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ASSISTANT DEPUTY MINISTER (REVIEW SERVICES)



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## Evaluation of Strategic Command and Control



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Canada

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## **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

ADM(DIA)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Data, Innovation and Analytics)
ADM(HR-Civ)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Civilian)
ADM(Mat)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel)
ADM(Pol)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)
ADM(RS)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services)
ADM(S&T)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Science and Technology)
ARA	Accountabilities, Responsibilities and Authorities
C2	Command and Control
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CATS	Contracted Airborne Training Services
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CFICC	Canadian Forces Integrated Command Centre
CJOC	Canadian Joint Operations Command
C-VEO	Counter-Violent Extremist Organization
DACV	Director Arms Control Verification
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DCO	Director of Current Operations
D GDI	Director Gender, Diversity, and Inclusion (DND)
DGO	Director General Operations (Strategic Joint Staff)
DGP	Director General Plans
DGSI	Director General Strategic Initiatives
D IGP	Director Integration of Gender Perspectives (CAF)

DM	Deputy Minister
DND	Department of National Defence
DOS	Director of Staff (Strategic Joint Staff)
DRDC	Defence Research and Development Canada
DRF	Departmental Results Framework
DSOC	Director Support Operations Coordination
FEPP	Force Employment Planning Process
FG	Force Generation
FMSD	Force Mix and Structure Design
FP&R	Force Posture and Readiness
FTE	Full-Time Equivalent (civilian employee)
GBA+	Gender-Based Analysis Plus
GC	Government of Canada
GENAD	Gender Advisor
IGP	Integration of Gender Perspectives
JIIFC	Joint Information Intelligence Fusion Centre
L1	Level One. A senior official, either civilian or military, who has direct accountability to the DM or the CDS
MND	Minister of National Defence
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OCI	Office of Collateral Interest
OFA	Operations Funding Account
OGD	Other Government Department

OPI	Office of Primary Interest
PAA	Program Alignment Architecture
PMF	Performance Measurement Framework
PY	Person Year (Regular Force military employee)
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
Reg F	Regular Force
Res F	Reserve Force
SA	Situational Awareness
SJS	Strategic Joint Staff
SOLA	Strategic Orientation Look Ahead
SOPG	Strategic Operations Planning Group
SSC	Strategic Situation Centre
SSE	Canada's defence policy: <i>Strong, Secure, Engaged</i>
Strat C2	Strategic Command and Control program
TB	Treasury Board
TD	Temporary Duty
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

## Executive Summary

This report presents the results of the evaluation of the Strategic Command and Control (Strat C2) program conducted by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Review Services) (ADM(RS)). This evaluation is a component of the Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) Five-Year Evaluation Plan (FY 2018/19 to 2022/23) in compliance with the Treasury Board (TB) Policy on Results (July 1, 2016) and examines the relevance and performance of the program from FY 2013/14 through 2017/18.

### Program Description

The Strat C2 program directly enables command decisions concerning the preparation, planning and execution of CAF operations including the development of readiness targets, the issuance of readiness directives, the promulgation of Force Posture Plans, and the development and issuance of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) directives and orders. It also provides military analysis and decision support to the CDS as the principal military advisor to the Government of Canada (GC) and undertakes activities including strategic analysis, planning CAF global engagement activities, and leading activities to ensure the operational sustainability of CAF operations.

### Relevance

The evaluation determined that there is an ongoing and future need for the Strat C2 program to support the CDS in the effective command and control of the CAF in support of Canada, Canadians and Canadian national interests, and enables DND/CAF to execute its departmental and federal roles and responsibilities as reflected in the defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (SSE) and the Department's Strategic Outcomes.

### Effectiveness

The Strat C2 program, based on the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS) organization, has effectively maintained the situational awareness of the CDS and senior CAF and DND leadership through

#### Overall Assessment

- The Strat C2 program has ensured direction, resources and activities are aligned with CAF operational requirements.
- The Strat C2 program provides vital support to the CDS in his exercise of Command of the CAF and as the senior military advisor to the GC.
- The Strat C2 program provides critical situational awareness and decision support to the CDS, supports current CAF operations, and ensures CAF Force Posture and Readiness.
- Some program staff elements do not directly support the CDS' C2 of the CAF.
- The program appears to have used resources efficiently; however available data and the nature of the program makes this difficult to assess.

frequent briefings and products covering operations and intelligence matters. It has also provided rapid communication of urgent critical information to the CDS and DND/CAF leadership, at any time, to support their strategic decision making. Finally, the program has ensured that CAF Force Generators and operational commanders were enabled and supported in generating required CAF force elements, and that operations were effectively maintained through integrated support and sustainment activities.

## Efficiency and Economy

The Strat C2 program appears to be operating efficiently; however, the nature of the program, (i.e., staff activity), does not easily lend itself to a quantitative assessment of the program's efficiency and economy. This assessment has been further hampered by the fact that the program did not exist prior to introduction of the Departmental Results Framework (DRF) in 2017, incomplete program data, and the SJS having undergone several reorganizations and significant growth over the period of evaluation.

## Key Findings and Recommendations

Key Findings	Recommendations
<b>Relevance</b>	
1. There is an ongoing and future need for the Strat C2 program to support the CDS in the effective command and control of the CAF in support of Canada, Canadians and Canadian national interests.	
2. The Strat C2 program supports DND/CAF in executing its departmental and federal roles and responsibilities; however greater clarification of roles and responsibilities between this and related DND/CAF programs is required.	
3. The Strat C2 program supports defence policy initiatives in SSE, is aligned with DND/CAF priorities, and is a key component in support of the Department's Strategic Outcomes.	
<b>Performance – Effectiveness</b>	
4. The Strat C2 program contributes to strategic and operational situational awareness in support of senior leadership decision making and military advice to Government.	



<p>5. The Director of Arms Control Verification (DACV) conducts operations, on behalf of the GC in fulfillment of Canada's arms verification objectives and obligations, which provide strategic situational awareness to the CAF and GC rather than direct staff support to the CDS as part of the SJS. Nonetheless, the SJS remains the optimum CAF organization for the DACV to perform its mission.</p>	
<p>6. Staff capacity to provide analysis and advice in support of the CAF strategic vision has diminished over the evaluation period; however, work continues in support of Strategic Outlooks, Force Posture and Readiness (FP&amp;R) Directives, and other strategic planning.</p>	<p>1. It is recommended that the requirement and maintenance of a Strategic Analysis capacity in support of CDS decision making and FP&amp;R planning be reviewed and that it be further strengthened, as appropriate, to fulfill those roles.</p>
<p>7. Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) perspectives and considerations are increasingly being incorporated across the organization; however roles and responsibilities are not well delineated between the DND and CAF GBA+ organizations.</p>	
<p>8. The current CAF GBA+ organization, Director Integration of Gender Perspectives (D IGP), does not have the staff capacity to fulfill its original mandate in support of the integration of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 and GBA+ within DND/CAF.</p>	<p>2. It is recommended that the Director of Staff (DOS) SJS and Corporate Secretary examine the organizational structures and responsibilities for integration of UNSCR 1325 and GBA+ in DND/CAF to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the D IGP and Director Gender, Diversity, and Inclusion (D GDI) organizations and align their resources accordingly.</p>
<p>9. CAF Force Generators and Operational Commanders have been effectively enabled and supported at the strategic level by the planning capability of the Strategic Command and Control program; however it has been strained, at times, by limited capacity.</p>	
<p>10. The Strategic Command and Control program has provided effective coordination of strategic level support and sustainment of CAF operations.</p>	



11. Limited staff capacity in the SJS, combined with frequent staff turnovers, has challenged, and at times impeded, the effectiveness of the Strategic Command and Control Program.	3. It is recommended that a comprehensive review be made of the establishment, organization, manning and the posting cycles of key SJS leadership, and that appropriate action be taken to ensure the CDS receives the timely analysis, advice and support required for his effective command and control of the CAF.
12. Except for the Director Support Operations Coordination (DSOC), the DGS/Strategic J4 organization is a collection of strategic logistics support and sustainment functions that are not part of the core Strategic Command and Control program supporting the command and control of the CAF.	
<b><i>Performance – Efficiency and Economy</i></b>	
13. Strategic Command and Control program expenditures, including personnel expenditures, increased significantly during the evaluation period. This was primarily attributable to the expansion of the SJS organization.	
14. Annual expenditures increased in most Strategic Command and Control program areas at or above the rate of increases in departmental spending over the evaluation period commensurate with the increase in SJS organization and activities.	
15. The Strategic Command and Control program has managed to deliver on program requirements, and has re-organized and re-allocated resources to respond to evolving strategic demands and priorities.	
16. Strategic Command and Control program staff and stakeholders have identified a need for an increase of personnel, within established levels, so that the program may achieve more of what is being asked.	
17. There is a lack of available business information collected to monitor Strategic Command and Control program performance.	4. It is recommended that the SJS develop a Performance Measurement Framework, employing data collection/analysis, to better manage the program and demonstrate program performance.

18. Overall, the Strategic Command and Control program is perceived as efficient with a hardworking staff that delivers what is required despite personnel resource challenges.	
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**Table 1. Key Findings and Recommendations.** This table provides a consolidation of report findings and recommendations.

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**Note:** Please refer to [Annex A—Management Action Plan](#) for the management responses to the ADM(RS) recommendations.

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## 1.0 Introduction

### 1.1 Context for the Evaluation

This report represents the results of the evaluation of the Strat C2 program conducted by ADM(RS) between February 2018 and March 2019 in compliance with the TB Policy on Results. As per the TB policy, the evaluation examines the relevance and performance of the program over a five year period, FY 2013/14 through 2017/18. The evaluation may be used to inform future senior management discussions regarding the organization and activities of the Strat C2 program in support of the CDS and effective command and control of the CAF.

