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# CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL



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# CANADIAN MILITARY JOURNAL

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The 'Old Eighteen': The first RMC cadets, 1876

Image by: Department of National Defence

## Editor's Introduction

CHRISTIAN LEUPRECHT

**We are particularly delighted about this issue, which features CMJ's redesigned format and layout. Readers should find it easier to peruse, and it is optimized to display digitally as CMJ branches out into new and different electronic delivery formats.**

As previously foreshadowed, upcoming issues will feature collections of contributions on a particular topic, either as an entire special issue, or as a special section. Some of these we will be curating, others will be curated by guest editors who brought forward proposals on a particular topic. In an attempt to introduce the topic and related debates, CMJ's special issues and special sections are preceded by a somewhat more extensive editor's introduction. While

every effort is made to be as balanced as possible, introductions are likely to reflect some of the editor's proclivities. Readers might keep this caveat in mind. Having curated this special double issue, for instance, my introduction is informed by my experience over 25 years as a senior member of the RMC faculty. Although as Editor-in-Chief of CMJ I make every effort to maintain professional arm's-length distance from articles, subjects and themes, my

lived experience necessarily shapes some of my views, which includes my current role as Editor-in-Chief at RMC's higher headquarters. I appreciate that readers may not necessarily share some of my views or interpretations. Rather, the intent is for introductions and contributions to special issues to raise the level of informed debate.

Issues 1 and 2 of volume 23 of CMJ appear concurrently as both cover the Canadian Military Colleges, military education, and professional military education. Debates about the military colleges cover inputs, process, outputs and outcomes. In this light, contributions in issue 1 deal primarily with the essence and rationale of military education in general, and military education in Canada in particular; issue 2 deals with options for and drivers of change.

Technically, the Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs) consist of four campuses: Royal Military College Kingston (RMC), Collège militaire royal de St-Jean (CMRSJ), Canadian Forces College (CFC), and OSSIDE Institute, which offers professional development programs for senior non-commissioned members. In practice, neither CFC nor OSSIDE see themselves as CMCs. Which explains why most of the content in these two special issues centres on RMC and CMRSJ. RMC, CMRSJ and CFC require other institutions for governance and accreditation: fully federally-funded universities that require provincial accreditation, since constitutionally education falls within their jurisdiction. CMCs, then, are a constitutional contradiction, which serves as a reminder that federal-provincial relations, provincial ministries of education, the wider university community, and the international world of defence education diplomacy are all integral to Canada's defence universities.

Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the remit of the referent CMCs, the four campuses constitute a formation under the aegis of the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA). In theory, it should perform the function of a quasi Defence Ministry of Education for Canada's national security university, across all four campuses. In practice, it has tended to function as a staff headquarters, and is structured accordingly. In other words, the headquarters is arguably misaligned insofar as it is optimized to perform a military function first and foremost, rather than an educational one. Successful university administrations think big: about their university, about its relationship with the country, and with the world. But perpetual internal challenges of the redcoat problems seemingly impede CDA and its components from living up to their full potential. In theory, as the administration of Canada's national security university, CDA should have plenty of whole-of-government allies, such as

CSIS, CSEC, CBSA, RCMP, provincial and municipal police forces, along with their educational institutions, such as the Canada School of Public Service, the Canadian Foreign Service Institute, perhaps along with some of the training academies such as RCMP Depot, the CBSA College, and the Canadian Coast Guard College. In practice, CDA needs to understand the ecosystem of provincial universities. But CDA delegates these responsibilities to RMC/CMRSJ Principal and Deans, which leads to the schizophrenic personality of CMC: CAF officers running a military training school and academic faculty running a provincial university. This split, and the lack of a senior academic voice within CDA, explains why CDA falls short of potential: redcoat problems that perennially overshadow the limited attention to the health of the university.

Although RMC Kingston tends to be the focus of attention, for the redcoat program the CMRSJ campus is just as important. The cover for this issue thus depicts a scene from RMC Kingston, whereas the cover for issue 23.2 is taken from CMRSJ. The cover for this issue depicts a recent cohort of RMC's Top 5 graduating Cadets. The covers for these two issues were chosen to reflect how these institutions continue to change. The diversity of officer cadets today stands in stark contrast to RMC's "Old Eighteen" of 1876. The obvious choice would have been an edifice, perhaps the Mackenzie building at RMC that figures prominently as a ceremonial backdrop in much RMC imagery. While the Mackenzie building stands for continuity, RMC today is a very different institution than it was back then; in fact, like any institution, it is quite different today even from a decade or two ago. Military education and the military colleges are not first and foremost about bricks and mortar: they are about people – future CAF leaders who constitute the force. Buildings are static; officer cadets, by contrast, are dynamic. They generate the force, they sustain it, and they operate it. People are a capability. In fact, they are the CAF's most important asset, and officer cadets are key to the future of the CAF.

A key function that military colleges perform is to calibrate the military to society. RMC began as a nation-building institution of empire before Canada had a home for its graduates. Military academies are often referred to as the School of the Nation. In deeply diverse multi-ethnocultural states such as Canada, the military can serve as a nation-building institution that forges a common sense of identity and belonging. Initially it exerted a homogenizing and assimilationist effect. But in the sense of liberal education, as an institution that draws its membership from across the country, it also fosters a greater appreciation

of tolerance, acceptance, accommodation and understanding amongst students from very different backgrounds.

The early "Rideout Row" (before the eponymous building that now houses CDA was built) established the primacy of education over training and set RMC up to be central, not to the CAF but to the battles over Canadian identity and the national narrative.<sup>1</sup> There have been at least five such campaigns. The first was the successful integration of new Canadians and social mobility that built a Canadian establishment. The second was then MND Brooks Claxton's effort to open the officer ranks to those who had enlisted during the Second World War as soldiers. The CMCs resisted for over three years. Finally, they allowed commissioned ("lower decks") from the ranks to attend Royal Roads for two years, but not receive a degree and not attend RMC. In the third campaign, RMC contributed to the bilingual officer corps that is central to Canada's narrative of two founding nations, and the reconciliation of French-Canadian elites to security within Canada. As the closure and reopening of CMRSJ and the continuing cultural evolution of Quebec demonstrates, this is an ongoing campaign. In the fourth campaign, the CMCs were laggardly in integrating women, partly because RMC had lost sight of its national mandate in a narrow focus on military requirements, further exacerbated by a focus on a specific subset of military technical requirements. As a result, RMC became engineering-centric, and staunchly resisted expanding to liberal arts. By way of example, RMC lagged other universities in offering psychology (usually the largest undergraduate enrolment across Canadian universities, with the distinction of being particularly attractive to women), which RMC only approved in 2004. The engineering culture combined with toxic military masculinity to produce the problems decried by Deschamps and Arbour. That campaign is still in the balance, but will probably be won, eventually. The fifth campaign, for Equity, Diversity, Inclusion and Indigeneity (EDII), enjoys support within the CMCs, but is a work in progress. The Canadian Military Colleges Faculty Association (CMCFA), military and academic hierarchies are aligned on the need to indigenize the academy, Gender-Based Analysis (GBA+) and government policies for EDII. That support for EDII is a direct result of the CMCs being embedded in the wider university community. Future institutional success will be judged partly by the CMCs' ability to reconcile and manage cultural tensions and social identity schisms.

In the science and engineering disciplines, "what" you know is key, but in the social sciences and humanities, social relations are as important as epistemic relations. That distinction in social relations and knowledge is key, putting the social

sciences at the crux of the cultural revolution, rather than science and engineering. To military colleges that have their roots and rationale in engineering and the sciences, that constitutes a profound shift. Yet, in each of these five campaigns to synchronize armed forces and society, the CMCs lag and fall short when they focus on narrow military requirements and esprit-de-corps socialization, and succeed when they seek to serve wider government and align with broader society.

To be sure, given the complexity and rapid evolution of the international security environment since the end of the Cold War, and the pace of technological change that has made conflict, defence and warfare more sophisticated than ever, it seems probable that the need to generate and sustain highly specialized human systems has never been more pressing than today. If the evolution of conflict over the past 30 years, and the emergence of asymmetric and hybrid warfare, cyberwar and a focus on national resilience is any indication, compounded by mounting challenges brought on by anthropogenic (e.g. conflict) and naturogenic (e.g. climate) change, then demand for highly specialized defence skill sets is bound to persist, let alone accelerate, for the foreseeable future. Madame Arbour's report serves to reinforce that the CAF's personnel generation model – how it attracts, recruits, trains, educates and retains people – needs renewal. A model that is ripe with discrimination, harassment, misconduct and assault is clearly not fit for purpose. Old Sergeants claim they are there to defend democracy, not to practice it. But the people expect the CAF to embrace democracy within. Channeling Madame Arbour, what would democratizing RMC governance mean, by way of an elected student council, for instance? Yet, the premise of democracy is that the ends do not justify the means. Rather, democratic institutions need to reflect the very values they are supposedly defending, the profession of arms first and foremost among them.

Any country can turn civilians into soldiers. A distinctive hallmark of the armed forces in a democracy, by contrast, is that they make citizens soldiers in general, and citizen officers in particular. The best means to that end is necessarily controversial, insofar as that debate reflects broader society disagreements on just about any other policy issue. This debate thus exemplifies the democratic character of civil-military relations more broadly: as the people, the government and the military tend to have different ideas about the ultimate purpose of the armed forces, that discord is necessarily reflected in different ideas about the ways, means and ends of military education. Militaries tend to see themselves first and foremost as war fighters, governments conceive of

their militaries as instruments of foreign policy, while the people often tend to want their militaries to provide disaster assistance and humanitarian relief. Ergo, is the ultimate purpose of military education to bolster prosperity by means of liberal economics and open trade routes, (the economic global order), or international security (the political global order), or humanitarian assistance and the protection of human rights (a cosmopolitan human rights regime)? With the possible exception of the United States of America, no ally has the resources for a force structure that can support the full spectrum of operations. Rather, countries have to pick and choose. As that choice is politically controversial, it should surprise no one that political decisions will usually optimize to allocate resources in ways that maximize political payoff. Military education is a laboratory that reflects the inability to reach consensus on force posture, let alone to resource it adequately. Ergo, debate over RMC, military education and especially its most visible manifestation – military post-secondary education – is as old as the colleges themselves and is prevalent not just in Canada, but the world over. Models to reconcile the competing revisions, while optimizing scarce investments in these institutions vary by country, but every NATO member country has (at least) one military university, and so do all of Canada's strategic partners. In other words, the consensus seems to be that they serve a purpose. But what is that purpose? Or, rather, what should it be?

In a democracy, the people have the right to decide – and the people have the right to be wrong.<sup>22</sup> By way of democratically elected governments that provide direction, from national defence writ large to the attendant outcomes of military education, the people ultimately get to set the outcomes they expect and the inputs governments are prepared to provide. As on defence more broadly, politicians are utility maximizers, endeavouring to optimize returns while minimizing their investments. Foreign policy, after all, has never been a vote getter, at least not in Canada.

Critiques of RMC thus reflect broader controversies over the military, military education and the allocation of scarce resources. Specifically, in the case of RMC, these critiques tend to centre on particular concerns that I discuss in the introduction to 23.2. While the Journal is necessarily agnostic on the future of the Canadian Military Colleges and the best model to adopt to deliver effectively and efficiently on expected outcomes within the Canadian context, the intent here is for CMJ to make an informed contribution to the timely discussion on Canadian military education and professional development.

This special issue opens with a letter by the senior retired officer who led the CAF's internal review of RMC in 2017, known

the Special Staff Assistance (SSAV) visit, and co-author of the subsequent Maddison-Neasmith Report.<sup>3</sup> It coincides with an external review of RMC by the Auditor General of Canada.<sup>4</sup> Together, these reports prompted a strategic action plan by RMC.<sup>5</sup>

The first three articles military and professional education from across the three CMCs mandated with providing university-level education are written by current and former CMC professors: Parentau (CMRSJ) on the rationale for undergraduate military education, Barrett (RMC) who reflects on over 50 years of debate and recommendations on RMC and its purpose, and Mitchell (CFC) on professional graduate-level military education. Commonly summed up as professional military education (PME), for the purpose of this conversation it is useful to distinguish between military and professional education, and their synthesis in PME. Parenteau makes the case for the military undergraduate education as integral to leadership in the profession of arms. In other professions, practitioners start as generalists before they specialize; the profession of arms is different insofar as it needs specialist practitioners to start but with broad enough a foundation on which to build to become eventual generalists. Barrett reminds us that concerns and debates about proposed remedies reverberate over decades. He traces professionalism through six reports, including the 1969 Rowley report, the Officer Professional Development Working Group (OPDWG) reports from 1995 and 1996, and the 1998 Withers report. The complement of contributions from CMRSJ and RMC are rounded by Mitchell at the Canadian Forces College. In the trinity of degree-granting CMCs, staff college tends to be overlooked because it specializes in professional graduate degrees. Mitchell discusses CFC's role in professionalizing the armed forces, and the bearing that has on the Arbour report.

The following article by Coombs succinctly surveys and reviews RMC. It offers a highly informative and comprehensive synopsis of the institution. On the premise of "no decision about me without me," it is equally important to understand the actual cadets themselves, what they think, and how they think. Measuring what matters in military education can be difficult; so, the temptation is to take what's measurable and make it matter, instead of ascertaining what matters and making it measurable. RMC Associate Professors Chouinard and Garnett make major strides to this effect, specifically on the type of future leader RMC produces, with a survey of political ideologies among a recent cohort of officer and naval cadets. Conversely, the Alumni Association represents all ex-cadet graduates of RMC, CMRSJ as well as Royal Roads Military College (RMCC, before its closure in 1995). This special issue gives them collective voice in a Commentary co-authored

by the current and immediate past chairpersons on how the Arbour Report inspired them to consider their responsibility for advocating for reforms at the CMCs to “make them safer for everyone and more effective in their vocation of producing exemplary leaders for the CAF and Canada.”

For good measure, the special issue contains an article on Arctic and continental defence by a former NORAD deputy and retired commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) that, although unrelated to the specific discussion about military colleges, nonetheless highlights the complexity of a rapidly evolving security environment, and the broad yet specialized expertise and demands for which a MilCol education prepares officer and naval cadets.

The penultimate piece is a new contribution in CMJ's ongoing series that is being coordinated by RMC's recently appointed Chair in Resilience. The piece in this issue features a team of co-authors that showcases the contribution of a second-in-command of a RMC squadron. The piece reflects the characteristics of leadership and teamwork that are foundational to RMC and puts on display the strengths of civil-military collaboration in building and purveying new knowledge enabled by the RMC and defence research ecosystem.

That ecosystem encompasses a highly diverse set of stakeholders: uniform and civilian, scholar and practitioner, serving and retired. Still missing from this special issue, are the cadets themselves. That is why each of these two issues begins with a cover that centers on cadets, and closes with

a contribution by a current officer cadet, in the case of this first issue a book review of a volume recently published by University of Toronto Press entitled *Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community*.

Contributions to the special issue met the usual rigours of double-blind peer review. Given the nature and proximity of the subject matter, articles in these two special issues were reviewed by at least four independent peers, of different genders, military and academic backgrounds. Contributions were selected to inform a broad set of perspectives, and to broaden horizons.

The heavy lifting of peer review is enabled and, in some cases, conducted, by CMJ's revitalized Editorial Board, whose new and extended membership you will find in the masthead. Scope conditions for membership on the Board include current or past uniformed or civilian membership of the Defence Team, broadly understood, as well as proven professional academic and/or scholarly credentials. As we strive for broad representation, the composition of the Board is intended not just to reflect the diversity of the Defence Team but also a breadth in diversity of topics and expertise in submissions that CMJ welcomes. Ultimately, it is the Editorial Board and peer reviewers that form the crux of quality assurance, which guarantees CMJ's unique status as independent and arm's-length from the Chain of Command. This issue also features updated submission guidelines and a newly adopted retraction policy.



## Notes

- 1 Preston, A.R. (1969). *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- 2 Feaver, P. D. (1996). The civil-military problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the question of civilian control. *Armed Forces & Society* 23 (2). pages 149-178.
- 3 Maddison, G.R., Neasmith, D.G., Tattersall, V.C., Bouchard, A.M.C., Dow, D.J., Gauthier, A.J., Halpin, C.A.M. Thibault, C.J. (2017). Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada. Ottawa. Online: <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/20170329-rmc-ssav-report-final.pdf>
- 4 Auditor General of Canada. (2017). Report 6-Royal Military College of Canada-National Defence. Ottawa. Online: [https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl\\_oag\\_201711\\_06\\_e\\_42671.html](https://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201711_06_e_42671.html)
- 5 Royal Military College. (2019). The Royal Military College of Canada Response to Report 6, Royal Military College of Canada - National Defence of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada. Kingston. Online: <https://everitas.s3.amazonaws.com/2019/12/RMC-Report-Response-to-AG-10-July-2019.pdf>

# Letter to the Editor

**BY GREG MADDISON**

*VAdm (Ret'd) Maddison served on the Board of Directors of Canada Steamship Lines Inc. (CSL) from 2005 to 2019 and Chaired their Human Resources Committee from 2010 to 2019. He had general strategic responsibilities and specific functions related to corporate ethics, governance, security and sustainable development. VAdm (Ret'd) Maddison was a naval officer who served 37 years within the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) rising in the ranks where he commanded Canada's Navy from 1997 to 2001 and was the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff from 2001 to 2005. He served as a Senior Mentor with the National Security Programme from 2008 to 2018 and led the Royal Military College (RMC) Special Staff Assistance Visit Group from 2016 to 2017 where the existing culture experienced by Officer Cadets was examined. VAdm(Ret'd) Maddison has an Engineering and Management Degree and an Honorary Doctorate from RMC.*

I read M<sup>me</sup> Arbour's important Independent External Comprehensive Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces with considerable interest. In particular, I refer to Recommendation #29, which states that "A combination of Defence Team members and external experts, led by an external education specialist, should conduct a detailed review of the benefits, disadvantages and costs, both for the CAF and more broadly, of continuing to educate ROTP cadets at the military colleges. The review should focus on the quality of education, socialization and military training in that environment. It should also consider and assess the different models for delivering university-level and military leadership training to naval/officer cadets, and determine whether the RMC Kingston and the RMC Saint-Jean should continue as undergraduate degree-granting institutions, or whether officer candidates should be required to attend civilian university undergraduate programs through the ROTP. In the interim, the CPCC should engage with the RMC Kingston and the RMC St-Jean authorities to address the long-standing culture concerns unique to the military college environment, including the continuing misogynistic and discriminatory environment and the ongoing incidence of sexual misconduct. Progress should be measured by metrics other than the number of hours of training given to cadets. The Exit Survey of graduating cadets should be adapted to capture cadets' experiences with sexual misconduct or discrimination."

In 2016/2017, I led a team of eight to examine the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College (RMC)-Kingston. The results of that examination were submitted in a report dated 10 March 2017.

The team consisted of two retired Flag/General officers, four serving senior officers and two serving Chief Warrant Officers. Four members of the team were women. The team included a medical officer, a lawyer, a logistics expert and a chaplain. One team member belonged to the LGBTQ community. Additionally, the team was supported by an RMC civilian and academic advisor.

The team recognized that RMC was and still is a unique national institution

of considerable value to Canadians that has made a valuable contribution nationally and internationally for over 140 years. "These contributions result from being astronauts, academics, successful business and corporate leaders, and noteworthy elected officials to name a few." It was this as background that the team felt a need to uncover the reality of the culture that existed in 2017. Specifically, the team examined areas relating to Command and Control, the Selection and Responsibilities of Staff and Cadets, Stressors, Morale, Support available and the College Four Pillars of Academics, Physical Education and Athletics, Social Development and Military Leadership.

To achieve this, the team spent five full weeks at RMC conducting extensive interviews with Cadets and RMC Staff. Additional interviews were conducted in Ottawa, Toronto and St-Jean, all related to RMC policies, and it also received input from parents and past RMC graduates.

The team constantly worked diligently at establishing an environment of trust, confidence and anonymity so that interviewees felt comfortable in expressing their views and experiences. All the individual interviews were conducted with an interviewee and two members of the team present—if a female cadet was being interviewed, at least one of the interviewers was female. This resulted in the team interviewing 412 people, including 209 Cadets, across all academic years and programmes.

“During this process, the [t]eam encountered female and male [Cadets] who were simply outstanding individuals in how they carried and presented themselves, as well as the mature, thoughtful and articulate way in which they expressed their views and concerns. The [t]eam took away from these encounters that the environment at RMC was [in 2017] one that can produce and develop positive character traits including truth, duty, valour, integrity and honesty.”

Nevertheless, the team was able to identify a number of areas of concern that needed to be addressed with balance and vigour. RMC had been under a decade of resource pressure and lower interest at the strategic level, such that RMC was low on the strategic priority list—as the team yearned to say, RMC suffered from benign neglect. As a result, there was uncertainty amongst stakeholders regarding RMC’s mission and priorities, considerable tension between the Academics and the Military Trainers, cynicism amongst some of the Cadets, disagreements between how RMC employs more traditional learning and military training

techniques, and challenges with the expectations of a new generation of technologically savvy and multi-tasking Cadets.

The team’s overall assessment in 2017 was that RMC continues to be viable in delivering on its mission of producing well-educated leaders for the CAF. The team made more than 70 recommendations, some of which were similar to a number of M<sup>me</sup> Arbour’s recommendations. It is unclear how many of the 2017 recommendations have been achieved or how many have been sustained.

In conclusion, I would make the following points:

1. There have been a number of RMC reviews conducted in the past, including the Wither’s Report, which have all made substantial and significant recommendations, and there have been a number of positive improvements.
2. I support M<sup>me</sup> Arbour’s Recommendation #29 as it relates to a detailed review of the benefits, disadvantages and costs of continuing to educate ROTP Cadets at the military colleges. I believe a third-party review will demonstrate the value of RMC as a national institution in producing well balanced and agile-thinking CAF leaders.
3. I suggest that the federal government/DND take the opportunity to review the 2017 Report so as to help inform decision makers when they craft a response to M<sup>me</sup> Arbour’s recommendations in her report.





RMC 2022 Commissioning Ceremony where the Officer Cadets and Naval Cadets are promoted to Second Lieutenants and Acting Sub-Lieutenants. May 20, 2022.

Image by: S1 Lisa Sheppard, Military Photojournalist

# Lieutenants are Potential Generals, and Generals Were Once Lieutenants: Reflections on the Military Academy's Role in Officer Training

**BY DANIC PARENTEAU**

*Royal Military College Saint-Jean*

*Dr. Danic Parenteau is a Professor at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean where he teaches in the fields of philosophy and political science. His research interests include officer education, the issue of culture change in the Western military, and civil-military relations more broadly.*

With the rapid evolution of warfare technologies, the increasing complexity of operational theatres, and the ever-more-diverse nature of the missions entrusted to military members in recent years, there is a more frequent need for armed forces to adapt or update their officer training programs. There has also been a general trend toward enhanced continuing education and professional military education,<sup>1</sup> including the development of new curricula, strengthened schooling, and greater use of information technology as a teaching tool. The proportion of time that officers spend on training or education activities is significant and, in the Western military, is estimated to range from one-fifth to one-quarter of officers' entire careers.<sup>2</sup> In fact, to our knowledge, no other profession spends as much time on training and education activities as officers do in the armed forces.

## “The fundamental mission of any military academy is to train officers to fulfill their responsibilities.”

This recent enhancement to officers' continuing education requires that it be seen as an extension of the initial training offered at the military academy, which is the main entry point to the officer corps. From the time that the first military academies in 18th-century Europe were created until relatively recently, the training path of officers throughout their careers was somewhat disjointed. The role of the military academy was essentially limited to providing basic training to junior officers. The few additional courses that were then offered during their careers, whether at staff college or at war college, were designed in a segmented manner in order to cover specific training needs related to the expansion of the officers' field of responsibilities as they advanced through their careers. Today, however, the overall training path for officers appears to be more coherent, with greater continuity. Although the military academy continues to fulfill its primary responsibility in terms of training and education as an entry point to the officer profession, its program today also tends to be increasingly conceived as a *step* in the officer's overall career path, while the courses offered during the officer's career are increasingly an extension of that initial path. Thus, any reflection on the training and education of officers inevitably requires an analysis of the unique institution that is the military academy.

What place does military academy training occupy in the overall professional training path of officers? In this essay, we will consider the academy's role in the officer profession as well as the nature of the multidisciplinary training program that this institution offers. We will attempt to sketch an “educational vision” for this unique institution, showing the central place it occupies in the training of officers, from their enrolment to the end of their careers, while also considering the fact that some of them are promoted to general officer ranks. This is a wide-ranging reflection based on the military academy model that prevails in most Western countries, with occasional reference to Canadian military colleges (CMCs).

### The military academy in the service of officer training

In serving the profession of arms, the military academy has an essentially *vocational* mission: to train officers. In most countries, the academy is the sole point of entry to the officer corps; it not only accepts candidates for a long program leading to Regular Force service (the equivalent of our Regular Officer Training Program), it also receives all officers from other recruiting channels (rank promotion, direct entry, recruiting for limited postings, etc.) for short, specialized programs.<sup>3</sup> Its mission is to *transform* candidates into future

officers.<sup>4</sup> One of its purposes, as part of its main training program, is thus to lead the young women and men who are admitted to its long program—most of whom are civilians—to adopt a new personal identity by embracing the profession of arms, both through adherence to a set of values and cultural norms as well as through the adoption of a lifestyle that is specific to military life, particularly to officers. It is in this institution that future officers are led to embrace the notion of “military service” and its inevitable “unwritten clause of unlimited liability,” in the words of military historian John Hackett.<sup>5</sup>

More specifically, the fundamental mission of any military academy is to train officers to *fulfill their responsibilities, the most essential of which is to perform duties in operational theatres, including theatres of war*. The scope of an officer's responsibilities is admittedly more all-encompassing since it also includes the management of garrison units, strategic planning, troop training, etc.<sup>6</sup> However, the unique task of commanding troops in military operations, or working as a member of a staff during operations, are responsibilities that are exclusive to this profession, as only officers can assume them in society. Compared to other fields of professional activity, there is nothing “normal” about the military, to use historian Michel Goya's term, since it is [translation] “an extraordinary event, and the individuals who participate in it do not do so in an ‘average’ way.”<sup>7</sup> Preparing officer cadets to exercise their expertise in an operational theatre has always been, and continues to be, the ultimate goal of military academies. In fact, it is the sole reason that this unique institution still exists and is maintained, although of course over time other important missions have been added (research, branding for recruiting purposes, development of courses for non-commissioned officers and non-commissioned members, and so on). If current trends are a harbinger of things to come, warfare may (fortunately) remain rare in the West. In this respect, the war currently being waged by Russia in Ukraine is an exception. Thus, it is possible, even highly likely, that the current generations of officer cadets may never have to experience war during their military careers—as did the generations that



Search and Rescue demonstrations and static displays for the Royal Military College (RMC) students during the annual MOS (Military Occupational Structure) Professional Development Weekend. April 03, 2022.

