THE SOCIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE ATLANTIC PROVINCES

DEPARTMENT OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC EXPANSION

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

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Chapter 1

On Affluent and Depressed Regions: An Introduction and Summary

This report describes some aspects of the socio-economic structure of the Atlantic Provinces of Canada. They constitute a distinctive geographic region in which topography, soil, climate, and relative location of resources and markets have been less favourable to economic development than is the case in other regions. Limited agricultural potential and a peripheral position industrially and commercially distinguish the Atlantic region from the prosperous heartland of Canada. Yet, there are close economic, social, and cultural ties with the other regions of Canada and these are assuming greater importance in development programs as secondary industry increases in importance. The realization that economic improvement can be achieved through increased efficiency in exploiting resources has made economic development the chief social movement of the 'sixties. The present concern is with the social aspects of economic development. In this introductory chapter we survey the problems discussed in the report and introduce some theoretical questions relevant to the sociology of economic change.

The Atlantic Seaboard of the United States has much similar terrain but it has become highly industrialized in

contrast to the Atlantic region of Canada. The Atlantic Seaboard between Washington and Boston, with about a twentieth of the land area, claims a fifth of the population of the United States and more than a fifth of its highly complex industry. Seaports between Boston and Baltimore handle the bulk of the shipping for the entire middle part of the United States, the same middle region that is now pressing to bring in more ocean-going ships over the St. Lawrence Seaway. Here we get a telling geographic reason that the Maritime ports, compared with the American Seaboard, are so little used; nature did not provide a deep seaway from the coast into the heart of the American Middle West. Had it been so, New York would be much less the metropolis than it is, and New England might very well have become depressed as have the Maritimes. The St. Lawrence River makes the difference, and it may be an enduring difference.

As we shall see in this study, the Atlantic region does have resources, including human resources, which permit an optimistic outlook. Traditional patterns of organization, systems of stratification, and attitudes are crucial areas in which the sociologist can provide information relevant to the economic problems of the region. It is to these areas that we now turn our attention.

Definitions

To avoid confusion, we use the term "region" to refer to the total geographic expanse which is customarilly identified as being distinctive in terms of climate, soil, topography, and location, and the term "area" to identify the various subsections of a region. Thus the four Atlantic Provinces comprise the Atlantic region. From time to time, we shall refer to rural or urban areas within this region.

Three characteristics tend to distinguish a depressed region, and they are found to be characteristic not only of the Atlantic region but also of three recognized regions in the United States: 1) The Great Lakes "cut-over" region of Northern Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota, in which the loss of valuable forests to intensive lumbering operations left a persistent depressed economy; 2) The "Ozarks," a mountainous section comprising parts of Kansas, Missouri and Oklahoma; and 3) The Appalachian Mountains, comprising parts of five southern states, largely the region drained by the Tennessee River. The three defining characteristics of these depressed regions are:

1. Chronic relative poverty. The condition of depression has endured for decades in the four regions. Even in periods of general prosperity their economies lag far behind those of neighboring regions.

2. Meager or poorly developed resources. Each of the four regions is poor in tillable land. The soil is either weak and thin or the strips of

tillable land are too limited to encourage agriculture. Pasture land is equally limited and much of the marketable forest has been removed with very little replacement under past practices. Where mining is carried on, as in the Ozarks, Appalachia and the Atlantic region, it has not been a notable asset in terms of permanent economic development. The Atlantic region has one resource, fisheries, which provides some promise for the future. All four regions, precisely because they have rugged terrain and are not inviting to industry, have high potential for tourism.

3. Potential for industry. Most of the industry found in these four regions is resource-based, mainly the primary industries that cannot operate at a distance from the natural resources which they exploit. They are mainly the forestry and mining operations and, in the Atlantic provinces, include the fisheries. They have been labour-intensive, rural-based industries which succeed in remote and sparsely-populated areas. The depressed regions have had difficulty in attracting a diversity of secondary industry, except for these resource-based industries and certain small enterprises that may be attracted by a cheap labour supply. Yet some long-established manufacturing plants have continued to operate in the Atlantic region in spite of extensive economic change and the growth of industrial concentrations in other regions.

Defined in these terms, the northern part of New England, including parts of Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont could be identified as depressed areas within a generally affluent region. Within the larger region are areas characterized by industrial concentrations of the most sophisticated sort.

A fourth characteristic of a depressed region concerns population. While an affluent industrial region, especially in

North America, contains a heterogeneous population and attracts a great variety of immigrants, the population of a depressed region tends to be homogeneous and to be relatively unattractive to immigrants. Its birth-rate tends to be higher than for affluent regions and its surplus numbers migrate to regions where jobs are more plentiful and wages higher. The migrants are typically young adults and this creates additional economic problems for the region.

A fifth characteristic to be included in defining a depressed region is level of education and skill. These levels are low and are prevented from rising by the out-migration of considerable numbers of the more highly-educated and trained workers, especially high-school and university graduates. A 1968 survey of University of New Brunswick students indicated that about 70 per cent wished to migrate from the province after graduation. Such migration, coupled with a strong urge for education and skilled training, widens the "knowledge gap" between the affluent and the depressed regions.

Natural Wealth of the Region

Historically, the economic role of the Atlantic region has been that of supplying raw materials for the industries of Europe, the United States and Central Canada. Living off its natural wealth, the region found little incentive to engage in

secondary industry apart from the temporary boom in building wooden ships in the nineteenth century. That lumbering era was followed in the twentieth century by the growth of the pulp and paper industry, also tied to the source of its raw material. Hence, the status of this region has been that of an "economic colony" for secondary industry elsewhere.

While environmental influences are major considerations in the attraction of industry, the location of industrial concentrations also serves to establish economic patterns. An evolutionary process evolves as industrial centres acquire the competitive strength to expand their industrial complex and increase economic centralization. Such an evolution did not occur in the Atlantic region. Political power, which reinforces economic power, has not been successful in the past in altering the marginal economy of the region. The region's economic problems, due in part to limited resources, have been aggravated by the relative absence of effective organization. Producers who compete individually are less effective in the marketing of their products. Such natural wealth as the region has tends to involve the intervention of strong outside business firms in its exploitation.

Ideally, an economic system is reflected in a social system and the social system is decision-maker for the economic system. However, the decision-making for the types of industries

most prominent in the Atlantic region, even for many of the largest merchandising establishments, rests with great corporations located elsewhere, and divorced from the social system of the region. Even decisions about exploiting the natural wealth of the region are often the prerogative of absentee owners. This state of affairs is no less true of other depressed regions.

The Depressed Region and the Slum

There is a tendency among journalistic writers to speak of a depressed rural area as a slum, and we hear not only of urban slums but of rural slums and slums on the fringes of cities. What these areas have in common are low incomes relative to other areas, dilapidated housing, and a deficiency in community services, taken for granted in other areas. But there are many differences among areas. In the cities of less developed countries where the amenities have not been extended beyond city limits, the residential areas of the upper classes are to be found near the urban centre while the poor are forced to live at the urban fringe. In the expanding industrial city where paved streets, electric power, water mains and sewer lines, as well as rapid transit are available, the more affluent classes can find social reasons for vacating the urban centre in favour of elite suburbs. The older, more congested neighborhoods of such cities, located near the central business district, often become the most clearly recognized

slums of the city.

These urban slums, which some prefer to call "ghettos," are very different from small rural areas which are often called slums. The rural area, however poor, has some of the traits of a community. Different classes will be found in these areas, although the poor and unskilled will predominate. The merchant, the public official, the teacher, the clergyman, and other professional, official or business leaders stand out in the rural community but tend to be rare in the urban slum. The members of the higher social class of the rural community may rank lower than their counterparts in a town or city, but they help to make up a mixed social structure even in the depressed rural community.

There is another difference between the urban slum and the depressed region yet, in socio-psychological terms, this difference is important. The slum is an extremely depressed residential area within a region of some affluence, and usually is an area identified with an industrial city. On the other hand, the whole of a depressed region is rated as poor both in natural wealth and in level of living, although some areas are more depressed than others within the region. There are often islands of affluence, sometimes urban communities, within the depressed region, but they have as little impact on the generally depressed region as the urban slum has upon the generally prosperous

industrial city.

Depressed Regions are called Rural

Whether published documents deal with the Atlantic region or other impoverished regions, they tend to describe such regions as "rural," perhaps because, in the retreat of ruralism before the changes wrought by the rise of industrial urbanism, these regions are the last strongholds of rural ways and values. In reality, they are far less rural than the descriptions imply. Many socio-psychological traits are equally present in more prosperous regions and some traits identified as "rural" may be characteristic of impoverished classes in both city and country.

The Atlantic provinces are provided with such urban-associated amenities as all-weather roads, paved streets in the towns, electric power, television, radio and other communication media, and a wide range of goods in national supermarket chain outlets, although at higher prices than the urban dweller is accustomed to. Understandably, there are fewer specialty shops than in the metropolitan centres of more populous areas.

The degree of urbanism found in more affluent communities within the depressed region is impressive but it is experienced "at the margin of things." The urbanism of the "rural depressed area" is neutralized by geographic, social and psychological isolation, and is dampened by the regional awareness of deprivation.

In such a situation, "rural values" are often identified by urbanized observers as indicative of backwardness and as a major obstacle to development.

The "rural" label is more often applied to agricultural areas than to the population of woodsmen, hunters, and fishermen who typify much of the Atlantic region. But in the Atlantic Provinces as in the "depressed rural" regions of the United States the farming areas which give rurality to a rural region are all but absent. Much of the tillable soil is in garden-size strips, too limited to enable field-crop farming using modern equipment. The difficulty of developing large-scale farming operations has limited the growth of rural villages which in turn would contribute to the growth of towns. This fact and the persistence of much "wilderness land" have served to differentiate the Atlantic region from the urban-rural complex to be found in more affluent regions.

Social Class in the Atlantic Region

There are two ways to define social class. The economic definition identifies persons in terms of income, their occupations, how they participate in the economic productive processes. The social definition identifies them in terms of consumer behavior, how they display their economic status, what they "put in evidence." In actual life, the two identifies intermingle.

Since the class structure of a region reflects its economic worth and its ways of earning a livelihood, it is to be expected that the class structure of a depressed region such as the Atlantic Provinces will differ greatly from that of a prosperous industrial region. The way of life in the Western World is increasingly determined by processes related to industrialization and urbanization and social class comes to be less associated with family background and property and more with the work people do, to be defined more by achievement criteria and less by ascriptive values.

The conditions which characterize social classes in the industrial urban setting do not wholly prevail in a depressed region where the situation does not encourage the kind of competition found in the large industrial centre. Hence the social order changes only slowly. The power and prestige structure found in communities in a depressed region is one in which family membership, ethnic origin and religious affiliation are important determinants of economic relationships. Where little happens to disturb these anachronistic relationships they tend to hold firm, even to the point of resisting change. This tendency may also be true of familial and other homogeneous control groups in other than depressed communities, but the tendency is especially marked in depressed regions. It may be an obstacle to development

programs.

It may be said, then, that the socio-economic conditions which are basic to a social class system tend to operate in a rural manner in a region of limited resources. The occupational structure will be excessively loaded with unskilled, low-income and frequently with unemployed workers in the primary sector of the economy. The great variety of skilled, white-collar specialist and professional occupations found in the typical industrial urban community are relatively absent. To the extent that such occupations are present they tend to be monopolized by members of top families. Again, such a condition may exist in communities in affluent regions, but it is more endemic in the depressed region. The social class structure in such a region is likely to be somewhat skewed in the direction of a feudalistic pattern. Areas sheltered from the full force of national market systems are preserves for an older style of life and a more traditional social structure.

To the extent that industrialization occurs, or contact with industrialized areas increases, it is normal for social patterns to change in the direction of the occupational class structure found in urban centres. Outside influences promote change even in the more isolated areas. The class structure of a depressed region may be resistant to change but it is not inimical

to migration. An individual may move elsewhere, learn to adapt to a different pattern of competition, achieve a higher occupational level, and so come to be identified with a higher social class level. The hope of such an improvement is apparently a continuing incentive for the exodus of the better trained and better educated from depressed regions.

The Poor as the Lower Class

Class systems have their "depressed fifth" or their "deprived third" and it is often assumed that this is inevitable, that any community will have its "impoverished" population. The changeable element is the definition of impoverished; a more parsimonious definition would lower the proportion considered as poor while a more liberal definition would raise it. Certain old notions about poverty need not be considered here. These include the idea that the poor, unless physically or mentally handicapped, have only themselves to blame for their poverty and can by their own efforts rise out of poverty. What is relevant is the fact that dissatisfaction among the poor has been increasing, especially in the cities. Organized expressions of dissatisfaction are sometimes found in protest marches and riots in cities but they are absent in depressed regions.

The apparent resignation of large segments of the poor to their position has led some students to speak of a "culture

of poverty." The poor are seen as a chronically deprived social class, "fenced in" by circumstances over which they have no control. It is argued that, being excluded by the industrial society, in particular by the industrial work system, the poor come to be continuously assigned to a status from which there is no escape. They respond, in large part, by accepting their lot. Middle-class virtues have little relevance; middle-class aspirations do not inspire; and middle-class faith in the wonder-working power of education is not generally present.

The recent wide-spread interest in the "other nation" or the "permanent poverty class" tends to be linked with the racial issues of great cities and to be spurred on by political ideologies, but it must be recognized that a submerged class does exist. Recent unrest among the urban poor is in part a result of population pressure on cities. They are expected to receive and provide work for the surplus from rural areas but are often unable to absorb the newcomers in any adequate way. In particular, the surplus is not being absorbed by the industrial work system. One reason is that as industry becomes more efficient its requirements for unskilled labour decline and it becomes less willing to employ applicants with little education and limited skill. This reduces the opportunities open to the poor and increases the problems of the depressed regions.

Organization in the Rural Sphere

In the past, protest movements on the part of workers, after much struggle, resulted in the formation of trade unions whose activities have had much to do with bringing the industrial system to its present efficiency. But the poor are not easily brought into any kind of permanent organization. Contrary to the impressions conveyed by news reports on the organized activities of the poor in great cities, there is little evidence that these are organizations with a continuing membership and ongoing programs. In most cases the groups are brought together with great difficulty, often by self-appointed leaders who are able to gather together a few loyal supporters. It would be a mistake to regard these activities as mass uprisings of the poor. There is more permanence to certain Negro organizations since the core membership is composed of leaders and members of established churches. Only a small percentage of the "other nation" is actively involved in mass demonstrations. But the small group of activists is usually enough to cause concern.

While the urban poor can be organized, they do not spontaneously form organizations. The poor in depressed regions have no record of forming into economic pressure groups, in contrast to farmers who become members of marketing associations. The rural poor often become members of religious cults whose

leaders may speak out on their behalf, but there is little likelihood of these voices joining in any regional protest movement.

The industrial urban society could hardly function without organization. The individual standing alone is a mere atom in the social mass, but he is one of the tithing if he joins with others having like interests or purposes. Thus we find hundreds of associations in a great city, each with its own purpose. The large community is to a high degree managed by private groups that sit at the table with government. To join an organization means that one has some goal to attain, some interest to promote, rights or property to protect. The joiner is assumed to have aspirations. The many studies that have been made of the poor tend to agree that they are low in aspirations, at least in those conventional aspirations which are valued by the majority. For this particular lack of interest they are often described as lethargic or socially alienated.

Trade Unions and the Jobless Poor

The strong trade union movement in the United States has taken no active part in organizing these masses of the poor except to support public programs on behalf of the needy or the poorly housed. During the Great Depression, when public relief projects were set up for the enemployed, the labor organizations demanded continually that trade union members be given priority in

relief jobs, and at union wages. This behavior is not surprising if we consider the economic nature of the trade union. Each labor union naturally gives prior attention to the interests of its own members in its own locality. It may extend moral support to efforts of workers to organize elsewhere and it may give token financial support. But it expects other unions to fight their own battles. Labor unions have not been major forces in the development of depressed areas.

It has sometimes been suggested that strong trade unions in the Atlantic region could do much to raise the income level of workers there. It has not happened, nor has it happened in the depressed regions of the United States, except among coal miners. A strong union of coal miners did not emerge until after nearly half a century of struggle, including considerable bloodshed. At the peak of its organization, with the association of mine owners in a state of disorganization, the United Mine Workers proposed a program of mechanizing the better mines and abandoning the weaker ones. The number of miners has declined to less than half of the peak enrollment. Miners with jobs have been raised from poverty, but the mining areas have not achieved permanent prosperity and the nonminers in these communities remain poor. The first responsibility of a trade union appears to be to its continuing members, actually employed in the trade.

From the present outlook there seems scant prospect that organized labour will be a dynamic force among the large and dispersed number of low-paid and mainly unskilled workers in the wide rural territory of the Atlantic region. There is increasing evidence that urban workers will form reasonably strong associations, but the income levels of the non-urban workers will continue to depend on the "going rate."

Rural-Urban Division of Labor

In the relationship between town and country, the role of the town is dominant in most respects. Each role is essential to the other and, in general, it may be said that the country supplies what can be taken from nature in a particular rural milieu, mainly food and raw materials. On its side, the town provides the country with goods and services from a man-made milieu. Ideally, the town-country relationship is one of exchange of mutual advantage to each. While this is basically true in practice, the arrangement centers in the town which is in a position of advantage respecting prices, measures, quality and terms. To the extent that wealth accrues from this relationship it tends to accrue in towns and cities. The amounts accumulated reflect the resources of the countryside, the hinterland upon which the town or city subsists. As wealth accumulates in urban centres, so economic power and political power accumulate there.

The unique role of the town made it expedient in earlier times for writing to be adopted by townsmen, for methods of keeping accounts to be devised, and for rules to be enforced by the town to permit orderly trading and protection of property. Much of the traditional role played by the town is personified in the merchant of the remote fishing village. He sets the prices for fish purchased as well as for the goods sold. He has the special knowledge involved in contacts with outside markets and public officials. He extends credit and he keeps the record which may run from year to year without a final balance. Often he is the trusted source of advice in local economic matters and of information about things beyond the fisherman's ken. The primary, personal relationship between the merchant and fisherman shades into the more formal, impersonal and contractual relationship between town anc country.

In this rural-urban relationship the town reflects the resources of its hinterland. Its work, in kind and amount, is determined by the kinds and amounts of resources derived from its area of supply as well as by its position with respect to external markets. Where the natural resources are lean and limited, or poorly exploited, the towns and even cities of the region will have the appearance of struggling for survival. However, if the hinterland is fertile and productive the tempo of towns and cities

will be livelier and their affluence will be evident in the shops and structures.

Morale in the Depressed Region

Observers both of rural poverty and of urban slums have used such terms as "inert," "anomie," or "alienated" in describing the state of morale among the inhabitants. They may note cynical attitudes toward middle-class values. From another viewpoint, the attitudes and behaviour patterns of the poor may be seen as an effective form of adaptation to the realities of a situation offering little opportunity for improvement.

Those who cannot escape to a better situation or who lack the imagination or courage to migrate are likely to adapt their thinking to existing circumstances. Ambition has little relevance in a hopeless situation.

Neglected in descriptions of the poor are the attitudes and behavior of the local elites: the public officials, professionals, and social personages of the depressed villages and towns, or even of the slum areas in large cities. They too face the problem of surviving while trying to live better with limited resources. These leaders achieve a kind of equilibrium by joining in various friendship and family combinations to gain and hold a measure of local economic power and come to fear any change which might threaten their position. They may speak in favor of

economic development and yet resist development projects. Their defensiveness is not unique to depressed regions but is more pervasive and effective than in more affluent and heterogeneous economies.

The felt need for economic security and preservation of an achieved style of life appears in large part to explain the attitudes of caution, of fearing to venture, of resisting any change that may contain some threat in disguise, so often as evident among the leaders as among the very poor. However, these attitudes can be a greater obstacle to regional development when held by the elites than similar attitudes among the poor. Conservatism in the cities of depressed regions may be particularly powerful in its expression in political decisions and in the orientation of mass media, and hence is often a hindering factor in regional development. Resourceful individuals in strategic positions in the community power structure have been known to successfully exclude new business enterprises which seemed likely to be a disturbing element. While such manipulation is found in other regions it is more likely to be effective within the community structure found in depressed regions.

Loggers, Miners, Farmers, Fishermen

Certain areas in the Atlantic Provinces have long retained something of a frontier character. Those who were identified

with such primary industries as logging, mining, farming and fishing have been accustomed to the style of life engendered by isolation and low income. This labour force, due to new roads, radio and television, and exposure to greater advertising pressure, have now acquired new wants and, to some extent, new aspirations.

Recent trends can be expected to increase insecurity and unrest among primary workers and a growing awareness of their deprived condition. Actually, these four primary occupations, along with some trapping and hunting, tend to be a complex of seasonal occupations, as workers shift from one to another. The prospect is already evident that mining, especially coal mining, will diminish in the region. It is unlikely that other types of mining, equally hazardous, will increase.

Farming is a marginal occupation for a good share of those no longer identified with agriculture in census enumerations. Many of them are forced to supplement their incomes as fishermen or woodsmen. Otherwise in some areas, were part-time farming not available, there might have been, heretofore, a shortage of labour for fishing and logging. There is an increasing tendency for such workers to abandon their marginal farms and to move into towns and cities where they hope to find steadier employment.

Technology is producing drastic changes in the way of life of pulpwood cutters and fishermen. While these industries

are becoming more efficient, less wealth is distributed among the local population as fewer workers are needed. Problems of resource depletion and water pollution become much more serious as mechanization is applied to logging and planning becomes much more important.

There is no question about technological improvements in the fishing industry but here again there are socio-economic costs: 1) Fewer workers will be needed on the more productive fishing vessels and those utilized will lose their former independent status to become seasonal hired workers, their economic position possibly being less secure than before; 2) Hundreds of little coastal fishing villages, especially in Newfoundland, will have to be abandoned and the people relocated in larger port communities. For most of these, the outlook for other employment is meager.

Our Faith in Education

Most studies of the unemployed and of poverty consider education at some point in the analysis, and figures are presented to show how low the level of education is among the poor as compared with other classes. The conclusion is that if more of these people had more education, then fewer would be among the unemployed. The level of education of the unskilled and semiskilled in the Atlantic region is strikingly low when compared, for example, with educational levels in industrial areas. More education would

doubtless increase the employability of workers. But much more than schooling is needed to overcome established patterns and to convert a dejected, impoverished population into so many self-sufficient citizens.

One challenge which stands in the way, once the problem of aspiration has been met, is the economic obstacle. The poor cannot meet the cost of education, and this holds for at least a third of the families in the Atlantic Provinces. A 1968 sample survey of University of New Brunswick students revealed that fewer than five percent of these students had fathers who were in unskilled or semiskilled occupations. Moreover, for sons and daughters of the poor to earn their own way is discouraging because job opportunities for such inexperienced young persons are few. The second barrier in the region is the paucity of job prospects for students, especially of lower-class origin, once they have completed their university training. The alternative is to migrate.

Proposals for Training in Industrial Skills

In the Atlantic Provinces a worker who has by turns been fisherman, logger and farmer, even if he lacks training in some industrial skill, is not unskilled in the sense of an urban worker termed unskilled. Detailed information of a systematic kind is lacking on the adaptability of such workers who have migrated to industrial centres. If it could be obtained it might show that

primary workers with sufficient schooling were able to manage fairly well in the industrial labour market.

Proposals have been made to establish in the Atlantic Provinces various programs for training workers in industrial occupations, ostensibly to provide a body of skilled workers to meet industrial needs. This involves the difficult problem of matching training to the job market, having in mind future as well as present needs. It also involves such policy decisions as whether regional or national labour needs are to guide training programs. Even though trained workers migrate and in that sense are lost to the region they will contribute to the national economy and, indirectly, to all regions. What may be a loss all around is random, sporadic and unplanned retraining, such as is attempted when a plant closes and the immediate crisis is met by attempting the retraining of workers for other occupations.

A Nova Scotia study found that many workers, most often young men, were interested in retraining but were not financially able to stop working while undergoing their studies. Responsibility for a family often developed motivation but at the same time increased their difficulty in taking advantage of educational facilities. We mention these difficulties only to stress the complexity of the issues involved.

Industrial Work and Family Orientation

One characteristic of depressed regions, compared with the more affluent industrial regions is the greater identification of work and living with family interests and organization. The social and economic order of the fishing community under traditional technology was familial. The typical boat crew was made up of kinsmen, often the father and his sons. Farming, too, even on the poor marginal farm, is still a typical family enterprise. In the small stable community people tend to be identified with the families to which they belong. Familial identification extends to local business enterprises, even in the slowly changing towns and cities of the depressed region. Nepotism, which is often frowned upon in the industrial urban environment, becomes loyalty and is a virtue. This may be one reason the depressed region is identified with rural conceptions.

The class structure too, even in the cities, is familial in nature and resistant to change. Family connections and personal loyalties are often involved in appointments and business relationships in communities in which change takes place slowly. This kind of social structure, placing high priority on established relationships, natural though it be, is not likely to make way readily for the innovating stranger. Nor is it to be expected that the initial impetus for change will come from within a traditionally oriented community.

Indeed, if change comes, it is likely to be the stranger who brings it. He is not identified with the local institutional patterns. Economic development involves a proliferation of new roles, new habits, new patterns of authority, new kinds of discipline and coordination, and new attitudes towards economic activity. Individuals must acquire new values and sentiments and adapt to new systems of ranking. All this is inimical to the fast-holding familial social and economic order. It involves achievement orientation more than familial ascription orientation. In short, it is urban.

Economic development involves a transition from family-centered work, property institutions, and motivation, to impersonal, individualistic, and industrial patterns. The broadly-competent but traditionalistic fisherman of the outport is replaced by the industrial specialist who cannot easily change his occupation. Transition in these terms is disturbing. It is painful not only to the fisherman, the marginal farmer and the woodsman, but equally so for the traditional merchant and those of the professions.

Economic Expectations and the Entrepreneur

Entrepreneurship flourished in the Maritimes in periods of economic expansion and declined in unfavourable periods. As the competitive position of Central Canada strengthened, that of the Maritimes weakened relatively, and businessmen became cautious

and conservative. Successful business often came to mean forming networks of personal relationships and organizing for defensive reasons. The less satisfied residents moved to more promising parts.

Entrepreneurs in the region have often come from immigrant families and belonged to dissenting religious denominations. Many were marginal persons but they proved to be able and willing to develop new enterprises in a new situation, to take advantage of the processes of change. They were not of the established status system which expects changing economic activities to adapt to existing social patterns. The entrepreneur, coming from outside the social system, was free of allegiance to it. Economic change often has the effect of lessening the importance of existing family reputations in the community. It causes, for a time at least, monetary values, specialization, achievement, and impersonal criteria in general to become important in ranking. So economic change and social change are usually found together.

Entrepreneurship, stimulating at the outset, tends itself to become patterned with its habitual ways and must be renewed with each generation. Otherwise old attitudes are carried into new situations. The traditional business image of the entrepreneur tends, however, to reflect the model of an earlier stage of industrialization.

Declining Role of the Entrepreneur

Big organization has become the order of the day. The little store often cannot survive against the great mercantile chain. It is the highly capitalized big farm that is profitable. A regional electric power company may be forced to merge into a greater one. Increasingly, the manager replaces the owner. The depressed region becomes mere "territory" for commercial and industrial corporations located in a metropolis.

Left to their own devices in outlying communities, businessmen endeavour to form closed market structures and try to maintain stable conditions and to reduce the impact of competition. Such efforts to seek shelter from competition and change involve the risk of lagging behind the morale of things.

The entrepreneur, so long the hero of economics, can no longer, as in the nineteenth century, "start on a couple of nerves and a shoestring." The potential entrepreneur may have a good idea but he needs capital and more capital for the "take-off." There may be capital in the depressed region, but the formation of groups for collective risk is difficult. Those with money to invest prefer to put it into the urban-centered stock market. The potential entrepreneur may find it wise to take his talents to some great firm in the city.

The Fear of Economic Development

Emerging nations, most of them eager to industrialize and none having the needed capital, are in about the same situation as a depressed region, and Eastern Canada is greater in area than many of these new nations. The new nations, like the depressed region, must turn to the giant corporations. The corporations are interested or not depending on the primary resources available in such nations or regions. Resource-based, labor-intensive industries bring out the raw materials needed in the industrial regions, but rarely to the profit of depressed regions.

In a depressed region, these primary industries do have a subsistence value, providing some employment where there was little or none before, but they cannot contribute much to the long-run economic security of the areas in which they locate. Nor can they be confidence inspiring; rather they are fear inspiring. Industrial processing, as in pulp and paper mills and metal smelters, provides some steady jobs for skilled workers, but even these have only a limited effect in increasing the incomes and security of the great number of workers who bring the raw materials to the plant.

Such industries may act as the opening wedge and hold the promise that secondary industries may be attracted. But they may also involve a decline in the size of the middle class of self-employed lumbermen and fishermen, the traditional entrepreneurs

of the region. Technological advance increases the security of both the fishing and lumbering industries in the larger sense of meeting world-wide competition. But it also displaces independent workers who often are unable to find alternative employment, in contrast to displaced workers in cities. In Newfoundland, for example, it has become next to impossible for many displaced fishermen to find other employment.

The Delicate Problem of Resettlement

Much criticism has been leveled against slum removal projects in American cities. Once the inhabitants of slum dwellings to be razed were merely given notice to move. Not able to pay for better dwellings, most of these crowded into other slums in other areas. It is now required by law that displaced families be assisted in finding other dwellings and that financial help be given for their moving. Still there is hardship.

In that American depressed region known as Appalachia there is also a program for encouraging the abandonment of submarginal farms and returning the land to pasturage or forest. The effort presents many difficulties. But these difficulties are minor in comparison with resettlement efforts that might be undertaken in the Atlantic region. Appalachia is less removed from industrial centers. In the Atlantic Provinces, as in Appalachia, many who should be resettled have no wish to leave the humble

communities where their families have lived for generations.

Newfoundland is encouraging movement out of isolated outports where modern services cannot be provided, endeavoring to cause whole communities to abandon their homes. Even though the cost of moving is paid, many families do lose financially and all are inconvenienced. It turns out that the initiative for moving usually comes from the local storekeeper, welfare officer or other local dignitary. Dissension often develops within the community although many of the moves have been successful.

One obstacle in Newfoundland's resettlement efforts is that, once relocated, families have difficulty finding houses and more difficulty in finding employment. To some extent this induced mobility, for families long rooted in one place, leads to further mobility. Inadequate information about places to which families will move and employment possibilities has increased anxiety and animosity in some cases.

It is to be expected that public efforts to resettle families will result in criticism, and even lasting grievances, when whole communities are moved. Nor is the criticism always justified or rational. Any program of resettlement will unavoidably impose some hardship. Yet resettlement is necessary in some areas in the interest of regional welfare and in order to make economic development feasible.

Economic Development and Welfare

It is not mere coincidence that the industrial countries of the West are all moving in the direction of some type of "Welfare state." This trend is not to be explained only in terms of pressure on governments by organized groups, nor in terms of new humanitarian interests on the part of governments. Industry itself must turn to government for help in crises, and it does not call resulting provisions "welfare." Approaches are made in the name of "the general welfare," and in recognition that economic well-being depends to some extent upon governmental policies. Welfare measures are relevant in increasing the social assets of the country.

Social welfare extends a degree of security to business and industry as it comes to the rescue, for example, in areas where seasonal unemployment may be chronic and in urban communities where industry may occasionally be forced to lay off workers because of slumps in the market. Certainly, without the welfare cheques, unemployment insurance, pension provisions, family allowances, and other social security measures, storekeepers in many areas of the Atlantic region would find the going difficult.

The growing view of public welfare recognizes that the industrial system does not permit many individuals to provide adequately for their own welfare when they are confronted with

unemployment, sickness or old age. But, in the circulation of money, welfare payments provide an indirect subsidy to business. They assume increasing importance in a complex system where all are interdependent and a depressed class in one region imposes economic costs on all classes and all regions. The consequences of withdrawal of public welfare would be even more severe in the Atlantic Provinces than among the so-called "permanent poor" in the slums of industrial cities.

Chapter 2

Poverty and Impoverished Regions

Canada's Rich Natural Heritage

While this report is about poverty in one of the poor regions of Canada, Canada is one of the world's least impoverished nations. There is still much free space which in a generation or so may be seen as a great resource. There is still much good land for food production whose full utility has not yet been reached and there are large water resources still to be tapped and used efficiently. These and other resources have a potential which will become increasingly important over the next generation as the world's population increases from some 3.3 billion to an estimated 6 billion or more.

Like other industrial nations, Canada faces the problem of preservation of natural resources. Water pollution is less advanced than in the United States but is already a serious problem. No country in the temperate zones is more blessed than Canada with wide areas of natural forest land, which in the future may have as much worth for tourism as it now has for wood-cutting. Unless these forest areas can be protected against the "efficiency" of the woodcutter, and scientific management adopted on a wide scale, only shambles will be the heritage of the next generation.

Recognition of the need for resource protection is increasing as interest in economic development becomes more general.

The Atlantic Region: Size and Population

The region which is the subject of this study includes New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland. This region of 218,148 square miles comprises 9.4 per cent of all Canada, with the exception of the sparsely-settled Yukon and Northwest Territories. Here lived in 1961 a population of 1,897,425, a little more than one-tenth of Canada's reported 1961 population. The area of the Atlantic region is more than the area of New England. Comparing the Atlantic Provinces with countries of Western Europe, we find that Newfoundland alone has more land area than the United Kingdom, Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands. But these four European countries contain a population of 78.4 million as compared with less than 1.9 million in the Atlantic Provinces.

The Atlantic region is recognized to be in a chronic state of depression as compared with other regions of Canada. Wide areas and thinly-settled population pose special problems in many parts of Canada for economic development programs. In contrast, about 35 per cent of the Canadian population is found concentrated in less than a third of the land area of Ontario. Canada's heaviest

industrialization is to be found in the same area. Some strenuous efforts may be needed in the Atlantic region in attracting new types of industry which will provide a nucleus for economic development by making the region more attractive to other industries.

A scattered population and wide areas of scenic forests are assets in terms of tourism. Located just north of the highly agglomerated urban-industrial Atlantic Seaboard of the United States, the Maritime Provinces have the resources for a natural play ground, the attractiveness of which can be expected to increase as available recreational space becomes scarcer in neighboring regions.

Population and Economic Growth

There is some justification for the notion that population increase stimulates economic activity. The crowding of people into a given area, it is said, stimulates competition. The more resourceful ones find new means of gaining a livelihood, especially in cities. The stimulated urban area encourages resourcefulness in rural areas as urbanites invent the machines that the farmer eventually uses. This stimulation and response relationship between cities and their hinterlands has marked the growth of urbanism and industrialism.

