TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF PROFESSOR MYRON J GORDON'S

"COST OF CAPITAL TO A TELECOMMUNICATIONS UTILITY"

Industry Canada

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BRIEFING

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MYRON GORDON'S COST OF CAPITAL

- Introduction

Return on capital and investment behaviour

Prices charged by a PUC for services or products are controlled by the regulatory commission

Principle in setting prices:

that they cover all the costs <u>required</u> to provide the services, including a return on the capital employed that is necessary to attract capital

GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS

- p price per unit of output
- Q quantity of output
- e variable cost per unit of output
- F fixed operating cost per period
- H depreciation on capital per period
- B outstanding debt per share of commom stock
- c coupon interest rate on outstanding debt
- τ corporate tax rate on income
- E book value of common equity, per share of C.S.
- r rate of return on common equity
- N number of shares of common stock
- P price per share of common stock
- x a utility's cost of capital
- k yield investors require on common stock
- Dt- dividend the company is expected to pay in period t
- b retention rate
- n number of shares to be issued to raise I dollars
- I amount of external financing required
- λ fraction of normal price per share realized per share on new issue
- g expected growth rate of dividend
- v fraction of funds raised expected to accrue to existing shareholders
- s fraction of existing common equity to be raised from new sale of
- k_m -i risk premium on a standard share
- B; ratio of the risk on share j to the risk on a standard share
- i current interest rate
- \mathcal{L} rate of increase in the number of shares
- R realized return to the investor
- m market portfolio of shares
- F risk free bond
- ρ value of k with no debt in the capital structure

- $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$ weighted average of k and c
- Z gross cost to the consumers on account of the capital employed by the utility
- z gross cost to the consumers per dollar of capital employed
- Pt subscription or issue price of stock

Notes from "The Cost of Capital to a Public Utility" Myron J. Gordon

Ch. I - Cost of capital in perfectly competitive capital markets

$$Z = (Pk + Li) / (P + L)$$

When current and coupon rates of interest are the same

Traditional cost of capital is

$$Z = (Ek + Bc) / (E + B)$$

P: Market Value of common equity

L: Market Value of debt

E: Book value or historical cost of common equity

B: Book value or historical cost of debt

i: current yield on firm's debt

c: imbedded interest rate on debt

k: yield at which stock is selling

Ch. 2 - Perfectly competitive capital markets

- Problem (A) Objective of regulatory agency:

 Allow the utility the lowest rate of return consistent with the investment in plant equipment by the utility that satisfies the demand for its output
 - (B) Objective of the utility:

 Maximize the market value of its outstanding common equity.

General model of share valuation

Value of share of stock may be represented as the present

value of the future cash flow it is expected to provide

V = Present value of share

 D_{t} = Dividend the share is expected to pay in period t

 P_n = Price at which the share is expected to sell at the end of t = n

k = Discount rate that converts a cash flow during or at the end of period t to its present value. For an investor with a one period horizon

$$v_0 = \frac{D_1 + P_1}{1 + k}$$

For an investor with an n period horizon

$$V_0 = \sum_{t=1}^{M} \frac{D_t}{(1+k)t} + \frac{P_n}{(1+k)^n}$$

For an investor with an infinite horizon

$$\begin{array}{c}
V_{0} = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} D_{t} \\
t = 1 (1 + k)t
\end{array}$$

Alternatively, using "n period" formula and "infinite" f.

$$P_n = \frac{D_{n+1} + P_{n+1}}{1 + k}$$

Market averages assume $P_o = V_o$

With P $_{\rm o}$ known and with defensible estimates of D $_{\rm t?}$ the value of k for a share can be derived

$$k = \frac{P_1 + P_1 - P_0}{P_0}$$

Realized yield = Dividend yield plus rate of growth in price.

Glossary of symbols

P = Price per share

E = Book value per share

N = # of shares outstanding

D = Dividends per share of stock

Y = EPS

L = Market value of debt on a per share basis

B = Book value of debt on a per share basis

i = current rate of interest

c = coupon or imbedded interest rate on outstanding debt

 \mathcal{K} = rate of return on common equity investment

w = Y/E =rate of return on common equity (or book value)

 $x = (E\pi + Bc) / (E + B) = rate of return on total assets (at book values)$

k = yield at which share is selling

P = value k would have if the firm had no debt in its capital structure

z = cost of capital

Ex Stationary firm

No investment and financing earnings in every future period = current earnings dividends in every future period = earnings No debt in capital structure

$$P = \frac{\infty}{\xi} \quad \frac{Y}{(1+k)^{t}} = \frac{Y}{\rho} = \frac{Ex}{\rho}$$

And price per share is the multiple of 1/p of the current EPS.

Stock financing - same company

loundering investment at cost I, and rate of return $\mathbf{x} = \text{rate}$ of return on existing capital

If the return investors require on a share is independent of the N of shares placed on the market, the N required is N = I/P

$$P = \frac{(\text{NEx} + \text{Ix})/(\mathcal{U}+n)}{\rho} = \frac{\text{NEx} + \text{Ix}}{p(\mathcal{U}+1/\rho)} = \frac{\text{NEx} + \text{I}(x-\rho)}{n\rho}$$

if $x = \rho$, the investment will not change the price per share; if $x < \rho$, $P \uparrow$ and vice versa Do not undertake if $x < \rho$

Debt financing:

Amount borrowed per share L=I/N

$$P = \underbrace{Ex + L (x-1)}_{k}$$

k is used instead of ρ for the discount rate since the firm has debt in its capital structure. N does not change and EPS Λ from Y = Ex to Y = Ex + L(x-i) on the assumption that x > i

the MM position

Stock of a leyered corporation

$$k = \rho + (\rho - i) (L/P)$$

$$P = \underbrace{Ex + L(x-i)}_{\rho + (\rho-i)(L/P)} = \underbrace{Ex + L(x-\rho)}_{\rho}$$

Retention financing

Dividend drops from $D_1 = Y = Ex$ to $D_1 = Ex-bEx$ where bEx=I/N Fraction of EPS retained is b = I/NEx

NEx = earnings on total common equity

Assuming no further investment contemplated, the D ofevery subsequent year is A from Ex to Ex+xbEx Retention raises common equity per share by bEx and a return of x is expected on the investment.

$$P = \frac{Ex - bEx}{1 + \rho} + \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \frac{Ex + xbEx}{(1 + \rho)^{t}}$$
$$= \frac{Ex}{\rho} = \frac{bEx}{\rho(1 + \rho)}$$

Continuous retention financing

no debt, return of x on investment

$$Y_1 = Y_0 + xbY_0 = Y_0(1 + bx)$$

in period t

$$Y_{t} = Y_{0}(1 + bx)^{t}$$

$$P = \begin{cases} (1 - b) Y_{0} (1 + b_{x})^{t} \\ t = 1 \end{cases}$$

$$(1 + P)t$$

$$\begin{cases} finite, pass & \text{if } P > by \end{cases}$$
so
$$P = (1 - b)Y$$

$$P - bx$$

Influence of retention financed investment on P, use derivative dP/db. Assumption in perfect capital markets ρ independent of b

$$dP = (x - \rho) \frac{Y}{(\rho - bx)^2} \frac{dP}{db} = 0 \text{ if } x = \rho$$

Thus, cost of retention capital remains ρ in the case of continuous retention and investment.

