FUTURE WAR

CONTINUOUS CONFLICT
IN AN ERA OF RISING PEER COMPETITORS

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THE CANSOFCOM EDUCATION & RESEARCH CENTRE

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Tony Balasevicius

FOREWORD

I am delighted to introduce our twenty-third monograph, *Future War: Continuous Conflict in an Era of Rising Peer Competitors* in our seventh year of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) Education and Research Centre (ERC) series. This publication continues our objective of promulgating interesting educational material that will assist individuals in the Command, as well as those external to it, learn more about the contemporary security environment, human behaviour, special operations, and military theory and practice.

In this monograph, retired former Canadian Armed Forces officer Tony Balasevicius, an experienced strategic analyst, examines the complex subject of hybrid, insurgency and multi-domain warfare within the contemporary security environment. As his title indicates, his analysis leads him to believe that future war will be waged on a "battlefield of battlefields" where state and non-state entities will compete for political objectives by using every tool available to them from cyber, informational, diplomatic, economic and military methodologies to achieve their end goals. In fact, Balasevicius contends that states specifically will endeavour to utilize means short of conventional military engagement to weaken and destabilize their opponents utilizing strategic means (e.g. diplomatic, informational, cyber), as well as tactical methods (e.g. fomenting social dissent and political agitation, using proxy forces) to achieve their objectives. To make his point, the author uses the Russian actions in Syria and the Ukraine as graphic case studies of what future war will look like.

As always, our intent at the ERC is to provide informative and interesting professional development material that is of value to your operational role. In addition, it is intended to spark discussion, reflection and debate. Please do not hesitate to contact the ERC should you have comments or topics that you would like to see addressed as part of the CANSOFCOM monograph series.

Dr. Emily Spencer
Series Editor and Director CANSOFCOM ERC

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INTRODUCTION

Recent operations undertaken by Russia in such places as the Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria, suggest the international order is in transition. The strategic environment is moving away from the unipolar system of American dominance established after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, into a multi-polar world where peer competitors are beginning to stake out their areas of interest and influence. The speed and efficiency of recent diplomatic and military success, particularly by Russia, has taken many analysts by surprise. In fact, Russian operations have exhibited an ability to undermine traditional Western military strengths in the areas of air and maritime superiority. Moreover, they have also displayed the ability to limit or prevent short-term access to key emerging capabilities such as space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum.[1]

Moscow has achieved this success by transforming its military and how it fights. The key to this change is the ability to fuse the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war with the integration of a greater selection of national resources into a broader concept of conflict. These state tools have included the coordinated use of political, economic, informational, cultural and diplomatic means, as well as societal friction. The aim of this new type of warfare is not to defeat the enemy in battle using military forces but rather to create social unrest leading to political crises and eventual political defeat.

These changes have had the effect of creating even greater complexity within the traditional military operating environment. More importantly, the coordinated use of these national instruments is serving to increase the number of operational domains that states and their military forces must now deal with. Within this context of multiplying domains of conflict, we are seeing a new phenomenon emerging in the form of the "battlefield of battlefields" or what the Americans are now referring to as multi-domain battle.[2]

This evolution towards a "battlefield of battlefields" is forcing a number of changes to how war is defined, how nations conduct warfare and what role military forces will play in future conflicts. Current trends suggest that national governments will need to closely integrate a complex iteration of diverse actions in order to achieve specific political outcomes. To do this task they will need to take a broader and more strategic approach to the idea of conflict and how it relates to warfare. This requirement is due to the fact that future conflicts will be focused on creating political or diplomatic *fait accompli* long before an opponent's military force can be applied.

In fact, these methods are now being employed by various nations and are proving particularly effective because they operate below internationally recognized thresholds that would normally trigger a decisive counteraction.[3] Examples of this new type of conflict were on display with the Russian seizure of Crimea during the early part of 2014, and with the creation of man-made islands by China in the South China Sea.

These examples must serve as a warning to the West that the character of war is changing. Emerging great nations are beginning to engage in a continuous cycle of competition, conflict and war to position themselves for advantage in order to circumvent Western strengths, specifically in military power.[4] To counter this threat,

Western governments will need to take a far more proactive and hands-on approach towards identifying, shaping and dealing with conflict and its transition to war. From a purely military perspective, war is also changing for Western military institutions as the rise of peer competitors change the dynamics of how wars will be fought.

Trends suggest that future warfare within the context of the "battlefield of battlefields" will focus on managing and controlling the integration of total conflict over a longer period of time. This change will include coordinating operations short of war such as economic, cyber, information, proxy and insurgent conflicts. These operations can occur sequentially or concurrently within the context of specific strategic outcomes and in all likelihood will be carried out by a combination of both state and armed non-state actors. Armed non-state actors will also play increasingly important roles for major powers in future conflict as both proxies and allies. Once operations move to conventional war these proxies or allies will be fused with regular armies to produce various forms of compound warfare tailored to specific tactical circumstances.

As diplomacy, operations short of war, and conventional warfare become more interrelated the ability of governments and their military forces to transcend complexity with a focused strategic outlook, flexible command and control, doctrine and force structures will become increasingly important. This monograph seeks to identify the key trends in conflict that have emerged since the Russian seizure of Crimea in 2014. It will then look at what needs to be done to prepare for the possible changes that are likely to occur in the coming years. In order to better comprehend these changes in the character of warfare one needs to start with an understanding of its construct as a frame of reference.

Understanding the Conflict Construct

In their book *Making Strategy: an Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*, Dennis Drew and Donald M. Snow assert that there are three types of war that modern armed forces might be required to fight. They state that these wars include conventional, counterinsurgency, and strategic nuclear warfare.[5] Interestingly, these specific conflicts have been broken down into what the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) referred to as View 1, 2 and 3 environments.[6]

The View 1 environment is defined as conventional battle between national entities and suggests that such conflicts will see "established military forces engage in high-tempo operations that involve the application of complex technologies."[7] More specifically, conventional warfare can be defined as:

> a form of warfare conducted by using conventional military weapons and battlefield tactics between two or more states in open confrontation. The forces on each side are well-defined and fight using weapons that primarily target the opposing army. It is normally fought using conventional weapons and not with chemical biological or nuclear weapons. The general purpose of conventional warfare is to weaken or destroy the opponent's military force thereby negating its ability to engage in conventional warfare.[8]

An example of this form of war in recent times is the 1991 Gulf War between the American led Coalition and Iraq. Since 1945, there has been an average of two View 1 conflicts per decade.[9]

The next type of conflict within the construct is View 2. View 2 clashes are referred to as asymmetric. In general, asymmetric warfare is defined as a war between belligerents whose relative

military power or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. As such, each side attempts to exploit the other's characteristic weaknesses. Historically this type of conflict "envisions the nation state opposed by armed bodies that are not necessarily armed forces, directed by social entities that are not necessarily states, and fought by people who are not necessarily soldiers."[10] Such struggles often involve insurgency warfare, where the weaker combatant attempts to use strategy and tactics to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality.[11]

In its broadest terms, an insurgency model is designed to mobilize supporters and establish a viable alternative authority to an existing government, while employing military means to attack and weaken the state through a relentless process of escalating violence.[12] This construct was designed, and has evolved, to defeat a stronger and more technologically superior enemy. This is achieved by avoiding the enemy's strengths and constantly hitting his weaknesses over an extended period of time. To this basic model have been added additional capabilities and methods. In their monograph, *Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority,* scholars Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, define an insurgency as:

> a protracted political and military set of activities directed toward partially or completely gaining control over the territory of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. The insurgents engage in actions ranging from guerrilla operations, terrorism, and sabotage to political mobilization, political action, intelligence/counterintelligence activities, and propaganda/psychological warfare. All of these instruments are designed to weaken and/or destroy the power and legitimacy of a ruling government, while at the same time increasing the power and legitimacy of the armed insurgent group.[13]

Historically, insurgencies have been successful because they have evolved to meet the specific conditions of their environment and circumstances.[14] The idea is to integrate political, social and economic elements into what has been essentially a military activity.[15] Recent examples of conflict where non-state actors fight insurgencies include Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq and Syria. Although asymmetric warfare is common among non-state actors, it is not as common among nation states. The Russian seizure of Crimea along with its subsequent operations in Ukraine and Syria provide an example of a large military power using unconventional strategies and tactics to offset the larger military capabilities of a potential threat in this case NATO and the United States.[16]

The third element within this construct is View 3, or strategic nuclear warfare. This type is war involving the extensive use of nuclear weapons. Although, nuclear warfare is beyond the scope of this particular study, it is important to have a general frame of reference regarding this aspect of conflict. Nuclear warfare is described as a military conflict in which nuclear weapons are used to inflict damage on an enemy. In contrast to conventional warfare, nuclear war can produce far greater destruction in a much shorter time-frame and can have a far longer impact on the enemy it is used against. This impact includes the long-term effects from the radioactive fallout that is released. Nuclear warfare can be divided into two subgroups including a limited or a full-scale nuclear war.

A limited nuclear war refers to the small-scale use of nuclear weapons by two (or more) belligerents. A "limited nuclear war" could include targeting military facilities – either as an attempt to pre-emptively cripple the enemy's ability to attack as a defensive measure, or as a prelude to an invasion by conventional forces. The second type of nuclear war, a full-scale nuclear war, would consist of large numbers of nuclear weapons used in an attack

aimed at a county's entire military, political, social and economic infrastructure.[17]

Of course, few conflicts fall neatly into one or the other of these three Views. In fact, many, if not most, conflicts have been mixtures of at least two Views. As a result, there is recognition that transitions may and will occur from one form of conflict to another very quickly (e.g. a shift from unconventional/guerrilla to conventional warfare). This occurrence happened during the French Indo-China conflict from 1948-1954. Conversely, these different Views may occur simultaneously, as happened in South Vietnam during the period 1963-1968 where North Vietnam waged both a guerilla campaign, as well as a conventional war.[18] Warfare within the realms of View 1, 2, and 3, where military force has not been clearly imposed has been referred to by some analysts as hybrid conflicts.

According to Frank Hoffman of the Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, hybrid conflict "entail a convergence and fusion of regular and irregular warfare techniques that can be employed both by states and non-state actors."[19] Within this construct no one type of warfare would necessarily predominate. In fact, the employment of a wide range of fighting methods, "involving conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts, coercion, and criminal disorder are all used singularly or in combination to achieve synergistic effects."[20] When looking at these different views and their manifestations on a graph they would appear somewhere within the range of Figure 1.

FIGURE 1: The Conflict Construct[21]

With the re-emergence of peer nations such as Russia, current trends suggest that warfare is moving towards asymmetric conflicts. This move is due to the fact that emerging peer nations still lack the resources necessary to successfully address overmatch within the military spectrum of the conflict against Western nations. Until they can reach a position of perceived overmatch themselves, they must determine where to focus their energies and resources in order to achieve the most decisive results.

To achieve the desired effectiveness, a nation's force planners will attempt to determine what View of conflict their military should be prepared to deal with, how they will fight that conflict and what additional capabilities, if any, it will require. More importantly the force structure must have sufficient flexibility to adapt itself to unexpected threats should they arise. For example, if a military force focuses its development of joint forces to be optimized for View 2 type operations, then it must also decide what additional capabilities it will need in order to transition into a more conventional View 1 conflict, even if only for a limited period of time.

Traditionally, states have fought conventional wars while non-state actors have focused on more asymmetric forms of warfare such as insurgency. However, as Hoffman points out, this trend is now changing as View 1 and view 2 conflicts are merging. Adding to

this complexity is the fact that Russia has successfully used state-level asymmetric operations, which some are referring to as "New Generation Warfare". The Russians have been able to achieve an asymmetric result by fusing the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and integrating a greater selection of national tools into a broader concept of conflict. This new concept was particularly effective in Crimea because it created a political and diplomatic *fait accompli* before an opponent's (NATO) military force even understood what was happening.[22] Although there has been much debate in the West on whether this type of war is something new or just repackaged traditional Russian methodology, there is general agreement that these techniques have produced stunning results.[23] Moreover, Western nations still have been unable to find an effective counter to this emerging threat.

This failure to find a workable solution is largely due to the fact that Western nations are looking for answers in the wrong places. Many analysts believe that Russian operations are well-executed military campaigns backed-up by an extensive use of deception and information warfare. Unfortunately, although this is correct, it is only part of Russia's success. In order to better understand the specific changes that are occurring within the context of this type of asymmetric conflict we must undertake a deeper look at its genesis and components.

