

WORTHINGTON FORCE

STAFF RIDE HANDBOOK

1



OPERATION TOTALIZE
8–9 AUGUST, 1944



CANADIAN ARMED FORCES

FORCES ARMÉES CANADIENNES

Source: Wikipedia





WORTHINGTON FORCE

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


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
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
COLOUR CODING



UNIT INDICATORS



OTHER



FOREWORD

Colonel Tod Strickland, CD
Commandant

Military doctrine and theory are intrinsically linked to military history; our experiences impact how our professional body of knowledge is shaped and continually evolves. Sadly, as many have noted, we are fated to learn more from our failures than from our successes.

This volume, the *Worthington Force Staff Ride Handbook*, is a way for you to profit from the experiences of others.

Modern students can glean a lot from reading the account of Worthington Force and studying the actions of this one battle group in Normandy on one day during the Second World War. Certainly, there is the litany of things that went wrong. While reading and studying, though, be generous. We have the clarity of hindsight and intervening years; we should not judge too harshly but should instead accept the lessons that have been given to us while acknowledging the sacrifice of lives that accompanied the observation and collection of this narrative.

But this is also the account of opportunities that presented themselves through the fog of war, enabling events to be manipulated and used by higher formations. That the British Columbia Regiment battle group, and Lieutenant-Colonel Don Worthington, had to operate in this fog should come as no surprise. As military professionals, we recognize that the fog of war is ever present; as commanders and staffs, it is our job to minimize it and see through it using sound planning. Unfortunately, as history shows, sound planning is not ever-present. You can judge for yourselves whether Worthington Force benefited or suffered as a result of both the way they planned and how they executed.

This handbook is designed to assist staff ride team leaders and students in the preparation and delivery of the Worthington Force staff ride and consists of operation orders, logs and orders of battle, first-person accounts and contemporary maps and air photos. The staff ride can be conducted virtually in any Canadian Army (CA) facility with access to Google Earth or on the ground in Normandy. If conducted in Normandy, the stands identified in Section 4 will greatly enhance the execution.

The *Worthington Force Staff Ride Handbook* is the first of its kind in the CA, and others will follow, covering different types of battles and operations. I hope that you will use this handbook to think critically about the fate of Worthington Force in 1944 and how we would fight similar scenarios today, given our modern equipment and communications.

GUIDANCE TO USERS

The purpose of conducting a staff ride / virtual staff ride (VSR) is to support the systematic study of an event/battle/campaign to foster creativity in military problem-solving among officers and non-commissioned members (NCM) in the Canadian Army (CA).

This purpose of this handbook is to assist staff ride team leaders in the preliminary study and on site phases of the Worthington Force Staff Ride. Worthington Force is an example of a failed battle group advance-to-contact in a brigade and division context during the Second World War. "On-site" may mean either a virtual experience in a garrison setting leveraging multimedia resources or a real-world experience on the ground in Normandy. Resources contained in this handbook include a division operation order, a brigade operations log, numerous first-person accounts, contemporary 1:100,000 maps, and air photos and detailed orders of battle. Recommended stands are also included to enhance the experience if the staff ride is conducted in Normandy. The resources contained in this handbook are sufficient for a leader-guided presentation, war-gaming, role-playing and tactical exercises without troops.

Approaches to Delivering the Activity

Staff ride team leaders will need to decide upon the specific approach required, given the circumstances at the time. The staff ride can be conducted in two basic ways, using either (1), the Socratic method (team leaders [uniformed members/PhDs/civilian historians] narrate the event and the participants ask questions) or, (2), the role-playing method (participants are assigned roles as different commanders early in the preparation phase). The differences between the two methods are important. In the Socratic method, the team leader describes events and decisions as they *actually* occurred, and participants primarily absorb the material. In the role playing method, the selected participants describe what *could* happen based on their own estimates. Role playing can be limited to simple discussion, but a more advanced method includes the requirement to conduct estimates and prepare orders. The team leaders can choose to situate the staff ride in 1944 or in the present. If the objective is to practise military staffs, the minimum essential doctrine required to maximize the Worthington Force Staff Ride is as follows:

B-GL-335-001/FP-001, *Decision-Making and Planning at the Tactical Level*

B-GL-321-005/FP-001, *Battle Group in Operations*

Considerations in the Preparation of the Staff Ride

- Objective to be achieved.
- Number of participants.
- Rank and experience level.
- Time of year in Normandy.

Methodology for Delivering the Staff Ride / Virtual Staff Ride

Regardless of the chosen approach—Socratic or role-playing—the three basic stages of delivery are orientation, description and analysis.

Orientation

Proper orientation at each stand (if conducted in Normandy) is essential for understanding time and space and the flow of events. Christening the ground includes identifying cardinal points, features and distances between key features such as villages, towns, rivers and elevations. While the team leader will usually do the orientation, the participants should be encouraged to do it, depending on the chosen approach. In a VSR, the participants should be encouraged to come right up to the screen or use a laser pointer.

Description

In the Socratic method, the team leader will spend considerably more time describing the action at the stand. In a role-playing activity, the team leader will provide a brief description and then let the role players take over, injecting corrective guidance and value-added commentary as necessary and when appropriate.

Analysis

The analysis will be primarily devoted to understanding the cause and effect relationships inherent in the unfolding of the Worthington Force story. However, if time allows, team leaders should strive to have the participants discuss the relevance of the Worthington Force scenario to the modern army and identify lessons learned. Worthington Force provides the opportunity to consider many aspects of current CA doctrine, including some of the following:

- battle group concept;
- groupings and tasks;
- effectiveness of vertical and lateral reporting;
- communication failures (technological and human);
- night attack and navigation;
- location of commanders on the battlefield;
- subordinate initiative;
- reconnaissance and intelligence; and
- the fog of war.

Team leaders can select whatever methodology they wish to achieve this outcome, but a few ways to frame the discussion include the following:

- Planning processes – battle procedure/estimate/operational planning process;
- Operational functions – command, sense, act, shield and sustain; and
- Fundamentals of find, fix, strike and exploit.

Specific Guidance for the Team Leaders**General**

- Depending on the total size of the group, you may decide to create sub-groups. Smaller groups create more intimate discussions. While desirable from a management perspective, sub-groups are dependent on the availability of team leaders. Time will have to be allotted for the sub-groups to share their results with each other.

- Patently inaccurate statements should be corrected. **Example:** A role player states that a particular battalion had four companies involved in the action when, in fact, there were only three. The team leader should politely correct the inaccuracy when an opportunity presents itself without abruptly interjecting into the role player's presentation. Time should be allowed for all participants to consider the implications of the corrected information.
- Do **not** forget the NCMs. **Non-commissioned members** input can be of tremendous value in bringing forward key considerations and generating valuable discussion. Indeed, much information about NCM activity can be gleaned for the annexes.
- A VSR requires the harmonizing of three elements: (1) the team leader's talk, (2) the screen with the script/maps; and (3) the live screen with Google Earth or digital terrain elevation data. It is particularly important to rehearse the interaction of those elements.
- Avoid having Google Earth screen movement at the same time as you are talking to the group.
- While it is possible for team leaders to guide the staff ride without ever having been to Normandy, it is strongly recommended that they conduct a reconnaissance (recce) of the area. For the best learning experience, team leaders need to demonstrate a solid grasp of the locations and not waste valuable time on the ground trying to harmonize their speaking points with terrain.
- If team leaders decide to follow the stands identified in this handbook, they should verify that information by recce. Local conditions may change with urban and road construction.
- Depending on the team leaders' knowledge level of the ground in Normandy, they may wish to develop alternate stands for the delivery of the staff ride. This is highly encouraged.

Specific Guidance to Participants

- The quality of your contribution to the staff ride is directly related to the degree of your preliminary preparation.
- Do not try to dominate the discussion. Listening is a skill.
- Ask questions of other participants who have expert trade knowledge (especially the signallers!).

Specific Guidance to Role Players

- Do not regurgitate the battle narrative.
- Do not try to mimic the actual personalities of the individual you are playing. If you are playing Major Carson, for example, do not make the same decisions as he did (unless, of course, you believe that they have merit).
- Constantly ask yourself, —“What would I do?”
- Follow the principles of effective communication, brevity, clarity and conciseness.
- Develop your own “battle box” with the materials that you would need to actually prepare and deliver abbreviated orders.



Source: Library and Archives Canada PA-1136

Sherman tanks and other vehicles of the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade await the order to move, 8 August 1944.


SECTION I – OPERATION TOTALIZE

The Worthington Force Staff Ride takes place during the Normandy Campaign of 1944. General Sir Bernard Montgomery was in overall command of the invasion, and his 21 Army Group initially consisted of First US Army on the west flank and Second British Army on the east flank. Throughout June and July, Second British Army on the left flank around Caen executed a series of massive operations to gain space, shield First US Army and attract and attrite panzer divisions so that First US Army to the west could break out. Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds' 2 Canadian Corps played a central role in the large-scale operations conducted by Second Army. The American breakout, Operation COBRA, began on 25 July and, by the beginning of August, Third US Army had been committed and was simultaneously advancing south into the Brittany peninsula and to the east. First Canadian Army, commanded by General H. D. G. Crerar, became operational on 23 July and assumed command of Simonds' 2 Canadian Corps by the end of the month. At that time, Montgomery ordered Crerar to break through I SS Panzer Corps' main line of resistance (MLR) south of Caen and secure the important crossroads of Falaise to prevent the Germans from withdrawing east.

The concept of operations

General Crerar gave the critical task of breaking through I SS Panzer Corps' lines to Simonds and the operation was codenamed TOTALIZE. Simonds prepared a detailed appreciation of the problem on 30 July. He believed that I SS Panzer Corps manned two main defensive positions, one stretching from May-sur-Orne (ALLEN) to Tilly-la-Campagne (MOORE) and a second line five kilometres to the south stretching from Bretteville-sur-Laize (FAYE) to St. Sylvain (YOUNG). The position was manned by 1 SS Panzer Division (PD) "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler" right and 9 SS PD "Hohenstaufen" left, and each division had an infantry regiment forward supported by all available tanks, while the other infantry regiment worked on the rearward position. "Two 'break-in' operations," Simonds deduced, "are required to penetrate the German defence." He also anticipated that 12 SS PD "Hitler Jugend," lurking somewhere to the southeast, would counterattack his left flank.

Simonds ultimately concluded that an armoured force could only survive a direct assault on the MLR if the powerful German anti-tank guns, including the deadly 88 mm *Flugzeugabwehrkanone* (Flak) guns, were rendered ineffective by darkness. He therefore proposed a massive armoured testudo assault of multiple, tightly-packed columns of tanks leading tightly-packed columns of ad hoc armoured personnel carriers (M7 self-propelled artillery with the guns removed) carrying infantry battalions. Simonds also concluded that he needed considerable reinforcement. 2 Canadian Corps then consisted of 2 and 3 Canadian Infantry Divisions (CID), 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade (CAB)



and 4 Canadian Armoured Division (CAD), but he asked for and received the British 51 (Highland) Division and 33 Armoured Brigade (AB) and 1 Polish Armoured Division (PAD). Simonds also requested that the heavy bombers of the strategic air forces execute separate nighttime and daytime bombings on the two prepared positions.¹

Simonds' initial plan consisted of three phases. In Phase 1, RAF Bomber Command would strike five targets on both flanks of the attack just before midnight on 7 August to partially destroy the first position and protect the armoured testudos from counterattack. Then, Major-General Charles Foulkes' 2 CID and Major-General Thomas Rennie's 51 Division, each spearheaded by 2 CAB and 33 AB respectively, were to penetrate, under cover of a massive 360 gun artillery barrage, some 6,200 metres and secure the Phase 2 start line, codenamed LAUGHTON. In Phase 2, the heavy bombers of Lieutenant-General Jimmy Doolittle's Eighth United States Army Air Force (USAAF) would strike the second position at around 1300 hours on 8 August. 3 CID and 4 CAD would then penetrate the second position. The exploitation was to take place during Phase 3, when 4 CAD and 1 PAD pushed deeper toward Falaise.


By 6 August, the situation with respect to the German formations holding the positions had changed. 9 SS PD had left the area entirely, and the newly arrived 89 Infantry Division had relieved 1 SS PD, which in turn had withdrawn to Bretteville-sur-Laize.² Simonds was sufficiently influenced by the intelligence picture as he understood it to update his commanders that day on changes to the plan as "a result of the rapidly changing enemy situation." Simonds reduced the phases to two on 6 August when intelligence indicated that 1 SS PD had pulled back to the second position and that 12 SS PD could strike the corps' left flank. He told Crerar that the

only change he intended to make in his basic plan, in view of the Intelligence lately received ... was to employ both 4 Cdn and Polish Armd Divs in Phase II, 3 Cdn Inf Div following up the advance of these two Armoured Divisions. If conditions proved favourable, he would therefore be in a position to exploit in the direction of FALAISE on D plus 1, instead, as previously planned, [the] night before D plus 2.³




I SS Panzer Corps

SS-Obergruppenführer Josef 'Sepp' Dietrich




12 SS Panzer Division

Battle Groups, 8 August 1944



Retained Under Meyer's Command



Unknown to Simonds, 1 SS PD had not just pulled back to the second position but had left the area entirely to participate in Operation LÜTTICH, Hitler's desperate gamble to disrupt Third US Army's lines of communications around Mortain. The wild card remained 12 SS PD, which was not, in fact, concentrated for a blow against Simonds' left flank but was scattered across the entire front to compensate for the departure of 1 and 9 SS PDs.⁴

Operation TOTALIZE Phase 1

Following Bomber Command's strike, the armoured testudos penetrated through to the artillery positions of 89 Division and by 0600 hours on 8 August, 2 CID, 51 Division and their armoured brigades had secured their objectives (See Map 1). The armoured brigades now sat for almost eight hours while Major-General George Kitching's 4 CAD and Major-General Stanislaw Maczek's 1 PAD approached the Phase 2 start line and prepared for a forward passage of lines (FPOL).


While the Phase 1 forces consolidated, 12 SS PD began preparations for counterattack. SS-Oberführer Kurt Meyer went to Cintheaux (MORGAN) on the Caen–Falaise highway (NEAGLE) very early and reflected that

The massed tanks [2 CAB and 33 AB] almost take our breath away. We cannot understand the Canadians' behaviour. Why does this overwhelming tank force not pursue the attack? Why does the Canadian command give us the time and opportunity to take counter measures? ... Nothing could have prevented the Canadians from taking Falaise that evening.

12 SS PD was conducting what the Canadian Army today calls adaptive dispersed operations (ADO). The weakened division was widely dispersed to cover the Caen–Falaise highway and block the British bridgeheads on the Orne River to the west. As the 12 Corps intelligence summary noted, at this critical moment 12 SS PD was largely committed "on the wrong side of the LAIZE [River]."⁵ Meyer decided to hold the Caen–Falaise highway at Cintheaux with forces already in place and make a surprise attack east of the highway with all available forces to "confuse the enemy's plan." Forces immediately available included Battle Group Waldmüller (SS-Sturmabführer Hans Waldmüller, commander 1 Battalion/25 SS-PGR), reinforced with the Panthers of 1 Battalion/12 SS Panzer Regiment and augmented by the Tigers of 3 Company/101 SS Heavy Panzer Battalion, the Corps and Division Escort Companies, and elements of 12 SS-Panzerjäger Regiment. Waldmüller was to assemble around Bretteville-le-Rabet (SPARKS), covered by a 12 SS-Flak Battalion anti-tank screen straddling the highway, and attack toward the hills south of St. Aignan-de-Cramesnil (STONE). The Corps Escort Company was to advance on the right and the Division Escort Company was to advance from Estrées-la-Campagne (BAXTER) towards the hills west of St. Sylvain (YOUNG). 12 SS-Panzer Artillery Regiment was to support from the Caen–Falaise road. 1 Company/12 SS-Panzerjäger Regiment moved towards Garcelles-Secqueville.

Meyer also recalled Battle Groups Krause (SS-Sturmabführer Bernard Krause commander, 1 Battalion/26 SS-PGR) and Wünsche (SS-Obersturmbannführer Max Wünsche, commander 12 SS Panzer Regiment) fighting around the British bridgeheads on the Orne River and Reconnaissance Group Olboeter (SS-Sturmabführer Erich Olboeter, commander 3 Battalion/26 SS-PGR) even further west of the Orne. Battle Group Krause was to occupy the high ground west of Potigny (CAGNEY) and defend between the Laison and the Laize Rivers. Having just attacked 59 Division's bridgehead at Briex at 0700 hours from the east and southeast, Battle Group Wünsche was nevertheless on the move east only thirty minutes later, moving via Grainville-Longannerie (ANABELLE) up the Caen–Falaise highway, the N158, past Hautmesnil to Cintheaux.⁶

Waldmüller's counterattack commenced just after 1200 hours. 33 AB, deployed around Point 122, reported the appearance of Tigers twenty minutes later. The Tigers were commanded by the legendary tank ace Hauptsturmführer (Captain) Michael Wittmann. The Tigers advanced straight up the east side of the highway and drove into a kill zone covered by the Phase 1 armoured brigades. Wittmann's Tiger 007 was destroyed, either by Canadian or British tanks, astride the highway just east of Gaumesnil (LANDI) just before 1300 hours.




Wünsche





SS-Obersturmbannführer
Max Wünsche Commander
12 SS Panzer Regiment

SS-Sturmbannführer
Bernard Krause Commander
1 Battalion / 26 SS-PGR




Olboeter

SS-Sturmbannführer Eric Olboeter
Commander 12 SS Recce Regiment



Waldmüller


SS-Sturmbannführer Hans Waldmüller
Commander 25 SS Panzergrenadier Regiment





4 Canadian Armoured Division

Major-General George Kitching



Major S. V. Radley-Walters of 27 Canadian Armoured Regiment (CAR) (Sherbrooke Fusiliers) or Trooper Joe Eakins of 1 Northamptonshire Yeomanry (1 NYEO) killed Wittmann. The other four Tigers with Wittmann were also summarily dispatched by direct gunfire. By this time, Battle Group Waldmüller was very close to the Phase 2 start line—LAUGHTON. While Bomber Command's strike had been fairly accurate, the Eighth Air Force bombing that began just before 1300 hours was inaccurate in several instances and inflicted significant damage on Canadian and Polish formations well back up the Caen–Falaise highway.

Operation Totalize Phase 2

Just before 1400 hours, 1 PAD crossed the start line with two armoured regiments up, but Lieutenant-Colonel Franciszek Skibinski, the deputy commander of 10 Armoured Cavalry Brigade (ACB), witnessed a “curtain of fire” strike the left flank of the brigade. The Poles were probably struck from both flanks almost simultaneously and lost at least twenty-six Shermans in a matter of minutes. The commander of the lead squadron of 2 Armoured Regiment (AR) reported that one of his tanks was on fire, then three, then said, “My whole first line is on fire. Am I to advance?”⁷ The Polish advance culminated almost immediately in the face of the fierce German fire. To the west, 4 CAD’s lead battle group, “Halpenny Force,” consisting of 22 CAR and the Lake Superior Regiment (LSR) of Brigadier Eric Leslie Booth’s 4 CAB, did not cross LAUGHTON until almost 1430 hours. The FPOL had been hindered by traffic congestion on the Caen–Falaise highway and routes to the west. Halpenny Force was almost immediately blocked at Cintheaux (MORGAN), and the war diarist noted that progress south “was impossible since it was open ground covered by 88 [mm] fire.” Halpenny Force never advanced much further than Cintheaux during the rest of the day, despite the continual urgings of Brigadier Booth.

Brigadier Booth Pushes Lieutenant-Colonel Halpenny, Phase 2

Time	From	To	Message
1504	Booth	Halpenny	"If you have no opposition you must push on."
1617	Booth	Halpenny	"You are reporting NO opposition so push on."
1700	Booth	Halpenny	"Advance must continue immediately."
1702	Booth	Halpenny	"What is hold up?"
1736	Booth	Halpenny	"Put SUNRAY on set. Get SUNRAY immediately."
1744	Booth	Halpenny	"Get on with it, too slow."
1830	Control	22 CAR	"Is your Sunray there yet?"

Tempo and armoured operations at night

By the early evening of 8 August, the Phase 2 armoured divisions had made virtually no progress down the trace, and Simonds realized that he was losing momentum. Angered by the lack of progress, and under pressure from both Crerar and Montgomery, Simonds decided to continue the attack during the night. The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps (RCAC) was not comfortable with night operations. Doctrine stressed that armoured regiments should go into harbour during the night for maintenance and refueling. In "exceptionally favourable conditions," however, an armoured attack at night may achieve surprise and "may have far reaching effects."⁸ At 2000 hours, half an hour after sunset, Kitching issued orders for the continuation of the attack at the HQ of 10 Canadian Infantry Brigade (CIB) just north of Rocquancourt (PLUTO). Even then, the regiments of 4 CAB were harbouring along the highway. The scene was thus set for Worthington Force's fateful advance into the dark.

NOTES

1. Simonds, Operation TOTALIZE Appreciation, 1 August 1944, LAC, Crerar Papers (CP), Vol. 2, File 958C.009(D40).
2. First Cdn Army Intelligence Log, 6 August, sheet 2, serial 9 (0900 hours); sheet 3, serial 12, (0900 hours), LAC, RG 24, C17, Vol. 13,645.
3. Brigadier Churchill C. Mann, Memo of Telephone Conversation Between C of S First Cdn Army, Speaking From HQ Bomber Command and Comd First Cdn Army, Commencing at 1213 Hours 6 Aug 44, LAC, CP, Vol. 2, File 958C.009(D40).
4. 2 Canadian Corps Intelligence Summary No. 25, 5 August 1944 [signed at 0400 hours on 6 August], DHH, File 112.3M1009 (D114).
5. 12 Corps Intelligence Summary No. 33, 8 August 1944, National Archives, WO 171/310.
6. Norbert Számvéber, *Waffen-SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of SS Panzer Regiment 12 and SS Panzerjäger Abteilung 12, Normandy 1944* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2012), 125; Hubert Meyer, *The History of the 12 SS-Panzerdivision "Hitlerjugend"* (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 1994), 172.
7. Quoted in P.A. Szudek, "The First Polish Armoured Division in the Second World War," in Peter D. Stachura, ed., *Themes of Modern History: Proceedings of a Symposium on 28 March 1992 in Honour of the Centenary of General Stanislaw Maczek* (Glasgow: The Polish Social and Educational Society, 1992), 35–59; 10 ACB Log, 8 August 1944, sheet 2; Major Jan Marowski, *With the Tanks of the 1st Polish Armoured Division* (Hengelo, Holland: H.L. Smit & Zn, 1946), 59.
8. War Office, *Military Training Pamphlet No. 63, The Co-operation of Tanks with Infantry Divisions*, May 1944, p. 20.

SECTION II – WORTHINGTON’S PLANNING

Brigadier Booth’s O Group, 2330, 9 August
(British Columbia Regiment (BCR) Harbour – Lorguichon)

Brigadier Booth held his Orders Group (O Group) just before midnight and explained that his concept of operations was basically the same as the division’s original plan for 8 August (see Appendix A), but with altered unit tasks. 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade (4 CAB) Control (Major A. G. Chubb) had attempted to give radio orders at approximately 2130, but communications were very poor.¹ In Phase 1, “Halpenny Force” would first seize Bretteville-le-Rabet (SPARKS). Booth appears to have directed Halpenny to get moving as soon as possible after midnight, and no later than 0130 on 9 August. In the event, this would prove impossible. In Phase 2, “Worthington Force,” another combined arms battlegroup, would then pass through Halpenny and seize and hold Point 195 (LOMBARDO) until follow-on forces arrived to reinforce it. The Phase 2 area was broken down into three sub-objectives and the units assigned to each were as follows:

Objective	Unit
2a Point 151 (St. Hillaire Farm) – CHRISTMAS	21 CAR
2b Point 180 – NEW YEARS	22 CAR
2c Point 195 – LOMBARDO	28 CAR (Worthington Force)

Once 4 CAB had consolidated on the Phase 2 objective, it would push on with Phase 3, the capture of Point 206 (SNOW).²

What route Booth expected Worthington to follow is unknown. However, the 4 CAB war diary does contain a trace with an arrow bypassing Bretteville-le-Rabet to the east with the words “Route Supposedly Taken by 28 CAR.”³

Worthington’s O Group – 0130, 9 August (BCR Harbour – Lorguichon)



LCol Don Worthington

Worthington’s notes for this period have not survived. His O Group statements have been pieced together from the recollections of Major Carson (Appendix D), Major Monk (Appendix I), Lieutenant Biddlecombe (Appendix M) and Captain Searle (Appendix P).

Major John H. Carson, OC B Squadron/28 CAR, went to see Worthington at 2330, 8 August, and received a warning order for Hill 195. Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Hay was just bringing the Algonquin Regiment into Worthington’s harbour at Lorguichon. Worthington then departed for Booth’s O Group in the BCR harbour just before midnight, while Carson returned to his squadron and issued his own warning order at 0015. Booth’s O Group ended at approximately 0100, and Major Lyle Monk (OC B Company) recalled that Worthington and Hay crawled out of Booth’s command tank and Worthington immediately held his own O Group just a few yards away, probably as soon as 0130.

Lieutenant James T. Jenkinson, Worthington’s Intelligence Officer (IO), noted that as Worthington left the Brigade O Group he was clearly not happy with the mission that Booth had given him and “commented quietly and off the record about the changes in the original plan. He recounted the Principles of War and how so many of them had been violated and that we would need luck if we were to ‘bring it off.’” Captain Searle, however, indicated that Worthington was nevertheless confident of success while giving the battlegroup orders.




4 Canadian Armoured Brigade Group

Brigadier Eric L. Booth




BM: Major A.G. Chubb
GSO 2: Captain H.E. Mackenzie
DAA & QMG: Major H.H.A. Parker
GSO III: Captain A.M. James
SC: Captain C.M. Paradis

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'Worthington Force'

Lieutenant-Colonel Don Worthington



SITUATION

(From Major Monk's Account – Appendix I)

"[T]he attacks have gone well today. The enemy is disorganized – the higher command intend to take advantage of the situation and push on [T]he Poles will be operating on our left. We will likely be beyond our artillery support, but may have some air co-operation."

Each of the factors Worthington mentioned (according to Major Monk) – the enemy, Polish intentions, artillery support and air support – are addressed in more detail below.

Intelligence


The extant intelligence that Worthington may or may not have had access to is contained in Appendix R. Worthington had no idea that Reconnaissance Group Olboeter was just then deploying around Point 195. During the night of 8/9 August, 2/12 SS Panzer Regiment, with the remaining three Tigers from Whittmann's 101 SS Heavy Panzer Battalion, withdrew from south of Hautmesnil to Soignolles. 5 and 7 Companies of 2/12 SS Panzer Regiment, fighting with Battle Group Waldmüller, were to establish positions on the northern outskirts of Soignolles.⁴ Worthington could not have known that III Flak Corps had established an 88-mm tank trap south of Langannerie (ANNABELLE), having exchanged positions with 12 SS Flak Battalion.⁵

Obviously missing are the relevant intelligence reports from 4 CAD and 4 CAB. Kitching's headquarters did not issue an intelligence summary for 8 August. The most recent one issued prior to that had been No. 4, up to 1200, 7 August.⁶ 4 CAB's intelligence report covering the period up to 2300, 8 August, has not been found. What Booth's Intelligence Officer (IO), Captain H. E. Mackenzie, actually said during the brigade O Group is unknown. As a minimum, however, Booth expected Mackenzie to conduct a rigid check of vehicle claims by units so that corps and higher "are able to give reasonable assessments of enemy t[an]k strengths."⁷ Mackenzie most likely would have had Defence overprints and going maps issued for 8 August.