Image by: Avr Makala Chapman, Imagery Technician

preceded them for half a century.<sup>8</sup> They will certainly have the opportunity to be sent on a mission to an operational theatre. However, experiencing war, an almost collective ordeal where the survival of the state or the country is at stake, may remain merely hypothetical. That is perhaps one of the greatest paradoxes of this singular profession. The entire training of officers—as well as of soldiers and NCOs—tends to prepare them for an activity in which they may never participate. No other profession is like this. Doctors, for example, are trained to perform medical operations, and they are called upon from the moment they leave school and throughout their careers to perform them on a regular, even daily, basis. Civil engineers may be called upon to prepare plans for major works such as the construction of a hydroelectric dam or a skyscraper only once or twice in their career. However, on a daily basis, they know how to put their university-acquired expertise to good use in society. Nothing like this awaits the majority of officers at the end of their military training.

Military academies everywhere provide a multi-disciplinary training program with distinct but complementary educational objectives, all tending toward a clear goal: to train and educate officers. Thus, in addition to a university-level education, they provide basic military and physical training, which prepares officer cadets for the rigours of the profession of arms. This is accompanied by a professional socialization and character-building program to help officer cadets embrace the officership vision and the cultural norms and values that go with it. In addition, in some cases, training in other national languages is also offered (in the case of multilingual or bilingual countries such as Canada or Belgium), or in English, which is currently

the universal military language. Thus, in the CMCs, this program is deployed around what is referred to as the “four pillars”: Academics, Physical Education and Athletics, Social Development and Military Leadership.<sup>9</sup> At West Point, four programs are provided: character, academic, military leadership and physical.<sup>10</sup> At the Royal Military Academy of Belgium, the training program is structured around four “training activities”: academic, military, athletic and character.<sup>11</sup>

This multidisciplinary educational mission is not a simple one, as aspects of the program can sometimes conflict with one another. The different educational objectives of this program are distinct in their mode of delivery, the learning tools they mobilize, the horizon of the goals they pursue, and the nature of the faculty that delivers them. While *military training* is primarily concerned with learning practical skills and abilities through exercises and workshops, *university education* is more concerned with imparting theoretical knowledge through the primary route of classroom instruction. This is compounded by the fact that, while the former is delivered exclusively by military personnel, the latter most often requires civilian faculty. This boundary between training and education is not, of course, hard and fast, in that any form of training always relies on certain knowledge, just as education allows for the development of certain practical skills, if it is only the development of oral and written debating skills, for example. In this sense, the training program offered at the military academy is a synthesis of these different educational objectives and approaches. Historian C. M. A. Hartman describes such an aim: “[i]ndoctrination teaches the students to think in exclamation marks. Scientific schooling teaches the students to think in question marks. Military education is supposed to succeed in both.”<sup>12</sup>

Military training provides officer cadets with everything they will need to perform the duties of second lieutenant (or sub-lieutenant in the Navy) that await them upon graduation from the military academy. In terms of acquiring military skills and abilities, the focus is primarily on the tactical level, which is the operational level that will be associated with the first command or staff position that the student will occupy upon commissioning. In addition to basic military training, in most cases officers will have the opportunity to receive additional professional training in the specific service or element to which they will be assigned (infantry, artillery, air operations, maritime operations, and so on) at the various training schools during the course of their military academy career. That occurs either during the summer, on weekends, or even during certain specially dedicated periods between terms, as is done at the

École spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr in France. However, in most cases, service military qualifications are acquired after passing through the military academy, as is the case here in Canada and in Belgium.

The educational program offered at the military academy is aimed, for its part, at helping students acquire knowledge and develop intellectual tools through university-level programs. It is comparable—in terms of the level of teaching, academic work requirements, and the professional qualifications of the professors responsible for this component—to the programs offered at civilian universities. Given the increasing complexity of the operational theatres and the missions entrusted to the armed forces over time, this level of education has become an essential requirement for entering the officer profession. As a result, most armed forces around the world now require their officers to have a university degree, with the United Kingdom being the rare exception in the West.<sup>13</sup> Some military academies have even recently chosen to enhance this education by offering a master's level of education to their officer cadets, as is the case with the Royal Military Academy in Belgium and the General Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military University of Land Forces in Poland.

In the words of military historian and Professor Emeritus Ronald G. Haycock, “training is a predictable response to a predictable situation. Education, on the other hand, is a “reasoned” response to an unpredictable situation—that is, critical thinking in the face of the unknown.”<sup>14</sup> In this sense, if military training is about acquiring basic practical skills and competencies essential to service, the purpose of military education at the military academy is to prepare officer cadets for the reality of the battlefield, which is unpredictable, complex, random, and evades any sort of perfect factual understanding. According to Clausewitz:

*War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. [...] War is the realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder. Chance makes everything more uncertain and interferes with the whole course of events.*<sup>15</sup>

In the same sense, the American historian S. L. A. Marshall describes the elusive nature of war from the perspective of officer training as follows:


*To square training with the reality of war it becomes a necessary part of the young officer's mental equipment*

*for training to instill in him the full realization that in combat many things can and will go wrong without it being anyone's fault in particular [...] War is aimed at destruction. The fire and the general purpose of the enemy are directed against one's own personnel, materiel, and communications, with the object of keeping one's own design from coming into play.*<sup>16</sup>

In order to respond to the evasive and chaotic reality of war, the best intellectual preparation is not to offer officers an education in overly specialized fields of knowledge but, rather, on the contrary, to develop in them *critical thinking rooted in a solid general culture in the service of the profession of arms*. In this sense, what is more important for the military academy is not so much the specific academic disciplines to be taught to officer cadets but the general intellectual culture that they must acquire and develop in order to face the responsibilities that await them in the armed forces.<sup>17</sup> This generalist approach goes a long way to explaining why there is no single academic degree for the officer profession. Unlike medicine, for example, where only study in the medical field can lead to the medical profession, or unlike law, where only study in the legal field can lead to the legal profession, there are several academic disciplines that can lead to the officer profession. There is certainly a field called “military studies,” but that field, far from being unified, does not have a vocational aim. Thus, military academies still tend to offer a variety of degrees, with a certain preference for fields of military utility, such as political science, international studies, and military studies of course, as well as management, in addition to engineering or natural sciences, to name but a few.

## Lieutenants are potential generals, and generals were once lieutenants

If we compare the skills and abilities acquired in the military training program, which is essentially designed to prepare officer cadets for the first level of responsibility that awaits them upon graduation from the military academy, with the skills and abilities acquired in the university curriculum, we must acknowledge that many of the skills and abilities imparted in the university curriculum are likely to be of very limited immediate use. Indeed, many of the concepts, theories and conceptual tools presented in classroom courses, such as political science, geography, history, management, not to mention philosophy and literature, will be of little professional use to young platoon commanders. The curriculum offered by the military academy thus suggests distinct “horizons”



Naval and Officer Cadets return to campus after the summer break for the first day of classes at RMC. September 06, 2022.

Image by: Avr Makala Rose, Imagery Technician

for the two main pillars of its training program. In military parlance, military training can be said to be guided by a more “tactical” concern, while education is oriented towards a more “strategic” horizon. Despite this recent image emerging of the “strategic lieutenant” (or “strategic corporal”), according to which, in an operational theatre, every action of a young lieutenant always carries the potential of being “strategic” in scope,<sup>18</sup> the fact remains that, in practice, both in garrison and on deployment, it is essentially to the tactical level that the junior officer’s scope of action is limited. The operational and strategic levels are usually only for senior and general officers. Therefore, should the training program offered at the military academy not focus solely on the tactical level and leave the operational- and strategic-level issues for later?

Some thinkers have questioned the emphasis placed on academics in military academies. Professor Emeritus Martin van Creveld argued in the 1990s that military academies should refocus their programs on what is actually useful for future lieutenants, pointing to “the existence of some scattered evidence that an early college education, with its heavy emphasis on theoretical work and written skill, can actually be harmful to junior commanders whose job, after all, is to lead men in combat.”<sup>19</sup> In that sense, the military academy should focus primarily on training students for the one level of immediate responsibility that awaits them upon graduation from that institution, thus leaving out the academic education.

However, other thinkers who are in line with the majority view held by military scholars instead argue for strengthening the academic component of military academies, thereby continuing a trend that began in the middle of the last century. Thus, according to Professor Emeritus Don M. Snider:

*Priorities for officer development must change. In the past, junior officers focused early in their career on the military-technical aspects of their service, broadening later on into other fields of knowledge, including the political-cultural aspects of the profession. Now, given the nature of hybrid warfare, that is insufficient—junior officers must be more knowledgeable about all areas of their service’s expert knowledge, and must develop broad professional identities from the outset.*<sup>20</sup>

However, this clash of viewpoints is really no clash at all as soon as one thinks of the officer’s career in a more holistic manner. There is no need to place military training and university education in opposition, or even to pit tactical concerns against strategic thinking, since all of these are essential to the training of any officer. One can say, by way of illustration, that all “[y]oung lieutenants are potential generals, and generals were once young lieutenants.”<sup>21</sup> And it is that image that should guide the educational vision of the military academy. That is not to say that all lieutenants who graduate from the military academy will one day be promoted to general, because we know that only a small number of them will reach this level of military responsibility. In the same way, it seems to us equally erroneous to see only future lieutenants in the officer cadets attending military academies. Military academies train officers, period. They train both lieutenants and future generals, as well as majors, colonels, and so on. In our opinion, that



Royal Canadian Air Force Commander Lieutenant-General Kenny speaks to attendees at the end of tour parade of Operation REASSURANCE ATF-R at the Mihail Kogalniceanu (MK) Air Base in Romania, November 25, 2022.

Image by: Corporal Eric Chaput

is the way to think about not only the training mission of the military academy but also the place of the training provided by the academy in officers' overall training path. This unique institution has the responsibility to train officer cadets for the full range of potential duties of the profession, subject of course to their completing additional courses and gaining professional experience.

When one attempts to understand the place of military academy training in the overall officer training path, different trajectories can be observed regarding the military-training and academic-education components. Most of the technical skills and practical abilities imparted through military training are part of a *progressive* learning path. The development of these skills and abilities from the military academy to war college by way of staff college follows a progression that can be described as incremental (see Table A), meaning that they

are incrementally added to the professional skills and abilities acquired in the earlier training processes to form an increasingly wide-ranging, consistent whole with relatively well-defined boundaries. For example, learning military manoeuvres follows such a step-by-step progression, where the young lieutenant must first learn to command troops at the tactical level, taking command of a platoon, before later learning as a lieutenant-colonel to lead a battalion at the operational level and then, possibly, as a general officer, taking command of a brigade, division, or even an army, and thus approach the strategic level.

In contrast, the progression of academic knowledge throughout an officer's career appears to be defined by *leaps*. As noted earlier, some of this knowledge will be of limited immediate use to junior officers. It is only later in their careers that it will serve as a basis on which they will seek to build when they undertake studies at staff college and then at war college in a new academic cycle. The progression of knowledge here does not follow a direct and progressive path but rather takes the form of different "bundles" that consist of leaps, from the military academy to the various subsequent stages of training in an officer's overall career (see Table B). Thus, when officer cadets graduate from the military academy, many of the skills learned in the classroom will be "put on hold" for a time before what they learned can be reused again much later in their career progression.

Let us illustrate this idea of progression with a single concrete example, that of critical thinking. This intellectual skill is now an integral part of a fair number of educational programs offered in Western military academies, either in the form of a university course dedicated to it, as has been the case at the Royal Military Academy since 2016 (course RS619, *Pensée critique*<sup>22</sup> [critical thinking]), at the West Point Military Academy (by the *Center for Enhanced Performance*; course RS103,

Table A





Table B



“Although improving military education may be a commonplace recommendation for critics who have run out of ideas, it is nevertheless foundational to learning how to learn.”

*Information Literacy and Critical Thinking*) or more spread out in several courses as modules or sections, as is the case at Royal Military College Saint-Jean (with course 340-101-MQ *Philosophy and Rationality* and PSY401 *Military Professionalism and Ethics*<sup>23</sup>). Compared to other academic subjects, critical thinking is more difficult to teach in the classroom.<sup>24</sup> It is an intellectual skill that is not only difficult to transmit but can only be fully developed through sustained and constant effort over many years.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, it is recognized that people have a greater chance of acquiring and really developing it if they are exposed to it early in life. If one compares the scope of responsibilities and the nature of the duties of officers during their career, it seems obvious that a young lieutenant will definitely have less opportunity to use this intellectual skill than a senior officer or even a general officer. As noted, the scope of duties and responsibilities of junior officers is generally limited to enforcing orders at the tactical level and does not normally include input into the development of strategic plans where critical thinking can be an invaluable resource.<sup>26</sup> But, for this intellectual skill to one day be of practical use to officers promoted to senior command or staff positions, they must have been exposed to it earlier in their training, specifically at the military academy. That is how some of the knowledge gained in the classroom at the basic officer training establishment may be critical to the success of senior officers many years later, even though it may have been of limited use to them in the past in junior positions.

Thus, if some of the knowledge acquired by officer cadets will be put “on hold” during the period immediately following their graduation from the military academy, it must still be kept fresh in their minds if it is to be used again one day.

In fact, this is one of the purposes of the military academy that we believe should be given greater emphasis if we wish to strengthen the overall training path for officers: *to better*

*prepare future officers to maintain their learning abilities between periods of attendance at different schools throughout their careers.* In other words, the military academy should do a better job of training officer cadets to be self-guided learners. In the words of Professor Andrew Hill, “[a]lthough improving military education may be a commonplace recommendation for critics who have run out of ideas, it is nevertheless foundational to learning how to learn.”<sup>27</sup> Indeed, this is one of the essential characteristics of any profession: members of a profession must possess the skills necessary for self-guided learning and need to devote a portion of their time to this activity throughout their careers. Like doctors, lawyers and engineers, officers must be able to maintain their professional skills and knowledge as experts in violence management. To this end, they can certainly count on their chain of command to provide them with the necessary professional courses during their careers and thus take cycles of study at the staff or war college. But, more fundamentally, maintaining these skills and knowledge also requires *personal effort* through reading, attending seminars, taking part in discussion circles, and so on. This is one of the other major differences between the officer corps and the NCO corps. Unlike the latter, for whom the armed forces are responsible for providing all the courses necessary for exercising their professions (which does not, of course, prevent their members from improving themselves individually by means of additional reading, for example), officers are partly personally responsible for maintaining their professional skills and knowledge by themselves, outside of the courses provided to them by the military institution. To ensure that officers are well prepared for this responsibility, military academies should also work to develop this mindset and sense of responsibility that is inherent to any “professional.” That should include fostering what Don M. Snider calls a “culture of professionalism” by encouraging “reflection-in-action,”<sup>28</sup> or the ability to “assume responsibility for constant inquiry into the applicability of knowledge to practice” during their careers.

For the majority of military academies, that may be one of the hitherto underutilized roles or functions that would further contribute to improving the coherence of the overall officer training path: to provide a wider range of continuing education courses for mid-career officers through graduate and post-graduate programs or general education (workshops, seminars, discussion groups, and so on). In that way, military academies would help bridge the gap between the initial training offered to officer cadets and the subsequent training they receive later in their careers (i.e. staff and war college training).

## Conclusion

Since the first military schools were founded in Europe in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the military academy institution has come to play a central part in the training of officers throughout the world. Not only does this institution have the mandate to provide initial training to candidates destined for this profession, but it also plays a central role in it that goes well beyond this primary mandate. Its unique multidisciplinary training program aims to produce not only future lieutenants (the rank that graduates will receive upon graduating and securing their first posting), but also, and more fundamentally, officers. For every *lieutenant always carries within them the potential to become a general one day, in that every current general was once a lieutenant*. And it is by this educational objective that we must measure the unique role that the military academy occupies within not only the officer corps but also the armed forces. From the lofty viewpoint afforded by their numerous operational experiences and the many training courses they may have taken as they moved up through the military hierarchy, any general or admiral will always remain, first and foremost, a “product” of the first school that they attended as an officer cadet or naval cadet.



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## Notes

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- 2 Fabrice Hamelin, "Le combattant et le technocrate: La formation des officiers à l'aune du modèle des élites civiles," p. 448; Larry A. Paziuk, "The Need to Balance Formal Academic Education Within the Overall Officer Development Program," p. 5; and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, pp. 139-149.
- 3 Canada is an exception in that CMCs make up only 20-30% of the total Regular Force officer corps (Army, Navy and Air Force). See James R. Mackay, et al., "Developing Strategic Lieutenants in the Canadian Army."
- 4 Sanford M. Dornbusch, "The Military Academy as an Assimilating Institution," p. 316; Sylvain Paile, *Europe for the Future Officers, Officers for the Future Europe*; and Ahmad Thamrini Fadzlin SyedMohamed, *Civilian to Officer: Threshold Concepts in Military Officers' Education*.
- 5 John Hackett, *The Profession of Arms: The 1962 Lees Knowles Lectures*, MacMillan, 1983.
- 6 Danic Parenteau and Michel Maisonneuve, "Time to Reset the Canadian Military Colleges as Military Academies," *Vimy Paper*, CDA Institute, 1 November 2022.
- 7 Michel Goya, *Sous le feu: La mort comme hypothèse de travail*, Tallandier, 2014, p. 23.
- 8 Without launching into a debate about what defines a war, as opposed to other types of military operations, let us simply say, in a deliberately rudimentary way, that a war is not really a war if it cannot be either "won" or "lost" by a state or a political community. Unlike other military operations, war always has an existential dimension for a state or political community. In this sense, Canada's Western military engagement in Afghanistan at the turn of the century, for example, was not really a war, in that Canada could not really lose or win that engagement, nor was it about an existential issue for that country. The current conflict between Ukraine and Russia, on the other hand, does constitute a war, even though Russia continues to call it a "special military operation."
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- 13 In Canada, it has been a requirement since 1997, following a recommendation in a report prepared by then Minister of National Defence Douglas Young, that all CAF officers have an undergraduate degree. There are only a few exceptions to this rule. Douglas Young, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, Department of National Defence, 1997.
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- 16 *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command*, p. 116.
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- 18 Bernard Boëne, "La formation initiale et sa place dans le continuum de la formation des officiers de carrière," pp. 53-54; Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War" and Scott A. Silverstone, "Educating Strategic Lieutenants at West Point," *Parameters*, Vol 49, No. 4, Winter 2019-2020, pp. 65-76.
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- 24 Daniel T. Willingham, "Critical Thinking: Why Is It So Hard to Teach?"
- 25 Ibid.
- 26 Danic Parenteau, "Teaching Professional Use of Critical Thinking to Officer-Cadets: Reflection on the Intellectual Training of Young Officers at Military Academies.
- 27 "Military Innovation and Military Culture," p. 96.
- 28 "Developing a Corps of Professionals," p. 23.



Taken on September 15, 2019

Image by: Royal Military College

# From Rowley to Arbour: The Royal Military College through Six Reports

**BY JIM BARRETT**

*Jim Barrett graduated from RMC in 1964, served with 405 Squadron RCAF, studied at King's College London, returned to teach mathematics at RMC, was successively Dean of Science and Dean of Continuing Studies, and retired in 2008 as Director of Learning Innovation at CDA HQ.*

## Part 1: Introduction

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has not always been a hospitable environment for military education. Many promising reforms have withered on the vine<sup>1</sup>. The Royal Military College (RMC), founded in 1876 and reconstituted as a military proto-university following World War II, is a long surviving educational project, one that has flourished academically and struggled militarily, an imbalance that feeds an unfortunate divide between the two essential cultures of the military college, and one that reveals a deep-seated anti-elitist strain in the CAF.

Over the course of a long working life at or close to RMC, I have often wondered about the relationship between the CAF and the College. The corporate attitude may be described as benign neglect overlaid by a saw-tooth pattern,

spikes of energetic reform followed by loss of interest, foot-dragging or even subversion, while the attitudes of individual personnel range from quiet support to outright hostility. Until recently few in the junior ranks

saw any evidence of benefit from RMC, and many have perceived the College as giving unfair advantage to members of an already privileged elite.

Since 1969 there have been at least a dozen studies<sup>2</sup> of RMC, its programs and its value to the CAF, some of them substantial. The first of these may legitimately be seen as the defining document for modern military education in Canada, while the latest suggested that RMC is a relic from a bygone age. Both studies proposed substantial change, the first to achieve military excellence, the second to achieve social justice. In 1969 social justice was not a military concern, but in 2022 it has become vital ground. One might well ask, is military education adaptable enough, robust enough, to deliver both military excellence and social justice? I have selected six studies, commonly identified by the names of the study leaders or sponsors: Rowley<sup>3</sup>, Morton<sup>4</sup>-OPDWG<sup>5</sup>, Withers<sup>6</sup>, Maddison-Neasmith (SSAV)<sup>7</sup>, OAG<sup>8</sup>, and Arbour<sup>9</sup>, in the hope of finding some answers.

## Part 2: The Reports in context

MGen Roger Rowley's Report is firmly set in the past, in a "world of white males". His Board was all male. Inclusive language is nowhere to be found, all pronouns are masculine. The one nod to diversity is a statement that his recommendations apply equally to male and female officers, "except as these concern undergraduate attendance at [Canadian military colleges]". These issues aside, Rowley gives a thorough appraisal of the principles and practice of military education, and makes sound proposals for the way ahead. Some fifty plus years later, Madame Justice Louise Arbour signals clearly that the world of white males is fading, and asks uncomfortable questions about an emerging future. These and the four other studies I have chosen illuminate the trajectory of Canadian military education, and how their underlying events have helped shape the Royal Military College.

### Rowley 1969<sup>10</sup>

The Canadian Armed Forces unified on 1 February 1968. For the three Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs), long functioning as separate, but closely coordinated tri-service institutions, there was little immediate impact. There were, however, large implications for the training and development structures of the three former services. In 1968, the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jean Victor Allard, tasked MGen Roger Rowley,



RMC's Fall Convocation, held on November 15th, 2019 in Kingston, Ontario.

Image by: Corporal Brandon James Liddy, RMC Public Affairs

Commandant of the Canadian Army Staff College, to chair an Officer Development Board, with a broad mandate: "To examine all phases of the regular officer profession from selection, recruitment and initial training to the highest levels", to propose a plan for the professional development at every stage of an officer's career from recruitment to the most senior appointment, to recommend how that professional development might best be coordinated, and "to define the responsibilities of the agency best suited to exercise control over the academies, colleges and other institutions responsible for this development." Rowley's 1969 three volume Report, following a one-year study, is still today an aspirational document for Canadian military education.

Rowley<sup>11</sup> began with a series of concise chapters that consider the profession of arms, then sketch Canada's geopolitical situation, trends in Canadian society and the current state of

the newly unified CAF. From that basis he determined precepts from which he built his plan. The most radical proposal was a single military university, the Canadian Defence Education Center (CDEC), to be located near the nation's capital. The CDEC would have two components. The Canadian Military College (CMC) would relocate and combine the programs of the three existing establishments, which would cease to exist as military colleges. The Canadian Defence College (CDC) would similarly consolidate the existing staff schools and colleges and the National Defence College. The new university would offer post-graduate studies and have a robust extension division. Programs would be run year-round. Commander CDEC would be directly responsible to the CDS, and Rowley was adamant that there should be a single combined military and academic staff. With this one dramatic model, Rowley resolved the knotty issue of command and coordination of military education.

Resistance began almost immediately. As we know, the CDEC never materialized as such, but events and technology have done much to shape today's system much as Rowley would have organized it. One may fairly think of the CDEC model as the root of the persistent notion of a Canadian defence university.

Rowley had other ambitions for the unified CAF. Rowley thought that the majority of new officers—about 60%—would come from the CMC. He urged that to the extent possible the system should enable Francophones to progress in their own language, and that all officers should have a functioning knowledge of the second language. He argued for an Arts entry to the CMC, and wanted a period of preliminary military training for all ROTP<sup>12</sup> recruits before commencing their academic program.

Rowley insisted that the baccalaureate must be the commissioning standard for officers, partly because it had become the de facto standard for professional society in Canada, but also because he foresaw that a disparity in educational qualifications for different entry plans would drive standards to the lowest common denominator. Rowley's largely ignored insight foreshadows Jack Granatstein's assessment for Minister Young twenty-eight years later: "The CF has a remarkably ill-educated officer corps—surely one of the worst in the Western World."<sup>13</sup>

The Rowley Report is, even today, a fascinating read for students of the game. Each chapter brings insights and reveals resonances with modern initiatives, highlighting issues that received little attention then, but can be seen today as the

exposed ends of problems in embryo. He notes the changing attitudes of Canadian youth, foreshadowing changing values in Canadian society and their implications for CAF recruiting and professional development. In Rowley's proposals we find the seeds of modern Canadian military education, and in Rowley's concerns we find early warning of future challenges.

### ***From 1969 to 1994<sup>14</sup>***

The next few decades brought academic growth and consolidation. By 1969 both CMR and RRMC were pushing for four year programs and their own degrees, projects that were soon realized. The seventies brought the UTPO and UTP(M) (now UTPNCM), and a French language engineering program. Changes in the secondary schools led to an Arts entry. The cadet wing was becoming more diverse and language became more inclusive. Female graduate students and UTPNCM's could occasionally be seen at the College. Women as ROTP and RETP cadets came in 1980.

Managing the aspirations and academic ambitions of the three universities proved to be a serious challenge for National Defence Headquarters. A study, not reviewed here, the 1993 Ministerial Committee on the Military Colleges<sup>15</sup>, was charged with assessing whether RMC, RRMC and CMR might function under the umbrella of a single Canadian defence university, a vision that faded when the 1994 Federal budget closed CMR, RRMC, and the National Defence College.

### ***Morton-OPDWG 1995***

In 1995, in the heart of the "decade of darkness", LGEn (retired) Robert Morton submitted the Report of the Officer Professional Development Review Board (ODRB). Seen by some as a reprise of the Rowley study, the Morton Report's "over 200 implicit and explicit recommendations" were taken as evidence that the study team was out of touch with fiscal reality. It might also have been seen as evidence that the CAF had not advanced much in matters of military education<sup>16</sup>. Some of the ODRB's recommendations echo Rowley's proposals, for instance that a baccalaureate be a precondition for commissioning and that the Commander of the Officer Professional Development System (OPDS) report to the CDS on matters of professional development. A call for increased coordination of military education sustained the single military university concept and Rowley's proposed Extension College now appeared as a College of Continuing Military Professional Education, located at RMC. Other recommendations concerned refinements to

various OPDS programs. The Commandant of the Canadian Forces College wrote: "Clearly the ODRB recommendations represent an evolution not a revolution in the CF's officer professional development policies."<sup>17</sup>

An Officer Professional Development Working Group (OPDWG) was struck to render the ODRB recommendations into a manageable plan. Some 18 broad issues were extracted from the recommendation pack, and each assigned to one of four categories: Category 1: recommended for action; Category 2: worthy of consideration; Category 3: not recommended; Category 4: Concurrent activity: no action required.