STATE ACTORS AND THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF FUTURE CONFLICT

Peer competitors emerging, or arguably re-emerging in some cases, onto the international stage are adopting asymmetric strategies in an attempt to even-out the playing field.[24] These strategies are specifically designed to avoid joint level operational art (i.e. military campaigns) by moving the focus of the fight to the strategic and tactical levels of war. As retired American Lieutenant General Ben Hodges points out, they are taking this

approach by "embracing the simultaneous employment of multiple instruments of war."[25]

This trend is moving conflict into a more holistic and state controlled, "whole of government" experience as authoritative governments such as Russia and China seek to undermine democracy's strength, which lies within its institutional checks and balances. These checks and balances prevent long-term cooperation between different governmental institutions. In this respect they are attempting to use democracy's strength against itself. By forcing democracies into a fight where long-term interagency cooperation is critical to success, authoritative governments gain the upper hand by rewriting the rules for conflict and forcing a fight in an area where they are much stronger.

Within this context, a democratic country's citizens become the primary target and the strategic outcome shifts from defeating an enemy's army on the battlefield to creating unrest and revolt within the social fabric of the opponent's society. The net result is to formulate a political crisis where the military becomes just one of many tools helping to produce a victory. This changing character of conflict means that future wars will likely become more dynamic and complex as nations deal with an international security situation that is constantly moving between a state of competition, conflict and all-out war.[26]

In order to address this shift in methodology for waging conflict, a new way of thinking about how wars are fought needs to be developed. Historically, Western political and military thinking has been confined to the results that can be achieved by military forces on the battlefield where victory or defeat is established. In future war this type of thinking may no longer be a valid construct. In order to understand what is happening and how nations must deal with this shift it is important to examine the basic concepts underlying this approach in detail.

The Concept of Unrestricted Warfare and its impact on the Character of Future War

Traditionally the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) relied on a "People's War" doctrine as well as an emphasis on numerical conventional force advantage to offset the technical superiority of its perceived opponents. However, as they started looking at power projection capabilities in the 1980s, the Chinese realized they needed to modernize both their force structure and doctrine.[27] The stunning victory of the American-led coalition in the first Gulf War against Iraq in 1991, gave the Chinese an opportunity to study best practices in modern military operations. From the PLA perspective the conflict demonstrated that the balance in warfare had shifted heavily in favour of smaller, high-technology forces.[28]

They were particularly impressed with the American use of new technologies such as networked computers, precision-guided munitions, Global Positioning System (GPS), global telecommunications, and unmanned aerial vehicles.[29] They realized that these capabilities gave the Americans an unprecedented degree of information about the opposing forces, and they believed this played a vital role in their subsequent destruction. As a result, PLA analysts started seeking ways to overcome this technological and informational advantage.[30]

The result was a two-step process. First the PLA embarked on a program to become more technologically enabled by acquiring advanced equipment and weapon systems. Additionally, they also looked at options to mitigate the advantages given to a high technology enemy.[31] Part of this latter effort bore fruit in February of 1999, when two PLA Air Force Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published a book entitled *Unrestricted Warfare*.

The thesis of their work was based on the idea that there was little value in directly confronting American operational excellence on

the battlefield. As a result, the focus of conflict needed to move away from conventional warfare. They argued this shift could be done by broadening the idea of conflict to include the various elements of national power. The authors reasoned that advances in technology and weapons, globalization, and the diffusion of state power had combined to create the needed conditions for this new form of warfare.[32] Moreover, they suggested that those involved in the planning and conduct of warfare had generally viewed the non-military domains as little more than accessories that serve military requirements. As a result, the development of the modern battlefield, as well as possible changes in strategy and tactics, had been limited to that one domain.[33]

The authors understood that developing a strategy involving a number of different domains would require integrating a complex mix of information and resources. This process would start with producing a detailed knowledge of the strengths and limitations of one's own national security capabilities. Armed with this information, a country would be able to superimpose "political and military factors on the economy, culture, foreign relations, technology, environment, natural resources, nationalities, and other parameters to draw out an 'extended domain'."[34] Once the strategic requirements (resources) were in place for this "extended domain" a nation would be able to create what they referred to as the "battlefield of battlefields."

In theory, the creation of the "battlefield of battlefields" would allow one to reduce the impact of superiority in one battlefield, a military one, by forcing an opponent to deal with many battlefields such as economic, political, informational, and social simultaneously.[35] They termed the synthesis of these ideas as "modified combined war that goes beyond limits".[36] A key pillar of this concept is to exploit the benefits of "combinations" in types of organizations and among the various domains of national power.[37]

In this respect, the authors reasoned that the key to victory on the "battlefield of battlefields" was understanding and coordinating the effective use of four specific types of combinations: Supra-National Combinations (combining national, international, and non-state organizations to a country's benefit), Supra-Domain Combinations (combining battlefields and choosing the main domain), Supra-Means Combinations (combining all available means, military and non-military, to carry out operations), and Supra-Tier Combinations (combining all levels of conflict into each campaign).[38]

Integrated within the idea of combinations was the use of eight principles that they outlined as follows:

1. Omnidirectionality;

2. Synchrony;

3. Limited Objectives;

4. Unlimited Measures;

5. Asymmetry;

6. Minimal Consumption;

7. Multidimensional Coordination; and

8. Adjustment and Control of the Entire Process.

Three of these principles are of special interest to the West in attempting to understand the future of state level warfare. These include Omnidirectionality, Synchrony, and Asymmetry:[39]

> **Omnidirectionality** – *is the starting point of "unrestricted war" ideology and is a cover for this ideology..., there is no longer any distinction between what is or is not the*

battlefield. Spaces in nature including the ground, the seas, the air, and outer space are battlefields, but social spaces such as the military, politics, economics, culture, and the psyche are also battlefields. And the technological space linking these two great spaces is even more so the battlefield over which all antagonists spare no effort in contending. Warfare can be military, or it can be quasi-military, or it can be non-military. It can use violence, or it can be nonviolent.[40]

Synchrony – *[is about] Conducting actions in different spaces within the same period of time... So many objectives which in the past had to be accomplished in stages through an accumulation of battles and campaigns may now be accomplished quickly under conditions of simultaneous occurrence, simultaneous action, and simultaneous completion. Thus, stress on "synchrony" in combat operations now exceeds the stress on phasing.*[41]

Asymmetry *– ...No matter whether it serves as a line of thought or as a principle guiding combat operations, asymmetry manifests itself to some extent in every aspect of warfare. Understanding and employing the principle of asymmetry correctly allows us always to find and exploit an enemy's soft spots. The main fighting elements of some poor countries, weak countries, and non-state entities have all used "mouse toying with the cat"-type asymmetrical combat methods against much more powerful adversaries… Instead, the weaker side has contended with its adversary by using guerrilla war (mainly urban guerrilla war), terrorist war, holy war, protracted war, network war, and other) forms of combat.*[42]

The fundamental precept derived from the idea of combinations used within the context of these principles is that there is no longer a distinction between what is or is not a battlefield. Along with the traditional battlefields normally associated with military operations (Air, Land, Sea, Cyber, and Space) everything from politics, economics, culture, to the national psyche may now become a possible battlefield. The key feature of this type of warfare is the ability to conduct, coordinate and synchronize actions within these different battlespaces, which potentially can, and in many instances should, occur at the same time.[43]

The authors theorized that throughout history military victories "display a common phenomenon: the winner was the one who could combine well."[44] To highlight the idea of combining activities within multiple battlefields they introduced the concept of "simultaneously" and emphasized that it would play an increasingly important role in future operations.[45] They reasoned that if a state could achieve a single full-depth, synchronized action across all battlefields the paralysis caused to the enemy could be sufficient to decide the outcome of an entire war.[46] The authors provide an example of how such an operation might unfold as it links into the concept of combinations:

> ...by using the combination method, a completely different scenario and game can occur: if the attacking side secretly musters large amounts of capital without the enemy nation being aware of this at all and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets, then after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hacker detachment in the opponent's computer system in an attacking nation advance, while at the same time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone

communications network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis. There is finally the forceful bearing down by the army, and military means are utilized in gradual stages until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty.[47]

In their analysis, Liang and Xiangsui suggested that preparation for and specific activities related to this form of conflict would have to occur well before the start of a formal declaration of war. Moreover, they saw the centre of gravity focused on creating social unrest and panic leading to a political crisis. Once the crisis had developed sufficiently conventional military force could be applied but only to the extent necessary to achieve victory.

In developing this asymmetric approach, the authors concluded that asymmetry, which is at the heart of this type of warfare, should be used to find and exploit an enemy's soft spots. They asserted that poor countries, weak countries, and non-state entities have all used some type of asymmetrical combat methods against much more powerful adversaries as a means to even the playing field. This methodology means that when a country faces a technologically superior enemy, the key to success lies in moving the fight from pure military operations to a much broader interpretation of warfare. Namely, one that includes Financial, Cultural, Media, Technological, Psychological, and Network Warfare, among others.[48]

By using such methods, a nation or armed non-state entity could minimize the impact of technological superiority and the associated increase in combat power that such advantages give a conventional military force. In so doing a nation would make the enemy fight one's own type of war, which if done correctly, would occur on a number of different and more complex battlefields

than has previously been the case. Interestingly enough, this approach is exactly what the Russians are now doing in Eastern Europe and Syria.

How much the Russians have been influenced by Chinese thinking on the subject of this type of asymmetric warfare is difficult to ascertain. However, it is clear that many of the key concepts underlying *Unrestricted Warfare's* philosophy, particularly the ideas of coordination, synchrony, producing the "battlefield of battlefields," creating social panic leading to political crisis, and the judicious application of military force, have all been displayed in recent operations undertaken by the Russians. Also, much of this philosophy has been articulated in public statements by senior officials on how the Russians view the future of conflict within the context of "New Generation Warfare". For this reason, it is worth examining Russian strategy and methods in more detail.

THE RISE OF RUSSIA AS A DIRECT CHALLENGE TO WESTERN DOMINANCE

In order to better understand Russian attempts to re-establish its position in the world it is important to understand its grand strategy and how "New Generation Warfare" fits into that overall plan. This approach is due to the fact that the tactical actions within *Unrestricted Warfare's* philosophy do not produce decisive results unless there is a focused strategic result.

Since 2014, Russia's increased aggression on the international stage has generated a great deal of surprise and commentary regarding both its methods and ultimate intentions. Much of the Western narrative has focused on the idea that Russia is attempting to bring back the old Soviet Empire. However, any serious examination of this issue shows, at least in the short term, this belief does not appear to be the case. In fact, some Russians feel that

the fall of the Soviet Union was in part due to the overwhelming burden of support required to prop up various occupied countries.[49] As a result, they do not appear to want to make that mistake again. Their main goal now is to gain and maintain influence over countries that are of strategic importance to them.

The concept of influence is important to understand because for the Russians it takes on many forms. It can include everything from economic aid and blackmail to direct military intervention. This large assortment of carrots and sticks gives Russia a great deal of flexibility in achieving its strategic goals. A major change in Russian actions on the international stage has been the increasingly effective use of these tools which have been combined with a strategic approach based on their traditional methods of operation. However, this methodology has occurred within the context of the basic principles outlined in the doctrine of *Unrestricted Warfare*. As their strategic thinking and approach is closely linked to their actions one must understand Russia's grand strategy in order to properly analyze and assess their goals.

Russia's Grand Strategy

In its most basic terms national or grand strategy is defined as the relationship among ends, ways, and means. The *Ends* are the goals being sought by a nation. *Means* are the resources available to pursue those goals and *Ways* or methods are how a nation organizes and applies its available resources to achieve their ends.[50] According to Robert H. Duff, Dean of the College of Humanities and Social Sciences at Kennesaw State University, each of these terms suggests a related question. What do we want to pursue (ends)? With what (means)? How (ways)?[51]

Because such goals are important enough to warrant national priority they are often referred to as national interests. Dean points

out that "the behavior of a nation-state is rooted in the pursuit, protection, and promotion of its interests. Therefore, if one can identify accurately the interests of a state, one should be able to understand much of its behavior vis-a-vis other states and actors in the international system."[52] This construct is extremely important to understanding Russian actions and activities particularly as we seek to link tactical outcomes to the strategic ends we believe the Russians are trying to achieve.

Russia's goal on the international stage is to create a multi-polar world order of three great powers (i.e. China, Russia, and the USA) where each power has its own area of special interest and influence. In fact, their English language website clearly states this fact. "The system of international relations," it contends, "is in transition as a new polycentric world order is taking root." It goes on to state, "We are witnessing the creation of a fundamentally new global model marked by growing competition in all spheres, including social and economic development and moral values."[53] Their goal (ends) of being a key player within the international system is based on the assessment that taking advantage of this current transition can allow them to become a major player.