If dividend in t = 1 is $(1 - b)Y_1$, and expected to grow at rate bx indefinitely, the yield at which the share is selling is

$$\rho = \frac{(1-b)Y + bx}{\Box}$$

Continuous debt financing

Retains and invests fraction b of income and also borrows and invests periodically to maintain debt - equity ratio

Ratio expected to maintain under purely competitive capital markets (PCCM) is L/P, based on market values of debt and common equity, rather than B and E, book values.

Amount earned on common equity during t = 1 is no longer $E_{o}x$ but

$$Y_1 = xE_0 + (x - c)B_0$$

$$Y_2 = Y_1 + xbY_1 + (x - i)\Delta B_0$$

Value of ABo determined:

 bY_1 = increase in common equity at book value P_0/E_0 market to book value ratio

the increase in common equity at market value is $bY_1(P_0/E_0)$ - If debt equity ratio is to be unchanged (at market value) ΔB_0 must be the fraction L_0/P_0 of bY_1 (P_0/E_0) Hence,

$$\Delta B_O = (L_O/P_O) bY_1 (P_O/E_O) = bY_1 (L_O/E_O)$$

And

$$\sum_{2} = Y_{1} + xbY_{1} + (x - i) bY_{1}(L_{0}/E_{0})$$

$$= Y_{1} (1 + br_{1})$$

where

$$r_1 = x + (x - i) (L_0/E_0)*$$

The debt/equity-ratio at t=0 in this expression is the debt at market value and the equity at market value.

* The value of r in this equation is the added income to the common dividend by the increase in common equity in period one. = Return on common equity investment during period one

$$P_0 = \begin{cases} \frac{(1-b)Y_0(1+br)^t}{(1+k)^t} \\ = \frac{(1-b)Y}{k-br} \end{cases}$$

where k is the yield on a share with a leverage rate of L/P.

The cost of retention capital under the perfect capital markets assumptions remains equal to ho .

$$P = \frac{(1 - b) [Ex + L (x - i)]}{\rho + (L/P) (\rho - i) - bx - b (L/E) (x - i)}$$

$$= \frac{(1 - b) [Ex + L (x - i)] - L(\rho - i)}{\rho - bx - b (L/E) (x - i)}$$

And the derivative with respect to b is

$$\frac{dP}{db} = (x - \rho) \frac{[x + (L/E) (x - i)] (L + E)}{[\rho - bx - b (L/E) (x - i)]^2}$$

the right hand side is $x-\rho *$ by a quantity that is positive if x>i. Hence, $d\rho/db=0$ if $x=\rho$ and the cost of retention capital, when the firm maintains a leverage rate of L/P is equal to ρ .

Continuous new equity financing

 W_t = total common equity at end of period t

 W_t^* = total common equity at end of t that accrues to shareholders at t = 0

s = funds raised from the sale of stock as a fraction of
 existing common equity

 Q_t = funds raised from sale of stock during t

v = fraction of Q_t that accrues to shareholders at the start of t

Hyp: Let total common equity at t = o be $W_O = NE_O$ and expected rate of growth in common equity due to sale of stock be s Common equity one period later is

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{W}_1 &= \mathbf{W}_o + \mathbf{b} \mathbf{N} \mathbf{y}_1 + \mathbf{s} \mathbf{W}_o \\ \mathbf{Since} \quad \mathbf{N} \mathbf{Y}_1 &= \mathbf{r} \mathbf{W}_o \\ \mathbf{W}_1 &= \mathbf{W}_o + \mathbf{b} \mathbf{r} \mathbf{W}_0 + \mathbf{s} \mathbf{W}_o = \mathbf{W}_o \ (1 + \mathbf{b} \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{s}) \\ \mathbf{And} \ \mathbf{W}_n &= \mathbf{W}_o (1 + \mathbf{b} \mathbf{r} + \mathbf{s})^n \end{aligned}$$

In each period, the total equity is raised by the fraction br due to retention and by s due to the sale of

additional shares. At the end of t=n the total common equity will include the equity of the shareholders at t=o and the equity arising from the sale of shares from t=o through t=n. Interest is in expected equity and dividend at t=n on a share outstanding at t=o. Let Qn=sW be the funds raised from the sale of stock during n, and let v be the fraction of the funds provided during n that accrues to the shareholders at the start of n

the right hand side is $x-\rho*$ by a quantity that is positive if x>i. Hence, $d\rho/db=0$ if $x=\rho$ and the cost of retention capital, when the firm maintains a leverage rate of L/P is equal to ρ .

Continuous new equity financing

 W_t = total common equity at end of period t

 $W_t^* = \text{total common equity at end of } t \text{ that accrues to shareholders}^{:}$ at t = 0

s = funds raised from the sale of stock as a fraction of existing common equity

 Q_t = funds raised from sale of stock during t

 \mathbf{v} = fraction of Q_t that accrues to shareholders at the start of \mathbf{t}

Hyp: Let total common equity at t = o be $W_o = NE_o$ and expected rate of growth in common equity due to sale of stock be s Common equity one period later is

$$\begin{aligned} & W_1 = W_o + b N y_1 + s W_o \\ & Since \quad N Y_1 = r W_o \\ & W_1 = W_o + b r W_o + s W_o = W_o \ (1 + b r + s) \\ & And \ W_n = W_o (1 + b r + s)^n \end{aligned}$$

In each period, the total equity is raised by the fraction br due to retention and by s due to the sale of additional shares. At the end of t=n the total common equity will include the

equity of the shareholders at t = 0 and the equity arising from the sale of shares from t = 0 through t = n. Interest is in expected equity and dividend at t = n on a share outstanding at t = 0. Let Qn = sW be the funds raised from the sale of stock during n, and let v be the fraction of the funds provided during n that accrues to the shareholders at the start of n

 W_n^* = portion of total common equity at the end of t = n that belongs to the share outstanding at t = 0.

$$\begin{aligned} &W_1^* = W_0 + b_r W_0 + vs W_0 \\ &W_n^* = W_0 (1 + b_r + rs)^n &\stackrel{*}{\leftarrow} & 2 \text{ sides by N and * by r} \\ &\text{gives } Y_n^* + 1 = Y_1 (1 + br + vs)^n \end{aligned}$$

Earnings on a share at t = 0 are expected to grow at the rate br due to retention and at vs due to sale of additional stock

Stock value model becomes

$$P = \underbrace{S}_{t=1} \frac{(1-b)Y [1 + br + vs]^{t-1}}{(1+k)^{t}}$$

if
$$k > br + Vs$$

$$P = \frac{(1+b)Y}{k - br - Vs}$$

$$\left(v = 1 - \frac{E}{P}\right)$$

.... further derivation of v

If market for new shares is perfectly competitive, the number of shares given to new shareholders during t = n in return for Qn dollars must satisfy two conditions

- 1. New issue must be sold at the prevailing price per share at time of issue
- 2. Dividend expectation of new shareholder should have a present value of Qn, the \$ he invests When discounted at the rate k.