Reconnaissance might have improved Worthington's enemy (red) situational awareness, but the available reconnaissance assets were inactive. 18 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (CACR), under Kitching's command and headquartered at Gaumesnil, did not conduct medium reconnaissance while the planning for Point 195 proceeded.⁸ 29 Canadian Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (29 CARR), Kitching's organic reconnaissance unit, had a squadron sitting as far south as Hautmesnil and could have conducted close reconnaissance, but it was under command of 10 CIB and could not be tasked by Booth. Divisional reconnaissance units existed to provide the division commander with intelligence as efficiently as possible. However, doctrine stated that a divisional reconnaissance unit "should not be used on night operations without good reason. It was not designed for working at night, and normally uses the hours of darkness for rest and administrative purposes. The very characteristics that are of such value during the day tell against it heavily at night. Its great mobility and fire power become practically useless." At night such units would be reduced to driving straight down the road, and the reality was that they "[would] seldom gain good information without having to fight."⁹ There is no indication that Worthington sent his own Reconnaissance Troop (11 Stuart light tanks) out to conduct close reconnaissance or even mark the route.

Polish Intentions

Worthington's friendly (blue) situational awareness was not much better than his enemy situational awareness. He had no idea when 10 ACB, the Polish formation closest to his east flank, would start advancing. Even Maczek was unsure and, given the casualties sustained during the day, he intended to probe forward cautiously with reconnaissance leading 10 ACB. Mutual support between 10 ACB and 4 CAB was illusory because 10 ACB's objective, Point 140, was some 6 kilometres east of Point 195.¹⁰






The Battle Lorry Concept



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Artillery Support

Worthington certainly expected to have artillery support at some point, but he did not indicate when. Given the location of divisional artillery at the time, it could support him perhaps 2 kilometres beyond the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) at Hautmesnil (ROBSON), and 11 Medium Regiment (5.5-inch/140-mm guns) could support him for a few kilometres more, but not on Point 195 or beyond it (see Map 9).



Worthington had the services of five forward observation officers (FOO), one from British 11 Medium Regiment and two each from 19 and 23 Self-Propelled Regiments.

Air Support

The air support procedures can be found in Appendix U. The Visual Control Post (VCP) Royal Air Force (RAF) officer was tasked with supporting 4 CAB on 9 August.¹¹ The VCP, however, was not part of Worthington's column. The exact location of the VCP (a Sherman tank) is unclear, but it was probably close to Booth's headquarters. The only way for Worthington to get air support was by relaying the request back to the Air Support Signals Unit (ASSU) Tentacle located at Booth's main brigade headquarters, or if the request was intercepted by the VCP.

Weather Forecast

One factor that Worthington does not appear to have considered was the weather. 11 Canadian Meteorological Section issued a forecast at 1815, 8 August calling for cloud with occasional rain or drizzle after midnight. Visibility was expected to decrease to one to two miles.¹² The moon was only in its first quarter at the time, and doctrine stressed that unless there was bright moonlight, "tank commanders tend to lose direction" and that even with it the enemy would have adequate warning of their approach through noise and silhouette.¹³ General Hans Eberbach, Commander of Fifth Panzer Army, was nevertheless very nervous about the moon conditions: "I have trepidations that the enemy will push further to the South [from Grainville-Langannerie] as there is moonlight."¹⁴

MISSION

(From Major Carson's Account – Appendix D)

Worthington's mission statement did not follow modern practice, but based on Major Carson's account it was probably similar to this:

"The battlegroup will seize Point 195 and retain it until reinforced by 21 and 22 CARs."

Execution

Concept of Operations

Intent

Seize and hold Hill 195 (LOMBARDO) until relieved/reinforced by friendly troops.

Scheme of Manoeuvre

(From Monk's Account – Appendix I)

"We will move out of this harbour, cross the highway at Cintheaux, pass through the Lake Superiors who are dug in at this point, advance south on the east side of the highway, taking advantage of ground until opposite the objective, then re-cross the highway and assault the hill from the southeast" (see Air Photo 1).

(From Major Carson's Account – Appendix D)

"To adv[ance] south some 400 to 600 yds, east and parallel to the Caen–Falaise highway; by-pass BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET; swing west across the highway near Pt. 132; and with the Caen–Falaise highway on the east, continue the adv south to Hill 195."

(From Lieutenant Biddlecombe's Account – Appendix M)

"to move south on the FALAISE road to a point just south of CINTHEAUX, where they will swing off the road so as to by-pass BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET on the left [east]."

(From Captain Searle's Account – Appendix P)

"[H]is orders were for the regiment to make a quick thrust southwards, to the large village of BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET [SPARKS], smash up German equipment and disorganize the whole area of the village. Having completed this task, to push on further south, occupy a high feature some three or four miles from BRETTEVILLE-SUR-LAIZE [FAYE], and hold it until our main body could break through."

Neither Carson nor Monk specifically stated that Worthington intended to bypass Bretteville-le-Rabet to the east, but Lieutenant Biddlecombe did. The original division orders (see Appendix A) stated that 4 CAB was to bypass Cintheaux and Hautmesnil to the east, but did not indicate a bypass of Bretteville-le-Rabet. Worthington may also have been restricted to moving east of NEAGLE (Caen–Falaise highway) because the Corps had established a primary tank track (RATHBONE) that ran through Bretteville-le-Rabet to St. Quentin (DURBIN). However, an alternate Corps tank track west of NEAGLE wove its way south towards Point 195.¹⁵

Main Effort

Worthington did not explicitly state a main effort.

End State

(From Major Carson's Account – Appendix D)

The battlegroup holding Point 195 regardless of casualties.

Groupings and Tasks

Worthington Force was a combined arms battlegroup based on the three armoured squadrons of 28 CAR and three companies and RHQ of the Algonquin Regiment. A Company and Support Company did not take part in the action. The armoured squadrons and infantry companies were grouped like modern combat teams, with the three infantry companies under operational command of the three armoured squadrons. Worthington Force was organized as an Advance Guard (C Squadron/C Company), Main Guard (B Squadron/B Company) and Rear Guard (A Squadron/D Company), each based on a combat team. There was no reconnaissance screen in front of the Advance Guard. Two sections of mortars were placed in B Company. No M-10 tank destroyers were taken from 5 Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment. Lieutenant Biddlecombe was tasked with guiding the battlegroup out of the harbour and then catching up with RHQ. The remaining 10 tanks of Reconnaissance Troop were tasked with following the Rear Guard and were designated as left out of battle (LOB). An officer from 28 CAR, apparently operating from a scout car, was tasked with acting as rear R/T link with 4 CAB Control. The Administrative Report Centre (ARC), commanded by RSM Ralph Jay, was to position itself for immediate replenishment of the Fighting (F) Echelon at Gaumesnil (LANDI), while the A1 Echelon, commanded by Major Eric Barlow, was farther up the highway.

The F Echelon of Worthington Force consisted of some 100 vehicles. All soft-skinned vehicles were left behind, making Worthington Force entirely mechanized. In order to make the Algonquins mechanized, all available half-tracks were withdrawn from division sources and used as troop carrying vehicles (TCV).¹⁶ D Company was given only two half-tracks, and the bulk of its infantry had to ride on T-16 Universal Carriers.

Battle Procedure

A fundamental of battle procedure – which still applies today – was that, of the time available, superiors should minimize their own to maximize that of their subordinates. Worthington had perhaps thirty minutes to look at his map and develop a plan prior to issuing orders. Booth had trained his regimental and squadron commanders to do rapid mental appreciations, and Worthington's skill in this regard was severely tested in his first combat action.¹⁷ His squadron commanders had virtually no time to prepare, as H-Hour was set for 0230. Major Monk stated,

The platoon commanders and I took a quick look at the map by flashlight under a blanket held down over our heads by our runners. We located the objective. Orders were very brief – laying on of the company order of march, and the stressing that direction would be maintained during darkness by contact. I don't think the platoon commanders had enough time to give their NCOs more than the briefest of orders as they piled into their vehicles.

Battle Procedure, 8–9 August

- 2000 Booth withdraws 4 CAB into harbour
Kitching's O Group
- 2355 Booth's Brigade O Group
- 0015 Squadron OCs issue Warning Orders
- 0100 Booth's O Group ends
- 0130 Worthington's O Group
- 0230 OCs conduct O Groups
H-Hr
- 0315 Halpenny Force's H-Hr



Top right: Major Carson, OC B Sqn
Bottom, left to right: Major Baron, OC C Sqn, Major Sidenius, OC A Sqn, Colonel Whyte and Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington

Source: British Columbia Regiment (BCR) Archives

NOTES

1. 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade Operations/Intelligence Log, 8 August 1944, sheet 5, serial 112, LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 14,052.
2. 22 Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary, August 1944, Appendix 24 [Traces], LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 14,260.
3. 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade War Diary, August 1944, Appendix 11 [Traces], LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 14,052.
4. Norbert Számvéber, *Waffen-SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 and SS-Panzerjäger Abteilung 12, Normandy 1944* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2012), 127.
5. Historical Section (General Staff) Army Headquarters, Report No. 50, The Campaign in North-West Europe: Information from German Sources, 14 Oct 1952, p. 105, DHH.
6. Appendices to War Diary G Branch 4 Cdn Armd Div, August 1944, LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 13,789.
7. 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade Training Instruction No. 1, Reporting of Enemy Casualties, 31 Jul 44, 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade War Diary, July 1944, Appendix 8, LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 14,051.
8. 18 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (12 Manitoba Dragoons) War Diary, 9 August 1944, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 14,248.
9. The War Office, *Military Training Pamphlet No. 60, The Tactical Employment of Armoured Car and Reconnaissance Regiments, Part 4, The Reconnaissance Regiment*, March 1944, pp. 2, 6.
10. First Canadian Army Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 1, serial 4, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,624.
11. 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade War Diary, 9 August 1944 LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 14,051; Main Headquarters 2nd Canadian Corps, Op TOTALIZE – AIR PROGRAMME, 7 Aug 44, 8-1/Ops, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,625; 1 Canadian Air Support Signals Unit Signals Instruction [no number, but obviously No. 1, as No. 2 follows on 8 August], 7 Aug 44, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 14,983.
12. 11 Canadian Meteorological Section, 1815 hours, 8 August 1944, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 10,800, File 225C.023(D23).
13. The War Office, *Military Training Pamphlet No. 63, The Co-operation of Tanks with Infantry Divisions*, May 1944, p. 20.
14. Information from German Sources, p. 106.
15. RCE 3 Cdn Inf Div Operation Order No. 1, Totalize, 7 August 1944, [Appendix] Operation Totalize, 3 Cdn Inf Div Engineers Route Responsibility, LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 14,697.
16. A & Q Branch, HQ 4 Canadian Armoured Division War Diary, 8 August 1944, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,793; Vehicle Summary, 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary, Appendix 1a, n.d., LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 12,292.
17. Appendix B to 4 Cdn Armd Bde Trg Instr No. 28, d/23 Mar 44, Pro-forma of Immediate Mental Appreciation and Orders, To be practiced by all ranks until it becomes a drill, LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 14,051.



Source: Library and Archives Canada PA132904

SECTION III — A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF WORTHINGTON FORCE


Sometime during the early morning hours of 9 August, 18 CACR, headquartered at Gaumesnil (LANDI), sent out a squadron to the southwest and another due east to establish contact with 1 PAD. As Worthington Force prepared to move, 4 CAB Control reported at 0200 that communications with the regiments were still poor. At approximately 0230, the Advance Guard of Worthington Force, led by Major Tom Baron's C Squadron, departed the harbour at Lorguichon guided by Lieutenant Arthur "Biddy" Biddlecombe, commander of the Reconnaissance Troop, and slowly moved down the Caen–Falaise highway with no lights. Worthington's RHQ took up position between C Squadron and C Company. Almost immediately, the tank of the 11 Medium Regiment FOO, Captain M. A. Searle, broke down, and Major Carson stopped to pick him up.

The integrity of the Worthington Force column was disrupted very early as elements of Halpenny Force, probably No. 2 Squadron, moved onto the road and got between the Advance and Main Guards. Halpenny's lead elements clearly left later than initially planned, perhaps as late as 0315.¹ Carson had moved off the road to the east only a short distance south of Lorguichon. The Advance Guard passed 4 CAB Control at Gaumesnil (LANDI), and at approximately 0400 it halted to deal with fire from west of Cintheaux (MORGAN), which was held by the Lake Superior Regiment (LSR). Carson's B Squadron came up on the east side of the village to avoid the engagement. While halted east of Cintheaux, Major Geoffrey Sidenius (A Squadron/28 CAR came up east of B Squadron. Carson could see Halpenny Force going by on the highway, and he dismounted to hold a short conference with Sidenius and Lieutenants Bruce Wilson (2 Troop), John Scudamore (3 Troop) and John Stock (4 Troop). Lieutenant J. O. Stevens (1 Troop) was leading the squadron and does not appear to have been present. According to Lieutenant Scudamore, Carson decided to "bypass well to the left of Cintheaux and push on" and Major Sidenius agreed to follow him. At that very early stage of the advance, Worthington Force appears to have been split into two distinct columns (see Map 7 and Air Photo 2).

Worthington's Decision at Bretteville-le-Rabet

At 0430, Brigadier Booth's Armoured Command Vehicle (ACV) - 1 took up a new position on the high ground at Point 122 south of Lorguichon. The Advance and Main Guards began moving once more at that moment, probably on separate but parallel paths. The Advance Guard and Halpenny Force converged on Bretteville-le-Rabet (SPARKS) at roughly the same time, and Baron's C Squadron soon began taking fire from the northern outskirts of the village.

Engagement Ranges



The logs indicate that Halpenny reported arriving at SPARKS at around 0530, and a few minutes later Control asked Worthington for his position “in relation to completing phase 2.” Worthington replied that he was halted at SPARKS and was trying to ascertain whether it was occupied by the enemy.

At some point Carson heard Worthington tell Baron over the radio to “try and go up the left hand side of the r[oa]d. Maj Baron reported that there was h[ea]vy enemy fire from this direction too; the CO told him to push on immediately or he was coming through himself with RHQ. He said we were losing the surprise and it would soon be daylight.” Worthington appears to have considered waiting for Halpenny to clear the village, but not for long; the war diary recorded Worthington’s direction as “Move on now anyway, while we still have surprise,” to which Baron replied, “‘Will go [all] out’ and proceeded fwd.” Unfortunately, Baron did not indicate which direction he ultimately took, an omission which leaves the possibility that he pushed through between Bretteville-le-Rabet and Grainville-Langannerie (ANNABELLE) and did not bypass Bretteville-le-Rabet to the east. Indeed, the context of Carson’s comments and Baron’s radio exchange with Worthington suggest that the Advance Guard was not as far east as the Main Guard at that point. Nevertheless, several participants, including Biddlecombe, indicated that Worthington had always intended to bypass the village to the east, and their recollections cannot be discounted.

The Main Guard Loses Direction

Near Hautmesnil (ROBSON) and just south of Caucourt (LESLIE), Lieutenant Stevens (1 Troop) appears to have moved farther to the east, possibly to avoid enemy fire from SPARKS and from Battle Group Klein at Hautmesnil, which was moving east across the Caen–Falaise road before dawn to join 25 SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment (PGR) around Soignolles.² It is possible that the Main Guard passed behind the tail end of the withdrawal by Waldmüller and Klein. What seems reasonably certain is that Stevens moved over into the Polish sector and soon crossed the Chemin Haussé du duc Guillaume, an old Norman road that intersected the Caen–Falaise highway at Cintheaux and ran southeast on a bearing of 133 degrees to the Laison River. Stevens’s 1 Troop, as well as the rest of the Main Guard, likely mistook the Chemin Haussé for the Caen–Falaise highway: air photos clearly show a hard right (southeasterly) turn immediately upon crossing the old Norman road (see Air Photo 3). What the photos do not reveal is *which* sub-units actually went that way. The entire Worthington Force column, with the Advance Guard in the lead, could have followed that route, but it seems reasonably clear that the integrity of the column had already been broken. Indeed, Monk stated that the Main Guard “went like hell” in a southeast direction towards Soignolles (HUTTON), an action that “*put our group in the lead*” [emphasis added]. There seems little doubt that the Main and Rear Guards crossed the Chemin Haussé, but the Advance Guard may have taken a different route, possibly closer to Bretteville-le-Rabet.

2 Troop/B Squadron

During B Squadron’s push to the southeast, Lieutenant Wilson, 2 Troop, indicated that he had lost contact with Stevens on the Chemin Haussé less than a mile southeast of Cintheaux, and he took over navigation for B Squadron at approximately 0545. Wilson, however, lost sight of the Advance Guard almost immediately, if he had ever had it. He further claimed that a little more than a mile northeast of Bretteville-le-Rabet, while still on the Chemin Haussé, he swung to the right (southwest) “heading directly for Pt. 195” and quickly lost communications with Carson. Wilson appears to have re-oriented onto the correct axis on his own, but Carson’s version of events was different.

Estrées-la-Campagne

The Main Guard continued down the Chemin Haussé for perhaps 2 kilometres before Carson halted due east of Estrées-la-Campagne (BAXTER). It was probably around 0600, as visibility had begun to improve. He was taking fire from the village and immediately started to engage it. Monk’s B Company had become temporarily disconnected from B Squadron while trying to get its T-16 carriers through a wood line just east of the Chemin Haussé and very close to Rénemesnil (AMECHE). When Monk finally caught up with B Squadron near Estrées-la-Campagne, he dispatched Lieutenant Claire Dutcher’s 10 Platoon to clear the village. Carson held a short conference with Monk and Major MacPherson (C Company) to determine their location. MacPherson’s presence raises

the question of how he came to be with the Main Guard when he was part of the Advance Guard following C Squadron and RHQ. According to Monk, "None of us knew where we were." Sometime during the engagement at Estrées-la-Campagne, Biddlecombe, the Recce Troop leader, finally caught up with Carson, who asked him where RHQ was. Biddlecombe did not know. Carson likely moved away some distance from the tanks, as the compasses did not work in proximity to them, and ascertained that the Caen–Falaise highway, on a bearing of 165 degrees, was to the west. He stated that during that conference, he recognized that he was too far east and sent Wilson's 2 Troop west to try to get across the highway. Wilson, however, never mentioned Carson's instructions. There is no doubt that in the slowly improving light conditions, Carson had finally corrected his navigation error and was on the verge of pushing the Main Guard back onto the proper axis. Unfortunately, Worthington, who was either ahead of Carson on the Chemin Haussé or closer to Bretteville-le-Rabet, was coming to a different conclusion.

Worthington's Disorientation

At 0538, ACV-1 broadcast that positions were "urgently required." Just after 0600, 4 CAB Control told Worthington to check his position. At 0624, only 20 minutes before sunrise, Worthington reported in the clear that he was just south of Bretteville-le-Rabet. The grid given may indeed have been correct and indicated that RHQ had either successfully looped around Bretteville-le-Rabet in a tight arc in the 50 minutes since Worthington had reported being at SPARKS, or pushed through between that village and Grainville-Longpre. At that point, Brigadier Booth may have thought that Worthington was generally on course and would swing west across the highway shortly. If Worthington was in fact where his 0624 sitrep indicated, he was only 1 kilometre from the Caen–Falaise highway. However, during the next half-hour he became fatally disoriented. Carson recalled hearing over the radio that Baron's lead troop did in fact attempt to cross west over the Caen–Falaise highway just south of Bretteville-le-Rabet, possibly near Point 132 as planned. The official history suggested that Worthington may have mistaken the road running east from Estrées-la-Campagne for the Caen–Falaise highway.³

At 0642 an unidentified element of 28 CAR radioed 4 CAB Control that Worthington was "ahead of me. Call you when he is able." It could have been Carson, but that cannot be proven. A minute later Worthington reported that he was 1,800 metres from the objective and was forming up for the final run to it. A distance of 1,800 metres from where he finally ended up would have placed him somewhere on an arc including the area south of Estrées-la-Campagne at the time of the call. If he was actually on the Chemin Haussé ahead of Carson, he would have been somewhere around Point 83 (see Air Photo 4). It is plausible that the Advance Guard and RHQ did not follow the Chemin Haussé du duc Guillaume. At no point did Carson or Monk ever suggest that C Squadron was ahead of them. C Company certainly was not. Monk only indicated that Worthington and RHQ eventually "came along," but he did not specify from which direction. It seems reasonable that RHQ did not suddenly appear from Carson's immediate front near the Chemin Haussé. It is evident from the recollections that Worthington recognized Carson but did not stop to discuss the situation or confirm navigation. Between 0624 and 0643, Worthington and Baron somehow got disoriented, possibly because of fire from nearby Quesnay Wood.

Occupation of High Ground

At 0651, eight minutes after reporting that he was 1,800 metres from Point 195, Worthington reported that he was on the objective and that he would hold until relieved. In fact, RHQ and C Squadron had gone astray and were close to Point 111, more than 6 kilometres east of Point 195, and in 1 PAD's area. Initially, only C Squadron and RHQ arrived together. Although Worthington reported that there was no sign of enemy occupation, C Squadron had engaged positions at the base of the hill during the run-up, forcing the HQ of 2 Battalion/12 SS Panzer Regiment to hastily redeploy to the west. B Squadron and B and C Companies were still fighting to the north, and the Rear Guard was even farther north along the Chemin Haussé. The Worthington Force column was broken up into different groups and did not snake towards Hill 111 as a single body (see Map 9 and Air Photo 4). Worthington chose to consolidate his force for the moment inside a rectangular wood line 100 yards wide by 300 yards long. The south was bounded by a wooded area, the west by a broken 7-foot hedge, the north by a thin line of tall trees and the east by a more extensive wooded area (see Air Photo 5).

4 CAB Control was not convinced of Worthington's location and immediately asked him to confirm it. Not until 0724 did Worthington answer that he would send his position as soon as possible; his response strongly implied his uncertainty. While Worthington surveyed his surroundings, B Squadron and B Company continued their engagement around Estrées-la-Campagne to the northwest. Worthington soon asked Carson what the hold-up was and ordered him to come up immediately. When Carson asked Worthington if he was on the hill "where all the smoke and fire was coming from, on the left hand side of the road," Worthington said "Yes" and told him again to "come up immediately." Although Carson was then convinced that he had corrected his navigational error, he never informed Worthington. Carson recalled Wilson's 2 Troop and moved the Main Guard up to Worthington's position. Wilson, however, heard Carson say, "Head for smoke," but the only smoke he could see was away off to his left and he "didn't consider it was ours." Wilson kept to his original path and crossed the Caen–Falaise highway. He made it to Point 151 near St. Hillaire Farm. He may have actually passed through Grainville-Langannerie, reported it clear and proceeded south to the railway. He passed very close to Quesnay Wood, where Battle Group Wünsche was concealed, and came under fire. Realizing that he was on his own, Wilson moved back across the highway towards the location where he had left B Squadron (See Map 7).

Worthington's intentions at the time are unclear, but Carson offered the tantalizing possibility that Worthington knew he was in the wrong spot at that early stage and did not intend to stay there. When Carson arrived on the position, passing by the fiercely burning German vehicles C Squadron had destroyed in its run-up, Worthington "pointed to a small woods about 500 yds further south [Thirty Acre Wood]. He said he wanted 'B' Sqn to occupy that, so that the enemy could not form up behind it and attack his present position. *He was also going to use it for a firm base for the next move towards Hill 195 [emphasis added].*" Worthington's understanding of the objective's location is problematic because, according to Lieutenant Jenkins, the IO, the woods commanded the forward slope of the main feature. This implies that Worthington thought Point 140, just a mile to the west of his location at the time, was Point 195. If that is the correct interpretation, taking Thirty Acre Wood made sense. However, it made little sense if Worthington thought Point 195 was 6 kilometres to the west.

Biddlecombe finally caught up with Worthington on Point 111 shortly before 0700 but had ordered Lieutenant Brooks, the Reconnaissance Troop 2IC, to hold the remainder of the troop at the Chemin Haussé–Bretteville-le-Rabet–St. Sylvain crossroads. Biddlecombe stated that Worthington "spread his map on the ground, and asked me about our location. I pointed out the location of BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET, and the church at ESTRÉES, which we could see. He then oriented his map, stating that he would have the Forward Observation Officer contact his guns for air-bursts over the fields immediately past our position." 23 Field Regiment had been ordered to move to an area south of Cintheaux at 0500, but as the division artillery war diarist noted, it "moved in error" to northwest of Bretteville-sur-Laize, which was just out of range of Point 195⁴ (see Map 9).


The Destruction of A Squadron

Sidenius's A Squadron, leading the Rear Guard, lost visual contact with the Main Guard around Point 83 due east of Estrées-la-Campagne. No. 2 Troop identified Worthington's position on the hill, but was destroyed by Tigers firing from Point 140 to the southwest. A Squadron came under intense fire at Point 83 and Major Sidenius ordered D Company to hold back until the way was clear. A Squadron, however, was in a very bad tactical position in the valley and was rapidly destroyed as it attempted to close on Worthington's position. Lieutenant John Stock, commanding 4 Troop/B Squadron, had fallen out but closed up behind A Squadron in time to witness its destruction. He recalled that these were the "first Shermans that we had actually seen destroyed in battle. ... As I watched through binoculars, the first tank that I saw hit was that of Captain Ray Tiffen, the Battle Captain. ... [H]is whole tank became a roaring torch of flame. Most of the rest of the squadron followed suit." Major Sidenius was killed and only two surviving tanks joined Worthington. Having witnessed the destruction of A Squadron, Major Keith Stirling withdrew D Company from the battle, moved back towards Bretteville-le-Rabet and linked up with the LSR. Stirling attempted to contact B and C Companies and Battalion HQ "without result." No effort was made to send a runner to 4 CAB HQ.



'Halpenny Force'

Lieutenant-Colonel William Halpenny



Shortly after Carson and Monk reinforced Worthington on the position, Typhoons appeared. They circled overhead and attacked the battlegroup, as Worthington was well south of the bomb line then in effect, which ran from Point 188 south of Quesnay Wood northeast to St. Sylvain. When recognition panels and yellow smoke were deployed, the pilots finally dipped their wings to signal friendly recognition. That should have generated an immediate contact report and a corps-wide broadcast to update the forward location of friendly troops. 4 CAB Control could have then used that information to zero in on Worthington.

The Reaction of 12 SS Panzer Division

SS-Oberführer Kurt Meyer was alerted to Worthington's presence on Hill 111 by Obersturmbannführer Bernard-Georg Meitzell, a staff officer at 12 SS headquarters who was attempting to establish contact with Battle Group Waldmüller to the east. From his headquarters at Saint Quentin south of the Laison River, Meyer, using binoculars, apparently saw the BCR fire on Meitzell and noted,

How could this enemy tank be on the hill? I am ill at ease. I dash to the phone and call [Max] Wünsche [commander of 12 SS Panzer Regiment]. Wünsche has already alerted his tanks and is waiting for the return of Obersturmbannführer Meitzell ... Meitzell reports ... 'There are no German forces on the hill, the height is occupied by enemy tanks.' An icy shock goes through my bones.

Meyer immediately drove across the river to coordinate the counterattack.⁵ They developed a plan to attack the Canadian position from the west with Tigers and from the east with a company of Panthers from 1 Panzer Battalion.

