CANSOFCOM EDUCATION & RESEARCH CENTRE

MILITARY ELITES

COLONEL (RETIRED) BERND HORN

THE CANSOFCOM EDUCATION & RESEARCH CENTRE

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FOREWORD

It is my great pleasure to introduce the latest CANSOFCOM Education & Research Centre (ERC) monograph, *Military Elites*. This extremely important publication is timely as a number of international elite organizations have recently faced scrutiny and censure for criminal and unethical behaviour on operations, as well as in the exercise of their normal activities. As is often the case, these incidents illicit warning-bells and shrill cries for greater oversight of elite organizations that are perceived as out of control or lacking in supervision.

As the author draws out, the whole concept of elite is a difficult one for liberal democratic societies where the idea that someone, or some group, is somehow superior to others goes against more equalitarian views. Indeed, this idea goes against the grain of our egalitarian, "everyone is created equal", paradigm. But the reality is that there are elites in society, business, politics, sports and, also, the military. In and of itself, this reality is not necessarily a problem. There are advantages to elites as Colonel (Retired) Horn articulates. However, there are also potential pitfalls and problems with elites if the leadership is not strong enough to constrain those that may abandon the high ethical and moral standards required of those serving in these organizations.

As such, this monograph explores the concept of military elites, specifically what constitutes an elite organization, the inherent disdain and resistance to elites, as well as the potential problems and benefits of elites. Importantly, elitism can be a very emotive subject. Therefore, readers are encouraged to carefully reflect on the content. Too often individuals myopically focus on a specific concept or argument, without fully considering the context or message that is actually being conveyed. For instance, in this publication the author

is actually a strong proponent of elites; however, his experience and research has led him to believe that without strong leadership at all levels of an organization, elitism can create problems that endanger the very lifeblood of the respective group.

As always, please do not hesitate to contact the ERC if you have questions or comments on this publication, or if you have ideas for future monograph topics.

Dr. Emily Spencer
ERC Series Editor

PROLOGUE

For those in the Profession of Arms, self-examination, both individually and collectively, is as hard as it is important, not the least of which is because of the burden of the time and effort it demands. The stresses and strains of operations, both during preparation and execution, often result in the reduction of our focus on the immediate. This reality is fully understandable and defendable from a moment-to-moment perspective. But, if the claim to success on operations is predicated on a multi-year, indeed a multi-generational selection and training process, then some recognition must be afforded to looking beyond those most urgent of tasks, lifting one's head and thinking about the larger issues that play such a crucial role in achieving operational success. Old aphorisms often become stale-dated and lose their value, but the SOF Truth that states that our personnel are more important than our equipment continues to be a universally accepted statement that is proven time and time again.

Our SOF value proposition is neither the presence of a frigate, the overflight of a fighter jet, nor indeed thousands of soldiers performing essential activities that are, in part, predicated on what such a deployment signals. Indeed, the value that SOF elements bring to any operational theatre is wholly predicated on the performance of an invariably small footprint looking to achieve outsized impact in relation to the size of the element on the ground. To achieve this impact constant adjustment in perspectives is needed and an associated agility to translate that ever evolving knowledge base into action. Critiquing past actions, matching them against outcomes, identifying sources of vulnerability, as well as avenues worthwhile to pursue is engrained in the minute-to-minute and day-to-day actions of our leaders at all levels. To remain strategically relevant demands nothing less.

My own experience, both directly and indirectly, now spanning 28 years of association with CANSOFCOM, has led me to believe that the aforementioned perspectives have become not just articles of faith but irrefutable expressions of our ethos. This perspective is best captured by one of our core values, namely "Relentless Pursuit of Excellence." The very purposeful adoption of the word "pursuit" was and remains a formal and explicit recognition that there will always be things that can be improved upon. I would go so far as to state that everything we have done, are doing, and will do: can be done better. The moment we start to believe that we are beyond criticism, and most importantly beyond self-criticism is the day we should recognize we no longer adhere to the very concepts and ideals that have made CANSOFCOM so successful over the past 28 years.

This belief leads to this work by Colonel (Retired) Bernd Horn. Having served in CANSOF, having studied Special Operations for decades and being the best informed and most prolific writer of our history, his work on *Military Elites* needs more than just careful consideration. It needs to be examined, internalized and translated into part of our regular practices of self-examination. The immediate reaction of some will be to be dismissive as not being applicable to CANSOF or at least themselves. It is my sincere hope that those with these opinions are excised from CANSOF or at least never allowed to obtain any formal leadership appointment. Not just because they refuse to be self-aware but rather that the longer-term consequences of refusing to accept the neverending pursuit of excellence will start to eat away at the fabric of our culture, its impact on the development of our people and therefore have a direct impact on our operational capability.

Perhaps the analogy that might best resonate is a post Mission Hot Wash. I have sat through countless of these sessions where each leader describes what happened. The absolute best, most

productive and invaluable sessions are the ones in which those same leaders took the time to also describe how they should have reacted, things they would do differently next time. Sharing, with humility and self-awareness, with the single goal of being better. Regardless how remarkable some of those operations were, and doubtless remain, there is always a chance to be better. Our future adversaries evolve and so must we.

Elitism is a trap. I fully understand the emotional push back but it is misplaced. We recruit, select, train and employ for very specific purposes. It results in having individuals who are remarkable. It is perfectly possible to have pride of achievement and indeed one can be comfortably considered as being part of an elite organization, yet, still avoid that unwanted consequences of thinking of one's self and organization as being beyond reproach. If people are our capability and if relentless pursuit of excellence is a core value then the connective tissue between these two ideas is humility: a recognition that we will make mistakes but those mistakes won't define who we are, nor what we do. What defines us is not solely what we do, but it must also include our determination to always improve, never hold ourselves above criticism and thus ensure we will be better on the next mission than we were on the last.

There is gold in this text, it merely needs to be mined. It starts with our leaders and I look forward to seeing the lessons that can be extracted from this work translated into action.

Lieutenant-General (Retired) Mike Day
Former Commanding Officer JTF2 and Former Commander CANSOFCOM

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps nothing can pique emotion more in western democratic societies than the concept of a privileged individual or group. Collectively, we pride, if not delude, ourselves with the idea of living in an egalitarian society that embraces the unassailable virtue that all humankind is created equal. Elitism automatically destroys that illusion. The term alone conjures up notions of favouritism, privilege, superiority, and standards that are unobtainable by the majority, and, consequently, it immediately creates angst. In fact, many have identified that the label "elite" is used as a derogatory descriptor that is used to sting opponents. One journalist explained, "It's become one of the dirty words of politics."[1] Similarly, history professor Beverly Gage observed, "it [the term elite] takes on a nefarious meaning when used as a noun and has become one of the nastiest epithets in American politics."[2]

The military is no different. Universally, military institutions parallel society's outward disdain for elites. Brigadier-General R.G. Thériault, a former regimental airborne commander, noted that in Canadian society, it is not a good thing to produce a group that is favoured above others.[3] His observation was not exclusive to Canada. American General Edward Charles Meyer asserted in 1980, "There was a great dislike for anything elite. Everybody had to be the same."[4] Similarly, Thomas Adams, a former Director of Intelligence and Special Operations at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute wrote, "the U.S. military, particularly the Army, has long distrusted the whole idea of elite units on the general principle that such organizations have no place in the armed forces of a democracy."[5] And, as Martin Kitchen, a professor of history explained, "the very mention of the idea of a military elite is enough to set the alarm bells ringing in sensitive democratic souls."[6]

In the military, elites are often perceived as resource intensive and particularly divisive. Elites are often accused of shunning

military protocol and decorum, and acting as a law unto themselves. Moreover, their privileged status, which normally includes higher pay, special badges and dress, special equipment and training, and "streamlined access" to the chain-of-command, as well as special considerations and relatively lavish resources, runs counter to a very hierarchical, traditional institution that prides itself upon uniformity, standardization, and rigid adherence to military norms, values, and traditions.

Yet, despite this outward scorn, elites do exist in society and within the military. Moreover, ironically, society and the military actively nurture and support elites. Some, such as the political, intellectual, and powerful business elites are largely ignored – based upon a degree of apathy, and even more so, upon a realization that someone has to make the decisions and run the political and economic engines of a prosperous western capitalist democracy. Normally, only when a scandal or a massive failure surfaces does the public become incensed and rally against the notion of excess privilege. Conversely, others, such as entertainment and sports elites, are actively nurtured and supported. Large portions of the population hang on every word, action, and fashion trend that members of these elites espouse and represent. In fact, society's fascination has bestowed almost iconic status on many entertainment and sport celebrities.

Within the military, a similar phenomenon exists. Despite the historical disdain and resistance to the idea of elitism within the armed forces, military elites, which in the contemporary environment refers mainly to special operations forces (SOF), have always existed. Collectively, the military has not only learned to live with elites, but powerful factions within the institution have actively promoted their existence. The reason is rudimentary, the presence of elites provides specific advantages to both military and political decision-makers. Quite simply, elites, if properly led,

represent an important capability and an incentive for those who strive to attain their personal best. However, elites, if not managed and led properly, can create turmoil and become a divisive component in the military institution.

WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ELITE?

The concept of elite is not necessarily new, but it is at times misunderstood. The word is often used, or, more accurately, misused by the press, public, and the military itself. It is a term charged with emotion, and it often carries negative connotations. Thus, it is not difficult to comprehend why the concept of elitism often generates enmity. Military analyst and author Tom Clancy observed, "As always, those who dare rise above the crowd and distinguish themselves will spark envy and resentment."[7] Similarly, elitism, acknowledged one former member of an elite unit, "is counter-productive. It alienates you from other people."[8]

The term elite normally confers an element of exclusiveness, and it refers to "a class or group possessing wealth, power, and prestige."[9] This description suggests that elites comprise individuals and groups that are ranked in the upper levels of a stratified hierarchy, and that they possess greater power, influence, mobility, status, and prestige than other individuals or groups ranked beneath them. In its purest form, the term elite translates into "the choice or most carefully selected part of a group."[10]

Traditionally, there are four principal types of elites. The first is the aristocracy, or any other group enjoying particular hereditary privileges. In essence, this is an elite of birthright. The second form is an elite of merit that includes the intellectual elite (i.e., academic, medical, scientific), as well as a more contemporary rendition that includes sport and entertainment celebrities.

In short, it is composed of people with outstanding merits and qualities as judged by the rest of society. The third type is the functional elite composed of individuals who hold particular positions in society essential for its efficient and effective operation. This bureaucratic elite is made up of key civil servants, and it can also include a military elite. Finally, there is a power elite. This category consists of individuals who hold and wield political and/or economic power. This group has now grown to include the contemporary cultural elite, those members (often also holding political and economic power) capable of influencing the terms of public debate on issues such as environmental and/or social concerns.

All elites share a set of common attributes. Sociologists and political scientists have long identified that elites are a cohesive minority that hold the power of decision-making in any given group or society. They further note that the chief strengths of a given elite are its autonomy and cohesiveness, attributes that are born from an exclusiveness that is protected by rigorous entrance standards of one form or another. Furthermore, the elite are extremely homogeneous and self-perpetuating.[11] In short, the term elite connotes a select minority within a group or society that holds special status and privilege. Traditionally, this has meant those who held political, administrative, and economic power within a society.[12] Simply put, "elites are viewed as the 'decision-makers' of a society whose power is not subject to control by any other body in society."[13]

In addition, elites (or ruling minorities) are usually constituted so that their members are distinguished from the masses by qualities that give them a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority – or else they are the heirs of individuals who possessed such qualities.[14] This meaning includes, for some, the interpretation that elites can also be elite because they are "[the]

sole source of values in the society or constitute the integrating force in the community without which it may fall apart."[15]

Sociologist John Porter's 1965 study of Canadian elites, *The Vertical Mosaic*, opined that, in Canada, the traditional political and economic elite represented less than 10 per cent of the population, and that it was almost exclusively Caucasian, English, and Protestant. Furthermore, he revealed that they attended the same schools, belonged to the same country clubs, and sat on the same boards of executives for many corporations and committees. Moreover, they socialized, married, and did business largely within their own stratified grouping.[16]

Although the central tenets of elitism, namely autonomy and exclusivity, have not changed since Porter wrote *The Vertical Mosaic*, the make-up of elites within society has done so. The new elites are now defined as those who control the international flow of money and information, preside over philanthropic foundations and institutions of higher learning, and manage the instruments of cultural production.[17] Within this new elite, the term is often meant to convey the simple concept of those who are "highly successful."[18] The new elites are "far more cosmopolitan... restless and migratory, than their predecessors."[19]

WHAT CONSTITUTES A MILITARY ELITE?

This general overview of elites aside, historically, the concept of a military elite, for sociologists and political scientists in any case, has centred upon their impact on the politics of a society – for instance, the Prussian military had an instrumental role in the creation of the state and its caste-like structure.[20] Obviously, however, from the 20th Century onwards, in the case of "military elites," the issue does not necessarily centre upon cultural, economic, or political power. Rather, most often, it relates to the relationship of a given group within its own institution.

Nonetheless, the whole question of what constitutes a military elite is not as clear as many people may believe. Due to a lack of understanding, the term is often misused by the press and public, and also by military personnel. Many different groups, including submariners, search and rescue technicians, paratroopers, fighter pilots, specific combat arms units, and even military police have been labelled as elites, just to name a few.

But this misappropriation of the term is not surprising when one considers the myriad of concepts that exist to define or explain the term "military elite." For example, the famous writer James Jones believed that "an elite unit is only elite when the majority of its members consider themselves already dead."[21] Clearly, he was referring to elitism as a military "forlorn hope" – the force of last or only resort. An Algerian veteran of the French Foreign Legion who captured the sentiment of his peers shared this view. "We were the elite," he proclaimed, "because of our will to obey and fight and die."[22] This romantic image is often utilized by the media who feed the public a more stereotypical Hollywood reflection of military elites that centres upon the concept "[that] elite units require troopers who can ignore pain and exhaustion, eat just about anything that grows or crawls, and fight on no matter what the danger."[23]

To others, military elitism is a question of command. The French Second World War General Paul Ducournau insisted, "There are average soldiers commanded by elite leaders."[24] He defined elitism as a quality imposed from above, springing from a small highly trained group of skilled officers. Similarly, Eva Etzioni-Halevy, in her study of Israeli forces, defined the military elite as "the most senior officers, holding the rank of colonel and above."[25]

Following an entirely different stream, Richard Szafranski, a military analyst with the Toffler Associates, asserted, "elite means

people and forces selected, organized, trained and equipped to rapidly adapt to, and even shape, changing or unforeseen circumstances."[26] His underlying belief centred upon individuals and/or organizations of greater intellect, ability, and power of decision-making who were capable of exercising control over their own destiny.

On a divergent plane, Roger Beaumont, an author and former military policeman, characterizes military elites as those organizations that are relatively free from ordinary administration and discipline, and whereby entry to these organizations is often through the survival of an ordeal or a "rite of passage," requiring tolerance of pain or danger and subsequent dedication to a hazardous role.[27] Somewhat similarly, the French author Gilles Perrault insisted that military elites are cults who possess special rites, a specialized language or vocabulary that includes passwords, their own apostles and martyrs, and their own distinct uniform. In addition, he stipulated that elites have a simple and very defined view of the world – there are those who belong to the group, and the rest who do not.[28]

Renowned political scientist Eliot Cohen developed specific criteria to define elite military units. "First," he stated, "a unit becomes elite when it is perpetually assigned special or unusual missions – in particular, missions that are, or seem to be, extremely hazardous." For this reason, he insisted, "airborne units have long been considered elite since parachuting is a particularly dangerous way of going into battle." His second criterion is based upon the premise that elite units conduct missions that "require only a few men who must meet high standards of training and physical toughness, particularly the latter." Finally, he argued, "an elite unit becomes elite only when it achieves a reputation – justified or not – for bravura and success."[29]

For the strategist Colin Gray, the designation "elite" pertains directly to the standard of selection, and not to the activity that soldiers were designated to perform.[30] Conversely, military historian Douglas Porch utilized conventional measures of performance to determine elite status. As a result, he relied upon such benchmarks as "battlefield achievement, military proficiency, or specialized military functions."[31] Similarly, Eric Morris, another military historian, defined units as elite by virtue of the fact "[that] they were required to demonstrate a prowess and military skill of a higher standard than more conventional battalions."[32] This approach appears to be the commonest of themes. In the words of Tom Clancy:

> It's not just the weapons you carry that matter, but also the skill, training and determination of the troopers… Elite is as elite does. Elite means that you train harder and do somewhat more dangerous things – which earns you the right to blouse your jump boots and strut a little more.[33]

In the same vein, military analyst and author Mark Lloyd was another who considered military units elite by reason of superior training and equipment, or from greater combat experience.[34] Similarly, journalist/author David Miller argued that military elites "are selected and trained for a special role, for which conventional troops do not have either the special weapons or training needed [or] …are given a special designation earned by a particularly meritorious performance in battle and are then expected to set an example which other elements should follow."[35] Along this line, Clancy also noted that military elites are "fit volunteers, trained to a razor's edge and beyond.[36] He added, "[Elites] have to be trained to sustain and accomplish more violence than do other military persons. Elites must acquire a greater sense of aggressiveness or 'fighting spirit' as well as a greater sense of esprit de corps."[37] For

this reason, Major-General Robert Scales stated, “Elite soldiers who are carefully selected, trained and well led always perform to a higher standard.”[38] Not surprisingly, the U.S. Ranger Creed contains the conceptual definition of a military elite, based upon the premise that “My country expects me to move farther, faster and fight harder than any other soldier.”[39]

These descriptions, however, do not exhaust the list of interpretations as to what constitutes an elite status. Professor of history Dennis Showalter has argued that military elites during the Second World War achieved their status, not from personnel selection, but rather upon functionalism “based on learned skills, [units] whose professionalism facilitated employing ways of war inapplicable to homogenized mass armies.”[40] For this reason, the former British soldier and renowned military historian James Lucas believed that military elites were thus designated because they were “given the hardest military tasks to perform”[41]

Conversely, Martin Kitchen, also a historian, believed that modern military elites were “classless, highly trained killers who have a wide popular appeal.”[42] Numerous other military analysts, researchers, and scholars have taken a comparable approach. Specifically, the designation of elite has been applied simply because individuals and units were not representative of their conventional brethren by virtue of the quality or type of personnel, training, or mission applied to them.[43] Similarly, as David Miller opined, “‘Elite’ and ‘special’ are simply ways to describe unconventional or supreme and paramilitary formations.”[44] Stated simply: unique equalled elite.[45]

Clearly, perceptions of what constitutes a military elite are wide ranging. Often, the criteria are somewhat contrived and misleading. But simply put, being different and/or performing a unique task is far from being a de facto elite. Nonetheless, there

is often misunderstanding as to what constitutes an elite. And, rightly or wrongly, perception often becomes reality, and those units so designated by others as elite, whether deservedly or not, become a *de facto* elite if they are provided with the resources and trappings that accompany the categorization. Conversely, self-proclamation seldom works because elite status entails rigorous selection processes, special training and equipment, as well as the bestowing of special privileges (i.e. higher pay, special dress, badges and insignia). And, all of these criteria must be sanctioned and brought about by a larger, higher institution, and if that hierarchy refuses to acknowledge the status or provide the necessary framework, there is little chance that a unit or formation can evolve on its own into an elite force.

RESISTANCE TO MILITARY ELITES[46]

One consistency with military elites is the fact that historically they have faced rancour, if not outright hostility, from the conventional military institution. "Almost all of the elite [SOF] units we have studied," Professor Cohen revealed, "faced considerable bureaucratic hostility – enmity translated into effective harassment."[47] It has only been the intervention of well-placed champions, either political and/or military, that have ensured that military elites were able to be created and maintained.

This institutional resistance to military elites is well documented. In World War II, the aggressive, combative Prime Minister Winston Churchill had a difficult time establishing commandos and other unconventional organizations. He explained, "In my experience of Service departments, which is a long one, there is always danger that anything contrary to Service prejudices will be obstructed and delayed by officers of the second grade in the machine."[48] Churchill groused, "The resistances of the War Office were obstinate and increased as the professional ladder was descended."

He explained, “the idea that large bands of favoured ‘irregulars,’ with their unconventional attire and easy-and-free bearing, should throw an implied slur on the efficiency and courage of the Regular battalions was odious to men who had given all their lives to the organised and discipline of permanent units.” He added, “The colonels of many of our finest regiments were aggrieved.”[49] Frustrated with the seemingly endless resistance from within the military, Churchill suggested to Anthony Eden, his secretary of state for war, that an example should be made of “one or two” of the reluctant officers.[50]

He was not wrong. One official report acknowledged that “Home Forces have consistently used their predominating influence at the War Office to thwart the efforts of those well disposed to us [special service brigade].”[51] In trying to raise the Special Air Service (SAS), Lieutenant David Stirling admonished that “I found during this and subsequent stages, that the A.G. [Adjutant General] Branch was unfailingly obstructive and uncooperative.”[52]

Field-Marshall Sir William Slim was representative of the traditional military mindset at the time. “Private armies,” he proclaimed, “are expensive, wasteful, and unnecessary.”[53] His disdain for their ideas and what they represented was clearly evident in the profile he painted. He stated that these “racketeers” were in essence of two kinds, “those whose acquaintance with war was confined to large non-fighting staffs where they had had time and opportunity to develop their theories, and tough, cheerful fellows who might be first-class landed on a beach at night with orders to scupper a sentry-post, but whose experience was about the range of a tommy-gun...Few of them had anything really new to say, and the few that had, usually forgot that a new idea should have something to recommend it besides just breaking up normal organization.”[54]

In fact, a War Office study dated 10 July 1945, concluded that "most conventional organizations and their senior leadership disagreed with the SOF concept."[55] Moreover, the director of Operations argued that "continued maintenance of any form of Corps d'elite most undesirable."[56]

The American approach was no different. General Douglas MacArthur successfully refused to allow Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operations in the Pacific.[57] American Army historian David Hogan observed that "except for some isolated instances, conventional U.S. generals discarded special operations in Europe and focussed almost totally on conventional warfare once their forces had consolidated beachheads in North Africa, Italy, and France."[58] The institutional inimicalness towards SOF flourished as the war drew to a close. As hostilities neared completion SOF organizations were quickly disbanded or at best, severely curtailed. Among the casualties were such well-known organizations as the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG), SAS, Phantom, Layforce, First Special Service Force (FSSF), OSS, the Rangers and Raider Battalions.