The Maritimes, in their heyday before the 1880's, attained a population of some 871,000 out of a total Canadian

population of only 4.7 million. By 1961, the inhabitants of the Maritimes numbered 1,440,000, while Canada's population was 17,743,000. In the eighty-year period the national increase had been 439 per cent while the Maritime increase had been only 165 per cent. The easy explanation, and one often heard when fast-growing communities are compared with slow-growing ones, is that the people of the fast-growing communities are more resourceful. Indeed, that explanation has been given for the slower growth of Boston than of New York.

The rate of economic growth in a developing region is due in part to the energy and imagination of the inhabitants, and it is possible that as population increases in the prosperous region development will be stimulated. But there is no simple relationship. It usually happens that a rapidly developing region of great promise will attract persons of energy, talent and imagination from less prosperous regions. This has been the lot of the Atlantic region. Persons of talent, energy and imagination have been migrating for many decades. Leaders in the region continue to be concerned about the exodus of many of the most qualified. This nourishes the belief that, were these potential leaders retained in the region, then the Atlantic Provinces would develop rapidly.

Both notions about population have some validity if not pushed beyond reality. First, the belief that population

increase itself brings prosperity, by increasing demand and the concentration of human resources, is valid within the limits of available natural resources upon which the increasing population can subsist. The growing population, within limits, can stimulate efficiency in the use of the natural resources. Pushed beyond this point, an increasing population begins to use the natural resources to excess. This is abundantly clear in overpopulated rural regions around the world; to increase the productivity of the land, more people must be moved out of agriculture. Moving people to the cities provides relief only if in the cities industrial employment can be found.

The second nation, which holds that economic growth in a depressed region would be stimulated if persons of energy, talent, and imagination did not migrate, is also true within certain limits. It is more true in isolated pre-industrial economies than it is in modern Canada. Under the present urban industrial economic conditions, opportunity in a depressed region is determined largely by conditions and controls which are centered mainly in affluent regions.

For the industrial economy, "population" is a synonym for "consumers." In this sense, the 1.5 million inhabitants of the Atlantic Provinces, dispersed over 218,000 square miles, may not be a barrier to primary industry but increase the difficulty

of developing a network of consumer industries. Even small cities find it difficult to provide the network of streets, sidewalks, water and sewerage lines, and other services which are considered essential in modern industrial society. A city of 10,000 is able to support only a limited variety of small business enterprises and such services as bakeries, laundries, and public transportation firms are findint it more convenient to concentrate their plants in larger cities. A scattered population is not easily supplied with modern amenities and is, in that sense, impoverished.

Besides being deprived of material comforts, the depressed region may also be limited culturally. One indication is seen in the number of public libraries and their circulation of books. According to the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, there were 25 public libraries in the Atlantic region in 1962 as compared with 315 in Ontario. Total circulation in 1962 for the Atlantic region was 3.9 million as compared with 35.7 million for Ontario. Ontario circulation per 100,000 population was double the rate for the Atlantic region. In addition, an unknown number of books supplied in Ontario school libraries increased the disparity. The positive side of the comparison lies in the more rapid change which can be expected as a depressed region undertakes to catch-up in its educational and cultural resources. The number of undergraduate students in universities in the Maritimes

increased by 303 per cent between 1945 and 1965, while the increase for Ontario was 269 per cent.

Even larger cities within the Atlantic region have had to face the competition of Ontario and Quebec industries located in areas of population concentration. As transportation facilities become more effective, the problems of a scattered population become greater in terms of competition with the industrial complexes located in areas of dense population. This limiting influence of the wider economy was much less a threat to the Atlantic Provinces during what might be called their pioneer period.

Characteristics of a Depressed Region

European countries also have their depressed regions. But they have little in common with the Atlantic Provinces except that they lack industrial employment and also suffer from an absence of good agricultural land. The deprived regions of Europe are small and rarely more than a hundred miles from industrial centers, but they do not attract industry. Their communities have a deprived aspect and the inhabitants are poorly educated and poorly paid. Moreover, public programs for economic growth have produced only limited response and development has been slow.

These characteristics are found in the Atlantic region but its great expanse and its comparative remoteness from industrial centers are major differences. In these respects, the Atlantic

region also differs from the three main depressed regions of the United States.

The government of Canada has now established certain flexible criteria for identifying areas of "economic and social disadvantage." These criteria take into account low income level, amount of unemployment and underemployment, lag in educational level, low level of health and the lack of social services. These are the negative conditions, appearing usually in a cluster, which serve to identify a depressed area or region, much as their relative absence serves to identify an area or region of comparative affluence. Menzies, who helped in a farm survey of Eastern Canada for A. R. D. A.,[1] elaborated on the findings in a later paper on "Poverty

[1]See The Report of the Eastern Canada Farm Survey (Ottawa: Rural Development Branch, Department of Forestry; 1963). The opening paragraph of this study is probably not an overstatement of the present outlook for farming in eastern Canada: "Approximately 50 per cent of the farmers in the study area, if provided with suitable alternative employment and the training required for it, could leave the agricultural industry to the benefit of themselves and to the net gain of the remaining farm community, and the national economy. Because of age and other factors, some farmers in this group are not retrainable and thus may constitute less of a problem to society if they live out their lives on the farm. The 50 per cent of low-income farmers make only a marginal contribution to the total agricultural output; it constitutes the core of the agricultural problem of Canada."

in Canada." In his opinion, while most of the farms produce incomes of less than $2,500. and are deemed to be "non-viable,"

they probably had been "viable enterprises in an earlier state of technology."[2]

[2]M.W. Menzies, Poverty in Canada (Winnipeg: Manitoba Pool Elevators; 1965), p. 5.

Observation five at the beginning of the Report of the Eastern Canada Farm Survey indicates that about half of the cash received by farmers with incomes of $2,500. or less came form off-farm sources, either from transfer payments or off-farm employment. Indirect evidence from the Census on farms indicates that between 1931 and 1961, in the three Maritime Provinces, many small farms have been abandoned or absorbed into larger farms, or the land-use has changed. In the Maritimes in 1931 there were 8,661 farms of ten acres or less as compared with 1,448 in 1961, a decline of over 83 per cent in the number of small farms. This compares with a decline of 54 per cent for all Canada in the same period. The number of farms of eleven to fifty acres in the Maritimes fell from 19,976 in 1931 to 3,657 in 1961, about 82 per cent, while for Canada the drop for the same size farms was about 58 per cent.[3] At least these figures suggest that the small

[3]Census of Canada, 1961, Series 51, Table 3. Comparable figures are not available for Newfoundland.

family farm is less than an asset in the Maritimes.

Many who are called farmers in the Atlantic Provinces could as correctly be counted among the fishermen or the loggers or others who work in the forests. The majority of these groups are in about the same economic position. Their incomes are below whatever point is set in defining poverty. To Menzies, the practical equivalent of poverty is unemployment and he sees unemployment and underemployment as forms of economic waste in that labour is not being utilized.[4] Unemployment as the ill and employment as cure

[4]Menzies, op. cit., pp. 13, 23.

cannot be taken as a sufficient definition, however. Those who have jobs should be able to live above the poverty line, whether it be $2,500., $3,000., or higher. Even though the most affluent provinces have areas of rural poverty, the Atlantic region is generally impoverished in spite of some pockets of affluence. Table 1 shows the extent to which the Atlantic Provinces are disadvantaged in terms of family income.

Family income disparities among the provinces are most apparent in the proportion of families earning less than $3,000 per year and in the proportion earning more than $6,000 per year. The Atlantic Provinces have roughly twice as many poor families and half as many families in comfortable circumstances as the rest of Canada. Elsewhere we shall show that living costs are relatively high in the Atlantic region, thus lowering the standard of living even more.

Table 1

Percentage Distribution of Families by Income: Canada, Ontario, Atlantic Provinces; Averages and Number of Families

Income Categories ($)	Percentage Distribution of Families					
	Canada	Ontario	Newfoundland	Prince Edward I.	Nova Scotia	New Brunswick
Under 1,500	8.5	6.3	22.8	17.7	14.2	14.5
1,500-1,999	4.3	3.2	10.0	8.1	6.7	7.5
2,000-2,499	4.9	3.9	10.0	10.2	8.1	8.6
2,500-2,999	5.6	4.5	8.3	8.9	8.4	8.4
Under 3,000:	(23.3)	(17.9)	(51.1)	(44.9)	(37.4)	(39.0)
3,000-3,999	15.2	13.7	15.6	18.0	17.7	18.8
4,000-4,999	16.5	16.8	11.2	13.1	15.6	15.7
5,000-5,999	13.8	15.3	7.9	9.1	10.8	9.5
6,000-6,999	9.7	11.1	4.7	5.1	6.4	6.2
7,000-7,999	6.6	7.9	3.0	3.2	4.0	3.7
8,000-8,999	7.2	8.5	3.0	2.9	4.0	3.5
10,000 & over	7.8	8.9	3.5	3.7	4.0	3.7
Total:	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Ave. income	$5,449	$5,868	$3,673	$3,919	$4,260	$4,155
Med. income	4,675	5,092	2,934	3,250	3,710	3,571
Families:	3,656,965	1,376,148	86,458	14,386	146,825	110,715

Source: Census of Canada, 1961: Series 7.1, Table 20.

In Table 2 we compare average incomes of male workers in the Atlantic region with those of their counterparts in Ontario by expressing them as percentages of comparable Ontario incomes for the year ending May 31, 1961, rural and urban workers being considered separately.

Table 2

Male Earnings in Canada and Atlantic Provinces as Percentages of Earnings in Ontario

Province	Rural	Urban	Total
Newfoundland	54.6	76.2	61.5
Prince Edward Island	65.5	77.8	66.1
Nova Scotia	71.1	83.0	73.5
New Brunswick	70.8	81.2	70.8
Ontario	100.0	100.0	100.0
Canada	85.2	95.1	92.2

Source: Census of Canada, 1961: Series 7.1, Table 17

As many others have done, Galbraith points out that there is no universal definition of poverty. It is a condition which assumes a different aspect according to time and circumstance. He adds the pertinent comment, "There is no firm definition of this phenomenon and, again, save as a tactic for countering the intellectual obstructionist, no precise definition is needed." It relates to needs people have but are unable to satisfy. "But just as it is far too tempting to say that, in matters of living standards, everything is relative, so it is wrong to rest everything on absolutes. People are poverty-stricken when their income, even if adequate for survival, falls markedly behind that of the community. Then they cannot have what the larger community regards as the minimum necessary for decency."[5]

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[5]John K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), p. 323.

A considerable proportion of any population can be defined as impoverished at any time but poverty means different things in rural and urban settings and in the practical problems of unskilled, skilled, and white-collar workers. George Caldwell, in his report on rural need in a Cape Breton community, came to this description of a rural family in poverty:

> The father is 47 years of age; his income is derived from self-employment and a combination of

> either unemployment insurance, part-time wage employment or welfare. He has a monthly average income of $197.10 to care for the needs of seven people. He is concerned about the future and would like to see changes in the County, particularly industrialization, but is resigned to raising his children and educating them to leave the area. He likes rural life and the close friends he has, and feels that he will never starve in Inverness but that he might if he moves. He is a person in conflict because of the mobility he has seen amongst relatives and friends and the onrush of urban living. He never seems to get that extra toe-hold that some capital would provide to make his farm or his boat or his woodlot more productive. He looks outward to the government or a bit of luck or relatives who are away to provide a stimulus to change.[6]

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[6]George Caldwell, "Iverness County, Nova Scotia," in D. E. Woodsworth, Director, Rural Need in Canada, 1965 (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council, 1966), pp. 18-19.

Caldwell found that, while community leaders could point to poor families, there was no agreement among them as to what constituted poverty. Those with public or organizational contact with the poor associated poverty with poor housing, large family, age, and unemployment, in the main. But he adds that,

> The authorities furnishing health, welfare and municipal services were able to identify quickly the destitute families who were having a real struggle to exist in the County. Disability or death of the father, mental retardation in the parents, inadequate housing, long-term unemployment, large families, alcoholism and mental illness were given as the contributing factors amongst this group of families.[7]

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[7]Ibid.

In a companion study, Bessie Touzel asked people in Ontario to name poor families known to them in the area. She found a tendency to think of the poor as either "deserving" or "undeserving." Some families on the list, when visited, turned out not to be impoverished and yet were said to be "hard up," an indication of the relativity and subjective nature of definitions of poverty. This is shown in the statement of the wife in a family on the fringe of poverty.

> She regards their standard of living, which is maintained through scrimping and hard work, as below her concept of what a good life ought to be - some rest and leisure, hobbies and recreation for the children, holidays once in a while, occasional treats, clothes for Sunday best should be possible. She is well aware that these things are enjoyed by other Canadians and blames her situation on lack of opportunity in the area.[8]

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[8]Bessie Touzel, "Lanarck County, Ontario," in D. E. Woodsworth, op. cit., pp. 22-24.

These two examples, the first in a depressed region, the second in a depressed area within an affluent region, really describe the condition of people in want. Poverty is also a condition in the labor market where some are unable to find regular and remunerative employment. Many must subsist on part-time or casual work of a temporary nature. Even those with regular employment may sometimes be impoverished because the kind of work they are able to obtain offers rates of pay inadequate to provide

customary living needs. Hence poverty may also be seen as a relative situation in the labor force.

To the extent that poverty can be equated with unemployment and underemployment, as one aspect of the problem, its relative nature can be seen in the economic relations between regions. Brewis observes,

> Just what the functional relationship is between levels of unemployment in the Atlantic Provinces and other parts of the country in a moot point, but it is striking that once unemployment in Ontario exceeds 4 per cent, the position of the Atlantic Provinces, which suffer from consistently higher unemployment, becomes very much more serious. Thus, in 1958, when unemployment in Ontario increased by 2 per cent from 3.4 to 5.4 per cent, it increased from 8.3 to 12.5 per cent in the Atlantic Provinces. Moreover, as long as unemployment in Ontario remained above 4 per cent, it never dropped below 10 per cent in the Atlantic Provinces.[9]

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[9]T. N. Brewis, "The Problem of Regional Disparities," in Areas of Economic Stress in Canada (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queens University, 1965), p. 102.

How Images of the Poor Differ

We see poverty as a characteristic of the Atlantic region, whose natural resources are limited. In particular, the limited amount of tillable land offers little hope of much expansion in the production of an agricultural surplus, traditionally the basis on which an industrial economy has developed. But poverty is a characteristic of people rather than nature. Hence

there is a never-ending controversy among those who attempt to define poverty in any specific way. Rossi and Blum, in their extended analysis of current literature on poverty, write:

> This disagreement can be expected to continue indefinitely for two reasons: first, because no index and no cutting point will do everything that every party to the dispute would desire, and second, because social change will not stand still to preserve the sensibility of any index. We have no reason to go into this dispute in this paper, nor do we have any contribution to make.[10]

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[10]Peter H. Rossi and Z. D. Blum, "Social Stratification and Poverty," Mimeographed paper distributed by the National Opinion Research Center (Chicago: University of Chicago; 1967), p. 9.

These authors note that in much of the literature a distinction is made between two types of poverty and two types of poor, although the distinction is often only implicit.

> On the one hand, there are the "respectable" poor, persons who are just like standard middle-class Americans except that they have less income and wealth. On the other hand, there are the "disreputable" poor, those who not only have limited resources but also behave differently or hold values different from those of standard middle-class Americans.[11]

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[11]Ibid., pp. 9-10. Here they cite as an example W. Lloyd Warner's distinction between a "common man" level, described by his respondents as "poor but respectable," "poor but honest," and "poor but hard working," and a "below the common man level" described as "river rats," "peckerwoods," "dirty and immoral," and "those who live like pigs." (See W. Lloyd Warner, Social Class in America (Chicago: Science Research Associates; 1949) for details.

What needs to be recognized, although it can only be mentioned here in passing, is that moral evaluations are best left out of any look at poverty as an economic or labor market problem. Yet working distinctions between types of poor are necessary in the development of a constructive program to deal with poverty. Rossi and Blum conclude that, despite the many images of the poor presented in numerous reports of the last decade, the concensus that the poor (apart from the aged and those specially handicapped) are those who are unable to cope effectively in a competitive society and hence have inadequate incomes. Being unable to maintain a productive role they become a social as well as an economic problem.

Some students of poverty are inclined to stress the socio-economic aspects. Being impoverished comes to be a way of thinking and behaving on the part of the poor themselves. Newfoundland fishermen, for generations isolated in their remote outport hamlets, were not beaten down by their state of deprivation. But they became painfully aware of their poor condition when roads were built to their hamlets and they began to have ready access to places where, comparatively, the affluence of the outside became visible. Awareness of poverty developed when some began to have aspirations which could not be satisfied. As Whyte observes, they now became aware, in ways that previously did not

matter, of "the criterion of need aspiration, when poverty is defined in terms of relative deprivation."[12]

[12]Donald R. Whyte, "Sociological Aspects of Poverty, A Conceptual Analysis," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 2, No. 4 (November 1965), p. 178.

Tremblay and Gosselin see two aspects of poverty. One aspect is "objective" poverty which can be measured in economic terms such as the standards which must be used in welfare programs, while the other is "subjective" poverty and relates to the psychological concomitants. Whyte notes the distinction:

> The definition of poverty in terms of relative deprivation affords a clearer understanding of the operational character of the phenomenon. Rather than being measured solely in terms of subsistence criteria, the poor are defined as those considered by others to be poor and who either consider themselves to be poor or would do so if aware of the standards held by the larger community to which they belong. Poverty, is a normative concept. The difficulty in applying such an operational definition is in determining which set of normative standards will serve as the basis of evaluation. A family may not be considered poor in relation to others in the community, but in relation to the larger regional or societal norms, the entire community may be considered poor.[13]

[13]Ibid, p. 180. For a discussion of the two aspects, see Adelard-Marc Tremblay and Emile Gosselin, "Continuum pouverete, son utilite en tant qu'indicateur de desin integration sociale," Service Sociale, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Nov.-Dec. 1960), pp. 3-18.

Isolation and Those in Poverty

The Atlantic Provinces are identified as both poor and rural. To the extent that they lie outside the main "economic stream" the Atlantic Provinces may also be called isolated. Within the region there are great variations in the degree of isolation experienced by different areas as well as differences in resources and attractiveness to in-migrants who might spur economic development.

The main consequence of isolation is a lack of the stimulus for social change which accompanies economic development. The slow rate of social change found in the depressed region causes it to be popularly identified as "backward," "conservative," or even "actively resistant to change." Dupuys, after travel in the Maritimes in 1910, mentioned the quiet, self-satisfied reserve of the people: "What New Brunswick needs is plenty of new blood and a grand shaking up all along the line. Immigration will do the work needed."[14] He thought this growth would result if more

[14]Edgar Dupuys, Eastern Canada, The People Therein (New York: Literary Bureau; 1912), p. 42.

people turned to agriculture.

Instead of receiving immigrants, Dupuys found even a half-century ago that the Maritimes were exporting the young,

strong and alert. He wrote with emphasis that "Nova Scotia has been in a dormant state for many years and shows little inclination to part with her sweet slumber. The big peninsula needs new blood and a violent shaking up, superinduced by the eruption of new ideas."[15]

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[15]Ibid., p. 52.

Poverty is isolating for individual families in need as well as for depressed communities. This is illustrated in essays produced by 65 students attending a summer session at the University of New Brunswick in 1967. Asked to describe small communities with which they were familiar and to tell something about one or two "marginal" or poor families, the students made strikingly similar comments. Two points stood out in their descriptions: 1) with few exceptions, the poor families were described in negative terms, and 2) these families were described as isolated or withdrawn. Typical comments were that "They do not join organized groups," "They stay away from church," and "They don't mix with other families." Similar findings were reported by Bakke and by Cavan and Ranck in their studies of poor families during the Great Depression. Bakke noted that not only is the unemployed man avoided by his neighbors, but he hesitates to keep alive his contacts in the neighborhood. The Cavan-Ranck study found that

needy families, who had previously not been in want, discontinued going to church or group meetings and had fewer contacts with friends.[16]

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[16]E. Wight Bakke, Citizens Without Work (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press; 1940), and Ruth Shonle Cavan and Katherine H. Ranck, The Family and the Depression (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press; 1938).

These studies were done in urban areas among families not ordinarily in need in prosperous times. In chronically-poor rural communities there is sufficient communication among families to ensure general awareness of the relative economic position of each family. This is shown in Caldwell's study of need in Nova Scotia:

> Two-thirds of the families interviewed were referred by other families. The poor obviously know the poor. The confidentiality that is so sacred to the middle class, in regard to earnings and family troubles, was not found to be characteristic of the families interviewed. They knew one another's troubles and had discussed their financial problems.[17]

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[17]Caldwell, op. cit., p. 20.

While the poor to whom Caldwell refers knew one another and had maintained not only family ties but a spirit of community, they were as a class isolated from the larger community. We read in the introduction to Rural Need in Canada, 1965, apparently written by the director, that "They belong to few organizations,

few of them hold office of any kind, and they have little hope of improvement." A page later we read:

> They know that the social organizations to which they may belong do not have much influence. Community life has little reward for most of them. Therefore most feel that they either are losing or have lost their desperate struggle to keep their sense of identity. Yet there are few signs of demoralization or "degradation" anywhere in terms which these words usually connote - sexual promiscuity, drunkenness, waste of money, deliberate damage of property or injury of persons, etc. These people seem not "misdirected" but undirected, cut off and unaided.[18]

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[18]D. E. Woodsworth, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

It should not surprise us that the poor in the Atlantic Provinces are often held in poor esteem by other classes nor that they withdraw from contact with the well-to-do. More affluent communities often attribute patterns of behavior to depressed communities which they do not deserve, just as non-slum dwellers in the cities are often scornful of the slum dwellers. In the next section, popular attitudes toward the poor will be considered further.

Poverty and the "Other Nation" Idea

The flood of literature now appearing on poverty and the poor, some of it in Canada, assumes the character of a crusade. Economists and sociologists who showed little or no interest in

poverty or unemployment during the Great Depression have been succeeded by those who display great concern about these problems. The social isolation of the poor is centuries old. Under feudalism their isolation was institutionalized in the "estate" system, as it is still institutionalized elsewhere in remnants of the caste system. The idea which has only recently become popular condemns such isolations, condemns even the idea of an affluent society having a "lower-lower" class. Menzies writes,

> The most significant fact about mass poverty in rural Canada in the latter decades of the Twentieth Century is that it is unnecessary. It exists, not because it is unavoidable, but because we have never tried to avoid it. Another fact is the frightful waste involved. The waste in economic terms is shocking enough but there is an even greater waste in human terms. Still another significant fact is that agricultural poverty cannot be solved within the farm fence, nor can rural, non-farm poverty be solved along the back concessions. The corrolary is, of course, also true, we cannot solve urban poverty and industrial unemployment independently of an effective attack on rural poverty and unemployment, since the continuous flow of the uneducated, the unskilled, the unready and the infirm from our outposts and reservations, our farms and forests to our towns and cities creates an indivisible social and economic problem.[19]

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[19]Menzies, op. cit., p. 10.

The viewpoint of Menzies is supported by Abell in her paper on the social consequences of the modernization of agriculture, which deals with the condition of Canada's rural poor in

general and only incidently touches on the Atlantic region. She cites figures showing that in terms of farm products at market values, 46 per cent of the 480,903 farms in Canada had incomes of less than $2,500 in 1961. These low-income farms comprised 23 per cent of the land devoted to farming but they yielded only 10 per cent of the total value of farm products sold. She adds that, at the other extreme, "We can point to the 10 per cent of the farms on which farmers and their families occupy 23 per cent of the land and account for 45 per cent of the value of all farm products sold."[20]

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[20]Helen C. Abell, "The Social Consequences of Modernization in Agriculture," in Marc-Adelard Tremblay and Walton J. Anderson, Eds., Rural Canada in Transition (Ottawa: Agricultural Economics Research Council; 1966), p. 180. Data are taken from the Census of Canada, 1961: Series 5.1, Table 31.

The same Census report shows that 72 per cent of all farms in the Atlantic region produce less than $2,500 worth of products as compared with 46 per cent for Canada. Abell mentions that about 10 per cent of the farms in Canada yield an income of $10,000 or more, but we find that less than one per cent of the Atlantic region farms are in that class.

The "other-nation" idea, which we are considering in this section, tends to regard these areas of deprivation, whether rural or urban, and the people within them as being "outside the pale," in part excluded and in part self-excluding from the

larger society. The social implications of the "other-nation" conception are contained in the argument that impoverished families are in a fixed condition as if they were identified with a lower caste. On the one hand, circumstances do not permit them to rise and, on the other hand, they come to accept the condition and to evolve their own level of culture. This was the condition of the poor generally in pre-industrial societies. It is often argued, however, that industrial society holds out the promise to all who are poor that they can, if they strive, rise out of their poverty. There is plenty of evidence in the development of North America that waves of people have moved up financially and occupationally out of the lower socio-economic ranks, although much of the evidence refers to pioneer times. The situation in contemporary industrial society is not so clear and segments of the lower classes appear to have been set aside in situations of apparently perpetual depression. Observers often find little basis for developing effective community organization:

> The literature on poverty and the poor describes the areas inhabited by the "lower-lowers" as severely lacking in community organization; i. e., voluntary associations usually found in many middle-class areas, whose purposes are to look after the collective interests and the commonweal of the areas in question, are not present. Consequently it is difficult to locate "indegenous" leaders and even more difficult to negotiate with someone who can legitimately speak for, and make commitments on behalf of the

> inhabitants. Even those local voluntary associations which can be found in such areas; e.g., churches, social clubs, etc., tend to be concerned with their internal affairs, and not with speaking out in behalf of local public interest.[21]

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[21]Rossi and Blum, op. cit., p. 20.

It may be said that the "other-nation" idea applies to certain heterogeneous urban slums and, with certain qualifications, it may be applicable in the poor communities of the Atlantic Provinces. In their study of Newfoundland relocation program, Iverson and Matthews found that the outports, which some would call slums, were homogeneous communities which were isolated from the larger society in spite of internal integration and the rivalries typical of organized village life. Those who were moved became very much aware of this after they had become resettled:

> Some spoke of the beauty of their former surroundings, in contrast to the drabness of their present environment. Others miss the freedom to walk unseen over the rocky escarpment that cradles Anderson's Cove (their former home). They feel they are too close to their neighbours. The older members of the community, in particular those on pension, tend to speak most nostalgically about Anderson's Cove, wishing many times that they could go back.[22]

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[22]Noel Iverson and D. Ralph Matthews, Communities in Decline; An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland, (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland; 1968), p. 82.

The necessary program of resettlement, in spite of inconvenience and disturbed social relationships, places these people among others of the same socio-economic level, with like origins and similar problems. Nor are they sealed in. They have shown a capacity to move and they are now in a better position to receive urban services. Their children can expect better schooling and a chance to enter industrial occupations. Thus the concept of "other nation" does not describe their situation. It is difficult to say with assurance when a class has become incapable of social mobility.

Motivation and the Competence Gap

A good part of Western industrial society has converted itself to the notion that all people are much alike or should be. It is assumed that all want about the same things and all have, or can be taught to have, about the same aspirations. In the world of business this outlook is so firmly rooted in all of its ramifications that it assumes the character of a cult. It comes to be accepted without question by some social scientists that the poor should be taught to have middle-class values and aspirations. They often attribute the different motivations of the poor to alienation from middle-class values as a result of the "ghetto-like" condition of the slum or depressed rural community. Emphasis is often placed on child-rearing and education with a

view to developing "leadership" talent and an "achievement" orientation.

Porter questions both the value and validity of the notion that all classes have or can have about the same motivations; that is, have a like avid urge to attain the same goals.[23] It is possible that school dropouts and many with less than upper- white-collar goals may be content with less than a high school education and may get the fullness of life out of a skilled occupation. Some are now asking, "What is so bad about there being different levels of aspiration in a population?" This view, being perhaps more realistic, may also relieve the worry of some about the "poverty of intellect" among the poor.

[23]John Porter, "The Future of Upward Mobility," American Sociological Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feb. 1968), p. 18. Of the many who express the view criticised by Porter, these are representative: S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkely: University of California Press; 1959), and Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World; 1957). The view that some prefer security to success is held by S. M. Miller and Frank Riessman, "The Working-Class Subculture," in Arthur B. Shostak and William Gomberg, Eds., Blue-Collar World (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall; 1964).

It is not that Porter objects to giving more education and training to those who can respond to it, or can be encouraged to. Some have less interest in social mobility, finding success in other directions. What may inspire one child may bore another.

Moreover it uproots and makes the upwardly

> mobile working class child suffer the strains of assimilating an alien culture; he becomes a marginal man trying to pass for what he is not. Here is another theme reminiscent of one in American sociology, i.e., the need to preserve ethnic cultures to mediate between the individual and the mass. These cultures are receptive, warm, protecting and fulfilling, and, no doubt, life can be lived with satisfaction in the ethnic or the working-class community. The trouble is that theories of democracy and equality come along and break down these sub-cultures and highly complex economies evolve which, if they are to be maintained and developed, may not be able to depend on what has been called "optional mobility," without at least a social policy directed towards influencing the options.[24]

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[24]Porter, op. cit., p. 18.

This line of thought in socio-psychological terms is especially pertinent to a depressed region in which sub-cultures are found which are seen as backward to most outside experts who come to study and recommend changes. They often call for raising the level of education, of exposing these people more to the civilizing influences from the outside. What Porter apparently has in mind is that while education is good it should not be a cultural broom that sweeps all old traits aside. In this sense, the Newfoundland resettlement program might be more valuable if ways could be found for conserving some of the community qualities that outport people lived comfortably with for so many generations in isolation. It might be added that a complex society calls for

a differentiated population rather than one subjected to a single, massive assembly-line style of education.

Chapter 3

The Economy of Expectations

Expectations and the Environment

Before considering the aspirations of people, specifically of people in the Atlantic region, it is well to consider the environing situation in which they live. Taking account of soil, terrain, climate, distance from markets, and natural resources, one environment may be encouraging, another merely permissive, and still another quite forbidding. In these provinces there are areas, some along the coast line of Newfoundland, where the land provides neither soil for pasture or gardens nor a climate suitable for agriculture, yet because of the bounty of the sea, people have lived there for generations. Now, because of technology and the increasing influence of urbanizing civilization, the old habitations have become both uneconomic and intolerable.

A more permissive environment may allow for a degree of agriculture which also encourages a stable type of settlement. The permissiveness of nature in most parts of the Atlantic region is limited in this respect, however. Some will say that at one time, 1880 or earlier, a much higher percentage of the families than now gained all or most of their subsistence from farming. Families had chickens, cows, hogs and gardens then, although their grandchildren on the same land do not have farm animals today, and

some have even become careless about having gardens. True, they did not have much produce then for sale, but they did wrest a livelihood from their land. Many of the men then as now did off-farm work to get cash, but they didn't go to the stores to buy most of their food.

The change which has come to the region is less a change in nature than a change in man. The soil is still there but it would be shocking even to the poor if they had to return to the 1880 rural standard of living derived solely from subsistence farming. While the lumber resources have been greatly depleted in the intervening years, thereby reducing a major source of income of the earlier period, the forests are still there and capable of more efficient utilization. Man has changed from the earlier frugal way of living to a style of life requiring more than the sparse resources of an earlier generation. The dilemma of the Atlantic Provinces lies in the attempt to live according to the expectations of more affluent regions in the face of limited means for achieving such a life. This means that inhabitants must choose between lesser aspirations or the adoption of new ways of earning their livelihood. Migration continues to be required of many who seek to change their occupational position. The alternative of increasing the technological content of Atlantic industries has had some effect in increasing the economic return from land,

forests, and the seas. But technological change often jeopardizes the position of the traditional worker. Thus more efficient methods in the fishing industry are making it increasingly difficult for the lone fisherman and his sons to earn a living by their traditional fishing methods. Hardships, real and imagined, thus accompany the changes wrought by man.

Industrial man's determination to turn every natural asset into profit and to think of resources in terms of economic growth, has perhaps seen its best days in the Atlantic Provinces. This proclivity is now being rebuffed by nature and, while more efficient use is being made of existing economic assets, new lines of development may be necessary which are less dependent upon physical resources. One development already discussed is the tourist industry. But other kinds of enterprises are also desirable which are less dependent on the fruits of the earth, but rely rather on the development of human resources.

On Changing Aspirations

The rapidly rising interest in problems of poverty and of economic development, especially since the second world war, is evidence of the relativity of definitions. The problem in the evolving situation is not merely that nonindustrial regions are worse off in absolute terms; it is also a matter of people

feeling worse off. They become aware of their deprivation as they become more aware of other regions where economic growth and concomitant change are more rapid.

Changing aspirations are at the heart of the problem and these are the product of new and different experience. They are encouraged by the North American emphasis upon progress, especially in the production of material goods. Changing aspirations are, in turn, a dynamic force which serves to give meaning and direction to economic development policies.

Much of the impetus for social and economic change must come from outside the depressed region. Such aspirations as are stimulated by conditions within the region are subject to a degree of repression as they come into conflict with values and patterns of organization which are deeply rooted in the past. This is illustrated by the field of education. New demands are made on educational agencies to meet the changing needs of the evolving society. But, says Porter, the new demands meet resistance even in education itself.

> The tradition of the curriculum also provides resistance to change, particularly in societies where high prestige has been given to humanistic learning. This Brahmanistic outlook prefers dead languages and conventional history, the less exact and undemanding disciplines where the criteria of excellence are subjective. Here the exact sciences and mathematics are thought to be a barbarian's breakfast.[1]

[1]John Porter, "The Future of Upward Mobility," in American Sociological Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Feburary 1968), p. 19.

Porter stresses the growing need in the industrial countries for trained people, more than can be provided by the middle classes, and that ways must be found to motivate large numbers in the lower classes to be upwardly mobile. He recognizes that not all can be so motivated and that some may have aspirations in other directions. The industrial army is not one of generals and colonels only but contains many occupational levels in the middle range. As the demand for unskilled labour diminishes, these middle levels become proper goals for many workers. Traditional definitions of "success" need modification in the light of modern realities.

> The occupational trends which have come about with industrialization, creating a new wave of opportunities in all Western industrial societies, now becomes increasingly integrated. We have the prospect, however, of the opportunities going in search of the opportunity-minded. I have tried to argue that the modern period of industrialization has created low levels of motivation, working-class culture, educationally deprived areas, and outmoded educational arrangements and curricula content for societies based on the culture of science and technology.[2]

[2]Ibid., p. 19.

What Porter is striking at in the closing sentence is

the "pool of ability" notion that there are few who are competent to study science and mathematics. "The idea of the sanctity of education which can only be acquired by a few blessedly endowed with the appropriate qualities, dies hard."

To say that "industrialization has created low levels of motivation, working-class culture, educationally deprived areas" and so on is, of course, to speak of unintended and unexpected consequences. This can be seen in the tendency of the level of education to rise faster in an affluent region than in a depressed region. Secondly, there is usually less demand in the depressed region for skilled workers, as measured in the variety of skills wanted as well as in the number of skilled personnel for which positions are available. The labour supply in such primary industries as mining, fishing, and lumbering is mainly one of low educational level and limited skills not easily utilized in secondary industries.