Attempts to Expand the Position

By 0800, C Squadron spotted the first Tiger tank 2,800 metres to the west and engaged it with 17-pounder Fireflies. Lieutenant Howard Armstrong (2 Troop/C Squadron) observed considerable movement some 3,000 metres to the east. Worthington then attempted to expand the perimeter by sending out Lieutenant Scudamore's 3 Troop/B Squadron to the northeast to suppress fire, probably from Battle Group Waldmüller elements near Soignolles, but the troop was partially destroyed. Monk recalled that Worthington came over to see him sometime after 0800 and "looked with his glasses back over the route we had followed. ... He was quite calm but I think concerned over the non-

arrival of the rest of our force. He told me we would stay and hold here, come what may." Incredibly, Monk also reflected that both he and MacPherson were aware that "we were not on the [right] objective ... but concluded that since we were under command [of] the BCRs ... that was not our worry." It seems apparent that the three sub-unit commanders on the hill all knew they were in the wrong spot, but did not make Worthington aware of their concerns.


At 0748, 4 CAB Control again asked Worthington for his position and received the garbled grid of 0964 as opposed to 0946. The former was up by Caen; the latter was Point 195. Only five minutes later, 4 CAD reported lead elements at Point 151 (CHRISTMAS), which was just west of Quesnay Wood and the Caen–Falaise road. That location could only have been reported by Lieutenant Wilson of 2 Troop/B Squadron, but the critical information that the rest of his squadron was east of the highway was either not relayed or was lost in transmission. 4 CAD reported at 0825 that it "firmly held" Point 195 with an armoured regiment.⁶

Between 0806 and 0841, Worthington informed Booth that he had run into the enemy and had already lost 10 tanks, including his own, and asked for artillery support. Captain Baker, the 19 Field FOO, had wireless communications with his regiment, but it, as well as 23 Field, was out of range of Point 111 and could just barely reach Point 195. 11 Medium Regiment was at Mondeville as of 0230, but it moved to just north of Secqueville-la-Campagne (HARDY) (see Map 9).⁷ The FOO, Captain Searle, did not have communications. At 0849, Brigade asked Worthington to confirm the enemy's location, to which he replied, "Same as 2 hrs ago. Approx 500 yds SE."

While artillery fell haphazardly near Point 195, B Squadron attempted to clear Thirty Acre Wood to the south at 0900 by sending out Scudamore's 3 Troop and Stock's 4 Troop, some seven tanks including Carson's and that of his Battle Captain (BC), Captain John Hope. Captain Baker again gave the battlegroup's location as Point 195 at that time, and when Brigade asked if the artillery was coming down seven minutes later it received only silence. Indeed, 4 CAB reported that they had no communications with Worthington after 0900.⁸ All of Carson's tanks were destroyed by direct gunfire or mines, and he, Scudamore and Stock were wounded. The survivors withdrew back to the main position by 0930.

Brigadier Booth's Actions

The lack of response from Worthington may have prompted Booth, at 0914, to order Lieutenant-Colonel Murray Scott to concentrate 21 CAR (Governor General's Foot Guards) at Gaumesnil (LANDI) and prepare to go to Point 195. Six minutes later, however, 4 CAD again reported Worthington on Point 195.⁹ Booth's plan had called for 21 CAR to follow up and occupy Point 151 (CHRISTMAS), and his decision to get 21 CAR ready can be interpreted in a few ways. First, since he had reports of Worthington's elements around Point 151, he may have felt it was time to send 21 CAR down to its objective. Second, he realized that Worthington was in the wrong spot.



The First Counterattack and the Withdrawal of the Wounded

The first significant attack came in at around 1000, just as 19 Field Regiment was ordered to Hautmesnil (ROBSON). Lieutenant-Colonel Hay was seriously wounded by either a mortar shell or an 88-mm round during the attack, and MacPherson (C Company), himself lightly wounded, assumed command of the Algonquin Regiment. At some point between 0930 and 1200, Worthington decided to send his growing number of wounded back in six T-16 carriers commanded by Captain D. E. Lewis, Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC). The time is in dispute, with 1000 and 1200 hours offered in the personal accounts. 1000 seems more likely, given the priority of care requirements. Monk, Brooks and Lieutenant Ken Gartley (11 Platoon) indicated 1000, while Carson (who was wounded), Jenkinson and even Meyer suggested 1200. MacPherson and Monk told Captain Lewis to report their actual position to 10 CIB HQ at Cintheaux if he got through.

The casualty column, which included Hay, Carson and Stock, withdrew northwest up the Chemin Haussé. One carrier was destroyed by an 88-mm anti-tank gun, but the column actually passed by Lieutenant Brooks, who was holding at the Chemin Haussé–Bretteville-le-Rabet–St. Sylvain crossroads with the Recce Troop's 10 remaining Stuart tanks. Brooks recalled that Stock "gave me a message from the CO to the effect that the regiment could hold the position with some assistance and also that their position was in square 0947," meaning that Worthington still believed he was actually on Point 195. Stock wanted that information passed back to 4 CAB, as he was out of contact with them. The column continued northwest and passed through the Polish 10 Mounted Rifles Regiment (MRR), which had just reported Caucourt clear at 1035. Behind it, the Polish 10 ACB was preparing to advance at 1100. The 10 MRR recognized the casualty column coming through and fired smoke to cover its withdrawal. The column appears to have reached a point near Cintheaux sometime around 1040.¹⁰

Curiously, no attempt was made to move to Bretteville-le-Rabet, where the BCR Regimental Aid Post (RAP) was to have been established. However, Hay may have been taken to the village; Halpenny would later report at 1330 that he was there. 4 CAB Control was literally 1 kilometre up the road at Gaumesnil, as was the Administrative Report Centre (ARC), led by Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) Ralph Jay. Brooks did not know where Booth's headquarters was located and decided to contact 22 CAR in Bretteville-le-Rabet, but did not indicate when. However, 22 CAR noted that it had no further contact with Worthington Force after 1000.

Direction Finding Zeroes in on Point 111

Sometime before 1200, Simonds's GSO 2, Major William Broughall, or someone on his staff, approached Captain R. S. Grant of 2 Canadian Wireless Intelligence Section and asked if his unit could ascertain whether the Germans were reacting to Worthington's attack. Grant's reply: "We are getting some reports of tank engagements away to the left and at right angles to the intended line of advance." That should have immediately raised eyebrows, but not much was made of it. At 1033, an even more tantalizing piece of information was received when 3 Canadian Wireless Intelligence Section reported intercepting a German transmission calling for artillery on Point 111, which was Worthington's position.¹¹ That critical piece of evidence was never investigated further and does not appear to have been passed on to Kitching, who was focused on Point 195 due to reports around 1000 of 24 88-mm anti-tank guns on the southern slope of the hill. That intelligence led him to direct air support there at 1055. Kitching's lack of curiosity was demonstrated when he later claimed, "We heard the thunder of gunfire over to our left, but we assumed it was connected with the Polish."¹²

Worthington Calls for the Reserve Ammunition

At 1100, Kitching's GSO 1 reported that the BCR had already lost 12 tanks.¹³ Simultaneously, RSM Jay in the ARC at Gaumesnil claimed that Worthington had contacted the A-1 Echelon to bring up the reserve ammunition. It is puzzling that the information about the destroyed tanks made its way back to the Division but the battlegroup's location did not. RSM Jay's resupply column initially proceeded down the Caen–Falaise highway; however, at some point it appears to have veered to the southeast, as it came into contact with some survivors



Source: Mike Bechhold

Escadron B, 28^e Régiment blindé du Canada (Régiment de la Colombie-Britannique), juin 1944.

of A Squadron. Here the echelon elements came under fire and a Crusader anti-aircraft (AA) tank carrying ammunition was destroyed. RSM Jay's route made sense if he was following Worthington's intention to bypass Bretteville-le-Rabet to the east.

By 1125, the advance elements of 10 ACB were on the northern outskirts of Estrées-la-Campagne and could hardly have failed to see the smoking hulls of A Squadron in the valley and the smoke from Worthington's position. Simonds went to see Kitching at 1200 and was "most anxious" that Booth get onto Point 195. However, based on the divisional situational report at 1220, Kitching clearly believed that Worthington already held the objective and intended to push the rest of 4 CAB on to Point 206 (SNOW)!¹⁴ 1 Armoured Regiment (AR) was at Cauvicourt and the Polish 24 Lancer Regiment (24 Lancers) were just south of Renésmeuil (AMECHE).

Brigadier Lane Searches for Worthington Force

At some point, probably during the afternoon, Brigadier J. N. Lane, Kitching's Commander Royal Artillery (CRA), searched for Worthington in an Auster IV Air Observation Post (AOP) but failed to find him, apparently because he could not fly south of the bomb line. There is no mention of this in the division or corps artillery logs.

Booth Appears to Zero in on Worthington Force

The Typhoons' early recognition of Worthington Force as friendly did in fact have an effect: the bomb line was altered at 1130 to pass through the southeast edge of Point 140 (see Map 10). Worthington was still south of it, but the very fact that the line had moved south in that area should have alerted someone at Brigade or Division to ask why, especially since it was a simple matter to confirm that the Poles were nowhere near that far south yet. Booth's first recorded air support request came at 1213 on targets a mile and half northeast of Point 140, almost on Worthington's position, and the northeast edge of Quesnay Wood. If Booth believed that Worthington was on 195, the need to call in air support so far east, and across the division boundary, made no sense. The VCP, wherever it was, refused Booth's request.¹⁵

At 1200, 11 Field Regiment was finally ordered to move forward to Cramensnil, one battery at a time. At 1250, Captain Baker, the 19 Field Regiment FOO with Worthington, reported that the position was being heavily shelled, but 19 Field was not in position to provide support because it had begun its move south at 1230 and was not ready to fire until 1420.¹⁶

RSM Jay claimed that he had last spoken personally to Worthington at 1415. It seems improbable that if Worthington actually thought he was in the wrong place, he would not have told Jay to report his true position. At 1420, the 21 CAR battlegroup finally began moving to reinforce Point 195, but it was blocked by heavy anti-tank and Tiger fire in the defile between Bretteville-le-Rabet and Grainville-Langannerie. RSM Jay continued to speak to Worthington's operator "several times until 1500 when all communications were lost."

Worthington Sends Back the Tanks

Lieutenant Biddlecombe claimed that at 1500 a new group of Typhoons arrived and again attacked the position. Around the same time, Worthington decided to send his remaining tanks back: "All tanks that can still run will make a dash for it; return to original FUP; use fire and movement." His decision was unfortunate, because at that very moment the Poles reported that Soignolles (HUTTON), little more than a mile northwest of Hill 111, was now held by the Polish 10 MRR, and Halpenny had completed the clearance of SPARKS.¹⁷ At the same time, the 4 CAB liaison officer (LO) with 10 ACB reported, "I spoke to Sunray Minor [Major C. E. Parrish] of 28 CAR over the air. He claims 7 tks left and withdrawn through our own positions 087549 [NE of Cintheaux]. He was asked to report here (HQ) at once." Parrish obviously had been in contact with someone, probably the A-1 Echelon, to obtain that information, but his subsequent actions are unclear. There is no evidence in the brigade log that he contacted Booth.

The surviving tanks, possibly as many as 10, which included Scudamore of 3 Troop/B Squadron, withdrew back along the Chemin Haussé, employing smoke as they went. The column halted along the way to pick up Wilson of 2 Troop/B Squadron, who had abandoned his tanks at 1300 because he was surrounded at the location where A Squadron had been destroyed. At that moment, members of the column also spoke to a Polish officer and finally withdrew to the A-1 Echelon. It seems improbable that Wilson and Scudamore could not have relayed Worthington's true position to Major Barlow or RSM Jay. The Poles had to have known which direction the tanks had come from in daylight. Incredibly, 4 CAD reported at 1525 that Worthington Force was "now doing stiff fighting" at Point 195; its location was "NOT firm" but "will follow later." Phantom (liaison officer) reported to First Canadian Army, via the GSO 2, that as of 1530 Worthington Force was "encountering hy opposition area pt. 195."¹⁸

Source: British Columbia Regiment (BCR) Archives



The End for Worthington

Leading elements of the Polish 10 ACB were now so close that Major Monk could clearly identify Sherman tanks with his binoculars. Unfortunately, the Polish 1 AR initially fired on Worthington's position. A squadron from 1 AR got to within 300 yards of the northeast corner, but the regiment sustained some 22 tank casualties trying to close on Point 140 and the Poles pulled back.¹⁹

By 1700, the end was near for Worthington. Captain Baker reported that the enemy was forming up for an attack at that time. A few minutes later, 18 CACR reported that there had been no contact with 28 CAR since before noon.²⁰ At 1720, 24 Lancers were ordered to press the attack, and two squadrons advanced from near Soignolles but were quickly blocked by six Tigers. At 1805, the Poles reported that 24 Lancers and 1 AR were blocked respectively at Soignolles and Estrées-la-Campagne by anti-tank fire, and at 1840 the Poles reported heavy anti-tank fire from Quesnay Wood to the west.²¹

In the last transmission received from Baker, he reported heavy mortaring at 1830. The Germans attacked from the southeast with infantry in waves, including elements of the newly arrived 1053 Grenadier Regiment (GR) of 85 Division. There was also intense pressure from the southwest. By then, there were only four tanks left capable of fighting. Worthington told Searle, the 11 Medium Regiment FOO, who had spent the day fighting as infantry, "Just fight on." Worthington was killed during that mortar attack when shrapnel penetrated the back of his helmet. Baron, OC C Squadron, was also hit around the same time and died on the position.

At 1930, the Poles sent a message to Kitching that was probably not well received. The message stated, “our RIGHT flank [is] being held up by enemy anti-tk guns” from the northern edge of Quesnay Wood. It was, the Poles said, “outside our bdy” and they asked, “[C]an you do anything about it[?]”²² That was the first and only communication between the two divisions recorded in the corps log during the entire day. With Worthington dead, and all the BCR squadron OCs dead or wounded, MacPherson (C Company) assumed command of the remaining forces and wanted to evacuate the position. Monk agreed, but recommended that they wait until after dark. MacPherson, however, suffering from possible shock as a result of his earlier wounds, gathered a few men and moved off the position to the northwest, where they were quickly killed. That left Monk in command. The Germans attacked again at 2000 and partially overran the position. The BCR war diary stated that the position was evacuated by 2100, but Monk stated that he finally withdrew the remaining infantry at approximately 2230, leaving many dead and wounded on the position. An hour later, Battle Group Waldmüller completed its withdrawal from Soignolles. It and 12 SS-Panzerjäger Battalion withdrew to Mazières on the Laison. At the same time, elements of 1053 GR/85 Division began occupying the hills north of the Laison.²³ Monk and the survivors crawled through gorse and wheat, headed north and reached Polish lines at Rénemesnil (AMECHE) at dawn on 10 August. The 2IC of the Algonquins, Major G. L. Cassidy, was ordered to assume command of the regiment, and he went down to Bretteville-le-Rabet and actually met with Stirling, OC D Company. Cassidy recalled that Stirling “had oriented himself fairly well on the map. We made a fairly close guess as to their location ... and sent out a small scout patrol to attempt to contact them.” Cassidy also sent out his scout troop to contact the Poles, but no contact was made.²⁴

A Communications Disaster

4 CAB’s sitrep to division at 2300 stated that “comms so essential to armd fms NOT satisfactory due to interference of nearby sta[tion]s.” The sitrep also stated that “some tk crews have returned to A-1 Ech area and it appears that the regt on coming suddenly under hy fire became separated ... the events which followed are not clear.”²⁵

The Cost of Misdirection

Worthington Force sustained 240 casualties in approximately 20 hours. Forty of the BCR’s men had been killed, including Worthington, Baron (C Squadron) and Sidenius (A Squadron). The BCR lost 47 tanks. Of the 234 officers and other ranks (OR) of the Algonquins that consolidated on the hill, 144 were killed, wounded or missing – a 62% casualty rate. Forty-five were killed, including MacPherson (C Company), and Hay was seriously wounded. 1 PAD also suffered heavily during the day: 12 SS-Panzerjäger Battalion alone claimed the destruction of 22 Polish tanks.²⁶ Despite these calamities, Worthington inflicted considerable damage on 12 SS PD during his advance and subsequent defence of Point 111. He destroyed numerous German vehicles, anti-tank guns and tanks, including Tigers, and killed many infantry. The cruelty and randomness of war was on full display when Wilson, who had survived the ordeal, was killed by a stray shell the next day; Worthington’s brother, John R. Worthington, would be killed by the Luftwaffe on 18 August. The irony of the regimental mottoes of the BCR and the Algonquins – “Clear the Way” and “We Lead, Others Follow,” was inescapable: although Worthington had gotten lost, he had indeed cleared the way, but in the wrong direction – and no one followed.

Windows of Opportunity

There were at least 15 distinct moments when the navigational error could have been discovered and exploited. The probability that all of these moments could occur seems incredibly low, yet they did. It was an extreme case of the fog of war.

1. *18 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment.* Not redirected to look for Worthington Force until late in the afternoon.
2. *No Close Recce in front of Worthington Force.* Why Worthington did not push out his own Reconnaissance Troop is a mystery.

3. *Typhoons acknowledge Worthington Force as friendly at approximately 0800.* The Typhoons should have been able to speak to the VCP with Brigadier Booth.
4. *Halpenny Force in Bretteville-le-Rabet does not report the fighting to their southeast.* By sunrise, Halpenny Force elements should have been able to discern a battle going on a mile to the southeast.
5. *Observed artillery fire.* Worthington's inability to spot the artillery should have led the brigade and the division to deduce that he was not where he said he was.
6. *Major Stirling (D Company) withdraws to Bretteville-Le-Rabet.* He tried, without success, to report the destruction of A Squadron to 4 CAB.
7. *The withdrawal of the wounded at 1000.* Up to five T-16 carriers and half-tracks made it back to the BCR A-1 Echelon. The Poles may have reported it, but there is no mention of it in 4 CAB's log.
8. *DF picks up German orders for artillery fire on Point 111 at 1033.* That critical piece of information never sparked any curiosity in the Corps or Division staffs.
9. *Worthington calls for the reserve ammunition at 1100.* Worthington's communications were sufficient to call for the resupply. The fact that RSM Jay veered to the southeast, off the centre line, suggests that he was given direction. Otherwise, RSM Jay would have moved in the direction of Point 195.
10. *The bomb line change at 1130.* The bomb line change clearly indicated that friendly troops were close to Point 111 and Point 140, one of the Polish objectives. Again, a lack of curiosity prevailed at Corps and Division.
11. *Brigadier Lane searches for Worthington in an Artillery Observation Plane.* The bomb line did not prevent Lane from investigating Point 195.
12. *RSM Jay speaks personally to Worthington for last time at 1415.* Worthington still seemed incapable of passing on his true location.
13. *The withdrawal of the tanks at 1500.* For the second time, a Worthington Force element withdrew and regained contact with the echelon.
14. *Major Parrish, BCR 2IC, knows the status of Worthington Force by 1500.*
15. *Remainder of BCR Recce Troop sits near Bretteville-le-Rabet inactive.*

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NOTES

Material sourced from Worthington Force participants is not included in the notes. Personal accounts appear in the appendices.

1. 22 Canadian Armoured Regiment War Diary, 9 August 1944, LAC, RG 24, C 3, Vol. 14,260.
2. Hubert Meyer, *The History of the 12 SS Panzerdivision Hitler Youth* (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 1994), 176.
3. C. P. Stacey, *Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, III: The Victory Campaign: The Operations in Northwest Europe, 1944-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), 226.
4. HQ Royal Canadian Artillery 4 Canadian Armoured Division War Diary, 9 August, LAC, RG 24, C-17, Vol. 14,332.
5. Captain Bernard-Georg Meitzell, "Caen–Falaise, Part 2," *Canadian Army Journal* 4, no. 2 (May 1950): 71; Kurt Meyer, *Grenadiers* (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 1994), 161-162.
6. 2 Canadian Corps Operations Log, 9 August 1944, sheet 4, serials 19, 21, 22 (0825 hrs), LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 10,804; First Canadian Army Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 5, serial 26 (0835 hrs), LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,624.
7. Location State 2 Cdn Corps Hq Fmns/Units, 9 Aug 44 (signed 0230), LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,712. Curiously, there were no grids for the Polish units.
8. 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade to Main 4 Canadian Armoured Division, Sitrep to 092300B, 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade War Diary, August 1944, Appendix 10, LAC, RG 24, C-3, Vol. 14,052.
9. First Canadian Army Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 7, serial 44.
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13. First Canadian Army Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 13, serial 78.
14. First Canadian Army Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 8, serial 50 [Phantom]; sheet 11, serial 69; 4 Canadian Armoured Division War Diary, 9 August 1944, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,789.
15. 2 Canadian Corps Air Support Targets, 9 August, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 10,819, File 225C2.095(D3).
16. 19 Field Regiment War Diary, 9 August, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 14,531.
17. First Canadian Army Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 14, serial 84.
18. 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade Operations/Intelligence Log, 9 August, sheet 2, serials 61 and 65, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 14,052; 2 Canadian Corps Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 9, serial 56; First Canadian Army Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 15, serial 91.
19. Janusz Jarzembowski and David T. Bradley, *Armoured Hussars, Volume 2: Images of the 1st Polish Armoured Division, Normandy, August 1944* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2015), 83.
20. 18 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment WD, 9 August, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 14,248; 2 Canadian Corps Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 12, serial 74.
21. Jacek Kutzner and Juliusz S. Tym, *Polska 1. Dywizja Pancerna w Normandii* (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, 2010), 191; First Canadian Army Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 20, serial 114.
22. 2 Canadian Corps Operations Log, 9 August, sheet 13, serial 84.
23. MS # B-846, The 85th Infantry Division (Feb-Nov 44), p. 18, NARA II, RG 338.
24. Major G.L. Cassidy, *Warpath: The Story of the Algonquin Regiment 1939-1945* (Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1948), 82.
25. 4 Canadian Armoured Brigade to Main 4 Canadian Armoured Division, Sitrep to 092300B.
26. Norbert Számvéber, *Waffen-SS Armour in Normandy: The Combat History of SS-Panzer Regiment 12 and SS-Panzerjäger Abteilung 12, Normandy 1944* (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2012), 171.



Source: Major John Rickard

Looking north from the Worthington Force Memorial

SECTION IV— BATTLEFIELD STANDS

Maps

Historical: Caen–Falaise Sheet 7F, scale 1:100,000

Modern: French IGN Serie Bleue, Sheet 1613 SB Saint Pierre-sur-Dives, 1:25,000

Google Maps

Getting to Stand 1

If you are staying in Caen, you will have to drive south down the Caen–Falaise highway (N158). There are few good spots on the southern outskirts of Stand 1 (Lorguichon) to accommodate buses or even vans. The best option is to pass through Rocquancourt and follow Rue Pasteur into the open ground southwest of Lorguichon.

STAND 1

Lorguichon (BOYER)

Grid Reference – Approximately 065568 (Sheet 7F)

Bearing – 165 degrees

ORIENTATION (Team Leader/participant)

Time: 2330 hours on 8 August to 0230 hours on 9 August.

You are now near the harbour for 28 CAR. You are west of the Caen–Falaise highway (NEAGLE, N158). The railway is approximately 500 metres to the east. Rocquancourt (PLUTO) is 1 kilometre to the northwest. 4 CAD Artillery (19 Field and 23 SP Regiment) is located around Rocquancourt. The high ground of Point 122 (La Jalousie on Google Maps) is 1 kilometre to the south. The British 11 Medium Regiment is just north of Secqueville-la-Campagne (HARDY) (see Map 9).

DESCRIPTION

The Algonquin Regiment began arriving at approximately 2300 hours to form the Worthington Force battle group. Brigadier Booth conducted his O Group in the Lorguichon harbour just before 2400 hours on 8 August and determined to use the same scheme of manoeuvre that he had tried to execute during the day. That consisted of first establishing a firm base at Bretteville-le-Rabet (SPARKS) before moving on to Point 195 (see Appendix A).

Role players – Brigadier Booth’s O Group

Brigadier Booth
Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington
Lieutenant-Colonel Halpenny

The participant playing Brigadier Booth will describe their concept of operations to get to Point 195. Since so little of Booth’s orders have survived, the role players are free to give their own set of orders based on their own understanding of the problem. The intent is to have a useful interaction between Brigadier Booth and the participants playing Worthington and Halpenny. This interaction will reveal many points that are not found in the historical record. Worthington held his O Group at 0130 hours.

Role Players – Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington’s O Group

BCR

Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington
Major Sidenius, OC A Squadron
Major Carson, OC B Squadron
Major Baron, OC C Squadron
Lieutenant Biddlecombe, IC Recce

Algonquin Regiment

Lieutenant-Colonel Hay
Major Monk, OC B Company
Major MacPherson, OC C Company
Major Stirling, OC D Company

Captain Baker, FOO, 19 Field Regiment
Captain Searle, FOO, 11 Medium Regiment

ANALYSIS

Worthington had perhaps thirty minutes to do his own mission analysis (See Appendix V for an example of the mental appreciation). The compressed battle procedure was central to the subsequent events. Even with more time to prepare, the mission was a tough one for the BCRs in their first battle. Definitive evidence that Worthington intended to bypass Bretteville-le-Rabet to the east is lacking. That would have been a difficult manoeuvre at night with the route unmarked (see Map 5). Consider under what circumstances the same mission might be given a current Canadian battle group in major combat operations.

Getting to Your Next Stand

You may now choose to drive down the Caen–Falaise highway to explore Worthington’s intended scheme of manoeuvre. This is best done by turning off the Caen–Falaise highway (N158) just north of Grainville-Langannerie and follow the D658 until you come to the D43 opposite Quesnay (DUNNE). Proceed southwest on D43 through the re-entrant that leads to Aisy (CROSBY). You can also proceed to Point 195 by turning off the D658 at Grainville-Langannerie (ANNABELLE) and follow the D239 (Rue de l’Eglise). Turn left onto Rue de Saint Hillaire and follow it to St. Hillaire Farm to gain an appreciation for this alternate route to the objective. This secondary road continues southwest past the farm for approximately 1 kilometre. Point 195 is where the road makes a 90-degree turn to the west.

*Note: You may need to obtain permission to proceed south of St. Hillaire Farm.

STAND 2

Point 195 (LOMBARDO)

Grid Reference – 0946 (Sheet 7F)

Bearing – 200 degrees

ORIENTATION (Team Leader/participant)

Time: N/A

You are now standing on Worthington's objective, Point 195. Point 206 (SNOW) is to the southeast near Potigny (CAGNEY). The rail line was less than a kilometre to the east. Aisy is just beyond the rail line to the east. Quesnay Wood, concealing Battle Group Wünsche, is to the northeast.

DESCRIPTION

Point 195 was a much higher feature than where Worthington would ultimately end up near Point 111. He had no idea that Reconnaissance Group Olboeter had taken up positions on the southern slope of Point 195. Worthington's H-Hour was 0230 hours.

ANALYSIS

Given the limited time for his map reconnaissance, Worthington's intended route seems reasonable, but he would have to pass directly in front of Quesnay Wood. Given the fact that he relied on the available intelligence indicating the presence of second-rate troops in the area, he probably felt the risk was justified. Another course of action was to advance through Grainville-Langannerie and Point 151 and approach Point 195 on a north-south axis. Doctrine indicated that anti-tank guns had to be brought up on the position to repel counterattacks, but Worthington did not bring any anti-tank guns with him. Discuss how you would deploy the armour and infantry to defend the position. Bear in mind that he did not know how long he was supposed to hold the position and could expect no support from 10 CIB to the west of 4 CAB.