Eight recommendations were cautiously advanced in Category 1. The recommendation for increased coordination of military education was endorsed, but not the College of Continuing Professional Military Education. The recommendation that Commander OPDS report to the CDS on professional development issues was not endorsed, nor was the recommendation that a baccalaureate be the commissioning standard.

### ***Morton 2 1996: The OPDWG***

Unlike Rowley, the ODRB had had no RMC representation. Concerned, the Dean of Arts, Ron Haycock, and I, then Dean of Science, approached the Principal, Dr John Plant, who suggested we "just show up." We were made welcome and the Chair of the OPDWG Steering Committee, Cmdre Ken Nason, graciously added us to his distribution list as Subject Matter Experts.

RMC figured not at all in the discussions on military education and the implications of increased officer education. It became painfully apparent that Canada's premier military education institution was seen as largely irrelevant, a fire-and-forget junior officer production facility that some officers argued was both expensive and entirely unnecessary. One officer told us that "you don't give a damn about the Canadian Forces, you only care about your little redcoats." At RMC we had often complained about the flip side, that the CAF didn't much care for its military college, but that comment struck home. Still smarting from the blows inflicted by the 1994 Budget, we were very much aware that RMC's social capital within the CAF was at a low ebb, and worried whether the College had sufficient support to resist another round of budget cuts or a future public scandal.

The OPDWG presented an unusual opportunity, two working deans conversing with the working managers of the CAF's training and education system. Most of the attendees were at the lieutenant-colonel or major level; we were the only civilians.



Indigenous Leadership Opportunity Year (ILOY) Naval and Officer Cadets receive their Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Universal Pattern Cap Badge, also known as the "Cornflake" to signify their entrance into the CAF. September 01, 2022.

Image by: Avr Makala Rose, Imagery Technician

Working with the OPDWG brought RMC into the community that delivers individual training and education (IT&E) across the CAF, and made us aware of the real struggles to place personnel in course seats and conversely, to find time in a busy officer's career for required courses. We discovered the gap that exists between requirements set by higher authority and the imperative to deliver program. In the struggles between the coal face and the centre, RMC is often seen to be on the side of the enemy. One successful outcome of the OPDWG was the RMC/CFC continuing studies project. Late in 1996, the RMC Principal said publicly that "Continuing Studies had saved the College's bacon".

### ***From 1990 to 1998***

The 1990s was a remarkably busy decade for military education. The Somalia incident had triggered a commission of enquiry, which Minister of National Defence Douglas Young brought to an early conclusion before submitting his 1997 Report to the Prime Minister<sup>18</sup>. Meanwhile in 1996 the Land Forces Technical Staff Program launched on the RMC grounds, the best example of a CAF training establishment that integrates RMC academic staff.

With the Young Report's recommendations based on the assessment of four respected academics, all of whom made clear that the educational standards of the officer corps were sorely deficient, military education reform was high on the agenda, giving tremendous impetus to both the RMC post graduate programs in War Studies and the continuing studies

project. The Report recommended a review of the RMC curriculum by its new Board of Governors. The result was the Withers study, a blue-ribbon team presided by a former Chief of the Defence Staff and with a future RMC Principal in its membership.

### ***Withers 1998***

With admirable understatement, the preface to the Withers Report spoke of finding “an institution experiencing turbulence”, and “some problems at the interface between the Canadian Forces and the Royal Military College”. It also found a “growing appreciation of the total worth of the Royal Military College to the Canadian Forces”, due to the new “continuing education program [that] has extended the educational riches of the College to thousands of all ranks ...” and the “hundreds of post-graduate candidates, both on and off campus, [who] have been added to the rolls”. The Report thus validated RMC’s educational outreach as it scanned RMC’s problems, progress, and potential.

The Minister approved the entire Withers Report, and the CDS directed execution of all but one of its 34 recommendations. The “big ticket” items were Recommendation 1, to implement the Balanced Excellence Model (BEM) which called for two years of academic study followed by two years of military training prior to returning to RMC for the final two years. Recommendation 5 proposed to increase the RMC fraction of new lieutenants from 25% to 35%-40%, and Recommendation 7 proposed developing the concept of a CAF university structure. Recommendation 13 was a call to refine and formalize a core curriculum. There were other ambitious proposals, notably concerned with strengthening the military pillar<sup>19</sup>, improving military training in the CAF, integration of the four pillars, and RMC-CAF relations.

Recommendation 1 was sent for further study, to be replaced by the Enhanced Leadership Model (ELM), which was approved for implementation, and ultimately delivered in pieces, in part through RMC Continuing Studies. Recommendation 5 was studied and eventually dropped for reasons that are not entirely clear. The approved Recommendation 7 gave a solid mandate for the bottom-up collaboration and consolidation already underway. Recommendation 13 was fully and successfully implemented and, through the Continuing Studies Division, extended to all members of the CAF.

“The Report thus validated RMC’s educational outreach as it scanned RMC’s problems, progress, and potential.”

### ***From 1998 to 2017***

Operations in Afghanistan, 2001 to 2011, reinvigorated the warrior qualities of the CAF but as the focus shifted, the energy that had driven the Young reforms dissipated. Still, there was progress. The Master of Defence Studies (MDS) at the Canadian Forces College commenced in 2001, and the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), intended as a governing structure for military education, was established on the RMC grounds in 2002. The aftermath of the 1994 budget had brought considerable consolidation; an effective partnership between RMC and the Canadian Forces College had built the substance of a credible military university. Though lacking the single geographical location, the new headquarters and its constituent colleges are organized much like Rowley’s proposed CDEC. The Canadian Defence Academy, however, differs in significant respects from Rowley’s model: Commander CDA reports to the Chief of Military Personnel and CDA HQ is not a truly combined military-academic staff- from a promising beginning it has become a military headquarters with at best a few academic staff officers.

The re-institution of RMC Saint-Jean as a separate military college in 2008 brought both new vigour and added complexity. Within RMC, increased military and bureaucratic oversight brought Faculty dissatisfaction to the point that in 2012 the Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT)<sup>20</sup>, established a Commission on Governance. That episode in RMC history deserves greater attention but will not be reviewed in this paper.

### ***Maddison-Neasmith/SSAV 2017***

The 2017 Senior Staff Advisory Visit (SSAV) marked a new direction. The SSAV was directed by the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), General Vance, to determine if the RMC climate contributes “to the healthy development of our future officers and leaders”. Focussed therefore on the morale and the well-being

of cadets, the SSAV team interviewed 412 people across all groups in the College, including 209 cadets, and its Report provided the most detailed picture of the modern College and cadet life<sup>21</sup>. While sympathetic to the College and its aims, the SSAV Report was nonetheless blunt about serious problems and shortcomings. The quoted excerpts from the cadet interviewees and others to be found in the Annexes make this Report stand out from the rest.

The study found that professional military training was judged by cadets to be of low value and not a good use of time. Cadets also complained about issues with the Cadet Chain of Authority (CCoA). Like Withers, the SSAV was concerned with integration of the four pillars. Academic Wing morale was judged to be good, Training Wing morale was no better than fair. Cadet morale too was fair, but low for cadets struggling to meet the four pillar standards. The Report recommended “humane” ways to fail students who don’t meet the standard. There are 79 recommendations, to which the CDS added an additional 11, for 90 in all. While the main focus was within the College, the SSAV also noted a diminished degree of priority for the College within the CAF, and the apparent indifference of the CAF to RMC.

Both the 2017 OAG Report and the 2022 Arbour Study drew on the SSAV findings. Putting aside the question of RMC’s cost, the OAG and the SSAV were in general agreement but, while Madame Arbour found a significant level of sexual misconduct, the SSAV did not. The College’s active response to the SSAV and OAG recommendations is thoroughly described in a recent paper by the RMC Principal<sup>22</sup>.

## **OAG**

The 2017 OAG study is mainly of interest because it, with the SSAV, serves as the only substantial research behind Madame Arbour’s opinions of the leadership aspects of RMC. Much of the OAG Report is a thoughtful, clear-eyed analysis of the College. Some of it is problematic. Comparing RMC to a small civilian university, the OAG found that RMC is too expensive, at odds with the Chief of Review Services, whose 2015 review found the “cost of operating the Royal Military College is also comparable both to Ontario universities and similar military academies in the United States and Australia”<sup>23</sup>. Nonetheless, the idea was picked up by Madame Arbour, who made it part of a report that has attracted far more attention than that of the Auditor General.

The second part of the OAG Report was strongly critical, particularly of governance, the quality of the military training program, and academic-military balance. In this it drew on and amplified some of the findings of the SSAV, but expressed doubts whether the SSAV’s 79 recommendations would receive serious attention from the CAF.

## **Arbour**

Madame Arbour was given a double mandate, to review sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and Leadership in the CAF. She assessed RMC under both headings; two recommendations and supporting arguments occupy 14 pages of a formidable 420 page document. It is clear that she saw an old-boy college with its cadet command structure as part of the problem, completely missing the modern military university’s potential to be a potent part of the solution.

Madame Arbour admits her assessment of RMC is cursory, as she made no effort to study the Academic Wing. While Recommendation 29 proposes a thorough study to assess the value of retaining RMC as an undergraduate military college, her accompanying remarks and public statements leave no doubt that she believes the military college is a relic from a bygone age. Her claims that an officer training model based on a civilian university would be “vastly superior”, are unsupported by any credible research other than the flawed arguments of the OAG 2017 Report.

Madame Arbour’s main purpose in visiting<sup>24</sup> RMC was to research the prevalence of sexual misconduct. On this one issue, there was stark disagreement between Madame Arbour and the SSAV. Both agreed that there is disturbing sexual misbehavior at RMC, but while the SSAV found that the College was dealing appropriately with it, Madame Arbour has found that is most definitely not the case. The findings in both cases were based on interviews with cadets. Why this difference? One possibility is that respondents were less guarded with Madame Arbour than with the SSAV team. This suggestion is supported by the College experience with the early classes of women suggesting that female cadets would not talk freely to the male staff, and especially not to the chain of command. Unlike Madame Arbour’s study, the SSAV was led by men and most definitely represented the chain of command. The undeniable fact is that sexual misconduct has been a festering problem for forty years, brought vividly to light by Madame Arbour’s



Image by: Cpl Charles Audet

inquiry. These are undoubtedly complex issues, but more could and should have been done.

Madame Arbour's Recommendation 28 calls for the abolition of the Cadet Chain of Authority. She correctly identified two elements that distinguish the military college from a civilian university: power and communal living. But power is a deeply embedded feature of military life and communal living is frequently required when forces are in the field or on board ship. How likely is it that a civilian university will prepare a young woman, or a young man, for these situations? Well designed and carefully managed by a Training Wing properly resourced and with the right talent, the Cadet Chain of Authority could prepare young officers- male and female- to deal with sexual incidents, not only for their own protection. One ancient military virtue is vital ground: duty of care to subordinates, without regard to race, colour, gender or religion, is an inviolable guide to behaviour.

### Part 3: Discussion

The authors of these six Reports have made literally hundreds of recommendations that, with the exception of OAG and Arbour, express a shared core vision of the way ahead. To capture fully and contain that vision is beyond a single review paper. Instead, I venture to offer seven more proposals<sup>25</sup>, inspired by the insights found in these six studies.

#### 1. Implement an officer recruiting and training system with two regimes, one with meaningful summer training to match the rhythm of colleges and universities, including RMC.

Rowley pointed out that the military training provided to military college cadets and ROTP civilian university cadets was inferior to that given to direct entry officers, largely because the three services could not or would not invest in the summer training that accommodates university rhythm. This has long been an issue, three radical restructurings of officer training have been proposed to address it: Rowley's CDEC with year-round operation, the Withers BEM and its progeny, ELM, but the problems arising from disparate entry models persist. Over time, as the impact of MND 10 (the degreed officer corps) takes hold, it will make sense to have an officer recruiting and training structure with meaningful summer training matching the rhythm of university and college cycles, and perhaps another maintaining the current rhythm. There is an inevitable cost to this proposal, not least the personnel it will demand from operational units to manage and deliver a larger and more complex training establishment, but with creative use of reserves, retirees and other contractors it can be done. It is an inevitable cost to a degree-level entry standard. Properly done, an initiative like this could dispel the notion that the university entry is an inconvenient adjunct to the "regular" entry.

## “The CAF an officer will lead will look very different from the CAF the cadet joined.”

### **2. Develop the concept of a single, integrated military and academic staff at RMC as suggested by Rowley.**

The keys to success for a modern military university are keeping an ambitious education and training program within bounds, and an appropriate military-academic balance. Contests for dominance are destructive. There is no question about who is in charge, but the Commandant is more than the leader of the Training Wing<sup>26</sup>. A carefully designed, truly integrated military-academic staff understands the imperatives of both cultures, and is sympathetic to academic rhythms, modes and culture as well as military rhythms, modes and culture. The core tension is not simply military vs academic, but equally transient vs stable. Newly posted personnel find RMC decidedly different from any other CAF unit, and their instinctive, sometimes reflexive, opinions and decisions exert a strong cultural pressure. Some of this is good, but wise leadership will resist pressures to militarize the academic function.

In 1994 to 1996, when the three military colleges were consolidated into one, and RMC's student population increased by 30%, the senior leadership of the College functioned much as a single combined staff. The Commandant, the Principal, the Director of Cadets, the Director of Administration, the Deans and the Registrar worked together to achieve miracles. When things eventually settled down, events conspired increasingly to separate the two communities. This event is more than a fascinating episode in RMC's history, it is a valuable lesson in how this College may successfully be governed in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **3. Invest in the military pillar, and create a Military Training Faculty.**

This is an important lesson learned from the Academic Wing. Created with a critical mass of talent, good leadership and a degree of independence, the Academic Wing is an outstanding success, achieving its mission and weathering good times and lean. In sharp contrast- and all the recent Reports make this clear- the military counterpart, the Training Wing, has been underfunded and under-resourced in all respects. Efforts at pillar integration fail because these are largely

attempts to harness the strong to the weak. Withers and the SSAV offer a series of excellent recommendations, many of which have been implemented or are in process. From this good beginning, one can imagine building a robust Faculty of Military Training, with resources, talent, and stability resembling those of the Academic Wing.

An early priority would be bringing the Cadet Chain of Authority into the 21<sup>st</sup> century by incorporating gender and diversity. Madame Arbour's Recommendation 28 must be rejected. She observes, correctly, that sexual misconduct is often an abuse of power, and the unfettered use of power by untrained leaders is no longer an acceptable practice. But the CCoA replicates, in miniature, the power structures that necessarily exist in the CAF, indeed in any hierarchical organization. Aspiring officers need to learn how to use power, how to temper it and, especially, how not to abuse it.

The informal lessons learned by exposure to the CCoA are priceless. The exercise of military authority at any rank level can be arbitrary: to see how one's seniors, juniors, and peers react, and especially how one's self reacts to the exercise of power, and equally how they behave when given power are important life lessons. When a young officer is given authority in the “real” CAF, recruited from an increasingly diverse and polarized Canada, they will have been there before, and will be better prepared. The CCoA, with good oversight, is one of the defining marks of the military college. It is, perhaps, one of the reasons that a military college education can be “vastly superior” to that from a civilian university.

### **4. Re-establish an office responsible for liaison with CAF IT&E.**

When the Division of Continuing Studies was closed in Jul 2020, the College lost an important conduit to the working CAF. This proposal, derived from the experience with the OPDWG and subsequently with Continuing Studies, seeks to re-engage the military colleges with the CAF IT&E community. There is no better way to understand the real-world challenges of those who manage the professional development of CAF personnel, to earn their trust, to be aware of trends, currents, problems and impending policy. It is equally important, especially when change is contemplated, for the Colleges to be seen as having a role to play in the delivery of professional development.

### **5. Explore a new Rowley attribute: Social Adaptability**

Rowley begins his description of officership by setting out eight attributes<sup>27</sup>; importance varies with rank:



Major-General Michel-Henri St Louis, Acting Commander of the Canadian Army walks with students and members of the RMC during the annual MOS w(Military Occupational Structure) Professional Development Weekend. April 3, 2022.

Image by: Avr Makala Chapman, Imagery Technician

- ▶ The soldierly virtues (classic qualities including loyalty, honour, courage)
- ▶ Command ability (command competency commensurate with rank)
- ▶ Branch and speciality skill (infanteer, aerospace engineer, logistician etc.)
- ▶ List competence (sea, land, air or support operations)
- ▶ Military expertise (knowledge of the capabilities of armed forces, domestic and foreign, and an ability to provide strategic level military advice)
- ▶ Intellectual capability (native intelligence for use in grasping concepts, reasoning logically and solving problems)
- ▶ Executive ability (capacity to deal with problems and decisions that defy solution), and
- ▶ Military-executive ability (a knowledge of the context in which the officer will apply executive ability and military expertise and give advice to government).

Rowley foresaw that the Canadian demographic from which CAF recruits are drawn will change and that the expectations of Canadians will change. Media attention to the Somalia incident and more recent misdemeanors have undermined what was once a bedrock of public support. The government has shown itself willing to impose social change on a military that may not welcome it. The recruiting pool is changing, as are the criteria by which recruits are selected. The last few decades have

shown plainly that the CAF an officer will lead will look very different from the CAF the cadet joined. To succeed, an officer must be both socially aware, and willing to adapt.

#### 6. Show more of the real-world face of the colleges, especially within the CAF.

Some twenty-five years ago the distinguished British military historian John Keegan saw a parade at RMC and declared the College to be an echo of the Victorian age<sup>28</sup>. The magnificent military pageantry draws the eye away from the substance of this modern and respected military university. Has the pageantry become a liability? The unfortunate confluence in the media of Madame Arbour's revelations with photographs of the cadet wing in full scarlets feeds her claim that the colleges are "institutions from a different era". When General Rick Hillier told the crowd at a commissioning parade that "these guys are the gods of drill", the comment may not have been meant entirely positively. In its study of the military pillar, Withers proposes a dramatic reduction of time spent on drill.

This proposal is not meant to recommend an end to drill and parades, rather to suggest that serious thought be given to the image RMC projects to the Canadian public and especially to the CAF.

#### 7. Create appropriate Review Boards for the Four Pillar program

One cadet's lament, recorded by the SSAV, found personal resonance:

*I am held back because of an injury (short 1 push up) and I won't be able to be tested until next spring (two tests per year with one re-test). So I will do my whole year at [level 1]<sup>29</sup>*

In my case it was a chin-up. Academic achievement, OLQs (officer-like qualities) were fine. I was moderately fluent in French, and I was fit, but on the last test had failed to meet the chin-up standard. So, after a board pass, I graduated as a "3.9 pillar"<sup>30</sup> cadet in 1964. Other near misses were given similar grace.

The four-pillar program is demanding and complex, and warrants better assessment processes than a primitive pass/fail. For years the College has wrestled with the question of cadets who lack the last *iota*. Remedies, ranging from punitive to generous, have tended to reflect the attitude of the Director

of Cadets of the day. Borderline cases like this are best decided by a formally constituted and stable review board, which can bring a mature jurisprudence, and thus consistency, to each case. This is not simply a matter of humane treatment, it is also about not wasting valuable human capital.

The College already has a long standing academic review board. Faculty Board Marks Meetings- Training Wing officers are voting members- spend most time discussing cadets who are just shy of a pass, or of honours standing. At this point assessment is focussed on attitude and effort. The question is not, "Does this cadet merit two extra marks in History 451?" but rather, "Is this cadet worthy of the RMC degree?" All Board decisions are reviewed by Faculty Council and the Senate. It's a good model.

## Part 4: Conclusion

Of the many threads that run through these Reports, two deserve particular attention. The first is a persistent, nagging thread that underlies the gulf that divides the "military" and "academic" worlds at RMC: the CAF has persistently failed to invest in the military development and socialization of its most promising young officers. It is easy to level criticism in this case, but we should understand it as another example of the perennial struggle for resources between force generation and force application, between tomorrow and today. Still, it is hard to understand why the numerous recommendations for improvement have received so little attention. The really interesting question, perhaps, is why the CAF anti-education lobby has been so persistent and so successful.

The second thread points towards the future. The three "big picture" reports: Rowley, Morton and Withers, looking at the College as one element in the larger context of CAF professional development, trace the growth and maturing of RMC's high-quality graduate programs, which reflect about a third of all degrees from the military college system. Even a cursory scan of the global horizon reveals that the future of

higher military education lies increasingly in postgraduate level education. This is a trend that demands some care. While higher military education is a form of graduate study, not all graduate study is higher military education. This brings us full circle to MGen Rowley's observation<sup>31</sup> that "there is little likelihood that Canada's civilian universities can provide course patterns tailored to [military] need."

These Reports span, roughly, my working life in and with the CAF. Anyone who has spent time working in and with the CAF is aware of an informal but real anti-military college lobby. Each new study has been accompanied by predictions from that gallery that the colleges would "be shut down". And yet, the studies have been almost uniformly supportive. Criticism there is in plenty, but also much thoughtful guidance. There is much more knowledge and wisdom in those Reports than can possibly be conveyed in a single review paper. Time spent with them is a wise investment for those who practice the art of military education.

Madame Arbour's Report is a prominent outlier. It may prove to be the most consequential one, given the high profile of sexual misconduct in the military and the prestige of the Author. She has set a clear challenge for the Royal Military College. It's been 40 plus years since women came to RMC, bright-eyed and hopeful, believing that they had won a place for themselves in the military college. What they had won in fact was the right to fight the hard battles for acceptance. While CAF policies, doctrines and orders are all correct, resistance continues and it is cultural, informal and oft times nasty. Is military education adaptable enough, robust enough, to deliver both military excellence and social justice? Rowley, Morton, Withers and Maddison-Neasmith leave no room for doubt, though it will take work and a clear-eyed look at the experiences of the last forty years in the light of Madame Arbour's findings. It will mean, once again, asking how RMC's capacities might best be harnessed to meet the demand for change.



## Notes

- 1 Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, *Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto, Dundurn, 2015).
- 2 Randall Wakelam, "Military Education in Canada and the Officer Development Board March 1969", in Wakelam and Coombs 2010. Footnote 51 gives details and references to many of these studies.
- 3 Department of National Defence, Report of the Officer Development Board (the Rowley Report), 1969
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2022 Convocation Ceremony.

Image by: Royal Military College

# Graduate Level Professional Military Education at Canadian Forces College: Adapting to the Demands of the Modern Complex Environment

**BY PAUL MITCHELL**

*Dr. Paul Mitchell was the first academic to join CFC as a permanent member of the College in 1998. He has served twice as the Director of Academics and was instrumental in the introduction of the Masters of Defence Studies in 2001. He was recently awarded the Canadian Forces Medallion for Distinguished Service for his contributions to PME.*

A striking absence from the Arbour report was any serious examination of professional military education (PME). The report gives a terse summary of professional education at both Canadian Forces College (CFC) and the Osside Institute.<sup>1</sup> However, despite the fact that most senior members of the Officer and Non-Commissioned classes pass through these schools, in other words, those in a position to influence the ethos and environment of Canada's military, the report failed to consider if either were part of the problem or part of the solution, a significant shortcoming in this author's opinion.

It is evident that CFC exhibited many of the pathologies identified in Arbour's report but has also sought to be a vector for institutional transformation. Gender concerns within the classroom had been anecdotally discussed by staff and faculty, but they were revealed in two landmark studies conducted by Vanessa Brown in 2016 and 2017.<sup>2</sup> Since then, CFC has sought to address the pedagogical issues as a point of departure for a broader consideration of "Equity, Diversity, Inclusivity, and Indigeneity" within the military institution itself (this effort will be discussed separately elsewhere in this edition).<sup>3</sup> The potential of this specific example calls to mind the impact of a previous military scandal, namely the Somalia Affair, which had a revolutionary effect, transforming the practice of PME at CFC, the subject of this paper.

For more than two decades, now, CFC has been undergoing a "quiet revolution" of sorts in how it designs and delivers professional military education. In the late fall of 1998, full time professional academics rejoined the staff of CFC.<sup>4</sup> Today, CFC hosts the "Department of Defence Studies" with 13 Royal Military College professors.<sup>5</sup> 2001 also witnessed the initial offering of the Masters of Defence Studies (MDS), the accredited professional degree associated with first the Command and Staff Course, and later, the Joint Command and Staff Programme. The impact of these related developments has been nothing less than revolutionary in terms of how CFC delivers educational to the senior officers of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). In this period, CFC has transitioned from a rather run of the mill staff college to a world class PME school to which other sister institutions increasingly look.<sup>6</sup>

The phase shift that has taken place is larger than simply the addition of academics, although that undoubtedly was the catalyst that has enabled this transformation. The intervening years has permitted the development of a specific vision for PME oriented around the challenges confronting the small (and politically neglected) military of an influential, but middle power nation in an increasingly hostile environment of collapsing international order and uncertain alliance relationships. This vision has had to meet the twin challenges of blending academic and military professional viewpoints to deliver relevant, continuously adaptive education to the officers of the Canadian Armed Forces. To do so, CFC has had to become a "hybrid" institution that integrates the standards set by Canadian universities for academic degrees with the institutional requirements of the profession of arms. This has been in



RMC holds the 2022 Resilience Plus Soiree event which showcases how individuals can be empowered to maximize their productivity and effectiveness in the pursuit of personal and professional goals. October 25, 2022.

Image by: S1 Lisa Sheppard, Military Photojournalist, RMC Kingston

no way an easy task, especially given the often diametrically opposed cultures in which each of these professions exist. In many ways, CFC sits at an intersection of complimentary tensions, which have been used productively to advance not just PME but have also enabled a highly productive research environment for the professors embedded within the College.<sup>7</sup> Still, this tension often manifests itself in outside academic circles in the form of skepticism on the academic value of the MDS, or in military circles as suspicion on watered down or irrelevant curriculum.<sup>8</sup> In reaction to both of these charges, the concept of "Graduate Level PME" gradually emerged to illustrate how the curriculum of CFC sits in the middle of this contested space.

This article explores the meaning, form, and implications of this concept. The nature of professional education, while growing in Canadian universities, is poorly understood by many academics, and is often dismissed as an inferior product to what normally proceeds in graduate classrooms. Similarly, military officers need to be reassured that the academic content of PME curriculum is, indeed, relevant to their careers, and not the idle insertion of narrow-minded professors. As such, this article proceeds in two parts. First, a philosophy of PME is introduced. Second, the implications for professional education concludes the argument.

## The CFC Learning Context

A former CFC Director of Academics, Dr. Peter Foot, originally articulated a threefold model illustrating how PME institutions have evolved in the since their establishment

## “academics become “organic” constituents of professional military schools, rather than exterior influences”

in the late 18<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>9</sup> The model relates to the utility of received professional knowledge in the conduct of operations. The first form of professional military schools appeared in Sweden and Germany. Their appearance was an adaptation to the rapidly evolving social environment within enlightenment era Europe where new approaches to discovering and expanding knowledge were appearing, and social classes were altering the historical arrangement of power in European society in the face of these developments. Military schools served the newly powerful bourgeois citizenry who were replacing aristocratic classes in the command structures of military forces. They served to educate those citizen soldiers in the profession of arms, something that had previously been a private and often family affair for the aristocracy. New scientific and engineering based ideas were influencing how the military arts were to be practiced, and an explosion of writing on the subject demanded professional study to master.