This Russian assessment is important in relation to the current geostrategic environment. A uni-polar world favours the United States, while a bipolar system would favour the United States and China. More importantly, a bipolar system would likely see the Russians moving into a Russian-Chinese or Russian-American strategic alliance, where Russia would be the weaker partner. As a result, Russia believes that if it is to be a major player in the global game it needs to create a multi-polar international system based on three not two major powers.[54] According to Timothy Ash, head of Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA) credit strategy at the Asia-headquartered Japanese global investment bank Nomura, President Vladimir Putin wants Russia and its strategic interests

to be respected by its peers. According to the Putin doctrine, as a global power, Russia is entitled to its own sphere of influence. Buffers against rival powers are a key part of its defensive doctrine so for Moscow, this naturally falls into the near abroad, and that includes the Ukraine.[55]

Of course, the Russians understand that creating such a system is not without risks. They realize that the key to maintaining stability within such a system requires carefully balancing policies and partners. As strategist Henrikki Heikka states, in his *The Evolution of Russian Grand Strategy,* the Russian interpretation regarding the working of the multipolar system is straightforward:

> Russia has a common interest with the USA in balancing the EU, Japan, and a potential Muslim bloc – and vice versa: it is in Russia's interest to try to break the trans-Atlantic link and further the role of Germany and France in balancing American power. As a response to the more immediate threat of NATO-enlargement, the opposition suggests that Russia should align itself with those countries that are "threatened" by NATO, such as China, India, Iran, and some other Arabic countries.[56]

In order to accomplish this goal of a multi-polar international system the Russians need to weaken the power and influence of the United States, consolidate their area of interest and influence, and if possible break up or at the very least create divisions within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). To achieve this end, they must, as in the case of Syria, create and/or take advantage of opportunities that have the potential to advance or achieve these goals. In order to achieve this strategy they need to build up their capabilities (means) by regaining their military and economic strength.

Regaining military and economic strength

Regaining military and economic strength has been an ongoing priority for Russia since the early 1990s. On the military side the 2008 war with Georgia, exposed a number of weaknesses in Russian military capabilities. As Dale R. Herspring, a former U.S. diplomat, put it, "The conflict highlighted the shortcomings, failings, and decrepit condition of both Russia's weapons and personnel." He goes on to say, the lessons learned from the Five-Day War "were so shocking and had such serious implications that the reinterpretation of the conflict from a Russian military perspective would become the *casus belli* for the radical and sweeping changes in Russian conventional forces."[57]

Although military reforms had been ongoing in the Russian military since the early 1990s, it was only after the War in Georgia that the general pace and focus of these reforms increased significantly. Everything from tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), to equipment, readiness, command and control procedures, inter-service and all arms cooperation was found wanting and became priorities for change.[58] Although their attempt to create a modern, professional and highly mobile force has been moving forward, in some cases, with surprising speed and results, it has not been without its pitfalls.

Issues regarding widespread corruption, a lack of professionalism of the Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps, living conditions, and recruiting have proven especially difficult for the Russians to deal with and overcome. That being said, there are signs of progress and the rest of the world is starting to take note. More modern equipment, better training and a focus on operational readiness are starting to be clearly seen. As Keir Giles, the Director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), at Chatham House has noted, "this transformation and the accompanying rearmament programme

are continuing, and the Russian military is benefiting from on-going 'training' under real operational conditions in Ukraine and Syria."[59] Moreover, new capabilities such as expeditionary force employment, cruise missiles launches, and Arctic militarization have proven surprising to Western analysts.

On the economic side, the Russians have been attempting to push reforms within the country while pursuing plans for a "greater Eurasia" project. According to Alexander Mercouris, Editor-in-Chief at *The Duran*, "this project is attempting to link the two sides of the Eurasian continent into a single economic space with Russia at the center, acting as the bridge. It is a proposal not for a 'Eurasia' but for a 'Greater Eurasia': a single colossal economic unit extending all the way from the Pacific to the Atlantic." He adds, "Putin sees no contradiction in working towards both." Mercouris goes on to say, "Far from wanting to choose between the EU and China as Russia's partner, Putin wants Russia to have a partnership with both of them, bringing the two together. If the Europeans prove unreceptive to the project then the Russians and the Chinese and their Central Asian allies have made it clear they will simply go ahead with the project on their own." This project is not without compromise. According to Mercouris, "it serves as an ideological screen intended to conceal the Kremlin's acceptance of the growing asymmetry in Russia's relations with China. This asymmetry is becoming evident in both the economic and the political sphere. In a more practical dimension, the rhetoric of the Greater Eurasia concept is intended to conceal Moscow's *de facto* abandonment of its attempts to block China's economic expansion in Central Asia and Russia's consent to a condominium in the region."[60]

Despite this military and economic progress, the Russians still have some major obstacles to overcome in forging a military force that can take on major powers. As Dr. Nora Bensahel of the School of International Service at American University has stated, "The

United States has long fielded the world's most capable armed forces. It spends more on its military than the next nine nations combined, of which five are U.S. treaty allies. It fields more active-duty military personnel than any country other than China, and its weaponry and technological capabilities are peerless." She elaborates, "U.S military superiority has helped deter major power wars, secure the global commons, and maintain the global order for many decades, and it continues to do so today."[61]

It is this military overmatch by the Americans and other Western nations that has forced the Russians to adopt asymmetric approaches in order to achieve their political and military objectives. This shift has led them to refine their military doctrine, the results of which the West is seeing today in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria. Some have referred to this as New Generation Warfare, Hybrid War or as the Americans have defined it, operations in the Gray Zone.[62] Regardless, of what it is called, it has proven effective and, at some point, it will need to be confronted directly and countered.

The Russian View of the Contemporary Operating Environment

Russia's approach to modern conflict derives from its military weakness and what it views as its primary threat which comes from Western democracies. That threat is based on what it perceives as a strategy of facilitating regime change in non-democratic countries through the manufacturing of social crises. British author and academic Keir Giles puts this perception into perspective when he states, "Viewed through the prism of Russian threat assessment, events of the previous 15 years, including the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, the Arab Spring, Western intervention in Libya, and election protests at home in 2011, had all represented a single trajectory: they gave rise to the perception that the West's habit of fostering and facilitating

regime change by means of 'color revolutions,' indiscriminately and with little regard for the consequences, might have Moscow as its eventual [target]"[63] He explains, "The Orange Revolution[64] cemented Russian perceptions that Western-encouraged regime change carried intent hostile to Russia. Given the role and significance of Ukraine to Russia, Moscow perceived this as a strategic defeat. However, importantly, this perception was insufficiently appreciated in the West—just as 10 years later in 2014, the strength of Russian reaction was not considered as a factor in what were ostensibly internal developments in Ukraine." He concludes, "The key difference in 2014 was that Russia felt empowered to act instead of merely protesting."[65]

This empowerment was based on a number of factors. These factors included, the continued modernization of the Russian military, lessons learned from the West's experience with facilitating regime change and a new asymmetric approach Russia is taking towards implementing its Grand Strategy. Combined, these changes created a new operating concept for Russia, one where conflict is always ongoing during what is now viewed as the competition, increased tensions and open warfare phases. From the Russian perspective war is no longer restricted to a battlefield of conventional military forces. The ideas for this vision of future war/conflict were encapsulated within the idea of "New Generation Warfare".[66]

"New Generation Warfare" was first introduced to the public in a paper published by General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the Russian General Staff, in February 2013.[67] In it, Gerasimov lays out a number of key principles behind Russia's thinking on the future of warfare. The first is the idea that the world is now in a continual state of conflict. He states that "in the 21st Century we have seen a tendency toward blurring the lines between the states of war and peace." He goes on to say that the conduct of wars has changed as they are no longer declared and, having begun, they

move in different and unfamiliar directions.[68] He asserts, "This unfamiliar template refers to asymmetrical operations using a host of [strategic] capabilities to 'nullification of an enemy's advantages in armed conflict.'"[69]

Gerasimov believes that the specific capabilities needed to affect change will include the use of Special Forces linking up with internal opposition groups throughout the target country to create an operating front that extends throughout the entire depth of the enemy's territory. These actions will be combined with information operations, cyber warfare, legal warfare, economic war and other activities that are linked to a strategic outcome and constantly modified to meet the specific needs of a particular operation.[70]

The Russians deem that such methods, employed and sequenced properly, can, in a very short period of time, throw a stable and thriving state into a web of chaos, humanitarian upheaval, and outright civil war, making it susceptible to foreign intervention.[71] Although, Gerasimov acknowledges that such events were not traditionally part of what would be considered wartime activities, he believes that they will now become typical of conflict in the 21st Century.

The idea of collapsing a state through social upheaval, before a declaration of war is made, is an important part of "New Generation Warfare's" underlying methodology. Gerasimov states, "The very 'rules of war' have changed…[as] the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures – applied in coordination with the protest potential of the population."[72] The example he uses to illustrate his point is NATO's role in Libya, where a no-fly zone and naval blockade were combined with the use of private military contractors working closely with the armed formations of the opposition.[73]

Gerasimov understood that new information technologies have allowed much of this change to occur. As a result, the information space has opened the door to the widespread use of asymmetrical possibilities for reducing the fighting potential of the enemy particularly through the use of influence operations.[74]

Jānis Bērziņš, Managing Director for the Center for Security and Strategic Research, at the National Defense Academy of Latvia, emphasizes this point. He insists, "The Russians have placed the idea of influence operations at the very center of their operational planning and used all possible levers of national power to achieve this."[75] He adds, the Russians "have demonstrated an innate understanding of the key target audiences and their probable behavior... Armed with this information they knew what to do, when and what the outcomes are likely to be."[76]

The Russians feel that these changes have reduced the importance of frontal engagements by large conventional military formations, which they believe are gradually becoming a thing of the past. This belief is due to the fact that even if conventional operations are required to finish off the enemy, this action will be done primarily by using stand-off operations, carried out through the entire depth of its territory.[77] The Russians believe this shift towards irregular war and stand-off operations are blurring the lines between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, as well as between offensive and defensive operations.[78]

These ideas of future conflict have been formally articulated into what has become known as the eight phases of "New Generation Warfare." These phases provide a good template for understanding how the Russians could conduct a state level hybrid war against a Western country. They are as follows:

- **First Phase**: deals with non-military asymmetric warfare (encompassing information, moral, psychological, ideological, diplomatic, and economic measures as part of a plan to establish a favorable political, economic, and military setup);

- **Second Phase**: special [specific] operations are used to mislead political and military leaders by coordinated measures carried out by diplomatic channels, media, and top government and military agencies. This is done by leaking false data, orders, directives, and instructions;

- **Third Phase**: is focused on intimidation, deceiving, and bribing government and military officers, with the objective of making them abandon their service duties;

- **Fourth Phase**: destabilizing propaganda to increase discontent among the population, this is boosted by the arrival of Russian bands of militants, escalating subversion;

- **Fifth Phase**: establishment of no-fly zones over the country to be attacked, imposition of blockades, and extensive use of private military companies in close cooperation with armed opposition units;

- **Sixth Phase**: This phase deals with the commencement of military action, which is immediately preceded by large-scale reconnaissance and subversive missions. This action includes all types, forms, methods, and forces, such as special operations forces, space, radio, radio engineering, electronic, diplomatic, secret service/intelligence, and industrial espionage;

- **Seventh Phase**: combination of targeted information operations, electronic warfare operations, aerospace operations, continuous Airforce harassment, combined with

the use of high precision weapons launched from various platforms including (long-range artillery, and weapons that are based on new physical principles, such as microwaves, radiation, non-lethal biological weapons); and

- **Eighth Phase**: roll over the remaining points of resistance and destroy surviving enemy units by special operations conducted by reconnaissance units to spot which enemy units have survived and transmit their coordinates to the attacker's missile and artillery units; fire barrages are used to annihilate the defender's resisting army units by effective advanced weapons; airdrop operations to surround points of resistance; and territory mopping-up operations by ground troops.[79]

Each of these phases can occur in sequence or simultaneously depending on the situation. According to Gerasimov, this new doctrine manifests itself in the use of asymmetric and indirect methods along with the management of troops in a unified informational sphere.[80] Should the conflict need to escalate these activities would be followed up by the massive use of high-precision weapons, special operations and robotics. These actions would be followed by simultaneous strikes on the enemy's units and facilities with battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space.

Shortly after Gerasimov published this work on "New Generation Warfare," Russia was faced with the "Euromaidan Revolution" in the Ukraine. Many of the key principles outlined in the paper were subsequently used in Russian operations with stunning success in that country. In this regard, it is useful to provide an overview of the conflict which will provide practical insights into the workings and effectiveness of this approach.

"New Generation Warfare" A Practical Application in Crimea

From the outset, the outbreak of the "Euromaidan Revolution" in the Ukraine was viewed by the Kremlin as a Western-backed plot to topple a legitimate government from power.[81] Fearing that the demonstrations could spill over into Russia and that the installation of a pro-western government in the Ukraine would eventually bring NATO to Russia's doorstep in the south, the Russians concluded that they had little option but to act quickly.[82] Before they could effectively deal with the crisis, however, they had a number of problems they needed to resolve.

First, the Russians wanted to regain direct control over Crimea and they wished to have Ukraine back under their influence. However, in so doing they did not want a direct confrontation with NATO or the possibility of having to deal with yet another nationalist-inspired insurgency campaign should they invade.[83] To that end, the idea of "New Generation Warfare" appeared to provide the answer. The country was in the process of breaking up so the trick was to allow it to continue imploding but to orchestrate the confusion towards a pro-Russian leaning.