Getting to your next Stand

To get to Stand 3 (Gaumesnil) you can retrace your route back through St. Hillaire Farm to Grainville-Langannerie and to the N158. Proceed north on the N158 and take the D23 at La Jalousie and proceed to the southwest. Find any spot along the roadside. One spot is possibly near the intersection of the D23 with the road that veers southeast into Gaumesnil.

STAND 3

Gaumesnil (LANDI)

Grid Reference – Approximately 072562 (Sheet 7F)

Bearing – 165 degrees

ORIENTATION (Team Leader/participant)

Time: 0315 hours

You are now on the northern outskirts of the tiny hamlet of Gaumesnil (LANDI). You are still inside friendly lines. 18 CACR HQ was located at LANDI, and 4 CAB Control and Worthington's A-1 Echelon would later move down and occupy the location. Halpenny's objective, Bretteville-le-Rabet, is approximately 4 kilometres to the south. 4 CAD's boundary with 1 PAD shifts perpendicular to the east at this point for about 800 metres. Michael Wittmann's 007 Tiger was destroyed just to the east of the N158.

DESCRIPTION

Halpenny Force had been in harbour here since 2000 hours on 8 August. He had to rebuild a squadron, re-bomb and re-fuel. He would leave No. 3 Squadron in the harbour. Halpenny's H-Hr was 0315 hours and Worthington's Advance Guard had already been moving down the road for approximately forty-five minutes.

ANALYSIS

It is unclear if Worthington and Halpenny discussed the operation and coordinated their movements. Both COs had to coordinate a forward passage of lines (FPOL) with the Lake Superior Regiment (LSR) in Cintheaux and the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders (A&SH) in Hautmesnil. Brigadier Booth was having communications difficulties very early on. Clearly, Halpenny was not going to have sufficient time to clear Bretteville-le-Rabet before Worthington passed through.

Getting to your next Stand

To get to Stand 4 (Cintheaux), proceed into Gaumesnil, turning off from the D23. Follow this road, Chemin du Parterre, south. You will pass the Bretteville-sur-Laize cemetery (on your left). You can pull off along the Chemin du Parterre or you can move into the Bretteville-sur-Laize cemetery parking lot. From here you can gain a good appreciation for the ground to the east.

STAND 4

Cintheaux (MORGAN)

Grid Reference – 078554 (Sheet 7F)

Bearing – 165 degrees

ORIENTATION (Team Leader/participant)

Time: 0400 hours (2 ½ hours to sunrise)

You are now on the northern outskirts of Cintheaux (MORGAN). You are still inside friendly lines. The LSR of 10 CIB has elements in the village. Caucourt (LESLIE), a Polish objective, is to the southeast. Hautmesnil (ROBSON) and the quarry (GAYNOR) are to the south, down the D158. Bretteville-sur-Laize (FAYE) is to the west. The division boundary with 1 PAD is approximately 800 metres to the east. Report line OPIUM runs through Cintheaux to the east. The ancient Norman road, the Chemin Haussé du Duc Guillaume, crosses the highway, veers southeast, crosses the divisional boundary and continues on to the Laison River.

Point of Interest: The Bretteville-sur-Laize Cemetery was to your left. Worthington and his brother John are buried there in Plot 19.

DESCRIPTION

Worthington Force had been moving for approximately ninety minutes. Major Baron (C Squadron) came under contact as he approached Cintheaux, and Major Carson (B Squadron) came up abreast of him to the east of the village. Major Sidenius (A Squadron) came up beside Major Carson and, during a brief conference, Major Carson decided to push south to avoid C Squadron's fight at Cintheaux. The Advance Guard was already bunched up somewhat with Halpenny Force vehicles back up the Caen–Falaise highway.

Role Players

Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington

Major Sidenius (A Squadron)

Major Carson (B Squadron)

Major Baron (C Squadron)

ANALYSIS

Worthington had to consider several factors as the Advance Guard was held up at Cintheaux. Sunrise was at approximately 0630 hours, but first tank light was even earlier, meaning he had approximately two hours to get to Point 195. With Halpenny Force coming down the highway and to the west of it, Worthington had to consider the risk of trying to bypass Cintheaux to the west, thereby passing through Halpenny Force in the dark.

Getting to your next Stand

To get to your next stand, continue south down the N167 (Rue du Pont des Vers). Turn left onto Rue de la Mine and then turn left onto Impasse des Antes. Follow this road to the end near the Caen–Falaise highway. There is an open area next to the highway where a bus or van can be parked.

STAND 5

Hautmesnil (ROBSON)

Grid Reference – 085528 (Sheet 7F)

Bearing – 165 degrees

ORIENTATION (Team Leader/participant)

Time: Approximately 0500 hours (1 ½ hours to sunrise)

You are now at Hautmesnil (ROBSON) on the edge of the FEBA and still on the Caen–Falaise highway. The Hautmesnil Quarry (GAYNOR) is immediately to the south on the west side of the D158. **Special Note:** *The large quarry you see immediately east of the highway was NOT there in 1944.* The division boundary with 1 PAD is approximately 800 metres to the east. Caucourt (LESLIE) is approximately 1 kilometre to the east.

DESCRIPTION

You are taking fire from Caucourt. The A&SH have elements in Hautmesnil but have not yet cleared the quarry. Battle Group Klein, a sub-element of Battle Group Waldmüller, had only recently begun withdrawing from GAYNOR. 10 ACB led by 10 MRR would not start advancing toward LESLIE on your immediate left until 0900, and 10 CIB would not advance at all on your right. It is here just east of Hautmesnil that the Main Guard, B Squadron leading, pushed hard to the east.

ANALYSIS

Worthington had no reconnaissance in front. The bulk of Recce Troop was at the rear of the column. 18 CACR sent a squadron to the southwest and one to the east to establish contact with the Poles. Worthington could not push west because of the quarry. There is little doubt that the column was split into two parts at this point. The Advance Guard (C Squadron and RHQ) were probably closely paralleling the N158 to the east, while the Main Guard was further to the east and was making a major navigational error.

Getting to your next Stand

To get to your next stand, turn off the N158 onto the D132a, head east to Caucourt, and turn south onto the Chemin Haussé. Continue down the Chemin Haussé until you pass the small tree line and collection of buildings on the left. You can pull off to the side of the road where feasible.

STAND 6

South of Cauvicourt (LESLIE)

Grid Reference – 104523 (Sheet 7F)

Bearing – 150 degrees

ORIENTATION (Team Leader/participant)

Time: Approximately 0515 hours

You are now on the Chemin Haussé south of Cauvicourt (LESLIE). Hautmesnil (ROBSON) and the highway are to the west. Renémesnil (AMECHE) is due east. The boundary between 4 CAD and 1 PAD is approximately 500 metres to the west (see Air Photo 3).

DESCRIPTION

You are literally standing on the spot where the Main Guard, with No. 1 Troop/B Squadron leading, crossed the Chemin Haussé to the east. As B Squadron moved south on the east side of Cintheaux, No. 1 Troop actually crossed the Chemin Haussé (which is the Rue de l'Eglise on satellite imagery north of the D132a) for the first time. As Air Photo 3 clearly shows, the Main Guard then made a hard turn to the east where the modern quarry is and re-crossed the Chemin Haussé approximately 1 kilometre south of Cauvicourt. B Squadron continued down the Chemin Haussé and crossed the Bretteville-le-Rabet–Renémesnil road (Rue des Polonais). Immediately north of the intersection of the Chemin Haussé and Rue des Polonais was a small wood line (still visible on satellite imagery). While B Squadron negotiated the wood line successfully, Major Monk's B Company had difficulty and lost contact temporarily with B Squadron.

ANALYSIS

The evidence does not conclusively prove who decided to push so far to the east. It appears that B Squadron, led by No. 1 Troop, went this way on its own, possibly put into a state of confusion by reacting to enemy fire in the dark. Other evidence, however, suggests Worthington ordered them to push east.

Getting to your next Stand

To get to Stand 7 (Bretteville-le-Rabet), continue southeast on the Chemin Haussé and turn right onto the D43 (Rue des Polonais) and drive towards Bretteville-le-Rabet. It is best not to enter the village of Bretteville-le-Rabet so as to retain a wider view of the surrounding countryside.

STAND 7

Bretteville-le-Rabet (SPARKS)

Grid Reference – 100505 (Sheet 7F)

Bearing – 150 degrees

ORIENTATION (Team Leader/participant)

Time: Approximately 0500 hours

You are now on the eastern outskirts of Bretteville-le-Rabet (SPARKS), the objective of Halpenny Force. The Caen–Falaise highway (N158) is immediately to the west. Estrées-la-Campagne (BAXTER) is 2 kilometres to the southeast. Grainville-Langannerie (ANNABELLE) is 500 metres to the southwest. Cauvicourt is to the north and the post-war quarry at Hautmesnil is to the northwest. The report line ASPIRIN runs through Bretteville-le-Rabet in the direction of Soignolles (HUTTON).

Point of Interest The only Polish cemetery in Normandy (Urville-Langannerie) is on the west side of the highway just north of Grainville-Langannerie.

DESCRIPTION

As Major Baron (C Squadron) approached Bretteville-le-Rabet, he was engaged by direct fire from the northern outskirts. The Advance Guard was also still vying for road space with the lead elements of Halpenny Force, who were converging on the village at roughly the same time. It is here at SPARKS that confusion as to the precise route taken by the Advance Guard increases (see Air Photo 1). With little more than an hour before sunrise, Worthington had to make a decision.

ANALYSIS

Worthington's intention to bypass Bretteville-le-Rabet to the east is not unambiguously stated in the surviving evidence. The wireless logs suggest that he attempted to force his way through between Bretteville-le-Rabet and Grainville-Longannerie, a possibility given added weight by his situation report at 0624 hours that placed him just south of Bretteville-le-Rabet.

Getting to your next Stand

To get to your next stand (Estrées-la-Campagne), drive into Bretteville-le-Rabet following D43 to Rue des Genettes and follow D131 into Estrées-la-Campagne. Turn left onto Rue du Cingal (D260) and proceed east to the outskirts of the village.

STAND 8

Estrées-la-Campagne (BAXTER)

Grid Reference – 120495 (Sheet 7F)

Bearing – 150 degrees

ORIENTATION (Team Leader/participant)

Time: Approximately 0500 hours

You are now on the northeast edge of Estrées-la-Campagne (BAXTER). Point 83 is to the northeast, very close to the intersection of the Estrées-la-Campagne–Soignolles road (D260). The Chemin Haussé is approximately 500 metres to the northeast. Bretteville-le-Rabet is to the northwest. Quesnay Wood is to the southwest.

DESCRIPTION

B Squadron halted due east of the village and was taking 88 mm fire. Major Monk (B Company) caught up with Major Carson at this point. Carson and Monk did not initially know their location, but Carson appears to have gained a correct compass bearing, probably from moving away from the tanks. Based on his new bearing, he dispatched No. 2 Troop towards Point 195.

Role Players – Carson's conference at Estrées-la-Campagne

Major Carson

Major MacPherson

Major Monk

Lieutenant Biddlecombe (IC Recce Troop)

ANALYSIS

While Carson was convinced that he had corrected his navigational error, there is no evidence that he informed Worthington over the wireless, especially when Worthington, now on Hill 111, ordered him to come up.

Getting to your next Stand

To get to your next stand (Point 111), you can follow D131 to Point 111. Move down D260 to D131 and turn left. Follow the D131 east. As you approach the high ground, you will see a trail bisecting the road and running up to the wood line to your right. This trail is the Chemin Haussé. There is room to pull off the road near the intersection of the Chemin Haussé and the D131, and you may wish to make this an alternate stand. You can walk southeast down the Chemin Haussé to the wooded feature on the hill. Worthington's final position is just south of the wood line.

STAND 9

Point 111 (Worthington Force Memorial)

Grid Reference – 146496

Bearing – 133 degrees

ORIENTATION (Team Leader/participant)

Time: 0650 hours (sunrise)

You are now at the Worthington Force memorial. The final position of the battlegroup is the high ground beyond the memorial, 400 metres to the south. The Caen–Falaise highway (NEAGLE) is 5 kilometres to the west. You might be able to see traffic on the Caen–Falaise highway. Point 140, a Polish objective, is approximately 1 kilometre to the southwest. Soignolles (HUTTON) is 1 kilometre to the north. The Chemin Haussé is to the west. The Laison River is a kilometre to the south.

DESCRIPTION

Not all of the battle group arrived. When Worthington sent his situation report at 0650 hours, only Major Baron's C Squadron and RHQ were actually on the position. Major Carson's B Squadron, Major Monk's B Company and Major MacPherson's C Company were still engaged in the valley to your north around BAXTER. The Rear Guard, Major Sidenius's A Squadron and Major Stirling's D Company were even further north along the Chemin Haussé. A Squadron would be engaged and destroyed around Point 83 to the northwest, and D Company would withdraw back towards Bretteville-le-Rabet.

Role Players – Worthington's Situational Awareness on Point 111

Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington

Major Carson


Major Monk

Major Baron


Lieutenant Biddlecombe (IC Recce Troop)

ANALYSIS


There is conflicting evidence as to whether or not Worthington believed he was on Point 195. One gains the impression that he was reluctant to move in broad daylight. He tried to take additional ground, including Thirty Acre Wood to the south, but failed in the attempt. His decision to ultimately stay on Point 195 was feasible as long as he could effectively communicate his true location. However, that proved impossible throughout the entire day.



AIR PHOTO 1 - Worthington's Scheme of Manoeuvre



AIR PHOTO 2 – Chemin Haussé du duc Guillaume





AIR PHOTO 3 – The Tracks of Worthington Force



AIR PHOTO 4 – Point 83








MAP 2 – The Situation at 0630 8 August and the German Reaction

1Km

- 4 CAD Objectives
- 1 PAD Objectives
- 12 SS PD Objectives




MAP 3 – Operation TOTALIZE, Phase 2

○ 4 CAD Objectives


○ 1 PAD Objectives

1Km








MAP 4 - The Situation at Last Light 8 August


- FEBA
- 4 CAD Objectives
- 1 PAD Objectives




MAP 5 – Worthington's Scheme of Manoeuvre, 9 August

1Km

-  Worthington Force, including possible route between SPARKS and ANNABELLE
-  Likely Route
-  Halpenny Force
-  10 ACB
-  Primary Tank Track







MAP 7 - B Squadron on the Right Track

- Likely Advance Guard Route
- Possible Advance Guard Route
- Main Guard – B Squadron
- Halpenny Force
- Bomb line

- ① 1 Tp loses contact with 2 Tp
- ② 2 Tp crosses Chemin Haussé
- ③ B Coy loses contact with B Sqn
- ④ 2 Tp turns to the SW
- ⑤ 2 Tp links up with A Squadron
- ⑥ 10 PI/B Coy begins clearing
- ⑦ Carson, Monk & MacPherson discuss the situation
- ★ Worthington's reported location at 0624





MAP 9 - The Artillery Situation

1Km

○ 1 PAD Objectives


○ 4 CAD Objectives

① 0500, OTM but moves in wrong direction

② 1230, OTM. Ready at 1420

③ 1200, OTM

④ 1600, moves to the new AMA




MAP 10 – Developments to 1200 Hours

➡ Polish movements

⋯➡ ARC movement

- - ➡ Worthington Force Wounded

- ① 0800 Typhoons bomb and recognized as friendly
- ② 0900 B Sqn attempts to clear Thirty Acre Wood
- ③ 1000 Worthington sends back the WIA
- ④ German R/T call for artillery support intercepted
- ⑤ 1100 Worthington calls for ammunition
- ⑥ 1130 Bomb Line updated
- ⑦ 1213 Booth's air support requests



MAP 11 – The Polish Advance

➡ Polish movements

--➔ Worthington's Remaining Tanks

→ 21 CAR

① 21 CAR finally advances, 1430

② Typhoons bomb position again, 1500


③ 1500 Worthington sends back the tanks

④ 21 CAR decisively blocked by 1730

⑤ Polish furthest advance by 1805

⑥ Sqn gets to within 300 yds of position

1Km



MAP 12 - The Destruction of Worthington Force

---➔ Survivors

- ① Heavy mortar attack at 1830 – Worthington killed
- ② Final attack partially overruns position at 2000
- ③ Major Monk withdraws survivors at 2230
- ④ Survivors arrive dawn 10 August

APPENDIX A



TOP SECRET

1-6

Main HQ 4 Cdn Armd Div

7 Aug 44

OUTLINE OF INSTRS ISSUED BY GOC 4 CDN ARMD DIV 071300B AUG 44

OP TOTALIZER

Ref Maps FRANCE 1/50,000, Sheets 7F/1 7F/2 7F/3 7F/4

INFM

1. Enemy

The 2 Cdn Corps front is held by 89 Inf Div and 272 Inf Div, reinforced by one bn from 711 Div, on the gen line FONTENAY-LE-MARMION 0358 – ROCQUANCOURT 0678 – TILLY-LA-CAMPAGNE 0760 – LA HOGUE 0960. There are definite indications that 1 and 12 SS Pz Divs are moving WEST, some elements already having crossed the R ORNE.

2. Own Tps

Outline Order of Battle, 2 Cdn Corps:

- (a) 4 Cdn Armd Div
- (b) POLISH Armd Div
- (c) 2 Cdn Div
- (d) 3 Cdn Div
- (e) 51 (H) Div
- (f) 2 Cdn Armd Bde
- (g) 33 Armd Bde
- (h) 2 Cdn AGRA
- (i) 8 AGRA

3. The task of 2 Cdn Corps is to break through enemy posns astride the Caen–Falaise rd.

4. Outline of Ops – 2 Cdn Corps

The op is divided into two phases:

- (a) Phase I: (i) RIGHT – 2 Cdn Div with under comd 2 Cdn Armd Bde and
(ii) LEFT – 51 (H) Div with under comd 33 Armd Bde are to capture the gen line CAILLOUET 0554 – GAUMESNIL 0755 – woods SOUTH of ST AIGNAN-DE-CRAMESNIL area 0855 – woods area 1058-1160. H hr 072330B Aug 44.

- (b) Phase II:
- (i) RIGHT – 4 Cdn Armd Div is to pass through 2 Cdn Div and capture the FONTAINE-LE-PIN feature (pt 180 0747 - pt 195 0846 – pt 206 0960).
 - (ii) LEFT – POLISH Armd Div is to pass through 51 (H) Div and capture high ground NORTH of FALAISE (area pt 170 1442 – pt 159 1451).

5. Corps SL, report lines and bdys as already issued.

6. AIR

- (a) Phase I – RAF Bomber Command is to drop hy bombs in the area indicated on traces already issued.
- (b) Phase II – RAF med bombers are to drop fragmentation bombs in areas indicated in trace already issued.
- (c) 83 Group RAF in sp First Cdn Army fighter-bombers and RP Typhoons area available on call.

7. Additional Tps Under Comd 2 Cdn Corps:

- (a) 1 LOTHIAN (Flail Regt)
- (b) 87 Sqn AVRE

8. Inter-Div Bdy – 4 Cdn Armd Div – POLISH Armd Div – Phase II

All incl 4 Cdn Armd Div – pt 112 084549 – church 097527 – BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET 1050 – WEST edge of woods 116483 – woods 117475 – excl br 127449.

TASK OF 4 CDN ARMD DIV

9. To capture FONTAINE-LE-PIN feature (pt 180 0747 – pt 195 0846 – pt 206 0943).

METHOD

10. 4 Cdn Armd Div will adv two up.

- (a) RIGHT – 10 Cdn Inf Bde with
 - (i) under comd
 - one sqn 1 LOTHIAN
 - two btys 17 pr A Tk (towed)
 - one tp 17 pr A Tk (SP)
 - (ii) in sp
 - 15 Cdn Fd Regt
 - one sqn less one tp 87 Sqn AVRE
 - one tp 5 Cdn Fd Sqn

(b) LEFT – 4 Cdn Armd Bde with

(i) under comd
one sqn 1 LOTHIANs
one tp 17 pr A Tk (SP)

(ii) in sp
23 Cdn Fd Regt (SP)
one bty 17 pr A Tk (SP)
one tp 5 Cdn Fd Sqn

11. The op will be carried out in two phases:

- (a) Phase I – Move from conc area, VAUCELLES, to assembly area, NORTH of Corps SL on two routes as per instrs already issued.
- (b) Phase II – Adv to capture FONTAINE-LE-PIN FEATURE – SL for this Phase to be bomb-line for Phase II

12. **Task – 4 Cdn Armd Bde – Phase II**

- (a) To adv SOUTH, bypassing CINTHEAUX 0653 and HAUTMESNIL 0852 to the EAST.
- (b) Est a firm base in the area BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET and
- (c) Adv SOUTH to capture the FONTAINE-LE-PIN feature.
- (d) A special force composed of the ALG R embussed in White scout cars and half tracks, with supporting arms, will be under comd 4 Cdn Armd Bde for mov in order to relieve elements 4 Cdn Armd Bde in BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET. This force will revert to comd 10 Cdn Inf Bde as soon as the firm base is consolidated in BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET.

13. **Task – 10 Cdn Inf Bde – Phase II**

- (a) To capture and hold in succession

(i) CINTHEAUX 0853
(ii) HAUTMESNIL, incl QUARRY 0852

A force of NOT more than one bn will be employed on this task.

- (b) To firm up and hold with one bn BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET and then clean up woods and houses between BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET and woods.

14. **Task – 18 Cdn Armd C Regt**

- (a) To be prepared to provide one sqn to act as a convoy escort for adm vehs moving fwd to the FONTAINE-LE-PIN feature from the assembly area.
- (b) To be prepared to exploit SOUTH and EAST from the gen line MESLAY 0043 – FONTAINE-LE-PIN 0844 – FALAISE 1435 – ARGENTAN 2018.

15. CL, report lines and bdys as already issued.

16. Timings

- (a) Phase I – Move to assembly area completed by 080600B.
- (b) To cross SL for Phase II at approx 081400B.

17. Arty

Arty sp in the form of pre-arranged concs on call will be provided by 4 Cdn Armd Div Fd Arty with under comd 19 Cdn Fd Regt (SP) and one med regt, sp by one AGRA after Phase I.

18. Engrs

- (a) Task during Phase II to construct, if necessary, crossings of the rly between 068563 and 070550.
- (b) After capture of CINTHEAUX and HAUTMESNIL open up CL on main rd Caen–Falaise, as far SOUTH as LANGANNERIE 0949.

19. Adm

Issued separately.

20. Inter-Comn

- (a) Axis of Adv, 4 Cdn Armd Div – Rd Caen–Falaise except between rd junc 047643 – CINTHEAUX, when it will be the EAST track developed by 2 Cdn Div parallel to the rd Caen–Falaise.
- (b) HQs locations
 - (i) Phase I – Area X rds 042663
 - (ii) Phase II – Axis of Adv
- (c) Code words as already issued.
- (d) Sigs instrs issued separately.

21. Ack.

FEW/RW **METHOD OF ISSUE:** LO/SDR/DRLS
Time **2359**

(F E Wigle) Lt Col
GS 4 Cdn Armd Div

* Actual order – 3 pages

APPENDIX B

4 Canadian Armoured Brigade Operations / Intelligence Log, 9 August 1944

Note: Worthington Force transmissions in blue

Serial	Time	Source	Item	Action	Remarks
1	0200	ACV	Comms poor to Control		ACV – Armoured Command Vehicle
2	0345	ACV	Comms no better. Preparing to move off.		
3	0355	Control	Locn of Control 077552		
4	0356	Control	Est comms with All regts		
5	0409	Control	Parcels arriving RV centre line where LAUGHTON crosses		LAUGHTON – Phase 2 Startline
6	0420	ACV-1	Moving now to 07553661		
7	0521	ACV-1	?LSR, 21 CAR ... reports signals		
8	0522	ACV-1	Parcels 0430 hrs RV where LAUGHTON crosses CL		
9	0525	ACV-1	Put Sunray on set at once		
10	0526	Control	Did Molar report to you[?]		MOLAR = Quatermaster
11	0528	22 CAR	Acorn in this tk. Sunray in another tk. (Find Sunray and see what time he expects to complete Phase 1 urgent)		ACORN = Intelligence Officer
12	0532	28 CAR	... You must maintain contact with me. How far have you progressed[?] Any oppos yet[?] [followed by illegible text]		
13	Between 0532 and 0536	?	Your posn in relation to completing phase 2. (halted at SPARKS – Recce says SPARKS is occupied. 1 sniper firing on our left flank. Trying to ascertain if SPARKS is occupied by enemy.		SPARKS = Bretteville-le-Rabet
14	0536	Control	Put Sunray on set		
15	0538	ACV-1	Posn fwd tps urgently required		
16	0542	28 CAR	Sunray ahead of me. Call you when he is able to.		
17	0559	22 CAR	ABSENTHÉ cleared.		ABSENTHÉ = report line
18	0620	Control	Check posn – ref slidex		
19	0623	21 CAR	Posn in slidex code- 063564		
20	0624	28 CAR	My posn 105468 (given in clear)		
21	0643	28 CAR	Objective less 1800m, considerable Maggie targets forming up now to reach objective		
22	0651	22 CAR	Completed phase 1. Now on objective.		
23	0655	28 CAR	Objective 0650 hrs. No evidence of enemy occupation – but recent signs. Few lorries destroyed, slit trenches and tools about. We are holding until our friends come fwd to consolidate.		
24	0705	Control	Your posn		
25	0724	28 CAR	Send locn as soon as possible		
26	0730	ACV-1	Our posn 075566		
27	0731	22 CAR	Opposition encountered. Small arms		
28	0746	22 CAR	Opium now. Four of our tks knocked out.		
29	0748	Control	Give fwd tps posn immediately (wait)		

Serial	Time	Source	Item	Action	Remarks
30	0755	28 CAR	Posn 0964		
31	0800	22 CAR	My posn 063364. Situation now one of our families moving around right of town in preparation to entering supported by [unknown]		
32	0806	28 CAR	Fetch acorn. We have 3 prisoners. Lt speaks English, says from 2		
33		4 CAB	How far back can you bring PWs [?].		
34	0841	Alq R	We are still out of contact with our sunray		
35	0849	Control	Give locn of opposition		
36	0850	28 CAR	Same as 2 hrs ago. Approx yds SE.		
37	0907	Control	Are you getting required sp now[?]		
38	0914	Control	Conc at LANDI	To 21 CAR	LANDI = Gaumesnil
39	0938	Control	45 tks reported area 1345 at 0840 hrs this morning	To 28 CAR and LSR	
40	1000	Control	Concentrate at LANDI – urgent		
41	1029	Control	Tell your sunray to report here	To 21 CAR	
42	1113	Control	Have you 500 gals spare pet[?]	To 21 CAR	
43	1114	21 CAR	Yes		
44	1120	22 CAR	Own guns are shelling us fwd area SPARKS		
45	1129	Control	Give posn your fwd tps (wait)		
46	1131	22 CAR	Posn fwd tps located at fwd pt of SPARKS		
47	1133	Control	Do you consider phase 1 complete[?]		
48	1135	22 CAR	They are still bringing in prisoners and cleaning up town		
49	1151	Sigs Recce	Sunray 28 CAR coming to you	To Control	
50	1245	Control	Yellow smoke when our planes come over. FOO white smoke on target (no acknowledgement)	To 28 CAR	
51	1250	Control	Our friends report 5 enemy tks in area 1151	To 22 CAR	
52	1256	Control	Is sunray of Alq R in SPARKS with you[?]	To 22 CAR	
53	1325	22 CAR	Sunray reported here (left 5 mins ago)		
54	1345	21 CAR	No movement here until 1430 hrs.		
55	1345	Control	Why[?]		
56	1345	21 CAR	We could not prepare ourselves any earlier that that in order to tie up other gps.		
57	1402	Control	Sunray anxious you get cracking		
58	1410	LSR	Notify 10 CIB LSR(M) HQ occupy SPARKS		
59	1443	21 CAR	Any report on progress of BAER[?]		BAER = Poles
60	1442	21 CAR	Tell the BAERS to stop firing since we are in SPARKS		
61	1500	LO 4 Polish Armd Bde	I spoke to Sunray minor of 28 CAR over the air. He claims 7 tks left and withdrawn through our own posn 087549. He was asked to report here (HQ) at once.		Sunray Minor = Major Parrish
62	1507	Control	Fetch Sunray: - report to ACV 4 Bde HQ immediately	To 22 CAR	
63	1510	Control	Anything to report on 28 CAR	To LSR	
64	1510	LSR	Will find out and let you know – nothing to report on 28 CAR		
65	1520	Molar Minor	Just saw GOC. He wants immediate infm by any means possible.		GOC = General Kitching