If the labour market in a depressed region or area is comprised mainly of unskilled workers who can get along with little or no formal education, it is to be expected that the social milieu in which they live will do little to stimulate aspirations relevant to the position of the middle classes in urban industrial centers. Children can hardly be expected to be influenced by goals outside their normal range of experience. The son may be encouraged to become a country priest, foreman on a

highway work crew, or the local mail carrier. Some sons or daughters may aspire to become elementary school teachers but this may not be highly valued in settings in which formal education seems essentially irrelevant. For many daughters, the logical aspiration may be to marry a sober and steady man. The minority who leave home to acquire higher education are often lost to the community as they discover little opportunity at home to apply their skills or to satisfy their developing ambitions.

Relation of Motivation to Livelihood

How one earns his living is likely to be reflected in his aspirations. Parsons points out that economic activities are subject to institutional patterns of action.[3] The normative patterns of any group define social obligations and proper,

[3]Talcott Parsons, "The Motivation of Economic Activities," in his Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied, (New York: Free Press; 1949), pp. 200-217.

legitimate, or expected relationships and behaviour. To be sure, it is well known that what is proper, legitimate, or expected depends on what expectations prevail in this community or region as compared with that one. An institutionalized structure of authority and rights defines the spheres in which some individuals may or may not exercise influence over other individuals. Decision-making in each situation is governed to a large extent by

institutionalized social definitions and approved behaviours within particular groups and organizations. Organizational goals and ranking systems, based on the evaluation of individual qualities and achievements, are other determinants of behaviour.

Every function in established organizations comes to have institutionally defined roles, which are thus basic to social order in any society. For example, "fishermen," "farmer," and "craftsman" define roles, and hence statuses, in the traditional localized economy. Comparable roles in the modern industrial economy are "engineer," "foreman," and "accountant."

In general, economic development involves, on the one hand, a proliferation of roles and greater explicitness and limitation in the definition of expected behaviour within roles. On the other hand, it involves changing definitions of some old roles or setting them aside. The individual is expected to change his behaviour radically as he moves from one role to another. Moreover, as one changes his roles and behaviour his relationships with others will have to change, as when a skilled worker becomes shop foreman. Such change may mean acquiring new ideas about the day's work, as when one moves from tools to machines, or from self-supervision to taking orders from a foreman. The changeover may involve stricter work discipline and unaccustomed tempo.

It is in this relation to changing work-place demands,

as well as in the need for greater technical knowledge, that education and training play a more important part today in the industrial society. Mass production within large organizations requires the coordination of departments or other sub-groups. Coordination, in turn, demands precise timing of all operations and a rigorous control over individual operators to insure the integration of related activities. Since all work in a process is integrated, there must be strict predictability regarding the performance of each part for the day and even for many days ahead. Coordination calls for elaborate systems of sanctions, which have the effect of raising economic interests above all other interests of participants in that particular economic activity, at least in the work place. Systems of mass public education at the elementary level became a necessary part of the industrialization process as the need for a military type of discipline and for basic skills became widespread.

In any community or region, the normative order is supported by systems of sanctions, moral sentiments, personal and social feelings of shame, indignation, duty and so on. Such sentiments are internalized from early childhood and become accepted patterns of reaction against deviance from the norms. Schools and other agencies for socializing the individual into his community reinforce the normative system by emphasizing the

virtues important to the local society, whether that society be one of fishermen and farmers or one identified with big industry. Among the many sentiments developed within the school system of our Western Society are those which define various roles, such as "good student," "good worker," and "ambitious person." Fundamental economic change involves the displacement of old roles by new ones and requires change in educational emphases as well as in other segments of community life.

There is a fundamental difference between an industrial order as a social system and the community as a social system. While one learns the roles in the work place in much the same way as those in the family and community, the industrial system of large-scale operations includes many specialized roles which can in no way be learned within the family. The traditional philosophy of industrial management insists upon a complete separation of work roles from the issues and sentiments of the family and community. Only with the growth of "public relations." and "salesmanship" has there been much attempt to relate work to non-economic interests of family and community. The industrial work place is an impersonal milieu, at least in theory. In practice, all sorts of primary contacts and relationships exist from the shop to the manager's office, and community interests are informally mixed into the work day. But the firm has generally

attempted to remain somewhat aloof from the community. Much other work in the community, done in small work shops, stores, and offices bay be more identified with community life.

Whether in the work place or out of it, the individual learns, often unconsciously, to respect legitimate authority in others, to obey the rules of cooperation and rivalry, and to be aware of situations in which to conform to social expectations. He learns how and when it is approved to out-do other members of his groups. He derives satisfaction as he is able to live within the moral norms, even when, as in economic matters, he is sometimes able to remain barely within the norms or finds himself subject to conflicting norms. The socialized individual is not likely to openly flout the norms. This is one source of inertia as individuals find it difficult to adapt to new demands requiring acceptance of new norms.

One's Aspirations and General Expectations

The pertinence of the above description of the socializing process to the aspirations of people in depressed communities needs to be underlined. As we shall consider in other sections, family loyalty in such communities increases the difficulty of developing a mobile and adaptable work force. The contrast with the demands of industrial society was formerly illustrated by the family feuds of isolated Appalachian communities. Pride in family

and community in stable rural areas remains marked even among those who migrate to other areas.

The custom in isolated and stable communities is to remain near home and aspire to meet local expectations. Onemay aspire to be a better farmer than his father, although reluctant to try new methods, but have neither knowledge nor interest in practices found to be more effective elsewhere. The urban interest in formal education cannot be expected to be held in such communities.

Many formerly isolated communities are now reached by the mass media and by officials and other agents of the outside world. But outside ideas are not accepted automatically. Even when they are not rejected they are likely to be modified according to local custom. A young person who has been stimulated by some outside contact or unusual ambition may often find that his parents are not ready to accept his idea of becoming a scientist, technician or other skilled vocation. He may become the subject of joking among his friends. Some may even charge that his ambition is a "high-toned" way to avoid honest work. Similarly, if a young person attempts to introduce new methods into farming, fishing or other local industry, he is likely to meet various kinds of resistance, at least until their effectiveness is demonstrated. All of this does not mean that one's family and friends are lacking in motivation or disinterested in improving their means of earning

a livelihood. It merely indicates the extent to which people unaccustomed to change become bound to existing practices which have been proven to work fairly well. In an uncertain economic situation, new and untried activities may seem fraught with risk. Hence many communities, not all in depressed regions, are so under the influence of local norms and values, so committed to their traditional expectations, that a generation may be needed for effective attitudinal changes in spite of a general awareness of social, economic and technological changes elsewhere.

Aspirations and Occupational Goals

Among the least industrialized people in both towns and rural areas, today as well as a century ago, aspirations and goals are not paramount interests of the individual. As in the past, the rules of family and community living set forth the expectations. One formerly grew up, as many still do, in the midst of his future work and learned occupational skills incidentally within the whole complex of family activities. This is still a characteristic of poor regions.

Industrial work is different in several respects. Its division of labor is more complex and its occupations are little influenced by tradition. Industry uses old ways only if they serve and not merely because they are old. Each occupation must change as changes in the nature of the work require. Occupations

tend increasingly to be interdependent and changes in one must be matched by changes in others as new goods are produced, new mechanisms invented, or organizational innovations introduced. While the course of change is rarely predictable, there is certainly about two aspects: 1) it promises to be continuous, and 2) the occupations and their relationships are becoming more interdependent and more complex.

It is true, as we often hear, that modern industrial work is impersonal, clock-regulated, and bureaucratic. It is also rational in the sense that every aspect of a work operation is calculated in advance in terms of time, costs and the appropriateness of all relations involved. Ideally, rationalized industrial work is detached from the many sorts of familial and ascriptive considerations that characterize earlier types of work. It must be guided by canons of efficiency which sometimes can be taken more lightly and variously compromised in other work.

Most important for regions where the industrial work culture has not yet become firmly rooted are its recruitment demands for qualified labour. Three generalizations come to be increasingly evident:

1. The more efficient an industrial operation becomes the less use it can make of the less educated and less skilled workers.

2. The more efficient an industrial operation

becomes the more it depends and makes demands on community agencies for equipping future recruits with the education and training in skills needed for their ready adaptation within the industrial work system.

3. The more efficient industrial operations become the higher the percentage of the labour force that is needed in the upper occupations requiring higher education and higher levels of skill. More insistent demands are made on high schools, technical schools and universities as automation progresses.

Whether these demands for more and better trained future workers are excessive or not need not concern us here. What is a fact is that the output from the middle classes is not sufficient to meet the demand. Now it is being recognized that a good share of those at the lower socio-economic levels are not attracted into the higher occupations. Where they have the means, their aspirations often focus on lesser goals. People in areas of chronic poverty, if they have aspirations at all, often aspire to lesser goals and may not even be aware of the most profitable opportunities.

The Economic Worth of Occupations

In the medieval town, those who did not own property were more than likely to enter apprenticeships through which they could acquire valuable trades training. A man became a shoemaker, tailor, blacksmith, weaver or builder and thereby acquired a valuable possession. A man's occupation became his property and was protected by his membership in the appropriate guild. His

work was a property in the sense that he had spent four years or more in learning the essential skills or "mysteries," and in the sense that his occupation could be rightfully inherited by his son. The guild controlled entrance into the trade so that strangers could not move in from elsewhere and threaten the proprietary rights of those already in the trade.

Skilled workers today from trade unions not only to protect their occupations against encroachment but also to secure their rights within particular firms. On a higher level, employees endeavour to professionalize their work for the same reasons. Hence accountants, nurses, insurance specialists, advertisers, and others as well as the more firmly established "professionals" organize to protect their occupational rights. They develop a literature, set minimum standards for entrance to the occupational group, often requiring a university degree plus special training, claim autonomy in judging the fitness of members of the occupation, and establish their own codes of proper practice.[4]

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[4]On this trend in the United States, in terms applicable to the more urbanized parts of Canada, see Harold L. Wilensky, "The Professionalization of Everyone?" in the American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 70, No. 2 (September 1964), pp. 137-158.

Unskilled workers are least of all able to claim property rights in their kind of work. They have no special skills to withhold and are most susceptible to displacement by machines.

Although the common labourers in cities have often managed to form unions and by sheer force of numbers to demand higher wages, they have generally gained a measure of security only by becoming semi-skilled operators of certain types of machinery and by establishing a proprietary right to such operations. This development has paralleled the increased mechanization of many operations, for example in the building trades, which were formerly labouring jobs. This type of organization is not easily achieved in rural areas and there unskilled labour remains unorganized, overcrowded, most exposed to insecurity and least blessed with a proprietary character. This describes the lot of much of the labour force in the Atlantic region.

Traditionally it has been accepted that a skilled worker or specialist learned his occupation once and for all. It was recognized that experience added to the worth of an occupation once the training period ended and older, seasoned workers were often preferred over those beginning their careers. Modern industrial society is changing so rapidly under the influence of technological change that age and experience are no longer simple indicators of competence. Old skills often become irrelevant under changed conditions and training, and may diminish in value. Erosion of the value of training in higher occupations, says Taylor, starts at graduation.

> This worker knowledge characterized by erosion and obsolescence takes place whether the graduation is from the graduate school, the undergraduate college, the high school or the elementary school. One-shot training for an occupational lifetime is outmoded in a dynamic urbanized society. While this problem of training erosion strikes at the very heart of the sciences and professions, it is in no way limited there, or even to the white-collar occupations. Among the ranks of blue-collar workers and service workers this skill erosion is also widespread. It is clear that there is no place in the modern world for workers who are untrained and uneducated.[5]

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[5]Lee Taylor, Occupational Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press; 1968), p. 237.

The implication is that the value of a skilled occupation rapidly declines unless the worker keeps abreast of change. The hazard is not as great as Taylor implies. What is more important for occupations in a depressed region is that the practitioners there are in greater danger of being out of date than their counterparts in an industrial urban centre. In the highly industrialized region competition is sharper both between enterprises and among workers. Workers in such a milieu expect to be required to take "refresher" courses or "on the job training." The influence of change radiates outward to less industrial regions, more quickly for some types of work than for others. The craftsman who migrates from an out-region to the industrial centre, however, will probably find that he has many adaptations to make.

An occupation has worth only to the extent that there is a demand for it, but that worth depends also on the ability of the person to sell his occupational skills in the labour market. Some "deliver themselves" with more skill than others. But the value of some occupations will decline while the value of other occupations is increasing. Similarly, occupations valued in one setting may not be in demand in other settings. Hence, workers are expected to be willing to migrate or to be adaptable to changing conditions. Hence too, economic change involves serious human problems of adjustment.

Expectations and Occupational Change

Only a small minority of people can earn a living from the ownership and management of land or other property. Most people, at all socio-economic levels, are wage or salary earners or depend on fees for services. They sell their time and skill in the labour market. They must, as we have seen, continually exert themselves to keep abreast of technological and other changes. This is the main argument for retiring workers at age 65. While this practice has some effect in reducing the size of the labour force competing for too few jobs its main effect is to ensure a constant influx of young workers better adjusted to new developments.

We turn to the summary of a report on qualified manpower in Ontario. This report attempts to forecast changes in skilled,

professional and technical, and managerial occupations between now and 1986. Certain obvious hazards are faced in such forecasting but the authors conclude that in spite of this they are able to predict generally higher standards demanded for admission to skilled and professional occupations.

In general, the authors find that there will be a steady gain in the managerial and proprietary occupations, a slower gain in the skilled occupations, but rapidly increasing gain in the professional and technical fields. These changes will require expansion of post-secondary educational facilities. But they emphasize the difficulty involved in relating census data on formal schooling to the standards relevant to the assessment of changing occupational skills.

> Conversion of the (census) data according to an occupational concept into data according to a qualification concept has been our most difficult problem. The census schooling record offers limited help. It generally provides information on years of schooling on three general educational levels (elementary, secondary, and university), but the specific categories of the upper two levels leave much to be desired. The definition "university degree" does not disclose the course followed or the type of degree, and a person holding a university degree, enumerated as a mechanical engineer (by occupation), might hold a B. Sc., an M. Sc., or a Ph. D. in science or applied science with one of a wide variety of sub-specialities. The "some university" classification covers such a range of subgroups as to be virtually useless.

The substitution of skills, professional registration

> with or without examination, upgrading on the job, and reward for long experience and ability interfere with every effort to draw a sharp dividing line between "qualified" and "unqualified." Quite properly, in our economy, priority is given to efficiency, regardless of formal qualification.[6]

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[6]Cicely Watson and Joseph Butorac, A Summary: Qualified Manpower in Ontario, 1961-1968, Vol 1, "Projection of Basic Stocks," (Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education; 1968), p. 18.

This perfectionist approach in terms of earned degrees and diplomas may seem far-fetched in terms of work-place reality but it does make clear what the trend is. The pressure is on, partly from the work place and partly from professional and other organizations, to raise recruitment standards. The pressure is greatest and most effective in the metropolitan industrial centres. Outlying areas must then fall into line.

Watson and Butorac, taking the position that ideal standards today call for a university degree or "some university," have estimated the number of persons who would be included in the two categories: 1) proprietary and managerial, 2) professional and technical. Comparing their findings for Ontario with census data relating to the Atlantic Provinces, we get the following percentages of formally qualified practitioners in each category:[7]

	Ontario	Atlantic Provinces
Proprietary and Managerial	29.5%	7.3%
Professional and Technical	50.2%	43.2%

[7]Ibid., pp. 13,20. Figures for the Atlantic Provinces are from Census of Canada, 1961, Series 3.1, Table 17.

Standards for skilled labour are also beginning to specify dimplomas certifying educational attainments.

Aspirations and the Social Milieu

Denton offers some 1961 figures, as seen in Table 3, comparing regions of Canada for level of education, setting the percentage of males with only elementary schooling against the percentage with university degrees. The Atlantic region is lowest in the proportion with university degrees and, together with Quebec, the region with the highest proportion of men having only elementary schooling.[8]

[8]Frank T. Denton, Analysis of Interregional Differences in Manpower Utilization and Earnings (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada; 1966), Staff Study No. 15, p. 12.

Table 3

Percentage of Male Population in Selected Educational Categories for Canada and Its Regions; 1961

	Level of Education Attained	
Region	Elementary Only	University Degree
Canada	52.4	4.0
Atlantic	59.0	2.3
Quebec	59.5	4.0
Ontario	48.9	4.7
Prairies	50.7	3.4
British Columbia	40.2	4.3

Regional differences in educational levels are, to an important extent, functions of differences in the educational requirements of different industries. In the Atlantic region, according to the 1961 census, there were 50,547 workers employed in forestry, fishing, and mining, comprising about 9 per cent of the labour force in the region. Of this number, 27.5 per cent had less than five years of schooling while 51.1 per cent had completed the upper elementary grades. Thus 78.6 per cent of the labour force in these industries had not progressed beyond elementary education. In Ontario, where less than 2 per cent of the labour force is engaged in forestry, fishing and mining, 68.6 per cent of those had only an elementary education, some 10 per cent fewer than in the Atlantic region.[9]

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[9]See tables in Appendix A.

Watson and Butorac, in the report previously cited, convey the thought that all occupations above the unskilled level are moving in the direction of greater efficiency and higher recruitment standards while the need for unskilled workers tends to diminish. When we compare Ontario with the Atlantic region in terms of the category "craftsmen," which includes a great variety of skilled manual workers, we find a greater tendency in Ontario to "squeeze out" workers with less than five years of schooling.

It also means that Ontario has fewer persons in the labour market with little education. It certainly means that persons from depressed areas who migrate to Ontario will have difficulty in finding skilled jobs.

	Ontario	Atlantic Region
Number of "craftsmen"	619,137	119,046
Percentage of labour force	25.9	21.2
Percentage with less than five years schooling	4.9	10.9
Percentages with five years or more of elementary schooling	47.2	47.3

A second observation may be made with respect to standards of living. Some 26 per cent of Ontario's workers are in the skilled categories as compared with 21 per cent of those in the Atlantic region. This means that a larger proportion of Ontario workers are in the higher income groups.[10]

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[10]See tables in Appendix A.

At this point it is pertinent to consider a viewpoint often expressed regarding low educational levels in an area or region. It is said to indicate an inefficient or wasteful use of manpower, to evidence limited aspirations among the people, to be conducive to attitudes of dependence rather than self-sufficiency, to produce cynical or hostile attitudes, and to lead to the acceptance of a way of life that drifts along. People in this condition are called alienated, indifferent or, in Durkheim's

terminology, "anomic," meaning people in a state of normlessness. Lacking clear goals, the poor people, especially in depressed regions, are said to lack ambition for attaining higher educational or occupational goals. This is seen as a malady which does not respond to treatment. During the past several decades hundreds of little projects have been undertaken by outsiders to raise the level of aspiration and living among the people of Appalachia. Most of the efforts were short-lived and even those which have endured have had relatively little influence. As one observer put it, "Like the tree that grows beside the water, these people just stand there."

Aspirations emerge normally for most people, even the poorest, but they emerge mainly in response to one's immediate milieu and they begin in one's childhood. For most people, poor or not, aspirations through early life tend to outdistance expectations. This has been found in many studies, such as the educational survey in the Halifax area which was undertaken by Connor and Magill. They based their questions on the following definitions: "Aspiration is defined as the occupation the student <u>wants to enter</u>. Expectation is defined as the occupation the student actually <u>expects to enter</u>." They found that high aspirations were more frequent among girls than among boys, especially for students from high status families. Their percentages show

	Status of Families			
	High Status		Low Status	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
High aspiration	55%	84%	46%	77%
High expectation	42%	83%	31%	69%

that, while high aspirations were less frequently expressed by students of low status families, they were still not low. The boys, when asked about their realistic expectations, were less optimistic than the girls.[11]

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[11]D. M. Connor and D. W. Magill, The Role of Education in Rural Development (Ottawa: ARDA Project #3053, Department of Forestry; 1965), pp. 49,51.

Taylor, as well as Connor and Magill, accepts the vocational theory of Ginsberg and, after distinguishing between aspiration and expectation, emphasizes the function of the social milieu in the development of aspiration. He mentions three phases in this development: 1) the stage of fantasy, 2) the stage of tentative outlook and 3) the stage of realistic outlook.

> The fantasy period is characterized by young children thinking about what they want to be as adults. The fantasy is unrestrained by visible considerations either of one's capacity or of the range of real opportunities. Presumably in fantasy one can become whatever one desires.
>
> The tentative period starts usually between the ages of 10 and 12. Youngsters with advanced intellectual and emotional development enter it at earlier ages and those who are less developed at later ages In the tentative period the individual

> refines his choosing in terms of desired future satisfactions rather than immediate satisfactions. Still the variables manipulated are subjective - interests and values.
>
> The realistic period starts between the ages of 16 and 18. Earlier subjective choices must now be compromised with the objective facts of one's enviornment. Often this period is characterized by narrowing one's choice from, for example, science in general, to a specific scientific occupation, say physics.[12]

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[12]Taylor, op. cit., p. 190. The theory is built upon that of Eli Ginsberg, Occupational Choice: An Approach to a General Theory (New York: Columbia University Press; 1951).

Whatever his social milieu, the child learns life and acquires his basic orientation almost entirely in terms of his immediate environment, although his fantasy is fed from mass media and other contact with other environments. Later the distant environment becomes a more real consideration and competes in his aspirations with local influences. The child in a remote depressed community can be expected to remain longest and most firmly under the influence of the immediate environment. He may reach adulthood with a total commitment to his local subculture, seeing in it the measure of the good life. In such a situation, a realistic appraisal of opportunities may very well involve an abandoning of ambitions taken for granted in more affluent settings. Unless the opportunities are present it is unrealistic to expect attempts to manipulate attitudes to have much effect on aspirations.

Visible Opportunities and Expectations

A person entering adulthood in a remote depressed community, who was quite willing to leave school as early as possible, after the manner of his most respected associates, is quite likely to have occupational aspirations similar to those of other young persons of his acquaintance. The occupational outlook would depend largely on what is visible, what the locality and surrounding places have to offer. We would expect this to hold whether one lived in Ontario or in the Atlantic Provinces. The difference is that visible occupations are many times more numerous in Ontario. It would be surprising if the incentives for continuing education were not greater in Ontario than in the Atlantic region. Table 4 compares the two regions for the number and percentage of wage-earners in the different industrial categories. The telling line in the table is the one for manufacturing, showing 17.76 per cent of the wage earners in the Atlantic Provinces as compared with 34.28 per cent in Ontario. Manufacturing, by the extent of its presence or absence, is the main feature distinguishing the affluent region from the depressed region. It provides a good share of the incomes above the common labourer level and strengthens other industrial categories. Many workers in the Atlantic Provinces who are listed with manufacturing in the census are actually in the primary industries which use a minimum of skilled labour.

Table 4

Percentage Distribution of Wage Earners by Types of Industry in the Atlantic Provinces and Ontario, 1961

Industry	Atlantic Provinces Number	Atlantic Provinces Percent	Ontario Number	Ontario Percent
Total	350,963	100.00	1,429,075	100.00
Agriculture	8,445	2.41	34,691	2.43
Forestry	19,355	5.51	16,053	1.12
Fishing, Trapping	6,175	1.76	862	.06
Mines, Quarries, Oil	15,794	4.50	41,170	2.88
Manufacturing	62,314	17.76	489,911	34.28
Construction	32,843	9.36	119,629	8.37
Transportation, Communication, Utilities	54,154	15.43	155,313	10.87
Trade	48,684	13.87	197,832	13.84
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate	5,609	1.60	44,666	3.13
Community Business and Personal Service	28,043	7.99	150,081	10.50
Public Administration and Defence	61,272	17.46	142,091	9.94
Industry Unspecified or Undefined	8,275	2.36	36,776	2.57

Source: Census of Canada, 1961, Series 3.2, Table 10.
*Original table shows a column for number in labour force which includes the self-employed. The total self-employed and wage earners in this category for the Atlantic Provinces is 21,493, of whom only 9.72% are wage earners.

What the relative absence of secondary industry means in the Atlantic region is suggested in this item from Poetschke describing northern Nova Scotia:

> The basic problem of this area is an inefficient and declining industrial sector. Studies clearly indicate that, without some major effort to exploit the substantial potential that exists in this sector, efforts to restructure and improve the productivity in agriculture, fisheries and forestry may only

> aggravate the problem of low incomes and under-employment. While substantial outmigration will no doubt continue for a number of years, analysis indicates that the prolongation of the present situation, which gives rise to this movement, can only result in a further widening of the income gap between this region and the rest of Canada. In fact, it may have a serious detrimental impact on the economy of the province as a whole.[13]

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[13] L. E. Poetschke, "Regional Planning for Depressed Rural Areas; The Canadian Experience," in Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1968), pp. 1-12.

This does not mean that the area mentioned by Poetschke is without potential, but that the area can be weakened by over-exploiting its limited resources. Many who have aspirations for a better life elect to migrate. Those who remain are not in a position to initiate economic development. Both initiation and funds must come from without.

Chapter 4

Class Structure and Economic Change

Types of Class Structure

The social order of a community describes how the different social organizations, including small informal groups, function in relation to each other, how power finds expression and by whom, how legitimate authority is distributed, and how people are ranked relative to one another. All of these elements are reflected in the system of classes found in the community. The class structure is closely related to the economic activities of the community and takes different forms according to the degree of industrialization and urbanization.

How the class system in a region or area is constituted and how it functions are pertinent to any analysis of social change. The class system is in large part an adaptation to local exigencies. This observation by Aubert, a Norwegian sociologist, is pertinent:

> The first precondition for systems to emerge on the basis of social stratification is that the similarities and dissimilarities of rank are being perceived by the members. Social rank must be psychologically salient, and no mere statistical construct based on differences observed only by the sociologist. In less cohesive societies, geographically disconnected or divided by different ethnic or linguistic groups, it is sometimes doubtful exactly what psychological significance the pattern of unequal access to scarce goods have on a national scale. The answer depends on

> what comparisons are relevant to the society in question, what reference groups the actors choose. They may have a frame of reference that is limited to local communities or to ethnic groups, making the stratification less relevant than it is in societies where the consciousness of national membership is highly developed.[1]

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[1]Vilhelm Aubert, Elements of Sociology (New York: Scribners; 1967), p. 122.

In these terms, the social class structure will not only be uniquely the product of the local community and the people there, it will also be less cosmopolitan than the social class system in an urbanized area.

Karl Marx made the relationship between social class and social change the central issue in his writings. For our purposes, we find a more adequate and sophisticated analysis in the writings of Max Weber.[2] Weber observed that there are both

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[2]Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Tr. and Ed. by T. Parsons and A. M. Henderson (New York: Oxford University Press; 1947), pp. 424-429; and H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Tr. and Ed.). From Max Weber; Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press; 1946), pp. 180-194.

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class systems and status systems and it makes a great deal of difference in the economic sphere which system is dominant at any particular time in any area. The social status system is based on consumption rather than production and involves social prestige awarded on the basis of style of life, level of education,

family of birth, or occupational attainment. Status is ascribed to the extent that it rests more on the social respectability of the individual than on the achievements attained by his own efforts. The result is a system of "social strata."

Social strata develop and subsist most readily where economic organization is of a monopolistic or liturgical character, where the economic needs of organized groups are met on a feudal or patrimonial basis. Hence, to Weber, "Every society where strata play a prominent part is controlled to a large extent by conventional rules of conduct. It thus creates economically irrational conditions of consumption and hinders the development of free markets by monopolistic appropriation and by restricting free disposal of the individual's own economic ability."

Such a situation is much more common than we typically realize and, even within market economies, many areas of behaviour are defined by personal standing and relationships rather than by impersonal criteria of competence and efficiency. Even business practices may be defined largely by tradition rather than by rational economic criteria.

Occupational associations, trade unions or professional organizations, are status groups which seek to control economic activity in terms of group membership and acceptability. A merchant's association is another example. Status groups are

favoured by stable economic conditions and are threatened by rapid economic change. Again, to cite Weber:

> When the basis of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stable, stratification by status is favored. Every technological repercussion and economic transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground. Epochs and countries in which the naked class situation is of predominant significance are regularly the periods of technical and economic transformations. And every slowing down of the shifting of economic stratifications leads, in due course, to the growth of status structures and makes for a resuscitation of the important role of social honor.[3]

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[3]Gerth and Mills, op. cit., pp. 193-194.

Economically, property and status distinctions tend to be associated with stagnancy in regions or areas where income opportunities are tightly controlled within a stable social structure. Vested interests in the existing system are most prominent in economic situations experiencing little change and are supported by the status structure. The most extreme status system is a caste organization in which an occupation becomes a monopoly of a closed, endogamous group.

Classes, on the other hand, as opposed to status groups, are defined by positions within market systems and involve an element of competition. Weber distinguishes three types of classes:

1. Property classes: those who own land or other tangible income-earning property.

2. Acquisition Classes: those whose position depends on the marketability of skills or other resources, as in business enterprise, skilled occupations and the professions.

3. Social Classes: defined in terms of both property and market relationships. The social class structure is a complex system in which ownership of property or special skills leads to a particular mixture of market strength, political power and social status.

At the bottom of the class structure are the most unskilled agricultural or industrial workers without property and without ownership of the tools they use. At the top are those with control of large property holdings and those in privileged professions. Weber points out that great differences in the ownership of property do not produce demands for change. Some of the most stable societies have been characterized by such differences, even to the point where one class has been the object of ownership by another class, i.e. enslaved. The primary significance of differences in the ownership of property lies in the potential ability of wealthy persons to control the sale of economic goods, to monopolize the purchase of high-priced consumer goods, and to monopolize the privileges associated with socially advantageous kinds of education. Those with unconsumed surplus wealth may, through loans and investment of capital, gain control over executive positions in business. But it is only as they apply their economic resources in market situations that the wealthy become

an acquisition class.

Weber, in describing the acquisition classes, was thinking mainly of the middle classes who offer marketable abilities gained through training and competitive experience rather than classes whose position rests merely on the ownership of physical assets. Insofar as skills are scarce resources, their owners are in the same position as those who control valuable property. This is the case, for example, among medical practitioners and other professional groups in a depressed region. "But always this is the generic connotation of the concept of class: that the kind of chance in the market is the decisive moment which presents a common condition for the individual's fate. 'Class situation' is, in this sense, ultimately 'market situation.'" Weber observes further:

> It is the most elemental economic fact that the way in which the disposition over material property is distributed among a plurality of people, meeting competitively in the market for the purpose of exchange, in itself creates specific life chances. According to the law of marginal utility this mode of distribution excludes the non-owners from competing for highly valued goods; it favors the owners and, in fact, gives to them a monopoly to acquire such goods.
>
> Other things being equal, this mode of distribution monopolizes the opportunities for profitable deals for all those who, provided with goods, do not necessarily have to exchange them. It increases, at least generally, their power in price wars with those who, being propertyless, have nothing to offer

> but their services in native form, or goods in the form constituted through their own labor, and who above all are compelled to get rid of these products in order barely to subsist.
>
> This mode of distribution gives to the propertied a monopoly on the possibility of transforming property from the sphere of use as a "fortune," to the sphere of "capital goods;" that is, it gives them the entrepreneurial function and all the chances to share directly or indirectly in returns on capital.[4]

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[4]Ibid., pp. 181-182.

In certain of its activities a property class, using knowledge gained through training, may function as an acquisition class. On the other hand, a lawyer, professionally a member of an acquisition class, may become identified with a property class if he gains wealth and uses it to acquire property. Entrepreneurs may come from either class.

It is possible for a member of a privileged acquisition class to gain control of the management of productive enterprises and from this vantage point gain influence in other enterprises. He may, with others, influence the economic policies of government. Merchants, shipowners, industrial and agricultural entrepreneurs, bankers and financiers and, to a lesser extent, members of the "liberal" professions or certain skilled trades may operate in this fashion.

At the bottom of the acquisition class structure are

workers of the various types, who may be skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. The middle classes include independent peasants and craftsmen, often public officials, the liberal professions generally, and occasionally workers who have exceptional monopolistic assets or positions.

Acquisition classes are the main dynamic force in the economy. Their position being determined by competitive strength in the market, they are most exposed to the effects of technological and other change. Hence, acquisition classes are the least secure and least stable. The problem of economic development which would convert subsistence economies into market economies intimately involves acquisition classes. Sociologically, the problem is one of breaking down fixed social strata and developing a market system of acquisition classes.

The foregoing paragraphs desceibe Weber's conception of the economic behaviour of social classes, as contrasted with the social behaviour of status groups to which the same people belong. Here is Weber's conception of the resultant social class structure:

1. Working Class: The more completely mechanized the productive processes become, the more completely the workers become a class.

2. Lower-middle Classes: Typically included are the small shop-keepers, proprietors of small handicraft workshops and other economically independent elements not employed in large-scale organizations.

3. The "Intelligentsia": Included are persons without independent property and persons whose positions are primarily determined by training, such as engineers, commercial and other officials and civil servants. These groups may differ greatly among themselves, in particular according to the cost of training.

4. Upper Classes: Those occupying positions of privilege through education or ownership or control of property.

There has been a tendency for the number of semi-skilled workers, who hold jobs calling for little skill-training, to increase more rapidly than the numbers of either skilled or unskilled workers. Opportunities for workers to acquire skills which insure continuous employment security are diminishing as the majority of industrial jobs are found at the handwork level. These working-class positions call for elementary or high school education, general skill, and a capacity for ready adaptation to different kinds of employment. Higher education or some specialized training lead into Weber's second and third class levels.

Inherent Inequality of Social Class

Marshall accepts, with minor reservations, Weber's view that the stratification system of industrial society is two-dimensional, with a social class structure related to productive functions and a status system based on patterns of consumption, but he adds that any stratification system is based on inequality. A very old stratified order, like the caste system, has so

institutionalized the inequalities that each caste accepts and defends its position against either higher or lower castes.

Citizenship in Western society stands opposed to the inequalities of class by admitting all classes on the basis of equality. Citizenship does not eliminate the class system but affords a means by which the extremes of class inequality can be withstood.

> Class is, as it were, an institution in its own right, and the whole structure has the quality of a plan, in the sense that it is endowed with meaning and purpose and accepted as a natural order .... Nor are there any rights - at least none of any significance - which all share in common. The impact of citizenship on such a system was bound to be profoundly disturbing, and even destructive. The rights with which the general status of citizenship was invested were extracted from the hierarchical status system of social class, robbing it of its essential substance. The equality implicit in the concept of citizenship, even though limited in content, undermined the inequality of the class system, which was in principle a total inequality.[5]

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[5]T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development New York: Doubleday, Anchor; 1965), p. 93.

Citizenship involves rights and in his study of the English situation, Marshall found that the struggle for these rights was marked by three stages. Civil rights were gained in the eighteenth century, political rights in the nineteenth century and social rights in the twentieth century. This does

not mean that rights have been enjoyed by all, but that they have been given statutory recognition in England.[6]

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[6]Ibid., pp. 105-106.

