgomery sided with the infantry, but the debate continued. Tactical problems could arise when APC’s, on loan to an infantry battalion from division, arrived late or became involved with disputes with the infantry commander. The *Kangaroos* were successful embedding the principle of infantry protection and illustrated the disadvantages of vehicles which were not organic to the combat unit.¹⁰

Other Canadian troops experimented with improvised infantry fighting vehicles. A prime example was the use of deturreted *Honey* (*Stuart*) tanks by reconnaissance troop of the Lord Strathcona’s Horse (Royal Canadians) in its assault crossing of the Melfa River. Major-General Bert Hoffmeister, commanding the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, had decided that a conventional attack with infantry covered by an artillery barrage would not work as the dust and smoke would limit visibility and betray the position of Canadian troops. He therefore left it to Brigadier J.D.B. Smith, commanding the 5th Canadian Armoured Brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel Paddy Griffin, commanding the Strathcona’s, to devise a plan. Smith and Griffin selected a crossing point they believed would be more lightly defended than the bridged sites and instructed Lieutenant Edward Perkins, commanding the reconnaissance troop, to seize it. The troop consisted of eleven *Honey* tanks, mounting .50 machine guns. The crew of five also carried a .30 Browning machine gun, four Thompson submachine guns, and a PIAT anti-tank weapon. Perkins staged a successful crossing using his carriers as an integrated part of his unit rather than as simple transportation.

vehicle. During TOTALIZE, the innovation of protecting infantry during an attack was a great success, with APC-borne infantry suffering only about 20 per cent of the casualties of foot infantry.⁹

First Canadian Army and its superior, 21 Army Group, were enthusiastic about the *Kangaroo* and both Canadian and British armoured personnel carrier regiments were created in Percy Hobart’s 79 Armoured Division menagerie of “funny vehicles” using a variety of deturreted tanks and self-propelled guns. The APC’s were too complex and too few in number to be issued

There were still many deficiencies. German armour was held at bay with the PIATs, but a heavier gun would have been helpful. Perkins found he could only communicate with the British Columbia Dragoon (BCD) tanks supporting him by personally crossing the river as the BCD *Sherman* tanks lacked the mobility of the *Honeys* and could not cross. The main infantry body, the Westminster Regiment, a motor battalion, arrived late because it also had mobility problems and had to travel by a different route. The operation, though small, showed what a team with a properly armoured vehicle integrated with its tactics could accomplish. Perkins was awarded a Distinguished Service Order and asked to write up a battle narrative as a training memorandum.¹¹

Other Canadian troops in Italy were coming to much the same conclusions regarding the need to provide infantry with fighting vehicles and further integrate infantry and armour. After a series of costly battles, the war diarist of the Three Rivers Regiment proposed that a special assault force be created:

this force would necessarily be highly mobile – a composite force of *Shermans*, M.10s, *Stuarts* cut down, armoured cars and possibly carriers. They should carry on their backs, a special trained force of assault infantry. Tough physically, these men would be armed with automatics, grenades. . . some sticky bombs, plus a small

amount of Engineer's supplies (to demolish roads). Such a force would be prepared to deal with any type of opposition, from infantry to tanks. . .¹²

At the war's conclusion the 1st Canadian Armoured Personnel Carrier Regiment (1CAPCR), its parent 79th Division, and the Lake Superior (Motor) Regiment summarized their experience with infantry carriers and made recommendations for the future. 1 CAPCR wanted a future APC which had overhead cover and a dropped door ramp in the rear. A turret would protect the gunner and the APC would be armed with both .30 and .50 calibre machine guns. The 79th Division wanted a lightly armoured, amphibious carrier which could switch to wheels for road moves. It recommended that APC's belong to the infantry units which used them, but persisted that the vehicle commander should be in charge until the infantry dismounted, a position consistent with the battle taxi model.

The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor), on the other hand, advocated infantry fighting vehicles. In its summary report on its war experience said:

There is no reason why the carrier cannot be used as a light tank, particularly against disorganized opposition. This has been done repeatedly with good effect. An infantry-

man attacking on the ground is no problem to infantry concealed and protected in a slit trench, but the same infantryman has very little chance against a carrier. If speculative firing with [a] .50 or .30 Browning is indulged in to the full and carriers are covered by others as they go forward, the only thing that will effectively stop them is anti-tank weapons and mines.

The LSR reported cited a case of a village clearance operation in which the scout platoon used all its firepower to cover infantry. The surrendering German officer said he had been amazed at the fire and would not have surrendered if he had known the true strength of the force.¹³



Sherman tank III of the Canadian Army after the invasion and liberation of Sicily 1943.

At the end of war, both the battle taxi and the infantry fighting vehicle had supporters based on varying wartime experience. The general outline of a modern battle taxi was in place as was the concept, supported by battle experience, of an infantry fighting vehicle. Neither of these ideas would carry directly forward in the post-war period.

Building the Mechanized Force

The early post-war period did not create a demand for mechanized infantry, or indeed, any much infantry at all. The Mackenzie King government reduced the Army from almost 500,000 personnel to about 15,500. The only immediate threat was the possibility of the Soviet Union seizing a lodgement in the north to provide forward air bases required by the short legs of its bomber force. The Canadian Army response was the Mobile Striking Force, initially an airborne battalion which was eventually expanded to three battalions. Given the limitations of the Royal Canadian Air Force transport fleet, this force had no light armour nor any infantry carriers other than oversnow vehicles. The MSF was eventually dropped as Soviet aviation improved and gained the ability to reach North American targets in one jump.¹⁴

Canada had exited the Second World War satisfied that its doctrine was superior and needed little revision, and with an abundance of surplus materiel, including 1,300 Universal carriers. Thinking about a replacement began only in 1951 and moved to a completed design by March 1952. The XA-20 design was for an open topped carrier of fourteen to fifteen thousand pounds with a three thousand pound cargo capacity. It could carry five men, including the driver and had only minimal armour.¹⁵ According to the statement of requirement signed off by Lieutenant-General Simonds, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), in late 1953 “the primary purpose of the carrier is the rapid transport of crew-served weapons across rough terrain with the protection for the crew against small arms ammunition and mortar fragments.” In other words, the Army had regressed all the way back to pre-war British Army doctrine and was not even contemplating a choice between a battle taxi and an infantry fighting vehicle.¹⁶

The return to the comfortable past was, however, quickly overtaken by the advent of tactical nuclear weapons. Simonds was particularly concerned with the target presented by the large logistic tail of a conventional army and launched a study, Exercise Gold Rush, to resolve it. Simonds had in mind that a large number of trucks could be replaced by short take-off and landing aviation. This line of study failed, but Gold Rush also developed a concept of operations for nuclear war. Canadian planners assumed that, given the disparity in numbers between NATO and the Warsaw Pact that NATO would have to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. This would result “in a dog fight characterized by considerable fluidity” as each side sought to define and attack nuclear targets while avoiding massing long enough to become a target themselves.

The concept required that the Army become entirely mechanized and designed to fight in small all-arms battle groups no larger than could be risked to loss in a single nuclear strike. Not only the infantry, but also artillery and combat support and service support would have to be mounted.¹⁷

Simonds’ successor as CGS, Lieutenant-General Howard Graham, approved Gold Rush only as a “concept,” not doctrine, wanting to take the Army in the whole new direction of total air mobility. This created three years of doctrinal confusion during which force structure and equipment planners had no approved reference to guide them. 1957 Staff College lectures provided various views as to whether infantry carriers should be light or heavily armoured and whether they were transport or assault vehicles. A consensus did not emerge until an agreed concept of future war was delivered at the Third Tripartite [America-Britain-Canada] Infantry Conference in August 1958 and did not become doctrine until 1960. The accepted concept was “attack and evade” which was an elaboration of the Gold Rush “dog fight.” Infantry would now

require a higher degree of mobility and hitting power than ever before. Its vehicles would have to be amphibious and air portable. The basic building block would be a company-sized all arms combat group capable of independent action and operating in a manoeuvre area of three to four thousand yards. Infantry carriers would be organic to their units and would be battle taxis, functioning only as protected transport. The APC would be shepherded by tanks and protected by artillery and infantry support weapons. While the carrier was not supposed to be put at risk, it was at the same time supposed to be a shock weapon with the combined APC and tank assault “striking with extreme violence.”¹⁸

Attack and evasion and the APC as a battlefield taxi become the new Canadian Army orthodoxy. It had become so without any evident consideration of either the feasibility of “attack and evade” tactics nor of other types of APC’s. The solution had been found by simply stating that the battle taxi could indeed act as a light tank, even while concepts and doctrine insisted it was not.

The adoption of new doctrine, even in the form of a “concept,” meant that the XA-20 vehicle project was unsuitable to meet the requirement of an APC that was meant to carry infantry as well as being a platform that could be used to transport all the other combat and combat support arms around the battlefield. In April 1956, as the XA-20 was nearing prototype completion, it was cancelled and the project transformed into the “Carrier Tracked Light” which was intended to serve all arms. As with the XA-20, the CTL, which became the *Bobcat* was to be amphibious and air portable, although it was never clearly established why. The Mobile Striking Force had no stated requirement for APC’s and Gold Rush did not foresee the airlift of anything other than the lightest weapon systems. Amphibiousness might be useful in some circumstances, but unless the tanks it was intended to work with could swim as well, the lightly armed and armoured vehicle could find itself alone on the wrong side of an obstacle.

**“the Army’s
determination to have
a unique vehicle built
in Canada outstripped
the country’s industrial
ability and perhaps
even the state of
the art.”**

The demanding requirement and the Army's determination to have a unique vehicle built in Canada outstripped the country's industrial ability and perhaps even the state of the art. After repeated failures to meet specifications and the migration of the project through a succession of industrial firms, the *Bobcat* was finally cancelled in November 1963. The Army selected the US M113 carrier, which would prove to be NATO's ultimate battlefield taxi, as the replacement for the *Bobcat* and the M109 howitzer as its self-propelled gun, finding no chassis available could be both APC and gun platform.¹⁹

While the *Bobcat* project was ongoing, in 1960 Canada was asked to participate in a NATO working group to develop a NATO APC. Canada accepted, but with little enthusiasm, at first suggesting that the Department of Defence Production, rather than National Defence, be the country representative. The FINABEL countries (France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg plus "Allemagne" or the Federal Republic of Germany) had adopted an infantry fighting vehicle concept, with both France and Germany fielding heavily armoured and armed vehicles intended to work closely with tanks. As this clearly conflicted with the *Bobcat* and the battlefield taxi model, Canada rejected proposals for NATO standards as they arose. Col. James Tedlie, the director of combat development, challenged the premise that an infantry vehicle needed heavy armour to operate with tanks. He wrote:

If this is so what we are asking is for another tank, one with more people in it, and with less effective firepower. This would appear to be a false concept as we would be risking the lives of 10 or 11 men in an AIFV [armoured infantry fighting vehicle] to do a job less effectively than it could be done by three to five men in a tank.

Tedlie accurately summarized the Canadian Army position, but this was based on opinion rather than trials or experiments.²⁰

The Army did conduct an overall review of its doctrine and force structure in the early 1960's. The CGS, Lieutenant-General Geoffrey Walsh, had commissioned a series of war games to determine the effectiveness of the Army's "attack and evade" doctrine. The results of the Iron Crown series of games were not encouraging, and led Walsh to establish the Army Doctrine and Organization Board (ATOB) under Major-General Roger Rowley. The ATOB conducted a comprehensive series of studies and field trials which overturned attack and evade and replaced it with a more static defence behind major obstacles. The ATOB studies did not reconsider the APC as the *Bobcat* was assumed to be the future vehicle. Rowley did conclude that much closer integration of infantry and armour was needed and wished to study the merger of the two branches into what he call a "panzergrenadier" structure. Walsh simply refused to consider it.²¹ The Army was now locked into the battlefield taxi.

The BMP Revolution

No sooner had the Canadian Army²² made its doctrinal decision than the environment began to change. A critical spur for change was the 1967 appearance of the BMP 1 in the Red Army. The BMP 1 was a much-improved version of the IFV. It could carry a fully infantry section, was amphibious, and – most importantly – carried a 73 mm gun whose HEAT round could penetrate the armour of current NATO main battle tanks. The tactical implication of this was that a NATO battalion would be faced with a Soviet force of fifty tanks and IFV's which exposed to fire at 2,000 metres would give the defending NATO force less than five minutes to destroy the attack, requiring a rate of destroying ten vehicles per minute.²³

The BMP 1 did not perform especially well in the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War of 1973, but rather than abandon the IFV, both the Soviets and the Americans accelerated development resulting in the BMP 2 for the Soviets and the *Bradley* IFV for the Americans. The Canadian Army revived its combat development capability and began to study the problem. The first major war game, BRONZE RAMPART, was completed in 1977 and concluded that against modernized Soviet forces, the Canadian brigade group in Europe could not move



Russian infantry fighting vehicle BMP 2 on the Orr's Hill Army Museum, Trincomalee, Sri Lanka.



Soldiers of the 68th Armour Regiment's 1st Battalion patrol in a M2 *Bradley* IFV (Infantry Fighting Vehicle) near Baqubah, Iraq, May 2006.

its infantry or anti-tank elements. Lieutenant-Colonel W.E.J. Hutchinson, who had played the Canadian commander, commented “the most disturbing question” was “*What* role does the infantry play on the armoured battlefield?” Equipped with the M113 the infantry had become “a nuisance if not a liability.” The M113 lacked the firepower and the armour to confront forces mounted in the BMP. He had to divert tank, anti-tank and air resources to extricate his infantry since, if he abandoned the infantry, they would not be very keen in the next battle.²⁴

In reaction to BRONZE RAMPART, the Army launched an Infantry Study which solicited two major papers from the Army staff. The Staff College came down strongly in favour of re-equipping with an IFV mounting a 20 to 30 mm gun and changing organization to fit. 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Germany was of a different opinion. It reiterated the argument for foot infantry fighting from dug-in positions. It advocated a “Canadian Infantry Combat Vehicle” (CICV) which could dig itself in and carry shelter materials. To increase the firepower of the infantry a “tank destroyer” with heavy armour and a large gun would be added to the battalion anti-armour platoon.²⁵ While the Infantry Study team found the Staff College paper “thought provoking” it adopted the 4 CMBG approach. The result was the Army would spend more than a decade pursuing a force structure which included two unique vehicles: an improved battle taxi which could still carry a full infantry section but somehow mount a 25 mm gun, and a tank destroyer. War gaming showed that the force designed by the Army’s System Study could defend against

“The Army had possessed wheeled armoured vehicles since 1977 when it had purchased the AVGP as a training expedient.”

vehicle (now a “Direct Fire Support Vehicle”) was found to be impractical as the DFSV could not be confined to an anti-BMP role. As soon as it began to fire, it became engaged by enemy tanks and with only light armour, lost heavily.²⁷ The light armoured vehicle project would go through several iterations because of doctrinal disputes and budgetary reductions until it was finally overtaken by the external force of industrial policy.

The Army had possessed wheeled armoured vehicles since 1977 when it had purchased the AVGP as a training expedient. The purchase had resulted in the creation of Canadian manufacturing capability for light armoured vehicles at GM Diesel (later General Dynamics) at London, Ontario. A further purchase of light armour to satisfy the Militia’s in-Canada training requirement came in 1990. The Army would have preferred to acquire M113’s so the Militia would have the same vehicle to train on as to use in Europe, but the GM Diesel LAV could be configured as the M113, and the company offered concessionary financing while simultaneously threatening to close the plant if it did not get an order. Having secured the Canadian Army order, the company went on to win a US Marine Corps order for the LAV-25 which resembled the model purchased for the Militia, but mounted a 25 mm chain gun. This subsequently led to a Canadian purchase of the Coyote, based on the LAV-25, to satisfy its reconnaissance requirement. Finally, in 1995 the Liberal Chrétien government announced it would re-equip the Army’s entire vehicle fleet around the latest version of the LAV, the LAV III. This version would meet NATO’s mobility

a Soviet-style force, but the plan to develop and acquire two unique vehicles within the Army’s desired corps-sized structure was unrealistic if not entirely grandiose.²⁶

The Rise of the LAV

The Army’s Combat Development Committee stayed with the two-vehicle concept even after the Conservative government abandoned its plan for a heavy division in Europe and opted to re-equip the Army around light armoured vehicles. The IFV option was firmly rejected, but separating the troop carrying vehicle from the gun

standard and have 95 per cent the off-road performance on the US Army *Bradley* IFV, and the capability to carry 3.5 tonnes more armour or equipment than the *Coyote*.²⁸

Successive decisions driven by industrial policy and the Army's budgetary restrictions had produced a vehicle which was arguably an IFV. It had a 25 mm chain gun, and could carry six or seven infantry plus its crew of three. It was air portable, but too heavy to be amphibious. War games would be conducted in 1999, field trials in 2001 and company-level tactical doctrine in 2003. Industry and equipment had preceded doctrine and the Army had acquired an almost-IFV but without ever resolving its position regarding the role of infantry in mechanized battle. While it was still "not a tank," the LAV was expected to kill enemy BMP's and its gun used an integral part of the infantry section.²⁹

Dénouement – the Close Combat Vehicle

The final installment of the taxi v. IFV debate came with the July 2009 decision by the government to re-equip the Army with tanks, reversing the political level's policy of maintaining only a light armoured force. National Defence shortly thereafter announced its intention of acquiring a Close Combat Vehicle (CCV) which would for the first time be defined as an IFV. The specifications allowed it to carry less than a full infantry section, but it would require enough mobility and protection to manoeuvre with tanks.³⁰ The evaluation of candidate vehicles, however, was flawed and delayed and there appeared

to be little senior support from the Army itself. The project was cancelled in December 2013 when the chief of the defence staff and the army commander announced that the LAV III had been so significantly upgraded that the CCV was no longer required.³¹

Conclusion

For over seventy years the Canadian Army as an institution has remained true to its inherited British Army conviction that infantry should walk into battle and fight from its foxholes. During the Second World War necessity became the mother of invention and the influx of Militia reservists broke down received wisdom. While much of the wartime experience pointed towards the superiority of the infantry fighting vehicle model and increased integration of infantry with armour the Army lacked the institutional means to distill its lessons learned.

The post-war Army quickly forgot what it had learned and initially sought only an improved *Bren* gun carrier. The advent of tactical nuclear war forced the acceptance of a battle taxi, but after that point the Army became dogmatic and never tested its decision in field trials or even by war gaming. With the advent of the BMP, wargaming definitively showed that the battle taxi was dead. Nevertheless, the Army clung to the battle taxi concept even if it required novel vehicles which existed in no other army. Its acquisition of the near-IFV LAV III was the product of foreign requirements and Canadian industrial policy more than a deliberate doctrinal choice. Doctrine followed long after.

The battle taxi/IFV debate illustrates the power of grooved thinking in the Canadian Army and how decisions made long ago in a country far away still affect today's decisions.



"The final installment of the taxi v. IFV debate came with the July 2009 decision by the government to re-equip the Army with tanks..."



DND photo by Cpl Tina Gillies/AR2011-0142-020

LAV III at work in Panjwa'i District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, 8 May 2011.

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Flags of Canada and Japan.