In the post-war period, when Colonel Aaron Banks arrived at Fort Bragg to begin work on establishing Special Forces, he was warned that he would "have to work carefully and not step on toes, since there was not only apathy about a UW [unconventional warfare] army capability but also actual resistance to elite special units."[59] In 1952, when Bank began recruiting, he attributed his initial difficulty to the "less than enthusiastic Army wide support for the program."[60] Banks explained, "To the orthodox, traditional soldier it [UW] was something slimy, underhanded, illegal, and ungentlemanly. It did not fit in the honor code of that profession of arms."[61]

His experience was not unique. The rejuvenated post-war SAS also found itself short of recruits because "the Regiment's reputation stood so low that commanding officers of other units were making it difficult for their people to go on selection course."[62] This attitude was also mirrored in 1963, when the French Foreign Legion (2nd REP) attempted to radically reform some of its elements into a rapid deployable SOF type unit. As the unofficial unit historian noted, "This was a revolutionary concept at the time and not one to please deskbound conservatives in the French military. To these officers the word "special" conjured up nonconforming, rogue units."[63]

Even during the Vietnam War, institutional prejudices within the Department of Defense (DoD) worked against SOF. General Maxwell Taylor recalled that despite President John F. Kennedy's urging, "not much heart went into [the] work [of placing greater emphasis on SOF]." Taylor, like many senior commanders, believed that Special Forces were not doing anything that "any well-trained unit" could not do.[64]

Major-General Harold Johnson agreed. Then acting Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, he acknowledged that the Kennedy regime was pushing Special Forces and that the "Army agreed that this was a good idea." However, he also conceded that the Army "sort of yawned in backing it up."[65] In 1963, several attempts to transfer a list of officers with known ability and experience to Special Forces was ignored and the "talent received was almost invariably inferior."[66] Once the war was over, a virtual blood-bath occurred. By the mid-1970s the Army slashed Special Forces manning by 70 percent and its funding by 95 percent.[67] At its lowest point in 1975, the SOF budget represented one tenth of one percent of the total American defence budget.[68] Colonel Francis Kelly, author of *Vietnam Studies: US Special Forces, 1961-1971*, wrote:

> An elite group has always appeared within the Army during every war in which the United States has been engaged...As surely as such groups arose, there arose also the grievances of the normally conservative military men who rejected whatever was distinctive or different or special...In the conduct of conservative military affairs, revisions of current military modes are frequently resisted with missionary zeal and emotional fervour simply because they mean change, they are different.[69]

The fortunes of military elites failed to improve in the near or far-term. Lingering images and hostility continued. The American example was largely representative of the attitude to military elites in most military institutions.[70] The sentiment of antipathy towards SOF was particularly resilient. "Over the years in the United States," the Secretary of the Army, John Marsh, admitted in 1983, "there has been resistance among leaders of conventional forces towards unconventional methods."[71]

This attitude was clearly evident a year later, when in the fall of 1984, a three-star Air Force general testifying before a classified session of a Senate Special Operations Panel, repeatedly referred to Delta Force as "trained assassins" and "trigger happy." In addition, he aired his personal concerns that Delta might "freelance" a coup d'état in a friendly nation to the USA.[72] Noel Koch, a key DoD proponent of SOF reform in the 1980s resignedly acceded that "I have discovered in critical areas of the Pentagon, on the subject of special operations force revitalization, that when they [DoD officials] say no, they mean no; when they say maybe, they mean no; and when they say yes, they mean no, and if they meant anything but no, they wouldn't be there."[73] In 1988, at the activation ceremony of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Admiral William J. Crowe Jr., the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, beseeched those assembled to

"break down the wall that has more or less come between special operation forces and other parts of our military."[74] This appeal, however, had limited impact.

The Gulf War in 1990/91 revealed that ingrained resentment still existed against the concept of SOF. Journalist and author Douglas Waller observed, "No one nurtured the animosity more than CENTCOM's [Central Command] commander General H. Norman Schwarzkopf III. 'Stormin' Norman Schwarzkopf despised special operators." The reason was almost predictable. Firstly, he had a negative image of SOF operators because of his experience with them in Vietnam and later in Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada.[75] Secondly, "In an Army now giddy over light divisions and paratroopers," explained Waller, "Schwarzkopf was somewhat of an anachronism – a tank officer whose first love was heavy armored units."[76] As a result, he initially refused SOF inclusion in his force. But the animosity went both ways. Officers in USSOCOM considered Schwarzkopf a "meat and potatoes thinker, a pompous, plodding tactician who knew little about unconventional warfare and didn't care to learn much more."[77]

Schwarzkopf seemed to ably represent the conventional military. And, it would seem that the sentiment remains smouldering under the surface. "There is a cultural aversion on the part of conventional soldiers, sailors, and airmen," Lieutenant-General Samuel Wilson asserted, "to things that smell of smoke and mirrors and feats of derring do....It's a little too romantic....It's not doing it the hard way."[78] This attitude seems to be reflected by the decision of General Tommy Franks, the Commander-in-Chief of CENTCOM responsible for prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, in the fall of 2001, when he questioned the use of Special Forces, reportedly believing it was a conflict for "heavy metal conventional units."[79]

Not surprisingly, throughout the evolutionary process most SOF operators, particularly officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) felt that SOF employment was career limiting. They were not totally wrong. For instance, "Marine Officers assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command or to USSOCOM," conceded one former high ranking officer, "for the most part have not fared well before promotion boards."[80] But, this was not a revelation, after all, there has always existed a cultural chasm that was difficult to breach.

The deep institutional resistance to military elites is long-standing. Yet, elites have always managed to exist. However, this life-line was a function of powerful champions such as Prime Minister Winston Churchill, General George C. Marshall, General William P. Yarborough, President J.F. Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and General Rick Hillier to name a few. Their vision and understanding of the inherent value of military elites allowed these groups to be created and maintained despite the consistently percolating resistance under the surface.

THE CASE FOR MILITARY ELITES

The aforementioned champions used their appointments and position power to, in many cases, bully their reports and subordinate organizations to get their way. Unfortunately, this approach was most, if not always, required to achieve the aim in the face of obstinate delay and repudiation. From the perspective of the champions, they were convinced that military elites provided great value to the national interest, if not the military institution. They were not wrong.

Firstly, elite units are extremely cohesive and they foster unquestioned solidarity among their membership. Normally within elites, officers and men undergo identical training, and

they are faced with the same tests of courage, endurance, and strength. Generally, they have all passed the rigorous selection standards. In short, there are no shortcuts and no exceptions granted for anyone. For instance, with respect to paratroopers, Colonel Peter Kenward, the last commander of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt), recognized "[that] it is impossible to hide weakness in the Airborne."[81] As a result of the exacting standards that all must meet, as well as the shared hardships, a bond is created, based upon group identity, mutual respect, and solidarity. Membership in the fraternity cannot be bestowed due to affluence, influence, or rank. It must be earned.

This unique, shared experience certainly builds group cohesion, solidarity and trust. Sociologists have argued that high standards and requirements for admittance into a group result in a greater sense of commitment and value placed on membership to that group by successful candidates.[82] In simple terms, the greater the degree of challenge, hardship, and danger, the greater is the development of mutual respect and affiliation.[83]

These bonds, which create a kindred Brotherhood, are significant. Samuel Stouffer's monumental study of battlefield behaviour, *The American Soldier,* indicated that 80 percent of respondents believed that strong group integration was the main reason for stamina in combat. This study also observed that motivation is primarily dependent upon group cohesion, and that group cohesion, in turn, is the decisive factor for determining combat efficiency. Steadfast self-confidence in oneself and in one's fellow soldiers engenders a belief and philosophy that there is no mission that cannot be accomplished.[84] This primary group cohesion also acts to mitigate stress and fear. It builds strong resilience within the group.

In addition, the aggressive pursuit of excellence, always reaching for the next level of accomplishment or challenge stimulates a proactive, "nothing cannot be achieved" attitude.[85] As Lieutenant-General Sir Cedric Delves explained of the SAS:

> We would be forever striving for the heights, achieving one goal perhaps only to move straight on to the next. The troops were fully seized by the philosophy. And if that wasn't pressure enough, we placed no monopoly on a good idea. All were encouraged to contribute their thoughts, whatever their rank; any apparently questionable decision became open to challenge. Indeed, sometimes it could feel as though anything and everything would be contested as a matter of course, or out of pure devilment.[86]

Moreover, the tight bonds and mutual trust, as well as the nature of small teams where everyone must be fully aware of the plan and be responsible for its execution develops shared responsibility and a belief in bottom-up planning, which allows for the full collaboration of all members of the team, allowing for a wider field of ideas, insight and reflection. Delves noted:

> I was conscious of the cultural differences that could ruffle relations when working alongside or with conventional forces, our apparently casual regard for rank and the use of first names between ourselves being obvious, outward social manifestations. There were other things that would grate, chief among them in planning terms the 'Chinese parliament,' which brought people together early in the assessment process to ensure that nobody's relevant thought go overlooked. If you had a suggestion to make, an idea, no matter your rank, we believed it should be heard. The parliament sought to

> harness the power of collective wisdom, simultaneously guarding against template solutions. We were aware of the dangers of 'group'; the parliament, comprising strong personalities, all capable of independent thought, was unlikely to commit that error.[87]

Another strength of military elites, due to the strong affiliation and mutual confidence that is developed is the presence of unconstrained trust. This realization was evident from the beginning. "You'd volunteered for the Commandos," one recruit recounted, "they realised that you were human beings and you had a bit of sense, that you didn't need to be roared at and shouted at, screamed at all the time." He added, "Not only that, if you did anything, even in training, everything was explained to you. If you'd a different idea, even as a lowly Private, you could say 'Well, sir, don't you think if we went that way instead of this way it would be easier?' If you were right that was the method that was adopted."[88]

One SAS commander explained the concept. "I never had a roll call or kit checks before operations [in Malaya]," he stated, "If a man could not look after himself our opinion was that he had no place in the SAS." He clarified, "The men responded to this trust and never once did I have cause to regret it."[89] It is this philosophy which is so alien to the conventional army but resonates so strongly with SOF. It also underlines SOF's greatest strength, yet also the greatest cause for the chasm between SOF and conventional forces, the individual operators.

As such, elite units provide a very reliable and effective combat force, regardless of the difficulty of a task assigned. This focus on mission accomplishment despite prevailing challenges, is foundational to elite SOF culture. As one SOF operator expressed, "No matter what happens, I simply refuse to lose. To me, it's really

that simple. I approach anything thought to be difficult with an attitude of I'll do this or die trying."[90] Another member reflected on the strength of elite units and explained it was born from "the ability to stay focused when ordinary men would buckle under the pressure or be consumed by fear."[91]

This culture of mission accomplishment at all costs also speaks to why despite institutional hostility elite units have been created and maintained. Quite simply, elites represent combat capability. Moreover, elites can also be a source of inspiration and can set a standard for others. Importantly, they provide opportunities and goals for those who wish to challenge themselves and aspire to meet the rigorous selection standards for entry into an elite unit. One SAS operator explained that those who excelled in the Regiment were those who "did not respect any limits: physical, psychological or of fear."[92] This opportunity and challenge can act as a catalyst to retaining military members.

Furthermore, elite units can provide a "leadership nursery." Members have the opportunity to learn additional skills, particularly, advanced leadership abilities, due to their exposure to different training and operational experiences, as well as exposure to different and often more experienced, mature, and highly skilled personnel. As these leaders return to their units or are deployed to other formations, schools, or various headquarters, they share their acquired attributes, insights, and skills. This "cross-pollination" strengthens the military institution as a whole. By way of example SOF leaders have been responsible for enhancing such skills as leadership, marksmanship and close quarter battle (CQB) drills within other combat arms units.

In addition, elite units are often a preferred testing ground for new tactics and procedures, and this is easily explained. Normally, elite units represent smaller, more experienced and talented

organizations. They also tend to operate in very small teams. As such, it is easier to test new processes, tactics, equipment, and techniques, and then refine them prior to transferring skills to the broader military community. Within the Canadian experience alone, the impact has been dramatic. Canadian SOF personnel have been responsible for a number of important evolutions in Canadian Army equipment and tactics – specifically with respect to load bearing vests, communications equipment, sniper equipment, CQB, and joint tactical air control, to name but a few initiatives.

But the greatest reason elites exist, and, within the contemporary environment, this refers mainly to SOF, is because the most senior military commanders and their political masters recognize their importance and the strategic capability that these forces can provide. A large part of this senior level support comes from the fact that they are privy to what elite units can actually accomplish, and senior leaders often get to work side-by-side with the members of the various elite units and their leadership. For these senior leaders, any public misperception of transparency or accountability concerns born from organizational security constraints do not exist as they are not only aware of the results that are achieved, but they actually provide the necessary direction and approval for operations. As such, any questionable "return on investment" concerns are not an issue. After all, political and military decision-makers are fully aware that their elite units "punch above their weight" and deliver results far in excess of the numbers of adversaries they engage. For instance, few realize Canadian SOF personnel during the war in Afghanistan (2001-2011) removed an entire generation of Taliban leadership in Kandahar, many of whom were responsible for the deaths of Canadian service personnel.

However, for those not privy to this level of information, the veil of secrecy still exists, which inevitably breeds misconception and misunderstanding. That said, with respect to security issues, elite units consciously err on the side of caution, rather than attempt to showcase their successes. This approach is due to two moral imperatives. The first is the requirement to protect their personnel, who operate against a ruthless enemy in an unforgiving, complex, operational environment. The second is to protect the security of operations in order to ensure mission success, which also includes the essential requirement to protect allies and their information, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Also, the intimate dealings of senior decision-makers with the members and leadership of elite units exposes those decision-makers to the over-riding humility and professionalism that is normally present in elite forces. This statement is not to imply that the occasional unsatisfactory exceptions do not exist – clearly they do, as they do in any organization. Overall, however, it is a quiet confidence and maturity that normally permeates elite organizations. As senior RAND analyst and Harvard scholar Linda Robinson observed with regard to SOF forces with whom she has worked, "they are largely self-policing because senior members usually detect and address breakdowns in a soldier's performance." She added, "There is a high level of intolerance among [the group] for performance that falls short of the standards and there are also the checks of peer competition with other teams and oversight by the hierarchy above."[93] In fact, since the beginning of modern SOF in World War II, the greatest fear and punishment for those in elite units is banishment, or, in the simplest of terms, to be "RTU'd" – returned to the unit of origin.

As an example, David Stirling, at the inception of the SAS in North Africa during his opening address to "L" Detachment on 4 September 1941, stated, "We can't afford to piss about

disciplining anyone who is not 100 per cent devoted to having a crack at the Hun."[94] The underlying premise of that short statement, namely the focus on fighting the nation's enemies, has held true for SOF throughout time.

However, the greatest reason for maintaining elite organizations is the capability they provide the government – a panoply of options (both kinetic and non-kinetic) that are not available elsewhere. Specifically, this includes agile, tailored, and rapid responses to high-risk, complex and ambiguous situations. Often, these organizations are charged with tasks in which failure is not an option. Their training, expert skills, high readiness levels, and specialized equipment position them to deter, disrupt and/or defeat enemy threats in the manner least disruptive and damaging to the society they serve. Any lack of success on their part may leave the government with little space in which to manoeuvre. In some cases, the only possible alternative to the use of elite forces would be to send in a large kinetic force and to deal with its ensuing footprint – an option that is sometimes not possible and often not desirable.

The importance of their ability to achieve success is also why elites are often provided with generous budgets and cutting-edge technology. Major-General Robert Scales assessed, "Elite soldiers who are carefully selected, trained and well led always perform to a higher standard."[95] As such, to counter a determined enemy that is networked and ever-changing, as well as myriad threats in a complex environment, it is not enough to be simply reactive. Ultimate success depends upon staying ahead of the threat environment. For this reason, a heavy investment in a nation's "no failure option" force to ensure they maintain the necessary capabilities is critical.

POTENTIAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY ELITES

Although the case in favour of elites is strong, questions still remain. If elites are so important and invaluable why are they so often despised? Why cultivate them within the military institution? Why allow them to exist? The resistance to their growth and presence is real enough. As noted earlier, they are generally opposed, and, worldwide, most military elites face bureaucratic and general hostility from the larger conventional institution to which they belong. Historian Barrie Pitt, a veteran of the Middle-East and European theatres of operation in World War II observed:

> They [elite units/SOF] offered an escape from the regulation and discipline of battalion life, freedom for the young subaltern or private from the incessant disfavor of adjutant or regimental sergeant-major, and they were all at one time or another gilded with glamour… but too often these ad hoc units were set up as a result of little but enthusiasm coupled with social salesmanship, and manned by youngsters with cheerfully vague notions of 'swanning around the blue,' blowing up enemy dumps with loud bangs and spectacular pyrotechnics, and wearing unorthodox and somewhat flamboyant variations of uniform.[96]

Similarly, Lieutenant-General Cedric Delves conceded:

> The SAS can trigger an almost visceral dislike among certain military professionals stemming in part possibly from British cultural distrust of elitism, aggravated by a presumption that we were indulged. This is true. The Regiment is sometimes accused, occasionally justly, of

> behaving like a private army, its operations having nothing to do with the rest of the campaign or forces deployed, and no proper business of their commanders.[97]

The animosity, as highlighted above, is rooted in a myriad of issues and/or grievances by those external to the tight circle of elite unit membership. Most military commanders either were, or are, convinced that elite units have a negative impact upon the larger institution. Firstly, elite units are frequently seen as "skimming the cream," or taking the best individuals from conventional units, thus leaving the losing units with lesser leadership. "Almost invariably the men volunteering," historian Philip Warner explained, "are the most enterprising, energetic and least dispensable."[98] Similarly, Lord Jellicoe, George John Patrick Rushworth, 2nd Earl Jellicoe, the wartime commander of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), conceded, "We wanted self-reliant men with initiative and self-discipline, not the imposed discipline of the barrack square. Above anything else I sought self-starters, men not dependent on an officer telling them what to do."[99]

Not surprisingly then, it was for this reason that Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff during the Second World War, never agreed with Churchill's sponsorship of special elite type units. He felt "[that it was] a dangerous drain on the quality of an infantry battalion."[100] The legendary Field Marshal William Slim was in strong agreement. He noted that special units "were usually formed by attracting the best men from normal units by better conditions, promises of excitement and not a little propaganda…. The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially of the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped *corps d'élite* could be expected to undertake them."[101] Field Marshal Bernard La Montgomery also believed

SOF drew away promising material from the conventional forces and that investment was not worth the return. “You want only my best men; my most experienced and dependable men,” he challenged, “What, Colonel Stirling, makes you assume that you can handle these men to greater advantage than myself.”[102]

This particular criticism remains extant to this day. Tom Clancy in his ongoing analysis of American combat capability wrote, “a private in an airborne unit might well be qualified to be a sergeant or squad leader in a regular formation.”[103] To exacerbate this problem, SOF units most often utilize a higher proportion of senior NCOs. This methodology has the result of reinforcing the claim that the quality of the army suffers from the deficiency of good NCOs.[104]

Elite units are also seen by some as bad for the morale of the larger institution. Military leadership historically has generally perceived only negative consequences for those who failed to pass the high standards normally imposed for selection to elite units. Alan Brooke and Slim were two commanders who were convinced that those who were rejected had their confidence undermined by failure.[105] Canadian Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton assessed, “I have watched with interest the organization here of such special units as Commandos, Ski Battalions and Paratroops. The cycle is always the same – initial enthusiasm which is very high, drawing good officers and men from regular units, distracting and unsettling others, and upsetting the units’ organization.”[106] Moreover, the nature of highly selective units created an impression that everyone else was “second best.” In fact, a Director of Infantry report at the end of World War II acknowledged, “The War Office directors have agreed that the formation of a specialist corps such as the SAS have tended to reduce the normal infantry man’s standing and prestige. Difficult to eradicate this tendency until such specialist forces are abolished.”[107] Not

surprising then that Major-General Orde Wingate argued, "As far as SEAC [South East Asia Command] is concerned, all evidence goes to show that well trained infantry units would be just as suitable as special troops."[108]

But this perception that those who fail are "second best" is often more than just an impression. It is also often a widespread belief within elite units. "I was glad they [those not selected] left camp immediately and didn't say any awkward farewells," one successful candidate confessed. "They were social lepers and I didn't want to risk catching the infection they carried."[109] This attitude is dangerous, and, more importantly, it underlines the chasm that develops between those in the group and those external to it.