As well he might, Marshall associates the emergence of citizenship with the evolution of industry. While the rights, once gained, apply to rural and urban people alike, the struggle to gain them took place in the urban sector. In the urban community, the organization required to demand and defend rights is more easily achieved than in rural communities where it is less possible for people to join forces to curb the power of the upper property class. Moreover, the struggle for rights becomes a form of challenging a traditionally-rooted order and a traditionally-established authority structure.

The challenging of a traditional social order is least likely to appear in a static society with a rural economy. It is to be expected in a dynamic society of the urban industrial type. As we shall discuss in some detail, change is likely to be most resisted in a situation, common in rural settings, where least change is being experienced, i.e. in areas most sheltered from the impact of technological, economic and social innovations. In the industrial urban society where the idea of innovation is taken in stride, there is likely to be an eagerness to accept

change as evidence of being abreast of the times. This type of society is likely to have an "open" class system in contrast to the "closed" class system of the slowly changing rural society.

Open and Closed Class Structures

Society in the Atlantic Provinces, with their dispersed clusters of population, dispersed industries, and diversity of local histories, is necessarily fragmented into numerous isolations. Moreover, as are all regions which are identified as rural, the Atlantic region is in the process of transition from a rather closed system of classes with localized referents to a more comprehensive, urban and industrial society with an open class system more like that of Central Canada. The transition now under way is not without its problems of adjustment.

A closed class structure, characterized by ascribed criteria of position and little movement between classes, provides little basis for change. Individuals are destined to remain in the classes into which they were born. One's occupation and style of life are expected to remain consistent with those of his father. The extreme case is found in the caste society which identifies one's level of culture with his occupation and equates person and position. It is still found in the villages of India. But the more common example of relatively closed class structures is one in which differences in income, educational opportunities

and awareness of employment patterns differentiate social classes. No formal restrictions are necessary to keep the members of the lower class in their place in a stagnant economy. Style of life and mutual support maintain the position of a class in a community isolated from outside influences. One's area of work and way of life are protected from outsiders but the converse is that it is difficult to move into some other occupation and level of living.

Expectations in the open class society lay emphasis on mobility and encourage one to seek the rewards associated with upward occupational movement. The impersonality of industrial society leads to an accepted distinction between position and person:

> In other words, an emphasis on loyalty, family ties, religiosity, or any other personal attribute or inherited quality is not enough for choosing among people when filling the positions that constitute the domains of society outside the domain of kinship. No society does without these. They are part of the concensus and of the structure of industrial societies as they have been of previous societies. But today they are insufficient. Increasingly, personal ties and concerns are complemented by impersonal considerations and by the cultivation of impersonal social relations.[7]

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[7]Kaspar D. Naegele, "Modern National Societies," in Bernard R. Blishen, et al, Canadian Society: Sociological Perspectives (Toronto: MacMillan, 1968), p. 10.

A Class society may be unlike a caste system and yet be

relatively closed in the sense that the higher public positions and key positions in the industrial and commercial establishments of the area go to the sons of the leading families. Access to educational institutions provides one measure of the openness of the occupational structure in an area. In his survey of students at the University of New Brunswick, Anderson found that most students came from the minority of families in secure economic positions. An analysis of the occupations of the fathers of the 303 students interviewed in the sample reveals that 218 were in the white-collar, professional or technical, and owner, official or managerial categories. While these categories constitute 61 per cent of the sample, they make up no more than about 20 per cent of the labour force of New Brunswick. Even when allowance is made for a tendency of students to upgrade their fathers'

Student's By Father's Occupation

Unskilled	7	Professional, Technical	83
Semiskilled	12	Owner, Official, Manager	67
Skilled	37	Small Business or Farm	29
White-collar	68	Total:	303

occupations, it is evident that the sons and daughters of the working class are not equally represented among university students. The social and economic situation apparently does not stimulate working-class families to send their childrer to higher educational institutions.

The open class system, so essential to the industrial

society, places great emphasis on formal education as well as on technical training to prepare youth for the more specialized occupations. Where other work systems make ready allowance for status considerations and kinship priorities, the industrial work system stresses know-how and achievement. As for its relation with the criteria of ascription, it neither gives nor accepts hostages. Its relation to traditional status systems is one of non-involvement for it can accept no conditions that may compromise its impersonal commitment to efficient operations. Its position vis-a-vis class is "open." Stratification systems must adapt to it and this tends to be disturbing in a region where the full force of "openness" has not been established. Chinoy sees the open system as characteristic of Western countries.

> The interrelations among the many attributes of stratification systems can be illustrated by examination of three cases: the Indian caste system, with clear-cut divisions, little individual mobility and the domination of inherited status; the relatively open Soviet class structure that has emerged in a totalitarian society dominated by political bureaucracy and subscribing to an ideology that denies the existence of classes; and the relatively open system of the United States, with fluid and vaguely defined class lines, a considerable volume of social mobility, and an equalitarian ideology that coexists with recognized class and status distinctions.[8]

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[8]Ely Chinoy, Society (New York: Random House; 1963), p. 140.

Class Systems and Social Change

While an industrial society is more heterogeneous than an agricultural society, it is particularly heterogeneous in its most urbanized and industrialized areas. Because of a higher rate of mobility in the more industrialized areas, the localisms characteristic of the rural areas tend to disappear. In their place appear the localisms of the urban neighborhood: the "Gold Coast" areas inhabited by the rich, areas of middle-class residence, working-class neighborhoods, ethnic or racial ghettos, and slums. The areas of homogeneity become smaller, both in extent and in the aspects of life involved, and the change characteristic of the city limits the establishment of traditional imperatives.

The urban industrial type of heterogeneity is the product of social and economic change imposed by a more sharply competitive, faster-moving and more open way of life. It is at once the product of change and change-inducing. Of this way of life, Naegele wrote:

> Industrial societies are <u>internally</u> heterogeneous. They consist of diverse groupings, aggregates, and styles of life. Besides, for all the emergence of mass society and totalitarian regimentation, modern societies have become the context for the development of individualism. In addition, they have provided opportunities on an unprecedented scale for diverse groups and individuals within one society to participate in the enjoyment and even management of that society. Such claims are, of course, subject

to much debate.[9]

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[9]Naegele, op. cit., p. 14. (The Italics are added.)

In any community, rural or urban, agricultural or industrial, social and economic arrangements tend to continue in the absence of disturbances, and this is an important basis for the maintenance of the social order and some degree of equilibrium. In the industrial urban situation changes come more rapidly and adaptation to change is more readily made, but even here resistance to change is found. Again we quote Naegele:

> Modern societies, however, are marked by fairly rapid and comprehensive transformations in relatively short periods of time. They value change and exhibit it. They also generate movements and institutions that counter social change in the name of various traditions. Progress and improvement, as well as stability and the preservation of certain cultural resources. Indeed, as Weber especially suggested, modern societies contain a series of dichotomies and strains that engender change, and are the product of it.[10]

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[10]Ibid., p. 14.

Whether our attention is on technological change, economic change, or social change, it is unreal to consider any one sector of change in isolation from the other two. All relate to patterns of social behaviour, to the values that people hold, and to the groupings with which people are identified. In modern

society, whether we consider an impoverished area or a dynamic industrial centre, some types of change will be found, and change will be seen to be continuous. The differences between areas is in the rate and variety of change. In either case, change is disturbing to existing structures and behaviour patterns, as well as traditional values and relationships. Yet, in the dynamic centre where the stimulus for change is greater, there will be found organized groups favourable to change, while in the more isolated, less industrial area, organized efforts to resist change may be stronger. Resistance to change arises out of fear of its moral effects as well as fear of its inherent threat to established social and economic interests.

In other words, change is a threat to organized social systems, in particular to the system of social stratification, such as the two-class system often found in depressed areas. Marshall notes that change, though continuous, receives its impetus in the social system of the more dynamic centres.

> In part it is produced by mechanisms built into the system, like legislative bodies which have power and even the duty to introduce systematic change. Sometimes it grows out of non-systematic elements, the deviations and the conflicts I have been describing. And here one meets one of the most bothersome of the distinctions one has to make in this subject, because it obviously exists and yet is almost impossible to pin down; it is the distinction between evolution and revolution, between change that occurs smoothly within the

system without breaking it or destroying its identity, and change which attacks it and swiftly transforms it into something different.[11]

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[11]Marshall, op. cit. p. 32.

Conservative Attitudes Toward Change

There have been dozens of studies of the poor and of poor areas, most of them about the poor in cities. Most of these, to some degree or other, give some attention to the attitudes of the poor, seeing them as behaving as people outside the larger society, as thinking of themselves as outside both socially and economically, and as being either indifferent to the larger society or cynical about it. As Rossi and Blum found in their review of this literature, there is considerable respect for tradition in the "lower-lower" class, and even evidence of conservatism on moral issues.

1. The lower socio-economic levels have a greater sense of insecurity and pessimism in their ability to control their own fate or affect the decision-making centers of our society.

2. The lower socio-economic status levels are more traditional in their views about deviance in the social, political, and religious spheres of life and more intolerant of deviants.

3. There is an inverse correlation between attitudes toward minority and ethnic religious groups and socio-economic position, as well as a greater authoritarianism in the lower socio-economic status levels.

4. On economic issues and in the support of political candidates and parties, the lower socio-economic status levels are more likely to support the "liberal" side.[12]

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[12]Peter H. Rossi and Zahava D. Blum, "Social Stratification and Poverty," Mimeographed Paper (Chicago: Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago; 1966), p. 79.

Despite much publicity given to marches, riots and collective protest on the part of the impoverished in American cities, only a small minority of the poor appear to be involved. The observations cited above may be taken as a fairly accurate description of their attitudes. Even though they participate only marginally in community life, they do have their values and they do have a stable life outlook which has been labeled conservative. It may be expressed in part by the slowness with which they respond to the cult of progress insofar as it calls for striving for education and entrance into higher level occupations. If they vote for "liberal" proposals, it is more likely because of their wish for economic security than because they seek any change in the social system they know or the values they hold.

Our attention in this study is on the rural poor, whether farmers, fishermen, woodsmen or the rural labourers who do various kinds of work. They can be thought of collectively as a social class, as identified with a particular category of

occupations and as having an identifiable level of living, even as a distinguishable class sub-culture. The thinking of these people toward any change that touches their subculture and social system, Whyte regards as conservative, and he gives the following reasons:

> Weber observed almost a century ago, that persons engaged in agrarian pursuits are more imbedded in traditionalism and are therefore less likely to initiate change. The principal reason for this difference is that rural people are engaged in pursuits which are as old as the history of civilization, hence traditions are more clearly established. Further, rural people are less mobile than urban, the result being that their traditions are more firmly imbedded in the social fabric of their society than is true of a pulsating and variformed urban populace. It is persons of ambiguous social status who are likely to be alienated from established institutions and more susceptible to new ideas.[13]

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[13]Donald R. Whyte, "Rural Canada in Transition," in Marc-Adelard Tremblay and Walton J. Anderson, Eds., Rural Canada in Transition (Ottawa: Agricultural Economics Council; 1966), p. 96.

Social Change in Dryden Cross

It is axiomatic that if a new work organization is established in a community that other work enterprises in the community will be affected by it. If the new enterprise calls for skills that are not found in the community, efforts will be made to import persons with such skills. In time the skills will be developed locally. The emergence of a category of

workers with special skills, especially with incomes higher than the old average, will be a disturbing influence on the class structure. If the new industry expands or becomes an inducement for other new enterprises, then the community may experience the appearance of categories of white-collar workers, another disturbing influence on the old class structure. The various occupations, adding complexity to the work system of the community, may be expected to bring about changes in the old social structure as well as in social behaviour patterns, and these changes may be resisted.

This process is illustrated in the story of an Atlantic region small town which may be identified as Dryden Cross, centrally located and within reach of three small cities. Until the arrival of modern highways, this place was economically and psychologically isolated. Good highways and motor transportation now enable Dryden Cross to support six garages where one sufficed four decades ago.

Dryden Cross has one advantage which is important to any town. It lies in the midst of a fairly productive farming area. In pre-automobile days it was an important local trade center, and there was a continuing interdependence between merchants and farmers. Much of the exchange was in the nature of barter, with farmers exchanging produce for the goods stocked by the merchants. This served well for more than a generation, with

the merchant naming the price for what he bought or sold. In this sheltered market the merchant was neither stimulated toward efficiency nor threatened by competition.

This earlier farmer-merchant relationship was symbiotic, even though farmers had little part in town activity, except to trade or attend church. The management of the town was left largely to the merchants who were content with stability. Their ideal for Dryden Cross was that it should remain quiet and respectable. Industrial expansion was feared; it might bring in migrant workers of low class and create slums.

At the beginning of the century, four men were the top influentials in Dryden Cross. Two were merchants, one the local physician, and the fourth was important in provincial politics. All four had served at one time or other as town mayor. The four families were also linked by marriage ties. In one marriage arrangement, two of the businesses became merged into one large store which, locally, was regarded as progress.

In time, this group of families, due to some political scandal, lost influence and, in the 1920's, a new group of families came to the fore. A World War I military base had been established in the vicinity and, although a disturbing element for community equilibrium, it was a spur to business and enabled a number of small enterprisers to get established. It was at this

time that the local leadership was undergoing the first real change in a generation. This interlude of growth was followed by a new period of stability during which business leaders again became content to be good church members, members of community clubs, and supporters of quiet progress. It was not the earlier type of quiet existence for the community had moved beyond that. A former resident remarked how older members of the community would express a sentimental attachment to the past.

> A few years ago one could not help but notice the continual reference to the "old days." Glorification of the old and an attitude of resignation towards the present seemed to be a prevalent attitude in Dryden Cross. On all sides a person was apt to hear how "at one time" Dryden Cross was such a peaceful town and was so pleasant to live in; how it was the most beautiful town in the province; how there had always been such a lively interest in the "arts" and how it had always been so full of wonderful people.

That stability had vanished, had been broken down by a new liveliness that came with the second world war. Further changes occured and settled relationships were again disturbed. The old isolation of Dryden Cross moved into the past with the opening of new opportunities for trade radically different from those of the farmer-merchant barter relations. In the process, the social status system gradually changed character. Older establishments were left with obsolete equipment and declining business. A small enterprise making wooden iceboxes went

bankrupt in the 1950's.

Good roads helped to speed change. Residents were now able to go by auto to do special shopping in one of the three cities located within an hour's driving distance. Local business now became aware of competition. The town was able to attract a small industrial plant from Central Canada.

Still there were many among the older residents of Dryden Cross who viewed with concern the coming of the new industrial plant. There was fear that workers would move in from other places and the religious and ethnic composition of the community would change. It was argued that the new people would be of the "poor class," and "poor" carried connotations of being less worthy. Growth has continued during the 1960's and there is evidence that community attitudes have changed. There is a trend toward Dryden Cross becoming a community of several social classes, quite removed from the former two-class society of merchant and farmer.

Conservative Stance of Isolated Communities

Much has been written about the innate, or at least chronic, resistance of the poor to social change, their often-noted reservations toward middle-class achievement values. What these reports often fail to note is that such attitudes of caution and conservatism are manifest at all social levels in isolated

communities. The insecurity sensed by the poor is not less a concern among the not-so-poor. Even though the less poor obviously exercise much influence in the management of community affairs, their positions are secure mainly in local terms. They usually have good reason to fear unpredictable intrusions from the outside world. Mills reported on a study of minor business firms in small American cities, which is pertinent here.

The findings of the study reported by Mills show the status of the small businessman as ambiguous. Among big businessmen he is seen as being very little above the working class, and his position vis-a-vis big businessmen is far from secure. More often than not, the little businessman has working-class origins. Nor is he held in high esteem by the working class, especially if he operates, as increasingly he must, on a cash basis. If he is careful and cautious about economic change, this attitude may be evidence of his sense of insecurity in the face of unpredictable change.[14]

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[14]C. Wright Mills, "The Middle Class in Middle-Sized Cities," in American Sociological Review, Vol. 11, No. 6 (December 1946), pp. 520-529.

It has become a truism that depressed areas and regions, generally speaking, are conservative, that this conservatism stems from a feeling of insecurity. This is evident not only among the

very poor but among all groups in such locations. Appalachia has been pictured as a backward region for several decades, although Ford remarks that the rate of change there is more rapid than formerly. He adds that there are factions within the region; those seeking more rapid change confronting those who are opposed to change, or opposed to certain changes.

> The course of transition is never smooth, for the adoption of new ways always carries the implication of the inferiority of the old ways and the values that have sustained them. It is therefore inevitable that some conflict should develop between the accepters of the new and the defenders of the old. But the people of a society undergoing transition are rarely divided into two sharply distinct categories. More commonly than not, the individuals who compose such a society are internally at odds, accepting some of the new, retaining some of the old, and seeking to resolve or repress whatever logical inconsistencies may arise as a consequence.[15]

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[15]Thomas R. Ford, "The Passing of Provincialism," in Thomas R. Ford, Ed., The Southern Appalachian Region (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press; 1962), p. 32.

In a depressed, slow-moving region, many minor changes that would be taken in stride by the more urbanized will be socially disturbing. New tools, new ways of work, new consumer goods, more moving about of people all serve to disturb established relationships. People do not remain in their accustomed roles. The main function of a class system, to place people in status relations with others with the expectation that they will stay

put, is thus subject to disturbance. Individuals are forced to adapt to the changing relationships which are inherent in changing roles.

Parks reminds us that changes which may be sorely needed in depressed areas cannot be legislated into acceptance or imposed merely by instruction. Time is needed for adaptation to take place. Efforts to force change upon a population by means of formal organization may merely stiffen resistance.

> Meanwhile, how has this difficulty, this resistance and inability to change, shown itself? That it is of considerable concern to voluntary organizations may be seen in seventeen references made to it in the eight interviews conducted in Eastern Canada. One aspect of the difficulty has to do with attitudes toward education.... At present many children do not go to school at all, as the family and their peers do not consider it important. It could be a process of generations. The change could be accelerated by organization of growth centres in the Atlantic Provinces which would influence the initiative to go to school.[16]

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[16]Arthur C. Parks and F. R. Drummie, "The Atlantic Privinces Research Board," Reprint from Canadian Public Administration, quoted by William M. Nicholls, Views on Rural Development in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Council on Rural Development; 1967), p. 66.

Fortin, writing about rural cooperatives, sees conservative behaviour and attitudes toward cooperatives in the conduct of their members and in the use made of cooperatives. This may be reflective of a general rural attitude.

> In fact, rural cooperation has often appeared as the factor which saved agriculture at the turn of the century and which delayed for as long as possible the basic transformations of agriculture. This conservative ideology still prevails among the great number of farmers who, as members of the cooperatives, use their vote to restrain directors or the officials who would be too much in the vanguard or who would try to orient agriculture too rapidly towards its modern destiny. Moreover, the members' influence is not the sole factor responsible for the survival of ruralist ideology. A yearning for an agriculture of self-sufficiency where the farmer was the absolute lord and master of his farm and family can still be found among a considerable number of administrators, directors, managers and other members of the executive.[17]

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[17]Gerald Fortin, "The Challenge of a New Rural World," in Marc-Adelard Tremblay and Walton J. Anderson, Eds., Rural Canada in Transition (Ottawa: Agricultural Economics Research Council; 1966), p. 357.

A conservative people, living in a situation which is conducive to conservative attitudes, can be expected to evince such attitudes in whatever organized relationship they may be involved. This applies to farmers who may join cooperatives or to small-town businessmen in their organized behaviour. They may genuinely believe in progress and be in favour of economic development. But favouring development in general does not commit them to any and all development projects. Like people anywhere else, urban or rural, they oppose particular projects which seem to be encroaching upon their security, or to threaten the measure of influence which they presently enjoy.

When a depressed region is compared with affluent regions in matters relating to economic development, the chief difference is likely to be the more intimate bonds between the economic structure and the local social structure in the depressed region. In the less affluent region, the economic organizations are often the proprietary interests of family networks. If new industry comes into a community it may not only change the organization of work and the hierarchy of occupations; it is likely also to disturb established and often sensitive class relationships.

Chapter 5

Social Classes in the Atlantic Provinces

Urban and Rural Class Structures

The social class system with which we are familiar is generally recognized as a development associated with industrialization and its gradual spread throughout the world follows the spread of industry. The spread is not in any sense due to conscious missionary activities but is rather the result of recognition that earlier systems of stratification could not be used as a basis for the organization of industrial work. The impersonal bureaucratic structure of modern industry substitutes achievement criteria for the ascriptive traditions of a pre-industrial era. Changes in governmental administrative organization parallel changes in economic organization. These changes are most clearly associated with urbanization and affect rural areas increasingly as large cities increase their dominance over the countryside.

In the traditional system of stratification, one was born to his estate, expected to follow the occupation of his father, and led a style of life predetermined for his station. Work activities took place within the family setting and were defined by the kinship system. Industrialism separated the place of work from the home and detached work from familism and other

ascriptive relationships. The factory created new occupations and new statuses more in keeping with the organizational needs of industry. Just as the caste system reflected a rural division of work, so the open class structure, defined in terms of occupation and income rather than family background, has evolved out of the needs of an urban industrial setting.[1]

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[1]For an uncomplicated analysis of the class system, see T. H. Marshall, Class Citizenship and Social Development (New York: Doubleday, Anchor; 1965), pp. 231-247.

Max Weber, as we have shown elsewhere, argued that the class system must be seen viewed in two ways: as a status system, related to consumption, social display and social prestige, and as a social class system which is expressive of occupational and other economic matters. He recognized the interdependence of status systems and class systems. While societies can be distinguished in terms of the emphasis placed on leisure, conspicuous display, and other status considerations as opposed to the emphasis placed on production and differences in occupations and incomes, it is clear that social status is strongly influenced by occupation and income. Occupational classes are often defined for statistical purposes in terms of a hierarchy of class levels: unskilled, semiskilled and skilled working class, white-collar workers, and other levels up to "owners, managers, and officials."

This permits useful studies of the labour force, social mobility, and class associated behaviour patterns. Social status distinctions do not lend themselves to such statistical classification.

To the extent that the social class structure reflects the work system, we must expect to find substantial differences in class structures between urban and rural communities, between rich and poor regions, and especially between areas dependent on mixed secondary industry and those dependent on mining, pulp and paper, or fishing for their livelihood. Among the differences are the following:

1. The industrial urban community will utilize a lower proportion of unskilled labor than is needed in the less urban community, even where resource-based industries are found.

2. The division of labour in the industrial urban community will include scores of occupations above the unskilled level which will not be found or needed in the more rural community.

3. The prospect for upward social mobility will be greater in the industrial urban community and, although competition may be sharper than in the more rural community, opportunities and choices are also more numerous.

4. The level of education will be substantially higher in the industrial urban community than found, or needed, in the less industrial and more rural community.

Examples of Nonurban Class Behaviour

Often in the rural community the chief employer is a

family enterprise. Something like a modern class order may exist in a rural community dominated by a mining company or a giant pulp and paper mill. Yet such enterprises may be family concerns and the work hierarchy, from the manager down to foremen and clerks, may be closely related to the local ranking of families. Rural-based industries, such as fish-processing plants, potato processing plants, and marketing firms are controlled in many communities by a few wealthy families who often wield monopolistic power over local employment opportunities, although the power is often indirectly exercised. The economic activities of such families are often supported and extended by their political activities and by their achievement of social prominence.

The control of local leaders may be elaborated through a paternalistic management which touches the lives of workers off the job as well as during working hours. There is, for example, the case in New Brunswick of a packer who employs only Baptist workers, with the more responsible jobs going to Reformed Baptists. Loyalty to the employer is expected to extend to the support of the political party in which he is prominent. While such a pattern is repeated again and again in the Atlantic Provinces, it is by no means confined there. It is traditionally rural but it must be viewed as one obstacle to industrialization of depressed areas. Here is an example of such control in the description of a small

community as it existed a few years ago:

> Politics divides the town. Everyone knows, or thinks he knows, how everyone else votes. The majority of people have to vote as the top men tell them; there is not really any freedom of choice.
>
> Lumbering is the main industry and nearly all men in the community work in one of the mills. Men in the rural areas cut logs and pulp as well as doing subsistence farming. The land is poor and stony. The men in these sections have very little education and do not make much money. They are at the mercy of the employers who own a lot of them body and soul.
>
> Two men direct the lives of the people. F. has a slaughter house and buys and sells wood and lumber as well as livestock. A millionaire, he holds mortgages on most of the farmers' houses as well as on many of the urban homes. He is able to get the livestock from the farmers for whatever price he wants to pay. He holds the mortgages on their houses and land, and if a farmer rebels and tries to sell to anyone else he faces the danger of having the mortgage foreclosed. F. uses direct methods in controlling the people. He tells his followers that he will make them pay off their debts at once if they do not vote as he says. He convinces them that he will know how they vote in spite of the secret ballot.
>
> P. owns one of the lumber mills and employs over half of the workers. His sons, sons-in-law and grandsons are all part of the lumber company. People like P. better because they say he is not as high-handed as F. and he is a better man to work for.
>
> Both men invest their money outside the community and seem to have no desire to do anything to improve the town. P. owns a wholesale company in another part of the province but has opposed attempts to improve local services.
>
> F. controls D. who, in turn, controls a number of

people. D. has a small lumber mill and a retail store and also is the local assessor. F. tells him where to buy his lumber, what men to hire, and, it is claimed, how to assess each home. He buys his meat from F.

C. was once influential and was the owner of a lumber mill and woodland. He was a smooth operator who had a reputation for cheating constantly on the measurement of lumber. He was active in politics. When he died he was a wealthy man and his lumber business was thriving. His sons squandered the money and let the business deteriorate. The mill is now operated only part-time.

The O. family run the largest general store in town and buy and sell wood and lumber as well as livestock. They are the only leading family to have their children return to work in the family store. They buy livestock from the farmers and expect the farmers to trade at their store in return. They own mortgages on a lot of homes and count on getting the business of these people.

Each of the powerful families has control over a store and this insures the return of money paid out in wages. The money not spent in the stores goes for payments on the mortgages or the rent. It makes little difference how high the wages are as the men are no further ahead in the long run.

Of course, there are men who are not controlled by these top families. They are the men who own their own homes and hold independent positions, such as teaching, working on the railroad, or working in another community. Yet, the top men have representatives on the School Board who will see that their wishes are carried out. A teacher is independent only so long as he does not step on the toes of the power men. There is much friction at the school between the town and rural students. The town pupils receive the best marks in school and win the prizes. Only a few of the rural students complete high school and those that do seldom go to college.

> The status structure of the community has changed a great deal in the last few years. At one time there were three families who set the styles and everyone else tried to imitate them. These social distinctions are no longer so important.
>
> But the power structure remains the same. Many of the people are so accustomed to being told what to do that they could not imagine what it would be like to do as they pleased. Even the yearly town meetings are controlled by the few powerful men. Other citizens make half-hearted attempts to obtain such things as sidewalks and more street lights but they are not successful.[2]

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[2]Taken from a report by a resident of the community.

The situation described above is not unique for small, isolated communities in which minor primary industries are located. The lack of diversity of economic opportunities results in the concentration of local economic power in the hands of a small cluster of key families who also tend to have more political and social influence than other residents. Harring, in a study of one-industry towns in the South of the United States done some years ago, found a similar concentration of economic and political control.[3] The mill operator was found to own or control the stores,

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[3]Harriet L. Harring. Passing of the Mill Village (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1949).

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select the parson and the teachers, and approve candidates for public office in local elections.

Class Relations in a Potato-Growing Area

Comparing the social stratification system of the community described above with a community having an open class system reveals its incongruity. Competition is there, both economic and political, but it functions under the control of a closed inner circle. The members of this elite are rivals vis-a-vis one another but their ranks are closed against others in the community. Their ownership of productive property enables them to enjoy extensive economic and political areas of control.

Size is an important characteristic of such a community for it must not be too small to support a cluster of leading families nor too large to retain its rural character. It is likely to be a service centre for several satellite rural communities which are economically subservient. The leading families are often the processors of the products of the rural settlements as well as the local wholesalers and retailers.

Economic differences among rural families often reflect the differences in the quality of land on which they are settled since the farmer on the richer land is in a better position to accumulate capital and expand or mechanize his operation. This permits him to extend his marketing operations in such a way as to dominate the surrounding farmers. The extent of his control depends on his own initiative and ability, the amount of competition

he faces, and the degree to which he is able to use political or social influence to further his operations. The two examples which follow relate to potato farming.

> Mr. P. had at one time several thousand acres of potatoes planted each year. With great political influence, he practically controlled much of the export of potatoes to certain countries. He owned the local starch factory, several large potato houses, and most of the town officials. As long as no outside interests entered the area he reigned supreme so he made sure that no outside interests came in. By giving so many jobs to the town people, he ran the town to suit himself, with few complaints except from rival potato growers. For years he was the only major buyer to whom the small farmers could sell their crops.
>
> Then several farmers organized a marketing firm which came to control almost as large a potato business as P. and the fur began to fly. At this time a young lawyer appeared to oppose P. politically and in business operations. They became bitter enemies and their rivalry split the community. After P. died the young lawyer became the most influential resident politically.[4]

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[4]Taken from a report by a resident of the community.

The next example concerns a community in which leadership was provided by the operators of lumber mills, a barrel factory, potato dealerships, and a contracting firm. It illustrates the extent to which political influence has been important in some business operations in the past and the fact, often ignored in studies of depressed economies, that changes occur which destroy the position sometimes of apparently well-entrenched families.

We are concerned with the fortunes of one family:

> The rise and fall of the position of businessmen was clearly demonstrated by the A. Brothers who owned a contracting company. They were in a position of power for seventeen years. Much of that time they were in favour with politically influential persons. They were able to get road contracts and could provide jobs for local residents. They were no longer able to get such contracts when the opposition party came to power. As a result the contracting firm declined rapidly.[5]

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[5]Taken from a report by a resident of the community.

The potato grower and exporter described above was the dominant figure in his community so long as he could exclude serious competition. His control was threatened when a competing organization entered the field. The contracting firm flourished only so long as it had a political advantage over competitors. The dominant independent merchants in these same small places are no less insecure for they face the danger of being priced out of the market once the community grows large enough to attract a supermarket operated by one of the nationwide mercantile chains. Much of the local economic power and social influence disappears as better roads and communication links destroy the relative isolation of the area in which they are exercised.

Economic Power and Its Effect in Newfoundland

Iverson and Matthews observe that the scattered fish

processing plants in Newfoundland communities keep the wages low and variable as the plant in each community is in a monopolistic position. With plenty of labour available and no competition wage scales in his area the local buyer and processor of fish is under no pressure to contribute to the advancement of wage levels.[6]

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[6]Noel Iverson and D. Ralph Matthews, Communities in Decline: An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland; 1968).

The local buyer, whether also the processor of fish or not, is usually the merchant of the outport fishing community. It is better said that he was usually the merchant, for he is due to pass into history much as are the independent fishermen, whom he served with one hand while exploiting them with the other. But the two roles made up a unique, somewhat primitive, outport society. The merchant stood for all those economic class functions above the handwork level which was the domain of the fisherman. The merchant was, in one sense, identified with the community, while in another sense retaining an essential and sensitive detachment from it. He was the trusted individual in all matters that concerned money, trade, prices, keeping accounts and providing information about the outside world. It was good business for him to deserve the confidence which the fisherman

invested in him. Szwed found that the merchant was mediator in many things, but in a personalized relationship rather than the stereotyped "courtesy" of the modern supermarket. He "offered a modicum of economic security but also performed other critical functions."[7]

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[7]John Szwed, Primitive Culture and Public Imagery (St. Johns: Memorial University of Newfoundland; 1966), pp. 42-49.

Unlike the wage-earner in the sawmills mentioned above, the traditional fisherman was no mere seller of his time at an hourly rate. He was a self-employed property owner, even though living year after year in poverty. Poverty was accepted as one of the facts of life. His independence was not compromised if this year he should be in debt to the merchant. Another year he could expect to be out of debt, at least temporarily. Nor was the merchant concerned. He went on keeping the books, which were never finally balanced. As Szwed remarked, there was no haggling over prices, as in the world outside. The fisherman went on working, leaving the market ups and downs to the merchant.

> Valued goods and resources are conceived to be in a fixed or "static" state, with no possibility of expansion or development by local individuals. Those who attempt or succeed at increasing their own holdings are seen to be disrupting the balance of local resources. One person's gain must be accomplished only at the loss of others.[8]

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[8]Ibid., p. 18.

Such a Garden-of-Eden conception of economics provided the traditional fishing community with a near-classless society, much as prevailed in early farming communities. Now that technological change is rapidly outmoding the old ways of fishing, most fishermen face the prospect of becoming wage-earners and of finding themselves near the bottom of the economic ladder whose rungs have come to be dividing lines between social classes. The specifications of the class structure in terms of occupation and income are the facts of the industrial work system as it centers in cities. Now the class ratings as defined by income and occupation are about to be applied in Newfoundland and other Atlantic fishing areas. This is in the nature of the emerging socio-economic order and its class divisions.

The present program for resettling households in Newfoundland, whatever the complaints against it, is an unavoidable consequence of changes taking place in the fishing industry. The old ways of fishing are being superseded, and many outport hamlets must be abandoned. Many fishermen are due to become employed workers on larger fishing vessels. Not only do they thus become identified with the industrial class system, but the fisherman-merchant relationship comes to an end.

Iverson sees the merchant as being disadvantaged by the transition; indeed, if the merchant continues in business he must

find a new role.

> Outport merchants are not uniformly pleased with the results of resettlement. They tend to regard the program as a threat to their livelihood. In one instance two merchant families opposed resettlement from the start. One merchant left the community early, claiming it cost him over $50,000 in buildings he could not salvage, in moving expenses, and in establishing a new business on the mainland. The other merchant intends to remain until the last family has left for he feels an obligation, he said, to help his old customers and friends by transporting their belongings to the mainland (at $40 a round trip). Neither merchant leaves his community and his business without regret and some bitterness, since both lose not only a great deal of money by moving (as much as $100,000 in some cases) but also a highly gratifying social position. They are forced to sacrifice a lifetime's work to centralization.[9]

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[9]Iverson and Matthews, op. cit., p. 95.

Socio-Economic Index of Occupations

There have been various efforts to devise objective methods of identifying social class in terms of income and occupation. Elishen, for example, was able to design a socio-economic scale for 320 occupations. These were rated in terms of income and level of education. The list is too long for total inclusion here, so the cutting points which follow are at 70.00, 60.00, down to 30.00 and under. For each group the top three and bottom three occupations are included.