Foot labeled this model of education the “Jena School”. While the philosophies surrounding the employment of force were often new, and sometimes radical, the object of military force remained traditional in nature: the imposition of the state’s will upon those who would oppose it. Military operations were violent in nature, and oriented towards the destruction of the enemy. In the Jena school, professional knowledge from the past was both necessary and sufficient for conducting operations in the future. Sound appreciation of enemy doctrine, technology, and terrain could all be rigorously mastered and applied in practice to deal with any foreseeable future challenge. As Clausewitz famously observed in his masterpiece however, both “genius” and “friction” would continue to serve as a restraint on the predictability of outcomes, making the outcome of war always uncertain.

No additional methods were necessary to inculcate the professionally certified techniques and concepts governing war. Jena schools were “hermetic” in professional approaches. Historians might be employed within their walls to guide the

study of officers, but they played no role in developing “new professional knowledge”. As a self-governing profession, Military “masters” could directly teach their students all that was necessary, and while historical study might resemble normal civilian education, curricula in these schools were more akin to training, with prescribed “Directing Staff Solutions” for every contingency under investigation.

For a very long time, all Western PME schools pursued this type of approach. Following the Second World War, however, new technologies began to alter the operational environments of developed military forces. Growing economic power and novel technologies transformed the military enterprise from a local affair to a global one, bringing states that had rarely or never interacted militarily in the past into close contact. Nuclear weapons created such destructive forces as to remove them from the sole control of military agency and to transform the formulation of strategies for their (non)use from a military to a civilian affair.<sup>10</sup> New information technologies enabled the generation of world spanning narratives, dividing the world into novel political configurations. Finally, the collapse of old European empires set loose a process of decolonization, that erupted in a series of local conflagrations, all of which were taken advantage by the super-powers to pursue their own strategic ends.

Into this environment, the traditional Jena School progressively evolved into what Foot described as the “Falklands” School. Here, traditional professional military knowledge remained “necessary” for officer development, but was no longer “sufficient” to address every contingency that might be confronted in the future. In the US, schools now offered curriculum in counter-insurgency and political warfare, while still preparing for the possibility of “World War III” against the Soviet Union on the Central Front of Western Europe. The conflict for which the model is named, the Falklands War, illustrated the conundrum confronting the United Kingdom. It was in the process of transforming its military from a colonial based structure to one designed solely to fight in Germany against the USSR when Argentina invaded its colonial possession in the South Atlantic. Had Argentina waited even a year more, the United Kingdom would have lost much of the capability to retake the islands and could have affected a *fait accompli* against a much bigger military power. Clearly, if force posture was to be “fit for purpose”, additional factors needed to be taken into account when thinking of future operations.

The Falklands School is distinguished from the Jena model by the growing role of academics in the study of military affairs. While it remains focused on well understood military problems, curricula begin to expand into new areas not traditionally considered for professional study. Enemy, doctrine, technology, and terrain all begin to vary in subtle combinations, making the determination of a “DS Solution” more and more difficult. While academics remain largely exterior to the PME enterprise, they begin to deliver more than simply lessons on history. Visitors from universities begin to become regular invitees before staff college classes, lecturing on a wide variety of subjects outside the traditional confines of PME.

The end of the Cold War shattered this transitory model, permitting the emergence of an entirely new form of professional education. This development was well underway even before the close of the Cold War in the United States. Foot’s “Kosovo School” is marked by profound uncertainty about possible future contingencies. The enemy, doctrine, technology, and terrain all become fundamentally unknowable. Indeed, the very terminology of “enemy”, “doctrine”, “technology”, and “terrain” becomes problematic. Professional knowledge under these circumstances may be neither sufficient nor necessary. As evidenced by the operations in Vietnam, and the continuing problems experienced by all developed militaries, Western or otherwise, in resolving conflict, professional knowledge successfully applied often led to paradoxical outcomes and the creation of greater strategic problems going forward.<sup>11</sup>

In this environment, academics become “organic” constituents of professional military schools, rather than exterior influences. Professional curricula become “accredited” against academic standards applied to civilian universities, permitting the award of degrees for the completion of professional studies. Moreover, these organic academics, along with their students, conduct increasingly specialized research in areas not normally covered in university curriculum, opening new areas for exploitation within military professional knowledge. This research is fed back into professional programmes, permitting the emergence of new professionally hybrid concepts of operations.<sup>12</sup>

By 1998, CFC was fully into its “Falklands” step of evolution in Foot’s typology. University professors from a wide variety of Canadian and American institutions were regular guests of the College. However, the incidents of the Somalia Affair and its subsequent coverup within the higher echelons of the CAF shook the confidence in the professionalism of the Canadian military, resulting ultimately in the issuance of the Young



Tweet by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) announcing the start of the year’s Joint Command and Staff Programme September 4, 2018.

Report on leadership.<sup>13</sup> The appearance of academics at CFC began this process, but it was not fully developed until their organisational acceptance that the full transformation began.<sup>14</sup>

### ***Graduate Level PME as a Practice: Three Distinguishing Factors***

“Normal” PME is distinguished from Graduate Level PME by a specific approach to knowledge. In the Jena model, knowledge is transmitted from the master to the apprentice. Practical problems may be either simple or complicated, but effective professional solutions to them can be developed and successfully applied in an operational environment. Professional “education”, thus, follows more of a training model where skills are repetitively practiced through certified processes, generating predictable outcomes. The Kosovo model, however, posits that there is no certainty about what type of problems might need to be resolved in future conditions.<sup>15</sup> Rather than the certainty afforded by training, graduate education begins from a *stance of inquiry*.

The contrast with “normal” graduate education with Graduate Level PME is stark. At a graduate level in university, students must “master” a discipline’s literature and demonstrate that knowledge to expert professors. Students at CFC, however, arrive *already* as professional experts. Majors are tactical experts, and Colonels are operational experts. Their interest in education is further instrumentally related to their professional practice. Unlike normal graduate students whose approach to knowledge is open ended and purely intellectual (going where the research leads them), PME students search for “relevant” knowledge that will aid them in their practical problem solving.

This professional expertise comes with pre-existing inclinations as to how the world works. These professional viewpoints are often limited by the restricted scope of the expert student's previous practice, and frequently do not consider the complexity of the environments into which they will step upon graduation. In metaphorical terms, students are expert at being caterpillars without necessarily realizing they will need to become butterflies. Therefore, Graduate Level PME must move them from this stance of "I understand; I know" to one of "How does this work; why is this the way that it is; can it be something different?"

Nevertheless, this inquiry differs in nature from normal graduate level inquiry by remaining bounded by a purely instrumental constraint. Graduate Level PME does not seek to create military simulacra of academic professionals. PME students remain subject to the professional demands of their careers and the institutional gates through which they must pass on their rise in rank: they do not have unlimited time to pursue their studies, and time spent on concerns other than the strict dictates of their own profession can never be retrieved. Graduate Level PME must remain relevant to the needs of the profession of arms, not that of disinterested scholarship. The pedagogical objective is not to create *professional researchers* out of military officers but *researching professionals*. **This is the first and most fundamental distinction between normal academic graduate studies and Graduate Level PME.**


Graduate education is composed of two actors: the student and the professor. Graduate level PME has three actors, each of which demonstrate the classic Aristotelian ontological divisions of knowledge.<sup>16</sup> First are the students themselves. As noted above, these students already have established professional knowledge, a basis from which they make informed judgements on the utility of information. These "frames of

reference" differ from one another. This difference is largely based in professional distinctions (the individual military services amongst students on the JCSP; military – public service on the National Security Programme [NSP]), but can also be based on educational levels, the nature of military occupational specialties (engineering, sciences, law, medicine, intelligence, or public affairs, for example), and operational experiences. Students bring "Know How" to professional education. In philosophical terms, this is known as "Techné", or "craft knowledge". This is the ability to recognise patterns and apply pre-existing technical knowledge to solve practical problems. Professional students, thus, learn from each other, first and foremost, in comparing their intra-institutional world views. Such learning takes place not just in the classroom, but in the many interactions in which professional students are engaged, including residence and mess environments, hallways, water-coolers, bus rides to venues, and airport lounges. In this "informal learning", professional students are focused on contemporary challenges they confront and thus represent the **present** in the mix of actors in PME.<sup>17</sup>

As this behaviour emerges from the context of the institutional setting of professional programmes, it is necessary to shape these conversations. This drives the need for the other two components of professional education.

Professional academics form the second component in Graduate Level PME. Academics may bring some military professional expertise, but their true function at CFC is to transcend professional knowledge. In this, academics perform several roles: the introduction of new knowledge, the design of critical and integrative curriculum, and critical challenge to the professional stance of students. Academics bring the "Know What" to professional education. They bring new categories to challenge what is already known professionally. In philosophic terms, this is "Episteme" or "book knowledge". This is what can be learned through independent study of military practice. By introducing new ideas from outside of the profession, new categories and new ways of thinking about old problems are introduced. In this, academics bring a perspective of "what might be" and thus are focused on the **future**.

However, the profession of arms is an example of an area of professional practice that has no organic discipline from which it emerges. The profession has accreted multiple disciplines as it has evolved in the modern era, including engineering, management, psychology, sociology, history, and political science. **Thus, in terms of academic support, this second fundamental distinction between Graduate Level PME and academic programmes is this inherent multi-disciplinarity.**



Tweet by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) announcing the start of the year's Joint Command and Staff Programme September 4, 2018.

Mentors form the third component of professional education. Mentors bring the important perspective of experience in terms of command, leadership, and (executive) management. They bring the “Know Why” or in philosophical terms, “Phronesis”. This is the perspective of practical judgement, effectively bringing the previous two perspectives together in the context of experience. Thus mentors are oriented by what has taken place in the *past* and how experience shapes the interpretation of what is taking place in the contemporary space, and relating it to what might take place in the future. Their role is to develop character and judgement in professional students. At CFC, mentors take the form of Directing Staff on the JCSP and Senior Mentors on the NSP.

It is the interaction of these three different actors which makes Graduate Level PME distinct from both its academic cousin and professional forerunners. The professional tensions between academic and military professionals noted above frequently raise questions as to “who is in control of the curriculum”. The experience of CFC in the past two decades suggest that this is entirely the wrong question. If curriculum is to serve instrumental ends that will be pursued in the future, and that future is inherently unpredictable, the focus on control is misplaced: exclusive control by either profession

will produce equally unsatisfactory professional results. This is not a new observation: Thucydides remarked, “The Nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools.” Professional knowledge based on what worked previously will often produce failures when dealing with complex problems; academic knowledge may be oriented around unprovable ideas or veer into territory of little practical utility. To return to the notion of inquiry, to address the future, an open mind capable of learning in the face of uncertainty in order to generate “novel practice” is the goal. To this end, all three actors must create the conditions for this to emerge.

There is a reciprocal relationship that takes place between all of the actors. Instead of an authoritative “DS Solution”, new knowledge emerges from the dynamic collision of factors within the syndicate room discussion. In the ideal form, each of the three actors exist in a dyadic relationship with the other two, influencing and shaping each other in an interactive relationship. **This is the final fundamental difference between purely academic and Graduate Level PME. It reflects a deep partnership between all three components, rather than the hierarchical and authoritative relationship between student and professor in university settings.**

Table 1: Distinctions between Graduate Level Academic and Professional Military Study

Characteristic	Academic Study	Professional Military Study
Aim	Professional Researchers	Researching Professionals
Disciplinarity	Typically Single Discipline	Inherently Multi-discipline
Authority of Instructor	Master-Apprentice	Professional Partnership

### ***Transcendent Knowledge and Emergent Behaviours***

In a university setting, students compete to gain admission to academic programmes and the number admitted is limited to only a select few. Professors control the curriculum which the students follow, limiting their critical enquiry to the issues under study. If they don't agree with the academic approach, they are free to pursue other programmes which suit their interests.


In PME settings, students continuously push back against the curriculum. To the novice professor working in a staff college environment, this can be an ego bruising experience. Accustomed to the respect professors often enjoy in university settings, the skepticism professional students bring to academic concepts is often profoundly disorienting to the

novice academic in a PME setting. Although they are professionally selected as the most deserving from the collection of their peers, PME students have been assigned to a programme of study rather than having competed for admission. They seek answers to problems they confront in their professional practice and knowledge that does not address these practical issues is not valued. Professional students have a limited window within which to complete their studies. *A fortiori*, this window of opportunity structures curricula decisions on what is to be included and excluded in PME courses. Students return to busy professional lives following their educational sabbatical and may have little time to continue the deep and engaging

learning they are afforded at PME institutions. All of these factors generate the deeply instrumental motivations for students to push back against the curricular programmes developed for them in PME institutions. However, as professional experts, this professional push back has beneficial outcomes as well. Academics are exposed to cases, institutions, and perspectives that are under-theorised or have not been considered within their own professional development. The push-back also generates new academic knowledge: many academics working in staff colleges experience this as a suspicion that they are, in fact, learning more than their students!

This reciprocal relationship also exists between mentor and academic. Academics expose mentors to the same new ways of viewing the world and learn similar lessons as the students in this regard. Mentors serve a similar role to academics as they do to students. The advanced professional perspectives that mentors bring can help shape curriculum decisions and provide structure for the ideas that academics bring to the mix of influences within a PME environment. Finally, students push-back equally against mentors: the lessons of the past are often not of the same relevancy for contemporary problems.

Figure 1: Three Actors of PME



As such, in introducing new approaches and developing new knowledge, academics shape how both professional students and mentors can view the world. The mentor – academic relationship is also reciprocal in that the mentor assists the academic in terms of his or her practice with students. The student naturally pushes back against both academic and mentor in their need for instructional material to be “relevant” to their

professional development. These interactive, often conflictual, sets of relationships are, in turn, facilitated within the context of a rich information environment provided by a College library and its information specialists, and enabled by the physical infrastructure itself of the educational institution – the mess and residences in particular at CFC, but in effect, any space in which students gather to talk amongst themselves or with the other two actors.


Thus, in the objective of transforming professional certainty into inquiry, the nature of Graduate Level PME is not the transfer of discrete information, but in *transcending* what is already known. Simon quotes Socrates to illustrate this outcome: “Education is the kindling of a flame, not the filling of a vessel.”<sup>18</sup> Figure one illustrates the arrangement of these reciprocal forces.

The PME institution does not exist independently for its own purpose. There are external influences which “steer” this interactive system towards particular needs. In the context of professional military education, two external influences act to steer the system as shown in Fig. 2 below. The first are the needs of the professional community. The military axis is oriented around the specific competencies it requires of its professional members. In Canada, these are defined by the documents *Trusted to Serve*, *Officership 2020*, the CF Professional Development Framework, and the Officer General Specifications.<sup>19</sup> In the United States military, they are defined by the Officer Professional Military Education Policy.<sup>20</sup> The other axis is dominated by the needs of the state. These can drive the system in ways that the profession might not otherwise choose. In the context of Canadian PME, the shift to a graduate learning model was prompted by the revelations of the Somalia commission, the arguments of the Blue Ribbon committee, the direction of the Young Report, and the oversight of the Minister’s Monitoring Committee.<sup>21</sup> In more recent experience, the emphasis on diversity and gender are inputs that emerge from the nature of contemporary Canadian society. This is not unique to Canada. Similar effects were generated in the US by congressional hearings on “Joint” education held by Senator Ike Skelton in the wake of the Goldwater Nichols reforms and direction contained within the National Defense Strategy under the authority of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.<sup>22</sup>

The model in Fig. 2 visually resembles a gyroscope, which provides an excellent metaphor for the transcendent quality of Graduate Level PME. As a physical object, a gyroscope at rest exhibits no special properties. However, once in motion, new

emergent behaviour enables the gyroscope to perform entirely new behaviours. The outcome of Graduate Level PME is to create new *emergent* professional behaviours, which in turn, generate novel, creative, and adaptive responses to the unpredictable demands of the complex contemporary security environment.

Figure 2: Formal PME External Influences



### Implications

Transitioning to a Kosovo style model is not simply a case of “add Ph.Ds and stir”, although in the early days of academic integration, it very much resembled this approach. Graduate Level PME does not come with a standard “How to...” manual. While comparisons with other PME institutions is always invaluable, every nation’s schools reflect inherent historical practices, geo-political realities, institutional practices and policies, and academic relationships.<sup>23</sup> PME schools borrow many practices from each other, but no curriculum is a simple cut-and-paste affair.

Over the long term, achieving this outcome has come through the development of “institutional empathy” on the part of CFC academics. This involves not only understanding the needs of the profession of arms, but also those of the students under our supervision. What might work with a group of civilian graduate students could easily fail with experienced professional. Early in the incorporation of design thinking into the NSP, we employed a set of techniques used by Stanford’s “D School”. These were rejected in an outright rebellion against the activity by one syndicate of students, who reverted to using a comfortable Operational Planning approach. While the students may have failed to learn any of the activity’s lesson, the professor had a profound, if painful, learning experience which resulted in a much-improved product the following year.<sup>24</sup>

The result of this dynamic partnership between student, academic, and mentor has resulted in several significant developments.

### Increased Student Choice on JCSP

While PME is overwhelmingly instrumental in nature, the types of careers CFC students will pursue differs significantly amongst them. A “one size fits all” curriculum would result in either a generic lowest common denominator programme, or one biased to a particular career path. Neither approach is suited to the instrumental needs of CFC students. Many of our students will not serve in operational posts or on Joint Operational Planning Groups, despite the importance of those skill sets for military endeavours. Many CFC graduates are destined to manage capital and personnel projects in NDHQ, or serve as technical specialists.

Following the development of the Masters of Defence Studies, both the extant CFC “Board of Visitors” advising the CFC Commandant on Academic matters and initial accreditation reviews of the degree by the Ontario Council of Graduate Studies argued for increased opportunities for students to choose their own path for learning. While the thesis like Directed Research Project enabled such choice, CFC experimented with elective courses between 2008-2010.

Reflecting the hybrid nature of PME education, for both academic and professional reasons, in 2010, the new Joint Command and Staff Programme introduced a Course Option, distinct from a Research Paper approach, which enabled students to choose between a Defence and Security, Institutional Policy, or Advanced Joint Warfare focused curriculum in the last term of their studies at CFC. The CAF reiterated its support for this innovation in the most recent review of JCSP curriculum.

The small size of the NSP unfortunately presently mitigates against such an option.

### Design Thinking


The operational challenges the CAF confronts, both domestically and internationally, reflect unique, non-repetitive issues that often evolve over time. While operational planning remains a powerful tool to address well defined problems for which there are known solutions, the wicked problems that stem from conflicts over the norms of governance, the effects of climate change, social strife inflamed by weaponized narratives, and other forms of social conflict have reduced the utility of traditional military professional approaches.

Design is the “creation of that which is needed but does not yet exist”. The challenges identified by Lieutenant General Mike Rouleau’s “How we Fight” initiative and the “Pan-domain Force Employment Concept (PFEC) all point to the creation of new ways of thinking and organizing military forces, in short a “design moment”.

Design first appeared in the context of addressing the examination by NSP of why traditional military operations were no longer delivering “decisions” as they had historically. While students enjoyed the academic critique of current practice, they were frustrated by the lack of practical tools to address this conundrum. Design was something CFC “stumbled upon” in a review of professional literature from the US as a solution to this pedagogical challenge.<sup>25</sup>

Figure 3: NSP Design Loop

#### CFC Strategic Thinking Process



Since that discovery, design thinking has been incorporated into the three major programmes of CFC. Design is a programmatic thread on the NSP, linking together all aspects of the academic material as well as the international experiential learning visit the programme conducts annually and resulting in a strategy presentation typically to the Foreign and Defence Advisor in the Privy Council Office. On the JCSP, majors on the JCSP conduct CJOC sponsored design enquiries throughout the

year, employing an “agnostic” design methodology<sup>26</sup> that has attracted the attention of the Polish War University, the École de guerre, and the Australian Defence College. CFC academics are recognized internationally for their expertise in this area, and are influential in the development of the nascent International Military Design Conference, held yearly.<sup>27</sup>

#### Professional Reflection on Courses of Action

The organisational theorist Russell L. Ackoff once noted “The more efficient you are at doing the wrong thing, the wronger you become. It is much better to do the right thing wronger than the wrong thing righter. If you do the right thing wrong and correct it, you get better.” But in the complex wicked problems that confront modern military practice, how do military professionals tell right from wrong?

The profession of arms amounts to a box of practical solutions for a wide variety of problems developed over more than a millennia of history. The progressive modernization of military practice has resulted in a “doctrinal trajectory”, described by Aaron Jackson, from drill manuals to strategic level doctrine.<sup>28</sup> Moving upwards from basic drill to tactics, operations, and strategy, guidance in these manuals becomes progressively more general and subject to judgement in its application as problems move from simple to complicated. At the highest levels, problems become complex given the number of actors and the degrees of freedom in their options. Finally, some of the most challenging problems confronting military decision makers result from circumstances that no doctrine manual addresses: international coalitions “of the willing”, and “whole of humanity” issues like pandemics, cyber-security, climate change, and catastrophe induced human migration.<sup>29</sup> Doing what is known well or is professionally “comfortable” in these complex situations can lead to paradoxical outcomes noted above.

Figure 4: The “Doctrinal Trajectory”




Consider the air operations over Libya in Operation Unified Protector. While by most measures, those operations were examples of outstanding professional success in the limited number of casualties and collateral damage, the integration of non-NATO partners into the operation, and the maintenance of allied unity in a fractious political environment, the outcomes following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime are anything but indicative of strategic success. Uncontrolled dispersion of military hardware of the defeated Libyan military spread into multiple militias, complicating the ability to reform a coherent successor state, as well as into regional paramilitaries destabilizing neighbouring countries. The breakdown of Libyan security forces contributed to the proliferation of human trafficking and smuggling organisations. The explosion of refugees from North Africa, along with the waves of misery emanating out of Syria and elsewhere in central Asia all contributed to the destabilization of political comity within Europe and the rise of nationalist populist forces challenging Europe's liberal institutions. Finally, the operation forced both China and Russia to conclude that working with Western forces was a losing proposition and that the “responsibility to protect” was a wolf in sheep's clothing strategy for regime changes against their proxies.

An effective metaphor for this is the example provided by the cartoon character Wile E. Coyote. The coyote is an engineer in his approach, employing technology to solve his problem of catching the fast moving Road Runner for his daily meal. However, the Coyote does not realise that he is embedded within a system of rules that prevent him achieving his ends, no matter how well constructed his engineering designs are.<sup>30</sup> Further, he consistently fails to reflect on his dilemma and doubles down on his strategy despite his repeated failures. Were he to reflect on his lack of success, he might realise that no matter what he does, he will never catch the Road Runner as the “rules” of the comedic system demand his failure, and the only way to transcend this situation is to remove himself from its dictates by pursuing new ends, ways, or means.

Graduate Level PME focuses on so-called “Triple Loop Learning”. The first loop: “Did we do things right?” is a process that is well understood by militaries, although not always respected in process, leading to the notion of “lessons observed”, as opposed to “lessons learned”. The second loop of “Did we do the right things” is captured by the notion of “measures of effectiveness” in operational metrics. The final loop, however, requires deep epistemological reflection: “How do we know what is right?” Few organisations are actually good

at this sort of reflection and the example of Libyan operations illustrates the consequences of getting it wrong. The model serves to re-emphasise the stance on inquiry that Graduate Level PME pursues as a pedagogical outcome.

Figure 5: Triple Loop Learning



Triple loop learning is particularly appropriate for dealing with the challenge posed by making the CAF more welcoming to women and diverse cultural groups, something it will have to rise to if it is to maintain and grow the numbers of Canadians it recruits each year. Generational change also poses challenges to “normal” career planning and leadership styles.

## Conclusion

The re-introduction of professional academics into the world of PME 22 years ago at CFC began a revolutionary shift in phase in how Canadian officers are educated that could not have been anticipated at the time. Indeed, in its early days, some at CFC may have felt that this was a viral infection that could be limited in its impact. Today, the virus has become part of the body in an integral fashion leading to remarkably

dynamic and evolutionary shifts in the development of military professionalism. As a tiny institution in the CAF, only 143 persons and a budget of less than 20 million dollars, the strategic impact of CFC on the CAF and the Public Service is potentially enormous but often overlooked as the Arbour report demonstrates.

The challenges Canada may confront in the coming decades are ominous. However, without a dramatic change in the local security environment, currently an *unimaginable* situation (which, given the context of this paper, should give pause for consideration), the size of the CAF is likely to remain small and its capabilities limited in nature. It is unlikely to tip the balance in any future coalition or alliance operation in a material sense. Canada *can* have a disproportionate impact with its physical contributions, nevertheless. The strategic challenges that will be posed by non-state actors and revisionist powers seeking to disrupt the security systems developed by Western states in the Cold War era will pose “graduate level warfare” problems to all developed militaries. Those challengers will not be interested in fighting Western forces on their own terms and will seek to limit their ability to employ the strengths they enjoy in organisation and technologies.

Graduate Level PME is a necessary evolution to meet graduate level warfare in these complex spaces. It will enable strategic impact because of the intellectual capital CAF officers will bring to the fight, and their ability to learn through the unique challenges our opponents will pose. Its fusion of professional competencies from both the military and academic worlds is a critical adaptation to this environment in the long history of military thought.



## Notes

- 1 Louise Arbour. *Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces*, (Montreal: Borden, Ladner, Gervais, 20 May 2022), p. 210.
- 2 Vanessa Brown, “I was furious that whole roto”: Report on Gender Dynamics and Hidden Learning Joint Command and Staff Programme (Residential) 43 Institutional Policy Studies, August 2017. Unpublished CFC commissioned study; and “Report on the Integration of Gender and Cultural Perspectives and an Inclusive Learning Environment in the Joint Command and Staff Programme”, August 2018. Unpublished CFC commissioned study.
- 3 Vanessa Brown, “Situating Feminist Progress in Professional Military Education”, *Atlantis*, Vol. 41, No. 20, 2020.
- 4 In the 1970s and 80s, a small contingent of professional academics worked at CFC, but were phased out in the late 1980s, according to the CFC Chief Librarian, in order to fund the College’s computer network.
- 5 Defence Studies presently hosts 16 full time academics, but three of those are funded by dedicated money from the CAF Culture Change initiative, which is time limited at the moment of this paper’s writing.
- 6 CFC has had direct impact on institutions such as the Baltic Defence College, and Singapore’s “SAFTI-MI”. It has also been influential on military design education as conducted in Denmark, Poland, and France.
- 7 Defence Studies is one of the most productive departments of RMC.
- 8 Both are evident in this recent piece: Tommy Conway, “When Soldiers Show a Dangerous Contempt for Reality”, *The Line*, February 3, 2022. <https://theline.substack.com/p/tommy-conway-when-soldiers-show-a>. See also, Pat Stogran, “Train Officers to Need”, *The Dorchester Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Autumn/Winter 2016.
- 9 Peter Foot, “European Military Education Today”, *Baltic Defence Review*, No. 5, 2001, pp. 12-31.
- 10 Justin Kelly, Mike Brennan, *Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy*, (Carlisle PA: US Army War College Press, 2001).
- 11 David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, (London: Hurst Publishers, 2017); House of Commons (UK) Foreign Affairs Committee, *Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK’s future policy options*, Third Report of Session 2016-17.
- 12 Arguably, Col. John Boyd’s research is an early example of this in how he employed multidisciplinary research to develop his ideas. However, the 2007 US Army/USMC COIN Doctrine is also an example of such a hybrid fusion of professional approaches.