With r the return earned on common equity investment, b retention rate and (1-v) On the book value of the common equity obtained by the new shareholders, the dividend in n+1 is

$$D_{n+1}^{*} = (1 - b)r(1 - v)Qn$$

Once in the corporation, the new shares are identical to old shares. Dividends are expected to grow at br + vs...

Hence, both conditions are satisfied if

$$Q_{n} = \sum_{t=m+1}^{\infty} \frac{(1-b)r (1-v)Q_{n}(1+br+vs)^{t-n-1}}{(1+k) t-n}$$

$$= \frac{(1-b)r (1-v) Q_{n}}{k-br-vs}$$

$$(\frac{1}{7} 25 \text{ by } Q_n) \rightarrow \text{And } v = \frac{r-k}{r-rb-s}$$

Finite horizon model

If we assume that the current value of g (continuous growth rate of share) is expected to prevail for n periods and that thereafter the dividend is expected to grow at a normal rate of g, the stock value model becomes

$$P = \underbrace{\underbrace{(1-b)Y(1+g)^{t}}_{t=1} + \underbrace{\underbrace{(1-b)Y(1+g)^{n}(1+g)^{n}(1+g)^{t-n}}_{t=m+1}}_{t=m+1}$$

produces a finite P with $k \le g$ as long as k > g With P known, the equation may be used to measure k since k is an implicit function of the other variables. Under this assumption re a share's dividend expectation, k is an average of g and g plus the dividend yield

Summary

Regardless of how investment is financed, the utility's cost of capital, Z, is equal to ρ , the yield at which its stock would sell in the absence of leverage.

When $x = \rho$, the price of stock is independent of its investment and financing decisions and the stockholder is indifferent as to the level of investment and its financing.

Hence, $x = \rho$ is the lowest rate of return the utility can be allowed to earn consistent with the investment decision that the public interest requires.

The level of \boldsymbol{x} is significant to stockholders since $\boldsymbol{\rho}$ increases with \boldsymbol{x}

Weighted Average Cost of Capital

Customary

Weights being the relative amounts of each type of capital in the capital structure.

If the market values of the debt and equity are the weights, then

$$Z = L\rho + sP_{\rho} + brP_{\rho} (1 - \tau P) / (1 - \tau g)$$

P + I

Where L, sP and brP each divided by P + L are the fractions of capital raised by debt, stock financing, and retention, respectively.

The alternative solution is to take Z = to the cost of retention capital if earnings are adequate to support the investment rate, and to take $Z = to \rho$ if stock financing and/or leverage on the retained earnings is required.

Solving for
$$\rho$$
 ($\rho = \rho^{\tau}$ / (1 - τp) =
$$\frac{\rho = (1 - b) Ex}{P} + xb (1 - \tau q) / (1 - \tau p)$$

for share yield in the absence of leverage and stock financing.

Use of Gordon's Models

A) Debt Financing

If a utility finances investment only by the sale of debt, it pays all earnings in dividends and these are not expected to grow; share price is

$$P = \sum_{t=1}^{\Sigma} \frac{Dt}{(1+k)^{t}} = \frac{D}{k}$$
 (111.1)

D = EPS = 4.83

$$P(1975) = 44.57$$

$$44.57 = \frac{4.83}{k}$$

Thus k = .1084

The equation may be written in terms of the common equity per share E, the debt per share B, the allowed return on assets x and the rate of interest on debt c as

$$\tilde{\mathbf{P}} = \underline{(E+B)\mathbf{x} - Bc}$$

for 1975, the known values are

P = 44.57

E = 2,011,807K/38,998K = 51.5874

B = 2,338,864 K/38,998 K = 59.9739

x = ?

c = 6.68% or .0668 k = .1084

Thus
$$44.57 = (51.5874+59.9739)x - 59.9739 x .0668$$

$$1029.1633x = 81.5281$$

 $x = .0792$

to set r=k, we set $x=\hat{x}$, making the substitution results in

$$Pk = (E+B)[Ek+Bc] - Bc$$

$$E+B$$

to prove....

$$44.57 \times .1084 = 51.5874 + 59.9739$$
 $(51.5874* .1084 + 59.9739* .0668) -59.9739$ $*.0668$

4.8314 ± 5.5921

Contrary to Gordon's assumption, market value is not independent of the amount of debt in the capital structure. The derived market value requires solving for an estimate of P

$$\hat{P}_k = 5.5921$$
 $\hat{P}.1084 = 5.5921$
 $\hat{P} = 51.5874 = E$

which is outside the actual market price range of Bell stock for 1975. (40.75 to 48.38)

for P = E, a change would be required in the controllable variable k; to yield in agreement with Gordon's hypothesis, k should be

$$44.57k = 51.5874$$

$$k = 1.1574$$

B) Retention Financing

E = Common equity per share

r = Allowed return

Er = Allowed earnings per share of common

b = Fraction of earnings retained

D = (1-b)Er = dividend per share

According to Gordon, it can be shown that with b the retention rate and r the rate of return on common, the expected rate of growth in the dividend due to retention is br. The price per share then becomes

$$P = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{Dt}{(1+k)^{t}}$$

$$= \underbrace{\frac{(1-b)Er(1+br)^{t-1}}{(1+k)^{t}}}$$

$$= \underbrace{\frac{(1-b)Er}{k-br}}$$

111.4

if k > br which must be true for share price to be finite. Setting r = k, the share price P = E. Assuming the current book value per share to be independent of the retention rate, the current price is also independent of b. For proof, derive $\partial P/\partial b$ while assuming that k and r are independent of b

$$\frac{\partial P}{\partial b} = (r-k) \frac{Er}{(k-br)^2}$$

The change in price with the retention rate is = 0 when r = k and + if r > k and - if r < k

In Bell's case:

Thus, expected rate of growth in the dividend, due to retention = br = .0286 Solving for k using P

eq 111.4 44.57 =
$$(1-.3)*.0953*.51.5874$$

k - .0286

$$= \frac{3.4414}{k - .0286}$$

$$44.57k = 3.4414 + 1.2737$$

$$k = .1058$$

In this case, r< k (.0953 .1058) and the Δ in price with the retention rate should be < 0

Example; if we set r at .09 and k at .10 so that r < k, the effect of change is (from \bar{P}_{1975})

from 111.4
$$\hat{P} = (1-.3) \frac{51.5874 \times .09}{.10 - .3 \times .09}$$

= 3.25/.0730
= 44.52

Thus, for a A of .01 in rik in favour of k, P varies -0.05

C) Stock Financing

If a stock issue at the present time is the only issue expected, the price per share may be written:

$$P = \frac{NEr + Ir}{(N+n)k}$$

N = # of shares currently outstanding

n=# of shares that will be issued to raise I\$. If new shares can be issued at a price of P to provide the new stockholders a return of k on their investment, I = np and

$$P = \frac{NEr + 1r}{(N+I/P)k}$$

$$= \underbrace{NEr + I(r-k)}_{Nk}$$

111.6

when r = k, Eq. 111.6 reduces to P = E

if
$$r > k \rightarrow P \uparrow$$
 as I is \uparrow if $r < k \rightarrow P \downarrow$

Commonly, a new issue of stock can only be floated to net the corporation a price per share below that at which the stock ordinarily sells - Because:

- 1. The issue is sold to an investment banker at a price below that at which the investment banker puts the issue on the market
- 2. The issue may be marketed at a price slightly below the normal price. Let λ be the fraction of the normal price per share that the utility realize on a new issue. Then $n = I/\lambda P$ and Eq 111.6 becomes

$$P = \frac{NEr + I(r - k/\lambda)}{Nk}$$
111.7

For example, if Bell's recent issue of 70m preferred stock had been in common, the elements of Eq 111.7 would be*

$$N = 38,998^{K}$$

$$E = 51.5874$$

$$r_{1975} = 280,808 \text{K}/2,011,807 \text{k} = .1396$$

I = 70M -

$$k = .1084$$

 $\lambda = (underwriting cost 3\%) = .97$

Eq 111.7

$$P = \frac{(38998^{EEX3} \div 51.5874 \div .1396) + (75^{EEX6} \div .1396/.97)}{38998 EEX3 \div .1084}$$

P = 80.95 non-sequitur

* Using as a base c.o.y. data 1975

- A) Utility should be allowed a return on capital equal to its cost of capital
- B) Return on capital = cost of capital if the allowed return on common is equal to or above the yield at which the common stock is selling

The problem raised consists in the measurement of the yield at which the common stock of a utility is selling at any point in time

A) Intrinsic Yield

The common approach to measuring yield is based upon the relation between yield and price. If price P is known and dividend D is known, k, the yield at which the share is selling, may be inferred.

The basic stock formula is

$$P = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{D_t}{(1+k)^t}$$

II.2

The growth rate of the dividend is g, the expression for P becomes

$$P = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{D(1+g)^{t-1}}{(1+k)^{t}} = \frac{D}{k-g}$$
1V.1

Using as a base, the dividend history for the period 1965-1975, the expected dividend for 1975* would be \$3, for 1976, 3.08 etc. for an annual growth rate g = .0267

Under the reasonable assumption that k>g (in fact), we may solve for k

$$k = \frac{D}{P} + g$$

IV.2

Using market data from 1975

$$P + = 48.38$$

 $P = 44.57$
 $P + = 40.75$

the range of k would be

$$k \neq \frac{3.12}{48.38} + .0267 = .0912$$
 $k = \frac{3.12}{44.57} + .0267 = .0967$
 $k = \frac{3.12}{40.75} + .0267 = .1033$

* OLSO
$$y = ux + b b = 2.17 m = .0753 r^2 = .826$$

Gordon states that the expected rates of growth in dividends, earnings and share price are all equal and may be used to obtain an estimate of g; however, historical data contradicts this hypothesis which would have: g =

Refer to appendix for additional data page 32

Substituting k into Eq IV.2

$$.0967 = 3.44 + g$$

$$44.57$$

$$g = .0195$$

g = br + vs

B) Intrinsic Growth Rate

The utility is expected to raise funds from the sale of stock equal to the fraction s of the existing common equity, and if the fraction v of the funds raised is expected to accrue to the existing shareholders, the dividend to the existing shareholders is expected to grow at the rate vs due to the sale of stock. The intrinsic rate of growth in the dividend is therefore given by

IV.3

Bell data 1975

$$b = .2878$$

$$r = .0953$$

$$v = 1-E/P\lambda = 1 - 51.5874/46*1 = -0.12$$

$$s = .06$$

We assume P to be the price at which new shares will be sold; warrants presently outstanding permit acquisition at 46.00. And no underwriting cost is involved, thus $\lambda=1$


Eq IV.3 g =
$$.3*$$
 $.0953 + -.12*.06$ g = $.0358$

this figure is substantially different from the intrinsic yield (.0195) obtained from Eq. IV.2

* Existing common equity, end of 1975: 2,011,807,000 Excercise of warrants yields 46* 2,625,000 = 120,750,000

Fraction = 6%

SCHLED BY 1890



Theory:

When the return on common is equal to the yield investors require on common, the price of the stock is equal to its book value. That is when r = k, we have P = E. It follows that when we observe that P = E, we can be satisfied that r = k, and we need not trouble ourselves with the task of measuring k.

It is also true that when P>E, we may infer that r>k, and that the allowed rate of return should be reduced to make r= k. The reverse is true when P<E.

Although the market to book value relation is a simple and powerful guide to regulatory policy, it does not render the measurement of k unnecessary for two reasons:

- 1. P>E means that r should be reduced, but not by how much. If P>E by 20%, it does not follow that r is 120% of k and should be reduced proportionately to realize r=k.
- 2. A policy of r=k is correct only if the utility is not expected to engage in stock financing. Should stock financing be a necessary or desirable source of funds, a return on capital equal to the cost of capital requires r>k and P>E. Specifically, we should have r=k/λ and the estimation of k and λ is preferred to juggling with r on the basis of the relation between P and E.