Another issue of criticism is the fact that many commanders perceive elite units as resource intensive, if not an actual waste of men and material, when one considers what is perceived as the return on investment. Detractors of special or elite units often liken their efforts to "breaking windows by throwing guineas (gold coins) at them."[110] Critics argue that elites are "expensive, independent, arrogant, out of uniform, [operate] outside normal chains of command, and [are] too specialized for [their] own good."[111] Again, Tom Clancy has observed, "[that elite] units and their men are frequently seen as 'sponges,' sucking up prized personnel and funds at the expense of 'regular' units."[112] Lieutenant-Colonel J.P. O'Brien reflecting on SOF in World War II opined, "it ate up far too many junior leaders who were badly needed in the infantry battalions"[113]

The critique was not lost on those serving in elite units. "In the first place, there is probably quite a bit of understandable jealousy that any newly formed unit should be given priority as to men and equipment;" Major-General Lloyd Owen conceded, "and secondly,

it is only the normal reaction of any good Commanding Officer to resent having his best men attracted to such 'crackpot' outfits when his own inherent pride in his Regiment has always led him to believe that it is the best, and second to none."[114]

There is a timelessness to this issue as demonstrated by the comments of General Fred Franks in regards to the expansion of American SOF in the mid-eighties, specifically the Rangers. "As an elite force [Rangers]," observed Franks, "they were given ample training budgets, stable personnel policies (less rotation in and out than normal units), their pick of volunteers, and leaders and commanders who were already experienced company commanders."[115]

A further disparagement that is often leveled at elite units is the danger of "Group Think." Individuals who have self-selected to volunteer to join a particular organization; have passed through the same rigorous tests of selection and training; have shared hardship and experience, and have developed tights bonds of cohesiveness, as well as the fact they share the same strong organizational culture, often see the world and solution sets to given problems in a similar way. Moreover, camaraderie and the desire to be seen "on-board" and supportive often kills objective dissent or alternate views. As such, the group can easily suffer from collegiality and a lack of critical thinking with the result being a poorly thought out plan or decision. Professor Wilfred Trotter observed, "He [Mankind] is more sensitive to the voice of the herd than to any other influence."[116] Similarly, Professor Janis concluded, "a high degree of group cohesiveness is conducive to a high frequency of symptoms of groupthink, which, in turn, are conducive to a high frequency of defects in decision-making."[117] Although a valid concern, it is equally applicable to other conventional organizations where rank, culture and personalities can have the same influence on killing input of differing opinions or ideas.

The most common, or perhaps emotive disparagement; the one that generates the greatest amount of resistance and animosity, is the issue of a "cult of the elite" mentality, specifically, the presence of arrogance and a rejection of conventional military discipline, practices, and protocol. It is what some scholars, analysts, and military personnel have described as the phenomena of elites becoming a "law unto themselves." Many argue that the perceived rejection of the authority, or the validity of anyone outside the elite group, by members of that group, generates an environment whereby only internal values, norms, and rules are followed, and those external to the group are often ignored. Adding fuel to the fire is what many outside the elite group perceive as arrogant behaviour and a flagrant flouting of military rules, regulations, and protocol. This phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that the elite leadership may ignore non-adherence to regulations and may also condone some non-conformist behaviour. Military analyst and author Roger Beaumont went so far as to describe elites as "virtually encapsulated delinquency."[118]

In this vein, historian and author Damien Lewis observed, the regular army officers viewed "special duty raiders as truly a villainous bunch – a band of ragged, renegade, warn-torn desperadoes."[119] A naval officer described commandos as "tiresomely dangerous children, always breaking or setting fire to things, wandering into minefields or getting into other scrapes from which they had to be extricated."[120] Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, addressing designated commanding officers, lamented, "Elites can become so inbred that they produce haemophiliacs who bleed to death as soon as they are nicked by the real world."[121] General Leslie Hollis spoke of the misconception that special formations are "a lot of resolute but irresponsible cut-throats, who roam around the campaign area, spreading confusion amongst their own troops and consternation amongst those of the enemy."[122]

This perception is often a result of the fact that the leadership and discipline within elite units are informal and the normal protocol and emphasis placed on ceremony and deportment relaxed. Professor Cohen revealed that "an almost universally observed characteristic of elite [SOF] units is their lack of formal discipline – and sometimes a lack of substantive discipline as well." His research determined that "elite units often disregard spit and polish or orders about saluting."[123]

Indeed, the issue of a lack of discipline, namely the dark side of the concept of the "Brotherhood," is probably the greatest seed of discontent with conventional military leaders with respect to elites, and it constitutes a major reason for that leadership's resistance, animosity, and active hostility. To those on the outside, units that do not fit the conventional mould, specifically those described as elite, special, or unique, are more often than not viewed as rogue outfits and divisive elements in relation to the greater institution. Former Canadian lieutenant-colonel and later sociologist, Charles Cotton, in his studies of military culture, noted that "their [elite] cohesive spirit is a threat to the chain of command and wider cohesion."[124]

The apparent lack of discipline and military decorum is not lost on conventional military personnel. Their criticism is telling. General Maxwell Thurman, a former Commander of Army Doctrine and Training Command grumbled in 1987:

> I'm tired of having to apologize for Special Forces. I am tired of their reputation. I am tired of having to deal with their lack of professionalism. Are they in the Army or not? If you don't do something about this, I am going to relieve you. I will run you out of the Army.[125]

Apparently, his open letter had its intended impact. SF leadership realized "we've got to convince the senior generals that we are

professionals, that we are capable of doing special missions, and that we're not just a camp of thugs."[126]

Other examples include the failure to show respect to officers and other senior leadership appointments. Delves recounted during the deployment to the Falklands by ship, "Naval officers in the fleet expected persons to move when they came through – our guys [SAS] did not – it caused problems. Our guys were not used to being talked to that way."[127] In another case, two SAS members failed to salute two captains. Upon reproach the guilty NCO retorted he couldn't because he was smoking and couldn't do two things at once.[128] The story elicited loud guffaws in the unit.

More recently, one Canadian officer professed in March 2006, "those in uniform distinguished themselves with large green Canadian flags and blood group Velcro stickers instead of the issue Canadian flag. The operator types wore civvies with long hair, beards, mountain equipment pants and t-shirts and base-ball caps or nothing. They had different vests and pistol rigs. They drank beer at Canada house despite the no alcohol policy." Another officer objected:

> [SOF] burned a lot of bridges with conventional troops. There was a clear double standard and it was seen by all the troops. For example, fraternization, troops were punished but SOF wasn't touched. Kit – they had every-thing. All wore beards like it was part of their uniform. We couldn't recognize them – who are these guys? They had different weapons, no uniform – you could spot them a mile away.

Cohen's point on the lack of formal or substantive discipline is not off the mark. Testimony of former members of a wide range of elite units support his assertion. For instance, the British General Sir Peter de la Billière recalled that, as a junior officer in the SAS,

"the men, for their part, never called me 'Sir' unless they wanted to be rude."[129] A SAS NCO conceded, "We were already conspicuous by our lack of dress code. The green army always dresses the same."[130] Jimmy Patch, a member of the LRDG, acknowledged:

> Discipline was different from the regular Army. Members of the LRDG were expected to be professional at all times; those who weren't were sent back to their original units. There was hardly any saluting, no drill, no inspections. All patrol commanders were called 'Skipper,' while all other ranks were on first-name terms.[131]

Similarly, Dick Holmes of the SBS, chortled:

> The rest of the British army hated us. They disliked us intensely. I mean, no doubt about it, we were arrogant bastards. We walked around with scarves on, carried guns, and most of us had shoulder holsters and one thing or another that we'd picked up along the way, guns concealed in our pockets somewhere – little Berettas and stuff. [132]

A more recent example is the reflection of a neophyte American Special Forces soldier who recalled his amazement on arriving at his new unit. "Sergeants-Major are the walking, breathing embodiment of everything that's right in the U.S. Army," he explained. Yet, his first glimpse of his new sergeant-major caught him unprepared. "His shirt was wide open and he wore no T-shirt. His dog tags were gold plated. His hat was tipped up on the back of his head, and he wore a huge, elaborately curled and waxed handlebar moustache."[133] The apparent abyss between elite standards and conventional army standards prompted Lieutenant-General Delves to recognise that much of the "visceral dislike" for the SAS stemmed in part from the SAS "getting away with things others couldn't; given equipment they hadn't had and which they envied."[134]

The perceived lack of discipline was also noted by scholars and journalists. Historian Eric Morris observed, "the LRDG and other like units did offer a means of escape from those petty tediums and irritants of everyday life in the British Army. Drills, guards, fatigues and inspections were almost totally absent."[135] A contemporary journal wrote of the LRDG, "A law unto themselves in many ways...dress is always very much a matter of personal taste with the men who venture far behind the enemy's lines."[136] Journalist Donald Grant speaking of the SAS and LRDG described:

> These raiding forces would not be very impressive on a parade down the Mall in London. They pride themselves on their beards while on operations…There is considerable variation in uniform but all are dirty, greasy and torn. About the only common garment to all raiding force men is a strangely hooded jacket, which often makes them appear to be a band of Robin Hood's merry men.[137]

A final example is that of a military historian who observed that "[mad Mike] Calvert, [Commander 2 SAS Brigade] like many fighting soldiers was not particularly concerned by the trivia of, for example, military appearance [since] uniformity and smartness have little bearing on a unit's ability to fight."[138] However, there is no doubt that this relatively minor aspect of elitist behaviour has had (and continues to have) an enormous impact upon how a respective unit is perceived by others, namely, outsiders.

The fact of the matter is that elite units have realized that their relatively lax discipline and dress codes have irritated the conventional military. This reality has been, and continues to be, in some cases, part of their appeal, as is their need to clearly differentiate themselves from the "regular" armed forces. This approach is also why, when it occurs, it generates such

enmity from the conventional hierarchy. Nonetheless, much of this dynamic is based upon the type of individuals that historically have joined these formations. David Stirling, the founder of the SAS, reflected that the "Originals" were not really "controllable," but rather, "harnessable."[139] The Rangers were acknowledged to consist largely of "mavericks who couldn't make it in conventional units."[140] Colonel William Darby, the first commanding officer of the U.S. Rangers, explained, "Commanding the Rangers was like driving a team of very high spirited horses. No effort was needed to get them to go forward. The problem was to hold them in check."[141] Similarly, a journalist wrote of Colonel Robert Frederick, the FSSF commander, "Frederick speaks fondly of his men as 'thugs.' A bunch of individualists and scrappers, they leave their mark and trail of distressed 'M.P.s' [Military Police] wherever they go."[142] Another SOF operator described his fellow operators as "buccaneers" and "pirates."[143]

General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army from 1964-1968 railed:

> Well, the Special Forces that were available at the time President Kennedy latched on to them as a new gimmick, were what I would describe as consisting primarily of fugitives from responsibility. These were people that somehow or other tended to be nonconformist, couldn't quite get along in a straight military system, and found a haven where their actions were not scrutinized too carefully, and where they came under only sporadic or intermittent observation from the regular chain of command… Perhaps there is a desirability for this highly specialized effort, but I continue to really question it as such.[144]

Similarly, American Special Forces (Green Berets) were later described as those "who wanted to try something new and

challenging, and who chafed at rigid discipline."[145] Furthermore, General de la Billière observed "most officers and men here do not really fit in normal units of the Army, and that's why they're here in the SAS, which is not like anything else in the Services."[146] He assumed that most of the volunteers, like he, "were individualists who wanted to break away from the formal drill-machine discipline" which then existed in the army as a whole.[147] This assumption fits a pattern. According to General Peter Schoomaker, who joined the American Delta Force under its founding commander, Colonel Charlie Beckwith. Schoomaker recalled, "Beckwith was looking for a bunch of bad cats who wanted to do something different."[148]

The element of self-selection, combined with the feeling of accomplishment as members of the select few who had successfully passed selection, combined with the inherent self-confidence born from challenging, difficult, and hazardous training, creates an aura of invincibility and an intense loyalty to what is perceived as a very exclusive group. An intimate bond is further generated through shared hardship and danger. Members of these "special" groups frequently develop an outlook that treats those outside of their "club" as inferior, and thus, unworthy of respect. "The more the group is centred on itself, thus increasing its cohesion," observed Professor Elmar Dinter, "the less it is interested in its environment." He argued "[that] an already existing behavioural pattern is thereby reinforced...What matters to the group is only what affects it directly." Dinter added, "The desire to distinguish the group from other groups is not restricted to insignia and ritualism, but leads, in addition, to a spiteful attitude towards others."[149] Often, this sense of independence from the conventional army, as well as the lack of respect for traditional forms of discipline, spawn what some analysts describe as the emergence of units that are more akin to militant clans than to military organizations.[150] Needless to say, this type of

organization and institutional attitude is an anathema to a military that prides itself upon decorum, tradition, and uniformity.

Not surprisingly, the arrogance and deliberate insubordination of some individuals in elite units has often fuelled the fire. Colonel Arthur "Bull" Simons was a perfect example. A researcher discovered, "It seemed Bull Simons penchant for ignoring the dictates of higher authority and his irreverence for the rules were shared by the men of the SOG [Studies and Observation Group] in Vietnam."[151] Moreover, a general perception of SOG personnel was that they were "undisciplined, wild-eyed Army Special Forces people ... who believed that the whole of Southeast Asia could be conquered by a handful of Green Berets."[152]

Even General Stanley McCrystal, who held commands in the 82nd Airborne Division and 75th Ranger Regiment, as well as commanding the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), referred to "the crusty arrogance" that he had come to despise "in some special operators."[153] One former support officer of a counter-terrorist organization revealed that "assaulters would refuse to listen to others regardless of rank because 'you hadn't done selection.'"[154] One special operator conceded, "We tended to have an arrogance that we knew it all, did it all, had nothing to learn."[155]

No image is perhaps more representative than the scene from *Black Hawk Down* when a Ranger captain gives direction to a group of senior NCOs. Upon completion, the group, less one, acknowledges the orders. The captain quickly confers with the recalcitrant NCO, asking him if he understood the direction. The Delta Force sergeant replies nonchalantly, almost contemptuously, "Yeah, I heard ya." This example is a classic case of art reflecting reality, and unfortunately, it echoes the behaviour of paratroopers in the Canadian Special Service Force during the

1980s, who consistently refused to salute "LEG" (conventional infantry) officers, and were not held accountable by their own chain-of-command.[156]

Conventional commanders often cite the circumvention or outright ignorance of the chain-of-command as another long-standing bone of contention. Most see this behaviour as one of the commonest examples of disobedience by elite forces. It also tends to raise the accusation that elites are, in essence, "Private Armies," that often tend to "become an object of suspicion to the public army."[157] This belief is usually due to the fact that elite units tend to value concrete action, and have little patience for bureaucracy. Coupled with an oft "ends justify the means" attitude, it is not surprising that some conventional feathers are likely to get ruffled. For example, Special Force commanders, through General Yarborough were able to bypass parent services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and make requests direct to national command level where it would be endorsed directly by the President to the Defense Secretary.[158] In yet another example, an executive assistant to a Sector Commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina disclosed, "whenever they [SOF operators] didn't like what they were told they [circumvented the chain-of-command] went in to see the commander."[159]

This habit of bypassing the chain-of-command has a negative impact. "One danger of the private army," one senior officer commented, "is certainly that it gets into the habit of using wrong channels."[160] He is correct. "Mad Mike" Calvert of SAS fame conceded that "a private army ... short-circuits command."[161] The 1982 Falklands War provides yet another excellent example. The commanding officer of the SAS, utilizing satellite communications, provided by American SOF, was able to reach back to national command at Whitehall faster than the actual Task Force commander.[162]

In the end, conventional commanders often believe that elites breed and nurture a Brotherhood, an "in-group" mentality that is dangerously inwardly focused. Elites are perceived to trust only themselves, namely, those who have passed the same rigorous selection standards and tests, and they may shun those on the outside. Anthropologist Donna Winslow has commented upon the negative aspects that often arise from an emphasis on the exclusivity of this "warrior cult." It nurtures an unassailable belief, she states, "[that] only those who have done it know, or can be trusted, or more dangerously yet, can give direction."[163] Alan Bell, formerly of the SAS, confessed that we "tended to have an arrogance that we knew it all, did it all, and had nothing to learn." Moreover, he acknowledged that they would work only with Delta Force or (U.S. Navy Special Forces) SEAL Team Six – no one else. "We figured," he confessed, "it wasn't worth our time."[164]

THE "BROTHERHOOD"

> …from this day to the end of time, without our being remembered: we few, we happy few, we band of brothers—for whoever sheds his blood with me today shall be my brother. However humble his birth, this day shall grant him nobility. And men back in England now safe in their beds will curse themselves for not having been here, and think less of their own manhood when they listen to the stories of those who fought with us here on St. Crispin's Day.[165]

The issue of "Brotherhood" is a complex one and requires a deeper analysis. It is not a new concept, nor is it limited to military elites. Brotherhoods exist in many organizations such as the clergy, law enforcement, motorcycle clubs and other fraternities. For those in the "in-group" there is only goodness. The Brotherhood binds its members, normally a select group of like-minded, self-selecting

individuals that have all passed a respective vetting process and often times trials of passage. For those members there is trust, confidence and an understanding all are capable of performing to the same level. Most importantly, there is a tacit understanding that members of the group, "brothers," will protect each other from external threats.

As a result of the respective exacting standards that all must meet, as well as the shared hardships (perceived or real), a bond is created based on group identity, mutual respect and solidarity. Membership in the fraternity normally cannot be bestowed due to affluence, connections, or rank. It must be earned.

This unique, shared experience builds group cohesion and solidarity. This outcome is significant. Sociologists have argued that high standards and requirements to enter into a group result in a greater sense of commitment and value placed on membership to that group by successful candidates.[166] In simple terms, the greater the degree of commitment, challenge, hardship and danger, the greater is the development of mutual respect and affiliation.[167] Within elite military units these factors are even more important. Professor Richard Holmes argued, "The rigorous nature of training for such units, with its high failure rate and its emphasis on physical fitness and mental toughness, welds young men from diverse backgrounds into highly-motivated and cohesive fighting units, which think of themselves as being not only markedly different from, but also considerably better than, the remainder of the armed forces."[168]

Historian Gavin Mortimer speaking of the SAS in North Africa in World War II observed, "They learned to depend on one another, to trust one another, to love one another like brothers. It was a fellowship of a sort few men are privileged to experience."[169] Within groups with a strong organizational culture, with members

who are extremely self-disciplined and a strong, vibrant leadership, the "Brotherhood" is an enabler and assists with effectiveness and efficiency. For example, historian Joseph A. Springer in his oral history of the First Special Service Force noted, "Individuals bound together by a common purpose can weather any combat situation – take one more step when the body is unwilling to take another step, vault one more hurdle when the mind is sick of hurdles, pull once more on the trigger when all hope should be gone, make one more lunge with the knife as the Forcemen's own life's blood washes to the ground."[170] In short, the "Brotherhood" is incredibly important for instilling cohesion, confidence and trust, as well as increasing individual and group resiliency. In essence, the "Brotherhood" improves combat efficiency and effectiveness.

However, at the risk of creating emotive trauma and angst for those within a "Brotherhood," who consistently refuse to even contemplate the notion that there could be a dark side to the "Brotherhood," the tightly knit fraternity can create potential problems ***if not properly controlled through strong leadership and discipline***. The issue can become a problem because often in a close brotherhood there is a resistance to self-examine member behaviour or actions, as well as a reluctance to criticize or discipline others. As noted earlier:

> The more the group is centred on itself, thus increasing its cohesion, the less it is interested in its environment. An already existing behavioural pattern is thereby reinforced.... What matters to the group is only what affects it directly. The desire to distinguish the group from other groups is not restricted to insignia and ritualism, but leads, in addition, to a spiteful attitude towards others.[171]

This attitude and behaviour can become self-destructive as it erodes the value base of the organization and creates a dysfunctional culture. Moreover, it attracts the enmity of others to

the detriment of the long-term health of the organization. As one experienced SOF practitioner explained, "physical courage is the easy part because of training and the people we select. Making guys be accountable; being accountable yourself – that can be a hard task."[172] In essence, the Brotherhood acts similar to a closed guild, answerable only to each other.

The potential danger becomes that the arrogance and aloofness that can be bred from a cult of elitism that is often endemic within groups that are specially selected. These groups can develop and nurture an "in-group" mentality that is dangerously myopic and inwardly focused. They trust only themselves – that is those who have passed the rigorous selection standards and tests. In the words of Professor Winslow, it cultivates a conviction that "only those who have done it know, or can be trusted, or more dangerously yet, can give direction."[173]

The point is, if the leadership, at all levels within the Brotherhood, fail to ensure the required discipline is instilled and maintained, the organizational culture within the group will mutate. This reality is significant since the organizational culture represents the collective repertoire of thought, perception and behaviour that has enabled a group to successfully adapt to, and react to, the internal and external environment. Renowned sociologist Edgar Schein defined organizational culture as:

> a powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces that determine both our individual and collective behaviour, ways of perceiving, thought patterns, and values. Organizational culture in particular matters because cultural elements determine strategy, goals, and modes of operating. The values and thought patterns of leaders and senior managers are partially determined by their own cultural backgrounds and shared experience.[174]

Schein also noted that within a group there are always basic underlying assumptions that evolve over time. They are based on continuous, repeated decisions and behaviours designed to provide solutions with regard to problem sets. Over time the accepted behaviour and responses become unconsciously recognized as the only accepted solution to similar problems. As an example, if disrespect to others regardless of rank is condoned and simply laughed off, the cultural reset is that this is not only accepted behaviour, but in fact, becomes the norm.