A Short History of Canada–Japan Military Relations

by **Hugues Canuel**

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The spread of COVID-19 around the world could have put a dramatic end to the flurry of Canada–Japan military initiatives that emerged in the 2010s, from Operation NEON—supporting the implementation of UN sanctions against North Korea—to participation in friendly events such as the International Cadets’ Conference at the National Defense Academy outside Tokyo.¹ Although there was a lull in the spring and summer of 2020 with the suspension of both personnel exchanges and the deployment of Canadian units to the region, it lasted only a few months. The frigate *Winnipeg* and a

CP-140 long-range aircraft were back by the fall to patrol the East China Sea from bases in Japan.² That episode, which went largely unnoticed by the international media, is a reminder of the complicated but little-known history of interaction between the Canadian and Japanese armed forces over more than a century of mistrust, hostility and cooperation. The purpose of this article is to fill in this gap in the narrative of Canada–Japan relations from the early 20th century to the present.

Feats of arms and great battles will find little place here as the periods of combat between the armed forces of the two countries have already been the subject of detailed study.³ Instead, the emphasis will be on how the two nations’ military relationship has evolved over time against the backdrop of an ever-changing geostrategic context. An attempt will also be made to illuminate largely ignored military interactions between the two nations, both in the past and in recent times. This approach will give the reader a glimpse of a unique dynamic as the two nations evolved from distant enemies in the interwar period to partners with common interests in the 21st century. But first, we need to return to the beginning, when British diplomacy made them reluctant allies across the vastness of the Pacific.



Commodore Matthew Perry meeting Imperial Commissioners at Yokohama, Japan, 1854.

Reluctant Allies

Following nearly two hundred years of seclusion and the first intrusion of the American Matthew Perry in 1854, Japan voluntarily opened to the world at the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868.⁴ Just a few years later, Canada gained a gateway to the Pacific when British Columbia joined the dominion in 1871.⁵ Exchanges soon followed with the visit of Canadian missionaries to Japan in 1873 and the arrival of the first Japanese immigrant to Canada in 1877.⁶ Before the turn of the century, eight thousand Japanese compatriots would follow, settling for the most part in the Vancouver area despite [translation] “anti-Asian sentiment that had been developing for several years in British Columbia among members of the Anglo-Saxon population.”⁷ Paradoxically, it was as these “yellow peril” denouncements in North America were increasing—reflecting concerns shared on both sides of the 49th parallel⁸—that Great Britain decided to tie its fortunes to those of the Empire of the Rising Sun by establishing the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902.

London—and the rest of the British Empire—thus recognized the primacy of Japanese interests in Korea in return for Tokyo’s support in countering Russian expansionism in the Far East.⁹ Ominously for those Canadians concerned about the security of the Pacific coast, the agreement with Japan also meant the gradual withdrawal of the Royal Navy, which had to concentrate its forces in European waters in the face of the German Kaiser’s ambitions.

“Exchanges soon followed with the visit of Canadian missionaries to Japan in 1873 and the arrival of the first Japanese immigrant to Canada in 1877.”

aged not only to send several British observers but also to add representatives from the dominions, including Canada. Artillery Captain Herbert C. Thacker was ordered to set out for Japan a few weeks after hostilities broke out.¹² He was breveted as a major

and arrived in Tokyo on 27 March 1904 to join Lieutenant-General William Nicholson of the British Army.¹³ Nicholson was leading a motley crew of British, Australian, French, German, Spanish and American officers who were to join the Japanese 2nd Army, which had already landed on the Liaodong Peninsula with the intention of marching into the heart of Manchuria. However, the attachés had to wait until they could observe the first major battle at Liaoyang on 26 August as the 2nd Army moved up the peninsula to combine forces with the 1st Army that was coming from Korea.¹⁴ Thacker was also present at the Battle of the Shaho River in October, but his campaign was already coming to an end—he was evacuated to Japan a few weeks later for medical reasons and returned to Canada in late November.

This first assignment of a Canadian attaché with the Japanese armed forces was not immediately followed by others. Major Thacker, who was confirmed in his rank in May 1905, wrote a few reports relating his experience, but his shortened trip caused him to miss the two most storied battles, the Siege of Port Arthur and the Battle of Mukden.¹⁵ Perhaps a more tangible benefit of the Russo-Japanese War was the spirit of affiliation with the British Crown that was apparent among members of Canada’s Japanese community. Twenty-four veterans of the conflict, after

In the meantime, enjoying the benevolent neutrality of Great Britain, Japan decided to counter Russian advances in Korea and Manchuria, launching an attack in February 1904.¹⁰ A precursor to the horrors of the First World War, the Russo-Japanese conflict attracted much interest overseas, and both sides accepted the presence of foreign observers in their ranks.¹¹

Exploiting the friendly spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Great Britain man-

based in Esquimalt, and two companies of Reservists—one in Victoria and the other in Vancouver.²¹

Yet Berlin had significant forces in Asia. An expanding colonial power since the 1880s, Germany had acquired a considerable aggregate of territory in the central Pacific—the Mariana, Marshall, and Caroline Islands, in addition to German New Guinea, Palau, Bougainville Island, and German Samoa—and had taken control of a large concession on China's Shandong Peninsula.²² The territory included a naval base supporting the East Asia Squadron, which in 1914 consisted of the battleships *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, as well as three light cruisers (*Nürnberg*, *Leipzig* and *Emden*). A cause for concern for the British

and Japanese Admiralties, these forces had sailed in July and their position was unknown when Great Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August.²³ After some hesitation, Japan followed suit on 23 August.²⁴ The Imperial Japanese Navy and British (and Dominion) naval forces were given the urgent task of finding the scattered units of the German squadron and neutralizing the threat.


London and Tokyo believed that the light cruisers *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* were off the coast of North America, ready to wage a merciless *guerre de course* against their merchant traffic. For a few weeks, therefore, there was some cooperation between the Canadian and Japanese navies (through the British Admiralty) as the *Rainbow* headed south and the armoured cruiser *Izumo*,



Japanese attack on Port Arthur, Russo-Japanese War, 1904.

emigrating to British Columbia, were able to put their experience to good use when they served with the Canadian Expeditionary Force during the First World War.¹⁶ Joining them were two hundred other Japanese immigrants who fought with distinction on the Western Front, with fifty-five of them losing their lives and fifteen of them receiving decorations for bravery.¹⁷ It was at sea, however, that the new agreement took on the greatest importance during the conflict.

The terms of the Alliance (which was renewed in 1905 and 1911) did not force Japan to join Britain in the event of a war in Europe.¹⁸ In fact, some even expected Tokyo to ally with Berlin given the influence of the Prussian model in Japan, as it had shaped the country's political and legal frameworks and the structure of its army.¹⁹ There was great anxiety in Canada about this, as London had agreed to entrust the security of its North Pacific interests to the Imperial Japanese Navy. By 1905 the Royal Navy had abolished its Pacific station, leaving residual forces in China and Australia while the Esquimalt Dockyard on Vancouver Island was transferred to the Canadian government even though the Dominion did not yet have its own navy.²⁰ It was not until 1910 that the Canadian Naval Service came into being. It was renamed the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) the following year, but by 1914 it had gathered together only meagre resources on the Pacific coast: the light cruiser *Rainbow*,



SMS *Scharnhorst* and SMS *Gneisenau*, 1914.



The German light cruiser SMS *Emden* attacked by HMAS *Sydney*, 9 November 1914, at the Battle of Cocos.

off Mexico, headed north, a pincer movement that could have culminated in a battle off the coast of California. Failing to detect the Germans, the two ships eventually headed for Esquimalt to resupply.²⁵ The presence of the Japanese naval flag in Canadian waters was short-lived, as the German threat never materialized off the coast of British Columbia.

In fact, the cruisers *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* had been recalled to join the German squadron that was then heading for South America, inflicting a bloody setback on the Royal Navy off the coast of Chile (on 1 November at Coronel, where four Canadian naval midshipmen perished on board the battleship *Good Hope*). The Kaiser's ships later escaped into the South Atlantic, but most were wiped out in the Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December 1914.²⁶ By this time, the flag of the German Empire had been swept from the rest of the Pacific. The only other ship of the *Kaiserliche Marine*, the light cruiser *Emden*, had sailed to the Indian Ocean where she caused much damage before being sunk on 9 November during the Battle of Cocos. As for the German colonies, those further south fell to British, Australian and New Zealand forces, while Japan seized the Shandong Peninsula as well as the Mariana, Marshall and Caroline Islands between September and November 1914.²⁷

Thereafter, the Japanese navy continued to cooperate with the British fleet in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, while Canada focused its military effort on the Western Front and the Atlantic.²⁸ Apart from a few visits to Esquimalt by Japanese ships seeking to resupply and take advantage of the only dry dock available to them in North America before the United States joined the hostilities in 1917, Canadian and Japanese forces did not really find themselves together for the remainder of the conflict; they

and moved rapidly inland, reaching as far as Lake Baikal and developing a considerable area of occupation before being joined by other foreign contingents.³⁰

More than 4,000 Canadians gained a foothold in Siberia, with the first detachment arriving in October 1918 and the remainder the following January, but this brigade played only a limited supporting role in the Allied operation.³¹ Most of the Canadian force remained in the Vladivostok area, while a contingent of fifty-five soldiers went to Omsk to serve as staff troops with a British formation.³² However, with hostilities already over in Europe, there was little support in Canada for that intervention.³³ The troops began their withdrawal to Canada in April 1919, and the bulk of the brigade was evacuated in June, leaving sixteen dead in Siberia, the victims of disease and one suicide.³⁴ This reluctant effort showed a certain parallel with that of the other Western partners, all of whom were tired of the war, but contrasted with that of Japan, which had invested considerable forces in the operation just as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was coming to an end.

"Most of the Canadian force remained in the Vladivostok area, while a contingent of fifty-five soldiers went to Omsk to serve as staff troops with a British formation."

Distant Enemies

The scale of the Japanese effort in Siberia was of concern to both London and Washington. Seventy thousand Imperial troops had deployed to the region, while the Entente countries and the United States had been able to send merely a little over 20,000 men to join a legion of Czechoslovakians who were already in Russia at the beginning of the intervention. Equally worrisome from a Western perspective was the fact that Japanese troops remained in Siberia after the other forces gradually abandoned the operation in 1919 and 1920.³⁵ Tokyo seemed determined to control an extensive area on the

did, however, cross paths again during the Siberian expedition. Even before the defeat of the Central Powers in Europe was complete, the Entente Powers, the United States and Japan had decided in 1918 to intervene in the Russian civil war in support of the last remaining White Army forces fighting against the Red Army.²⁹ Japan took the initiative in the Far East while other contingents headed for northern Russia, the Crimea and the Caucasus. By August, the first Japanese troops had landed in Vladivostok

continent from which the Japanese government could exercise political and military dominance, not only in Siberia but also in neighbouring Manchuria. The situation could only fuel the suspicions of those who accused Japan of pursuing a “rapacious” policy since its entry into the war on the side of the Entente, having already consolidated its hold on the German colonies in the central Pacific as well as the Shandong Peninsula. Tokyo had also sent a list of twenty-one imperious demands to Peking in 1915, causing considerable outrage in the United States, where the move was seen as a direct infringement of China’s sovereignty and a threat to Western interests.³⁶

Relations between the Entente Powers and the United States on the one hand and Japan on the other only worsened in the immediate post-war period. Japanese representatives were allowed to sit alongside the victors at Versailles, and Japan was invited to join the League of Nations and granted an “administrative” mandate over the central Pacific islands.³⁷ However, the consolidation of the Japanese presence on the Shandong Peninsula could not be resolved because of opposition from China and the United States (in the face of the agreement in principle of England and France), while Western leaders agreed to decline Tokyo’s proposal to include the principle of racial equality in the League of Nations pact.³⁸ These tensions were accompanied by a ruinous naval arms race between the three great post-war powers.³⁹ Particularly troubled by this last issue, but also seeking to put an end to the whole range of problems left unresolved at Versailles with regard to the Far East, President Warren Harding invited all countries with an interest in these matters to a large meeting in the United States.

The Washington Conference of 1921–22 kicked off an unprecedented arms control effort while addressing a series of diplomatic disputes and resulted in the signature of several agreements.⁴⁰ The most famous of those was the Five-Power Treaty (or Washington Naval Treaty), which limited the war fleets of the signatories for the first time in history. The Nine-Power Treaty affirmed the respect of these countries for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. Japan renounced its occupation of the Shandong Peninsula but managed to keep its railway and economic interests there (as in Manchuria). And, by signing the Four-Power Treaty, Washington, London, Paris and Tokyo committed themselves to respecting the territorial demarcations already in place in the Pacific. Without specifically mentioning it, this agreement endorsed the mandate granted by the League of Nations to Japan but put an end to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was formally abandoned in 1923.⁴¹

The repeal of the pact was welcomed in Canada.⁴² The establishment of a regime of neutrality in the Pacific instead of an alliance reviled by the Americans was a real gain for the Canadian government. Another step forward for Canada was the Balfour Declaration of 1926, which gave the dominions control over their foreign policy.⁴³ Canada quickly increased its international presence, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1928. The opening of a Japanese legation in Ottawa that same year and a Canadian mission in Tokyo in

“Canada quickly increased its international presence, including the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1928.”

1929 seemed to bode well for future relations.⁴⁴ The evacuation of Japanese troops from Siberia (1922), the Shandong Peninsula (1923) and northern Sakhalin Island (1925) signaled a curbing of expansionist tendencies within the Imperial Army, which had to contend with a more moderate political class.⁴⁵ And yet, Japanese militarists regained the upper hand over the following decade. Japan acquired a growing sphere of influence in China, gave up its seat in the League of Nations, and withdrew from the naval arms control system, all while democratic rule gradually faded in Tokyo.⁴⁶ Simultaneously, the issue of Japanese immigration and the treatment of these newcomers in the climate of racial animosity that still prevailed in British Columbia continued to undermine diplomatic exchanges between the two countries.⁴⁷

The Imperial Army sent its first attaché to Ottawa in 1931 (Major Tadamichi Kuribayashi, who later commanded the desperate defence of Iwo Jima in 1945), and the Navy followed suit the next year, but Canada did not reciprocate.⁴⁸ Any potential for military collaboration between the two countries was dead in the water as Tokyo pursued an expansionist policy in Asia.⁴⁹ Japan established a puppet government in Manchuria in 1932 and advanced south of the Great Wall of China in 1937 while aligning itself with Germany and Italy.⁵⁰ Ottawa, for its part, followed the American example by imposing economic sanctions against Japan beginning in the summer of 1940. Imperious voices were raised condemning the presence of a “fifth column” within the Japanese community in British Columbia, while hostile mobs attacked Canadian missionary establishments and businesses in Japan. Others in China were damaged in the fighting between Japanese and Chinese troops.⁵¹

Canada had been concentrating its military forces in the Atlantic and in Europe since 1939, yet it was in Asia that the Canadian Army would first engage in battle. Even before entering the war against Japan in the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, Canada had agreed to reinforce the British garrison in Hong Kong with two infantry battalions and a brigade staff. These troops landed just three weeks before the Imperial Army launched its assault on 8 December. In the fighting that ended on Christmas Day, nearly three hundred Canadians were killed and five hundred were wounded, and all of the survivors were taken captive.⁵² Although they could count themselves lucky to have survived the battle, their ordeal had only just begun. The prison conditions were appalling and the weakened prisoners were forced to work, both in Hong Kong as well as in Japan, where 1,183 Canadians were transported, most of them to toil in coal mines and shipyards.⁵³ Of the 1,975 Canadian servicemen who landed in Hong Kong (including two nurses), 556 never returned home: 290 died in battle, 264 died in detention (136 of them in Japan), and two more died after their release—one in Japan and one en route to Canada.⁵⁴

Some 40 other Canadian servicemen serving with Allied units across Asia fell to the Japanese in 1942 and suffered similar depravities.⁵⁵ Among them was pilot Leonard Birchall, “the saviour of Ceylon” (now Sri Lanka), who was shot down off the coast of that British colony by Japanese fighters on 4 April 1942 after send-



Leonard Birchall.


ing a radio message reporting the approach of an Imperial Navy fleet.⁵⁶ He and his crew belonged to 413 Squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), as Canada had accepted a request for help to reinforce the Allied posture in the Indian Ocean after the fall of Singapore.⁵⁷ The RCAF also sent two fighter squadrons and a light bomber squadron to assist in the defence of Alaska in the days following the Battle of Midway in June 1942, when the Japanese had taken advantage of the opportunity to occupy the small islands of Attu and Kiska in the Aleutians.⁵⁸ In September, Squadron Leader K. A. Boomer shot down a Japanese fighter in a raid on Kiska, earning the only victory claimed by a Canadian airman based in North America during the conflict.⁵⁹

This episode constituted the only instance of combat involving Canadian military personnel deployed in the western part of the continent, as the Japanese threat was otherwise limited to a few submarine patrols.⁶⁰ On 20 June 1942, submarine I-26 attempted to destroy the Estevan Point lighthouse on Vancouver Island with cannon fire but failed to inflict any damage.⁶¹ Another type of threat came in the form of explosive-laden balloons in the winter of 1944–45. Thousands of the balloons were released from Japan to drift towards North America using high altitude air currents, but only eighty made it to Canada, causing little damage and no loss of life (although there were six casualties in the United States).⁶² Despite this lack of real threat in British Columbia, the Canadian government began evacuating the 22,000 Japanese nationals then living on the West Coast to internment camps inland as soon as hostilities in the Pacific began. Most of them were held in these camps until the end of the war, often under harsh conditions.⁶³

These measures limited the participation of Japanese immigrants in the Canadian Forces. About 30 of them, all from outside British Columbia, enlisted at the beginning of the war and several served in Europe, one of them falling in combat on 20 February 1945.⁶⁴ After Pearl Harbor, the “Nisei,” although born in Canada, were excluded from military service. It was not until early 1945 that Ottawa began a recruitment campaign among the Japanese community, under pressure from the Allies to meet the growing need for translation in the Far East. About 100 Japanese immigrants served with the Allied forces in Southeast Asia and Japan, but they could only work as interpreters.⁶⁵ Many other Canadians were also scattered among the British units that drove back Japanese troops. Among them were Lieutenants William Asbridge and Robert Hampton Gray, both of whom were aboard the British aircraft carrier *Formidable*. The former was killed in a raid in the Tokyo area on 18 July 1945, and the latter in Onogawa Bay on 9 August when he sank an enemy destroyer and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.⁶⁶

These two pilots were the only Canadians to die in action in the Japanese archipelago, and Gray remains to this day the last Canadian (and only member of the RCN) to earn this illustrious award.