The use of Beta to measure share yield

P. 20-C

The yield investors require on a share may be represented as equal to the interest rate on a risk free bond plus a risk premium

let k_m —i be the risk premium on a standard share β j be the ratio of the risk on share j to the risk on a standard share

The yield investors require on a share may be written:

$$k_j = i + \beta j (k_m - i)$$
 IV.6

For estimating $\beta_{\mbox{\scriptsize j}},$ Gordon suggests that common practice is to run the time serves regression

$$R_j t - R_{Ft} = \alpha_j + \beta_j (R_m - R_{Ft})$$
 IV.7

where $Rj_t = [Djt + Pjt]/Pj$, t-1 = the realized return relative on share j in period t

Dit = dividend during t

 P_{jt} = price of a share at the end of t

 R_{mt} = the realized return relative on a market portfolio of snares

RFt = the realized return relative on a risk free band

The regression is run over n prior periods to obtain estimates of β_j and j, the latter being the average excess return realized on the share over the n periods.

One course of action to estimate $k_{\rm m}$ is to use an average of $R_{\rm mt}$ over n prior periods. If we have accurate estimates of kj and β j for one or more other shares, they may be used to estimate $k_{\rm m}$ by means of the expression.

$$k_{m} = i + 1$$
 [kj-i] IV.8

The resulting value of k_m along with the value of βj for the share of interest are employed in Eq. IV.5 to estimate k_j for that share

Eq. IV.5
$$k = \frac{D}{P} + br + s[1-E/\lambda P]$$

End of 1975

Average number of common shares outstanding 38,998,000. Dividends per share 3.44

*Common equity @ 31.12.75 (000's)

Common @ 25 par 974,950.

Premium .

441,213

Retained

earnings

595,644.

Equity 2,011,807 or 51.59 per share

 Σ Dividend payments 1975 = 135418 = 6.73%

Σ Equity 1975

2011807

Yield: <u>E.P.S. 1975</u> <u>4.83*</u>

B.V.S. 1975 51.59

= 9.36%

Net yield to investor: $\frac{Dt}{D} = \frac{3.44}{44.57} = 7.727$

 $P.E._{1975} = 9.23 - Capitalization ratio .1084$

* from application to CRTC re issue of 75 m. preferred stock 9/76 p.29

* exclusive of extraordinary items.

End of 1975

Preferred Stock Dividends (000's)

3.20	series		2,705
3.34	series	,	4,132
4.23	series		8,459
2.28	series		5,900
2.25	series		3,649

Preferred Dividends 24,845

Preferred equity 331,307

Average rate on preferred = 24845/331307 = 7.5%

Historical Rates

Year	<u>Dividends</u>	Equity	Rate(%)
1970	5,706	93,997	6.07
1971	9,350	197,997	4.72
1972	13,079	197,991	6.61
1973	14,020	248,988	5.63
1974	17,594	332,002	5.30
1975	24,845	331,307	7.5

Cost of Debt (Pre Tax) Non-Consolidated

End of 1975

Total debt outstanding end of 1975 (000's)

Long Term Debt	2,294,023
Notes Payable	44,841
TOTAL	2,338,864

Interest Charges 156,218

Average ratio on debt 156,218/2,338,864 = 6.68%

Bell Canada (Unconsolidated) Value of Capital

77.	_	C		70	75	,
	•	\sim	٠		,,,,	

(1) Annualized

*Rrimded

Book Value App	proach	%			Marke	t Value	App roac	<u>h</u>	
Preferred Shares	331,307	7.08	5. •	Preferred share	s Avg. Mc	Val	<u> </u>		
Common Stock	2,011,807	42.97		Series A(3.20)	44	.5	845	37,602	0.85
Debt	2,338,864	49.95		Series B(3.34)	44	.5	1,237	55,046	1.24
				Series C(2.25)	26	.38	1,622	42,788	.96
TOTAL	4,681,978	100		(4.23)	49	.44	2,000	98,880	2.23
	•			(2.28)	25	.50	5,000	127,500	2.87
				Preferred Equit	У	· · ·	•	361,816*	8.15
,				Common Stock	44	.57	38,998	1,738,140*	39.16
				Debt				2,338,864	52.69
		· .			TOTAL	1		4,438,820	100
			Cost	of Components		•	•		
				<u>Series</u> Σ	Dividends	3	Rate		•
Preferred Sto	ck: 7.5%			3.20	2,705		7.19	· :	•
Common Stock:	6.73	%		3.34	4,132		7.51	•	
Deb ::	6.68	%		2.25	3,649	Þ	8.53		
				4.23	8,459		8.55	•	
		•		2.28	5,900	•	8.44(1)		,
garan da				Common	135,418		7.79		
<i>,</i> •		•		Debt			6.68		

Explicit Cost of Components - Tax Adjusted

End of 1975

	Book Value Approach			en e				Market V	ket Value Approach		
	Cost	Weight	Composite				Cost		Weight	<u>Composite</u>	
Preferred Stock	7.5%	.0708	•5310			:	7.19		.0085	.0611	
Series 3.20	•	<i>',</i>					7.51		.0124	.0931	
3.34 2.25	-						8.53		.0096	.0819	
4.23 2.28	. *			:			8.55 8.44		.0223	.1907 .2422	
Common Stock	6.73	.4297	2.8919			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	7.79		.3916	3.0506	
Debt	6.68	.4995	3.3367	•			6.68	d la constitución de la constitu	.5269	3.5197	
Weighted Average	•	1.	6.7595			· · · . · ·			1	7.2393	
Cost of Debt		•					•		•		

Assumptions: Bell's Internal Rate of Return 11% for 1975, 10 3/4% for 1976*

Issue 70 M @ \$20 D = 1.80 @ 9%

Commission 3% = 2.1 M

Continuous interest cost:

Net proceeds = 67,900,000 @ 9% (on 70M) end of year = 9.2784%

Opportunity cost of

2.1 M over 20 yrs @ 10 3/4% yield = 225,750

N.P.V. 1,827,513.75

Add NPV of Comm. 2,100,000.00

TOTAL Opportunity Cost 3,927,513.75

N.P.V. of opportunity cost as a % of net proceeds: 5.78%

Total N.P.V. to Bell Canada

67.9M 75M Investment 75 M: Net IRR = 10 3/4% - 9.2784% = 1.4716%

Net Investment 67.9 M

NCF per year = GCF 67.9 * 10 3/4% - 75m * 9% = 7,299,250 - 6,750,000 = 549,250 * 20 yrs.

N.P.V. of projectsssuming IRR of 10 3/4%, I of 70 m and annual N.C.F. of 549,250 exclusive of taxes:

- 63,453,657.

Bell's IRR must be significantly higher than 10.75% as implied.

^{*} See p.33, Application to CRTC re preferred stock 9/76.

The burden of a corporate income tax is different for a public utility than for a non-regulated business enterprise:

A) A business enterprise is presumed to make output and price decisions which maximize its profit before interest and taxes (EBIT). Hence, EBIT is independent of capital structure and the income tax paid, and taxation reduces earnings on common stock. However, since interest is a tax allowed expense, debt financing reduces the tax charge and raises the after-tax earnings on the total capital.