- 13 Department of National Defence, M. Douglas Young, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Armed Forces*, (Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence, 1997). See also: David Bercuson, "Up from the Ashes: The Re-Professionalization of the Canadian Forces After the Somalia Affair", *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 9, no. 3, 2009.
- 14 Indeed, academics were initially welcomed much as viruses are: as untrustworthy foreign invaders. Like the development of cellular mitochondria, however, over the years, the bonds of professional trust have grown and now their activities are fully integrated into the normal function of College activities. At CFC, the creation of the Director of Academics in 2000 recognised this phase shift. Previously, College academics had individually worked for a variety of other departments in the College. Subsequently, they reported directly to the CFC Commandant.
- 15 In 1998, the idea that the CAF would fight a land war in Afghanistan, bomb Libya, or return to semi-permanent bases in Europe would all have probably been greeted with ridicule (to say nothing about the deployment of CAF personnel into long term care facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic). The last 30 years of operations should have inculcated a level of professional humility in terms of what can be expected in the future.
- 16 Bent Flyvbjerg, *Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 55-58.
- 17 See Murray Simons, *Holistic Professional Military Development: Growing Strategic Artists*, Ph.D. Thesis, Massey University, 2009.
- 18 Simon, *Ibid*, frontispiece.
- 19 Canada, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*, (Ottawa, Dept. of National Defence, 2009), <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/duty-with-honour-2009.html> (accessed July 12, 2020); Canada, *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020). Strategic Guidance for the Canadian Forces Officer Corps and the Professional Development System*, (Ottawa: Dept. of National Defence, 2001); Canada, *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 5031-8, Canadian Forces Professional Development* (Ottawa, Dept. of National Defence, 2003); Canada, *Profession of Arms, Officer General Specification* (Ottawa, Dept. of National Defence, 2020).
- 20 Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, *CJCSI 1800.01 Officer Professional Military Education Policy*, (Washington: Department of Defence, 15 May 2020). [https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/cjcsi\\_1800\\_01f.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102430-580](https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/education/cjcsi_1800_01f.pdf?ver=2020-05-15-102430-580)
- 21 John A. Fraser, *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Final Report*. 1999, (Ottawa: The Committee, 1999).
- 22 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Report of the Panel on Military Education of the One Hundredth Congress*, 101<sup>st</sup> Cong., 1<sup>st</sup> sess., 1989, no. 4; Jim Mattis, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy*, (Washington: Office of Secretary of Defense, 2018), p. 8. See also: House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, *Another Crossroads? Professional Military Education Two Decades After the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Skelton Panel*, H.R. 111-4 (Washington, DC: House Committee on Armed Services, April 2010).
- 23 A particularly Canadian military problem is the perennial lack of political direction on the purpose of military defence, and how that affects both force development and operations. Almost every problem discussed in syndicate rooms on either JCSP or NSP ultimately reverts to this issue. It is captured most succinctly Kim Nossal and Jon Vance. Kim Richard Nossal. "The Imperatives of Canada's Strategic Geography" in *Canadian Defence Policy in Theory and Practice*, Thomas Juneau, Philippe Lagassé, Srdjan Vucetic (ed.s), (Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020), pp.11-28; Col J.H. Vance, "Tactics Without Strategy or Why the Canadian Forces Do Not Campaign", in *The Operational Art: Canadian Context and Perspectives*, Allan English, Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs, and Laurence M. Hickey (ed.s), (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), pp. 271-292.
- 24 Paul T. Mitchell, "Stumbling Into Design: Action Experiments in Professional Military Education at Canadian Forces College", *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol. 17, Is. 4, 2017. [https://aodnetwork.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Mitchell\\_Stumbling-into-Design\\_2017.pdf](https://aodnetwork.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Mitchell_Stumbling-into-Design_2017.pdf)
- 25 Mitchell, *Ibid*.
- 26 Philippe Beaulieu-B. & Paul T. Mitchell, "Challenge-Driven: Canadian Forces College's Agnostic Approach to Design Thinking Education", <http://militaryepistemology.com/challenge-driven/>, (accessed 10 July, 2020).
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RMC hosts their 123rd annual commissioning parade in honour of their 2022 graduating class. Family, friends, classmates and staff all join in celebrating this year's newly commissioned officers, May, 20, 2022.

Image by: Wyatt Brooks

# The Royal Military College: A National University

**BY HOWARD G. COOMBS**

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## Introduction

In keeping with this enduring and aspirational goal the Royal Military College (RMC) was founded in 1876 at Kingston, Ontario. It had the dual purpose of developing personnel for employment as military officers, as well as ensuring that they had the skills required of civilian professions. Despite the vicissitudes of external events, like the closure during, and for three years following

the Second World War, the College has managed to withstand challenges and cope with adversity over the last 146 years. One can argue that, notwithstanding the incongruence of such seeming dichotomy, since its inception, RMC has managed to maintain a tradition of excellence in these twin roles. Today that includes producing educated and professionalized entry level bilingual officers, military personnel of all ranks and educating civilian professionals. A key part of this accomplishment was becoming, in 1959, Canada's first degree granting university that is fully federally funded. RMC is overseen and resourced by the Department of National Defence, yet is simultaneously responsive to the educational standards set by Ontario. This Canadian province, which hosts the College, provides the legal statute underpinning the university level education supplied by RMC, through the Royal Military College of Canada Degrees Act.<sup>1</sup>

Critical to its mandate, RMC offers an undergraduate education, second language instruction, physical fitness training combined with professional development and experience to military students holding the rank of Naval Cadet or Officer Cadet (N/OCdt) of the Regular Officer Training Plan (ROTP), who will become commissioned officers in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). At the same time, the College serves other student populations and gives undergraduate and graduate education in arts, science and in engineering to hundreds of military and civilian students on campus and via distance learning.<sup>3</sup>

If anything over the years RMC has illustrated the tenet of Greek philosopher Heraclitus that "the only constant is change." The College has grown institutionally to better deliver upon its core mandate of producing Canadian leaders. At the same time RMC has come to provide undergraduate and graduate level education to a myriad of students and through its research supports the Government of Canada and National Defence. One can discern this adaptation in the evolution of the university, the changes within its programs and the College's willingness and responsiveness to recommendations to better fulfill its mission and reflect and promote twenty-first century Canadian societal values.

## Modern Context

While today the idea of providing undergraduate education as part of the preparation of military officers is common, in Canada this was the result of post-Second World War debates

"The Royal Military College (RMC) is a national university for educating and developing leaders committed to serving Canada."<sup>2</sup>

**CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE,  
ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE,  
"INTRODUCTION," (2022).**

regarding the preparation of officers. The opening in 1940 of the naval college *His Majesty's Canadian Ship (HMCS)*<sup>4</sup> *Royal Roads*, later Royal Roads Military College, near Esquimalt, British Columbia, combined with postwar plans for a joint Royal Canadian Navy (RCN)/Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) College, prompted debate concerning reopening of RMC in Kingston. Unlike the First World War, when it ran shortened courses, the College had closed over the duration of the Second World War and devoted itself to other training activities supporting the war effort.

The crux of the postwar discussion was that the Navy and Air Force, anxious to put newly commissioned officers to sea or in the air, initially believed that a two-year matriculation program would meet the needs of non-technical officers of their respective services in the postwar environment. The RCN would send its officers to the Royal Naval College in Greenwich, England, for shore-time advanced training. However, the Army was adamant that a four-year degree programme was required for Canadian Army officers. General Charles Foulkes, at the time Chief of the General Staff, argued that officers capable of controlling combined operations needed the intellectual capacity developed by degree programs. He also noted growing military ties with the United States and opined that sending junior naval officers exclusively to England for advanced training was out of line with the needs of future inter-service cooperation. After some debate and further study, it was agreed among the services that most officers needed a degree and that the Royal Military College would open as a tri-service institution. The bulk of the college program would focus on academics to develop officers who would meet the unpredictable demands of the operations and alliances of the postwar environment. This decision demonstrates a Canadian desire to

## “...RMC is a significant participant in the CAF officer productions system.”

invest in its own degree-granting institution to meet the exigencies of the Cold War. However, despite the desire to create an RMC that would eventually award undergraduate degrees, it took the Minister of National Defence Doug Young's 1997 *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces* (Young Report) in the wake of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia (Somalia Inquiry) in the late 1990s to create a universally degreed officer corps within the Canadian military.

The College was re-opened in 1947 and its first intake of cadets took place in 1948. By 1950, it was taking students from Royal Roads to complete a four-year non-degree program.<sup>5</sup> In 1959, as previously mentioned, RMC became a degree-granting institution with undergraduate and graduate programs. Canada had created a truly multi-service cadet college, and one perpetuating the combined service perspective of the Second World War. This multi-service orientation was further reinforced by the unification of the major services as the CAF in 1968. This joint service academy orientation is not shared by other Western states, particularly Canada's closest military ally the United States. About a decade after unification, during 1979, the decision was made to admit women into the military colleges. These first female entrants would *have* been admitted in 1980.<sup>6</sup>

Other Canadian military colleges have co-existed in the past and currently operate in conjunction with RMC. First, and already noted, was the 1940 opening of *HMCS Royal Roads*, later Royal Roads Military College (RRMC). In the beginning, this college was not a degree granting institution. Students completed the first two years of their undergraduate programs at RRMC and finished the balance of their degree at RMC. In 1977 RRMC achieved degree granting status, although some students continued to RMC to finish their programs. RRMC was closed in 1995 as part of larger Canadian military reductions.<sup>7</sup> Second, was the Royal Military College St-Jean (RMCSJ)<sup>8</sup> founded in 1952 at St-Jean, Quebec to provide education and training to OCdts in French. This was an effort to address the underrepresentation of francophones within the Canadian military. While 27.5% of the Canadian population were French speaking this was not

reflected in the officer demographics of the three services. Only 2% of naval officers, 12% of army officers, and 4% of air force officers were French speakers. The non-commissioned francophones were respectively 11, 20 and 16%. The College at St-Jean could not award undergraduate degrees until 1971 when an agreement was reached with the Université de Sherbrooke. Until that point, as in the RRMC instance, RMCSJ students finished their degrees at RMC and some continued to do this after the implementation of the Université de Sherbrooke arrangement. In 1985 RMCSJ gained the ability to award its own degrees. This college was also closed in 1995, but reopened in 2008, with all its students finishing the last years of their program at RMC. In 2018 RMCSJ returned to university status, and the first class graduated in May 2021 with undergraduate credentials in International Relations, currently the sole degree program offered.<sup>9</sup> There is close cooperation between RMC and RMCSJ in many education efforts, as well as students moving between the institutions. Although the flow of students is currently one-way, with many RMCSJ ROTP students moving to RMC to complete degrees other than a Baccalaureate of International Relations, that movement will eventually evolve to cater to the opportunities and programs that both institutions will offer.<sup>10</sup>

### The Four Pillar Program<sup>11</sup>

RMC offers a selection of undergraduate, graduate and non-degree programs to aspiring officers, serving members of the military, civil servants, and a small number of civilians. However, the education offered to officer candidates within ROTP is the core of the College's efforts. This plan provides a chance to acquire an undergraduate degree and an officer's commission in the CAF at RMC or at another Canadian university. While ROTP is not the sole source of entry level officers into the Canadian military, it does provide approximately 30% of the officer intake for the CAF. Given that the ROTP accounts for roughly one-third of CAF officer intake, it is worth noting that the ROTP at RMC takes in roughly 20%-25% of the total officer intake in recent years. This is about two-thirds of the entire amount of the annual ROTP acceptance. In 2018, the total officer intake was 1137 and from 1997-2018 that figure averaged 903 per year for the CAF. Consequently, RMC is a significant participant in the CAF officer productions system. During the period 2011-2020 RMC and RMCSJ averaged a total 340 officers per year as their intake and in turn graduated an average of 226, averaging about 33% attrition.<sup>12</sup>

The selection process for limited ROTP vacancies ensures that the officer aspirants who attend RMC have high levels of academic and military potential.<sup>13</sup> Education is tuition-free for these undergraduate students due to the obligatory post-graduation military service commitments incurred for their education. While they live on campus and are charged for meals and accommodations, they are paid a modest monthly salary.<sup>14</sup> The sailors, soldiers and aviators of the University Training Plan – Non-Commissioned Member (UTPNM) do not reside on campus and continue to receive their normal salary. They too are not charged for their education; in return, they also incur obligatory service commitments. Additionally, there are a small number of on-site undergraduate students, usually reservists, who pay for their education and are not under the same terms of service as the ROTP students. Further to on-site education, distance courses at the undergraduate and graduate levels are available that offer flexible education options for military personal, active duty and reserve personnel, as well as civil servants and spouses of regular force members. Through the prior learning assessment process, students taking selected undergraduate programs can receive academic credits for certain military and professional experiences.<sup>15</sup>

A further difference between RMC and other universities is the incorporation of an obligatory set of common courses, or core curriculum, across the arts, sciences and engineering to ensure a professionally relevant foundation for future military employment: “Military professionals today require the abilities not only of the soldier-warrior, but also of the soldier-diplomat and the soldier-scholar.”<sup>16</sup> It is worth stressing that core courses in civilian universities are established per program, rather than across the whole university. The RMC core curriculum, approximately 30% of the degree requirements across the programs, gives all students a balanced mix of liberal arts, science, and military education. It is made up of economics, psychology, mathematics (including logic and Information Technology), English, calculus, Canadian history and military history, chemistry, physics, and civics.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to academic success, students need to demonstrate proficiency in Academics, Physical Education and Athletics, Social Development and Military Leadership. These four areas are known at the “four pillars” and are linked to all RMC activities for on-site undergraduate students who are ROTP.<sup>18</sup> Research by the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis (DGMPPRA) has shown that the four pillars have demonstrable value in the early stages of an officer’s career and create the foundation for future success. As a



RMC, November 28, 2019.

Image by: Royal Military College

result, students may be removed from the sponsored program or not graduate unless all these requirements are met.<sup>19</sup> The core curriculum and four pillars underpin the sobriquet a “university with a difference.”<sup>20</sup>

**Academic pillar.** N/OCdts are required to complete a degree program as part of the ROTP. Degrees available vary based upon the needs of the career path they have chosen. Included in all degree programs is a core curriculum component identified in the *Withers Report* (1998) as essential to the development of critical thinkers as junior leaders.<sup>21</sup> Successful completion of the core component and undergraduate degree is required to graduate successfully from RMC.

**Military Leadership pillar.** As part of the entry level officer requirements<sup>22</sup>, the ROTP program has a military component laid out with RMC instructions that specify the objectives a ROTP candidate must attain to graduate from RMC. These objectives include: General Military Knowledge, Personal Attributes, Teamwork, Leadership, Communications and Ceremonial Activities. These are accomplished over the four years at RMC through classes, self study, leadership assignments and mentoring. During this process, N/OCdts are assigned leadership positions within the Cadet Chain of Responsibility to provide them the opportunity to develop their leadership techniques.<sup>23</sup>

**Social Development pillar.** The CAF mandates a bilingual officer corps and RMC ROTP includes a second language training program designed to take either an Anglophone or Francophone N/OCdt from no second language capability to a bilingual level. This effort requires over 650 hours of second language education while living, studying and working in a bilingual environment and is measured according to civil service criteria administered at the end of their four years. The



January 18, RMC-West Point Exchange 2020.

Image by: Royal Military College

program in past years has averaged a 97% success rating if the time requirement is met. As an added incentive, if the requisite bilingual level is met or exceeded, non-specific arts credits valued at 90% on the transcript will be added. Depending on the bilingualism scores achieved, the numbers of non-specific credits can range from one to four. These credits are not counted towards degree attainment but do apply to calculating average mark. This may assist with graduate applications at a future date. When considering bilingualism, it is important to contrast the level of bilingual RMC ROTP graduates with the Canadian bilingualism rate. The percentage of Canadians able to hold a conversation in both official languages was 17.5% in 2011 and, depending on immigration levels, is projected to range from 18.3% to 18.8% of the population in 2036.<sup>24</sup>

**Physical Education and Athletics pillar.** The fourth pillar of the RMC ROTP is physical fitness. Cadets are tested in physical fitness based on both the RMC fitness standard and the CAF standard. The former is more demanding than the latter. Additionally, all cadets are required to take part in the intramural sports program conducted throughout the academic year or participate in one of the varsity level sports teams or competitive clubs, such as rowing. As part of their academic program, cadets are required to take part in physical education classes that build on basic knowledge and participation in their first year to teaching and supervising fitness in their fourth year.<sup>25</sup>

## A Comprehensive Institution

Currently, RMC is internationally acknowledged for its focused research in areas that are of direct and indirect support of the Government of Canada, the Department of National Defence and CAF operations. In addition to undergraduate degrees associated with the RMC ROTP and other programs, the College also delivers undergraduate education onsite and via distance learning to CAF personnel and public servants. These degrees are Bachelor of Military Arts and Sciences (BMASc), Bachelor of Military Arts and Science (Honours) (BMASc (Hons)), and Bachelor of Arts (General).<sup>26</sup> There are also Certificates in Ammunition Technology, Environmental Protection, Management with Applications to Defence, Military Leadership and Management. Residential graduate programs include the Master of Defence Studies (MDS) at the Canadian Forces College; Master of Science (MSc) in Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, Computer Science, Mathematics, and Physics; Master of Engineering (MEng) in Aeronautical, Chemistry and Chemical, Civil, Electrical and Computer, and Mechanical Engineering; Master of Applied Science (MASc) in the Engineering disciplines, and Doctorates of Philosophy in both Science and Engineering.

It is important to note that the Masters of Defence Studies, awarded at the Canadian Forces College in conjunction with

the Joint Command and Staff Program, is an RMC postgraduate degree, and the CFC Department of Defence Studies functions within RMC's academic framework. It is fair to say that, with CFC and CFCSJ, RMC provides the substance of a comprehensive Canadian defence university.

In addition to these residential graduate programs there are online graduate programs: the Master of Business Administration (MBA), Master of Public Administration (MPA), and a Master of Arts and Doctorate of Philosophy (Arts), both in War Studies. All these programs are open to military applicants, military spouses, veterans, and civilian members of the Department of National Defence. Additionally, graduate programs will also accept, based on merit, civilian applicants domestic and foreign who do not fall in the previously described categories.<sup>27</sup>

In addition to supporting educational activities, faculty members of RMC are solicited in various national and international fora to present papers and lectures as experts in their fields. Additionally, they produce a great deal of both peer reviewed and non-peer reviewed publications. From 2012 to 2017 the average number of annual publications, proceedings and presentations was approximately 940 per year.<sup>28</sup>

Research activities at RMC take many forms other than publication. Currently, RMC is internationally acknowledged for its focused research in areas that are of direct and indirect support of the Government of Canada, Department of National Defence and CAF operations. Emphasized are scholarly efforts in the humanities; engineering, including computer, electrical, mechanical, aerospace, ammunition, chemical, and civil; fundamental and applied science, such as physics, space science, chemistry, mathematics, and computer science, along with environmental science and defence economics. While these research areas are also offered at civilian institutions, at RMC their defence focus makes them unique within the Canadian university milieu.<sup>29</sup>

First, RMC has a SLOWPOKE-2 Facility which provides for Department of National Defence nuclear educational, research and operational requirements. Second, the Centre for Space Research supports space research programs and activities, including Space Science and other space-related degree programs. Third, the Environmental Sciences Group (ESG) is a one of a kind internationally acknowledged cross-specialized group that brings to bear scientific expertise in the management of contaminated sites. This knowledge is available to individuals and organizations in both the private and public sectors. Fourth, RMC is a co-founder with Queen's University of the Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health

Research (CIMVHR). CIMVHR is now a network of 1700 researchers, 43 Canadian universities and 10 international affiliates. This research group examines the health research needs of military members, veterans and their families. Fifth, RMC has a Computer Security Laboratory, the CSL, which is a leading research organization for cybersecurity and computer matters. Sixth, RMC is part of the national Canada Research Chairs Program (CRCP). The CRCP is a Canadian government strategy to enhance research opportunities in Canada. Created in 2000, this program endowed 2000 Canada Research Chairs in about 80 universities with about \$265 million annually to recruit and retain gifted scholars. RMC has five Canada Research Chairs. Finally, faculty are active in international and national academic societies and support scholarly competitions, like such as the graduate Three Minute Thesis (3MT®) competition. RMC faculty contribute greatly to education, research and publication within their respective fields.<sup>30</sup>

RMCSJ faculty also have vibrant research programs which that contribute to student success. They access and receive grants from federal and provincial (Quebec) based organizations. Similarly, their outputs are varied and touch many scholarly domains.<sup>31</sup> On top of academic programs, RMC offers professional military education to members of the CAF other than ROTP students, as well as technical capability to the Government of Canada. RMC provides a range of short technical education courses and assists technical inquiries and related research of operational importance to the CAF. This focused technical education includes cyber-security and electronic warfare programs. These latter activities and the support that they provide the Government of Canada and the Department of National Defence are unique to RMC and not



Officer Cadets from the Indigenous Leadership Opportunity Year (ILOYY) receive their cap badges at RMC, September 3, 2021.

Image by: Royal Military College

reflected in other institutions. Other longer technical programs of about one year include Army Technical Staff Officer (ATSO) and Army Technical Warrant Officer (ATWO) courses, as well as Ammunition Engineering and Aircraft Structure. There are also other year long defence related programs such as the the Indigenous Leadership Opportunity Year (ILOY) participants. This program, located onsite and within the Cadet Wing, offers education and military opportunities to young Indigenous Canadians, without any obligation for military service beyond the program year. Furthermore, the Non-Commissioned Member Executive Professional Development Program (NEPDP), which give Chief Warrant Officers/Chief Petty Officer 1 the opportunity to complete undergraduate courses that may assist with their future career paths and leads to Certificates of General Military Studies or Advanced Military Studies.<sup>32</sup>

## Constant Evolution

Over the course of its existence RMC has, like other federal institutions, been scrutinized as part of normal reviews or in the wake of significant events and undergone organizational change in response of governmental direction. For example, during the last decade RMC underwent examination and cost cutting measures as part of the federal government *Report on Transformation* (2011) that resulted in the Strategic Review (DRAP) and Deficit Reduction Action Plan (DRAP), which directed a lessening of \$4.5 million to the overall budget (approximately 1/10 of its baseline), as well as Work Force Adjustment (2012) that saw cuts of 28 of 189 academic positions and 25 academic support staff. Since then, the RMC budget has been even further reduced as part of the general reductions across the Federal government in the wake of COVID 19 related budget disbursement.<sup>33</sup> Additionally, there have been several specific reviews of the College and its operations, like the Canadian Association of University Teachers "Report of The Commission On Governance Of The Royal Military College Of Canada" (2013), the CDS' "Special Staff Assistance Visit - Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada – Kingston," or SSAV Report (2017), and the Office of the Auditor General's "Report 6–Royal Military College of Canada–National Defence." (2017).<sup>34</sup> Moreover, there have been wider context reports discussing the CAF. These reviews have either directly or indirectly had implications for RMC. Included in this category are the "External Review into Sexual Misconduct and Sexual Harassment in the Canadian Armed Forces," or Deschamps Report (2015), "Report of the Third Independent Review



Indigenous Leadership Opportunity Year (ILOY) Naval and Officer Cadets receive their CAF Universal Pattern Cap Badge, also known as the "Cornflake" to signify their entrance into the CAF, September 01, 2022.

Image by: Cpl Alex Brisson, Imagery Technician

Authority to the Minister of National Defence," or Fish Report (2021), concerning the military justice system, and "Report of the Independent External Comprehensive Review," or Arbour Report (2022), also dealing with sexual misconduct.<sup>35</sup> The history of RMC shows the only constant is change and that the College will continue to strive to meet the needs of these constantly changing strategic, operational and organizational settings.

## Conclusion

Through the ROTP, RMC gives a thorough sponsored education program, including common core competencies, to potential officers in four pillars – academics, military leadership, social development, and physical education and athletics – "to produce officers with the ethical, mental, physical and linguistic capabilities required to lead with distinction in the Canadian Forces."<sup>36</sup> At the same time RMC provides undergraduate and graduate level education to other members of the defence team and select civilian students. As part of its mandate, RMC conducts a vibrant research program across the various departments and divisions. Faculty produce high quality research that not only supports the needs of the Government of Canada and Canadian defence establishment but is also recognized both nationally and internationally. Faculty members engage as part of varied scholarly communities of practice to cultivate and propagate knowledge. RMC operates efficaciously and economically, comparing favorably with the costs of Ontario civilian universities and US service academies. Additionally, RMC is evolving to mirror the diversity and values of today's Canada within its student population.

Although over the years there have been various challenges as RMC has changed with the times, it continues to graduate people who contribute positively to Canada's efforts at home and abroad and, in doing so, RMC, is truly deserving of the title "university with a difference."