Occupation	Socio-Economic Index
Chemical engineers	76.69
Dentists	76.44
Professors and College principals	76.01
(18 other occupations follow.)	
Industrial engineers	70.43
Osteopaths and chiropractors	70.25
School teachers	70.14
Accountants and auditors	68.80
Owners, managers, education and related services	68.32
Actuaries and statisticians	67.50
(20 other occupations follow.)	
Credit managers	60.81
Office managers	60.42
Owners, managers, health and welfare services	60.07
Security salesmen and brokers	59.91
Radio and television announcers	59.81
Owners and managers, printing, publishing	59.69
(30 other occupations follow.)	
Physical and occupational therapists	51.11
Athletes and sport officials	51.11
Musicians and music teachers	50.93
Nurses-in-training	49.91
Bookkeepers and cashiers	49.55
Funeral directors and embalmers	49.47
(46 other occupations follow.)	
Printing workers (not elsewhere stated)	40.13
Mechanics and repairmen, radio and T. V. receivers	40.12
Photographic processing operations	40.05
Engineering officers, ship	39.86
Millwrights	39.82
Inspectors, examiners, gaugers - metal	39.76
(97 other occupations follow.)	
Operators, earth-moving, other construction machines	30.03
Painters (except construction and maintenance	30.00
Coremakers	30.00
Baby sitters	29.99
Labourers, mine	29.96

Blacksmiths, hammermen, forgemen	29.93
(73 other occupations follow.)	
Shoemakers and repairers - in factory	26.56
Fish canners, curers and packers	26.09
Trappers and hunters	25.36

In the lowest of these categories, 30.00 down to 25.36, are found the following occupations which are characteristic of the Atlantic Provinces:

Mine labourers	29.96
Labourers, paper and allied industries	29.73
Farm labourers	27.77
Fishermen	27.17
Lumbermen, including labourers in logging . . .	27.01
Fish canners, curers, packers	26.09
Trappers and hunters	25.36

Hence, the occupations which most typify the region are to be found near the bottom of Blishen's scale.[10]

---

[10]Bernard R. Blishen, "A Socio-Economic Index for Occupations in Canada," in Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, Vol. 4, No. 1 (February 1967), pp. 41-53.

Blishen recognizes that comparisons between provinces must be made with caution but he apparently feels justified in making this observation regarding the Atlantic Provinces as a region:

> The labour forces of the Atlantic Provinces are under-represented in the top occupational levels, while Ontario and Alberta tend to stand out slightly as being above the remaining provinces...The use of the deciles provides more discrimination at the bottom (He uses two methods of analysis, including the one presented,

> which puts the cutting points at the deciles.), since nearly a third of the Canadian labour force hold occupations scoring below 30.00 and nearly another third hold occupations scoring between 30.00 and 39.99. The provinces with the largest per cent of their labour forces in occupations below 30.00 are P. E. I. (48%), Newfoundland (47%), New Brunswick (41%), Saskatchewan (39%), and Nova Scotia (35%). Ontario has only 26 per cent of its labour force at this level.[11]

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[11] Ibid., p. 51.

This means that the four Atlantic Provinces are at the bottom among the low-level occupations, which is tantamount to being low for both level of income and level of education.

Class Implications of Occupations

An adequate test of the Blishen socio-economic index for the Atlantic region would call for information about income and education of workers in particular occupations, say an adequate sample of workers representative of a series of occupations from chemical engineers down to trappers and hunters. While this is not possible for the present study, we can examine the 1961 census reports on occupations, first considering the levels of occupation in relation to level of education. This will be followed by looking at the relation between level of occupation and level of income. In Table 5, the male and female labour force of the Atlantic Provinces is compared with that of Ontario

for level of education. The first striking contrast is that the

Table 5

Male and Female Labour Force, 15 years of age and over, for Atlantic Provinces and Ontario by Years of Schooling, 1961

Years of Schooling	Atlantic Prov. Number	Atlantic Prov. Per cent	Ontario Number	Ontario Per Cent
Elementary				
0-5 years	50,330	8.96	96,748	4.04
over 5 years	197,042	35.08	817,165	34.15
High School				
1 - 2 years	142,499	25.37	543,200	22.70
3 years	73,145	13.02	236,209	9.87
4 - 5 years	57,755	10.28	495,882	20.72
Some university	24,222	4.31	92,067	3.85
University degree	16,639	2.96	111,744	4.67
Total:	561,632	99.98	2,393,015	100.00

Source: See appropriate tables in Appendix A.

percentage of workers with less than five years of schooling in the Atlantic Provinces (8.96%) is more than double that for Ontario (4.04%). Note that for workers with four or five years of high school the Ontario percentage doubles that for the Atlantic Provinces (20.72% to 10.28%). The Ontario percentage is nearly a third higher for those with university degrees (4.67% to 2.96%).

In Table 6, Ontario and the Atlantic region are compared for the extremes of educational level represented in the different occupational categories, those with less than five years schooling being compared with those with university degrees. There is little difference between the two regions for the first two

Male and Female Labour Force, 15 years and over, by Occupation and Schooling, Atlantic Provinces and Ontario, 1961

Occupation	Atlantic Provinces			Ontario		
	Labour Force (No.)	Under 5 yrs. (%)	Univ. Degree (%)	Labour Force (No.)	Under 5 yrs. (%)	Univ. Degree (%)
Managerial, Proprietary Professional, Technical	92,694	3.81	83.19	447,169	4.56	84.22
Clerical, Sales	88,785	1.68	7.09	516,558	3.57	8.09
Service, Recreation	87,583	9.61	5.95	294,474	19.87	3.03
Transport, Communication	39,613	6.20	0.52	136,657	4.19	0.41
Farmers, Farm Workers	36,042	9.54	0.69	172,171	12.55	0.78
Loggers, Fishermen, Hunters, Miners, etc.	50,547	27.88	0.22	39,112	5.37	0.15
Craftsmen	119,056	25,77	1.51	619,137	31.60	2.08
Labourers, n. e. s.	33,895	13.18	0.27	113,306	14.43	0.19
Other	13,437	2.35	0.77	54,431	3.88	0.96
Total:	561,632	100.02	100.21	2393,015	100.02	100.01

Source: See appropriate tables in Appendix A.

categories. More than nine out of each ten persons with university degrees are in the managerial, proprietary, professional, and technical occupations or in clerical or sales occupations. In the Atlantic Provinces, the five primary occupations (loggers, etc.) have the largest proportion of workers with less than five years education, 27.88 per cent as compared with Ontario's 5.37 per cent. Contrary to much that is said about the need for more education in the skilled crafts, it appears that these occupations are still receptive to workers with less than five years of education, including 25.77 per cent of this category in the Atlantic region and 31.60 per cent in Ontario. This does not confirm the view that workers with little education fare badly when

they migrate to the more affluent region. Apparently some manage to get jobs.

Table 7 compares the occupational distribution of men and women according to whether they have less than five years of education or university degrees. Of the female workers with

Table 7

Male and Female Labour Force, 15 years and over, by Occupation and Schooling, Atlantic Provinces, 1961

Occupation	Female Workers			Male Workers		
	Labour Force (No.)	Under 5 yrs. (%)	Univ. Degree (%)	Labour Force (No.)	Under 5 yrs. (%)	Univ. Degree (%)
Manager, Proprietor, Profession, Technical	33,613	8.56	85.16	59,061	3.38	82.74
Clerical, Sales	45,923	6.06	11.24	42,862	1.28	5.86
Service, Recreation	37,075	58.44	2.08	50,518	5.13	6.86
Transport, Communication	3,243	0.54	0.19	36,370	6.72	0.59
Farmers, Farm Workers	1,803	3.57	0.16	34,239	10.09	o.81
Loggers, Fishermen, Hunters, Miners, etc.	95	0.40	0.00	50,452	30.39	0.27
Craftsmen	9,609	16.30	0.44	109,437	26.63	1.76
Labourers, n.e.s.	1,087	2.32	0.00	32,808	14.17	0.33
Others	3,306	3.81	0.73	10,131	2.21	0.78
Total:	135,754	100.00	100.00	425,878	100.00	100.00

Source: See appropriate tables in Appendix A.

university degrees, 96.4 per cent are in the first two occupational categories, a large share probably being school teachers, and 11.24 per cent of those with degrees are in clerical and sales positions, as against 5.86 per cent of the males with degrees. This suggests the limited job openings available for women with degrees. It is also notable that 58.44 per cent of the females with little education are in service and recreation fields of

employment as compared with only 5.13 per cent of the males with less than five years of schooling. These are often the lowest-pay occupations. Skilled occupations in which women can be employed are scarce in the Atlantic Provinces. This is shown in the "craftsmen" category when female and male workers in the Atlantic region are compared, and again women Ontario is compared with the Atlantic region in terms of female occupations.

Table 8 provides a comparison of the position of women in the Atlantic labour market with that in Ontario where the number of occupations available to women is both greater and more

Table 8

Female Labour Force, 15 years and over, by Occupation and Education in Atlantic Provinces and Ontario, 1961

Occupation	Atlantic Provinces			Ontario		
	Labour Force (No.)	Under 5 yrs. (%)	Univ. Degree (%)	Labour Force (No.)	Under 5 yrs. (%)	Univ. Degree (%)
Manager, Proprietor	33,613	8.56	85.16	115,724	3.13	79.79
Profession, Technical	45,923	6.06	11.24	286,123	5.69	15.16
Clerical, Sales	37,075	58.44	2.08	147,704	51.04	2.83
Service, Recreation	3,243	0.54	0.19	14,398	0.26	0.27
Transport, Communication	1,803	3.57	0.16	22,869	7.08	0.42
Farmers, Farm Workers	95	0.40	0.00	39	0.01	0.01
Loggers, Fishermen, Hunters, Miners, etc.	9,609	16.30	0.44	83,835	26.17	0.60
Craftsmen	1,087	2.32	0.00	9,406	3.75	0.08
Labourers, n.e.s.	3,306	3.81	0.73	12,350	3.88	0.85
Others						
Total:	135,754	100.00	100.00	692,448	100.01	100.00

Source: See appropriate tables in Appendix A.

varied. A higher proportion of women in the Atlantic Provinces

with degrees are in the top line, 85.16 per cent as compared with 79.79 per cent for Ontario. About 25 per cent of the female workers in the Atlantic region are in this category as compared with only 17 per cent of the female labour force in Ontario. This reflects the important position of teaching as a leading source of employment for women in the Atlantic Provinces. Women in Ontario fare better in the clerical-sales category, comprising 41 per cent of the female labour force as compared with 33 per cent in the Atlantic region. It is also evident that women in Ontario have more opportunity to enter the crafts, for 12 per cent of the employed women are found in this category in Ontario as compared with only 6 per cent in the Atlantic Provinces.

Table 9 shows the percentage of males and females in

Table 9

Level of schooling attained by males and females in the Labour force of Ontario and the Atlantic Provinces, 1961 (in Percentages)

Years of schooling	Ontario		Atl. Provinces	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
Under 5	4.50%	2.92%	10.83%	3.11%
5 - 8	37.39	26.18	38.93	23.05
Elementary	41.89%	29.10%	49.76%	26.16%
9 - 10	22.19	23.95	24.98	26.60
11	8.95	12.15	10.70	20.30
12 - 13	17.55	28.51	7.65	18.53
High School	48.69%	64.61%	43.33%	65.43%
Some university	3.93	3.63	3.75	6.07
Univ. degree	5.49	2.66	3.16	2.33
University	9.42%	6.29%	6.91%	8.40%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	99.99%

Source: Data in above tables 5 - 8.

the labour force of the Atlantic Provinces and Ontario by level of schooling attained. Females in the Atlantic Provinces show higher educational attainment than do those in the Ontario labour force. Indeed, their record is much better than that of males in the Atlantic region. There is evidence, in terms of these numbers, that women are investing more time in gaining a formal education than are the men, but the effort appears to be less rewarding for women in the Atlantic Provinces.

Class Implications of Income

Level of education is one of the variables used by Blishen in determining the socio-economic categories to which occupations may be assigned. The other variable is income. The average annual incomes for males and females which follow concern wage earners in the non-farm population for 1961. To be sure, the average earnings in 1968 would be higher but it is doubtful that the gap between regions will have narrowed, although it may have narrowed for certain occupations, notably those that have

	Male	Female[12]
Newfoundland	2,665	1,133
Prince Edward Island	2,867	1,061
Nova Scotia	3,188	1,243
New Brunswick	3,070	1,255
Ontario	4,335	1,747
Canada	3,999	1,657

[12]Census of Canada, 1961, Series 4.1, Bulletin 1.

been organized into trade unions.

The comparative annual earnings of employed males and females for the Atlantic region, Ontario and Canada are given in Table 10 in rounded percentages. The poorest province is

Table 10

Income Distribution for Males and Females of the Non-Farm Population 15 years and over in the Atlantic Provinces, Ontario and Canada, Year Ending 31 May, 1961

Province	Per Cent in Each Income Category									
	Under $1,500		$1,500-2,999		$3,000-4,999		$5,000-9,999		$10,000 and Over*	
	%M	%F	%M	%F	%M	%F	%M	%F*	%M*	
Newfoundland	39	79	26	14	23	6	10	1	2	
P. E. I.	35	75	29	19	24	5	10	1	2	
Nova Scotia	28	70	25	21	31	7	14	2	2	
N. Brunswick	29	69	27	22	30	8	12	1	2	
Atlantic Prov. average	32	72	26	20	28	7	13	1	2	
Ontario	17	55	16	26	37	15	26	4	4	
Canada	20	58	19	26	35	13	22	3	4	

*Upper level of income for females is listed as $5,000 and over.
Source: See appropriate tables in Appendix B.

Newfoundland where, for the year ending 31st of May 1961, more than a third of the males (39%) and more than three-fourths of the females (79%) earned less than $1,500. The average for the four Atlantic Provinces was 32 per cent for males and 72 per cent for females in this category. At the other end of the scale, 15 per cent of the males and but 1 per cent of the females in the Atlantic Provinces had incomes of $1,500 or higher, while in Ontario the respective figures were 30 per cent for males and

4 per cent for females.

We lack information on the "market-basket" income, what Atlantic region people must pay when they buy necessities but it is to be expected, because of geographic remoteness, that prices will be higher than in Ontario, and observation tends to support this. There is information on the expenditures of families with incomes between $3,000 and $8,000, from the studies of urban family expenditures in seven cities (Vancouver, Edmonton, Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal, Halifax and St. John's) which are done periodically by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics. These studies may be useful for affluent cities but hardly serve for the Atlantic Provinces where 60 to 70 per cent of the families receive less than $3,000 annually. It is safe to assume that most of the higher incomes in Nova Scotia are concentrated in Halifax, as those in Newfoundland would be most numerous in St. John's.

Table 11 summarizes family expenditures as of 1962 for both Halifax and St. John's as compared with Toronto and Vancouver. What is striking in the first line is the $1,410 spent for food by the families interviewed in St. John's. This item alone would exceed half of most family incomes in Newfoundland. In Newfoundland, we note as well, the lowest amount is spent on medical care although the average family size (4.16 members) is the largest in

Canada. Even this is misleading since the families included in the study are in the higher income brackets. While family expenditure studies are useful for comparative purposes, the standards applied in this case do not serve the needs of a depressed region; they might have the mischievous effect of conveying a false impression.

Table 11

Family Expenditures for Families with Incomes of $3,000 to $8,000 in St. John's, Halifax, Toronto, Vancouver, and Canada, 1961

Expenditure and Income	All Canada	St. John's	Halifax	Toronto	Vancouver
Food	1288	1410	1215	1258	1254
Shelter	1022	864	938	1089	1019
Household Operations	217	174	235	222	230
Furnishings, Equipment	235	248	200	224	287
Clothing	486	498	435	440	437
Transportation	616	579	662	574	771
Medical care	235	136	188	239	202
Personal care	125	112	123	128	114
Recreation	169	175	188	180	191
Reading	36	36	33	39	37
Education	36	58	17	32	47
Tobacco, alcohol	231	230	210	216	194
Other expenditures	62	16	65	65	75
Total Consumer costs:	4758	4535	4509	4704	4858
Gifts, Contributions	151	161	146	161	146
Personal Taxes	351	220	268	391	370
Security	246	162	321	220	247
Total Expenditures	5506	5078	5244	5475	5621
Income before Taxes:	5436	5054	5160	5487	5591
Families Interviewed:	1070	92	93	265	175
Number in Family:	3.49	4.16	3.80	3.42	3.46

Source: Urban Family Expenditures, 1962 (Ottawa: Dominion Bureau of Statistics; 1967), p. 18.

Chapter 6

Social Challenges to Economic Growth

Family Farm in the Maritimes

In 1880 a good share of the people in the Maritimes were identified with agriculture, even though a majority of these divided their time between farming and taking occasional off-farm jobs as fishermen, loggers or other kinds of labour. What Touzel wrote about the work schedule and ways of life of a presently depressed area in Ontario could have been said of the same area several decades ago, as it also could be said of rural life in the Maritimes today. She writes of Lanarck County, settled at the beginning of the last century.

> Many rural people in all social and economic groups live on but not wholly, if at all, from the land. Some live on farms from which they grow little or nothing and do not consider themselves farmers but industrial workers. Some farm as much of their time as possible and do as much work off the farm as is necessary and available to maintain families. Sometimes work is done to secure equipment or pay off debts, often to maintain the farm. A similar range of situations exists in the more wooded areas where trees may be like money in the bank when there is a market. For such on-and-off the farm employment, the labour supply is often unskilled, except for those skills required for farming or woodcutting. The industries established in the area are those that can use unskilled labour.[1]

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[1]Bessie Touzel, "Lanarck County, Ontario," in D.E. Woodsworth, Director, Rural Need in Canada, 1965 (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council; 1966), pp. 9-10.

One conclusion of the Eastern Canada Farm Survey of 1963 is that the great majority of farmers in the eastern region identified as agricultural in their occupations do not earn as much as $2,500 per year from their tilling, and many with incomes of $2,500 earn much of that off the farm.

> For the farmers with less than $2,500 in farm income the farm is providing only half a living. This can be the product of the fact that, though classified as farmers, 1) they are actually making their living in off-farm employment, and do not really regard themselves as farmers, or 2) though considering themselves as farmers, they are forced to supplement the earnings that are produced by their very limited farm resources.[2]

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[2] Report of the Eastern Canada Farm Survey, 1963 (Ottawa: Department of Forestry and Rural Development; 1966), p. 18.

From the report on rural need in Canada we take some observations by Caldwell who made a study of a rural area on Cape Breton Island in Nova Scotia. Before the Loyalists arrived following the American Revolution, the Island had been occupied by French farmers and fishermen. Through the decades, this area, Inverness County, like other rural areas in the Maritimes, was poor but it was not an area in distress. There was a different economy then. Today farm viability is measured by a more stringent standard. Of the 1,046 farms in Inverness County only 235 are classed as commercial. "The other 811 farms are occupied by part-time farmers who supplement their incomes by fishing,

lumbering or wage-related employment."[3] These farms are typical of many in the Atlantic region.

[3]George Caldwell, "Inverness County, Nova Scotia," in D. E. Woodsworth, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

Turning again to that sobering report of the Eastern Canada Farm Survey, we find that great emphasis is placed in the "Observations" on two suggestions, focussing on 50 per cent of the farms in the region: 1) Most of these farms, if still marginally tilled, should be taken out of agriculture and the land put to other uses such as pasture, forest or recreation, or 2) Farms that have tillable land should be consolidated with more viable existing farms. It is recognized that many of the present occupants, often elderly people, should be permitted to remain in occupancy for their remaining years.[4]

[4]Report on Eastern Canada Farm Survey, op. cit., pp. 1-5.

Pépin, in his study of Life and Poverty in the Maritimes takes a similarly pessimistic view. In reporting on a section of Northumberland County, New Brunswick, he observes that "agriculture is primarily a means of subsistence and it ensures a place to live; to call it an economic activity is usually too generous."[5] He notes that some hope lies in the exploitation of

[5]Pierre-Yves Pépin, Life and Poverty in the Maritimes /"Milieu, genres de vie et pauvrete dans les Maritimes"/, (Ottawa: Ministry of Forestry and Rural Development, ARDA Project #15002; 1968), p. 21.

vast peat deposits in the area. Kent County is similar:

> The county of Kent is to be classed as a depressed area on the socio-economic level. A high point was reached during the second half of the nineteenth century with the lumber trade and shipbuilding, but since then the county has been on the down grade. It happened slowly at first, until the thirties, then ruthlessly after the 1939-1945 War, at which time rural communities were fragmented.
>
> The County of Kent still lives in the nineteenth century. The drying up of immigration after 1850, the disappearance of ocean traffic, accelerated urbanization (elsewhere) and its accompanying industry, are basic factors which had to lead to the present situation, a situation which is made worse by an excessive and clumsy system of taxation, which in itself is largely a result of the inadequate planning of the school system. The owner of a subsistence farm has to pay taxes at a similar level to that of a Montreal citizen: $400 to $600.
>
> The world of industry and of the machine has bypassed the County of Kent. The consumer market is insignificant from the standpoints of income, the number of consumers, and manpower, 75 per cent of which is largely engaged in primary occupations, has little to offer to the outside employer. Half of the labour force is on welfare for six months of the year; their yearly incomes do not average $2,000. People cling to the region partly due to inertia and fear of the outside world.
>
> Emigration is considerable. In fact, all the

elements are being lost. It is the answer of the young to felt poverty.[6]

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[6]Ibid., pp. 38-39.

Maritimers in 1880, even in 1900, would have reacted violently against any proposal to take a third to a half of all farms out of agricultural use. They would have pointed out, and correctly, that the then typical family farm was a substantial element in the Maritime economy. However, it would not be hazardous to estimate that not less than half of the farms of 1900 have since been abandoned. In Canada in 1931 there were 738,623 farms but the number was down to 480,903 in 1961. Much of this decline is due to consolidation.

As the figures below indicate, the rate of decline in the number of farms in the Maritimes has been much greater and the possibility of joining three or four small farms to make one productive farm is limited. The spots of tillable land are often too small for commercial farming and often scattered. We see

	Farms Enumerated	
	1931	1961
Nova Scotia	39,444	12,518
New Brunswick	34,025	11,786
Prince Edward Island	12,865	7,335
	86,334	31,639

that the total number of farms dropped by nearly two-thirds. For Newfoundland, 3,626 farms were enumerated in 1951 against

1,752 in 1961. There the explanation is that many who occupied subsistence farms prior to 1950 later discontinued the unrewarding effort.[7]

[7]Census of Canada, 1961, Series 5.1, Table 3.

On People and Their Ways

From the carefully worked-out development plan for the Lower St. Lawrence, Gaspe, and the Iles-de-la-Madeleine we are made aware that the problem with which the planners wrestled is one of conserving and better using the resources of the region, including the human resources. On the one hand, the aim is to find productive jobs for 50,000 workers. On the other hand, the aim is to reduce the population from 325,000 to 200,000. Farms not commercially productive would be put to other use. The province of Quebec is asked "to encourage a mass migration to the province's urban centres."[8]

[8]Development Plan for the Pilot Region; Lower St. Lawrence, Gaspe and the Iles-de-la-Madeleine, done by the Bureau d'Amenagement de l'Est du Quebec (Ottawa: Department of Forestry and Rural Development; 1967), p. 6.

While, unfortunately, the summary B.A.E.Q. Report, intended no doubt as a plan in ideal terms, contains little information about existing conditions in the region or about the

people and their ways, it does spell out specifically what needs to be done if that "pilot region" is to become economically self-sufficient. Here are some of the objectives:

> The 83,870 farm population on 11,700 farms will have to be shifted about until by 1977 there will be a total of not more than 5,500 workers on 4,200 farms comprising something over 800,000 acres.
>
> In the primary sector (agriculture, fishing, forests, mining) the labour force will be reduced from the 1961 level of about 30,000 (35% of the labour force) to about 13,000 (15% of the labour force) by 1981.
>
> Through more efficient operations forestry manpower will drop from 6,000 in 1963 to 2,800 in 1972 and the annual income will rise from $1,300 to $3,500.
>
> In-shore and deep-sea fishing would be re-organized, using the most efficient equipment and methods. The season would be 10 months by 1972 employing altogether about 2,000 workers with incomes ranging from $3,100 to $4,000.
>
> By 1972, two priority industrial centres, Rimouski and Riviere-du-Loup will have taken the lead, and will have such facilities as urban planning, industrial parks, and municipal industrial boards. Firms wanting to locate in these centres will be entitled to a premium for initiating employment opportunities, and a special fund will provide risk capital for new business or expansion. These centres make the creation of 2,000 new industrial jobs attainable by 1972.[9]

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[9]Ibid., p. 15, also pp. 9, 13, 41.

Minimum conditions would be established to determine

the qualifications of a young person to become a farmer. Elderly persons on poor farms would be exempt from these requirements. For other farmers, manpower reclassification services would be available to those under 55 "who must or will leave agriculture for another trade." Recommendation 16 reads:

> That young people who want to take up farming during the intensive reorganization period (1967-1977) be required to continue schooling until they obtain the option diploma, and be induced by a substantial annual subsidy to complete their apprenticeship (three years) on a profitably operated farm selected for this purpose.[10]

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[10]Ibid, p. 56.

Throughout the B.A.E.Q. report emphasis is placed on two essentials: 1) upgrading the level of education of the people in the region and increasing the facilities for training in skills; 2) the use of trained specialists, "know-how" men of every type. Toward the end of the report we read:

> Planning demands the co-ordination of decisions made by numerous agencies whose actions are likely to influence socio-economic development. This function is the task of government and the regional and local authorities. It involves not only the public agencies and authorities, but also the private centres of decision, including individuals, businesses, cooperatives and associations... It is essential that co-ordination be based on much more than wishful thinking. It requires the modification of certain political institutions and the establishment of new institutional machinery. A characteristic of the new or modified institutions

> would be the promotion of an attitude that favours co-ordination: this is their motivating role.[11]

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[11]Ibid., p. 229.

There appears to be the assumption throughout that, while the people of the pilot region may not understand the objectives of the program, they can be induced to support it once specialists have explained it to them and motivated them in the right direction.

> Social motivation is the use of the whole range of methods, techniques and instruments designed for systematic intervention in the factors that prevent a group from rationalizing its actions with respect to an objective. The efforts of the motivator are always directed towards a group; he concentrates on the standards and values of the group. He bases his approach on non-directed means; he counts on the comprehension of the group rather than on persuasion or compulsion.[12]

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[12]Ibid., p. 197.

The Manipulation of People

The B.A.E.Q. report, too briefly summarized, presents a well-conceived plan for a depressed area of more than fifteen thousand square miles occupied for two centuries or more. The plan seeks more efficient utilization of primary resources, of human resources, and of existing cooperative and other business

organization. The plan is comprehensive and seeks to change the total structure of the Gaspe to bring it more in line with trends in the national economy.

The plan, if implemented in all of its dimensions, negatively or positively, would affect every family and individual in the study area. It would disturb in some way or other every social arrangement in even the tiniest communities, and many small settlements would be eliminated. Many of the families would be asked to move from one location to another. Like those pioneering an area all over again, families would find themselves farming new land before market arrangements could be established. Others would be asked to train for jobs not yet in existence. Every family would be a new neighbour or would be confronted with new neighbours. The plan does not look at people or take notice of their long-established institutions. They are seen as potential labour supply, some as able, others as getting old, still others as needing training.

It may not be the task of a planner who outlines a scheme for the economic reclamation of a depressed area to give attention to social needs. The position taken may be that implementation is the problem of others, with government taking the lead. At many points thought is given to technical implementation problems in which work in each instance is to be placed

in the hands of trained experts recruited from outsdie the region.

Despite its merit as an objective document, the plan makes no mention of native qualities and hence risks being judged as another urban evaluation of a rural problem. Graham had something like this in mind in his remark about inadequate programs for farmers and fishermen in the Atlantic region:

> At the same time, one must be wary of urban-rural comparisons, for investigators of rural areas generally have a strong urban bias, since they are themselves strongly oriented toward urban living. There is the opposite pitfall, not unrelated to the first, of assuming an idyllic view of the life of the country dweller. While country living may conform to this picture, no one who has seen the unrelieved poverty of, for example, some of the rural areas of northern New Brunswick could be misled by it.[13]

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[13]John F. Graham, "Areas of Economic Stress in the Canadian Federal Context," in Areas of Economic Stress in Canada (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queens University; 1965), pp. 10-11.

While urbanized physicians and lawyers may be quite acceptable to rural people, they may well have reservations about the urban-trained "motivator" who comes to convert them from their old ways or the equally urbanized experts who come with advice about breeding their stock or managing their crops. They may not take kindly to the suggestion that their sons, before being allowed to farm, must have more schooling and even special agricultural training involving a three-year apprenticeship on

an approved farm. This is a large order and old-fashioned farmers may react negatively, even resorting to non-cooperation. It is also possible that stress is being placed on formal training in areas which, like many engaged in by woodsmen, fishermen and other rural workers, can be learned on the job.

In this connection we turn to the Connor-Magill study of rural areas near Halifax where they interviewed 1,672 male household heads. They asked questions concerning education, employment and desire for more education or skill training. The percentages which follow show the levels of education reached by the members of the sample.

38% had 7 years of schooling or less
58% had 8 years of schooling or less
76% had 9 years of schooling or less
88% had 10 years of schooling or less
25% wished to take some type of skill training
68% had had no training in special skills

Of the 1,367 who had had no skilled training
18% were retired, pensioned or unemployed
82% were in the active labour force
33% were in unskilled occupations

The telling line is at the bottom where we see that only 33 per cent of those 1,367 without skill training were employed in unskilled work. This means that 40 per cent or more of those employed had acquired skills without formal training. Where better jobs are available, men can and do learn skills at the work place.[14]

[14]D. N. Connor and D. W. Magill, The Role of Education in Rural Development (Ottawa: Department of Forestry and Rural Development; 1965), pp. 27, 28, 30, 33.

No criticism of vocational or skill training is involved in this observation. Some 25 per cent of the workers interviewed saw the need for such training but were financially unable to acquire it in most cases. In many modern enterprises such training is given systematically on the job. Workers recognize the need and learn the skills quickly. The farmer, fisherman or woodsman may not see the need for such training, however, or even be aware of his limitations.

The Delicate Matter of Moving Families

Urbanized people, including the experts who are themselves quite mobile, may be quite inured to the idea of families or individuals moving from place to place and job to job. They may not understand why rural people are often loathe to move, the rational arguments of the expert notwithstanding. Iverson and Matthews make this observation about relocatees in Newfoundland.

> Moving is a costly business. It is not always relevant, however, to calculate the costs of moving in simple monetary terms. Outporters are not wholeheartedly concerned with economic betterment. The precariousness of their marginal fishing economy does not inspire them to plan for the future, or even to imagine that they can achieve prosperity by the shrewd management of

> their affairs. Their reluctance to calculate the cost of resettlement in profit-loss terms is strikingly evident in their attitude toward the property they left behind. While all Anderson's Cove migrants were aware of the extent of their holdings, most seemed vague and indifferent about the worth of their property...Very few Anderson's Cove relocatees, for example, spoke enthusiastically, if at all, about the future, about a better job, about the manifold opportunities for progress that government and business herald and by which programs of resettlement and economic development are justified.[15]

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[15]Noel Iverson and D. Ralph Matthews, Communities in Decline: An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland; 1968), p. 94.

Iverson and Matthews found that many families, after accepting the idea of moving, usually after being persuaded, and after being resettled, were disappointed. They were prone to blame the authorities, insisting that they were given misinformation. People who resettled on their own volition were often equally disappointed but they could not shift the blame. Where the onus of a household settlement program can be passed on to the public authorities, such a program, however justified and however carefully managed, may be made a political issue. Iverson and Matthews found that, in general, officials in charge of the Newfoundland resettlement project moved with caution and used careful judgment. But it was not within their power to provide employment in that job-hungry province, or to provide housing in

the places of resettlement. Then, too, the relocatees were often ill-prepared for the transition "from a subsistence economy to a market economy. Many are ill-prepared to make the necessary adjustments, particularly adjustments to the economic institutions of mortgages, banks, and credit as well as to the demands of industrial work on a year-round basis."[16]

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[16]Ibid., p. 143.

Crawford writes about the hazards involved in any effort by government to relocate people. His remarks are in response to a suggestion by A. D. Scott that depressed places be dismantled and the people asked to move but what he says is pertinent to any effort by government to resettle people. The attitudes of resistance of which he speaks may very well be as strongly felt among a cluster of marginal farmers or in a fishing community as in the organized town to which he refers.

> No municipal council is going to urge its people to go elsewhere to better themselves... the policy makers are put in office to promote the interest of their region, be it in province or municipality. To do otherwise would be political suicide. Local and provincial governments exist to fulfill many functions; the promotion of the economic welfare of the inhabitants is only one... If there is one issue that seems to meet with universal resistance, whether in communities with a strong economy or communities in declining regions, it is the proposal to remold their structure of government, and particularly local government... Assuming,

> as this paper does, that it may be desirable to attain complete evacuation of an area, the dismantling of local government gives no assurance of this result as is suggested by the many population clusters in unorganized territory in several of the provinces.[17]

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[17] K. G. Crawford, "Policy for Declining Regions; A Theoretical Approach," in Areas of Economic Stress in Canada, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

Scott, whose paper appears in the same volume, takes the view that when an area falls into depression the more energetic people will leave first and as outmigration continues a spirit of depression increases, some communities even being abandoned. But he appears not to be proposing programs for initiating the abandonment of communities, or for compensating for losses suffered when places are abandoned. In his own words,

> Even when it is admitted that emigration is less rapid than immigration, that labour is less mobile than capital, that some people are not mobile at all, this assumption in itself leads to two propositions. First, a truism: when an industry and its region begin to decline relatively to the whole nation, the more mobile people leave first. Second, more substantially: the people who leave first impose a greater loss than those who are squeezed out later. The second proposition actually stems from a recognition that labour is not a homogeneous stock, but is composed of persons of different ages, strengths, marital and family status, skills, training, risk-taking propensities, and propensities to participate in local institutions and governments. Of these, some characteristics are valuable both to employers and to the local community; furthermore, it may be suggested, they are highly valuable

> to employers in other regions. Thus people with these valuable characteristics are likely to be the first lured away when local opportunities falter, and their departure is likely to impose the greatest per capita loss.

Scott then pictures the depressed community as losing the capacity to respond, as being inhabited by a class of people lacking in imagination, too individualistic to join with others in ventures and too bound to their conservative ways to recognize opportunity.

> Thus a community which has been declining for a few years is usually observed to have more than the national percentage of older, married, unskilled, uneducated and risk-averse people, conservative and individualistic with respect to the proposal or support of community "booster" projects. Obviously, this composition of the labour force is going to reinforce the tendency of the local population to specialize in activities connected with the old staple and in agriculture. Furthermore, it will make them disinclined to remold the structure of the regional government and its services to accord with new circumstances.[18]

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[18] A. D. Scott, "Policy for Declining Regions; A Theoretical Approach," in Areas of Economic Stress in Canada, op. cit., p. 85.

Scott appears to hold to some type of location theory, an ecological concept which is concerned with the natural distribution of population and production. Such distribution changes, often unpredictably, in response to market forces as well as to changes in technology. As with any ecological map, "at any given time the map of population and production is fixed." But the map does not stay fixed, although its changes are not

easily predictable.