Schein, for example, argues that the essence of an organization's culture is its basic underlying assumptions, which are often taken for granted by members.[175] Significantly, underlying assumptions often drive values and function as a set of unwritten rules upon which people base behaviours. As such, although core values are always touted as guiding behaviour, the reality is that the underlying assumptions (e.g. only those who have completed selection are capable of making decisions or warrant respect) actually drive behaviour.

Importantly, strong organizational cultures frequently develop a sense of invulnerability and over time can cultivate an intractable unwillingness to change. The culture in turn drives attitudes and behaviours (as well as fuelling group think). Quite simply, the existing culture within an organization socializes those within the group, particularly newcomers, and shapes their attitudes and behaviours to correspond to the existing framework in place. In sum, it creates common expectations of what is and is not acceptable behaviour.

If the culture is dysfunctional it in turn creates problems. "Conduct," observed one SOF practitioner, "is largely governed by the culture of that unit. This extends to right and wrong conduct on the part of an individual warrior and what is tolerated by those who may themselves act properly."[176] Therefore, it is

critical to continually assess the organizational culture and ensure that aberrant behaviour is immediately and ruthlessly addressed and remedied. However, if the Brotherhood succumbs to an inability or unwillingness to censure digressions in behaviour, not only will the culture evolve to reflect that, it will create institutional problems with dramatic impact on the respective organizations (e.g. Cdn AB Regt, the Roman Catholic clergy, Australian SOF transgressions in Afghanistan, German KSK neo-Nazi scandal, public revolt to abuse of power by law enforcement).

Importantly, the fact that a unit is elite, has gone through rigorous selection standards and testing, does not guarantee someone will not do something illegal, immoral or unethical. Quite frankly, everyone makes mistakes, especially when operating under the extreme mental and physical stress of combat or operating in ambiguous, complex environments. Moreover, the U.S. Army Surgeon General in 1972 created a committee of three psychiatrists led by Dr. M. Scott Peck to research and make recommendations to try and explain the psychological causes of the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. The committee explained:

> In a situation of prolonged discomfort we humans naturally, almost inevitably tend to regress. Our psychological growth reverses itself; our maturity is forsaken. Quite rapidly we become more childish, more primitive. Discomfort is stress. What I am describing is a natural tendency of the human organism to regress in response to chronic stress. The life of a soldier in a combat zone is one of chronic stress…They were at the other end of the world from their homes. The food was poor, the insects thick, the heat enervating, the sleeping quarters uncomfortable. Then there was the danger, usually not as severe as in other wars, yet probably even more stressful in Vietnam because it was so unpredictable.[177]

In essence, potential transgressions, even in elite units, are unavoidable. Arguably, they are bound to happen based on individual and environmental circumstance. These inevitable transgressions in behaviour are in and of themselves not insurmountable. However, the failure to hold individuals accountable; to report, correct and discipline the wrongdoing(s) because of the perceived requirements of the Brotherhood are certainly cause for concern. This failure to abide by the stated values of the organization and to ensure proper discipline will always threaten the organization and its standing within its own institution, as well as the government and public it serves. Once an organization loses its credibility and the trust of the political and military decision-makers, as well as the society it serves, it will lose its autonomy to regulate itself and its freedom of action (i.e. it will result in outside investigations and tight supervisory frameworks and limited authorities to act on their own).

General Richard D. Clarke, the current USSOCOM commander captured the essence of ensuring the Brotherhood does not lead to the failure to hold individuals responsible and accountable. "Never," he declared, "allow a disordered loyalty to an individual or team to obscure the values, commitment, and trust with [their] service, with SOCOM, and with the nation."[178] That advice holds true for all forms of Brotherhood.

Although the theory sounds simple, the execution is not. Firstly, for those in a Brotherhood, arguably, what others think is irrelevant. Secondly, once immersed in a culture, a culture through which individuals have dedicated their lives, endured hardship and danger, developed tight primary relationships, been rewarded for performance through promotion and awards, it often becomes difficult to see issues with the organization, its culture or the "brothers." It becomes easy to look at the transgressions of other organizations and say, "they have/had issues but we're different. There is no comparison." Reality might prove otherwise.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment: A Cautionary Tale

The disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt) on 5 March 1995, is a fitting example of the consequence of the failure to ensure accountability within a Brotherhood.[179] There were more than a few sobs on the windswept icy Nicklin parade square on Canadian Forces Base Petawawa on the late afternoon of 5 March, as the commanding officer dismissed the Cdn AB Regt for the last time. The event was actually quite historic. It was the first time in Canadian military history that a unit was disbanded in disgrace. To many, particularly those serving in the unit, it was a travesty. However, to others it was a self-fulfilling prophecy – just a matter of time. Their desire to say "I told you so," was only suppressed by their haste in demanding "well, what did you expect?"

Regardless of viewpoint, the fact remained that justifiably or not, for the political leadership, some military commanders and many Canadians, the Cdn AB Regt had come to personify disobedience and a unit out of control. A series of highly publicized and very embarrassing incidents for the government and the senior military leadership pushed them both too far. As a result, on 23 January 1995, the Minister of National Defence (MND) announced the disbandment of the Cdn AB Regt. In the end, the difficulties, particularly the disobedience, were explained as the inevitable problem with a unit of "that type." It was based on a simplistic belief that a military elite will inherently breed trouble.

As is the case with all such simplistic explanations – they are as inadequate as they are inaccurate. Disobedience in the Cdn AB Regt was due to a complex array of factors, many of which extended well beyond the unit itself. In the end, a toxic mix of elitism, favouritism, manning issues, immaturity, poor leadership, organizational defects, Army culture, misplaced loyalties, and personalities all coalesced to create an environment that often

bred disobedience within the Regiment. Importantly, the concept of the Airborne Brotherhood played a significant factor in its demise.

The birth of the Cdn AB Regt had its roots in the Cold War. The late-1950s and early-1960s witnessed an international explosion of nationalistic movements and political unrest. “Brush-fire” conflicts, insurgencies, and wars of national liberation flared-up around the globe. The concept of rapid deployable forces under United Nations (UN) auspices captured the imagination of the Canadian Government that was still euphoric about its new-won international role caused by its diplomatic and military success in the outcome of the 1956 Suez Crisis. Four years later, the emergency in the Belgian Congo reinforced the apparent need for international forces that could deploy quickly to avert the potential escalation of regional conflicts into superpower confrontations.

At the same time, as a result of the changing international security environment, the Americans embarked on a program to better address the “spectrum of conflict” that they now faced. The Americans realized that their existing force structure was not adequate to deal with “limited wars” in distant lands. As a result, the Pentagon now stressed greater strategic mobility, the expansion of Special Forces (SF) to deal with the proliferation of guerilla type conflict, and the development of an airmobile capability.

The Canadian political and military leadership followed suit. By 1964, the blueprint for a revitalized Canadian Army was based on the concept of a truly mobile force, called Force Mobile Command (FMC) capable of quick reaction and global reach. Instrumental to this envisioned force was an airborne element that could provide the country with a strategic reserve capable of quick reaction and worldwide deployment.[180]

On 8 April 1968, this showcase organization became known as the Cdn AB Regt. However, it owed its existence almost exclusively

to the vision and tenacity of the MND, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), the FMC (i.e. Army) Commander and the FMC Deputy Commander. Their immediate subordinate commanders were, for the most part, adamantly opposed to the creation of this new regiment, particularly at a time when many proud, long-standing regiments such as the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, the Royal Highland Regiment "Black Watch" of Canada and the Canadian Guards were tagged for removal from the Regular Force Order of Battle. The resistance was so great that initially the general consensus of the staff at FMC Headquarters (HQ) and National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) was that the plan would never come to fruition (especially if enough obstacles were placed in front of it while not rejecting the idea outright). As a result, little assistance was forthcoming from various headquarters staffs since most felt it would be a wasted effort.[181]

However, the CDS, General Jean Victor Allard, who developed the idea while he was the Army Commander, and his hand-picked successor, Lieutenant-General W.A.B. Anderson ruthlessly enforced their will. As a result, the Cdn AB Regt was established, but with great resentment in the Army at large.[182] Adding insult to injury, it started out as a very privileged organization. It was given formation status with direct access to the Army Commander and it was spared the tedium of national taskings such as providing manpower to run Reserve training or to act as instructors at Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) or Army training establishments. This dispensation simply added to the undercurrent of resentment and anger among many senior Army officers. As a result, although its creation was characterized by great passion and high ideals by a very few senior Army officers and politicians, by the late 1970s, as its benefactors left the service, it began to come under greater scrutiny. Quite simply, the larger military establishment and the Army in particular, never fully accepted the existence or designated role given to the Cdn AB Regt, and as a result they continually (or at least tried to) marginalize it.

The Regiment's mandate was impressive if not overly optimistic. The Cdn AB Regt was required to be capable of performing a variety of tasks which included: the Defence of Canada; the UN "stand-by" role; peacekeeping operations; missions in connection with national disaster; "Special Air Service" (SAS) type missions; coup de main tasks in a general war setting; and responsibility for parachute training in the CAF. The respective Canadian Forces Organizational Order (CFOO) stated, "the role of the Canadian Airborne Regiment is to provide a force capable of moving quickly to meet any unexpected enemy threat or other commitment of the Canadian Armed Forces."[183]

In addition, the Army Commander, Lieutenant-General W.A.B. Anderson, ordered the Cdn AB Regt planning team to visit both the U.S. Special Forces Centre, as well as the British SAS Regiment to gather the "necessary stimulus and factual data upon which to develop your concept."[184] Moreover, he directed that an element of the Regiment must be proficient at: HALO [High Altitude Low Opening] team parachute descents; deep penetration patrols; underwater diving; obstacle clearance and laying of underwater demolitions; mountain climbing; and "Special Service Forces" type team missions.[185]

Although outwardly a conventional airborne regiment, by design it was clear that the Cdn AB Regt, both officially in accordance with its CFOO and through direction given by the CAF chain-of-command, was intended to be capable of special operations as understood at the time.[186] The emphasis on "SOF" like capability was also enshrined in the Operational Concept, as well as in the later doctrinal manual, *CFP 310 (1) Airborne - The Canadian Airborne Regiment*. Under the heading "Special Operations" a long list of tasks were included that were clearly Special Forces in nature. Specifically, the document stated that the "Canadian Airborne Regiment is to be prepared to carry out the following

operations for which it is specially trained: disruption of lines of communications, destruction of critical installations; psychological warfare operations; special intelligence tasks; recovery tasks; deception operations; internal security operations; counter-guerilla operations; and support of indigenous paramilitary forces."[187]

The emphasis on special operations was not lost on the Cdn AB Regt's leadership, which focused at times almost exclusively on daring direct action commando like raids. Moreover, as a number of former commanding officers noted, if something happened (e.g. terrorist incident) they knew they would get the call so they attempted to train individuals in the necessary skills required for special operations.

The quality of the original individuals was incontestable. Official recruiting themes stressed the superior attributes of the new genre of warrior. They emphasized the fact that the new paratrooper had to be an excellent athlete, an expert at small arms and a survival specialist. Furthermore, they underscored the necessity to be robust, courageous and capable of a high level of endurance. Not surprisingly, the Cdn AB Regt received a larger percentage of the more ambitious, determined and energized individuals. They skimmed the cream of the Army. Only experienced officers, NCOs and soldiers were accepted. All riflemen within the commandos were required to be qualified to the rank of corporal. This criterion meant that the respective individual had previously served within a regular rifle battalion. As a result, they were already competent and experienced in the basic drills of soldiering. Equally important, they were on the whole older and normally, more mature. This selection allowed the Regiment to direct its training effort towards specialized training such as mountain and pathfinder operations, patrolling courses, raids, skiing, and unarmed combat.

The Cdn AB Regt quickly forged a reputation for undertaking tough, demanding and dynamic activities. It set new standards for physical fitness and training realism. In consonance with its status as a strategic force capable of global deployment, the Regiment travelled throughout Canada, the United States, as well as exotic locations such as Jamaica, to practise its lethal craft. It conducted training and exchanges with the British SAS, American Rangers and Special Forces, and the French Foreign Legion. By the early-1970s the Airborne Regiment was at its zenith of power. It had the status of a mini-formation, direct access to the Commander of the Army, and an increased peacetime establishment of 1,044 all ranks.

For those within the Regiment, as well as those external to it, they perceived, rightly or wrongly, that the Cdn AB Regiment was an elite military organization. General Jean Boyle, a former Canadian CDS stated, "There is no doubt that the Airborne are the toughest and some of the meanest soldiers. They have a tremendous fighting capability."[188] Similarly, Lieutenant-General Marc Lessard believed, "The Airborne Regiment soldier was superior to the infantry man in the Canadian Army. They had more basic and advanced knowledge and more self-confidence (cocky even). The transformation of an individual in one year in terms of self-confidence was amazing."[189] Colonel Clyde Russel asserted, "The Regiment represented the premiere combat component of the CAF. Everything from tactical prowess, range practices, fieldcraft skills, parachute capability, fitness. Wherever we took the field we dominated."[190] He added, "We operated with international SOF. We did exercises with the SAS, French Foreign Legion, USSF, 82nd Airborne, U.S. Rangers. We saw ourselves more as a commando unit."[191] Colonel Mike Beaudette agreed. "It [Cdn AB Regt] had a special operations focus," he explained, "rather than an airborne rapid reaction focus."[192] Colonel Dave Barr opined, "The Airborne Regiment was an elite. It was seen as the place where the best and most challenging Army training was. That gave it an elite status."[193]

The belief in the Regiment's elite status did not stop with senior officers. "The Regiment housed the best of Canada's combat soldiers," argued Major Brett Nesbitt, "There was no other unit that could have fielded better soldiers in significant numbers or was on average a better unit."[194] Captain Greg Grant declared, "I saw the Airborne Regiment as the best combat troops in the CAF."[195] Major Charlie McNight concurred. "There was a huge separation between the Airborne Regiment and the rest of the Army," he declared, "It was a step above."[196] He opined, "The Airborne soldier was fitter, more operationally minded and possessed greater mental and physical toughness."[197]

Similarly, Chief Warrant Officer (CWO) Joe McInnis confirmed that everyone "always referred to the Canadian Airborne Regiment as the top of the pyramid when it came to professional soldiering. It possessed the hardest and best soldiers the nation had."[198] CWO Tom Verner affirmed, "The Regiment ate the weak. Troops were as hard as nails. Training was tough. Troops had to be robust. No-one wanted to show weakness."[199]

For CWO Dan Legault it was simple. "I saw it [Cdn AB Regt] as Canada's killer elite," he acknowledged, "The force of choice for raids, quick deployment and strategic reconnaissance to get the ground truth."[200] Master Warrant Officer (MWO) Dale Allen explained, "We dressed different. We had smocks, maroon berets, SSF boots. It set us apart, made us elite."[201]

He added:

> We had to live up to our elite status. We had to be that much better than everyone else. We were ready to deploy in hours, not days or weeks. We had greater trade skills, higher level of fitness and we jumped out of airplanes. We were elite because of what they expected you to do.[202]

Key to the Regiment's success was the extremely high morale and cohesion, in other words the strength of the Airborne Brotherhood. Colonel Barr revealed, "Everyone took pride in not letting the side down. They would rather die than let the side down or to be known as not doing their job/packing it in."[203] He continued, "The moment you put on the maroon beret and t-shirt, all of a sudden a guy can go 20 kilometres further with more weight – just out of the pride."[204]

Lieutenant-Colonel Denis Hartnett indicated, "If you had the maroon beret you had higher motivation, greater fitness, more skill."[205] He conceded, "The chain-of-command played up the airborne mystique as well. They held us to a higher standard."[206] CWO McInnis concurred. He explained, "we were operating at a higher level of hardness and commitment. We drew on our airborne esprit de corps."[207]

Despite the perceived elite status, the inability to fully rationalize the role, structure, and relevancy of the Cdn AB Regt simply increased the resistance to its survival within the Army. During the seventies, its existence was marked by changing priorities in both relevancy and role. It went from an independent formation tasked as the national strategic reserve to simply another "conventional" unit within an existing brigade. It became the target of continual malevolent debate within the Army and the hostage to the individual impulse of those in power. As a result, its strength, both in terms of manpower and organizational integrity, was insidiously whittled away.

By the 1980s, the lack of a clear, credible and accepted requirement for Canadian airborne forces proved to be a difficult obstacle to overcome. As Canada's role in the world turned away from Europe and toward different goals of foreign policy, the CAF underwent a self-definition crisis. This turmoil was manifested by shrinking

budgets and declining manpower levels. The Cdn AB Regt found it difficult to convince its political and military masters of its relevance. Furthermore, the more its advocates (those commanders who had been young subalterns in the early days and had now percolated to the senior echelons) attempted to prove its utility, by assigning it new tasks or reinitiating old ones, the more they highlighted its greatest weakness. It had no credible or consistent role that made it indispensable.

This lack of organizational support had a direct impact on the state of the Regiment. The continual erosion of its status and institutional support was paralleled by a decrease in postings to the Regiment of the vital experienced leaders and soldiers from the other regiments who were responsible for feeding the Cdn AB Regt with manpower. The Regiment now began to receive young soldiers, some right out of basic infantry training. These individuals were much less mature than the seasoned corporals to which the Regiment was accustomed. Their youth and immaturity, combined with the airborne mystique and the distinctive maroon beret, created an explosive mix. Moreover, an inability to recruit the necessary number of senior NCOs willing to volunteer for airborne service necessitated keeping those who were willing – individuals who were not always the cream of the crop. Their agreement to serve, however, often meant a promotion they most likely would never have received otherwise, or at least not as quickly.

More damaging yet, was the problem associated with the parent feeder regiments. When the Chair and/or members of the senior councils of the feeder regiments were not supporters of the Cdn AB Regt they would, not surprisingly, restrict the quality and number of officers posted to serve in the Airborne. Worse yet, the feeder infantry regiments saw in the Cdn AB Regt a home for their malcontents and trouble-makers – a sort of reform school. Often,

the Airborne was seen as a place to "tame" them or at least an easy way to get rid of a problem, while at the same time meeting the manning quota that they were responsible to fill. As a result, troublesome members would often be sent to the Airborne and conveniently forgotten. An Army study revealed that the Cdn AB Regt had to "rely almost exclusively on the goodwill of the parent regiments for troop replacements."[208] Although on one level this meant that the Cdn AB Regt reflected the army as a whole, practically, it evolved into a unit that had more than its fair share of troublemakers and individuals who were "rough around the edges." Unfortunately, chronic manpower shortages, due to the fact that not enough Army personnel, particularly senior NCOs, volunteered for service with the Airborne due to its reputation for hard soldiering, meant the Regiment had to accept anyone they were sent or go short.

As if this was not bad enough, the appointment of the Regimental Commander also became a "political" issue. Command was rotated and passed not to the best individual available, but rather the choice of the regimental senate of the feeder infantry regiment whose turn it was to provide the commander. Often, it became a consolation prize for an officer who was not deemed worthy to become a commanding officer of one of the conventional infantry line battalions of the respective feeder infantry regiment.[209] In sum, all of these factors resulted in a number of weak leaders, at times more than others, being responsible for harnessing the energy, both positive and negative, of a group of self-selecting, young, aggressive soldiers imbued with a sense of elitism and indestructibility.[210]

Not surprisingly, by the mid-1980s there were severe disciplinary problems in the Cdn AB Regt. Disobedience, insubordination, assaults, weapon thefts, linkages to criminal motorcycle gangs were just some of the manifestations.[211] One serving member at

the time recalled the sense of anarchy. He confided, "it is a bad sign when officers are threatened by the troops. You clearly have a problem."[212]

Just as disturbing, and a key cause of the disobedient behaviour, was a distinct non-sanctioned airborne ethos and culture, which was promoted by some elements within the Regiment's NCO corps, centred on an elitist, macho, renegade attitude. Loyalty to the Airborne Brotherhood was defined in terms of the airborne itself, and often, to a particular clique therein. Moreover, airborne service became an end in itself. Service to Canada and the public, as well as appreciation for national policy and the concept of the greater good was rejected. Outsiders were shunned and considered only worthy of contempt. Soldiers would not salute "LEG" (i.e. pejorative term for non-airborne personnel) officers on bases and treat outsiders with contempt. Worse yet, their chain-of-command would do nothing to discipline their soldiers if a complaint was actually received. It would be treated as a joke. Quite simply, the failure of leadership in the Airborne Brotherhood created a "we/they" attitude. Significantly, this outlook undermined discipline and obedience. Not surprisingly, this overall lack of discipline fostered an unofficial attitude that authority, especially the chain-of-command outside of the Regiment, was a target to be defied.