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## Notes

- 1 Richard A. Preston, *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982; rpt., 1969), ix-xii, 50, 347-348; Email from Colonel (Retired) Karl Michaud 24 November 2020 11:06 AM; Email from Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) David Gregory 26 November 2020 3:13 PM; and, Email from Lieutenant-General (Retired) Michel Maisonneuve 27 November 2020 12:47 PM.
- 2 Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada, "Introduction" (07 July 2022), n.p.; internet, available at <https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/registrars-office/rmc-university>, accessed 07 August 2022.
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- 4 HMCS stands for His or Her Majesty's Canadian Ship dependent on the gender of the reigning monarch, in this case King George VI.
- 5 At that time, those who completed the four year program and wished to obtain an undergraduate degree continued to civilian academic institutions. This was not a systemic process. Email from Colonel Corinna Heilman and Lieutenant-Colonel Craig Moore 25 November 2020 10:59 AM.
- 6 Richard A. Preston, *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982; rpt., 1969), 303-349, 399-400; S. H. Dobell, "The Reopening of the College," in *As You Were! Ex-Cadets Remember, vol. 2, 1919-1984*, ed. R. Guy. C. Smith (Kingston: RMC Club of Canada, 1984), 214-23, 214-223; Howard G. Coombs, "From Imperial to Nationalist Canadians: The Impact of the Second World War on Canadian Staff Education," in *Military Education and the British Empire, 1815-1949*, eds. Douglas Delaney, Robert Engen, and Meghan Fitzpatrick (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2018), 212-228; see Colonel Bernd Horn and Dr. Bill Bentley, with a forward by Romeo Dallaire, *Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015); see Canada, Department of National Defence, Minister of National Defence, "Report of the Inter-Service Committee on Officer Training" (Ottawa, 1947); Douglas E. Bland, ed., *Canada's National Defence Volume 2 Defence Organization* (Kingston: Queen's University School of Policy Studies), 93-158; and, Email from Colonel (Retired) Karl Michaud 09 September 2022, 4:51 PM.
- 7 Richard A. Preston, *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982; rpt., 1969), 332-349; "For Posterity's Sake: A Royal Canadian Navy Historical Project" (n.d.), n.p.; internet, available at <http://www.forposterityssake.ca/RCN.htm>, accessed October 10, 2020.
- 8 The French translation Collège Militaire Royal (CMR), was the original name of the College in St-Jean, and is also commonly utilized when discussing RMCSJ. Email from Colonel (Retired) Karl Michaud 09 September 2022, 4:51 PM.
- 9 This is a multidisciplinary degree encompassing "complex situations involving relations between states, international development, security issues, and international issues pertaining to various disciplines: political science, history, geography, economic science, law, sociology, anthropology, communication, psychology, literature, and more." Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College Saint-Jean, "Backgrounder," (2020), n.p.; internet, available at <https://www.cmrsj-rmcsj.forces.gc.ca/di-b/di-b-eng.asp>, accessed November 30, 2020.
- 10 Richard A. Preston, *Canada's RMC: A History of the Royal Military College* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982; rpt., 1969), 332-349; Grazia Scoppio, Nancy Otis and Yan (Lizzie) Yan, "Looking at Recruiting and Selection for the Canadian Military Colleges through the Lens of Gender-based Analysis Plus," *Res Militaris* 8, no.1 (2018): 2-13; internet, available at <http://resmilitaris.net/>, accessed October 10, 2020; Email from Lieutenant-General (Retired) Michel Maisonneuve 27 November 2020 12:47 PM; and, Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College Saint-Jean, "Backgrounder," (2020), n.p.; internet, available at <https://www.cmrsj-rmcsj.forces.gc.ca/di-b/di-b-eng.asp>, accessed November 30, 2020.
- 11 The foundation of the four pillars was a review led by General (Retired) Ramsey Withers and known as the *Withers Report*, see Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) Board of Governors, "Report to the Board of Governors by the Withers' Study Group - Balanced Excellence: Leading Canada's Armed Forces in the New Millennium" (1998); and the academic aspects were most recently updated by Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada, "Final Report of the Core Curriculum Committee to Faculty Board, Royal Military College of Canada" (2020).
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- 16 Canada, Department of National Defence, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada 2009* (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2009), 18, 52-53).

- 17 Former RMC Principal, Dr. John Scott Cowan, noted that the competencies, not courses, that underpinned the 1999 renovation of the core curriculum were "ethics, psychology, leadership, Canadian history, Canadian civics, politics, law, military history, international affairs, cross-cultural relations, mathematics, logic, information technology, physics, chemistry, English and French" Email from Principal Emeritus Dr. John Scott Cowan 27 November 2020 11:27 10:44 PM. See Canada. Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) Board of Governors, "Report to the Board of Governors by the Withers' Study Group - Balanced Excellence: Leading Canada's Armed Forces in the New Millennium" (1998).
- 18 Participants in the UTPNCM are required to achieve the CAF fitness standard and are encouraged to improve their second language abilities. Email from Colonel Corinna Heilman and Lieutenant-Colonel Craig Moore 25 November 2020 10:59 AM.
- 19 As of September 2021, physical fitness and second language requirements became zero-credit courses, or courses required but not contributing to the cumulative credits needed by the degree programs. The credits will make physical fitness and second language requirements integral to the successful completion of the academic degrees of the ROTP - Bachelor of Arts (Honours), Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Science (Honours); Bachelor of Science, and Bachelor of Engineering. This will strengthen the implementation of "Four Pillar Degrees" Brigadier-General Sebastien Bouchard Email 24 November 2020 10:48 AM.
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- 23 The Cadet Wing is structured into divisions and squadrons. The military officers and NCMs of the Training Wing advise and appraise the N/OCdts of the Cadet Wing. N/OCdts within the Cadet Wing are appointed into positions in the Cadet Chain of Responsibility (CCoR), which works with the military training staff to oversee the administration and functioning of the Cadet Wing. The CCoR has a Cadet Wing Commander, who is a senior N/OCdt in their last year of the program, a Cadet Wing Headquarters and four subordinate divisions. Each division has a Cadet Divisional Leader, also a senior N/OCdt in the final year of their degree. Divisions are made up of three squadrons, each led by a similarly senior N/OCdt, known as the Cadet Squadron Leader. Every squadron is made up of flights led by a senior N/OCdt who, also nearing completion of the program, is the Cadet Flight Leader, and Flights are broken into sections each overseen by a Cadet Section Commander, who is a third year. One of the squadrons is a separate squadron consisting of sailors, soldiers and air personnel participating in the UTPNCM to obtain an undergraduate degree. See Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada, "I150 (DPS) Implementation Order - Organisational Realignment," (05 June 2020) and Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada, Office of the Principal, "Academic Wing Orientation/Orientation de l'escadre académique August /août 2017 Part II - Teaching / Administration Partie II - Enseignement / Administration," (2017); Canada, Department of National Defence, "Special Staff Assistance Visit - Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada - Kingston" (2017), 6-8, 12-15; internet, available at <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/20170329-rmc-ssav-report-final.pdf>, accessed 08 August 2022; Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada, "I150 (DPS) Implementation Order - Organisational Realignment" (05 June 2020), B-1 to B-2, C-1 to C-4; Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada, "Office of RMC Vice-Principal of Research" (2021), n.p.; internet, available at <https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/division-graduate-studies-and-research/office-vice-principal-research>, accessed 07 July 2021; and, Canada, Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, "Indigenous People in the Canadian Armed Forces" (2019), n.p.; internet, available at <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2017/06/les-peuples-autochtones-dans-les-forces-armees-canadiennes.html>, accessed 07 July 2021).
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- 25 Canada, Royal Military College, "Strategic Review Working Documents" (2009) [in possession of Author]; Harry Kowal, "The Royal Military College of Canada: Responding To The Call For Change," *Security and Defence Quarterly* 24, no. 2 (2019): 94-102; internet, available at <https://securityanddefence.pl/109259,0,2.html>, accessed October 10, 2020; Email from Colonel (Retired) Karl Michaud 24 November 2020 11:06 AM; Email from Colonel Corinna Heilman and Lieutenant-Colonel Craig Moore 25 November 2020 10:59 AM; Canada, Statistics Canada, "Language Projections for Canada, 2011 to 2036  
  
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- 30 Canada, Department of National Defence. Royal Military College of Canada, "The Commandant's Report 2016-2017: An annual review of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research at the Royal Military College of Canada," (2017), 26-45; internet, available at <https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/sites/default/files/Commandants-Report-2016-17.pdf>, accessed November 21, 2020; and Dr. Gregg Wade Email 01 December 2020 9:03.

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- 32 While the CAF has an Employment Equity goal of 3.5 %, and as of January 2019 indigenous self-identification figures indicate CAF had reached 2.8% representation within both regular and reserve forces the purpose of the ALOY program is to enable young, indigenous men and women from across Canada to connect with each other and with the RMC student body and vice versa. If none of them join the CAF or applied to ROTP it is still a successful program. Email from Colonel (Retired) Karl Michaud 09 September 2022, 4:51 PM; Canada, Department of National Defence, "Special Staff Assistance Visit – Report on the Climate, Training Environment, Culture and ROTP Programme at the Royal Military College of Canada – Kingston" (2017), 6-8, 12-15; internet, available at <https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/dnd-mdn/documents/reports/20170329-rmc-ssav-report-final.pdf>; accessed 08 August 2022; Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada, "1150 (DPS) Implementation Order – Organisational Realignment" (05 June 2020), B-1 to B-2, C-1 to C-4; Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada, "Office of RMC Vice-Principal of Research" (2021), n.p.; internet, available at <https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/division-graduate-studies-and-research/office-vice-principal-research>, accessed 07 July 2021; Canada, Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, "Indigenous People in the Canadian Armed Forces" (2019), n.p.; internet, available at <https://www.canada.ca/en/departement-national-defence/news/2017/06/les-peuples-autochtones-dans-les-forces-armees-canadiennes.html>, accessed 07 July 2021; Email from Colonel (Retired) Karl Michaud 24 November 2020 11:06 AM; Canada, Department of National Defence, Royal Military College of Canada, "The Royal Military College of Canada Response to Report 6, Royal Military College of Canada – National Defence of the 2017 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada" (2019), 2/33; internet, available at <https://s3.amazonaws.com/everittas/2019/12/RMC-Report-Response-to-AG-10-July-2019.pdf>, accessed October 10, 2020; Interview with Principal Emeritus Dr. John Scott Cowan 27 November 2020; and, Email from Dr. Jim Denford 02 December 2020 8:16:04 AM.
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First day of classes for the Naval and Officer Cadets from RMC, September 06, 2022.

image by: S1 Lisa Sheppard, Military Photojournalist, RMC

# Political Attitudes in Formative Years: Results from the RMC Student Political Attitudes and Behaviours Survey

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## Introduction

This article studies the political attitudes of officer cadets and naval cadets (OCdts and NCdts, respectively) at the Royal Military College (RMC). We know that political attitudes<sup>1</sup> shape leadership style and behaviour in an increasingly diverse Canadian Armed Forces.<sup>2</sup>

**These cadets will soon be responsible for members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), some of whom will be young adults themselves, possibly imprinting their political attitudes on their subordinate troops. It is therefore particularly relevant to measure this population since they will eventually be in positions of authority in the military hierarchy.**

Concurrently, young adulthood is a crucial time in one's life for political socialization. Those years are widely considered to be "the impressionable years";<sup>3</sup> that is to say, the moment in individuals' lives where sociopolitical attitudes not only change the most, but also eventually crystallize for the rest of adulthood.<sup>4</sup> Postsecondary enrollment in particular has long been shown to have an important effect on political attitudes, notably through processes of peer-based normative influence.<sup>5</sup>

Research has also shown that the military as an institution fosters a specific culture, leading to political attitudes among its members that are different than that of the society it is meant to serve and protect.<sup>6</sup> However, in recent years this gap has appeared to narrow.<sup>7</sup> Our literature review will show that while this civilian-military gap has been studied to an extent in the American context, recent research on this topic is lacking in Canada.

This article, then, aims to fill a gap in the literature on civilian-military attitudinal differences by shedding light on Canadian OCdts and NCdts' political behaviours and attitudes towards civic life. Through surveys administered at RMC in the context of a course from the core curriculum, POE/F 205: Canadian Politics and Society/*Société et politique canadiennes*, we measured several cohorts of cadets' attitudes towards politically salient issues relating to democracy and civic life and considered how their attitudes compare to civilian citizens'. We chose this course to populate our survey because it allowed us to have the largest possible number of participants of all the courses offered in our department, as all OCdts and NCdts enrolled in all programs offered at RMC must take it over the course of their studies.

This article first outlines the literature on political socialization and how attitudes and behaviours towards political life develop, particularly around the college years. It also highlights the role that military education may play in shaping military members' worldviews, as well as whether a "socialization gap" between civilians and military members still exists, resulting in different

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political attitudes among the two groups. Next, the article provides a summary of the survey activity. It will then present summary results, comparing the cadet population to the general Canadian population and its peer group. It concludes with a discussion providing important insights into the attitudes of Canada's new generation of military officers and a discussion on the significance of our results for military education and civil-military relations in Canada writ large.

## Literature

### ***The formation of political attitudes and attitudinal change in young adults***

The question of how individuals' political attitudes form, whether they can change over time, and if so, how, has long been occupying the minds of political scientists in the flourishing literature on this topic over the past 60 years. One of the key variables identified in this process early on by researchers has been age, and more specifically the relationship between age and openness to change. Indeed, the attitudes of older people are demonstrably more stable than those of younger people.<sup>8</sup>

However, this observation alone does not explain *why* younger people's attitudes appear to be more malleable. There are at least two plausible explanations. The first posits that younger people may be more easily impressionable, because of a lack of life experience.<sup>9</sup> Alternatively, age may not really be the important factor, but rather one's lifestyle. More recent research suggests that the experiences younger people face provide them with more opportunities to reconsider their opinions and attitudes than they will have later in life.<sup>10</sup> In other words, it's not that older people are incapable of attitudinal change,

but rather that they are not faced with situations that allow them to reconsider their prior beliefs often as they get older.<sup>11</sup>

### ***The importance of postsecondary enrollment in attitudinal change***

In both scenarios, postsecondary enrollment is considered an important event in attitudinal formation and change. The age at which most individuals will enter college or university is concordant with the age of their official political maturation as full citizens.<sup>12</sup> As they gain the right to vote, they likely have a heightened sense of political awareness. This new civic responsibility may foster a greater “political vulnerability” at that specific age which makes individuals more receptive to new ideas.<sup>13</sup> Postsecondary education thus becomes an important milestone for attitudinal change, through the confrontation between the values and beliefs held at home, which have been “in part idealized in childhood,”<sup>14</sup> and new ideas to which students are exposed, either formally in the classroom environment, or less formally, through their peers. Postsecondary education may be so important an experience for political socialization that according to some research, it could be the one factor that explains why so much change takes place between the ages of 18 and 25.<sup>15</sup> Moreover, attitudinal change during college years appears to be long-lasting in nature, crystallizing into one’s adulthood, making it a milestone of paramount significance.<sup>16</sup>

From the processes at play in the postsecondary experience, the literature stresses the role of “normative influence,” or “group identification” as having a great impact on attitudinal change. In other words, the influence of peer groups is seen as highly relevant in understanding how change occurs during those years: “Students [...] change their social and political views to conform to standards set by their peers, the change being motivated presumably by a desire for acceptance and social approval – the need to be liked.”<sup>17</sup> However, an alternative explanation can also be offered: that students’ attitudes would change through their academic program, “because of the information to which they are exposed, and their motivation would [rather] be a concern for being right.”<sup>18</sup> It has also been shown that smaller college settings, such as the one found at RMC, tend to produce a college experience that as a whole outweighs the influence of a specific program, and create stronger cohesiveness among a given cohort.<sup>19</sup>



Naval and Officer Cadets participate in the Royal Military College (RMC) obstacle course to mark the end of this year's First Year Orientation Program (FYOP). RMC Grounds, RMC, Kingston, ON September 23, 2022.

Image by: Avr Makala Rose, Imagery Technician, OJE, RMC, Kingston 2022-RMC2-0115

### ***Political attitudes among military students***

By way of comparison, students enrolled in U.S. military colleges tend to hold more socio-politically conservative views than their peers enrolled in civilian universities.<sup>20</sup> For example, American research from 2001 demonstrated that West Point students were more “conservative, patriotic, and warrioristic,” than their civilian peers at the time.<sup>21</sup> Military students have also demonstrated higher levels of authoritarianism than civilian peers in the past, for example when asked their opinions about convicts and ex-convicts.<sup>22</sup> A more recent study on attitudes towards the issue of homosexual serve in the American military found that military academy students were more likely to agree with the barring of homosexuals from military service, followed by ROTP students, and then civilian students.<sup>23</sup>

However, there remain questions whether this gap in attitudes found in the American context is related to pre-existing attitudes or the process of socialization. For example, recent research indicates no significant differences between military and civilian students *upon enrollment* on the measurement of two indicators: right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. These indicators have been associated in other studies as indices of political conservatism and negative prejudices towards certain nondominant groups in society.<sup>24</sup> According to Nicol, Charbonneau and Boies (2007), students who elect to attend a military college are, at the onset of their studies, no different than their civilian peers on these two

measures, but eventually score higher for social dominance. The authors posit that the process of military socialization, rather than pre-existing political beliefs, is what fosters more conservative attitudes in military members.<sup>25</sup> The result of this process is what we commonly call the “military-civilian gap,” where the attitudes of members of the military do not reflect those of the civilians they are meant to serve and protect.<sup>26</sup>

These results once again highlight the significance of the college experience on political socialization. By focusing on only two measures of these students’ attitudes, however, this recent study only gives us a narrow glimpse into their political beliefs. For example, how satisfied are they with our democracy or our other Canadian political institutions? How much trust do they place in our elected representatives? Does this affect their civic engagement? And how do they compare with their civilian peers, as well as the Canadian population writ large, on these issues?

The issue of political attitudes of members of the armed forces, in Canada and abroad, has always been crucial, as this is a population we trust with the protection of the sovereignty of the state, which involves, among other things, the manipulation of lethal weapons. In Canada these questions, which have preoccupied researchers and the public writ large in the past following the “Somalia incident”<sup>27</sup> for example, are once again gaining salience in recent years. According to some observers,

what can be considered a weak civilian oversight of the military in Canada<sup>28</sup> has led, among other things, to the development of troubling attitudes among officers and members of the rank. Instances of systemic racism and discrimination, gender bias, sexual misconduct, and white supremacy and right-wing extremism<sup>29</sup> in the CAF have recently come to light, raising once again questions about the military-civilian gap in political attitudes in Canada and the erosion of public trust in the CAF.

### ***Research Questions & Hypotheses***

We are interested to know the attitudes of Canadian OCdts and NCdts towards civic life and how these compare with their civilian counterparts. To do so, we look at a number of key indicators of an individual’s core political beliefs and behaviours.

Considering first fundamental opinions towards democratic politics and community, we compare how RMC students’ generalized trust differs from the general population and their age cohort peer group. Generalized trust is a key indicator of social capital, and refers to feelings of reciprocity within the networks that make up the fabric of our democratic society.<sup>30</sup> This attitude has been known to affect many other political attitudes and behaviours, from political participation<sup>31</sup> to violent crime.<sup>32</sup> CAF members are required to have a greater level of trust in their colleagues than in most workplaces. At the same time, they are also trained to keep a careful eye on potentially difficult social and political situations. Nonetheless, because generalized trust is such a fundamental attitude, we predict that due to self-selection into the CAF among those most likely to have higher levels of feelings of civic community, we expect generalized trust to be higher among RMC students.

Next, we ask: Do RMC students differ from the general population and their peer group for satisfaction with democracy? Satisfaction with democracy has been theorized to measure both (or either) aspirational perceptions of the concept of democracy, but also the reality of how a democratic regime is working or political support.<sup>33</sup> We anticipate that RMC students, by the self-selection into the CAF where they are serving the democratic regime, may have greater satisfaction with democracy. Just as popular support for democracy is important for the health of a democratic regime, it is possible that support for democracy within this cohort of young cadets will be important to the health of the CAF.



Naval and Officer Cadets participate in RMC’s obstacle course to mark the end of FYOP. September 23, 2022.

Image by: Avr Makala Rose, Imagery Technician, OJE, RMC, Kingston.

“...RMC cadets may be more likely to participate in politics through the traditional means of voting due to an awareness that elected government officials.”

Turning to more concrete political attitudes, we are interested in knowing RMC students' interest in politics and general feelings towards politicians and political life as it functions in Canada. Regarding feelings towards political actors, we do not expect to see much difference between RMC students and their peer groups. Their self-selection into military life or military training should not have a major influence on feelings towards politicians and political campaigns. Conversely, we expect that interest in politics may be affected through RMC training, as students are required to take a core curriculum that includes social sciences and humanities, including politics and history. Exposure to these subjects may improve RMC students' interest in politics beyond their peer group.

Finally, we are interested to know whether these attitudes and beliefs of RMC students translate into different patterns of political behaviours and civic engagement. Considering voter turnout, we expect that although youth are generally the least likely to vote, RMC cadets may be more likely to participate in politics through the traditional means of voting due to an awareness that elected government officials, through civilian oversight of the military, have a concrete impact on their day-to-day life in the CAF. We also expect higher rates of civic engagement through volunteerism, due to the self-selected or indoctrinated sense of community responsibility which is one of the core values of the CAF.

However, we know that some forms of political participation are unavailable to RMC students and all CAF members. For example, their terms of engagement explicitly state they are not

to participate openly in partisan political activities<sup>34</sup> or in some cases sign petitions.<sup>35</sup> Thus, these political activities should be lower among RMC students than the general population.

### **Method**

To respond to these research questions, we undertook a survey of students at RMC in the mandatory POE/F 205 (Canadian Politics and Society/*Politique et société canadiennes*) course in the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 academic years. As part of the core curriculum, this course provided us an opportunity to survey a broad cross-section of the student population at RMC. Students<sup>36</sup> enrolled in this course took two surveys, though the focus of the present research is the first survey that establishes baselines of political attitudes. The survey was administered in-person (paper) in 2019-2020 and online in 2020-2022 (due to pandemic constraints), however it was the same survey administered. This resulted in 503 attempted surveys: 239 from 2020, 200 from 2021 and 64 for 2022. The decline in responses in the final year was due to fewer professors administering the survey to their students. Response rates for single questions vary since students had the option of skipping any question or terminating the survey at any point in time. Of the 473 respondents who chose to answer their gender, 75% were male and 24% were female; the remaining 1% responded “other”.

The survey utilized question wording from the 2015 Canadian Election Study (CES)<sup>37</sup> to allow for comparisons against a broader representative sample of the Canadian population and cover basic socio-demographic variables and attitudes about Canadian politics. Thus, to compare the students with the general population, we employ the data from the 2019 CES. This nationally representative survey is conducted during and after every federal election in Canada, and the individual-level data are (minus identifiers) available openly to the public. The 2019 study, run by the Consortium for Electoral Democracy, included both a phone and an Internet sample.<sup>38</sup> Although survey weights are available, we did not weigh these data in our analysis. The entire sample from the 2019 CES consists of over 37,000 respondents over multiple waves and survey modes. In most cases, however, an individual question was only answered by a portion of these respondents.

To compare the student population with their peer group in the general population, we compare with those born between 1997-2001 from the CES, which results in 2,019 respondents, though again the exact number to have responded to any particular question is much smaller. We likewise also present the results only for the subset of the RMC student data who are also born between 1997 and 2001, recognizing that there may be fundamental differences between younger students and their older counterparts. Thus, the results consider four major groups:

1. The full RMC sample
2. The RMC sample born between 1997-2001
3. The full Canadian population sample
4. The Canada population sample born between 1997-2001

A final note on the methodology employed – we do not ascribe causality in any way to any differences noted. We believe that the student population that elects to attend RMC may be significantly different, having different motivations and goals for pursuing a career in the CAF. Thus, we are careful not to ascribe any differences to their RMC experience.


## Results

### Attitudes

We first consider the fundamental beliefs that these students hold about civic life: including satisfaction with democracy, generalized trust, beliefs about politicians and government, and interest in politics.

We first note generalized trust to be higher in RMC students than their civilian peer group, but slightly lower than the general population (Figure 1). This is unsurprising given that generalized trust is known to increase with age; research has demonstrated that the youngest cohorts tend to be the least trusting.<sup>39</sup> It is also unsurprising that these young citizens interested in becoming military officers will be likely to have greater trust in others. Military members are required to have a high degree of trust in their fellow military members, as decisions and actions could have 'life or death' consequences. This could be self-selection into the military or skills learned during their short military career thus far.


Figure 1: "Most People can be Trusted" (Generalized Trust)



*Question Wording: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or, that you need to be very careful when dealing with people?*

We next consider satisfaction with democracy, asked through the question: "On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied at all with the way democracy works in Canada?" We note that the RMC student sample tends to have slightly higher responses of being "fairly satisfied" than their peer group and the general population, and consequently are less likely to say they are "not very satisfied" (Figure 2). This points to RMC students being slightly more satisfied with democracy than their peers. Satisfaction with democracy is an important predictor of an individual's willingness to support how the government is working (and for some scholars, democratic principles more generally).<sup>40</sup> Thus it makes sense that if an individual is more satisfied with how the democratic system is working, they may be more likely to volunteer to participate in it through military service.

Figure 2: Satisfaction with Democracy




*Question Wording: “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not satisfied at all with the way democracy works in Canada?”*

Two questions considered fundamental political opinions. Here we see a similar percentage of respondents who agree or strongly agree with the statement “politicians are ready (willing) to lie to get elected,” with about 90% of RMC students agreeing (Figure 3). This is close to the general population and their peer group and demonstrates a widespread distrust of politicians.


However, we do note lower agreement with the statement “The government does not care much about what people like you think,” at only about 45% of the RMC student sample in affirmative (Figure 3). This provides some indication of higher perception of government caring about their opinions. Again, it is impossible to know for certain whether this is a result of their short military careers, or their opinions and beliefs that led them to enter the military; however, it does demonstrate that RMC students – and future officers – have a bit more confidence in democratic government, unsurprising given their future line of work to uphold it.

Figure 3: Two Questions from the Battery on Fundamental Political Opinions



Finally, we consider interest in politics (Figure 4). We note the mean political interest score (on a 0–10 scale) is lower for the students surveyed, with the mean for full sample at 4.95; Mean for sample born 1997 and after at 4.92. This is in contrast to the higher means for the general population (6.45) and their peer group (5.8). It is important, however, to note that the CES (from which these data come) tend to have respondents with greater overall interest in politics, as many respondents would simply not be willing to take a long survey about politics unless they had some preliminary interest in the topic. On the contrary, RMC students in the POE/F 205 course from which our sample of students was drawn are taking a required course, and thus did not self-select into the survey (though all had the option to withdraw at any time).

Figure 4: Self-Reported Political interest




***Question Wording:** How interested are you in politics GENERALLY? Use a scale from 0 to 10, where zero means no interest at all, and ten means a great deal of interest.*

### Behaviours


We now turn to political behaviours, that translate the above variables of attitudes and interests into action. Firstly, we consider voting. Since many of the students were unable to vote in the previous election (as they were underage) and we know that turnout is often subject to recall and desirability bias, we use the question of whether the respondent agrees that voting is a duty or a choice (Figure 5). But we know that a sense of duty to vote is a key predictor of turnout.<sup>41</sup> We note that student respondents tended to be more likely to state that voting was a duty than their peer group, but not more likely than the general population. This corresponds to expectations: young military members know that their lives are directly affected by government decisions, or they may have a keener sense of civic duty (either self-selected for those who choose to enter the military or instilled in them during training).

Figure 5: Respondents who Agree Voting is a Duty (not a choice)



We also compare the RMC students on alternative modes of political participation. Students (and the comparison group) were asked how often they had done one of the following civic activities, from volunteering to signing a petition, in the last 12 months (Figure 6). Here we note some 'occupational hazards' on display. We see similar results between the RMC student population and the general population sample for two political activities: volunteering and boycotting (or "boycotting"). It is notable that these two actions are not prohibited by the CAF, whereas there are limitations on other more overt, or traditional, political activities. We see a much lower likelihood of responding they had attended a rally or protest, donated to a party or candidate, or signed a petition. These remain less likely than even their peer group. Thus, while their military service may in some cases bolster civic mindedness (for example, a duty to vote), for other forms of participation not sanctioned by (or discouraged by) the CAF, young military members are stifled in their ability to exercise their political attitudes with alternative forms of action.