There has been no previous evaluation of Strat C2; however the following related programs have been evaluated:

- *ADM(RS) Evaluation of Global Engagement/Military Diplomacy*, May 2018;
- *ADM(RS) Evaluation of Canadian Armed Forces Operations*, November 2017;
- *ADM(RS) Evaluation of the Joint and Common Force Readiness*, April 2017; and
- *ADM(RS) Evaluation of the Defence Engagement Program*, May 2016.

This evaluation was supported by the SJS which is the principal organization responsible for the Strat C2 program.

### 1.2 Program Profile

#### 1.2.1 Program Description

The Strat C2 program is an element of DND/CAF DRF Core Responsibility 2: Ready Forces. The program directly enables command decisions concerning the preparation, planning and execution of CAF operations including the development of readiness targets, the issuance of readiness directives, the promulgation of Force Posture Plans and the development and issuance of CDS directives and orders. Program activities include:

- Provision of situational awareness, military analysis and decision support to the CDS;
- Conduct of strategic level engagement with other government departments, allies and partner nations;
- Conduct of strategic analysis;
- Enablement of CDS directives and orders;
- Force Posture and Readiness planning and support;
- Synchronization of CAF strategic sustainment and support;
- Arms control verification; and
- Integration of GBA+ into CAF policies and operations.

A summary of the Strat C2 program financial and personnel resources over the evaluation period is presented in Table 2. In FY 2016/17 the Strat C2 program represented only 0.5 percent

of the DND annual expenditures based on DRF program attributions; however the program provides essential support to the CDS in his command of the CAF and as military advisor to the Minister of National Defence (MND) and GC.

Expenditures (\$M) & Personnel Data	FY 13/14	FY 14/15	FY 15/16	FY 16/17	FY 17/18
Strategic Command and Control (DRF)	N/A	N/A	N/A	\$92.9	\$65.0
SJS Expenditures	\$5.8	\$5.2	\$7.6	\$20.6	\$21.9
DND Expenditures	\$18,764.4	\$18,453.9	\$18,666.1	\$18,606.2	\$22,877.1
SJS – Regular Force (Reg F) Person Years (PY)	161	unknown	155	unknown	202
SJS – Reserve Force (Res F)	unknown	unknown	unknown	unknown	21
Civilian full-time equivalents (FTE) (Average)	N/A	30	N/A	55	73.7
Contractors	N/A	1	8	17	17

**Table 2. Strategic Command and Control Program.**<sup>1</sup> This table provides a summary of Strat C2 and SJS expenditures and SJS personnel resources over the period of the evaluation.

The Strat C2 program is the responsibility of the SJS headed by the DOS. The SJS is a staff organization in National Defence Headquarters whose primary role is direct support to the CDS as described in the SJS Mission and Vision Statement:

The SJS provides military analysis and decision support to the CDS who is the principal military advisor to the Government of Canada. This enables the CDS to effect strategic command. The SJS supports the CDS in translating government direction into effective and responsive CF operations by, for example, taking part in the preliminary stages of operational planning with other government departments, CF operational and environmental commands, and the strategic staffs of Canada's key allies. The key roles of the SJS are:

<sup>1</sup> Data source: SJS expenditures and personnel data from SJS program data. DND expenditures from 2016/17 and 2017/18 Departmental Results Report. DRF estimate includes ADM(Mat) (Contracted Air Training Services (CATS) contract), ADM(Fin) (statutory payments), and SJS expenditures. MPC (Military Salaries) not available. Ref: Staples VS@ADM(Fin) DPC(Fin)@Ottawa-Hull email, RE: 18-19 Departmental Plan Planned Spending figures - Strategic Command and Control, sent March-20-19 2:26 PM. The CATS expenditures are no longer attributed to the Strat C2 program commencing in FY 2018/19 and CATS was not considered in this evaluation. Ref: Babcock SM@SJS Business Mgt@Ottawa-Hull email, RE: CATS, sent Mon 01/04/2019 1:38 PM.

- to provide timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the CDS as the principal military advisor to the Government of Canada;
- to enable the CDS' strategic level planning, initiation, direction, synchronization, and control of operations; and
- to translate the CDS' intent into strategic directives.<sup>2</sup>

Additionally, the CDS has assigned the Operational Authority for the CAF Command Network to the DOS, delegated to the Joint Information Intelligence Fusion Centre (JIIFC),<sup>3</sup> and the Deputy Minister (DM) and the CDS have assigned the DOS the following DND/CAF Functional Authorities, which are managed by the Strategic J4:<sup>4</sup>

- Transportation;
- Food Services;
- Fuels and Lubricants;
- Ammunition program performance;
- Postal Services Policy; and
- CAF Road and Vehicle Safety Program.

In 2018 the SJS was comprised of the following organizations:

- Director General Operations (DGO) comprised of:
  - Director Current Ops (DCO),
  - Director Arms Control Verification (DACV), and
  - JIIFC;
- Director General Plans comprised of:
  - Director Strategic Plans (DSP),
  - Director National Security (DNS),
  - Director Strategic Engagement and Capacity Building (DSECB),
  - Director Plans North America (DPNA), and
  - Director Strategic Effects and Targeting (DSET);
- Director General Support / Strategic J4 (DGS/Strat J4) comprised of:
  - Director Support Operations Coordination (DSOC),
  - Director Sustainment Strategy and Readiness (DSSR),
  - Director Logistics Programs (D Log P), and
  - Logistics Branch Integrator (LBI);
- Director General Strategic Initiatives (DGSi) comprised of:
  - Director Strategic and Operational Analysis (DSOA); and
  - Strategic Initiatives Coordination;

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<sup>2</sup> Strategic Joint Staff, Our Mission and Vision at <http://intranet.mil.ca/en/organizations/SJS/index.page>. Last consulted May 10, 2019.

<sup>3</sup> 1905-01 (J3 Coord), Concept of Operations for Strategic Information Management, May 3, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> Defence Administrative Orders and Directive (DAOD) 1000-4 - Policy Framework for Materiel and Asset Management and DAOD 1000-8 - Policy Framework for Safety and Security Management.

- Director General Coordination (DG Coord); and
- Director Integration of Gender Perspectives (D IGP).

In 2012, prior to CAF Transformation (Bound 2), the SJS structure was comprised of the DOS, DGO, DGP and DG Coord organizations with 76 Reg F, 7 Res F, and 11 civilian staff.<sup>5</sup> Following CAF Transformation (Bound 2) the SJS was reorganized with the transfer of the Canadian Forces Integrated Command Centre (CFICC) to the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and eventual establishment of the DGS/Strat J4 organization. The Strat J4 element was created in 2015. It was established as a strategic level office to prioritize, synchronize and coordinate joint sustainment requirements for the CAF to sustain operations between DND/CAF corporate and operations functions and among Level One (L1) organizations.<sup>6</sup>

### 1.2.2 Program Objectives

The Strategic Command and Control program objectives are:<sup>7</sup>

- Ensure direction, resources and activities are aligned with requirements for current and future CAF operations;
- Support informed decision making and advice by the CDS and senior DND/CAF leadership;
- Enable and support CAF Environmental Chiefs of Staff, and operational commanders are enabled and supported to force generate CAF force elements; and
- Enable DND/CAF operations through the coordination and integration of strategic logistics support and sustainment activities.

### 1.2.3 Stakeholders

Principal DND/CAF stakeholders of the Strat C2 program include the Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), Canadian Army, Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, CJOC, Military Personnel Command, Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, Judge Advocate General, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) (ADM(Pol)) and ADM (Materiel) (ADM(Mat)). External stakeholders include the Privy Council Office, Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety Canada, NATO, NORAD and other allies.

## 1.3 Evaluation Scope

### 1.3.1 Coverage and Responsibilities

When the Strat C2 program was established in 2017, it was initially based on the former 2013 National Defence Program Alignment Architecture (PAA) Sub Sub Programs 5.2.1 Strategic

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<sup>5</sup> SJS DG Coord. Presentation, *SJS Transformation Briefing*, June 18, 2012.

<sup>6</sup> Brigadier General Russell. Presentation, *Strategic J4 Briefing to Sustainment Coordination Committee*, October 30, 2015.

<sup>7</sup> Performance Information Profile (PIP) 2.1 Strategic Command and Control Program Logic Model.

Capability Planning Support and 5.2.2 Strategic Force Posture Planning Support. The CAF's Contracted Airborne Training Services (CATS) was later added to the Strat C2 program during development of the DRF.

Early discussions with the SJS, ADM(Mat) and RCAF staff to establish the scope of the evaluation concluded that the CATS activity was not relevant to the Strat C2 program and it was omitted from the evaluation. Elements of the CATS program were subsequently assigned to the RCAF and ADM(Mat) as part of their DRF Ready Forces Programs.

The Strat C2 evaluation focused on the following five key activities identified in the program Logic Model at Annex C:

- Develop and maintain the strategic vision for the CAF;
- Support strategic and operational situational awareness;
- Develop CDS guidance and direction for CAF support and sustainment of operations;
- Develop CAF operations, readiness and global engagement plans; and
- Manage strategic logistics support.

### **1.3.2 Resources**

Expenditures and personnel attributed to the Strat C2 program are provided at Table 2.

### **1.3.3 Issues and Questions**

In accordance with the TB Directive on Results (2016),<sup>8</sup> the evaluation report addresses the evaluation issues related to relevance and performance. An evaluation matrix listing each of the evaluation questions, with associated indicators and data sources, is provided at [Annex D](#). The methodology used to gather evidence in support of the evaluation questions can be found at [Annex B](#).