In addition to those individual contributions, few Canadian units participated in the defeat of Japan. After recapturing Attu Island in the spring of 1943, the Americans asked the Canadians to help liberate Kiska. The 13th Infantry Brigade (and the well-known “Devil’s Brigade,” a mixed force of American and Canadian commandos) joined the landing on 15 August, but the Japanese had already evacuated the island, leaving behind explosives and



The aircraft carrier HMS *Formidable* (R67) on fire after being struck by a Kamikaze off Sakishima Gunto, 4 May 1945.

booby traps that cost the lives of four Canadian soldiers in the weeks that followed.⁶⁷ The RCAF sent two transport squadrons to India to support the Allied advance in Burma in October 1944, while 413 Squadron returned to England in January 1945.⁶⁸ As for the RCN, the cruiser *Uganda* joined the British Pacific Fleet in the spring of 1945 and participated in the Okinawa campaign. However, the following month, the majority of her crew chose to return to Canada when offered the choice under a new policy dictating that only volunteers could fight in the Pacific after the end of hostilities in Europe. Having thus “voted” to withdraw from combat, the cruiser headed for Canada—to the great shame of the Canadian admirals—and arrived at the base in Esquimalt as the atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, leading to the surrender of the Empire of the Rising Sun.⁶⁹ Soon Canada and Japan would no longer be enemies, but would they become allies?

Partners with Common Interests

The Canadian government had reluctantly approved the deployment of a large military contingent to participate in the invasion of Japan. Of the forces designated for that purpose, only *Prince Robert*—a liner converted into an anti-aircraft cruiser—had time to get underway before the end of hostilities, arriving in Australia as the *Uganda* set sail for Canada.⁷⁰ At the same time, the Canadian military attaché in Canberra, Colonel Lawrence Cosgrave, was dispatched to sign the Japanese Instrument of Surrender on Canada’s behalf at a ceremony on 2 September aboard the battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay.⁷¹ Ottawa, however, declined the suggestion that it join the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, preferring to speed up the demobilization of its armed forces.⁷² The priority in the fall of 1945 was the repatriation of the remaining prisoners of war in Japan and Hong Kong, many of them aboard the *Prince Robert*.⁷³ That was going on while Canadian officials continued to discourage Japanese Canadians from returning to the Pacific coast. When given the chance to leave the internment camps, many had no choice but to head east to start a new life in the Prairies and Ontario or face deportation to a devastated Japan.⁷⁴

Ottawa also had to determine the form of its representation in the Allied-occupied country. Colonel Cosgrave remained in Tokyo as a delegate to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), American General Douglas MacArthur.⁷⁵ Two Canadians took on important roles in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Judge Edward Stuart McDougall and Military Prosecutor Henry Nolan.⁷⁶ E. H. Norman—a scholar of Japan whose 1940 study *Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State* became a prized reference for the occupation forces—returned to Tokyo in 1946, becoming head of the Canadian liaison mission to Japan.⁷⁷ The Canadian government had already identified the integration of Japan into the world economic system as a key element in the long-term preservation of peace in the Far East.⁷⁸ The shift in control of Canadian representation from Cosgrave, a military man, to Norman, a diplomat, symbolized the importance of a mission that was separate from the occupation structure dominated by the SCAP soldiers.⁷⁹

The April 1952 entry into force of the Treaty of San Francisco signalled the end of the Allied occupation and Japan’s return to full sovereignty.⁸⁰ Ottawa and Tokyo re-established diplomatic relations that same year—relations that would continue to be dominated primarily by economic factors in the decades that followed. To this day, Japan continues to express its appreciation for Canada’s support in its 1954 admission to the Colombo Plan (accompanied by a bilateral trade agreement), its inclusion in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1955, its entry into the United Nations in 1956, and its admission to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1963.⁸¹ Nevertheless, the Canadian military was called upon to set foot on Japanese soil even before all these agreements were concluded, as the Cold War was heating up on the Korean peninsula.

“The RCAF sent two transport squadrons to India to support the Allied advance in Burma in October 1944, while 413 Squadron returned to England in January 1945.”

Canada soon announced its intention to join the United Nations force put in place under American command (United Nations Command [UNC]) to repel the North Korean troops who had attacked their southern neighbour on 25 June 1950.⁸² Five days later, three RCN destroyers were ordered to set out for Korea. 426 Transport Squadron began its participation in the North America–Far East air bridge on 20 July, which was essential to maintaining allied forces in the region. Meanwhile, RCAF fighter pilots attached to American units were soon going to take part in combat missions in the skies over the peninsula. Then,

on 7 August, the Canadian Army began establishing a volunteer force to serve in Korea, the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade, which was eventually integrated into the 1st Commonwealth Division.⁸³ More than 26,000 Canadians served during the three-year conflict and 516 lost their lives, a considerable sacrifice for Canada, as its military had been largely demobilized after the Second World War, requiring a commensurate logistical and administrative support structure.⁸⁴

Japan, still under Allied occupation in 1950, could not join the UN force, but the Japanese islands served as a major rear base.⁸⁵ While General MacArthur remained in Tokyo, combining command of SCAP and UNC, many of the nations contributing troops in the Korean peninsula, including Canada, also moved to Japan. In September 1950, Brigadier General F. J. Fleury arrived in Tokyo to head a liaison mission with UNC headquarters. In May, a support group moved to Kure (near Hiroshima) to take advantage of the infrastructure already established by the British Commonwealth Occupation Force, which had been deployed there since 1945.⁸⁶ The group included several nursing sisters employed at the British Commonwealth General Hospital until 1954.⁸⁷ As for the destroyers, they could take advantage of the support of the American navy at the base in Sasebo (where an RCN liaison mission was established in 1952) and in Kure, at a base administered by Australia.⁸⁸ Canada also opened a rest and relaxation (R&R) centre in that city and another in Tokyo for combatants enjoying leave during their tour in Korea.⁸⁹

The armistice of 27 July 1953 ended the fighting, but the parties remained at war as no peace treaty was established, making it difficult to repatriate combatants. The Canadian brigade remained deployed near the demilitarized zone until November 1954, while a medical group in Korea was not disbanded until June 1957.⁹⁰ 426 Squadron ceased trans-Pacific transport flights

in June 1954, and the last of the RCN's destroyers left the area in September 1955.⁹¹ In the meantime, SCAP disappeared as the Allied occupation of Japan ended, although the Americans were allowed to leave forces in Japan as part of the bilateral security treaty signed at the same time.⁹² However, the UNC also remained in place and still needed Japan's support as a rear base, necessitating the signing in 1954 of an agreement between the United Nations and Tokyo regarding the status of these forces on Japanese territory.⁹³ When it became clear that the stalemate in Korea would continue, it was decided that UNC headquarters would be moved from Tokyo to Seoul in 1957, but a small staff—United Nations Command – Rear (UNC-R)⁹⁴—remained in place to maintain access to US bases in Japan in case of renewed conflict.



Korean War Armistice signed at Panmunjon, 27 July 1953. US Army Lieutenant General William Harrison, Jr. signs on behalf of United Nations Command.

As a UNC Sending State, Canada was one of the signatories of the UN–Japan agreement even though its military presence in the region was coming to an end. The units in Tokyo, Kure and Sasebo were disbanded in 1954. Colonel E. D. Elwood, who was already serving with the military liaison mission in Japan, was accredited in 1955 as the first Canadian defence attaché to the Japanese government.⁹⁵ From 1957 onwards, he was housed at the Canadian embassy in Tokyo and was supported by a non-commissioned officer to handle administrative needs.⁹⁶ One of their duties, which continues today, was to make regular visits to the Yokohama War Cemetery, which holds the graves of 136 Canadian prisoners of war who died in detention during the Second World War, along with the graves of twenty-three other Korean War veterans, most of whom died of their wounds after being evacuated to hospitals in Japan.⁹⁷ Since that time, the attaché has also served as a liaison officer to UNC-R, a useful role in facilitating access to American bases for Canadian ships and aircraft passing through the area.

A useful role but not always that busy. With hostilities over in Korea, Canada–Japan relations remained dominated by trade issues. Canada concentrated its military effort during the Cold War on the defence of North America (NORAD) and its European allies (NATO) while contributing to UN peacekeeping efforts.⁹⁸ Japan quickly reconstituted its armed forces but limited their use to the defence of the Japanese islands alongside their American ally, leaving little chance for regular collaboration between the Canadian and Japanese militaries.⁹⁹

“Colonel E. D. Elwood, who was already serving with the military liaison mission in Japan, was accredited in 1955 as the first Canadian defence attaché to the Japanese government.”

The two navies were the first elements to come into more regular contact, as their ships would cross paths on mutual visits (such as the annual deployment of the Japanese Training Squadron beginning in 1957) or on multinational exercises (such as RIMPAC, a bi-yearly event conducted by the US Navy in Hawaii that has included Canadian participation since its inception in 1971 and Japanese participation since 1980).¹⁰⁰ But the vastness of the Pacific remained a challenge for more regular interaction. Thus, the attaché posted to Tokyo in 1980–82 later claimed that no Canadian ships or aircraft had made a stop in Japan during his stay, while the memoirs of a successor posted in 1995–98 makes no mention of such a visit.¹⁰¹

Canadian leaders attempted to pivot their focus to the Asia-Pacific region a few times after the Cold War, but international upheaval continually shifted their attention back to Europe and Africa in the 1990s (the Balkans, Rwanda, and Somalia) and the Middle East, including the almost continuous deployment of military forces to Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean after 9/11.¹⁰² At times, Canadian and Japanese peacekeepers crossed paths during operations, such as in Cambodia in 1992, when the first Japanese Self-Defense Forces contingent was deployed under the UN flag. Military personnel from both countries served simultaneously in Mozambique, the Golan Heights, Sudan and South Sudan, as well as in Haiti.¹⁰³ More recently, in April 2019, two Japanese officers joined the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai alongside Canadians

who have served there since 1985. This effort, which continues to this day, was the first deployment of Japanese military personnel with an independent UN peacekeeping force.¹⁰⁴ However, direct military exchanges between Canada and Japan have been irregular. Tokyo created a position in its embassy in Ottawa in 1975 for a civilian defence agency official (a first in the Japanese system), but military attachés posted in Washington since 1954 were not accredited in Canada until 2010.¹⁰⁵

In spite of these fits and starts, the challenges of the post-Cold War era have led Canada and Japan to realize that they share common interests in the face of the 21st century's uncertainties. As far back as 1991, as a Canadian naval group prepared to head home after the liberation of Kuwait, a flotilla of Japanese minesweepers set sail for the Persian Gulf to participate in the multinational effort to sweep up mines planted by Saddam Hussein's forces—the first such operational deployment for both countries since the Korean War.¹⁰⁶ The two navies met in the same region a decade later when Japanese supply groups rotated in between 2001 and 2009 to support multinational forces, including Canadian ships, conducting counter-terrorism operations there.¹⁰⁷ Also in 2009, as a sign of their common interest in humanitarian aid missions, Ottawa and Tokyo concluded a memorandum of cooperation allowing RCAF transport aircraft to use certain Japanese bases when called upon to deploy to Asia to distribute humanitarian aid in the event of a natural disaster.¹⁰⁸ Canada then accepted a request from the UN forces in Korea to take responsibility for the position of Deputy Commander of the UNC-R (still based in Japan), and the first RCAF major assumed this position in 2012, a commitment that continues to this day.¹⁰⁹

Meanwhile, as these events were unfolding, a number of initiatives at various levels were initiated, leading to greater military dialogue between the two countries. These initiatives include:

- The Joint Declaration on Political, Peace and Security Cooperation by Prime Ministers Stephen Harper and

Naoto Kan in 2010;

- The first “2+2” deputy minister-level dialogue (foreign affairs and defence) in 2011;
- The introduction of Japan as an implementing partner of Canada's Military Training and Cooperation Program in 2011; and
- The first participation in 2012 of a Japanese instructor in the Canadian-sponsored civil–military relations course in Tanzania as part of a joint commitment to continue building the peacekeeping capacity of African partners.¹¹⁰

This was followed by a flurry of mutual visits and activities in Canada and Japan, including the unprecedented deployment to Northeast Asia of submarine *Chicoutimi* in 2017 and the launch of the Canada–Japan KAEDX maritime exercises, as well as the participation of Canadian ships in US–Japan Exercise KEEN SWORD the following year.¹¹¹ That culminated in a flurry of exchanges in 2019 with Prime Minister Abe's visit to Ottawa in April and Defence Minister Sajjan's visit to Tokyo in June, as well as the ratification in July of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) as Canada affirmed its support for Japan's vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific region.¹¹² That was followed by further bilateral discussions between the two joint staffs, the RCAF and the Air Self-Defense Force, and the two navies; the first visit to Canada by the chief of staff of the Ground Self-Defense Force; the presence of Canadian Army observers at U.S.–Japan Exercise YAMA SAKURA in Japan; and the participation of a Japanese instructor in a Canadian-led seminar in Malaysia on women, peace and security, while Canadians observed a Japanese-taught construction engineering training session in Vietnam.¹¹³ Although the 2020 pandemic slowed this unprecedented momentum, dialogue between Canadian and Japanese authorities continues, and it remains to be seen how these relationships will recover as health restrictions are gradually lifted in both countries.

Conclusion

The history of military relations between the two countries in the 20th century is, at best, a series of unrelated episodes: Major Thacker in Manchuria, the hunt for the German East Asia Squadron, the intervention in Siberia, rear support for troops deployed in Korea, and a few peacekeeping operations after the Cold War. Regrettably, we must also remember the appalling abuses of Canadian prisoners at the hands of the Imperial



US Navy ships assigned to *Ronald Reagan* Carrier Strike Group joined ships of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Royal Canadian Navy HMCS *Winnipeg*, in formation during Exercise KEEN SWORD, Philippine Sea, 26 October 2020.

US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Erica Bechard

Army and the unjust internment of Japanese-Canadians during the Second World War. Yet the common interests between Canada and Japan that have led to a flurry of activity since the beginning of the 21st century remain. Operation NEON is a striking example of this collective willingness to participate side by side in a multinational effort to counter [translation] "... threats that challenge the rules-based international order."¹¹⁴ The revival of this Canadian operation after some

delays at the start of the pandemic seems to mark an interest on Ottawa's part to maintain a credible and persistent military presence in the region. It remains to be seen (at the time of writing in July 2021) whether this desire will translate Canada's recent pivot towards the Land of the Rising Sun into a concrete long-term commitment.



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Royal Military College of Canada Commissioning Parade, 2016.

“Here’s to the Heroes”: Teaching Alice Petersen’s “Champlain’s Astrolabe” at the Royal Military College of Canada


by Chantel Lavoie

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(Dedicated to those who began their studies in Fall 2020)

How can fiction help us reflect on ourselves and others? How can such reflection make us better leaders? This article addresses those questions by looking at a story by New Zealand–Quebec writer Alice Petersen, “Champlain’s Astrolabe,” from Petersen’s first collection, *All the Voices Cry* which won the Quebec Writers’ Federation First Book Prize in 2013, “Champlain’s Astrolabe” has become a set piece in my teaching at the Royal Military College of Canada (hereafter RMC), where students from across the country become well-educated officers in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF).

One of the things that makes Petersen’s story valuable in this context is that she addresses mythologies of Canada with a straightforward plot and an objectionable yet nevertheless relatable protagonist, Brian Armstrong, who begins the story driving eastwards from Toronto “[f]uelled by a coffee of mythic proportions. . . in a mood so foul it made his flesh cold and his armpits sweat.” Brian, who works for an architectural firm, hates what he is driving into, another “site visit[] in Quebec”:



MJ Photography/Alamy Stock Photo

All The Voices Cry by Alice Peterson, Winner of the Quebec Writers’ Federation (QWF) First Book Prize in 2013.

Beyond Montreal there must have been a hundred groundhogs perched on their burrows in the weak spring sunshine or squashed along the sandy shoulders of the road. Brian would have liked to wrap up a few of the riper ones and courier them back to [his boss] Irwin as a present. Still, in the car he at least felt safe from the hovering clouds of French vowels that swirled in the air outside. The deeper he got into the province, the more roly-poly the French accent would become and the less likely it was that he would ever understand a word of it. Men, women and children: a whole province-full of people talking through a mouthful of steel wool. The main thing was not to stop until he got to the site at Lac Yahoo. (33)

Brian's fear of trying to make out Quebecois accents and dialogues "through a mouthful of steel wool" evinces anxiety about getting by in a second language. His annoyance provides a good beginning to our classroom discussion, since attaining their degree requires officer cadets at RMC to achieve "four pillars": academics, military leadership, physical fitness, and bilingualism in both official languages. For some of them French is a third or fourth language. Further, unless already a serving member of the CAF, a cadet's military training starts with Module One of the Basic Military Officer Qualification Course (BMOQ) at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS) at St-Jean Sur Richelieu, Quebec (Heilman). After the course, many of them will drive "beyond Montreal" (in another direction) to RMC in Kingston, Ontario, full of coffee and nerves. As we discover, Brian Armstrong's anxiety about understanding strangers speaking French is an extension of his difficulty understanding those closest to him in a different language—the language of intimacy.

Given the setting, the "coffee of mythic proportions" that fuels Brian's irritation and fills up his bladder suggests Tim Hortons—or at least I suggest this to the students by putting up a slide of their largest cup with the well-known colours and font. This company's roots in ice hockey—another Canadian obsession—are not lost on them, and hockey comes into the story. Despite the triviality (describing perhaps a double-double) the adjective "mythic" sets the reader up for more. Petersen, I argue, employs myth not just in terms of a large hot

beverage, but also as both "a traditional story, typically involving supernatural beings or forces, which embodies and provides an explanation, aetiology, or justification for something such as the early history of a society, a religious belief or ritual, or a natural phenomenon," and myth as "a widespread but untrue or erroneous story or belief; a widely held misconception; a misrepresentation of the truth" ("Myth" 1.a and 2.a). She alludes to myths of Canada, and Canada as myth, before the first sentence—in the title of her story.

"attaining their degree requires officer cadets at RMC to achieve 'four pillars': academics, military leadership, physical fitness, and bilingualism in both official languages."

Champlain, and the Sutton Hoo Ship Burial

Brian thinks of Samuel de Champlain (1567-1635) when his coffee-full bladder forces him to stop his car to urinate in the woods. In order to avoid having to speak with anyone, he eschews the "risk" of "going into a café" (35). In the woods, a metal disk in a puddle takes his thoughts to Champlain's astrolabe, the device used to measure the altitude above the horizon of a celestial body, day or night; to identify stars or planets, to determine local latitude given local time (and vice versa), to survey. Brian, familiar with surveying and triangulating,

also knows his Canadian history, including that a boy found the astrolabe some three hundred years after it was dropped by Champlain while portaging with his men over and among logs at Green Lake (now named Astrolabe Lake) in Renfrew County, Ontario.¹ "Brian would have liked to have been the boy who found it but at least he had not been the man who dropped it"



Samuel de Champlain Statue gazing up at the heavens through his astrolabe, Nepean Point, Parliament Hill in distance, Ottawa, Ontario.

MJ Photography/Alamy Stock Photo

(37). When we discuss this part of the story in class, we look at a photograph of a statue of Samuel de Champlain, who founded Quebec City in 1608, explored the Ottawa River, and is referred to (now controversially) as the Father of New France. The statue stands on Nepean Point, overlooking the river and not far from the Parliament buildings in Ottawa. Champlain is gazing up at the heavens through his astrolabe.² The government site for the statue admits, “Champlain certainly knew how to use an astrolabe—an old navigational instrument—but the sculptor did not. Champlain is depicted holding it upside down!” (*Samuel de Champlain*). There is something fitting about this error, in keeping with current ambivalence about statues commemorating exploration and colonization.