Figure 6: Means of Political Participation



*“Have you done any of the following things in the last 12 months?”*

See question wording differences in Appendix.

## Conclusion

This article considered the differences in fundamental political attitudes and behaviours between (primarily) young future military officers at RMC, and the general Canadian population. We undertook a survey of RMC students between 2019 and 2022 as part of the POE/F 205: Canadian Politics and Society/*Politique et société canadiennes* course, comparing their responses to those given in the 2019 CES.

We find that the RMC students surveyed do show a small attitudinal gap when compared with their peer group and the general population. We note that RMC students' generalized trust is higher (closer to the general population) than their peer group of fellow young Canadians born after 1997. Additionally, we see some greater general satisfaction with the

way democracy works than their peer group, which we suspect may be part of the reason they chose to enter the military in the first place, rather than an RMC socialization effect, though we cannot be certain. At the same time, we note that the RMC students have lower general political interest, although we know that the CES sample tends to consist of citizens more politically interested to respond to the survey.

We note that political behaviours are similar between the RMC students and the general population for activities that are generally not openly discouraged within the CAF, including a sense of duty to vote, volunteering and buying or boycotting items. However, they do have lower levels of partisan political activities (which are not permitted for CAF members), and other more discouraged forms of participation like attendance at rallies or signing petitions. This demonstrates some “occupational hazard” surrounding the development of political activism among these future officers. Future research may consider how the stifling of political activities in the young impressionable years may impact how they engage in civic life in the long term, post-release from the CAF.

There remain limitations to this research, notably the question of causality: are these differences in attitudes and behaviours a result of self-selection into the CAF? Or do they emerge during, and as a result of, their training at RMC? Further longitudinal study considering how attitudes change from before and after a student's time at RMC could address this question.

In sum, this research contributes to our understanding of how future military officers' political opinions and behaviours differ from their peer group and the general population of Canadians. It shows that these young future military officers can, in fact, have different approaches to politics from the population they serve. These findings may be of use for those training future officers in the civic values desired by the CAF, in particular through the RMC core curriculum.

## Appendix: Question wording

Variable	Example	Survey Question																																																												
<b>Generalized Trust</b> (on page 52)	<p>Percentage of Respondents "Most People Can Be Trusted"</p> <table border="1"><caption>Percentage of Respondents "Most People Can Be Trusted"</caption><thead><tr><th>Group</th><th>Percentage</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>RMC Student Sample</td><td>40%</td></tr><tr><td>RMC Student Sample Born 1997+</td><td>40%</td></tr><tr><td>CES Sample</td><td>46%</td></tr><tr><td>CES Sample Born 1997+</td><td>22%</td></tr></tbody></table>	Group	Percentage	RMC Student Sample	40%	RMC Student Sample Born 1997+	40%	CES Sample	46%	CES Sample Born 1997+	22%	Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or, that you need to be very careful when dealing with people?  Most people can be trusted. (0)  You need to be very careful when dealing with others. (1)  Don't know (99)																																																		
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<b>Interest in Politiics</b> (on page 53)	<p>Percentage of Respondents</p> <table border="1"><caption>Interest in Politics (Percentage of Respondents)</caption><thead><tr><th>Political Interest (0-10 Scale)</th><th>RMC Student Sample</th><th>RMC Student Sample Born 1997+</th><th>CES Sample</th><th>CES Sample Born 1997+</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0</td><td>~2%</td><td>~2%</td><td>~2%</td><td>~2%</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>~5%</td><td>~5%</td><td>~5%</td><td>~5%</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>~15%</td><td>~15%</td><td>~15%</td><td>~15%</td></tr><tr><td>7</td><td>~20%</td><td>~20%</td><td>~20%</td><td>~20%</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>~15%</td><td>~15%</td><td>~15%</td><td>~15%</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td><td>~10%</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>~5%</td><td>~5%</td><td>~5%</td><td>~5%</td></tr></tbody></table>	Political Interest (0-10 Scale)	RMC Student Sample	RMC Student Sample Born 1997+	CES Sample	CES Sample Born 1997+	0	~2%	~2%	~2%	~2%	1	~5%	~5%	~5%	~5%	2	~10%	~10%	~10%	~10%	3	~10%	~10%	~10%	~10%	4	~10%	~10%	~10%	~10%	5	~10%	~10%	~10%	~10%	6	~15%	~15%	~15%	~15%	7	~20%	~20%	~20%	~20%	8	~15%	~15%	~15%	~15%	9	~10%	~10%	~10%	~10%	10	~5%	~5%	~5%	~5%	How interested are you in politics GENERALLY? Use a scale from 0 to 10, where zero means no interest at all, and ten means a great deal of interest.  1 - no interest at all (0)  2 (1)  3 (2)  4 (3)  5 (4)  6 (5)  7 (6)  8 (7)  9 (8)  10 - a great deal of interest (9)
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Variable	Example	Survey Question																														
<b>Voting a Duty or Choice</b> (on page 53)	<p>Percent responding Voting is a Duty</p> <table border="1"><thead><tr><th>Group</th><th>Percentage</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>RMC Student Sample</td><td>63%</td></tr><tr><td>RMC Student Sample Born 1997+</td><td>64%</td></tr><tr><td>CES Sample</td><td>71%</td></tr><tr><td>CES Sample Born 1997+</td><td>61%</td></tr></tbody></table>	Group	Percentage	RMC Student Sample	63%	RMC Student Sample Born 1997+	64%	CES Sample	71%	CES Sample Born 1997+	61%	<p>People have different views about voting. For some, voting is a DUTY. They feel that they should vote in every election. For others, voting is a CHOICE. They only vote when they feel strongly about that election.</p> <p>For you personally, is voting FIRST AND FOREMOST a Duty or a Choice?</p> <p>Duty (0)</p> <p>Choice (1)</p> <p>Don't know (99)</p>																				
Group	Percentage																															
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<b>Political Behaviours/Activities</b> (on page 53)	<table border="1"><thead><tr><th>Activity</th><th>RMC Student Sample</th><th>RMC Student Sample Born 1997+</th><th>CES Sample</th><th>CES Sample Born 1997+</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Volunteered</td><td>45%</td><td>40%</td><td>45%</td><td>40%</td></tr><tr><td>Attended Rally, Protest etc.</td><td>10%</td><td>10%</td><td>10%</td><td>10%</td></tr><tr><td>Boycotted (or Boycotted)</td><td>45%</td><td>40%</td><td>45%</td><td>40%</td></tr><tr><td>Donated to Party or Candidate</td><td>10%</td><td>10%</td><td>10%</td><td>10%</td></tr><tr><td>Signed Petition</td><td>20%</td><td>20%</td><td>20%</td><td>20%</td></tr></tbody></table>	Activity	RMC Student Sample	RMC Student Sample Born 1997+	CES Sample	CES Sample Born 1997+	Volunteered	45%	40%	45%	40%	Attended Rally, Protest etc.	10%	10%	10%	10%	Boycotted (or Boycotted)	45%	40%	45%	40%	Donated to Party or Candidate	10%	10%	10%	10%	Signed Petition	20%	20%	20%	20%	<p>Have you done any of the following things in the last 12 months?</p> <p>Have you signed a petition?</p> <p>Have you donated money to a political party or candidate?</p> <p>Have you bought products for political, ethical, or environment reasons?</p> <p>(CES Question Boycotted or bought products for ethical, environmental, or political reasons)</p> <p>Have you taken part in a march, rally, or protest?</p> <p>(CES Question Attended a rally or participated in a protest or demonstration)</p> <p>Have you volunteered for a group or organization like a school, religious organization, sports, or community associations?</p>
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## Notes

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# A Different Kind of Alumni Association for the Royal Military Colleges of Canada

**BY GEORGE LUNDY AND  
JILL CARLETON**

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*Jill Carleton. Past Chair RMC Alumni Association. Graduated from RMC in 1987. She served as a Naval Logistics Officer until 2005, and subsequently worked as an Executive at the Canadian Forces Housing Agency. She has served on the Board of Governors of Excellence Canada as well as on the board of both the RMC Club and the RMC Foundation. She was the first Chair of the RMC Alumni Association.*

**What is the Royal Military Colleges Alumni Association (RMCAA)? How did it come about? What does it do? Where does it stand on the pressing issues affecting the Canadian Military Colleges? This article aims to answer all of these questions, all in the context of its overarching mission of *advancement*.**

The Royal Military College (RMC), the Royal Military College St-Jean (RMCSJ), and Royal Roads Military College (RRMC) prior to its closure; these are not typical universities. Their primary vocation is the development of leadership for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), and for Canada. The education that they deliver, whether through specialized graduate programs, continuing studies and distance learning, or through the rigorous demands of the undergraduate Regular Officer Training Program (ROTP), has the potential to transform lives. Without the critical thinking capabilities developed through these programs, a leadership capability gap would exist in the CAF. Not surprisingly, the alumni association that serves these universities has some notable differences from typical alumni organizations at civilian universities. It has evolved as the Canadian Military Colleges have changed throughout their history, but it remains focused on three interdependent goals: advancing the military colleges, fostering camaraderie among the alumni, and promoting the heritage of their contributions to Canada.

With a history stretching back to the formation of the RMC Club in 1884, today's Royal Military Colleges of Canada Alumni Association (RMCAA) is a central part of the university community of the Canadian Military Colleges. From

its incorporation in 1966 until last year, the RMC Foundation operated distinctly from the Club as a registered charity. On October 7<sup>th</sup> 2021, some 400 members voted in favour of: combining the finances and activities of the RMC Club and the RMC Foundation Inc; changing the name to the RMC Alumni Association Inc; and modernizing its bylaw so that (among other things) all those who have attended a Canadian Military College, whether as an undergraduate, graduate or continuing studies student, are eligible to be members. The new bylaw creates two categories of members: "non-voting", which includes every person eligible for membership, and "voting", which includes all those who have paid either for a life membership or who are currently paying for an annual membership<sup>1</sup>. These changes, which make the RMCAA more like the alumni organization of any other Canadian university, were made possible by a favourable interpretation by the Canada Revenue Agency on the scope of activities that a registered charity can perform. When it became obvious that the RMC Foundation as a charity could do everything the RMC Club was doing, then all that remained was for a group of committed volunteers and staff to work out the details of the merger, and for the members to agree. The new organization currently has six full-time

professional staff, a volunteer board of 19 directors, more than 7,000 paid-up voting members, and an estimated total eligible membership of approximately 30,000.<sup>2</sup> The RMCAA also recognizes and maintains a relationship with the regional clubs or branches of the RMC (or ex-cadet) Club<sup>3</sup>, and it continues the Old Brigade, made up of those classes who have passed the milestone of 50-years from their entry into one of the colleges.

Being a federally incorporated not-for-profit corporation and a registered charity, the RMC Alumni Association is independent of the Canadian Military Colleges (CMCs), the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Government of Canada. There are some important differences in the RMCAA's relationship with the CMCs that make it distinct from the alumni organizations of Canadian civilian universities. For example, public universities, like [Royal Roads University](#), have vice-presidents responsible for advancement and alumni relations who are part of the administration and supported by university employees. There are no equivalent positions at the CMCs. Accordingly, when the RMCAA performs fundraising and alumni relations functions for the CMCs, it does so essentially as an act of good will, in keeping with its mission. The RMCAA, based on an agreement between the RMC Foundation and DND, also acts as a trustee. It manages the research grants that the CMCs receive from the federal research granting councils<sup>4</sup> through a trust agreement, which supports the CMC's administration of their research program. The advantage for the RMCAA in this arrangement is that these funds have contributed to growth in total assets under management. In 2016, the RMC Foundation had about \$14 million in assets and distributed more than \$670 thousand to RMCC and RMCSJ. In 2021, the RMCAA had \$37 million in assets, including \$8 million in research funds, and distributed some \$380 thousand to the CMCs, with the decline in demand for financial support being driven by the COVID-19 pandemic. In keeping with the strategic direction and priorities of the senior leadership at RMCC and CMRSJ in recent years, an increasing amount of these charitable gifts goes into funding activities that enhance the leadership, academic, athletic development, and bilingualism of students, rather than into funding monuments and heritage. As the pandemic restrictions have lifted, annual gifts to the Colleges have increased with more than \$860 thousand flowing in 2022, year to date.<sup>5</sup>

The impact of Alumni charitable funding can be found not only across the four-pillars of the ROTP, but also on the continuing studies programs, research activities and the

**“The military skills teams, combat shooting, mountaineering, most other clubs, recreational and cultural activities, these all benefit from Alumni funding.”**

graduate programs. There are too many examples of activities supported financially by the RMC Alumni Association to list here, but a brief selection follows. Alumni funding for RMCSJ experiential learning and cultural trips enhance the quality of the International Studies degree program. Sports and athletics programs at both Colleges receive charitable funding for items not covered by either public or non-public funds, as do the bands and other elements of military heritage. RMCC's varsity hockey and rugby programs have enhanced their competitiveness with sustained Alumni funding over the years and have strengthened their connection with the donor community to generate this success. The military skills teams, combat shooting, mountaineering, most other clubs, recreational and cultural activities, these all benefit from Alumni funding. A series of historical learning tours to the sites of key Canadian battlefields in Europe, and more recently in Niagara, have been supported with the donations of a single donor, complimenting the history curriculum. The RMCAA and the *fondation des ancien(ne)s du CMRSJ* are collaborating to fund the renovation of the RMCSJ cadet mess through the St. Maurice project, which will greatly enhance the social connection and morale of students at that College, thanks in large measure to the generosity of individual donors and the collective donations of specific classes.

Fostering philanthropy, or donorship, is a key activity for the RMCAA. Graduating (or entry) classes are a key part of fundraising, with the annual “Battle of the Classes” generating hundreds of thousands of dollars in donations. Some classes collaborate to achieve shared objectives, like 1981 and 1984 partnership to commemorate the presence of women at the Canadian Military Colleges with a female cadet statue, unveiled in May 2022. Other classes, like 1969, have accumulated funds in an endowment. Originally intended to fund bursaries for

Reserve Entry (RETP) cadets who had to repeat an academic year, after the RETP program ceased, these funds were redirected to support heritage projects at RRMC, RMCC and RMCSJ, including the St. Maurice project, the new RMC museum building project and a memorial at Royal Roads. Other classes, like 1965, have chosen to sponsor a *Professorship in Leadership*, which promotes the academic and research agendas of RMC as well as leadership development. There are numerous endowments which fund prizes to recognize excellence, including in teaching and research. The Association also offers progressive ways of supporting the experiences of students at the military colleges, including through a Diversity Fund and the Truth, Duty, Valour Fund which both give the Colleges greater flexibility in funding activities than a restricted donation for a single purpose. Donations from outside the alumni community, including from corporations, are also part of RMCAA fundraising efforts.

Over the decades, alumni philanthropy has created a legacy of positive impact on the lives of current Naval and Officer Cadets and other students. Beyond their contribution of iconic monuments honouring the fallen at each campus, including the memorial arch in Kingston and the plinth at St-Jean, throughout the history of the RMC Club and the RMC Foundation, charitable giving to the Colleges has been a tremendous source of pride in the alumni community. The RMC Alumni Association proudly continues that legacy today.

Another key activity for the Alumni Association is advocacy and promotion of its mission, which includes:

- ▶ bringing together our alumni and other members for their mutual benefit, support, mentorship and camaraderie;
- ▶ advancing education by establishing and maintaining scholarships, bursaries and prizes; supporting and promoting training and leadership programs by providing funding for programs and initiatives for the benefit of the CMCs to grow and develop Canada's future leaders;
- ▶ establishing, preserving, protecting, and commemorating monuments and significant heritage sites at the CMCs; and
- ▶ enhancing, preserving and promoting the experience, history, traditions and culture of the Canadian Military Colleges.

The overarching objective across the various elements of this mission is *advancement*. This means that when the Alumni Association advocates, it is advocating for change, improvement, and enhancement of the programs and the contributions of the Canadian Military Colleges to the Canadian Armed Forces.

With this orientation towards advancement in mind, the RMCAA Board of Directors was deeply concerned when it read the *Arbour Report*<sup>6</sup> as noted in its *statement* issued on June 30<sup>th</sup> 2022<sup>7</sup>. The RMCAA wants the Canadian Armed Forces' and DND's efforts to prevent and eradicate sexual harassment and sexual assault to be successful. It hopes that implementation of the report's recommendations will contribute to that goal. Institutional reforms aimed at achieving cultural and systemic change to reduce or end sexual harassment and assault in the CAF and DND must succeed. The Association wants to contribute to these objectives, to change and improvement, in part by better connecting the alumni community with the Canadian Military Colleges.

The Board of Directors, representing graduating classes from the 1960s to the early 2000s, includes a range of professional experiences, with a mix of women and men and an independent director (a parent of a graduate). The experience of the directors is an important source of insight which creates opportunities to build empathy and peer support at the board level and across the Association. The Board recognizes that there are 42 cohorts of women from the ROTP/RETP programs in the Alumni Association's membership, and that women are currently about a quarter of the Canadian Military College undergraduate student population. The Board knows that within the student population, and among the alumni community, there are survivors and victims of sexual harassment and assault. Certainly, there are allies for survivors among the remainder of the students and alumni. However, because gender-based violence is a societal problem, there are also offenders, persons accused of wrong-doing, enablers, bystanders, and others who continue to question how the situations described in the Arbour Report came to pass. All of that to say, the Board understood that one of the first priorities in its response to the Arbour Report was to recognize and offer support to survivors.

The Alumni Association has work to do in this regard. "Bringing together alumni for their mutual benefit and support" seems like a straightforward part of the RMCAA mission. But for those who have experienced trauma, returning to campus for a reunion weekend might not be a celebration. Listening compassionately to the survivors in the alumni community is one of the first steps that can be taken as an organization. Fostering peer support networks is another, through classes, branches, and at the national level. In the fall of 2022, the Alumni Association began engaging with its

members on the question of how best to support survivors. Hopefully, this engagement will be the start of an ongoing dialogue that can inform future decisions. That said, the RMCAA must be mindful of its capacity and areas of expertise. Accordingly, it is exploring partnerships with organizations that have expertise and capacity in this field. To that end, the Association is engaging with Survivor Perspectives Consulting Group to raise awareness and build capacity at the national level and in branches in these important areas.

More broadly, the Arbour Report has prompted the Alumni Association to reflect on how best to advocate for reforms at the CMCs to make them safer for everyone and more effective in their vocation of producing exemplary leaders for the CAF and Canada. The Colleges already receive charitable funding from the RMCAA to support inclusive leadership development activities, including *Resilience Plus*<sup>8</sup>, and the *Athena Network*<sup>9</sup>, among other programs. Continuing charitable donations to the RMCAA ensures programs like these are supported, enabling Canadian Military College students to contribute to culture change. Certainly, there have been important examples of CMC graduates influencing CAF culture throughout Canada's military history. It is only logical then, that creating a positive and respectful leadership culture at RMCC and RMCSJ should have a positive effect on CAF leadership culture. There are opportunities for the Alumni Association to advocate for change that advances these goals. The Association can also set an example by continuing to maintain the highest expectations for the standards of conduct of its members. The rare expulsion of an RMCAA member following an admission of guilt to a charge of criminal misconduct in 2022 was an unfortunate but necessary decision.

That being said, the membership of the Alumni Association is a rich source of expertise, experience, and ideas on how to improve leadership development at the CMCs. Many have shared reflections with the RMCAA about their positive and negative experiences at military college. For example, while some have noted there was little direct supervision from military staff in their time, others have pointed to the opportunity of creating leadership-coaching and mentoring relationships for students as a resource for reflection and for generating improvement in self awareness and empathy. Others have recalled the critical role that leaders play in shaping organizational culture through the actual standards of behaviour that they tolerate as either a positive or negative example and signal to their organization. As the review driven by M<sup>me</sup> Arbour's recommendation number 29 proceeds, the RMCAA stands ready

to bring together experts, from industry, academe and other areas of its membership that would be relevant to the review team.

The Alumni Association is also exploring the question of how best it can support and enable needed changes to conduct and culture of the CAF. Indeed, many of the CAF's efforts in this regard are being led by CMC alumni currently in senior leadership positions, who are truly in the front lines of generating positive culture change. At the same time, other alumni – including survivors – are some of the most insightful critics of CAF leadership when it falls short of expectations, drawing on their lived experience and the depth of their own expertise. Alumni are also playing key roles in producing the new doctrine aimed at generating a more inclusive framing of the CAF Ethos, *Trusted to Serve*<sup>10</sup>, with its emphasis on respecting the dignity of all persons as a key element of leadership. The RMC Alumni Association and its vast network of members are not just a vital stakeholder in this process, they are a unique and vibrant resource for the CAF and the Canadian Military Colleges to draw on for expertise, to raise awareness, and to generate momentum for change. The Association has a continuing role to play in enabling culture change by raising awareness among its membership, including by working with individual classes and regional branches.

Clearly, when the Arbour Report was tabled, recommendations 28 and 29 aimed at the Canadian Military Colleges, caught the attention of alumni. In the first weeks following the report, there was an immediate, emotional, and passionate reaction. Many alumni posted social media profile photos of themselves in scarlet uniforms. Some alumni published opinion pieces in defence of the Colleges, while others advocated for change. There was (and there remains) a palpable fear of seeing another round of college closures, like in 1994/95, with strident cries of “don't throw the baby out with the bathwater!” At least those who have derived personal and professional benefits from their education and leadership development experience at the CMCs can take some assurance from knowing that the main recommendation (29) calls for an expert, external review. Regrettably, this immediate, reactive wave of support also had negative impacts, with many in the survivor community feeling that their perspectives and experiences were being denied yet again.

As the RMC Alumni Association engages with its members, and as it advocates for advancement of the Colleges, it should position itself to play a constructive role. Knowing that there have been many reviews of the Canadian Military Colleges in the past, it will be vital for the CAF, DND and the Government to ensure that this review is properly mandated, resourced and

enabled with relevant expertise. The composition of the review team, in terms of expertise, lived experience, gender, linguistic and other societal characteristics, military and leadership perspectives, will have to be carefully considered for the review to be credible and effective. Similarly, the mandate of the review should be looked at with Canada's national security strategic context in mind, beginning with Mme Arbour's recommendations, but not necessarily confined to those terms. The first principles that led to the founding of the Royal Military College in 1876 should be kept in mind today. To be an independent country, Canada must be capable of educating and training the highest calibre of leaders for its armed forces. Those military leaders should be educated and trained on subjects and concepts that will equip them to defend and serve the interests of Canada in a complex, dynamic and too often hostile international security environment. These leaders should continue to play a role in building Canada into a country that is capable of being a role model for the world. The leaders produced by the Canadian Military Colleges should be exemplary to ensure that they and the CAF remain a source of pride for Canada.

Since the merger in 2021, the RMC Alumni Association is in a critical position to continue to be a key stakeholder as the CAF and DND consider the future of the Canadian Military Colleges. By engaging an unparalleled network of alumni across Canada and around the world, and by building on the legacy of giving of the RMC Club and RMC Foundation, the Royal Military Colleges of Canada Alumni Association remains a vital platform for charitable support for the ongoing enhancement and

**“The first principles that led to the founding of the Royal Military College in 1876 should be kept in mind today. To be an independent country, Canada must be capable of educating and training the highest calibre of leaders for its armed forces.”**

reform of academics, physical education and athletics, social development, and military leadership development programs at RMCC and RMCS. The merits of continuing to integrate these four developmental “pillars” have been reviewed before and should continue to be the subject of rigorous review. *Advancement* means finding ways to evolve and improve the quality of leaders produced by the Canadian Military Colleges. As an advocate, the Alumni Association will be tireless in supporting the generation of exemplary leadership for the Canadian Armed Forces and for Canada. That means tireless support of safety, of respect for the dignity of all persons, and of leaders capable of succeeding in the complex conflicts of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.



## Notes

- 1 Existing life memberships were grandfathered, including for those who attended the Colleges before they had degree granting status.
- 2 More information on the structure of the RMCAA, including the board committees and staff roles can be found on its website, <https://www.rmcalumni.ca/en/about-us/>
- 3 The regional clubs or branches are legally independent affiliates, as noted in the Bylaw, Article 9, available here: <https://www.rmcalumni.ca/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/By-Laws-English.pdf>
- 4 Including the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, among others.
- 5 Based on unaudited financial results, as of the time of writing.
- 6 <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/report-of-the-independent-external-comprehensive-review.html>
- 7 <https://www.rmcalumni.ca/en/statement-by-the-rmc-alumni-association-inc-on-the-report-of-the-independent-external-comprehensive-review-arbour-report/>
- 8 <https://www.rmc-cmr.ca/en/college-commandants-office/resilience-plus>
- 9 <https://www.instagram.com/reseau.athena.network/?hl=en>
- 10 <https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/canadian-armed-forces-ethos-trusted-to-serve.html>



The Northern lights can be seen beyond HMCS HARRY DEWOLF during Cold Weather Trials near Frobisher Bay on February 21, 2021.

Image by: Corporal David Veldman

# North American Defence and the Canadian Arctic in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

**BY CHRISTOPHER COATES**

*LGen Coates started his military career flying tactical helicopters in support of the Canadian Army in Germany. He commanded at Sqn, Wing levels in Canada and deployed. He served as the Deputy Commander of NORAD and the Commander of CJOC prior to proceeding with retirement from the Canadian Armed Forces. The views expressed are those of the author and are not the views of the Government of Canada, the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Armed Forces.*

**Abstract:** Dangers and threats to the Canadian Arctic in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century are not limited to advanced military threats and also include adversarial activities that seek to achieve aims and goals without resorting to military means. Russia continues with ambiguous, dual-purpose military activities that would allow it to dominate approaches to North America. China, through dependencies or other means, seeks access to resources and decisions favourable to its interests. It can achieve these through non-military means – economic, informational, and political – insidiously degrading the sovereignty of Canada and other nations. Countering this requires a comprehensive Whole of Government and Whole of Society approach to address a key threat in the Arctic to Canadian security and sovereignty – hybrid or gray-zone threats that are below-the-threshold of armed conflict.

**The Canadian Arctic occupies a romanticized place in the minds of many Canadians. It is a remote region, seldom seen or experienced directly by most Southern Canadians, our perceptions filled with images of Arctic wildlife, resilient people pursuing traditional skills, and vistas of unimaginable beauty and depth – at times barren and stark, untouchable and, most significantly, impassable. But the Canadian Arctic is in the midst of transformation. The impacts of global warming and climate change are important and need to be addressed; so too must the accompanying changes in the role of the Arctic in global affairs, which challenge Canadians' quixotic view of the region.**

The return to the dynamics of great power competition, with Russia, China, and the United States at the centre, are changing the North American defence equation. The rules-based international order is threatened, jeopardizing peace and security, and endangering the foundation that has raised the world economically and politically for the last 65 years and brought increased prosperity to so many of the world's citizens. Intensifying resource competition affects everything from energy supplies to vital rare metals, to protein sources.