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<sup>8</sup> Treasury Board. *Directive on Results*, July 1, 2016. <https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=31306>. Last consulted April 12, 2019.



## 2.0 Findings and Recommendations

### 2.1 Relevance

**Key Finding 1:** There is an ongoing and future need for the Strat C2 program to support the Chief of the Defence Staff in the effective command and control of the CAF in support of Canada, Canadians and Canadian national interests.

The *National Defence Act*<sup>9</sup> provides for the appointment of a CDS who is charged with the control and administration of the CAF. Unless the Governor in Council otherwise directs, all orders to the CAF that are required to give effect to the decisions and to carry out the directions of the GC and the MND must be issued by or through the CDS. Under the Queen's Regulations and Orders for the CAF, the commanders of military commands are responsible directly to the CDS or such officer as the CDS may designate, for the control and administration of all elements allocated to them.<sup>10</sup>

The Strat C2 program, embodied in the SJS, directly supports CDS decisions concerning the preparation, planning and execution of CAF operations including the development of readiness targets, the issuance of readiness directives, the promulgation of Force Posture Plans and the development and issuance of CDS directives and orders. The program also provides timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the CDS as the principal military advisor to the GC.

**Key Finding 2:** The Strat C2 program supports DND/CAF in executing its departmental and federal roles and responsibilities; however greater clarification of roles and responsibilities between this and related DND/CAF programs is required.

The CDS serves as the principal military advisor to the GC. In addition, the CDS fulfils his responsibilities for the control and administration of the CAF by exercising command at the strategic level. The CDS is supported in fulfilling his advisory and command roles by the SJS, led by the DOS, who reports directly to the CDS and who has the authority and responsibility to issue guidance as directed by the CDS. The role of the SJS is as follows:

- The SJS provides timely and effective military analysis and decision support to the CDS in his advisory role to the Government; and

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<sup>9</sup> Government of Canada. *National Defence Act*, section 18.

<sup>10</sup> DND. *Queens Regulations and Orders* at <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/about-policies-standards-queens-regulations-orders-vol-01/ch-01.page#cha-001-13>. Last consulted April 12, 2019.

- The SJS supports the CDS in his critical role of translating Government direction into effective and responsive CAF operations, enabling the CDS to effect strategic command, by allowing him to plan for, initiate, direct, synchronize and control operations at the strategic level. In doing so, the SJS supports the CDS by establishing both access and military information exchanges with select government departments that directly lead or support security and Defence missions and ensuring effective liaison with the strategic military staffs of key allies.<sup>11</sup>

The SJS organization has evolved and grown significantly since 2006 but the program's activities remain aligned with DND/CAF roles and responsibilities.

**Key Finding 3:** The Strat C2 program supports defence policy initiatives in *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, is aligned with DND/CAF priorities, and is a key component in support of the Department's Strategic Outcomes.

The Strat C2 program is comprised of activities that are essential to the CAF's ability to achieve the GC's Defence priorities and ability to perform its core missions in accordance with SSE. This includes support to the following defence policy initiatives in SSE:

- SSE initiative 12 - Integrate GBA+ in all defence activities across the CAF and DND, from the design and implementation of programs and services that support our personnel, to equipment procurement and operational planning;
- SSE initiative 68 – the SJS' JIIFC contribution to integrate existing and future assets into a networked, joint system-of-systems that will enable the flow of information among multiple, interconnected platforms and operational headquarters; and
- SSE initiative 72 – Establishment of a CAF targeting capability to better leverage intelligence capabilities to support military operations.

As well, the annual CDS Directive on CAF Force Posture and Readiness (FP&R), produced by the Strat C2 program, is aligned with DND/CAF priorities and establishes a clear relationship between readiness, operational requirements and GC policy.

## 2.2 Performance—Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness)

Effectiveness of the Strat C2 program was evaluated using program documents and data, and interviews of key program staff and stakeholders.

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<sup>11</sup> DND. *Annex A to CDS Directive on Canadian Armed Forces Command and Control and the Delegation of Authority for Force Employment*, April 28, 2013.

## 2.2.1 Decision Support and Situational Awareness

**Key Finding 4:** The Strat C2 program contributes to strategic and operational situational awareness in support of senior leadership decision making and military advice to Government.

As noted by interviewees, the SJS provides situational awareness (SA) products on a daily basis, ranging from morning briefs to the CDS to the constant contact and information flow with the CFICC that is quickly relayed, as required, to the CDS and the senior DND/CAF leadership.

The SJS is the principle conduit of strategic and operational SA in support of the senior CAF leadership decision making and advice. This is supported by CAF operational command centres, intelligence sources, and key stakeholders including Global Affairs Canada, Public Safety Canada, Transport Canada and allies. Information is gathered, processed and disseminated through staff engagements and various Command and Control Information Systems (C2IS) that range from Unclassified to Top Secret.

The CDS and the key DND/CAF leadership, or their respective staff, are provided regular briefings for their SA. The briefing schedule has evolved over the evaluation period based on the nature of current CAF operational activities and the requirements of the incumbent Minister, DM and CDS. The DND/CAF leadership, including the MND, DM, CDS and DOS, are also provided classified daily operations and intelligence briefs each morning on tablets prepared by the SJS Strategic Situation Centre (SSC).

There is also a comprehensive plan to provide the CDS and MND notification of any urgent operational developments through the SJS DCO organization.<sup>12</sup> The DCO is the focal point for current operations issues and is responsible for:

- SA and reporting on current domestic and international operations;
- SJS/CAF lead for CDS/MND Commander's Critical Information Requirements;
- Managing MND Office/Privy Council Office Requests for Information;
- Strategic level Crisis Management for operations;
- Decision support and strategic advice on current domestic and international operations;
- Providing analysis of key strategic issues; and
- Maintaining the SSC, which provides the CDS/DOS with a strategic command support element for intelligence and operations including:
  - morning classified briefing products to DND/CAF senior leadership (E-binder) and open-source intelligence strategic orientation briefs; and

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<sup>12</sup> Colonel S.G. Graham. Presentation, *Directorate of Current Operations Introduction for BGen Prevost (DGO)*, August 14, 2018.

- CAF lead for Air Security Incidents and Operation NOBLE EAGLE.<sup>13</sup>

As mentioned previously, the strategic 24 hour/7 days a week watch centre for the SJS is the CFICC. The CFICC informs the strategic leadership of significant events or incidents that have occurred on operations, reporting to the CDS through the SJS DCO. In addition to reporting on the CJOC's operations, the CFICC monitors worldwide events (including terrorist incidents, territorial incursions by one state into another, missile launches, among a host of other newsworthy events) to ensure that strategic leadership is informed. The CFICC also receives all Significant Incident Reports and Casualty Reports from all CAF units and distributes these to multiple organizations, including the SJS.

**Key Finding 5:** The Director of Arms Control Verification (DACV) conducts operations, on behalf of the GC in fulfillment of Canada's arms verification objectives and obligations, which provide strategic situational awareness to the CAF and GC rather than direct staff support to the CDS as part of the SJS. Nonetheless, the SJS remains the optimum CAF organization for the DACV to perform its mission.

The DACV is a unique element of the Strat C2 program mandated by the GC/GAC to perform arms control verification in fulfillment of Canada's obligations to a number of international arms control treaties and agreements. The DACV's arms control activities, and strategic level military and political engagements, contribute to strategic situational awareness for the CAF and GC.

The DACV staff were part of the operations branch of the former Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS) based on NDHQ Policy Directive P2/94.<sup>14</sup> The DCDS staff were split between the new Canada Command, Canadian Expedition Force Command, and the newly established SJS when CAF Transformation occurred in 2006. While other DCDS operations staff were assigned to the new operational commands, the DCDS J3 ACV organization was assigned to the SJS and became the SJS DGO DACV.

As part of the SJS, the DACV plans, coordinates, executes and reports on international arms control verification regimes in support of Canada's legally and politically binding obligations and rights.<sup>15</sup> The Canadian DACV team partners with NATO nations and non-aligned partner nations to perform arms verification missions, and works closely with the US Armed Forces to ensure

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<sup>13</sup> Immediately following the September 11 attacks, NORAD established Operation NOBLE EAGLE to defend against similar terrorist attacks using hijacked or private civilian aircraft. Since September 11, 2001, NORAD has responded to more than 3,500 possible air threats and intercepted more than 1,400 aircraft in Canada and the U.S. Ref: <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/news/article.page?doc=domestic-and-continental-defence-and-security-accomplishments-post-9-11/hnps1vdh>. Last consulted 29 April 2019.

<sup>14</sup> 3145-0 (DNAC Pol) 1243-23-4, NDHQ Policy Directive P2/94 Department of National Defence Responsibilities under the Provisions of Arms Control Agreements, June 3, 1994.

<sup>15</sup> Col C. Namiesniowski, DACV. Presentation, "Familiarization Brief MGen O.H. Lavoie, DOS SJS", May 1, 2018.

treaty obligations are met for Russian arms verification missions in Canada and the US, as well as in Russia and non-NATO nations.

During the course of this evaluation the following points were noted with regard to ACV:

- The *Report on Transformation 2011* noted, “Though structurally dissimilar, there were no gross functional inconsistencies noted [between the operational commands and SJS], with the possible exception of the existence of an Arms Control Verification (ACV) capability within the SJS.” However, unlike CJOC, the DACV performs political/diplomatic engagements of a strategic nature from the political to the tactical level.
- When the ACV teams are deployed to operations they are eligible for various benefits, including the associated CAF service medal. They could be eligible for the CAF Operations Funding Account (OFA) as those funds are “directly attributable to a specific mission...”; however:
  - By definition, “OFA expenditures are incremental, which is defined as costs considered above and beyond the normal cost of an organization and/or planned activities.” The DACV costs are not considered incremental and are provided a baselined budget to execute their mission out to three years in advance.
  - The DACV employs Temporary Duty (TD) funds as part of its annual budget to attend annual meetings that are part of International Treaty and Agreement obligations but separate from its ACV missions. The TD and mission expenditures are approved and tracked separately using the DACV Operations and Maintenance budget.
  - While OFA eligible operations may be approved by Memorandum to Cabinet, Prime Minister approval letter, MND approval letter or CDS Direction, the DACV has a standing task from the GC to execute its ACV mission at a well-established funding level which requires no special approval or incremental funding.