> Thus we are unable to deduce from location theory whether recent trends and migrations will be continued or must be reversed. Furthermore, while the map is temporarily fixed, the business incentives to produce, sell, and trade continue to exert forces toward new, temporary, regional specializations, and factor-price patterns. We may well imagine that this production and trading will alter the equilibrium map toward which the entire country is moving. Similar changes of path toward a final equilibrium will result from changes in the technological processes used by the various industries, and from changes in taste and fashion.[19]

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[19]Ibid., p. 76.

The above observation on location theory would apply to depressed and affluent regions alike, but much of the paragraph would have little relevance to a region of limited resources whose morale is too low to initiate even small projects. Outside help is needed, which appears to be a solution which Scott disapproves.

> Tariffs, regional subsidies, and fiscal equalization and the like may be regarded as compensation, and thus as a sort of conscience money paid by a growing economy for the havoc it creates among the regions that are unable to stand the pace.
>
> It should be clear that I reject both the analogy with compensation and the implied growth theory. To take the latter first, the theory of growth outlined here does not depend on a set of regions, with different populations and different growth rates, successively taking off by clambering

> over the people of the regions that have failed to grow. Instead it depends on a group of factors moving from region to region as export advantage dictates. ...grasping the opportunities to produce those export staples that promise the highest incomes. Of course, there can be more than one staple; there is likely to be more than one kind of person; and the migration cannot be apprehended or performed overnight. But these qualifications do not suggest that the abandoned region ... should be "compensated."
>
> My rejection of the analogy with the compensation principle follows from these remarks about growth. The failure of a region to grow is reflected by the gradual reversal of a growth path. If it is gradual enough, and if there is no government to offer comfort to those who will not observe the unmistakable signals, all of those who are in danger of losing by the reversal can take their productive capacities elsewhere, except the owners of land. They, and their local government, will naturally have a regionary bias. But even their loss will be small if the decline is recognized and slow.[20]

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[20]Ibid., p. 90.

Many are not Innately Mobile

In these citations from Scott we read between the lines the conviction that both men and firms when confronted with reverses are able and should be willing to move elsewhere. While he recognizes that some are less prone to mobility than others, and some are physically incapable of mobility, the firmly offered idea is that people not "in the growth path" should, and normally do, migrate voluntarily. Or it is assumed that those who do not

move or "take their productive capacities elsewhere," should not be "compensated." The grim fact stands, however, that few individuals stranded in depressed areas have the capacity to work out their economic salvation. Galbraith would say organization is needed, which again is beyond their ken. "It is not to individuals but to organizations that power in the business enterprise and power in the society has passed."[21]

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[21]John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin; 1967), p. 61.

It is the function of government to help people solve problems they cannot solve themselves. Moving from one place to another is no problem for some while to others moving is an insurmountable challenge.

It hardly needs to be documented that poor people who live in depressed areas, where resettlement is seen as advisable, do not respond favourably. What families on Cape Breton Island told Caldwell would be repeated elsewhere:

> "I prefer to live in a rural area rather than in the city."
>
> "We've been here this long now, and with eight kids I couldn't move."
>
> "There is real closeness and friendliness between neighbours."
>
> "I used to think about moving, but it's too late in life now, especially with a large family."

"I wouldn't like to leave, but if I was well I might."

"We have a comfortable home here. I wouldn't like to go to a city where I would have to pay rent."

"I would lose money if I sold the farm and then I would have to pay rent in the town I can't afford."

"We would find it hard to move because all our friends are here, and we have no money."

"I never considered moving before; this is where I was born and brought up."[22]

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[22]Caldwell, op. cit., p. 38.

In this connection, Caldwell speaks of a view expressed in the locality that, while many families and individuals have moved away, those who see themselves as persons "of quality" remain and offer evidence in support of the "claim that to suceed in Nova Scotia demonstrates an extra talent."

Resettlement versus Migration

Where the B.A.E.Q. report mentions migration from the Project Region, the implication is that this would be to cities in Quebec. The resettlement program in Newfoundland, where there is no big urban labour market, still is not a project to encourage people to leave the province. The study by Connor and Magill of students in three high schools near Halifax found that, of 284 male students, 68 per cent were planning to leave their home communities or were thinking seriously about migrating

to more distant places. The respective proportion of potential migrants among the 319 female students was 79 per cent. Political leaders, understandably, view this migration from the region with alarm, their greatest concern being about the migration of the young and better educated.

A press report on the graduation exercises of the Saint John Institute of Technology quotes from a speech to the graduating class by Robert J. Higgins, provincial Minister of Economic Growth. The central thought expressed by him was that one of the major problems of New Brunswick is the out-migration of trained people: "Only 142 of last year's 257 graduates of this school are working in this province."[23]

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[23]The Telegraph-Journal (Saint John, N.B.), 27 June 1968.

While there is not the same concern about the migration of unskilled workers, political leaders are generally opposed to out-migration. After mentioning that the Atlantic Provinces had lost 97,100 outmigrants between 1951 and 1961, which he considers to be far from enough, Brewis observes:

> It may be wondered why relative declines in the Maritime population have not improved more substantially the economic situation of those who remain. A possible explanation is that the migration has not gone far enough. Given the fact, for example, that per capita incomes in Newfoundland are 40 per cent below those in the rest of the country, it

> could be urged that, if something like one-third of the population were to leave that province, the per capita incomes of the remainder would rise fairly close to the national average. I can see how one might argue such a case but I have certain reservations about it.
>
> Even if such a migration could be induced, say the next decade, by various forms of encouragement, I suspect that a substantial income gap would still remain. For one thing, certain overhead costs would have to be borne by a smaller population and, for another, a decline in population would reduce still further the incentives to produce for a local market. To the extent, moreover, that the migrants consisted of young adults, as seems likely, the age distribution of the remaining labour force would be less favourable than it is at the present time.[24]

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[24]T. N. Brewis, "The Problem of Regional Disparities," in Areas of Economic Stress in Canada, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

The Rural Poor and the Knowledge Gap

It is doubtful that the development plan outlined in the B.A.E.Q. report, even in broad perspective, is understood by more than a small minority of the inhabitants of the pilot region, although many may be aware that something in the way of a study had been carried out. Very likely the whole of it would be above the comprehension of most of the ordinary people of the region, even if they wished to understand it. Making the whole plan understandable to them would be a greater task than the study itself, and would require very much more time, possibly a

decade of continuous skilful effort.

For practical reasons, such a plan, once formally launched, would have to proceed according to its time schedule. The unfolding of the details of the development would itself be the educator. Until something is under way and visible, the "motivators," whose task it is to enlist "voluntary" cooperation would, it can be assumed, find their work difficult but becoming easier as the development proceeded. It would be surprising if complaints were not heard about the failure of the authorities to inform the people in advance. The situation is not unlike that which existed over the years regarding the well-known Tennessee Valley Authority. It began to have meaning to the hill people only when they could see the dams, the man-made lakes and the power-generating plants. More than likely, the hill people, now pro-TVA, would have been incredulous at any full explanation of the program, apart from a natural tendency to be critical at the outset of planned changes.

Metzger and Philbrook make a similar observation about the residents in the area of the Mactaquac Dam development on the Saint John River. In this case, it appears, a minimum effort had been made to inform the people about the project.

> The strongest impression we received was one of bewilderment, confusion and apprehension. In the minds of many Mactaquac residents, the project took on the aspect of a massive force sweeping down on them from outside, threatening them, literally

> with a deluge, on all they held dear. The atmosphere was thick with apprehension and rumour, often of the most fantastic sort, and there was little, if any, sense that the course of action could be altered or influenced by their own efforts. Apathy and resignation seemed to be the only mechanism for quieting anxiety and quelling resentment, although, because of the magnitude of impending events, these feelings could often not be contained.[25]

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[25]L. Paul Metzger and Thomas A. Philbrook, Sociological Factors Influencing Labour Mobility (Fredericton: New Brunswick Department of Labour; 1964), p. 62.

The Mactaquac dam is now a fact and today, after the event, efforts are being made to enlist the cooperation of the people. At several points in the Iverson-Matthews report on their study of the Newfoundland Household Resettlement Program, mention is made of inadequate efforts on the part of the authorities to inform the potential relocatees about the nature of the program and the risks involved. Indeed, decisions were being made by urbanized people who seldom visited the outports.

There is a vast difference between a giant development program for a depressed area and some community venture in a local area. The latter often requires local discussion, which in theory should also apply to the giant program. But the very complexity of the great project defies all ordinary devices, all efforts to bring about before-the-fact knowledge-diffusion and discussion. The area embraced is often so wide and the

interests and localisms so varied as to render this difficult. Such ventures appear to be in another sphere and must be left to the governments which represent the people at the provincial and national levels. The need is still there to make information about the undertaking available to the people who will be affected by it. Those who fear they will be hurt need to know what adjustments they can make. Even those who expect to benefit need to have the pertinent knowledge.

This task of getting necessary information to the people so they may be better able to utilize new resources is called persuasion by Metzger and Philbrook:

> Persuasion consists of much more than occasional use of the mass media to release information, at the convenience of the policy-makers. It is well known that the mass media can do little to change attitudes and opinions in a direction contrary to that already held by the audience. At best, they can reinforce or make use of existing predispositions. Without minimizing their importance, we can point out that persuasion is most effective when carried out at the face-to-face level, or in mass situations, by contact with opinion leaders and molders within the community. Persuasion is an active, continuous process at the grass roots level; it cannot be carried out through the impersonal influence of mass media alone.[26]

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[26]Ibid., p. 69.

These great programs, whether Mactaquac, the B.A.E.Q. regional project, or the projected rural development program for

Northeast New Brunswick, not only were not conceived in the areas to be served; they could not have been. They are the product of know-how and knowledge which accumulates in cities. They reflect the competence of a specialized professional elite whose background, in most cases, and whose style of life and ways of thinking are far above the knowledge level of the people for whom the programs are intended. For these people to communicate with, to persuade, to motivate the many at the lower level may be more of a challenge than many of them can meet. For these elites, communication and persuasion means that the people who are to be helped are expected to accept the programs as planned, although they have had no part in the planning, and to accept the upper-level ways of thinking about the programs. Perhaps this problem cannot be entirely avoided. Those who are to be helped have experienced only an economy and a traditional way of life which are increasingly defined by the elites as unacceptable.

The economy of the new dispensation is beyond the comprehension of a people whose majority has had less than eight years of schooling, whose social world is an isolated community, and whose utility as labour is linked to already outmoded occupational pursuits. The ailments of such a depressed region cannot be treated longer by the old home remedies or, as Graham say, by limited local projects. What Graham says of farming is equally

true of fishing and the exploitation of the forests:

> Such farms are especially common in, although not confined to, Quebec and the Maritime Provinces. They are often characterized by poor soil, small size, unsuitable topography for the use of machinery, and a poor location in relation to markets. The obvious prescriptions of farm consolidation, where economically feasible, are being followed in a hit and miss manner; but their implementation is impeded by the consequent displacement of people who would be virtually incapable of coping with life in any other environment. Much the same can be said for small-scale fishing and logging activities in the Eastern Provinces.[27]

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[27]Graham, op. cit., p. 10.

On Attitudes Toward the Poor

It may be said in this connection that attitudes which are voiced are probably less to be deplored than attitudes which are conveyed by implication. For example, a large development project for a depressed area is drawn up jointly by experts in the offices of the provincial and national governments. There may be consultation within departments and between departments at both provincial and national levels. Outside experts may be engaged to make a preliminary survey of available and potential resources. These experts may consult with officials and business leaders in the communities involved in the planning. The persons talked to are likely to be those who would benefit most or who

might hope to benefit should the program be carried through since such an approach could be expected to encourage cooperation.

But the thousands of persons who would be most intimately affected by such a program, who would be asked, or told, to find other kinds of employment or abandon their farms, or perhaps move because their little community should be evacuated, are not so likely to be consulted. Yet, in the absence of dependable information, rumours will circulate among the poor and fears will be generated, as we have seen in the case of the Mactaquac development.

The pertinent thought here is that as the work of development goes forward, attention being centered on achieving this goal and the next, the undertaking becomes a self-insulating bureaucratic operation. In the process, the relation of the program to the people assumes a professional character. It is not that the people have been forgotten. They are kept in mind, but somehow their role changes from being the purpose for the program to being the means. The drawing-board conception of the project involves it in the bureaucratic set-up. Concern about people becomes secondary to the effective conclusion of the program. The efficiency tests which must be met by those responsible are impersonal and professional, and little related to people as such. Those who manage the program must meet the

requirements of a time budget on the one hand, and a money budget on the other.

Whenever, in the course of developing such a program, it becomes advisable to take information to the people, it will be in the nature of "selling" the program. The attitude expressed in this relationship is not anti-social, rather it is official and professional, but not very informing.

There is mounting criticism of various development and renewal projects in American cities. Among the best known of the critics is Jane Jacobs who takes the position that in most of these efforts people are forgotten. Rather, so she argues, the planners and experts are capitvated by their projects. She speaks of low-income housing projects which quickly become slums no better than the slums they replaced. She speaks of grand civic centers to which people are not attracted, and notes further:

> Under the surface, these accomplishments prove poorer than their poor pretenses. They seldom aid city areas around them, as in theory they are supposed to. These amputated areas typically develop galloping gangrene. To house people in this planned fashion, price tags are fastened on the population, and each sorted-out chunk of price-tagged populace lives in growing suspicion and tension against the surrounding city. When two or more such hostile islands are juxtaposed the the result is called "a balanced neighborhood." Monopolistic shopping centers and monumental cultural centers cloak, under the public relations hoohaw, the subtraction of commerce, and of culture

too, from the intimate and casual life of cities.[28]

[28]Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Random House; 1961), p. 4.

Elsewhere in her criticism of urban developments which disregard people, Mrs. Jacobs mentions that slums may be removed not for the benefit of the poor who live there, but to serve the interests of other social classes, that in some slums, despite the poverty of man, there are real communities which are destroyed by renewal. This criticism may not apply to economic development programs in the Atlantic Provinces, at least not with the same force, but it offers a warning to planners of all kinds. Her argument is that development plans are evolved in the conceptual terms of some rationalized model and people are then expected to adapt themselves to the plan. The term "co-operation" is used to describe this adaptation.

It needs to be recognized that rural, more than urban, people do not have a tradition of picking up and moving on short notice, in many of the older settlements. There is often a strong attachment to "home" and, especially in depressed areas, a strong attachment to a piece of land, perhaps to a piece of land which has sustained a family for years, and this attachment is not likely to be put aside only as a result of listening to a

"motivator." In much the same way, there is attachment to particular lines of work, such as fishing or logging or mining. A long time is often needed to change attitudes and ways of life, although attitudes may change if visible and immediate, rather than indefinite future, alternatives can be offered. The treatment calls for more patience than a development scheme has time for and more "persuasive" skill than is often offered.

An article by Phillips in the Canadian periodical, Maclean's, calls attention to another attitude among the better-to-do towards the poor in their own communities. It is expressed in these terms: one knows the poor are there but one does not talk about them. One would rather call the attention of a distinguished visitor to some civic improvement. This article mentions a television program regarding Bathurst, New Brunswick. The television story had included pictures of poverty in the area, to which some citizens objected. Phillips observes:

> They pointed to the 117-million-dollar complex of minerals, steel and chemicals now rising at Belledune Point, near the richest new base-metal find in North America, to two new mines soon to open and two large ones now producing, to a new forest products plant, and expansion in two pulp and paper firms. Growth, they seemed to think, denied decline.
>
> In fact, there are two worlds in Canada, existing side by side. In Bathurst you can see the new store fronts, apartments and houses being built. But along the roads that radiate out

> this community of thirteen thousand the pockets of good farm land shade into mile after mile of scrubby clearings in which squat tarpaper shacks, their chinks plugged with rags. ...In a rectangle of one hundred miles by forty, the hard core of the poor "camp" on fifty to one hundred uncleared acres and commute to seasonal jobs in construction, the mines, fish plants, peat bogs or bush. At times in winter one-third have no work. ... These are the poor who inhabit the world of hunger and delinquency that tells less about them as persons than about the society that created them. And alongside the wealth that is breeding the new wealth of which Bathurst is proud, their poverty continues to breed poverty.[29]

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[29]Alan Phillips, "Our Invisible Poor," Maclean's, Vol. 78, No. 4 (20 February 1965), p. 10.

Actually the economic security of this city, leaning as it does on primary industries that may or may not prosper, depending on outside markets and outside financing, is not much greater than that of the poor. It could well be that the attitudes of the better-to-do, their unwillingness to talk about the poverty around them, is itself expressive of their own sense of insecurity. This tendency to avoid even a discussion of poverty and the poor is not peculiar to any city. The affluent element in a city often regard it as bad form to bring such a subject into the open and they are likely to be resentful if the poor join together in some type of protest. Yet the same affluent element who would oppose many public welfare plans, such as medicare, will be in

the forefront as supporters of private charities. There are thus approved and disapproved ways in which the problems of slums and poverty may be discussed.

Thomson, who made a case study of poor families in Saint John, as well as three other cities, found that her presence in each city caused considerable uneasiness:

> Throughout the whole project there were demonstrations of the fact nobody and no community wants to be identified with poverty. For example, a newspaper explained, "Local welfare officials said this morning there is no stigma attached to the fact that Saint John has been chosen as one of the four Canadian cities for an urban poverty subject." Saint John's inclusion did not mean that the city was being classified as poor.[30]

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[30]Lillian Thomson, "A Case Report on the Problems of Families in Four Canadian Cities," in Urban Need in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council; 1965), pp. 64-65.

Northeast New Brunswick Development Plan

The development scheme identified by this title is concerned with a strip about 180 miles east to west, with a depth of 30 to 40 miles, with much of its settlement along the coast. It embraces the counties of Restigouche and Gloucester and a single parish in Northumberland County. This development would include most of the social challenges mentioned in this chapter. The area is sparsely settled by approximately 106,000 people,

a good share of them clustered in the Dalhousie-Campbellton area or the Bathurst-Belledune area. The labour force of an estimated 29,000 includes 10,000 who are underemployed or unemployed. But much of this labour force is widely dispersed and almost all of it is unskilled and untrained as far as industrial employment is concerned.

Moreover, the level of education of these people is low. Some 73 per cent have had less than eight years of schooling or no schooling at all, compared with 58 per cent for the whole of New Brunswick and 47 per cent for Canada. At the other end of the scale, only 4.5 per cent have had 12 years or more of schooling, compared with 7.2 per cent for New Brunswick and 12.5 per cent for Canada.[31]

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[31] Agreement Covering a Comprehensive Rural Development Plan for Northeast New Brunswick (Ottawa: Department of Forestry and Rural Development; 1966), p. 23.

Within the area are about 455,000 acres of rural freehold land of which 56,000 acres are in commercial farms (gross sales of $1,200 upward) and 114,000 acres are in non-commercial farms (earning less than $1,200 per farm), and rural non-farm holdings total 585,000 acres. Almost all of the 550,000 acres of private forest land is heavily cut-over. It is estimated that not over 40,000 acres could be used for productive farming.

The great majority of people now living on farms below the subsistence level will be persuaded to sell their holdings and move to one of the more urbanized areas. This would mean a transfer from a relatively rural existence to a more urban, industrial way of life.[32]

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[32]Ibid., p. 31.

The program aims to rationalize the four primary industries of the area: farming, fishing, forestry and mining, which would require the injection of some degree of order and organization, as well as technological improvement in their operation. It is assumed that this would afford higher and more steady income for those who are employed. It is hoped that resettling more of the people in or near the urban centres will generate other types of employment. While the program as planned, being itself somewhat of a gamble, can be a step ahead, it remains true that even if the goals can be fully reached the area would still be poor relatively. The aim is to find 4,000 jobs of reasonable good income in forestry, agriculture and fisheries, 1,500 jobs in mining, and around 4,500 jobs in other kinds of work. Obviously, this type of plan is experimental and those in charge of it can make no firm predictions or give definite answers to the many questions that the people involved will

naturally ask. In these respects the plan is cautious. It is suggested that on the finding of new jobs three distinct problems will have to be overcome:

> First, the bulk of the unemployed and underemployed population is located in the eastern portion of the region, while most of the new employment will be generated in the western portion.
>
> Second, because of the generally low level of education, many of those requiring work are not at present in a position to benefit from vocational and technical training programs.
>
> Third, a large number of the underemployed are presently engaged in low-income abriculture and fishing operations. Rationalization of these operations will free many of these people for more productive work elsewhere but, to be effective, release and training of this labour force must be taken in step with the expansion of job opportunities.[33]

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[33]Ibid., p. 25.

These three obstacles relate, not to the possibility of finding new employment but, 1) to moving people from locations of no work or very little work to locations offering greater prospect for employment, and 2) to upgrading the relocatees occupationally through courses in technical training. Regarding the second of these two objectives, raising the education and skill level of the workers, there is no problem in improving general educational facilities. But training in skills may present difficulties. While the existence of a skilled labour force

in an area may attract secondary industry, the absence of secondary industry is not likely to inspire young persons to accept such training on faith. However, some who hope to migrate from the region may accept technical training for preparatory reasons, much as many university students, hoping to migrate, get their degrees first.

Regarding the first objective, involving the first and third problems in the paragraphs quoted above, it is likely that many families in the project area will be advised to move, often as far as sixty or more miles from locations where they may have inherited land from parents or grandparents. The language used, "free many of these people for more productive work elsewhere," implies that these people have the wish to move and need only some financial inducement to leave. It may turn out that this assumption is not well based. It may be merely expressive of the wish of the planners. To the credit of the plan, it is not intended to force outmigration from the poorest locations, but rather to help "those families who choose to move out of these areas."[34]

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[34]Ibid., p. 30.

It is to be expected that the general objectives of the development plan for Northeast New Brunswick will be difficult

for many of the more scattered families in the area to understand. While the need for the program is imperative, it is not a plan that can be implemented in all respects at once with clearly definable results. The plan will unfold gradually and will involve many uncertainties, thus increasing the difficulty of keeping the ordinary people informed. Yet the program will be hurt without cooperation from those involved. Realistic information based on fact rather than empty promises will be expected. Social betterment resulting from early stages of implementation will produce positive attitudes and cooperation in later stages and pave the way for other comprehensive projects. Any other result will merely increase cynical attitudes toward any project.

Chapter 7

Ways of Life in Deprived Areas

The Sub-Cultures of the Poor

Two generations ago the poor in the Atlantic Provinces were not called poor in the urgent sense that exists today. This may be one of the consequences of the national economy becoming more closely knit. This trend tends to focus attention on the gaps in levels of living. Changes in the organization and technology of agriculture remove many formerly viable family farms out of the class of the economically productive units. Similar changes have outmoded traditional ways of fishing so that the once independent and proud fisherman is now placed in the category of the economically depressed. Many woodsmen, farmers and fishermen, once recognized as poor but self-reliant, are now seen as impoverished and economically helpless. Their old self-sufficient ways of life, to which many still cling, are now equated with backwardness. They are called poor in what Coser would call opprobrious terms.[1] The attitudes of outsiders toward these occupational groups have changed in a negative direction.

[1] Lewis A. Coser, "Sociology of Poverty," in Social Problems, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Autumn 1965), pp. 140-148.

Consideration in this chapter will be given to the various sub-cultures of the poor in the Atlantic Provinces but this does not necessarily mean support for the "culture-of-poverty" conception of such writers as Harrington and Lewis, although there is some basis in fact for their ideas. Briefly put,

their view assumes a "lower-lower" stratum that is helplessly mired in poverty and hopelessly unable to move out of that condition. The members of this stratum are, in a sense, fenced in by condidtions over which they have no control. Compared with the children of the middle class, their children have no prospect of escape. So they develop a sub-culture which reflects their hopeless position and perpetuates their way of life.[2]

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[2]Michael Harrington, The Other America (New York: MacMillan; 1962); Oscar Lewis, La Vida, A Puerto Rican Family in the Culture of Poverty, San Juan and New York (New York: Random House; 1965).

That conception of a poverty culture would hardly apply even to the most depressed areas of the Atlantic region. To some observers, such areas may seem alienated from middle-class values but they are not alienated from their own traditions and values. To some, they may seem to lack motivation in the direction of the accepted aspirations of an industrial urban society, but they are not devoid of either motivations or aspirations. It is only that their aspirations may focus on lesser and more immediate goals than those of the urban middle class. In the main, their families are firmly knit and their tendency to feel identified with a place and a people sets them apart, not as being caught in a "culture of poverty," but as often being too proud of a traditional style of life and too slow to adopt the attitudes of an industrial way of life. In Newfoundland the people in one cluster of villages may have a different way of speaking, different words in their vocabularies than are found in another

cluster of villages some fifty miles distant. This, we submit, is a characteristic of the Atlantic Provinces: the very isolation of clusters of people has permitted sub-cultures to develop. They have persisted into a period when large-scale organization has become the norm.

Woodsworth sees the rural poor as much like other people. But they are individualistic and varied in their attitudes. "They differ on almost every subject, even on such a matter as moving from a marginal farm to an urban community. Some would move if financially able, but "others love the land they have lived on for years, or for generations, and do not want to move."[3]

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[3]D. E. Woodsworth, Director, Rural Need in Canada, 1965 (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council; 1965), p. 5.

In the report of the Eastern Canada Farm Survey there is a paragraph regarding the attitude of farmers on marginal farms in Nova Scotia, noting their unwillingness to sell their farms and move away, and yet the land is poor and without prospect of providing a good living.

> The farmers interviewed averaged about 50 years of age and had nine years of schooling. Older farmers have the attitude that they are too old to expand their farming operations; also, they do not wish to sell their farms, but are content to live out their lives as they are. Most of the operators are debt-free, and they indicated a reluctance to use credit in their farming operations.[4]

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[4]Report of the Eastern Canada Farm Survey, 1963 (Ottawa: Department of Forestry and Rural Development; 1966), p. 89.

Elsewhere in this report on the attitudes of farmers on poor land, it is noted that they do not want to leave farming for other work, they will not borrow money for development, and they will not adopt new farming methods. Their attitudes are similar to those found among poor farmers elsewhere. Yet, as we have already noted, the rate of farm abandonment indicates that many farmers are no longer content to cling to their land.

Philbrook's study of three Newfoundland communities in which the central activity was, respectively, fishing, logging and mining, reveals a lively community consciousness in each of these places. Whether loggers, fishermen, or miners, they are totally identified with their little communities, totally conversant with the community history and lore. Isolation from the wider world appears to be of little concern, and each community tends to have its own individuality organized around work and the related style of life.[5]

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[5]Tom Philbrook, Fisherman, Logger, Merchant, Miner (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1966).

It is true that in the isolated communities reported on by Philbrook the levels of education are low. The people are not anti-education but for many of them the work world they visualize makes no great educational demands. This is recognized by Connor and Magill.

> For example, the child of parents who live on a non-commercial farm in a small rural community (inland or coastal) may well develop a set of values which stress the present rather than the future, the

> concrete realities rather than the world of ideas, and the local in place of the societal. This child then confronts a school system which is geared to societal needs and based on values which assume present sacrifices for future advantages gained through facility with abstract concepts and viewed in a national or international framework acquired through extensive and intensive reading. The result is a pervasive incompatibility between the local-familial and that of the school system which, in this case, represents the larger society, a garrison of urban elements in the midst of the local subculture.[6]

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[6] D. M. Connor and D. W. Magill, The Role of Education in Rural Development (Ottawa: Department of Forestry A.R.D.A. Project #3053; 1965), pp. 84-85.

This statement touches the crucial issue in all efforts to bring social and economic development to people in submarginal areas. It means that the school and other urbanizing factors designed to bring in the standardized culture of the wider society must first break down the local subculture. It amounts to an invasion from without and it is not always welcome. To quote Connor and Magill again,

> The nature of the subculture in which the child is initially enveloped and later absorbed is also a major factor in his choice of an occupation, as can be seen in the inheritance of occupations from one generation to the next. This occurs because of parental encouragement in some cases and in others because of the limited range of occupations demonstrated and available in the local community. ...
>
> As the child becomes an adolsecent and makes decisions concerning his education and occupation, the decision is taken to remain in the community or to migrate from it.[7]

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[7] Ibid, p. 85.

Familism and the Money Economy

However attractively the objectives of rural development may be phrased, the hypothetical child of whom Connor and Magill write in the above paragraphs is to be manipulated. The object of education is to urbanize the child and orient him to the industrial urban way of life. He is to be put on a road leading away from the old familial way of life, which is often strongest in the least developed areas. This in a sense is a threat, an incursion uninvited, but all of Canada has passed through this experience except the people in isolated areas, and they have now come to be the object of development programs.

To speak of an isolated community as being familial in its way of life does not necessarily mean that it is a big happy family. A community made up of fifty families may comprise some four or five family clusters. If the place has been isolated for long, the lines between the family clusters may be sharply drawn, although family differences will be set aside in a common crisis. The individual in such a community identifies with his kinship group. Firestone relates how the family in Savage Cove, Newfoundland, is the work unit and in many respects the only economic unit.

> The continuance of the patrilocal extended family is due to its economic utility. ... It is felt that brothers should stay and work together, and when this does not occur people tend to feel that it is because they could not agree rather than because of economic advantages in separation. Nonetheless, brothers sometimes leave such groups when they feel it is to their own advantage. ... Cooperative fishing endeavor forms the core integrating activity of families. This activity provides the greatest income; and

> the management and upkeep of fishing gear and structures, and the entire process of fishing and drying ties together the labors and the interests of the individuals involved. In a secondary sense, sealing and other hunting carried on by family members produces the same effect. Such activities as relate to gardens and cows tend to be only household affairs.
>
> As long as there is a core cooperative activity the group will remain together, in spite of independent temporary jobs taken by individual men. Therefore woodcutting on contract where a family member obtains a contract to provide so much wood and the men of the family cut the wood as a group, can maintain a patrilocal extended family as a core economic activity. In contrast, permanent employment of men on an individual basis tends to break it down.[8]

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[8] Melvin M. Firestone, Brothers and Rivals, Patrilocality in Savage Cove (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland; 1967), pp. 84-85.

Work in these family combinations (fishing, sealing, hunting or cutting wood) is carried on in terms of money values but, with work trading and other exchanges in kind, little cash is handled, or needed. Each remembers what he owes others and what is owed him. Over time the accounts are balanced. It is really a quasi-subsistence economy, as it is also quasi-familial. Philbrook, after observing work and life in a fishing, a mining, and a logging community, described it as based on personal relations, awareness of "the individual's qualities, family position and religion," with each individual knowing the merits of another individual. In such communities "the force of individual sanction, through gossip, chiding, joking, and face-saving devices is strong."

> A subsistence economy has often been taken as one of the elements of pre-industrial communities. However, the existence of a cash economy does not necessarily conflict with the pre-industrial way of life. The fact that pre-industrial economies are being destroyed at the present time relates not to the fact that such communities must have a subsistence economy to endure, but that they are at a competitive disadvantage with modern mass industries. The reason for this is simple; pre-industrial forms of production are labor-intensive, and if individual remuneration is raised to the level of the industrial workers, the product is priced out of the market if it can be produced by mass industrial means.[9]

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[9] Philbrook, op. cit., p. 3.

This tendency for people in many Atlantic small communities to be highly family-oriented, especially in work arrangements, is part of a syndrome characteristic of the organization of subsistence economies. Other features are involved, as we shall see in looking at Grand Manan Island.

Community on Grand Manan

Grand Manan Island was originally occupied by settlers from Maine. Its population reached 2,500 in the 1880's and has changed very little since then. It was studied by McPhee in the early 1960's in terms of the themes which permeate the Island's culture, social class, economic organization, politics, education and religion as these persist in an isolated community.[10]

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[10] S. E. McPhee, Social Organization and Economic Change in a Fishing Community (Fredericton: University of New Brunswick, unpublished M.A. Thesis; 1963).

Isolation, independence, factionism, suspicion of leaders and resistance to change, characteristic of most small communities, were found to be especially evident among the islanders. Fishing is an occupation in which self-reliance is often imperative. The organizational pattern which has developed in a precarious environment tends to operate to maintain that precariousness. A philosophical islander's thought is reported by McPhee:

> In order to exist, he becomes quite resourceful. Very, very independent. Someone goes and says, "I want you to come to a meeting." He says, "Well, its a good thing, but I'm not interested in that kind of thing." He feels self-sufficient and doesn't understand the need for cooperation. He sees this independence as a wonderful thing, but has seen it to be a detriment communitywise so many times.[11]

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[11]Ibid., p. 17.

This man took pride in his independence but recognized that the attitude made his community a community of individuals. He had no wish to work for bosses and be regulated by time clocks. Serving his family was something else. Another local citizen, also a fisherman, said to McPhee:

> Grand Manan people is the most independent people there is in the world. If you asked a Grand Mananer here and if he didn't want to come - last night he got it in his head he wanted to go away this morning - he wouldn't let you know. As a majority, they're independent.[12]

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[12]Ibid., p. 25.

Leighton's study of other Bay of Fundy fishermen, from "Stirling County," Nova Scotia, shows a similar individualism.

> This sentiment of individualism is reflected in fishing practices. Fairhaveners avoid grouping up to form a "fleet" even if a threatening wind comes up; there is an "every man for himself" tendency. They are also secretive about their catches. A story is told about two men and their partners who lobstered in the same small cove and yet, despite their close proximity, never told each other how many they caught. ...
>
> The fisherman takes pride in the independence of his work and is inclined to cooperate only when his particular contribution does not get lost in the group effort. If he helps haul up the boats, it is because his was hauled up. He does not like to "wait for the next fellow," and he grows restless when his ties to others become too binding. He would rather be lonely than restricted.[13]

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[13]Charles C. Hughes, Marc-Adelard Tremblay, Robert N. Rapoport and Alexander M. Leighton, People of Cove and Woodlot (New York: Basic Books; 1960), Vol. II, Disorder and Sociocultural Environment, pp. 232-233.

Employers are often frustrated at the refusal of workers to obey orders and Grand Manan islanders recognize themselves that sometimes their love of independence is carried too far. Their individualistic way of work may result in defensive behaviour toward other fishermen, their closest competitors. One does not tell the outcome of his haggling with dealers. Each tries to outdo the others in finding the best fishing grounds, in getting the largest catch, and in undercutting prices to insure selling their catches to the factories.

Jealousy over large catches may even, on occasion, estrange fathers and sons or separate brothers. "They hate, as far as fishing is concerned, to have their own brother go out and catch twenty-five pounds more of fish. Oh yes, that's true. They hate to see anyone go out and trim them."[14]

[14]McPhee, op. cit., p. 6.

This does not mean that these fishermen cannot cooperate in a crisis. That is a different situation and one may risk his life to save another. Still they are competitors in a hostile environment, unable to cooperate to maintain prices, or to promote effective processing and marketing arrangements. Unorganized, uncooperative and willing covertly to underbid one another, they are no match for the buyers of their fish.

