CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL

Vol. 22, No. 4, Fall 2022

National Defence Défense nationale

Canada

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"a tribute to the new and old generation fighters of the RCAF"
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ISSN 1492-465X

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CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL

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NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for "translation of original quote", indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.

Corporal Jessey Gagné, Canadian Army Trials and Evaluation Unit (CATEU), Gagetown, Canadian Armed Forces Photo

Captain Pierre-Alexandre Dufour, Master Corporal Adam Hanna, and Master Corporal Trevor Neelin of the SkyHawks (the Canadian Armed Forces parachute team) perform a parachute demonstration at North Peace Regional Airport during the Fort St. John International Airshow in Fort St. John, British Columbia, on 30 July 2022.

This issue marks the beginning of the second year of my appointment as editor-in-chief and the final issue of CMJ's 22nd year. Readers will continue to experience transformation in content, design and delivery of the journal, as well as in the composition of the team that delivers it. Readers can look forward to a redesigned journal and cover, improved digital delivery mechanisms and greater accessibility, new features, and a new brand logo. In accordance with my mandate, all submissions now undergo systematic and rigorous peer review. To reduce the turn-around time from acceptance to publication, we have been receiving great cooperation from authors in limiting their submissions to about 5,000 words so as to be able to increase the number and diversity of contributions in each issue. We thank authors for their patience as we strive for efficiencies while aiming to become even more effective at striving for the highest possible quality for each contribution and issue.

In my continuing efforts as editor to showcase more original Canadian artwork in CMJ, this month's cover is a tribute to the new and old generation fighters of the RCAF. The latest 5th generation F-35 Lightning 2 is depicted coming toward the viewer as symbolic of the eventual entry of the CF-35 into RCAF service. Lightning bolts were added as an homage to the name of the F-35. The CF-18 is depicted banking away into the sunset a symbolic end of the venerable Hornet's service with the RCAF. The original painting is 16 x 20 inches and now privately owned by a retired RCAF Colonel.

The cover's creator is Haligonian Peter Robichaud, who has been painting since he was about twelve years old. Except for various deployments and duties at home and abroad with the Army, has never put the brushes down. Peter's preferred medium is acrylics. He is currently working on subjects for a book series on Canadian Forces jet powered fighter aircraft, is producing commissions for the Air Force, Army, and Navy, and works on other non-aviation related art subjects.

His paintings are defined by a meticulous attention to detail of his subjects, which include aviation, portraiture, animals, various military subjects, and abstract pieces. He has produced numerous commissions for military units and personnel, as well as private individuals throughout the country and internationally. He has had art shows at museums and other locations throughout the Maritimes.

Peter has spent most of his life in one uniform or other – from Beavers and Scouts to Air Cadets, followed by nearly three decades in the Canadian military. He has extensive operational experience with all elements – air, land, sea, and the Special Operations Forces.

Peter's passion for aviation began at a very young age in Chatham, New Brunswick. The nearby air base providing an endless source of inspiration. After flying with gliders, Cessnas, and other military airframes as an Air Cadet, his dream was to pursue a career as an Air Force pilot. Yet, lack of the required perfect vision prevented this. In 1986, a chance conversation led

him to discover, somewhat reluctantly, the world of Army tanks, which became his career until 2004 when he transferred to the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch.

Peter is currently the artist in residence for the 5th Canadian Division, CFB Shearwater Aviation Museum, and The Royal Artillery Park Officer's Mess and is a featured artist at The Halifax Citadel Army Museum.

The CMJ team is also striving to showcase a greater diversity of voices and themes to represent the breadth of ranks, trades, sociodemographics and preoccupations across the Defence Team. This issue features an article on heteronormativity in CAF structures – readers who are unsure about this term will find that this article in particular offers fascinating insights into the organization's institutional culture. It showcases a female junior NCM's lived experience on cultural change within the CAF in a courageously eloquent piece entitled "The View Looking Up: A Junior NCM perspective on Culture Change." It discusses the transition of disabled veterans to the civilian world in "Gender-Based Analysis Plus and Medically Released Canadian Armed Forces Members." In "Entrenched Heteronormativity: Gender and Work-Life balance in the military," von Hlatky and Imre-Millei examine the implications of military life on active members. In light of Madame Arbour's recent Report, advancing equity within CAF and DND leadership is as critical as ever; the insights offered by these articles go a considerable distance in moving the yardsticks, from a host of different lenses and experiences. We hope that they will inspire and encourage greater debate and more submissions on critical issues of the day.

In this issue, reader also find two contributions on the CAF and the public's definition of a heroic leader and warrior, and how these have shifted over the decades. In his article, "Leadership Through Adversity: Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall in Japanese Captivity", Madsen analyzes how Burchill's imprisonment in a Japanese POW camp exemplifies leadership under almost unimaginable strain. In "Is the Term 'Warrior' Suitable for the CAF", a collective of experienced co-authors review how our understanding and use of the term "warrior" has evolved alongside the CAF – and question whether that referent is in the military's best interest.

CMJ's last issue included articles on the war in Ukraine and the Task Force in Latvia. In an ongoing effort to feature timely and relevant pieces on the dynamism of the current threat environment, readers of this issue will find a contribution on "Applying Human Security to Understand the Russian Invasion of Ukraine." The Commentary is co-authored by a team from the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security (DCOE-PS), whose work will henceforth feature more regularly in CMJ. This issue also features a highly à propos review essay on the "Rise of the Chinese Navy." In covering strategic priorities in the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific theatres, in keeping with Canada's national motto – *ad mare usque ad mare* – the lead article in this issue "The Arctic Search and Rescue Region: Frozen in Time" makes a case to reapportion Canada's SAR regions. Long a flyover region at the geostrategic periphery, the polar regions are now hotly contested, and nowhere else are the impacts of climate change greater and more rapid and thus climate and security imperatives more complementary. In June the Minister of National Defence recently announced a down payment on Canada investing in NORAD renewal, in August NATO's Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited Canada's North where he warned about Russian and Chinese designs on the Arctic, the same month that the US launched DOD's first new Regional Studies centre in decades, the Ted Stevens Center for Arctic Security Studies and appointed an ambassador-at-large for the Arctic.

Each issue of CMJ is a labour of love that takes a lot of effort and dedication to put together. I am particularly grateful to CMRSJ Deputy Editor Chantal Lavallée and to Digital Editor Alex Green, who is co-author on this introduction, in recognition of her exceptional efforts in helping to get this particular issue over the line under trying circumstances. Since joining CMJ on Assignment in February, she has consistently stepped up and gone well beyond the call of duty in support of CMJ, and in helping to drive digital transformation. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not thank CMJ's dedicated readers and authors for their input and support over the past year, and over the coming months as CMJ's management, editorial and administrative team position CMJ fit-for-purpose in continuing to excel at meeting its ministerial mandate and, in the process, strive to exceed expectations of CMJ's clients: its loyal readership and stakeholders.

Sgt Matthew McGregor, Canadian Armed Forces

Canadian Rangers, riding snowmobiles, move over the high arctic tundra on a sovereignty patrol near Baring Bay, Nunavut, during Operation NUNALIVUT 2012.

The Arctic Search and Rescue Region: Frozen in Time

by Jean G.R. Leroux

LCol Jean Leroux *is an experienced Royal Canadian Air Force Search and Rescue (SAR) aircrew with over 5000 flying hours on both fixed wing aircraft and SAR helicopters. He is an Aircraft Commander on the CH149 Cormorant helicopter and has conducted over 350 rescue missions across Canada. LCol Leroux experienced the Arctic during multiple operational and training missions in Inuvik, Whitehorse, Yellowknife, Iqaluit, Resolute, Eureka, Alert and multiple communities in between. He also operated in Greenland, Iceland and Alaska. The culmination of four operational postings was the Command of 103 (SAR) Squadron based in Newfoundland and Labrador. Between 2017 and 2021, LCol Leroux traded the flying helmet for a pen and worked in HQ Ottawa as the RCAF project director for all Air Mobility and SAR acquisition projects. He earned a Master's degree in Defence Studies from Royal Military College and a Master's of Leadership and Management from University of Portsmouth, UK. LCol Leroux is now back on the flight line as the Commanding Officer of 442 SAR Sqn.*

Introduction

Sovereignty for a country of Canada's size *is not solved by borders and control but by an established responsibility of its territory*. The Canadian Government has a "moral duty to protect," and upholds this principle through law enforcement bodies, first responders, and in some cases a Search and Rescue (SAR) system. Additionally, the Canadian Government has a legal duty to provide a safety net to all commercial aircraft and marine traffic transiting Canadian territory. To meet this requirement, Canada participates in several international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the Arctic Council. The government has agreed to adopt SAR standards and practices following conventions outlined by these bodies.

Despite the challenging Canadian landscape and climate, SAR in Canada has been an enduring success story, thanks to the professionalism and dedication of the men and women that put their lives on the line every day to save others. The Canadian SAR force is comprised of federal and provincial government agencies and committed volunteers, who together respond to more than 15,000 calls for assistance each year and provide assistance to over 25,000 people annually in the most challenging conditions.[1] Canada's immensity and climate diversity bring unique challenges to the coordination of resources. This challenge drastically escalates as humans move north and away from more populated areas, infrastructure, and SAR resources.

At the highest level, the coordination of SAR is a function of the Federal Government. The Government has divided the Canadian territory into three Search and Rescue Regions (SRRs): Victoria, Trenton, and Halifax to make coordination more manageable. Each of these regions is controlled by dedicated rescue centres called Joint Rescue Coordination Centers (JRCC). The largest of these regions is the Trenton SRR, which includes most of the Arctic and covers more than 10 million km^2, stretching from Toronto up to Alert, the last piece of Canadian land before the Arctic Ocean.[2] In reviewing the current SAR region construct, this article proposes that Trenton SRR be divided in two. This division would produce a fourth region that would cover the Arctic. The government should equip this new region with a dedicated JRCC.

The Federal Government's current SAR regional divisions do not reflect current policies; reorganizing the regions would increase the quality of the coordination, leverage Northern communities' expertise and thus ultimately increase the potential for saving more lives in the Northern region. Hence, based on a paced pragmatic approach, an Arctic Search and Rescue Region (Arctic SRR) is the next logical step in the SAR system evolution.

Resources Allocation

Status Quo?

Global warming and recent increased human activity in the Arctic have made Canada and other northern states focus more intently on this region. This rising interest, fueled by economic opportunities, tourism, and subsequent increased activity levels in the North raised concerns among Canadians. One key concern relates to the country's ability to respond to emergencies in the Northern region. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, states that "the rise in activity will also bring increased safety and security demands related to search and rescue and natural or man-made disasters to which Canada must be ready to respond."[3] The defence policy announced the CAF will "enhance the mobility, reach and footprint of the CAF in Canada's North to support operations, exercises, and the CAF's ability to project force into the region."[4] This footprint, however, is costly and more planes, vessels, and military bases come at a high monetary cost.

The Arctic Area of Operation (AOR) is massive and characterized by a harsh climate, low population density, and a lack of infrastructure. The Canadian Arctic represents 40% of the country's landmass, but only 0.3% of Canadians live in the region. These population statistics represent approximately 110,000 residents located in Nunavut (NU), North West Territories (NWT), and the Yukon (YK), or less than 0.1 people per square km.[5] Most SAR missions occur in the southern portion of the country, where the level of activity and the population are the highest. Correspondingly, SAR resources are concentrated in Southern Canada.

Despite an increase in activities in the Arctic, the number of incidents requiring SAR intervention has remained low. A study by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans conducted between 1996 and 2011 revealed no increase in SAR incidents requiring CAF resources north of the 60th parallel. All in all, the number of SAR incidents in the area represents less than 5% of all incidents prompting a CAF aircraft response. To Colonel Danny Poitras, the Chairman of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) SAR Capability Advisory Group, this low incidence rate justifies allocating resources to the more populous south instead of the Arctic.[6]

"This data also highlights an interesting pattern: increased human activities in the North with the associated infrastructure makes the area less austere and safer."

Similarly, marine activities have also increased but have not resulted in more incidents, most likely thanks to safer transportation and advances in tracking technology and communications. This data also highlights an interesting pattern: increased human activities in the North with the associated infrastructure makes the area less austere and safer.

Another element making the North a safer place despite increased activity articles 131(1) and 132 of the *Canada Shipping Act* (2001). These articles state the obligation for seamen to be good Samaritans if another ship is in distress. Therefore, every additional traffic in the North brings potential distress and potential sources of help. The North-West passage traverse of the luxury cruise ship *Crystal Serenity* in 2016 illustrates this point. While CBC reported that if the *Crystal Serenity* were to become compromised, such a scenario would "break" the current Canadian search and rescue system, facts suggest otherwise.[7] The *Crystal Serenity* was escorted by the British vessel *RSS Ernest Shackleton*, a vessel ready for emergencies, fully equipped with an operating room with medical teams and two onboard helicopters.[8] The *Crystal Serenity* was self-sufficient and had enough SAR and medical capability to assist those who travelled in the same Nordic areas.

The *Crystal Serenity* was one of the first large luxury cruise ships to venture into the Arctic, and its preparation was impeccable. Evidences of that foresight were built through multiple years of research and collaboration with American, Canadian and Danish (Greenlandic) authorities which included route studies, mass evacuation, SAR response exercises and ultimately a full

Cavalier Marc-André Leclerc, 5 CMBG, Canadian Armed Forces

A member of 12e Régiment blindé du Canada stands watch for polar bears at Crystal City Camp during Exercise GUERRIER NORDIQUE in Resolute Bay, Nunavut, February 28, 2019.

mission simulation at the marine training center in St. John's, Newfoundland. Moreover, Crystal Cruises brought onboard four renowned Ice Navigators, survival equipment and rations well above prescribed requirements, oil pollution response gear, and rigid hull inflatable lifeboats[9]. It would be naïve for Canadians and Northern States to assume that all future adventurers and travellers will all have those costly means of assuring self-rescue. The 1989 accident that triggered a Norwegian rescue of more than 1000 people after a solo Russian cruise ship named *Gorky* hit an iceberg off Iceland is a contrasting case study that needs to be considered.

More is Required?

Despite the North seemingly becoming safer as activities in the area become more frequent, there remains concern about the lack of permanent Government SAR facilities in the Arctic. In light of increased activities, the current SAR governance fueled numerous debates and requests for establishing a CAF primary SAR unit in the North.[10]

Due to the extreme cold weather and lack of medical care access, people who find themselves in trouble in the Arctic have fewer chances to survive than those involved in an incident in the South. This scenario is especially true if the emergency is a plane crash or boating incident, both of which require immediate care and shelter from the elements.

Research conducted in the early 2000s made two SAR-related observations. First, the requirement for capability is on the rise. Second, the current CAF/Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)/Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) response times are potentially too slow. They concluded that the mismatch between the available SAR resources and the rising rate of activities in the North might lead to an inappropriate response to emergencies.[11] Additionally, not much progress has been made in the last two decades to improve Canada's response to Northern SAR events.[12] It is problematic, as it creates discrepancies of resource access between Canadians, depending on their geographic location.

Policies

The proposed concept in this article can be divided into two phases: creating an Arctic SAR region followed by establishing a JRCC for that region. The creation element is simply a paper exercise to redefine region boundaries in the policy document called Canadian Air and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (CAMSAR). This initial step, which could be implemented overnight, is a significant statement on the Canadian's vision for Arctic SAR. Phase two, which would equip this newly defined region with a dedicated rescue centre, is more resource-intensive process and has the most significant impact. Not only is creating an Arctic SAR region cost-effective, but it also responds to the Government's espoused policy approach to the Arctic. Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy details how Canada will "show leadership and work with others to demonstrate responsible stewardship and to build a region that is responsive to Canadian interests and values."[13]

Three of the four published pillars are relevant here. The first concerns sovereignty, which again supports that military SAR services in the North are an effective and inexpensive means to ascertain sovereignty on its claimed territory. Second is the promotion of local economic and social development to empower Northerners."[14] An Arctic Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC) in Iqaluit or elsewhere in the North fits into this pillar. It would create a very stable employment platform to which the local indigenous knowledge and skills would be an invaluable asset. Much can be learned from the ingenuity and adaptability of the Northern population. The Arctic policy supports a "creative, dynamic, sustainable Northern economy and improvement of the social well-being of Northerners as essential to unleashing the true potential of Canada's North."[15] Additionally, *Strong, Secure, Engaged* puts at the forefront the importance of the Northern population; it states that "Indigenous communities are at the heart of Canada's North, we will also work to expand and deepen our extensive relationships with these communities, …this will also

include engaging local populations as part of routine operations and exercises."[16]

The last aspect of the Canadian Arctic policy, "Improving and Devolving Governance: Empowering the Peoples of the North," is where the Arctic SAR region shines. This pillar strives for Northerners' greater autonomy, economically and politically speaking.[17] Thus, giving the people of the North their own coordinated SAR network will contribute significantly to their empowerment.

Greaves stated that sovereignty in the Arctic needs to be conceptualized through the lens of its inhabitants, the views of whom need to become the center of policymaking.[18] A Southern Ontario-based organization cannot compete with the depth and the wealth of the local knowledge of the Northern population in their unique environment. A governance devolvement from South to North within the SAR network is an easy and significant step towards advancing the fundamental basis of the Canadian Arctic Foreign Policy, which is the well-being of the Northern population.

An Arctic SAR region is also in line with international conventions. Indeed, the Arctic expands beyond the Canadian territory and is a vast region shared by multiple Arctic states, namely Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, and Sweden. These countries created the Arctic Council in 1996, an intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic indigenous peoples, and other Arctic inhabitants.[19] In May 2011, in Nuuk, Greenland, the Arctic Council signed their first legally binding agreement ever negotiated in the Arctic," which played an "important role…for safe transport and enhancing cooperation in assisting people in distress in the Arctic".[20]

The members of the Arctic Council highlight SAR as a priority and a means of linking the communities together. SAR is a constant concern that requires cooperation between states, allowing them to act as a single unit. The current rescue centre representing Canada on the council table is Trenton. While Trenton is meeting its objectives, a group of Arctic SAR professionals like the proposed Arctic JRCC would be the ideal organization to provide leadership as subject matter experts for the entire international community.

Solution

A permanent establishment of SAR presence in the Arctic would ultimately require a similar footprint to bases located in the lower latitudes. This approach would include planes and infrastructure dedicated to Northern SAR responses. The optimum composition of that arsenal has to be researched to ensure they meet the operational environment of the Arctic. Research on the material challenge could consider UAVs and traditional SAR assets. While much work needs to be done on the procurement endeavour and site selections, using resources from existing SAR bases is the reality for the foreseeable future. In practical terms, the management and coordination of a SAR region do not necessitate instant new military or Coast Guard equipment. An Arctic JRCC would have access to Southern resources as required, as is the case for current coordination by Trenton SRR for SAR incidents in the North. Current JRCC teams leverage the most appropriate assets for the task. For example, if a missing mariner case occurs in Resolute Bay, a CC130H Hercules from Trenton and a CH149 Cormorant from Gander could be launched. This solution is all about having the right asset at the right time. Having a permanent SAR base and air assets in the Arctic would bring more effectiveness to the response. This article's posits the concept of an Arctic SAR region with Northern management as an opportunity to establish and expand precise requirements to expand governmental assets and ultimately set an appropriate military/Coast Guard SAR base in the Arctic.



Source: National Search and Rescue Secretariat - *Quadrennial SAR Review*

Figure 1: Current Canadian SAR regions allocation and associated JRCCs.



Source: Author

Figure 2: Proposed Arctic SAR region boundary

The current three SAR regions with their associated rescue centres are depicted in Figure 1.



Source: Author

Figure 3: Proposed construct for an Arctic Joint Rescue Coordination Center

The proposed Arctic SAR region would divide the Trenton SRR with the current military defined Northern Area of Operation, as depicted in Figure 3.

There are two distinct elements of SAR regional governance; a Command and Control (C2) structure with associated staff and Commander and an actual Rescue Center. For example, JRCC Trenton is located in Trenton, Ontario, while the SAR region C2 is embedded within 1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg. The two elements are complementary but do not have to be co-located. Additional research needs to be done to establish the appropriate home for Arctic C2 and JRCC. However, an existing military C2 construct in the North could be leveraged to reduce the required personnel and minimize cost. The current Northern defence governance is composed of the Joint Task Force North (JTF(N)), the military detachment in Yellowknife that oversees all defence operations north of the 60th parallel. Their mission is to "exercise sovereignty and contribute to safety, security and defence in the Canadian North."[21] They have the framework and the command structure to assume similar responsibilities that other SAR regions enjoy. This existing military command structure can absorb the SAR command structure required for an additional region without much increase in personnel. [22]

Complementary to the C2 but arguably the most significant commitment financially is the creation of an Arctic Joint Rescue Coordination Center (JRCC), which would be a physical place of duty to enable the coordination of SAR cases in this new region. An ideal location for an Arctic JRCC would be Iqaluit in Nunavut, and Nunavut is the Northern region with the highest rates of SAR incidents. Furthermore, most future Arctic activities would be based on the sea traffic enabled by the increasingly accessible North-West Passage and the increase of Northern adventurers on Elsmere Island, located near Iqaluit.

The traditional composition of a JRCC is a combination of RCAF staff who ultimately deal with aeronautical emergencies and the Canadian Coast Guard who coordinate maritime emergency responses. The proposed Arctic JRCC suggests an innovation that would include other players that coordinate ground SAR to truly make a 911-type centre for all incidents in the Arctic, whether air-, marine-, or land-based. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is the lead agency for ground SAR in the North. The proposed Arctic JRCC would have a seat in the ops room for the RCMP to work side by side with RCAF and CCG staff.

One of the best resources in the Canadian North is the Canadian Rangers, a sub-component of the CAF Reserve and the military's eyes and ears in the North. They provide patrols and detachments for national security and public safety missions in sparsely settled northern, coastal, and isolated areas of Canada.[23] They are recognized for their flexibility, cost-effectiveness, cultural inclusivity, and community outreach. These characteristics make the Rangers a vital defence asset in the North.[24] An effective and efficient way to develop SAR capability in the North would be to integrate the Rangers into the proposed Arctic JRCC. Incorporating Indigenous science and traditional knowledge into decision-making would allow for a better response to emergencies. This inclusion aligns with the March 2016 Canada-U.S. joint statement on Arctic leadership, which commits to harnessing the knowledge and capabilities of the North for Arctic decision-making.[25]

Another organization that needs attention is the Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of Canada (SARVAC). The association represents 300 teams and 12,000 volunteers across Canada, and SARVAC is an active player for Ground SAR in Canada, including the North. SARVAC is a registered not-for-profit and educational organization that supports, coordinates, develops, informs, promotes and implements approved search and rescue emergency responses within the underlying principle of saving lives.[26] This group of trained volunteers has 34 SAR teams above the 60th parallel, giving them a wealth of Arctic experience.[27] SARVAC also has a place on the proposed Arctic JRCC. Figure 4 represents the concept of an Arctic JRCC.

To succeed, a new SAR region in the Arctic has to present eight key elements:

1) **Sovereignty:** taking ownership of our environment.
2) **Local knowledge:** using the unique skillset of the communities to save lives.
3) **Historical evolution:** logical evolution with the increase of Arctic activities.
4) **Non-resource-based:** use of assets of main Southern bases.
5) **Empower First Nations:** integrating communities in SAR coordination.
6) **Arctic SAR council participation:** empower the people of the North to become leaders.

7) **Inclusion:** CAF, CCG, RCMP, SARVAC, and Rangers in the JRCC team for synchronized coordination of all SAR incidents in the North under one roof, as depicted in figure 3.
8) **Economics:** this solution requires minimal capital spending.

Conclusion

SAR is not a new concept; it is an everlasting capability requirement. If the current statistics hold, there will be 6,000 lives in danger in the Canadian Arctic over the next 50 years that will require coordinated efforts, and arguably this number will be much more significant as Northern activities increase.[28] Logical and gradual changes such as an Arctic SRR will make Canada successful at fostering lasting change in the Arctic.

Canada's commitment to Northern economic and social development includes a deep respect for indigenous traditional knowledge, work, and cultural activities. Through its current Arctic foreign policy, the Government is also sending a clear message that Canada controls its Arctic lands and waters and takes its stewardship role and responsibilities very seriously.[29] In the future, Canada needs to promote a better understanding of the North in all of its aspects and better express its commitment to the Arctic.

Creating an Arctic SRR through the coordination of Arctic assets is a crucial step to empower Northerners. The strength of this proposal is the ability to plug and play into the current system, without having to change in the current SAR governance. This solution adds value and improves the system at minimal cost.

NOTES

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18 Will Greaves is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Victoria. His research examines global security theory and politics concerning climate change, resource extraction, and Indigenous peoples; Canadian foreign policy and Canada-US relations; and the politics of the circumpolar Arctic. Wilfrid Greaves. "Re-thinking Sovereignty and arctic security" Last access 23 December 2016. https://www.opencanada.org/features/re-thinking-sovereignty-and-security-arctic/
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Corporal Parker Salustro, Canadian Armed Forces

A CH-149 Cormorant helicopter and its crew from 442 Search and Rescue Squadron provide support for Operation LENTUS, evacuating people out of Merritt, British Columbia (BC), after heavy rain triggered mudslides along a BC highway on 15 November 2021

Search and Rescue Blues

by Martin Shadwick

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In December of 2016 and May of 2018, respectively, the Trudeau government announced its decisions to replace the long-serving and austerely-equipped CC-115 Buffalo and legacy CC-130H Hercules search and rescue aircraft with 16 sensor and data management system-rich Airbus (originally CASA) CC-295s and to upgrade and life-extend the Leonardo (previously AgustaWestland) CH-149 Cormorant and augment the existing CH-149 fleet with additional helicopters. Although the Winter 2018 edition of this column (*Canadian Military Journal,* Vol. 19, No. 1) expressed concern over a variety of issues—including but not confined to the repeated delays in both the Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR) and Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade (CMLU) projects, the lower speed and endurance of the CC-295 compared to the legacy SAR CC-130H and whether "the available funds will stretch sufficiently to provide a truly comprehensive and integrated upgrade for the Cormorant" and a "meaningful increase in fleet size"—it expressed the hope that the decisions would herald "a long-awaited rejuvenation and renewal for a vital component" of the Canadian search and rescue system. In retrospect, a more nuanced assessment would have been prudent given the very worrisome and intensely frustrating array of challenges—admittedly different types of challenges—that now beset the CC-295 and the Cormorant upgrade initiatives.

In a scathing analysis in *The Hill Times* of 30 May 2022, for example, Richard Shimooka, a Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, criticized successive governments, the loosening of operational requirements to create competition—thereby "allowing the C-295 to compete and, thus, blunting the...advantages" of the air force's long-assumed preference, Alenia's C-27J Spartan—and the perceived technical and operational deficiencies of the CC-295. Since winning the competition, he argued, "the C-295 has struggled to meet its promised performance. Modifications increased the aircraft's weight and it is now underpowered for its missions." Along "with a number of other major deficiencies, such as...operation in icing, paradrop limitations and problematic centre of gravity" this "severely impacts the aircraft's ability to operate effectively, and even safely." He also argued that the cabin layout "posed difficulties for SAR technicians to move around." Shimooka concluded that "the recent announcement to push back

the [aircraft's] Initial Operational Capability...is a clear punt by [the Trudeau] government to offload these problems until a later date. While some of the deficiencies are fixable (e.g., avionics), the problems around weight, power and icing capabilities are very likely not, as they are fundamental to the aircraft's design. There is a significant chance that Canada will need to scrap the entire $2.9 billion purchase, and seek a different outcome." Similar concerns were voiced during his 7 June 2022 testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Indigenous and Northern Affairs.

The reservations enumerated by Richard Shimooka and others have inevitably raised the ire of CC-295 advocates who see them as unfair or exaggerated and the critics disinclined to acknowledge either the merits of the Canadian SAR-specific modifications to the baseline C-295 or the shortcomings of would-be alternatives (e.g., the lack of a missionized C-27J). They point, in particular, to a very sophisticated mission avionics suite that offers a quantum leap over the legacy CC-130H Hercules and Buffalo, extremely high levels of availability and serviceability, an outstandingly reliable powerplant and the ready availability of spares (in part a reflection of a substantial customer base and a lengthy and on-going production run). They note that some perceived problems have already been addressed (a point also made in a variety of venues by government officials), reject suggestions that the aircraft is underpowered (it is, admittedly, slower than the CC-130H Hercules but faster than the now-retired Buffalo) and posit that the so-called centre of gravity "issue" has been misunderstood and misinterpreted (a point also made by a senior government official in 22 March 2022 testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates). The CC-295's defenders are no happier about the slippage in Initial Operational Capability (IOC) and Full Operational Capability (FOC) than its detractors, but stress that the pandemic was a very significant factor. It is possible, too, that some of the slippage can be attributed to the shortages of military aircrew and technicians—a systemic problem not confined to the SAR world—and that a perceived lack of DND/CF focus on the project also had negative consequences.

The debate between the CC-295's detractors and defenders has become distressingly polarized but it nevertheless broaches a host of important questions and dilemmas. If the fully modified Kingfisher is ultimately deemed satisfactory for the Canadian SAR operating environment, albeit with serious slippage in the IOC and FOC, it will vindicate the aircraft's governmental (see, for example, the laudatory comments in Hansard [5 April 2022] by Kevin Lamoureux, the ex-air force Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons about the "amazing" and "incredible" Kingfisher) and non-governmental supporters and confound its critics. If, on the other hand, some notable perceived weaknesses defy correction, then the implications—be they operational, political, military, bureaucratic, legal, financial or industrial in nature—could prove profound. Canada would require both modified interim arrangements for primary fixed-wing SAR and a search for a replacement type (or types, if a hybrid fixed-wing SAR fleet was deemed the superior option). Ottawa also would need to determine the fate of the already-delivered Kingfishers. If retained on the Canadian inventory, it might find a viable niche as a ramp-equipped, multi-purpose transport with a useful—albeit not Aurora-like—Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Others might seek to recast the Kingfisher as the more modest end of a two-type fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft fleet with the other aircraft carrying the bulk of the primary SAR load. The political fallout from a jettisoned or recast fleet would be significant and undoubtedly extend well beyond the Kingfisher. The Opposition and political pundits would be quick to remind Canadians that an earlier Liberal government, that of Jean Chretien, also experienced challenges and embarrassments with SAR (i.e., cancelling the plans of the Brian Mulroney and Kim Campbell governments for a fleet of AgustaWestland EH101s, absorbing a cancellation penalty and then ultimately purchasing a somewhat more austere SAR member of the same EH101/AW101 family). To compound the conundrum with a third scenario, what would happen if the fully modified Kingfisher was deemed workable but not optimal?

The technical, operational, certification and qualification issues which confront the Kingfisher differ in a variety of important respects from those which confront the Cormorant. The core CMLU issues are rooted in issues of cost and affordability but if the resolution of those issues requires a more austere upgrade and reducing or eliminating the proposed augmentation of the

Aviator Justine Dusablon, Valcartier Imaging Services

Members of the 3rd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment release cargo from a CC-130J Hercules aircraft during Exercise PÉGASE NORDIQUE in the training area of CFB Valcartier in Québec, Québec, February 14, 2018

Cpl Louis Gagné, Canadian Armed Forces

The CC-295, the newest fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft in the Royal Canadian Air Force arrives at 3 Wing Bagotville on September 16, 2020

Cormorant fleet, there will be adverse consequences not only for the operational effectiveness of the Cormorant but, more broadly, for the overall credibility of the Canadian search and rescue system. Complete failure to reach a deal with Leonardo would have an even wider array of implications. In 22 March 2022 testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates, Simon Page—the Assistant Deputy Minister, Defence and Marine Procurement, Department of Public Works and Government Services—acknowledged that the discussions between Ottawa and Leonardo "have not been easy."

The latest chapter in the FWSAR saga was sparked on 4 May 2022 when the federal government announced that "as the [CC-295] project has progressed, we've gained a better understanding of the complex work needed to meet all the requirements necessary for the CC-295 to conduct its search and rescue missions. This includes significant design and development, integration of new capabilities, testing, qualification and certification, as well as work required to deliver the necessary technical publications, courseware and support systems." Consequently, and given "the added impacts of COVID-19", the Initial Operational Capability target date for the aircraft would be shifted from Summer 2022 to Fiscal Year 2025-2026 and its Full Operational Capability from Summer 2024 to Fiscal Year 2029-2030. This represented a very substantial further delay from the schedule envisaged when the CC-295 was selected in 2016 (i.e., mid-2020 for the IOC and 2022 for the FOC). Astonishingly, the latest FOC, if realized, would be more than a quarter of a century removed from Prime Minister Paul Martin's 14 April 2004 speech at CFB Gagetown announcing that the Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue project would be fast-tracked.