Serial	Time	Source	Item	Action	Remarks
66	1605	Control	Posn[?]		
67	1605	21 CAR	ASPIRIN. Notify 28 CAR of our approach		ASPIRIN = report line
68	1610	LO Pol Bde	Posn unchanged. Enemy recce patrols approached St. Sylvain 1354		
69	1615	LO Pol Bde	The Regt with tp of A tk u/c holding woods area 1054 Regt with u/c a tp of A tk holding LESLIE. Remainder using TCVs ready to exploit any success of Armd Bde. Leading regts still at 115583.		LESLIE is Cauvicourt
70	1630	Control	Fetch Sunray: - (posn DRESSLER plus 600 yds) imperative that you push on at all speed. Expect you to be on your objective very shortly. Its important that you do so.	To 21 CAR	DRESSLER = report line
71	1637	21 CAR	[unkown #] tks knocked out. 103477 approx loc of gun. (do you want Shelldrake to knock out gun that shot out your baby[?] Wait. Are elements 28 CAR might be.		
72	1653	Control	Posn and infm to be kept coming back	To 21 CAR	
73	1703	21 CAR	Posn 106493		
74	1721	Control	Posn of fwd tps and sit rep on them	To Alq R	
75	1723	Alq R	Have to get that from 28 CAR		
76	1725	28 CAR	Pronto Minor here. Sunray Minor will give my locn in a few minutes.		PRONTO = Signals
77	1726	LO	Are fwd tps moving [?]	To 21 CAR	
78	1727	LO	Fwd tps moving – posn in few minutes		
79	1732	LO	Posn of 21 CAR 1000 yds past last ref and pushing on		
80	1733	28 CAR	Posn 073553. Enter from 076560	To Control	
81	1735	LO 21 CAR	Numerous A tk guns. Lost 5 tks		
82	1736	LO	Changing direction and pushing on from 21 CAR	To Control	
83	1753	21 CAR	Now in contact with enemy inf		
84	1814	LO	Air attack just went in		
85	1815	Control	Fetch Sunray – Sunray report to Bde HQ immediately	To 22 CAR	
86	1818	Control	Friendly attack by air going in at 105483 very soon.	To 21 CAR	
87	1823	21 CAR	Enemy and Inf – tk battle now. Cannot identify tks yet. Cannot give clear picture yet.		
88	1837	Control	Get posn of fwd tps and brief sit rep of exercise of 21 CAR	To LO	
89	1837	21 CAR	What time was air attack to start[?]		
90	1837	Control	1814 hrs		
91	1845	21 CAR	Sitrep. Fwd posns are same. Enemy tks A tk guns and inf. We are org attack with sp arms. They tried to bypass but to no avail.		
92	1853	LO	Can now see bears left flank of 21 CAR		
93	1859	21 CAR	Lost 6 tks destroyed at least 1 enemy tk.		
94	1900	LO	My posn 100494		
95	1902	Control	Infm 21 CAR smoke will be laid at 1910 hrs. Red smoke	To LO	
96	1911	Control	Was air attack success (yes)	To 21 CAR	
97	1919	Control	Air attack will be retpd at 1923 hrs	To 21 CAR	

Serial	Time	Source	Item	Action	Remarks
98	1928	Control	Slidex – change code sign ANNABELLE to code sign SNUFF		SNUFF = Grainville
99	1935	LO	2 ND air attack completed and successful		
100	1938	Control	Ask 21 CAR for posn. Posn no change.	To LO	
101	1939	LSR	Have 2 PWs shall I send them to you[?] Yes.		
102	1941	Control	Further air attack coming slightly south of previous one		
103	1955	Control	22 CAR making thrust close to WEST edge of SNUFF. They will be without LSR.	To 21 CAR	
104	1956	21 CAR	Time on [of] last message.	Wait	To Control
105	1957	Control	Give time of move	Wait	To 22 CAR
106	2000	22 CAR	Slidex – 2015 hrs ref last message		
107	2001	Control	Ref time slidex – 2015 hrs	To LO	
108	?	Tac/R	Bomblin 056397 – 074555 – 114445 - 127462		
109	?	AGAB	179500 – 161535 -160601	To ASSU	
110	2016	Control	Did you see last air attack[?]	Yes successful (to LO)	
111	2026	Control	Slidex – Fd and med on WEST of wood 1047 at 2035 hrs	To LO	
112	2043	Control	Show of 22 CAR cancelled	To 21 CAR	
113	2046	Control	Seagull here: - ref your report what will we do with ref to subject[?]	Subject cancelled for tonight. To 22 CAR	SEAGULL = Adjutant
114	2047	Control	Mines located at 094594		
115	2050	Control	Could you see results of last shoot[?]	Good. To LO	
116	2050	Control	Can you identify enemy vehs moving out my right flk under cover smoke[?]	To LO	
117	2119	Control	Give me posn of RVO. Are they moving now[?]	To LO	
118	2119	LO	No – no changing posn.	To Control	
119	2126	Control	It has been reported 4 hy A tk guns at 093455		
120	2143	22 CAR	On move for last 5 mins. 22 CAR moving now as planned earlier.	To Control	
121	2230	Control	Units of Algn R now under your comd revert under comd 10 CIB[.] OC Alq will contact you as soon as possible.	To 21 CAR	
122	2245	Control	Any mov contemplated[?]	No. To 21 CAR	
123	2245	Control	Your posn GAYNOR check it	No. To 22 CAR	GAYNOR – quarry at Hautmesnil
124	2325	22 CAR	Posn GAYNOR plus 300 yds	To Control	
125	2326	Control	Bears doing attack on your left	To 21 CAR	
126	2351	22 CAR	Fwd elements reaching 1 st phase	To Control	
127	2353	Control	Firm up on first phase and remain in posn	To 22 CAR	

APPENDIX C

28 Canadian Armoured Regiment (BCR) War Diary, 8-9 August 1944

Tuesday 8 Aug 44

Weather: Bright and hot

The unit moved off at 0130 hours down the centre line [Caen–Falaise highway]. Progress was slow due to movements of armoured columns at night. First light found us in a field just north-east of TILLY-LA-CAMPAGNE. Movement was very slow during the day. At 1300 hours, our formations, and others in the vicinity, were accidentally bombed by 18 Flying Fortresses during the heavy bombardment carried out at noon on the enemy positions. No enemy had as yet been encountered in the move forward. 21 CAR [Governor General's Foot Guards] lost two tanks on mines. Infantry moved slowly forward towards CINTHEAUX. At last light, the regiment was just north of CINTHEAUX, where it blackhorsed in an open field. We were put on five minutes notice [to move]. The CO went to Bde HQ at 2130 hours. During this halt, final preparations were made for action. 2 CDN INF DIV were formed up in the immediate vicinity.

Casualties: Officers-Nil

Other Ranks-Nil; Vehicles-Nil

Wednesday 9 Aug 44

Weather: Bright and hot

At 0230 hours sqn "O" groups were held. Our intention was to seize and hold the high ground Pt. 195 Sq. 0846 (ST. PIERRE-SUR-DIVES Sheet). 22 CAR [Canadian Grenadier Guards] were to clear BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET before we passed on. Order of march of the regiment was 'C,' 'RHQ,' 'B,' and 'A.' At 0400 hours south of CINTHEAUX, the regiment now assembled and started "flat out" to objective. The light was very poor this early in the morning. We were fired upon from the woods north of BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET. The 22 CAR were just arriving in this area and it was undecided for a moment or two whether we should wait for them to clear the town or not. Then the CO gave the order "Move on anyway, while we still have surprise." 'C' Sqn and RHQ pushed off, firing at obvious targets. Haystacks were seen to explode, and bullets ricocheted from small hay mounds. High ground was sighted, and we headed for it. As we approached, there were woods on either flank in which we sighted enemy soft skin vehicles, armoured cars, and half-tracks. These were duly shot up as we proceeded and many of the enemy were killed. 'C' Sqn and RHQ finally took up a position at 144490 (ST. PIERRE-SUR-DIVES Sheet). Lt. Col. D.J. Worthington gave the order to take up a defensive position. By this time, our force consisted of: 16 tanks in 'C' Sqn; 11 tanks in 'B' Sqn; 4 RHQ tanks, 1 Recce [Troop] tank, and a large proportion of A and B Companies of the ALGONQUIN Regiment **[Note: A Company did not take part in the action. This should be C Company]**. Known enemy units facing us were the 12th Panzer Jaegers, 58th Panzer Grenadiers, and a Div of Schutz Stufel. **[Note: 12 SS-Panzerjäger Regiment. There was no 58 PGR. 12 SS PD consisted of 25 and 26 PGR; the war diarist could mean 85 Division's panzergrenadiers which were approaching.]**

Note: This next section appears to have been written from B Squadron's perspective.

During this time 'B' Sqn had reformed near CAUVICOURT (ST. PIERRE-SUR-DIVES Sheet), less one troop, which at that time was at Bde Tactical HQ. Orders were given to push off around BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET, and flank well out to the left to get around the resistance. We kept on until first light, when we stopped near ESTRÉES-LA-CAMPAGNE, Sq. 1249. Enroute, No. 1 Troop had rejoined us. An "O" group was held, attended by 'B' Sqn officers, plus Lt. A.E. Biddlecombe and one FOO. Attempts were made to orient ourselves, after which we decided to push on towards Hill 195 Sq. 0846. Shortly after this, Major Carson, OC 'B' Sqn, received an order

from the CO to “advance to high ground in front.” At this point we fell in with the remainder of the regiment, minus No. 2 Troop. Meanwhile, No. 2 Troop had advanced on the centre line decided on in the ‘B’ Sqn “O” group, and advanced to Pt. 151 Sq. 0947, where they were fired upon by two anti-tank guns. After knocking out the guns, No. 2 Troop started back, but was hindered by scattered groups of enemy infantry trying to surrender to them. Near ESTRÉES-LA-CAMPAGNE they met several tanks of ‘A’ Sqn, who had pinpointed an enemy tank, believed to be a Tiger. The enemy moved into the village, and while trying to take it out, three ‘A’ Sqn tanks and one ‘B’ Sqn tank were knocked out. The other two tanks of No. 2 Troop were pinned in the valley, and couldn’t move.

Lt. Col. Worthington was in charge of the whole force on Hill 143, MR 144490 and he placed Major Baron, OC ‘C’ Sqn, in charge of the tanks. The first Tiger tank was sighted at 0800 hours by Lt. Bicknell, who took two 17-pdr tanks forward to fire HE at 2,800 yards. A task force composed of ‘B’ Sqn was sent forward to secure the high ground at 147484 **[Note: This was Thirty Acre Wood]**. Lt. Stock [4 Troop] was to attack with his troop, with Lt. Scudamore’s [No. 3] Troop supporting by fire. The position was reached, and reported clear of the enemy and FHQ moved forward on the left flank to [the] area of [the] woods. At this point, tanks began to “brew-up” and none were able to return, even with the smoke provided by the remaining troops. Major Carson and Capt. Hope were among those who were brought back from that position. They were evacuated by ambulance **[Note: T-16 carriers]**. The remaining troop of ‘B’ Sqn then became part of ‘C’ Sqn. The garrison was increased at this time by two tanks from ‘A’ Sqn, the only two to reach this point. They brought the information that enemy armour and anti-tank guns had completely cut off our approaches, and that no further reinforcements from the original battle group could reach our position.

Note: This next section appears to have been written from A Squadron’s perspective.

‘A’ Sqn had started out as reserve squadron of the regiment. After advancing for an hour in the dark, we stopped to orient ourselves, and decided that we were a mile west of CAUVICOURT. On an order from the CO we swung east and continued toward the objective. Infantry support in the form of one company of the Algonquin Regiment was directly behind us [D Company]. All through, we were fired on by enemy machine guns and snipers. Order of march was 2 Troop, FHQ, 1 Troop, 3 Troop, which later changed to 1 Troop, FHQ, 2 Troop, 3 Troop by Major Sidenius, OC ‘A’ Sqn, when one tank had a mechanical breakdown. North of ESTRÉES-LA-CAMPAGNE, No. 1 Troop came upon two casualties, both ‘B’ Sqn vehicles. At this point we were joined by No. 2 Troop ‘B’ Sqn from the right flank. Major Sidenius ordered his sqn to advance toward Hill 143 MR 144490. At MR 135500 **[Note: 1 km due south of Soignolles]** Lt. L.D. Stevens reported unidentified tanks on the next hill, and was about to fire on them when they were recognized as the remainder of the regiment. He and his corporal proceeded into open ground and were knocked out by a Tiger tank. Following this, a third tank of No. 1 Troop, and one of No. 2 Troop ‘B’ Sqn were hit. One Tiger tank and one anti-tank were accounted for by this group. Meanwhile, No. 2 Troop ‘A’ Sqn began to advance on Hill 143. Lt. McDermott [McDiarmid] and his sergeant only, reached the hill. Major Sidenius with his FHQ tanks, supported by No. 3 Troop, made a dash for the hill, but all three were hit within a few yards of their starting point. Major Sidenius was seen to start out of his turret, and then fall back again. The force left in the valley, pinned by the enemy, was as follows: No. 3 Troop ‘A’ Sqn, 1 tank [of] No. 1 Troop ‘A’ Sqn, 3 tanks No. 2 Troop ‘B’ Sqn, and two vehicles from the Algonquins. More ammunition was sent to them on an Ack-Ack tank, but it was hit just before it reached them **[see Appendix O]**. The remaining tanks were knocked out after having accounted for another Tiger tank. The Algonquin vehicles were hit as they tried to withdraw.

Throughout the morning the position was under continuous mortar, shell, and sniper fire. Lt. Col. Worthington’s tank was one of the first hit by anti-tank gun fire. Since he was in charge of the composite force, he decided to stay on the ground where he could control all his force. Numerous small counterattacks were launched from all sides during the day. By 1500 hours, the infantry was well entrenched, and the order came over the air “All the tanks that can still run will make a dash for it; return to original FUP; use fire and movement.” Eight tanks got out under friendly

smoke of the Polish forces. At 1800 hours, a warning came from our forward elements that a strong counterattack was being launched from the SE sector. Four tanks remained that could still be fought, and they immediately engaged the German infantry advancing in waves, and inflicted heavy casualties on them. This attack coincided with very heavy mortar concentrations which accounted for a large proportion of our infantry around the perimeter, and a direct hit set fire to one of the tanks. The attacking force of infantry, judged to be two Companies in strength, suffered heavy casualties, and was pinned down. Lt. Col. Worthington at this time returned with some wounded infantry men and gave them first aid in a dugout under a tank. In a few moments the counterattack was renewed, led by a mixed force of Tiger and Panther tanks. As the tank Lt. Col. Worthington was under was in an extremely vulnerable position, and had been hit, he ordered it forward to a covered position. He evacuated the wounded to the slight shelter of a hedge-row, and was killed by the burst of a mortar shell. Major Baron spent most of the day with Lt. Col. Worthington, and it is believed that he too, was killed by mortar fire.

Fighting still continued unabated, and soon another tank "brewed-up." Lt. McDermott's [McDiarmid] tank ran out of ammunition, and Lt. Biddlecombe's Stuart tank, which by this time, had only the use of its Browning, had also run out. As they had a 200 yard gap to cross, and the Tigers were only 100 yards away, they decided to go on foot. Lts. Biddlecombe and McDermott [McDiarmid] called the remaining men, who numbered only twelve to fourteen, together, and told them to split up into groups and make their way back to our own lines. HILL 143 MR 144490 (ST. PIERRE-SUR-DIVES Sheet) was left to the enemy at 2100 hours, after having been held for 14 hours. This, our first day in battle, had been an extremely costly one, since among the casualties were – Lt. Col. D.G. Worthington, CO of the Regiment, CAPT. Renwick the Adj., Major Sidenius, OC 'A' Sqn, Major Carson, OC 'B' Sqn, Major Baron, OC 'C' Sqn, the Rear-Link Capt of all sqns, six subalterns, plus 101 Other Ranks killed, wounded, or missing.

Casualties: Officers

(Killed) Other Ranks (Missing) - 33 /0

LT. COL. D.G. WORTHINGTON
MAJOR T.S. BARON
CAPT. R.A. TIFFIN
LIEUT. C. ALLEN
LIEUT. W.H. BICKNELL

(Missing)

Other Ranks

MAJOR G.R. SIDENIUS
CAPT. D.E. HARKER
CAPT. J.A. RENWICK
LIEUT. C.J. CHANDLER
LIEUT. L.D. STEVENS

(Missing) – 33
(Wounded) – 78

(Wounded)

Vehicles:

MAJOR J.H. CARSON
CAPT. J.I. HOPE
LIEUT. J.S. STOCK
LIEUT. J.T. JENKINSON

SHERMANS - 44
STUARTS - 2
CRUSADERS - 1
SCOUT CAR - 1

APPENDIX D

Account of Major J.H. Carson, B Squadron / 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

8 August

Move forward continued throughout the day. Finally ending in area LORGUICHON - 058578 – at 2230 hrs on 8 Aug. Unit adm was carried out at about 2230 in this area. An additional 50 rounds of 75mm HE (total mov, 150 rds) and .30 were loaded - .30 sandbagged on back of tanks. At 2330 hrs I went and saw the CO and he told us (all sqn comds) that we were proceeding to Hill 195 – 0846 on the 9 Aug; the OC was Lt-Col D.G. Worthington. I reported my squadron topped up and battle-worthy and the men resting. Three coys of the Algonquin Regiment arrived in this area at 2330 hrs. At 2355 hrs the CO went off with the Brig (Brig Booth) and Lt-Col Scott (CO 21 Cdn Armd (GGFG)) to the Brigadier's 'O' Gp. I returned with Maj Monk, OC B Coy Alq Regt, and settled them in a bivouac area near my squadron, so they could follow us out. The Algonquin Regiment were in T-16 carriers.

9 August

At 0015B hrs I returned to my own squadron and had an O Gp with my troop leaders. I told them we were going to Hill 195 to-day, and to set up and mark their maps as far as the information available permitted them to do so. I returned to the CO's tank; Maj Sidenius [OC A Sqn] and I crawled under the CO's tank and tried to get some sleep. At 0130B hrs the CO returned from the Brigade O Gp and held his O Gp, consisting of all squadron comds, all coy comds of the Algonquin Regiment, FOO from 3 Cdn Medium Regiment [Note: 11 Medium Regiment], CRA's rep from 23 Cdn Field Regiment (SP), and one FOO from 23 Cdn Field Regiment.

Lt-Col Worthington's orders were, roughly:

Information

(a) Enemy

Merely a few second rate German formations holding feature 195 and vicinity.

(b) Own Tps

The Poles were on our left in Cromwell tanks – codename 'Polar Bears.' 22 Cdn Armd Regiment with under command Lake Sup Regiment (mot) were to take BRETTEVILLE-LE RABET – 095500, and 21 Cdn Armd Regt were to follow the 28 Cdn Armd Regt; and on the 28 Cdn Armd Regt taking Hill 195 were to firm up the position on 195 by taking up a position forward, in the area 088455.

Intention

To advance south some 400 to 600 yds, east and parallel to the Caen–Falaise highway; by-pass BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET; swing west across the highway near Point 132 – 099487 – and with the Caen–Falaise highway on the east, continue the advance south to Hill 195. Here the 28 Cdn Armd Regt would firm up and hold till supported by 21 Cdn Armd and 22 Cdn Armd Regts. Then when 4 Cdn Armd Bde (21, 22, 28 CARs, LSR, and under comd Alq Regt) had seized and held Pt 195; units of 3 Cdn Inf Div would take over Pt 195; and 4 Cdn Armd Bde would strike through 3 Cdn Inf Div and continue the advance to FALAISE, probably 10 Aug. 28 Cdn Armd Regt to take Pt 195 and hold, regardless of casualties.

Method

28 CAR will advance from present position one squadron up.

OOM: C Sqn with under comd D Coy Alq Regt (in T-16 carriers) and FOO of 23 SP Regt; RHQ and FOO of 3 Cdn Med Regt and CRA's rep (a maj of 23 SP regt); B Sqn with under comd B Coy Alq Regt; A Sqn with under comd A Coy **[actually D Coy]** Alqonquin Regiment.

Leading squadron to move at 0230B hrs, 9 Aug 44.

Administration

Already topped up. RAP to be in ROCQUANCOURT and then move to BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET.

Intercommunication – Regt net.

At 0230B hrs on 9 Aug C Sqn moved off, followed by RHQ, followed by the point troop of B Sqn – B Sqn. FHQ (Maj Carson) stopped to pick up the FOO from the 3rd Medium Regt **[actually 11 Medium]**, whose tank had become a mechanical casualty. Before B Sqn FHQ got started again the 22 CAR came in from the side onto the road, and was then between the leading squadron and B Sqn. I then moved the squadron off the road to the left (roughly 500 yds) and proceeded south. We left the road at approximately 072575. There were plenty of stars out and I had no trouble getting direction. We were travelling well dispersed, governed by the light; the tanks were about 50 yards apart. The enemy was firing on us with small arms, mortars and 88s. We had no lights on whatsoever.

About 0400 hrs we were opposite CINTHEAUX. C Sqn was held up by intense enemy fire for some fifteen minutes. As we were on a regimental net, everyone was in the picture at this time. While halted here, A Sqn came in from the left. I contacted Maj Sidenius and he decided to follow me south. We had lost some of our infantry in the carriers, as they were unable to quit the road where the tanks did. We put a man on the Caen–Falaise road to collect the carriers as they went by. The 22 CAR was going down the road with the LSRs on their tanks at this time.

At about 0430 hrs C Sqn moved again and proceeded on the Centre Line. The next I heard, the leading troop of C Sqn was held up on trying to cross over to the right hand side of the Caen–Falaise road just south of BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET. The CO then told Major Baron to try and go up the left hand side of the road. Major Baron reported that there was heavy enemy fire from this direction too; the CO told him to push on immediately, or he was coming through himself with RHQ. He said we were losing the surprise and it would soon be daylight. Major Baron replied, 'Will go all out,' and proceeded forward.

At about 0500 hrs it was getting light; and with the haystacks, buildings and vehicles burning, you could see the enemy positions. All troops had their arc of responsibility and kept up a continual fire from the coax and 75mm.

On B Sqn arriving due east from LACROIX – MR 120493 – the enemy opened up with 88s and got one tank. I immediately moved the tanks into a hull down position, and systematically started to shoot up this small town. While I was engaged on this target, I sent one troop under Lt Wilson to try and get across the main road on our Centre Line. He went through GRAINVILLE-LANGANNERIE, reported the village clear, and proceeded south to the railway. Major Monk sent two carriers over to investigate the village, and they came back and reported the same clear.

The CO came up on the air and wanted to know what was delaying B Sqn. I told him I was engaging the enemy in a small village, and he said for me to come up immediately. I asked him if he was on the hill where all the smoke and fire was coming from, on the left hand side of the road; he said Yes, and to come up immediately. I gave orders for my squadron to follow me. I led off and gave my operational instructions to recall No. 2 Troop under Lieutenant Wilson.

Lieutenant Wilson at this time was asking for help; he was wounded, had two tanks shot out, and wanted assistance. The village that had previously been reported vacant was now full of troops. I could not go to his assistance, told him to use smoke and get out the best he could. He was unable to get any tanks out, and later reported back to A Ech on foot, with about six men. His 17- pounder had been hit on the barrel and knocked about two feet off the end, making it useless.

On my way up to the CO I asked if I would go on my original position, which was to be on the right of 'C' Sqn. The CO said no, that he had a special job for 'B' Sqn. On the way up onto Hill 111, C Sqn had a very good shoot on enemy tanks that had harboured by backing into the woods on both sides of the open place that C Sqn had advanced through. These tanks were all burning fiercely when I went through with my squadron. When I came within 100 yards of the top of the hill, I got out of my tank and went up to the CO. C Sqn and RHQ had formed a battle laager on the crest of the hill, with approximately four tanks facing in each direction. There was no enemy fire coming down at this time. The CO pointed to a small woods about 500 yards further south. He said he wanted B Sqn to occupy that, so that the enemy could not form up behind and attack his present position. He was also going to use it as a firm base for the next move towards Hill 195. He said half of C Sqn facing south would support me with HE and smoke.

I went back and got my two troop leaders of Nos. 3 and 4 Tps – Lieutenant Scudmore and Lieutenant Stock. I told Lieutenant Stock his troop would go out to the woods first, with at least 200 yards between tanks. He reported he only had two tanks left. No. 3 Troop and FHQ would support him until he reached the woods; then FHQ would go out to the woods, No. 4 Troop moving to the far end of the woods; then No. 3 Troop would go out. Lieutenants Scudmore and Stock went to make a recce of their route out and action of objective. I went back to the CO to tie in the fire plan with C Sqn and the artillery. We were now ten miles south of the starting point. The field regiment could not reach us to support, and the FOO from the 3 [11] Medium Regt had no communications, as we could not net in another No. 19 set at this distance.

At approximately 0900 hrs No.s 4 and 3 Troops reported 'Ready.' I gave the word for No. 4 Troop to advance; and two troops of C Sqn, plus my two troops, opened fire on the hedges running southeast and southwest from this position. No. 4 Troop fired coax and 75mm at the woods as they approached on the move. They arrived safely at the woods, and then turned their guns on the hedge about a mile to the right, near the top of Hill 88. I immediately started out with FHQ, travelling about 20 mph; and on coming within 20 yards of the woods was hit in the tracks by an 88. This stopped my tank, and I came on the air and told the CO I had gone up on a mine. Captain Hope, rear link, passed me on the left, and when his tank was about 10 yards past mine, was hit in the turret and brewed up immediately.

I gave the gunner orders for 75mm shell action, traversed the turret by the master switch, gave him 1800 yards, pointed out a spot in the hedge, and told him to fire. We were 50 yards short of the position from which I thought I saw the flash come; so I gave him 'Up 50' and we got that A/T gun. As the same time another A/T gun 50 yards closer opened up and hit Lieutenant Stock's tank; it brewed immediately, but four men got out of it at once. The 88 went through the front of the tank through the gunner between Lt Stock's legs. My gunner saw the flash from this A tk gun himself and took it out without any further orders.