For example, assuming for simplicity the IM position that the cost of equity and debt capital with no tax is \hat{x} . If we now let \hat{x} be the after tax cost of equity capital, the pre-tax cost of equity capital is $\hat{x}/(1-\tau)$, but the pre-tax cost of debt capital is only \hat{x} .

Ex.: Cost of equity (pre-tax) =
$$10\%$$
 \hat{x}
Cost of debt (pre-tax) = 9% \hat{x}
Tax rate (τ) = 45%

Assuming \$ Debt = \$ Equity $\rightarrow \hat{x} = 9.5\%$

Pre-tax cost of equity = .1/(1 - .45) = .18 or 18%Pre-tax cost of debt capital = .09 or 9%

The common stockholders gain the difference between $\hat{x}/(1-\tau)$ and \hat{x} (9%) times the cost of an investment by financing it with debt instead of by the sale of stock or retained earnings.

B) A public utility differs in that the price of its products are set by the regulatory agency to provide it with \hat{x} on the total capital after taxes. The income tax falls on the consumers; it is implied that a dollar of debt financing raises the charges to consumers by the current interest rate i plus any change in k that takes place (k follows i), while a dollar of equity financing raises the charges to consumers by $k/(1-\tau)$ less any reduction in k that takes place.

The consequences of the debt equity decision on the pre-tax cost of capital to the consumer is expressed through the gross cost of capital without the depreciation term.

$$\hat{\beta} = \frac{Bc + Ek/(1 - \tau)}{B + E}$$

VII-1

fle value of h as a tenedion of the firm's leverage rate is

$$k = \rho + \alpha B/E$$

 ρ = value of k with no debt in the capital structure

$$\alpha < \rho - i$$

Substituting for k in VII-1

$$\widehat{\widehat{g}} = \underline{Bc + (E\rho + \alpha B)/(1 - \tau)}$$

The consequence of a change in the leverage rate for the value of ? is expressed by 33/3B

For a change in debt c = i, and with B + E

constant $\partial E/\partial B = -1$

$$\frac{\partial \mathcal{J}}{\partial \mathcal{B}} = \frac{\mathbf{i} - (\rho - \alpha)/(1 - \tau)}{B + E}$$
 VII.3

Since $\alpha < \rho - i$, the above is negative and the cost of capital falls as leverage rises.

Evaluating Eq. VII -3

Bell 1975 data
$$i = .0668$$

 $\rho = .1$ (Assumption)

$$\rho = 1$$
 (Assumption)

$$\alpha \approx .03$$

$$\tau = .45$$

$$\frac{32}{98} \frac{.0668 - (.1 -.03)/.55}{59.9739 + 51.5874} = -.000542$$
or $-\frac{0.06}{8+E}$

With no tax, we would have

$$\frac{\partial \hat{3}}{\partial 6} = \frac{-0.0032}{\text{B+E}} \text{ or } -.000029$$

Consequently, with no corporate income tax, a one per cent rise in the debt asset ratio reduces the cost of capital by .32% per cent, but with a 45% tax rate, a one per cent rise in the debt asset ratio reduces the cost of capital by 6% of its amount.

Another way of considering the issue is to contact the revenue requirements on an additional dollar of capital financed by equity with the same dollar of capital financed by debt. For the revenue requirement under the existing capital structures, Eq. VII.2 is rewritten

$$\hat{\mathbf{g}}$$
 (B+E)= Bc(E ρ + ω B)/(1- τ)

Assuming once again that \$ Equity = \$ Debt (Ratio 1:1), the revenue requirement increase due to an additional dollar of debt financed capital is

$$\frac{\partial [\widehat{\beta}(B+E)]}{\partial B} = i + \alpha/(1-\tau) = .0668 + .03/.55 = .12$$

The revenue requirement is greater than the 6.68% interest rate because the higher leverage rate raises the required yield on the common stock.

For an additional dollar of equity financed capital, the revenue requirement is

$$\frac{\partial (\hat{k}(B+E))}{\partial E} = \rho/(1-\tau) = .1/.55 = .18$$

Thus, the cost of equity capital to the consumer is substantially higher than that of debt capital.

Note - Eq. VII.3 is valid only up to the leverage rate at which i remains constant. Beyond some leverage rate, the i a utility pays rises with leverage, the absolute value of \$\frac{3}{2}/\partial B\$ falls below its Eq. VII.3 value, and at a high enough leverage rate \$\frac{3}{2}/\partial B\$ turns positive.

Accelerated degreciation and temation

The government prescribes the procedures a firm may follow in computing depreciation for tax purposes. The depreciation charge that results may be, and usually is, larger than the depreciation charge that results from the practices the company follows in preparing its own annual reports and in the calculation prescribed by the regulatory agency.

In this case, the tax actually paid to the government is less than it would be if the tax allowed depreciation had been the same as the company's own deprecaition charge.

For example, in 1975, Bell Canada's book depreciation was approximately 338.26 million; this represents 5.9% on average gross depreciable fixed assets of 5,767 million. This amount (338.26M) is less than CCA on Bell's depreciable assets for 1975, since Bell's internal accounting provides for longer life on many assets, thus a lower rate. The rate on Bell's books, if used for tax purposes, would result in a substantially lesser claim for depreciation expenses and a higher tax payout.

Deferred taxes for 1975 were of 78.4 m and this amount represents the difference between the CCA and internal depreciation. Income taxes claimed (income statement) were of 174.24 m; this implies that actual taxes paid were 95.84m or an effective rate of 25% on EBT (387.3m) and of 18% on EBIT of 543.5m. (1)

The accelerated depreciation (CCA) for tax purposes makes the effective tax rate on corporate income less than the nominal tax rate. It would seem reasonable for the corporation to record the actual income tax levied and compute income after taxes to the common equity on the basis of the actual income tax levied. Instead, common practice is to compute the tax on a straight line (i.e. true) depreciation and show a smaller net income to common. This excess of the CCA over the tax actually levied is treated as a liability for deferred taxes on the assumption that it will have to be paid at some later date, when the straight line depreciation charge will be above the CCA charge.

The implications are that the government, and consumers, is therefore only lending the company the difference. This loan carries a zero interest rate; it may be payable in future if two conditions occur simultaneously.