Based on the preceding considerations, it was concluded in discussions with program staff that the SJS remains the best organization for DACV to conduct its multifaceted strategic level engagements and activities. However, if a Joint Force Command that is currently under consideration is established, then consideration could be given to establishing the DACV as a unit within that organization dependent upon its mandate and focus.

## 2.2.2 Strategic Vision Supports Current and Future Operations

**Key Finding 6:** Staff capacity to provide analysis and advice in support of the CAF strategic vision has diminished over the evaluation period; however, work continues in support of Strategic Outlooks, Force Posture and Readiness Directives, and other strategic planning.

The DGSi organization was established in late 2012 by the DOS, MGen Hood, and the CDS, Gen Lawson, to enhance SJS strategic analysis through four Strategic Orientation Look Ahead (SOLA)

reports each year, and an annual Strategic Outlook report that would support FP&R planning, Military Strategy, and Global Engagement plans.<sup>16</sup>

As of April 2018, DGSi had produced ten SOLAs and 100 peer-reviewed strategic studies, with some of the reports briefed to the Prime Minister and read by the former government's MND. The DGSi had two lines of effort:

- Shorter studies, responsive to CDS inquiries, that provided analysis at the strategic and operational levels; and
- SOLA-type strategic studies – multiple papers, providing in-depth analysis of a strategic level subject.<sup>17</sup>

The annual Strategic Outlook was to assist identification and prioritization of key threats to Canadian security to inform CAF planning.

In 2015, DGSi was comprised of the Director GSI, three CAF staff officers, and seven civilian Strategic Analysts provided from Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC). Strategic analysis reports were produced to support CDS military advice, FP&R requirements, Force employment/military response options, strategy development, strategic doctrine, a variety of initiatives and capability development in Horizon 1 (one to five years).<sup>18</sup>

Following the turnover of the CDS in July 2015 and DOS in August 2015, a draft DOS letter was produced in September 2015 regarding the annual SOLA Briefings but was never promulgated. It indicated that the new CDS recognized the value of the SOLAs and Strategic Outlook process, but proposed a revised SOLA briefing program and the desire for each SOLA to produce actionable outcomes.

Nonetheless, Strategic Analysts were subsequently withdrawn over a two year period without backfill or other mitigation.<sup>19</sup> A proposal has now been put forward by DGSi to establish five new civilian positions to fill the Strategic Analyst requirements. In the meantime, there has been a diminished interest and capacity to produce SOLAs; however DGSi still provides FP&R and Strategic Outlook support and maintains contact with external partners to support their research.<sup>20</sup> As well, the following issues remain with the Strategic Outlook/SOLA reports:

- They are not institutionalized;
- Outcomes of reports are not developed or followed through on; and
- Reports are disconnected from other processes and not integrated into planning.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Dr. G. Smolynec. Presentation, "DGSi SJS Orientation Day Briefing", September 29, 2015. Acronyms: AFC – Armed Forces Council, CC – Command Council, DCB – Defence Capabilities Board.

<sup>17</sup> Dr. G. Smolynec. Presentation, "DGSi SJS Orientation Day Briefing", September 29, 2015. Acronyms: AFC – Armed Forces Council, CC – Command Council, DCB – Defence Capabilities Board.

<sup>18</sup> Dr G. Smolynec. Presentation, "DGSi Initiatives: Vision, Mission, Concept & Structure", April 17, 2018.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> DGSi Familiarization – Meeting with Mr. P. Johnston, A/DGSi, October 30, 2018.

<sup>21</sup> Dr G. Smolynec. Presentation, "DGSi Initiatives: Vision, Mission, Concept & Structure", April 17, 2018.

Interviewees noted that the Five Eyes (AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US) National Assessments, which look ahead as far as 50 years, the Counter-Violent Extremist Organization (C-VEO) framework assessment, and assessments by Allied committees such as the Multinational Strategic Operations Group are all pulled into the CAF FP&R and Force Mix and Structure Design (FMSD)<sup>22</sup> as part of the SSE and FP&R driven changes to the CAF force structure.

Finally, a draft CAF Canadian National Military Strategy was produced by DGSI following release of the new defence policy, SSE; however that document remains in draft undergoing further revision.<sup>23</sup>

#### ADM(RS) Recommendation

1. It is recommended that the requirement and maintenance of a Strategic Analysis capacity in support of CDS decision making and FP&R planning be reviewed and that it be further strengthened, as appropriate, to fulfill those roles.

OPI: DOS SJS

OCI: VCDS, ADM(S&T)/DRDC

**Key Finding 7:** GBA+ perspectives and considerations are increasingly being incorporated across the organization; however roles and responsibilities are not well delineated between the DND and CAF GBA+ organizations.

**Key Finding 8:** The current CAF GBA+ organization, D IGP, does not have the staff capacity to fulfill its original mandate in support of the integration of UNSCR 1325 and GBA+ within DND/CAF.

On January 29, 2016, the CDS promulgated his Directive for Integrating UNSCR 1325 (Women, Peace and Security) and related UNSCR resolutions into CAF planning and operations. This was followed, in January 2017, with the promulgation of the CAF Diversity Strategy and as one of the new initiatives in the new defence policy, SSE, promulgated in June 2017. In September 2017, the DM authorized the creation of two new positions, the Director Integration of Gender

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<sup>22</sup> The purpose of the FMSD is to realize required SSE and FP&R driven changes to the CAF force structure. FMSD will build on the work previously conducted as the Force Mix and Capability Analysis, incorporating FP&R, the Defence Team HR Strategy, Capability Based Planning inputs, and CDS direction. The initiative will also consider and inform the apportionment of the Primary Reserve establishment. This work will leverage and build on ongoing L1-led SSE initiatives. Ref: *Defence Plan 2018-2023*.

<sup>23</sup> DGSI Familiarization – Meeting with Mr. P. Johnston, A/DGSI, October 30, 2018.



Perspectives Plus for the CAF and a similar position, Director Integration Gender Perspectives Plus for the DND.<sup>24</sup> The CAF position was established in the SJS as the D IGP and the DND position was established in the DND Corporate Secretariat organization as the D GBA+, now identified as the D GDI. The CAF position stemmed from the CDS Directive on UNSCR 1325, while the DND position was based on the GC commitment in 2015 to fully implement GBA+ across all departments by 2019.<sup>25</sup>

Interviewees opined that GBA+ has evolved significantly in the CAF since being introduced and has become an important element of CAF planning. There is a plan for each L1 to have a GBA+ Advisor (GENAD), and training to achieve this objective is ongoing. The CJOC has a GENAD who supports CJOC Headquarters GBA+ considerations and another GENAD to support operational planning and participate in operations planning groups.

However, it was apparent through interviews and discussions that there is significant confusion regarding the responsibilities of the CAF D IGP and the DND D GDI. As well, the D IGP has extremely limited capacity, particularly compared to its DND counterpart organization. The D IGP organization is comprised of the Director and two staff and is responsible for delivering its program to nearly 67,000 CAF Reg F personnel, while the D GDI, with ten staff, is delivering that program to approximately 23,000 DND civilians.<sup>26</sup>

An ADM(RS) Evaluation of Diversity and Inclusion, conducted concurrently with this evaluation, is doing an in-depth assessment of the integration of gender perspectives in DND and the CAF. Its preliminary findings also indicate that stakeholders lack clarity around roles and responsibilities of the several DND/CAF related organizations, which go beyond just the D IGP and D GDI. As well, it notes that those organizations, particularly D IGP, have limited capacity to fulfill the broad range of responsibilities detailed in the position's description.<sup>27</sup>

Notwithstanding capacity issues, the D IGP organization had several notable accomplishments in 2018 that included:

- The Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations conducted GENAD training for 37 CAF personnel. A total of approximately 60 CAF personnel received GENAD training through various courses.
- The CAF filled the Integrated Military Staff GENAD position at NATO HQ, Brussels.
- Canada (Dir IGP) is the deputy chair of the NATO Committee for Gender Perspectives (2018-2020).
- The SJS staff worked with Global Affairs Canada to conduct preliminary assessments of partner countries for the Elsie Initiative<sup>28</sup> and the CAF will work with Ghana to partner in

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<sup>24</sup> CCM: HRCIV2017-1163197, dated September 13, 2017.

<sup>25</sup> DND DM letter to the Chair, Standing Committee on Public Accounts, April 30, 2018.

<sup>26</sup> DND and the CAF 2017-18 Departmental Results Report.

<sup>27</sup> Executive Group Position Description, Director Integration of Gender Perspectives for the CAF, Unit SJS, February 6, 2017.

<sup>28</sup> The Elsie Initiative is a key element of Canada's feminist foreign policy. Ref: <https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2018/03/the-elsie-initiative-on-women-in-peace-operations.html>. Last consulted February 2, 2019.

identifying barriers to deployment of women. The CAF will also undergo a self-assessment to support this initiative.

- Thirteen presentations provided on CAF Integration of Gender Perspectives in various forums.<sup>29</sup>

Finally, the CDS will assume the Chair of the Women, Peace and Security Chief of Defence (CHOD) Staffs' Network in July 2019. Forty-four CHODs have signed onto the network and Canada will seek to increase the network's membership.