Accompanying these changes has been a revolution in the way that states conduct military programs and other coercive behaviors. Technology's rapid spread has lowered the threshold for the development of advanced capabilities, while at the same time accelerating the rate and tempo of military engagements. The manifestation of grey zone conflict or hybrid warfare in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has blurred lines that separated competition from conflict, and it has linked defence and security across the whole of government.

Traditional Canadian views of the Arctic need to evolve to deal with these emerging 21<sup>st</sup> Century challenges. Vulnerabilities that were acceptable in the past can now pose unacceptable risks in a hyper-connected world, where actions in one domain or sphere can present overriding challenges in other areas. This might include influence in and connections between transportation, communication, energy and resource sectors, which may in turn reduce independence or market freedoms in these areas, affecting development or other social programs. Canada's success in identifying and mitigating these risks and vulnerabilities will be key to realizing successful outcomes, from defence through security, to economic prosperity and development, to governance and social resilience.

**“Technology's rapid spread has lowered the threshold for the development of advanced capabilities, while at the same time accelerating the rate and tempo of military engagements.”**

## **Canadian Policy Perspectives**

Both Canada's 2017 defence policy, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, and the 2019 *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* (ANPF) recognize the need for Canada to be strong in the Arctic, ensuring the defence and security of this expansive homeland. *Strong, Secure, Engaged* lays out necessary initiatives aimed at adapting Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to the challenges of a changing Arctic, including the fielding of new Arctic-focused capabilities such as the *Harry DeWolf*-class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ships, the RADARSAT Constellation Mission, polar satellite communications, Remotely Piloted Aerial Systems, the Nanisivik Naval Facility, and Arctic-capable ground vehicles. The evolution of 21<sup>st</sup> century strategic competition towards gray zone or hybrid threats such as cyber, informational or economic, however, dictates that Arctic defence and security cannot be left as a solely DND/CAF responsibility.

Canada's ANPF recognizes the changing nature of the international environment and the impact that it will have on and in the Canadian Arctic. It recognizes the need to ensure that the people of Canada's North are “safe, secure and well defended”<sup>1</sup>. The challenge is seen as one associated with climate change and increased accessibility, both of which are contributors to the unfolding changes, but we must also recognize the salient security dimensions or nexus for Canada as an Arctic nation. The Framework identifies safety-related initiatives that will increase Search and Rescue and domestic response capabilities in the Arctic, while acknowledging that the principal test is ensuring “a future in which the people of the Arctic and North are full participants in Canadian society.”<sup>2</sup> Canada's defence policy and Arctic policy must also be aligned on the threats posed by the changing geostrategic


environment. Just as threats and risks arise from a variety of domains or dimensions, so too should the mitigation and the elements of security be broad in their scope and their application, or vulnerabilities will remain able to be exploited. Another test needs to be the security and defence, in the broad sense, of Canada's Arctic and Northern people.

## Military and Whole of Government Approaches in the Arctic to Address 21<sup>st</sup> Century Threats

The ANPF emphasizes that "Canada sees no immediate threat in the Arctic and the North," but that both Arctic and non-Arctic states are "expressing a variety of economic and military interests in the region" as the physical environment changes and the Circumpolar North rises in "strategic international importance."<sup>3</sup> Neither the Framework nor *Strong, Secure, Engaged* provide specific defence objectives to address military threats to or in Canada's North or Arctic Region. Instead, securing or defending the Canadian Arctic relies on cooperation with allies, particularly the US through NORAD or in the context of NATO. After all, this approach to collective defence and deterrence has served as a reliable foundation for Canadian security since the Second World War. But while conventional deterrence has proven effective against legacy, kinetic-style threats, its success against grey zone or hybrid threats is less proven. Traditional alliance approaches to deterrence are a necessary component of defence against grey zone threats – but no longer sufficient.

The ANPF astutely notes that closing the gap in the Arctic requires combined efforts of all levels of government as well as the participation of Northern peoples and their communities. The common focus of these efforts relates to healthy families and communities, addressing the impacts of climate change and supporting healthy ecosystems, and investment in Northern infrastructure with a view to creating jobs and growing Arctic and northern economies. Similarly, a wide, collaborative approach is necessary to counter the threats below the threshold of military conflict that pose dangers to and in Canada's Arctic and North.

Although the renewal of great power competition internationally is unlikely to see kinetic conflict erupting in the Canadian Arctic, we cannot overlook the strategic implications of the Arctic region as part of this competition which transcends all domains and multiple sectors of security. Non-likeminded states seeking military supremacy and economic dominance will use a combination of means and ways to meet



This photo has been digitally altered due to operational security. A sailor monitors their computer as HMCS HARRY DEWOLF sails the Atlantic Ocean during Operation CARIBBE on 14 April 2022.

Image by: Canadian Armed Forces

their national objectives. The tendency for Russia and China to compete with the United States and Western allied nations (including Canada) below the thresholds of armed conflict has exposed weaknesses and vulnerabilities in our established approaches to defence and deterrence. Below-threshold activities in the technological, political and ideological spheres, with potential access and influence via industrial or commercial activities, often occur outside of the conventional "military" realm, and analysts are increasingly attuned to coercive activities in the economic, cyber, space and informational domains.

The sophisticated weaponization of information, in particular, is increasingly central to coercive efforts to influence opinion and decision making in target audiences and countries. Russia uses information tools persistently and in a sophisticated way, as Canadian troops have experienced first-hand in both Latvia and Ukraine. China's tactics are less refined and subtle, but it flexes economic and diplomatic muscle to achieve its aims, as seen in the South China Sea Region and through its expansive Belt and Road Initiative.

Consistent with Chinese and Russian techniques and actions elsewhere in the world, we should expect that these countries will use significant informational tools as part of their efforts to shape and influence the human environment in the Arctic. This includes the strategic use of information, misinformation, and open media, including social media, to mislead and to influence public perceptions in ways that are favourable to their national interests and ambitions. Furthermore, both countries – and China, in particular – will use economic levers to advance their interests, setting the stage for future actions while seeking to avoid direct confrontation. A clear-eyed

## “The Kremlin claims that its heavy investments in expanding Russia’s military footprint in its Arctic are defensive in nature and intended to protect and support national interests in the Northern Sea Route”

appreciation of the threat that these activities pose to Canada’s Arctic region is necessary to ensure the responses and mitigation are appropriate.

Canada’s ANPF mentions the challenge of non-traditional activities by nation states and non-states, and Canadians must be deliberate in situating these within the broader context. We must not downplay the insidious and pervasive nature of the activities and how these can represent threats to Canadian sovereignty and security, and we must be attentive to gaps and vulnerabilities in Canada’s approach to Northern and Arctic defence and security that non-likeminded states or actors would wish exploit.

### **The Return to Strategic Competition: Russian and Chinese Aims and Ambitions**

As Russia continues to enhance and expand its Arctic military capabilities, it presents the more traditional threat to North America. Russia’s future economic success depends upon reliable access to and exploitation of its Arctic resources, which serve as a core justification for its vigorous development of the Northern Sea Route. The Kremlin claims that its heavy investments in expanding Russia’s military footprint in its Arctic are defensive in nature and intended to protect and support national interests in the Northern Sea Route. The multi-purpose nature of the capabilities being introduced, however, could permit their rapid reorientation for additional purposes. Given the relative distances involved, Russia’s Arctic airfields, communications and other infrastructure, amongst other resources, can be used to support offensive operations further afield, as easily as they serve to meet the country’s defensive needs.

China also recognizes the importance of the Arctic for its ongoing economic growth and international influence. In Chinese discourse, the Arctic represents an increasingly accessible reserve of strategic energy and mineral resources, while Arctic shipping routes (the Northern Sea Route, Northwest Passage, and Transpolar route through the central Arctic Ocean) offer the prospect of diversified—and potentially more economical—access to markets in the northern hemisphere. China has made deliberate efforts to build relationships (and potential dependencies) in the Arctic over the last decade, effectively using diplomacy and its scientific research ice-breaker to normalize its polar presence, and seeks to reshape our perceptions about polar stakeholders by self-declaring its rights as a “near-Arctic state.”

Both *Strong, Secure, Engaged* and Canada’s *Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* depend on the rules-based international order and the cooperation of states to ensure the peace and security of the Arctic region. While international conventions and solutions remain the ideal means to maintain stability, the grey zone or hybrid nature of emerging threats makes this increasingly challenging. The Arctic is not immune to these pressures and lacks regional institutional mechanisms to address them directly. The Arctic Council is prohibited from addressing matters of defence and military security, and the disruption of military-to-military dialogue between Russia and the other Arctic states since 2014 separates these issues from other Arctic affairs and governance.

### **Canadian Arctic Vulnerabilities**

The effectiveness of grey zone or hybrid threats is heightened in areas that lack infrastructure (and redundancy), are comparatively disadvantaged economically, or face distinct political, social, or cultural challenges. These criteria describe much of the Canadian Arctic, which Inuit advocate, and now Governor General of Canada, Mary Simon emphasizes “continue to exhibit among the worst national social indicators for basic wellness.”<sup>4</sup> The ANPF highlights the broad spectrum of socio-economic challenges facing the North, ranging from a lack of economic opportunities, to mental health challenges, to food insecurity, to gaps in infrastructure, health care, education, skills development, and income equality across the region. The ANPF’s first and primary goal is to create conditions so that “Canadian Arctic and northern Indigenous peoples are resilient and healthy.” While doing so, these persistent challenges and gaps present opportunities for exploitation by actors or entities with



Canadian Ranger Master Corporal Solomon Mikki secures a Canadian Ranger flag before leaving on patrol during Operation NUNALIVUT 2017 in Hall Beach, Nunavut, February 25, 2017.

Image by: P02 Belinda Groves

short- or long-term agendas that are not bound by a Canadian view of the Arctic or its inhabitants and may seek to manipulate the circumstances to advance their particular agendas. For example, the lack of robust telecommunications in the North makes it vulnerable to foreign companies willing and able to provide or underwrite such services. The creation of transportation infrastructure can enable economic opportunities, but as seen elsewhere in the world, it can also create dependencies that influence decision making and undermine sovereignty in other matters. The second and third order connections and consequences of ingress by potentially malicious actors into the Canadian Arctic are widespread, and we must anticipate and address risks and threats which have not previously been assigned much weight.

Canada's ANPF has identified gaps in infrastructure, development, employment, and connectedness as priorities that we must close as a country. The *Framework* does so from the perspective of opportunities and standard of living or wellbeing rather than from the viewpoint of defence and security. The latter dimensions are critical, given that competition below the threshold of armed conflict will necessarily involve the non-military aspects of a region and hostile or competitive activities will seek to influence regional inhabitants, masked under the apparent or surface benefits. The sinister or dangerous nature of the actions may not be apparent unless we recognize how 21<sup>st</sup> Century grey zone and hybrid conflict is truly global in its reach, extending throughout North America.

The solutions to these challenges are within reach. NORAD modernization is an important step to address the military

dimension by increasing the ability to monitor and respond to military threats in or travelling through the approaches to North America. The challenges are wider than simply military threats, however, so the solutions require a broader approach – involving other government departments and agencies with the ability to influence development in the Arctic and the North. Regional vulnerabilities to below-threshold and grey zone activities must be reduced. The North needs to be able to withstand the sustained, malicious influence of external actors.

Adherence to the rules-based international order in the Arctic is dependent upon Canadians establishing conditions that discourage or do not permit actions that fall outside accepted norms of conduct. In the context of grey zone or hybrid warfare activities, this requires a Canadian Arctic and North that is robust and vibrant, meets the needs of Canadians living in the region, and reflects the development goals of Northerners. A North that is energetically supported by the rest of Canada will be less accessible to pernicious actors who might seek a “foothold” in economic or cultural terms or endeavour to disrupt our country's social and political fabric.

The defence and security challenges of the Canadian Arctic cannot be framed simply as a “NORAD problem” to be solved by modernizing the aging North Warning System (NWS). Grey zone, hybrid and below-threshold threats need to be part of the explicit considerations and calculus of Canada's defence policy and our co-development and -implementation of the ANPF. Failing to see Northern economic, health, communication, and transportation gaps as security vulnerabilities opens the door to actions that might overlook significant security dimensions. This can exacerbate vulnerabilities and risks to Canada's sovereignty in the region: not merely in terms of defending lines on a map against foreign military threats, but about defending the rights of Canadians – and particularly Northern Canadians – to chart our own path using our democratic governance systems and free and informed debate without foreign interference.

## Final Reflections

100 years ago, Raoul Dandurand famously described Canada as “a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.” This encapsulates most Canadians' view of the Arctic. Today, however, globalization, technology, climate change, and the changing nature of security threats mean that in a renewed era of great power competition, the Canadian Arctic is not insulated from international security pressures.

Canada's approach to the defence of the Arctic is rooted in our nation's alliances and overall approach to deterrence.

While advanced Russian and Chinese weapons and delivery systems pose a real danger to the defence of Canada and North America, mitigating these threats will not protect Canada and North America from below-threshold, grey zone, hybrid threats. Official statements reiterate that Canada anticipates no immediate military threat in or to its Arctic beyond those associated with North American defence more generally, but this does not negate the need for multi-pronged efforts to ensure security and defence in that region, including deliberate efforts to identify and characterize threats below the threshold of military conflict that seek to polarize Canadians, undermine the integrity of our institutions and decision-making process, and undermine Canadian sovereignty.

In the absence of a current Canadian national security strategy, 21<sup>st</sup> Century threats and challenges require comprehensive cross-departmental approaches to ensure the defence and security of Canada's North. *Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework* must be applied within the context of great power competition and of threats that extend well outside the traditional military sphere, while the military approach to continental defence needs to address the North in a holistic manner, providing a "comprehensive" solution. The defence and security of Canada's Arctic is about much more than the latest over-the-horizon radars and should embrace a whole-of-government approach as the Canadian Armed Forces have embraced in their support to other nations (with Afghanistan

"The defence and security of Canada's Arctic is about much more than the latest over-the-horizon radars and should embrace a whole-of-government approach as the Canadian Armed Forces have embraced in their support to other nations"


and Ukraine serving as prime examples). Defence and security needs are almost always more than a simple military problem, and this is certainly the case with respect to the North American Arctic.



*Acknowledgement. The author would like to thank P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North and Professor in the School for the Study of Canada at Trent University for contributions to this work.*

## Notes

- 1 Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587>, accessed 11 Apr 2021
- 2 Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587>, accessed 11 Apr 2021
- 3 Canada's Arctic and Northern Policy Framework, <https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1560523306861/1560523330587>, accessed 11 Apr 2021
- 4 [library.assembly.gov.nt.ca/2018/LA/19780660094922td\\_80-183\\_New\\_Shared\\_Arctic\\_Leadership\\_Model.pdf](https://library.assembly.gov.nt.ca/2018/LA/19780660094922td_80-183_New_Shared_Arctic_Leadership_Model.pdf)



RMC's first year Naval and Officer Cadets participated in the 2022 Obstacle Course, September 23, 2022.

Credit: S1 Lisa Sheppard, Military Photojournalist, RMC

# I S.E.A You: A Virtual Character Strengths Intervention for Team Building

**BY VALERIE WOOD, LOBNA CHERIF, AND STAN PARNELL**

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*Lobna Chérif, PhD, CAPP, CRT, PPCC, MBSP is the Founder and Director of the Resilience Plus program at the Royal Military College where she is an Associate Professor at the Department of Military Psychology and Leadership and where she also holds the Chair in Resilience. Dr. Chérif's current research focuses on character strengths, mindfulness, resilience, and accomplishment – and how to apply this understanding to improving well-being and performance.*

*2Lt Stan Parnell is the second-in-command of a Squadron at the Royal Military College. 2Lt Parnell has an interest in how practicing positive psychology can contribute to CAF members' quality of life and mental resilience.*

According to Lyubomirsky and colleagues<sup>1</sup>, those who experience greater well-being are likely benefitting from one of three things: a genetic predisposition that allows them to experience greater well-being naturally, fortunate life circumstances (e.g., income, winning a lottery), and intentional activities and practices. Interventions focusing on leveraging and developing our character strengths are one such example of that third pathway to enhanced well-being. These interventions typically involve helping individuals focus on a limited set of strengths and encourage their usage in a new way. Strengths-based interventions have been shown to significantly impact our positive emotions and happiness<sup>2</sup>, with most of this research focused on interventions focused on ‘using strengths in new ways’<sup>3</sup> where participants receive individualized feedback on their top five character strengths and are instructed to use one of their top five strengths in a new way every day for one week. These interventions mainly focused on identifying, acknowledging, and improving *one’s own* strengths. However, recent research has shown how others’ recognition of our strengths (known as ‘strengths-spotting’) can be beneficial.

Haslip and colleagues<sup>4</sup> had early childhood educators (ECEs) spot the strengths of love, kindness, and forgiveness in both themselves and their students over 12 weeks. The researchers collected the responses and found that the ECEs naturally and frequently drew upon the character strengths of love, kindness, and forgiveness in their daily educational practice. In other words, the ECEs had started to habitually observe these strengths in their students, it had changed the way that they thought about, and approached, their educational practice. In addition, Quinlan and colleagues<sup>5</sup> investigated the role of teachers’ strength-spotting in a strengths-based intervention for elementary students. These researchers found that for students who participated in the intervention, their teachers were more likely to spot their strengths, and these students also experienced changes in indicators of well-being, and classroom behaviour including. More importantly, teachers’ strength-spotting explained why those who participated in the intervention felt happier, more engaged, autonomous, competent, and connected to others. Finally, Kashdan and colleagues<sup>6</sup> found that romantic couples who reported greater recognition

“Appreciation is a wonderful thing. It makes what is excellent in others belong to us as well.”

– VOLTAIRE

and appreciation of one another’s character strengths reported higher quality relationships and indicators of intrapersonal well-being relative to those who reported less strengths recognition and appreciation.

Altogether, these findings are in line with much of the social psychology literature that shows that one’s own sense of self-worth is based on the extent to which we think others value and accept us<sup>7</sup>. In other words, while interventions geared towards identifying and enhancing our own character strengths seem effective in improving our well-being, these effects could potentially be enhanced if the identification and acknowledgment of our strengths came from close others. Such interventions might be particularly relevant for military populations, with the quality of one’s organizational relationships critical for operational effectiveness and safety. Indeed, if applied to comrade-comrade and leader-subordinate relationships, such interventions might have the potential to increase unit cohesion and perceptions of leadership, both factors which are related to indicators of intrapersonal well-being such as resilience, subjective well-being, and lower prevalence of psychological disorders<sup>8,9,10</sup>.

## Proposed Intervention

Early research indicates that 1) character strengths might prove relevant in predicting the success and well-being of military recruits and Naval/Officer Cadets and 2) that spotting and appreciating the strengths of others is associated with beneficial intrapersonal and interpersonal outcomes. We propose a strengths-spotting/appreciation intervention that could be effective in promoting social cohesion among military personnel both horizontally and vertically across chains of command. This intervention will help comrades and leaders identify, demonstrate, and then express one’s appreciation of one another’s character strengths for promoting individual well-being, organizational relationships, and potentially even operational effectiveness. This intervention is an adapted

version of **Niemiec's SEA model**<sup>11</sup> and entails the basic actions of spotting, explaining, and appreciating (hence SEA) strengths within military teams.

**S – Spotting Strengths.** The team lead (or whom ever is facilitating this session) should create a Padlet ([padlet.com](https://padlet.com)) using the 'shelf' template, with team members' names listed at the top, meaning one name per column. The Padlet will be anonymous so long as individuals do not log in to a profile, or set up a profile, prior to completing the Padlet. The team member or individual organizing the Padlet, will be sharing the link with all team members below.

All participants then take the VIA Adult Survey ([www.viacharacter.org](http://www.viacharacter.org)) to determine their character strengths profile. This process should be free for all participants and will result in participants accessing a list of their strengths in rank order from most prominent, to less prominent, according to their scores. When finished, everyone should see their top five strengths (their signature strengths) listed on screen. Write these down/keep them handy. Participants should take a few minutes to review their strengths.

The team lead should send the Padlet link to all team members at this point. Participants then carefully examine the VIA list of 24 character strengths with definitions ([www.viacharacter.org/character-strengths](http://www.viacharacter.org/character-strengths)), and identify a strength for each team member (aside from yourself) thinking a time/situation/general observations of them where you saw this strength in action. To help recall a particular instance, participants are encouraged to think of times where that individual was at their best.

**E – Explaining Strengths.** Team members should then post that strength and explanation underneath the appropriate individuals' column on the Padlet (underneath their name). If the team is large, you may have to scroll across the Padlet to find all members. You will repeat this until you have posted a strength/explanation for each individual on the team aside from yourself, so that each individual ends up with the same number of strengths spotted. This should be an anonymous process, so authors of posts should not indicate their names in their posts.

**A – Appreciating Strengths.** Prior to breaking the group into small groups, everyone should take a moment to observe the strengths that others spotted in them and compare these

“Indeed, promoting subordinate relational needs through supportive leadership behaviour is related to subordinate emotional well-being, decreased stress, and organizational effectiveness”

posts to the top strengths from the survey. Then, in small groups (2-3 people), team members should briefly discuss their observations and thoughts. Individuals can discuss alignment/differences between strengths spotted by others and those that the survey indicated were most prominent, strengths that stood out to individuals (were unexpected or not closely tied to their sense of self).

We recommend ending the activity with a larger team discussion. Participants should be encouraged to discuss take-aways (lessons learned, insights gained), in addition to potential implications for team functioning and organizational effectiveness. How can the team use this to their benefit going forward?). Teams should walk away from this activity with an appreciation or recognition of the value of character strengths for their personal and professional lives.

## Implications for Improved Military Leadership, Unit Cohesion, and Member Well-Being

Potential implications of such an intervention include improvements in intrapersonal well-being, perceptions of military leadership (i.e., by promoting a supportive relationship between leader and subordinates), and cohesion (through facilitating or maintaining bonding, comradery). Indeed, promoting subordinate relational needs through supportive leadership behaviour is related to subordinate emotional well-being,

decreased stress, and organizational effectiveness<sup>12</sup>. In fact, Key-Roberts<sup>13</sup> argued that leaders' recognition of their subordinates' strengths can provide such teams with a distinct advantage in task and mission completion, in more successfully at mobilizing individuals within the organization to address various and challenges. This author identified specific methods by which (army) leaders can support their subordinates' well-being and unit success including the identification and utilization of their strengths, providing individualized feedback that focuses on what went right relative to what went wrong, building and maintaining a positive climate, and caring for and

empowering their subordinates. Niemiec<sup>14</sup> highlights the importance of complementary signature strengths in teams, or 'character strengths interpersonal synergies', where strengths can come together and create a synergy in which the new whole is greater than the sum of the strengths (e.g., kindness and judgement). Leaders' awareness of the ways that even seemingly unrelated character strengths of unit members can work together in impactful ways could provide the unit with distinct advantages relative to teams where leaders are less attuned to, and less supportive of, subordinate's unique strengths.



## Notes

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
# Top Secret Canada Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community

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Craig Forcese, eds.

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Top Secret Canada  
Book Cover

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Toronto Press

## BY THOMAS TURMEL

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The Canadian intelligence community has long been overshadowed by the size, capability, and *faux pas* of its American and British counterparts; Canadians seem to know more about the Central Intelligence Agency (and its mystique), than about the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS). In the words of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Chief, CSE is “the most important government agency you’ve never heard of.”<sup>1</sup> This collection is perhaps the first effort of its kind to survey the Canadian intelligence community and take stock of the publicly available information.

*Top Secret Canada* takes an organizational approach by having 13 of its essays focus on an intelligence organ from the relatively well-known Global Affairs Canada, to the lesser-known Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC). The emphasis put on quantitative data such as the number of employees, budget, or number of warrants is particularly useful to illustrate, and compare the size of agencies. The willingness of the authors—some being current public servants—to explore even the most contentious ebbs and flows in budget as well as recent and past controversies must be commended. Each essay provides information about the

organ, its mandate within the intelligence ecosystem, and the challenges it faces. This approach provides an all horizon which makes this source an asset for students and practitioners of intelligence and national security.

However, the organizational structure of the volume prevents in-depth critical analysis. Those concerned with a particular issue—notably scholars—will find the comparative approach limiting. For instance, issues of accountability and resource limitation that cut across the Community cannot be explored holistically. In fact, the lack of emphasis on the interconnected nature of the intelligence ecosystem is the volume’s main weakness. Further, this might prevent readers from grasping the context that led to the current organization of the Canadian intelligence community or the legislative measures taken to address current gaps. The introduction and conclusion of the volume, nevertheless, attempt to bridge the observations made in each chapter. This is achieved by highlighting controversies and challenges applicable across the Community such as Constitutional and Charter limitations, retention of data, and oversight.

Two of the essays are outliers as they address not a particular organ, but the role that the free press and oversight measures play in creating a nexus between the intelligence community and the Canadian public. This system is integral to understand the Community as it is the vehicle through which legislative changes are called for and implemented. The authors of these chapters address the tension between the intelligence

community and the free press as well as review bodies. The chapter on the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) is also an atypical chapter as it is not written by a scholar, but by a practitioner, Meredith Lilly who served as Foreign Affairs and International Trade Advisor to Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper. This most important chapter highlights the dialectic between intelligence, and policymakers.

In addition, the collection might only be three years old, but it is already showing its age. At the time of its writing, the broad sweeping changes implemented with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) Act that created an overarching oversight mechanism for the Community was not yet understood. Today, it is recognized that NSIRA increases transparency in the Canadian intelligence community most notably by publishing reviews on topics such as CSIS's threat reduction activities (2021) and interagency collaboration. In addition, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians published its first two annual reports (2019, 2020) that shed light on the intelligence

activities of almost every federal organization covered in the book which would have benefited the collection.

The authors were able to compile and wrestle a remarkable amount of information from the Canadian intelligence community through Access to Information and Privacy requests. This has ensured that not only the aggregate scope of the collection is novel, but also facets of the articles, by incorporating new information. However, as it is invariably the case with works on intelligence, the gap in public knowledge is significant. The editors must be commended for the remarkable cast of scholars they were able to assemble in a field that remains understudied in Canada. Most of them have some form of working knowledge of the Community, bridging the divide between practitioners and academia. This edited collection will remain the standard Canadian intelligence community reference and textbook for the years to come for its depth and unprecedented scope.

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## Notes

- 1 Communications Security Establishment, government of Canada, (2021) *Chief Shelly Bruce's speech for Centre for International Governance Innovation*, May 18, 2021, <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/information-and-resources/chief-shelly-bruces-speech-centre-international-governance-innovation-may>.