⁽¹⁾ CCA claimed = 338.26M + 78.4 m = 416.66 m or average of 7.22% of current depreciable assets

- A) When the company contracts in size
- B) When and if, the company has no taxable earnings

In the case of the federally regulated carriers, the probabilities of occurrence are extremely remote. As of the end of 1975, cumulative deferred taxes for Bell Canada (parent company)

Effect of deferred taxes as a source of capital on the cost of capital $% \left(1\right) =\left(1\right) +\left(1\right) +\left($

Book Value Approach - Using 30/06/76 data (i)

Source	Cost	Amount (000)'s)Weight	Composite A	Composite B
Common Equity.	0.0712(2)	2,079,582	.388	2.7627	3.1173
Preferred Stock	0.075(3)	331,307	.0618	.4636	.5231
Long Debt Debt	0.0724	2,294,023	.428	3.099	3.4968
Notes Payable	0.098	44,841	.0084	082	.0925
Deferred Taxes	0.0	609,702	.1138	0.0	N/A
	:	5, 359,455	1	6.4073	7.2298

By including deferred taxes as an element of capitalization, which in the long run it is, the effective cost is reduced to 6.4% (Composite A) from 7.2298 (Composite B). The difference of 0.8225% on total capitalization (including the deferred tax component) represents a savings of some 44 million dollars per year based on 6/76 data.

Rate of Return data, using earned return on common equity, yields the following rates:

Source	Cost	Amount(000's	Composite B	
Earning on Common	10.18(4)	2,079,582	3.95	4.46
Preferred Stock	7.5	331,307	.46	.52
Long Term Debt	7.24	2,294,023	3.1	3.5
Notes Payable	9.8	44,841	.08	.09
Deferred Taxes	0.0	609,702	0	N/A
•	•		7.59	8.57

- (1) Source Non Consolidated balance sheet Application to the CRTC represerved stock 9/76 p.28.
- (2) Auge. C.S. 0/S 39,873,000, E = 52.16 (non consolidated) Cost: D = 3.72 r = 7.12%
- (3) Using 12/75 data, change to 6/76 not significant
- (4) Six months to 30 June 105,821,000 on 2,079,582,000 X 2(annualized)

As a consequence, it may be claimed that the effect of "deferred teration" is to radice the company's cost of capital by .32 to .98 of 1%; however, there are a number of more complex issues (which are presently under consideration by the cost inquiry committee) affecting the deferred taxes issue, one of these being a potentially close crossover point between ELG and CCA depreciation allowances for certain telecommunications utilities. The examples given serve only to evidence the current effect of deferred taxes on the capital structure of the utility.

Pre-tax Costing

An application of the MM position on capital costing may assist in clarifying in the cost issues further.

The pre-tax cost of equity capital is $\hat{x}_{\rm eq}/(1-\tau)$, since dividends paid to stockholders are not tax deductible; in this case, the cost of debt is $\hat{x}_{\rm d}$ and that of deferred taxes remains $\hat{x}_{\rm dtx}=0$

The pre-tax cost of equity, both common and preferred, assuming a 45% tax rate is derived as follows:

Common	2,079,582	@	.0712	Component	= .	.0614
Preferred	331,307	@	.075	Component	÷	.0103
	2,41 0,889		Weig	hted Cost	=	.0717

The pre-tax cost is equal to .0717/.55 = .1304

Substituting into the composite cost table

Source	Cost	<u>%ofΣ(A)</u>	<u>%ofΣ(B)</u>	$\widehat{x}(A)$	$\widehat{x}(B)$
Equity	.1304	44.98	50.76	.0587	.0662
Debt	.0729	43.64	49.24	.0318	.0359
Deferred Taxes	0.0	11.38	N/A	0.0	N/A
		100	100	9.05%	10.21%

In this example, the spread in costing has been substantially increased through inclusion of tax effects; the advantage is now of 1.16% on total capitalization.

We should now consider the pre-tax gross yield required to meet capital costs without considering deferred taxes since the rate of return as regulated does not provide for a yield on the total infusion of funds, this would amount to having the consumers provide a portion of the capital (11.38% at end of 1975) and, in addition, pay the stockholders a return of \widehat{x} on this contributed capital.

Pre-tax rate of vatura as of December 21st, 1975.

	% Capital Structure	Rate	Weighted Cost
Cost of Debt	49.24	.0729	3.59
Earned Return on Common Equity	50.76	.2118	10.75

Pre-tax rate of return on capital 14.34%

⁽¹⁾ N.I. Applicable to common @ 12/75 = 280,808, common equity = 2,410,889 (000's)

Return = 11.65% and pre-tax cost = 11.65/.55 = 21.18

Leverage Concepts

1. Operating leverage is not a financial concept per se. It concerns the effect of a firm's cost structure on its earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). Operating leverage can be defined as the use of assets with fixed costs (as against assets whose costs vary with output). The greater the proportion of fixed to total costs the greater the use of operating leverage. The "degree of operating leverage" (DO_L) measures the sensitiveity of the relationship between changes in output and EBIT.

output.

For example, using Bell Canada data with operating costs as a proxy for output:

	•		
	<u>1974</u>	<u>1975</u>	_%Δ
Operating Costs (Output)	723.1	837.5	15.82
EBIT(2)	717.	828.5	
Less Depreciation	287.6	338.3	
	429.4	490.2	14.16

(Millions)

 $DO_{1} = 14.16/15.82 = .895$ for 74, 75

The other two concepts - <u>Trading on the equity</u> and <u>Leverage</u> - are financial in nature. These concepts refer generally to the fact that if a firm uses funds with a limited, explicit cost ("levered funds") lower than the return earned with these funds, then the return on common stock equity will be higher than otherwise would be true. Use of levered funds magnifies the effect of a change in return on assets on the return to common-stock equity

When the return on assets is greater than the cost of levered funds, the effect on return to common equity is favourable, the greater the use of levered funds and/or the lower their cost, the larger is the corresponding

⁽¹⁾ From: Dr. John A. Haslem, Arizona Review, Vol. 19, March 1970 pp. 7-11

⁽²⁾ Operating profit before depreciation, interest and taxes

favourable effect on the return to common stockholders. Of course, the opposite holds true if the use of levered funds is unfavourable.

2. Trading in the equity is defined as "the use of fixed (or limited) charge securities in the capitalization of a company, (3) measured by the ratio of (1) the rate of return on -1- the existing common stock equity to -2- the rate of return on the entire capitalization as it would have been if there only common stock outstanding". The concept is also known as "balance sheet leverage" since it involves alternative capital structure proportions.

Algebraically, the before-tax ratio of trading on the equity (ex. preferred stock) is defined as

$$\frac{1}{S} \cdot \frac{Y - F}{F}$$

where S equals the proportion of common stock in the firm's total capitalization (long term funds); Y equals net operating income; and F equals the interest charges on debt

The use of trading on the equity involves a relationship between alternative capital structures and earnings per share (EPS) Analogous to that between alternative cost structures and EBIT.