This airborne sub-culture also fuelled an unofficial chain-of-command centred on the "old timers," particularly NCOs. Due to their long service in the airborne, often seven or more years (a function of the necessity to keep those willing to serve) they became the guardians of the airborne ethos. They defined what being a paratrooper meant – and socialized new members. Often, newly arrived senior NCOs and junior officers would look to these "airborne veterans" as role models. Colonel Ken Watkin observed that a major problem developed when officers tried too hard to be

privates because they wanted to be accepted by the men.[213] Often questionable behaviour, disciplinary infractions or disobedience was overlooked and ignored by the neophyte airborne supervisors because of a desire to fit in. "You're in the Airborne now," quickly became a nuanced rebuke that inferred non-acceptable behaviour within the Regiment.

However, these problems were also a reflection of the larger malaise in the Army.[214] In the Spring of 1984, then Brigadier-General R.I. Stewart, the Commander of the Special Service Force (SSF) addressed his command:

> The problem in a nutshell is that we have far too many cases of ill-disciplined behaviour, assault, disobedience, disrespectful behaviour; theft of private and public property by soldiers; impaired driving offenses; vehicle accidents; inadequate control of stores; ammunition/ pyrotechnics, weapons and equipment that result in loss or theft; and a general laxness in properly controlling soldiers, all which contribute to an erosion of disciplined/soldierly behaviour. We have in many cases lost our regimented pattern of behaviour and our standards of performance are seriously in jeopardy. The danger of allowing standards to slip is self-evident. Once started on the decline, the process picks up momentum and reaches a point when we have no junior leaders who comprehend the standard and it is then impossible to reverse the process.[215]

By the summer of 1985, the problem in the Army had reached such a state that the CDS agreed to the commission of an investigation titled the *FMC Study on Disciplinary Infractions and Antisocial Behaviour with FMC with Particular Reference to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment.* This

probe became known informally as the "*Hewson Report*," named after Major-General C.W. Hewson, the Chief of Intelligence and Security, who was the chairman of the Board of Inquiry.

Its aim was to review disciplinary infractions within the Army and investigate the factors that led to the excessive antisocial behaviour. The Terms of Reference, guidelines and investigative team was left to the Army, who in turn entrusted the inquiry to a group of "loyal" Army officers and staunch airborne supporters who saw themselves as part of the Airborne Brotherhood. Needless to say, they were anything but critical of the Army or the Cdn AB Regt.[216] They concluded that there appeared to be a higher number of assault cases in the two infantry units in the SSF (1 RCR and the Cdn AB Regt) compared to the remaining infantry units in the rest of the Army.[217] The FMC team then went on to rationalize the discrepancy in behaviour within the Cdn AB Regt to a combination of factors such as: the absence of junior leaders, the immaturity and lack of experience of some of the replacements sent to the Regiment, and the semi-isolation of Canadian Forces Base Petawawa itself, which failed to provide an adequate number of drinking establishments and other off-base social outlets which could absorb the large single male population of the base.[218] The final report declared, "there is no cause for alarm or requirement for precipitate action."[219] It went on to argue, "there appears to be a lower incidence of serious pathology and violent behaviour in the Canadian Forces than in the Canadian population at large."[220]

The *Hewson Report* had no real effect. The chairman, Major-General Hewson himself, later conceded, "I know of no specific action that resulted from our study."[221] A strong commanding officer in the wake of the report, however, seemed to put a temporary lid on the problems, but by the early 1990s, disciplinary troubles once again raised their ugly head. This time, they would not be so easily brushed aside. By the summer of 1992, Canada's

decision to participate in a United Nations (UN) mission to Somalia, which eventually evolved into the American led peace-enforcement operation known in Canada as Operation Deliverance, allowed pro-airborne senior Army officers in influential positions within the CAF hierarchy to pull strings to ensure that the Cdn AB Regt would be the unit sent to fulfill the Canadian commitment. Although the paratroopers were not the ideal unit to deploy (i.e. they were already scheduled to undertake a Cyprus rotation and they had no light armoured vehicles) they received the nod anyways – quite simply because their benefactors wanted them to have the choice operational mission.[222]

However, the storm clouds began to gather as the Regiment began its preparatory training. Discipline problems, a lack of Regimental SOPs and overly aggressive behaviour by 2 Commando raised the concerns of the Brigade Commander. However, these problems were largely waved away by the same senior military commanders who had cleared the path for the Regiment's assignment in the first place.[223]

In theatre overall, the Cdn AB Regt performed superbly for the most part and earned the praise of U.S. Commanders, UN envoys and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) representatives for their efforts and success at both securing their sector and delivering humanitarian aid.[224] But, there was also a dark side. Once in Somalia, many of the concerns about discipline and professionalism that were raised during the pre-deployment training rose to the surface. Undeniably, the flaws were attributable to poor leadership at the NCO and officer level. This malady was a direct outgrowth of the problems that had been identified earlier but not corrected. Very quickly it became evident that some elements within the Cdn AB Regt Battle Group (Cdn AB Regt BG) were mistreating Somalis who were captured while illegally entering the Airborne compounds to steal.[225]

The frustration of the paratroopers is unquestionable. The Somali population was not always appreciative of the soldiers' efforts on their behalf. The paratroopers were exposed to rock throwing, shootings, protests, spitting and constant thievery. The Cdn AB Regt BG compounds became natural targets; night after night, looters and thieves would slip through the razor wire barrier and steal anything and everything. Those thieves who were apprehended were turned over to local authorities, only to be released without sanction. For the paratroopers the incessant ingratitude and hostility, from the very people they were there to assist, was difficult to understand and accept.[226] Nonetheless, the reaction of many, seemingly condoned by the officer and NCO corps, was unacceptable.

Through the course of the whole operation Canadians killed four Somali nationals and wounded numerous others. Some of the deaths were unquestionably avoidable. One such killing occurred on 4 March 1993. Increased security at one of the Cdn AB Regt BG camps resulted in gunfire as two would-be thieves attempted to escape. Initially, the shooting was termed justifiable within the Rules of Engagement by a unit-controlled investigation. However, continuing allegations by one of the Canadian contingent's medical officers, who professed that the death of one of the interlopers was the result of a deliberate execution style killing eventually raised some disturbing questions.[227] Although these allegations have never been conclusively proven or refuted, the shootings themselves have been declared unjustifiable. The carefully planned ambush operation obviously was "designed to send a strong message to would-be infiltrators that any attempt to penetrate the perimeter of Canadian installations would be met with gunfire."[228]

As disturbing as these allegations are, they are not the only ones. Mixed messages reverberated through the Airborne compounds

in Somalia. Not only was a questionable shooting very quickly dismissed and the participants praised, but there existed a perception that abusive behaviour was ignored and not punished. This outlook became prevalent in some elements of the Cdn AB Regt BG. This approach was due in part to the fact that mistreatment of prisoners was condoned by some officers and NCOs within the Canadian contingent. In sum, this laid the groundwork for the defining moment of the Somalia mission.

On the night of 16 March 1993, an apprehended teenaged looter, Shidane Arone, was systematically beaten to death while in the custody of 2 Commando. What made this tragedy even harder to understand is the fact that throughout the beating, which lasted several hours, numerous soldiers, senior NCOs and officers either heard the cries or actually dropped by the bunker and witnessed the beating in progress; yet, no one stopped it until it was too late.[229]

Initially, the death was explained away as due to injuries sustained during capture. However, the sergeant leading the patrol that apprehended Arone refused to accept that explanation. Subsequently, one of the guilty individuals, Trooper Kyle Brown, brought forward evidence and explained what had happened. The other perpetrator, Master-Corporal Clayton Matchee, was subsequently arrested. The matter was kept low-key. To that point no word was released to the public and senior political and military decision-makers felt they could control the situation. Top officials in DND learned of the death within 48 hours of the event, yet it appeared that a decision to contain rather than disclose information was taken.[230] However, while in custody Matchee attempted to commit suicide and his body being taken for medical treatment was witnessed by a reporter who very quickly learned the full story.

As the incident became national news an overwhelming wave of enmity, by both the public and other military personnel, swept over the paratroopers.[231] Its impact was enormous. Even those senior military commanders who for years showed preferential treatment towards the Cdn AB Regt and who had previously dismissed their antics with a "boys will be boys" attitude now abandoned them fearing for their own careers.[232]

Not surprisingly, the media put DND and the CAF under a microscope with devastating effect. That single event itself was numbing and the failure of so many to do anything to stop the beating, remains inexplicable. Incredibly, the tragedy magnified. The appearance of an attempt to cover-up the incident outside, as well as inside, the Regiment spoke volumes about serious failures in the military and political chain-of-command at DND. The military leadership decided to deal with the continuing criticism by formally establishing The *Board of Inquiry (BOI) – Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group* (informally named the de Faye Commission after its Chairman, Major-General Tom de Faye) to "investigate the leadership, discipline, operations, actions and procedures of the Airborne Battle Group."[233] The Board presented its Phase I Report in late-summer 1993, and much like the *Hewson Report*, indicated that there was no real cause for alarm. But this failed to placate critics within or outside of DND.[234]

The disciplinary and leadership problems evident in the Airborne in the early-nineties and specifically during the pre-deployment period and during the unit's time in Somalia from October 1992 to May 1993, were reminiscent of problems identified as early as the beginning of the 1980s. Moreover, the increased scrutiny of DND now revealed other disturbing problems.

Quite simply, the Cdn AB Regt's problems seemed to be a direct a reflection of the larger long-term failure in the Army and the CAF – specifically, the inability, or reluctance, to take the necessary steps

to make hard decisions ensuring the stability of the institution. The CAF officer corps placed a priority on acquiescence instead of critical thought, on a tolerance for the secretive machinations of Regimental Councils who were largely unaccountable and on the parochial interests of individual services and corps, as well as providing the government politically acceptable solutions instead of sound military advice. All of these, added to the anti-intellectual officer corps that was unable to realize and react to the changing social and geo-political environment, led to a collective abrogation of responsibility and strategic impotence in regards to correcting the problems that were evident in the Cdn AB Regt and the CAF long before Somalia. Peter Desbarats, one of the Somalia Inquiry Commissioners, noted that the "Airborne was only the most brutal manifestation of the disease. Amputating it did nothing to resolve the real problems except to allow the leadership to pretend that they had cured it." He summarized that "this was more dangerous than doing nothing."[235]

Even after the return of the Regiment to Canada, the issue of the torture-murder never fully disappeared. Courts martial and ongoing commentary kept the subject alive. Two high profile disciplinary incidents by 3 Commando (Cdo) paratroopers serving in Rwanda in the summer of 1994 simply fuelled the fire. In the first case, two off-duty paratroopers became drunk in their quarters and decided to become "blood brothers." The resultant cuts to their palms required only a few stitches, but the resultant furor in the press brought unneeded publicity. The second, and more serious lack of judgment, transpired when a section second-in-command, while tasked to provide security for a local building, allowed several soldiers not on duty, to consume beer and discharge shotgun blasts at the large stone structure they were protecting. Needless to say, this incident quickly exploded in the media and brought renewed criticism of the Regiment and the Airborne Brotherhood.[236]

But these were mere preludes to more ominous events. On 15 January 1995, the CTV television network broadcast excerpts from a homemade video, made by soldiers of 2 Cdo during their tour in Somalia, on the nightly news. Several members were shown making racial slurs and behaving in an unprofessional manner. Media reaction was sharp, as was the subsequent political anger. Once again, the recurrent Somalia issue catapulted the Cdn AB Regt into the public and political spotlight. The mortal blow, however, came three days later when another amateur video depicting a 1992, 1 Cdo "initiation party" was aired. The tape exhibited 1 Cdo paratroopers involved in behaviour that was degrading, disgusting, and racist in nature and contrary to CAF rules and regulations. Its release embarrassed the government and the CAF yet once again. It also completely destroyed any remnants of the Regiment's image. As a result, the MND announced the disbandment of the Cdn AB Regt in disgrace, on 23 January 1995.[237]

The political and senior military leadership very quickly promulgated a consistent message to the public. Quite simply, they maintained, the troubles experienced, and the embarrassment caused to the nation's government and military institution, were inherent, and inescapable, as a result of the existence of an elite "airborne" organization. The disciplinary problems, allegations of wanton violence, racist innuendo, elitist attitudes, ties to U.S. paratroopers in the American "Deep South," and connections to the "paras" of the notorious French Foreign Legion, were all presented as clear manifestations of the claim. Paratroopers, as part of a military elite it seemed were simply unsavoury characters, if not born killers.[238]

Political motives aside, this rationalization to explain disobedience within the Cdn AB Regt is grossly inadequate. The answer is complex and a combination of internal and external factors. Initially, the Regiment itself must take responsibility for its failings.

It allowed the "airborne mystique," cult of the elite and Airborne Brotherhood to impact on its culture and behaviour.[239] Justifiably or not, the members of the Regiment, as well as the CAF at large, considered the paratroopers an elite.[240] They were entitled to special orders of dress and distinctive clothing items; allowance to wear unique insignia; extra pay; privileged access to the chain-of-command, allowances for special courses; a greater number of foreign exchanges for training, exemption from routine taskings, as well as the element of parachuting. In addition, they were far fitter, and normally more proficient in field skills than their counterparts in the regular infantry battalions.

Their unique status, combined with the self-selecting nature of the unit (i.e. individuals had to first pass the basic parachutist course, then volunteer for the Regiment and subsequently pass the Airborne Indoctrination Course), as well as their reputation for extremely demanding and tough exercises and physical fitness regimes, developed both a cohesion and arrogance that created the airborne as a "group apart." Their intense "esprit de corps" and elitist sentiment that was nurtured by the group in the form of an Airborne Brotherhood, which was both promoted and tolerated by the Regimental leadership, as well as the higher chain-of-command, allowed the Regiment to devolve into an exclusive club that shunned outsiders. This outlook created an "us against them" attitude, which manifested itself in complete disregard for, and overt disobedience to, the external chain-of-command, as well as military rules and regulations in general. One senior officer recalled, "we acted independently and did what we wanted to do." But this was only part of the problem. "Furthermore," he added, "we got away with it."[241]

As is often the case with special type units with extremely high levels of cohesion and special mandates, discipline and the enforced adherence to the tedious rules and regulations of the

"conventional army" are normally lax. Moreover, airborne officers and senior NCOs were loathe to discipline one of their own for petty offences committed against a "LEG" or in violation of normal military protocol (e.g. not saluting a non-airborne officer), which were more often than not discounted as "chicken shit rules" not worthy of attention by "real soldiers." As such, the internal chain-of-command often fostered a "we're above the law attitude" that seeped into member behaviour and conduct. This mindset bred a culture that later in the Regiment's life, morphed into a cancerous underground ethos that imbued resistance to any authority – including that of the Airborne chain-of-command.

The lax approach to discipline and dismissive attitude towards external organizations and individuals are problematic by themselves. However, manning practices proved to be another key factor in disobedience within the Cdn AB Leadership. The early philosophical intent that only the seasoned, mature and deserving be allowed to serve in the Cdn AB Regt to provide additional challenge and act as a leadership nursery served the Regiment well in the early years. But, as explained, the manning pressures and continuing erosion of support for a "special and privileged" unit over the years resulted in a less than desirable rotation practice. By the late 1970s, young immature soldiers, right out of battle school in some cases, were sent to the Regiment. These youngsters, who inherently by their youth and occupation of choice were prone to bravado and macho posturing, now fortified by the vaunted maroon beret and fuelled by the airborne mystique and Brotherhood, compounded by the Regiment's legacy of aggressive, daring and fearless action, became trouble waiting to happen. Adding to the problem was the lax environment and contemptuous attitude towards outsiders. This seemingly permissive attitude provided little restraint and in many ways set a tone, if not a socialization process, that almost encouraged members to flaunt convention.

More corrosive yet to the discipline of the Cdn AB Regt was yet another manning practice – dumping. Many of the commanding officers of feeder battalions of the parent infantry regiments who were obligated to post a set number of personnel to the Cdn AB Regt every posting season often utilized the opportunity to rid themselves of troublesome individuals. As such, the Regiment became a form of reform school. Once again, the prevailing attitude and lax discipline provided those already prone to flouting rules and regulations to prosper. Worse yet, because of their experience and time in, they became role models for the young soldiers who had just joined the CAF and the Regiment.

The faulty manning practices had another negative consequence that directly contributed to disobedience in the Cdn AB Regt. Due to chronic manpower shortages and a reluctance to order personnel to serve in the Regiment – those willing could stay in the unit for as long as they chose. In some cases, to fill the necessary rank structure they even received promotions that they may not have received, or at least not as quickly, had they not remained in the Regiment. As a result, many individuals who did not "fit in" a regular battalion remained within the Regiment. These "long timers" became the continuity. They were the holders of the airborne ethos and socialized new members in the unit. They defined what being a paratrooper meant. Part of this definition included the disregard for "petty rules and regulations." In the most extreme cases, underground parallel chains-of-command emerged that defined loyalty only in terms of small inclusive sub-groups within the Regiment. Open acts of defiance, such as the display of banned rebel flags and the stonewalling of authority were demonstrated.[242]

The greatest significance of the defective manning of the Regiment, however, was the impact it had on leadership. There are several dimensions to this. It is important to point out that

many exemplary individuals of all ranks served in the Regiment. However, there were some that were less so. It was not unknown for officers and senior NCOs to be dumped as well. In these cases, weak leaders were either unwilling or unable to enforce rules. Often, they simply acquiesced to those with time-in both out of incompetence, as well as an effort to fit in and get by.

Conversely, in some instances, these leaders were strong personalities but poor leaders and caused problems of their own. Within a unit climate that provided little structure or control over its sub-units, which often acted very independently, an officer could run a "regime" that created frustration, if not injury, to his subordinates. With little recourse, soldiers often turned to disobedience, such as damaging personal property (e.g. slashing a bivvie bag, or torching a vehicle) as a sign of protest or as a signal that the leadership had gone too far. In this case, disobedience was a direct result of weak leadership throughout the chain-of-command. It was symptomatic of a *laissez-faire* attitude and misguided belief that strict discipline was somehow "unairborne."

The other element at play, often ensnaring even the strongest of leaders was the desire to fit in as an airborne warrior and be accepted by the more experienced personnel. The airborne mystique and allure of the maroon beret and Airborne Brotherhood are powerful motivators. Newly arrived individuals wish to conform. As a result, they often turn a blind eye to minor transgressions to which they would normally react. Very quickly, they become acclimatized and become part of the problem. They accept the persona and all that it entails.

As such, a number of factors created a conducive environment for disobedience. Unfortunately, the normal safeguards such as a chain-of-command that enforces normal military protocol and rules and regulations as part of its normal military ethos was not

in place. What added to this problem was another leadership failure – one at the most senior levels of command. The senior chain-of-command (including commanders from the Army level to senior institutional appointments) for almost the entire lifespan of the Cdn AB Regt inexplicably tolerated the Regiment's demeanour. It turned a blind eye to incidents and general behaviour and attitudes. The conventional wisdom posited that you had to allow for such behaviour because the airborne was more aggressive – a bit wilder. Quite simply, senior commanders maintained a "boys will be boys" attitude. Instead of demanding a higher professional standard, which should be expected of a supposed elite, and providing the necessary talent required, the Army leadership acquiesced to, if not endorsed, the airborne attitude and disposition. As such, they directly contributed to disobedience within the Cdn AB Regt. Disappointingly, when the Regiment went into its death spiral, some of its previous loudest supporters ran for cover and hid, denying any culpability in the tragedy. In some cases, they became the most ardent critics.

And so, although the disbandment of the Cdn AB Regt cannot be simply attributed to an inevitable by-product of an elite organization, the presence of a strong "Airborne Brotherhood," without the consistent strong leadership to maintain its core values and culture, contributed to its demise. The camaraderie, cohesion and tight bonds of the Airborne Brotherhood undisputedly fueled the combat effectiveness and efficiency of the Regiment. It was a catalyst for motivation, confidence and an unrelenting mission focus. In the words of one former member, "Nothing seemed insurmountable – a problem was just another hurdle."[243] A lack of leadership, however, destroyed its viability.

The case study of the Cdn AB Regt is a cautionary tale. The simple fact that an organization is elite, or that it has a tight "Brotherhood" does not foreshadow problems. Conversely, it is more than

likely an indication of combat effectiveness. Quite simply, strong leadership, which is intolerant to non-acceptable behaviour and promotes critical self-reflection, is fundamental to ensuring the "brotherhood" promotes cohesion and group identity but does not translate into an untouchable cult of the elite. Weak leadership, however, which fails to make the hard decisions and to enforce the core values through action and discipline, and does not simply repeat them gratuitously, will inevitably lead to crisis.

The challenge with Brotherhoods, however, lies in self-identification. No-one in the Cdn AB Regt prior to disbandment felt that there was a cultural or real substantive leadership issue. The "a few bad apples" refrain continued up to and after disbandment. Politicians, journalists and senior officers were all to blame for the demise of the Regiment. Few understood, or at least conceded, that there were problems, which evolved and deepened over time, with the Airborne culture and Brotherhood. This failure of realization is not difficult to comprehend. It is challenging to see warts from the inside, especially as they slowly evolve. As a result, to bring additional clarity to the matter, a few more examples are provided of issues that can arise, no matter how elite or expert a unit, command, or institution, when leadership fails to closely regulate and control its members.