#### **ADM(RS) Recommendation**

2. It is recommended that the DOS SJS and Corporate Secretary examine the organizational structures and responsibilities for integration of UNSCR 1325 and GBA+ in DND/CAF to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the D IGP and D GDI organizations and align their resources accordingly.

**OPI:** DOS SJS

**OCIs:** VCDS, Corporate Secretary

### **2.2.3 Plans Enable and Support CAF Force Generators and Operational Commanders**

**Key Finding 9:** CAF Force Generators and Operational Commanders have been effectively enabled and supported at the strategic level by the planning capability of the Strategic Command and Control program; however it has been strained, at times, by limited capacity.

Planning capacity within the Strat C2 program is largely centred within the DGP organization of the SJS, with additional support and contributions from the DGSi organization. There are a number of planning initiatives that these groups either contribute to or manage in order to enable and support the CAF Force Generators and Operational Commanders. In partnership with other groups, the SJS conducts ongoing strategic analysis to identify threats, crises or trends that may affect Canadian interests, focusing on decomposition, detailed examination, and interpretation of internal and external factors affecting national defence and security.<sup>30</sup>

Interviewees noted that in general the planning support provided by the Strat C2 program is good and, while the information available at the initial stages of planning is not always complete, this is considered normal and acceptable. Planning is an iterative process, and they

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<sup>29</sup> D IGP email, Info follow-up to meeting, Thu 15/11/2018 3:00 PM.

<sup>30</sup> Strategic Joint Staff, Director General Plans. *The CF Force Employment Planning Process: An Aide-Mémoire*, September 17, 2008.

do the best they can with the available information, remaining adaptable and flexible as new information or direction is received.

At times, there can be issues with the production of timely and detailed strategic direction. This is generally attributable to staff capacity and availability, or the time required to resolve legal and both domestic and foreign political issues. The latter includes foreign basing arrangements for deploying forces. An example cited was the CAF deployment in support of the United Nations in Mali, Op PRESENCE. It was also noted, in particular, that it can be difficult to focus efforts on planning and strategic thinking due to constant staff engagements and requirements to respond to requests for information. That being said, when necessary, a condensed battle plan is possible.

The planning process is necessarily based on a network of relationships, both within and outside DND/CAF considering the input of force employers, force generators, and collaborative planning with key domestic and international stakeholders, allies and partners.<sup>31</sup> Additionally, DG Plans staff produce and coordinate Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with other government departments (OGD) and allied/partner nations and international exercises that are critical to the CAF's ability to mount and sustain operations.<sup>32</sup>

Relationships between DGP and partners internal to DND/CAF (particularly ADM(Pol)) are described in positive terms. Interviewees noted that engagements between SJS and Policy staff are regular and consistent, and that the SJS reaches out whenever needed for advice and to maintain mutual awareness of policy-related strategic issues.

Finally, it was also noted that an overarching CAF military strategy based on SSE would be a useful tool, for example, in laying out the CAF's philosophy in decision making. That document remains in draft form as it undergoes staff review.

## 2.2.4 Strategic Support and Sustainment Activities Support CAF Operations

**Key Finding 10:** The Strategic Command and Control program has provided effective coordination of strategic level support and sustainment of CAF operations.

Prior to the establishment of DGS/Strat J4, there was a lack of governance and accountability and focus on sustainment excellence, resulting in inefficiency and reduced effectiveness in sustainment of CAF operations.<sup>33</sup> One document noted that "the lack of a strategic level office

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<sup>31</sup> Commodore Brad Peats, Director General Plans (DGP). Presentation [SJS Staff Orientation Brief September 2018].

<sup>32</sup> Colonel Smith SJS DPNA. Presentation, "Briefing to Director of Staff SJS: Director Plans North America", April 25, 2018.

<sup>33</sup> Brigadier General C.A. Lamarre. Presentation, "Requirement for a Strat J4", October 12, 2013.

to prioritize, synchronize and coordinate joint sustainment requirements into effective, timely, and efficient support, in concert with institutional programs and operational/tactical capabilities has had a significant impact on both the CAF's ability to sustain operations and the Department's credibility in managing the Defence program."<sup>34</sup> The DGS/Strat J4 was established in April 2015 in response to these and other deficiencies.<sup>35</sup>

The DGS/Strat J4 role is to provide sustainment and support advice to the DOS and CDS, coordinate logistics support across the CAF, and ensure balance between operational effectiveness and strategic resource management.<sup>36</sup> It was envisioned that the Strat J4 would shape the delivery of support by providing a strategic focal point for the planning, prioritization and synchronization of sustainment effects across L1s by linking the corporate program and military operations to ensure an effective focus on the sustain function. The Strat J4 was to coordinate input in the development and coordination of the sustainment concepts, plans and activities at the strategic level, as well as assume responsibility for joint sustainment functions that were previously housed within ADM(Mat) but not assigned under his Functional Authorities.<sup>37</sup> The DGS/Strat J4 also ensures interoperability by aligning strategic engagements with allies, NATO, UN, OGDs and industry on support and sustainment issues.<sup>38</sup>

On a day-to-day basis, DGS/Strat J4 staff regularly review or draft several strategic level documents, incorporating strategic support and sustainment input. These include international MOUs/agreements/arrangements, Memoranda to Cabinet, CDS directives/planning guidance, strategic level plans, DND policies and publications, departmental/CAF reports, formal and informal support and sustainment assessments, and doctrine. Still, DGS/Strat J4 is not always part of the official SJS review/drafting cycle. In some cases they are asked for input (either formally or informally) at the beginning of the review/drafting cycle and, in other cases, they are not consulted until much later in the process. On occasion, this has had a direct impact on both the comprehensiveness and quality of their input to final products.

A challenge that was mentioned during the evaluation with regards to DGS/Strat J4 is a lack of properly defined Accountabilities, Responsibilities and Authorities (ARA) specific to the Strat J4. According to DOADs and a draft Organization and Accountability document, only L1s and specialist advisors can have ARA, so DAODs 1000-4 and 1000-8 have assigned DOS the functional authority for transportation, food services, fuels and lubricants, ammunition program performance, postal services policy and the CAF Road and Vehicle Safety Program, which the DGS/Strat J4 manages on his behalf. Other logistics and sustainment functions currently being carried out by the Strat J4, which have not been officially identified and assigned to the Strat J4, include doctrine, lessons learned, readiness and capability development. This sometimes creates difficulties when work needs to be coordinated and

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<sup>34</sup> Brigadier General N.E. Russell. Presentation, "Strategic J4 Briefing to Sustainment Coordination Committee", October 30, 2015.

<sup>35</sup> 1901-1 (DGS) Strategic J4 Master Implementation Plan – Spiral 1, December 2, 2015.

<sup>36</sup> Brigadier General M. Rafter. Presentation, "[DOS Handover] DGS/Strat J4", April 2018.

<sup>37</sup> Briefing Note for the CDS - Requirement for a Strategic J4, October 22, 2013.

<sup>38</sup> Colonel Morrison, A/DGS/Strat J4. Presentation, "DGS/Strat J4 SJS Orientation Brief", September 26, 2018.

decisions need to be made in these areas. This situation is seen as a limiting factor for the DGS/Strat J4 to achieve the required outcomes, and updating and aligning the ARA with the Strat J4's functions should be a priority moving forward.

Overall, the SJS is seen to have effective, positive, complementary relationships with other partners, with whom there is regular communication in regards to the support and sustainment of operations. This is an important aspect of the SJS' role. The relationships are well-established, and work well in support of operations or engagements when required.

## 2.2.5 Factors affecting success of the program achieving its required outcomes

**Key Finding 11:** Limited staff capacity in the SJS, combined with frequent staff turnovers, has challenged, and at times impeded, the effectiveness of the Strategic Command and Control Program.

A number of interviewees noted the hardworking, motivated, professional and dedicated staff of the SJS was a major factor in the success of the program. That being said, many of those interviewed felt that areas of the SJS are under staffed and overburdened, and that this has an effect on the program's ability to achieve its required outcomes. DGO and DGP are seen as especially short-staffed, and personnel in those groups are required to work very hard and long hours to meet their requirements. As well, the DGS has less capacity than previously to produce SOLAs and support SA requirements, and has had to rely significantly on outside resources. The D IGP is also seen as being understaffed, particularly when compared to D GDI in the Corporate Secretariat, which holds a similar mandate for DND as D IGP does for the CAF. Finally, the DGS/Strat J4 has had to deal with manning shortages since its creation in 2015 when positions and funding were not transferred from other L1 organizations as anticipated. Some of these issues have been mitigated by the SJS Human Resources Management Board that was established to manage SJS personnel issues.

The SJS has dealt with a constant turnover in senior leadership positions, with four DOS over the five year evaluation period,<sup>39</sup> as well as frequent SJS DG turnovers.

On top of this, the regular turnovers at the staff level as part of the military posting cycle lead to difficulties in retaining corporate knowledge and the need to constantly familiarize incoming staff with their responsibilities and re-establish relationships with key stakeholders. Currently, most people learn on the fly, through passed on corporate knowledge and convention rather than a codified set of practices. It was noted that a more standardized on-boarding process,

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<sup>39</sup> DOS changes: FY 2013/14 - 2017/18: MGen Vance June 2011 – June 2013; MGen Hood June 2013 – August 2015; MGen Lamarre August 2015 – May 2017; and MGen Meinzingler May 2017 – May 2018.

including a staff procedure manual, could significantly reduce the learning curve for new SJS personnel.