As the situation started to come apart in Kiev, the Russians had already put the various elements it needed to secure the Crimea into place. As things got worse the only visible sign of Russian preparations was the fact that they began to deploy significant military forces along the Russia/Ukraine border area. This activity immediately captured, and for the most part held, NATO's interest. When Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich fled the country, in late February 2014, NATO braced for a Russian invasion and waited to see what the Kremlin would do. Surprisingly, Russian military forces remained on the border. However, news networks began reporting that well-armed and equipped pro-Russia

separatist rebels wearing green military uniforms with no insignia began taking control of key points within the Crimean Peninsula and establishing checkpoints in and around cities and government locations, including airports and military bases.[84]

What NATO, along with the rest of the world, did not know at the time was that these events were signalling the closing stages of the Russian operation in Crimea rather than its beginning. As it turned out, the first five phases of "New Generation Warfare's" doctrine had already occurred and the events that followed the establishment of the control points exposed both the true extent of Russian preparations along with the potential of this new form of warfare.

Shortly after the Peninsula had been secured the Head of the Ukrainian Navy, Admiral Denis Berezovsky, along with about half of the Ukrainian military forces stationed in the region defected to the Russians.[85] This disloyalty was followed by the seizure of the Crimean parliament, which was immediately dissolved and a new pro-Russian Prime Minister installed.[86] The new parliament lost no time declaring the Republic of Crimea to be an independent, self-governing entity, and quickly announced it would hold a referendum on the status of Crimea recommending succession from the Ukraine to join the Russian Federation. In a majority vote held on 16 March 2014, Crimea decided to become part of Russia and a treaty to that effect was signed between the two entities at the Kremlin on 18 March 2014.[87]

While Crimea was getting ready for its referendum, demonstrations by anti-government groups were already taking place in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Eastern Ukraine. These demonstrations followed a similar format to the events in Crimea. So-called civilians holding Russian flags along with pro-Russia separatist rebels stormed buildings of regional state administrations and when successful in getting inside and raised Russian flags on

top of the structures.[88] Their demands were the same as those in the Crimea, a referendum to join the Russian Federation. News media outlets in the region captured the scene of hundreds and sometimes thousands of Ukrainian residents waving Russian flags wishing to reunite with Russia. Not surprisingly, some local reports pointed out that many of the key personalities and organizations associated with this separatist movement were either Russians or people with identifiable connections to Russia.[89]

The speed and efficiency of these operations was facilitated by Russia's ability to infiltrate the Ukraine's political and economic institutions through various Russian security and intelligence agencies. Dr. Mark Galeott, who writes a blog, "In Moscow's Shadows," believes that "the GRU [military intelligence directorate] supported by regular military units took the lead in Crimea, while the Federal Security Service (FSB), directed operations in eastern Ukraine." He states, "The FSB had likely penetrated much of the Ukrainian security apparatus prior to [President] Yanukovich's fall, where it was able to monitored Kiev's plans and encourage at least some of the defections. Members of the Interior Ministry (MVD) used its contacts within the Ukrainian establishment to identify potential agents and other sources of information."[90]

As these activities were ongoing the military was being used in a show of force role providing a distraction along the border area while supporting the ongoing operations as needed. Moreover, Russian media and diplomatic sources kept up a constant campaign to characterize the new government as illegitimate and brutal, while in cyberspace so-called "patriotic hackers" attacked Ukrainian banks and government websites causing additional confusion and damage.[91]

In Crimea the underlying premise of this new form of asymmetrical warfare was validated. This approach includes the idea of collapsing a state through social upheaval. Moreover, victory

was accomplished using various state tools and a minimum use of direct military force. These tools included political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other non-military measures. These measures were specifically used to maximize the protest potential of the population. As General Gerasimov also predicated, the Russians effectively used their Special Forces to link up with internal opposition groups throughout the target country. This coordination created an operating front extending throughout the depth of the enemy's territory. These actions were also effectively combined with information operations, cyber warfare, legal warfare, and economic warfare that were specifically linked to the strategic outcome of the campaign the Russians desired.

Some believe the asymmetric methodology behind this doctrine is the single most important lesson to come out of the Ukraine conflict. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, a Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS) observed, "Experts have focused on the military novelties in the Russian approach – the use of asymmetric, covert, and otherwise innovative military tools. However, the real novelty in Crimea was not how Russia used its armed might (in terms of new military doctrine), but rather how it combined the use of military with state tools."[92]

The devastating effectiveness of this new combination can be seen when looking at the larger context of the conflict and its impact on security thinking within NATO in the aftermath of the Russian operation in the Ukraine. Imants Viesturs Liegis, the Latvian Ambassador to Hungary, and a former Defence Minister, put the Ukraine situation into context when he said:

> Russia is conducting several parallel wars at the same time. There has been a military intervention by stealth into Ukraine's Crimea and Eastern territory. An economic war is taking place following sanctions imposed on Russia

by the EU, U.S. and other Western powers. An information war is being conducted by Russia on a massive and asymmetrical scale...The toxic results are there for all to see in Ukraine.[93]

In this regard, the Russians appear to have successfully moved their doctrine to the point of creating the "battlefield of battlefields."

Strategic Thinking and the Coordination of State Tools: The heart of Russian Success

Creating the "battlefield of battlefields" and maintaining a unified informational sphere is almost impossible without the ability to conduct and coordinate the various events within the different battlespaces in a strategically effective way. In fact, it is this ability to synchronize these very different activities into a coherent plan that has been the biggest change in recent Russian operations. Scholar Ven Bruusgaard believes that this ability to coordinate has been the key to Russian success so far. She insists, "Since Putin came to power, there has been increased academic and policy debate on the coordinated use of state tools to reach formulated goals. This awareness has led to a large-scale formulation of strategies on how to pursue policy goals, and, most recently, to bureaucratic changes that have likely improved Russia's ability to use its policy tools in an integrated manner."[94]

One of the more important of these bureaucratic changes has been the creation of the National Defense Control Center (NDCC), which reached initial operating capability in December 2014. NDCC has the task of coordinating federal executive authorities and three state-owned corporations engaged in Russia's defense. The Center includes the armed forces, the Interior Ministry, the Federal Security Service, and the Emergencies Ministry.[95] One could argue that the concept of the NDCC goes back to the Chinese

idea of creating the "extended domain." This coordination is done by integrating information that superimposes national interests and national security requirements onto the larger strategic situation map. As such, if the Russians have achieved this goal it means that the Russians can now create and simultaneously coordinate a multitude of complex events with their version of the "battlefield of battlefields."

RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN SYRIA IMPLEMENTING ITS GRAND STRATEGY

Strategy development and the coordinated use of state tools to reach formulated goals has been a key aspect of Russia's actions and success since 2014. More importantly, they have been very efficient in achieving success with relatively little national investment. This outcome is the result of setting the political and diplomatic conditions for success before acting, the effective organization and employment of proxy forces, and adapting policy and force structure to the changing conditions on the ground. No better example of this methodology can be found than the Russian deployment into Syria.

In Syria, Russia was able to advance it grand strategy objectives, while creating a defensive template to counter armed non-state actors being utilized in what it perceives as the Western Liberal democracy's strategy for regime change. From this perspective, Syria is an interesting case study of the adaptability of the Russian methodology regarding the concepts behind "New Generation Warfare".

In is important to remember that although the Russians used their military capabilities to great advantage in this campaign, the primary focus always remained on its strategic and diplomat objectives. As a result, tactical actions were specifically tailored

to achieve particular political outcomes. In this respect, Syria also provides interesting insight into how Russia is implementing its grand strategy.

The Civil War in Syria started as part of the much wider Arab Spring protests which began in late in 2010, throughout much of the Middle-East. By early 2011, fighting erupted between multiple opposition groups and government forces after a series of protests were violently suppressed by security forces.[96] Adding to the complexity of the situation on the ground was the fact that a significant part of Syria's territory was taken over by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as Daesh, or more commonly as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Moreover, in the north-west part of the country, government forces were facing opposition from an al-Qaeda-affiliated al-Nusra Front.[97]

Despite a lack of cohesion between the various opposition groups, by September of 2015, they had made significant military gains throughout much of the country. In fact, it appeared that the days of the Syrian strongman Bashar al-Assad government were numbered as government forces were being pushed back on almost all fronts. In an effort to cope with this deteriorating situation Assad requested Russian support.[98]

Following a series of high-level discussions with Syrian leaders and key players in the region, the Russians publicly announced they would join the Western backed "War on Terror".[99] They immediately began sending warplanes, tanks and artillery, as well as troops into the country. By the end of September that had established a base of operations in the country and a joint information centre in Baghdad to coordinate their operations.[100]

As troops and equipment began deploying the Russian leadership started developing their tactical plan. They believed that once you destroyed the fragile structures of Arab governments,

you get a fragmentation of the state where warlords and criminal elements tend to takeover and rule.[101] This outcome is due to the fact that nationalism is not something people in the region relate to. Instead, identities such as the clan, village, region, tribe and religion are far stronger and this fact tends to undermine the idea of a central common identity.[102]

The Russians may not have liked Assad but their analysis of the situation told them that he still had the loyalty of the military, police and intelligence agencies. All were controlled by longtime supporters which owed their position and much of their wealth to his leadership and patronage. More importantly Assad still controlled key parts of the country and had the backing of Iran, as well as support from Hezbollah. Under these circumstances the Russians realized that any chance Syria had of creating a stable government structure within the country would have to come from Assad. In this respect, where the West saw Assad as the problem, the Russians realized he was the only chance for a solution to the ongoing chaos, at least in the short term.[103]

The Russians also understood that on the ground the radicals, namely ISIS and the al-Nusra Front, were the real threat. The so-called "moderate militias" backed by the West had little if any chance of success in Syria. According to Joshua Landis, head of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, the idea that the United States could have made a difference with the Syrian opposition with money was unrealistic. He asserts, "Many activists and Washington think tankers argue that the reason the radicals won in Syria is because they were better funded than moderate militias; Gulf States sent money to radicals while the United States and Europe starved moderates." He adds:

> No evidence supports this. Radicals got money because they were successful. They fought better, had better strategic vision and were more popular. The notion that

had Washington pumped billions of dollars to selected moderate militias, they would've killed the extremists and destroyed Assad's regime, is bunkum.[104]

Landis believes that the Russians well understood the fact that Middle Eastern societies are in many cases not ready for democracy and that the Western (America's) policy of promoting democracy has been the primary cause of the spread of chaos and jihadism in the first place.[105]

As the West was already doing much of the heavy lifting by fighting the primary threat (the radicals) the Russians were able to focus the Syrian Government and its supporters onto the moderate militias. For Russia, success in Syria would depend more on getting the strategic situation right and following that up with appropriate diplomatic arrangements.

This approach would be a difficult balancing act because there were so many different players but if successful it would bring the Russians a number of benefits. It would undermine the credibility of the United States and its allies, a key grand strategy objective. It would make Syria and those helping Assad a friend and partner in the Middle East and it would show the international community that Russia could be a trusted friend in world affairs.

To accomplish these aims Russia simply needed to keep Assad in power. And, as it has become evident, this effect was not as difficult as it first appeared. Once his position could be assured, the international community would be forced to negotiate a peace settlement that would have to preserve both the territorial and political integrity of the Syrian state.[106]

In order to achieve its goal, the Russians needed to isolate and destroy the moderate militias. To do attain this result they needed to build up the military capability of the Syrian Armed Forces. They

approached this problem using a multiphase plan. The first phase was to stop the continuing loss of government territories buy stabilizing the situation on the ground. This result was realized by implementing an aggressive bombing campaign that was designed to meet both the short and long-term military goals of destroying the rebels and then eliminating them as a long-term threat to the government.[107] In this respect, the Russians not only hit the anti-Assad combat forces but they also devastated their supply routes, oil, command and control, training, and supply infrastructure. The destruction of the rebel bases and supporting infrastructure would undermine its long-term ability to sustain their war effort.[108] In the short-term, unaccustomed to being targeted by modern air power, the opposition's ground operations stalled. This setback allowed the Russians time to re-equip and re-train the Syrian military.