U.S. SOF

A stark example of failure to rein in the "Brotherhood" is the U.S. Special Operations Command, which suffered a number of very public scandals that included: the beating and killing of captives in Afghanistan and Iraq; charges of negligent homicide related to a hazing death; drug use and smuggling; domestic violence, and an entire SEAL Team ejected from Iraq for drinking and debauchery.[244]

In fact, the most recent National Defense Authorization Act emphasized the "growing congressional concern with misconduct,

ethics, and professionalism" within the Command.[245] Moreover, Lieutenant-General Francis Beaudette, Commander Army Special Operations Command, in a 29 November 2018 memorandum to force, wrote, "Recent incidents in our formation have called our ethics and professionalism into question, and threaten to undermine the trust bestowed on us by the American people and our senior leadership."[246]

Factors for the sudden increase in misconduct include the fact that U.S. SOF forces have doubled since 1999, and they have been squeezed by the relentless pressure of persistent combat operations. However, the "Brotherhood" and the unwillingness to censure "Brothers" also plays a large role. As the recent USSOCOM-directed *Comprehensive Review* concluded, "not only potential cracks in the SOF foundations at the individual and team level [were discovered], but also through the chain of command, specifically in the core tenets of leadership, discipline and accountability."[247] The Review Team added, "… those who did deploy forward, specifically in some degree of combat, are held as almost an infallible standard bearer for the rest of the organization to emulate — seemingly regardless of if it is a positive or negative standard."[248]

Additionally, the Review Team noted that some USSOCOM personnel are allowing the "special" label go to their heads, starting with their first days in the military.[249] Lieutenant-General David Barno and Dr. Nora Bensahel argued:

> Special operations culture is increasingly characterized by a sense of entitlement. Dangerous problems with entitlement are growing throughout the force, but are particularly acute in the special operations community. From the very start of their selection and training, prospective members of special operations units are

> segregated from the conventional military, which is often held in barely disguised contempt. Newly assessed operators are repeatedly told that they are the best of the best, and are immersed in an environment marked by seemingly unlimited resources. Even during times of tight defense budgets, special operations units have generally been protected from large cuts and continue to acquire new and expensive gadgets and weaponry. Many of these units have their own fitness trainers and dieticians, expensive gyms and special dining facilities, and treated like elite athletes preparing for the Olympics. Some units adhere to relaxed grooming standards, wearing beards and long hair which further marks them as exempt from normal military regulations. While many of these measures are needed to prepare special operations forces for the strenuous demands of their missions, they also instill special operators with an unhealthy sense of privilege from their very first days in the community. And the pressures of constant deployments and casualties make it all too easy for that privilege to transform into entitlement and a sense that normal military standards and discipline no longer apply.[250]

General Richard D. Clarke, the current USSOCOM Commander, conceded that in practice "leaders often hesitate to deal with a problem, either because they are afraid of punching a hole in their formation and blowing their readiness for combat, or because they are afraid that misconduct in their formation will be a black mark on their career advancement." He explained:

> The other facet is that treasuring of combat skill while disregarding personal conduct. To a special operations team, where the utmost skill can be the difference

> between life or death, it's a tough sell to say that a leader should take someone out of their formation because he's got a problem. Who's to say everyone will come home without him? He was well known, well thought of, had been in multiple deployments, but his character and what I had personally observed of him — but his leaders all said this guy should deploy – "This guy is so good in combat, we need him." I allowed him to deploy, and my gut said I should not. I allowed him to deploy and he committed crimes.[251]

Clarke stressed, "When our country sends SOF abroad, they send us into some of the most ambiguous situations. They do so because they trust us to handle these missions with competence and character. Trust is our currency with our leaders and the American people," he said, adding that "tough calls" will be necessary to reinforce the trust." He further recognized, "Culture does not tend itself - it must be cultivated by leaders and only active, consistent engagement from leaders at every level will make us better."[252]

Lieutenant-General Beaudette concurred. "It is incumbent upon our leadership down to the team-room level to intensify our emphasis on [Army SOF] values and character." He argued, "Service is a privilege, and this privilege is grounded in a culture of accountability and professionalism that extends far beyond program compliance."[253]

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) attempted to assist with the education component of ensuring SOF operators better understand the issues at play. A JSOU briefing note on ethics clarified:

1. Individual moral character is neither inherent nor fixed. Ethical decision-making requires continuing education for even the most experienced SOF operators. Members of SOF units who cannot be shaped by education and experience must be removed from SOF formations;

2. Despite rigorous selection and training programs, SOF operators will be morally challenged when they are least prepared to deal with it. Ethical problem-solving skills must be developed and strengthened;

3. SOF ethical decision-making must be developed with honest and frank consideration for the harsh realities of SOF environments and operational requirements. SOF units must see the world for the way it is, not for how they might want it to be;

4. Binary ethical codes do not provide sufficient guidance in SOF environments. In fact, strict adherence to binary ethical codes can be harmful in some SOF environments;

5. SOF leaders should not be naïve or insensitive to human behavior and must recognize that people are not as ethical as they think they are. SOF operators need training to close the gap between the expectation and reality of what they must do; and

6. SOF culture must become an environment where conversations about ethical decisions, good and bad, are a natural occurrence.[254]

In the end, General Clarke summed up the issue. "The bottom line," he asserted, "is that we have disproportionately focused on SOF employment and mission accomplishment at the expense of the training and development of our force. In some cases, this imbalance has set conditions for unacceptable conduct to occur due to a lack of leadership, discipline and accountability."[255] As noted throughout, the issue of lack of leadership, discipline and accountability is often exacerbated by a strong "Brotherhood" that is reluctant to be seen as "turning" on its own. Even with the evidence of events, the *Comprehensive Review* findings and the exhortations of senior commanders, there remains a strong

chorus of denial stating that enough effort has gone into examining culture and ethics within the force, "its time to move on."

Kommando Spezialkräfte (KSK)

The absence of accountability and willingness of leadership at all levels to deal with known incidents of misconduct or questionable behaviour as a result of a Brotherhood also recently raised its ugly head in Germany in the elite KSK that was formed in 1996. A total of 20 KSK commandos are currently under investigation for suspected ties to the far-right. The Government considered that number out of a force of only 1,400 concerning enough that it stood-up an independent commission to examine ways to overhaul the KSK.[256]

The Commission concluded that the KSK "cannot continue to exist in its current form" and must be "better integrated into the Bundeswehr [German army]."[257] The allegations include a KSK sergeant-major hiding a cache of weapons in a bunker at his home; other leaders within the unit using the Hitler salute, listening to neo-Nazi music and playing a game involving the tossing of a pig's head. In addition, approximately 62 kilograms of explosives and 48,000 rounds of ammunition are unaccounted for. Defense Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer berated the "toxic leadership culture" and a "wall of silence" among its members."[258] She went so far as to disband one of its combat sub-units and announced a restructuring of the organization.[259]

The defense minister described the restructuring as a chance for a "reset" of the elite commando force. Germany needs the KSK, Kramp-Karrenbauer said, but she would be going through it with an "iron broom." She has given the remaining KSK soldiers until 31 October 2020 to prove themselves worthy of the institution. The defense minister cautioned that the entire KSK might be dissolved if the problems continue.[260] She announced that KSK

operations will be moved to other units as far as possible, and the force will not take part in international exercises and missions until further notice.[261]

Australian SOF – SASR

Australian SOF is yet another case study worthy of note. The Government launched a probe in 2016 to investigate a disturbing number of war crimes committed by the country's Special Forces in Afghanistan, including the killing of civilians and prisoners. An annual report by the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force said 55 separate incidents were being investigated as part of a years-long probe into allegations Australian soldiers committed war crimes while serving in Afghanistan. The report noted that the incidents relate primarily to unlawful killings of "persons who were non-combatants or were no longer combatants", as well as "cruel treatment" of such persons. The initial review was instigated due to "rumours" of "very serious wrongdoing" over more than a decade by members of Australian Special Forces in Afghanistan.[262]

Major-General Adam Findlay, commander of Australia's Special Forces, conceded that some elite soldiers committed war crimes in Afghanistan. He blamed the misconduct on "poor moral leadership." Moreover, he admitted that war crimes may have been covered up and that Australia's Special Forces will take a decade to recover from the long running investigation overseen by senior New South Wales judge Paul Brereton.[263] The Brereton Inquiry identified "trigger pullers" and "names that come up beyond the trigger pullers" who enabled war crimes. The Inquiry has prompted the Australian Government to manage public "expectations ahead of the release of the Brereton report, warning that it will make for 'uncomfortable reading' and could lead to significant structural reform of the Special Forces."[264]

Reacting to the allegations and investigation, General Findlay attributed the atrocities to "one common cause," specifically,

"poor moral leadership."[265] He did take heart from one positive outcome, namely, some SAS soldiers "were brave enough to blow the whistle on war crimes." He lauded their "moral courage" while cautioning those who had lied to Justice Brereton out of "misguided loyalty" as "perjurers" and warning them that they would be removed from the SAS "as a minimum."[266]

The aspect of the Brotherhood and the impact of poor leadership did not escape General Findlay. He explained that a small number of commissioned officers had allowed a culture where abhorrent conduct was permitted. One SAS officer admitted that commanders "allowed a culture where lower ranked soldiers became more influential than their officers." He explained, "You've got guys doing six or seven tours with heavy combat…all these things [influence of experienced other ranks, toll of combat, wild swings in tasks and national strategy] led to a culture and an environment where I think there was a degree of impunity." He conceded, "the only thing that was important to us was our own tribe. We didn't trust anyone."[267]

This admission was not lost on General Findlay. He asserted that a handful of experienced soldiers including patrol commanders and deputy patrol commanders, who typically led five-man SAS teams on missions, had also enabled this culture to exist.[268] "If you have led a command climate that has permitted people to think egregiously wrong acts [are allowed], you need to be rooted out. One, as an individual and, two, as a group," he asserted.[269] An external review in 2016 also reinforced the dysfunctional culture that was allowed to exist. Australian sociologist Samantha Crompvoets, who conducted a review of Australian Special Forces' culture, alluded to "a culture of impunity about the use of force, illicit drug use and poisonous rivalries between the Special Air Service and Commando regiments."[270]

The revelations were disheartening. General Findlay recognized that it was unfair that the misconduct of a few soldiers had damaged the reputation of the majority of the SAS who had done nothing wrong. "I imagine this is tainting the regiment you love," he declared.[271] He went on to criticize a very small number of serving members who acted as "self righteous entitled prick[s]" who believed the rules of the regular army didn't apply to them. He explained that the "arrogance in this small group had fuelled a poor internal culture" and "caused all the problems" now facing the SAS.[272] Findlay went on to state that the "brutal truth" was that the war crimes scandal had caused "an issue of trust" between Special Forces and with the Australian people and the wider military. He said people within the SAS who "had nothing to do with this" now had to "serve to make this place better and pay for the sins" of others.[273] Findlay believes the fallout will last for a decade.[274]

In all of the military case studies the common thread is the wall of silence and the adherence of a loyalty to the Brotherhood that, through acts of commission and omission, fail to correct abhorrent behaviour. The importance of the misguided "loyalty" and concern for the reputation of the group, seems to outweigh the importance of doing the "right thing." Paradoxically, this misguided loyalty intended to protect the "brothers" and the organization, actually creating the exact opposite effect. In the end, the failure to correct misconduct and the dark side of elitism destroy the credibility and trust required from the chain-of-command, government and society that military elites serve.

Importantly, this is not an issue exclusively prevalent in military elite Brotherhoods. It is also present in "Brotherhoods" in other organizations and institutions. The results of poor leadership in these entities has a similar devastating effect.

Law Enforcement

The "Blue Brotherhood" is another case in point. For decades the "Blue Brotherhood" could withstand criticism and complaints of abuse of authority or misconduct because of its wall of silence. "Brothers" would never turn on another. Lying, perjury, actively covering up or simply turning a blind eye to the misdeeds of others was normally enough to ensure no allegation would lead to "harm" of any law enforcement individual under scrutiny. The penalty of betraying the Brotherhood would be abandonment in the field when assistance was required. While transgressions of behaviour may have been limited to a few, the requirements of the Brotherhood shackled the majority. The system, despite outrage and condemnation by those outside law enforcement, was seemingly impervious. Claims of "I feared for my life" and a subsequent lack of evidence, ensured most cases that actually made it to court ended in acquittals.

A recent American grand-jury decision to indict a police officer made a point of emphasizing that there is a strong sense "that police departments across the country are simply not held accountable enough." Criminologists and other experts note that "police officers are typically given the benefits of all doubts in the use of force and are rarely prosecuted."[275]

Significantly, the advent of the cell phone and the internet, where everyone is a potential reporter and live events are streamed to millions in real time (and could be accessed by anyone without limit) could not be easily denied or defended. Slowly the persistent videos that emerged began to fuel the injustice and outrage many felt. The Brotherhood could no longer protect the guilty. In fact, even those who chose not to participate, but equally, did nothing to stop the inappropriate behavior, were now also swept up in the backlash.

The 25 May 2020, unlawful death of George Floyd seemingly was the final straw. Violent protests against police brutality and racism erupted across the United States, with similar action occurring in Canada and some European countries as well. The inability, or refusal, of law enforcement leadership to ensure that the Blue Brotherhood was not a vehicle for protecting those who committed unlawful activities or abused their authority now caught up with them.[276] The unrelenting protests, many which became extremely violent, ensured that politicians, civic leaders and the general public could no longer ignore the issue.

For example, on 6 June 2020 alone, half a million people turned out in nearly 550 places across the United States.[277] Moreover, four recent polls indicated that about 15 million to 26 million people in the United States have participated in demonstrations for George Floyd in the weeks following his death.[278] Similarly, a *Times* analysis reported that across the United States, there have been more than 4,700 demonstrations, or an average of 140 per day, since the first protests began in Minneapolis on 26 May.[279]

"It's a blue issue," acknowledged Frank Serpico, the former New York City detective whose efforts to expose corruption were made famous in a 1973 movie starring Al Pacino. "The fact is that police have never been accountable," Serpico conceded.[280] The failure to act for so long now erupted in an enormous international movement.

The cost to the law enforcement institution has been severe. Not only has it become more difficult for police to perform their vital duties, but their credibility as an institution, and the level of trust from the society they serve, plummeted. Calls for defunding police, reallocation and redirection of funding from police departments to other government agencies, and massive payouts for police wrongdoing have cost police departments and municipalities hundreds of millions of dollars.[281]

The statistics are compelling. According to the *Wall Street Journal*, the ten cities in the U.S. with the largest police departments paid out $248.7 million in 2014 in settlements and court judgments in police-misconduct cases. The city of Chicago in the first eight weeks of 2018 paid out $20 million in police misconduct lawsuits. New York City paid a record $302 million in 2017 for police misconduct lawsuits.[282]

Moreover, in Los Angeles at least $100 million was reallocated away from Los Angeles Police Department to programs for minority communities. Similarly, San Francisco has stated it will work with community groups to reprioritize funding. Baltimore City Council voted to reallocate $22 million away from the police department's fiscal budget for 2021, which is typically over $500 million.[283] Closer to home, on 6 June 2020, Edmonton city council decided to cut $11 million over two years from the Edmonton Police Service budget.[284]

Once again, the failure to demonstrate strong leadership within a Brotherhood led to cataclysmic negative results. Weeks of protests causing billions of dollars of damage and unanticipated government funding for extra policing, to repair damage and to settle payments created fiscal difficulties when economies were already reeling from the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, the credibility of, and the trust in, the law enforcement institution writ large, collapsed. As a result, the task for front-line police officers has become more difficult. Additionally, demands for defunding police and reallocating those funds has, and will continue, to create stress on budgets and the ability to deliver the required law enforcement.

Roman Catholic Church

The final example is the "Brotherhood of the Cloth." Similar to the Blue Brotherhood, the Clergy for decades has allowed the

Brotherhood to shield those who have done heinous harm to others. Rather than deal with the perpetrators of crime, they were hidden away, redeployed and their sins denied. The Catholic Church actively condoned through its practice of enabling and systematically covering up the rape and molestation of children by priests. Their focus was a zealous protection of the organization and those in it, rather than an emphasis on protecting those external to it. Pope Francis, on a visit to Dublin, Ireland, confided, "The failure of ecclesial authorities – bishops, religious superiors, priests and others – to adequately address these repugnant crimes has rightly given rise to outrage, and remains a source of pain and shame for the Catholic community."[285]

The cost to the institution has been immense. Aside from the loss of credibility, trust and respect, the Catholic Church has paid out nearly $4 Billion in lawsuits over allegation of clerical sexual abuse leading back to the 1980s.[286] The issue has been worldwide. For example, in Ireland, four Dublin archbishops were found to have effectively turned a blind eye to cases of abuse from 1975 to 2004. The Dublin archdiocese conceded it "operated in a culture of concealment, placing the integrity of its institutions above the welfare of the children in its care."[287] The German Catholic Church concluded at least 3,677 people were abused by clergy between 1946 and 2014. It reported every sixth case involved rape and at least 1,670 clergy were involved.[288] Similarly, in Australia a four-year national investigation determined 4,444 people were abused at more than 1,000 Catholic institutions between 1980 and 2015. Approximately seven percent of Catholic priests in Australia between 1950-2010 were accused of sexually abusing children.[289]

Investigations in the United States reveal similar conclusions. In September 2003, the Boston archdiocese agreed to pay $85 million to settle more than 500 civil suits accusing priests of sexual abuse and church officials of concealment.[290] A report commissioned

by the Church the following year exposed that 4,000 American Roman Catholic priests had faced sexual abuse allegations in the last 50 years, in cases involving more than 10,000 children. This acknowledgement resulted in a series of huge payouts, the largest being $660 million from the Los Angeles Archdiocese in 2007.[291]

And, this was not all. In 2018, Pennsylvania's Supreme Court released a massive report on decades of alleged abuse in six of the state's eight dioceses. The report, the culmination of a two-year grand jury investigation supervised by the state attorney general's office, laid out what "clearly amounts to a criminal conspiracy, breathtaking in its scope, reaching from parishes and parochial schools to the Vatican." The report "named 300 accused predator priests, who allegedly abused at least 1,000 victims." Incredibly, those implicated involved bishops, archbishops and even cardinals.[292]

The examples provide only a snapshot of the scope and scale of the active conspiracy and actions to hide the abhorrent behaviour of members of the Brotherhood of the Cloth. Rather than uphold the stated values and principles, not to mention the responsibility of the institution, the leadership at all levels of the Church chose instead to protect their fellow clergy and the reputation of the institution. The eventual cost of this failure of leadership, born of misplaced loyalty, has been immense.

At this point it is important to reiterate that a strong Brotherhood is not intrinsically a bad thing. Conversely, it is a powerful enabler. The fundamental point is that elites and "Brotherhoods" require fervent leadership to ensure the values of the organization are upheld in practice, not just rhetoric or lip-service. Misplaced or blind loyalty damages the credibility, trust and reputation of an organization and can lead to its dismemberment. In essence, this misplaced loyalty can protect the minority while endangering the collective.

Equally imperative, the examples should provoke some deep self-reflection. The five examples given are certainly not outliers. Careful scrutiny of any organization will demonstrate incidents of behaviour or actions that are in contradiction to the group's stated values and ethos. Everyone can recount stories that are carefully safeguarded within the sanctity of the Brotherhood. However, the consistent failure to correct such behaviour can and will lead to cataclysmic consequences. However, it is difficult see the issues when you are immersed in the culture. As one senior officer of the SOCOM Commander's Action Group reflected, "we can't see it because we live it every day."

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The concept of an elite may be disdainful to some; however, military elites serve a necessary purpose to military institutions. Quite simply, they represent military capability and effectiveness. It is normally misunderstanding and misperception that breeds resistance and enmity. Learning to live with elites requires an effort by all parties. Although operational security can never be compromised, better effort is required to educate others and to challenge dated misconceptions (i.e. poor return on investment, lack of discipline, rejection of institutional processes, rules and regulations).

In addition, strong leadership is absolutely required at all levels to ensure the "Brotherhood" stands by its values and imposes a real discipline on its members. A reliance on self-discipline should be the primary expectation. However, transgressions must be transparently and aggressively dealt with. The underlying cultural assumptions within the group must be in consonance with the stated organizational values. Lapses in judgment must be addressed. Transgressions in military rules and regulations, particularly norms of behaviour, including perceived trivial

disregard of conventional military protocols, must be addressed to reinforce the importance of adhering to the organization's stated values. Turning a blind eye to lapses of discipline creates a slippery slope that normally leads to great turmoil for the entire organization. As most within the SOF community know, credibility and trust is the currency that allows SOF the manoeuvre space to best accomplish its mission.[293]

Similarly, the "conventional" military must make a better effort to understand the role, capabilities, and importance of elite military organizations. The existence of elite units should not be seen as a zero-sum game where the advance of one group means a net loss to the other. Each has an important role to play in the defence of the nation. It is a recognized fact that elite units normally require assistance from the conventional Services. Collaborative effort makes all parties stronger and more effective.

In the end, military elites represent an important capability in a nation's arsenal. In terms of "what is their value added," the answer lies in the capability that elites provide to the military institution and the government they serve. It is for this reason they have always survived despite the animosity and enmity that often surrounds the concept of elites.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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ENDNOTES

1 Mark Gollom, "Canadians say country split between ordinary folks and elites. But what is an elite?" *CBC News*, 1 July 2020, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/elites-canadians-politics-word-negative-1.5182816>, accessed 2 July 2020.

2 Ibid.

3 Interview with author, 28 April 1998.

4 Cited in Susan L. Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare. Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), 73.

5 Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action. The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 9-10.