A DND backgrounder of 4 May 2022 attributed the "extended timelines" to a combination of certification and qualification, technical and training maturity issues. In order "to meet the Canadian requirements for search and rescue and as part of their initial proposal, for example, Airbus included over 30 design changes to the base [C-295] model for the CC-295 Kingfisher." These changes to meet Canadian mandatory or rated requirements, reported Chris Thatcher of *Skies* magazine (19 May 2022) ranged from a "cockpit roof hatch to allow the crew quick egress" in the event of a water ditching to a heads-up display in the cockpit to "enclosing the main landing gear tires that protrude from the underbelly of a C-295 during flight" in a bid to enhance range and endurance. Such changes, noted the backgrounder, "have resulted in a requirement for additional certifications", adding that "the volume and sequencing of work by Airbus and by the CAF requires more time and cannot be expedited." In addition, "Airbus chose to develop and integrate new capabilities. In the process of the development, unforeseen technical challenges have been identified that are taking Airbus and its sub-contractors time to resolve." The testing of the avionics associated with the glass cockpit proposed by Airbus, for example, "uncovered problems with the Crew Annunciation System, which monitors aircraft systems and provides alerts," noted Thatcher. Such deficiencies, reported Ottawa, "must be corrected through software and/or hardware development and updates which takes time and follows a rigorous testing and certification process." Finally, "for any new capability, aircraft operating instructions and related training materials must be developed that are reflective of the final configuration. Delays with the qualification of capabilities and the resolution of technical issues are, therefore, in turn, impacting the development of the operating instructions and courseware." Although not explicitly referenced in the 4 May 2022 statement or backgrounder—but confirmed in a variety of venues by DND officials—other issues have included defining "a safe envelope" for search and rescue technicians exiting via the rear ramp—since resolved but, notes Thatcher, "the test teams are still finalizing procedures to retrieve a jumper whose parachute gets snagged behind the airplane" and managing the Kingfisher's centre of gravity.

As an interim measure to compensate the Victoria search and rescue region for the retirement of the CC-115 Buffalo and the delay in the IOC of the Kingfisher, a detachment of two CC-130H Hercules from 435 Transport and Rescue Squadron has been redeployed from CFB Winnipeg to CFB Comox—thereby producing a decidedly far-flung squadron with SAR responsibilities at two bases and a reduced capability to meet its air-to-air refueling and air transport mandates. In a statement to *Skies*, the RCAF reported that it is "also exploring the option of using part of the

CC-130J fleet to augment the CC-130H in the SAR role." The implications for the RCAF of the significantly delayed service entry of the Kingfisher, however, go well beyond the shuffling and potential reassigning of aircraft. They will "disrupt" the training schedules and posting cycles of "SAR pilots and maintenance technicians preparing to transition to the new aircraft from the legacy CC-115 Buffalo and CC-130H Hercules" notes Thatcher, potentially foster morale and personnel retention challenges, and generate a massive test and evaluation workload.

The 4 May 2022 statement and backgrounder have helped to rekindle debates that in some cases extend back to the earliest days of the Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue aircraft project. These include but are not confined to the procurement process and subsequent changes to that process, the perceived air force bias toward the Alenia C-27J, the ramifications of the determined quest by some actors for Canadian industrial benefits (e.g., the Pratt and Whitney Canada powerplants of the C-295), the relative merits for search and rescue in the Canadian operating environment of the C-295, the C-27J and other contenders, potentially revised basing options and approaches for Canada's fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft (particularly in the north and near north) and whether due consideration was given to "the cost and potential benefits of providing *part* (emphasis added) of the fixed-wing search and rescue solution through contracted support for elements such as aircraft, aircrew, and maintenance" (a 2010 National Research Council study commissioned by the Department of Public Works and Government Services urged Ottawa to conduct an "in-depth analysis" of this option). Indeed, the myriad range of issues raised by the particularly blunt NRC study could potentially prove instructive today as one seeks to fully understand the circumstances and decisions that led to such serious and implication-laden delays in the IOC and FOC of the CC-295. Fundamentally, in the case of the CC-295, was there a failure—by multiple parties and actors—to appreciate fully the extent, the scope and the complexity of the design changes necessary to meet Canadian search and rescue requirements and of the amount of time and energy that would be required—again, by multiple actors—to fully address those issues? Ottawa's statement of 4 May 2022 argues that "while the delay is unfortunate, these types of issues are not unusual given the complexity of the capability being developed." Although such downplaying of problems is not unexpected in a statement of that type, and is to some degree accurate, it is uncomfortably close to claiming that these are mere teething problems.

"in the case of the CC-295, was there a failure—by multiple parties and actors—to appreciate fully the extent, the scope and the complexity of the design changes necessary to meet Canadian search and rescue requirements and of the amount of time and energy that would be required—again, by multiple actors—to fully address those issues?"

The rotary-wing component has encountered its own trials and tribulations since the Trudeau government announced its decision to pursue a Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade (CMLU) project via a "non-competitive process" with the Original Equipment Manufacturer, Leonardo, in 2018. Based on the impressive Royal Norwegian Air Force AW101-612 variant of the AW101, the CMLU sought to "replace or upgrade current and projected obsolete systems on the Cormorant fleet", to enhance the Cormorant fleet with new SAR capabilities, to augment the current fleet size of 14 aircraft—in part to permit the reintroduction of the Cormorant to CFB Trenton (which very briefly operated the type early in its career)—and to procure a Rotary-Wing Search and Rescue Simulator. In a follow-on statement, a DND spokesperson noted that the CMLU "will extend rotary-wing SAR services to at least 2040" by upgrading the existing helicopters and by augmenting the current fleet with *up to seven* (emphasis added) additional helicopters. A Leonardo press release of 29 May 2018 posited, ironically as events transpired, that the undertaking would "provide a very low risk solution" to Canada's future requirements for rotary-wing search and rescue.

Minister of National Defence Harjit S. Sajjan confirmed in August 2019 that the Cormorant fleet would be upgraded "to extend its life to at least 2042" but noted, in an apparent downward shift, that the existing fleet would be bolstered by "at least two additional helicopters." A 2019 DND document mapped out a very aggressive timeline for the CMLU, including the first delivery of an upgraded Cormorant by 2022 and initial operational capability in 2024. Key elements of the CMLU included upgraded flight management, communications, navigation and safety capabilities, the introduction of modern SAR mission sensors, upgraded engines, maintainability and reliability enhancements, an extended service life, improved in-cabin wireless communications and the return of the Cormorant to CFB Trenton.

Unfortunately—or perhaps inevitably given the pitfalls and vagaries of defence procurement in Canada—negotiations for the Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade project were paused in July of 2021 following Ottawa's determination that Leonardo "could not do the work at a cost that would respect the project's overall budget." DND noted that the Cormorant had been in service for almost two decades and that consequently some "of the onboard systems are...becoming obsolete and increasingly difficult to support including engines. Additionally, the helicopter does not have the required avionics to meet new regulatory standards." The Department was therefore "working to see what can be done to extend the life" of its Cormorant fleet. One "option is a life-extension of the existing [fourteen] helicopters to meet regulatory requirements and replace obsolete parts. This would extend the life of the aircraft and leverage its existing capabilities." To that end, "intermediate steps are currently being taken within the in-service support program to ensure the helicopter is viable until an upgrade program can be put in place." The DND statement added that replacing the CH-146 Griffon in the SAR role at CFB Trenton "is still a consideration." Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel) Troy Crosby noted, additionally, that DND and the RCAF "will now examine what other options could be available for the [Cormorant] helicopters. First and foremost, we

will ensure the helicopters remain capable and available. But the mid-life upgrade project had sought to do more than that and we'll have to look at what we can achieve through various options."

In a Twitter statement of 13 June 2022, Leonardo reiterated that it "remains fully engaged with the Canadian Government in relation to the upgrade" of its CH-149 Cormorant search and rescue fleet. The "Cormorant Mid-Life Upgrade (CMLU) Project will address obsolescence issues, ensure compliance with emerging airspace requirements, extend the life expectancy of the fleet to 2042+ and *provide the option* [emphasis added] to augment the fleet, enabling the return of Cormorant helicopters" to the main operating base at CFB Trenton. Somewhat curiously given the lack of explicit references to enhancements and modifications unrelated to obsolescence issues and emerging airspace requirements, the statement posited that "the CMLU Project will transition Canada's [AW101/CH-149 Cormorant] SAR helicopter fleet to the latest standard currently being delivered for SAR in Norway and arguably the best search and rescue helicopter in the world."

Precisely where the post-pause CMLU discussions between Ottawa and Leonardo will lead remained unclear at the time of writing. Sufficient additional funding to pursue CMLU as originally envisaged appears unlikely even if Ottawa is now at least modestly more amenable to increased defence spending. At the very least, though, Canada must pursue—and pursue expeditiously given the buffeting of the original CMLU timelines—the life-extension of the existing Cormorant fleet and address a pressing range of obsolescence, serviceability and regulatory issues. In the absence of additional funding for CMLU, a comprehensive and fully integrated AW101-612-inspired mission avionics suite would be a non-starter but some useful enhancements, albeit non-integrated or only semi-integrated and less advanced, should be pursued. Thoughtful observers, though, would be left to ponder how Norway, but not Canada, can afford "arguably the best search and rescue helicopter in the world."

A credible augmentation of the Cormorant fleet—partly to replace the ill-suited CH-146 Griffons at CFB Trenton, partly to cover for Cormorants undergoing CMLU upgrades and partly to provide a modest number of maintenance "floaters" and a hedge against future attrition—remains extremely important but also extremely problematic. Indeed, the accident involving Cormorant 149903 at CFB Gander on 10 March 2022—thereby sustaining "very serious" Category B damage—has at the very least temporarily reduced the active Cormorant fleet to only thirteen aircraft and further underscored a fleet size dilemma extending back to the days of the CH-113/CH-113A Labrador. A "determination has not yet been made as to whether it is feasible to return [Cormorant 149903] to active service. This assessment is ongoing." Another Cormorant, of course, was lost in a fatal crash on 13 July 2006. Instead of "at least two additional aircraft", the fleet needs to be reinforced by at least three—and preferably four or even five—additional Cormorants. A more modest number would suffice if Ottawa opted to forego replacing the Griffons at CFB Trenton with the Cormorant, but the Griffon, even if upgraded under the broader Griffon Limited Life Extension (GLLE) project and additionally provided with some SAR-specific enhancements, is no Cormorant. A potential alternative, if one is prepared to embrace niche privatization, would be to privatize the SAR operation in Gander—with an appropriate helicopter type to be determined—and shift its Cormorants to CFB Trenton as Griffon replacements. If so, it could prove useful to examine the hybrid civilian and military crewing model originally envisaged when the Royal Air Force exited the primary SAR role.

While the various relevant parties attend to the woes of the Kingfisher and the CMLU, we would do well to remember, as this column has stressed on multiple occasions (see, for example, *Canadian Military Journal*, Winter 2018, Vol. 19, No. 1), that "broader issues of SAR policy and SAR governance remain to be tackled—and tackled on a holistic, priority basis." One could posit that we still lack "an up-to-date, integrated and comprehensive national search and rescue policy", that SAR in Canada suffers from a lack of accountability, that there remains a lack of coordination between the strategic level and the operational components of the national SAR system, that meaningful levels of service remain ill-defined or non-existent, that the concept of "lead minister" for search and rescue has effectively disappeared and that the de facto loss of the National Search and Rescue Secretariat has had deleterious consequences. Any independent review and analysis of the problems encountered by the Kingfisher and CMLU projects should not fail to take such broader weaknesses and defects into account.

"Canada must pursue the life-extension of the existing Cormorant fleet and address a pressing range of obsolescence, serviceability and regulatory issues"

Problems with the Kingfisher and the Cormorant also have the potential—the conceivably very messy and controversial potential—to energize anew the decades-old debate over stripping primary fixed-wing and rotary-wing SAR from DND and the Canadian Forces and transferring it to the private sector by emboldening those who seek, wisely or unwisely, full privatization. It is also conceivable but distressing that some heretofore staunch supporters of the military's retention of primary SAR have now become so frustrated with SAR equipment deficiencies, the delays in fielding the FWSAR aircraft and upgraded (and augmented) Cormorants, the polarized debates and questionable decision-making—not to mention frustration with broader issues of Canadian national SAR policy and governance—that they may now be more willing to ponder, if not yet full privatization, at least the increased niche privatization of SAR in Canada. Whether this would do search and rescue, the military or the country—we far too readily forget that such issues demand a broad and genuinely holistic national perspective—any favours remains very far from clear. To what extent a privatized approach to search and rescue could have avoided or reduced the problems associated with the Kingfisher and the Cormorant upgrade is debatable, but even a *perception* that it could have might prove challenging to dislodge.

CMJ

Corporal Parker Salustro, Canadian Armed Forces

The CAF Journey poster.

Entrenched Heteronormativity: Gender and Work-Life balance in the Military

by Stéfanie von Hlatky and Bibi Imre-Millei

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Acknowledgements: The authors would like to acknowledge the following undergraduate and graduate researchers at the Centre for International and Defence Policy who assisted in the coding of the data and the editing of the article: Anna McApline, Heni Pupco, Kaiya Jarvis, Melika Khajeh-Hosseiny, and Wesley Nicol. We would also like to acknowledge the graduate research assistants at the Centre for International and Defence Policy who assisted with the interviews for this project: Meaghan Shoemaker, Thomas Hughes, Lindsay Coombs, Charlotte Duval-Lantoine, and Charlotte Blatt.

Funding Statement: This research project is supported by funding from the Early Research Award, Ministry of Research and Innovation, Government of Ontario (grant # ER14-10-220) and was conducted at the Gender Lab, a research group within the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen's University. Ethics approval was sought and obtained from the Queen's University General Research Ethics Board (GREB TRAQ #6020537).

Introduction

The military has acquired a reputation for being a greedy institution because it requires the full dedication of its members.[1] This idea is best exemplified by the principle of unlimited liability but also manifests itself through the daily experiences of military life. Yet, there are other demands on military personnel that come from their personal circumstances, demands that are not always easy to reconcile with a military career. A focus group participant summed it up dryly in the context of this study: 'Well we're in the military, we never had a life. We just work.' In carrying out our research on recruitment and retention in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), we have developed a more granular understanding of the gendered dynamics that underlie work-life considerations in the military. Given the CAF's current focus on reconstitution, driven by culture change and the aftershocks of COVID, initiatives to promote the well-being and professional satisfaction of members should be a priority. A gender-based analysis of military experiences is all the more important given that the CAF has set specific recruitment targets for women.[2]

Western armed forces, including Canada's, have taken steps to improve personnel well-being and work-life balance, often prioritizing mental health initiatives. The CAF is implementing some promising programs, including an 'Adaptive Career Path' approach, and a Defence Team Total Health and Wellness Strategy to better coordinate all health and wellness services, but as Peckham notes,[3] they are not always widely known about or utilized.[4,5] The military has also experienced demographic changes over time and now includes more women and more dual-service couples, who we argue face unique challenges when it comes to balancing the demands of military life with caring responsibilities. As of 2016, 65% of married CAF women in the CAF were in a dual-service couple, compared to 10% of men.[6]

The data we present in this article, which features 52 Canadian active-duty and veteran men and women, reveal work-life balance to be a major concern, even prompting serving members to consider ending their military career because of perceived work-life conflict. Given the significance of work-life balance considerations for recruitment, personnel wellbeing and retention, our research suggests more attention should be paid to helping service-members better manage professional and personal demands on their time. We argue that the military still largely operates from a heteronormative construct which assumes that their mostly male organization can rely on military spouses (mostly wives) to manage the situation at home. Building on insights from Lane,[7,8] Spanner,[9] and Wegner,[10] we bring original data to illustrate work-life balance conflict in the military, with the aim of informing innovative policy solutions to better support CAF members.

"career prioritization has become more of a challenge over time within the military, with evolving gender roles."

This article turns first to the literature on work-life balance within and outside of the military, noting in particular how work-life balance relates to heteronormativity and gendered expectations. After reviewing work life balance in conjunction with CAF policies, this article covers our methods and limitations. We then introduce our own data, from focus groups conducted with Canadian service-members and veterans in Ontario. Finally, we offer some strategies and recommendations to improve the wellbeing of military members, focusing on ways to break down heteronormativity.

Insights from the Literature

Day-to-day responsibilities, including family obligations, are difficult to balance with military service, that much is not contested in the literature.[6] While work-life challenges are felt acutely by military families, they are also felt more broadly within the armed forces.[11] As one Canadian study notes, all participants (men who were parents in this case) acknowledged that work-life balance is a constant struggle.[12] Furthermore, some studies point to work-life balance concerns as a primary reason for service-members releasing from the military.[13] Our research contributes to the literature in showing that perceptions of organisational support are tied to job satisfaction and retention. Therefore, the CAF could improve military personnel policies by paying closer attention to how family life is negatively impacted by frequent relocation and deployment of service-members and better recognizing that evolving gender roles translate into more demanding work-life expectations.

The Elusive Work-Life Balance

In our study, we identify heteromativity as a driver of work-life balance strain. Our conceptualization of heteronormativity pulls from Rubin's[14,15] who views patriarchy as the primary organising principle for sex and gender and her "sex/gender system" which posits the mutual construction of heterosexual and cisgender privilege. Applying Rich's[16] idea of "compulsory heterosexuality", we see military heteronormatity as the normalized and entrenched nature of heterosexuality and cisgender identities within the organisational culture, which relies on and perpetuates the ideals of Western nuclear family models. These family models continue to hold sway despite women being encouraged to work, creating the so-called double burden on women's lives as both financial providers and providers of unpaid care work in the home.

For our conceptualization of work-life balance, we use Odle-Dusseau, Britt, and Bobko's definition, who highlight "the extent to which effectiveness and satisfaction in work and family roles are compatible with an individual's life values at a given point in time" (p. 332). We also draw from Eichler and Albanese's definition of housework to more fully represent how men and women in the CAF balance their responsibilities as a CAF member with other responsibility and activities: "household work consists of the sum of all physical, mental, emotional and spiritual tasks that are performed for one's own or someone else's household and that maintain the daily life of those one has responsibility for" (p. 248). As Thompson and Walker have argued, we must think of work as broader than paid activities to include unpaid labour in the home. They have found that women spend more time shifting between paid and unpaid family work than men, and that women are more likely to restrict time doing paid work to care for family. Thompson and Walker, as well as Moen and Yu, suggest that the term work-life balance itself is gendered, whereas women are expected to do the balancing and men the working. The authors found that women perceive their husband's jobs as more important than their own, occupy jobs with less autonomy and high demands, and report higher levels of stress.

In the Canadian context, being a military spouse makes it difficult to develop and maintain a career and social life, as a result of frequent moves.[39] Thus, the spouse that is serving and their career becomes the priority in the household.[39] For dual-service couples (such as those in our sample), there is further strain, as one military career might be prioritized over the other. We show career prioritization has become more of a challenge over time within the military, with evolving gender roles. Both spouses expecting to be gainfully employed makes assigning postings more complicated.[17]

Deployment undoubtedly strains work-life balance, making it even harder to reconcile family responsibilities with the professional demands of the military.[19] Interviews conducted by Robertson[12] and Black show parents anxieties about reintegrating into family life after deployment, as supported in the broader literature.[19,18] Family reintegration has its own separate literature from work-life balance, but also deeply affects how caring responsibilities are distributed in the home.

The extent to which family-friendly policies and supervisor support can improve work-life balance is made clear in the literature.[19, 20, 18, 21] Dupré and Day[22] found that positive perceptions of organizational support increased job satisfaction in the US, mitigating turnover intentions of service-members.[23] Similarly, Sachau et al.[24] found that organizational support had the greatest positive impact on retention of service-members. Bourg and Segal[25] found that US Army policies that are responsive to family needs not only increase the commitment of male soldiers towards the military directly, but show how more positive spousal attitudes matter for job satisfaction.

Immediate supervisors are also a key source of organizational support, with Matsch et al.[26] finding supervisors offered greater support than the organisation as a whole. Building on supervisor support and investing in the training of supervisors is offered as a promising avenue to create a healthier military workplace. In a review of women from 135 organizations Greenberg and Laudry noted that flexibility was a key benefit that women negotiated with their supervisor, and that both supervisor and policy support was necessary for women to reach such arrangements. Increasing job autonomy is a method that can contribute to better work-life balance perception among both men and women.[27, 28] While this may seem incompatible with military culture and practices, the increasing professionalization of the forces, experiences with remote work during the pandemic, and the many support trade roles in the CAF, suggest that the findings of this study could be applicable.

"Building on supervisor support and investing in the training of supervisors is offered as a promising avenue to create a healthier military workplace."

Military Personnel Policies in Canada

In the Canadian context, the difficulty of balancing family commitments with the requirements of a military career was the primary reason for voluntary release.[20] In exit surveys administered to regular force members leaving the CAF between 2013 and 2017, service-members listed job dissatisfaction, geographical stability and family reasons as the top three reasons for leaving the CAF.[23] Men were less likely to say that family issues were a reason for release than women[38, 29] The 2016 Auditor General's report found that former service-members cited challenges of managing work-life balance as a reason why they left the military.[30] Consistent with the previously cited studies, maintenance of work-life balance is also key to personnel retention in the CAF.[31] A retention survey of the regular force in 2019 suggests that women have better work-life balance than men and are generally more satisfied with their career. The results suggest that while some women find work-life balance difficult, they take a more active role than men at trying to balance their work-life tensions.

In 2017, *Strong Secure, Engaged* described the CAF's strategy to retain service-members as focusing on simplifying the transition from regular to reserve forces as well as allowing for longer-term breaks from service without impacting a service-members' pay-grade or pension eligibility, this has been referred[32] to as "*The Journey*," but few explicit references to this policy exist in the public domain.[33] Similar to what has been found in non-military workplaces, service-members are seeking better organisational support in the form of improved childcare services, including on-site subsidized childcare, and flexible work arrangements like shorter work weeks, job sharing and flexible hours.[34] While there have been measures to improve job satisfaction and retention in the CAF, this study highlights further avenues to address gendered work-life strain.

It is important that gendered experiences be taken into account when designing military personnel policies. Studies which discuss the inclusion of women in the military, for example, have long noted that work-life balance can impact service-women and service-men in unique ways. Smith and Rosenstein's[35] study found that women may be exposed to more work-life balance conflict, have different work-life challenges than men or at the very least, perceive an important trade-off between staying in the military and starting a family. In general, women[36] in male-dominated professions have to take on certain roles and self-presentations to fit into heteronormative cultures, an additional stressor that comes with the job. While the 2015/2016 Annual Report on Regular Force Attrition noted women had roughly the same attrition rates as men overall, women's attrition rates were higher than that of men after 20 years of service.[37] This suggests that work-life issues might compound over time as women begin to start families and progress in their careers.

Historically, women in operational roles in the CAF had to put their plans to have a family on hold if they wanted to advance their careers while men had more support to pursue both concurrently, as they could more often count on a spouse at home.[38] Waruszynski et al. show that some women in the CAF continue to plan pregnancies to accommodate their unit and leadership to avoid the potentially negative repercussions of having a family,[40] this included not taking the family leave they were entitled to. Ultimately, women are in a double bind because they also face criticism when they put service before self (i.e. leaving children for lengthy training exercise or deployment) rather than upholding traditional gendered roles which would dictate the opposite.[39, 40, 45]

Ultimately, for the CAF to be successful in attracting and retaining women, it needs to consider how their unique needs play into the work-life balance equation. As Waruszynski et al. note, women's top concerns include nursing while training, returning from leave, and childcare.[41] Over time, these concerns cause serving mothers to veer away from their military careers.[46] Unsurprisingly, career progression is also cited by women as one of the concerns bearing on their decision to leave the military.[41] Gendered expectations disadvantage women as their family responsibilities are made to be incompatible with their military career progression, whilst men are better able to reconcile these competing demands because heteronormativy is still ingrained in military organizational culture.[44,45,46] The variation in the conditions for achieving job satisfaction, work-life balance, and healthy family life between men and women is what we examine in our study.

A Gender-Based Analysis of Military Work-Life Balance

Our study highlights that the military system was built around the traditional family model, failing to adapt as its demographics shifted over time. The military now includes more women with caregiving responsibilities, more dual-service couples as well as members of the 2SLGBTQIA+ community. Building on Spanner's work, who notes that, "the civilian family becomes subservient to the soldier and the military as an institution",[42] we found that the military embodies this heteronormative construct. The result is that military spouses will take on most of the caring and family responsibilities, so that the serving member can focus on professional demands. This model fails servicemembers who do not conform to that expectation. Through focus group data, our research sought a more detailed understanding of how women and men experience work-life balance stress. We propose a typology of factors that affect work-life balance as a theory development exercise to foster future research and steer policy recommendations for the military and veteran organizations.

> **"a heteronormative construct imposes constraints on both men and women in the military, and disproportionately disadvantages women."**

Methods

To recruit participants, we sent email ads for focus groups in Ottawa, Kingston, Petawawa and Trenton. Those who filled out our initial demographics survey (results below) and who were available for a focus group were all given a chance to participate. We aimed for a disproportionate stratified sample to create a gender balance in participants as opposed to proportional representation of gender. We determined a 60:40 balance would be acceptable either way (40% men and 60% women or vice versa) and ended up with roughly 42% (n=22) women and 58% (n=30) men out of 52 participants.

Eight focus groups were conducted in total. There was one focus group for men and one for women each in Ottawa, Trenton, and Kingston. Kingston had an additional focus group for men, and there was also a focus group for women in Petawawa. The number of participants in focus groups ranged from three to eleven, with an average of around six participants per group.

All participants were asked the same set of semi-structured questions (see Annex). The open focus group format prompted participants to discuss why they joined the military, what their experiences were like throughout their career, how they and other Canadians felt about the military, diversity initiatives, support offered by the military, and experiences in the transition to civilian life. Three PhD students and two masters' students assisted the principal investigator with the focus groups.

The average age of our sample was 47 years old, with most participants falling between the ages of 35 and 55. 34 participants were married/common law, 9 participants were single, 7 were divorced. Men and women were married, single, and divorced at roughly at the same rates. Most participants stated their highest level of education was college (n=19), and over two thirds of the sample had some form of tertiary education. Out of the remaining 16 participants, all but two finished high school. Of those who provided information on element (50), 19 served in the army, 12 in the Air Force, 2 in the Navy, and 1 in Special Operations Forces, with 16 participants serving in multiple elements. The sample contained 16 junior non-commissioned members, 20 Warrant Officers, Petty Officers or Senior Non-Commissioned Officers, 3 junior officers, and 11 senior officers. Proportionally, 20% of women and 40% of men were junior non-commissioned members; 55% of women and 30% of men were Warrant Officers, Petty Officers or Senior Non-Commissioned Officers; 10% of women and 3% of men were junior officers; and 15% of women and 27% of men were senior officers. 75% of women and 70% of men were non-commissioned members, with the rest being officers.

We designed a coding matrix with categories that included work-life balance considerations as part of a qualitative content analysis (See Annex). First, two undergraduate students transcribed audio-recorded focus groups and interviews. Two PhD students, a masters student, and two undergraduate students participated with the principal investigator in an initial reading of the transcripts to conceptualize coding categories in line with the literature on veteran transition. One of these categories was work-life balance throughout the military career cycle. The masters student and the two undergraduates then carried out manual coding which was verified by the principal investigator. Each transcript was coded by two separate members of the team for intercoder reliability.

To facilitate the data analysis, the research team identified 18 dominant themes from the literature on gender and work-life balance in the military and compared these with data from our codebooks, adding confirming and disconfirming evidence for each theme. 15 additional themes which were not present in our initial literature review, but were present in broader work-life balance literatures or literatures on gender in the military were identified. We then consolidated our 33 themes into 4 overarching categories to build our typology (competing responsibilities, deployment, support systems, personal relationships) and a fifth crosscutting one: heteronormative standards. Our findings lend further evidentiary support to our argument about why and how a heteronormative construct imposes constraints on both men and women in the military, and disproportionately disadvantages women. Examining the gendered factors that affect work-life balance in the military provides insight into the inner workings of this heteronormative construct, identifying the mechanism through which it imposes a double standard that impairs women's career progression in the CAF.

Limitations

We acknowledge that our sample is limited in size and scope, since we only conducted the focus groups and interviews in Ontario, as per our grant specifications. However, based on our argument, we would not expect to have different findings in other provinces and territories, except for Québec, which has distinct provincial childcare benefits. Moreover, since many of our participants had moved to multiple provinces throughout their careers, the experiences that were shared with us are not limited to Ontario.

While our participants were often quite open, even blunt when sharing stories about their personal trajectories, we acknowledge power dynamics could have affected the focus groups discussions, when both lower-ranking and higher-ranking members shared the space. On one occasion, we did notice that when a higher-ranking member (who was in the process of transition) left early, the focus group participants opened up further.

Finally, while we focus on a single country (Canada), we would expect the work-life balance strains we identified to be experienced in other countries, like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Our findings offer novel insights into how gender affects work-life balance in the military, and could open avenues for future research in Canada and beyond.

A Typology for Military Work-Life Balance

This section introduces our typology, based on the five aforementioned themes: the demands of a military career, the deployment double standard, military support systems, personal relationships, and heteronormative standards. In this section, we also include data in the form of quotes from our focus group discussions, which are representative of the views shared.

"Both men and women expressed that constantly privileging their career over their family contributed to their decision to leave the military"

Competing Responsibilities

The first theme relates to a military culture which favours professional demands over family responsibilities. We found that, while men are impacted by this, women appear to be more systematically disadvantaged. CAF members are expected to sacrifice aspects of their personal lives to fulfill the demands of the military, but women participants noted experiencing the double standard of being expected to prioritize their family responsibilities despite the demands of military life.

Though more prevalent in men, our participants generally felt they could have their career first and focus on family later. Men and women in our focus groups and interviews talked about the need to make up for lost time with families and expressed regret for neglecting their families because of the demands of their military career. This echoed a 2019 regular force retention survey, which suggests that members of the CAF are often unsatisfied with how postings affect their partners and children.[39] One of our participants expressed this sentiment very explicitly after discussing how her previous children had experienced her and her husband's multiple deployments and postings:

> We call our youngest our makeup child, in the sense that you know, she's really the one that we concentrate on cause we're trying to give her that good foundation, where with our other children we're like, three years here, four years here, you know like always moving, always unstable in a way.

Another participant expressed how an injury made him re-evaluate his priorities:

> I think if I didn't get shot, I would still be doing the job and putting shit on my family, because I never learned how to stop, I didn't know where that break was, now, I have no choice.

In the literature, this trade-off between family and a military career is most salient in accounts about military deployment, but we found this to be a concern at every career stage. The idea that work-life anxiety is a constant rather than transient issue is consistent with Pickering's work, which finds that the military lifestyle beyond just deployment disrupts and interferes with family responsibilities.[43] Many of our participants discussed work-life strain being a regular of their day-to-day reality. One woman, for example, opened up about her struggles as a single parent:

> I just found that I couldn't give enough. […] I used to bring my daughter with me at 3'oclock in the morning 'cause I was doing supply tech.

Both men and women expressed that constantly privileging their career over their family contributed to their decision to leave the military, which is consistent with studies on work-life conflict and retention conducted in other countries.[11, 23,44,45] However, being able to say no to disruptive deployments or assignments, or even leaving the military, depended on the person's rank and their economic circumstances. Our participants who were higher ranking often felt they had room to negotiate, or had amassed enough income and experience that they could leave the military. Considerations based on rank were repeated multiple times, especially throughout the men's focus groups:

> I missed my granddaughter's second birthday party, and I was told I would be home for it – and they sent me off in the opposite direction to where I was supposed to be going, and I was fortunate enough I had the time and the advantage in that time to say, 'I'm done, family is too important to me.'

Our findings indicate that if the CAF further enhanced family support services, it could possibly improve retention by creating an environment where service-members can progress without sacrificing their family lives.

Deployment

The second theme reveals the gendered double standard in deployment, whereby men are praised for deployments, but women are sometimes criticized by their superiors and peers for abandoning their caregiving responsibilities. Men are encour-

aged to deploy and praised when they do, even when they have a family at home. Having a family at home may even translate into additional praise, because men are seen to be making a sacrifice. Women participants recounted expectations that they should put their families first and often felt judged by their colleagues when taking assignments or deployments which took them away from their families:

> It's normal for a man to deploy and not for women. So, the guy won't have to ask his wife, 'is it ok if I deploy?' No, 'I'm gonna deploy and you're gonna take care of the kids.' The other way around, it's not necessarily the same thing.

And another participant, commenting on the judgmental nature of her workplace, noted:

> I was a single parent too. I got deployed, uh, three times, but twice when I had my son and I had to leave him behind. And the people were so judgmental about the fact that I was leaving my son behind when I got deployed.

We also found that some men enjoy deployment precisely because it freed them of their family responsibilities. Men in one focus group agreed that deployment was "relaxing" even if their families might suffer, because 'there are no distractions." This was not the same for women who seemed more anxious about leaving their family behind. As one participant noted, '[women are] leaving two jobs behind.'