Although Russia's air campaign in Syria garnered most of the international press coverage it is the supply of equipment, the establishment of a logistics infrastructure, and the operational planning and mentoring provided by Russian advisors that has proven to be decisive in turning the conflict around.[109] According to a *TASS* Russian News Agency interview with *th*e Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, Gerasimov stated that, "any military unit – a battalion, a brigade, a regiment, a division, has Russian military advisors and their assistants – intelligence and artillery specialists, military engineers, as well as translators and other officials." He continued, "They, in fact, plan combat operations and assist in commanding those units while they fulfill their combat tasks. In all directions, those operations are a part of a single strategy, a single plan, guided from the grouping's command center in Hmeymim."[110]

The equipment, reforms and guidance provided by the Russians were quick to have an impact on the ground. Aron Lund, a non-resident fellow at the Carnegie Middle East Center, wrote in

December 2015, "Over two months into the Russian intervention, President Assad appears to have been strengthened. The Syrian president was losing territory fast by mid-2015, but with Russian and Iranian support, he has now turned the tide of battle on several fronts and slowed rebel advances elsewhere." He added, "In addition, we should not exclude the possibility that the bombings may have a delayed effect, by taking out rebel logistics and command centres, depleting ammunition storages, and causing chaos and humanitarian crises in insurgent-controlled areas, thus paving the way for sudden breakthroughs that have yet to occur."[111]

Despite their successes with the Syrian military, the Russians were concerned about the possibility of a clash with the Western Coalition and NATO. They perceived the greatest threat to their operations was from American airpower and the possibility of a major push by a Western backed coalition to remove Assad before he could fully re-establish his authority throughout the country. In order to minimize this possible threat from the air the Russians deployed advance air defence systems, fighters, and tactical ballistic missiles. More importantly, they demonstrated new military capabilities to the world with the launch of long-range air and sea-based cruise missiles. Although the action was targeted at the opposition forces in Syria, the message to the international community was clear. We have the capability to hit NATO and American military facilities throughout the Middle East in the event of an escalation.[112]

With the Western coalition focused on the defeat of ISIL, Syrian Government forces were free to consolidate their position within the country and, by the end of 2017, they had produced a string of significant victories on the ground including the recapture of Palmyra in March 2016, the retaking of Aleppo in December 2016, and the return of Deir ez-Zor in November 2017.[113]

In fact, they were so successful that in December 2017, President Vladimir Putin made a surprise stop at Russia's airbase in Syria to declare "victory" in the campaign. In an interview to *Rossiyskaya Gazeta,* a Russian daily newspaper, Aleksandr Dvornikov, the Commander of the Russian Military Grouping in Syria explained the Russian success:

> The activities of the Russian grouping during these five and a half months radically reversed the situation in Syria. The coordinated work of the Russian aviation in the air with the government and loyalist forces on the ground formed the basis of the success of the military operation against the terrorists. In order to increase their combat capabilities, we gave the Syrian army modern weapons and military equipment within the framework of military-technical assistance. This included artillery systems, means of communication, intelligence etc. In the shortest possible time, a system of military advisors with its administrative apparatus was established in Syria. They successfully accomplished the task of preparing the government forces as well as the Kurds and other loyalist formations. The situation was affected positively by the fact that our advisors took a most active role in the preparation of combat activities.[114]

Dvornikov further elaborated, "This collaboration allowed them to destroy the terrorists' infrastructure and lines of supply, to take back the initiative and to go on the offensive. And this they did in 15 directions at the same time. This forced the militants to abandon large offensive operations and to act instead in small groups."[115]

The tactical success on the ground enabled Russia's political and strategic success in the region. According to *South Front* analysts, "Outside Syria, both friend and foe have taken note. Russia's

engagement has served as a veritable 'seed capital' that drew larger contingents of Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Iraq's Shia militias, and Lebanon's Hezbollah, into the fray. Turkey has opted for what amounts to a negotiated 'separate peace' with Russia and Syria in exchange for a free hand to focus on the Kurdish threat to its own sovereignty."[116]

Russia's active military presence and success in the region has also reshaped its relationships with Israel, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, and Iraq among others. In this regard, Russia, not America, has become the decisive force in the Syrian war and by extension throughout much of the Middle East. This success and control of the battlefield has given it control of the negotiating table making them key to any negotiated solution to the conflict.[117]

Notwithstanding, its political and military successes, the Syrian campaign showed the world the extent of Russian military transformation since 2008. Russia displayed its ability for rapid deployments and maintaining large formations in the field for extended periods.[118] A number of senior Russian military commanders have received combat experience in Syria and have learned how to command joint forces in various operations. More important to the "New Generation Warfare" doctrine, the Russians have also become very adept at working with proxy forces.[119] According to Paul McLeary, a senior reporter covering the U.S. Defense Department and national security issues at *Foreign Policy Journal*, "In Syria, U.S. officials have seen small groups of Russian special operations forces 'work quite effectively' with Assad regime troops and the Iranian *Qods* Force and Hezbollah."[120] He noted, "That's been their M.O. [modus operandi] in the Donbass and in Syria."[121]

The Russians have had the opportunity to use Syria as a testing ground for various types of equipment and procedures. According to British Russian expert Keir Giles, this suite of experimentation includes "[electronic warfare] systems, UAVs [unmanned aerial

vehicles], new communications systems, antitank weapon systems, and much else."[122] He believes, "It has also offered the opportunity to trial a wide array of longer-range weapons and missiles, with heavy emphasis on the use and testing of standoff weapons from extreme ranges, including from the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas and delivered by air from the eastern and western approaches to Syria. Other learning opportunities unique to Syria include air-ground coordination [and] interaction with indigenous forces."[123]

Giles provides an intriguing look into how the Russians will use the information they have gained. Citing General Gerasimov from an interview from VPK news, he notes, "today [Russia is] acquiring priceless combat experience in Syria." He adds, "It is essential for this to be analyzed in the branches of service and the combat arms at both the operational and tactical levels, and for a scientific conference to be held on the results of the military operations."[124] Giles concludes that these assessments "are expected to lead directly to increased production of precision-guided munitions, further development of capabilities for concealed deployment of forces, and the establishment of separate aviation units operating UAVs." He assesses, "lessons learned are already being spread throughout the [Russian] Armed Forces, accompanied by a willingness to test the performance of officers and remove those who do not meet operational standards."[125]

Within two years Russia was able to achieve in Syria what Western backed coalitions have proved incapable of doing in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, namely to defeat the opposition on a complex political and military battlefield and pave the way for a peace settlement. The Russians were able to accomplish this result with a relatively small military force that was properly employed within a realistic strategic framework, and backed up by a pragmatic diplomatic process. In so doing the Russians have continued to

refine an effective tool to stop what they perceived as the Western Democracies approach towards creating international democracy through social destabilization and regime change. Moreover, they have shown the advantages of using military forces to achieve very specific strategic and political outcomes.

The experience acquired and lessons learned from the Syrian campaign will likely define the direction of Russia's military capabilities planning for a number of years. In terms of conventional military operations Syria has shown the world that the Russians have studied and implemented key concepts from the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and these changes will have a major impact of how future wars will be conducted if they are forced to use a military option.

THE FUTURE OF ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: WHAT THE WEST SHOULD EXPECT

Based on Russia's experiences in Crimea, Ukraine, and Syria one can envision how "New Generation Warfare" would translate into specific operations against Western nations in a future conflict. As the most likely target of Russian actions would be a NATO member or members, the Russians are very likely to initially focus their activities on the first four stages of its doctrine in order to prevent the activation of NATO's Article Five doctrine for as long as possible. This attitude means that over the long term there would be emphasis on information operations, cyber, legal, economic, and environmental warfare as well as any other such activities the Russians felt might be effective and that they could possibly exploit. The level of intensity of the attacks would depend on the country they have targeted and the specific situation they are dealing with, however, such activities would likely start off slowly to show displeasure and increase steadily in both pressure and scope until a satisfactory result is achieved.

On the ground, the Russians would likely employ private military and security companies, criminal organizations and Special Forces. Most likely it would be some combination of all these organizations. Once in country they would link up with or infiltrate previously identified internal opposition groups and criminal organizations. Their aim would be to create and spread dissent. Specific activities could include any or all of the following:

- gain physical or cyber control over critical infrastructure including government and military systems;

- employ Information Operations (Information War) against target nations and target groups within that nation;

- use criminal organizations or private security companies to carry out intelligence, the movement of weapons, and strategic-level *espionage* or sabotage if this were to become necessary;

- conduct cyber-warfare including espionage, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, data modification and infrastructure manipulation;

- employ Airborne or Special Forces to carry out attacks on infrastructure or to create discontent among, as well as train, indigenous peoples and other minority groups; and

- deploy conventional military forces to provide support for ongoing operations by Airborne or Special Forces, criminal organizations, private military and security companies and for intimidation.[126]

Initially, Russia's conventional military forces, which have traditionally been at the centre of security calculations when dealing with potential threats, would likely only be used to support different aspects of "New Generation Warfare's" non-military operations.

For example, they could provide the arms, training or explosives to criminal organizations who could smuggle them into a target country for the purpose of a terrorist event or to support an armed struggle. As has been shown in the Ukraine, the military would likely confine itself to conventional deployment for exercises or in a show of force operation until there are clear indications that their services were needed.

New Security Priorities for the West

Once the target country has been identified and conditions have been set the long-distance war can commence. The key tools for this type of attack includes cyber warfare, information war, the acquisition of western companies, and the use of surrogate organizations**.** As such, it is important to look at each of these areas in greater detail.

Cyber Warfare – A central component to "New Generation Warfare" is cyber warfare. Long before any overt increase in tensions is realized the Russians will attempt to infiltrate Western government organizations, research institutes, armed forces, energy distribution facilities, telecoms companies, financial services, and logistics management capabilities within the cyber domain.[127] In addition to carrying out pecific cyber activities will include such things as propaganda, denial-of-service attacks, data modification and infrastructure manipulation.[128]

Should the Russians decide to launch an all-out cyber-attack against a Western nation they will likely hit banking, government, media outlets and other infrastructure targets that rely heavily on the digital medium to function as a priority. The primary method of assault will likely be a series of denial-of-service attacks that could result in shutdowns to many of these essential services.[129]

Also at risk is the internet infrastructure along with government ISP addresses, which will be hit in an attempt to disrupt communications between government agencies and the various levels of government.[130]

Information War – Another key component of this strategy is the employment of "information war." The Russians view these operations in a holistic manner and as such they encompass a wide range of activities including cyber operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and influence operations.[131] As a result, information war not only deals in disinformation campaigns that could contain such things as fake news, half-truths and leaks, it actively attempts to reinvent reality in an effort to shape the global narrative.[132]

To reach global opinion the Russians are very active on social media. For example, the *BuzzFeed* website recently reported that the Russian government is recruiting large numbers of online trolls in an effort to change global sentiment regarding the invasion of Ukraine.[133] These trolls are currently driving discussions on many of the principal western online media outlets, including "Fox News, Huffington Post, The Blaze, Politico, and WorldNet Daily."[134] Such activities are intended to get Russia's message out while creating confusion and uncertainty within the targeted community/society.

Should the Russians decide to unleash a full-scale information campaign against the West it will be a coordinated effort combining psychological and influence operations. They will attempt to capitalize on internal tensions between regions, religions, and ethnic groups. The main focus of any campaign will be to isolate targeted groups within the country from the central Government while attempting to disrupt the public's confidence in the ability of the government to deal with the situation effectively or to protect them should a confrontation escalate.[135]

The Acquisition of Western Nation Companies – During the competition phase, and long before any conflict, the Russians will attempt to penetrate established Western companies likely through full or partial commercial acquisition. According to Andrew Davenport, Deputy Executive Director of Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) in Washington, "Russia makes significant use of its State owned enterprises for strategic purposes, pursuing key roles in the energy sectors and power production industries of target countries."[136] Such control will allow the Russians to use these assets to pressure decision-making, engage in economic warfare, or simply give them a bargaining tool against a Government should an appropriate situation arise. This use of acquisition for economic and political influence means that Western Governments must be cautious about what they allow the Russians, or any foreign power for that matter, to acquire, particularly regarding resources and critical infrastructure within the country.

The Use of Surrogate Organizations – Another aspect of "New Generation Warfare's" operational approach is the use of surrogate organizations to do as much of the dirty work as possible. In this regard, there are two specific threats to Western Countries that must be monitored, namely Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and criminal organizations.

There has been speculation that the Russians have used criminal organizations to perform various tasks in Eastern Ukraine. For example, Tom Porter, writing for the *International Business Times*, stated, "It is alleged that Russian organized crime figures have served as agents for Russia in east Ukraine, where they have been used to foment pro-Russian unrest, and transport arms and supplies to rebel groups."[137] José Grinda González, a Spanish prosecutor who has spent a great deal of time looking into the activities of Russian organized crime in Spain reinforces this claim. He believes Russian spies often use senior mafia bosses to

carry out criminal operations such as arms trafficking. He asserts, "Law enforcement agencies such as the police, spy agencies and the prosecutor's office operate a de facto protection racket for criminal networks."[138]

The close relationship between government and crime organizations means that as the Russian military and commercial interests expand their presence in any targeted country they wish, so too can organized crime linked to the government. More importantly, as Russian organized crime becomes more established in Western Countries the Russian Security Services will have a direct link to a pool of contractors already operating within the country. As a result, these gangs have moved from a purely criminal justice problem to a national security threat and both government and law enforcement must be extremely vigilant regarding these organizations within Western Countries.