6 Martin Kitchen, "Elites in Military History," in A. Hamish Ion and Keith Neilson, eds., *Elite Formations in War and Peace* (Wesport: Praeger, 1996), 8. The Australian military has a similar experience. SAS historian, D.H. Horner noted, "The Australian Army has always been ambivalent about special operations and special forces. Australians in general have been suspicious of anything which includes the word 'special.'...any organization which thinks of itself as special or elite is under suspicion." D.H. Horner, *SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle. A History of the Australian Special Air Service* (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1989), 19.

7 Tom Clancy, *Special Forces* (New York: A Berkley Book, 2001), 3.

8 Andy McNab, *Immediate Action* (London: Bantam Press, 1995), 381.

9 Katherine Barber, ed., *The Canadian Oxford Dictionary* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).

10 Kitchen, "Elites in Military History," 7.

11 See John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic - An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 27, 207; Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), 4; Geraint Parry, *Political*

Elites (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), 30-32; Sylvie Guillaume, ed., *Les Elites Fins de Siècles - XIX-XX Siècles* (Editions de la Maison des Sciences de L'Homme D'Aquitaine, 1992), 27; and M.S. Whittington and Glen Williams, eds., *Canadian Politics in the 1990s* (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1990), 82.

12 Hervé Bentégeant, *Les Nouveaux Rois de France ou La Trahison des Élites* (Paris: Éditions Ramsay, 1998), 19.

13 Parry, *Political Elites*, 3. This includes leadership positions of special interest groups. Those who lead such organizations are often designated as "elites," as differentiated by the "non-decision-making" mass of their members. Leo V. Panitch, "Elites, Classes, and Power in Canada," in Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, eds., *Canadian Politics in the 1990s, 3rd edition* (Scarborough, ON: Nelson Canada, 1990), 182.

14 Moshe M. Czudnowski, ed., *Political Elites and Social Change - Studies of Elite Roles and Attitudes* (Northern Illinois University Press, 1983), 221.

15 Parry, *Political Elites*, 13.

16 See Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic*, 27, 207.

17 Some scholars believe "The nation-state used to be a strong player in shaping national and international politics, albeit it is losing influence and power – and fast. Where it has been losing 'fastest and mostest' is in its own domestic political and social cohesion. In short, the elite goes more and more international while the majority of the population is being left in its slipstream to fight for themselves as best they can. The elite takes it cue from the global and international development. It buys international, it gets its information from international channels, it sends its children to internationally recognized universities, it communicates with the elite in other nation-states and not with the population inside the nation-states."

18 Reg Jennings, Charles Cox and C.L Cooper, *Business Elites. The Psychology of Entrepreneurs and Intrapreneur* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 10.

19 Christopher Lasch, *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 3, 5, 25-26. See also Guillaume, *Les Elites Fins de Siècles*, 112-113. In accordance with this

study, an elite must fulfill two conditions. First, it must be recognized by the respective 'local society' as an elite (By definition, the author states that the elite is of small composition). This aspect is symbolic in nature. The second requirement is that the elite have control and power over the cultural infrastructure of the society.

20 Parry, *Political Elites*, 75-76.

21 Douglas Porch, "The French Foreign Legion: The Mystique of Elitism," in A. Hamish Ion and Keith Neilson, eds., *Elite Formations in War and Peace* (Wesport: Praeger, 1996), 131.

22 Ibid., 126.

23 Steve Payne, "Hell is for Heroes," *The Ottawa Sunday Sun*, 19 March 1995, 6.

24 Porch, "The French Foreign Legion," 118.

25 Eva Etzioni-Halevy, "Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: The Case of the Military-Political Elites' Connection in Israel," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Spring 1996): 401.

26 Richard Szafranski, "Neocortical Warfare? The Acme of Skill," in *In Athena's Camp* (New York: Rand, 1999), 408.

27 Roger A. Beaumont, *Military Elites* (London: Robert Hale and Company, 1974), 2-3.

28 Gilles Perrault, *Les Parachutistes* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1961), 42.

29 Eliot A. Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 17.

30 Colin S. Gray, *Explorations in Strategy* (London: Greenwood Press, 1996), 158. The question of selection is important. For an example using one school of thought to highlight the point, SOF, which are universally seen as elite, as an example their selection/status is based upon a three-tier basis. For instance, 'Tier One' SOF consists of primarily 'Black Ops,' or counter terrorism. Normally, only 10-15 percent of those attempting selection are successful. What makes this number so impressive is that a large percentage of those trying are already second or third tier SOF members. Organizations that fall into this category include the U.S. 1st Special

Forces Operational Detachment - Delta, the German Grenzschutzgruppe-9 (GSG 9), and the Canadian Joint Task Force - 2 (JTF 2). 'Tier Two' SOF reflects those organizations that have a selection pass rate of between 20-30 percent. They are normally entrusted with high value tasks, such as Strategic Reconnaissance and Unconventional Warfare. Some examples include the American Special Forces (also referred to as Green Berets), the American SEALs, and the British, Australian, and New Zealand SAS. 'Tier Three' consists of those units, such as the American Rangers and the British Royal Marine Commandos, that have a selection success rate of 40-45 percent, and whose primary mission is Direct Action. See Colonel C.A. Beckwith, *Delta Force* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1985), 123,137; Leroy Thompson, *The Rescuers. The World's Top Anti-Terrorist Units* (London: A David & Charles Military Book, 1986), 127-128; General Ulrich Wegener, Presentation to the RMC Special Operations Symposium, 5 October 2000; Judith E. Brooks and Michelle M. Zazanis, "Enhancing U.S. Army Special Forces: Research and Applications," *ARI Special Report 33*, October 1997, 8; General H.H. Shelton, "Quality People: Selecting and Developing Members of U.S. SOF," *Special Warfare*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Spring 1998): 3; Commander Thomas Dietz, CO Seal Team 5, Presentation to the RMC Special Operations Symposium, 5 October 2000; Leary, 265; Bernd Horn and Tony Balasevicius, eds., *Casting a Light on the Shadow* (Toronto: CDA Press / Dundurn, 2007), Chapter 1; and Colonel Bill Kidd, "Ranger Training Brigade," *U.S. Army Infantry Center Infantry Senior Leader Newsletter*, February 2003, 8-9.

31 Porch, "The French Foreign Legion," 117.

32 Eric Morris, *Churchill's Private Armies* (London: Hutchinson, 1986), xiii. See also David Chandler, "Indispensable Role of Elite Forces," *Military History Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Spring 2003): 77-78.

33 Tom Clancy, *Airborne* (New York: Berkley Books, 1997), xviii.

34 Mark Lloyd, *Special Forces - The Changing Face of Warfare* (New York: Arms and Armour, 1995), 11.

35 David Miller, *Special Forces* (London: Salamander Books, 2001), 15. Similarly, author Duncan Anderson defined military elites as "a relatively small highly trained force specializing in extremely hazardous operations, often of a militarily non-conventional nature." Duncan Anderson, *Military Elites* (London: Bison Books Ltd., 1994), 7.

36 Tom Clancy, with General Fred Franks, *Into the Storm. A Study in Command* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997), 119.

37 Clancy, *Special Forces*, 4.

38 Major-General (ret'd) Robert H. Scales Jr., *Yellow Smoke. The Future of Land Warfare for America's Military* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003), 69.

39 Matt Labash, "The New Army," *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 6, No. 31 (30 April 2001).

40 Dennis Showalter, "German Army Elites in World Wars I and II," Ion and Neilson, *Elite Formations in War*, 152.

41 James Lucas, *Storming Eagles. German Airborne Forces in World War II* (London: Cassel & Co., 2001), 14.

42 Kitchen, "Elites in Military History," 26.

43 See D.R. Segal, Jesse Harris, J.M. Rothberg, and D.H. Marlowe, "Paratroopers as Peacekeepers," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Summer 1984): 489; and Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia. A Socio-cultural Inquiry* (Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997), 128-138. Gideon Aran stated, "Jumping can be viewed as a test which allows those who pass it to join an exclusive club, to be initiated into an elite group." Gideon Aran, "Parachuting," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 80, No. 1 (1974): 150.

44 Miller, *Special Forces*, 8. Miller goes on to give a further, albeit more convoluted definition of elite: Elite - "some are selected and trained for a special role, for which conventional troops do not have either the special weapons or training needed. Other elites are given a special designation earned by a particularly meritorious performance in battle and are then expected to set an example which other elements should follow. Other elites are formed on an ethnic or tribal basis, of which the best known are the Gurkhas. Two well-known elites are formed by units of foreigners: the French Foreign Legion and the Spanish Legion. The majority of special units are, however, associated with countering modern terrorism." Ibid., 15.

45 This emphasis on discernable differences between the "special" units and their "conventional" brethren became the core of the Canadian

military's understanding of elite. Many senior commanders defined and treated the Canadian paratroopers as elite, at least, prior to the Somalia debacle, based upon the higher levels of fitness, distinctive uniform, and the parachuting requirement. Colonel Painchaud, a former Airborne Regimental Commander, was representative of many when he explained, "…the airborne soldier is the elite of the Canadian Army. He must be in top shape compared to any other soldier, in physical fitness and shooting and weapon handling." Dick Brown, "Hanging Tough," *Quest*, May 1978, 12. See also Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, Information Legacy. A Compendium of Source Material from the Commission of Inquiry (Hereafter Information Legacy). [CD-ROM], 1998, Hearing Transcripts, Vol 36, 22 January 1996, testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel Morneault, 6898.

46 In the context of this monograph as in most literature SOF units are considered elite. As such, while most, if not all SOF units are elite, not all elite military units are SOF.

47 Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians*, 95.

48 Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War. Their Finest Hour* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company Boston, 1950 second ed.), 413-414.

49 Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War. Their Finest Hour* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), 413-414 and 467. See also Hilary St. George Saunders, *The Green Beret. The Story of the Commandos* (London: Michael Joseph, 1956), 29-30.

50 Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, 467; and Robert W. Black, *Rangers in World War II* (New York: Ivy Books, 1992), 8.

51 "Role of the Special Service Brigade and Desirability of Reorganization," 2. National Archives (NA), DEFE 2/1051, Special Service Brigade, role, re-organization, 1943-1944.

52 Anthony Kemp, *The SAS at War* (London: John Murray, 1991), 10.

53 Field Marshal Sir William Slim, *Defeat into Victory* (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1956), 548.

54 See Charles Messenger, *The Commandos 1940-1946* (London: William Kimber, 1985), 408; Morris, *Churchill's Private Armies*, 172 & 243 and Brigadier T.B.L. Churchill, "The Value of Commandos," *RUSI*, Vol. 65, No. 577 (February 1950): 85-86.

55 "Precis of a Memorandum by Commander 1 Airborne Corps on the Value and Future Use of SAS Regiment," 6. NA, WO 193/705, "Future of SAS Regiment."

56 "Precis of a Memorandum by Commander 1 Airborne Corps on the Value and Future Use of SAS Regiment," 4. NA, WO 193/705, "Future of SAS Regiment."

57 Thomas K. Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action. The Challenge of Unconventional Warfare* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 40.

58 Gray, *Explorations in Strategy,* 223.

59 Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: the birth of Special Forces* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986), 155.

60 Alfred H. Paddock, *U.S. Army Special Warfare. Its Origins* (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 1982), 148.

61 Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets*, 147.

62 General Sir Peter de la Billière, *Looking For Trouble. SAS to Gulf Command* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995), 102.

63 H.R. Simpson, *The Paratroopers of the French Foreign Legion* (London: Brassey's, 1997), 39. The author noted a similar mentality in the Pentagon which tended to "label U.S. Special Forces 'snake eaters' and to shortchange the budget for Special Operation Forces."

64 Cited in Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action*, 70, 148. See also Michael Duffy, Mark Thompson, and Michael Weisskopf, "Secret Armies of the Night," *Time* Vol. 161, Issue 25 (23 June 2003).

65 Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action*, 75.

66 Ibid., 69.

67 Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare,* 4, 35, 40 & 78. Special Forces manning went from the tens of thousands to 3,600 personnel.

68 Ibid., 68.

69 Colonel F.J. Kelly, *Vietnam Studies: US Army Special Forces, 1961-1971* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1977), 160; and cited in David Charters and Maurice Tugwell, eds., *Armies in Low Intensity Conflict* (London: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1989), 32.

70 The stand-up of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) in 2006 was forcefully contested both overtly and covertly by a number of Service chiefs who felt the new command was unnecessary and a threat to their resources, both in personnel, equipment and budgets. See Colonel (retired) Bernd Horn, *We Will Find A Way: The Canadian Special Operations Legacy* (Kingston: CANSOFCOM ERC Press, 2018), 83-87. Another example, in the depths of Africa, torn by internal strife and rampant with insurgency, a lethargy to new ideas still remained. Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Reid Daly, in his efforts to establish the Selous Scouts in the former Rhodesia, observed, "I began to get the feeling of a distinct resistance block against me personally, and the scheme as a whole." Peter Stiff, *Selous Scouts. Top Secret War* (Alberton, South Africa: Galago Publishing Inc., 1982), 54. Only 15 percent of candidates passed the Selous Scouts selection course. Ibid., 137.

71 Terry White, *Swords of Lightning: Special Forces and the Changing Face of Warfare* (London: Brassey's, 1997), 1.

72 Ibid., 117.

73 Cited in Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare,* 107.

74 Major-General J. L.Hobson, "AF Special Operations Girds for Next Century Missions," *National Defense*, February 1997, 27.

75 Clancy, *Special Forces*, 12; D.C. Waller*, Commandos. The Inside Story of America's Secret Soldiers* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1994), 231 and D.C. Waller, "Secret Warriors," *Newsweek*, 17 June 1991, 21.

76 Waller, *Commandos*, 231; and Waller, "Secret Warriors," 21.

77 Waller, *Commandos*, 230. In the end, despite his initial reluctance to use SOF, he later singled out those forces as critical to the allied victory. Approximately 7,705 SOF personnel participated in all.

78 Cited in Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare*, 6.

79 Robin Moore, *The Hunt for Bin Laden. Task Force Dagger* (New York: Ballentine Books, 2003), 21, 31-32.

80 Colonel (retired) W. Hays Parks, "Should Marines 'Join' Special Operations Command?" *Proceedings* Vol. 129, (May 2003): 4. See also Tom Clancy, *Shadow Warriors. Inside Special Forces* (New York: Putnam, 2002), 221.

81 Interview with author, 4 October 1996. One sergeant-major of the British 2nd Parachute Regiment stated that in airborne units, the officers and men rely upon one another. He explained, "A special bond was created because of the fact that the men knew that the officers, like them, endured the same difficult training prior to arriving at Regiment." Rory Bridson, *The Making of a Para* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson Ltd, 1989), 81. Major-General Newman declared, "There's a close bond between the airborne soldier and his officer, because each knows the other has passed the jump test. And they continue to do so together. Each believes the other will be a good man to have around when things get sweaty." Major-General A.S. Newman, *What Are Generals Made Of?* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1987), 193.

82 E. Aronson and J. Mills, "The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group," *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology* (1957): 157-158. Elliot Aronson of Stanford University and Judson Mills of the U.S. Army Leadership and Human Research Unit established this in their 1959 laboratory experiments. They stated, "Subjects who underwent a severe initiation perceived the group as being significantly more attractive than those who underwent a mild or no initiation." See also R.B. Cialdini, *Influence. Science & Practise, 3rd ed.* (Arizona: Harper Collins, 1993), 70, 74; and Major James McCollum, "The Airborne Mystique," in *Military Review* Vol. 56, No. 11 (November 1976): 16.

83 W.D. Henderson, *Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat* (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1985), 14.

84 Elmar Dinter, *Hero or Coward* (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 41; and Anthony Kellet, *Combat Motivation* (Boston: Nijhoff Publishing, 1982), 45-46.

85 There is a potential down-side to the constant reach for perfection, namely the pursuit never ends. For example, one former commander of CANSOFCOM noted, "Our mottos, ethos all work against us – relentless pursuit of excellence holds us back. Example, sniper course – best in the world yet our guys always say it needs to get better." Lieutenant-General Mike Rouleau, Context & Strategy Session, 19 August 2016.

86 Lieutenant General Sir Cedric Delves, *Across an Angry Sea. The SAS in the Falklands War* (London: Hurst & Company, 2018), 3-4.

87 Ibid., 27.

88 Will Fowler, *The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D-Day* (London: Harper Collins, 2002), 29.

89 John Leary, "Searching for a Role: The Special Air Service (SAS) Regiment in the Malayan Emergency," *Army Historical Research,* Vol. 63, No. 296 (Winter 1996): 269.

90 Cited in Lawrence Colebrooke, *Special Operations Mental Toughness* (Middletown DE: private printing, 2019), 34.

91 Cited in Ibid., 34.

92 Mike Urban, *Task Force* Black (New York: St. Martin's Griffin, 2010), 15.

93 Linda Robinson, *Masters of Chaos. The Secret History of the Special Forces* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), xx.

94 Jon E. Lewis, *The Mammoth Book of Covert Ops* (Philadelphia: Running Press, 2014), 251.

95 Scales, *Yellow Smoke*, 69.

96 Barrie Pit, *The Crucible of War. Auchinleck's Command* (London: Cassell & Co., 1986), 7-8.

97 Delves, *Across an Angry Sea*, xvi.

98 Philip Warner, *Phantom* (London: William Kimber, 1982), 11.

99 Damien Lewis, *The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare* (New York: Quercus, 2016), 164.

100 Morris, *Churchill's Private Armies*, 90.

101 Slim, *Defeat into Victory*, 547.

102 Cited in James Kiras, *Special Operations and Strategy* (London: Routledge, 2006), 90.

103 Clancy, *Airborne*, 54.

104 See Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians*, 56-58.

105 Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, 546; and Morris, *Churchill's Private Army*, 243.

106 Library and Archives Canada (LAC), RG 24, Vol 12260, File: 1 Para Tps / 1, Message (G.S. 1647), Lieutenant-General McNaughton to Major-General Crerar, 19 August 1941.

107 "Precis of a Memorandum by Commander 1 Airborne Corps on the Value and Future Use of SAS Regiment," 4. NA, WO 193/705, "Future of SAS Regiment."

108 Ibid., 3. NA, WO 193/705, "Future of SAS Regiment." His assessment ran counter to an official WO Report that concluded, "Generally speaking a party of three or four specialists is as good as a party of twelve or fifteen normal good soldiers led by one officer. The size of the party is little guide to its operational efficiency." Ibid., 2. Nonetheless, a SAS historian noted, "There was a feeling among some officers that well-trained infantry could do all that was expected of the commandos, and that the formation of these special units represented a drain on infantry strength that was out of proportion to the results likely to be achieved." D.H. Horner, *SAS: Phantoms of the jungle. A history of the Australian Special Air Service* (Nashville: The Battery Press, 1989), 22.

109 Command Sergeant Major Eric L. Haney, *Inside Delta Force. The Story of America's Elite Counterterrorist Unit* (New York: A Dell Book, 2002), 97.

110 Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians*, 61. For example, General Matthew Ridgway commander UN forces in Korea, in April 1951 – one month into his tenure informed the Army that the Ranger units in Korea were not providing enough bang for the buck that they were costing the rest of the Army. As a result, he recommended deactivation of all Ranger units in Korea. Mike Moyer, *Oppose Any Foe. The Rise of America's Special Operations Forces* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 108.

111 Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action*, 162. For example, the annual small arms ammunition allotment for SEAL Team 6 was larger than that of the entire United States Marine Corps. Sean Naylor, *Relentless Strike. The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2015), 16.

112 Clancy, *Special Forces*, 3-4.

113 Churchill, "The Value of Commandos," 86.

114 Major-General David Lloyd Owen, *The Long Range Desert Group* (London: Leo Cooper, 2000), 12, 22; and Clancy and Franks, *Into the Storm*, 119.

115 Tom Clancy, with General Fred Franks, *Into the Storm. A Study in Command* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1997), 119.

116 Richard Holmes, *Acts of War. The Behaviour of Men in Battle* (New York; The Free Press, 1989), 25.

117 Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 199.

118 Beaumont, *Military Elites*, 192.

119 Lewis, *The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare*, 347.

120 Nicholas Rankin, *Ian Fleming's Commandos: The Story of 30 Assault Unit in WWII* (London: Faber & Faber, 2011), 246.

121 (Then) Brigadier-General Andrew Leslie, Address to the Commanding Officers Indoctrination Course, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, 20 June 2001.

122 Colonel J.W. Hackett, "The Employment of Special Forces," *RUSI*, Vol. 97, No. 585 (February 1952): 41; and Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians*, 74. Although the term elite is consistently used, the study was specifically on SOF type units. This is a common phenomenon. The term elite is often used interchangeably with SOF by authors.

123 Cohen, *Commandos and Politicians* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), 74.

124 Charles A. Cotton, "Military Mystique," (Source Canadian Airborne Forces Museum files – no publication material available.)

125 Cited in Moyer, *Oppose Any Foe*, 181.

126 Cited in Ibid., 181.

127 Alan Bell, presentation on SAS operations in the Falklands, 1982, 19 March 2004, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario.

128 Cameron Spence, *All Necessary Measures* (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 43.

129 Billière, *Looking For Trouble*, 117.

130 Spence, *All Necessary Measures*, 43. A humorous anecdote speaks to the issue of dress. An official GHQ Middle East Forces report recounted that GHQ dispatched a Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) patrol to rescue a Free French pilot that had crashed and was reported hiding near a well in enemy territory. The LRDG patrol located the well but could not find the pilot. As they were about to leave, he showed himself. It turned out he was reluctant to reveal himself because "he thought that the party of bearded and dishevelled ruffians could not possibly be British troops." "L.R.D.G.," circa 1942. Churchill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge, C 8-9.