The sgt of No. 4 Troop, Sgt Wallbank, went down to the far end of the woods, came under heavy fire, and came back to the near end of the woods, when his tank was hit. Sgt Wallbank's leg was shot off just below the knee. I looked back over my shoulder and saw Sgt Shank's tank burning. This meant that all the tanks I had started out with were burning, except mine. I ordered my crew to evacuate by the escape hatch. We took out a box of some 30 grenades and our personal weapons. I told the CO what had happened, and he told us to come back on foot. I also told No. 3 Troop not to come out. While I was crawling out from under my tank, it was hit again and brewed immediately. Just before leaving the tank, I saw someone fall from Capt Hope's tank; so I crawled over and found

it was Capt Hope, with his right arm shot off. I gave him morphine and told him I would come back and get him. I then went back to my crew and we crawled to the edge of the woods and annihilated one enemy section of infantry, which was all we could see in the woods. We got back to C Sqn about 0930 hrs with all the wounded.

The CO then decided to hold the area he was now on, as we did not know where A Sqn was; B Sqn only had two troops left (Nos. 1 and 3), and C Sqn had lost two tanks. There were none of our own troops within four miles of us, and the enemy had us completely surrounded. At about 1000 hrs the enemy counterattacked with about 200 infantry and 4 tanks. We threw back this counterattack, and they did not attack again before noon. They mortared and shelled us heavily all morning. The three coys of the Alg Regt which had come up with B Sqn (the coy with the leading sqn had been unable to keep up, and a coy had lost A Sqn and had followed B) now had dug in on the crest of the hill. We had plenty of small arms fire, as the inf were well equipped with automatics; and we had our coax and Browning bow gun. About 1030 hrs Col Hay was hit with a mortar shell and lost one leg. About 1200 hrs the CO decided to take a chance and send out the badly wounded. Six T16s were fixed up and made a break for it; they had at least four miles to go before they reached our own forward troops. Jerry shelled us all the way in and only two carriers got through – the one in which were Cols Hay and others, and the one with myself and five others. When I left, the CO's intention was to hold the hill until the 21 CAR or the Polish Div came up.

APPENDIX E

Account of Lieutenant J.O. Stevens, 1 Troop / B Squadron / 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

On the evening of the 8 August 1944 we moved up to our concentration area and got ready for the push we were to make to Hill 195. Everybody was in the best of spirits and ready to get a crack at the Boche, after waiting and training for nearly five years. We finally got started off while it was still dark and lined up with the Algonquin Regiment who were to go in with us. I was the last troop to go in with the initial push and covered 3 Troop who was in front of us. It wasn't long before we had our machine guns combing everything we passed in the way of possible hiding places of the enemy.

After we travelled about 1 ½ miles I looked back and saw my sergeant's tank burning well and just hoped and prayed they were all out of it. Not long after that I felt my own tank get hit on the left track and after looking around to make sure it wasn't on fire we carried on not knowing at that time that we had also been hit on a bogey wheel on the right side. The Boche took three more shots at us but missed each time. At this time I still had my two corporal's tanks running. We carried on about another mile and I noticed one of my corporal's tanks had been put out of action but was not burning.

The other corporal's tank and my own reached the bottom of the hill and we could hear the battle raging on top. Just then the track on my tank that had been hit broke. I called over the corporal and was going to take his tank over but when we were getting out we were machine gunned and sniped at and made a hurried retreat into our turrets again. It was only too plain that the hidden gunners were not going to let us change so I threw my secret codes and maps to Corporal N.H.E. MacDonald and told him to go up and see what he could do to help on top. That was the last time I saw him and his crew but heard later from one of the fellows that got back that four of them were in a bush uninjured. The gunner Trooper Archibald was missing.

Within the next few minutes some of the infantry came up to my tank. Their vehicle had fuel trouble. The diver, name unknown, went back to fix it and was underneath when he was machine gunned. He bandaged his head, fixed the vehicle, and brought it up to my tank. It was then we saw he had been injured and kept him at my tank and made him as comfortable as possible after giving First-Aid until we stopped a vehicle to take him back. A short time later Major Sidenius tank along with Sergeant Perry's [and] were hit immediately behind me and both burned out. Three men got out of the Major's tank, but the gunner and the Major had been wounded and couldn't get out. His driver came over to us and the other two made their way back along with Sergeant Perry. Our friend the sniper who was in the woods close by didn't touch us after that, except for the odd shot just to let us know he was still about, until we started to dig in some weapons pits. My operator and Maj Sidenius's driver got one finished, but as soon as my driver, Trooper L. Mighton and I started one he let fly with one at my head and one at my feet. I don't know yet how he missed. Mighton made a dash for the tank and I got into the other weapon pit. I had been sitting there a couple of minutes when two tiger tanks came around the corner of the woods and stopped about ten yards from my tank. We felt it was all over then, but they motioned everyone to get down and drove off (I sure would like to meet those two crew commanders someday).

Nothing else happened until around 9 PM when Lt. Ken Clarke came into sight with an infantry sergeant. I called them over to my tank and Ken just flopped [down] with exhaustion. I crawled out with some whiskey to give them both a good shot. He told me he had some more chaps back a little way, that were wounded and after a short rest went back to get them. We redressed their wounds and fed them and made them rest a short while until dark. It was then we had two 88 mm shells come close to the tank. After dark we picked up what we could in the way of food, water and smokes and started back. I didn't think we would make it that night as some of the fellows were pretty badly wounded and we had to help them. Trooper A. Saunders and Trooper Wharton were helping an infantryman in the rear of the column. It wasn't long before he couldn't walk and they dropped back without letting us know about it. We reached the lines in front of the Poles who took us in, fed and bedded us down until the following morning. After that it was just a bunch of happy thankful fellows walking along to our own unit.

Signed. J.O. Stevens

APPENDIX F

Account of Lieutenant B. Wilson, 2 Troop / B Squadron / 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

We received orders at 0300 hrs in the AM to move and seize Hill 195 MR/08089461. We pushed off from 769574 with C Sqn leading RHQ, B Sqn, A Sqn. B Squadron's order of march was 1 Troop, 2 Troop, FHQ 3, & 4 Troop. We moved down the Centre Line [Caen–Falaise Highway – NEAGLE] to point 088533 when we lost contact with 1 Troop. At this time I was ordered by Maj Carson to lead. I then pushed off on CL. It was then first light (0545). From this time on we fired coax into all hedges, haystacks, and kept in contact with the sqn comd but had lost touch with (visual) leading sqns. At 118511 I swung to the right heading directly for Point 195. At this time I lost contact with FHQ at 118500 after passing through an orchard but heard on radio "Head for smoke," but could only see smoke away off to my left and didn't consider it was ours and so continued on CL. I carried on, still firing at likely places of concealment as far as 097483 which is just near march area Quesnay [Wood] and also crossed the CL to the west. We stopped here to get oriented and all troops dismounted for a smoke. Saw movement around in field (people in slacks, coveralls). Remounted convinced that we were on right track [and] we pushed off again for Point 195 by this time completely out of touch with the rest of the regiment. We then ran into enemy infantry who were very startled and immediately deployed. A/T guns of small calibre opened up at point blank range and heavy A/T guns from woods at 089483 and [I] decided this was no place for one troop to stay so [I] swung right after silencing two A/T guns, into enemy infantry positions. We overran them firing everything we had (grenades). Three of my troop were hit at this time but none [were] put out of action. Six Germans came up from the ground right in front of us and I threw grenades and continued back to where I had last seen my squadron and met A Sqn at 119508.

Reported to Jeff Sidenius [OC A Sqn] on foot and was instructed to fall in with A Sqn, at rear, [but] was not in wireless communications with them. [W]e headed in a SE direction into a valley. I stopped in a valley and A Sqn continued ahead of me to a rise of ground Point 83. At this point I met Lieutenant Carl Allen who had had his tank knocked out at the top of the hill. He told me what had happened and that other tanks in his squadron had been hit. There were about 15 men and some Algonquins. One of my crew commanders Sgt Smith then came down and reported a Tiger in [an] orchard to the right. I gave orders to my Troop Sgt [Neilson] to bring his tank along the hedge while I went forward on foot to locate the position of the Tiger [and] spotted it about 500 yards away. He must have seen me as he opened up with MG fire. I made my way back to [my] 17-pdr and put him in a suitable position to fire at the Tiger. All this time my tanks were being plastered with 88 and mg fire. Three A Sqn tanks were hit there. Just as the 17-pdr was on the Tiger and ready to fire, he received a direct hit on the gun mount. It was then apparent that the rest of my tanks would go too, so [I] moved back to a depression and tried to fire on the Jerry tanks indirect. Fired 3 shots and found it impossible to register and another tank opened fire on me from the rear. Then I put my other two tanks in position and L/Cpl Fedyk under MG fire directed his own tank into the same hull down position. With my tank and Cpl Patterson's [we] moved right into the hedge and fired four shots at the Tiger and scored hits. I then rallied the troop around me and Carl Allen said we were surrounded, so [I] decided the best thing was to abandon the tanks (1300 hrs) and get the men out. We moved into a hedge 100 yards north and laid low and were fired on by mg and mortars.

At approx 1500 hrs C Sqn tanks came fast so [I] tried to stop them and asked them to take us in on back. They only stopped momentarily and Troopers Hawkins, Morton, and myself jumped aboard. Our idea was to stop the tanks long enough for the rest of the troops to run out. So the three officers went out with the idea of returning a vehicle for the rest of the troops. This we did the next day and found Sgt Smith taking care of the wounded including Sgt Neilson and Trooper Bogart (approx 1700 hrs 10 Aug). Came out and got ½ track [from] RSM Jay and the M.O. and returned and brought out all wounded (under very heavy 88 HE fire) A/Cpl Paterson had died of wounds. Sgt Smith did a fine job of looking after wounded under heavy fire for 30 hours and even penetrated back to our tanks through German infantry to get water for the wounded.

APPENDIX G

Account of Lieutenant John T. Scudamore, 3 Troop / B Squadron / 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

To: Lt. Biddlecombe
From: Lt J.T. Scudamore

We formed up at the FUP at approximately 0200 hrs and advanced along given CL [Centre Line]. During the initial stages of the move there was some confusion caused by the Arty Rep's tank **[Note: Capt Searle, 11 Medium Regt]** breaking down and the leading elements gained quite a lead. The Sqn eventually got away and by moving up by the fields at the left of the road, arrived at a posn east of CINTHEAUX. I had dropped out as I had run down a telephone pole, but when I arrived at CINTHEAUX I managed to get my three tanks together. The other machine had dropped out at Caen in an accident. We formed up just north and east of CINTHEAUX and Major Carson had a short 'O' Group, present at which was also Lt. Stock, Lt Wilson and Capt Hope. The major decided as 'C' Sqn had had some sort of a fire fight near CINTHEAUX we would bypass well to the left of CINTHEAUX and push on. This we did with # 2 Troop commanded by Lt Wilson leading, followed by # 4 Troop, FHQ, and # 3 Troop and the infantry [behind]. I eventually ended up protecting the infantry's rear. We worked tactically along, Sgt Rekert and Cpl Pearson doing a marvelous job of protection and fire. We gradually worked along having considerable difficulty keeping together in the dim light and advancing along a Centre-Line of fires started by the lead sqn. I was very busy firing & running the troop [and] my map reading was entirely neglected. However, we eventually stopped near a church **[Note: most likely at Estrées-la-Campagne]** and I joined two tanks of # 4 Troop, # 2 Troop and FHQ. At the time it was just light and I went to Maj Carson who was discussing the map situation with Lt. Biddlecombe, the Arty FOO, and Lt Stock and Lt Wilson. The opinions were very varied. However the discussion was cut short by the Col [Worthington] who could see us and who ordered the major to advance to high ground to the left on top of which fires were burning. This order the major immediately obeyed and we started out again, # 2 Troop leading **[Note: 2 Troop had moved southwest by this time]**. I stayed again behind the infantry. I heard # 2 Troop call for support but we were unable to see him. My Sgt, however, moved across to the left and fired into the hedge-row. I joined him. By this time it was our turn to go through. I advanced covered by the Sgt and the Cpl. Then the Cpl to the left took up a position behind a long lane of trees. As I was just advancing up the hill the CO of the infantry [LCol Hay] came up in a carrier and asked me to stay there and protect the tail of his column which had come up on the right into the hill position. This I did and we then moved up the hill.

At the top I moved over to the right and dismounted, to meet Maj Carson who told me to get my tanks to the far side of the field. I phoned the Sgt & Cpl to follow and went to # 4 Troop. Lt Stock was going out first followed by FHQ, followed by myself [to clear Thirty Acre Wood]. At this time we had [seven] tanks in the sqn. Stock asked for H.E. on the woods and co-ax on a small copse to the left. I was still waiting for my other two call signs and sent my co-driver to get them over. I did not know they were pinned by fire, and that my Sgt had had 5 x 88 shots fired at him coming up. Lt Stock advanced and I fired into the top of the woods thinking the H.E. would burst down into it. Lt. Stock reached the edge of the woods and reported nothing seen. My other tanks arrived and moved up ready to fire. Other tanks of Lt Clarke of 'C' Sqn were firing on the left front with co-ax. Lt. Stock's Sgt moved up to the first hedge-row. There Major Carson and Capt Hope moved up on the left. They had just reached the area when the left hand tank brewed up. I phoned Lt Stock and informed him. He called Maj Carson, but before he could answer all three remaining tanks brewed up. I had put down 75mm smoke but the range was too short and no effective screen was laid.

Next Lt. Stock came across the fields, without helmet and walked into the area. He told me his Sgt's leg was off and that he was out there, also that he had given him morphine. I asked where the fire came from and he said away off to the right. Lt. Stock then went over to the half track and in spite of the obviously very painful burns,

returned and brought in a load of wounded including Maj Carson, Captain Hope, Sergeant Nester and others. The corporal from the RAP [regimental aid post] of the Algonquins was dressing the wounds. I went and asked Maj Carson where the fire was from and he replied he had blown up on a mine. I went to see Sgt Wallbank and couldn't find him so we organized a party and went out and found him; (Sgt Rekert and I flipped coins to see who would go). He [Sgt Wallbank] was in great pain but in good spirits. Sgt Rekert gave him first-aid and I reported to the Col who told me to wait awhile until he got things organized, so I reported to Maj Baron who gave me code-sign 'King 5' and put me in position on the opposite side of the field. I gave orders for the tanks to be dug in and a man with binoculars to search for targets be put in each turret. One target was reported and Cpl Pearson engaged it with his crew.

During this period we were shelled and mortared and a few tanks burned up. The captain of the Algonquins came along and told us to get inside as a lot of people were getting hurt with the mortars and shells. He was wounded but carrying on. We patched him up and he left to see to the defense. Evidently he was the only officer left with their crowd. The colonel came along and they had a short conference under my sergeant's tank. The colonel told me Major Baron was in charge of the tanks.

More tanks were burning up. Just after my sergeant's tank burned up. He brought two wounded men and the remainder of his crew over under my machine and after[ward] took the shovels to put them in the woods. I took them the tea we had had brewing. The ammunition was exploding from the burning tank. The corporal's tank then burned up. Sergeant Rekert was taking the crew and wounded into the woods. I reported to the colonel who came along and he told me to get my tank out of the hedge and dig my men in. I got my driver and we started to back it out. Then we got it around to the left.

More tanks were burning up. I heard an all stations call to take all runners and form up to return to the FUP [forming up place]. I took my tank over to the edge of the woods to try and locate the other members of the crew, but they were not there. So I fell in at the rear of the other tanks and dashed down between the woods. My driver reports we were fired at several times. I was throwing out smoke grenades. Two tanks burned up on this move. Polish tanks from hull-down gave us more smoke.

We returned to beyond the ridge picking up Lt Wilson. A short conference was had and liaison was made with a Polish officer. There were Polish tanks all through the area and also trucks and half-tracks with infantry. We decided to return to the FUP as instructed and did so eventually returning to the A-1 Echelon.

NOTE: Sgt Rekert, H.M. was invaluable throughout the entire action; handling his tank very skillfully and showing great coolness under fire. Also reports have come in [that] he organized one of the escape parties and brought wounded men out.

APPENDIX H

Account of Lieutenant H.J. Armstrong, 2 Troop / C Squadron / 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

Preparatory to the unit thrust towards Height 195 'C' Squadron formed up in area 0853 just east of the Centre-Line. As assault squadron, we were leading followed by RHQ and the other two squadrons. With us was a company of the Algonquin Regiment in armoured vehicles. As we formed up here the 22 CAR were observed heading south on the Centre-Line. It was ordered that 'C' Squadron would move to outflank Bretteville-Rabet to the east, regardless of the situation re 22 CAR, as surprise was our greatest factor.

'C' Sqn lead with 2 Troop left, 1 Troop right, followed by RHQ. (it appears since that we swung too far left). As we moved past Bretteville-le-Rabet we were fired on by small arms and automatic weapons. We advanced indulging in speculative firing. This was mostly co-ax and was effective. Rounds were observed to ricochet off 'hay' mounds and one haystack exploded when hit. As we approached Height 145 (1347), I observed movement in the woods 138488 and successfully destroyed a hidden enemy armoured car and from this fire, a tall column of smoke rose indicating either a petrol or ammunition dump. My corporal (FINLAYSON H.J.) at the same time scored hits on enemy transport.

Time was just first light now. My troop was given the east flank of the position to observe. 4 Troop was responsible for the north-east corner, 1 Troop for the south, sharing it with 3 Troop. Squadron Headquarters and RHQ looked after the other flanks. (At this time, first light, only 'C' Squadron and RHQ plus one company of Algonquins had reached the position.) No enemy fire had been observed. Shortly after first light 'B' Squadron was heard approaching the general area - my first sight of them was on the south west corner of the position when I noticed two vehicles "brewing" and one on a mine (?). My front was quiet except for movement of men and transport which was quite successfully engaged. It was at this time that 1 Troop on the south reported personnel movement and later took a prisoner, an S.S. Lieutenant, one private and a captured English type scout car.

Lieutenant Bicknell, 4 Troop, reported two Tigers to the north at extreme range. Sergeant Cameron of 3 Troop was detailed to fire on them. Sergeant Quarry of 2 Troop later assisted with his 17-pounder. It was at this stage that Lieutenant Bicknell was knocked out. Sgt Quarry was then ordered to withdraw and then placed himself near Lieutenant Hooton where he engaged Tigers to the south-east of our position and claimed hits. The enemy armour remained at extreme range in this sector.

On my own flank I observed considerable movement of men and vehicles approximately 3000 yards east. The morning was spent shelling these targets as they appeared. Several rounds of armour piecing (AP) registered on a tree beside my tank, but the location of the enemy vehicle firing was impossible [to determine]. Sgt Quarry later spotted a Tiger and engaged it with his 17-pounder. Mortar fire and sniping was quite heavy and accurate. The enemy seemed to lay a concentration down on the four sides of our position, each one in its own turn. By moving my tanks forward or backwards 20 - 30 yards I remained "lucky".

Communications became poor - I was aware now of many tanks "brewing" in our position and I last remember hearing the CO roughly at noon. Major Baron was still on the air, however, from time to time, requesting information and positioning vehicles. It was hard now to tell who was who and how many [tanks] were knocked out. Between Lieutenant Hooton and myself we continued to observe to the east and to the south; 3 Troop to his right seemed out of action.

'B' Squadron tanks had come in earlier in the morning and taken position in the northerly end of the position, but I heard little of their actions. By mid-afternoon control on the air was spasmodic and it was hard now to tell who was still alive. Major Baron visited my position and told me to carry on watching that particular flank. At approximately 1530 hours an order came to "All Stations" that as the situation looked hopeless for the tanks that as many tanks as could move would return to the original FUP of the morning. It was ordered that fire and movement would be used and all speed possible. 10 tanks then moved. I reversed from my position and fell in behind a 1 Troop tank. We rallied in the woods 137496 and control had gone off the air. Lieutenant Hooton then said he would lead, and in open formation we moved through the woods and towards Cintheaux. Just as we cleared the woods my corporal's tank was disabled, it was later reported to me. His crew was seen to abandon the vehicle and were running towards a half-track vehicle.

We moved quickly and used smoke. Approximately at MR 1250 we sighted Polish armour who must have recognized us as they "smoked" off the enemy for us. We ran through their formation and finally reached a point near Cintheaux where the ARC personnel took charge of our now remaining two vehicles. In due course we returned with recce vehicles and the ARC to our echelon area. Of the eight tanks [that survived], six were from 'C' Sqn the other two were from 'B' Sqn. Lieutenant Scudamore and Lieutenant Wilson were with the two 'B' Squadron tanks.

APPENDIX I

Account of Major L.C. Monk, OC B Company / Algonquin Regiment

The following is the initial account written by Major Monk and included in the 8 August entry in the Algonquin Regiment's war diary, and is different from his account found in the appendix to the war diary.

**Eye witness account of battle at Hill 140 near BRETTVILLE Le RABET, NORMANDY, Aug 8-9 -1944.
By Maj L C Monk, OC 'B' Coy.**

Force: – B, C and D Coys and 2 sec 3 in mortars U/C British Columbia Regt.

Task: – Night raid four miles enemy territory, seize hill feature. B Company were with B Squadron under Major Carson. Zero [was] 0230 hrs. Lieutenant-Colonel Hay, OC Algonquin Regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington, OC BCR, were in [a] tank. A Squadron leading [followed by] B, C and D. **[Note: C Squadron was leading]**. B Coy [was in] 7 half -tracks, one [for] company HQ, [and] 2 per platoon. Captain Lewis RCASC [was] in [a] company HQ half-track. I was in a carrier with two signalers and a driver (one signaller wounded before we left harbour area). Column moved [in] column of route, 'A' Sqn, 'B' Sqn, 'B' coy, 'C' Sqn, 'C' Coy, 'D' Sqn. 'D' Coy. Command was floating.

Hit enemy first at Cintheaux at 0315 hrs. A Squadron engaged enemy. B Squadron and B Company flanked left and came under fire from St. Sylvain – went like hell [in the] general direction [of] Soignolles, [and] this put our group in the lead. Fought (tanks doing most) to point one mile east of Estrées-la-Campagne – getting daylight, tanks getting hit. Force I was with at this point consisted of B Squadron, B and C Companies. I sent 10 Platoon into [a] little settlement on [a] short patrol while we tried to get oriented, the time was approx 0445 hrs. 10 Platoon returns and Lieutenant Dutcher reports enemy escaping out of Estrées-la-Campagne on [the] road running south. Took company to fire position, dismounted and engaged for fifteen minutes vehicles and enemy on foot moving south.

HQ tank with the two colonels, by this time came along. A Squadron **[Note: B Squadron]** went up to Hill 140 **[Note: closer to Point 111]** and began consolidation. We followed – came to stumped area, tanks had no trouble but I had to get out and lead our gang through on foot. Some vehicles got stuck and had to be pushed with others, used my carrier a bit for this – Time approximately 0515 hrs. We were not directly fired on, but tanks in vicinity were being hit and were firing back – it was a bit exciting.

As soon as B and C Companies were through the obstacle, we raced on through wheat fields firing the Brens from the moving vehicles when we had a target. At the foot of Hill 140 (in woods) an enemy position was located and by-passed by tanks and C Company. Ordered 10 and 11 Platoons to take it on. This they did at the double, firing Brens and rifles from the hip. Left 10 and 11 Platoons to mop up, went on 200 yards to report to the CO with 12 Platoon and the Mortars.

Was ordered to get B Company into position at once, [and was] given area at east end of the position. Placed 12 Platoon and returned to 10 and 11 Platoons, they had killed fifteen men, captured six, including an officer and one man wounded. Position had four x 88mm guns and four dummy guns and eleven motorcycles. As much of this equipment as possible was wrecked.

Moved 10 and 11 Platoons into new position and organized digging in and dumping of ammunition reserves. Then reported to the CO to get permission to take a force down to the gun position, but enemy fire was getting severe and permission was refused. At approximately 0930 hrs, Lieutenant-Colonel Hay was wounded. At 1000 hrs, [I] helped to organize half-track convoy under Capt Lewis to take the wounded out. Firing from 1000 hrs to 1500 hrs became so intense that it was practically impossible to move, this was mostly 88mm and mortar fire, no small arms.

At approximately 1000 hrs we were accidentally “Tyffied” and strafed by two of our own planes. These however, recognized us and returned many times during the day to have a go at the enemy and we would cheer the Tyffies and curse the Jerries. Casualties were occurring every few minutes. Made a megaphone out of maps and kept the platoon commanders and others in the picture in this manner so as to minimize unnecessary movement which always drew fire.

Around 1400 hrs, Colonel Worthington ordered the eight remaining tanks to RV at the west end of the field which offered some cover for them. Wounded men were everywhere, both tank crews and infantry. Got prisoners to dig extra slits. Spent a hell of a lot of time helping the SBs [stretcher bearers] with the wounded, they had to be controlled and quietened because of the effect on those still trying to man the position. At about 1430 hrs in front of 10 Platoon’s position [on the] east flank, an enemy attack, tanks and infantry, was seen forming up. They were engaged with LMG [light machine guns] and mortars by 10 Platoon, [and] a Polish squadron of tanks which managed to get close enough to help. Thanks to the Poles and 10 Platoon the attack was never put in from this flank (this was our withdrawal route later). At 1600 hrs, the Poles having been forced to withdraw, the enemy were able to give us their complete attention. Fire, including artillery, came from all directions.

A second attack, tanks and infantry, was seen forming up to the south at 1830 hrs. All our tanks by this time were out of action, the Poles had withdrawn and our position was serious. The Jerries to the south were kept at a safe distance by small arms fire from C Company and 12 Platoon. At about 1900 hrs I found out that Colonel Worthington had been killed, Major McPherson (OC, C Company) was wounded, part of C Company had withdrawn and our mortars were out of action. We had about 50% casualties and ammunition was very low.

At 2030 hrs, [I] ordered the remainder of C Company to close on our position. We were under continuous machine gun and small arms fire – Heavy concentration of enemy mortar fire at 2130 hrs, under which enemy infantry got into the northwest corner of our position and their tanks closed to about 200 yards. It was getting dark – [I] ordered withdrawal to begin through 10 Platoon’s position, [and] gave directions how to get to Polish lines. Left position at approx 2230 hrs. Enemy infantry were within 30 yards, [so we] had to crawl about 1000 yards to get clear. Bumped into an enemy tank at about 2400 hrs, but was not seen so party continued to Polish lines, reaching there at first light. Privates Prodanick, Wilson and McLeod were with me. Rallied what was left of the two companies at Ren mesnil and marched to 10 CIB HQ at Cintheaux. Spent the next day re-organizing and re-fitting the company. Joined battalion in concentration area at 1700 hrs 11 Aug 44. Out of nine officers and 225 ORs of Algonquins who consolidated [on the] position, seven officers and 137 ORs were killed, wounded or missing.

APPENDIX J

Account of Lieutenant Ken Gartley, 11 Platoon / B Company / Algonquin Regiment

On the night of Aug. 8, 1944, the Algonquin Regiment u/c Lt. Col. A.J. Hay, were loaded into half-tracks, supplied by the engineers. As we lined the streets, nose to tail, B Coy was u/c of Major L.S. Monk, with Lt. C. Dutcher in command of 10 Platoon, Lt. K. M. Gartley in charge of 11 Platoon, and Lt. W. A. Fraser in command of 12 Platoon. CSM D. Fraser was in Coy HQ. NCOs in 11 Platoon were Sgt. Reynolds, Cpl Lafontaine and Cpl C. Richmond. As we were waiting here, our artillery to the south of the town were pounding that old target continually, then came that rumored 1000 plane raid in a deafening roar, carrying their heavy loads to the objective, Tilly-la-Campagne, the Normandy stumbling block. This was part of the softening process for the SS troopers who had held the town for so long, despite the shelling by our arty and the bombing handed out by the rocket-firing Typhoons.