Before his reverie about Champlain, another mythology occurs to Brian on his walk in the woods. This is the discovery of the medieval ship at Sutton Hoo, Suffolk, buried 600-650 CE, and excavated in 1939. This remarkable burial mound commemorated a leading figure of East Anglia, possibly a king. As Brian observes the leaves and puddles of the springtime forest, he thinks about the discovery: “Brian had always envied the retired electricians of Great Britain, swinging their metal detectors over the sodden furrows, drawn to the unmistakable edge of metal rising out of the dull clods. Nose guards, helmets, pom-poms, cintures: the biting beast and its winking garnet eye; words that spoke of gold warmed by a good grip had always excited him” (36). This description speaks to treasure recovered in the excavation of the chamber; “the biting beast and its winking garnet eye” refers to the most famous object recovered, an ornate iron helmet. I show students photographs of these treasures, now at the British Museum. Here is a myth from a time before Champlain: the medieval world of the Angles and Saxons, kingdoms and sub-kingdoms, wars and treaties prior to our colonial past, synonymous with heroic masculinity in that “gold warmed by a good grip.” Brian Armstrong’s very name is a hint at such envy, such hunger for heroism.³

It is just after this line of thinking that Brian notices the “metal disk, dull and serrated: a winch, a gear, cog-like” in a pool of snow water. Although “it was junk”, it makes him think about “Champlain’s Astrolabe” (36). At this moment Brian remembers he has locked his keys in the car, and he takes courage from the example of the explorer: “What did Champlain do after he lost his astrolabe? He walked on into the unknown. Brian walked on” (37). That he comes across a strip-club in a Quonset Hut in this “unknown” shows how bathetic his quest is compared with these other, heroic figures; how little treasure there is to be found.

“Generous, Speechless, Understanding”

Even so, Brian is grateful for the strip club, and more jokes about Brian’s befuddlement about Quebec come through in his pathetic gratitude for the *Danseuses 7 Jours* sign outside the hut. “With a bit of luck *Danseuses 7 Jours* might also mean women dancing at eleven o’clock in the morning” (37). Peering into the dim bar he sees a glimmer of light, imagines it to be “light on a ruby tassel”: “*How little I*

really know about Quebec, he thought. *Gallic societies are so much more generous than Anglo-Saxon ones, when it comes to tassels*” (38). Brian’s naïveté is sent up right away, by “a woman wearing the longest red and black plaid overshirt that Brian had ever seen. She was mopping the floor with sullen strokes” (38). Even so, and with her “eyebrows [that] met head to head like embattled tadpoles” Brian’s hope does not die; it “occurred to him that mopping might be part of her routine.” Given a pitcher of beer in response to “put[ting] his hands up in a gesture of submission” and “saying ‘anglaise anglaise,’” he is “grateful for such generous, speechless understanding” (38). Funnily, as he drinks, “Brian watched her, entranced” (39). My students, whether more or less dismissive of Brian, understand him to be a very lonely man, nearly desperate. While the silent woman mops the floor, Brian thinks of his son, Kelvin, and his ex-wife, Cynthia.

Perhaps the problem with Kelvin was that he had yet to find a girlfriend. What he needed was a woman whose touch shocked him, whose presence confused his thought processes, who rendered his entire body as brilliantly lit as a landing strip. Brian had felt that way about Cynthia, in the beginning. Once he had narrowly escaped a collision between his bike and a car. At the time he had been thinking about the way Cynthia’s eyelashes cast shadows on her cheeks. (39)

He is dreamy, fantasizes, students remark, picking up on the word “entranced”. *He lives in the past. His thoughts distract him to the point where they are dangerous.*

In fact, there are only two women to speak of in the story—Cynthia, Brian’s ex-wife, for whom he has a great deal of bitterness and anger (with nostalgia for their love seeping through, as above), and this woman mopping up the empty bar who brings Brian his beer. Otherwise there are fantasy women: as he drove, “Brian was

hoping for a small-waisted, red-maned, green-eyed fearless photographer” being the client he’s on his way to meet. Then “for a few kilometres Brian returned to one of his favourite fantasies: a willing woman in a dry sugar shack with a clean floor and no cobwebs. . . . the stickiness and the sweetness were all” (35). At one point or another he is evidently “entranced” by each of these real or imagined women, his longing to escape his reality painfully apparent. Even the woman mopping the floor with a sour expression on her face “must surely be narrow-waisted, full-breasted,” he tells himself, “under the plaid thing” (38-9). It is useful to consider such entrancement—like other fantasies, including chivalry—from a feminist perspective in our discussions. “What does he want here?” I ask. Sex, and companionship, yes, but also whatever domesticity he associates with the feminine: “the stickiness and the sweetness” and “the clean floor with no cobwebs.”

RMC is a homosocial world. Despite ever increasing and very real efforts to accommodate women (who first came here as officer cadets in 1980), the percentage of female cadets hovers around 20%, “and their voices in class are subdued by more than mere numbers” (Osborne, 129).⁴ In one of my early years teaching

“Despite ever increasing and very real efforts to accommodate women (who first came here as officer cadets in 1980), the percentage of female cadets hovers around 20%.”

at RMC, a young man offered up that *most of us think there are two kinds of women here: lesbians and motherly types*. It is not easy being a woman at RMC.⁵ Brian's sugar shack fantasy is a way into discussing constriction, as well as how we perform all of our roles, including gender (or adhere to gender constructs), and what happens if we do not, including fear of others, and othering.

“Caught Up in Some Kind of Game”

If Brian's fantasies make him immature, Kelvin, his son, epitomizes arrested development (for which his ex-wife blames him). The extent of Kelvin's ambition has been a grow-op recently discovered by Brian in the basement, where he spends all of his time.

Kelvin had always been a question-mark kid. Whenever Brian thought about what to do with him, his mind developed black and white static like an old television. The boy might be awake by now, lounging in his chair in the half-light, prisms reflected off the computer screen jiggling their way across the lenses of his glasses. Kelvin was caught up in some kind of game. He said he had hoards of imaginary charm, plenty of character and wealth stored in the basement computer. Kelvin had lately turned twenty-one but the basement still smelt of socks and apple cores. (34)

Kelvin's subterranean existence suggests he might be another buried treasure, but Brian has no idea how to recover him. His son's possession of charm, character and wealth is not only ironically useless (“imaginary”), but apparently harmful. Adulthood is at issue, specifically manhood, and how to achieve both.

Students have no trouble giving a character sketch of the protagonist, heavy-laden with flaws. “And does Brian have anything in common with Kelvin?” I ask.

Yes: they both like to role-play.

They both fantasize.

Brian imagines himself as Samuel de Champlain; imagines the woman mopping the floor will start stripping for him.

They both lack communication skills.

There is a mixture of sympathy for game-playing Kelvin (*Look at his dad!*) and scorn (*He's a loser!*) that gets complicated as



Obstacle Course at the Royal Military College of Canada, 2021.

we delve deeper into the story. One of the largely mythologized parts of human life under scrutiny at present is the nature of masculinity—within the CAF and generally. Helping men to identify the full range of their emotions, and to speak these emotions, can mitigate some of that wide range of feelings manifesting simply as anger.⁶ Whereas Brian's anger, sometimes misplaced, is evident (as in wanting to wrap road-kill up for the boss who sent him on this trip), Kelvin's life in the basement looks like satisfaction. It isn't.

1993 “Here's to the Heroes”

As Brian drinks his beer in the club, he recollects himself at eighteen years old, one summer working a logging camp. He recalls “making a run for it” with the other men who worked there, “a tribe of rank sweaty bears with chainsaws,” when a forest fire broke out, “leaping from tree to tree across the crest of a hill” (40). His future wife, Cynthia, was a waitress then, and he'd held her in his arms telling her about it. Now, in the bar, he recalls the comfort of her arms around him, days after the fire, and he wonders:

Maybe a brush with mortality was what Kelvin needed. Not the serious kind of brush that would leave you armless or tin-faced, or worse, but the positive kind of cathartic full-length body shiver that made you relieved to be alive; eager to find out what was next. Initiation. Was that what it was all about? Scarification rituals, raiding parties, controlled bloodletting and walkabouts in cracked dry lands. Surely every culture had a way of galvanizing teenage slothfulness into energetic adulthood? Brian only had to think of the Canadian way. (39)

When we come to “Brian had only to think of the Canadian way,” I flash a slide of RMC—the clock tower with cadets parading in their scarlets before the iconic building, then another of them in camouflage, mud-covered and gasping, climbing over a wall

DND photo by MCpl Red Doucet, CFB Kingston Public Affairs, 2021.

or through a trench full of water during the obstacle course that marks the end of First Year Orientation Program (FYOP), pitting squadrons against each other. The institution to which they have come is itself a military unit, participating in the timeless tradition of arming and training the young of a nation to march and follow orders. It is one Canadian way “to galvanize teenage slothfulness.”

“Isn’t it?” I ask the class, “Wasn’t such galvanizing what your parents, and you, had in mind?”

It is the memory of a heightened sense of the value of life that leads Brian to mulling over finding the “Canadian way” to help his son, along with the keen memory of manliness when, at eighteenth, he held Cynthia in his arms, the smell of forest smoke in his shirt.

Yes, a good galvanizing brush with death, that was what Kelvin needed. Not role-playing HriPkringle the Bard of the basement; not altercations with the pizza delivery man. But wait, hadn’t there been a school friend of Kelvin’s who had been sent home in a box from one of those places you are thirsty all day? Now that Brian thought about it, that kind of thing could throw you off balance. Somalia or the Sudan? Cynthia would know. It was a pity that they were not talking. (40)

In addition to underscoring how bad his relationship with his ex-wife has become, this gap in Brian’s knowledge about his son’s life—and loss—is startling. Kelvin had a friend who *was*

left “armless or tin-faced, or worse” (39). Much grumbling about Brian as a father ensues when students discuss this part of the story, as we note further evidence of Cynthia being closer to their son than Brian is.

**“The Somalia affair
drove a renewed
interest in the arts at
RMC, in providing a
rounded liberal
education to every
officer cadet.”**

But, back up a step—When is this story set? Evidence had appeared before this recollection of the forest fire and meandering thoughts about Kelvin—when Brian first wrapped his grateful hand around his glass of beer: “‘Here’s to the heroes,’ said Brian, waving his glass at a newly framed photograph of Les Canadiens holding aloft the Stanley Cup” (39). Petersen has set her story in spring 1994, following the Stanley Cup Finals championship series of 92-93, which saw the Los Angeles Kings beaten by Les Canadiens, who won the series four games to one to win the team’s 24th Stanley Cup. 1993 was, moreover, the 100th anniversary of the Cup.⁷ Plenty of cause for celebration—Canadian, and Quebecois.

This timing is important not just because hockey is significant in the myth of Canada, however. Brian wondering about which of “those places you are thirsty all day” Kelvin’s friend returned from “in a box”, and speculating that it might have been “Somalia or the Sudan” invites some context as regards the Canadian Forces serving in these countries, a probable cause for the young man’s death.

1993 witnessed a famine in the Sudan complicated by civil war, homelessness, and disease that killed at least 20,000 people. The CAF participated in international humanitarian missions during this disaster—a famine that provided the subject of the

DND/CFJC photo/ISC93-10411



Members of “A” Squadron. Royal Canadian Dragoons, on patrol near Mataban, Somalia, 1993.

horrifying Pulitzer Prize-winning photograph “The vulture and the little girl” taken by South African photojournalist

Kevin Carter. Carter committed suicide shortly after being awarded the prize.⁸ The mention of Somalia has other tragic—and more shameful—implications for the CAF, as well as the Royal Military College. In 1992–93, Canada contributed military forces to UNITAF (Unified Task Force), a U.S.-led, United Nations-backed humanitarian mission in Somalia, as part of the relief operations in response again to famine and civil war, along with domination by warlords following the collapse of Siad Barre’s government. Part of the legacy our students at RMC inherit is this:

The Somalia affair was a 1993 military scandal, which peaked with the beating to death of a Somali teenager [Shidane Arone] at the hands of two Canadian soldiers participating in humanitarian efforts in Somalia. The act was documented by photos, and brought to light internal problems in the Canadian Airborne Regiment. Military leadership were sharply rebuked after a CBC reporter received altered documents, leading to allegations of a cover-up. (Winslow)

The Somalia affair drove a renewed interest in the arts at RMC, in providing a rounded liberal education to every officer cadet there, including those in engineering, maths, and sciences, because investigations concluded “the problem was not restricted to the isolated case of the Somalia peacekeeping mission, nor to one regiment; rather, it concerned a fundamental failure of leadership and ethics and that the root of the problem lay in education” (Osborne 121–22). The 1997 Withers Report was part of the response to this push for curricular integration: “to ensure for each graduate a broad-based education, well grounded in the sciences and the humanities, with special emphasis being placed on the development of values, ethics and leadership skills needed for responsibilities and service to country” (Withers’ Study). Huw Osborne, who also teaches in the Department of English, Culture, and Communication at RMC, noted in 2010, “the post-Somalia Affair CF is now committed to the liberalizing effects of humanist education” (Osborne 135).⁹ When I mention the Withers Report, my students have usually heard about the Somalia Affair as part of their orientation. Brian Armstrong’s Stanley Cup toast, “Here’s to the heroes”, and his confusion about “one of those places you are thirsty all day,” along with his speculation “that kind of thing could throw you off balance,” starts to hit closer to home.

Institutional Culture

At RMC, Osborne explains, “When students read and discuss literary texts, they not only discuss the Renaissance sonnet, or the nature of 1980s British national identity, or the experience of World War I combat; they also face some of the central ethical questions of becoming officers in the CF” (135). Some of these questions involve the bystander effect, complicated by desire for belonging and acceptance by a squadron; some involve critical thinking within a chain of command; some involve failures of imagination and compassion. I find Petersen’s story about a somewhat ridiculous civilian locking his keys in his car in Quebec to be an excellent text for approaching such questions. Students who have

already been some time in the CAF, deployed on missions, now with permission to earn a degree at RMC are especially savvy about adulthood, and grateful for such literature. One older student—married with children, and who has served for some time and been deployed overseas, this year thanked me for the “engaging, topical, and thematically apropos” choice of Petersen’s story, especially as aimed at students in their first term of first year.¹⁰

“the CF has officially supported the constructive use of literature in the practical activity of making war.”

Osborne points out that, since “the CF has officially supported the constructive use of literature in the practical activity of making war. . . this alignment and support raises questions for literary scholars concerning the relationship between theory and practice. Is one in danger of reducing the complexity and ambiguity of literature and literary theory to sensitivity training for the CF?” (122). Given the plethora of viewpoints (and media) we consume, our CAF students are getting plenty of *de*-sensitivity training outside the literature classroom. Osborne notes that “blurring the boundaries of identification” is “one of the most important elements of officer education” (135). He is especially concerned with LGBTQ+ communities, to which the CAF has made strides in responding. That area of diversity is not an issue in “Champlain’s Astrolabe”; however, sensitivity is sensitivity: we find it as we grow it.

Unconsidered reactions to Brian Armstrong’s paltry life and parenting skills (and non-parents are deeply judgmental about this) are complicated by his appreciation of beauty in the forest, and even his longing to imagine himself into other places, like Champlain’s seventeenth-century woods. Students disinclined to have sympathy for him often come around when we read more closely together, such passages as “Afterwards, Brian walked into the woods a few paces in order to stretch his legs. He kept his eyes on the ground in case there was treasure to be discovered. Leaves of dogtooth violet slanted in fat green stitches across the leaf mould” (36). The third-person privileged narrator may or may not be voicing the protagonist’s perception of the violet and the leaf mould. *There is treasure to be discovered*, remarked one insightful young woman this past term; *he’s too miserable to see that’s what it is*. So, here, we talk about depression, and ways it can manifest. One compassionate observation engenders another: *Well, he does take his boots off “as a gesture of good will” when he walks into the bar because that woman is mopping the floor,”* someone notes.

Story of the People

“Champlain’s Astrolabe” ends with Brian Armstrong ejected, forcefully, from the strip club by a bouncer (a man with a stronger arm) who appears when Brian cannot pay for his beer because, it turns out, he locked his wallet in the car along with his keys. His helpless gesturing about this to the woman in the bar leads quickly to him being head-butted off his stool, shoved out the door, and tossed into the parking lot by “a man built like a fire hydrant”:

Life flashing before your eyes and all that: there’s not as much time as you might think when you are being flung through the air. In Brian’s case all he experienced was

a brief sensation of passing through a cool column of air followed by the impression that the gravel reached up and pulled him down, blasting its sharp points into his shoulder. All he managed to think was: *and now my head goes down*, which it did, hard.

For some minutes Brian found himself unwilling to leave the horizontal world where the vertical mottled stripe of the parking lot softened into bulging green hillocks and where the rain apparently fell upwards like bubbles in an aquarium. Meanwhile the last battle of the cosmos had come upon him. Giants were uprooting burning trees out of his left temple and tossing them into a frazzled prism that had appeared in his right eye. (41)

In the classroom we look closely at the violence here: it is not every day one is thrown onto a gravel parking lot. Students (usually athletes) who have experienced concussion are quick to point out that the man has, after all, sustained a head injury. No laughing matter. The violent incident is also a reminder of something else, something voiced by one of my students thus: *I'm sex-positive, but I find that strip clubs are exploitative to basically everyone involved* (Email message).

The images in this scene of pain and trauma connect Brian even more closely to game-playing Kelvin. At the same time they serve as a reminder of Brian's own past: the "Giants uprooting burning trees" and "last battle of the cosmos" reminiscent of computer games, the surreal basement world his son inhabits to hide from this world and in another, as well as the forest fire Brian experienced in youth. The "frazzled prism" brought about by the head injury recalls Kelvin "in the half-light, prisms reflected off the computer screen jiggling their way across the lenses of his glasses" (34). Students are quick to point this out.

They're more alike than Brian knows, one suggests.

Adults don't have a better handle on reality than younger people, another posits.

(Of late the words "Ok, Boomer" are employed to deride Brian).

Once Brian struggles to his feet, the very end of the story is open to interpretation: perhaps he learns a lesson about making more of his time and his life; perhaps he is just glad to escape:


What had Brian been thinking about? That Kelvin needed a brush with death. Maybe so.

"But not my death," he said in a low croak, breaking into a hunch-backed run, feeling strangely exhilarated by the lacerating bite of the gravel through the thinning soles of his socks. (42)

One of his boots had just been thrown at him as he lay there, the other withheld. His exhilaration is doubtless adrenaline, a high from having survived an experience so dramatic, although he moves on in pain and unshod. The lacerating gravel is a

reminder that of what he recently wished for Kelvin: Brian is "relieved to be alive; eager to find out what was next. Initiation. Was that what it was all about?" (39). This would suggest that violence at the hands of another man is a kind of "initiation" he has thus far escaped, and that it *might* have done him some good. There might or might not be a play on him having a thinning soul. Either way, he is exhilarated, evidently, by the fact that he is not (yet) himself "in a box." At the same time, Brian, on his way to the fictional Lac Yahoo—a name resonant with the coinage of Jonathan Swift's brain in *Gulliver's Travels*—is in this "hunch-backed run" himself a little less *homo erectus*. Worth recollecting is that this story is set in the spring; there is still snow on the ground, along with puddles and new flowers peeping up. There might be the hope for renewal here, and for wish fulfillment; alternately, winter's satire and Brian's bitterness may win out.