In addition, an emerging Russian security threat that Western Nations will have to deal with is the deployment of Russian-based PMSCs. The Russians have been monitoring the employment of Western PMSCs in Iraq and Afghanistan for some time and have started using them in the Ukraine and Syria.[139] In the future, this capability will likely become an increasingly important part of "New Generation Warfare" doctrine. As Mark Galeotti, a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague, points out, "The Kremlin regards all Russian companies and institutions – and especially those owned, backed or facilitated by the state – as potential tools at its disposal."[140] He affirms, "Gazprom turns off the taps when there is a need to squeeze a neighbor; arms companies flock to do deals with despots the government would support…" Galeotti goes on to say, "Russia's PMSCs would no doubt be expected to act at the Kremlin's behest when need be."[141] Galeotti concludes his assessment of PMSCs by declaring, "The employment of these companies is 'neither the soft power of

influence and authority, nor the traditional forms of hard power, this would be a kind of elastic power' – flexible much of the time, but surprisingly tough and painful when wielded with intent."[142]

Employing Russian PMSCs within targeted nations to protect Russian owned companies would be viewed by many as nothing out of the ordinary. However, these companies usually employ members with specialized military backgrounds and skills. As a result, they could be used by the Russian government to carry out missions ranging from reconnaissance and sabotage on critical infrastructure, to assisting resistance groups or criminal organizations. Because they are working for commercial enterprises the Russian government has built-in plausible deniability should they be apprehended.

If the West is to effectively deal with this threat, it will need to address the security issues specific to the application of Russia's doctrine. These include preventing the acquisition of Western companies and infrastructure by Russian state-owned companies, monitoring operations by possible surrogate organizations, and countering Russia's information war and cyber warfare defence by building resilience into the infrastructure and population. More importantly, Western countries will have to gain a better understanding of how this type of conflict is waged and how it can be tailored to the specific weaknesses of a particular country. Once this understanding has been achieved the West must learn how to go onto the attack to fight this type of conflict.

COUNTERING THE NEW ASYMMETRIC WARFARE THREAT

If Western countries want to seriously counter the effects of this type of conflict, they will have to start by adapting their thinking and capabilities to meet the threat head on, offensively and as

early as possible. The evidence suggests that countries seeking to employ this type of asymmetric warfare are attempting to shift the emphasis of conflict from operational level where military campaigns are fought into the strategic realms of national defence/national security, and into the tactical realm of social disorder. Therefore, the critical first step in adjusting to this new reality is to also move back into the strategic realm by thinking and acting strategically while providing resiliency at the tactical or social level of this type of conflict.

The strategic realm is defined as the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, informational and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.[143] To achieve the necessary level of proficiency to win in such conditions, Western nations will need to open debate on how best to carry out strategy formulation and how best to apply it in order to achieve its strategic goals of defeating an enemy employing an asymmetric warfare approach before the start of conflict.

To realize this objective, nations will need to conduct an analysis on how the concept of Asymmetric warfare defence should be adapted to meet specific national security and defence needs both within the nation and for collective alliances such as NATO. Moreover, they will need to review and implement the type of training required to produce better strategic thinkers. Just as importantly, study is also needed to identify what bureaucratic changes need to be made to improve a country's (and alliance's) strategic processing abilities along with how they can make more efficient use of its policy tools to counter the current threats posed by "New Generation Warfare".

Although such changes at first glance appear to be relatively simple, they may be very difficult to bring about. This reality is due to the fact that strategy formulation and implementation has

not been a strong point for the West for some decades. A recent RAND Corporation study, *Improving Strategic Competence Lessons from 13 Years of War*, found that strategy is the missing link in current operations. Among others, shortfalls included a deficit in the understanding of strategy, deficits in the process for formulating strategy, and a failure to incorporate the essential political element of war into strategy.[144]

A key finding noted, "The U.S. government has experienced a persistent deficit in understanding and applying strategic art. The blurry line between policy and strategy requires both civilians and the military to engage in a dynamic, iterative dialogue to make successful strategy, but that often failed to occur."[145] The report continues, "Americans [Western nations] are very competent at fighting, but they are much less successful in fighting in such a way that they secure the strategic and, hence, political rewards they seek."[146] This point is significant as the focus of "New Generation Warfare" is to specifically seek and attain those political rewards as part of an overriding strategic goal at minimal cost.

Although, Western nations need to become more strategic in their thinking and application if they wish to neutralize the effects of this form of warfare in the future, this realization is only part of the solution. The ability to think is of little value without the appropriate tools to do the job properly. These tools need to include the creation of a strategic coordination agency, and the production of a new doctrine for asymmetric conflict. Finally, Western nations must overcome the stigma of using other state tools as a primary means of dealing with conflicts.

Creating a National Strategic Coordination Agency

In order for Western nations to defeat this type of state-level conflict they will need to compete with an enemy operating at a tactical level but fighting within the strategic realm. To accomplish

this outcome, each nation will need to set up an agency that can effectively process information and coordinate the required state tools as necessary.

Initially, the role of such a national agency would be to define the end state of the asymmetric war against any nation prosecuting such a conflict, articulate the means to achieve that end state, and produce a coherent plan to set the concept in motion. Once this result has been accomplished it would need to coordinate the necessary activities to bring about the chosen end state. In effect, such an organization would need the capacity to create a model of the nation's "extended domain" so that it could produce and coordinate a Western version of the "battlefield of battlefields."

To this end, the agency would need to be able to monitor the military, political, informational and economic situation worldwide. More importantly, it would need the analytical power to anticipate, recognize and analyze threats to its national entity (as well as its alliance partners) both ongoing and emerging. It would also need the authority for control over its national military forces, along with any other national bodies and national organizations needed for the overall security of the state. This includes intelligence, national police forces, national emergency measures troops, diplomatic affairs, and cyber warfare capabilities, to name but a few.

In effect, the National Strategic Coordination Agency becomes a country's asymmetric warfare planning and operations centre. In the case of an alliance such as NATO, a similar organization that connects the national coordination centres of participating countries is also required. As there will no longer be a distinction between war and peace, it will need to operate continuously on a high readiness posture. The capabilities within the agency would need to be networked into national-level strategic coordination centres with similar abilities and functions in order to be truly effective.

Creating an Asymmetric Warfare Doctrine to fight New Generation Warfare

Once the Strategic Coordination Agencies are in place Western countries will need to develop a doctrine for the use of this new type of warfare. This process may not be as difficult as it first appears. The ability to hit a country in such a way to induce social chaos leading to a political crisis is not as easy as it first appears. Historically, nations have attempted to achieve these results as a secondary task primarily by military means through the use of Airpower, Special Operations Forces and undercover agents. Emphasis was usually placed on critical infrastructure directly supporting the war effort or of political significance. Despite massive efforts and great destruction, it was difficult to determine how much a strategic bombing campaign or operations behind enemy lines contributed to victory.[147] In an effort to bring more precision to this form of attack, Colonel John Warden, an American Air Power theorist, advanced the idea during the 1991 Gulf War of the enemy as a system that has an organization.

Warden believed that like all organizations, the enemy's was based on certain principles that could be clearly identified and attacked. He asserts, "Whether we are talking about an industrialized state, a drug cartel, or an electric company, every organization follows the same organizational scheme." In his view, the idea was to identify and target centers of gravity within the organizational scheme until the enemy submitted to your will. He explained, "As we understand how our enemies are organized, we can easily move on to the concept of centers of gravity. Understanding centers of gravity then allows us to make reasonable guesses as to how to create costs which may lead the enemy to accept our demands."[148]

In order to better articulate his idea, Warden represented the enemy system organization in a concentric rings format, with each ring representing a layer of the enemy's centre of gravity.

The priority of effort he emphasized was in descending order of importance starting with the inner most rings and working out. This effort included leadership, system essentials, infrastructure, population, and the military. He viewed the leadership ring as the most important and focused on the state's leaders as they control the systems of the state. System essentials represent production critical to the state's survival, such as oil, food and money. Infrastructure, transportation, and electricity keep the system together. The population is the state's civilian population, and a fielded military is the security mechanism that defends the state from attack.[149]


Fielded Military
Population
Infrastructure
System Essentials
Leadership

FIGURE 2: Warden's Concentric Ring Format[150]

As the object of war is to force your will onto the enemy, Warden felt that the most effective and quickest way to achieve this goal was through a simultaneous attack on all of the components of the enemy's inner ring or its leadership. Only if one is unable to attack an enemy's leadership does Warden recommend attacking, in ascending order of importance, the latter or outer rings.[151] Although there has been a great deal of debate regarding the validity of the model and the actual effects it achieved in defeating the enemy during the Gulf War, it did nonetheless attempt to identify and prioritize strategic targets in a systemic way. This analysis is important, particularly when one examines what constitutes a strategic attack.[152]

The difference between Warden's model and the concept behind "Unlimited Warfare" or "New Generation Warfare" is that with this form of warfare the idea is to target the population in such a way that it forces its leadership to seek a solution to the problem preferably by stopping the conflict altogether. In this respect, under Warden's construct all the rings must play their role. However, both the population and its leadership become the primary focus of attack. The remaining rings are used to assist in the process based on perceived weaknesses. This means that once identified, there should be a simultaneous attack on all of the centers of gravity but in a way that can influence both the population and its leadership. The problem is that this is not as simple as it sounds. This complexity is due to the fact that the population and its leadership must be viewed within the context of the other elements of national power.

According to David Jablonsky, a professor of National Security Affairs, Department of National Security and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, "Most scholars focus on power as a means, the strength or capacity that provides the ability to influence the behavior of other actors in accordance with one's own objectives."[153] He adds, "National power is historically linked with military capacity, a natural relationship since war in the international arena is the ultima ratio of power."[154] However, Jablonsky cautions, that one element of power on its own cannot in itself determine national power. He states, "In this context, the elements of national power, no matter how defined, can be separated only artificially. Together, they constitute the resources for the attainment of national objectives and goals."[155]

The Elements of National Power

Jablonsky breaks down the elements of national power between natural and social determinants. "The natural determinants (i.e. geography, resources, and population) are concerned with the

number of people in a nation and with their physical environment. Social determinants (economic, political, military, psychological, and, more recently, informational) concern the ways in which the people of a nation organize themselves and the manner in which they alter their environment."[156] The problem when isolating and attacking an enemy's different elements of national power, as in Warden's theory, is that one element, like leadership for example, is difficult to separate from the others as all are intertwined and it is this interconnectedness that creates national resiliency. As Jablonsky points out, in practice, it is impossible to make a clear distinction between the natural and social elements of power.[157] For example, he states, "resources are a natural factor, but the degree to which they are used is socially determined. Population factors, in particular, cut across the dividing line between both categories. The number of people of working age in the population affects the degree of industrialization of a nation, but the process of industrialization, in turn, can greatly alter the composition of the population."[158]

Breaking the National Will

Historically, military attacks by Western countries on their enemies have focused primarily on the physical destruction of critical infrastructure, resources, the population, as well as political, and military capabilities. Information and economic warfare have been centred on the population, including military personal and politicians through the use of psychological operations. The problem with such attacks has been that despite great physical destruction, the resiliency of the society as continued to survive within the national structure. For example, allied strategic bombing of Germany during the Second World War was based on a policy of "area attack" which meant that the primary objective was to attack "the morale of the enemy's civil population and in particular, the industrial workers."[159] The idea was that bombing raids were

to destroy Germany's factories and surrounding residential areas. It was believed that such attacks would "force Germany to reallocate resources, overwhelm the civilian sector, and eventually destroy the German war machine while breaking the morale of the German people."[160] Unfortunately, for the Allies, despite great physical damage, the morale of the German people remained intact. According to Ryan Patrick Hopkins of East Tennessee State University, "In fact, it angered the populace, possibly explaining why the Germans continued to fight on for months, even as it became increasingly obvious that the Germans were going to lose the war."[161]

In order for such attacks to work, one must not only attack each of the natural and social determinants but do so in a coordinated way that will break down the resiliency of the social fabric within the population. However, this approach can take a great deal of time and effort. The key is to find the right set of conditions to start and then accelerate the process when it is needed. That is why some countries in Europe are seeing ongoing information and disinformation campaigns being pushed by the Russians. The Russians are trying to prioritize their national set of "tools" for strategic attack by focusing assaults on the population, specifically towards the psychological and political components of national power. The other elements of national power are attacked only when there is a clear weakness and it is opportunistic to do so. Starting such strikes before an apparent increase in inter-state tensions allows a possible opponent more time to wear down that social resilience. Using non-state actors to conduct confrontations against minorities within the target country is another.

By attacking the strategic zone of a democratic country, an opponent attempts to exploit the very fabric of democracy by using its own strengths (e.g. freedom of expression/speech, protest) against itself. This methodology is possible because democratic countries need strong and independent government institutions

to provide the necessary checks and balances in order to prevent the concentration of power. However, it is this independence of different levels of government and governmental departments that hinders intergovernmental cooperation for any extended period of time. Real cooperation, when it does happen, usually only occurs during a national emergency. Once the emergency is over, organizations within the government structure see little value in continuing cooperation as they compete for resources, relevance and influence within the governance structure.