McPhee reports on an effort to start a fertilizer plant on Grand Manan. This would have provided a means for gaining some value from extra catches of fish for which there is no market. But the effort failed. One fisherman who favoured the idea said:

> A big item here would be a fertilizer plant. Have to sell fish a lot cheaper, but they can handle so many fish, if there's an overflow. .... Yes, there is capital here to start one, but there's not enough cooperation. I guess you could put it down as jealousy. One fellow's scared the other fellow's going to get more than he is. ... We also need a cold storage. That wouldn't help us in the seining and weir business, but the economy of the Island as a whole should have a cold storage. There's been three attempts to have a cold storage built here; government to put up two-thirds - started to raise the rest. Some people didn't want it for the simple reason they wanted it all themselves, and if they couldn't have it, no one else would. Wasn't ones to go in with someone else.[15]

[15]Ibid., p. 9.

In this community, persons who elsewhere might be encouraged to assume leadership roles are reluctant to do so. Some, who do not

have time themselves or lack interest in collective activity, speak of the unwillingness of others to accept responsibility. Newcomers who accept office in local groups are often regarded as aliens trying to change island customs.

Over the past century there have been many changes in the herring fisheries. Change has been forced on Grand Mananers in meeting competition but it has often met much resistance. Weir ownership amounts to a virtual monopoly of a scarce public resource. The suitable spots for weirs are licensed to individuals and become inheritable property of families, to be jealously held. A better-to-do family in a depression year may be able to buy weir rights from others and so extend its influence. Weir fishermen invest capital and time at the risk of uncertain returns. Owners of weirs are often inactive themselves and become employers of fishermen. But their position is increasingly threatened by purse seining.

Seiners, with electronic equipment on their boats, have the advantage of mobility over weir fishermen. Weir fishermen hold that the seiners locate schools of fish and net them before they can reach the weirs. They have resorted to dumping old automobiles into the water to foul the nets of the seiners. The decline of weir fishing was noted by an observer who found that many weirs seemed to be abandoned in the summer of 1968.

Sardine canning has given some security by extending the market for small herring but it has provided only irregular employment. The dominance of one packer and its increasing control over a number of weirs have caused ill feelings. The introduction

of expensive draggers, requiring a capital investment of $80,000 to $500,000, has further threatened the old way of life on Grand Manan and hastened the transformation of independent fishermen into wage workers. The need for radio detection equipment, large nets for scooping-up the fish, and freezing plants for packing the fish effectively introduces corporate and capitalist structures into the industry at all levels. This means that many fishermen can look forward only to a future as hired workers on vessels. Their old skills have become outmoded and they become a working class. They are becoming absorbed into the industrial complex as a matter of survival in a world which will no longer accept the low standard of living associated with the perservation of traditional work patterns.

Social Change on Grand Manan

Formerly, the Grand Mananers had achieved a way of life which fitted the seasons. When time for fishing came they were ready for that work, and when the fishing season ended many went to the mainland where they found jobs as loggers or as common labourers. Many now look back to that period as a golden age. Now they see their proud old occupation and its way of life so pushed aside that young people are no longer attracted to it. Now there are classes of fishermen defined by access to modern equipment and differences in ability to accumulate unemployment insurance stamps. Said a Grand Mananer:

> We'll take the two classes of fishermen here. We'll take the man with the dragger and his crew. He's gone out early spring, and made a big year

> already. By the time it gets cold and he stops he's made enough for all winter - for two winters. He gets the biggest kind of unemployment. The other fellow has a small boat, can only fish a short time, trying, but can't get big stamps. I've seen cases when fellows who don't need it, get it, and those who do, don't.[16]

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[16] Ibid., p. 159.

Now, in the new social order which is emerging, the owners of the big boats, speaking as employers, complain that they must contribute to unemployment insurance for members of their crews but are not themselves eligible to draw benefits, although they are far from affluent. Some call the unemployment benefits a "pension" which enables fishermen to take a winter vacation rather than seek other work.

The former role of the buyer has been taken over by the outside packer who controls marketing over a wide area. Draggermen and seiners are emerging as a new class of fishermen-capitalists. The ordinary fisherman, lacking the necessary knowledge and sources of capital for expensive equipment, accuses them of using political influence and is bitter when he observes some of them leaving for winter vacations in Florida. The old order has broken down.

New differences in incomes are translated into differences in consumption patterns and differences in social influence as social class lines become more evident. But many traditional patterns change only slowly. Thus good housekeeping remains an island virtue. The risks inherent in fishing have encouraged the tendency to spend money freely when one has it but the decline in

the importance of the local merchant has made credit less easy to obtain. Municipal political organization is still amost non-existent and ordinary people show little active interest in it. Such organization as exists tends to be identified with national political parties, and leadership is provided by a few leading families. Religious conflict continues to divide the islanders and each effort to form a new congregation meets resistance from the established churches. Church membership remains an important source of status. Revivalist meetings add to the rivalry as they tend to draw young members from one denomination to another. Divisiveness and the ambivalence of loyalty to clergymen provide further evidence of the individualistic independence of the islanders.

Much as formerly, the average islander evinces little interest in education but outside pressures are causing changes in this sphere. A high school was accepted but not without considerable concern on the part of church groups. "There is a consistent feeling among fundamentalists that too much education spoils your religion." There remains a concern about moral standards. As gossip has it, certain families are assumed to have low moral standards as a consequence of heredity. In general religion, moral beliefs, and educational differences serve to divide rather than unite the population. Another concern about the high school is that two-thirds of its graduates leave the island.

One continuing aspect of the Grand Manan subculture concerns the inability of the people to organize for collective action.

This may reflect fear of change as well as their traditional individualism. It explains much of their resistance to change in any form. Many of the problems of Grand Mananers are inevitable in any traditionalistic community being drawn into more intimate association with the outside world and undergoing revolutionary social change.

The Ways of a Poor Mining Community

Three decades ago, Minto, New Brunswick, was little more than a company-owned coal camp of tarpaper shacks located some thirty-five miles from Fredericton. It has changed into a settled rural community with paved streets, improved homes, and increasingly adequate public services at the very time when its economic base has undergone an inevitable and continuing decline. Minto's existence was always uncertain but depletion of coal reserves, high costs of production and disappearance of markets have recently threatened the very existence of the community. The people, much like those in many another mining community, remained acquiescent in spite of the obvious warnings of future crisis. The belief that "things are no worse here than in many other places" dampened the incentive to look elsewhere. They clung to the hope that something would turn up. To discover the basis for this attitude, Metzger and Philbrook studied the underlying traits of the Minto residents.

Individualism, self-reliance, and impatience with outside controls characterize the people. Combined with pride in home ownership, these values limit willingness to move. Strong community ties and friendships which carry over from work to

recreational activities are evident among the miners. The miner goes hunting and fishing with his work mates and thereby achieves amusement, sociability and the family's supply of meat. He could not easily achieve a similar style of life in a large industrial city. The fact that mine owners are local residents, or were until recently, who rose out of the common class tends to mitigate awareness of class differences. Unlike Grand Manan, Minto has strong community cohesion and is not divided by class and denominational antagonisms. Its members are apathetic rather than restless:

> Mixed with the sense of human companionship and social cohesion, which this community represents, is an unmistakable atmosphere of resignation, listlessness and apathy - a mood which is not unique to Minto, but which pervades the "culture of poverty" everywhere.
>
> The mood hints at many things - blocked and perhaps deeply buried aspirations, a sense of frustration and of having been left behind in a rapidly changing world. In our interviews occasional expressions of discontent with things as they were, of awareness that a better life was possible, of hopes for achieving it, were present, but almost always were followed by disclaimers representing an inability to believe that life could be much different.[17]

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[17] L. Paul Metzger and Thomas A. Philbrook, Sociological Factors Influencing Labour Mobility (Fredericton: New Brunswick Department of Labour; 1964), pp. 22-23.

The functional isolation of this community, its detachment from the urban flow of life, its rustic setting and its small size have produced a distinctive way of life. Residents turn their interests inward to local matters rather than to the external events which attract the attention of urban dwellers. Their work is industrial, using machines to extract a natural product out of the

earth. Like fishing, it is hazardous work and this provides a communal element among miners. But mining makes every man in the work force dependent for his safety on the actions of every other man and this introduces an awareness of large-scale organization and inter-dependence. Miners develop an occupational solidarity that is enhanced by the isolation inherent in life in a mining community. The whole of their routine of living, say Metzger and Philbrook, is the opposite of urban living.

> The changing and change-oriented community opens new vistas and opportunities for its members; it stimulated their ambitions and may more or less ruthlessly force change upon them, even if they prefer to remain in established ways. The stable community, on the other hand, reinforces an acceptance of things as they are; in place of challenge, it offers the security of what is familiar and known.[18]

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[18]Ibid., p. 24.

Day in and day out, the same themes dominate their conversation, things remembered are about the same, the same local terms enter their vocabulary, and common values give them a distinctive subculture.

Residents of Minto are hampered in adjusting to jobs other than mining by their limited education. Eight out of ten Minto adults have less than seven years of schooling, enough for mining but not enough for meaningful community leadership experience or for technological adaptability. The person with little education is prone to leave civic concerns to others while mistrusting those in the know.

> Finally, the "civic-minded" in Minto are hampered by an attitude of cynicism and suspicion with respect to participation in civic affairs, particularly government. This attitude pervades all social levels and appears to be deeply ingrained in the New Brunswick view of things. Almost universally, the term "politics" is synonymous with favoritism, nepotism, and corruption, and it is taken for granted that the sole motive for anyone interested in civic participation and public life is "lining his pockets" at the expense of the public. ... Needless to say, it is time when government at all levels is by necessity playing an increasingly important role in economic development, this attitude is an enormous barrier to constructive policy, the success of which is partially dependent on widespread popular support.[19]

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[19] Ibid., pp. 35-36. A crash program of educational upgrading and technical training has been undertaken with the closing of one of the last important mines, but it is too early to assess the probable results of the program.

One observation made by Metzger and Philbrook about Minto was that the young are very restless. Mining is not visualized in the aspirations of the boys. Adults speak of the young as being rebellious and often delinquent. The high school graduates often left in search of work, returning to Minto only when they were unsuccessful in finding it. The authors conclude:

> There is little reason to educate people if there is no opportunity for them to exercise their acquired skills in a permanent and rewarding occupation. The net effect of education under these conditions is to enlarge discontents and increase the probability of anti-social behavior which is, at root, a protest against thwarted aspirations.[20]

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[20] Ibid., p. 33.

Not all in Minto are happy with things as they are. Some "dissenters" would do something to get industry for the place and want to upgrade community services. They are in a middle stratum: clergymen, teachers, civil servants and a few businessmen. Mostly they are newcomvers and their tendency to judge Minto unfavourably in comparison with other places tends to alienate those they seek to influence. Churches offer traditionalism and evangelical fundamentalism and seem little aware of the social and other needs of Minto residents. Thus apathy is reinforced. A way of life for a limited number in a limited habitat is the essence of a subculture, whether that limited number be poor fishermen, poor miners, or a cluster of rich families on a Malibar Hill. Metzger and Philbrook describe Minto as that "kind of haven of security for people who have never been taught to think and to act as if change were possible, and who have been conditioned to accept an inferior place in the general scheme of things."[21]

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[21]Ibid., p. 28.

Subculture in the Small Town

Novels about people in little places never cease to irritate rural people or to amuse city folk, especially urbanites who have migrated from small towns maintaining rural traditions. Sinclair Lewis' description of "Gopher Prairie" in Main Street has enjoyed more than four decades of popularity. The small town, feeling itself more important than a village and yet not able to call itself a city, is doubly isolated. On the one side, it clings

to rural ideals, and on the other imitates city ways.

Small towns, with unique histories and economic ties with their locality, have acquired a reputation for conservative and inward-oriented attitudes which tend to act as psychologically isolating influences. This is seen in the case of McAdam, New Brunswick, for a half-century a railroad division point for freight traffic and passenger traffic, a point where cars and locomotives were repaired, the home base for train crews, and a community almost entirely dependent on the railroad.

The dependence of most residents of McAdam on employment with the railroad encouraged confidence about a secure future and led to a settled way of thinking and living. Railroad employees could estimate their probable positions at different ages until they retired. They could buy or build homes, secure in their assurance of continuous income. They could expect that changes in their working conditions would not be radical changes. The shopkeepers and other community functionaries acquired similar attitudes. Then the shock came, called automation by some and dieselization by others, the killer of many small railroad centres. The diesel engine could pull longer trains twice as far between stops at less ton-mile cost. A study by Andrews describes the effects of dieselization on McAdam and tells how unprepared McAdamites were for the profound changes involved.

> The story of McAdam is not unlike that of a man trained for a special occupation, who believed he would have continuous employment, who then finds his occupation outmoded by technological change. Indeed, that is not only the story of a large share of the labor force in McAdam; it applies to McAdam as a community.

> This place of 2,700 inhabitants in the southwest part of New Brunswick was established by the railroad in the 1890's to be a service point for the railroad and it has served few other functions since. Unlike most small towns, it has no rural hinterland and has no function as a market center for a surrounding area.
>
> Losing half of its sustenance, McAdam was doubly disadvantaged by its physical isolation from other sources of employment. It was this detachment from a wider community that served largely to increase attitudes of dependence on the railroad, and it helps to explain the unwillingness of the disemployed workers to migrate. Migration and acquaintance with job opportunities elsewhere were not in their experience. Many workers dismissed from their employment preferred to accept reduced pensions, recognizing that, while they had not yet reached retirement age, they were too old to begin their occupational lives anew in a strange labor market. Others, especially homeowners, despite economic hardship, preferred to remain in McAdam, doing odd jobs and persuading themselves that one day railroad employment in the community would increase.
>
> The story of McAdam, then, depicts some of the consequences and social implications of technological change, how under particular circumstances it can disrupt the morale of a work force and of a community.[22]

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[22]Alick R. Andrews, Social Crisis and Labour Mobility (Fredericton: University of New Brunswick, M.A. Thesis; 1967), pp. ii-iii.

Some of the younger disemployed men did migrate and did find other work. Others were unsuccessful in finding satisfactory employment elsewhere and returned to McAdam to remain among the unemployed. After a decade of unemployment, some of them have given a characteristic feeling of apathy and helplessness to McAdam. Many live in expectation that they will be called back by the railroad someday.[23]

[23]Ibid., pp. 101-102.

Security for these ex-railroad workers is best insured by "sitting tight." To venture into the more competitive world is to risk losing the little income they have and increase costs perhaps beyond their control. Their very presence in the community makes for a general attitude of resignation, an attitude not shared by the young people, who move away when they are able to. Efforts by community leaders to attract new industry have produced some new employment but the future is not encouraging.

Dilemma of the One-Economy Outlook

In speaking of the subcultures of isolated clusters of people living at low income levels, we have said nothing new. It is only that attitudes toward such communities have changed. It was rarely expected in 1890 that these isolated clusters would ever have the things that even the urban poor consider necessities. The ability to do without material comforts was a source of respect as such communities were held up as models of hard work and frugality, and as examples of wholesome, honest people. With the rise of the cult of consumption and the spread of urban values, these isolated communities are defined as backward as well as impoverished.

Formerly, as Verner remarks, if there was concern about the poor, the concern related mainly to those who were derelict, and their problem was seen in terms of sin. Today there is a growing conviction that the existence of a great number of poor is a general

social responsibility. Moreover, says Verner:

> We are beginning to recognize only lately that susceptibility to poverty is a condition transmitted from one generation to the next so that we have families in which the line of descent is marked by the inability of individual members to break away from this family tradition. The significant economic differential that identifies the rural poor is accentuated by the socio-economic forces in society which relate to this group in such a way as to create a permanent self-perpetuating peasant class. ...
>
> This peasant class is identified by a low standard of living, large families, persistent unemployment, substandard values, inadequate education, poor health and resistance to change. The children of the peasant families are among the first to leave school which makes them equally unemployable and the attitudes and values of the group are perpetuated ad infinitum. Thus the peasant class reproduces itself in its own image.[24]

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[24]Cooley Verner, in discussion of a paper by Helen C. Abell, "The Social Consequences of Modernization in Agriculture," in Marc-Adelard Tremblay and Walton J. Anderson, Eds., Rural Transition in Canada (Ottawa: Agricultural Economics Research Council; 1966), p. 220.

What Verner says of poor farmers, identified by him as a peasant class, could also be said of the families of woodsmen in the Atlantic Provinces, the families of outport fishermen, families in isolated mining communities, or of families living in shacks beyond the limits of towns. His description of these families would have been about the same two generations ago, but the attitudes of the majority toward them have changed. Development programs indicate the growing recognition by governments that poverty can no longer be tolerated as a drain on an industrial economy. Pepin stresses the psychological aspect of poverty:

> The feeling of poverty will be aggravated when the individual judges that his situation is unjust; the result of regional economic disintegration or of unemployment caused by automation. The nature and intensity of poverty vary in space and time, and according to the socio-economic scale. This is why it would be wiser to speak of a combined comfort-poverty concept, where variations within the scale are subtle and complex.
>
> This concept is a gauge which finally expresses the success and failure of human endeavor. It is a means of relating characteristics like the bio-physical setting, ethnic and religious groups, occupations, mental health and physical energy, family size, education, external influences, and perception of the outer world.[25]

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[25] Pierre-Yves Pepin, Life and Poverty in the Maritimes (Ottawa: Ministry of Forestry and Rural Development, A.R.D.A. Project #15002; 1968), p. 4.

The pioneer virtues are now offered as explanations of poverty:

> The strong individualism retained by both the Scots and the Acadians is more the result of their "natural ties" to their original ethnic group than of their isolation and rural environment (Hobson 1954). This is true, but the response to the phenomenon is different in the two groups; withdrawal of the individual among the Scots, community life with the Acadians. The former are gloomy and withdrawn, listless, creatures of habit, individualistic and attached to the land. The latter are cheerful and outgoing, active, industriousness, sociable and men of the sea. The former are set in their ways, the latter still have the qualities which sent their ancestors out to man schooners and sail the seas as far as the West Indies in the early nineteenth century.[26]

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[26] Ibid., p. 111.

On the whole, the population of Kent County seems to accept its modest standard of living.

> The explanations are numerous, and the traditional patience and resignation of the Acadians play an important role. It should also be taken into account that the adults remaining in the area (those over 40) have known much darker days than those of the present time; exploitation by the merchants, scarcity of cash, bad roads, low level of education, etc. Progress is actually felt by them; for the young, however, it is taken for granted. Furthermore, the population does not see the situation in all its crudity and in perspective: the outside world is not well understood and people still live mainly at the level of the local cell, the parish.[27]

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[27] Ibid., p. 41.

Pepin elicited the following information from an informant on Prince Edward Island:

> The people of the Island lack confidence in their own potential. Those who have any capital invest elsewhere. The government does not appear to give enough encouragement to local initiative. It seems that politicians interfere with A.R.D.A. projects and the choice of their location. There was a project to develop a peatery in order to improve the soil for farming. The project was rejected. In 1963 people became discouraged with presenting projects to A.R.D.A. "There are probably too many bosses there."[28]

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[28] Ibid., p. 66.

It is argued in this chapter that merely moving people out of impoverished communities or moving them from one line of work to another will not be effective in overcoming the effects of a long-established local subculture. They are being asked to accept new aspirations, as defined by middle-class values, new kinds of organization, and a more urban style of life suitable in segments

absorbed into a national market economy. Failure to recognize these facts is likely to lead to non-cooperation and even open resistance to development schemes. Iverson and Matthews describe some of the obstacles to change in Newfoundland:

> Rural Newfoundlanders are not entirely unaware of the formidable obstacles they face as they attempt to cope with change. Ironically, these obstacles, which for convenience may be placed into three general categories, are in no small measure raised by the very bodies that appear to favour the program of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland. One can say with considerable justification that the system itself obstructs the alleviation of social and economic inequality. These obstacles are:
>
> 1) The reluctance of the business community to create conditions that will encourage the formation of a stable, educated, middle-class working population;
>
> 2) The barely muted antagonism of all levels of government in the province towards the establishment of well-organized powerful labour unions throughout the province; and
>
> 3) The active and passive resistance of both government and business toward the creation of a more competitive atmosphere for enterprise that would help to bring the province into the national sphere of social, commercial, and educational services.[29]

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[29] Noel Iverson and D. Ralph Matthews, Communities in Decline; An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland; 1968), p. 98.

The aim of the household resettlement scheme is to raise the level of living of the poor, but this involves higher wages and this is as hard to accept for traditional employers as moving from the villages they have occupied for generations is for the poor.

> Permanent economic marginality conditions a people to make adjustments which are inimical to urban industrial requirements of growth, mobility and change. Adaptation to impoverishment is antithetical to doctrines of progress; economic stagnation breeds social conservatism. Hence, most Newfoundland fishermen look back, not forward. They are tradition-oriented. Many go back to their old fishing grounds after they move, even though it is not economically feasible to do so.[30]

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[30] Ibid., p. 97.

It is the view of Iverson and Matthews that the social conservatism of the outport fishermen is not the only social conservatism involved in the efforts of government to resettle households. There is also an upper-level subculture which is disturbed by change, and the upper level is more able to resist change because it has better weapons for its defence. This upper class also receives public benefits but these benefits are not stigmatized. In theory at least, it assumed that such benefits return "quid pro quo" in contrast to welfare for the poor but, as Woodsworth would say, the poor cannot return welfare benefits in any practical way.

> "Welfare" is apparently accepted by most of those who receive it as a necessary but degrading experience. Having no choice, they are glad to have the aid but feel it is not enough to let them feel they can take a normal part in the community. A survey of the interview records suggests that most would work if they could, but some would earn even less than welfare rates and so remain bitterly inactive.[31]

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[31] D. E. Woodsworth, Director, Urban Need in Canada, 1965 (Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council; 1965), p. 33.

Woodsworth's remarks are based on his summary of need in four Canadian cities, including Saint John, New Brunswick. He is well aware that many in the lowest classes have come to regard "welfare payments" as a proper income, much as sons in the upper class expect parents to pay for their university education and to provide certain luxuries. Woodsworth notes too, as was found by Iverson and Matthews, that the poor are not eager for resettlement; they see enormous risks ahead. Woodsworth seems a little disturbed that urban people in the "lower-lower" categories are not complaining much about their poor housing and that they tend to be averse to moving:

> People in the four cities showed great unanimity in their opinions about the adequacy of their housing. About 65 per cent feel that their present home is limited or inadequate for their needs. But, on the contrary, about 70 per cent do like their present neighbourhood and do not want to leave it. It is a bit pathetic that many of the people whose homes are in fact inadequate or in bad condition express themselves as satisfied either with their homes or their neighbourhoods.[32]

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[32] Ibid., p.20.

This study of the poor in four Canadian cities found that 47 per cent of the families lived in houses "unfit for habitation" or in "bad condition," but the poor, like the rural poor, have different standards. They know about the one-economy outlook, but that is beyond their reach. This outlook assumes that all of us are similarly motivated and it assumes that we all have more or less the same aspirations and are able to visualize the same goals. It assumes with Barber that "Through the mobility ethos

a potential motivation of some or even many individuals becomes a compulsory life goal for all."[33] This view can be pursued to the point of making it a cult. Porter sees the need of recognizing different levels of motivation, which calls for being aware of a "working-class culture," and there are "educationally deprived areas" which may be settled in their ways and unable to respond to the change-inducing efforts from the outside.[34]

[33] Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World; 1957), p. 345.

[34] John Porter, "The Future of Upward Mobility," in American Sociological Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 1968), p. 19.

Economic development plans must be based on a recognition that many depressed people may change only slowly and that traditional ways will hamper adaptation. Long-range plans must involve working with the young, giving them a higher level of education and a more optimistic and active orientation.

Chapter 8

Indigenous Leadership and Economic Development

Economic Development and Community Development

A wide gap often separates conceptions of economic development from conceptions of community development, the same gap that frequently separates reality from social sentiment. Both conceptions, as they relate to the reclamation of a depressed area, are predicated on the idea of cooperative effort. Neither is likely to originate in the depressed area; they are stimulations from the outside.

Economic development, as the term is used in this report, refers to plans, projects, or extended programs which, however initiated, have become public commitments of national and provincial governments. A situation has been studied and its needs for economic growth have been assessed. A course of action has been determined and sums of public money have been allocated to the attainment of certain growth goals. While the basis upon which such a public scheme rests may involve humanitarian sentiments, the methods used must be rational. The execution of the scheme must operate within a bureaucratic framework with goals defined in terms of money budgets, time budgets, and concrete evidence of achievement. The justification for expenditures lies in the expectation that effective measures will transform an area from a position of economic dependency to one of solvency and economic growth.

The assumption is usually inherent in economic development schemes, although often only implied, that citizens in the depressed

area will cooperate in recognition of the economic gains that their area will experience. If they fail to cooperate, or are fearful of change, all that is needed, some assume, is to explain the objectives to them. The explaining may be done formally through television or radio programs or "motivators" may be sent around to talk to the people. Even when it is recognized that simple explanation may not produce favourable attitudes it is often assumed that the fault lies in the people themselves who hold fast to outmoded sentiments and are irrational. Regardless of ability to achieve the cooperation of the residents in a development area, the development program is imposed from outside and must be carried forward.

Community development proceeds on the assumption that well-meaning persons moving among the people in a depressed area should be able to persuade them to organize into groups for the purpose of achieving certain developments through cooperation. The community development agent calls local meetings, maneuvers local persons into leadership roles and may succeed in getting the men of the neighbourhood to join forces to repair a road that has been neglected for years, or to engage in some other cooperative effort, perhaps painting the school or tidying up the school yard. He counts his efforts successful if a degree of local initiative and cooperation has been achieved, quite apart from any practical considerations.

Community development has become sufficiently popular to be identified as "CD" by those who engage in it. Their enthusiasm

has already brought into use a considerable library of reports and studies. In his report on the failure of an effort to mix CD with social research, Davis makes the following observations about this type of community endeavor:

> Under favorable conditions, these small-scale projects have achieved varying degrees of success. On the other hand, the concept of community development, especially in North American social policy, has become a euphemism for "doing little things in little places," i.e., for talking about social change in rural hinterlands without actually doing much about it. To be significant, social change must be structural; it must entail relatively lasting revisions in economic, political and social role patterns. This in turn requires not only the involvement of the people who are supposed to change, but also among other things, the involvement of real money. Too often North American programs of community development have been strong on grass roots involvement but weak on investment. They appeal to politicians, naturally enough, because they cost little more than a few staff salaries for field workers. Such programs also attract many other well-intentioned people, because "community self-development" conjures up the magic aura of grass-roots democracy and the sacred myth of gradualism, so dear to the hearts of "liberals."[1]

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[1]Arthur K. Davis, "A Prairie 'Dust Devil,' The Rise and Decline of a Research Institute," Human Relations, Vol. 27, No. 1 (Spring 1968), p. 63.

Economic development, to be meaningful and effective, cannot limit itself to some peripheral treatment of needs in depressed areas. For many, it unavoidably becomes a painful experience. Unlike the more personal and more limited community development approach, economic development may have to cut deep, imposing short-run inconveniences for long-run advantages. Its weakness is that the long-term goals may not be attainable for decades. It

should also be noted that no amount of explanation or community "activism" will produce cooperation in the absence of real benefits to rhe residents.

An example of economic planning and development in the private sphere concerns the rationalization of coal-mining in the United States, pertinent here because the model may be applied one day in Canada where various types of extractive industry are often found in depressed areas. For many years coal-miners in the United States were impoverished, being subject to low wages as well as being in a dangerous occupation. The miners developed a strong union in spite of brutal resistance. At the point where the owners were least organized, standing helpless against the competition of other fuels, the United Mine Workers offered a program for mechanizing the mines and establishing a welfare fund for miners supported by a per-ton tax on coal.

The rationalization of coal mining has been painful. Reducing the mine force from more than 400,000 in 1950 to half that number in a single decade has resulted in the disemployment of many miners. Poor mines have been abandoned but those which remain are on a sounder footing and the miners who have jobs receive high wages and have better working conditions. Their output has increased from two or three tones per man-day to fifteen tons, and often far more. The United Mine Workers and their leader, John L. Lewis, have been roundly condemned as makers of poverty. Here is the opinion of Vance:

> One need not approve of all the policies of the United Mine Workers to recognize the realism of the U.M.W.'s policy in regard to the displacement of miners. John L. Lewis never opposed the mechanization of coal mining; he only contended that miners' wages must remain at national levels. Only through the application of such a policy is the eventual raising of the economic level of mining areas to national standards likely to be achieved. The problem of displaced miners is a serious one, but its existence should not blind us to the fact that the alternative policy of providing employment for many miners at substandard wages can only perpetuate poverty.[2]

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[2]Rupert B. Vance, "The Region's Future, A National Challenge," in Thomas R. Ford, Ed., The Southern Appalachian Region (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press; 1962), p. 295.

A trade union is a private economic association whose first loyalty is to its own members. It is not likely to give much more than token support to unorganized workers earning substandard wages, especially in depressed areas. Trade unions may be a force in obtaining social welfare legislation but they are not more likely than local businessmen to be a dynamic force for the development of depressed areas. In fact one problem in economic development lies in the contrast between subcultures of affluent and depressed regions. Ford describes the problem in Appalachia:

> To an appreciable measure their distinctiveness as a people is vested in characteristics that have persisted only because of restricted social and economic opportunities. The economic development of the Region is not so much dependent upon their cultural integration as their cultural integration is dependent upon economic development. Whether or not it is considered desirable, it seems almost certain that as the economic problems are solved, the provincialism of the Region itself will fade.[3]

[3]Thomas R. Ford, "The Passing of Provincialism," in Thomas R. Ford, op. cit., p. 34.

Ford's statement describes in essence what is the approach to rural development in Northeast New Brunswick. The plan includes funds for an information service designed to encourage understanding and active participation in development by the people most affected.

> In order that the people of the area will be fully informed about the program and be able to actively participate in it, it is intended that a carefully planned and executed program of public information, extension services and education will be initiated in the immediate future. These programs will be oriented to meet the needs of each of the various sectors of the population residing in the area. The objective is to foster full public understanding of the program and to encourage active participation of the local people in carrying out the development plans in the area.[4]

[4]Agreement Covering a Comprehensive Rural Development Plan for Northeast New Brunswick (Ottawa: Department of Forestry and Rural Development; 1966), p. 37.

Quest for Indigenous Leadership

Economic planners usually consider the reception of their plans by the people involved only as an afterthought. During the planning period of the Bureau d'Amenagement de l'Est du Quebec (B.A.E.Q.), a number of staff members, called "animateurs," were given the task of discovering or developing community leaders and informing them of the plan and its objectives. These leaders were not expected to help define the plan but rather to insure its acceptance. Morency describes the objectives of "Animation Sociale"

as inducing people to participate somehow in the attainment of the goals visualized by the plan, to adapt positively to it:

> In effect, since the plan represented a major decision affecting the region's population, two main tasks emerged. There was firstly the need to sustain and spread the B.A.E.Q.'s conceptions of social participation in a social milieu which often blocks this form of participation, preferring instead to use the traditional structures of power which often do not favour development. There also was secondly the job of organizing an active way of participating in the planning process, and hence in defining the goals and means of development.[5]

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[5]Marc A. Morency, "Animation Sociale," The Experience of the BAEQ (Ottawa: Rural Development Branch, Department of Forestry and Rural Development; 1968; Condensed Report), p. 2.

The hazards involved in the task and the potential resistance of "the traditional structures of power which often do not favour development" were apparent even among those who were anxious to cooperate. Montminy had the task of interviewing the priests, most of whom wondered why they had not been approached much earlier. Some mentioned how they had not been invited to meetings. "To have bypassed the priests during the first year of the work seems to have been a tactical error." Perhaps the idea was to develop secular leaders for the region instead.

> Although one might say they would like to exchange old elites for new ones, nevertheless the relationship of the parishioners to their priests is too deep and long-standing to submit to rapid change. As for the priests themselves it seems probable that, in time, they will support the emergence of new elites. It should be our job to help and guide the priests in this area, indeed they expect guidance. This is why a significant number of priests expressed disappointment at not having been contacted by the social animateur in their area.[6]

[6] J. P. Montminy, An Experiment in "Animation Sociale" Among the Clergy of the Pilot Region (BAEQ) (Ottawa: Rural Development Branch, Department of Forestry and Rural Development; 1968; Condensed Report), p. 6.

The observation that the relationship between "parishioners and their priests is too deep-rooted and long-standing to submit to rapid change," would apply no less to other deep-rooted attitudes found in isolated depressed areas. It is precisely in such areas that indigenous leadership does not develop as spontaneously as in affluent areas. Local jealousies, as we saw on Grand Manan, discourage the rise of leaders. Metzger and Philbrook speak of leadership in a small depressed coal town where those who assume leadership roles are often little appreciated and they may choose to act on their own initiative.

> The chief function of leadership here is to legitimize the proposed new action, i.e., to substantiate that it is in accordance with past activities. Village improvement actions, on the other hand, seek to accomplish things which, a) villagers have gotten along without in the past, and b) even when achieved may not be of immediate or direct benefit to the individual. Finally, village action probably involves direct contribution of time and money to the project. Leaders of village action not only must push a project through in the face of local opposition and indifference, but expect continuing apathy and more or less public criticism.[7]

[7] L. Paul Metzger and Thomas A. Philbrook, Sociological Factors Affecting Labour Mobility (Fredericton: New Brunswick Department of Labour; 1964), p. 90.

Not only is a stagnant community, settled in its ways, not likely to develop leadership qualities; those with leadership

talent are likely to leave. Such a community is likely to respond negatively and cynically toward development. Metzger and Philbrook identify Kingsclear, New Brunswick, a small hamlet whose main importance formerly was that it had been a railroad station, as such a stagnant community. It begins to lose its identity and is becoming an adjunct of Fredericton, the main object of its present animosities:

> For to many in Mactaquac, especially Kingsclear, the image of Fredericton casts up recollections of economic domination, exploitation, special privilege, and "less than square dealing." After all, as they relate, the unyielding mortgage holders and absentee landlords within the compass of Fredericton's blackened image. "You can't trust them politicians down in Fredericton," an old man noted, "as soon as they gits there all they can think of is linin' their pockets." Finally, Fredericton evokes images of snobbishness, discrimination against rural children in the schools, "loose morals" (particularly among the youth) and other evils of "city life."[8]

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[8]Ibid., p. 55.

These are characteristic attitudes of poor people in depressed areas toward an affluent town in the vicinity, and they may be a block to popular participation in a development plan. Most of the recognized leaders are to be found in the town or city rather than in the poor village or rural area.

While effective operation of plans require "a full public understanding of the program" and "active participation of the local people," this may be asking for more than most of the people are able to give. The plan may be quite understandable to the better educated and better situated minority and yet

incomprehensible to the least educated and worst situated majority. People at this level are among those of whom Porter speaks, and we can be sure he has Canadians in mind as well as Americans.

> In the light of evidence that levels of aspiration and attitudes to education vary so much by class one wonders how it could ever be claimed that, as part of the common value system, all Americans are achievement-oriented or share in a great quest for opportunity. Middle-class investigators seem genuinely puzzled about how the lower or working classes do or should react to the realities of their own class position. Evidence is presented that they are deviant, depressed or despaired and adopt a devil-may-care attitude. These would be logical reactions if working-class people had indeed internalized middle-class norms, and were not blessed by any kind of "false consciousness." But could they not be participants in a working-class culture with different norms, and view their class position in relative terms according to their membership reference groups?[9]

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[9]John Porter, "The Future of Upward Mobility," American Sociological Review, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 1968), p. 13.