Men in our focus groups would not consult their wives on decisions around deployment, yet, the military requires the support of the whole family during deployment.[11, 43] Our focus groups revealed that, for dual-service couples, wives felt an incredible strain when attempting to compensate for their husband's absence. There were also notable gender-based differences when it came to preparing for deployment. We found that women in particular were stressed about making preparations for their family prior to their departure, compared to men. Echoing findings from other studies, it seemed that both men and women in our study believed that you could not have a successful military career and family life, a dynamics which is exacerbated by deployments.[46]

Support Systems

The third theme deals with the support systems of service-members, where men seem to draw support from their wives, and from their direct supervisors. Women, by contrast, needed additional sources of support, often drawing on a community of other women in the military, as is supported by other studies.[47] Some of our participants remarked on the lack of help for women, when men with similar struggles were supported more readily. In many focus groups, both men and women focused on promises of support that were not met by the military. Many remarked that "they preach family first" but that this was not really the case in practice.

The results from our study suggest that perceptions of support were affected by the relationship with direct supervisors, but that this varied based on the supervisor's personality, gender, trade, and marital/familial status. Our participants also expressed the importance of having superiors who promote a healthy work-life balance but remarked that this was not consistently the case. One man, commenting on the behaviour of a high-ranking CAF member, remarked that "He would burn his people into the ground, and he lived that way too. He just retired by himself, his family's gone, he's divorced." Many participants expressed similar sentiments about leaders, but some also discussed how they internalized and praised toxic work-life habits themselves, not realizing the negative effects until much later.

Women often felt that supervisors and colleagues who were men did not understand their needs and had trouble supporting them. However, support seemed to be better in some trades than others. For example, women mentioned that the infantry and combat arms were not supportive of family and caring responsibilities. Support trades on the other hand, where the majority of women are concentrated, tended to be more sensitive to work-life balance concerns. Men noted how in combat units, desiring a healthy work-life balance was often seen as weakness.

"it seemed that both men and women believed that you could not have a successful military career and family life, a dynamics that is exacerbated by deployments."

Personal Relationships

The fourth theme highlights how the demands of the military can damage romantic and familial relationships. Some participants also noted strained friendships from moves, constant work, and a lack of understanding on the part of civilian friends. Spousal support was identified as an important factor in both men and women's conception of their work-life balance, but men and women experienced different struggles.

Men discussed how their wives did not understand their commitment to the military. A gender-based double standard is at work as men are expected to be committed to their career, while women are expected to be committed at home despite their career. Women claimed that they were made to feel selfish for being committed the military while having a family. For the men who participated in our study, wives who "understood" their need to work were deemed to be strong and worthy. Men rarely admitted that their relationships were destroyed by work-life strain and instead discussed how their wives and girlfriends couldn't "take" the sacrifices of military life. This does not mean that men were not affected by work-life strain, rather, that they were taught work-life strain is an expected aspect of the job that they and their family must endure.

Heteronormative Standards

The final theme relates to the military's heteronormative standards, incorporating aspects of the previous four themes in the typology. As one of our participants noted, the military system is "made by a man who assumes there is a wife behind," articulating very clearly why work-life balance in the military affects women and men in unique, gendered ways.

Women in our study felt men were treated more favorably, and also felt that men, including supervisors, did not understand their needs and struggles. For example, a participant discussed

how when a member of her unit was going through a divorce, he received an outpouring of support from her unit, when she and the other single mothers had never received any. Our women participants often felt judged on the basis of traditional gender roles, and felt they had to conform to masculine norms or disprove misconceptions about women, as supported by the broader literature on field dominated by men.[36] While men were labeled as 'brave' and devoted for performing household and caring duties, women were just expected to perform these roles naturally on top of military tasks.

The experiences mentioned above have real impacts on how women receive support, navigate relationship and responsibilities, and deal with postings and deployments, all of which impact work-life balance. Women participants claimed leadership (mostly men) did not understand women's needs when it came to work-life balance and therefore could not adequately support them. One woman discussed how when she asked her supervisor to go to her child's kindergarten opening, citing the fact that they lived in the same neighborhood so he must be attending too, he answered "no, my wife handles all of that," and would not let her go.

However, women in our study also held some heteronormative attitudes themselves. Some women said that men were incapable of fulfilling certain familial responsibilities and felt the need to manage the home even when they were deployed. In many of these conversations, the implication was that men were dismissive or completely incompetent:

> [M]y husband has no concept of what it means to prepare the children for daycare and lunches and schoolwork and everything. No concept! And yet, we both deploy, we both do the same job every day and in my case, I'm the senior rank.

Some women were assumed to be a civilian spouse in both military and civilian situations and felt that their role as service-members was often downplayed. Based on the literature, civilian spouses mention that it is difficult to work due to their caring responsibilities and the work demands of their CAF partner.[18] The military perpetuates the expectation that spouses will stay home to support the military member, a dynamic which is amplified for dual-service couples and service-members who are single parents.[46] Women in our study, especially those who were part of dual service couples, felt that they were expected to perform the double duty of civilian spouse and service-member, while receiving little support and understanding.

To summarize our analysis of the focus group data, we found that women were just as enthusiastic about the military as men, just as excited for deployment, and just as willing to sacrifice time for the military. The women we interviewed planned to serve for similar lengths of time as the men we interviewed, but women had additional family expectations and pressures which men did not have to the same extent, creating an environment where women felt overworked. Women often brought up their family and did so much more readily and without prompting, compared to the men in our focus groups. When men did discuss family, they were more likely to discuss their partners over their children, and whether those partners supported or did not support them. The struggle to balance work and life seemed to always be on the minds of the women participants, whereas the men felt they could set aside their life almost completely for their work.

"The women we interviewed planned to serve for similar lengths of time as the men we interviewed, but women had additional family expectations and pressures which men did not have to the same extent, creating an environment where women felt overworked."

It is important to note that heteronormative standards also hurt men in the military. As the data from our study shows, men are expected to put service before family, and socialized within military culture to view extreme versions of this as normal, negatively affecting their relationships with family, and creating a culture of overwork which can impact mental health.

Conclusion and Recommendations

While studies and military personnel policies have recognized that work-life balance effects military members and their families, the gendered nature of military experiences is often overlooked, a gap this article addresses. Our findings illustrate our argument that heteronormative standards affect women and men in the military in distinct ways and suggest that the CAF should pay closer attention to gendered work-life strains in designing retention strategies. It is particularly important for the CAF to push against the assumption that men in the CAF have a spouse at home who will take care of family life or that serving women will bear most of the caregiving burdens of their family. Furthermore service-members should be encouraged to take time for their families, and supervisors should check in to make sure this family time is actually taken. Encouraging men to take on caring roles could begin to mitigate some of the prevailing biases on gender roles. Ultimately, women should be supported in the caregiving duties they already participate in, while men should be encouraged to be actively involved in balancing their work and their life.

Our research findings can hopefully open the door to more intersectional analyses of work-life strains in the military. If cisgender, heterosexual white women are negatively impacted by the CAF's definitions of and ideas about family structures, the experiences of racialized minority and 2SLGBTQIA+ CAF members should be further examined. The findings from our focus groups point to a work-life balance system set up with a heteronormative and Western family model in mind, which assumes men in the military will have a civilian wife at home. This model is outdated and has caused harm to military personnel and their families.

ANNEX 1: FOCUS GROUP AND INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Entering Military & Military Experience Questions

1) To get the conversation started, can everyone introduce themselves and tell us why you joined the military? Were you considering other jobs?
2) What was your experience like in the military?
NOTE: some people go into intense detail and give their biography and employment history with CAF. This can take a lot of time and is also information we have from the preliminary survey when making selections. Try to get at their experiences rather than employment history.
3) Is work life balance a consideration when you're in the military? What about once you've left? Do you think this balance is easier or more difficult to achieve in the military?
4) Do you think men and women have different experiences in the military? How?
5) If you deployed, what was your decision making process for this?

Leaving the Military Questions

1) Now I'd like to talk about your experiences transitioning out of the military: What was your release like?
2) What were/are your expectations when you transitioned to civilian life?
3) Do you/did you have a plan for entering the work force? What was it?
4) What resources or services might you/did you need to support you during this transition?
5) Were resources for the transition from military-to-civilian life easy to access?
6) Did you attend a SCAN seminar prior to your departure? Executive or general? Experience?
7) What were the most challenging aspects of returning to civilian life? What helped you when returning to civilian life?
8) What were your responsibilities upon returning to civilian life? (parents, family, children, animals).
9) What preparation did the military/government provide you leading up to your civilian transition?
10) Were you aware of transition services (government or private) before/during your transition?
11) What are your thoughts on DWDs?

Entering Labour Force Questions

1) How do the skills that you gained in the military translate into civilian sectors?
2) What challenges do/did you anticipate or have you experienced on the job market?
3) Do your/did your experience experiences in the military have a positive or negative effect on your transition?
4) How do you think the general population perceives veterans and your abilities/skills?
5) Did you feel competitive entering the job market? (i.e. qualified, confident?)
6) What are some professional strengths and skills you may have gained as military personnel and how do they translate into civilian sectors?
7) What would have helped you during this transition from military to civilian lifestyle, be it personal or professional? (Usually comes out naturally)

Is there anything else that is important to you that you would like to share?

ANNEX 2: Codebook

	JOINING	DEPLOYMENT	MIL EXPERIENCE	LEAVING/ TRANSITION	VETERAN EXPERIENCE
Financial Considerations					
Support System (Family, Friends)					
Health (Mental/Physical)					
Military Identity and Culture					
Professional Fulfillment/ Purpose					
Dignity/Pride/ Recognition					
Work-life Balance/ Personal Sacrifice					
Denial/Making Excuses/ Rationalizing					
Resources/Services/ Institutions/Bureaucracy					
Routine/Structure/ Autonomy					
Military Community/ Camaraderie					
Work Conditions (Perks or Grievances)					
Civil/Military Connection or Disconnect					
Career Advancement/ Management/Leadership					
Sexual Violence					
Sexism + Gender-Based Resentment					

For Each Entry Specify: **M/F** (male or female) AND **+/-/N** (positive/negative/neutral)

If text is too vague/general, or if unrelated, don't include in codebook: "I can describe it, um, for me, it was great. I would do the same thing over again"

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Sgt Jean-François Néron, Valcartier Imaging Section, Canadian Armed Forces

Corporal Dominic Larocque, a member of the Training Centre of 2nd Canadian Division participates in a friendly game of sledge hockey as part of a sports day organized at CFB Valcartier in Courcelette, Qc, on November 28, 2014, to mark the RBC Sports Day that took place in communities across Canada.

Gender-Based Analysis Plus and Medically Released Canadian Armed Forces Members

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Introduction

Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus) is an analytical tool used to assess the potential impacts of policies, programs, services, and other initiatives on diverse groups of people, taking into account sex (i.e., biological assignment at birth), gender (i.e., how a person identifies), as well as intersecting identity factors that include race, LGBTQ2S+, indigenous, people of colour, and disability.[1] GBA Plus is a critical tool in the decision-making process, and is recognized as a key competency in support of the development of effective programs and policies for Canadians). The Government of Canada developed an action plan to address recommendations for the full implementation of GBA Plus in response to the Fall 2015 Auditor General's report on GBA.[2] Given Canada's growing diverse population and the commitment of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to increase the proportion of women in the military to 25% representation by 2026,[3] it is important

to consider the needs and experiences of military personnel by exploring gender, sex, and the intersectionality of identity factors. To date, little data on sex, gender, and intersectionality in medically released CAF members have been collected by Veterans Affairs Canada (VAC)[4]. Data limitations may impede Canadian government decisions from reflecting an understanding of the needs and experiences of persons with disabilities in the workplace.

The purpose of this article is to identify some of the barriers faced by medically released members of the CAF seeking civilian employment as persons with disabilities through the lens of GBA Plus. Our objective is to highlight the importance of the need for systematic data collection for informing and advancing policy and program development, service delivery, communications, and societal recognition for persons with disabilities. We advocate that a GBA Plus lens be integrated into programs and policies coupled with required training for all individuals for cultural change to help remove barriers, thus leading to increased hiring and retention of qualified persons with disabilities. To be clear, there is no expectation of the employer to accept a less productive employee, simply for the sake of hiring a person with a disability. Persons with disabilities, like others, want to and deserve to be hired based on their talent, to be employed in sufficiently challenging jobs, and to be given opportunities for career advancement.

The outline of this article is as follows. We first discuss medical release in the CAF. Next, the low employment rate of persons with disabilities in Canada is presented followed by the barriers impeding the employment of persons with disabilities that permeate across the employment cycle (e.g., recruitment, selection, social integration, and performance management). We then discuss interventions to remove workplace barriers for persons with disabilities that are aimed at increasing their employment and retention. Finally, we discuss the integration of GBA Plus into the civilian employment of medically released CAF members.

Medical Release in the Canadian Armed Forces

Members of the CAF are medically released when they cannot meet minimum operational standards related to universality of service.[5] Of the approximately 5,500 personnel that are released from the CAF each year, about 1,500 (27.3%) are released for medical reasons that are attributed to service to their country.[6] Musculoskeletal (MSK) injuries and mental health (MH) disorders are the leading causes of medical release in the CAF.[7] Mental or psychological reasons for medical release frequently fall under the CAF term "operational stress injury" (OSI). An OSI is broadly defined as any persistent psychological difficulties (e.g., anxiety, depression, or post-traumatic stress disorder) resulting from operational duties performed by CAF personnel in Canada or abroad. Women in the CAF are medically released more often than men, and medical releases often occur earlier in women's careers.[8]

Medical release from the CAF is a major life change and can be stressful for members and their loved ones. Women veterans often have a harder transition from military to civilian life than their men counterparts, for example, wait times for disability benefit decisions are substantially longer for women VAC clients than for men VAC clients.[9] The transition process may also involve wounded veterans identifying as persons with disabilities; moreover, some of these veterans might experience, for example, their OSI as a shameful defect to be hidden, further complicating the transition process.

Adjusting to civilian life for some medically released members may involve seeking civilian employment. These members are less likely to be working in the year after release compared with the vast majority of able-bodied veterans who work after release from the CAF.[10] Medically released members are likely to encounter employer concerns (e.g., regarding the impact of workers with disabilities on co-workers) that are barriers to hiring and retention of persons with disabilities.[11] These concerns materialize as stigma (i.e., negative views held by others) and discrimination (i.e., differential treatment of individuals based on their group membership). Stigma and discrimination may prevent persons with disabilities from finding employment. Once employed, it can be quite challenging for persons with disabilities to advance in their careers. This is concerning given that work is an important part of the human experience and is beneficial for promoting health and subjective well-being.[12]

"GBA Plus may promote an understanding of the needs and experiences of persons with disabilities, and as such, may further culture change"

'Promoting a diverse and inclusive workplace that values persons with disabilities requires culture change to break down barriers. As an analytical tool, GBA Plus may promote an understanding of the needs and experiences of persons with disabilities, and as such, may further culture change. One of the core components of GBA Plus is to examine and challenge assumptions about an issue or a group of people. Cultural change takes time to have a broad and meaningful impact on diversity and inclusion in Canada. For instance, efforts to implement GBA Plus within the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CAF have been challenging because organizational culture is a barrier.[13]

Employment Rate of Persons with Disabilities in Canada

Despite Canadian legislation on diversity in the workplace, persons with disabilities face attitudinal barriers in their attempts to gain and maintain employment.[14] Compared to their able-bodied counterparts, persons with disabilities have lower employment levels, are employed more often in part-time jobs, and have a lower annual income.[15] For instance, the 2017 Canadian Survey on Disability found that persons with disabilities aged 25 to 64 were less likely to be employed (59%) than those without disabilities (80%).[16] As the level of severity of disability increased, the likelihood of being employed decreased. Among individuals aged 25 to 64, 76% of those with mild disabilities were employed, whereas 31% of those with very severe disabilities were employed.

Differences in the employment rate between women and men with disabilities were also found in the 2017 Canadian Survey on Disability[17] The employment rate further differed based on age and the severity of the disability. Persons with disabilities aged 25 to 64 had a lower employment rate for women than men with a mild/moderate disability. Among those with more severe disabilities, younger women aged 25 to 34 were more likely to have been employed (59%) than their men counterparts (46%). Among those aged 35 to 64, however, women and men with more severe disabilities had approximately equal rates of employment.

More recently, the 2021 audit of employment equity representation in recruitment in the federal public service found that persons with disabilities represent 5.2% of the core federal public service, despite forming 9.0% of the available workforce.[18] Persons with disabilities made up 679 (4.4%) of the 15,285 job applications by members of the four designated employment equity groups (women, Aboriginal peoples, persons with disabilities, and members of visible minorities) to 181 externally advertised appointment processes in 30 departments and agencies. At the organizational screening stage and at the assessment stage, women with disabilities experienced greater success than their male counterparts. However, only 11 candidates with disabilities (1.6%) were appointed.

"the unemployment rate for persons with disabilities in Canada is high compared to the rate for those without disabilities"

Barriers to Employment of Persons with Disabilities

Persons with disabilities represent a significant talent pool that is often overlooked (and often underestimated) by employers.[19,20] There are no major differences between persons with disabilities and employees without disabilities in rates of accidents and workplace injuries or insurance costs.[21] In addition, more and more persons with disabilities are completing higher education, and technological advances are eliminating many physical and informational barriers that in the past used to limit their work activities.[22] Failing to tap into this talent pool will cost more to leave persons with disabilities out of the labour force than it will to implement policies and programs that will improve their long-term employment outcomes. Yet the unemployment rate for persons with disabilities in Canada is high compared to the rate for those without disabilities.[23]

We now focus our attention on why employers are reluctant to work with persons with disabilities across the employment cycle (e.g., recruitment, selection, social integration, and performance management), and the subsequent negative consequences of workplace barriers on persons with disabilities.

Employer Attitudes and Concerns in the Workplace

Two employer concerns or areas of discomfort regarding the employment of persons with disabilities are attitudinal barriers and co-worker reactions to persons with disabilities in the workplace.

Attitudinal barriers. The primary obstacle to the employment of persons with disabilities is attitudinal barriers.[24] Attitudinal barriers are pervasive negative perceptions and value systems present in individuals without disabilities that focus on a person's disability rather than their abilities and other valued characteristics.[25] These negative attitudes are not only harmful but through active or passive discrimination prevent persons with disabilities from participating fully and equally within society, including in terms of finding employment.[26] Attitudes are often derived from negative stereotypes and ignorance (e.g., speaking loudly to a person with sight loss while assuming they are also hard of hearing).[27] In general, males have more negative attitudes toward persons with disabilities than females do.[28]

Attitudinal barriers can be more harmful for persons with invisible disabilities than for persons with visible disabilities. Symptoms of invisible disabilities include debilitating pain, fatigue, dizziness, cognitive dysfunctions, brain injuries, learning differences, and mental health disorders, as well as hearing and vision impairments.[29] To the casual observer, there are no outward physical signs or other cues to indicate a disability. Invisible disabilities are just as debilitating as visible disabilities, but they are not as talked about and are not easily understood. This can lead to assumptions or behaviour based on misinformation and ignorance. In comparison to persons with visible disabilities, persons with invisible disabilities are less likely to be hired among job applicants.[30] Employers are less inclined to hire individuals with a mental health disorder, for example, because individuals diagnosed with a mental health illness are perceived as violent, unpredictable, and unable to work.[31]

Co-worker reactions to persons with disabilities. Employers may be concerned about the negative reactions of co-workers to persons with disabilities.[32] Unlike social settings in which able-bodied individuals may be able to avoid persons with disabilities, co-workers may be required to interact with persons with disabilities who are assigned to the same work.[33] In work-related situations, tasks may be highly interdependent, and able-bodied co-workers may not believe that persons with disabilities can perform tasks successfully. As a result, reactions to persons with disabilities may be more negative in work situations than in social situations. Females exhibit less discomfort working with persons with disabilities than males.[34]

Consequences of Workplace Barriers on Persons with Disabilities

Two negative consequences of workplace barriers on persons with disabilities are reluctance to disclose disability, and obstacles to the career advancement of persons with disabilities.

Disclosing disability. Persons with disabilities must weigh the costs and benefits of disclosing their disability to a potential or current employer. If a disability is disclosed, then persons

MCpl Marc-André Gaudreault, Canadian Armed Forces

John Hapgood (right), support staff for the Canadian Association for Disabled Skiing, is tethered to Sergeant Bjarne Nielson (left) at Calabogie Peaks Resort, in Calabogie, Ontario, on February 15th 2012

with disabilities must address the associated stigma and the resulting discrimination. The decision to disclose a disability is influenced by the visibility of the disability. In a national survey of 1,002 Canadian adults, the vast majority (77%) said that they would not feel comfortable talking to their employer if they thought that they had a mental illness. In contrast, the majority of survey respondents said that they would discuss with friends or co-workers diagnoses of cancer (72%) or diabetes (68%) in the family.[35]

Persons with disabilities are faced with the dilemma of disclosing their disability when applying for a job. Disclosing a disability when applying for a job can lead to denied interview opportunities if the disability is disclosed beforehand.[36] In other instances, persons with disabilities who disclosed their disability in their job applications and were fortunate to be invited for an interview have been overlooked and rejected during the interview process due to their disability.[37] Employers negate human capital of persons with disabilities and fail to look beyond the disability to see the value of the individual's education and skills.

Employees with invisible disabilities are obliged to disclose their disability to initiate the workplace accommodation process that would enable them to realize their full potential. Disclosing disability for workplace accommodation is less successful for persons with invisible disabilities than persons with visible disabilities. In a recent survey of federal public servants with disabilities who requested an accommodation for themselves in the last three years, employees with conditions or disabilities that are more readily recognizable to outside observers tended to have more successful accommodation experiences than employees with invisible disabilities.[38] The proportion of accommodation requests that were denied was twice as high among those with mental health disabilities as was the proportion among those with more readily recognizable disabilities.

Career advancement of persons with disabilities. The promotion of persons with disabilities is disproportionately low compared to that of able-bodied persons. The 2019 employment equity promotion rate study conducted in the federal public service found that persons with disabilities experienced lower promotion rates than people who did not self-identify as having a disability.[39] Persons with disabilities are more likely than those without disabilities to encounter barriers to advancement.[40] Not surprisingly, persons with disabilities are underrepresented in management positions in both the public and the private sectors.[41,42] As a result, persons with disabilities are rarely considered for career development and advancement opportunities, especially for leadership positions.[43,44]

Interventions to Remove Workplace Barriers for Persons with Disabilities

As we have discussed, persons with disabilities in Canada have low employment levels compared to those without disabilities, and previous research suggests that employer discrimination is a contributing factor.[45] Effective strategies in the form of interventions are required to remove barriers to increase the employment of persons with disabilities. Using the approach taken by Bonaccio et al.,[46] we address the previously discussed employer concerns by mapping them to interventions that can be applied to remove negative attitudes in each stage of the employment cycle (e.g., recruitment, selection, social integration, and performance management). We present examples of interventions to promote increased hiring and retention of persons with disabilities that can be initiated by employers, as well as examples of interventions that persons with disabilities can initiate to remove workplace barriers. It is important to note that interventions are not always conducted in isolation from one another across the employment cycle, and that interventions can benefit everyone in the workplace.

Employer Initiatives

The inclusion and integration of persons with disabilities into the workplace involves the design of practices and policies through the lens of GBA Plus to identify and remove barriers that hinder the individual's ability to fully participate on the same level as persons without disabilities. Once barriers are removed, having a physical injury or mental illness does not preclude the individual from being a productive or even superior employee.

To be most effective, the inclusion of persons with disabilities in the workplace should stem from the top of the organization and from the beginning of employment. Employers that are not proactive about disability inclusion are risking the loss of qualified talent. To create a respectful and inclusive workplace, employers need to acknowledge that barriers such as implicit bias exist. Implicit or unconscious biases lead to actions or behaviours that are unknown to the individual as a problem.[47] While they are usually unintended and unconscious, implicit biases are nonetheless powerful influences on human behaviour that can negatively impact the hiring of persons with disabilities. Overcoming unconscious biases in the workplace is essential to support a bias-free hiring process in the federal public service and the private sector.

Being aware of implicit bias as a barrier is the first step to its removal and thus to real change. With such awareness as a starting point, workplace culture can transform into one that is accepting of differences, and one that is committed to having all employees feel a sense of belonging and inclusion.[48] Educating hiring teams and all employees organization-wide through scheduled training sessions on equity in the workplace and unconscious biases against persons with disabilities can help fill knowledge gaps and dispel myths and misconceptions. Training and education can change attitudes about persons with disabilities in the workplace[49,50] and interpersonal contact with persons with disabilities may augment the effects of such interventions on reducing stigma.[51]

Once employers are committed to the inclusion of persons with disabilities, changes to hiring strategies to reflect this commitment may take place. One change is to make the job application process accessible for all applicants, including those with disabilities. An application process that is accessible to persons with disabilities, for instance, sends the message that the organization is an equal opportunity employer that values diversity and inclusion of persons with disabilities. Conversely, if applicants with a disability struggle in completing the application due to accessibility issues, they may become discouraged from applying for the position. Indeed, the Government of Canada was forced to make its websites accessible to visually impaired users due to a lawsuit from a person with sight loss who was unable to apply online for a government job.[52] Other changes may include ensuring that descriptions of job requirements are accurate and use inclusive language, advertising the position broadly with alternative formats where appropriate (e.g., large print, Braille), and adapting traditional assessment methods for skill evaluation.[53]

"Once employers are committed to the inclusion of persons with disabilities, changes to hiring strategies to reflect this commitment may take place."

Consideration should also be given to the demographic composition of the hiring team, noting any gaps or imbalances in the representation of diverse groups. Research indicates that minorities tend to fare better when decision making bodies are more diverse,[54] as such groups are less likely to be affected by the existence of in-group biases (i.e., the tendency of people to favour those who are similar to themselves.[55,56] Such strategies may lead to a better candidate experience for all applicants, including people with and without disabilities, and a richer talent pipeline.

For those employees requiring adaptation to perform their job, workplace accommodations can play an important role in creating an inclusive and accessible work environment for employees with disabilities. Providing accommodations for new and established employees can promote productivity and attendance, improve interactions with co-workers, and create an overall positive environment.[57] Workplace accommodations for the majority of persons with disabilities either involve no financial cost (e.g., flexible work schedules), or are low-cost and high-impact (e.g., adjustments to desk height to allow for a wheelchair), or have a one-time average cost of $500.[58] For employers that may not have the time or resources to develop an accommodation policy, there exists an Accommodation Policy Template that was developed by the Canadian Human Rights Commission to assist employers in meeting their human rights obligations.[59]

Workplace accommodation should be provided in a timely manner. Employers should aim to provide an open, supportive environment so that employees can feel comfortable in raising any concerns about accommodating their disability. Working without accommodation can negatively impact health, productivity and morale for both the affected employee and others in their organization.[60] Accommodation can be offered by the employer starting in the recruitment phase of the employment cycle. The employer should ask the applicant if they require accommodation measures prior to the interview (e.g., people who are hard of hearing might have difficulty in telephone interviews).

Employers can create a workplace culture that encourages disclosure by persons with invisible disabilities about accommodating their disability by being clear about the competencies required for a job. Such an environment would allow for adjustments to be made as needed and can strengthen relationships by ensuring that persons with disabilities are being seen and heard. Moreover, not requiring the employer to know the specific diagnosis of the disability would help to remove the stigma, particularly for persons with an invisible disability who may not wish to disclose the specifics of their disability to an employer.[61] A doctor's letter, for example, could serve as documentation indicating a need and underlying rationale for a specific accommodation, without disclosing the specifics of the disability.

Some individuals may be unable to disclose or communicate their needs for workplace accommodation because of the nature of their disability. In such circumstances, employers should assist a person who is perceived to have a disability by offering accommodation, keeping in mind that employers are not

expected to diagnose illness or "second-guess" the health status of an employee. Nevertheless, if the employer notices that the employee is having difficulty performing their job (e.g., failing to show up for work), the employer should first consider whether the actions of the employee are caused by a disability. Progressive performance management and employee assistance supports help to ensure that all employees have a range of opportunities to address performance issues on an individualized basis. Thus, employee accommodation needs should be discussed during performance reviews and at any other times deemed appropriated.[62]

The accommodation needs will certainly differ amongst persons with disabilities, and thus accommodation will need to be made on a case-by-case basis, which might involve innovative solutions.[63] At the same time, accommodations are provided to remove barriers in the workplace faced by persons with disabilities and as such these employees are expected to work towards meeting demands from their work supervisors. Hence, employers should not have lowered expectations for persons with disabilities relative to other employees as this may prevent employees with disabilities from realizing their full potential in the workplace.[64]

It is also important to acknowledge that there is a reasonable limit to how far the employer or service provider must go to accommodate the needs of persons with disabilities. Sometimes an accommodation is not possible because of costs or health or safety risks. This is known as undue hardship under the Canadian Human Rights Act.[65] The employer or service provider can claim undue hardship as the reason why certain accommodations cannot be made, or certain policies or practices need to stay in place, even though the policies or practices may have a negative effect on the person with the disability. However, employers or service providers will need to provide sufficient evidence as to why the requested accommodation imposes undue hardship. In such circumstances, all involved should attempt to participate in discussions regarding possible alternative accommodation solutions.

Various methods can be explored by the employer to increase hiring and retention of persons with disabilities. One method to address any negative employer attitudes is meeting with a vocational rehabilitation (VR) professional who works with individual clients who have a disability.[66] The purpose of the meeting between the VR professional who works with persons with disabilities (e.g., individuals with sight loss) is to identify what they believe to be the best techniques to encourage an employer to consider hiring their clients. Direct contact between a VR professional and an employer can help to improve employer attitudes, knowledge, and intent to hire persons with disabilities.

The existence of a diversity champion in the organization specifically for persons with disabilities is another valuable resource that can help break down barriers. The diversity champion can use their expertise to actively identify and access potential new hires of qualified persons with disabilities. In addition, a sign of commitment to inclusion is for organizations to support the creation of a disability-focused employee resource group[67] (ERG). ERGs are voluntary, employee-led groups formed to act as a resource for both members and the organization for promoting a diverse and inclusive workplace. The existence of an ERG can also serve as a facilitator of disclosure, especially among employees with invisible disabilities.[68]

Failing to disclose a disability could have negative consequences for the employer when the disability somehow interferes with the job or the safety of others in the workplace.[69] Disclosure also carries significant benefits for employers as well as employees. These include the ability to make accommodations, and to improve the workplace climate for individuals with disabilities.[70] Also, persons with disabilities are more likely to disclose their disability if they have had a positive and supportive relationship with their supervisors. When employees feel comfortable self-disclosing a disability, this can serve as an informal indicator of the employer's success in achieving a supportive workplace culture.

Creating a supportive workplace culture also requires improving co-workers' attitudes toward persons with disabilities through education and training in an effort to reduce discrimination.[71] Co-workers can be important stakeholders in the accommodation process.[72] They can spread accurate information on disabilities, especially invisible disabilities, to able-bodied co-workers, which can help with the acceptance for accommodation. Common accommodations such as the restructuring of work, changes in shift schedules, and the trading of tasks require co-worker cooperation and support.

MCpl Shilo Adamson, Canadian Armed Forces

Corporal Dale Cross of the Soldier On team for the 2012 Nijmegen Marches, lays down and relaxes at the second rest stop on day two of the four-day marches. Corporal Cross marches with the first Canadian Forces team made up of ill and injured soldiers.

Persons with disabilities may also hesitate to request accommodation due to fear that co-workers may become resentful or view the accommodation as a "special treatment" instead of a necessary intervention. Because the accommodation of persons with disabilities can be viewed as an allocation of limited resources, co-workers may perceive that they are having to work undesirable hours (e.g., to accommodate someone who cannot work early in the morning) or that the accommodation takes away a reward that can benefit other employees.[73]

Employees with disabilities who do not attain social acceptance in the work environment may experience negative implications such as lower job performance and may receive less help and cooperation from co-workers. It is disproportionately more common for employees facing workplace barriers due to mental health conditions to take extended sick leave at some point in their career as a result of not being appropriately accommodated.[74] Structuring work relationships so that they require interaction between persons with disabilities and their able-bodied co-workers can promote social inclusion. The opportunity to interact can allow persons with disabilities to exhibit their skills and abilities and to dispel disability stereotypes.

"Early recognition and intervention with physical and mental health problems generally leads to better health outcomes"

Role of Persons with Disabilities

Persons with disabilities can and should take an active role in removing barriers to their employment. Active participation begins by promoting their own mental and physical health. For veterans, this is harder for women than for their men counterparts. Women veterans' willingness to seek out health supports and to continue to access them is influenced by stigma, gender bias, and experiences of harassment in health care settings.[75] The successive phases of rehabilitation and transition into civilian life for the medically released CAF member involve creating an active partnership amongst the member, the health care/support staff team, and the CAF/VAC team. This partnership enables the CAF/VAC to encourage treatment and improve health outcomes for released members more quickly, possibly resulting in their earlier readiness for civilian employment. Early recognition and intervention with physical and mental health problems generally leads to better health outcomes, and it can begin with the member's own active participation and self-report of mental distress, within the context of the partnership with the health care/support staff and CAF/VAC teams. The effective diagnosis and treatment of a mental illness can occur only after self-report. Avoiding or delaying treatment is unfortunate because all mental illnesses can be treated.[76] The earlier a mental health problem is identified the sooner one can intervene and improve health outcomes.