It is this inability to work together during non-crisis periods that doctrines such as "New Generational Warfare" attempt to exploit. The exploitation is achieved by driving wedges between the governmental institutions and into the checks and balances within a democracy. In the process they strip away the layers of national resiliency by creating, or expanding on, discontent thereby preventing effective government response to crises. Ultimately, the aim of such action is to separate the people from their government.

Going back to Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui's *Unrestricted Warfare*, which emphasized the importance of developing a strategy involving a number of different domains (e.g. economic, political, informational) within the strategic zone that requires integrating a complex mix of information and resources, they realized that the process would need to start with the production of a detailed knowledge of the strengths and limitations of one's own national security capabilities, which is then compared to that of the enemy. Armed with this information they could superimpose "political and military factors onto such things as the economy, culture, foreign relations, technology, environment, natural resources, nationalities, and other parameters as needed to draw out the complete picture of the "extended domain."[162] Once the strategic requirements (resources) are in place to deal with this "extended domain" a nation can then create the specific battlefield of battlefields for the target country.

In this respect, the "battlefield of battlefields" is enemy-dependent and will need to be adjusted to the changing situations within the targeted country. It is this specific to situation analysis and coordination at the strategic level that has made Russian successes so quick and efficient thus far. The Russians are moving rapidly towards achieving the capability of a single full-depth, synchronized action across the entire battlefield of battlefields that could paralyze Western countries and their militaries. This reality means that the preparations for and specific activities related to this form of conflict are likely occurring right now.

Creating an Asymmetric Warfare Doctrine using the Concept of Political Warfare as the Foundation

 A Cold War application of this specific concept was first introduced by George Kennan in 1948 under the idea of Political Warfare. Kennan was an American diplomat and historian best known for developing the concept of "Containment" to limit Soviet expansion during the Cold War. John Lewis Gaddis, a cold-war historian, and author of *George F. Kennan: An American Life* observed that the genius behind the thinking regarding containment was that "Kennan laid out a third path between the extremes of war and appeasement." Kennan believed, "if the US and its allies could be patient and …develop a coherent strategy of non-provocative resistance, this third path would lead to a settlement … or even to the break-up of the Soviet Union."[163]

In a Policy Planning Memorandum, dated 4 May 1948, Kennan argued that political warfare was the means to achieve Western objectives and was in fact, "the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in time of peace." He asserted, "in [its] broadest definition, political warfare is the employment of all the means at a nation's command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives." He further explained:

Such operations are both overt and covert. They range from such overt actions as political alliances, economic measures (as ERP [the Marshall Plan]), and "white" propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of "friendly" foreign elements, "black" psychological warfare and even the encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states.[164]

Kennan provided three broad areas of focus for Political Warfare's activities, Liberation Committees, Support of Indigenous Anti-Communist Elements in threatened countries of the Free World, and Preventive Direct Action in Free Countries. In 2014, the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) updated these ideas to include a more detailed listing. These include:

- Economic sanctions against countries, groups, and individuals, as well as coercive trade policies;

- Diplomacy, including boycotting international events, establishing treaties or alliances to counter adversary UW, severing diplomatic relations, or excluding offending states from membership in international forums;

- Support for "friendly" insurgent groups to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow an adversary regime;

- Support for friendly governments to counter adversary political warfare activities;

- Support for foreign political actors and parties opposing adversarial regimes; and

- Strategic communications and information operations to expose adversary activities.[165]

The strategy of containment became the central pillar in the post-war concept for dealing with the Soviet Union. Although, it had its detractors, it kept the cold war in check for forty-one

years and it achieved Kennan's ultimate vision of ending with the break-up of the Soviet Union.

While, Kennan was not interested in managing the transition from peace to war, in broad terms, the other components of political warfare, particularly within the context of USASOC updated listing, are still relevant to developing an effective counter to Russia's "New Generation Warfare." These include finding the enemy's weaknesses, developing a long-term strategy to attack those weaknesses, and identifying and coordinating the necessary state tools to do the job effectively. Interestingly, USASOC has already started to move in this direction. In their *SOF Support to Political Warfare White Paper* they lay out the requirement for a suite of complementary options to counter this type of warfare carried out by state and non-state adversaries. They feel that any effective response will need to "comprehensively mitigate the effect of subversion, UW, and delegitimizing narratives in partner countries targeted by adversaries. They also feel that it is important to dissuade adversaries from conducting hybrid warfare by increasing the cost of such activities to the point that they become unsustainable."[166]

To do deter their foes, USASOC believes it can overmatch its adversaries. However, USASOC understands that this can only be done through a whole-of-government approach that is expressed through an integrated strategy and a cohesive set of policy options that uses both overt and covert tools.[167]

Special Operations Forces the Key Player in the Future of State Level Asymmetric Warfare

The central idea behind the evolving character of state level Asymmetric warfare is to de-emphasize the use of conventional military forces and if possible to eliminate their use altogether. Unfortunately, the ability to not use conventional forces will not

always occur. During the Cold War, even though NATO and the Warsaw Pact never went to war in Central Europe, the strategy of containment, using Political Warfare as its means, produced a number of proxy wars between various Communist nations and the Americans including Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan to name a few.[168] In fact, central to the initial phases of "New Generation Warfare" was the use of security services, intelligence and Special Operations Forces (SOF) operating in a covert manner or with local forces in the form of irregular warfare. Consequently, even though the aim of Asymmetric warfare is to reduce military conflict, it is reasonable to assume that military operations will be needed with the idea that they would be limited to as small a force as possible.

The most suitable and likely military intervention in future conflict, at least initially, will likely be SOF and counter-SOF capabilities. This is due to the fact that such capabilities are the most capable physical component for transitioning between the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict and war. The major question is how can these forces fit into the realm of Political Warfare in such a way as to allow them to contain the situation or effectively destroy an enemy's capacity to carry out specific aspects of "New Generation Warfare". One possibility could be the use of an innovated concept being referred to as Special Warfare.

In a research paper, "Special Warfare: The Missing Middle in U.S. Coercive Options" published by the RAND Corporation in 2015, the authors argue that special warfare fills the missing middle for exerting influence between the costly commitment of conventional forces and precision-strike options provided by drones, aircraft, missiles, and special operations forces' direct action. The idea is that special warfare campaigns are designed to "stabilize or destabilize a regime by operating 'through and with' local state or non-state partners, rather than through straight unilateral action."[169]

The specific authors have identified a number of campaigns that could support this type of capability, these include, hybrid guerrilla warfare in the defense, support to conventional power projection, support to distant blockade, covert foreign internal defence for eliminating weapons of mass destruction, counter proliferation against a global network, foreign internal defense in a fractured state, building a regional security exporter, and counter genocide unconventional warfare. Most of these missions are directly applicable to three of USASOC's Political Warfare's activities. As such, they may provide a good foundation for deploying SOF on such operations.[170]

The research paper goes on to say, these Special Warfare campaigns have six central features:

- Their goal is stabilizing or destabilizing the targeted regime;

- Local partners provide the main effort;

- Military forces maintain a small (or no) footprint in the country;

- They are typically of long duration and may require extensive preparatory work better measured in months (or years) than days;

- They require intensive interagency cooperation; and

- They employ "political warfare" methods to mobilize, neutralize, or integrate individuals or groups from the tactical to strategic levels.[171]

Like the USASOC White Paper, the RAND document emphasizes the need for strategic thinking and coordination. It cautions, "accepting this broader definition of war would then require

a theory of victory to adequately account for that dimension." Political outcomes would be embraced as a principle and articulated specifically in each case.[172]

Overcoming the Stigma and Institutional Resistance of using Asymmetric Warfare

Although there is sufficient evidence to support the need to adopt state level Asymmetric Warfare doctrine as part of the West's security strategy, the idea will face a number of difficult obstacles. For example, despite the publicity and analysis surrounding the initial launch of the *Unlimited Warfare* publication, there is little evidence that the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has adopted any of its core concepts. In 2003, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (CMC) did endorse the 'three warfares' concept, based on the need to integrate Psychological Warfare, Media Warfare, and Legal Warfare into its doctrine.[173] However, according to the Department of Defence's *Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China for 2011,* "The Chinese concept of "three warfares" … reflects China's desire to effectively exploit these force enablers in the run-up to, and during, hostilities."

The term "force enablers" suggests little more than a supporting role for these capabilities within the context of conventional military operations. Something Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui specifically warned against. In fact, the evidence suggests that the PLA is very much on the road to developing a capability and doctrine to conduct a head-on conventional war against a high-technology conventional opponent. According to another Department of Defence review "China is investing in military programs and weapons designed to improve extended-range power projection and operations in emerging domains such as cyberspace, space, and

electronic warfare. The Report adds, "current trends in China's weapons production will enable the PLA to conduct a range of military operations in Asia well beyond China's traditional territorial claims."[174] This ability would clearly suggest that the PLA's views on future warfare appears to be very similar to Western ideas of integrating selected national capabilities to support operational level activities rather than creating a specific Asymmetric doctrine or warfare components to support strategic operations.

Why have the Chinese adopted a more conventional approach to military modernization? As Dr. Andrew Scobell, Senior Political Scientist at RAND in Washington, D.C., points out, "it is likely that China's political leaders would find many of the concepts discussed in *Unlimited Warfare* appealing as it would offer an alternative defence policy where strategic (government) control would be far greater and likely for far less money. However, the military establishment of the PLA would likely view such a reorientation as a threat to the defence budgets, manpower, bureaucratic clout, and a decline in prestige."[175]

Notwithstanding this institutional resistance, the idea of state-level asymmetric warfare is still very much viewed as the poor man's weapon, and, although effective in defending a weaker opponent, it is unable to provide the necessary power projection capabilities needed to become a real player on the international stage. In this respect, the Russians may have found the right balance; they have integrated asymmetric warfare into their conventional warfighting doctrine, which demonstrates a willingness to transition from hybrid war to conventional operations as required. But they still have a significant conventional military capability they can call upon. That being said, the success of asymmetric warfare in places such as Crimea, Ukraine and Syria may start to change some perceptions on how war should be fought.

CONCLUSION

In summary, peer competitors are seeking to move the centre of gravity for conflict from the operational level where conventional military forces play a predominant role into the strategic realm where the integration of strategic planning and the coordination of state tools becomes the critical denominator. This coordinated action is achieved by converging different methods, battlefields, and force structures so that they are blurred into a single entity operating within the same battlespace and where the irregular component (e.g. insurgents, agitators, protesters) of the combined action may prove to be operationally decisive.

This concept of conflict originates from the Chinese idea of creating the "extended domain," which is done by integrating information from an opponent, such as their national interests and national security requirements, and mapping any vulnerabilities onto a larger "strategic situation map" that allows for a holistic strategy to attack the opponent. Once the strategy is mapped out, the product allows for engagement across the entire "battlefield of battlefields."   If the strategy is coordinated correctly, the methodology allows for a reduction in the impact of the West's overwhelming advantage in conventional military operations.

This eventuality is no longer conjecture. The Russian have already shown that they are well on their way to developing this concept in the form of "New Generation Warfare." Based on the theory of unlimited warfare they will only become more effective over time as experience creates sophistication of both process and capabilities. As a result, Western countries must seek to better understand this form of warfare in order to effectively counter its devastating results.

To counter these types of operations, Western countries will need to have the appropriate concepts, tools and organizations in place

so that they can plan, act and coordinate the strategic capabilities both within respective nations, as well as in their alliances and coalitions. In the future, Western countries will still be required to fight and win conventional wars; however, they must also be able to fight on the "battlefield of battlefields" that globalization, technology and the evolution of the future security environment is now creating. In order to win the various conflicts, whether through the media battle, the cyber battle, the political battle, or on the irregular/conventional military battle, the West must adapt. As such, they must make the following changes to their current practices:

The first and most important, is to move from Operational to Strategic Level Thinking;

- Create a Strategic Coordination Agency;

- Create a Hybrid Warfare Capability using the concept of Political Warfare;

- Bring Special Operations Forces to the forefront of Hybrid Warfare by integrating Political Warfare with Special Warfare; and

- Understand and adopt Hybrid War.

In order to bring all of these factors together, Western countries will require a unifying doctrine for conflict from the tactical to national strategic level. They will need to deal with the problems associated with the idea of the "Whole of Government" approach, which appears to be more rhetoric than actual concrete action.

Finally, Western nations will have to plan for, and develop, resiliency within all layers and elements of national power and society. Clearly, the examples of the Ukraine and Syria have shown the West that, should Russian wish to take on a Western country,

they will do so by avoiding the West's strengths in military and high technology and instead strike at its soft underbelly, namely its social structures and political system. As such, the West must be prepared to defend and counter these attacks.

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NOTES

1   Department of the Army, *Multi-Domain Battle: Combined Arms for the 21st Century* (TRADOC, 24 February 2017), 2, online at: <http://www.tradoc.army.mil/MultiDomainBattle/docs/MDB_WhitePaper.pdf>, accessed 12 October 2017.