Alice Petersen's "Champlain's Astrolabe" is about mutability, fragility, and mortality: the human condition and the difficult questions. One of the interesting things about Brian Armstrong is that, like most of us most of the time, he does not *want* to think about the difficult questions. He is a man stumbling through woods—grappling with (and avoiding) the otherness of a second language, grappling with (and avoiding) the role of women in this life, grappling with (and avoiding) the barriers to his son's maturation, and grappling with (and avoiding) the Canadian way. Such ambivalence makes the text valuable in the literature classroom where we consider myths large and small, including myths about gender, nationhood, power, and responsibility—myths that "provide. . . explanation, aetiology, or justification for something such as the early history of a society. . . belief or ritual," as well as those that qualify as "widespread but untrue or erroneous. . . widely held misconception[s]" ("Myth" 1.a and 2.a). In a class of eighteen-year-olds labouring with a second language and encountering cultural differences, questioning myths of empire and colonialism, and asking what we mean by "the Canadian way" at the Royal Military College of Canada—there is no guarantee one of those eighteen-year-olds will not one day come back in a box. The hope behind engaging with stories like Brian's is no less than this: that the liberalizing effects of humanist education might improve the Canadian way by fueling imagination and empathy, by blurring boundaries, and that these skills in turn might sometime, somewhere, save a life.



Gulliver's Travels by Jonathan Swift, first published in 1726. Jonathan Swift was an Anglo-Irish author who is widely regarded as the foremost prose satirist in the English language.

Lebrecht Music & Arts/Alamy Stock Photo

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NOTES

- 1 A farm boy in 1867 found the astrolabe, which he handed on to a steamboat captain. The boy was never remunerated.
- 2 Created by Hamilton MacCarthy in 1915, the statue commemorates the 300th anniversary of Champlain's second voyage on the Ottawa River, erected where he made his solar observation in 1615 (*Samuel de Champlain*). The astrolabe itself is now in the Museum of History in Hull, Quebec, across the river from the statue.
- 3 "Brian" might derive from an Old Celtic word meaning "high" or "noble" ("Brian").
- 4 Osborne also discusses rituals at RMC including "the banishment of the feminine in many literary songs and chants" (129). See too Kate Armstrong's recent memoir *The Stone Frigate: the Royal Military College's First Female Cadet Speaks out* and the novel by John-James Ford, based on his experiences at RMC in the early 1990s, *Bonk on the Head*.
- 5 Nancy Taber refers to women at RMC having to take an anti-feminist stance and so becoming "social males" (293). I am grateful to Huw

Osborne for calling my attention to this article. Even when I began teaching there in 2010 at the age of forty, my first thought walking into the room full of men in uniform who towered over me was, "Oh, I'm just a silly girl to these guys."

- 6 See Jackson Katz's talk "Violence Against Women—It's a Men's Issue." Recently Katz was brought in by the Canadian Forces Base Kingston Family Violence Advisory Team (FVAT) and the Kingston Military Family Resource Centre to speak about "Stepping Up: Men's Leadership in the Prevention of Family Violence."

7 As of 2020, this is the last Stanley Cup Finals won by a Canadian team.

- 8 See Greg Marinovich and João Silva's book, *The Bang Bang Club*.

9 When Osborne wrote this, the standard acronym was CF for Canadian Forces; this has since been expanded.

- 10 RMC as *place* is profoundly important to its culture (and its history). Dale Tracy, with whom I also teach at RMC, calls the college "an institution that is hyper-aware of its cultures." She explains

The daily routine exists through and with the symbolic features, historical artefacts, and cultural messaging that make up this campus such that the experience is a meta-experience: there is, as part of everyday life, the higher-level consideration of what it means to be at RMC. Add to this that the institution is small and physically isolated on a peninsula, making it possible and frequent that the entire college—faculty, staff, and students—shares experiences, and it becomes difficult not to have a sense of the RMC community in everyday life. (1)

I must note the drastic shift in climate at RMC, pandemic-driven as that culture has been in the past year. Although first year officer cadets came for six weeks the important military training and squadron bonding of FYOP (first year orientation program), they were then sent home at Thanksgiving to do all of their classes (as they did when they were on campus, online).



Ukrainian servicemen (L) talk to armed men, believed to be Russian servicemen (Green Men), at Ukrainian military base in Perevalnoye, near the Crimean city of Simferopol, 13 March 2014.

Russia's Green Men: The Strategic Storytellers of Hybrid Warfare

by Tyler D. Wentzell

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The “Little Green Men” who seized Ukrainian military and government facilities in February and March 2014 have become the mascots of Russia’s “new” way of war.¹ Russia’s Green Men infiltrated Crimea, linked up with local irregular forces, and seized their objectives. The obfuscation of their origins was relatively limited – the Green Men wore no national

markings and Russian officials simply claimed that they were Crimean in origin – but the approach achieved the desired effect. Crimea acceded to the Russian Federation amidst much political outrage but little meaningful action. Russian Green Men appeared in South-Eastern Ukraine shortly thereafter, and, presumably, they will play an important role in a Russian intervention in the Baltic region. Consequently, the Green Men are a phenomenon worth understanding. This article argues that the Green Men are best understood through the lens of Russian hybrid warfare in that they produced physical effects, but that these were secondary to their effects in the information domain. By understanding the use and context of the Green Men in Crimea and South-Eastern Ukraine, the method can be more effectively countered in future conflicts.

Little is known – from publicly available sources that is – about Russian internal decision making. We are left to draw conclusions based on observed actions, reasonably foreseeable outcomes, presumed objectives and what published records exist.²



Crimea, peninsula in Eastern Europe, political map.

Within these constraints, this article argues that Russia's Green Men were employed as they were in order to create a strategic narrative meant to distract the international community from aiding Ukraine. This article first sets out the background of the Russia intervention in Crimea and the concept of hybrid warfare. Second, it examines what value there was to these Russian Green Men deploying without identifying markings, concluding that it made little difference in terms of the tactical or legal situation. The main effects were in the information domain. Third, this article examines what utility there might be to Russia's future employment of Green Men in the Baltic States.

Background

Crimea was part of either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union from 1783 until 1991. In 1954, shortly after the death of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union transferred control of Crimea from one of its constituent republics to another. Crimea left the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, and joined the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Crimea became the Autonomous Republic of Crimea within the Republic of Ukraine. However, Russian interest in and influence upon the peninsula persisted. According to the 2001 Ukrainian census more than 60% of Crimeans identified as Russian-speakers. There was considerable trade between Crimea and Russia across the Kerch Strait, and Russia maintained its military facility at Sevastopol, home of its Black Sea Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet, although separated from the Mediterranean Sea by the Bosphorus, is critical to

Russia's ability to project power against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) southern flank.

The Green Men appeared in Crimea at the height of a political debacle in Kiev. Tensions had been high for some time. The polity was divided in many ways, relevant here was the split between those that saw their country's future with Russia and those who saw it with the European Union (EU) and NATO. Amidst the tumult, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich fled Ukraine on 21 February 2014 and sought refuge in Russia, by which time Russia had already begun moving additional forces into Crimea across the Kerch Strait and directly through the port of Sevastopol. Then, on the morning of 27 February, fewer than 60 masked soldiers appeared in the Crimean capital of Simferopol and seized government buildings. They raised a Russian flag over the Crimean Parliament and forced the law-makers to accept the prime ministership of the leader of the pro-Russian party. That night, more Green Men seized airports and military facilities. The Green Men appeared without warning, and seized their objectives before handing off what they had seized to local irregular forces principally composed of pro-Russian separatists.³ The Ukrainian Ground Forces and police offered little resistance to the Green Men or the militias in the chaos, and then the hamstrung political leadership in Kiev ordered them not to resist.⁴

Russian President Vladimir Putin initially denied that these soldiers were Russian, claiming instead that they were members of local Ukrainian self-defence forces.⁵ The press dubbed these soldiers "Little Green Men" or sometimes, due to their discipline

and professionalism, “Polite People.”⁶ The soldiers wore green uniforms and carried Russian personal equipment and weapons, but did not bear Russian flags or other identifying insignia.


Despite the absence of this insignia or an expression of responsibility by Russia, early media reports show that there was little doubt that these invaders were Russian. Indeed, why would the Green Men need a different term at all to distinguish them from the militias if they were believed to be one and the same? There was ambiguity in the situation, certainly, but by mid-March, an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) inspection team reported substantial evidence that the Green Men were Russian soldiers based on their use of Russian personal equipment, small arms, crew-served weapons, and BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers.⁷

On 2 March, claiming to be acting in support of the Crimean Parliament and to secure Russian interests at their naval base at the port of Sebastopol, Russian military units overtly entered the peninsula, marking the transition from plausibly deniable actions to open military intervention.⁸ Russian information operations, already successful in narrative building, now included significant counter-command activities: cyberattacks shut down Ukrainian communications infrastructure and government websites, and the cellular phones of Ukrainian officials were jammed.⁹ At that point, Russia had special operations forces (SOF) operating throughout the Crimean Peninsula with significant influence over pro-Russian militia groups, an armoured force ashore, naval supremacy in the Black Sea, and the means to project considerable air power from bases in the Northern Caucasus region. Russia had called the international community’s bluff, and military intervention to save Crimea seemed impossible. On 18 March, Russia and the ostensible representatives of Crimea signed a treaty incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation. Although this accession is not recognized by the international community at large, the fact remains that Russia presently holds *de facto* control over the peninsula.¹⁰

Hybrid Warfare

Although most characteristics of hybrid warfare are hardly new, a reasonable starting point for discussing the idea is the 2013 article written by then Russian Chief of the General

Staff, General Valery Gerasimov. Writing in the wake of the 2011 Arab Spring, Gerasimov noted that conflicts with a clear delineation between states of war and peace were a thing of the past. Most conflicts occurred somewhere in between, and the outcome of these conflicts were more likely to be shaped by non-military means than by firepower. Disinformation and subterfuge precede combat operations. SOF working with “internal opposition” in concert with information operations create a “permanently operating front through the entire territory of the enemy state.” Gerasimov noted: “The open use of forces – often under the guise of peacekeeping and crisis regulation – is resorted to only at a certain stage, primarily for the achievement of final success in the conflict.”¹¹



Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, 23 May 2013.

REUTERS/Alamy Stock Photo

Gerasimov’s article was not doctrine, nor was it a description of how he intended to conduct offensive operations – it was actually a description of how he thought NATO might attack Russia.¹² Consequently, it would be an error to ascribe too much to Gerasimov’s words. He was not setting out his plan for invading Crimea, South-Eastern Ukraine, and the Baltic states, but rather reflecting upon the realities of modern warfare. Nonetheless, in Gerasimov’s article, we can see the basis of Russia’s Green Men.

Gerasimov states that non-military activities – such as information operations – are often more potent than firepower, and although he makes no express mention of obscuring the national origins of the SOF elements working with internal opposition, he juxtaposes them against the subsequent “open use of force.” This suggests that the SOF he imagines operating throughout the enemy state should ideally be plausibly deniable by their country of origin.

This “new” form of warfare is referred to in Russia as non-linear warfare or new generation warfare. In the West, it is often misleadingly called the “Gerasimov doctrine” or, more commonly, hybrid warfare.¹³ The term hybrid warfare existed before Gerasimov’s article or the Russian occupation of Crimea. The term is generally credited to United States Marine Corps Officer Frank G. Hoffman, writing in 2007, who described it as incorporating, “a full range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder.”¹⁴ Notably, while regular and irregular forces have long complimented each other, Hoffman described hybrid warfare as

blending the two forces in the same space, at the same time, and within the same organization.¹⁵

Since Hoffman's writing, and especially in the years since 2014, many English and French-language scholars have offered their own definitions of hybrid warfare. Several of these definitions have been reverse-engineered from Russian actions in Crimea and South-Eastern Ukraine, and often encapsulate almost everything besides large-scale conventional combat operations. Consequently, although the term remains broadly used in military documents, the term has also been heavily criticized for its lack of precision, the fact that the term describes how the West views Russia and not how the Russian military or national security apparatus views itself, and for being "astrategic", in that it does not help us understand either Russian activities or intentions. Rather, hybrid warfare, if it is anything, is a pragmatic operational approach that will largely be shaped by local conditions.¹⁶

The analysis that follows is predicated on the idea that the specific definition of hybrid warfare is not as important as the broader concept. Adversaries will seek to further their objectives using whatever military and non-military tools are at their disposal, while remaining below the threshold that might trigger conventional operations where NATO and its allies excel. This is a pragmatic approach to war that makes significant use of misinformation, disinformation, and difficult or impossible to attribute military and non-military activities in the grey zone between war and peace such as cyberattacks, proxy warfare, and irregular warfare. The Green Men, as used in Crimea, are certainly an example of this.

What the Green Men Did and Did Not Achieve

The Green Men fall within the parameters of the modern Russian approach to warfare, but that alone does not explain why Russia employed Green Men in Crimea. We must also ask what, if anything, was achieved by the absence of national markings from either a tactical or legal point of view. The answer is: very little, if anything.

In international humanitarian law, there is no requirement to display national insignia on military uniforms or equipment. Although the use of coloured or subdued patches indicating country of origin has become a common practice, the practice is lawfully the result of the home country's internal regulations of its forces and not their international legal obligations. Military forces are prohibited from engaging in perfidy – the act of disguising themselves as civilians – but failing to display Russian flags is quite a different matter. The Green Men could be described as failing to outwardly demonstrate their status as Russian soldiers, or in misrepresenting themselves as irregular forces. The former is entirely lawful. The latter is still lawful, but potentially denies these soldiers access to the full rights of prisoners of war should

they be captured. Regardless, the use of Green Men is a presumptively legal ruse of war.¹⁷

As a tactical consideration, the presence or absence of national insignia was of no importance. Had they construed the Green Men exclusively as a domestic threat, the Ukrainian Ground Forces would have been constrained by their domestic legal regime concerning the use of force against their own people. This may have shifted the resistance from being a military-led operation to a police-led operation with military support, but the use of force would certainly be warranted. More likely, however, recognizing that the conflict was driven by foreign interference, the rules of international humanitarian law would have governed the conflict and the Ukrainian Ground Forces would have only been required to distinguish combatants from non-combatants.

In the majority of cases, the Green Men were obviously combatants committing hostile acts. The Ukrainian soldiers could have fired upon the Green Men whether they believed they were Russian state forces, irregulars, or otherwise. There was no obligation for the Ukrainian Ground Forces to determine the precise identity of the combatants.

If the use of Green Men – that is, the simple act of removing patches and pretending that the soldiers were Crimean in origin – did

not afford a particular tactical or legal advantage, then what was the point? Why establish this fiction, and who was the intended audience? The audience was not the soldiers who might have immediately opposed the Green Men – the Ukrainian Ground Forces and the local police to whom the narrative made little difference – but rather the international community. The approach did not have to be entirely convincing. It had to sow confusion and disunity, and buy time. It had to obfuscate the Russian involvement only as much and for as long as was necessary to establish "facts on the ground" such that reversing what had been gained by the Russians would have cost more blood and treasure than anyone was willing to spend. Arguably, it also provided the international community with a sufficient excuse to not commit to such a costly intervention.

It is important to note that the Russian claims regarding the Green Men both addressed what the Green Men *were* (positive statements), and also what they *were not* (negative statements). According to Russian authorities, the Green Men *were not* Russian soldiers. This was an entirely predictable claim. The Russian Federation sought to maintain plausible deniability of the military operation and disavowed their actions within a sovereign state.¹⁸ But they also made the positive claim that the Green Men *were* Ukrainian self-defence forces.¹⁹ This claim – implausibly, given all the other known factors – shifted the characterization of the conflict from an international conflict to a domestic one. If it was a domestic conflict, then the sovereign state of Ukraine could certainly invite foreign intervenors onto its territory to provide assistance, but there was less of an impetus to rally the international

"although the term remains broadly used in military documents, the term has also been heavily criticized for its lack of precision."



Armed men, believed to be Russian servicemen (Green Men), stand guard, with Ukrainian servicemen seen in the foreground, at a military airbase, in the Crimean town of Belbek, near Sebastopol, 22 March 2014.

community. If it was an international conflict – that is, Russian interference in the domestic affairs of Ukraine – then it was, at a minimum, a violation of the United Nations (UN) Charter’s prohibition on the use of force against the territorial integrity of a state, and a call to action for the UN’s membership.²⁰

Russian officials justified their annexation of Crimea using three key messages. First, they argued that the transfer of Crimea within the Soviet Union from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 was illegitimate – the annexation was therefore righting a historical wrong. Second, they dismissed American and EU condemnation of their actions as nothing more than their instinctive, vestigial Cold War resentment. Third, they argued that the ascension of Crimea to Russia was an act of self-determination.²¹ The Green Men were directly relevant to the latter point. The Green Men communicated that the uprising in Crimea was an act of self-determination – the Crimean people were rising up against the Ukrainian state – and the annexation was merely the continuation of this desire.

Future Applications

Although Russia’s use of Green Men was very successful in Crimea, it should not be viewed as a panacea. Specific conditions were required for the Green Men to be effective. Anton Shekhovtsov, a Ukrainian expert on Russia’s manipulation of right-wing proxies, points to three conditions necessary for the Green Men operations. First, the targeted region must largely be Russian in terms of culture and language – this affords the Green Men with ethno-cultural camouflage. Second, the forces must be able to reach their objectives covertly which limits the geographical range of the Green Men from Russian territory. Third, border control must be weak enough in the target country for the Green Men’s reliable insertion.²² To these three, I would add one more: the will to fight. When Russia’s Green Men arrived in Crimea, the Ukrainian state

was politically divided and perhaps unsure if they could win in Crimea given Russia’s substantial forces on or near the Crimean Peninsula. Consequently, the Green Men were able to seize and hold their objectives while establishing the narrative that the conflict was an internal matter. While the international community dithered in the face of this narrative, Russia continued the ruse and Crimea acceded to the Russian Federation.

The circumstances in South-Eastern Ukraine were similar to Crimea, but dissimilar enough to make all the difference. The three conditions described by Shekhovtsov were not met. There is a Russian-speaking minority in

South-Eastern Ukraine, but it is less predominant than in Crimea. Although South-Eastern Ukraine is contiguous with Russia, the border was more secure and Russia did not already have sizeable forces in South-Eastern Ukraine (such as their naval base in Sebastopol). Furthermore, by the time Russia launched operations in South-Eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian state had mobilized greater cohesion and the will to fight. Perhaps for these reasons, the Russian intervention in South-Eastern Ukraine made less use of Green Men, and greater use of proxy forces and direct intervention by conventional forces – claimed by Russia to be “volunteers” and not acting under state direction.²³

The next conflict in which Russian Green Men may play a role is the Baltic region.²⁴ Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are contiguous with Russia, and Estonia and Latvia are home to large Russian-speaking minority communities. The residents of the border city of Narva in Estonia are mostly Russian-speaking, and the Latvian capital of Riga has a population of approximately 50% Russian-speakers – they seem likely candidates for the sudden appearance of Green Men.²⁵ While this threat should not be ignored, there are a few reasons why Green Men in the Baltic States are less likely to be successful in the seizing of territory.