To help address mental health conditions, the CAF developed a mental health education program known as Road to Mental Readiness (R2MR). The goal of R2MR is to improve short-term performance and long-term mental health outcomes for CAF members and their families. R2MR program development and delivery accounts for many individual differences that may be relevant to mental well-being, stress, resilience, and performance. These individual differences may include sex, gender, age, culture, ethnicity, prior experiences, ability, and others. The program emphasizes throughout that individuals will differ in how they perceive and respond to stressors, how they interpret situations, the coping skills that they find helpful, the recovery activities that they engage in, the resources that they access, and how the demands they are faced with may impact them. These characteristics may also vary by situation and over time for the same individual, depending on their life events and well-being at any given time. For certain topic areas, such as suicide or intimate partner violence, information on gender differences in prevalence rates is included. The Canadian Forces Health Services strives to remain current with evidence-based practices and to ensure that guidance and direction is integrated to align R2MR courseware with evolving CAF conduct and culture, including the adoption of non-binary pronouns into courseware. Recently, DND/CAF released the R2MR Mobile Application, which is a training tool developed to supplement the original classroom-based delivery of the R2MR curriculum being implemented across all CAF training institutions.[77]

Another way that medically released CAF members can actively participate in their own rehabilitation is by improving their quality of life through sport, recreational, and creative activities. Both females and males can gain health benefits from non-sedentary activity.[78] While physical exercise can improve physical and mental health, persons with physical disabilities who exercise may help to reduce the stigma associated with disability by making a positive impression on others.[79]

GBA Plus and Next Steps for Employment of Medically Released CAF members

The foregoing discussion on barriers impeding the employment of persons with disabilities and proposed interventions for their increased hiring and retention clearly shows that work remains to achieve fully inclusive workplaces. A key component of GBA Plus is recognizing and challenging our own assumptions. When incorrect and unchallenged, the assumptions that we make in our workplaces can lead to unintended impacts on and even discrimination against persons with disabilities. The Government of Canada is committed to facilitating diverse and inclusive outcomes through its work, including ensuring that diverse populations of Canadians benefit from policies and programs, and recognizes the importance of GBA Plus in achieving this goal. GBA Plus should be conducted at various stages throughout the development of a government policy, program or initiative. GBA Plus requires early attention to the development of effective options and strategies for delivering programs and services to Canadians. For GBA Plus to be most valuable, it must ideally be built directly into the early stages of the policy development process.

Systematic data collection is required for government and private sector employers to explore sex, gender, and intersectionality with disability. The type of data to fulfil these gaps will

depend on designing and refining tools that include (but are not limited to) disability-sensitive surveys and programs. The tools used to collect data on persons with disabilities will need to rely on self-identification of disability. The introduction of a more inclusive definition of persons with disabilities in the 2017 Canadian Survey on Disability has not yet been introduced in the federal public service self-identification exercise and, as such, was not included in the 2021 federal public service audit of employment equity representation in recruitment.[80] Hence, steps must be taken to identify gaps (if any) when it is adopted for self-identification purposes. Data collection will require continuous engagement with stakeholders (e.g., decision-makers, persons with disabilities) and potential critics to ensure the utility and relevance of the data being produced and the subsequent buy-in from leadership at all levels in the organization, both formal and informal.

One of the goals of GBA Plus is to use the collected data to produce a transformation. A transformation will be required for implementing barrier-free recruitment and appointment processes for members of employment equity groups. For example, the Public Service Commission of Canada can use the data to work with advocacy groups for persons with disabilities, and with departments and agencies, to find solutions to address the lower employment success rates of persons with disabilities in the federal public service.

The transformation created by GBA Plus will require awareness and training of all employees with respect to sex, gender, and intersectionality with disability to ensure strategic implementation. Training can take various forms that include (but is not limited to) presentations, seminars, online courses, one-on-one and focus group interviews, and video clips of persons with disabilities successfully working with persons without disabilities, along with employer testimonials. The content of the training could include information about varying types of disabilities (visible and invisible disabilities) in an effort to decrease the extent to which employees view the disabilities as personally threatening.[81] For training to have a high impact, a person with a visible disability should provide the training to facilitate opportunities for the attendees to engage in high-quality interpersonal contact with the trainer that could help reduce negative stereotypes toward persons with disabilities.[82]

Undoubtedly, there will be challenges for GBA Plus implementation in the short term. Transformation in an organization requires seeing the value of change and it can take time to remove systemic barriers. Change in an organization requires attracting, retaining, and maintaining expertise in employment equity and diversity and inclusion. Funds will need to be secured for ongoing training and education, which should be considered throughout the organization. Measuring the success of GBA Plus initiatives will include an analysis of the representation and other work-related outcomes of persons with disabilities in the Federal Public Service compared to their workforce availability. The results of these efforts will be the promotion of the dignity of medically released CAF members as persons with disabilities and at the same time will help to maximize organizational effectiveness.

"The results of these efforts will be the promotion of the dignity of medically released CAF members as persons with disabilities and at the same time will help to maximize organizational effectiveness."

Conclusion

Many CAF members are medically released every year and they face challenges in the transition from military to civilian life. Medically released members have a better outcome in transitioning – in navigating the successive phases of the employment cycle – if barriers are removed. Having a physical injury or mental illness does not preclude an individual from being productive or even a superior employee. Persons with disabilities need to be judged on the basis of their capability with any workplace accommodation and not on the basis of their disability. Employers must engage in capitalizing on the talents and skill sets of persons with disabilities to reflect the diversity of Canada and to maximize organizational effectiveness.

For successful diversity and inclusion in the workplace, and to achieve real and lasting cultural change, there must be a collective effort to break down barriers faced by persons with disabilities. Although such effort may involve some financial costs, ultimately, it will cost more to leave persons with disabilities out of the labour force than it will cost to implement policies and programs that will improve long-term employment outcomes. Steps to break down barriers must be taken not only by able-bodied members, but also by persons with disabilities. In particular, cultural diversity training is required to help overcome the negative stereotypes of co-workers towards persons with disabilities, and employees with disabilities could also benefit from training that focuses on developing and sharpening their skills. The workplace accommodation process is a shared responsibility. Everyone involved should cooperatively engage in the process, share information and avail themselves of potential accommodation solutions. GBA Plus can and should be used at all stages of such an initiative, and GBA Plus initiatives must have measurable requirements and outcomes. Increasing the diversity of the workforce by hiring qualified persons with disabilities may not be as challenging as one might assume. Moreover, a diverse and inclusive workforce can enrich the opportunity for organizational growth.

Acknowledgements

We thank Dr. Joshua Granek and LCol (Ret'd) Suzanne Bailey for information on R2MR and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

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Sgt Yannick Bédard, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

Master Sailor Rebecca Gallant, Port Inspection Diver from Fleet Diving Unit (Atlantic) stands on parade during the closing ceremonies for Phase 1 of Exercise TRADEWINDS 15 in St Kitts and Nevis on June 9, 2015.

"The View Looking Up: A Junior NCM Perspective on Culture Change"

by Emily Caroline Reiman

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Introduction

In 2020, international protest movements such as "Black lives matter" and #MeToo, brought awareness to systemic issues such as racism and misogyny serving as a call for change. People were no longer willing to stand by and observe social injustices in relation to patriarchy, colonialism, heteronormativity or any other form of discrimination and violence. During this time, Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) also emerged as an internationally recognized series of practices that are critical to an organization's success and sustainability.[1] DEI can help frame an important dialogue for employers to create strategies to foster significant and sustainable workplace change.[2]

Similar to other governmental and public sector organizations, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) was suffering from its own organizational problems stemming from severe instances of sexual misconduct and discrimination against women and members of the LGBTQ2+ communities. To confront and respond to the organizational problems, the CAF has begun to employ DEI strategies. DEI recognizes that beyond diversity, organizations must also attend to systemic and structural power inequities. Thus, a focus on equity seeks out policy, procedural and structural injustice, while inclusion focuses on normative, cultural and social ways to increase acceptance, recognition and feelings of belonging.

Addressing the culture of the CAF is inherently an interdisciplinary problem and also, a "wicked problem".[3] Theorists Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber introduced the term "wicked problem" in 1973 as a way to understand complex social problems. Unlike scientific problems that can be solved and have a definitive end, which Rittel & Webber coined as "tame problems", "wicked problems" do not have a definitive or objective answer.[4] Policies

on implementation of DEI to encourage the CAF to become more inclusive often fail to address the systemic barriers of the military organization.[5] It is not enough to simply propose changes within policy, we must critically evaluate the social environment and culture of the CAF. As illustration, scholars from political science, sociology, and gender studies have identified covert barriers within the military that normalize misogynist and racially charged forms of militarized masculinity which in turn has led to inequality and a resistance to change.[6] Applying the theoretical frameworks of masculinity studies, hegemonic masculinity and social systems of power all offer explanations towards why changing the culture of the CAF is a complex problem.

The Problem with Implementation – From the Lens of a Junior NCM Woman

The complex task of implementing DEI and dismantling the systemic barriers within the culture of the CAF is often organized and implemented from the top down. In this way, the voices and perspectives of junior ranking members are often overlooked. As a serving junior non-commissioned (NCM) woman, my experientially and academically informed perspective can illustrate the contributions that the lesser heard demographic of the CAF is able to offer. The CAF has failed to see and acknowledge the reactions and responses from Junior NCM's, despite the fact that implementation of policy is critical to modification of behaviours and shattering systemic issues of misogyny, racism and heteronormativity. The use of autoethnography is a helpful way to frame my personal experience and thoughtfully investigate policies and social practices within the CAF.[7] This methodological approach of institutional ethnography was developed by Dorothy Smith and 'explicate the actual social processes and practices organizing people's everyday experience from a standpoint in the everyday world'.[8]

I have served in the RCAF for 7 years, and have been a part of three different units, deployed twice on operational tours, and participated in multiple domestic exercises and short-term deployments. I have an extensive educational background that has primarily focused on equity and feminist studies. I position myself with a strong educational background and a unique lived experience within the CAF to be able to frame my perspective.

Having a background in law enforcement prior to the military, I am no stranger to the pervasive hyper masculine culture that permeates the para military culture that is policing. Joining law enforcement at such a young and impressionable age, I was confronted with a culture to which I felt obliged to conform to succeed. After joining, it was no surprise to me that the CAF was experiencing a similar culture. I quickly realized that law enforcement and the military were outwardly projecting an inclusive front, but were simply hiding its exclusionary, sexist and racist behaviour as a veiled form of fitting into the old boys club. I witnessed firsthand what happened to those who spoke out against misconduct and was intimately aware that doing so was a "career killer". Observing this served as a warning to stay silent and conform if you wanted to succeed.

"law enforcement and the military were outwardly projecting an inclusive front, but were simply hiding its exclusionary, sexist and racist behaviour as a veiled form of fitting into the old boys club"

The Harassment Prevention and Resolution Instruction for CAF members states that "self-help" is an initial option and that conflict should ideally be resolved not reported at the lowest level. Sexual misconduct, hateful conduct must be reported to MP, CFNIS, CO, CCMS or SMRC. There is no stipulation in policy or guidance to report at the lowest level. Despite the direction, it is common place in units to encourage and promote reporting "at the lowest level". Solving at the lowest level has translated into a way to make issues silently go away without holding anyone accountable. It is veiled as a way to address inappropriate behaviours proactively, but given the lack of buy-in of DEI policies, the mid-level ranks become echo chambers with resistant leadership. This can often result in leadership protecting favourite subordinates themselves. My recommendations will speak to a suggestion for a better way forward with reporting – one that would eliminate the harmful practices that are weaponized to silence those brave enough to speak out.

The importance of my perspective is amplified when considering the majority of professional literature written on DEI and the CAF. A cursory search of keywords on DEI on the CAF Virtual Library (CAFVL) reveals that most pieces are written by senior officers. Education is more accessible and recognized within the officer cadre and the Masters of Defence Studies at Royal Military College (RMC) through which senior officers are encouraged to produce papers. NCM's can be reimbursed for academic studies they undertake on their own but higher education is not part of NCM professional development. Due to the disinterest and lack of perceived incentive for NCM's to complete higher education, coupled with a limited dispersion of women across the ranks in the CAF – it becomes clear why there is a gap in academic contribution from junior ranking non-commissioned women.

Not until NCM's achieve higher ranks are they expected to contribute to higher level decision-making, military research, or academic scholarship. In the spirit of DEI, this is a missed opportunity. It takes roughly 30 years to create the Generals, Admirals or Chief Warrant Officers and Chief Petty Officers (CWOs/CPO1s) who constitute the senior ranks of the CAF.[9] Given the CAF's underrepresentation of women over the past 30 years, it is unlikely that we will see women dominating the senior ranking positions any time soon.

Despite this gap in research from junior ranking women members, the exploitation of their emotional labour and lived experience is pervasive. After participating in numerous focus groups that address culture change in the CAF, I have left feeling drained and unproductive. I may be made hopeful by the promise of grand changes and feel validated, but I have never been offered a concrete way forward.

The emotional labour of a woman in the CAF is often exploited as a "token voice" or to provide education and advice on how to behave appropriately in the workplace. What becomes exhausting is the expectation that initiatives will simply implement themselves and that women and underrepresented groups must continually explain to others why these projects are necessary. Brown and Okros validate this emotional labour and suggest, "While

gender perspectives concern "the equal rights and opportunities of everyone," the brunt of the work towards gender equality typically rests squarely on the shoulders of women, often bifurcating women's practices from maintaining unequal gender orders."[10] For women's inclusion to be fully realized, women are the ones that must continue to take responsibility for this implementation. Similarly, those stepping forward to speak their truth are potentially re-victimized by a resistant culture, unwilling to hear about the harassment they have endured. Kendall frames the experience of the warrior narrative and its effect on the survivor:

> It sounds great in passing, the idea of those who fought the patriarchy being stronger, braver, more ferocious than those who did not take the same risks. But what we don't talk about is what that costs victim. While they were fighting their way through whatever obstacles and feminism stands on the sidelines cheering them on, what happens when the coolness fades?[11]

Advocacy is the responsibility of everyone, and to marginalize women to be the sole advocates for culture change further perpetuates an othering mentality.

The Problem – From a Theoretical Perspective

Despite the CAF's history of women serving in the military, there has been a constant battle for women members to be accepted amongst men or equality among men and women, let alone gender-diverse members. Despite the removal of formal legal barriers to women serving in all military roles in 2001[12] the issue of gender integration in relation to equity and inclusion was not addressed effectively. The CAF declared that gender integration was complete, but the changes were superficial.[13] Simply allowing women into the CAF without a plan to overcome systemic processes that placed them at a disadvantage speaks to the issues CAF members are still dealing with today. In a candid article on barriers to women in the CAF, Pierotti[14] suggests, "Despite all the progress, the CAF is still not the safe and desirable employer of women that it wishes it could be". As an organization, the CAF needs to address and combat systemic issues that perpetuate inequality, harassment and misconduct.

"sexual misconduct, hostile culture, or inequality are exacerbated in the CAF due to the institution's professional purpose, rank structure, power imbalances, and historical systemic issues with misogyny, racism and heteronormativity."

From Representation to Inclusion

In 2017, *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (SSE) presented the Government of Canada's (GoC) new defence policy. SSE asserted, "The Canadian Armed Forces is committed to gender equality and providing a work environment where women are welcomed, supported and respected".[15] SSE emphasized a need to reflect the Canadian demographic through more inclusive recruitment and avows that the CAF shall align with the Canadian values of inclusion, compassion, accountable governance, and respect for diversity and human rights.[16] SSE set a target of 25% female representation by the year 2026. As of March, 2020, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) was comprised of approximately 68,000 regular force and 27,000 reserve force members, with only 16% of that population being women.[17] As of April 2022, the population of women remains stagnant at 16%.[18] While greater representation of women in the armed forces aligns with Canada's national and international commitments[19], the inclusion of women requires considerable attention to institutional culture.

DEI have become important values to organizations seeking to foster meaningful and significant culture change. Yet, approaches to DEI in other organizations are wildly different when considering the military's unique structure. Despite being similarly experienced in other organizations, sexual misconduct, hostile culture, or inequality are exacerbated in the CAF due to the institution's professional purpose, rank structure, power imbalances, and historical systemic issues with misogyny, racism and heteronormativity.

Military Structure

The military is a rigid organization that is known in modern society as a "profession" or "profession in arms".[20] The military operates much like other businesses or corporations, but is set apart by the requirement of "unlimited liability", the contractual obligation to lay down one's life.[21] The military rank structure creates a highly hierarchical social system where power is used to control those of subordinate rank. The military rank structure has the potential for misuse of power and dominance, which are frequently associated with status or, in the context of the military, rank.[22] As Magee and Galinsky suggest, "Inherent to the definition of a social hierarchy is the stratified ranking of group members along a valued dimension, with some members being superior or subordinate to others, and fewer members occupying the highest positions."[23] Men are more concentrated at higher ranks.[24] The power and dominance of rank is deeply entrenched in the CAF member's psyche and is performed through symbols, behaviour, the chain of command and tradition. Members are socialized to follow the rank structure as a form of discipline and order. Brown and Okros explain that both men and women experience this socialization by suggesting that "gender inequalities within militaries continue despite women's increased representation, as women along with men go through processes of socialization where they each adopt traditional gender norms of the military institution and the profession of arms".[25]

Hypermasculinity and Patriarchal Systems

Not only does the military emphasize a power-based hierarchal system, but the Deschamps Report describes its organization culture as "highly sexualized and hypermasculine".[26] Reinforced through Connell's theory of power, "Men in general are advantaged by current social structure."[27] The construction of social power in the CAF is highly gendered and remains patriarchal in nature. The required culture change is much less about equality, as it is more concerned with the discomfort of giving up power



MS Dan Bard, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

A member of the ship's company stands by the .50 calibre heavy machine gun as HMCS HALIFAX enters the port of Aksaz, Turkey at the end of Exercise DOGU AKDENIZ 19, in the Eastern Mediterranean, as part of Operation REASSURANCE on November 18, 2019.

and confronting the perceived entitlement of benefits offered by a patriarchal system.

Hegemonic Masculinity

Connell's theory of hegemonic masculinity is one way to frame the structure of the military.[28] Connell suggests, "Hegemonic masculinity is always constructed in relation to various subordinated masculinities as well as in relation to women".[29] Militarized masculinity suggests that the process of creating soldiers idealizes specific forms of combative and competitive masculinities.[30] The associated behaviours of the ideal warrior and soldier are highly gendered and favour masculine traits.[31] The embodiment of idealized masculine traits such as, "toughness, violence, aggression, courage, control, and domination" have been noted as idealized by members regardless of gender identity.[32] However, the intersections of gender with other categories of difference such as racialization, sexuality, service, occupation and rank can make it difficult to fit the norm of militarized masculinities.[33] Over the years, more women in the CAF has not resulted in a change in militarized masculinity, as women have been socialized into the military in the same way as men. Thus, militarized masculinity remains a powerful systemic barrier to the inclusion of women as well as diverse members.

Critical Perspectives

The CAF has been advancing culture change through new policy and by implementing DEI initiatives. In addition to my ethnographic observations, the dominant narratives in the media and formal government reports about the problems of the CAF provide valuable lenses to assess progress.

Lack of direction or strategy. A common theme amongst media stories and external reports on the CAF is the lack of direction or strategy to obtain DEI goals. A report from the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) Purge Fund released 23 recommendations to improve training and inclusion. The Purge Fund report noted there are no long-term strategies to monitor its effectiveness, little onboarding for employees to share resources and supports, and few efforts to expand LGBTQ representation through recruitment and retention.[34] Similar concerns were raised in an internal audit on the Evaluation of Diversity and Inclusion.[35] Findings revealed that "despite some progress in terms of representation of EE groups, this progress has been slow and not all goals have been met".[36] A report on recruitment and retention shared the same concern in its findings.[37] The report sought to determine if the systems and practices intended to increase recruitment and encourage retention was successful. Overall, the report found: "In our opinion, it is unlikely that the Regular Force will be able to reach the desired number of members by the 2018–19 fiscal year as planned. We also found that although the Canadian Armed Forces had established a goal of 25 percent for the representation of women, it did not set specific targets by occupation, nor did it have a strategy to achieve this goal".[38]

Tone-deaf. Despite the sentiment in SSE asserting, "The Canadian Armed Forces is committed to gender equality and providing a work environment where women are welcomed, supported and respected" the CAF has been accused of being tone deaf.[39] In February 2021, then Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Art McDonald's tweeted about diversity, inclusion and culture change. The photo featuring eight, white men at the table and one woman (LGen Francis Allen (now VCDS) participating virtually) sidelined on the screen, caused backlash from the general public. Tricia Doyle urged that people take this as a lesson in blanket diversity statements stating, ""No one is looking for token changes," she said. "We're looking for systemic changes, we're looking for access to opportunity at all levels."[40]

By December 2021, the originator of the tone-deaf photo tweet had been terminated in connection with sexual misconduct allegations. McDonald was one of eleven senior Canadian military leaders who were investigated or forced into retirement that year. The CBC observed: "The investigations often came to light publicly only after journalists started asking questions of the Department of National Defence (DND)."[41] In response, military police cited privacy and limitations on the public's right to know.

Empty promises. Many articles have quotations from leader who make vague statements and promises that fall through. In a 2017 article on encouraging inclusion, General Vance, stated that if the Canadian Forces wants to "become more diverse and inclusive, we're going to have to change."[42] Then the article references a need for proper fitting women's body armour. Despite the announcement of a $2 million dollar project, it was later abandoned. General Vance was later stripped of the prestigious Order of Military Merit and conditionally discharged from the military after having completed his term as Chief of Defence Staff.[43]

Recommendations

DEI is a "wicked problem" for the CAF and requires structural changes to influence practices. Despite the CAF continuing to present solutions to promote equity through the CAF employment equity plan 2021-2026, the CAF is waiting for the new Chief of Professional Conduct and Culture to provide strategic direction on culture change.[44] Based on the critical analyses presented and from my vantage point within the RCAF, I offer four recommendations for how to move forward with the implementation of DEI.

Cpl Braden Trudeau, Canadian Armed Forces

Members of the Helicopter Air Detachment aboard HMCS MONTREAL conduct helicopter hoist drills with a CH-148 Cyclone helicopter, call sign Strider, during Operation REASSURANCE on February 13, 2022

Flight Safety Model

The Flight Safety (FS) program is used by the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) to investigate aviation accidents or incidents with potential to cause loss of lives or resources[45]. The FS program is based on a "just culture" that seeks to shift from placing blame to focusing on reducing future safety incursions. "Our Flight Safety culture is founded on decades of learning from our mistakes and the fact that everybody can contribute to improving our operations without fear of retribution".[46] Personnel at all ranks and levels are required to be a part of the FS program. The spirit of the FS program can be directly applied to the implementation of DEI within the CAF. The fifth fundamental principle of the FS program emphasizes: "Free and open sharing of critical safety information between managers and operational personnel, without the threat of punitive action."[47]

The framework of the FS program could be applied to discussions and education on DEI, as well as a more appropriate, accessible reporting system. The reporting system would remove biased responses and eliminate the fear of retribution towards the individual for raising a concern. An application of DEI would see members being encouraged to foster an environment that welcomes discussions on inclusion, without fear of being ostracized. Rather than mandating self-study courses on issues of DEI, open discussions that facilitate psychologically safe and honest conversation should be implemented.

In many ways, the FS program is intended as an equalizer to prevent future major disasters instead of holding an individual accountable for a minor mistake. The FS program states, "Personnel are able to report occurrences, hazards or safety concerns as they become aware of them, without fear of sanction or embarrassment." In the spirit of the "just culture", I recommend that this culture be extended beyond FS to become the primary way of informing culture change efforts and a starting point for reporting. Members should have the ability to report in a timely manner that removes residual fear of retribution and protects their dignity. Most importantly, just culture would remove the biased first step of "reporting at the lowest level" so often encouraged and applauded. As outlined in my autoethnography, resolution at the lowest level is often ill equipped to handle reporting and responses can serve to silence the victim, protect the offender, and remain unresolved. The success of the FS program indicates that the model of just culture is an effective way to transform culture and encourage a way to report misconduct safely and effectively.

The Role of Allyship in Culture Change.

The inherent power that accrues to men from a masculinized military can be used in a productive way to promote effective allyship with women members. Kendall suggests "Sometimes being a good ally is about opening the door for someone instead of insisting that your voice is the only one that matters."[48]

Likewise, the reciprocal relationship of allyship could foster the support from women as men become more informed on issues of DEI. Similar to the FS program of open and honest communication, respectful support for members who feel intense pressure to embody hyper-masculine traits may help them learn how to create an inclusive culture that enables transformation. Respectful support meets members where they are, supports their learning and provides useful feedback to change the culture of the CAF. Such a reciprocal relationship can only happen if the member is receptive to change, and if others are supportive in facilitating their learning and transformation. That is, it is the right thing to do. Pierotti asserts the role of men in changing the culture in the CAF:

> "Men must make changes to the culture that will eliminate harassment in the workplace and encourage flexible work arrangements for all personnel across the military. The men leading and shaping the CAF must make this a priority because we are already struggling to maintain the size of the force demanded by the Government."[49]

Knowledge is Power

This article posits the majority of academic research contributed by CAF leaders as being conducted by men who are senior ranking officers. This is a function of accessibility for senior ranking members, the decrease in women's representation in mid to senior levels of leadership, and a lack of incentives for junior ranking members to pursue higher education. "Generically, the military tends to deliver skills training rather than a broader education of the theories, concepts, and frameworks that comprise the theory-based body of knowledge that informs professional practice".[50] Academia teaches students to think critically about an issue or problem. The first time the CAF delivers theory-based learning is for the select group of senior officers who are nominated to take graduate level courses at Canadian Forces College. Senior NCM's receive much more limited learning on short courses at the Osside Institute, but junior NCM's are restricted to trades-based technical skills training. Encouraging junior ranking members to explore defence and security issues through academic inquiry and to produce research for and about the CAF would broaden professional intellectual capabilities and expand the wealth of institutional knowledge beyond a narrow group of professionals. An inclusive professional body of knowledge requires investigation and scholarly contributions from all perspectives and ranks, but this necessitates a greater commitment by the CAF to educate its members differently. After all, SSE asserts, "Investing in our people is the single most important commitment we can make."[51]

Reverse Mentoring

Finally, I recommend that reverse mentoring become part f an informed culture that would give voice to junior ranking members. I have identified throughout my article the lack of junior ranking contributions in academia, as well as the lack of action taken when members contribute to focus groups. Reverse mentoring became popular in the 1990's as a way to inform executives of technology changes; while currently being applied to support diversity and inclusion initiatives.[52] Reverse mentoring provides the opportunity for senior ranking members to be informed on issues or concerns of they would not otherwise be aware. Reverse mentoring could provide transparency at all rank levels of how culture change is being implemented and received.

Given the generational gap between most junior and senior ranking members, there is often a disconnect between the Zeitgeist of their respective generations. Proposed culture change within the CAF has generally failed to be informed by the desired values and workplace environments of younger generations. When considering future policy that affects CAF culture, it would be beneficial to co-create between junior and senior ranks. The benefit is reciprocal, as it provides junior ranking members an opportunity to have their voices heard and to develop their leadership skills. For senior ranking members, the use of reverse mentoring explicitly shows a desire to be inclusive of the unique knowledge and experience of their subordinates, which promotes an inclusive team. To be heard, to be valued, and to be recognized for the skillsets one holds is the key to promoting an environment that shows full respect for one another.

"Reverse mentoring provides the opportunity for senior ranking members to be informed on issues or concerns of they would not otherwise be aware."

Conclusion

This article has used an autoethnographic lens to analyze systemic barriers of implementation of DEI in the CAF. Future research might see the CAF encourage members engage in critical autoethnography to identify how they have been affected by institutional policies, to have a voice in shaping them, and to assess how DEI policies and initiatives are being experienced at the unit level. The CAF stands to benefit from research that gives voice to the often-overlooked junior ranking members. This glaring gap in research results in a lack of insight into how well policy and initiatives are working. Junior and non-commissioned members offer an underutilized advantage for the CAF to learn about the way the institution functions, as they are often the ones who have the most to say, but with the least opportunity to speak up. After all, junior ranking members will become the leaders of the future CAF. By incorporating junior members in the discussion and positive implementation of DEI, we will see faster, permanent culture changes and more effective feedback loops to ensure strategic plans that actually deliver on intended results.

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Leadership Through Adversity: Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall in Japanese Captivity

by Chris Madsen

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Captivity as a prisoner of war is a challenging experience for any military member. After the point of capture, arguably the most dangerous moment at start of a longer ordeal, the surrendered soldier enters into a confined world dictated by respect for governing legal rules and military convention, differences of culture and language, expectations of mutual interaction, and the vagaries of personality and behaviour.[1] It is hard to characterize a typical captivity experience because circumstances of each situation can be so different. Certainly, freedoms become restricted, life revolves around set routine, and the prevailing boredom of confinement is interrupted by instances of excitement. Provision of food and daily personal requirements involve constant struggles, and in extreme cases, disagreements can lead to violence, threats, serious injury or even death while in captivity. The lot of prisoners of war represents a lottery, wherein chance and causality determine treatment after capture.

Captors who follow established legal rules and treat prisoners with respect according to humanitarian principles and military convention will generally ensure better conditions. The prisoner of war is not a criminal, but only held out of combat for duration of captivity until conflict ends.[2] Prisoners look forward to eventual return home, reintegration into the professional armed forces, or release into civilian life. When responsible authorities care less about expected standards, neglect basic needs, and wilfully abuse prisoners through arbitrary and brutal conduct, the situation is far more trying physically and emotionally for those enduring captivity. At these points of stark abnormality, the will to survive almost appears beyond the control of any single individual. The experience of Canadian and Allied prisoners of war in Japan during the Second World War fits the pattern of a harsher captivity at hands of a sometimes cruel and inimical enemy.[3]

Squadron Leader Leonard Birchall, during three years and four months in Japanese captivity, manifested true military leadership in confronting a truly terrible situation. A native of St. Catharines, Ontario, Birchall was a professional officer and pilot in the Royal Canadian Air Force deployed in maritime patrol squadrons flying long-range Catalina aircraft. In April 1942, he and his crew were shot down in the Indian Ocean after locating a large Japanese fleet steaming toward the British naval base and air stations at Colombo for a major air strike comparable in scale to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor five months earlier.[4] Subsequently called the Saviour of Ceylon by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, Birchall was picked up by a Japanese destroyer and then returned to Japan onboard the aircraft carrier *Akagi*, flagship of the naval task force.

Upon reaching the port of Yokosuka, the RCAF officer was separated from other crew members and despatched to a special naval interrogation camp at Ofuna for a period of time until handed over to Japanese army authorities responsible for overall care of prisoners of war. In the next four camps, Birchall was the most senior ranking officer amongst prisoners (squadron leader was equivalent to major in the Canadian Army) and as such he assumed the leadership function of camp spokesman for dealing directly with the Japanese and maintaining discipline within the ranks.[5] Birchall also felt responsible for the health and welfare of those below him in the camps, an obligation not all captured officers shared. In everyday interactions, he tried to better the conditions of prisoners as a group and softened the worst excesses of Japanese actions. When reason and logical argument failed with the captors, the camp spokesman frequently received beatings on behalf of other individuals or collectively. Despite the constant threat of physical assault and worse sanctions, Birchall remained steadfast in his belief that prisoners should be treated as professional soldiers and human beings and that the group could only come through captivity stronger together. He demonstrated that one person through leadership and adherence to professional conduct can make a difference and thereby influence and alleviate the most negative aspects of captivity, so exemplified by the Japanese experience.[6]

"one person through leadership and adherence to professional conduct can make a difference and thereby influence and alleviate the most negative aspects of captivity"

The naval interrogation camp's purpose was to extract relevant military and operational information. The means were long hours of questioning, tricks, segregation, sleep deprivation, and purposeful restriction of food rations.[7] During his months there, Birchall dropped several kilograms in weight, no doubt related to his lack of cooperation. Arrival of new prisoners of interest to the Imperial Japanese Navy from sea battles in the Java Sea and the southern campaigns put further strains on available accommodation and food supply. Camp authorities and guards insisted on prisoners speaking Japanese, and Birchall recognized that rudimentary learning of the foreign language would be necessary for increasing survival chances in captivity.[8] The choice was entirely pragmatic, as he expressed neither fondness nor comprehension of Japanese culture and society. It is safe to say that Birchall, like many Allied prisoners of war held in Japan, came to hold a lasting hatred of the Japanese borne from captivity that persisted long after the war. The conviction derived from firsthand experience in enemy hands as much as the prejudices of a generation that lived and fought through an ideological and racially motivated world war.