The evidence which has been presented in this section indicate that the development of cooperation, attitudes favourable to change, and effective leadership will not be achieved quickly or easily but will require action on many levels, including education. The task is likely to become easier as development plans actually begin to show some signs of success. People have proved remarkably adaptable to occupational changes when real industrial opportunities are presented to them. Attitudes and behaviour patterns are, to an important extent, functions of economic and occupational positions.

Leadership in Two Small Communities

It is particularly pertinent here to take account of a study done in the late 1950's in Nova Scotia by Hughes, Tremblay, Rapoport and Leighton. Of several communities in the study area, our excerpts here concern mainly L'Anse des Lavellee, Acadian French, and Fairhaven, Protestant-English. As in many Maritime communities, the people mix fishing, logging, farming and general labour in earning a livelihood. Of the 620,800 acres in the county, 128,749 acres are classified as farm land but only 19,996 acres of this are "improved land." Of the 1,303 farms in the county only 264 were ranked as commercial farms in the 1951 census. It is noted that the farmer may also be fisherman and logger.

> In a word, the main use of farms is in line with their historic supplementary role. The farmers stand poised between two infinities - the sea and the forest - and, in that posture, choose a variety of courses. The "pure" farmers are rare. Those who work the farm and the sea are found along the coast; those who farm and cut in the forest, in the backlands. Some favorably situated do all three - fish, farm and cut in the woods. But there is a large remaining pool of workers who do very little farming and hold an industrial, commercial, or other job.[10]

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[10]Charles C. Hughes, Marc-Adelard Tremblay, Robert N. Rapoport, and Alexander H. Leighton, People of Cove and Woodlot (New York: Basic Books, Vol. II, "Disorder and Sociocultural Environment"; 1960), pp. 32-33.

While the way of life in the French-Acadian and Protestant-English communities differs considerably, both are kin-oriented and informal associations are kin-based. Formal roles are rare and not

needed. Major decisions in each community "are made by people who have prestige; they may or may not also have formal powers of leadership such as councilor, chairman of the school board, church deacon, school principal, fish plant manager." Whether Catholic or Protestant, the Church is an important institution.[11]

[11]Ibid., p. 23.

This study distinguished between communities that were economically depressed and those, like Lavallee and Fairhaven, which were less so. These places were found to be more integrated than the depressed communities.

> Fairhaven and Lavallee remained classed as far more secure economically than any of the Depressed Areas, although a differentiation was possible in terms of locating neighborhoods of relatively poorer people in both these integrated villages. The Depressed Areas again stood out as loci for problems of Cultural Confusion, and the integrated areas as places having relatively little of this. ... Similarly, with regard to Secularization, the primary distinction between secularized areas and relatively religious areas remained, with two qualifications. The nature of the religious institutions in Fairhaven was found to be more "diffuse," not so highly structured - but in many ways as effective - as that in Lavallee.[12]

[12]Ibid., p. 87.

For both Fairhaven and Lavallee the incidence of broken homes was lower than in the depressed areas; physically broken by death, separation or divorce, or psychologically broken by fighting, philandering, nonsupport, etc. "In the Depressed Areas no local person held any formally sanctioned leadership position; in general,

followership was based on coercion and fear of consequences. In the integrated areas, there were not only the formal offices of leadership but, more important, an acceptance of such formal leaders. Furthermore, there were informal power structures of a stable nature, a phenomenon little encountered in the Depressed Areas."[13] Moreover, there was an absence of formal associations

[13] Ibid., p. 88.

in the depressed areas, leisure activity was of the self-defeating type, and identification with church was minimal.

The unity of the Acadians at Lavallee rests on their pride in three hundred years of history, pride in their language and their acceptance of church leadership. No problem of the people is outside the interest of the priest.

> In all parishes the priest and the hierarchy of the church provide an important framework of leadership by control over vast areas of life through precepts backed by religious sanction and, in addition, through the general prestige which they hold. Of major importance is the priest's participation in nonreligious associations as advisor or sponsor. Some attend meetings of the Board of Trade, for example, and have effective influence in school board matters.[14]

[14] Ibid., p. 40.

At different points this report mentions how the residents view their own past with pride, noting that the Acadians are especially prone to visualize the future as continuing the image of the past. Leadership in Fairhaven, and to some extent in

Lavallee, tends to be a preempted domain of a clique of families of comparative wealth and prestige. Those who provide social leadership also figure variously in local decision-making. In Fairhave, for example, there are two levels of such leaders. The "first level" comprise top families long resident in the community who see themselves as the well-born. The "second level" include newcomers who may try to bring about changes.

> Perhaps the degree of friction and indecision now present in Fairhaven lies in the fact that in the past years more of the decision-makers participated equally in church, lodge, and other community institutions. Then, too, the "second level" leaders are probably less vocal in their development of community projects, waiting instead for signals from the older men and women. Now, due to the splitting of the leadership functions, there is often no co-ordination. ... Community sentiments, however, regarding the role of leaders ... are in change. Dissatisfaction in the community often obscures the confidence and esteem which traditionally have been the villagers' orientation toward their leaders. Leadership exists in Fairhaven, and things get done - but it is changing and that change has brought confusion.[15]

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[15] Ibid., pp. 188-189.

Observations in this study about leadership in the very poor areas have considerable pertinence to programs for economic development, especially when these are concerned with unorganized rural areas of depression. Not only was leadership found lacking but there was little felt need for it.

> Lack of patterns for leadership is another feature common to all the Depressed Areas. Because there are no associations in the neighborhood, no formal offices of leadership can exist; but neither are any leader positions held by the people in associations based outside

> the neighborhoods. The situation with respect to informal leadership is for the most part the same, and it is recognized by the people themselves. ....
>
> The main locus of what leadership exists in the Depressed Areas lies within the individual families and their patterns of generational authority. This guidance and direction, informal and unsystematized, varies with families. In some, the elderly men or women are not particularly respected or deferred to; in others, this guidance provides the only semblance of leadership in the neighborhood. Universally, for instance, clergymen are rejected, and municipal officers and even sympathetic employers do not have much influence; only the public health nurse seems to have the confidence of the people, and this is only in a very limited way.[16]

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[16] Ibid., pp. 273-274.

Entrepreneurship and Economic Development

The extensive report on Stirling County says much about the efforts of people in that area to find employment, mentions often the low levels of income, and describes the uneasiness of parents because of the continuous exodus of the young, especially those who gain some education. Here and there the entrepreneur is mentioned, but only in connection with small operations. He is not regarded as playing the innovator role as often idealized in classical economics. He is far from the role of "mover of things" as described by Schumpeter.

> The function of entrepreneurs is to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an invention, or more generally, an untried technological possibility for producing

> a new commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new source of supply of materials or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing an industry, and so on .... To undertake such new things is difficult and constitutes a distinct economic function, first, because they lie outside the routine tasks which everybody understands and, secondly, because the environment resists in many ways.[17]

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[17]Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper, Row; 1950), p. 132.

Entrepreneurship is always relative to the opportunities present in any historical situation. In the last decade of the nineteenth century in Fredericton, New Brunswick, such entrepreneurs applied capital accumulated from the lumber trade to the establishment of factories to make shoes, boats, cotton fabrics, and other products. Similar developments appeared in Saint John. Businessmen were responsive to changing conditions and imaginative in undertaking new ventures. The expansion of an earlier period had prevented "ossification" of the class structure and permitted sons of immigrant families to improve their economic and social standing through new ventures.

The decline of entrepreneurship really followed the decline of economic opportunities in the region, coupled with exciting new possibilities associated with the settlement of Western Canada. Industries in more central provinces were better able to exploit the enlarging needs of the prairie provinces and both talent and capital began to be diverted from the Maritimes. Immigration now bypassed the Maritimes and young people continued to move west in large numbers. Existing industries continued to

struggle in competition with those better located with reference to newly emerging national trading patterns and the impetus to expansion was lost. The chief new industries established in the twentieth century were the pulp and paper mills for which access to raw materials, an ample water supply, and convenient access to shipping facilities were primary considerations in determining location.

The little entrepreneur is still present. Philbrook tells, for example, of the occasional Newfoundlander able to purchase a crawler tractor, so useful in the cutting and moving of pulpwood.

> Mechanized training, road construction, and trucking of pulpwood created demands for these specialized vehicles which were largely met by subcontracts to individuals who owned, operated and maintained single units of such equipment. In hiring these private operators, the companies were able to shift the burden of capital investment and maintenance costs to these small entrepreneurs. In order to realize a substantial profit, these entrepreneurs worked long hours, but each at his own pace free from direct supervision. The owner-operators are usually United Churchmen or Anglicans, from families with a tradition of steady, but not high, incomes and these men ingeniously exploited local economic conditions to their advantage.[18]

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[18]Tom Philbrook, Fisherman, Logger, Merchant, Miner (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland; 1966), p. 166.

Effective enterprise is often out of reach of the small operator. Entrepreneurial talent is often applied to administrative interests within or between large corporations. Attracting new enterprises, as anticipated in economic development programs, may

very well take the course of convincing boards of directors to establish branch plants to serve regional markets. Ambition for the individual often finds expression, not in founding a firm, but in joining a big firm and working his way up through an elaborate corporate bureaucracy.

Typical of many small businessmen in the Atlantic region is the fish processor who has acted as merchant, employer, and packer. Hughes and associates describe the transition of fish processing in Fairhaven, Nova Scotia. The main processor in 1900 was a family firm. The firm went into decline during the Great Depression and an outside group established a canning plant which today employs up to thirty for a six-month work season.

> The outside ownership and control the somewhat aggressive business practices, and the "factory" type of labor organization were foreign to the village when the plant located there in 1931, and its complete assimilation has not been attained. The other plants (of the traditional type, and small) fear the competition, and the factory workers, whether justly or not, have been termed by some people the "bad element" in town. There is little doubt that this particular factory was a boon to the village during the Depression of the 1930's, but it still has not meshed with the traditional informality, the "neighborly" concern, and the muted though real and vigorous competition.[19]

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[19]Hughes, et. al., pp. 178-179.

Not only did this fish plant from outside bring the impersonal industrial way of work to the village, it operated on the money economy and was soon to be followed by stores which were not adjunct activities of the fish buyer. The change spelled

transition from the subsistence to the market economy and in this evolution the indigenous entrepreneur was pushed aside. The first representative of the modern industrial system encountered a certain amount of hostility as it offered the first threat to the traditional way of life of the community.

In the large city where, mainly because consumers are more numerous, the entrepreneur may still find many ventures without too high a risk, although the secondary and tertiary sectors of the economy are much developed. In rural areas, there are often considerable risks in any operation. Such risk can only be taken by large corporations with large capital resources and such companies are likely to be interested in the primary sector of the economy more than in the secondary sector. Galbraith states:

> By all but the pathologically romantic, it is now recognized that this is not the age of the small man. But there is still a lingering presumption among economists that his retreat is not before the efficiency of the great corporation, or even its technological proficiency, but before its monopoly power.[20]

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[20]John K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin; 1967), p. 32.

Galbraith answers that it is not only the size or efficiency of the big corporation that excludes the small entrepreneur, although these are not unimportant; it is the increasing complexity of technological processes, which results in greater interdependence between work places and which calls for interlocking networks of technicians on the one hand and networks for

management and decision-making on the other hand. This he calls the "Technostructure," and the lone entrepreneur may not easily enter the system.

> With the rise of the modern corporation, the emergence of the organization required by modern technology and planning and the divorce of the owner of the capital from the control of the enterprise, the entrepreneur no longer exists as an individual person in the mature industrial enterprise. Everyday discourse, except in the economics textbooks, recognizes this change. It replaces the entrepreneur, as the directing force of the enterprise, with management. This is a collective and imperfectly defined entity; in the large corporation it embraces chairman, president, those vice-presidents with important staff or departmental responsibility, occupants of other major staff positions and, perhaps, division or department heads not included above.[21]

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[21] Ibid., p. 71.

Change is hampered by the fact that patterns of organization already exist even in cities which operate in a conservative manner. New businessmen have to gain acceptance among lone established families and firms. Voluntary associations of many kinds extend the business class pattern of economic influence into the social sphere while local politics provides a means of maintaining existing patterns of community leadership. In a relatively stagnant economic situation, fear of change and the desire to protect what one already has lead to actions detrimental to economic development interests. Nablo's study of "Port City" describes how the organization of a city can operate to discourage the establishment of new enterprises, even when active efforts are exerted to attract such enterprises.

> The close personal relationship amongst the most powerful men in the community permits the use of the social organization of Port City in a variety of ways, without the personal involvement of the decision-maker at any stage of the negotiations. One industrial group, wishing to discourage the establishment of a competitive firm in Port City, persuaded the director of community planning to rezone the desired land for residential purposes. The same group arranged that the price of a parcel of land wanted be set exorbitantly high to keep out a national chain store. A member of parliament was approached to ensure that a necessary licence be refused for a second cold storage company. The director of a national bank persuaded a number of local clients of the bank to boycott a lumber firm until a controlling interest in the company was sold to him rather than to a competitive firm from outside Port City. After the purchase was completed the lumber firm was able to obtain capital to finance its "accounts receivable." The loan had been refused before the change in control.[22]

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[22]Ronald W. Nablo, Social Structure Related to Business and Finance in a Seaport City (Fredericton: M.A. Thesis, University of New Brunswick; 1960), p. 5.

A plan for the economic development of a depressed area, to attain its goals, needs every type of cooperation that can be secured. Cooperation of the indigenous groups, the main objects of the plan, is especially needed. The challenge is to find indigenous leaders to interpret the program to those who will be most affected. Participation is more likely on the part of the more articulate and better situated minority but these are likely to be the most conservative just because they have the greatest investment in the status quo. The poor, who could be the likeliest to benefit, lack the skills called for in participation development projects.

Most important in any scheme is the development of leadership and a complete awareness of the effects of the scheme. Failure to consider all of the implications of resettlement, especially in terms of employment and housing, has resulted in much discontent among those Newfoundland residents who have been uprooted from their homes in the outports.

> There is reason to doubt that economic development in Newfoundland will benefit the majority of Newfoundlanders in the short run. As it is now being managed, economic development will tend to aggravate discontent among the working classes and cynicism among the educationally handicapped and technologically unemployed. It is doubtful that by building capital-intensive industry in a labour-intensive economy, a balance will be automatically struck between the two. The early fruit of industrialization, as it is presently being nurtured, will seem as withered promises to a great many ill-trained Newfoundland labourers. Inasmuch as economic development fails to involve, and benefit, the public, it will fail to mean advance for the general economy.[23]

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[23]Noel Iverson and D. Ralph Matthews, Communities in Decline, An Examination of Household Resettlement in Newfoundland (St. John's: Memorial University of Newfoundland; 1968), p. 113.

Time is needed for developing or attracting the kind of leadership which is able to provide jobs. We note that a central thought in the "Agreement Covering a Comprehensive Rural Development Plan for Northeast New Brunswick" concerns precisely this problem. The intention is not to resettle people unless and until reasonable prospects for jobs are present. In the meantime there are plans for educational upgrading.

Table A-1

Male and female labour force 15 years of age and over by occupation and years of schooling, Atlantic Provinces, 1961

Occupation	Total	Elementary -5	Elementary 5+	High School 1 - 2	High School 3	High School 4 - 5	Some Univ.	Univ. degree
All occupations	561,632	50,330	197,042	142,499	73,145	57,755	24,222	16,639
	100.00	8.96	35.08	25.37	13.02	10.28	4.31	2.96
Managerial & Proprietary	42,821	1,757	9,746	11,193	8,572	5,961	3,470	2,122
	100.00	4.10	22.76	26.14	20.02	13.92	8.10	4.96
Prof. & Tech.	49,483	162	1,620	3,675	9,769	12,995	9,911	11,721
	100.00	0.32	3.25	7.37	19.60	26.07	19.88	23.51
Clerical	54,422	328	5,964	13,835	16,257	14,053	3,233	752
	100.00	0.60	10.78	25.42	29.87	25.82	5.94	1.38
Sales	34,363	518	7,619	13,073	6,901	4,257	1,601	394
	100.00	1.51	22.17	38.04	20.08	12.39	4.66	1.15
Service and Recreation	87,593	4,835	31,625	29,425	10,594	8,052	2,072	990
	100.00	5.52	36.10	33.59	12.09	9.19	2.37	1.13
Trans. & Comm.	39,613	3,119	17,443	11,972	4,219	2,192	582	86
	100.00	7.87	44.03	30.22	10.65	5.53	1.47	0.22
Farmers and Farm Workers	36,042	4,802	19,191	8,362	1,970	1,147	456	114
	100.00	13.32	53.25	23.20	5.47	3.18	1.27	0.32
Logger and Related Workers	18,577	6,043	9,201	2,403	502	289	116	23
	100.00	32.53	49.53	12.94	2.76	1.56	0.62	0.12
Fishermen, Hunters, Trappers	21,466	6,274	10,955	3,414	526	235	57	5
	100.00	29.23	51.03	15.90	2.45	1.09	0.27	0.02
Miner, quarry	10,504	1,711	5,638	2,383	481	212	71	8
	100.00	16.29	53.69	22.69	4.58	2.02	0.68	0.08
Craftsmen	119,046	12,968	56,260	32,749	9,975	5,437	1,406	251
	100.00	10.89	47.26	27.51	8.38	4.57	1.18	0.21
Labourers n.e.s.	33,895	6,631	18,022	6,441	1,406	861	489	45
	100.00	19.56	53.17	19.00	4.15	2.54	1.44	0.13
Others	13,437	1,182	3,758	3,574	1,973	2,064	758	128
	100.00	8.80	27.97	26.60	14.68	15.36	5.64	0.95

Table A-2

Male Labour force 15 years of age and over by occupation and years of schooling, Atlantic Provinces, 1961

Occupation	Total	Elementary		High School			Some Univ.	Univ. degree
		-5	5+	1 - 2	3	4 - 5		
All occupations	425,878	46,102	165,749	106,393	45,584	32,594	15,984	13,472
	100.00	10.83	38.93	24.98	10.70	7.65	3.75	3.16
Managerial and Proprietary	36,376	1,442	8,066	9,213	7,234	5,160	3,239	2,022
	100.00	3.96	22.17	25.33	19.89	14.19	8.90	5.56
Prof. and Tech.	22,685	115	984	1,943	3,038	3,193	4,288	9,124
	100.00	0.51	4.34	8.57	13.39	19.08	18.90	40.22
Clerical	23,569	257	4,095	6,425	5,858	4,703	1,790	441
	100.00	1.09	17.37	27.26	24.85	19.95	7.59	1.87
Sales	19,293	333	4,372	6,412	3,875	2,630	1,322	349
	100.00	1.73	22.66	33.23	20.09	13.63	6.85	1.81
Service and Recreation	50,518	2,364	15,194	17,222	7,035	6,055	1,724	924
	100.00	4.68	30.08	34.09	13.93	11.99	3.41	1.83
Trans. and Comm.	36,370	3,096	17,038	10,524	3,344	1,744	544	80
	100.00	8.51	46.85	28.94	9.19	4.80	1.50	0.22
Farmers and Farm Workers	34,239	4,651	18,404	7,798	1,793	1,048	436	109
	100.00	13.58	53.75	22.78	5.23	3.06	1.27	0.33
Loggers and Related Workers	18,560	6,040	9,190	2,400	502	289	116	23
	100.00	32.54	49.52	12.93	2.70	1.56	0.63	0.12
Fishermen, Hunters, Trappers	21,290	6,260	10,923	3,394	519	231	56	5
	100.00	29.27	51.07	15.87	2.43	1.08	0.26	0.02
Miners, quarry	10,502	1,711	5,637	2,382	481	212	71	8
	100.00	16.29	22.68	53.68	4.58	2.02	0.68	0.08
Craftsmen	109,437	12,279	51,380	29,770	9,292	5,119	1,360	237
	100.00	11.22	46.95	27.20	8.49	4.68	1.24	0.22
Labourers n.e.s.	32,808	6,533	17,437	6,139	1,338	829	487	45
	100.00	19.91	53.15	18.71	4.08	2.53	1.48	0.14
Others	10,131	1,021	3,029	2,771	1,275	1,379	551	105
	100.00	10.08	29.90	27.35	12.59	13.61	5.44	1.04

Table A-3

Female labour force 15 years of age and over by occupation and years of schooling, Atlantic Provinces, 1961

Occupation	Total	Elementary		High School			Some Univ.	Univ. degree
		-5	5+	1 - 2	3	4 - 5		
All occupations	135,754	4,228	31,293	36,106	27,561	25,161	8,238	3,167
	100.00	3.11	23.05	26.60	20.30	18.53	6.07	2.33
Managerial and	6,445	315	1,680	1,980	1,338	801	231	100
Proprietary	100.00	4.89	26.07	30.72	20.76	12.43	3.58	1.55
Prof. and Tech.	27,168	47	636	1,732	6,731	9,802	5,623	2,597
	100.00	0.17	2.34	6.38	24.78	36.08	20.70	9.56
Clerical	30,853	71	1,869	7,410	10,399	9,350	1,443	311
	100.00	0.23	6.06	24.02	33.70	30.30	4.86	1.01
Sales	15,070	185	3,247	6,661	3,026	1,627	279	45
	100.00	1.23	21.55	44.20	20.08	10.80	1.85	0.30
Service and	37,075	2,471	16,431	12,203	3,559	1,997	348	66
Recreation	100.00	6.66	44.32	32.91	9.60	5.39	0.94	0.18
Trans. & Comm.	3,243	23	405	1,448	875	448	38	6
	100.00	0.71	12.49	44.65	26.98	13.81	1.17	0.19
Farmers and	1,803	151	787	564	177	99	20	5
Farm Workers	100.00	8.37	43.65	31.28	9.82	5.49	1.11	0.28
Loggers and	17	3	11	3	0	0	0	0
Related Workers	100.00	17.65	64.71	17.65	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Fishermen, Hunt-	76	14	32	20	7	2	1	0
ers, Trappers	100.00	18.42	42.11	26.32	9.21	2.63	1.32	0.00
Miners, quarry	2	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
	100.00	0.00	50.00	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Craftsmen	9,609	689	4,880	2,979	683	318	46	14
	100.00	7.17	50.79	31.00	7.11	3.31	0.48	0.15
Labourers n.e.s.	1,087	98	585	302	68	32	2	0
	100.00	9.02	53.82	27.79	6.26	2.94	0.18	0.00
Others	3,306	161	729	803	698	685	207	23
	100.00	4.87	22.05	24.29	21.11	20.72	6.26	0.70

Table A-4

Male and female labour force 15 years of age and over by occupation and years of schooling, Ontario, 1961

Occupation	Total	Elementary		High School			Some Univ.	Univ. degree
		-5	5+	1 - 2	3	4 - 5		
All occupations	2,393,015	96,748	817,165	543,200	236,209	495,882	92,067	111,744
	100.00	4.04	34.15	22.70	9.87	20.72	3.85	4.67
Managerial and Proprietary	209,532	4,004	45,473	39,888	23,545	63,920	14,608	18,096
	100.00	1.91	21.70	19.04	11.24	30.51	6.97	8.64
Prof. and Tech.	237,637	402	8,792	15,152	12,439	92,216	32,621	76,015
	100.00	0.17	3.70	6.38	5.23	38.81	13.73	31.99
Clerical	357,343	1,903	45,936	92,031	61,664	136,731	13,919	5,159
	100.00	0.53	12.85	25.75	17.26	38.26	3.90	1.44
Sales	195,215	1,544	35,071	46,613	22,694	41,955	7,463	3,875
	100.00	0.97	22.03	29.28	14.25	26.35	4.69	2.43
Service and Recreation	294,474	19,221	127,290	75,611	26,041	36,856	5,957	3,498
	100.00	6.53	43.23	25.68	8.84	12.52	2.02	1.19
Trans. & Comm.	136,657	4,050	61,377	41,609	12,908	14,445	1,807	461
	100.00	2.96	44.91	30.45	9.45	10.57	1.32	0.34
Farmers and Farm Workers	172,171	12,146	103,533	37,787	8,674	12,644	2,020	867
	100.00	7.05	60.13	18.75	5.04	7.34	1.17	0.50
Loggers and Related Workers	11,607	2,389	6,923	1,429	282	410	133	41
	100.00	20.58	59.65	12.31	2.43	3.53	1.15	0.35
Fishermen, Hunters, Trappers	1,856	588	335	292	63	65	12	1
	100.00	31.68	44.99	15.73	3.39	3.50	0.65	0.05
Miners, quarry	25,649	2,214	13,934	5,424	1,540	1,925	490	122
	100.00	8.63	54.33	21.15	6.00	2.51	1.91	0.48
Craftsmen	619,137	30,569	292,351	157,518	53,007	74,885	8,453	2,324
	100.00	4.94	47.22	25.44	8.56	12.10	1.37	0.38
Labourers n.e.s.	113,306	13,962	57,617	23,027	6,564	7,982	1,944	210
	100.00	12.32	52.62	20.32	5.79	7.04	1.72	0.19
Others	54,431	3,758	16,033	12,319	6,788	11,848	2,610	1,075
	100.00	6.91	29.45	22.62	12.47	2.196	4.79	2.00

Table A-5

Male labour force 15 years of age and over by occupation and years of schooling, Ontario, 1961

Occupation	Total	Elementary		High School			Some Univ.	Univ. degree
		-5	5+	1 - 2	3	4 - 5		
All occupations	1,700,567	76,498	635,914	377,404	152,138	298,366	66,888	93,359
	100.00	4.50	37.39	22.19	8.95	17.55	3.93	5.49
Managerial & Proprietary	188,666	3,519	40,051	35,143	21,018	57,858	13,706	17,371
	100.00	1.87	21.23	18.63	11.14	30.67	7.26	9.21
Prof. and Tech.	142,779	253	5,823	10,018	7,815	37,861	18,999	62,010
	100.00	0.18	4.08	7.02	5.47	26.48	13.31	43.47
Clerical	129,932	1,337	26,684	32,695	17,432	41,699	7,394	2,691
	100.00	1.03	20.54	25.16	13.42	32.09	5.69	2.07
Sales	100,503	959	18,703	26,538	14,065	30,194	6,488	3,556
	100.00	0.95	18.61	26.41	13.99	30.04	6.46	3.50
Service and Recreation	146,770	8,885	56,945	37,612	14,471	21,639	4,241	2,977
	100.00	6.05	38.80	25.63	9.86	14.74	2.89	2.03
Trans. & Comm.	122,259	3,998	58,967	35,574	10,066	11,581	1,661	412
	100.00	3.27	48.23	29.10	8.23	9.47	1.36	0.34
Farmers and Farm Workers	149,302	10,712	90,517	27,868	7,234	10,362	1,819	790
	100.00	7.17	60.63	18.67	4.85	6.94	1.22	0.53
Loggers and Related Workers	11,594	2,389	6,918	1,423	282	409	133	40
	100.00	20.61	59.67	12.27	2.43	3.53	1.15	0.35
Fishermen, Hunters, Trappers	1,837	586	824	288	63	65	10	1
	100.00	31.90	44.86	15.68	3.43	3.54	0.54	0.05
Miners, quarry	25,642	2,214	13,933	5,423	1,539	1,922	489	122
	100.00	8.63	54.34	21.15	6.00	7.50	1.91	0.48
Craftsmen	535,302	25,269	248,387	135,024	47,407	68,914	8,087	2,214
	100.00	4.72	46.40	25.22	8.86	12.87	1.51	0.41
Labourers n.e.s.	103,900	13,203	55,063	20,366	5,895	7,285	1,892	196
	100.00	12.71	53.00	19.60	5.67	7.01	1.82	0.19
Others	42,081	3,174	13,099	9,432	4,851	8,637	1,967	919
	100.00	7.54	31.13	22.41	11.53	20.52	4.68	2.18

Table A-6

Female labour force 15 years of age and over by occupation and years of schooling for Ontario, 1961

Occupation	Total	Elementary		High School			Some Univ.	Univ. degree
		-5	5+	1 - 2	3	4 - 5		
All occupations	692,448	20,250	181,251	165,796	84,071	197,516	25,179	18,385
	100.00	2.92	26.18	23.95	12.15	28.51	3.63	2.66
Managerial & Proprietary	20,866	483	5,422	4,745	2,527	6,062	902	725
	100.00	2.31	25.98	22.74	12.11	29.05	4.32	3.47
Prof. & Tech.	94,858	149	2,969	5,134	4,624	54,415	13,622	13,945
	100.00	0.16	3.13	5.41	4.87	57.36	14.36	14.70
Clerical	227,411	566	19,252	59,336	44,232	95,032	6,525	2,468
	100.00	0.25	8.47	26.09	19.45	41.79	2.87	1.09
Sales	58,712	585	16,368	20,075	8,629	11,761	976	319
	100.00	1.00	27.88	34.19	14.70	20.03	1.66	0.54
Service and Recreation	147,704	10,336	70,345	37,999	11,570	15,217	1,716	521
	100.00	7.00	47.63	25.73	7.83	10.30	1.16	0.35
Trans. & Comm.	14,398	52	2,410	6,035	2,842	2,864	146	49
	100.00	0.36	16.74	41.92	19.74	19.89	1.01	0.34
Farmers and Farm Workers	22,869	1,434	13,016	4,419	1,440	2,282	201	77
	100.00	6.27	56.92	19.32	6.30	9.98	0.88	0.34
Loggers and Related Workers	13	0	5	6	0	1	0	1
	100.00	0.00	38.46	46.15	0.00	7.69	0.00	7.69
Fishermen, Hunters, Trappers	19	2	11	4	0	0	2	0
	100.00	10.53	57.89	21.05	0.00	0.00	10.53	0.00
Miners, quarry	7	0	1	1	1	3	1	0
	100.00	0.00	14.29	14.29	14.29	42.86	14.29	0.00
Craftsmen	83,835	5,300	43,964	22,494	5,600	5,971	396	110
	100.00	6.32	52.44	26.83	6.68	7.12	0.47	0.13
Labourers n.e.s.	9,406	759	4,554	2,661	669	697	52	14
	100.00	8.07	48.42	28.29	7.11	7.41	0.55	0.15
Others	12,350	584	2,934	2,887	1,937	3,211	641	156
	100.00	4.73	23.76	23.38	15.68	26.00	5.19	1.26

Table B-1

Number by size for the non-farm male population 15 years of age and over for the year ending 31 May 1961, for Atlantic Provinces, Ontario, and Canada

Income levels	Nfld.	P.E.I.	N.S.	N.B.	Atlant. Prov.	Ontario	Canada
Totals	111,521	18,844	186,399	139,149	455,913	1,716,085	4,608,044
	100.00	99.99	100.01	100.00	99.99	100.00	99.99
Under 500	10,903	1,394	14,449	10,659	37,405	92,823	266,038
%	9.78	7.40	7.75	7.66	8.20	5.41	5.77
500 - 999	18,754	3,089	22,173	16,910	60,926	113,600	392,170
%	16.82	16.39	11.90	12.15	13.36	6.62	8.51
1000 - 1499	13,377	2,037	16,156	13,306	44,876	83,688	276,685
%	12.00	10.81	9.67	9.56	9.84	4.88	6.00
1500 - 1999	10,951	1,854	14,587	11,672	39,064	76,845	255,441
%	9.82	9.84	7.83	8.39	8.57	4.48	5.54
2000 - 2499	10,399	2,162	17,108	13,447	43,116	97,652	309,174
%	9.32	11.47	9.18	9.66	9.46	5.69	6.71
2500 - 2999	8,130	1,508	15,575	12,372	37,585	105,816	319,115
%	7.29	8.00	8.36	8.89	8.24	6.17	6.93
3000 - 3499	8,772	1,603	17,920	13,814	42,109	160,779	445,275
%	7.87	8.51	9.61	9.93	9.24	9.37	9.66
3500 - 3999	7,004	1,252	15,402	11,206	34,864	156,494	412,032
%	6.28	6.64	8.26	8.05	7.65	9.14	8.94
4000 - 4499	6,067	1,056	13,755	10,465	31,343	176,468	431,437
%	5.44	5.60	7.38	7.52	6.87	10.28	9.36
4500 - 4599	3,838	593	9,695	6,397	20,523	137,688	319,172
%	3.44	3.15	5.20	4.60	4.50	8.02	6.93
5000 - 5999	6,004	910	13,045	7,925	27,884	210,864	479,902
%	5.38	4.83	7.00	5.70	6.12	12.29	10.41
6000 - 9999	5,583	960	12,382	8,223	27,148	227,100	521,468
%	5.01	5.09	6.64	5.91	5.95	13.23	11.32
10,000, over	1,739	426	4,152	2,753	9,070	76,268	180,135
%	1.56	2.26	2.23	1.98	1.99	4.44	3.91
Average income	2,665	2,867	3,188	3,070	--	4,335	3,999

Table B-2

Number by size of the non-farm female population 15 years of age and over for the year ending 31 May 1961, for Atlantic Provinces, Ontario and Canada

Income levels	Nfld.	P.E.I.	N. Scot.	N.Brun.	Atlant. Provin.	Ontario	Canada
Totals	44,541	11,379	102,610	74,947	233,507	1,086,805	2,703,793
	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.01	100.01	99.98	100.10
Under 500	13,237	3,477	29,130	19,623	65,467	252,064	611,495
%	29.70	30.56	28.39	26.18	28.04	23.19	22.62
500 - 999	16,576	3,502	30,061	23,044	73,183	229,151	642,350
%	37.19	30.78	29.30	30.75	31.34	21.08	23.76
1000 - 1499	5,547	1,601	12,981	8,859	28,988	121,304	312,909
%	12.45	14.07	12.65	11.82	12.41	11.16	11.57
1500 - 1999	2,768	951	7,843	7,074	19,536	94,702	251,834
%	6.21	8.36	8.52	9.44	8.37	8.71	9.31
2000 - 2499	2,304	833	7,888	6,198	17,223	104,597	257,081
%	5.17	7.32	7.69	8.27	7.38	9.62	9.51
2500 - 2999	1,264	399	4,563	3,418	9,644	81,724	185,444
%	2.84	3.51	4.45	4.56	4.13	7.52	6.86
3000 - 3499	1,338	256	3,871	2,863	8,328	76,503	170,684
%	3.00	2.25	3.77	3.82	3.57	7.04	6.31
3500 - 3999	514	158	1,748	1,518	3,938	44,805	95,185
%	1.15	1.39	1.70	2.03	1.69	4.12	3.52
4000 - 4999	541	111	1,835	1,273	3,760	42,239	91,352
%	1.21	0.98	1.79	1.70	1.61	3.89	3.38
5000, over	482	91	1,790	1,077	3,440	39,716	85,459
%	1.08	0.80	1.74	1.44	1.47	3.65	3.16
Average	1,133	1,061	1,243	1,255	--	1,747	1,659