First, the border between Russia and the Baltic states is hardly porous. It is a well-guarded border in terms of waterways, airspace, and land crossings. This reduces – but does not eliminate – the likelihood of infiltration by Russian SOF. Russian commanders might still accept the risk inherent to Green Men slipping across the border as formed military organizations, or they may adopt novel means of infiltration such as using commercial travel or smuggling.

Second, the Baltic States continue to communicate their will to fight any would-be invaders. For example, the Estonian head general in 2015, Riho Terras, stated that, “the first little green

man to set foot on Estonian soil will be shot.”²⁶ Russian Green Men would have difficulty building a strategic narrative if they are captured or killed early in their operations.

Third, the Baltic states (unlike Ukraine) are members of NATO and afforded protection under the collective defence provisions of NATO’s Charter, and NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) reduce the effect of Green Men-related ambiguity delaying initial mobilization.²⁷ The initial mobilization, including Canada’s eFP Battle Group in Latvia, has already occurred. That said, Russia’s Green Men do present specific challenges to the concept of collective defence.

The use of Green Men presents the eFP units with a conundrum: To what extent should the Green Men and any local supporters be treated as a foreign incursion (which falls within their mandate) or as domestic unrest (which does not)? Consider a scenario where an eFP unit engages in a limited combat operation in Estonia against Russian Green Men operating with a local criminal element. This event is simultaneously an act of foreign interference and domestic criminality. While the use of force may be entirely justified, the secondary and tertiary effects might be disastrous for the alliance. Russian information operations would almost certainly seize upon the event as an infringement upon Estonian sovereignty, a manifestation of NATO’s alleged heavy-handedness, and invoke its historical claim as the protector of Russian-speaking peoples everywhere. For the eFP contributing nation, public support for the continued deployment may be irrevocably eroded. In this scenario, the physical effects of the Green Men’s incursions would be minor compared to the effects in the information domain.

An additional consideration is that the collective defence provision of the NATO Charter requires clear evidence of an armed attack. Article V of the NATO Charter states that an armed attack upon one of the member states in Europe or North America shall be considered an armed attack against all members. Should that occur, member states “will assist the Party or Parties so attacked

by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”²⁸ Russian use of Green Men might sufficiently obscure the Russian origin of the attack to give more reluctant members of NATO grounds to debate whether or not an armed attack has indeed occurred (as opposed to a domestic uprising), or to minimize their contribution.²⁹ Thus, a limited use of Green Men in the Baltic States might have disproportionate effects in the information domain. A crisis of confidence within NATO would be an ideal precursor to Russian aggression in the Baltic States or elsewhere.

Conclusion

Russia’s Green Men were effective in Crimea. Russian SOF soldiers skillfully infiltrated Ukrainian territory, moved to their objectives, coordinated activities with irregulars, and most importantly established a strategic narrative. The fact that these soldiers were unmarked achieved little from a tactical or legal perspective. The principal effect of the absence of national markings and the broader information operations campaign was to bolster the strategic narrative that the events in Crimea were initially domestic in origin. This distracted the international community and facilitated Russia’s subsequent actions: Overt military operations to support the purported self-determination movement and secure its interests, and incorporate Crimea into the Russian Federation. Russia’s Green Men were strategic storytellers, providing an important element to the story that Russia sought to tell the international community.

Russia may use its Green Men on future operations. For reasons outlined in this article, the Baltic States present the Green Men with a more challenging environment and much greater risks than were faced in Crimea. However, the threat should not be dismissed out of hand. The Green Men are strategic storytellers, and if they can overcome the physical challenges of operating in the Baltic States, they may well be used to achieve effects in the

informational domain. While their ability to support the seizing and holding of territory as they did in Crimea seems dubious, they may well be effective in sowing confusion and disunity within NATO. The effects of this confusion and disunity may not produce immediate effects at the tactical level, but they stand to create a crisis of confidence in NATO with mid and long-term ramifications. This is the challenge that contributing nations must prepare to confront.



Members of Duke’s Company with the Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group Latvia, wait for extraction during Exercise TOMAHAWK SOARING at the Meza Mackeviči Military Base, Latvia, 7 October 2018.

DND photo/FP BG ROTO 10 LATVIA Imagery/FP18-2018-0083-038

NOTES

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Photo by Cpl Brad Upshall, 36 Canadian Group Brigade Headquarters



'Black Canadians in the CAF' guest speakers Chief Warrant Officer (Ret'd) Cy Clayton (centre left civilian clothes) and African Nova Scotian Affairs (ANSA) President and CEO Wayn Hamilton (centre right civilian clothes) pose for a group photo with members of the Princess Louise Fusiliers during a meeting of the Diversity Soldier Experience Program (DSEP) at the North Park Armoury in Halifax, NS, 25 February 2021.

The Princess Louise Fusiliers: Diversity Soldier Experience Program (DSEP)

by Ahmed Elkar and Michael Gray

Background

In the fall of 2020, the Commanding Officer of the Princess Louise Fusiliers (PLF), LCol Barry Pitcher, launched a new initiative called the Diversity Soldier Experience Program (DSEP). The idea for this came following a summer basic training graduation in which LCol Pitcher attended as reviewing officer. According to LCol Pitcher "Looking out at the soldiers on parade that day, I felt that what I was seeing wasn't a true representation of the community we serve." A working group was then formed, and the team came to the conclusion that to effect true change and promote inclusion within the Primary Reserve, there needed to be synergy from within. In other words, DSEP would be designed to educate ranks through the medium of 'shared experiences'. As such, it was decided that DSEP would focus on key stakeholder groups to introduce soldiers to the societal diversity within Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in particular.

The initiative template was then designed by the unit working group to be encapsulated in an informal course format for Primary Reserve members to attend both in-person and through an online portal. Given pandemic restrictions, the course had to be flexible enough to shift online at a moment's notice. The unit formed a small cadre to teach this, and this was led by 2Lt Jerome Downey who conceptualized key teaching points and experiences into deliverable course content. The course focused on three modules spanning 6 months delivered in both classroom and online

mediums. Each session was then further divided into a historical education piece followed by a special guest speaker chosen by the focus group. The DSEP subject areas for the three modules were: Role of Women in the CAF, Indigenous Canadians in the CAF and Black Canadians in the CAF.

Women in the Canadian Armed Forces

This first module covered the history of how women have contributed during wartime and peacekeeping service, and



Photo by Cpl Bradley Upshall, Public Affairs

Corporal (Ret'd) Marelene Clyke, Canadian Women's Army Corps, special guest speaker at the DSEP held at North Park Armoury, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 15 October 2020.

how women continue to serve our Country today. The course had the pleasure of hosting many special guest speakers over these first sessions at the North Park Armoury in Halifax, Nova Scotia. One such speaker was Marelene Clyde, Corporal Retired, who was one of the first Black women to enroll in the Canadian Women's Army Corps. She is a respected advocate in her community and a pioneer for Black Canadian women in uniform. She spoke proudly of her time serving in the army beginning at age of 17, and of how her experiences in the military shaped her as a present-day community leader. As October was Women's history month, this coincided nicely with these initial presentations. Course attendees did various round tables on highlighting the achievements of women and their important contributions on the world stage. One of the key themes for module one was the emphasis on the fact that Canada was one of the first countries to allow women to serve in the military and that it now boasts one of the highest proportions of women in uniform. Another important takeaway was the lesson on how Canada was one of the first countries to demonstrate women as fully capable (physically, mentally and emotionally) of serving within Combat Arms units. The course had the honour of hearing from LCol Eleanor Taylor in this regard, who shared her personal experiences of overcoming adversity and breaking barriers as a female infantry Company Commander in Afghanistan.



(L to R) Guest speaker Honorary Capt(N) Debbie Eisan with Capt Michael Gray, Princess Louise Fusiliers and Richard Taylor, DSEP, 22 October 2020.

Indigenous Members of the Canadian Armed Forces

The DSEP program continued throughout December of 2020 with a module on Indigenous, Metis and Inuit Canadians in the CAF. These lessons offered the opportunity for the candidates to be immersed in the indigenous culture. In doing so, they learned of the historical evolution of treaty rights and the terrible chapter of residential schools and the lasting impact it has to this day. The CAF 'Black Bear' program was also highlighted as an ongoing best practice in this particular module.

How this landmark course leverage connections to communities and enables a pipeline for Indigenous youth to gain a career in the CAF were key takeaways. In this regard, guest speakers included Hon Col Dr. Donald Julien, CM, Executive Director of The Confederacy of Mainland Mi'kmaw and John Sylliboy, Executive Director at Wabanaki Two-Spirit Alliance. One notable guest speaker near the end of this interactive module was Honorary Capt(N) Debbie Eisan. As part of a collaborative in-person event for the course, she attended in her ceremonial



Warrant Officer Ritchie Hamilton speaks of his military experience, DSEP, 21 January 2021.

dress and sang the Mi'kmaw Honour Song for all the participants. Debbie offered insight into the important connections of people and territory, and taught the values of Mi'kmaw cultural competencies.

Black Canadians in the Canadian Armed Forces

The final module on Black Canadians in February of 2021 coincided with Black History Month. Course participants were exposed to the history of Black and African Canadians in the Canadian Armed Forces. One of the first key takeaways for this module was the importance of recognizing No. 2 Construction Battalion; a World War One all-Black Canadian unit initially based out of the Pictou area of Nova Scotia. The significance of highlighting this particular unit was the fact that they were a segregated unit and that, despite volunteering to fight overseas, they were not allowed to engage in frontline combat. The course learned that despite facing severe limitations on recruitment and wartime employment, they would go on to distinguish themselves as a premiere construction unit deployed throughout Europe. Guest speakers included Dr. Kirrily Freeman, Associate Professor, St Mary's University and Sgt Craig Smith, currently in charge of the Nova Scotia RCMP Crime Prevention & Victim Services.

Mr Smith, an accomplished author of various publications including the book labeled *You Had Better be White by Six a.m.*, focused on his own struggles with bias and racism in law enforcement and many parallels evolved for discussion with life in military uniform and the concept of unconscious bias.

The final session in this module was an in-person session at the North Park Armouries with two guest speakers, CWO (ret'd) Cy Clayton, MMM, CD and Mr. Wayne Hamilton, Chief Executive Officer of African Nova Scotia Affairs (ANSA). Mr. Clayton discussed his forty year career with the Canadian Armed Forces, his many encounters with racism along the way, and how those acts were contrasted by experiences with great leaders who promoted his career. Mr. Clayton highlighted that if it were not for leaders that 'went against the grain' he would never have been entrusted with key roles such as being the first black Base Chief Warrant Officer. Wayne Hamilton described the role of ANSA and all the ways its dedicated service to African Nova Scotians is promoting new community and educational opportunities. As a part of Mr. Hamilton's keynote presentation, he shared a personal message from the Honourable Tony Ince, Minister of African Nova Scotian Affairs, as follows:

"The Diversity Soldier Experience Program is designed to promote issues of diversity and workplace equity. This



Lieutenant-Colonel Barry Pitcher presents Mr. Wayne Hamilton (R) with a presenter gift at the final DSEP session.

program will give each of you, a better understanding of the histories, accomplishments, and challenges faced by people of African descent, Indigenous peoples, and other equity-seeking groups."

The Way Ahead

On conclusion of this new and innovative program, all participants received a certificate and symbolic patch that highlighted their 6 month journey of interactive and immersive learning. Based on feedback from students, instructors and guests, the DSEP pilot program has been a resounding success. There is no doubt that the course met the aim of creating that synergy within, and thereby stimulated much needed discussions on diversity in the CAF. Following a comprehensive review on the conclusion of DSEP in March of 2021, the new plan for the course is for the modules to be expanded to include historical site visits and interactive community events. This course is also set to be shared across 36 Brigade and 5 Canadian Division in the fall of 2021 such that all units can avail of the opportunity of this shared experience in the spirit of inclusivity.

Second Lieutenant Ahmed Elkar is a Reserve Officer with three years of experience with the Princess Louise Fusiliers. He enrolled as a mature member with a family, and is a first generation immigrant to Canada.

Captain Michael Gray is a Class A Reserve Infantry Officer currently serving as a Company Commander with the Princess Louise Fusiliers. He supervised the introduction and execution of the pilot DSEP program. He is a former RSM with 39 years of service in the Reserves. In his civilian life he is the Deputy N6 for Maritime Forces Atlantic.



"Course participants were exposed to the history of Black and African Canadians in the Canadian Armed Forces."



Snipers, Pathfinders and Reconnaissance members, from 2e Bataillon Royal 22e Régiment, conduct insertion and extraction by helicopter training with a Royal Canadian Air Force CH-147F Chinook helicopter during RIMPAC 2016 on Camp Pendleton in San Diego, California, 15 July 2016.

The Planning and Execution of Complex Military Activities

by Thomas LaCroix

Popular culture depictions of warfare often seem straightforward. There are clear lines between enemy and friendly forces, few complications, everything makes sense in the end, the good guys prevail, and everyone else falls into line. From an early point in training as a Canadian Army officers, my fellow officers and I learned that planning for and operating in this context is seldom so simple. Capable and experienced leaders conceive of plans that take into account all the known relevant factors, but the results can be unexpected and far from desirable. Leaders think they are delivering what groups in the battlespace need, only to have stakeholders react with apathy. There is no clear definition of success. Technology has connected the actors in ways that never seemed possible in the past, and developments take place at incredible speed. It was not a surprise to find these themes repeated during my Developmental Period 3 (DP3) education.

Actually, I was surprised to hear these themes because, at the time, I was one of only two or three military personnel in a classroom at the University of Ottawa. Many of my fellow students were public service employees from the Department of National Defence, while others were from other departments like Public Services and Procurement Canada, Global Affairs Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard, and the Canada Revenue Agency. Some

students were even from major defence industry players. What kind of DP3 was this?

During the summer of 2019, my family was preparing for a move to Toronto, where I would attend the Joint Command and Staff Program (JCSP). However, just as we were about to leave for our house-hunting trip, I was informed of the opportunity to attend an alternative DP3 program by completing a master's degree program in Toronto or Ottawa. This new pathway was developed in order to address gaps in analytical capabilities in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). I competed for and was selected for the program, and applied to attend the Master of Business in Complex Project Leadership (MBCPL) at the Telfer School of Management, University of Ottawa.

Due to the aforementioned challenges that face complex projects, I think there are lessons and insights that can be applied to the planning and execution of complex military activities. My intent with this article is to show that projects and military activities can be defined in similar ways. Recognizing complexity is often the first step to taking appropriate action. Therefore, I will explain how complex activities differ from simple and complicated ones, and then provide examples of categories of complexity. Finally, I will show that studies of complexity and projects reinforce some military planning and execution practices, and that there are some lessons that can be learned from project practices.

Definitions

In my experience, the word project, in the Canadian Army context, is often associated with people in Ottawa or Gatineau who work to deliver military hardware or equipment. I would argue that this is a missed opportunity as military operations and training have a lot of similarities with projects. According to the Project Management Body of Knowledge, a project is “a temporary endeavour undertaken to create a unique project service or result.”¹ The temporary nature means that the organization that produces the deliverable or output will disband once the work is complete. It is not unusual for military groups to come together to accomplish a mission, even if the elements belong to the same unit. In the military, a product or service, the output of the project, may not always be unique in the strictest sense, especially in the case of individual training where there are multiple serials of a course. However, the output may be unique due to the circumstances, e.g. a course that is delivered in a new way, in summer versus winter, or to a regular force or primary reserve audience. With these definitions in mind, the word “project” could easily be replaced with “operation,” “course,” or “program.”

Stakeholders often play critical roles in the selection of projects and their success – the same is true in a military context. Broadly defined, stakeholders are “any individual or group who has an interest in the [organization’s] strategy and who can exert an influence on the [organization].”² A powerful stakeholder may decide to pay for the construction of a school in a conflict area. However, the project will not deliver desired outcomes if local families prevent their children from attending due to safety concerns, because it goes against cultural norms, or they require help with domestic tasks. Even if children are interested, someone must hire teachers and pay salaries. The school may also require the endorsement of local political or religious leaders. There can be myriad stakeholders who directly or indirectly influence a project.

Simple, Complicated, and Complex

During the MBCPL program, we have benefitted from learning about complexity and project practices. The two realms overlap in some areas but are not mutually inclusive: there are project practices that do not help deal with complexity and not all studies of complexity will help with projects.

To understand complexity, it is helpful to know how it differs from simple and complicated matters. By recognizing the differences, it can be easier to know what actions are required. Rick Nason’s book, *It’s Not Complicated: The Art and Science of Complexity and Business*, has useful examples of the three levels. Making coffee is a simple system: you know what you want and, even if you are not exact and put in too many coffee grounds, coffee will be the output of the process. His illustration of a complicated system is the preparation of financial reports for a business firm. Accounting rules must be followed precisely to produce the expected outcome. A complex system is like a sales call, or, in a military context, like briefing a commander in order

to obtain approval to proceed with a desired course of action. Two people could deliver the same sales call or briefing, and the outcome could vary. Even if the same person delivers the same sales call or briefing to the same customer or commander multiple times, there could be a different outcome each time. And even if the response is good, it can be difficult to define success. Is a sale of \$1,000 not successful compared to one of \$100,000? What if the \$100,000 sale was significantly discounted, reducing profit? What if the commander responds positively to the briefing but specifies a new course of action that you are not prepared for?

Figure 1 shows a framework that could help to recognize whether a project, operation, or task is simple, complicated, or complex.³




Figure 1: Decision Framework for Classifying System Types

Categories of Complexity

Some authors have defined categories of complexity that can help explain how military activities are affected. According to Kaye Remington and Julien Pollack⁴, there are four kinds of complexity: directional, structural, temporal and technical.

There is an old military adage that the ‘enemy gets a vote’ on how your plan unfolds. The same can be true of other actors whose objectives are different from yours. *Directional* complexity “...is found in projects which are characterized by unshared goals and goal paths, unclear meanings and hidden agendas.” Directional complexity, which is commonly involved in systems that involve people, can prevent the unity of action. For instance, think of a local leader who agrees to support a major construction project. Perhaps he knows that the project will deliver marginal benefits to his area, but he will get kickbacks from the construction firm

performing the work, and the project will result in the destruction of a rival's farm field. In the eyes of some, your work is developing the area and supporting the economy. In the eyes of others, including the rival, you are tacitly supporting corruption. There does not need to be malicious intent behind the diverging goals. There could simply be a difference of opinion or even a case where goals have not been stated publicly and, therefore, are not acknowledged. A more common example might be how units in a formation vie for limited resources to support competing activities.

The next category of complexity is *structural*, which "... stems from the difficulty in managing and keeping track of the huge number of different interconnected tasks and activities." By receiving pieces of information or reports from a variety of different elements, the higher headquarters may not have a full appreciation on the ground. As a result, they may fail to predict or anticipate developments that would be evident to an individual in the area. The corollary to this idea can be seen when people attempt to manage complexity by decomposing a single deliverable into several different sub-deliverables. The danger of taking this approach is that some complex systems are "greater than the sum of its parts." Sometimes, the interplay between the elements produces outcomes that are not possible when the parts are separated.