SSE requirements have been a key driver for SJS re-organization since 2017, with the addition of several new staff activities based on SSE, including C-VEO and Targeting. The SJS is now seeking additional staff for these latter responsibilities. A D IGP was also established as an advisor to the CDS and CAF lead for GBA+ in response to SSE priorities.

The SJS has also undergone a number of transformations over its lifespan, and a significant number of reorganizations, realignments and growth. One number cited was nine reorganizations in 12 years, although not all of them were to address capacity limitations. Some of those activities have been characterized as a means of coping with personnel shortages (a combination of an inadequate establishment and vacant positions), which has resulted in staff being frequently reshuffled to meet requirements. A plan was established to further reorganize the SJS in April 2017, but was not promulgated with changes of DOS in 2017 and again in 2018. Another attempt was made to promulgate an SJS realignment directive in July 2018 but it remains in draft. Current thought involves reorganizing DGO and DGP along geographic lines to create efficiencies and allow for more strategic/long-term thinking; however there does not seem to be full consensus on the best way to organize these activities.

Limited staff capacity and frequent senior leadership changes, combined with constant organizational changes, have regularly altered SJS work priorities. These factors are assessed to have been a significant impediment to SJS productivity based on initiatives that have reached a high level of maturity but not been signed or implemented.<sup>40</sup>

### **ADM(RS) Recommendation**

3. It is recommended that a comprehensive review be made of the establishment, organization, manning, and the posting cycles of key SJS leadership, and that appropriate action be taken to ensure the CDS receives the timely analysis, advice and support required for his effective command and control of the CAF.

**OPI:** DOS SJS

**OCI:** VCDS, CMP, ADM(HR-Civ)

**Key Finding 12:** Except for the DSOC, the DGS/Strategic J4 organization is a collection of strategic logistics support and sustainment functions that are not part of the core Strategic Command and Control program supporting the command and control of the CAF.

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<sup>40</sup> Examples include a draft DOS letter, February 2014, initiating an update for the CDS Command and Control Directive, a draft DOS letter, August 2015, revising the structure for Strategic Orientation Look Ahead (SOLA) Briefings, and a DOS letter, April 2017, "Strategic Joint Staff Realignment Directive".

The DSG/Strat J4 was established in April 2015 with the following directorates:

- Director Support Operations Coordination (DSOC) (transferred from the DGO organization) and a Plans section to ensure effective strategic level planning, coordination, and delivery of support for operations;
- Director Sustainment Strategy and Readiness (DSSR) to integrate readiness with sustainment strategy and capability development;
- Director of Logistics Programs (D Log P) with responsibility for Fuels and Lubricants , ammunition, transportation, food services and supply;
- Logistics Branch Integrator (LBI) to manage the framework and oversee long-term production and training of the CAF Logistics Branch personnel; and
- Integral Support Cell for the DG's business planning, accounting, administration and coordination.<sup>41</sup>

DSOC delivers the DG Support function managing both routine and urgent operational requirements as required to support the DGS, DGO and DGP. The functions carried out by this group are considered to be in line with the role of the Strat C2 program, supporting the command and control of the CAF.

The other functions of the Strat J4 are seen as less in line with the mandate and responsibilities of the Strat C2 program. Specifically, while performing an important role, the Strat J4 does not provide staff support to the CDS which is the principal *raison d'être* of the SJS. Several interviewees stated that while the SJS is not necessarily the appropriate organization for the Strat J4 function, it seems to be the best option available at this time. While ADM(Mat) was discussed as a possibility, it is not, in fact, seen as a better option for these functions as ADM(Mat) is institutionally focused on materiel compliance and procurement, whereas the Strat J4 is focused on CAF strategic logistics support and readiness. Several people brought up the Joint Force Command Study that is currently underway, noting that if a Joint Force Command was established, it might be a more appropriate organization for the Strat J4 function.

### **2.3 Performance—Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy**

Efficiency and economy of the Strat C2 program was evaluated using program documents and data and interviews of key program staff and stakeholders.

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<sup>41</sup> 1901-1 (DGS) Strategic J4 Master Implementation Plan – Spiral 1, December 2, 2015 and 1901-1 (SJS DGS) Inter-Capability Component Transfer Agreement Between the Material Group (Mat Gp) and the Strategic Joint Staff (SJS), March 15, 2016.



### 2.3.1 Trends in Program Resource Utilization

**Key Finding 13:** Strategic Command and Control program expenditures, including personnel expenditures, increased significantly during the evaluation period. This was primarily attributable to the expansion of the SJS organization.

Program expenditures increased significantly during the evaluation period, reflecting the growth of the SJS organization over this timeframe. As shown in Table 2, expenditures more than doubled from FY 2015/16 to 2016/17 mainly due to the transfer of logistical and support functions from ADM(Mat) to the SJS, the establishment of the SJS DGS/Strat J4 organization, and other new staff in response to SSE priorities. The latter included Strategic Effects and Targeting, C-VEOs, and Strategic Engagement and Capacity Building.

In regards to personnel, the DOS intent throughout the evaluation period was to ensure that personnel were assigned as necessary to sustain essential functions, and the appropriate capacity was in place to effectively develop expertise in emerging functions.

In July 2012, as part of the government-wide Deficit Reduction Action Plan and preliminary CAF transformation plans, the SJS proposal to the CDS for HQ reductions reduced core SJS staff directly supporting the CDS from 84 Reg F and Res F to 75 (11 percent reduction) and civilian FTEs from 38 to 31 (18 percent reduction). A subsequent restructuring of the SJS was viewed as a natural response to the creation of the CJOC and was intended to optimize the SJS ability to meet requirements with reduced staff. Personnel reductions were completed as part of the Strategic Review in 2013/14 and the Deficit Reduction Action Plan process at the end of 2014/15; however, as shown in Table 3, the SJS personnel expenditures grew by 160 percent over the five-year evaluation period as a result of the later growth in the SJS organization. Despite the growth in program resources over the evaluation period, many interviewees opined that the organization had insufficient personnel to fully achieve its desired outcomes. More specifically, although a perception may exist that the organization employs a large number of personnel, 297 in 2017/18 as shown in Table 2, fewer than 50 of those were employed within the higher tempo, key functional areas of DGO and DGP.<sup>42</sup> In addition, many personnel are only “one-deep” in their respective organization, limiting the organization’s ability to handle requirements during their absences from the office for duty travel, vacation, training or other reasons.

As seen in Table 3, annual TD expenditures for the SJS increased by almost 37 percent over the five-year evaluation period. A program area that accounts for a large portion of TD expenditures is Arms Control Verification (ACV). Because the ACV organization is a staff element of the SJS and not considered an operational element, TD funds are used for travel and expenditures associated with all their operational activities, whether for deployed or domestic operations. ACV accounted for \$850K (43 percent) and \$890K (33 percent) of SJS TD fund

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<sup>42</sup> Presentation, “SJS BP Submission FY 2019-2022 DOS Decision Briefing”, November 26, 2018.

expenditures in FY 2016/17 and 2017/18 respectively.<sup>43</sup> According to the Program, increased DGP expenditures in FY 2016/17 and 2017/18 are related to TD expenditures for the new DGP staff activities, which include Strategic Engagement and Capacity Building, Strategic Effects and Targeting, and C-VEOs.

Expenditures	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/2018
<b>SJS TD</b>	\$1,989,000	\$1,611,000	\$2,051,000	\$1,985,000	\$2,718,000
<b>% Change YoY</b>	N/A	-19.0%	27.3%	-3.2%	36.9%
<b>SJS O&amp;M</b>	\$2,366,076	\$2,635,003	\$4,120,267	\$14,132,092	\$14,149,443
<b>% Change YoY</b>	N/A	11.37%	56.37%	242.99%	0.12%
<b>SJS TD as % of SJS Total</b>	34.4%	31.0%	27.0%	9.6%	12.4%
<b>SJS TD as % of SJS O&amp;M</b>	84.1%	61.1%	49.8%	14.0%	19.2%

**Table 3. SJS Annual TD Expenditures.**<sup>44</sup> This table compares SJS' annual TD expenditures against total annual SJS expenditures and SJS annual operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditures. The table also presents the percentage of total SJS expenditures and SJS O&M expenditures attributed to SJS' TD expenditures.

Travel is viewed as a necessity for strategic engagement activities, reconnaissance in advance of operations, and liaising with allies and partner militaries. It was suggested that one-on-one strategic engagement and cooperation with allies requires spending money up front to establish a relationship with staff, but can then be sustained through means such as videoconferencing and phone calls so long as the staff remain the same. Travel expenditures also tend to be unpredictable due to unforeseen requirements such as regional crises.

**Key Finding 14:** Annual expenditures increased in most Strategic Command and Control program areas at or above the rate of increases in departmental spending over the evaluation period commensurate with the increase in SJS organization and activities.

Table 4 demonstrates the growth and expansion of the SJS from a functional area expenditures perspective and, again, reflects how the organization and its roles and responsibilities have expanded during the evaluation period. The large increase in annual program expenditures beginning in FY 2016/17 was mainly attributable to establishment of the Strat J4 organization.

<sup>43</sup> Presentation, "DGO BP FY 2019/2020 DOS Back brief", October 5, 2018.

<sup>44</sup> Data source: SJS program data.

In FY 2017/18 the Strat J4 organization expenditures accounted for 59 percent of program spending.