2   Ibid., 2.

3   Ibid., 2.

4   Department of the Army, *The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare* (TRADOC, G2 Assessment, March 2017), 17-18, online at: <http://www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/The-Operational-Environment-and-the-Changing-Character-of-Future-Warfare.pdf>, accessed 12 October 2018.

5   Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems*, (Alabama: Air University Press, Maxwell Air force Base, 1988), 205. For the purposes of this work nuclear warfare will not be considered. This section was taken from Tony Balasevicius, "Adapting Military Organizations to Meet Future Shock," *The Canadian Army Journal,* Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 2009).

6   In January 2001, the Canadian Army adapted the NATO vision of this construct, when it published *Future Army Capabilities* and addressed a future operational environment that imagines two forms of conflict.

7   Definitions & Translations, *Definition of conventional warfare,* <http://www.definitions.net/definition/conventional%20warfare>, accessed 15 November 2017.

8   Ibid.

9   Department of National Defence (DND), Director Land Strategic Concepts (DLSC) Report 01/01. 2. *Future Army Capabilities* (Kingston: Fort Frontenac, Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts, January 2001), 4.

10   DND DLSC Report 01/01. 2. Ibid., 4.

11   Definition of asymmetric warfare, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Asymmetric_warfare>, accessed 15 November 2017. Asymmetric warfare "is in contrast to *symmetric warfare*, where two powers have similar military power and resources and rely on tactics that are similar overall, differing only in details and execution. The term is also frequently used to describe what is also called 'guerrilla warfare,' 'insurgency,' 'terrorism,' 'counterinsurgency,' and 'counterterrorism,' essentially violent conflict between a formal military and an informal, less equipped and supported, undermanned but resilient opponent. Asymmetric warfare is a form of irregular warfare."

12   Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare,* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1990), 13. O'Neill, a recognized expert on the subject, articulates this concept as a "struggle between a non-ruling group and the ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g. organizational expertise, propaganda and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of legitimacy." It should be noted that over the past few years' western nations have come to recognize the trans-national nature of modern insurgencies and now refer to insurgency as, "a competition involving at least one non-state movement using means that include violence against an established authority to achieve political change (Definition as developed by a COIN study group during USMC Joint Urban Warrior 2005. Taken from National Defence, *Canadian Army Counter-Insurgency Operations* (Draft) (Kingston: LFDTS, 2005).

13   Richard H. Shultz, Douglas Farah, and Itamara V. Lochard, *Armed Groups: A Tier-One Security Priority,* (USAF Institute for National Security Studies USAF Academy, Colorado, INSS Occasional Paper 57, September 2004), 17.

14   The concept of insurgency is not new to military operations. In fact, insurgencies have been around for almost as long as organized warfare. Examples of such struggles can be found in ancient Egypt and China, while the Roman, Ottoman and Napoleonic empires each had to deal with various types of insurgencies throughout their histories.

More recently, there have been numerous insurgencies in response to European colonial expansion into Asia and Africa. Interestingly, conventional military forces have also used elements of insurgency doctrine through the use of Special Forces in support of conventional operations since the First World War.

15   C. P. Fitzgerald, *Mao Tse-tung and China* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1976), 16, 26, 38. Also see Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, *Mao: The Unknown Story* (New York: Knopf, 2005), 350 -365.

16   DND, *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations* (Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2007), 6.

17   Wikipedia, Nuclear warfare, <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_warfare>, accessed 15 November 2017.

18   DND DLSC Report 01/01: 2-4.

19   Francis G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), 28, online at: <http://www.projectwhitehorse.com/pdfs/HybridWar_0108.pdf>, accessed 01 May 2015. At the time he wrote the paper, Hoffman was an employee of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and working for the USMC.

20   Ibid., 29.

21   Tony Balasevicius, "Adapting Military Organizations to Meet Future Shock," *The Canadian Army Journal,* Vol. 12, No. 2 (Summer 2009).

22   In a 2011 presentation for the Annual Security Review Conference, Janusz Bugajski, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C. outlined three components to intra-state conflicts. These were: "a. civil conflicts precipitated by deepening political cleavages; b. economic distress, and growing inequalities, which in worst case scenarios can lead to the erosion of government legitimacy; and c. a breakdown of law and order, and escalating ungovernability. State weakness can spawn the creation of armed criminal gangs and armed vigilante groups, provoke inter-ethnic conflicts,

anti-immigrant pogroms, separatist movements, and significant refugee outflows. Such developments will also stimulate the growth of organized crime and smuggling operations Transcending national borders. For inter-state conflicts he noted: These may include conflicts over the status of disputed territories and the treatment of ethnic kindred in which intra-state conflicts can pull neighboring powers into the fray. They can also involve energy conflicts and other resource disputes stemming from the short and long-term impact of climate change. Finally, for trans-state conflicts he observed: these could include international terrorism, economic sabotage, and cyber-attacks that precipitate state paralysis, undermine national security, or provoke international conflicts with sponsoring states." Online at <http://www.osce.org/cio/80530?download=true>, pages 1 and 2, accessed 15 November 2017.

23   Keir Giles, *Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power* (Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016), 2, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/2016-03-russia-new-tools-giles.pdf>, accessed 15 November 2017.

24   TRADOC, *Multi-Domain Battle,* 1.

25   Stephen J. Blank, "Imperial Ambitions: Russia's Military Buildup," *World Affairs* (May/June 2015), online at <http://www.worldaffairs-journal.org/article/imperial-ambitions-russia%E2%80%99s-military-buildup>, accessed 1 October 2015.

26   TRADOC, *Multi-Domain Battle,* 2-3.

27   Xiabing Li, *A History of the Modern Chinese Army,* (University Press of Kentucky, June 2007), 271. Note: This section appeared in an article in the *Canadian Military Journal,* Tony Balasevicius, "Looking for Little Green Men: Understanding Russia's Employment of Hybrid Warfare," *Canadian Military Journal,* Vol. 17, No. 3 (July 2017),   <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/Vol17/no3/page17-eng.asp>, accessed 15 January 2018.

28   Dean Cheng "Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars," in Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and Roy Kamphausen (eds.), *Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples' Wars* (The Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2011), 159.

29   Ibid., 159.

30   Ibid., 159.

31   Ibid., 159.

32   Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999), 189, <http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf>, accessed 01 May 2015.

33   Ibid., 118.

34   Ibid., 190. This approach superimposes both national interests and national security requirements onto the larger strategic situation map.

35   Ibid., 190.

36   Ibid., 181.

37   Ibid., 181.

38   Major John A. Van Messel, USMC, *Unrestricted Warfare: A Chinese doctrine for future warfare?* (United States Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, Quantico, Virginia, 2005), 7, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a509132.pdf>, accessed 01 May 2012. The author provides a good overview of both the combinations and principles.

39   Liang and Xiangsui, 206.

40   Ibid., 207.

41   Ibid., 207.

42   Ibid., 206-209.

43   Ibid., xx.

44   Ibid., 140. By "combined well" the authors meant the winner was able to coordinate and synchronize the different forces they had available to them to enable victory.

45   Ibid.,140.

46   Ibid., xx.

47   Ibid., 145-146.

48   Ibid., 38-43.

49   The Cold War Museum, Fall of the Soviet Union, Online, <http://www.coldwar.org/articles/90s/fall_of_the_soviet_union.asp>, accessed 2 September 2017.

50   Robert H. Dorff, "A Primer in Strategy Development," in Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb Jr. (eds.), *The U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy* (U.S. Army War College, February 2001), 11, <https://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/01cerami.pdf>, accessed 2 October 2017.

51   Ibid., 33.

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markets between the East & West, through three business divisions: Retail, Asset Management, and Wholesale (Global Markets and Investment Banking). To do their job effectively they need strategic insight into the developing political and security environment in regions they want to work in. As such, they do their own analysis using the insights and inputs from 28,000 people worldwide. With regard to "credit strategy" fundamental analysis includes the viability of lending money to organizations operating in places like Libya/Syria. As such, long term security/stability of a region is critical and that is where business overlaps with government. More specifically, "Global Credit Strategy seeks attractive total returns from income and price appreciation by investing in a globally diversified portfolio of multi-currency debt issued by corporations and non-government issuers. To help achieve this objective, the strategy combines a top-down macroeconomic assessment, to determine optimal beta positioning for the portfolio, with rigorous bottom-up fundamental analysis." Morgan Stanley, *Investment Management Overview: Global Credit Strategy,* <https://www.morganstanley.com/im/en-us/institutional-investor/strategies/fixed-income/global-credit.html>, accessed 15 January 2018.

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67 Mark Galeotti, *The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear*, (War, blog in Moscow's shadows), online at <https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-Gerasimov-doctrine-and-Russian-non-linear-war/>, which first appeared in the Federation Military-Industrial Kurier, February 27, 2013, accessed 10 May 2015. Many authorities on Russia believe that the article may have been written by someone

else. Also, the same briefing was presented by the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Army General Valeriy Gerasimov, in January 2013 at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences' annual meeting; key elements of the Gerasimov Doctrine have since been integrated into the new edition of the Russian Military Doctrine, as approved in December 2014.

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69   Ibid.

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71   Col. S.G. Chekinov (Res.), Lt. Gen. S.A. Bogdanov (Ret.), "The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War," *Military Thought: A Russian Journal of Military Theory and Strategy*, No. 4 (2013), 13, online at <http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/MT_FROM%20THE%20 CURRENT%20ISSUE_No.4_2013.pdf>, accessed 5 July 2015.

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73   Galeotti, *The Gerasimov Doctrine.*

74   Ibid.

75   Jānis Bērziņš, *Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy,* (National Defense Academy of Latvia, Policy Paper no. 02 April 2014), 6.

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77   Chekinov and Bogdanov, 13.

78   Galeotti, *The Gerasimov Doctrine.*

79   Jānis Bērziņš, *Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy,* (Center for Security and Strategic Research, National Defence Academy of Latvia, Policy Paper, 6 April 2014), 2.

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81   The Euromaidan Revolution, also known as the Ukrainian Revolution of 2014 or the Revolution of Dignity transpired in February 2014. During this period protesters battled riot police in a series of violent encounters, which included shooting by unknown armed assailants. The revolution culminated in the ejection of incumbent Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych.

82   Sergey Maidukov, *The Crimea Crisis -- Cui Bono?,* (American Thinker daily internet publication, 5 April 2014), <http://www.american thinker.com/articles/2014/04/the_crimea_criss__cui_bono.html>, accessed 17 June 2015. Critical to their planning was the status of Crimea, which is of special strategic interest to the Kremlin. Not only does Crimea hold the Russian Black Sea fleet, the peninsula serves as an economic thoroughfare connecting the Caucasus region and the Caspian Sea to central and Eastern Europe but way of the Dnieper River. Additionally, it is believed that the Crimea may hold a significant amount of natural resources. According to the American Thinker, "Within 200 nautical miles of the Crimean shoreline there are an estimated 45 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves." It goes on to say, "Hydrocarbons in the Black Sea shelf could yield as much as 1.5 billion cubic meters per year."

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84   Analysis, *Putting Russia's Crimean Intervention in Context*, (Stratfor Global Intelligence), April 12, 2014, online at <https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/putting-russias-crimean-intervention-context>, accessed 15 June 2015. Russia's successes in the Ukraine were the result of a number of factors, only one of which included the employment of "New Generation Warfare." At the time of the intervention there was an overall weakness in the Ukrainian economy, wide spread corruption, a lack of investment in its military capabilities, and a fragile interim government in the capital. To this was added a number of advantages for Moscow, which including the presence of Russian forces in Crimea, the high readiness of Russian military forces in southern Russia due to the Sochi Winter Olympic Games, and extensive use of the large pro-Russian speaking local population, particularly in Crimea and the East. In addition to exploiting these various weakness and strengths, the Russians also displayed an innovative use of a modern doctrine, employing a wide

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91   Ibid.

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115   Ibid.

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117   Ibid.

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119   Paul McLeary, "Russian Military Draws Lessons From Ukraine and Syria Ops," *ForeignPolicy.com*, 9 December 2016, online at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/09/russian-military-draws-lessons-from-ukraine-syria-putin-war-islamic-state/>, accessed 11 January 2018.

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123   Ibid.

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131   Keir Giles, "Information Troops: A Russian Cyber Command?," in C. Czosseck, E. Tyugu and T. Wingfield (eds.), *Proc. 3rd International Conference on Cyber Conflict* (Tallinn, Estonia, 2011 © CCD COE Publications), 46, online at <https://ccdcoe.org/ICCC/materials/proceedings/giles.pdf>, accessed 5 October 2015.

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134   Pierluigi Paganini, *Russia and Ukraine: Information Warfare,* (INFOSEC Institute 17 June 2014), online at <http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/russia-ukraine-information-warfare/>, accessed 4 October 2015.

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