It was the plan for the 51st Highland Division to take this town and consolidate it. Then the 4th Armd Division was to pass through, thundering on in all its might to Hill 195, our next objective; the first armd attempt to break through the Hitler Orchard Line. This was our first big show, the many months of training in England were now being put to the test; everyone was crowded in the half-tracks (2 per platoon) but no one complained because "this was it."

At 2359 hrs the long armoured column of the 4th Div moved out of Caen. Progress was slow, however, and the following morning found us only 3 or 4 kilometres south of Caen where we stopped for the day in a large field. We dismounted here and spent most of the day anxiously awaiting the plunge into the Orchard line. During the day the Grenadier Guards [22 CAR] and GGFGs [21 CAR] met with disastrous results in trying to reach their objective.

On the afternoon of the 9th [Note: he means the 8th], word was passed along that the Algonquin's and BCRs were going to make the attack that night. So late in the afternoon we began to move forward again, passing through the tired, grimy, but successful 51 Highland Division. As darkness fell we stopped again, and waited while the coy commanders were called to an "O" group. Later, at approximately midnight, we received very brief orders, that B, C, and D Coys of the Algonquins u/c of the BCRs were going to make an unannounced dash for Hill 195, under artificial moonlight. We had to hold this objective till the rest of the division caught up.

As the platoon commanders issued these sketchy orders, comments were many as we clamoured back into the half-tracks to follow the BCRs. As the squadron of tanks with B Coy following closely rumbled forward, it sounded like a formidable weapon. Everything went smoothly until first light, when we received our first taste of enemy 88mm fire. As our tanks moved over the brow of a hill, overlooked by our ultimate objective, they were picked off like pigeons. At this time we came upon a small village on the right of our advance. A troop of tanks went into the town, and the remainder of the tanks and infantry moved into dead ground again. There were now only two companies as 'D' Coy had disappeared. Later we learned they had reached Bretteville-le-Rabet. From the dead ground we were able to fire on a few fleeing Germans being chased out of the town by our tanks. From the dead ground we were waved forward in our last rush for our objective and to silence the 88s in the woods at the base of the hill. As we moved up the hill, one crew of 88 gunners gave themselves up and we took them along with us.

When we reached the top of the hill, there was a large field approximately 300 yards long and 100 yards wide, with a bush at the west end and a large clump of trees due south of the woods. At the east end of the field there were a few scattered evergreens and a large area of gorse, spreading to a road running due south into enemy territory. It was about 300 yards from the end of the field. This was high ground but could be easily overlooked by higher ground to the south. B Coy took up position at the east end of the field (see diagram) accompanied by the remainder of the squadron of tanks [B Squadron] which had suffered a few casualties. C Coy under Maj MacPherson took up position at the west end of the field. It was now approximately 0800 hrs.

Almost immediately the tanks spread out to give all round protection, while the infantry were digging in. This was the beginning of our failure. As a troop of tanks moved out to the clump of trees in front of C Coy, they were stopped in formation and "boiled up." Similarly, a troop moved out to B Coy's left flank to cover the road leading south, and met the same fate. The remainder of the tanks stayed in the field, periodically moving up to the hedge to our front, firing a few rounds, and then "hulling down." At approximately 0930 hrs Col. A. J. Hay was seriously wounded while discussing the situation with Col. Worthington of the BCRs. At approximately 1000 hrs the half-tracks with the wounded made their mad dash to safety. When they left we had no further way to take out our wounded. During this time the infantry were frantically trying to dig in on the gravel hill. The Germans had not concentrated on the infantry, as yet, and No. 11 Platoon had no casualties till this time. Now at approximately 1000 hrs the tanks had suffered almost complete casualties, and the enemy turned to mortar fire to wipe out the infantry, which had had very few casualties until this time. We were still unlocated, and the tank commander and Arty O.P. [FOO] tried continually to reach our HQ. Near noon they were successful and our arty fired three rounds of smoke which fell nearly 2000 yards short, fired at maximum range. While this was going on Maj. MacPherson now acting/O.C. came to B Coy HQ. This was the last time I saw him alive.

Early in the afternoon our rocket-firing Typhoons found us and gave us good support by silencing the enemy guns. However in their absence we were suffering heavy casualties from the mortar and arty fire which surrounded us. At five o'clock the casualties in No. 11 Platoon were heavy, with Privates Palangis, Prus and Vanderlip, and Sgt. Reynolds wounded. Privates Grubb, C.A. Rogers, and L/Cpl Fedoration were dead. Every platoon was the same and our bandages were running low, but the SBs were doing a marvellous job despite the terrific odds. At this time we had one tank left (a Stewart out of ammunition) to my knowledge in C Coy area, hulled down to cover the wounded. Among these was Lt. Col. Worthington, later found buried in that area.

At approximately 1800 hrs we were beginning to lose hope about seeing another day. Being late in the day the friendly troops we had seen in the afternoon coming towards us, had evidently been halted. At last light the Germans started to line up an attack to wipe out the remainder of the attacking force that had moved in so boldly that morning. The first information of this was in C Coy area when we heard machine gun and rifle fire; thence the roars of a tank and the shouting of infantry. Almost simultaneously we heard shouting to our rear, as another force was moving from the east to the west along the dead ground. We then saw C Coy u/c Lt. R.A. Saville in single file along the front edge going through 12 Platoon's area. Lt. R. Blais had had the forward platoon in C Coy and was taken prisoner along with his men when they were overrun.

No. 11 Platoon was then being held down by spasmodic machine gun fire coming from the tank in C Coy area, and the force to the rear were in the woods NW of our position. It was now almost dark, and realizing the terrific odds, it was our last chance to escape to fight another day. Cpl Lafontaine took the 6 of the platoon with a few of the wounded into the long grass and crawled due east and then north to clear the enemy. Then following the trail of the blazing tanks found his way with the men into the Polish lines. L/Cpl Rodel, Pte McLeod and myself, crawled to Coy HQ to report the situation on our front. Here we met Lts. Fraser and Saville with Maj. L. C. Monk. While we were here we were held down by machine gun fire. Lt. Saville received a slight flesh wound. As the Germans were attacking No. 11 Platoon's area B Coy HQ moved into the gorse and crawled away, leaving Lt. Fraser and C.S.M. Fraser who chose to stay with the men in order to help them, and were captured. After getting out about 200 yards L/Cpl Rodel and myself lost contact with the other members of Coy HQ. We arrived in the Chaudière Regt. at 0500 hrs 11th August, 1944. We slept till 0900 hrs and then were taken back to 10 CIB HQ. For the following two days stragglers were returning to the unit.

On the 12th of Aug the remainder of B & C Coys were organized into one coy u/c Maj. L. C. Monk, with Lts. R. Saville and Caron, acting as platoon commanders. Lt. C. Dutcher was sent to hospital at Bayeux with shrapnel in his wrist, and I was kept in B Echelon while my knee and hand were healing. With all available reinforcements the new coy numbered approximately 72.

APPENDIX K

Account of Major Keith Stirling, OC D Company / Algonquin Regiment

We had received orders that there was to be a strong armoured and infantry thrust out from Caen towards Falaise. The task of our unit was to capture and consolidate our position at Bretteville-le-Rabet. A number of semi-armoured carriers were allotted the Battalion to carry the infantry into battle. Unfortunately, there were not enough to go around and 'D' Company was only given two. The majority of 'D' Company men had to ride on the Universal Carriers of the Carrier Platoon which were already fully loaded. This gave 'D' Company men no protection from small arms fire.

We moved off in convoy from Vaucelles. Shortly after midnight [we] moved down the Falaise road to a field near Ifs where we took up a harbour area with the armour.

Late in the afternoon we received our orders to go forward. A Company leading, Battalion HQ, B, C and D [Companies], in that order. Enroute, B, C and D Companies were cut off from A Company and Battalion HQ and during the night we went into harbour with the BC Regiment in the area of Rocquancourt.

Due to a change in Plan, B, C and D Companies were placed under command [of] 4 Armoured Brigade, and thence under command [of the] BC Regiment. Orders were received for us to make a strong armoured and infantry thrust around Bretteville-le-Rabet, and attack and capture Hill 195. Each company was married up and put under command [of] a squadron of BCR. D Company was with A Squadron with Major Geoff Sidenius in command. We were the last to move forward and were a considerable distance behind B and C Companies.

On approaching Cauvicourt we ran into some small arms fire from the Church, but our infantry soon cleared up this resistance and we pushed on with the tanks leading and the infantry leap-frogging forward at the squadron leader's command. As we went through Cauvicourt the sun came up and we lost the protection of darkness.

When we came opposite and a little forward of Bretteville-le-Rabet, our squadron ran into heavy enemy resistance and the squadron CO ordered D Company to hold back until he could clear the way with his tanks. The enemy which had been by-passed by B and C Companies were now fully awake and with daylight on their side, soon made short work of our tanks, knocking out all but two, which got through to B and C Companies. The squadron commander was killed.

When D Company could no longer make contact with the squadron we went forward to a position where we were heavily mortared and subjected to a great deal of anti-tank gun fire. The company took up a defensive position in this area, while a recce party of one platoon went forward, but were driven back by fire from enemy tanks. We saw our tanks destroyed in front of us. We attempted to gain communication with Battalion HQ and B and C Companies, without result.

A troop of Poles with tanks came forward as we explained the forward position to them. They went forward but were soon driven back by the enemy armour. D Company then withdrew to a position on a hill where we dug in. This was directly opposite Bretteville-le-Rabet. We went into Bretteville with a fighting patrol and on finding the LSR clearing the town we offered our assistance which was immediately accepted. We went back and brought the company into Bretteville, but on the way in were shot up by the Poles. We helped clear up Bretteville and took up a defensive position in the town. We were still digging in when we received a message from Major Cassidy, who had taken over command after Colonel Hay had been wounded. The message was to move down the road to a railway and road junction where we were to be met by the OC of 18 Cdn Armd Car [Regiment] who was to give us our orders for an attack on St. Hillaire Farm opposite Quesnay Wood. We loaded the Coy on to the carriers

again and at 2200 hrs on the 9th we were at the Rly and Rd junc. The carriers returned to Bretteville. There was no infm of any kind. The only order was to move in and take the farm without any assistance. At 2330 hrs Lt. McNairn arrived and told us that we were to attack St. Hillaire Farm at once. We were to have no supporting arms, but A Coy was to come along within the hr, also that the Regt. de Chaud. were to attack Quesnay Wood. Col. Roberts of the 18th CACR did not show up.

We formed up immediately and moved along the rly and into St. Hillaire Farm where we found no one. The enemy had left a few hours before. We took up our posns on the right of the farm. About 0800 hrs in the morning Bn HQ and A Coy moved in on our left. The Chauds never did get to Quesnay Wood.

By this time our men were near exhaustion, having had no sleep and only the food they carried on them. Later in the day we were supported by the Carrier and A Tk pls.

We remained in this posn for days, and during this time were heavily shelled and mortared by the enemy in Quesnay Woods. Our Armour Gren Gds moved into the posn and took heavy loss from the enemy's well-concealed A Tk guns. We suffered a number of casualties from the shelling, but captured a number of the enemy whom we caught in the fields where they had been sniping at us. Due to the enemy cross fire on the road leading into the Farm we were a bit short of food during these days, but no one suffered too much from that. There were threatened enemy counter attacks from Quesnay Woods but these were broken up by our Tk fire and our Rocket firing Typhoons.

We were relieved in this posn by the H.L.I. and we moved back in the early evening to a biv area near Cauvricourt.

APPENDIX L

Account of Lieutenant J. T. Jenkinson, Intelligence Officer / 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

At 1200 hrs on 8 Aug 44 the regiment was deployed on the open ground between the east of IFS and VERRIERS. The brigade column was halted there for most of the day while the attack of 2nd Canadian Division, 51 Highland Division, 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade and 1 Polish Armoured Division [were] put in. Once ROQUANCOURT was cleared 22 CAR with a battalion from 10 CIB put in a two-squadron attack on [the] CINTHEAUX area. When this was completed the column started moving and by shortly before last light the unit was laagered between the road and railroad tracks just south where the railroad crosses the Caen–Falaise road north of CINTHEAUX. Lt. Col. Worthington attended a Brigade O Group late in the evening and returned with the following instructions: A squadron of 22 CAR with a company of LSR (Motorized) were to put in an attack on BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET as soon as possible after midnight and to start not much later than 0130 hrs on 9 Aug. This was Phase 1 of the Brigade plan. As soon as this position was firmed up Phase 2 was to commence which called for 28 CAR moving to Point 195 with support of a half-track carried infantry company from the Algonquins with each squadron.

At approx 0300 to 0330 hrs the unit moved out of the laager in the following order: C Squadron, RHQ, B Squadron, A Squadron, in column with the Algonquin companies in half-tracks with their respective infantry. The route was south from the laager area and swinging left onto the Caen–Falaise road. C Sqn and RHQ, moved out onto the road and turned south on it some distance north of CINTHEAUX. B Sqn was delayed a short time when a FOO tank moving with them broke down. [They] were not far behind although there was a gap between RHQ, and B in the column of march. The column moved down the road [and] tanks moved up behind RHQ, and in the dark it was not realized for some time they were not part of B Sqn. When they started passing down the column and were seen to have infantry riding on the back decks it was apparent that it was the sqn from 22 CAR moving down to the attack on BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET. The lead troop of C Sqn had meantime nearly reached BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET and reported it very quiet. The leader of an infantry patrol came by and he reported to the troop leader that the town had not been touched and was still in enemy hands. The order from RHQ then was to swing left around BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET and proceed across country to Point 195.

The commanders of B and A Sqns, in the confusion of the sqn of 22 CAR interrupting the line of march in the darkness, moved their squadrons over to the left of the road and started to move south across country. C Sqn and RHQ arrived on what was then thought to be Point 195 by about half an hour after first light. B Sqn arrived about an hour after first light and two tanks of A Sqn arrived some time later, and A Sqn's coy of Algonquins **[Note: D Company]** did not arrive at all.

About 0900 hrs the CO ordered B Sqn to secure a small wood in the grain fields ahead of the hedge row perimeter occupied at that time. It appeared as though the woods would command the forward slope of the main feature. B Sqn commander took his sqn HQ, and one troop out with supporting fire from another troop. Hardly had these tanks reached the small woods when they were all knocked out in rapid succession. It was apparent then that the opposition was fairly heavy all around the position and the tanks were placed in whatever covered positions the hedgerows on the hill top afforded. The two companies of infantry dug in forward of the hedgerows around the field and preparations went ahead to hold the feature as long as possible with the force of two infantry companies and part of two squadrons and RHQ tanks. The feeling then was that the momentum of the advance would soon change the unfavorable situation the unit was in.

At 1200 hrs it was decided to evacuate all wounded in the half-tracks which had brought up the Algonquins. These were in charge of an RCASC officer (Captain Lewis of 10 CIB) and were required for another phase of the operations. These left about 1230 and ran through enemy shell fire in spite of Red Cross flags which they were displaying, to 12 Field Ambulance.

Synopsis of Brigade Orders for Operation TOTALIZE 7 Aug 44

Information

Enemy: Believed to be planning to remove the SS troops to prepared positions well in rear and disengage same to counter the American thrust. Inferior troops were expected to be substituted in the lines.

Own Troops: For the operation 1 Canadian Army would employ in its striking force 51 Highland Division, 1 Polish Armoured Division, 33 British Armoured Brigade, 2 and 3 Canadian Infantry Divisions and 4 Canadian Armoured Division and 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade. 49 British Division and the Airborne Division were to continue their holding role. 3 Canadian Infantry Division was to be held in reserve at first.

Intention

4 CAB to break through between CINTHEAUX and the rail line tracks and dominate high ground covering FALAISE.

Method

To be carried out in three phases.

Phase 1. Object to strike down between the road and rail road tracks and seize and hold BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET (MR 1050).

Phase 2. When BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET is firmed up the armoured brigade will push forward to high ground. Three features were selected. One for each armoured regiment and Point 195 was for 28 CAR.

Phase 3. After the firming up of Phase 2 the armoured brigade will push on to high ground in area Potigny. Three similar features were chosen about — miles forward of Phase 2. At the same time the Polish armoured division would strike left for FALAISE.

Administration

No wheeled vehicles to go in the move. Each tank to carry six days rations and as much water as possible. Stow plenty of .30 ammunition. An advanced dressing station (ADS) to be established in BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET as soon as it was firmed up.

APPENDIX M

Account of Lieutenant A.E. Biddlecombe, IC, Recce Troop / 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

On the evening of August 8, 1944 the regiment was in harbour in the "IFS" area near CAEN. The Colonel, Don Worthington, called his "O" Group, which I attended as Recce Officer. This followed the usual form with very little information about the enemy. The town of CINTHEAUX had been taken that day. The Canadian Grenadier Guards [22 CAR] with accompanying infantry were to advance on BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET this night. At 2 a.m. the BCR [28 CAR] with two companies of the Algonquin Regiment were to move south on the FALAISE road to a point just south of CINTHEAUX, where they will swing off the road so as to by-pass BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET on the left [east]. They will then make for Hill 195 situated west of the FALAISE Road. We would be out of range of field artillery; however, a Forward Observation Officer from medium artillery would accompany us. Order of March, 'C', "RHQ", 'B' and 'A'. Ten of the Recce Troop were to be left out of battle under command of Lt. Bob Smith. I was to take a position on the FALAISE road and ensure that all regimental tanks cleared the harbour. I was then to overtake the regiment and join up with RHQ. The regimental Intelligence Officer, Lt. Jim Jenkinson, marked my map with center line, etc.

At 2 a.m. the regiment moved off according to orders, clearing harbour in good order. I moved off overtaking wherever I could. It was still quite dark and visibility was poor, partially caused by the dusty conditions. We turned left [east] off the FALAISE road in about half-light. As I was passing the head of 'A' Sqn I heard the CO give orders to the lead squadron [C Sqn] to swing farther to the left, so as to clear the Guards [22 CAR]. Shortly after this I passed a squadron of Shermans on my right. I could see men standing behind the tanks which were not moving. Passing BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET I could hear guns firing ahead and heard 'C' Squadron request and receive permission to change to squadron frequency on their radio. The Shermans of 'B' Sqn, which were near me commenced firing and I could see tracer striking the hedgerows and church near ESTRÉES-LA-CAMPAGNE. I heard 'B' Squadron request and receive permission to change frequency. Shortly after this 'A' Squadron did the same. I reached the head of 'B' Squadron at the ESTRÉES road. It was stopped and Major Carson signaled me to stop which I did. As I dismounted he ran to me and asked "Where is Regimental Headquarters?" I answered that I did not know, but from the sound of gunfire they must be up on that hill over there. He then asked what I was going to do. I answered that my orders were to rejoin RHQ.

I set off immediately, entering a long valley of standing grain, and headed for the hill. To my right [west] down the valley I could see two Tiger tanks in the open. I called to the driver to push the Stewart tank to its fastest possible speed. My driver's answer was we are doing 55, 'I can't get any more.' Keeping the Stewart at right angles to the Tiger we continued towards the hill, I could see the muzzle blast as the Tiger opened fire, the tracer passing directly behind me. This happened three times as I crossed the valley. Approaching the base of the hill, the woods, running along one side, came in clear view. I could see a battery of German guns positioned just inside the woods. I opened up on them with machine gun and 37 mm H.E. passing within 25 yards of their left flank. I was now out of sight of the two Tigers I had seen, and started up the hill. About two-thirds of the way up the hill, and to my left I could see an 88. It was not firing and I could not see anyone around it. On reaching the top of the hill, I passed through a hedge, stopped and dismounted near the southwest corner of the field. I located the CO nearby and reported in at about 6:30 a.m. Some of 'B' Squadron followed up behind me and I heard the CO directing them out to defensive positions.

The field we were in was about 300 yards long, running north and south, and about 100 yards wide. It was bounded on the south by a wooded area, on the west by a broken hedge, part way along which was a small thicket. At the north end there was a thin line of tall trees. The west side was a seven foot hedge row, in front of which ran a dirt wagon track. Tanks were stationed all around the perimeter. There was an English style armoured car of the same type we used, with a black cross painted on it, parked in the field. Nearby were two German prisoners, one an

officer, sitting on the ground. I was told that it had come along shortly after the leading element of tanks reached the hill and was captured. We were under anti-tank, mortar and sniper fire. Two 'A' Squadron Shermans came up the hill. One of these was I/C Lt. Harvey McDiarmid which had taken a couple of A/T hits. The two centre bogies were taken out by our friend the Tigers down in the valley.

Taking cover under McDiarmid's tank, the CO requested that I return to the valley floor and see if I could find and direct any further tanks to our location. I did this by moving north in the field for about 100 yards, then down the hill using a bushy area for cover. Near the bottom I found a place where I could see the fields in the valley. I could see a number of Shermans, all of which were knocked out. At the far side near the trees, I could see four Shermans moving directly south still on their original centre line. About 1000 yards directly in front of them was a Tiger tank. I attempted to contact them by radio, however, they were on squadron frequency and I was on regimental so I was unable to do so. The Tiger knocked them out with four shots, and then repeated on all of them. They all "brewed". I made a further search but could find no other tanks in action. Apparently, the tank commander of one of the Tigers was doing the same thing and spotted me. The next thing I knew an anti-tank shell screamed over my turret. I scuttled out of there, making my way back up the hill.

The Stewart tank was a 15-ton light tank manned by a crew of four. A driver and co-driver, with a turret crew of gunner/operator, and crew/commander/loader. It was armed with a 37mm gun plus a Browning machine gun. The top hatches were two large steel plates the size of the top of the turret. They were hinged at the back, protruding out the back of the turret when open. These hatches could not be opened or closed from inside the turret. For the latter reason they were normally kept open. The seats were adjustable and spring loaded so they could be quickly set to a convenient height.

On arriving back at the top of the hill I reported my findings to Col. Worthington who was then located in the southwest corner of the field. The CO spread his map on the ground, and asked me about our location. I pointed out the location of BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET, and the church at ESTRÉES, which we could see. He then oriented his map, stating that he would have the FOO contact his guns for air-burst over the fields immediately past of our position.

A number of tanks had already been knocked out, RHQ tanks included. The latter were in a position back of the hedge on the east side, about half-way up the field. The turret of one was sitting on the back deck. There was another four knocked out behind the hedge on the west side. Another Sherman in a hull-down position in a hollow in the southeast corner was also knocked out. As all Squadron rear-Links, and RHQ tanks had been knocked out there was now no radio communication. I tried on several occasions to contact someone on regimental frequency without success, the FOO advised that he was unable to contact his guns by radio.

There was still one medical half-track located in a concealed position in the small woods at the south end of the field. It contained a number of wounded, including Capt. Douglas Harker. The CO requested it be brought into the defensive area. When asked if he wanted it to make a run out, he answered, no, the last one was knocked out when he tried that. As a result it was brought in and positioned close to the bushes at the south end.

The Germans then put in an attack with infantry from the east side. This side was stubble fields as far out as we could see. The cut grain was in standing stokes. The Germans advanced in a long line, about two companies in strength. They were on a downhill slope so the first thing we saw was their bobbing heads. They were allowed to advance until we could see them from the knees up, which was about 300 yards away. We then opened up with machine gun fire with such force that they broke and dived for cover behind the stokes. We then targeted on the stokes with high explosive from our main armament. Those that were left then scurried down the hill out of sight. They continued to pour on the mortaring and anti-tank shelling and within the hour were coming at us again with the same plan of action. They continued with this type of action all day.

About 3 p.m. three groups of five rocket-firing Typhoons arrived on the scene. They circled and then formed into a line ahead and dived at us, each plane firing two rockets on each pass. We tossed out orange smoke markers and pulled the orange blinds over the back decks. This had no effect, so I then made a large white star on the ground with a can of chloride-of-lime I got out of Sgt. Glendenning's tank. This also had no effect as they continued with their attack until out of rockets. This attack, like that of the Germans, came in from the east side. It was aggravating, and must have been an amusing show for the watching Germans. The only tank I saw hit from this attack was an RHQ tank that had already been knocked out earlier in the day. I wonder what score they reported when they got back?

About 4 p.m. I could hear the sounds of heavy gunfire from about one mile or so to the north of our position. This I thought was someone attempting to break through to us. This only lasted for a short time then went silent. I later found out that this actually was the Poles, who did attempt to break through but were unsuccessful.

The German attacks by infantry and tanks continued throughout the afternoon and evening. Each had its accompanying losses. Shortly after 8 p.m. in came what was to be the last. At this time the only tanks remaining in action were my Stewart, Lt. McDiarmid's Sherman and Sgt. Glendenning's Sherman. We were all in the southern half of the field, staggered, and well back from the eastern hedge row. Due to the mobility of the Stewart, I was able to move about easier than the Shermans. Things got really hectic so I do not know just when the two Shermans went out of action. I recall changing a shot-out barrel on the Browning, very quickly I might add. The German infantry were now so close that I was losing sight of them behind the hedge on the east side. Seeing a gap in this hedge, near one of the knocked-out RHQ tanks, I moved forward with the intention of fighting through it. As soon as I reached this opening I saw a Panther tank about 75 yards from me. He appeared to be making for the same opening. I don't know who was the most surprised. His first shot hit the ground directly beside me throwing up a fair amount of dirt and I believe breaking my track. My driver crashed into reverse, and the second shot went across in front of us. We got back far enough to be out of his sight, with the hedge giving us cover.

One track was now gone and it was time to bail out. All four of the crew hit the ground. I directed my driver and co-driver to split and head for the woods behind us. (I later heard that they were both taken prisoner.) My gunner, Bill Wyllie, stayed with me. Just beside where I had landed I saw the body of Col. Don Worthington. He had been hit by shrapnel through the back of the helmet, killing him. There was a wounded infantry soldier close by into whom I injected a Morphine surette. I could not see anyone else alive nearby. The Germans were now coming through the bushes and hedgerows into the field so we did not have time to get away. We were close to a small thicket in the West side hedge and only had time to crawl into it. The Germans over-ran the position with much small arms fire and shouting, "NIX SHEESON" and "HANDS HOGH". The two together didn't seem to make much sense.

We remained hidden for the next 3 hours. I could catch a glimpse of their boots when they came close, and could hear them talking and moving about. About midnight, everything had quietened down, so we made a break for it. Running as fast as we could we headed for the woods just to our left and about 30 yards away. More by good luck than management, I happened to hit right on a small trail. We ran down this for a short distance, then remembering having seen the German gun position at the bottom edge of these woods, turned and headed south through the brush. We continued in this direction for what we thought was a safe distance, then turned West and worked our way to the edge of the woods. We stopped to have a good look, and were granted another piece of good luck. A very short distance to my right I saw a cigarette flair from a smoking German night guard. We then worked our way farther to the south and, following a good look around, crept out into the standing grain of the valley. We crawled far enough to be out of sight of any sentry in the woods, then started walking in a northerly direction. It was not too difficult as we could see the searchlights back in the beach head area. En route we passed a number of burnt out tanks. As it started to turn daylight we decided to find a place of concealment. Finding a thicket, we crawled into it and much to our surprise found it already occupied by a member of the Algonquin Regt who was using it

for the same purpose. Having had no sleep or anything to eat for about 40 hours, we were all very tired, hungry and thirsty. Particularly the latter after travelling through the fields of ripe grain. I broke open a can of emergency ration and passed a section to each of the others. Our throats were so parched we had difficulty in swallowing. We remained here throughout the day of August 10, catching up on some much needed rest. As it got dark that evening, the three of us started off again heading north. Shortly after midnight we contacted members of the Polish Division, who had apparently been advised to watch for survivors. They treated us very well, with hot drinks, etc. After remaining with them long enough to be rested and revitalized, we made our way on foot to the centre line. Here we managed to jump a ride on a Sherman that was heading our way. We saw the 4 Armoured Brigade tactical sign, so gave up on our transportation and reported the group in. While the other two were being fed, I had a long conversation with Brig. Booth. I explained to him what had happened and pointed out to him the location of the German gun positions that I had seen.