131 Sean Rayment, *Tales from the Special Forces Club* (London: Collins, 2013), 46.

132 Lewis, *The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare*, 347.

133 Haney, *Inside Delta Force*, 20.

134 Delves, *Across an Angry Sea*, 6.

135 Morris, *Guerillas in Uniform*, 15.

136 "Long Range Desert Patrol," *Illustrated*, 24 October 1942, 14-15.

137 Lewis, *The Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare*, 263.

138 Adrian Weale, *Secret Warfare* (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1997), 154.

139 Kemp, *The SAS at War*, 11.

140 Charles M. Simpson III, *Inside the Green Berets. The First Thirty Years* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1983), 14; and Charles W. Sasser, *Raider* (New York: St. Martins, 2002), 186.

141 William O. Darby and William H. Baumer, *Darby's Rangers. We Led the Way* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, reprint 1993), 184. Wartime airborne commander Major-General R.E. Urquhart spoke to the issue of discipline in an elite organization. "Not unnaturally, the Division [1st Airborne] was perhaps over-weighted with 'characters'...The standard and morale of the units was as high as ever; but every trainer knows that thoroughbreds, exercised to racing pitch, are no easy problem to handle if there is no race to run!" C.F.H.G., "Airborne Commanders (5) Major-General R.E. Urquhart," *Pegasus*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (October 1948): 72.

142 Rita Hume, "Yank-Canadian Force in Italy Puts Fear in Hearts of NAZIs," *The Denver Post*, 6 August 1944. Hoover Institution, R.T. Frederick Fonds, Box 3, Accession 68009 8:39, File: Orders, correspondence 1942-48.

143 Urban, *Task Force Black*, 15.

144 Cited in John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005), 128.

145 Ibid., 21.

146 Billière, *Looking for Trouble,* 236.

147 Ibid., 98.

148 Greg Jaffe, "A Maverick's Plan to Revamp Army is Taking Shape," *Wall Street Journal*, 12 December 2003.

149 Dinter, *Hero or Coward,* 70.

150 John Talbot, "The Myth and Reality of the Paratrooper in the Algerian War," *Armed Forces and Society*, November 1976, 75; Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, 69; and Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 135-141.

151 Robert M. Gillespie, *Black Ops, Vietnam* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 65.

152 Ibid., 90.

153 General Stanley McChrystal, *My Share of the Task* (London: Portfolio / Penguin, 2013), 256.

154 Interview with former SOF member, September 2002.

155 Allan Bell, formerly of 22 SAS, Presentation to the RMC Special Operations Symposium, 5 October 2000.

156 Interview with Lieutenant-Colonels Watkin and Peter Bradley, 4 June 1998 and 15 September 1997 respectively. The derogatory term "LEG" originates from the Second World War. Regular infantry wore canvas "leggings" as part of their uniform. The "elite" paratroopers were spared this ordeal. They were issued with high cut "jump boots" into which the uniform trouser could be tucked. Needless to say, the paratroopers quickly christened their brethren with the contemptuous label

of "LEGs." A more contemporary version translates the meaning to "Lacking Enough Guts." This new meaning was, not surprisingly, a peacetime mutation. Beyond the obvious that "leggings" are no longer worn, the act of parachuting is seen as a test of individual courage. It had taken on an importance of far greater proportion than it did during the war. Since virtually all infanteers saw combat, and those in the regular line infantry for longer periods than the airborne units, the question of individual courage was rather moot.

157 Hackett, "The Employment of Special Forces," 35.

158 Adams, *US Special Operations Forces in Action*, 68.

159 Interview with Canadian infantry captain, 25 October 2002.

160 Hackett, "The Employment of Special Forces," 39.

161 Ibid.

162 Delves, *Across an Angry Sea*, xvii.

163 Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 26-133.

164 Allan Bell, formerly of 22 SAS, Presentation to the RMC Special Operations Symposium, 5 October 2000, Kingston, Ontario.

165 Henry Shakespeare, *Henry V*, "No Fear," Act IV, Scene 3, 3. <https://www.sparknotes.com/nofear/shakespeare/henryv/page_186/>, accessed 8 July 2020.

166 E. Aronson and J. Mills, "The Effect of Severity of Initiation on Liking for a Group," *Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology* (1957): 157-158. Elliot Aronson of Stanford University and Judson Mills of the U.S. Army Leadership and Human Research Unit established this in their 1959 laboratory experiments. They stated, "Subjects who underwent a severe initiation perceived the group as being significantly more attractive than those who underwent a mild or no initiation." See also R.B. Cialdini, *Influence. Science & Practise, 3rd ed.* (Arizona: Harper Collins, 1993), 70 & 74; and Major James McCollum, "The Airborne Mystique," *Military Review* Vol. 56, No. 11 (November 1976): 16.

167 W.D. Henderson, Cohesion: *The Human Element in Combat* (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1985), 14.

168 Richard Holmes, *Acts of War. The Behaviour of Men in Battle* (New York: The Free Press, 1989), 48.

169 Gavin Mortimer, *Stirling's Men. The inside history of the SAS in World War II* (London: Cassel, 2004), xxiii.

170 Joseph A. Springer, *The Black Devil Brigade. An Oral History* (New York: ibook Inc., 2001), xxiv.

171 Dinter, *Hero or Coward*, 70.

172 Confidential interview.

173 Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia*, 126-133.

174 E.H. Schein, T*he Corporate Culture Survival Guide* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999), 14.

175 Ibid., 22.

176 Dick Couch, *A Tactical Ethic. Moral Conduct in the Insurgent Battlespace* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 74.

177 Cited in Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia,* 192.

178 John Taft, Ken Tovo and John Forsythe, "SOF culture is the mission. Culture is key to special operations' transition to great power competition," Deloitte Insights, 16 July 2020. <https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/industry/public-sector/ethics-in-military-leadership.html>, accessed 16 July 2020.

179 For a definitive history of the Cdn AB Regt see Bernd Horn, *Bastard Sons: A Critical Examination of the Canadian Airborne Experience*, 1942-1995 (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishers, 2001).

180 See Lester B. Pearson, "Force for U.N.," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (April 1957); Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Tacaberry, "Keeping the Peace," *behind the headlines*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (September 1966): 7; "Appreciation and Proposed Options for the Structure of the Canadian Army Field Force 1965-1970 Period," 5 April 1965, 2. Directorate of History and Heritage (henceforth DHH), File 112.11.003 (D3) - Box 3; Canada, *Rationale For Canadian Defence Forces* (Ottawa: DND, 14 May 1968), 29. Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), File 90/452; General Jean V. Allard, *The Memoirs of General Jean V. Allard* (Vancouver: The University of British

Columbia Press, 1988); Paul Hellyer, Damn the Torpedoes. *My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1990); and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapter 5.

181 See Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 120. The perception held by FMC and NDHQ staffs had a real effect on the Regiment. During the initial period of the Regiment's establishment it suffered from a dearth of equipment. This shortage was due to the fact that no serious effort had been made at locating or obtaining equipment by the various staffs because no one thought the Regiment would actually be formed. It was not until the actual stand-up that a concerted effort was undertaken.

182 "General Allard," Rochester recalled later, "was determined it would happen." He further added that Lieutenant-General Anderson, the FMC Commander, "was convinced." Rochester readily admitted, however, that "no one else seemed to be." He also remembered being told as late as February 1968, "by a very senior officer, who was a friend of mine, that I might as well forget it because the Airborne Regiment would never be formed." Colonel D.H. Rochester, "Birth of a Regiment," The Maroon Beret, 20th Anniversary Edition (1988), 34; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 120.

183 "Formation of the Canadian Airborne Regiment - Activation and Terms of Reference," 15 May 1967, 3.

184 Ibid., 3.

185 Ibid., 2.

186 The official CAF magazine, *Sentinel*, announced the creation of the Cdn AB Regt and underlined its special mandate. It noted, "Some personnel will be trained to carry out deep penetration patrols, while others in all arms of the regiment will be trained in underwater diving techniques. There will be jumpers who specialize in High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) techniques for infiltrations patrols or pathfinder duties. "…Scattered throughout the Regiment will be soldiers who speak a variety of second languages." Major K.G. Roberts, "Canadian Airborne Regiment," *Sentinel*, (June 1968): 2.

187 "Canadian Airborne Regiment - Operational Concept, Annex C" (written by the Cdn AB Regt planning staff) and *CFP 310 (1) - Airborne, Volume 1, The Canadian Airborne Regiment*, 1968, Chapter 1, Sect 2, "Role, Capabilities and Employment."

188 Cited in Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia,* 117.

189 Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Marc Lessard, interview with author, 21 February 2012.

190 Colonel Clyde Russel, interview with author, 21 February 2014.

191 Colonel Clyde Russel, interview with author, 21 February 2014. Brigadier-General James Cox shared, "In our hearts we equated ourselves with the SAS and the SF [Special Forces] in the U.S." Brigadier-General Jim Cox, interview with author, 27 April 2010.

192 Colonel Mike Beaudette, interview with author, 4 May 2009.

193 Colonel David Barr, interview with author 31 August 1997.

194 Major Brett Nesbit, interview with author, 5 May 2015.

195 Captain Greg Grant, interview with author, 26 March 2015.

196 Major Charlie McKnight, interview with author 9 November 2009.

197 Ibid.

198 Chief Warrant Officer Joe MacInnis, interview with author, 23 September 2014.

199 Chief Warrant Officer Tom Verner, interview with author, 28 August 2012.

200 Chief Warrant Officer Dan Legault, interview with author, 13 August 2013.

201 Master Warrant Officer Dale Allen, interview with author, 30 January 2013.

202 Ibid.

203 Colonel David Barr, interview with author 31 August 1997.

204 Colonel David Barr, interview with author, 17 September 2014.

205 Lieutenant-Colonel Denis Hartnett, interview with author, 23 September 2012.

206 Ibid.

207 Chief Warrant Officer Joe MacInnis, interview with author, 23 September 2014.

208 There is overwhelming consensus on this issue by former Airborne personnel who served in leadership positions (i.e. Regimental Commanders, Commanding Officers, Officers Commanding, Regimental Sergeant-Majors (RSM), Commando Sergeant-Majors (CSM)). All conceded that there were numerous, and very blatant, instances of weak personnel being posted in. In the same vein, it was noted that the calibre of replacements was often directly related to the COs and RSMs of the dispatching units. Not surprisingly, there was agreement from those interviewed that those COs and RSMs without Airborne experience were more likely to unload weak or "problem" personnel. See Mobile Command (FMC), *Mobile Command Study - Report on Disciplinary Infractions and Anti-social Behaviour with particular reference to the SSF and the Canadian Airborne Regiment* [henceforth Hewson Report], September 1985, 46; "Manning - Canadian Airborne Regiment," 9 October 1985, *Information Legacy*, Evidentiary Exhibits; and Major-General Tom DeFaye, Board of Inquiry, - Cdn AB Regt BG, Phase I, Vol XI, 16-30, H-1/6, and K.

209 See Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapters 6 & 7.

210 Lieutenant-Colonel Lorne O'Brien, a former 3 Commando Commanding Officer, believed, "You had to run herd on them [the soldiers] all the time." He likened it to a professional athletic team. "You keep them pumped-up but that comes with certain problems," O'Brien explained, "you have to let steam off judiciously and you have to be ruthless with discipline." When the "screws were loosened," he revealed, "it [Airborne Regiment] had enormous problems." Interview with author, 14 April 1997. The Regiment's last Commander, Colonel Peter Kenward agreed. He was convinced that "more rigid control, if not a tight rein is required because of the high level of energy in the ranks. Things can go adrift, and as a result leadership by example and being in people's face becomes very important." Interview with author 4 October 1996.

211 Incredulously, a 1 Commando motorcycle club, called the "Para Nomads," with known connections to the "Hell's Angels" existed within the Regiment and it seemed to be tolerated by senior leadership. Brigadier-General Ian Douglas acknowledged, "We knew from the SIU [Special Investigations Unit - military] and the OPP [Ontario Provincial Police] that they [Para Nomads] were tied to the Hell's Angels."

Douglas' attempts at eradicating the 'club' were largely frustrated. The 1 Commando CO at the time insisted that it was just a R22eR club and that the members had a legal "right" to participate. Douglas stated that the problem was eventually solved by a combination of making it difficult for the motorcyclists to come onto the base and slowly posting the participating members back to their parent regiments. Interview with author, 18 March 1998. Brigadier-General Ernie Beno, and Major-Generals Gaudreau and Stewart all asserted that weapon thefts in the Regiment in the 1980s were "inside jobs" and were linked to the "motorcycle club." Interviews/letters to author.

212 Confidential interview. Specific incidents include the booby-trapping of an officer's office with an artillery simulator wrapped with nails, as well as the later well-known burning of an officer's car on the parade square in 1990 and that of a Senior NCO in 1992.

213 Interview with author, 15 September 1997.

214 See Peter Desberats, *Somalia Cover-Up. A Commissioner's Journal* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1997); David Bercuson, *Significant Incident* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996); Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment*; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapter 7.

215 R.I. Stewart, "Discipline, Soldierly Behaviour and Leaders Responsibilities," 7 May 1984. Accessed from Major-General Stewart's personal papers.

216 See *Hewson Report* and Covering Letter. For additional details see Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 172-174.

217 Although statistically 1 RCR had a greater incidence of assault cases than the Airborne, the Study Team dismissed this as an unexplainable anomaly. The fact that 3 Commando, the RCR component of the Airborne Regiment, had the highest number of incidents of assault within the Airborne also seemed to have gone unnoticed.

218 *Hewson Report*, 51-54. The argument was an attempt to return to a "no taskings" for the Regiment and preferred manning status similar to the early era.

219 Ibid., Executive Summary, 1. This one line underscored the importance of the study, namely to prevent the disbandment of the Regiment.

220 Ibid., 51.

221 Canada. *Dishonoured Legacy*. *The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* [henceforth *Somalia Commission Report*], Transcript of Evidentiary Hearings, Vol 2, 3 October 1995, 361.

222 See Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapter 8.

223 See Ibid., 193-195.

224 See Berel Rodal, *The Somalia Experience in Strategic Perspective in a Free and Democratic Society* (Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997), 1; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 198-201.

225 Letter, Brigadier-General E.B. Beno to Colonel J.S. Labbé (Commander Canadian Joint Task Force Somalia), 8 April 1993. See also, "General Urged Troops to Lighten Up." *Globe & Mail*, A6; Allan Thompson, "Wider Airborne Violence Revealed," *Toronto Star*, 6 October 1996, A1; and Beno, "Treatment of Somalis in the Custody of the Canadian Airborne Battle Group," Brigadier-General E. Beno personal files and records [henceforth Beno Papers].

226 *Somalia Commission Report,* Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, Vol 7, 23 October 1995, testimony of Dr. Menkaus (academic specialist on the Horn of Africa), 1266-1352; and Peter Worthington, "Private Brown," *Saturday Night*, September 1994, 34.

227 According to the report of Major Armstrong, "the deceased had been first shot in the back and subsequently "dispatched" with a pair of shots to the head and neck area. Major Armstrong considered that the wounds were consistent with the Somali being shot as he lay wounded on the ground." *Information Legacy*, Executive Summary - Mission Aftermath, Record 2874. Master-Corporal Petersen testified that he observed that "the dead Somali's neck was blown out, his head was gaping open at the back of the skull and his face was sagging to one side." Ibid., Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 1 - March 4 Shooting, Record 2871.

228 *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 5, 4 March - Findings, Record 9569. The Commission was scathing in its comments of the handling of the incident. It asserted that actions both within theatre and by the command structure in Canada were negligent in ensuring a proper investigation was conducted. See also Jocelyn

Coulon, *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order* (Toronto: U of T, 1994), 97.

229 Peter Worthington, *Scapegoat. How the Army Betrayed Kyle Brown* (Toronto: Seal Books, 1997), 116-135; Worthington, "Private Brown," 35-36; Brian Bergman, "A Night of Terror," *Macleans's* (28 March 199): 26-28; and "Brutal Allegations," *Macleans's* (7 March 1994): 13.Major Seward the OC of 2 Commando later wrote in his diary, "it is my intention to openly and readily state that I did order Somali intruders to be abused during the conduct of apprehension and arrest." *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol. 1, Record 3026. See also George Shorey, "Bystander Non-Interventionand the Somalia Incident," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Winter 2000-2001): 19-28; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 196-198.

230 See *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 1, "MGen Boyle's Analysis of the De Faye Report, Record 3160 and Hearing Transcripts, Vol 95, testimony of Colonel Haswell 18480-18555. Colonel Haswell, then a staff officer in the Director General of Public Affairs (DGPA), later testified that "we recommended that we should get this information out as quickly and completely as possible because the Public Affairs branch felt that early disclosure would reduce the negative impact on DND." But he revealed that that the overriding concern at the moment "at very high levels in the Department [was] that nothing be done to interfere with the leadership run." This restriction affected the release of information. The Chief of Staff of Kim Campbell, then the Minister of National Defence (MND), acknowledged that he was informed of the death only hours after it occurred and Campbell herself stated she was briefed around 17 March. As early as 22 January 1993, and again on 1 March 1993, due to the expected leadership candidacy of the MND for the position of Prime Minister, the Deputy Minister, Robert Fowler, had reminded members attending the Daily Executive Meeting that it was necessary to exercise "extreme sensitivity in all matters relating to public statements, speeches, press releases." See Luke Fisher, "On the Defence," *Maclean's* (26 July 1993): 16; David Pugliese, "HQ in Somalia Coverup," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 June 1997, A1; D'Arcy Jenish, "What did He Know?" *Maclean's* (15 April 1996): 17-18; "Colonel cites politics in delay over Somalia," *Globe & Mail*, 14 September 1996, A1; and David Pugliese, "Military hid murder to shield Kim Campbell, inquiry told," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 September 1996, A1/2; and *Information Legacy,*

Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol. 1, Passage of Information about the March 4th Incident, Record 2888.

231 Mistreatment of Somalis by other military international contingents later caused scandals in countries such as Belgium, Germany and Italy. Allegations included mental and physical abuse, beatings, as well as the killing of captured thieves. Relative to the other contingents in Somalia and elsewhere, the Canadian cases of mistreatment and killings may have appeared minor. But in the context of Canadian society and the self-conception of Canadian soldiers its impact reverberated through both society and the military institution. See Andrew Duffy, "Now its Belgian Soldiers," *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 April 1997, 1; Raf Casert, "Somalia scandal sparks Belgian review," *Ottawa Citizen*, 18 April 1997, A10; "Now Belgium rocked by Somali scandal," *Toronto Star*, 12 April 1997, A18;"Burns, shocks given Somalis Italian says," *Toronto Star*, 7 June 1997, A21; and Vera Haller, "Italy's Somalia scandal grows," Ottawa Citizen, 15 June 1997, A5. See also Coulon, *Soldiers of Diplomacy*, 98-99.

232 See Rodal, *The Somalia Experience*, 1 & 70; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 226-227 & 253-255.

233 The Board was established on 28 April 1993. After running off course, over budget and over time, the MND shut the Commission down in March 1997. The *Board of Inquiry (BOI) - Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group* (henceforth BOI Cdn AB BG), Phase I, Volume XI, Appendix 3 to Annex A, 1/5.

234 The Board of Inquiry, unlike the *Hewson Report*, did not placate the critics in or out of the military. An internal DND review considered the final report as flawed. Major-General Jean Boyle, then the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications) and Chairman of the NDHQ "Somalia Working Group" conducted an assessment of the study that pointed out in July 1994 that "a close reading of the de Faye board's report, comparing it with information from courts-martial testimony, would reveal that there were weaknesses and, more important, significant discrepancies in the de Faye board's findings and recommendations, on which the CDS was basing a number of reforms." He further noted that certain conclusions did not appear to be borne out by the actual testimony heard. Moreover, Boyle felt that there had been enough evidence before the de Faye board to suggest that leadership problems reached up the chain-of-command right to the Canadian Joint Force Somalia Command. In addition, Boyle then also acknowledged that there

were documents that indicated direct attempts to cover up facts behind the 4 and 16 March 1993 incidents. He finished by concluding that the most pressing issue regarding the Canadian Airborne Regiment was leadership. *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 1, "Major-General Boyle's Analysis of the De Faye Report, Record 3160.

235 Desbarats, *Somalia Cover-Up*, 3. See also Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 242; Winslow, 8; and *Information Legacy*, Letter Commander LFCA to the CDS / MND, "Report Fact Finding Mission Into the Canadian Airborne Regiment," 22 January 1995, 2. Lieutenant-General Kent Foster, a former Regimental and Army Commander, also thought that the Airborne Regiment's problems were really a manifestation of those in all of the Canadian Armed Forces. Moreover, he blamed the Army for failing to deal with the flaws at the root of the Airborne's demise. Interview with author, 6 June 1998. Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel Lorne O'Brien, a long-serving Army officer and former paratroop commander, said what many were too frightened to admit. He declared that if in fact there was a problem in the Airborne, then there was also a problem in the entire Regimental System. O'Brien pointed out that by its very nature the airborne was the sum of the component parts of the line infantry regiments. Interview with author, 14 April 1997.

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