The main camps where Birchall found himself most senior in rank and leader amongst prisoners of war were makeshift places of detention holding a diverse collection of defeated persons from Japan's early military conquests: British and Canadians from Hong Kong, Americans from Guam and the Philippines, Dutch from the East Indies, Australians from New Guinea, and merchant seamen taken off interned ships.[9] The first, designated Camp No. 3, was housed in a large requisitioned baseball stadium outside Tokyo located near factories and other industrial concerns. Transferred there in September 1942, Birchall discovered little semblance of military authority and open resentment toward the behaviour of some officers after surrender. Many other ranks felt that their own officers had abandoned them. The Japanese promised Allied officers favours and better treatment in return for cooperation and turning against subordinates. The result was a leadership void that the Canadian Birchall sought to fill by uniting all prisoners of war, regardless of nationality and service affiliation, into a common body following a military structure with shared goals.

"Enduring captivity was much less an individual survival mechanism than a collective effort"

The Japanese commanding officer at the baseball stadium camp was Lieutenant Hayashi Junsho whom Birchall found inconsistent and unpredictable. He vacillated between arbitrary demands and occasional shows of force and violence. Even minor infractions were severely punished, including failing to salute. Birchall and other prisoners learned quickly which Japanese amongst non-commissioned officers and guards were most brutish or amenable to enticements. Although subject to punishment if caught, prisoners traded for medicines, food, and other items useful to living in captivity. When barter or paying off proved impossible, stealing and concealment were resorted to. The change instituted by Birchall was that all such activity would benefit the group as well as the individual. Careful records were kept of all transactions and values placed on items, split evenly between the prisoner who took the risk and the general ledger. Deaths from sickness and malnourishment were soon reduced in total numbers within the camp. Enduring captivity was much less an individual survival mechanism than a collective effort.

The Japanese, in situating camps and employing prisoners, were chiefly interested in labour. Allied prisoners of war were brought to Japan from other parts of Asia where they had been captured, to work in industrial concerns and factories as manual and semi-skilled workers. The 1929 Geneva Convention made distinctions between labour directly related to the war effort, which was prohibited and work performed by prisoners of war in selected industrial sectors of importance to the broader civilian economy. The Japanese, however, hardly respected legal stipulations because Japan had never signed and ratified the international convention governing prisoners of war.[10] Instead, the Japanese military followed its own laws and regulations which were heavily influenced by Bushido, a modern interpretation of the ancient Samurai code popular in Japan's militarized wartime society.

In the Japanese view, prisoners of war, by choosing to surrender or allowing themselves to be captured, lived in shame and were no better than common coolies. Birchall, like most soldiers from western militaries, held a different conception about status and obligations of prisoners in captivity. For them, existing international law and custom dictated that they be held and cared for to the same standard as the captor nation military, as much as possible. It was small comfort that the brutality meted out prisoners of war was probably comparable to that prevalent throughout the Japanese military toward lower ranks.

Although the 1929 Geneva Convention stipulated that officers were not required to work manual labour and perform only supervisory functions over men in their charge, actual practice in Japan was that all prisoners of war from camps worked regardless of rank. The Japanese selected places of employment, numbers, working hours, and quotas for output. Birchall constantly interceded with Japanese camp commanders to limit the most strident demands in terms of reasonable work. Many conflicts involved exemption from employment of sick prisoners and extent to which individual prisoners actually suffered the effects of ill-health. Given the inconsistent and sub-standard diet, most prisoners suffered from malnutrition and in their weakened bodily states were prone to disease and ailments beyond the normal run of most militaries. A considerable number of prisoners inside Birchall's camps, for example, lost their eyesight due to vitamin deficiencies. They were expected to put in full days of work as well. Ironically, outside employment allowed prisoners wider opportunity to forage food and other items to barter for medicines. Fresh produce and meats were clandestinely brought into camps and cooked for benefit of the group.

At Birchall's second main camp on the Asano Docks, working parties and individuals regularly broke into shipping packages and containers to find anything useful. The Japanese forbade such activity, and severely punished offenders when discovered, but they could not halt the practice. Birchall reflected later that theft and stealing was a necessary acquired skill in captivity. Prisoners engaged on work details grew the most adept and enjoyed the best opportunities. The Japanese faced a dilemma because labour provided by prisoners was a top priority, but employment in scattered concerns outside camps loosened supervision and positive control leading to increased conflict between the two sides. In such situations, Birchall reminded Lieutenant Hayashi and other Japanese camp commanders that only healthy and alive prisoners of war could be useful workers. Due to acute shortages in civilian labour and urgent need, the argument usually won out. Birchall directly used labour performed by prisoners of war as leverage over Japanese authority and actions.

Birchall always recognized his limitations in dealing with the Japanese, particularly the junior officers running camps. He technically held higher rank according to military convention, but they were clearly in charge and well able to exert their authority over prisoners, at times in very arbitrary and unreasonable ways. Orders passed to Birchall were expected to be observed without hesitation, and if transgressions discovered, as they inevitably were, Birchall was either held personally responsible or forced to explain on behalf of the prisoner population. The Japanese disliked lying and deliberate untruths, which they considered shameful conduct by officers and soldiers. For his part, Birchall believed it was all part of the game, and he frequently lied and misrepresented facts until caught out or forced to construct another elaborate concocted

story made somehow believable to buy more time. In captivity, professional officers bound by honour and codes of conduct were bendable in times of extreme distress under an enemy showing sadistic tendencies. Flexibility and realistic probabilities of least harm were key to handling the Japanese and their demands.

Nonetheless, Birchall condemned individuals who cheated and benefited at the expense of other prisoners of war in satellite camps and treated in hospitals away from main camps beyond his immediate control. When such prisoners returned, Birchall enforced his own sanctions or fully documented each case for later judgment by military authorities after liberation. Active collaboration with the enemy and treasonable behaviour were never tolerated for long.

Burning of sick prisoners in the guise of medical treatment provided perhaps the starkest conflict with Japanese orders and authority. Acting upon higher directives, Japanese medical personnel began selecting prisoners with acute ailments from the camp hospital and subjecting them to a procedure involving lighting of powder applied to sections of the skin, which left burns that reddened and blistered. Birchall, as camp spokesman, and the Allied camp doctor protested such experimentation and told the Japanese commander that they would not condone "the branding of prisoners like cattle." Lieutenant Hayashi, however, remained unmoved, and only after negotiation did Birchall convince him that if sick prisoners were to receive such medical treatment, then burning should be applied by responsible medical staff amongst the prisoners.

"In general, prisoners of war should be protected from medical experimentation under international law and customary practice."

Birchall immediately ordered the practice stopped, much to the relief of the distressed doctor, and saved more patients from the burning treatment, except for a few later at the hands of a Japanese medical sergeant on his own accord. The Japanese apparently were only concerned that an order had been given from above and cared less about adverse physical effects on prisoners. Birchall successfully used his skills of persuasion and some guile to end objectionable and arguable illegal acts on the most vulnerable prisoners in the camp. None of the sick prisoners suffering from a variety of health conditions gained from the unusual Japanese treatment and in fact they now had greater health complaints that compromised pre-existing conditions. Most tellingly, the Japanese declined to perform burning treatment on other Japanese, military or civilian. In general, prisoners of war should be protected from medical experimentation under international law and customary practice.

Defiance in captivity was carefully considered. Location of camps in the heart of Japan meant escape or attempted escape were virtually impossible. There was simply nowhere to go. Waters surrounding Japan provided a barrier to reaching any friendly territory. Any prisoner of war trying to escape faced considerable risk of being shot and killed during the act of getting through wired enclosures and past guards, and even from surrounding civilian populations and police once free and on the run. White-skinned Caucasians emasculated by work and thin diets speaking English or European languages hardly blended into the countryside.

Far more often, prisoners of war employed on worksites stayed longer than allowed or exited the camp for short periods of time to free-range, thereby missing roll-calls and counts. The Japanese response was unequivocal about breaking of promulgated rules and orders. Birchall acknowledged that in such situations little could be done beyond simple reasonable argument. Caught prisoners were separated from camp populations and confined, required to stand at attention in yards for lengthy periods of time, and subjected to physical blows and slaps. These sanctions, except the last, were routine in most captivity situations and allowable under international convention.

Situational awareness was important even in a prison camp. Birchall consciously befriended Japanese interpreters to improve sources of information and gain some advantage during translation of interactions with Japanese officers and commanders. The interpreters were often civilians conscripted into the Imperial Japanese Army, and some even had visited or came from North America, as students to attend universities in Japan. Japanese interpreters privately told Birchall of military plans to liquidate or kill Allied prisoners should the war turn decisively against Japan and the Americans tried to invade the Japanese home islands. By strength of numbers, prisoners of war could have attempted to over-power guards and seize the camp by force or riot, but in their weakened state the object might not have been feasible and casualties likely would have been high. Even if the camp was taken, the Japanese could always bring in troops to quell any disturbance. Resort to force was therefore a losing proposition one way or the other. Birchall decided it was much better to wait out events and only act when necessary with sufficient forewarning. If the Japanese intended to kill all prisoners at once, then suitable action as soldiers could be warranted. Slaughtering unarmed men *en masse* would be a conscious choice. To defy openly the armed Japanese, whom possessed all the advantages, was a last resort in Birchall's mind.

Contacts with the outside the world beyond camps and extended workplaces in Japan were limited. Mail was sporadic and very one-sided. The Japanese eventually allowed Birchall the privilege of sending cards back to his wife and family according to strict rules about content and format. Sentences were restricted in length and written in capital letters for ease of translation. In the first two years, he received no correspondence from home because Canadian military authorities still listed him missing in action whereabouts unknown until March 1943. Neutral Switzerland, through its legation in Japan, advised the Canadian government that Birchall was alive and acting as camp leader near Yokohama. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his actions in the Indian Ocean. In January 1944, the Royal Canadian Air Force promoted Birchall to Wing Commander, dating for purposes of seniority and pay from 5 April 1942 when he entered captivity. He only learned of the news in a letter from his father over a year later. The Japanese still recognized his existing rank and the promotion really made little difference in day-to-day administration inside the camps since he was already the most senior and actively engaged in leadership roles.

As part of propaganda efforts, the Japanese recorded Birchall reading scripted messages broadcast on short-wave radio to Allied forces and North America. These personal messages were directed to family members, specifically his wife and daughter, and mentioned the level of treatment afforded in Japan and his desire to go home.[11] Birchall reasoned that such messages, despite the clandestine purpose to make Japanese captivity seem more comfortable than in actuality, really only expressed feelings that he genuinely held. Personal information only mattered to his immediate family members, and it was better to have them know that he was surviving captivity in Japan. Civilians back in North America sent packages and parcels to Japan through neutral organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Canadian Red Cross Society.

Distribution of Red Cross parcels and other amenities meant for prisoners of war was in reality far less than depicted in Japanese propaganda. Civilians pilfered goods during transportation and military authorities held back supplies either to enforce good behaviour from prisoners or for their own enrichment. Birchall, however, was thankful for any parcels sent from home or provided by neutrals that finally reached prisoners, which boosted morale and frequently bettered chances in the continual contest between life and death in the camps. Most importantly, external contacts reminded prisoners that they were not forgotten as the war came closer to the Japanese home islands.

Gradual signs that military operations were tipping in Allied favour increased by the time Birchall reached his third camp at Omori in Summer 1944. Cut off from current news and subjected to strict censorship, prisoners of war held in Japan were kept ignorant about the war's prosecution and strategic matters in general. If guards were to believed, Japan was still winning victory after victory against weak and outnumbered foes. Rumours abounded about conduct of the war, since actual headlines were frequently out-of-date by months or arrived sporadically. Prisoners rarely had a complete picture of events, just what could be gleaned from contact with friendly Japanese or other reliable sources. Birchall logically deduced that lack of new arrivals from battlefronts suggested the Japanese were not taking further large numbers of prisoners and therefore at least checked in their offensive advances and maybe losing battles and campaigns.

Appearance of long-range American bombers in the skies over Japan's capitol city provided the clearest evidence so far. The Omori camp, located on a man-made island in the Shinagawa district on outskirts of Tokyo, furnished a front row spot to observe the effects of strategic bombing on Japan's industries and urban civilian population. Prisoners of war cheered the flying formations overhead and watched in fascination as planes dropped loads of incendiaries and high explosives in coordinated bombing runs on targets. Birchall, ever the air force professional, marvelled at the technical proficiency and accuracy achieved by the big US Army Air Force planes. Even so, large white PW letters were painted on building roofs to better distinguish the camp from the air in relation to its surroundings. Somehow it worked because Omori camp was spared the destruction and killing all round the general area. Prisoners were detailed to collect dead bodies thrown into the river, and civilians increasingly crowded onto the island seeking a safe haven from bombing. Fresh water supply to the camp was cut-off and electrical power flickered on and off.

A number of heavy bombers were shot down in the camp's general vicinity. One plane that crashed close-by was stripped of anything valuable and useful. American flying crews who survived crashes or parachuted out from burning aircraft, Birchall noted, were kept separate from the general prisoner of war population when brought into camp. The Japanese were interested in operational and technical intelligence, and moreover held the view that these terror flyers should be treated as criminals responsible for mass deaths. Many captured Americans were roughed up and killed before Birchall could intercede on their behalf and convince the Japanese to spare their lives.

"Prisoners of war shared in shortages of food afflicting the civilian population and disruption or breakdown of transportation networks"

The newest prisoners brought the latest news and reported on the war's progress. The American navy under Admiral Chester Nimitz strategically seized islands closer to Japan to provide the necessary airfields and long runways for heavy bombers, China with American assistance and supply held off Japanese land offensives, General Douglas MacArthur fought sea and land battles for retaking the Philippines, and Nazi Germany was close to defeat in drives by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, thereby depriving Japan its closest Axis ally.

While welcome tidings from a strategic perspective, conditions in Japanese camps actually worsened. Prisoners of war shared in shortages of food afflicting the civilian population and disruption or breakdown of transportation networks.[12] Already meagre diets became even more restricted. Opportunities for bartering or purchasing from civilians were curtailed because homes were burnt-out and factories where they had previously worked mostly destroyed. Birchall realized that time was working against them in this stage of captivity. What good was winning if prisoners of war in Japan starved before Allied military forces arrived? Or worse, what if Japanese military authorities decided that prisoners should be eliminated prior to conceding defeat, as a last passing mark to Bushido? Ominously, Birchall was told to prepare for transfer of himself and a large contingent from Omori to a new camp farther away in the remote hills.

The move to Suwa, the last camp in which Birchall resided from June 1945 until several weeks after Japan's unconditional surrender, was undertaken for entirely practical motives. The camp, adjacent to an open pit mine where prisoners of war were intended to work, was entirely new and roughly constructed. It lacked most amenities and even the fact that the water supply fed through agricultural fields was problematic. Crude conditions at Suwa were not the only challenges facing Birchall in his role as camp spokesman. A familiar opponent, Lieutenant Hayashi, was again Japanese commanding officer in the camp. Guards were a mix of regular army and civilian, all too willing to abuse prisoners at any opportunity.

Birchall again emphasized collective group interests and instituted the same system of sharing and reward from previous camps. Fresh produce and meat procured from civilian sources - purchased, foraged, or stolen - was pooled to augment rations provided by the Japanese military.[13] Cooking was communal and equal shares given out to all prisoners. As availability of food became more sporadic, meals frequently consisted of no more than thin soups or rice gruel with a few cut-up vegetables and little protein. Still, prisoners of war were now eating better than the guards and Japanese camp staff. Birchall concluded that living through the coming winter months at the Suwa camp would be almost impossible given declining availability of food, if the war continued for much longer.

Fortunately for Birchall and other Allied prisoners of war, end of the war against the Japanese in August 1945 came sooner rather than later. Atomic bombs dropped on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Americans initiated governmental and military actions in Japan to accept unconditional surrender.[14] Birchall only learned of these significant events through the Japanese camp interpreter. Hayashi, much less forthcoming with information, went to Tokyo to discuss with higher military authorities, intentions toward the prisoners and any subsequent arrangements for transfer and movement from Suwa. He was told to stay in place until the surrender instrument was signed and occupying American forces arrived.

"Making contact with Allied forces and planning for eventual movement and repatriation of prisoners of war was uppermost in his priorities."

Birchall, not willing to trust the Japanese completely, asserted his personal leadership upon Hayashi's return. Individual Japanese, he told them, would be held responsible for all acts against prisoners of war until liberation with clear obligations to take every reasonable step to ensure survival. Beatings and physical violence by guards stopped. Henceforth, control of the camp was shared between Birchall and Hayashi. Remaining stores of food and other materials were opened to the prisoners for inventory purposes and distribution. Hayashi still maintained contact with the far-away Japanese military headquarters, while Birchall negotiated and bluffed with the Japanese to assume more authority inside the camp. When the Japanese refused to release some prisoners from detention, Birchall threatened to take over the camp completely, since there were at least 230 prisoners and only 30 guards left. Privately, he dreaded taking such action, but the Japanese thankfully conceded by freeing the prisoners. Making contact with Allied forces and planning for eventual movement and repatriation of prisoners of war was uppermost in his priorities.

To alert the Americans to the location and presence of prisoners of war at Suwa, large PW letters were painted on building roofs on the camp's south side. On morning of 29 August 1945, a formation of eight American fighter aircraft overflew the camp, Birchall observing "it was a great thrill to see those white stars on the starboard wing."[15] It was the first contact with outside Allied military forces. The next day, another flight of naval aircraft returned dropping the first supplies by parachute and instructions for prisoners to line up one man for each 10 in the yard to give quick indication of numbers inside the camp. The items included 156 military ration packs, cigarettes, magazines and newspapers, canned meat and biscuits, packages of navy survival clothing, emergency rations taken from life rafts and boats, toilet paper, bandages and medical supplies, soap, powdered juice and cocoa, as well as chocolate fudge.[16] Well wishes were scribbled from the aircraft carrier USS *Bon Homme Richard*, whose personnel obviously had hurriedly collected whatever they could find and pushed into fighter, dive bomber, and torpedo planes for dropping to the prisoners. A US flag found in the bundles was raised on the camp's main flag pole.

Two more flights on 30 August and 5 September (the weather was inclement between those dates) delivered more military ration packs, canned meat and salmon, razor blades, tooth brushes and paste, and medical supplies. It was a remarkable example of military helping military. Birchall made sure all air-delivered bundles were collected, carefully inventoried, and then put in safe storage for general distribution. He even allowed the Japanese to keep a portion for their own needs. In no sense was the sudden bounty a free-for-all. Birchall worried about the effect of introducing rich food in greater quantity might have on weakened bodies and constitutions of those who had gone without for so long. He also planned to use whatever food and supplies remained to hasten an earlier departure from the camp.

Japanese arrangements for movement of Allied prisoners of war from Suwa pushed forward. Hayashi told Birchall to be ready to leave at any point. Birchall purchased a couple horses from nearby Japanese farmers for slaughter and killed two last pigs. Horsemeat was traded for fresh vegetables and a night's entertainment at a local hot springs hotel for some Allied and Japanese officers, which Birchall enjoyed as a fitting tribute before leaving the camp. The impending transfer was hardly secret, and large numbers of prisoners roamed the countryside trading existing and newly acquired goods for Saki and other alcohol, to celebrate themselves. Drunkenness and intoxication, Birchall observed, made keeping discipline hard amongst prisoners. Although willing to give them some license, Birchall still insisted on roll-calls and mandatory parades to keep up military forms. The difference was that these regular events were run by the prisoner of war leadership instead of the Japanese. In late evening on 6 September 1945, ten buses and trucks for baggage took Birchall and all prisoners to board a waiting train at the closest station. Birchall organized prisoners into groups, and not a single person was left behind. Once loaded, the train left for the port of Yokohama at 0030 early morning 7 September. The journey was delayed by several hours by derailment of another train on the tracks ahead. Prisoners of war helped injured survivors with blankets and gave out remaining medical supplies.

The train loaded with prisoners of war arrived at the Yokohama train station at 0900, and soon war journalists and photographers started to appear for a story. Trucks took them to the docks for processing, identification, and preliminary medical examinations.[17] The mood was celebratory and just a bit overwhelming. To American troops freshly arrived in Japan, the thin prisoners of war resembled skeletons, though they were grinning and happy to be free at last. The lucky ones survived Japanese captivity, in no small measure thanks to the leadership shown by Birchall in getting the group through trying situations together to the very last. Birchall, for the first time no longer responsible for the lives of the prisoners, collapsed onboard the hospital ship USS *Marigold* with

characteristic Canadian under-statement: "All the fight had gone out of me & just the big feeling of relief made me feel "What-the-Hell."[18] He was soon on his way back to Canada.

Birchall's Japanese captivity experience did not end with repatriation. Throughout his time in Japan, Birchall had meticulously recorded events and impressions in written diaries. Those pages in his possession at liberation were handed over to American military authorities. Other sections from diaries were subsequently dug up from hiding places in previous camps. About half the total pages were destroyed during shore bombardments from American warships or never found again. Although incomplete, this documentary record represented a bonanza for investigators and prosecutors of alleged war crimes. Birchall's rank and position as camp spokesman furnished unique insights into understanding what had happened in individual camps and the actions of specific Japanese military personnel in positions of responsibility and authority. Hayashi was one Japanese officer on Allied war crimes lists, as a so-called minor war criminal accused of committing alleged violations against American and Allied personnel.

To this end, the Americans held war crimes trials before eight military commissions at the district courthouse in Yokohama. At American request, the Royal Canadian Air Force authorized Birchall for travel to occupied Japan in November 1947, to give witness testimony and confirm details from his diaries entered into evidence. He flew from Ottawa to Montreal, Washington D.C., Fairfield, Hawaii, Guam, and then to Tokyo, a nine-day trip arriving 12 November.[19] In a deposition for the military commission, Birchall recounted his recall of events and answered questions about complicity of the three accused on trial – two Japanese camp commanders and one medical sergeant who allegedly abused prisoners of war. His testimony was straightforward and without prejudice.[20] Once finished, Birchall departed Japan in mid-December 1947, travelling through India and Europe, back to Washington, D.C. in time to join an American joint staff course as a student. Birchall resumed his professional career in the Royal Canadian Air Force and rose in rank to higher levels of responsibility in the Canadian armed forces.

The experience in Japanese captivity and leadership style developed during that time stayed with Birchall for the rest of his life. A less resilient person might have been irretrievably broken by the ordeal, as many prisoners of war held by the Japanese undoubtedly were. Birchall kept any psychological and emotional scars to himself, and in fact appeared to emerge from captivity stronger and more self-assured.[21] The decision to remain in the Royal Canadian Air Force was never in question. With his health and weight regained after extended leave with his family, Birchall returned to military service and duties as a professional officer. He served as the Canadian air attaché in Washington D.C., Canadian military attaché at NATO headquarters in Paris, and commanded a fighter base in Canada.[22] His last military posting was commandant at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, where he resided for four years until retirement in the rank of air commodore in 1964. Birchall stressed the importance of leadership in the military context and through personal example inspired younger generations of military leaders.

Retired in Winnipeg, he regularly talked to junior air force officers about his wartime exploits, Japanese captivity, and later Royal Canadian Air Force career. Just as he had once felt responsible for the lives of Allied prisoners of war, Birchall believed only sound leadership better prepared military officers for complex and potentially adverse situations faced by them in the future. In doing so, Leonard Birchall always kept his professional perspective, modest demeanour concealing an inner strength, and a sense of humour.

CMJ

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MCpl Angela Abbey

Corporal Sebastien Gratton from Bulldog (Bravo) Company, 1er Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment Battle Group (1R22eR BG), provides local security in Nakhonay during Operation HAMAGHE SHAY where clearance patrols searched for caches of weapons and IED-making supplies.

A RoCK Looks Back

by Tim Martin

Tim Martin's *diplomatic career spans 30 years. In addition to RoCK, he has served as Canadian Representative in Palestine, Ambassador to Argentina and Ambassador to Colombia. Tim recently published his debut novel, Moral Hazards, set in the Somalia peacekeeping crisis of the 1990's and he is working on a sequel about conflict minerals. Tim has received three medals for his service to Canada and the Treasury Board Award of Excellence in the Public Service for assistance to Palestinian children effected by conflict.*

Introduction

In every generation Canada puts itself to the test at the epicenter of a geopolitical crisis. Afghanistan was that geopolitical crisis for my generation of diplomats and aid workers. I was the fourth Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK) and led Canada's civilian team there in 2011. It was the final year of Canada's mission in Kandahar. This personal commentary is about how it worked and what I learned.

The RoCK (Representative of Canada in Kandahar) was a new kind of diplomatic position in the Government of Canada designed to lead our civilian stabilization and development work in the Province of Kandahar. With Head of Mission rank, it operated in a peer relationship to the general in charge of Task Force Kandahar and directed the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT) which operated out of Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar city. The civilian team was also responsible for dialogue with the Provincial Government. The RoCKs who proceeded me were Elissa Golberg, Ken Lewis and Ben Rowswell.

Canadians can be proud of the way our government delivered stabilization, aid and governance projects in the hostile conditions of Kandahar. Canadian public servants stepped up to serve their country in a war zone and in circumstances that were unprecedented, austere and dangerous. It's to the credit of the professionalism and ethics of the public service that many women and men did sign up, leave their homes and serve. Finding and training great people with the necessary skills who were prepared for the sacrifices and risks was a challenge, but not a barrier, to deploying a fully staffed civilian operation.

A decade later, with the Taliban in Kabul and Afghans suffering a humanitarian catastrophe, I won't minimize the painful failure of NATO and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. It's a result of errors at the level of intelligence, strategy and over-optimism about what was achievable. It's also a defining geopolitical and historical reality. Nevertheless, it would be a pointless mistake not to look back and learn from experience.

How the Civilian Mission Worked

At its peak, more that 120 civilians from across the federal government were deployed in Afghanistan alongside 2880 Canadian Forces Members. We had four main lines of civilian business.

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided development, sectorial and project management experts in the areas of health and humanitarian affairs, agriculture, education and economic growth. Since the objective was to enable the Afghan government to govern, everything we did was done with responsible handover in mind.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police led a team of Canadian policemen and women from police services across Canada. It was some 20 officers at its peak with a mandate of training and mentoring the Afghan National Police (ANP). This included training in subjects from literacy to investigation techniques. A purpose-built Police Training Centre was established in the KPRT and this was subsequently handed over to the Afghans. Afghan police were Taliban targets for assassination. For this reason, a training centre inside the wire of Camp Nathan Smith was of huge value to the students and instructors alike. Canada made a concerted and effective effort to include Afghan policewomen in our training programs.

Correctional Services Canada provided four experienced officers who came from active duty in Canadian prisons. Their work was to bring the central prison in Kandahar, Sarpoza, up to international standards. This meant improvements in security, as well as living conditions and vocational training for prisoners. It also meant training in areas of management, administration, prisoner handling and attitude shift on the Afghan side. Sarpoza operated in an extreme threat environment. It faced internal threats from insurgent prisoners and constant external threats from the Taliban seeking to break out its fighters.

The Department of Foreign Affairs conducted the classic diplomatic work of political analysis and dialogue which was crucial for understanding and engaging the political dynamics of Kandahar. Foreign Affairs also funded and implemented infrastructure projects for governance, justice and security. Critical among them was creating safe living and working spaces for officials; a fundamental requirement when they are assassination targets of a determined insurgency. Canadian diplomats were additionally responsible for monitoring the conditions and wellbeing of those detainees captured by Canadian Forces then transferred to the Afghan authorities and held in Sarpoza prison or the detention centre of the National Directorate of Security. This was Canada's practical expression of our commitment to the Geneva Convention and prevention of torture. In terms of improving human rights, it's hard to think of anything more important than implementing international standards for prisons in situations of armed conflict.

Finally, Foreign Affairs, together with CIDA, handled strategic communications and media relations.

Both CIDA and DFAIT deployed civilian stabilization officers with diplomatic and development skills to support the effort in the district centres which was where the rubber met the road in terms of Afghan citizen contact with their government.

Military Support

The Canadian Forces provided essential capabilities. A stabilization company (STAB A) gave us dedicated transportation in the form of tactical vehicles (LAVs and Cougars) for movement in our area of operations (the province of Kandahar is some 54,000 square km). STAB A would accompany us and provide foot patrol and perimeter protection for all our work outside the wire. This was augmented by helicopter transportation which was a Regional Command resource.

SET, or the Strategic Engineering Team oversaw the design and construction of key projects and infrastructure. This was complemented by a contracting and finance unit. Afghan contractors were the most economical option for construction and gave employment benefits to Kandaharis.

"Canada completed its work in Kandahar and closed a unique, innovative and effective model of joining civilian capabilities with a large multinational military campaign"

In the summer of 2011 Canada completed its work in Kandahar and closed a unique,innovative and effective model of joining civilian capabilities with a large multinational military campaign.

In remarks to the Kingston International Security Conference of 2011, I said, *"The Canadian military and civilian effort was remarkable and successful in an extremely difficult context. Canada took on an operational role in a hostile environment with a spirit of innovation, resolve and purpose and made a huge positive change in the lives of the people of Kandahar."*

What I Learned from Kandahar

Looking back, I pull out three learnings that I think we should park in corporate memory to be pulled out the next time Canada steps up to play a leadership role in a crisis like Afghanistan.

Express Canadian Values through Conduct

The issue of the risk of torture of detainees transferred by Canadian Forces to Afghan authorities was a matter of bitter political controversy as the counter-insurgency effort intensified in 2006-2007. Out of this a highly unusual civilian function of detainee monitoring was established. This involved frequent structured meetings in Afghan prisons with Afghans detained by Canadian forces and then transferred to Afghan prisons prior to trial and sentencing in Afghan courts. As we were completing our mission in Kandahar in the run-up to July

2011, I made calls on our Kandahari partners to ask them what they would remember as the Canadian legacy in their province. Some said that they would remember that Canada held the line against the fierce Taliban surprise offensive in 2005 and 2006. Some mentioned the training of police and soldiers. Others spoke about the building of schools and help for Kandahar University or irrigation for farmers. Many were impressed that a faraway country would send and sacrifice their young men and women to help Afghans.

The most unexpected comment that I heard was about our detainee monitoring. We never publicized it actively, although it was included in reports to parliament. But it seemed that everyone in Kandahar was aware. It was discussed on their radio stations. Most people knew someone by first, second or third hand who had been in jail. They were amazed that Canada cared about the rights and dignity of its enemies. Moreover, we gave practical and visible expression to Canadian values through our conduct. For this Canada will be remembered as a country that does the right thing.

Protect Civilian Leaders

Four of the five most important Afghan civilian officials in Kandahar province were assassinated within seven months of the completion of our mission. The Chief of the Kandahar Police, Khan Mohamed Mujahaddin, was killed on April 14, 2011. Ahmed Wali Karzai, the Chairman of the Provincial Council, was killed July 20, 2011. The Mayor of Kandahar City, Ghulam Haider Hamidi was killed July 27, 2011. Faizluddin Agha, District Governor of Panjwa'i, (which was the primary focus of the military effort at the time of our departure), was killed on January 13, 2012.

Our strategic objective was the extension of Afghan civilian governance over the territory of Kandahar province. It was much easier to defeat this objective by assassinating Afghan civilian government officials than to take on NATO soldiers, or the Afghan military. So that's what the Taliban did. The lesson for the future is to find ways to nurture and protect civilian leaders, and to do it in a low-profile way that does not sever relations with communities and is distinct from military counter-insurgency operations.

Women, Peace and Security as the Centre of Gravity

When you think about the systematic, egregious and cruel discrimination suffered by women and girls in Afghanistan, it's hard to imagine a worse human rights crisis in the world today. Canada and others tried to equal up education opportunities for girls by building schools, providing economic opportunities and training women police. I don't want to minimize the obstacles to overcoming the misogynist traditional culture that permeated Kandahar. At the same time, I now feel that a more aggressive approach, and one that was integrated with our overall security and stabilization strategy could have delivered more enduring rights. As I think back, no Afghan women were ever present in the meetings I attended with district councils and the Provincial Council, and certainly did not occupy any positions of influence.

Sergent Frank Hudec

A Canadian soldier with the 3rd Battalion, Royal 22nd Regiment Battalion Group (3 R22ndR Bn Gp) returns from patrol in Kabul, Afghanistan.

We should have sent stronger signals about bottom line international expectations. The word "woman" does not appear at all in the peace agreement that the US negotiated prior to its withdrawal signed on February 29, 2020 *(Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban and the United States of America)*.

There was advice for our civilian women when they went to NATO's sprawling multinational Kandahar Airfield (KAF) not to walk alone at night because of safety concerns. Closer to home, our government is trying to end discrimination, sexual misconduct and gender-based violence in the military. The rights and safety of women should move to the centre of gravity in future expeditionary missions we undertake; for the local women where we operate and for the military and civilian women who serve in these operations.

Joint Task Force-Ukraine

Canadian Armed Forces members compete with other nations in tribute to the Invictus Games held in Sydney, Australia at the International Peacekeeping and Security Centre in Lviv, Ukraine during Operation UNIFIER on October 22, 2018.

Is the Term "Warrior" Suitable for the Canadian Armed Forces?

by T. Kent Gregory

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Contributions by: Lieutenant Colonel (Ret) William G. Cummings, CD; Captain Lee T. Jarratt, CD; Guilherme Martinelli.