Transportation was then supplied and we were taken back to our echelons, where we were greeted with much excitement and liquid refreshment. It was now the morning of August 11, 1944. In the afternoon of August 12, 1944 I was reposted to a reformed 'B' Squadron as 2 I/C to Major John Toogood.

A.E. Biddlecombe

APPENDIX N

Account of Lieutenant J.E. Brooks, 2IC Recce Troop / 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

I was in charge of the remaining 10 recce tanks and our position was at the rear of the column, immediately behind the Algonquin company which was supporting 'A' Squadron. We advanced along the Centre Line with no opposition until approximately 0600 hrs when I heard the lead Troop of 'C' Squadron report on the air that he had captured a German armoured car and had taken 374 prisoners. At approximately 0700 hrs we were at Point 110517 (X-rds) and the coy ahead of me stopped. They deployed along crest of the hill and the OC D Coy was not sure just [where] the tanks had gone. Communications were getting steadily worse and I was unable to get in touch with RHQ for approximately one hour. On finally getting through to Mr. Biddlecombe **[IC Recce Troop]** he ordered me to remain where I was for the time being. An hour or so later the casualties started to come out, among them Lt. J. Stock, who was badly burned about the face and neck. He gave me a message from the CO to the effect that the regiment could hold the position with some assistance and also what their position was in square 0947 **[Note: 0947 is Point 195]**. He wanted that information passed back to brigade, as he was out of contact with them. I did not know location of brigade so decided to contact 22 CAR in Bretteville-le-Rabet and get them to relay the message back. Was finally able to accomplish this, (I had left my tanks under control of Mr. Mallam) and when I returned they had been withdrawn through the Polish Division. I came back along with the Tech Adj to the straggler's pool.

APPENDIX O

Account of Chief Warrant Officer (RSM) Ralph Jay / 28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

I am the OC of the Admin Report Centre of this unit which consists of the Tech-Adj and Sqn fitters and recovery vehicles and unit MO and his two half tracks ambulances. On the night of the 2th the C.O. attached Ack Ack Tp to my group as they were loaded with 75mm ammo and 17 pdr which was a reserve for the unit. We moved off from the forming up place at 0315 at the tail of the column end as first light broke we could see the tks shooting up hedge rows and hay stacks which were set on fire. We took up our position beside the church at while the unit was moving tactically across country. We were following Recce Tp less one tank. They took up their position on the forward sloop, in our position we were blind to the country ahead. At 1100 hrs of the 9th the C.O, called for his reserve of Amran so we left our position and proceeded down the unit centre line. When we reached Point [?], Two men got up off the ground and waved us down; as we slowed down they told us to turn back; then these two lads were fired upon by machine guns, so we turned around at full speed and headed over the rise out of sight of the enemy. I lost one Ack Ack Tk as it went up in flames, but the crew got out and went to ground.

When I had the tks back to a safe spot, I contacted the infantry comd who had been cut off and had to leave their vehs and were pinned to the ground by enemy cross-fire. They could not help us out as to getting the men out of the field. These men were men from A Sqn who were 25 minutes behind the main body and had got cut off by enemy Anti-Tk guns and Panther tks which were dug in. This sqn lost 12 tks in this area. I then contacted the Polish sqn comd who was 500 to our rear and gave him the location and type of enemy in the woods to his front. He brought fire to bear and attacked the woods but had to leave as the enemy knocked out two of his tks, but this fire and action enabled twelve of our men to get back to Admin Report Centre.

The Air conditions were very bad and I had trouble getting through to my unit. I last heard from the C.O. at 1415 hrs, but spoke to his operator several times until 1500 hrs then all communications were lost to us. I then tried to contact Bde on the Q, link but could not get through to them. I heard an order over the air for the remainder of unit to form up on the ARC but could not identify the sender. At this time we were receiving a pounding from enemy artillery and Machine Gun fire, so we had to withdraw to the next draw out of range. We then, that is the Tech adj and myself went forward and directed own tks back to the FUP. By this time I had contacted Lt. Jensen our L.O, to Bde and gave him the picture as to the strength of our unit. We then had a short counting of noses and found there were 168 all ranks in my group. Our A-I Ech contacted us and we proceeded down the C.L. and into our A-I harbour and were well taken care of with hot meals and then we accounted for all personnel.

Sir, at this point I would like to state that Tpr Maries and McDuff while under enemy fire stood up and warned our group, which allowed all of us to return to safety in spite of one tank going up in flames. These men definitely risked their own lives to save ours.

APPENDIX P

Account of Captain M.A. Searle, 11 Medium Regiment FOO

To summarize quickly, his [Worthington's] orders were for the regiment to make a quick thrust southwards, to the large village of BRETTEVILLE-LE-RABET [SPARKS], smash up German equipment and disorganize the whole area of the village. Having completed this task, to push on further south, occupy a high feature some three or four miles from BRETTEVILLE-SUR-LAIZE [FAYE], and hold it until our main body could break through. This appeared to me to be a very daring plan, typical of Col. Worthington...who was very confident of success. This armoured thrust was to be supported by the Algonquins, a motorized infantry unit, commanded by Lt. Col. Hay.

At 0330 hours, the squadrons moved out, but unfortunately, my tank broke down just outside Rocquancourt [PLUTO]. My presence up forward was vital, as only our Medium Artillery could get the range. I therefore jumped on to B Squadron Commander's tank, which was passing and asked him to take me along. His wireless was not working, so he displaced his operator for me and I took over [as] gunner in his tank for the first phase, my wireless operator, Biggs, got a ride in another tank. We reached the village about 0500 hrs, and Capt Carson, B Squadron Commander, gave orders to 'beat up' the place and destroy the Germans there. This officer was a very dashing and daring leader, he led his squadron into the village area and really got the place 'hotted-up', with plenty of German vehicles ablaze and Germans running for their lives. I had a glorious, exciting time in this tank and shall never forget the experience of getting a real punch at the German. By this time I could load and fire the Browning gun from my side, and proceeded to do so with great pleasure. We circled the village and made for the high feature where we met Col. Worthington, with his RHQ tanks and two companies of the Algonquins. At this point our luck seemed to be deserting us, as one squadron of tanks plus two troops had missed the high feature and only two companies of infantry were there commanded by Col. Hay. This left our force somewhat depleted, but everybody seemed cheerful and the infantry began to dig-in. The area we were to hold was a very large field, some 500 yards square surrounded by hedges and gorse, which overlooked the surrounding country. We captured 2 German officers here, and they did look surprised, they just did not know what was happening.

The time was about 0800 hrs, when suddenly two of our tanks were hit and set ablaze. I did not see what happened to the crews, I hope they got out. I was transferred to another tank, and just as we moved off, up the field to take up a position from where I could see some targets, a shell hit us and my tank was ablaze. I escaped through the escape hatch, the driver set the tank in gear, and we rolled clear. When I looked up I saw Capt. Hope coming out of his tank, which had been hit, with his arm blown off, he was the only survivor of the crew. He reached the safety of our own lines. At about 0900 hrs the enemy was shelling and mortaring our position, causing a great number of casualties, among whom was Lt. Col. Hay, badly wounded in the head. The wounded were placed under a tree in the middle of the field, but there was no cover and Col. Worthington decided to evacuate them through the enemy lines in a scout car.

I had no communications because at this time our tanks were being hit very heavily and half of them were burning. On three occasions I went to tanks to use their sets, only to see them ablaze after a few minutes. By mid-day... only five tanks were left, and these were placed in one corner of the field for offensive action should German tanks appear, unfortunately their wireless sets could not get me through to the Regiment, in spite of many attempts to do so. I told the CO of my difficulty, but he said 'Don't worry, I cannot get my set working either.' Communications seemed cut from the outside. All through the afternoon we were fighting steadily, holding our own, and the Germans did not close in, this gave us time to dig in for all round defence. I was given one side of the field to fight on and had ten men with me in slit trenches, well prepared to meet the enemy.

The beginning of the end came about 1830 hrs, when the enemy rushed my position, we threw grenades and stopped him for half an hour, but we sustained a great number of casualties and his final rush came about 1900 hrs and overran us. A stick grenade landed in my trench, knocking out most of my fellows and I moved back towards the tanks. I saw many acts of gallantry here, our men were really fighting mad and I saw wounded men fighting it out. I walked to the tanks to get some orders from the CO. I was unhurt. I met the CO and he gave me a smile and said 'Just fight on', I am making my plans for the night. I told him what was happening at my end of the field. There were a number of wounded under some tanks, one fellow was in terrible pain and I saw Col. Worthington reach over and give him his last morphine injection. I said to the CO 'Is that your last[?]' and he just gave a grin and said he probably wouldn't need it anyway. He was still the same confident, cool man who gave his orders at Rocquancourt and I was glad I was with him.

At about 1945 the end came, five Tiger tanks appeared and gunned us in the corner. The CO gave the order for our three tanks to engage and they moved forward to meet the enemy. I did not see the outcome of this, it was so dusty and anyway I had about fifteen men in the last pocket of resistance to think about. I yelled to the CO for any orders and before he could reply, a shell exploded a few yards from him and he received terrible head wounds, I feel certain he was killed. This explosion blew my pistol out of my hand and rather dazed me. I did not see any other officers, so I shouted 'Come on chaps, crawl', and they followed me down to a wood. We passed a great number of dead Germans on the way, about thirty, I should say, extremely well turned out, SS troops, no doubt.

APPENDIX Q

Kurt Meyer's Critique of Canadian Tactics



Source: www.alexshistory.com

The Canadian Army never followed up their opening successes to reach a complete victory. Every one of the Canadian attacks lost its push and determination after a few miles. For example, in operation 'Totalize', after gaining its first objective. British and Canadian planning was absolutely without risk; neither Army deployed its Armoured strength for which it was created. In both Armies the tank was used, more or less, as an infantry support weapon. Armoured warfare is a matter of using given opportunities on the battlefield, therefore, the Divisional Commander belongs in the leading combat group, to see for himself, to save precious time, and to make lightning decisions from his moving tank. He, and no one else, must be the driving force of his division. I cannot assume that this principle was executed in 'Totalize'; the development of this battle is against any such assumption. The British and Canadian forces executed the operations in an inflexible, time wasting, method. Never once did 'Speed' as the most powerful weapon of Armoured Warfare, appear.

At late evening of Aug 8th the new line north of Potigny was occupied by a few hundred Infantry and two batteries of Artillery. The Infantry of KG 1 [Waldmüller] and the HQ Coy (St. Sylvain) were completely missing and therefore the whole heights east of Quesnay Wood [was] without any defense whatever. This situation was not known at the HQ of the Div before morning; 0500 Aug 9, an officer of the HQ of the Div who was trying to find the missing infantry on the Height came back to HQ and reported: "On the hill is not one German soldier, but Sherman tanks." Now something incredible occurred: The OC of the Panzer Regiment, who was with 6 Tigers and 15 Panthers lurking south of Quesnay Wood, attacked the Sherman Tanks on the Heights without a single loss. Over 60 tanks were reported destroyed. I know now that there were 47 tanks from the 28th Armoured Regiment. It is interesting to note that the guns of the destroyed tanks pointed in most cases exactly to the south and were either destroyed by 88s of the Tigers that were attacking from the west, or by Panthers that came from the east. The 28th Armoured Regiment men did not lose one tank through Anti-Tank Gunnery; every one lost was through the action of Tigers and Panthers.

APPENDIX R

Intelligence Products

1. 2 CANADIAN CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY No. 28¹

(For twenty-four hour period ending 2000 hrs 8 Aug 44)

PART I

In the early stages of the advance the infantry of 89 and 272 Divisions was met and there have been no further divisional identifications. The fact that no Panzer Units have been identified makes a serious gap in our knowledge of the enemy forces still opposing our advance.

Tanks, both Panthers and Mk IVs as well as assault guns, provided serious opposition, particularly on our Left flank during the day. At first it was believed that these belonged to either 1 or 12 SS but as the armour of both these divisions has been identified in strength at VASSY and on the Orne bridgehead respectively, this assumption loses much of its weight. Unless some new tank unit has arrived on the scene undetected, no better explanation for the presence of these can be offered at the present time than that they are an element of 12 SS left behind when the Division moved West across the ORNE.

There have been unconfirmed reports of both Tigers and Ferdinands. If there are Tigers in the area, they would probably belong to either 101 Heavy Tank Battalion of 1 SS Pz Corps or 503 Heavy Tank Battalion left behind when 21 Pz Division moved West. 89 Infantry Division has been severely mauled during to-day's operations. Well over 1,000 PW from it have been taken and they are still coming into the Corps and Divisional cages.

With the complete absence of any clue to the identification of the armour on our front, an assessment of the enemy's immediate capabilities is almost impossible. Our advance is continuing at the present time and there appears to be no substantial reserve available to him. To-day's operations have burst open the vital hinge of CAEN at a time when the enemy was least prepared to defend it after moving 1 and 12 SS Divisions away to meet an immediate threat in the West. Although he is short of first class infantry, the enemy is well prepared to delay our advance by the use of the anti-tank line. Well sited Panther tanks and SP guns and the 8.8cm guns of the Heavy Flak Battalions used in an anti-tank role will be the mainstay of his opposition to our advance.

2. 3 CANADIAN WIRELESS INTELLIGENCE SECTION DAILY REPORT²

Period ending 1600 Z hrs, 8 Aug 44

PART I

GENERAL

The bulk of information derived from D/F and from traffic for this period, serve to confirm and consolidate the items reported yesterday.

Operation TOTALIZE does not appear to have unduly excited the enemy, as far as WT is concerned and only normal activity prevailed. 12 SS Pz Div, 83 Werfer Regt and 1 SS Corps Arty were again the principal customers.

The intelligence produced can be summarized as follows:

- i. 12 SS remains in the same general area as yesterday.
- ii. 12 SS Pz Regt – or the larger portion of it – is WEST of the R. LAIZE in the area FORET de CINGLAIS.
- iii. If 12 SS tks are operating EAST of the R. LAIZE they are showing no signs of wireless activity.
- iv. 25 SS PGR is on general line BRETTEVILLE sur LAIZE [FAYE] – WEST of FALAISE (i.e. WEST of R. LAIZE).
- v. 83 Werfer Regt is working in close co-operation with 12 SS Pz Div.
- vi. There appears to be a group of 12 SS – Main or Rear HQ – on a general line VIMONT-MEZIDON.

D/F RESULTS

12 SS PZ DIV

- i. Pz Regt – area FORET de CINGLAIS and on general line BRETTEVILLE sur LAIZE – WEST of FALAISE (possible area 0644).
- ii. 25 SS PGR – Control of this group is df'd in very general area 4 kms WEST [of] POTIGNY [CAGNEY].
- iii. Main – Rear HQ – One, shown in general area BOIS du ROIS (1048). The other on a general line VIMONT-MEZIDON. (N.B. It is not possible to distinguish).

83 WERFER REGT

III Abt [battalion] in general area WEST [of] BRETTEVILLE sur LAIZE.

I SS PZ CORPS ARTY

Control of a group in area 3 kms SE [of] BRETTEVILLE sur LAIZE. Other elts in general area BRETTEVILLE le RABET (1050). There is an unknown group (M 145) df'd in general area 4 kms NW [of] MEZIDON.

Time of Origin [Signature] 001 hrs 9 Aug

3 CANADIAN WIRELESS INTELLIGENCE SECTION DAILY REPORT

Period ending 1600 Z hrs, 9 Aug 44

Extract from PART TWO

1033 hrs – Hill 111 Predicted shoot

Notes: Spot height 111 at U147496 [Worthington's position]

Mention of range [of] 14,600 [m] would seem to indicate Med Arty.

3. 1 Polish Armoured Division Sitrep, 2015 hrs, 8 August³


[A]ll troops moving SOUTH from ST. AIGNAN DE CRAMESNIL [STONE] encountered 20 mk VI tks area 102551. [S]ome mk V or mk VI direction CINTHEAUX [MORGAN] 080540. [W]e have suffered some losses in tks. [E]nemy shelling with 150 mm area NE wood 0858 and area 0855 – 098568. [H]arassing fire from SE. [A]ppreciate that enemy pushed fwd by armour to gain time to strengthen second def line with tps reported by tac R coming from SOUTH.

NOTES

1. 22 Canadian Corps Intelligence Summary No. 28, 8 August [signed 0105 hours 9 August], DHH, File 112.3M1009 (D114).
2. 3 Cdn Wireless Section, Daily Report, 8 August [signed 0001 9 August], 1944, RG 24, Vol. 10,715, File 215C1.98 (D387).
3. 2 Canadian Corps Operations Log, 8 August 1944, sheet 16, serial 111, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,712.

APPENDIX S

Orders of Battle






'B' Squadron/28 Canadian Armoured Regiment

OC – Maj. J.H. Carson


53



Algonquin Regiment*

Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Hay


62






B Company / Algonquin Regiment

Major L.C. Monk




18 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment

Lieutenant-Colonel James A. Roberts






2 Canadian Corps Artillery




4 Canadian Armoured Division Artillery






23 Field Regiment (Self-Propelled)



Crew: 6
Weight: 57,000 lbs
Speed: 20 mph
Ammunition: 87 smoke / HE & 18 AP
Range: 10,000 yds




Major-General Stanislaw Maczek





12 SS Panzer Division Artillery



APPENDIX T

Timeline of Events

*Approximate

Time	Event
2000 hrs 8 August	Brigadier Booth withdraws 4 CAB into harbour. General Kitching conducts O Gp at 10 CIB.
2300 hrs	Brigadier Booth conducts O Gp.
0130 hrs 9 August	Lieutenant-Colonel Worthington conducts O Gp near 4 CAB Tac.
0230 hrs	OCs conduct O Gps. H-Hr.
0400 hrs	Advance Guard halts to deal with fire near Cintheaux. Major Carson (B Sqn) comes up on the east side of the Advance Guard.
0430 hrs	C Squadron begins moving south again.
0500 hrs	Advance Guard takes fire from Bretteville-le-Rabet (SPARKS).
0523 hrs	Booth asks Halpenny to confirm his progress at SPARKS and tells Worthington he must stay in contact with the brigade.
0545hrs	2 Troop takes over navigation from 1 Troop/B Sqn.
0624 hrs	Worthington reports position as immediately south of Bretteville-le-Rabet (SPARKS).
0643 hrs	Worthington reports that he is preparing for the final run up to 195 (LOMBARDO).
0650 hrs	Worthington reports that he has arrived on Point 195.
0706 hrs	4 CAB Control asks Worthington for his position.
0755 hrs	Worthington gives grid 0964, which was near Caen (0946 was Point 195).
0800 hrs	Worthington attempts to expand his position for the first time. First Tiger tank spotted to the southwest by C Sqn.
0830 hrs	Worthington reports that he is under contact and has already lost 10 tanks.
0900 hrs	Polish 3 Infantry Brigade crosses SL by sending B Squadron (-) to secure 30 Acre Wood. B Squadron returns from 30 Acre Wood.
0914 hrs	Booth orders 21 CAR to concentrate at Gaumesnil (LANDI).
0920 hrs	4 CAD reports Worthington Force on Point 195.
0930 hrs	LCol Hay seriously wounded; Maj MacPherson slightly wounded.
1000 hrs	First German counterattack. Worthington sends back his wounded in carriers.*
1033 hrs	3 Canadian Wireless Intelligence reports picking up German plan for artillery fire on Point 111.
1035 hrs	Polish 10 Recce reports Cauvicourt clear.
1055 hrs	Kitching's first request for close air support—southern slope of Point 195.
1100 hrs	Polish 10 ACB crosses S. Worthington calls for the ARC to send up the reserve ammunition.
1130 hrs	The bomb line is updated and it now passes just north of Worthington's position.
1213 hrs	Booth requests air support just northeast of Worthington's position.
1230 hrs	19 Field Regiment begins moving south to a new AMA.
1345 hrs	21 CAR informs Booth that it cannot move before 1400 hrs.
1415 hrs	RSM Jay last speaks with Worthington.

1420 hrs	21 CAR finally starts to advance.
1500 hrs	Major Parrish, 2IC of 28 CAR, speaks to Polish LO. RSM Jay loses all communications with the battlegroup. Typhoons strike the battlegroup.
1525 hrs	4 CAD reports Worthington Force fighting on Point 195, but its location is not firm.
1605 hrs	21 CAR tells brigade to inform Worthington of their approach to Point 195.
1700 hrs	Captain Baker (FOO of 19 Field) reports Germans forming up for an attack.
1730 hrs	Worthington is killed by shrapnel.
1830 hrs	Captain Baker reports heavy attack. No further communications.
1930 hrs	Maczek asks Kitching for assistance in dealing with fire from Quesnay Wood.
2000 hrs	Final German attack on the position.
Dawn 10 August	Major Monk and remnants of the battlegroup arrive at Polish lines near Ren�mesnil (AMECHE).

*Lieutenant Biddlecombe stated that this occurred at 1200 hrs.

APPENDIX U

Communications

Nets

A “net” was a group of wireless operating on the same frequency. Simonds possessed a command net, but there were also separate nets for intelligence, air support, artillery, engineers, anti-aircraft and counter-mortar. The artillery net, for example, allowed the Commander, Corps Royal Artillery (CCRA) to communicate with survey, artillery reconnaissance and photo reconnaissance. Rear headquarters were linked by a separate network.¹ The challenge for an armoured officer was that a squadron commander had to fight his own tank, monitor his squadron over the A channel, and monitor the regimental net on the B channel.

“Netting” was done after wireless silence was lifted. A standard operating procedure was that, after netting, battalions, regiments, arms and services closed down. A wavemeter was designed to adjust senders and receivers to particular frequencies, for checking frequency calibration and for determining the frequency of a received signal. All control stations were to set their frequencies by wavemeter.²

Ground Communications


The principal communications equipment used in infantry battalions was the No. 18 set, a portable man-pack radio. It weighed 32 pounds and required a carrier and an operator. It was also issued to forward observation officers (and others) for communication with infantry. Its range was no more than 5 kilometres. The mortars used the low-power No. 38 set, a portable, 22-pound man-pack. Its maximum range was 3.2 kilometres and it was easily bumped off frequency.³ The No. 19 set was the standard wireless in armoured units and formations and had a range of 16 kilometres. It came in three basic configurations. No. 19 A (HF) was the main internal regimental net and provided a rear link to 4 CAB. 19 B (UHF) was used for short-range inter-tank communication. It could be augmented with a 155-pound amplifier to produce a high-power set used in HQ armoured command vehicles, extending the range to 50 kilometres.


Air Communications

The Air Support Signals Unit (ASSU) network enabled brigades to bypass the division and the corps and call directly for air support on the G Ops Branch at Army/Group headquarters and provide rear links to Air Liaison Officers at Wings.⁴ The deployed units of the ASSU were referred to as Tentacles. Each of these was a small entity consisting of a Tentacle Liaison Officer (TLO) and a small team of signallers. A TLO was a junior Army officer. Although Tentacles played an important role in passing information to higher levels, they could not communicate with aircraft that were inbound or in Cabrank.

Only a VCP, manned by a RAF pilot, could communicate with Typhoons through a VHF radio. The No. 9 set (or C-9), came in the R/T and W/T modes and was used for division signals and wireless intercept and by Tentacles for air support. It had a range of 12 to 30 kilometres. TR-1143 Type A was in a half-track or White Scout Car operating a low-power VHF R/T. Type B was in a Sherman Command tank. Through July and early August, a VCP could communicate only with aircraft in Cabrank.⁵ VCP operators absolutely had to know what they were doing, especially when establishing communications with aircraft and when reverting back to normal procedure on the link.⁶

By the end of 8 August, 1 Canadian ASSU was making further procedural changes because the VCP, while deemed satisfactory in terms of directing aircraft during the first day of Operation TOTALIZE, was found wanting in terms of relaying information about bomb-lines and positions of forward troops. A new signals instruction was issued at the end of the day indicating that new procedures would be adopted with effect from 0500 9 August.⁷ This new procedure took effect just as Worthington Force was going astray toward Hill 111.





Communications Security

SLIDEX radiotelephone code was used when time did not permit enciphering. It provided short-term security (approximately four hours) for short messages only. It was to be used “exclusively to conceal *those portions* of a RT or key conversation which it is considered might be of value to the enemy. It will NOT be used to encode the *whole* of a conversation unnecessarily.” SLIDEX, however, could be compromised by passage of messages in clear text or simply by using “or” before the encoded portions.⁸

NOTES

1. Major-General R.H.F. Nalder, *The History of British Army Signals in the Second World War* (London: Royal Signals Institution, 1953), pp. 179–80.
2. 4 Canadian Armoured Division Signals Instruction No. 1, 13 June 1944, LAC, RG 24, C3, Vol. 14,937. *Wavemeter Class D No. 1, Mk. I, Mk. II and Mk. II**, Working Instructions, p. 1.
3. BEQ, A/Major D.M. Ripley (NNSH), n.d., and BEQ, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Petch (NNSH), n.d., LAC, RG 24, Vol. 10,450; BEQ, LCol G.H. Christiansen, 31 August 1944, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 10,450.
4. 4 Cdn Armd Div Provisional Operational Standing Orders, Section 8 – Air, 21 Jun 44, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,788.
5. Historical Section (G.S.) Army Headquarters Report No. 74, Offensive Air Support of First Canadian Army during Operations in North-West Europe, 5 July 1955, pp. 12–13; Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston and William P. Rawling, *The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, III: The Crucible of War, 1939–1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), p. 312.
6. 2 Canadian Infantry Division Operation Order No. 2, 7 August 1944, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,751; 1 Canadian ASSU Signal Instruction [no number but obviously No. 1 as No. 2 follows on 8 August], 7 Aug 44, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 14,983.
7. 1 Canadian ASSU Signals Instruction No. 2, 8 Aug 44, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 14,983.
8. Air Ministry. Report on the Air and Administrative Organization of the 2nd Tactical Air Force, August 1947, p. 31; Louis Kruh, “The Slidex RT Code,” *Cryptologia* 8, no. 2 (April 1984): 163–171; *Instructions for the Use of SLIDEX RT Code*, January 1944, p. 1; HQ 4 CAD, Intercom Current Ops, 23 Jun 44, 4 CAD WD, June 1944, Appendix 38, LAC, RG 24, Vol. 13,788.

APPENDIX V

4 Canadian Armoured Brigade Pro-forma of Immediate Mental Appreciation and Orders

1. OBJECT

My task is ...

2. LOCATION OF ENEMY

Where are his likely posns?

3. FIREPOWER OF ENEMY

Tanks, guns or inf?

4. GROUND

From where can I deal with him best?

5. COURSES OPEN TO ENEMY

What is he likely to do if I do so & so?

6. PLAN

My plan is:

ORDERS

1. INFORMATION

Enemy (location/strength/armament)

Own Troops (strength/positions)

2. INTENTION

I will destroy, capture, seize ...

3. METHOD

(a) My plan is ...

(b) I will do it like this ...

4. ADMINISTRATION

Petrol, ammunition and wounded will be dealt with as follows:

5. ANY QUESTIONS

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