Temporal complexity is common in the military environment. Ten minutes after H-hour, the assault force encountered unforeseen developments, resulting in substantial changes to your meticulously thought-out plan? Maybe you knew that something was going to happen, but expected that it would happen several kilometres later. The fact that it happened earlier than anticipated throws off the rhythm of the advance. Temporal complexity "...can be found in projects which are subjected to unanticipated environmental impacts significant enough to seriously destabilize the project, such as rapid and unexpected... changes..." As with the previous example, even when changes are expected to occur, the timing or magnitude of the change may be unknown. Temporal complexity can also result when there are delays prevent action from being taken – e.g. sequential activities where one thing must be done before another.

Technical complexity is likely familiar to anyone who has used a newly introduced piece of equipment or software. "Projects which have technical or design problems associated with products that have never been produced before, or with techniques that are unknown or untried and for which there are no precedents." On paper, it is supposed to work! But, in practice, a problem emerges that no one could have foreseen.

Regardless of the category of complexity, most definitions of complex systems have some common characteristics. The first is *emergence*, when a system produces an unexpected result. Remington and Pollack use the example of a bike – by looking at the individual parts, you might not see how they go together to form something upon which a person can ride.

Adaptiveness is another commonly agreed-upon characteristic of complex systems. When faced with changes in the environment, complex systems react so that they achieve stability. For instance, when new legislation or regulations affect the military, we learn how to adapt to the new reality. When complex systems are

comprised of people who are capable of learning and influencing activities, the adaptation can be unpredictable. Simple systems may also be able to adapt because exactness is not necessary, but will often adapt in a predictable way. Complicated systems may not adapt and stop functioning, leading to the need for redesign.

How are Existing Military Processes Suited to Complexity?

Despite my initial thoughts that many of the techniques for dealing with complexity were unique to project practices, it became clear to me that the military already deals with complexity in several regards.

Expect the Unexpected

Most military leaders expect that there will be some degree of change or deviation from the plan. It may seem cliché to state this, but there are countless examples where military or project personnel fail to account for change and cannot adapt in a timely manner. A quote often attributed to Dwight Eisenhower is that he "...always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable." Plans need to be updated because of developments or changes that take place after they are developed.⁵ Often, the emergent strategy, the plan that is adapted in response to change, is better than the original plan.⁶ Perfect planning, the idea that an operation order can account for every single occurrence along the path to the objective, is seldom possible. The risk of perfect planning is that, when faced with the need to change, some planners resist and try to stick with their original plan. In complex projects, planning processes sometimes use gates or stages that are linked to decision points. Using this approach can help to make planning horizons more manageable and reduce the need to rework a plan. A far-flung vision of the future is useful, but the vision could also need to be adjusted due to developments.

A challenge is that expecting change is only one part of the problem. Knowing that change will require the adoption of an emergent strategy does not make us better at understanding what the changes are likely to be. Humans are "psychologically ill-equipped to deal with the future" because we base our view of the future on our view of the present, and we are overoptimistic about our ability to respond to risks.⁷ In some cases, group-problem solving may help chart the way forward.

Group Problem-Solving

Most military planning processes involve groups of individuals with different skills, coming together to map the way forward. At the formation level and higher, planning groups can involve a dozen or more people. This is, essentially, problem-solving in response to structural complexity. Groups are better than individuals at tracking the interdependencies in a system and how a change will propagate through it. Therefore, groups are better at making decisions that involve complexity.⁸ The more diverse the group, with different values or perspectives, the better the potential outcome as their interaction is one of the only ways to achieve "objectivity in social systems."⁹ This objectivity stems from the fact that groups are better at avoiding an idea that "lacks merit."¹⁰

"there are four kinds of complexity: directional, structural, temporal and technical."

However, some downsides must be acknowledged in a military context. First, if a group has worked together too often, they may be locked into the same way of thinking, which could prevent objectivity.¹¹ Power dynamics can also be a concern; for example, if a senior individual is leading an activity, more junior individuals with conflicting views may hesitate to raise them. Finally, the fact that many military personnel go through similar training may be a limitation. As a result, there is value to having educational opportunities like the Individual Learning Plan (ILP) or training with other NATO members or partner militaries.

Collective Leadership

Complex project leaders also have a thing or two to learn from how the military deals with complexity. A fundamental aspect of manoeuvre warfare is mission command, “the philosophy of command that promotes the unity of effort, the duty and authority to act, and initiative to subordinate commanders.”¹² The aim of mission command is to ensure that military forces take advantage of rapidly changing situations, be they threats or opportunities, by allowing subordinates to take actions that are consistent with the commander’s intent without obtaining permission first. It is achieved by ensuring that subordinates fully understand their role in the superior commander’s intent or vision, and their responsibility to take action. The complex project community is beginning to appreciate that they cannot rely on the notion that ‘hero/heroine’ leaders will be able to shepherd their organizations to success through sheer force of will and determination. Visionary leaders are still important, but “collective leadership” must extend from the top of the project organization to the bottom. Because of the categories of complexity explained above, members at all levels must have suitable decision rights and accountability to respond to threats or opportunities, engage appropriate stakeholders, and synchronize activities.¹³

An interesting aspect of the collective leadership approach is the idea that the distributed leadership within a project can move beyond a tangible deliverable or output to actually create meaning. The creation of meaning through conversation between parties can be a step toward building relationships and defining success.¹⁴ In a military context, creating meaning would go beyond explaining the desired effects and the reason for their importance and also include the needs of the stakeholders. For instance, the mission and effect of “1 Platoon will clear the area around the district centre in order to demonstrate the coalition’s presence...” could be followed with “...and because residents of the area have requested help after receiving threatening night letters.” The creation of meaning could help to define success – at least from the perspective

of some stakeholders. The challenge of creating meaning, be it in a purely military or complex project environment, is that the process must be a dialogue, valuing the perspectives of all parties to the conversation (e.g. 1 Platoon as well as the residents near the district centre), to be more than just words.¹⁵

What the Military Can Learn from Complex Projects

There are also opportunities for the CAF to learn from project practices that help manage complexity.

Stakeholder Engagement

Studies of complexity continually urge greater engagement of stakeholders, particularly those external to the organization. Stakeholders are the ones who will influence and be affected most by the project, operation, or mission, creating meaning and defining success. As a result, their involvement in planning will allow them to “understand the role they can play.”¹⁶ The involvement of people within and outside the organization, not just senior leaders, and debate over the action to be taken can lead to bursts of insight that result in new, better strategies.¹⁷ For stakeholder engagement to be successful, leaders need to accept that there is no single truth and that it may be necessary to create “negotiated knowledge”

with the points of view on which the stakeholders can agree.¹⁸ Engagement with stakeholders can help them to see the information as “authoritative”, but only if they are involved in the definition of the problem and the formulation and selection of the solution.¹⁹ Therefore, it may be helpful to avoid developing potential courses

“plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”



General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, June 5, 1944, as American paratroopers prepare for the Battle of Normandy.

IanDagnall Computing/Alamy Stock Photo

of action in isolation from stakeholders, especially if doing so will make you biased in favour of your plan. Instead, you may need to develop courses of action *with* stakeholders. Ultimately, it may even be preferable to act as a facilitator while stakeholders take the lead. “The role of professional planners is not to do the planning, but to help others plan for themselves.”²⁰ Increased interaction between planners and stakeholders can create bonds between the groups, making both more invested in the success of the project.²¹ Although this process may not be straightforward and can take time, it may yield “...benefits in terms of synergy and motivation considerably [that] outweigh the disadvantages.”²²

Of course, it is essential to acknowledge that a significant degree of stakeholder engagement may not always be possible, even when there is sufficient time to do so. In situations where lives depend on decisive action, command is necessary. It would also be challenging to engage stakeholders in cases where operation security is a factor. However, stakeholder engagement would be useful in other contexts such as institutional activities or initiatives that take place at the unit or garrison level.

Change Management

By “expecting the unexpected,” I referred to the flexibility to plan and react to uncertainty. If one cannot plan for all contingencies, some things are left to chance. A related concept is the idea that, if change is anticipated, it should be managed intentionally. Change is at the heart of most complex projects that aim to transform how stakeholders go about their business by influencing

“groups are better at making decisions that involve complexity.”

their minds, attitudes, and habits to a new normal.²³ A project that delivers a new light rail transit system requires users to make two transfers to get to their place of work instead of the single bus they used to take. The introduction of gender-based analysis training requires trainees to adapt their long and deeply held perspectives and values. In a military context, the command structure and discipline ensure that orders, such as those to implement change, are followed out. However, adaptability and emergence may mean that change is not fully embraced throughout an organization, leading to sub-optimal adoption. Instead of believing fully in the concepts taught during the gender-based analysis training, some recipients of the training may only memorize the key phrases and rules they need to know to get by. And if those members do not fully believe in the concepts, they may transgress with negative consequences.

So, what can complex projects teach the military about managing change? Any effort to change will be countered by resistance, the reflex to maintain the status quo. Resistance may be passive, overt, or covert and must be understood to be neutralized. Understanding the nature of the resistance will help stakeholders have a vision of the positive future, which leads to a desire for and first steps toward change.²⁴ If leaders sense a need for change, it may be helpful to share the information with stakeholders to learn if they sense dissatisfaction or other opportunities exist. The stakeholders are more likely to take ownership of the change if they are involved in deciding what to do differently. Once momentum has been created, the change must also be sustained so that resistance does not build up and undo what has been achieved.

Experimentation

		Experiments	1 (start here)	2	3	4	5
Who is your customer? Be as specific as possible.		Customer	DP1 Infantry students	DP1 infantry students who fail their first attempt	DP1 Infantry students who fail a second course attempt due to injury	DP1 infantry students who fail their first attempt due to injuries	Regular force applicants
What is the problem? Phrase it from your customer's perspective.		Problem	High failure rate due to injuries and academic deficiencies	High failure rate due to injuries and academic deficiencies	Continued failure due to injuries	Risk of continued failure due to injuries	Some choose occupations they are not fully committed to
Define the solution only after you have validated a problem worth solving.		Solution		Allow a second attempt to complete training	Physical training package between courses	Use Progress Review Board to assess suitability for additional attempts	Etc.
List the assumptions that must hold true, for your hypothesis to be true.		Riskiest Assumption	There is a training delta between BMQ and DP1 Inf	Students will perform better on a second attempt	Students will not exacerbate existing injuries	All students want to succeed during DP1 Inf	
To form a Customer/Problem Hypothesis: I believe <u>my customer</u> has a problem <u>achieving this goal</u> .	To form a Problem/Solution Hypothesis: I believe this solution will result in a <u>quantifiable outcome</u> .	Method & Success Criterion	Get feedback from students and instructors about their views	Speak to instructors and students who fail, review course files	Observe training, consult with medical staff, follow specific students	Questions during Progress Review Board after 1 st failure	
GET OUT OF THE OFFICE! TALK TO PEOPLE, VALIDATE ASSUMPTIONS, GET FEEDBACK...							
To form your Assumptions: In order for <u>hypothesis</u> to be true, <u>assumption</u> needs to be true	To identify your Riskiest Assumption: The assumption with the least amount of data, and core to the viability of my hypothesis is...	Result & Decision	Instructors deliver preparatory training before course – invalid assumption	Some students who failed first attempt succeed on the second attempt	Students who did the extra PT program still failed 2 nd attempt	Some admitted they did not want to succeed on the 2 nd attempt	
Determine how you will test it: The least expensive way to test my assumption is...	Determine what success looks like: I will run experiment with # of <u>customers</u> and expect a strong signal from # of <u>customers</u> .	Learning	Focus on those who failed (go to column 2...)	Students who fail the second attempt often did so because of injuries	Additional PT may not increase odds of success	Some only joined as infantry to get their foot into the door of the CAF, then transfer occupation	

Figure 2: Hypothetical Example of an Experiment Board for Developmental Period 1 Infantry Failures²⁶

Because complex systems are characterized by emergence and adaptability, with connections between parts of which it is difficult to keep track, it is hard to know what will happen. Relying exclusively on experience or lessons learned can be dangerous because doing so assumes that the situation is comparable to one that has occurred in the past. Recall the example of the briefing to a commander: even if the past approach led to success, it could have, just as easily, led to failure. Because it is difficult to define success, there may be multiple paths forward, and it is not clear which is the right one because you cannot see more than a step ahead. In the context of the CAF, with so many perspectives and sets of values, a plan that achieves success in one L1, in one part of the country may fail in a different L1, in another area.

How can experimentation be increased in a military context? First, start with a question that you want to answer and then speak with stakeholders to find out what they think of the question and problem. Once you have a better understanding of the problem, you can start looking at solutions. One approach could be to evaluate courses of action simultaneously by conducting small scale trials. Another way could be to use a tool like an experiment board and conduct experiments in series with the hope that the path will reveal itself. An example of an experiment board, using the example of reducing failure rates during DP1 Infantry NCM courses is shown in Figure 2. This topic is subject to a significant degree of directional complexity because goals and perspectives can differ from the student, to instructors, to the officer commanding of the company, to the commanding officer of the training centre. Each numbered column represents an experiment that can lead to learning, prompting subsequent experiments. There is no requirement to perform precisely five experiments – some problems will require fewer iterations, while others may need a greater

number. An important consideration is that there is no guarantee that solutions will work – and, even if they do, the results may not be consistent. However, making and correcting mistakes are a critical part of learning what to do next.²⁵

Conclusion

I am grateful for the opportunity to attend the MBCPL as part of my DP3 education. The material has been eye-opening and helped to explain some observations I have made over my career. It is clear to me that the CAF, as a large organization that is dependent on its personnel while operating in ambiguous and uncertain circumstances, experiences a high level of complexity. The CAF has some practices that accept complexity, but there are also areas where we could do better with the input of others. I will not say that I am an expert, but I look forward to continuing to learn!

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Canada Elections.

Defence and the ‘Seinfeld Election’

by Martin Shadwick

The federal election campaign of 2021 was not, as some pundits suggested, “about nothing”—the catchphrase invariably associated with comedian Jerry Seinfeld’s eponymous and stunningly successful television series of 1989-1998—but it certainly represented a not insignificant expenditure for the sake, seemingly, of accomplishing little more than a slight reordering of the seating arrangements in the House of Commons. It also brought uneven or disquieting electoral experiences for most party leaders, including Justin Trudeau (who remained Prime Minister but with a second minority government), Erin O’Toole (who adopted a somewhat more centrist Conservative position but encountered internal ideological pushback), Jagmeet Singh (who registered a solid performance but gained only one NDP seat) and Green Party leader Annamie Paul (who, given the spectacle of a dysfunctional Green Party and a fourth-place finish in Toronto Centre, subsequently announced her intention to resign as party leader).

The dangerous and delusional Canadian tradition of relegating issues of foreign policy and, in particular, defence and national security policy, to mere cameo appearances during federal election campaigns continued for the most part unabated in 2021. Indeed,

one can only despair at the marginalization of such public policy issues, or their virtual disappearance, in every single election in the 21st century (2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2019 and 2021). The federal election of 2015 was admittedly something of an outlier in that an excellent Munk Debate on foreign affairs actually managed to elevate foreign policy somewhat beyond the threshold of a cameo appearance and fuelled hopes—sadly misplaced—for an expanded foreign and defence policy presence in subsequent elections. The essential question is how much longer this lamentable state of affairs will be allowed to stand.

During the 2021 election, noted the Conference of Defence Associations and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute in late August, Canada’s political parties “should be prepared to address” what “modifications or updates” they would bring to the 2017 defence policy (*Strong, Secure, Engaged*) and whether the allocated funding remained adequate, how they envisioned working with the United States on the territorial defence of North America and whether the latter was “now an urgent priority for which new and additional resources should be provided quickly” and what “specific actions” they would take “to ensure rapid cultural change” in light of the “long-term” and “persistent” problem with sexual misconduct in Canada’s armed forces.” Most of the ‘responses’

to those eminently sensible queries and concerns, and a host of other proffered questions, were lamentably less than fulsome.

This is not to suggest that defence and defence-related issues were entirely absent from the 2021 election campaign. The issue of sexual misconduct in the military—a systemic and exceptionally serious problem with numerous, multi-faceted implications—inevitably surfaced during the campaign. It is intriguing, though, that some of the most candid comments from the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister surfaced a few weeks after the election. Speaking at a 6 October 2021 news conference, Prime Minister Trudeau observed that “it is obvious that despite the work that the military has done, despite the work that we’ve done, the military still doesn’t get that survivors need to be at the centre... of everything in regards to sexual misconduct and harassment in the military.” Deputy Prime Minister Chrystia Freeland added that “it just seems as if the [military] leadership just doesn’t get the harassment issue.” Such comments almost inevitably generated a post-election firestorm of their own. Campbell Clark of the *Globe and Mail*, for example, observed on 14 October 2021 that “it is though the top politicians in the Liberal government don’t realize that it is [defence minister] Sajjan’s job, and their job, to fix problems in the military. Especially when the leadership of the Canadian Forces has shown that it cannot fix itself. Over the last six years, the politicians have abdicated responsibility, except for tut-tutting about the culture.” Academics weighed in, too. “It is appalling that that can’t see that civilian control of the military means civilians controlling the military,” noted Professor Stephen Saideman, the Paterson Chair in International Affairs at Carleton University and the director of the Canadian Defence and Security Network. In the final analysis, though, there is more than enough blame to go around. As the lead editorial in the *Toronto Star* of 15 October 2021 noted, “both civilian and military leadership have failed Canadians, and the men and women serving in the Canadian Forces. It’s time to turn the page.”

Other defence-related issues were unexpected. The newly-unveiled security pact linking Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS)—clearly much more than a mechanism to equip the Royal Australian Navy with a fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines—prompted a wave of unflattering late-election and post-election analysis. Some Canadian observers labelled it a ‘strategic snub’ by close allies while others bemoaned the lack of timely advance notification (although, for much better reasons, so did the French) or the Prime Minister’s downplaying of the pact as simply “a deal for submarines.” Looking further afield, Professor Paul T. Mitchell of the Canadian Forces College opined that “Canada’s exclusion from the pact represents

growing suspicions about the Canadian commitment to rules-based international order.” The hasty American withdrawal from Afghanistan also made an electoral appearance, raising questions about the perceived lack of timely consultation with allies and about the adequacy of Canadian preparations—whole-of-government preparations—to evacuate Canadians as well as Afghans who had laboured alongside Canadian military personnel and Canadian diplomats.