There is an ongoing debate whether or not all Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members can be described as warriors, given that they are first and foremost members of the profession of arms. There are historical, positive and invigorating aspects of being a warrior, and this may resonate more with certain sub-groups within the CAF. However, a strong argument can be made that this term does not define all CAF members today because they are part of a modern military profession with a wide range of occupations and ranks that perform a wide spectrum of tasks from institutional staff-work to war fighting. In addition, a case could be made that warrior identify causes more harm to the military than good.

Although a warrior is defined primarily as a person engaged or experienced in warfare[1], it is also more popularly understood as a person who demonstrates great vigour, courage, or aggressiveness, as in business or athletics. Because it has this second, much broader and therefore accessible definition outside the field of military conflict, it has been adopted by many different groups, such as first responders, to suit their particular circumstances. It has also been widely used in popular media in varying contexts. As well, other military forces view and experience it differently.

If the term warrior is to make its way into official doctrine in a positive manner, it needs to be critically defined, and these gaps of perception will need to be bridged, so it becomes an encompassing term that resonates with everyone who wears the Canadian military uniform.

CAF Environments and Doctrine

There is no unanimity within the CAF regarding the use of the term warrior to define themselves. While warrior appears to strongly resonate within some in the combat arms trades within the Canadian Army (CA) and Special Operations Force (SOF); the connection is more tenuous with those in the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), as well as those in support occupations across the military environments.[2]

The ongoing fascination with warriors and the desire to use this term to describe oneself or a specific group is not a new concept. Interestingly, the appeal of the word warrior appears centred on those who traditionally fight on the land, namely the CA and SOF. These two organizations rely on teamwork but place greater emphasis on the individual's skills to carry the day when necessary. The PPCLI's stand on Hill 677 during the Korean War serves as but one example of this emphasis on skill and individual performance affecting the battle. After seeing the adjoining Royal Australian Regiment suffer from the assault of numerically superior Chinese forces, the Canadians knew they were next to face this overwhelming force. Through both group effort and individual achievement, the Canadians managed to stop the Chinese advance through heavy all-night fighting on 24 and 25 April.[3] Individual actions by Private Wayne Mitchell and Private Kenneth Barwise, both taking action single-handedly against their Chinese opponents, did much to secure the Canadian victory at Kapyong. They personified the best qualities lauded as the hallmark of the modern warrior.

"the appeal of the word warrior appears centred on those who traditionally fight on the land, namely the CA and SOF"

Interestingly, the RCAF and RCN do not place as much importance on being warriors. Though the individuals from both of these elements need to be skilled in the art of war, the emphasis is more focused on the team than the individual carrying the day. Within the RCAF, one could argue that "aces" are warriors as they have to use particular skill and daring against enemy aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel William (Billy) Bishop, Canada's most notable air ace from the First World War, was never identified as a warrior even though he individually shot down 72 German aircraft.[4] The RCN places even less emphasis on the individual warrior, as a ship cannot fight with just one individual. It requires the entire crew working together, using both individual and collective expertise, to fight a ship and win battles effectively.

With this divergence on how fighting is conducted across the four elements of the CAF, it would be challenging to land on a single term that would resonate across the entire spectrum of individuals that make up the CAF. However, all elements share common values and expectations, which are necessary for the well-being and professional conduct of everyone who wears a CAF uniform. Terms already exist that identify what CAF members do as members of each environment: soldier, sailor, aviator and operator. These terms describe the unique aspect of the force they belong to without running the risk of being grandiose and are already part of our accepted doctrine.

In its foundational doctrine, the Canadian military espouses a warrior culture. *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (DwH), attempts to frame the warrior term in a positive light. However, DwH does not give sufficient treatment of the term warrior. The term is not defined and is used only twice within the publication. DwH specifically states that "military professionals today require the abilities not only of the soldier-warrior, but also of the soldier-diplomat and the soldier-scholar." Only in the final instance of the chapter on ethos, does DwH directly equate living the military ethos to the highest professional standards to achieving a warrior's honour.[5] In essence the 2009 DwH equates warrior status to living the ethos to the best of one's ability.

The Canadian Army Integrated Performance Strategy, Appendix 2, Annex A (2015)[6] describes the concept of the Canadian Army warrior culture. Other than simply replicate the Army's motto "strong, proud, ready", this warrior concept offers little more than what is already espoused in the 2009 DwH ethos, and that which is further expanded in the *CAF Ethos: Trusted to Serve* (2022) (TTS).[7] The warrior ethos, to be the ideal fighter in times of war, is easily linked to the military value of excellence and professional expectations of duty, fighting spirit, readiness, and unlimited liability found in TTS. More broadly, the ethical principles and military values in TTS serve to connect the ideal warrior to society while espousing virtuous character traits. With these ethical principles, military values and professional expectations already describing idealized warrior status, it would appear redundant for any environment to repurpose them yet again in another doctrinal publication.

International and Academic Perspectives

There is no consensus on the perception and effects of a warrior identity across military forces and academic research. There is indication however that historical and national contexts exert direct inference on how the warrior identity is experienced.

The New Zealand Army (2020) subscribes to the notion of warriors as a single, unifying group guided by a set of core values by which they serve. In their *Way of the New Zealand Warrior*,[8] the role of the Maori warrior and the British soldier are front and centre, as is the modern New Zealand warrior. The historical reasons why the notion of warrior works for their national context are beyond the scope of this article, however their more homogenous indigenous nations and the single colonial entity contribute to a narrower and possibly positive understanding of the concept.

Pedersen's (2017) research into the Danish Army indicates that the notion of warrior is experienced positively by their members. Anthropological fieldwork suggests that Danish warriorhood was revived with Denmark's military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Danish troops who sought out war in Afghanistan as an existential window of opportunity for following their desires to become 'true warriors' and thereby regenerate themselves as

authentic individuals.[9] This draws on their history as Viking warriors and a largely homogenous population. Pedersen's article demonstrates that the pursuit of a warrior ethos can be a powerful attraction for self-growth, and sheds light on why people may want to pursue such a path.

Cpl Braden Trudeau, Canadian Armed Forces

Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Eric Poissant, CWO of Canadian Joint Operations Command, addresses the members aboard HMCS MONTREAL during their deployment on Operation REASSURANCE, in Catania, Italy, on March 06, 2022.

In the American context, Christopher Coker (2007) acknowledges that the warrior myth, skepticism of warriors by civil society, and technological threats to warrior agency serve to erode a much needed rejuvenation of the warrior's ethos in the face of a global long war on terrorism.[10] Notably, Coker's delineation of a warrior's ethos in his final chapter is entirely virtuous and excludes critical discussion of operant warrior culture and its effect on the organization.

Vanessa Brown and Alan Okros (2019) advance our understanding of the Canadian military context.[11] Their research reveals that the CAF have an operant hegemonic masculine culture that assimilates and marginalizes rather than integrates women and minority groups. This militarized masculinity is focussed on a warrior culture that has the potential to cause harm to the various minority out-groups within the military. As an antidote to this hyper-masculine warrior identity they suggest a critical analysis of masculinity to fully understand the implications of this operant warrior ethos. Their analysis recommends that the CAF move away from a tight culture narrowly focussed on masculine interpretations of how warriors should act, and to move towards a loose culture of flexible social norms where nobody imposes their own norms values and standards on others. This loose culture would allow for the full expression of gendered warrior identities and better facilitate integration of women and minority groups into a recreated warrior ethos.

H. Christian Breede and Karen Davis (2020) research highlights a failure in the CAF to critically define the warrior ethos within DwH which has led to contemporary conceptions of the warrior to be based on assumed hegemonic masculinity. They assert that those who espouse a warrior ethos consider themselves superior to non-warriors creating in/out-groups and setting the climate for hostile interactions between the two.[12]

Breede and Davis indicate that negative aspects also encompass the possibility that the military member will be more emotionally invested in the mission and will personalize combat (as opposed to a being professionally distanced). Warriors may eschew civil-military relations and subscribe to a culture that requires persistent testing among team members which leads to exclusionary behaviours, even within the warrior team. The authors also reinforce Brown and Okros' assertion that women and minorities are assimilated rather than integrated into the CAF operant warrior ethos in that the warrior ethos allows for female masculinity rather than male femininity. Though the authors contend that many of the personnel issues that the CAF faces today stem from this operant warrior ethos, the authors allow that a recreated warrior culture with a broader and more inclusive interpretation aligned with that of a professional soldier has potential for use within the CAF. In discussing the "Return of the Professional", the authors offer a summary table illustrating competing military identities where factors such as motivation, culture, application and focus are shown on a spectrum from warrior to professional to bureaucratic identities.[13] A comparative analysis of the table elements, especially the professional ones, indicate that they are highly aligned with those of TTS (e.g.: inclusion and diversity, use of judgement, etc).

Deanna Wilson's (2021) critical analysis of the CAF indicates that gender-based violence has been perpetuated for decades because of a CAF masculinist culture that has an embedded warrior identity. This persistent masculinist culture has maintained power and dominance over others, primarily women and minority groups.[14] Wilson's analysis is anchored in both quantitative and qualitative data and offers an in-depth appreciation of the cause and widespread deleterious effects of gender-based violence. She rightly contends that ensuring the wellbeing of one's subordinates is a leader's highest priority. She highlights the normative and generational issues related to perpetuating this masculinist cul-

ture that need to be overcome and recommends the adoption of a transformational style of leadership focused on compassion as an antidote to gender-based violence. This combined with changes to the CF and DND Code of Values and Ethics (addition of equality as a value) and the CAF Ethos (addition of inclusion as a value) are offered as remedies towards changing the masculinist culture. Wilson's recommendations have been largely reflected in the renewed CAF ethos (presented in TTS), namely the addition of inclusion as a military value and a discussion of the importance of equality for institutional leaders. Given its importance, the notion of equality is incorporated throughout the TTS publication.

Popular Culture

If the divide between the military and academia regarding the use of the term warrior and how it is interpreted fails to achieve a consensus, how then will current popular (pop) culture references affect how the general public perceives its use?

Pop culture references affect how the general public perceives the notion of a warrior. The CAF is a volunteer armed force drawn from society. It is reasonable to presume that even the youngest recruits have been exposed to pop cultural references in the form of movies, video games, discussion with peers. The world of entertainment has probably done the most to influence the general perception of the term warrior through such blockbuster movies and television shows as Troy (2004), 300 (2006), Kingdom of Heaven (2005), Vikings (2013-2020), and Warrior (2019-present) to name but a few; and in sports, we have the NBA's Golden State Warriors.

The warriors presented popular culture were not always ones that current proponents would like us to believe a warrior is today. The movie Troy gives us a glorified version of Achilles as played by Brad Pitt. For many, this may be the only exposure they have had to the warrior described in Homer's "*Iliad*." We are given a heroic figure, highly skilled in individual fighting and revered by those around him who are willing to follow him into battle. We are exposed to an individual who battles not only the Trojan enemy but King Agamemnon over how the war is being conducted. In the end, he fights not for Agamemnon and the Greeks but for himself and his own personal reasons. The television program Deadliest Warrior gave us a large selection of warriors to choose from: Apache vs. Gladiator, Pirate vs. Knight, Yakuza vs. Mafia, Green Berets vs. Spetznaz, Irish Republican Army vs. Taliban, SWAT vs. GSG 9, Nazi Waffen-SS vs. Viet Cong, Navy Seal vs. Israeli Commando, U.S. Army Rangers vs. N.K. Special Operations Forces, French Foreign Legion vs. Gurkhas; the list is far-ranging. The ubiquitous availability of such programs to the general population will undoubtedly have contributed to their understanding of what constitutes a warrior based upon which depiction coincides with their personal beliefs or desires. Combatting these perceptions will continue to be problematic at best.

Warrior Culture Examples

When discussing the use of the term warrior, particularly the negative qualities of warriors, most examples cited are those from the ancient past like Achilles. Current proponents for using the term warrior, like Christopher Coker, are quick to point out that the examples are outdated and that the modern warrior does not resemble these traits. They further argue that if we debate the use of the term warrior, then we must do so using modern examples to keep the discussion within the contemporary context.

There can be no doubt, on either side of the debate about the term warrior, that all military forces need highly capable fighters within the context of fighting an actual war. People need to be skilled in the art of fighting and possess a tenacity and relentless determination to carry the day. Canada has a proud history of individuals and groups stepping forward to fulfil this role when called by our nation to fight. During the First World War, Canada, and by extension, the CA, came into its own at the battle of Vimy Ridge. That this comparatively small army was victorious in capturing strategic objectives that larger, more experienced armies had failed to achieve became the birthplace of the modern Canadian warrior. Even then, Canadian soldiers were not exempt from falling prey to a warrior's excesses in that many unarmed German combatants were savagely bayoneted.[15]

This legacy of a strong warrior spirit continued during the Second World War. The creation of the First Special Service Force in 1942 gave rise in Canada to an elite fighting force. Although this force was a combined American and Canadian organization, Canadian participants remained part of the CA. The First Special Service Force would distinguish itself and cement its fighting reputation in the Aleutian Islands, Italy, Anzio and France. All Special Forces in Canada can trace their lineage back to the First Special Service Force.

"the development of powerful in-group/ out-group attitudes, one of the major pitfalls of the warrior identity"

The Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) was formed on 8 April 1968 in Edmonton, Alberta, with the primary role of providing a quick reaction force in support of national security.[16] Although never officially designated as such, the CAR, with their distinctive maroon berets, were never reluctant to advertise their status as Canada's elite warriors.[17] Unfortunately, by identifying themselves as elite, the CAR set itself up for the development of powerful in-group/out-group attitudes,[18] one of the major pitfalls of the warrior identity. This in/out-group mentality didn't just separate the Airborne Regiment from the rest of CA units; it also developed schisms between the various Commandos within the Regiment itself. 2 Commando (Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry) invested itself in a strong sub-culture, rooted in a rebel identity, separating themselves from the society they were designed to protect.

Hindsight shows us that it was inevitable that disaster would befall this Regiment. On 16 March 1993, this elite warrior culture came to a crashing end. MCpl Clayton Matchee and Pte Kyle Brown tortured and killed Somali teenager Shidane Arone that day. The very idea that members of the CAR considered themselves superior to others allowed for this crime to occur. The in/out-group mentality of the warrior allowed Somalis to be dehumanized in their eyes, making them constant legitimate targets, not just when engaged in direct hostilities. This is another negative feature of the warrior mentality; when no direct enemy is provided to fight, warriors seek out an enemy of their own.[19]

"Although the warrior culture was initially founded on virtuous qualities, vices eventually became manifest and overtook the virtues."

With the death of Shidane Arone known to Canadian authorities and Canadians, the Regiment went into defensive mode. The warrior culture closed ranks and protected the Regiment. Even those members of the CAR who knew that what had happened was wrong were required to maintain the wall of silence[20] while investigators tried to find out about this and other serious breaches of discipline.

The CAR was disbanded in November 1994 by the Liberal government of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, and a public inquiry was established to investigate the growing scandal.[21] This investigation discovered that military officers tried to conceal information by altering releases to the media. Several senior officers were found to have misled the inquiry in an effort to protect these elite warriors. The public inquiry was shut down in 1996 and released its report in 1997. However, this report was incomplete as the Prime Minister unfortunately closed the inquiry before it could investigate the warrior culture that existed within the CAR.

Canada is not alone in experiencing difficulties associated with an operant warrior culture. The Australian Defence Force encountered many of the same issues within their Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) during its deployment to Afghanistan between 2007 and 2016.[22] Like the CAR, the SASR considered themselves warriors and embraced and fostered a warrior culture, particularly among the non-commissioned officers.[23] Creating an organization where members were made to feel superior to other forces, particularly the Afghan people, allowed for the worst aspects of warrior culture to take hold. This warrior-hero mentality embraced the notion that being designated "special" justified exceptionalism from ordinary rules and oversight.[24] Unimaginable to most militaries, the investigation revealed that subordinate NCOs within the SASR acted as the gatekeepers in the selection of junior officers, favouring those who would be compliant with the NCOs' operant culture. This resulted in a lack of leadership, particularly at the junior officer level, to the point where these junior officers became disempowered and therefore failed to restrain the negative impulses advocated by their subordinate NCOs. Those officers who fought against this operant warrior culture were ostracized and, in many cases, did not receive support from superior officers at the cost of a Special Forces career.

Eventually, this warrior culture led to the unlawful killings of 39 Afghans[25] during the SASR's deployment. Much like the CAR, when discovered, the members of the SASR closed ranks and created a wall of silence around their activities in Afghanistan. Many took deliberate steps to conceal behaviours and actions from their officers. The Australian Defence Force convened a formal inquiry under Major General Brereton to investigate rumours of unlawful conduct concerning the Special Operations Task Group in Afghanistan. While conducting the investigations, MGen Brereton's team was able to determine that unlawful conduct by the SASR had occurred and that this conduct extended to the committing of war crimes.

Unlike the Canadian inquiry, MGen Brereton was able to investigate not only the war crimes rumoured to have happened, but also conduct a comprehensive review of the warrior culture contained within the SASR. Although the warrior culture was initially founded on virtuous qualities, vices eventually became manifest and overtook the virtues. Under the leadership of those who propagated the worst acts, the established warrior culture was left unchecked, as it grew apart from virtuous military culture. The report determined that the warrior culture in itself lead to the atrocities committed and concluded that members of the ADF needed to be re-educated in their virtuous core beliefs and values.[26] Key to their conclusion was that this type of criminal behaviour can happen to anyone when vices are permitted to take root and subvert the virtues.

Conclusion

The term warrior remains problematic for use within the CAF because it was never critically defined in Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada. In the absence of such definition, it allowed the dominant male fighting culture to infuse it with meaning. Research has demonstrated that this operant expression of warrior identity has caused considerable harm across the CAF, and yet despite this, Canadian academics advocate for the use of the term warrior, but only if it is recalibrated.

When Canadians enroll in the CAF, they have already been exposed to popular culture's interpretation of a warrior. Depending on their references, whether movies, television etc., these experiences will significantly affect their understanding of the term's uncritical use within doctrine. In short, they will be required to not only learn a new definition of a warrior but will need to unlearn their preconceived notions. Additionally, the lack of unanimous acceptance of the term across CAF environments creates another hurdle regarding the use of the term.

The CAF was shaken by the findings of the Deschamps (2015) report and most recently by the Arbour (2022) report. Both of these reports validate many of the insights surrounding the academic

research on the topic of warrior culture and its attendant harm. In particular the Arbour report is quite damning:

> They now need to adapt to a new reality – the women warriors are here to stay. And they will stay on their terms, seeking the substantive equality to which they are entitled. Women should no longer feel like guests in the CAF.[27]

> The long-established way of doing business in the CAF is anchored in operational imperatives that are often nothing more than assumptions. One of the dangers of the model under which the CAF continues to operate is the high likelihood that some of its members are more at risk of harm, on a day to day basis, from their comrades than from the enemy.[28]

Canadian operant warrior culture is gendered towards a masculine and exclusionary identity, and is best left relegated to the past and to popular entertainment. It has the potential to promote fragmentation and tear at the fabric of teamwork. Such a warrior culture requires constant vigilance on the part of leadership to ensure that sub-groups and elitism over perceived non-warriors is consistently held in check.

If the CAF sees the need to recalibrate a warrior culture, it will need to take stock of the current operant culture and its failures, come to terms with its hegemonic masculinity and look towards the adoption of a more loose culture to allow the full expression of a gendered warrior. Similarly, if such an attempt is to succeed in making meaningful change, this new warrior culture must be anchored in professionalism, based upon the new CAF Ethos.

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Sgt Frank Hudec

Sailors run on the flight deck of HMCS Winnipeg in the Gulf of Oman. Crewmembers of the frigate are required to maintain a high level of physical fitness and there are numerous facilities onboard for this purpose.

Becoming Antifragile by Creating S.P.A.C.E

by Lobna Chérif and Valerie Wood

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"Between stimulus and response there is a **space**. In that space is our power to choose our response."

~ Viktor E. Frankl

In the academic literature, resilience is typically defined as the ability to successfully bounce back from adversity, and to successfully adapt to the obstacles or difficult situations that life continuously presents. However, beyond resilience, is the concept of antifragility. According to Taleb (2012), "The resilient resists shocks and stays the same; the antifragile *gets better*." Antifragility is about bouncing back better and stronger than before the experience of adversity. It is about thriving and growing when exposed to stressors, volatility, and uncertainty.

We propose one tool for promoting antifragility: the ability to create S.P.A.C.E., a five-step strategy that combines approaches from both character strengths and mindfulness practice which are inextricably linked with resilience and human flourishing. It is meant to prompt individuals to interrupt negative thought and emotional responses and instead leverage mindfulness practices and character strengths use.

Character strengths are the positive parts of our personality that impact how we think, feel, and behave, that are associated with human flourishing, and that contribute to "*good life*, for oneself and for others" (Niemiec, 2019; Peterson and Seligman 2004, p. 17). These 24 character strengths can be treated as continuous dimensions, which each of us possessing varying levels of each, and all of which are ubiquitously recognized and valued across

cultures (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). These 24 strengths can be grouped into six larger virtues which reflect core characteristics valued by moral philosophers and religious thinkers (see Table 1 for more information). The first virtue is wisdom, which captures cognitive abilities such as the acquisition and use of knowledge for purposes of good, and includes the strengths of creativity, curiosity, judgment, love of learning, and perspective. The second virtue is courage, reflecting one's disposition to perform the right act in the face of external or internal opposition, despite resistance and a high risk of loss. Courage is comprised of the more specific strengths of bravery, perseverance, honesty, and zest. The third virtue is humanity, which reflects interpersonal strengths such as attending to and befriending others and taking part in acts of generosity and kindness that inspire others. Related character strengths include love, kindness, and social intelligence. The fourth virtue, justice, captures civic strengths that underlie healthy community life and accentuate a sense of fairness between people and their larger society. Character strengths included in this virtue are teamwork, fairness, and leadership. The fifth virtue is temperance, which consists of having control over excess and having the strengths that protect against it. This virtue is demonstrated through the character strengths of forgiveness, humility, prudence, and self-regulation. Finally, transcendence is the sixth virtue, which refers to the extent to which one reflects on life's meaning, and that one is connected to the larger universe. Related character strengths are appreciation of beauty, gratitude, hope, humor, and spirituality.

Virtue	Strength	Description
Wisdom	Creativity	Original & Adaptive, Clever, A problem solver, Sees and does things in different ways
	Curiosity	Interested, Explores new things, Open to new ideas
	Judgement	A critical thinker, Thinks things through, Open minded
	Love of Learning	Masters new skills & topics, Systematically adds to knowledge
	Perspective	Wise, Provides wise counsel, Takes the big picture view
Courage	Bravery	Shows valor, Doesn't shrink from fear, Speaks up for what's right
	Perseverance	Persistent, Industrious, Finishes what one starts
	Honesty	Authentic, Trustworthy, Sincere
	Zest	Enthusiastic, Energetic, Doesn't do things half-heartedly
Humanity	Love	Warm and genuine, Values close relationships
	Kindness	Generous, Nurturing, Caring, Compassionate, Altruistic
	Social Intelligence	Aware of the motives and feelings of others, Knows what makes others tick
Justice	Teamwork	Team player, Socially responsible, Loyal
	Fairness	Just, Doesn't let feelings bias decisions about others
	Leadership	Organizes group activities, Encourages a group to get things done
Temperance	Forgiveness	Merciful, Accepts others' shortcomings, Gives people a second chance
Transcendence	Humility	Modest, Lets one's accomplishments speak for themselves
	Prudence	Careful, Cautious, Doesn't take undue risk
	Self-Regulation	Self-controlled, Manages impulses and emotions
	Appreciation of Beauty and Excellence	Feels awe & wonder in beauty, Inspired by goodness of others
	Gratitude	Thankful for the good, Expresses thanks, Feels blessed
	Hope	Optimistic, Future-minded
	Humor	Playful, Brings smiles to others, Lighthearted
	Spirituality	Searches for meaning, Feels a sense of purpose, Senses a relationship with the sacred

Table 1: The VIA Classification of Character Strengths and Virtues

According to Peterson and Seligman (2004), each person has a truly unique character profile, comprised of different degrees of each of these 24 strengths, and it is assumed that having knowledge about someone's character strengths provides us with insight into their thoughts, beliefs, values, emotions, motivations, and behaviour. In fact, we each have a set of core strengths, called our signature strengths, that are well developed for which expressing them comes quite naturally to us. Some, on the other hand are our lesser strengths that are more dormant, that have not received much of our deliberate attention over the years. Just as we all have a unique set of signature strengths, and overall strengths profiles, the ways that we express our strengths varies. For example, love might be expressed through romantic gestures or thoughtful acts, compassionate listening, or devoting our time to loved ones. Humour can be expressed through joke telling, laughter and appreciation of others' humour, witty banter, or goofy behaviour. However we express our strengths, they are an important part of our identity. Indeed, our signature strengths are thought to be essential to who we are, are effortless and natural to express, and we like we are living our authentic selves when expressing these strengths, which energize and uplifts us.

Research on Peterson and Seligman's character strengths taxonomy has flourished in recent years, and largely shows that by tapping into our character strengths, we can experience enhanced subjective well being, resilience, organizational effectiveness, and interpersonal closeness or connectedness (e.g., Niemiec, 2013; Niemiec & Pearce, 2021 for overviews). Indeed, by leveraging our character strengths, we can experience improved life satisfaction, relationship quality, positive affectivity, and workplace productivity and job satisfaction. In times of crisis, character strengths as a foundation can aid in our efforts to cope with stress, can buffer against the ill effects of stress, and can have energizing effects when resources are low or depleted (e.g., Harzer and Ruch, 2015). Martinez-Marti and colleagues (2020) evaluated the relationships among scores on the 24 character strengths and resilience over a period of one month during the COVID-19 pandemic (between March and May of 2020). These authors found the presence of five strengths factors (so strengths that tended to 'hang together' to meaningfully predict outcomes) which included *fortitude*, *goodness*, *intellectual*, *interpersonal*, and *restraint*. They found that all strengths factors predicted later resilience, and that fortitude *strengths* (spirituality, bravery, persistence, hope, leadership, and vitality) were the most predictive of later resilience during the pandemic.

However, what makes character strengths useful in times of duress? In 2018, Niemiec outlined the six functions by which character strengths help us to thrive in the face of adversity. They include prompting and preparing us for strengths awareness and use, mindfulness, appreciation such that strengths use expresses value or meaning for what has occurred, buffering or preventing problems from arising, reappraisal of negative events, and helping us to bounce back from stressors (resilience).

Thus, mindfulness seems to be one such mechanism that explains how character strengths supports resilience. Indeed, mindfulness is strongly correlated with resilience, well-being, and workplace performance (e.g., Lomas et al., 2017) and consists of these two core mechanisms: a) the self-regulation of attention and b) adopting the mindsets of curiosity, openness, and acceptance. These components of mindfulness complement the VIA strengths taxonomy well, specifically aligning with at least character strengths (namely, self-regulation and curiosity). Indeed, there has been much resilience on the association between character strengths and mindfulness. For example, Hendriks and colleagues (2021) studied the relationship between character strengths and meditation in a group of practitioners of Sahaja Yoga and found that the practitioners (compared with non-meditators) were higher in spirituality, forgiveness, gratitude, self-regulation, teamwork, appreciation of beauty and excellence, and hope. Similarly, Pang and Ruch (2019b) investigated the association between mindfulness and character strengths and found that they mutually impact one another and that when used as practices (mindfulness-based strengths practice) this relationship strengthens. They found that meditators were higher in the following strengths than non-meditators: spirituality, gratitude, appreciation of beauty, love of learning, and curiosity. The study also found that the character strengths most highly correlated with mindfulness include hope, bravery, curiosity, social intelligence, and zest. Thus, many strengths appear to be meaningfully related to mindfulness.

For this reason, we thought that these two approaches, mindfulness, and character strengths, can intersect in a meaningful way to enhance our antifragility. The steps of S.P.A.C.E are as follows.



Figure 1: S.P.A.C.E. icon outlining the five steps for building antifragility.

Credit: Cherif & Wood 2022

1) **Stop.** Mindfully give yourself the mental space it needs to move forward. Pay attention to the present moment, and nothing else. This is an important component of mindfulness, in directing our attention and engaging our executive control networks (e.g., Sumantry & Stewart, 2021).
2) **Practice tactical breathing.** Tactical or purposeful breathing helps to activate the rest-digest neurobiological system that calms us, decreases the stress response, and allows our bodies to recover. Breathing is so simple, but it's immediate, and effective. It helps us to check, and manage, negative emotions and even has long term health benefits (Röttger et al., 2021). The four steps of tactical breathing include the following. Breathe in slowly through your nose for a count of

four. Then, hold your breath for a count of four. Exhale slowly through your mouth for a count of four. Finally, hold for a count of four. This sequence should be repeated 3-5 times, visualizing each number as you count.

3) **Acknowledge thoughts and emotions:** Acknowledging both any emotions felt, and our perspective about a situation, gives us the opportunity to identify maladaptive responses, and then adapt and revise. Ask yourself, what am I thinking and how am I feeling? Do any thoughts reflect fact or opinion? Are these thoughts and emotions adaptive for me, or maladaptive? Researchers have known for some time that the simple act of putting feelings into words helps us to manage our negative emotional experiences like sadness, anxiety, and fear. However, Lieberman and colleagues (2007) have explained why this is the case (the mechanism). Using neuroimaging techniques (brain scanning), they found that labelling our emotions (compared to other forms of emotional processing or encoding) helped to decrease responses in the amygdala and other limbic regions when viewing negative emotional images. These regions play key roles in the subjective experience, and expression, of emotions (see Rolls, 2015). Affect labeling also was associated with more activation in the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (RVLPFC). This area of the brain is linked with regulation of emotions. Altogether, these findings tell us that encountering situations that elicit negative emotions *feels less bad* when we actively label the emotions that we experience.
4) **Call on your character strengths:** Remember, much of what you need, is already within you. Which of your character strengths can you tap into at this moment to help you navigate this situation? Call up a strength that you have chosen before that has worked or call up one of your signature strengths. Ask yourself what your role is in this situation, and how you can fulfill this role more fully (e.g., "How can I be the best co-worker/mom/brother/friend in this situation?"). By reflecting on and reminding ourselves of the current context, ways to use our strengths become more relevant, more context-specific. This allows us to think of specific strategies to use our strengths rather than simply priming the idea of these strengths. Our strengths expression becomes more easily actionable and role and context-appropriate (adapted from Niemiec, 2018).
5) **Empower yourself.** Take the reins, identify what you can control, and keep an objective, goal-oriented mindset. Focus on what you can do (and not what you can't), and how you can make the best of the situation. Express your thoughts and feelings eloquently, unapologetically, and respectfully. Indeed, feeling a sense of control, confidence, and optimism in our ability to manage our stressors is important for building and maintaining our resilience (e.g., Schwarzer & Warner, 2012).

We believe that through these five steps, individuals can lengthen that space between stimulus and response, an ability afforded to humans specifically. As a result, we will be better equipped to manage difficult and uncomfortable emotions, and grow from personal challenges. While the mindfulness-related components of this tool help us to remain calm and refocused in situations of challenge and stress, the component focusing on leverage our character strengths allows us to truly flourish and experience continued growth following adversity.

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Canadian Armed Forces Photo

A CC-177 Globemaster aircraft arrives at Lviv Airport, Ukraine, carrying lethal military equipment, on February 22, 2022, which will be provided to the Ukrainian security forces in order to help them defend against threats.

Applying Human Security to Understand the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

by Alan Okros

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Special Contribution: This article was developed by the Canadian Defence Academy Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security as part of ongoing research and analyses to deliver on its mandate to establish an enduring platform on child soldiers and build expertise in other human security issues with contributions from: Emmanuelle Caucci, Shanel Feller, Melissa Hollobon, David Hughes, Shannon Lewis-Simpson, Heather Low, Melinda Mansour, Shannon Smith and Stefan Wolejszo.

Reporting of the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine influences how we understand the conflict and, subsequently, how we assess responsibility, pursue accountability, and determine the array of threats that stem from Russia's aggression. Accordingly, the frameworks through which such reporting is produced matter. Traditionally, armed conflicts have been analyzed through the lens of state security. State security views the state and state interests as the principal objects of attention. Grounded in considerations of territorial integrity, this orientation emphasizes the military defence of state interests, prioritizing the protection of borders, people, and values against threats that emanate from abroad.[1] Yet as the global security landscape evolves, as the nature of conflict shifts from inter to intra-state, the continued prioritization of state-centric security perspectives is inadequate to determine and address the panoply of threats that challenge the "survival, livelihood, and dignity" of people.[2] By focusing on communities and sub-groups, human security emerged as a complementary means to expand upon state security's singular focus. Its emergence aligned with the changing nature of armed conflict in which wars of conquest were supplanted by asymmetric conflict and sustained political violence.