Fiscal Year	DOS	DGSI	D IGP	DGO	DGP	DG Coord	DGS	Strat J4	TOTAL
2013/14	\$231,992	\$0	\$0	\$3,966,625	\$1,240,289	\$339,998	\$0	\$0	\$5,778,904
2014/15	\$290,310	\$288,402	\$0	\$3,691,340	\$722,454	\$142,544	\$60,666	\$0	\$5,195,717
2015/16	\$321,257	\$168,842	\$0	\$4,981,201	\$851,924	\$82,730	\$456,966	\$725,440	\$7,588,360
2016/17	\$316,552	\$185,608	\$11,108	\$6,297,307	\$1,398,237	\$808,068	\$216,652	\$11,391,656	\$20,625,187
2017/18	\$346,678	\$198,962	\$149,031	\$5,306,489	\$1,960,064	\$565,196	\$348,711	\$13,042,252	\$21,917,383
5-yr change	49%	-31%	N/A	34%	58%	66%	-24%*	14.5%**	279%

**Table 4. Program expenditures by SJS DG organizations.**<sup>45</sup> This table presents the annual program expenditures by DG organization along with the percentage change over the five-year evaluation period. (\* Percentage change measured from 2015/16; \*\* Percentage change measured from 2016/17).

### 2.3.2 Appropriate Utilization of Resources

**Key Finding 15:** The Strategic Command and Control program has managed to deliver on program requirements, and has re-organized and re-allocated resources to respond to evolving strategic demands and priorities.

**Key Finding 16:** Strategic Command and Control program staff and stakeholders have identified a need for an increase of personnel, within established levels, so that the program may achieve more of what is being asked.

Interviewees, including program senior staff and stakeholders, mentioned near-unanimously that the program has consistently met requirements, and provided unique and valuable support and strategic military advice to clients and other L1s.

Many interviewees described program staff as dedicated, hardworking, and often working long hours to meet deliverables. At the same time, most also felt the program was not sufficiently

<sup>45</sup> Data source: SJS program data

resourced from a personnel standpoint. Program clients mentioned that in some instances they had provided analysis and planning support to assist program staff.

It was also mentioned that certain areas within DGO and DGP, both considered core business areas, employ only one or two PYs while mirror organizations in other L1s, such as CJOC and ADM(Pol), are more deeply resourced in comparison.

For the most part, interviewees shared the view that the program's resourcing issues are generally not financial, although not all established civilian staff positions are funded and additional Vote 1 funding for salary and wage envelope and Reserve Pay would allow the program to staff up and accomplish even more.

The program has demonstrated efforts to address the lack of personnel resources through numerous reorganizations with the goal of strategically re-allocating resources to maximize outputs. The SJS has re-organized approximately nine times over the last 12 years and is currently considering further organizational changes. This speaks to the program's need and efforts to find resources internally to respond to shifting demands.

During interviews, senior program staff suggested hiring civilian staff to help bolster SJS information management capability and increase corporate memory, while also enabling senior staff to remain more strategically focused. Others opined establishment of additional staff positions may not be required if the program's existing military and civilian positions were filled to a greater percentage.<sup>46</sup>

Finally, based on the variance figures presented in Table 5, as well as the increased availability of financial data compared to earlier in the evaluation period, it would appear that the Program's financial management capabilities became more robust during the evaluation period.

Fiscal Year	Initial Allocation (A)	Final Expenditures (B)	Variance (= B/A)
2013/14	\$15,550,487	\$15,526,710	99.8%
2014/15	\$4,770,671	\$5,195,717	108.9%
2015/16	\$6,086,343	\$7,588,360	124.7%
2016/17	\$19,780,000	\$20,625,187	104.3%
2017/18	\$21,386,000	\$21,917,383	102.5%

**Table 5. Final Program Expenditures versus Initial Allocation.**<sup>47</sup> This table compares initial annual funding allocations to final program expenditures and the variance between the two sets of figures.

<sup>46</sup> SJS is a VCDS category B unit and can anticipate a manning level of 85% based on the Defence Team Establishment Plan. With an extra 5% fill rate the Program may not require additional resources.

<sup>47</sup> Data source: SJS program data.

### 2.3.3 Overall Efficiency of Program

**Key Finding 17:** There is a lack of available business information collected to monitor Strategic Command and Control program performance.

Presently, the SJS measures its performance through its support to operations to allow operations to achieve their objectives. The SJS also assesses its performance based on successful management of its allocated resources in accordance with its Business Plans.

Most of the outputs generated by the program's activities are advice, briefings or "paperwork" which makes the assessment of the program's impact challenging. Aside from collecting and monitoring FP&R related data, along with standard L1 business information such as financial and personnel data, some interviewees mentioned that the SJS was not actively engaged in business analytics and could do a better job of performance measurement. It was also noted that with the introduction of new systems, the program would be better able to measure its performance, impact and efficiency in specific areas. For example, logistics systems are sometimes not fully integrated, causing force generators and force employers to duplicate orders. Improved integration of systems would have the potential to streamline performance and increase efficiencies.

This evaluation recognizes that due to the nature of the program's work, along with the staff capacity considerations previously discussed, finding meaningful performance measures that provide an ongoing and quantifiable assessment of the program's effects is difficult.

#### ADM(RS) Recommendation

4. It is recommended that the SJS develop a Performance Measurement Framework, employing data collection/analysis, to better manage the program and demonstrate program performance.

**OPI:** DOS SJS

**OCI:** C Prog/DDDRR, ADM(DIA), ADM(RS)

**Key Finding 18:** Overall, the Strategic Command and Control program is perceived as efficient with a hardworking staff that delivers what is required despite personnel resource challenges.

During the course of the evaluation, certain interviewees were asked to rate how efficiently they thought the program has used its resources to deliver on its mandate on a 4-point scale,

from one to four, for “not at all efficiently”, “not very efficiently”, “somewhat efficiently”, or “very efficiently”. All respondents to this question noted that the SJS had used its resources either somewhat or very efficiently. As well, interviewees felt that despite personnel resource constraints, the program effectively supported the CDS.

From a financial perspective, it was mentioned that in previous fiscal years the SJS would lapse funds as early as the third quarter of the fiscal year but are currently on track to lapse the smallest percentage of funds in years. This would indicate increased efficiency in financial resource management. The availability of more complete data, particularly with regard to personnel, also supports the notion of better resource management within the program.

Some interviewees believe that additional personnel would allow the SJS to become less reactive and more efficient in the provision of military advice. That said, since the beginning of FY 2017/18, the SJS has focused on increasing its civilian workforce and, supported by FY 2018/19 FTE utilization projections, is looking to continue to substantially increase civilian FTEs.<sup>48</sup>

As mentioned previously, many interviewees feel an increase in personnel would allow the program to become more effective and efficient in the provision of military advice and their responsiveness to issues that arise. A symptom of program personnel shortages mentioned by some interviewees was that the program is perceived as being in a reactive state and at times is unable to provide in-depth strategic analysis or viewpoints when requested.

Finally, a development during the evaluation period that has produced certain efficiencies was clearer delineation between operational and strategic level planning for developing potential courses of action for military operations. The CJOC assumed the lead for developing military options, which has permitted the SJS to focus their operational planning at the strategic level. Interviewees mentioned that the program may realize further efficiencies by better delineating SJS responsibilities in terms of strategic level operational planning and military advice. SJS personnel would also benefit from a better understanding of what constitutes military policies and defence policy, the latter being the responsibility of ADM(Pol).

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<sup>48</sup> FY 2018/19 SWE Analysis\_20190130.xlsx - Utilization forecast for SJS civilian FTEs for April 2018 is 78.3, increasing to 102 by March 2019.

## Annex A—Management Action Plan

### ADM(RS) Recommendation

1. It is recommended that the requirement and maintenance of a Strategic Analysis capacity in support of CDS decision making and FP&R planning be reviewed and that it be further strengthened, as appropriate, to fulfill those roles.

### Management Action

Based on direction from the CDS regarding strategic analysis and research requirements, DGSI will assess anticipated requirements versus available staff to determine if there is a delta in demand and staff capacity.

A plan will be developed to deliver the required decision support to L1s and L0s with a battle rhythm to maximize information flow once requirements are understood and a Strategic Outlook capability analysis is completed. This plan will be presented to the CDS for approval of the proposed Strategic Outlook way ahead, including commencement of competition to hire new Economic and Social Science staff (dependent on Defence Team Establishment Plan outcome).

**OPI:** DOS SJS/DGSI

**Target Date:** April 1, 2020

### ADM(RS) Recommendation

2. It is recommended that the DOS SJS and Corporate Secretary examine the organizational structures and responsibilities for integration of UNSCR 1325 and GBA+ in DND/CAF to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the D IGP and D GDI organizations and align their resources accordingly.

### Management Action

D IGP will seek direction from the CDS for permission to begin the strategic planning necessary to review the gender portfolio from a capability development perspective. Future planning will encompass work on common terminology, division of responsibilities, doctrine, a central knowledge repository and review of current processes for integrating gender perspectives.

Pending approval, working group to conduct strategic and capability planning for the gender portfolio.

**OPI:** DOS SJS/D IGP

**OCIs:** VCDS, Corporate Secretary, CMP, ADM(HR-Civ)

**Target date:** begin August 2019

Draft CDS/DM Joint Directive on Gender completed.

**OPI:** DOS SJS/D IGP

**OCIs:** VCDS, Corporate Secretary

**Target date:** begin August 2019



The CDS/DM Joint Directive on Gender has been signed.

**OPI:** DOS SJS/D IGP

**OCIs:** VCDS, Corporate Secretary

**Target date:** NLT March 31, 2020

#### **ADM(RS) Recommendation**

3. It is recommended that a comprehensive review be made of the establishment, organization, manning and the posting cycles of key SJS leadership, and that appropriate action be taken to ensure the CDS receives the timely analysis, advice and support required for his effective command and control of the CAF.

#### **Management Action**

DG Coord will lead a review process to examine the establishment, organization, manning and the posting cycles of key SJS leadership. The intent is to optimize the organization structure and address staff shortages.