3. Leverage is defined as "the effect on changes in earnings under conditions where the capitalization is not altered, created by use of fixed (or limited) charge securities in the capitalization of a company measured by the ratio of -1- the rate of growth in earnings available to common equity, to -2- the rate of growth of earnings before interest and taxes. The concept is also called "income-statement laverage" since it involves changes in earnings (with a given capital structure). The degree of financial leverage (DF_T) is algebraically stated (ex preferred stock) as

Y-F

⁽³⁾ Pearson Hunt, "A Proposal for Precise Definitions of 'Trading on the Equity' and 'Leverage'," Journal of Finance, XVI (September 1961), pp.377-386

The use of levered funds means more variability in the EFS associated with changes in EBIT.

Graphical Estimation of Earnings

Steps:

- A) Plot total revenue and total operating expenses for years 1965-1975 against sales volume.
- B) The line representing the relationship between total operating expenses and sales volume (or proxy) is fitted by inspection to the plotted points. If drawn properly (!), the cost line should approximate a line computed by LSQ. While acknowledging the assumptions and limitations of linear cost-revenue analysis, linearity is assumed for its simplicity and probable appropriateness in the short run for relatively small changes in output (volume).
- C) A line representing the \$ difference (EBIT) between the values on the revenue and cost lines is drawn in part (b). This line shows the estimated relationship between EBIT and volume (EBIT line). Part (b) serves a transitory role between the use of operating leverage reflected in part (d) and the financial leverage concepts illustrated in part (c).
- D) The relationship between EBIT and EPS (EPS line) is drawn for the 1975 capital structure as Eq.1 in part (c). This line is drawn from the EPS that would result from any two levels of EBIT⁽⁴⁾. Thus, derivation of Eq.1 allows the effect of changes in total revenue as evidenced by EBIT to be reflected in EPS for the particular capital structure. In other words, for a
- on decreases in total revenue and EBIT can be estimated by movement along Eq. 1.

⁽⁴⁾ EBIT
Interest
Income Taxes
Net Income After Taxes
EPS


- E) The relationship between EBIT and EPS with the 1975 capital structure is shown by Eq. 2 in part (a). Eq.(2) shows that the estimate of Bell's 1975 EPS using the EBIT line with actual revenue is >\$6. The difference between this estimate and the Eq.1 estimate is explained by any change in the capital structure.
- F) The intersection of Eqs. 1 and 2 represents the indifference level of EBIT(=EPS) between the two capital structures. The more highly levered capital structure will cause higher EPS above this level and vice-versa below it.


Briefly, on the EBIT-EPS relationship:


- (1) for a change in EBIT, movement along a line representing the relationship between EBIT and EPS for a particular capital structure illustrates leverage
- (2) with a given EBIT, comparison of EPS among lines representing the EBIT-EPS relationships for various capital structures illustrates "trading on the equity".











EBIT (ii)

650


530

150 100 50

A- A East by 100 m = +1.41

B- A ERIT by 200 m + +2.82

Buse EDIT at 300 m



TOTAL REVENUE - (millions \$) (1965-1975)

10

Effect on EBIT and EPS of changes in Bell's Capital Structure

Assumptions:

- 1) Apparent tax rate of 45%
- 2) Ex. preferred stock
- 3) Capital Structure end of 1975 (Rounded)

Debt 50% 2,375 Equity 50% 2,375 40 M C.S.

4) Preferred equity included in common Calculations used to show alternative results only

<u>Eq.</u>	A-50% Debt 2,375 (40M-C.S.)	B-60% Debt Eq. 1,900 (32M-C.S.)	C-70% Debt Eq.1,425 (24M-C.S.)
	Dt 2,375	Dt 2,850	Dt 3,325
EBIT (incl.depr.)	490.1	490.1	490.1
Interest @ 7.77%	184.65	221.58	258.51
EBT	305.45	268.52	231.59
Taxes	137.45	120.83	104.22
Earnings	168	147.69	127.37
E.P.S.	4.20	4.62	5.31

DATA FOR TOTAL REVENUE-EBIT-EPS GRAPH

Bell Canada (non-consolidated)

\$ Millions

	•					
Years Ended Dec. 31	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Operating Revenues	936.6	1018.8	1125.4	1275.2	1440.1	1665.9
Total Operating Expenses	623.9	691.9	766.4 %	876.0	1010.7	1175.6
INTEREST COSTS	7 7.5	87.2	98.7	113.2	127.6	156.2
ACTUAL E.P.S.		3.22	3.54	3.75	3.86	4.20
C.S. 0/S (000's)	``	36,680	36,808	36,931	37,128	. 38,998

Cost of Depreclasion in Addition to Other Capital Charges .

Gross charge to the consumer per dollar of capital employed

$$2 = \frac{Z}{N(B+E)} = \frac{H + NB_C + NE_{\Gamma}/(1-\tau)}{N(B+E)}$$
 VI.2

this expression may be called the allowed gross return on the capital employed. Substituting r for k (assuming r = k) we have an expression for what the gross return should be

$$\hat{\vec{\beta}} = \frac{(H/N) + B_c + k/(1-\tau)}{B+E}$$
 VI.2(b)

where H is the depreciation on capital per period.

Using V1.2 for Bell Canada for 1975

in VI.2(b)

$$\hat{j} = 338.26\text{M}/38.998\text{M} + (59.9739 * .0668) + (51.5874*.1084) (1)/(1 - .45) 59.9739 + 51.5874$$

°≃ .20480

N(B+E) = 4,350,667,577.

from Eq. 111.1

Using data obtained from the LOM study (1)

EPS @ 31/12/75 = 6.20

H = 338 M p.37

N = 39,763,689 p.45

B = 2160.9M/N = 54.3435 p.40(2)

c = 7.5379% p.41

E = 2030.9 M/N = 51.0748 p.44

r = 10%

p.39

 $\tau = 45\%$

р.46

Using formula VI.2

Z = 338M + (39.7M*54.3*.07) + (39.7m*51.0742*.1) / .55

/39.7m*(54.3+51.07)

= .20758

Z = 870, 140, 624

N(B+E) = 4,191,796,638

Consequently, empirical tests situate the allowed gross return on capital employed at approximately 20%. In other words, the consumer is charged \$20 per annum for each \$1 of capital employed.

Substituting LOM data into VI.2(b) in order to obtain $\hat{3}$, the gross return should be (substituting k = .1084 for r = .09765

$$\hat{\vec{\mathbf{J}}}$$
 = .1958 or \simeq 20% also

At this point, k is slightly larger than r, and in theory, could be increased slightly until r = k, all other conditions being the same.

⁽¹⁾ Loewen, Ondaatie, McCutcheon & Co. Ltd. dated 22/06/76 - Analyst John L. Drolet

⁽²⁾ Appears to be exclusive of notes