In many ways, ongoing events in Ukraine confound these shifts. The Russian occupation of Crimea that began in 2014 and the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine is a reversion to inter-state conflict in which a foreign aggressor seeks the dissolution of a political entity through territorial aggrandizement. Although the contours of the Russia-Ukraine conflict align, in many ways, with a traditional state-security paradigm, a human security framework facilitates analysis from the level of civilian populations. This lens

is relevant across the full spectrum of military activities, from assessing the future security environment to responding to natural disasters. As the CAF and its Allies assume non-traditional roles, such as working in displaced persons centres outside of Ukraine, human security provides necessary, complementary, insights into the local, regional, and international consequences of events in Eastern Europe.

Understanding Human Security

Human security is subject to competing definitions and understandings. At its core, a human security approach focuses on the under-conceptualized nature and consequences of threats that affect people and communities. By centring vulnerable sub-groups, this approach identifies and assesses the complex set of insecurities that people face within an interconnected world that presents a new array of threats, not neatly captured under conventional security frameworks. While this emphasizes, and in a sense is a response to, the changing nature of armed conflict, understandings of human security also look beyond the use of force to acknowledge that issues such as extreme poverty, pandemics, environmental degradation, or the proliferation of misinformation pose security threats and fuel instability. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 66/290 (2012) calls for "people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention orientated responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of people." The Resolution presents a human security approach to "assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people."

"understandings of human security also look beyond the use of force to acknowledge that issues such as extreme poverty, pandemics, environmental degradation, or the proliferation of misinformation pose security threats and fuel instability."

Building on human security's normative development in the mid-1990s, the UN, NATO, and the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence have developed their own human security frameworks to integrate holistic security analysis within current operating environments. Amongst Canada's allies, NATO places increased emphasis on the development and advancement of a human security framework. In 2021, Secretary-General Jen Stoltenberg announced that human security "is at the heart of who NATO is and what NATO does."[3] The 2022 Madrid Summit Declaration emphasized the centrality of human security and pledged to ensure its integration into NATO's three core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security.[4] Currently, NATO structures its human security focus around five, non-exhaustive, cross-cutting themes: (i) Protection of Civilians (POC); (ii) Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC); (iii) Countering Trafficking in Human Beings; (iv) Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); and (v) Cultural Property Protection (CPP).

A human security lens offers a more comprehensive picture of events in Eastern Europe. Historian Timothy Snyder recently described the conflict in Ukraine as both a war for territory and a war for reality.[5] As contrasting narratives and purposeful disinformation campaigns cloud understandings of the conflict, assessing events through a human security lens offers clarity. While a full, human security-focused, assessment of the conflict is beyond the scope of this commentary, a short appraisal structured around each of the current NATO themes illustrates the value of applying a human security perspective to the conflict and its consequences for Canada, the Canadian Armed Forces and, more broadly, the international community.

Protection of Civilians

NATO's Policy for the Protection of Civilians states that "protection of civilians (persons, objects and services) includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimize and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military operations on the civilian population and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment."[6] The focus on civilians and establishing safe and secure environments are clear illustrations of a human security approach.

Since the current phase of the conflict began in February, media, international organizations, civil society groups, and actors on the ground in Ukraine have warned that Russian forces are targeting civilians. The UN's Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine has documented thousands of civilian deaths from indiscriminate attacks by Russian forces.[7] A June 2022 report by Amnesty International found that Russia had used cluster bombs and scatterable land mines during attacks on Kharkiv that resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths.[8] Furthermore, a recent fact-finding report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe described how Russia had targeted hospitals, schools, residential buildings, and water facilities. These actions have led to mounting civilian casualties and may amount to war crimes.[9] The targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure highlights the importance NATO has given to enhancing national resilience.[10] The active engagement of Ukrainian civilians in reporting on or seeking to disrupt Russian troop movements is blurring distinctions between combatants and non-combatants. A human security approach provides insights into the consequences of these shifting categorizations.

Children and Armed Conflict

In 2015, NATO published its guidance to support "the further integration" of UN Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005) on Children and Armed Conflict. The NATO directive prioritizes support for UN efforts to monitor instances of the six grave violations committed against children affected by armed conflict as well as training to recognize and respond to instances that amount to one of the six grave violations. It further emphasizes the protection of children in armed conflict and the need to develop and promote reporting and monitoring mechanisms that focus on the six grave violations.[11] Children are disproportionately affected by armed conflict. They suffer from increased rates of recruitment and use as child soldiers, killing and maiming, sexual violence, abduction, detention, radicalization, denial of access to schools, hospitals,

and humanitarian assistance, as well as forced displacement and separation from their families.

These disproportionate impacts are occurring in Ukraine. Media have reported on civilian combat training sessions in Kyiv that included child participants and have, since the first phase of the conflict began in 2014, pointed to evidence of child soldiering on both sides of the conflict. The use of landmines and wide-area explosive weapons in populated areas has not only resulted in higher mortality rates among affected children but has also triggered intense child displacement and separation from their families, which has resulted in more frequent reports of child abduction and sexual violence committed against children. As of May 2022, over 200 medical facilities including neonatal clinics, had been destroyed in the conflict, which inhibits access to urgent healthcare needs, including access to prosthetic limbs in cases of maiming. According to Save the Children, more than 20 schools per day have been attacked since the beginning of the conflict, and the Ukrainian Ministry of Education has noted that more than 869 schools have been damaged and 83 educational facilities destroyed. This is estimated to deprive approximately 5.5 million children remaining in Ukraine of the right to education. UNICEF has reported that as a direct result of the conflict, three million children in Ukraine and 2.2 million in nearby, refugee-hosting, states are currently in need of urgent humanitarian assistance. Human security provides a means of identifying and emphasizing the unique risks that children encounter within armed conflict and the security challenges that stem from these realities. When, for example, a 15-year-old child from Ukraine was reported to have used a drone to pinpoint Russian troop locations, this posed pertinent questions that problematize international efforts to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers and to ensure the special legal protections to which children are entitled within armed conflicts.[12]

Human Trafficking

The NATO Policy on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings states that trafficking involves any form of force, coercion, or exploitation of vulnerability to exercise control over another person. The Policy aims to develop cooperation among the Alliance, its members, and international organizations to implement a zero-tolerance approach to trafficking. Members are required to review national legislation and report on national efforts to align with relevant international frameworks, encourage ratification of the UN Convention Against Organised Crime, its Protocols, and the OSCE's Code of Conduct, provide training about trafficking, and actively prevent its occurrence.[13] The policy is the oldest to be included under NATO's human security rubric and acknowledges that, as well as the impact on victims, trafficking of human beings affects countries of origin, transit and destination, and fuels corruption and organized crime.

Pramila Patten, UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, notes that the humanitarian crisis in Ukraine is rapidly turning into a human trafficking crisis.[14] The UN International Organization for Migration (IOM) has highlighted that the risk of human trafficking for those fleeing Ukraine has been exacerbated following Russian aggression. Potential exploitation, they explain, often follows the promise of onward transportation or services to those that seek to flee the conflict.[15] The UN estimates that nearly six million people have been displaced from Ukraine to neighbouring countries and that eight million are internally displaced.[16] The growing humanitarian crisis and refugee flows from Ukraine increase the risk of human trafficking and related abuses. As an extension to traditional understandings of human trafficking, the Ukrainian government has accused Russia of forcibly taking thousands of civilians, including children, to Russia where they may be used as "hostages" to pressure Kyiv.[17] Viewed through a human security lens, these issues emerge as central to the conflict and amount to purposeful Russian tactics, not simply collateral consequences of military action or warfare.

"The growing humanitarian crisis and refugee flows from Ukraine increase the risk of human trafficking and related abuses."

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

NATO's CRSV policy commits to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1820 on sexual violence in conflict. NATO has developed a series of military guidelines on the prevention of both CRSV and gender-based violence. These aim to reduce occurrences and improve responsive measures for the protection of vulnerable populations and oblige NATO personnel to prevent, act on, and stop CRSV, understand the risk of CRSV through information collection and reporting obligations, and cooperate with both international and local actors in combating CRSV.

In early June 2022, the Secretary General's Special Representative for Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict reported to the Security Council, that instances of CRSV violations were mounting, in a context where specialized medical and psycho-social support is acutely lacking.[18] The UN's Human Rights Monitoring Team has reported 124 alleged acts of sexual violence since Russia's incursion into Ukraine, a number that is likely a significant under-count. Recently, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, in her capacity as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, called for the dedication of resources to combat CRSV in Ukraine.[19] A human security lens facilitates the understanding from numerous conflicts over the last 30 years that CRSV has become a deliberate tactic that aggressors use to target specific groups within the general population.

Cultural Property Protection

The NATO approach to human security recognizes the importance of protecting cultural property, both as an element of its operations and a component of efforts to build peace and maintain security. In its 2016 Policy for the Protection of Civilians, and as enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty itself, NATO has committed to the protection of property. This extends to the protection of cultural and religious sites and is included as a priority in several NATO operational directives.[20] NATO's commitment to the protection of cultural property stems from obligations imposed by international law. Under international humanitarian law, parties to a conflict are prohibited from conducting acts of hostility directed against the "historic monuments, works of art, the places of worship that constitute the cultural heritage, both tangible and intangible, for strategic gain and tactical advantage."[21] While destruction and theft of cultural objects provide a means

of erasing national identity, it also funds other forms of illicit activities that constitute additional security risks.

Russian forces have destroyed or targeted places of cultural significance in Ukraine. As of June 2022, 152 cultural institutions have been destroyed or damaged along with over 2000 educational institutions.[22] Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, UNESCO has tracked a deteriorating human rights situation that includes the destruction of Tartar and Muslim cultural sites and the persecution of Crimean Tartars and Ukrainians, especially those who "seek to preserve their native language, religious and cultural identity."[23] By applying a human security lens to understand how Russia has exploited cultural heritage in the conflict's initial phase, these patterns provide insight concerning the nature of the threat that Russian objectives pose to Ukraine.

"human security facilitates holistic security assessments"

Why Human Security?

Human security remains an open concept. The Canadian delegation to NATO is taking an active role in the development of the Alliance's human security policy. Independently, other actors are advancing and applying their own understanding of the concept. Human security continues to evolve and is not limited to the abovementioned themes. When the concept of human security was first introduced in the 1994 UN Human Development Report, seven, non-exhaustive, concepts were listed. These included considerations of food, health, and economic security. Collectively, these diverse efforts constitute a normative shift from an exclusively state-focused conception of security to one that emphasizes how individuals and communities face direct and indirect threats from a multitude of complex factors. While early iterations of human security focused on development and humanitarian activities, the conflict in Ukraine illustrates that each of the cross-cutting themes considered above has a military nexus.

Armed conflict is inherently gendered. NATO has committed to the Women, Peace and Security agenda, which includes methods to ensure gender-responsive approaches throughout all NATO policies, planning, and procedures. This includes applying a gender-based perspective to the five cross-cutting themes discussed above. Further, the Canadian government's application of Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA+) highlights the importance of intersectional analyses to recognize other important identity factors. In this context, GBA+ enables enhanced understanding of who is affected the most under the five cross-cutting themes presented.

From this basis, human security facilitates holistic security assessments. The UN has outlined how a human security framework enhances the analysis of threats and insecurities in an era of human-made planetary crises and global changes. Within the current context, a human security lens not only draws attention to the nature of Ukrainian suffering but also serves to identify both the strategic goals and tactical actions of the Russian Federation. It furthers our understandings of the interconnected global challenges and dimensions of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Assessing the global implications of the conflict alongside concurrent security threats like the COVID-19 pandemic and the climate crisis creates what the UN Global Crisis Response Group describes as a "perfect storm" for states that are vulnerable to the downstream impacts on global finance, food security, and energy.[24] These impacts both exacerbate current security challenges and create additional global insecurities.

Human security provides a valuable means of framing and analyzing defence and security issues. It poses novel questions and focuses on often overlooked implications, options, and consequences that have a direct military nexus. Along with providing a more comprehensive account of events in Ukraine, such an approach can enhance military understandings of domestic disaster responses, emerging maritime and air defence requirements, the evolving future security environment, the disruptive impacts of climate change and pandemics, and extend to the recognition that Great Power contests entail all elements of national power, not only traditional defence considerations. Identifying the military dimensions of these challenges and threats is the necessary first step toward ensuring that Canada and the CAF safeguard Canadian interests while also meeting Canada's international obligations.

NOTES

1 Paris, 2001: 87 (see Denov, p. 2)
2 https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/476/22/PDF/N1147622.pdf?OpenElement
3 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_181806.htm
4 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm
5 https://www.msnbc.com/msnbc-podcast/why-is-this-happening/uncovering-true-origins-putin-s-war-timothy-snyder-podcast-transcript-n1294084
6 Policy for the Protection of Civilians
7 https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/06/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-15-june-2022
8 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/research/2022/06/anyone-can-die-at-any-time-kharkiv/
9 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/a/515868.pdf; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/13/osce-investigation-russia-ukraine-human-rights/
10 NATO Strategic Concept 2022
11 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_181779.htm#children
12 file:///C:/Users/davmi/Downloads/children-legal-protection-factsheet.pdf
13 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_71856.htm?selectedLocale=en
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An Intelligence Deficiency in Times of Crises

by Alistair Hensler

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Scholars and policy analysts have discussed the creation of a Canadian foreign intelligence service (FIS) for more than sixty years, but intransigent governments and public servants have failed to act. Today, inaction is not an option as the world faces conflicts in Europe, the Middle and the Far East. Increasingly, Canada is faced with foreign threats to security, democracy, and economic stability.

Yet, Canada remains alone as the only G7 democracy without a FIS to provide independent foreign intelligence to its government. Instead, Canada maintains an inadequate foreign intelligence collection system that relies on allies' generosity and signals intelligence, both of which are providing diminishing returns.

In 1981 Justice D.C. McDonald recognized the need for a FIS when he completed an extensive and definitive commission of inquiry on the subject of certain activities of the RCMP. The principal recommendation of this report led to the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984. An earlier commission of inquiry in 1969 had made the same recommendations that successive governments did not accept.

Justice McDonald also advised that the government should accompany the creation of CSIS with the establishment of a separate foreign intelligence service. He reasoned cogently that the lack of a FIS would limit the effectiveness of CSIS and would provide, *inter alia*, economic and political intelligence for the Government of Canada, a practice that the Americans and British had been successfully pursuing for decades. The government did not act on that advice.

Democracies large and small maintain FISs. No democracy's reputation has been tarnished by merely maintaining a foreign intelligence capability. In World War Two, democracies witnessed firsthand the significant benefits of having advanced knowledge of the intentions of other countries and organizations. While other states created their own FIS institutions, Canada adopted a narrower approach. Instead of creating their own institution, officials began to foster relationships with the allied FISs. Thus began the long-term reliance on allies for a whole suite of Canada's foreign intelligence requirements.

While this approach may have been sufficient for a bipolar world, today, the commonality of interests among allies has gradually diminished. At the time, public servants and politicians could not have predicted that the world would become more multipolar, despite Justice McDonald's forecast in 1984 that "…the emergence of new issues and changes in the international climate…has been blurring the once clear distinction between one's friends…."

We had seen examples of the changing relationships between allies when American declared Australia it's most reliable ally, an accolade usually reserved for Canada. Additionally, with the unprecedented American threat to stop supplying foreign intelligence to Canada if Huawei 5G technology is adopted here, the chasm between American and Canadian interests is deepening. In any event, we know that allies will not provide Canada with economic or commercial intelligence that will benefit us over them. This practice is a matter of national interest, independence and sovereignty.

While skeptical senior public servants and successive governments have been responsible for the failure to create a FIS, the process should not be an arduous or a long-term undertaking once a government commits to moving forward. Within the government, several departments and agencies are now engaged in collecting and assessing foreign intelligence. The leader of this group is Communications Security Establishment (CSE) which collects signals intelligence. CSE is the only agency legally dedicated to collecting foreign intelligence outside Canada. Other leaders include the Department of National Defence, and Global Affairs Canada. The amalgamation of these disparate groups from within these departments under the leadership of CSE could form the nucleus of a FIS, thereby ensuring coordination of collection efforts.

"today, the commonality of interests among allies has gradually diminished"

The function of collecting foreign intelligence from recruited secret human intelligence (HUMINT) sources outside Canada is missing from this amalgamation, i.e., foreign nationals who are prepared to impart classified information to a Canadian FIS. Justice McDonald emphasized the necessity of this function to support CSIS and argued that these two functions, security and foreign intelligence, must be assigned to separate, independent services. He was concerned about creating an intelligence "monolith" – familiar to dictatorships – and "contagion" – the more liberal investigative activities of foreign intelligence collection abroad creeping into strictly legislated security intelligence investigations in Canada under oversight by the judiciary. These concerns remain valid today.

Amalgamating the existing disparate groups with CSE, as mentioned above, will considerably reduce the costs associated

with creating a FIS. However, this proposal is not a suggestion to attempt to emulate the American CIA or British MI6.

Instead, Canada should look to the examples presented by similar or smaller countries such as Australia, which maintains the Secret Intelligence Service on a modest budget. The only additional funding for a Canadian FIS would be for staffing positions for recruiting foreign nationals abroad as sources.

Organizations could recruit personnel from within the federal public service, which offers a culturally diverse group with linguistic skills and experience working abroad. Staffing with current public servants will reduce the intake time because the lengthy vetting and security screening processes will be minimized or eliminated.

Training FIS agents who would be assigned abroad would require expeditious action. The identification and recruitment of security intelligence sources in Canada is a learned technique taught to CSIS members. That technique can be adapted with the assistance of the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) or ASIS to recruit foreign nationals abroad. The risks are more significant, but the technique is similar.

This paper does not presume to identify targets for a FIS. Annually, the government sets FI priorities which, in the absence of a FIS, are unrealistic or reliant on allies. World events of the past decade should guide the government's priorities. No country should be excluded. Allies spy on one another, and there are no friends in the world of economics and commerce.

"If Canada aspires to be an influential middle power, it needs to develop a less reliant foreign intelligence policy on allies"

In some cases, Canada may prioritize assisting an ally in an area where the ally does not have access. For a new FIS, the priorities would be modest but realistic.

If Canada aspires to be an influential middle power, it needs to develop a less reliant foreign intelligence policy on allies. That reliance, which can lead to misinformation and manipulation, creates an impression that Canada is subservient to allied powers rather than an independent arbitrator. A FIS should be viewed positively as a valuable adjunct to foreign policy, not as a negative to Canada's reputation. The way forward will not be easy. Departments and agencies will decry the loss of staff, budget and responsibilities. Others will complain about a FIS infringing on their jurisdictions. Creating a FIS will require a robust and committed government to overcome these protests. Given the deteriorating situations in various areas of the world, now is the time for government action.

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation: A Canadian Case Revealed

by Sean M. Maloney

Canadians, including myself, generally do not have a grasp of the complexities of eastern European history. Canada was founded by western Europeans, and it is situated in the context of a western European legal, political, and religious historical framework. The ebb and flow of history in eastern Europe was different, particularly when it came to nationality, ethnicity and the antagonisms between them in a shifting imperial context very different from the west's.[1] Our primary opponent in the Cold War, the Soviet Union, and our current opponent, Russia, understood and understands this state of affairs. Both regimes have skilfully exploited the shallowness of how Canada views the world and its history to fulfill their objectives. They have played emotional issues like a concert cellist to accomplish their aims. They understood that ideas and culture are fronts in what has been repackaged as so-called hybrid warfare or, more accurately, gibridnyye metody (hybrid methods). They know that attacks conducted at one point in time have the potential to echo deeply into the future to generate more confusion and damage. Canada remains affected by Soviet active measures that were deployed nearly fifty years ago, measures that were specifically designed to activate racially-based animosity in this country.



Kashtan Press, 2021

My colleague Lubomyr Luciuk, the author of *Operation Payback: Soviet Disinformation and Alleged Nazi War Criminals in North America* is best described as a proud Ukrainian-Canadian patriot and he has written extensively about his heritage and his community. His personal context consists of the Cold War battleground whereby the Soviet Union attempted to manipulate the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada for its purposes. This manipulation had roots going back to the subjugation of an independent Ukraine by the Soviet Union in 1919-1920. Any expatriate or diasporic community that had connections to what the Soviet Union conquered and subjugated was considered a threat by the Soviet leadership. Not a potential threat, not a theoretical threat, but threat to the existence of the Soviet Union because these were presumed to be enemies bent on revenge. Indeed, the Soviet secret services expended a significant amount of time and effort infiltrating expatriate and diasporic communities. They created anti-Soviet organizations run by the Soviet Union to identify and entrap those they deemed to be enemies.[2] There was even a Russian Fascist organization that was allied to a German organization that turned out to be controlled by the Soviet secret service.[3] The Soviets used diasporic communities as a conduit for disinformation and propaganda targeting the countries they were part of. The Soviets sowed dissention and uncertainty. They manipulated people by threatening their families back in the Soviet Union. And yes, they convinced some to conduct espionage on the Moscow's behalf. The Ukrainian-Canadian community was not unaffected in this environment.

Concurrently, the Soviet Union implemented a policy that produced the deaths of millions of subjugated Ukrainians in the 1930s. This later become known to us as the Holomodor. However, these deaths were kept secret at the time, and the Soviets mounted an extensive international disinformation campaign to conceal the crime. This skilful campaign targeted western media, and policymakers who were dependent on that media to understand global affairs. It employed blackmail, bribery, coercion, discreditation, and murder in what we now know as kombanitsiya, a coordinated attack using several disparate measures against a target to accomplish Soviet goals. The disinformation campaign on what happened in 1930s Ukraine was maintained well into the Cold War and history was in effect re-written to erase the crime. It was only in the late 1960s and early 1970s that western historians started to unearth what had happened. They were roundly attacked by academics in the west sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Indeed, it was only after the Soviet Union dissolved itself in 1991 that scholarship could be undertaken to the depths required to understand the enormity of that and other crimes concealed by Soviet leaders and those who enabled them. Consequently, the dimensions of the Holomodor crime has taken between 40 and 70 years to emerge.[4] At this point in history (2022) the Putin regime has halted all other research into Stalin-era crimes inside Russia and has intimidated and jailed historians in Russia who were undertaking that work in an effect to turn the clock back and deny these events occurred.[5]

Luciuk has uncovered a Soviet-era active measures campaign directed at Canada but it requires substantial context to situate it. From the archival material reproduced in Operation Payback, it is clear that the Soviets set out to deliberately aggravate tensions between the Ukrainian community and the Jewish community in Canada. Their goals were twofold: societal disruption and

the driving of wedges between Canadian communities; and to prove to their home audience that aggressive Soviet activities around the globe were justified because the West harboured National Socialists after the Second World War. This is exactly what the Russia of Vladimir Putin is doing today vis-à-vis Ukraine. Indeed, resurrecting this Cold War-era controversy and attacking scholars that examine it even serves Russian objectives today.

The issue of Ukraine and what happened to its peoples during and after the Second World War has been handled in great detail by Timothy Snyder in **Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin** and Anne Applebaum in **Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe**. For the purposes of this discussion, ethnic Ukrainians and the Jewish population in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were subjected to extreme levels of brutalization by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the 1930s, then by National Socialist Germany in the 1940s, and then again by the Soviets after the Second World War. They were also subjected to horrific ideological manipulation. Some Soviet Commissars that were involved in repression in Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s were Jewish, therefore to some Ukrainian nationalists the Soviet Union was a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy to enslave anyone who was Christian did not want to go along with the atheistic Communist programme. That was exploited by the German occupation forces later on.[6] As Donald Rayfield notes in **Stalin and his Hangmen** there was fertile ground for this kind of thinking:

> The prominent roles of Jews in the killings of 1918-21 is a very thorny question, if only because one has to share debating ground with Russian chauvinists and plain anti-Semites. From Trotsky down to the executioners of Odessa, Russia's Jews ruthlessly avenged the victims of a century's pogroms, and the perceived Jewishness of the Cheka, in the minds of not just anti-Semitic fascists… reflected a widespread view of the Bolshevik party and its Central Committee as a Jewish cabal….The motivation of those Jews who worked for the Cheka was not Zionist in origin. The war between the Cheka and bourgeoisie…can be seen as being between Jewish internationalists and the remnant of Russian national culture.[7]

Stalin, on the other hand, exhibited high levels of anti-Semitism and later ruthlessly purged the security forces of anyone who was remotely Jewish, particularly those he used to do his dirty work in the 1920s and 1930s.[8] Indeed, Soviet propaganda even asserted later that "Zionists" controlled Hitler and fabricated the Holocaust.[9] The deliberate setting of two potentially enemy communities against each other surely counts as one of Stalin's masterstrokes to ensure the objectives of the Soviet regime. And this would later echo in Canada in the 1980s and again today.

There were constant tensions between the ethnic Polish community, the ethnic Ukrainian community, and the Jewish community in eastern Europe, tensions that went back to at least the 1800s, and were stoked by Imperial Russia in the first place.[10] Almost none of this complexity makes its way into Canadian history schoolbooks, despite the fact that 1.5 million Canadians claim Ukrainian decent and almost one million Canadians claim Polish decent. It is far easier to look at the Second World War in a simplistic black-white framework then it is to explain the complexities the Soviet Union's antagonistic relationship to the rest of the world, its assistance to National Socialist Germany in its rise in the 1930s, how that relationship deteriorated, and what happened to the peoples of eastern Europe before, during, and after the Second World War.[11]

"It is far easier to look at the Second World War in a simplistic black-white framework then it is to explain the complexities the Soviet Union's antagonistic relationship to the rest of the world."

Unsurprisingly, people in the Bloodlands zone sought out the best means of personal survival under monstrous conditions in the 1940s and in that context there is no doubt at all that murderous outrages were committed against any community that was deemed a threat by either or both national socialist or Soviet socialist ideology. There is no doubt that millions and millions died in one of the great tragedies of the 20th Century. None whatsoever. And when all was said and done, the victorious Soviet Union set out to re-order the area in its own image and assert control on all levels. The Second World War did not end for people in eastern Europe like it did for Canada in western Europe on VE Day. Soviet operations resulted in more mass death of Poles and Ukrainians in the so-called "national operations" that lasted until at least 1947 and whose existence was denied until the 1990s.[12] This meant the deliberate, targeted destruction of all flavours of Ukrainian patriotism, whether its proponents supported or were supported by National Socialist Germany, or not. It also meant denial of the Holocaust because the Soviet state refused to accept that this was unique historical event and it was subsumed into the large numbers associated with civilian deaths in the Soviet Union during the war, whether or not they were generated by the Soviets or the National Socialist Germans.[13]

Stalin needed a secure rear area so he could continue his struggle with National Socialist Germany and after they were defeated, the Allied powers in the form of NATO. Ukraine had to be secured. And there were obstacles to this. One of these was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the associated Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), organizations that was the product of the back and forth abuse by both totalitarian states, organizations whose members were not by any means lily white but who ultimately resisted all comers in the hope for the eventual emergence of an independent Ukrainian state. The OUN and UPA resisted the Soviet Union well into the 1950s, with the OUN continuing the struggle against enforced Russification in the 1960s and 1970s after the armed struggle ended in the late 1950s. Importantly, the OUN and UPA had support from the secret services of Western countries.[14] The existence of anti-Soviet resistance groups was a significant factor in distracting Stalin from

achieving his objectives during the period he was in power, particularly war with the West after the Second World War.[15]

In the heat and light of the Cold War ideological struggle, the Soviet Union justified its aggressive and repressive behaviour in a number of ways. It was constantly on the lookout for "revanchism" by anyone associated with German National Socialism-or anybody who had been abused by the Soviet system in the 1920s or 1930s. It sought to impugn those in West Germany trying to build a post-Nazi polity as mere extensions of Nazism manipulated puppet-like by the other enemy, Capitalism, embodied by the United States and its allies. Basically, anyone who opposed the Soviet Union was a "fascist" whether they were or not. And everybody of course understood Nazis and fascists were the same thing. The Soviets sought to make connections between the Ukrainian resistance and its checkered past to discredit it in the West: the OUN were supported by Nazis during the war, they continue the struggle against the Soviet Union now, therefore they are Nazis being employed by the United States to destroy the Soviet Union. That logic of course ignored the Holomodor and the fact that Ukrainian resistance pre-dated the Second World War. The logic also ignored the inconvenient fact that one million Soviets worked for National Socialist Germany in uniform, including the Vlasov Army and the "Hiwis": Russian interpreters, cooks, manual labour, concentration camp guards, and others.[16]

"anyone who opposed the Soviet Union was a "fascist" whether they were or not"

By the 1950s, the Soviet leadership examined the strategic terrain and concluded that the nuclear stalemate seriously limited how they could accomplish their objectives of global domination. Consequently, they decided to rejuvenate two tools they had employed in the pre-Second World War period. One of these was collectively labelled "support to wars of national liberation" and the other were a collection of activities called "active measures." It is the second that concerns us here. Today these are generally referred variously as influence activities, information operations, information warfare, or some variant of hybrid methodology.

Active measures in the Soviet sense involved a host of methods designed to influence an opponent to accept Soviet political and ideological influence without open warfare. Thomas Rid in *Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare* catalogues Cold War-era active measures in significant detail and I deal with it to some extent in my *Deconstructing Dr Strangelove: The Secret History of Nuclear War Films* when the Soviets tried to undermine the American nuclear deterrent using these techniques. But Rid explains it best:

> The goals were the same: to exacerbate existing tensions and contradictions within the adversary's body politic, by leveraging facts, fakes, and ideally a disorienting mix of both…The means may vary creating divisions between allied nations, driving wedges between ethnic groups, creating frictions between individuals in a group or party undermining the trust specific groups in society have in its institutions.[17]

Active measures in the Cold War built on long-standing Soviet delivery systems honed in the 1920s and 1930s. Stephen Koch described this in his work *Double Lives: Spies and Writers in the Secret Soviet War of Ideas Against the West*:

> [there were the] covertly controlled propaganda front; and the secretly manipulated fellow traveller. His goal was to create for the right-thinking non-communist West the dominating political prejudice of the era: the belief that any opinion that happened to serve the policy of the Soviet Union was derived from the most essential elements of human decency…that to seriously criticize or challenge Soviet policy was the unfailing mark of a bad, bigoted and probably stupid person….[fronts were created and] used every resource of propaganda….[they] organized the media: newspapers, film, radio, books, magazines, and theatre. Every kind of "opinion maker" was involved: writers, artists, actors, commentators, priests, ministers, professors, business leaders, scientists, psychologists, anyone at all whose opinion the public was likely to respect.[18]

Rid describes some of the more spectacular Soviet active measures. The Soviets determined that "By portraying west Germany as riddled with neo-Nazis, the Soviets could weaken Bonn, alienate it from its French, British, and American allies…. delay or prevent German rearmament, paralyse political debate, and drive a wedge in NATO." To assist this measure:

> [the KGB leadership] dispatched a small group of intelligence officers to a Russian village about fifty miles from Moscow. Their instructions: instigate anti-Semitism and gauge the village's reaction. One night the KGB team kicked over tombstones, daubed swastikas, and painted anti-Jewish slogans. Officers reported back… that most villagers were shocked and frightened by the incident. But among a small number of Russians, they reported, the Nazi symbols and slogans also triggered latent anti-Semitism and inspired them to become anti-Jewish activists on their own…[19]

This proof of concept was then deployed globally but particularly in New York City: "Our New York [KGB] station hired people to desecrate Jewish cemeteries."

Another Soviet active measures objective was to deliberately aggravate racial tensions in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s. KGB operative Oleg Kalugin:

> Our active measures campaign did not discriminate on the basis of race, colour, or creed: we went after everybody….The goal was to show that the Western world was plagued by tensions among a number of racial. Religious, and ethnic communities…[we] stirred up trouble in the black and Jewish communities.[20]

KGB cells "simply didn't pose as KKK-remarkably the same operators posed as an African-American organization agitating against the KKK."[21]

Eventually, the Soviets set their sights on Canada. Luciuk's **Operation Payback** includes photographs from the Kyiv archives of KGB material.[22] One of these is an 18 October 1986 summary of activities for the Canadian component of an operation code-named PAYBACK. PAYBACK's apparent objective was to "counteract" the activities of "OUN" outside of the Soviet Union. The UPA ceased to exist as an armed resistance group by the 1960s, so we can take the Soviet use of OUN to be an umbrella term for all Ukrainians who opposed the Soviet Union whether they were part of the original OUN, UPK, or not. The KGB believed that all anti-Soviet Ukrainian activity was a pure extension of CIA activities and could not process the reality that there were many, many people who opposed the Soviet Union that were not under the control of Western security services.

"in the late 1970s the human rights movement in the Soviet bloc dramatically expanded"

What is not in this document but is pertinent context is that at this point in the late 1970s the human rights movement in the Soviet bloc dramatically expanded. This included the 'refuseniks', Jewish people in the Soviet Union who were not permitted to emigrate to Israel, who had tremendous support from Jewish communities in the west and particularly in the United States. This was a cause celeb and embarrassed the Soviet Union internationally.[23] At the same time, there was Ukrainian agitation in Soviet occupied Ukraine for more autonomy and push-back against the Russification policies of the 1960s.[24] These two factors likely underpinned the creation of Op PAYBACK.