Key items related to the review process are to improve timely decision support to the CDS, enhance the ability to effectively identify emerging threats, institutionalize and manage the force posture and readiness of the CAF, and augment the capacity to adequately consider the growing requirement for strategic engagement around the globe in support of GC priorities.

DG Coord will draft a review plan. The first step of the review plan will be to assess if resources exist in SJS to conduct the review or if additional resources may be required (contractor?).

**OPI:** DOS SJS/DG Coord

**Target date:** NLT April 2020

The review will be completed and authorized actions initiated to optimize the SJS organization and address staff shortages.

**OPI:** DOS SJS/DG Coord

**OCIs:** VCDS, CMP, ADM(HR-Civ)

**Target Date:** December 2021

#### **ADM(RS) Recommendation**

4. It is recommended that the SJS develop a Performance Measurement Framework, employing data collection/analysis, to better manage the program and demonstrate program performance.

## **Management Action**

The SJS remains amenable to advance a Performance Measurement Framework (PMF), employing data collection/analysis, to better manage the program and demonstrate program performance for public consumption – while maintaining the requisite security of information/data.

DG Coord will lead the management aspects of the PMF. The first step of this plan will focus on the assessment of what can actually be subject to performance measurement and secondly, to assess whether resources exist in SJS to advance its PMF review, development and implementation or if additional resources may be required. If so, depending on resource availability, the timelines may need to be adjusted. The development will encompass four phases.

Phase 1: Review process to evaluate and define the best means (what, who, where, when and why) by which to advance its PMF and report finding.

Phase 2: Secure human and financial resources.

Phase 3: Lead the selected team in developing the PMF and report findings and recommendation.

Phase 4: Lead the selected team to implement, monitor, review and readjust its PMF.

**OPI**: DOS SJS/DG Coord

**OCIs**: C Prog/DDDRR, ADM(DIA), ADM(RS)

**Target Date**: December 2023

## **Annex B—Evaluation Methodology and Limitations**

### **1.0 Methodology**

#### **1.1 Overview of Data Collection Methods**

The evaluation of the Strat C2 program considered multiple lines of evidence to assess the program's relevance and performance. The methodology established a consistent approach in the collection and analysis of data to help ensure the reliability of the evaluation process. Quantitative and qualitative data collection methods were used and included: document review, financial data review and key informant interviews. Qualitative information was used to establish the program profile and context and to interpret the significance of numerical data assessed. Comparisons of both qualitative and quantitative assessments were used to validate the overall analysis and to develop the evaluation findings and recommendations.

#### **1.2 Details on Data Collection Methods**

##### **1.2.1 Document Review**

A review of program and related departmental documents was conducted in the initial phase of the evaluation to establish a general understanding of the Strat C2 program. This informed the scope of the evaluation and supported the creation of the logic model and evaluation questions. A comprehensive document review was subsequently undertaken to collect evidence against indicators for relevance and performance. Reviewed documents included GC policy documents, CAF strategic directives and guidance, program reports and assessments, business plans and departmental performance reports.

##### **1.2.2 Financial Data Review**

Financial data was reviewed to assess efficiency and economy of the program (i.e., sustained funding), trends in resource utilization and operational costs associated with the Strat C2 program, financial data from the Defence Resource Management Information System (DRMIS), business plans and the SJS comptroller's financial reports and departmental financial reports.

##### **1.2.3 Key Informant Interviews**

The team conducted extensive interviews including key CJOC and ADM(Pol) staff, and SJS staff, including the DOS.

##### **1.2.4 Data Analysis**

Data from each of the sources was compiled against indicators for program relevance and performance identified in [Annex D](#).


## 2.0 Limitations

The SJS provided excellent access and support to the evaluation team, including interviews, full access to their networks for documentary research and responses to our requests for information. The following general limitations are noted, however.

Limitation	Mitigation Strategy
Possibility of interviewees providing biased information.	A comparison was made between interview evidence and other sources (e.g., program documentation and financial records) to confirm fidelity of evidence, and these were weighted as appropriate based on the preponderance of other evidence.
There was no specific performance measurement data available for the program. This is attributable to several factors including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>There was no analogous PAA program prior to establishment of the Strat C2 program.</li> <li>The SJS has been in a state of reorganization and growth over the period of the evaluation.</li> <li>Performance metrics are difficult to define for a program based almost entirely on staff work, which supports less measurable outcomes.</li> </ul>	The assessment of program effectiveness was primarily qualitative based on correlation of between documentary sources, when more than one was available, and a synthesis of multiple responses to the same interview questions.
Certain program data, including personnel and financial information, was not available to assess program efficiency and economy. This was a result of the SJS not having maintained certain of those records. As well, attributions for program expenditures were only translated, at a high level, to the new DRF for FY2016/17 and 2017/18.	Trending data was based primarily on SJS/DRMIS data and not program attribution data.
Program performance was difficult to assess based on trend information as the SJS organization was in an almost constant state of reorganization and growth over the period of the evaluation.	Program performance was limited to the information available that supported trend analysis.

**Table B-1. Evaluation Limitations and Mitigation Strategies:** This table lists the limitations of the evaluation and the corresponding mitigation strategies.

## Annex C—Logic Model



**Figure C-1. Logic Model for Strategic Command and Control.** This flowchart shows the relationship between the program's main activities, outputs and expected outcomes.

## Annex D—Evaluation Matrix

Relevance				
Evaluation Issues/Questions	Indicators	Program Data	Document Review	Key Informant Interviews
1.1 Is there an ongoing need for the Strategic Command and Control Program?	1.1.1 Evidence that the program has directly enabled preparation, planning and execution of CAF Operations	No	Yes	Yes
	1.1.2 Evidence that the program has supported the production of CDS strategic directives and orders	Yes	Yes	Yes
1.2 Does the Strategic Command and Control program support DND/CAF in performance of its federal roles and responsibilities?	1.2.1 Are the SJS responsibilities aligned with DND/CAF roles and responsibilities	No	Yes	Yes
	1.2.2 The extent to which the program conducts activities that are the responsibilities of other DND/CAF organizations	No	Yes	Yes
1.3 Do the Strategic Command and Control program activities align with Government priorities and Defence Strategic Outcomes?	1.3.1 Alignment with or inclusion of Strategic Command and Control activities in stated government priorities	No	Yes	Yes
	1.3.2 Alignment with or inclusion of Strategic Command and Control in DND/CAF priorities or Strategic Outcomes	No	Yes	Yes

Effectiveness				
Evaluation Issues/Questions	Indicators	Program Data	Document Review	Key Informant Interviews
2.1 To what extent are CDS and CAF senior leadership advice and decision making supported by strategic and operational SA?	2.1.1 Strategic reports and briefings support SA	Yes	Yes	Yes
	2.1.2 Arms Control Verification support strategic and operational awareness	Yes	Yes	Yes
2.2 To what extent does the Strategic Vision for the CAF support current and future operations?	2.2.1 Strategic Vision has supported CAF planning and operations	No	Yes	Yes
	2.2.2 Number of strategic studies completed	Yes	Yes	Yes
	2.2.3 Strategic studies have informed current or future requirements	No	Yes	Yes
	2.2.4 GBA+ and gender consideration are incorporated in CAF institutional and operational planning and activities	Yes	Yes	Yes
	2.2.5 Support is provided to FMDS	No	Yes	Yes
2.3 To what extent do CAF operations, readiness and global engagement plans enable and support CAF FGs and Operational Commanders?	2.3.1 CAF FGs and Op Commanders are adequately prepared to undertake assigned tasks	No	No	Yes
	2.3.2. Global engagement plans support strategic and operational level engagement in support of operations	No	Yes	Yes
	2.3.3 Operations Plans are aligned with	No	Yes	Yes

	domestic and allied operational doctrine, plans and policies.			
2.4 To what extent are coordination and integration of strategic support and sustainment activities achieving the intended effects/outcomes?	2.4.1 Relevant documents incorporate strategic support and sustainment input.	No	No	Yes
	2.4.2 Operations are supported and sustained through effective collaboration with departmental, OGD and operational partners.	No	Yes	Yes
	2.4.3 MOUs and other international agreements required to support Operations were/are established	No	No	Yes
2.5 Are there any barriers or factors affecting success of the program in achieving its required outcomes?	2.5.1 Factors that present barriers or impediments to achieving required outcomes.	Yes	Yes	Yes
	2.5.2 Factors that support successful achievement of required outcomes.	No	Yes	Yes



<b>Efficiency and Economy</b>				
<b>Evaluation Issues/Questions</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Program Data</b>	<b>Document Review</b>	<b>Key Informant Interviews</b>
3.1 Trends in Program Costs	3.1.1 Cost of program as percentage of DND budget	Yes	Yes	No
	3.1.2 Cost of Personnel as percentage of DND budget	Yes	Yes	No
	3.1.3 Cost of TD as percentage of Program budget	Yes	Yes	No
	3.1.4 Cost of Program activities	Yes	No	No
3.2 Have Program resources been utilized appropriately in relationship to the resources allocated, activities and outputs produced and demand for services by area of activity?	3.2.1 Annual budget and expenditures are aligned with Business Plans	Yes	Yes	Yes
	3.2.2 Variance between planned and actual budget expenditures	Yes	Yes	Yes
3.3 Are Program activities being delivered efficiently and economically?	3.3.1 Business information monitored to optimize Program efficiency and economy	No	No	Yes
	3.3.2 Perception of overall efficiency in Program delivery	No	Yes	Yes
	3.3.3 More efficient/economical ways of delivering program activities are considered	No	No	Yes

**Figure D-1. Evaluation Matrix.** This table indicates the data collection methods used to assess the evaluation issues/questions on relevance and performance.