The foreign and defence policy components of the 2021 party platforms offered a decidedly mixed bag—and at times a decidedly thin gruel—of campaign pledges. As a package they offered a measure of commonality on some issues (most noticeably, perhaps, on the need for measures to address sexual misconduct within Canada’s armed forces. Also apparent was the somewhat increased (but still cryptic) attention to NORAD modernization and the future shape of continental defence cooperation with the United States, the increased attention to the ‘greening’ of defence in the context of climate change and a perceived requirement for enhanced

disaster relief capabilities (most notably the Liberal and Green platforms) and the curious overabundance (as in the New Democratic and Green platforms) or the complete or almost complete absence of references to international peacekeeping (as in the Liberal and Conservative platforms). There were also a few surprises, such as at least one entry on the Conservative list of projected naval procurements. On balance, though, it is difficult to disagree with Professor Wesley Wark’s contention that “the Conservatives produced the most exhaustive list”

of foreign and defence policy promises but that they were “scattered and unfocused,” that the New Democratic Party “made some general pledges without a lot of specifics” and that the “Liberal government’s position [was] status quo.” Tellingly and disconcertingly, he concluded that “none of the parties have a central coherent statement on national security. What is it? What does it mean to us?”

The 2021 Liberal platform posited that “global challenges like the COVID-19 pandemic and the climate crisis underscore how the health, security, and prosperity of Canadians are profoundly impacted by the world around us. Rising authoritarianism and reemergence of great power competition is undermining international peace and security, the rule of law, and respect for human rights.” Canadians, it asserts, “understand that building a safer and more stable world requires investments in our strength at home and active engagement with our partners abroad.” On defence, “Canada faces a host of global threats, including rapidly evolving risks posed by cyber attacks, foreign interference, and climate change. Canadians deserve a 21st century military that is



Canada's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Chrystia Freeland speaks during a news conference in Ottawa, 6 October 2021.

REUTERS/Alamy Stock Photo



Two CF-188 Hornet jets, 425 Tactical Fighter Squadron, fly in formation with four F-16 fighting falcon aircraft, 120th Fighter Squadron, from Buckley Air Force Base, Colorado, over the skies of Labrador during a NORAD Arctic Air Defence Operation, 20 September 2020.


equipped to respond to emerging threats to our national security.” Building on 2017’s *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, a re-elected Trudeau government would “ensure that our military has the equipment and resources needed to keep Canadians safe, secure our Arctic sovereignty, and respond to the full range of hostile, cyber, and environmental threats we face.” It would “work to modernize NORAD, including by upgrading the North Warning System, deploying new technological solutions to improve surveillance and monitoring, improving command and control systems, and investing in the infrastructure and capabilities necessary to deter and defeat threats to North America.” Regrettably, there were no explicit references to the relevant sections of the 23 February 2021 *Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership*.

A third Trudeau government would “expand Canada’s long and short-range strategic airlift capability”—‘short-range’ being something of an oxymoron—“in order to increase Canada’s contribution to NATO, coalition and allied military operations abroad” and “improve support for domestic and international emergency response,” expand cooperation and assistance to “partners, allies and international organizations” in humanitarian assistance and disaster recovery, including health and climate emergencies, and conflict response,” as well as “remain a leading contributor to NATO operations, including...Operation Reassurance in Eastern Europe.” It would additionally “work with international partners to establish a NATO Centre of Excellence on Climate and Security in Canada” and “lead international efforts to establish a global coalition to respond to wildfires and other climate emergencies.” Peacekeeping, unlike the 2019 and oft-cited 2015 platforms, was not—unsurprisingly given very modest Canadian contributions—explicitly referenced in the foreign and defence policy sections of

the 2021 platform. Pledges to implement “the recommendations of the Independent External Comprehensive Review led by Justice Arbour to address sexual harassment and misconduct” in the military, to “modernize” the military justice system, to “expand resources available to survivors through the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre” and to “undertake ambitious efforts to improve the diversity of the CAF” did, however, figure prominently in the 2021 platform.

Released unusually early in the 2021 campaign—a strategy offering both advantages and disadvantages—the Conservative platform devoted noteworthy attention to foreign and defence policy. Arguing, in a tone reminiscent of Liberal attacks on Stephen Harper’s foreign and defence policy during the 2015 election, that “the Trudeau government has presided over a Canada with diminishing influence on issues that affect our prosperity and security,” the Conservatives pledged to “make the decisions that the [Trudeau] government has neglected, including updating the 2017 defence policy to the realities of a disrupted international order, investing in Canadian leadership in the Five Eyes alliance, and strengthening ties with new and traditional allies.” The eight priority areas for the new foreign policy included northern and Arctic diplomacy, Canada and the United States, cooperation on the world stage via the United Nations and other organizations, renewed Canadian leadership in the transatlantic alliance, and Canada and the Pacific, the Middle East, the Americas and Africa.

To renew Canada’s commitment to NATO, the Conservatives pledged to increase spending on national defence “to move closer to our [two percent] aspirations,” expand Canada’s contribution to “NATO Baltic Sea Air Policing and NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia,” and to “intensify” Canada’s military training



Navy ships from NATO member nations sail in formation during exercise BALTIC OPERATION in the Baltic Sea, 8 June 2020. The ships pictured are Royal Canadian Navy Halifax-class frigate HMCS *Fredericton*, German Navy Bremen-class frigate FGS *Luebeck*, German Navy Rhine-Class replenishment oiler FGS *Rhoen*, Royal Norwegian Navy Fridtjof Nansen-class frigate HNoMS *Otto Suerdrup*, US Navy Blue Ridge-class command and control ship USS *Mount Whitney*, US Navy Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS *Donald Cook*, and the US Navy Supply-class fast-combat support ship USNS *Supply*.

and capacity-building mission in Ukraine, create a “NATO Centre of Excellence for Arctic Defence” in Resolute Bay and to ensure “active” Canadian participation in NATO training missions and NATO centres of excellence in the areas of cybersecurity, strategic communications and energy security. They also pledged to “update and enhance the North Warning System as part of NORAD and extend it to protect the entire Canadian Arctic, including our Arctic archipelagoes” and expand “our current regional defence participation” in the Indo-Pacific by joining the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. To bolster sovereignty in the Arctic, the Conservatives pledged to expand and better train and equip the Canadian Rangers, refurbish and expand RCAF Forward Operating Locations, complete the Nanisivik Naval Facility and develop “a new Arctic naval base” at Churchill and, in an essentially unnoticed echo of an early but subsequently abandoned Harper-era pledge, acquire “two armed, heavy icebreakers” for the RCN.



Former Supreme Court Justice Marie Deschamps speaks during a news conference upon the release of a report on sexual misconduct and sexual harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces, in Ottawa, 30 April 2015.

The Conservative platform pledged to appoint a Minister for Defence Procurement and reaffirmed a decidedly optimistic 2019 pledge to depoliticize defence procurement. A Conservative government would “fast-track” the selection of a CF-18 replacement, “remain committed to the National Shipbuilding Strategy by proceeding with the Canadian Surface Combatants, icebreakers, Joint Supply Ships, and Coast Guard vessels,” order a second *Asterix*-type conversion from Chantier Davie while “awaiting the completion” of the two purpose-built *Protecteur*-class Joint Supply Ships and replace the *Victoria*-class submarines. The platform also identified a series of measures designed to make the armed forces a “better workplace,” including “enhancing the participation of women, Indigenous people, and visible minorities through proactive, targeted recruitment at the community level,” ensuring a “respectful and professional workforce free from sexual misconduct and discrimination” and calling a public inquiry into harassment and discrimination in the military.

In its 2021 platform, the NDP reaffirmed—at times distressingly word-for-word—its assertions from the 2019 campaign that “Canadians are proud of our role in the world, and they want a government that will make the right choices to help people—but under Conservative and Liberal governments, decades of cynical politicking and cuts have meant that Canada is often on the wrong side of important global issues.” New Democrats believe “that Canadian interests are best served by a strong and principled foreign policy based on human rights, multilateralism and the best interests of peace and security.” To that end, “Canada will be a force for peace. We will support nuclear disarmament, recommit to peacekeeping, and make sure that Canadian-made weapons are not fuelling conflict and human rights abuses abroad.” The NDP

pledged to boost Canada’s international development assistance and to take a “leadership role in helping low-income countries deal with the impacts of climate change.”

The NDP reaffirmed the salience of three core military roles—defending Canada, protecting Canadians at home and contributing to a more stable, peaceful world through operations abroad—but asserted that “decades of Liberal and Conservative cuts and mismanagement” have left the military with “outdated equip-

ment, inadequate support and an unclear strategic mandate.” Arguing that “we need to do better for Canadians in uniform and for the [defence of] our country,” an NDP government “will make sure that our troops have the equipment”—largely unspecified—“training, and support they need.” We “will ensure that funding supports our national defence and international commitments, with a renewed priority of advancing multilateral peacekeeping initiatives around the world.” At home, the NDP is “committed to bringing our

search and rescue response times up to international standards, and ensuring that our capabilities are sufficient to meet the needs of the north.” In contracting for “new military equipment, including ships and fighter jets, New Democrats will ensure maximum industrial benefits and jobs.” An NDP government would “oppose the privatization of services on Canadian Forces bases across the country”, put an “end to sexual harassment and assault in the military,” and “immediately implement the recommendations of the Deschamps Report.”

Canada, argued the Green Party’s 2021 platform, needs “a new approach to foreign affairs and defence” centred on “the promotion of human security” and engaging “in more egalitarian forms of collaboration with a more diverse set international partners. This requires re-tooling and preparing our military to support disaster preparedness and response, while maintaining combat readiness.” It would consequently “pursue a defence policy centred on the pursuit of disarmament, support for disaster preparedness and relief [and] defending Canada’s Arctic sovereignty” and “re-align our defence spending to increase our capacity and speed in delivering disaster assistance (e.g., through the DART—the Disaster Assistance Response Team), responding to domestic crises (e.g., pandemic outbreaks in long-term care homes), our contributions to UN peace forces and missions, and cyber defence initiatives.” It would “reinforce Canada’s Arctic sovereignty through expanded patrols” and “assess Canada’s membership in military alliances including NATO and NORAD to ensure they are meeting Canada’s priorities of diplomacy, development and defence.” The noticeably enhanced attention to disaster relief appeared to signal at least a partial shift from the priorities outlined in the 2019 platform.

The party would also “urgently implement” the recommendations of the Deschamps Report.

In matters of international relations, noted the Bloc Québécois, “le Québec a pour politique officielle la doctrine Gérin-Lajoie. Celle-ci énonce que tout ce qui est de la compétence du Québec sur son territoire est de la compétence du Québec dans le monde. C’est le cas en matière d’éducation et de culture.” The party also restated its long-standing concerns regarding the inadequacy of the shipbuilding work share allocated to Chantier Davie. The People’s Party of Canada reaffirmed its 2019 stance that “Canada needs a common-sense foreign policy focused on the security and prosperity of Canadians, not an ideological approach that compromises our interests.” It pledged to “work closely with our allies to maintain a peaceful international order” but promised to “withdraw from all UN commitments” and once again offered no specific insights into its defence policy.

In his postmortem on the role of foreign, defence and national security policy in the 2021 federal election, Murray Brewster of CBC News observed that “rarely has the world intruded so viscerally—and with so little apparent effect—upon the great national conversation that we call a federal election.” True, he continued, “events in the world beyond our borders did come up during the 36-day campaign. More often than not, however, they were used by campaigning leaders as a cudgel with which to beat down their opponents.” In his analysis, Martin Regg Cohn of the *Toronto Star* opined on 14 September 2021 that “if foreign policy seems more fleeting than ever on the campaign trail, it’s a reminder that the electoral cycle is increasingly captive of the news cycle, just as it was for [Kim] Campbell when she lost the [Prime Minister’s] job in 1993. The dirty little secret of foreign affairs is that for most Canadians, it remains a domestic affair.” Others have attributed the foreign and defence policy disappearing act during Canadian federal elections to micro and macro factors as diverse as “embarrassing” and “lousy” debates and the absence of a permanent Munk or Munk-style debate on foreign and defence policy to the lingering consequences of Raoul Dandurand’s fireproof house. As Paul T. Mitchell has pointed out, “three oceans and a superpower” have sufficiently shielded us “from having to think about how to achieve national security. Canadian defence policy has never varied from three priorities—defend Canada, defend North America and contribute to international peace and security—that have appeared in every [defence] white paper since the 1950s, regardless of the governing party. This attitude



United Nations (UN) Security Council session within the 60th jubilee session of the UN General Assembly, New York City.

was evident in the recent election campaign, when discussions about defence were largely absent, despite growing threats from abroad and the turmoil within our own military.” Still others have expressed concern over a perceived erosion of broadly-based public interest in and knowledge of foreign, defence and national security policy and pondered the means by which that interest could be reinvigorated, thereby elevating the discourse—not just at election time—on increasingly worrisome issues of public policy. As Aaron Shull, managing director and general counsel at the Centre for International Governance and Innovation has cautioned us, “the world is a pretty angry place.”

Surely a full court press by journalists, academics, university and non-university-based research institutes, non-governmental organizations, members of the attentive public, those Parliamentarians already genuinely interested in questions of foreign and defence policy—and other voices—to get our political parties to ‘up’ their foreign and defence policy game should not be too much to ask. Similarly, a permanent Munk or Munk-like debate focusing on foreign and defence policy during federal election campaigns should not be too much to ask in what purports to be a fully functioning democracy. But why stop there? Clearly what Canada requires is not just periodic injections of foreign and defence policy during federal election campaigns but a thoroughgoing and permanent deepening and broadening of public interest in and knowledge of foreign, defence and national security issues.

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Armies of Sand: The Past, Present and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness

by **Kenneth M. Pollack,**

Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021.

676 pages, \$27.50


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Reviewed by **John Keess**

The recent fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban has reinvigorated the academic and popular debates about what makes militaries effective. One recent work might provide some insight from the Arab world. In *Armies of Sand*, Kenneth A. Pollack seeks to provide contextualised case studies of why Arab armies from the end of the Second World War through the rise of Daesh have consistently performed so poorly against a variety of opponents. Pollack succeeds in providing some interesting material on the development of employment of modern Arab armies. Unfortunately, his undisciplined writing and technical flaws in non-Arab case studies leads to serious problems with his analysis.

Pollack brings an interesting perspective as a former CIA analyst, NSC advisor, and NDU professor. During his time at the CIA and NSC, he became a noted expert in contemporary Middle Eastern military affairs, and this is where his book is the strongest. Pollack makes the case that the best explanation for poor Arab military performance cannot be blamed on the importation of Soviet doctrine, politicisation, or economic underdevelopment, as some experts assert, but that Arab culture does not produce a sufficient quantity of individuals able to cope with the current “dominant mode of warfare” - that is, aggressive, combined arms warfare requiring maneuver and initiative (p.345-346). Pollack employs a wide range of case studies from the Arab world, including the Jordanian, Egyptian, Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan armies in the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars with Israel, the Libyan involvement in Chad in the 1970s and 1980s, and the Egyptian performance in 1991, and all of these anecdotes include interesting detail of military performance in peer-on-peer engagements. His studies of Hezbollah’s performance in the 2006 Israeli incursion into Lebanon and the Iraqi military’s problems with Daesh in 2015 do a good job of supporting his thesis with examples from asymmetrical opponents.

To make his thesis stick, Pollack relies on a series of non-Arab case studies to examine the effects of politicisation, economic underdevelopment, and of Soviet doctrine in different cultural settings. On a purely methodological level, the comparison of Arab and non-Arab case studies could be effective at highlighting the role of culture - for example, the successful use of Soviet doctrine by the North Vietnamese in the 1970s shows such a doctrine could be effective, and thus poor Syrian performance in the 1973 cannot be blamed on the Syrians’ use of the Soviet model. Unfortunately, the execution of these case studies are unbalanced and shallow. For example, Pollack describes Chinese doctrine in the Korean War as effective, noting that Chinese industrial



underdevelopment in 1951-1953 did not prevent Beijing’s forces from inflicting some severe tactical defeats on American and South Korean forces. Bizarrely, Pollack makes pains to note that the Chinese “employ[ed] mass as a substitute for firepower” who “won battles by deceiving, confusing, and outmanoeuvring their opponents, not by drowning them in a sea of manpower,” (p.329) but makes no mention whatever of central Korea’s mountainous terrain, which limits the coordination of firepower, and waves off the fact that the Chinese took three times as many casualties as United Nations forces (p.320). In another case, during his analysis of the 1982 Falklands War, Pollack underplays difficulties faced by the British, describing the attack on Mount Harriet as “1,800 crack troops in three battalions against 850 tired, hungry, frost-bitten Argentines” (p.211). Crucially, the author omits the vital context 3 Commando Brigade had just spent the better part of a month “tabbing” across the unforgiving South Atlantic landscape, had already fought an exhausting battle at Goose Green, were themselves tired, cold, at the end of a very tenuous logistical tail – and were attacking up a mountain which afforded the defenders excellent fields of view.

The concluding section of this book, which is supposed to make a broader argument about the importance of culture on war-making, relies on grossly incomplete historical examples. For example, Pollack uses the example of the vaunted Spartiate hoplite phalanxes from ancient Greece to illustrate the importance of cultural factors in producing enough individuals from an individual society who can excel in the dominant mode of warfare. “As long Spartan culture continued to produce large numbers of [highly effective hoplites,] and as long as the phalanx was the dominant mode of war-making,” he notes, “Sparta was the

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dominant military power [in the Hellenic world].” (347) But Pollack never explains what he means by “dominate” or what period of ancient Greek history he is talking about. Sparta did not in fact produce enough Spartiate hoplites to dominate the Hellenic world and had to rely on weak alliances, lost its ascendancy to Athens during the Persian invasions, and even after winning the Second Peloponnesian War, did not “dominate” outside the Peloponnesus.¹ The vague bleeds into the absurd when Pollack contends that the British Army in 1945 was “largely the same British Army – with new kit – fighting largely the same way [as the British Army at Waterloo in 1815].” (351). In this case, the author engages in no real discussion but merely footnotes a handful of studies on the development of the British Army in various time periods – none of which deals in the British Army before 1904, and the most complete of which, Bidwell and Graham’s study of British approached to firepower between 1904 and 1945, was nearly forty years old at the time of publication.²

Armies of Sand is an interesting read to anyone with a foundation of twentieth century warfare. If the reader has a strong enough base to pick through some of the serious technical flaws in Pollack’s non-Arab case studies, the work provides some interesting perspectives on wars in the Middle East since 1945. Beyond this function, however, the author’s methodology is spoiled by a sloppy execution and burdened by numerous factual and interpretational errors. This book is not recommended for inclusion on academic or professional reading lists.

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NOTES

- 1 For the reader interested in a good stand-alone volume on the development of Greek warfare, see: Matthew A. Sears, *Understanding Greek Warfare* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019).
- 2 Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham, *Fire-Power: The British Army Weapons and Theories of War, 1904-1915* (Winchester: Allan and Unwin, 1982). **For a more recent study on British and Imperial doctrinal development in the twentieth century, see:**

Douglas E. Delaney, *The Imperial Army Project: Britain and the Land Forces of the Dominions and India, 1902-1945*, 2017.

More specific studies on British or imperial doctrinal development and leadership in the world wars which may be of interest to the reader include:

Jonathan Fennell, *Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Gary Sheffield, “Manpower,

Training and the Battlefield Leadership of British Army Officers in the Era of the Two World Wars,” in *Manpower and the Armies of the British Empire in the Two World Wars* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2021), 101–15; Doug Delaney, “Army Apostles: Imperial Officers on Loan and the Standardization of the Canadian, Australia and New Zealand Armies, 1904-1914,” *War in History* 23, no. 2 (2016): 169–89.