The United States portion of PAYBACK included:

> [the dissemination of] the book *Lest We Forget*, along with a list of OUN accomplices of the Nazis; three counter-propagandistic films were handed over to 17 anti-fascist organizations; the mass media and the authorities in the USA were sent messages from a number of people's assemblies [demanding[] that these war criminals be handed over to Soviet justice.

The objective appears to have been to force the US Government to create bodies to investigate "Nazi war criminals" to sow disruption, expend investigative resources, and get opponents of the Soviet Union to expend resources defending themselves instead of focusing those energies on the Soviet Union. PAYBACK was considered to have been successful in the United States ("it allowed us to shape US public opinion advantageous to us") so it was expanded to Canada in 1980.

The summary documents states that the Soviet point of main effort in Canada was to be the "SS Galicia division." The existence of a Ukrainian military formation that fought under National Socialist German command against the Soviet Union, the 14th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS (1st Galician), intrigued the KGB. And here is where the controversy lays. This formation fought in western Ukraine, was destroyed, and then rebuilt in Slovakia. It was then deployed to Slovenia, came under Ukrainian command and re-named the 1st Ukrainian Division (UNA) where it surrendered to Allied forces in Italy in 1945. The SS was declared to be a criminal organization after the war when the horrors of the concentration camp system were revealed, so on one level there were SS who were permitted to settled in Canada. On another level, most of the divisions' personnel were not people who ran extermination camps. It was basically a combat unit that was placed under SS command. But it was still an SS formation and thus bore the guilt associated with the larger crimes of the parent organization and the regime it served. That said, members of this formation were permitted to emigrate to Canada and to Great Britain after successive vetting process conducted by British, Canada, and Soviet commissions during and after the war.[25] There is irony in that Stalin himself considered the matter "disposed of" in July 1945 when he met with Churchill and this was recorded in Foreign Office memoranda.[26]

To accomplish the objectives of driving a wedge between communities, the KGB document explains that, among other measures, "materials about the punitive activities of the SS Galicia Division were planted in the Toronto Star." Seven pamphlets created by the KGB but disseminated through third and fourth parties were distributed. And, according to the Duschene report, Canadian media with an appetite for the sensational took the bait. The report itself marvels how the media and activist groups steadily inflated the number of Nazis hiding in Canada from "over 50" to 6000.[27] Now anybody associated with the Galicia division was suspect, and by extension the Ukrainian-Canadian community that they were part of.

The Op PAYBACK campaign led to the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals in 1985 and after two years of investigation the Commission concluded that assertions that there were thousands of Nazi war criminals hiding in Canada were completely unfounded. The KGB congratulated themselves anyway:

> The implemented measures succeeded in showing the public abroad that reactionary circles in a number of countries are harbouring Nazi war criminals and their accomplices in the persons of OUN ringleaders. This in turn struck a serious blow at attempts of ruling circles to use OUN centers abroad in hostile activities against the Soviet Union; forces the OUNites to divert efforts and funds to their own defence.

What did this mean in practical terms in Canada? There was no OUN armed resistance movement at that time and thus there was no support for it in Canada, so it wasn't disrupted. The relationship between the Jewish community and the Ukrainian community in Canada was, however, permanently harmed and in many cases personal relationships were destroyed when people felt they had to take sides. Attempts to coordinate anti-Soviet human rights or political action between the two communities could not take place in such an environment.[28] Suspicions that the Canadian government was hiding Nazis spread in the body politic assisted by the media, who ensured that anything Nazi was sensationalized, regardless of the truth. The affair engaged government resources that should have been investigating Soviet and Communist Chinese influence activities in Canada.

But there are long-term effects. And those effects have been harnessed by Russia in its campaign against an independent Ukraine over the past 15 years. The exploitation of the Russian fascist ideology of Ivan Ilyan and the geopolitical rantings of Alexander Dugin are key underpinnings of Vladimir Putin's ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Putin's justification for the invasion rests on the Russian assertion, carefully curated over the years, that the 2014 Maidan revolution was a fascist/neo-Nazi-Zionist-LGBTQ coup that was going to unleash a genocide against the Russian-speaking inhabitant of Ukraine. And once again, Canada has been targeted by active measures, some of which involve portraying the Ukrainian-Canadian community as Nazis or as Nazi sympathizers, magnifying the importance of a relative small number of right wing Ukrainian extremists, or sowing doubt as to the democratic credentials of the Zelensky government. The defacing of Ukrainian monuments in Canada, the stimulation of outrage over ancient animosities and associating them with modern events, and the ongoing campaign to portray Chrystia Freeland as a Nazi sympathizer fit in the framework of Russian active measures based on past Soviet active measures. **Operation PAYBACK** is a window into Soviet and Russian active measures directed against Canada. It is crucial that we as Canadians understand how foreign powers conduct influence operations in this country and the subject requires further and extensive study. Failure to do so will result in increased diversion of scarce investigative resources, increased and possibly violent ethnic animosity, and other opportunities for our opponents to interfere with the Canadian polity to our detriment.

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NOTE

1 The best study on this issue is John Connelly's *From Peoples into Nations: A History of Eastern Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020).

2 Donald Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen: The Tyrant and Those Who Killed for Him* (New York: Random House, 204) particularly chapter 3.

3 Walter Laquer, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia* (New York: Harper-Perennial, 1993) ch. 6.

4 See Martin Amis, *Koba The Dread: Laughter and Twenty Million* (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992); Robert Conquest, *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* (London: John Murray, 1999); Robert Conquest *Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2017).

5 "Russian Court increases jail sentence for Gulag historian, *The Guardian* 27 Dec 21, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/dec/27/russian-court-increases-jail-sentence-for-gulag-historian ; Richard Cohen, "Vladimir Putin's Rewriting of History Draws on a Long Tradition of Soviet Myth-Making," Smithsonian Magazine, 18 March 2022, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/vladimir-putins-rewriting-of-history-draws-on-a-long-tradition-of-soviet-myth-making-180979724/; Luke Harding, "Russian Historian Arrested in Stalin-era Clampdown," *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 October 2009, https://www.smh.com.au/world/russian-historian-arrested-in-stalinera-clampdown-20091016-h15c.html; Masha Gessen, "The Russian Memory Project That Became and Enemy of the States," *The New Yorker*, 6 January 2022, https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-russian-memory-project-that-became-an-enemy-of-the-state

6 This topic is expertly handled by Paul Hanebrink in *A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2018).

7 Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*, 75.

8 Rayfield, *Stalin and his Hangmen*. Rayfield notes that Genrikh Iagoda, the murderous head of the NKVD, was Jewish (206), and discusses the "cosmopolitan" purge (305).

9 Laquer, *Black Hundred*, 107-8

10 Serhii Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine* (New York: Perseus Books, 2015), 145.

11 The nature and extent of the Soviet Union's assistance to National Socialist Germany is slowly emerging, now that oppositional elements in academia who were pro-Soviet age out. See Rueiger Barth and Hauke Friederichs, *The Last Winter of Weimar Republic: The Rise of the Third Reich* (New York: Pegasus Books, 2020), 30. See also Ian Ona Johnson, *Faustian Bargain: The Soviet-German Partnership and the Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

12 Applebaum, *Iron Curtain*, Ch. 6.

13 Nina Tumarkin, *The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia* (New York: basic Books, 1994), 49-50.

14 CIA CREST, "The History, Development, and Organization of the Ukrainian Resistance Movement, Including the OUN, UPK, and the UHVR," 28 May 1952 at https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP83-00415R010100150006-6.pdf

15 Dimitri Volkogonov *Stalin: Triumph &Tragedy* (New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1988), 531. The more extensive research I am currently conducting on this bears this out. Stalin was prepared to conduct military operations against the West but the combination of the existence of the atomic bomb and the unsecured rear area in Ukraine played a role in deterring him from doing so.

16 As discussed in Sven Steenberg, *Vlasov* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1970), 104. See also Juergen Thorwald, *The Illusion: Soviet Soldiers in Hitler's Armies* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Janovich, 1974).

17 Thomas Rid *Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2020) 7-9.

18 Stephen Koch *Double Lives: Spies and Writers in the Secret Soviet War of Ideas Against the West* (Toronto: The Frees Press, 1994) ,13.

19 Rid Active Measures 131.

20 Rid Active Measures 134

21 Rid Active Measures 137

22 I am indebted to Olga Bertelsen who published the crucial study "Ukrainian and Jewish Emigres as Targets of KGB Active Measures in the 1970s," *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* Vol. 34 No. 2 pp. 267-294. The document reproduced in *Operation Payback* came from the Sectoral State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine in Kyiv. With regards to the essay you are reading, a peer reviewer suggested that there was something "suspicious" because I did not note a challenge to the Bertelsen piece made by Efraim Zuroff and Per Anders Rudling (Efraim Zuroff and Per A. Rudling, "Response to Olga Bertelsen's Article," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* Vol 34, 2021 Issue 2, pp. 293-297). I find it equally suspicious that the peer reviewer omitted the fact that Bertelsen responded to Zuroff and Rudling…. See Olga Bertelsen, "Author Response," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* Vol 34, 2021 Issue 2, pp. 298-299. The debate as to whether the Holomdor should be considered a genocide is beyond the scope of this essay.

23 See Pauline Peretz *Let My people Go: The Transnational Politics of Soviet Jewish Emigration During the Cold War* Ethan Rundell, trans. (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2015).

24 Plokhy, *The Gates of Europe* 311-314.

25 *Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals report. Part I : public* / Jules Deschênes, commissioner, 30 Dec 86 at https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/471452/publication.html

26 The document is reproduced in *Operation Payback*, 192.

27 *Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals report. Part I : public* / Jules Deschênes, commissioner, 30 Dec 86 at https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/471452/publication.html , 246-7

28 Bertelsen "Ukrainian and Jewish Emigres as Targets of KGB Active Measures in the 1970s," *The International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* Vol. 34 No. 2 pp. 267-294.

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY

The Rise of the Chinese Navy

by Richard Desjardins







China as a Twenty First Century Naval Power: Theory, Practice, and Implications

by Michael McDevitt

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2020

320 pages, $48.19

ISBN: 978-1-6824753-55

China's Maritime Gray Zone Operations

edited by Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019

324 pages, $85.98

ISBN: 978-1-59114-693-3

China's Vision of Victory

by Jonathan T.D. Ward

Fayetteville, NC: Atlas Publishing, 2019

314 pages, $28.81

ISBN: 978-0-57-843810-8

Red Star over China: China's Rise and the Challenge to US Maritime Strategy

by Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes

Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010

292 pages, $47.16

ISBN: 978-1-59114-390-1

As the world turns its attention toward the Indo-Pacific region, there is growing concern for a potential confrontation between the United States and its allies on the one hand and China on the other. The conclusion of an agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, known as AUKUS, for the provision of nuclear submarines to Australia, is just a recent indicator that Western powers are responding to aggressive Chinese behavior in the form of irredentist claims and encroachment in the East and South China seas[1]. Chinese moves in the region compounded with such issues as Taiwan and the Korean peninsula further complicate an assessment of the prospects for conflict.

Grounding a solid policy response to the current situation would require investigating what factors brought this situation to the fore. Failure to do so could lead to miscalculations with dire consequences for all parties involved. While it is now a cliché that China's rise led to a shift toward the region in the areas of trade and the economy, less clear until recently were the motivations behind China's military moves in the East and South China seas and what they reveal about China's objectives. Is China seeking to expand its range in the near seas as part of an attempt to secure a regional sphere of influence or should it be seen as one step toward much larger ambitions beyond the region? And what is the role of the Chinese navy in these scenarios? The evidence suggests that the immediate role of the Chinese navy is to address national security concerns around Taiwan on the one hand and protect sea lines of communications (SLOCs) involving China's global trade network on the other.

The Dream of Great Rejuvenation

Ever since China's admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, there was an implicit understanding that it would lead to greater stability in

relations between China and the West. China's efforts to comply with and integrate international norms in the area of economic development and trade were expected to contribute to turning China into an observant partner of the established international order. Certainly the country has taken advantage of its access to international markets as well as foreign investments to transform an agrarian economy and a relatively backward industrial base into a formidable economic competitor. What became less clear is what China was going to do with this new economic power.

Having built a solid industrial base in many advanced fields of the economy, China grew more confident about areas that it had neglected in that pursuit. It did carry out reforms in the military as early as the mid-1980s and into the 1990s but they involved mostly slimming exercises such as retiring military personnel in the pursuit of greater informatization (信息化 - xinxihua), the result of a shock caused by the stunning victory of US forces (and its allies) in the Gulf War of 1991. China also became more assertive on the Taiwan front to prevent what it feared was an attempt to create a fait accompli with a formal declaration of sovereignty. The launch of missiles in the Taiwan Strait during the presidential election in 1996 was a reminder that China was taking the situation seriously and that a move towards independence would likely trigger a military response[2]. China's sensitivity to developments across the Taiwan Strait was not new. Ever since Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan at the end of the Chinese civil war, China had been looking for an opening to recover the island. In the wake of the Cold War, a stalemate created by the presence of the US 7th fleet became permanent and remains in place today, even as China shows increasing impatience and a growing ability to respond.

"What became less clear is what China was going to do with this new economic power."

Largely missed by Western analysts were that China's motivations were part of a broader mission going back to the late imperial period when it had been subjected to infringements on its sovereignty by European powers following the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century. This 'century of humiliation' that came to an end with the communist victory of October 1949 has been relied upon extensively by successive Chinese leaders and none more so than under current Chinese President Xi Jinping to rally domestic support as China sought to achieve what came to be known as the China dream of national rejuvenation.

As John T.D. Ward recounts in his sharp analysis titled *China's Vision of Victory,* it becomes clear that what we are witnessing is not merely the recovery of a wounded civilization but rather the awakening of a sleeping giant bent on resuming its central role as the Middle Kingdom of old (中国zhongguo), but with a difference. If Imperial China was not interested in foreign goods but satisfied with tribute payments from neighboring countries, it now aspires to integrate the lands beyond in a global commercial system with Beijing at the centre. While Ward argues that Chinese leaders see it as a restoration rather than a rise, China's current objectives appear to reach much farther than imperial China ever conceived. China's presence in all the international organizations such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and WTO as well as organizations of its own creation (Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank, Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and BRICS) and partnerships in Africa and Latin America clearly spell out a leadership role that imperial China never had. In that regard, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) represents a massive effort to harness a large part of the Eurasian landmass into a commercial empire without any historical precedent[3].

Ward's interpretation of China's long-term view of its rise finds much support in earlier pronouncements by Xi's predecessors. Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), successor to Mao, had already outlined in November 1984 his vision of the role of the military as providing support for national (economic) development. In other words, military priorities would have to take a backseat to economic goals[4]. What is impressive but also somewhat daunting about this vision is the considered rationality of the leaders under this planned development of China. It is as if each Chinese leader saw himself as a stepping stone in the long march towards all-round power. Such long-term view speaks to the patience but also to an unusual exercise in self-control that has proven effective in solidifying an incremental plan that has seen China, a backward developing country some forty years ago, now threatening American economic supremacy in the not-too-distant future.

Protecting the Dream

Now that China has secured a solid economic base with its enterprises among the leading groups around the world, China can finally turn its attention to securing these economic gains with a military force that has grown from coastal defense to maritime power with growing power projection beyond the immediate region. As Chinese economic interests abroad grow, the Chinese navy will be called upon to play an increasingly important role. Indeed, there is much to protect in this emerging Chinese empire. Access to oil and minerals from the Middle East and Africa, much of it traveling through the Strait of Malacca, imposes on the Chinese navy a heavy responsibility with massive challenges. While China has created alternative routes through the BRI, it remains a gigantic task to shield this trade network from potential regional threats to its SLOCs. Furthermore, many Chinese projects abroad involve thousands of Chinese workers providing a human face to China's interests which it cannot ignore.

In line with its program of economic development, Chinese naval developments have experienced formidable growth beginning in the 1990s. While the focus on economic development exerted some constraints on military reforms, China sought to prepare for contingencies that could not wait. Developments in Taiwan where island politics saw the rise of a more militant native movement pushing for political reforms brought Chinese fears that Taiwanese leaders might take advantage of China's focus on domestic economic reforms to declare independence. China responded by developing a strategy focused on anti-access and area denial (A2/AD). If the Chinese navy was no match to the US Navy, it could at least try to raise the stakes by, for instance, purchasing Russian-made submarines to patrol the area and keep US aircraft carriers at bay while targeting land-based missiles at the island[5].

As China grew more confident about its ability to deny the US Navy access in the Taiwan Strait and as its economy continued to develop by leaps and bounds, the Chinese military began to shift its focus to areas beyond the immediate Taiwan contingency. President Hu Jintao (2002-2012) outlined in his last speech before stepping down that China should become a 'maritime great power' (海洋强国 – haiyang qiangguo), a term that requires some pondering as it encompasses a much broader meaning than a trading power with a great navy. As Michael McDevitt defines it, China's idea of 'world-class' maritime power includes a coast guard, merchant marine and fishing fleet, shipbuilding capacity (cargo and navy) as well as the ability to harvest or extract economically important resources. China seeks to achieve such status by 2035.

Under the cover of contributing to world peace and stability, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) gained experience and tested the seaworthiness of its growing navy in anti-piracy operations off the coast of Africa in the mid-2000s. It found much to improve in its ability to carry out naval activities far from China, including equipment breakdown in weather-challenging conditions as well as lagging logistical support to its warships. While the PLAN did perform well given its lack of experience and the absence of bases close to its operations, it also realized that if its aspirations to be world-class were to be achieved it would require considerable investments in developing an infrastructure that could support naval operations in far seas. Interestingly, the PLAN was able to rely on China's trade network to refuel and replenish supplies for its ships thanks to COSCO, the Chinese shipping conglomerate with facilities in the Arabian Sea.

Michael McDevitt, a retired Rear-Admiral with the US Navy, provides an impressive and detailed overview of the development of the PLAN over the past fifteen years. The picture that emerges reveals a characteristic modus operandi: Slow and incremental development bent on learning and adapting warship construction and training as required. Thus, the Chinese military moved slowly but surely by initially acquiring equipment from abroad and reverse-engineering them. Subsequently they developed their own local versions and test ran them to assess performance. McDevitt looks at China's efforts on destroyers (DDG) and aircraft carriers (Liaoning and Shandong with a third under construction) as well as fighter jets (J-15) that were scheduled to equip them. His assessment reveals gaps but also an impressive ability to learn and improve on existing platforms by Chinese engineers.

While McDevitt is not convinced that China is seeking preeminence as a superpower (p. xi), his assessment leaves little doubt that it seeks to be on a par with the United States in areas of immediate concern. China's strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait and East and South China Seas as well as its global trade network and security needs demand matching naval assets. According to McDevitt, it was not lost on the Chinese military how Germany threatened Great Britain's ability to secure supplies from the United States during World War II in the Atlantic and the equivalent scenario in the Pacific War involving the United States and Japan[6]. If China is indeed concerned that its trade SLOCs could be vulnerable to such scenarios in the event of a conflict with the US and its regional allies (Japan for instance), it is looking at massive investments in warships and submarines but also ashore facilities in a vast area that extends between China and the Arabian Sea.

The PLAN has been on a purchasing spree since 2004 that include 131 ships of various types: two aircraft carriers, thirty-six DDGs, eleven large replenishment ships, eight nuclear-powered submarines, and nine large amphibious ships. These are all considered blue-water capable. In addition and in the same time frame, China has also put at sea 160 ships considered near-seas capable. It remains to be seen to what extent such purchasing power will be matched by equivalent training and coordination. China's performance in anti-piracy operations suggests that it will be successful[7].

"the Chinese military moved slowly but surely by initially acquiring equipment from abroad and reverse-engineering them."

Strategy and Development: An Ongoing Debate

Ward and McDevitt have relied mostly on official sources and thinking in providing the public a detailed understanding of Chinese government thinking and PLAN. Indeed, an accurate picture cannot but review and assess that evidence to determine where China as a naval power stands and where it is likely going. Such approach, however, may not capture the larger debate going on within China. Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, both PLAN experts at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, have led an intensive study of the Chinese debate on naval thought and discussion in open-source literature, including thousands of journals, thanks to the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) library. The picture that emerges is the existence of a lively debate in Chinese intellectual circles concerning the purpose and function of a navy[8].

Various Chinese think tanks have been exploring the thought of Alfred T. Mahan for years seeking to determine the extent to which his views could be adopted by China. As might be expected, Mahan is well-regarded by many Chinese military strategists but his ideas have not led to the emergence of a consensus view. Yoshihara and Holmes paint a picture of a field of study that is somewhat divided. This state of affairs should not come as a surprise. What is more crucial is the extent to which this situation is also reflected in the Chinese high command and whether Chinese military leaders have planned for contingencies in the event that a conflict should take place between China and the United States and whether the PLAN will be able to respond with enough flexibility. Certainly, having various views expressed benefits a better informed decision and strategy in the event of conflict.

While Mahan indicated that all great powers had a navy, he also qualified that naval power was not an end in itself[9]. In fact, great powers were primarily trading powers that navigated international waters to feed their markets in various goods. Thus, such networks needed the protection that only national sea power could bring. Chinese military circles have been struggling to adapt the Mahanian concept to the realities of China and its environment. It is not clear at this point to what extent the Chinese military leaders have satisfied themselves that these lessons from history have been digested and integrated into their naval strategy.

What Chinese analysts seem to agree on is that geography has not been kind to China. As a land power, China borders fourteen countries. As a sea power, it faces six countries with Japanese islands locking China from the north to nearby Taiwan while the Philippines archipelago locks it from the south. In this context, the military value of Taiwan in breaking this encirclement increases exponentially. Thus Taiwan's return to the fold is more than just about reunifying lost territory to the motherland[10].

If Mahan is well-known in Chinese navy circles for the larger purpose of a naval force, they still rely on indigenous inspiration in approaching actual combat. Here Chairman Mao and his writings on warfare continue to guide Chinese military strategy thinkers. The concept of active defense, for instance, which Mao developed in the context of ground attacks during the civil war and the war against Japan, continues to inspire Chinese military thinking[11]. Yoshihara and Holmes caution that this approach to fighting a superior force could draw the US Navy in an unexpected encounter that it might lose.

"As a land power, China borders fourteen countries."

Another area of potential vulnerability that Yoshihara and Holmes raise is the increasing presence of missiles in the immediate area of the Taiwan Strait. In the context of a Taiwan crisis, for instance, China benefits from being barely 160 km from the island. With hundreds of missile launching ramps along the Chinese coast, it presents any intervening navy (such as the US and Japan) with a challenge difficult to match. Yoshihara and Holmes note that the Chinese military have spent considerable time studying the Falklands War involving Great Britain and Argentina for its possible lessons for a Taiwan contingency as well as the Argentineans' use of an Exocet missile to sink the HMS Sheffield[12]. The reach of coastal-launched missiles places any foreign navy in a vulnerable position to land-based attacks and a potential challenge in terms of response[13].

Soft power is an area in which the PLAN has been slow in promoting its efforts to gain acceptance in the world community. This was in evidence in 2004 when a tsunami reverberated off the coast of Japan. Countries like the United States were quick in making use of their navy ships to provide humanitarian assistance. China eventually responded by building large hospital ships[14]. Last November 2021, China also broadcast a series focused on one of these ships, the Peace Ark, highlighting its efforts in bringing medical assistance to affected areas in Southeast Asia and Africa[15].

Chinese Naval Militia with Chinese Characteristics

A typical illustration highlighting the unique challenge that China represents to the international order is the concept of "gray zone operations", a term that is used to describe naval tactics with Chinese characteristics in the waters off the Chinese coast as well as in contested zones in the East and South China seas. While the term "gray zone operations" has been around for some time, it has been given new prominence by what might be called paranaval forces in China. In his concise definition of the term, Philip Kapusta calls them "*competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality* [and] *are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and legal frameworks*[16].

In a chapter devoted to defining the term, Michael B. Petersen adds that these operations "*are oriented to specific objectives and conducted with more directed intensity than traditional peacetime competition, but they also do not involve overt military conflict*"[17]. This distinct approach to the pursuit of national security policy at sea allows China to "*conduct operations to alter the status quo, without resorting to war*", according to Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson, editors of this outstanding collective effort to demystify Chinese naval operations in regional contested waters. Their book is the result of a conference of the CMSI held in May 2017 in Newport, RI. When carried out adroitly, gray zone operations eventually put the status quo power before a dilemma. Having failed to react to earlier transgressions, it finds itself in the difficult position of either responding and appearing to be the aggressor or running the risk of having its deterrence losing credibility. Gray zone operations are not to be confused with hybrid warfare, as Petersen explains. The latter belong squarely to the domain of conflict. China's investment into gray zone operations leads Peter Dutton, in his own chapter on conceptualizing the term, to make the remarkable claim that it could lead to a revolution in military affairs.

The forces involved in gray zone operations have gone through significant reorganization in the past few years in part to streamline their operations but also to clarify the command structure. According to PLAN experts, the force is leaner and more effective[18]. The force to watch now that the structure has been simplified is the People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia or PAFMM (中国海上民兵zhongguo haishang minbing). The Erickson and Martinson book covers a wide spectrum of issues in relation to gray zone operations, including international law, the reorganization of the China Coast Guard and its transfer to the People's Armed Police, as well as the role of the China Maritime Police in enforcing sovereignty in disputed waters, among many others.

Conclusion

For reasons of space, it was not possible to do full justice to the extent and quality of the scholarship of the books reviewed. Many topics covered in them cannot be addressed here. Yoshihara and Holmes, for instance, cover at length the interest of Chinese military commentators in aircraft carrier killer missiles and what it could mean for the US Navy's ability to weigh in on a conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

A review of Chinese naval development reveals that much has been learned about what the Chinese navy has achieved, but also much that remains in the dark. Furthermore, the books reviewed highlight that we cannot look at the PLAN in isolation from the

other elements of the Chinese military as well as Chinese developments in the economy and international trade. They all affect each other in one way or another.

American expertise on the PLAN has shown increasing maturity over the years and great respect for their Chinese counterparts and the efforts they have invested in building a world-class navy of their own. Many of the authors are themselves fluent in Chinese and have access to the Chinese literature on military developments in China. This allows them to view directly what the Chinese military community is thinking. In that respect, the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College has engaged in a singularly impressive effort in developing an indigenous knowledge base on the PLAN and sharing that knowledge with the larger community of military experts. This knowledge grows as the Institute holds a conference every other year and publishes its results in book form.

The field of PLA studies in the United States also benefits from efforts by various government institutions to share, debate, and evaluate what is happening in the field and what policy response should be given. The US Department of Defense publishes its annual report on 'Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China' while the US Congress via the US-China Economic and Security Commission holds hearings on the Chinese military throughout the year and publishes its own annual (public) report. These various efforts allow a healthy debate about military developments in the Western Pacific and helps raise awareness among the public at large.

This raises the question about what is being done here in Canada. As any Canadian observer of China will attest, the country has been a laggard with reference to this emerging power[19]. Every major university in Canada has its department of Asian studies, but unfortunately what is being done in them is not shared with the other institutions or the public in a manner that could help develop a position on various issues of national interest. Surprisingly, as this reviewer found out, our two military colleges affect virtually no resources to the field of PLA studies. China is generally buried in a general course involving power politics or history. Nor do we hold annual conferences on the topic and what it means for Canada.

Expertise on the Chinese military can easily take years to develop. Fluency in the Chinese language alone can take that long. Furthermore, in the case of China, expertise in its military cannot be narrowly construed. The Chinese military is an arm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as are many other areas of Chinese society. China military expertise thus covers a much larger spectrum. Furthermore, China conceives national security from a broad perspective, a concept that appears to have just begun making inroads here in Canada. Yet, the Canadian military needs to have this intellectual infrastructure to assess what impact military developments in the Western Pacific will have on Canadian security and what response should be developed, including in terms of naval resources. Unfortunately, if any debate is going on it is behind closed doors. As a result, when action may have to be taken, the Canadian public will have not been brought on board, presenting a huge challenge in developing a popular understanding and support for policy action. As tensions heat up in the Western Pacific, Canada still has time to build an intellectual infrastructure to support a policy response in line with its national interest. There is, however, no time to waste.

"A typical illustration highlighting the unique challenge that China represents to the international order is the concept of "gray zone operations"

Richard Desjardins *retired from the Canadian public service after twenty-nine years (1991–2020). He holds an MA in political science.*

NOTES

1 Despite constitutional constraints on the use of its military, Japan is expanding its options that suggest concerns about regional military developments, including turning its helicopter destroyers into aircraft carriers. See Julian Ryall, "Kishida puts military strike option on table for Japan, in 'show of standing up to China'", *South China Morning Post*, December 6, 2021. Japan and Australia have also signed a security agreement intended to boost cooperation in response to challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. See ABC News (Australia), 'Australia and Japan sign security pact to respond to 'challenging' Indo-Pacific environment' at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-01-06/australia-japan-sign-security-agreement/100742760.

2 During the presidential election in Taiwan (1995-1996) involving the first native Taiwanese candidate (Lee Teng-hui), the Chinese military launched several missiles off the coast of Taiwan as an intimidation tactic. Michael McDevitt reports in his book that despite media claims that the US 7th Fleet sent a carrier group through the Taiwan Strait, no such move took place. The carrier group stayed away from the Strait although it did remain in the region. His statement finds support in an article published many years earlier on this crisis. See Chen Qimao, "The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions", in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), *Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan*, and the 1995-1996 Crisis, London, Routledge, 1999, p. 131. In that crisis, a PLA major general revealed to the Taiwanese military that the missiles were not equipped with warheads. The PLA officer, Liu Liankun, was later executed for spying for Taiwan. See Lawrence Chung, "Honour for Chinese spy killed for tipping off Taiwan during missile crisis", *South China Morning Post*, 6 April 2018.

3 In fact, as Ward describes it, BRI covers an even wider area: 65 countries in Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, West Asia and North Africa (p. 185). Separate agreements with Russia and the European Union would complement this massive undertaking.

4 Deng Xiaoping, "The army should subordinate itself to the general interest, which is to develop the country", in Deng Xiaoping, *Fundamental Issues in Present-Day China*, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1987, p. 91.

5 For a detailed account of China's submarine program, see Andrew S. Erickson and als. (eds.), *China's Future Nuclear Submarine Force*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007. For China's growing concern about a Taiwan contingency, see David Lai and Marc Miller, 'Chapter 1: Introduction', in Roy Kamphausen and als. (eds.), Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, 2009.

6 Yoshihara and Holmes devote an entire chapter to the case of Germany and England (pre-1914) and the lessons that Chinese strategic theorists could draw from it. See chapter 3 of their book.

7 For reasons of space, it is not possible to detail here the types of ships being commissioned by the PLAN. McDevitt does provide a detailed account of these ships, particularly for the blue-water element of the PLAN. See chapter 4 of his book.

8 Yoshihara and Holmes had already explored the influence of Alfred T. Mahan on Chinese naval strategic thought in an earlier book. See their *Chinese Naval Strategy in the 21st Century: The Turn to Mahan*, London, Routledge, 2008.

9 Alfred T. Mahan's conception of naval power was elaborated in a book widely read in Chinese naval circles, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 2003.

10 Chinese interest in historical precedents runs deep. National broadcaster CCTV put together a 12-part series on the subject in 2006. This production can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9ebJ3eJCrI&list=PLwXMmy5fUrVzrhuQ4Bp-CB9qIN1rOmhdf.

11 A thorough study of the Maoist concept of active defense can be found in M. Taylor Fravel, *Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019.

12 Yoshihara and Holmes rely in part on a paper on the subject by another CMSI expert, Lyle Goldstein, 'China's Falklands Lessons', *Survival*, vol. 50, no.3, June-July 2008, pp. 65-82.

13 Yoshihara and Holmes devote considerable space to reviewing Chinese efforts in the development of missiles and antiship ballistic missiles. See chapter 5 in their book.

14 The PLAN's efforts at soft power have not received much coverage in the literature. For a concise but informative account regarding its hospital ships, see *Semaphore* (Sea Power Centre – Australia), issue 3, April 2011 at the following: https://www.navy.gov.au/media-room/publications/semaphore-03-11.

15 The series titled Ark of Peace (和平之舟 – hepingzhizhou) broadcast 32 episodes. It can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WGdb0-Z2KO4.

16 Philip Kapusta, 'The Gray Zone', *Special Warfare*, October-December 2015.

17 Michael B. Petersen, 'The Chinese Maritime Gray Zone: Definitions, Dangers, and the Complications of Rights Protection Operations', in Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson (eds.), *China's Maritime Gray Zone Operations*, p. 16.

18 While the Erickson and Martinson book is the best single reference on the topic, both editors as well as Conor M. Kennedy have provided an update on these issues in appendices included in the McDevitt book, a more recent publication.

19 Canada has been doing poorly in involving itself in the Pacific community despite its membership in various regional organizations (ASEAN Security Dialogue, APEC). For one assessment, see *Canada's Engagement with East Asia: Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development*, November 2018.