

From the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's Research Files:

DIMENSIONS of **MILITARY LEADERSHIP**

Edited by
Allister MacIntyre & Karen D. Davis

VOLUME 1

**DIMENSIONS of
MILITARY LEADERSHIP**

From the Canadian Forces
Leadership Institute's
Research Files:

VOLUME I



DIMENSIONS OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Edited by:

Allister MacIntyre and Karen D. Davis



CANADIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY PRESS

Copyright © 2006 Her Majesty the Queen, as represented by the Minister of National Defence.



Canadian Defence Academy Press
PO Box 17000 Stn Forces
Kingston, Ontario K7K 7B4

Produced for the Canadian Defence Academy Press
by 17 Wing Winnipeg Publishing Office.
WPO30204

Library and Archives Canada Cataloguing in Publication

Dimensions of military leadership / edited by Allister MacIntyre and
Karen D. Davis.

Issued by Canadian Defence Academy.
Includes bibliographical references.

Soft Cover
ISBN 0-662-44030-7
Cat. no.: D2-183/2-2006E

Hard Cover
ISBN 0-662-43964-3
Cat. no.: D2-183/1-2006E

1. Command of troops. 2. Leadership. 3. Canada--Armed Forces.
I. MacIntyre, Allister T. (Allister Tompkins), 1954- II. Davis, Karen D.
(Karen Dianne), 1956- III. Canadian Defence Academy

UB210.D55 2006 355.3'3041 C2006-980233-5

Printed in Canada.

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors of this volume would first and foremost like to express their appreciation to Colonel Bernd Horn, the Director of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, for giving us the necessary support to work with the excellent material in this volume. We thank him for the trust that is implicit in this opportunity.

We would also like to thank each of the authors for their contributions. Their work, of course, makes a volume such as this possible. It has been professionally rewarding to gain knowledge and insight from their analysis and treatment of the issues challenging military leaders.

Many 'invisible' details must also be handled to produce a book. We sincerely appreciate the editing provided by Tracy McDonough. Her response was extremely timely and efficient. In addition, the constructive feedback on earlier versions of some of the chapters provided by Emily Spencer is greatly appreciated.

Finally, and of course not least, the publication of this book would not be possible without the high quality polishing and production provided by Captain Phil Dawes and his staff at 17 Wing Publishing Office in Winnipeg. We thank them for their continued professionalism and expert support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword	i
Preface	iii
Chapter 1	1
Dimensions of Military Leadership: An Introduction and Overview	
<i>Allister MacIntyre and Karen D. Davis</i>	
 PART I: Leadership and Culture	
Chapter 2	21
The Way of the Warrior: A Warrior Ethos for the 21 st Century	
<i>Colin Magee</i>	
Chapter 3	45
The Senior NCO Corps and Professionalism: Where do we stand?	
<i>Allan English</i>	
Chapter 4	81
Adaptive Skills as a Basis for Leadership Success in the Canadian Military With a Special Emphasis on Special Operations	
<i>Steven F. Cronshaw and Damian F. O'Keefe</i>	
 PART II: Changes in the International Security Environment	
Chapter 5	113
Command of Coalition Operations in a Multinational Environment: A Canadian Naval Niche? The Case Study of Operation Apollo.	
<i>Richard H. Gimblett</i>	
Chapter 6	137
The Prominence of Military Intervention to Support Human Rights in Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: <i>The Responsibility to Protect</i> .	
<i>Steve Nolan</i>	

Chapter 7	157
Leadership in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Example of the Israeli Defence Forces <i>Sergio Catignani</i>	

PART III: Leadership and Transformation

Chapter 8	185
Mission Command and <i>Bitsuism</i> in the Israeli Defence Forces: Are They Complementary or Contradictory in Today’s Counter-Insurgency Campaign? <i>Sergio Catignani and Eitan Shamir</i>	

Chapter 9	215
Setting Things Right: Some Lessons from American Reform <i>Kenneth Allard</i>	

Chapter 10	245
An Absence of Honour: Somalia – The Spark That Started the Transformation of the Canadian Forces Officer Corps <i>Bernd Horn</i>	

PART IV: Organizational Approaches to Military Leadership

Chapter 11	283
The Organizational Cultural Approach to Leadership: ‘Social Structures’ – A Tool for Analysis and a Way Ahead <i>Charles Kirke</i>	

Chapter 12	311
Culture, Climate and Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Approaches to Measurement and Analysis <i>Karen D. Davis</i>	

Chapter 13	337
Attitudes and Behaviour: A Primer for Military Leaders <i>Allister MacIntyre</i>	

Contributors	365
--------------------	-----

Glossary	371
----------------	-----

Index	375
-------------	-----

FOREWORD

As always, it gives me great pleasure to introduce yet another scholarly release through CDA Press, a book that focuses on several aspects associated with military leadership. This particular publication is especially significant for two critical reasons. First, it represents the initial volume in what will become a series of collected works on diverse leadership topics and issues. Unlike previous CDA Press publications, the chapters selected for this book, and for the volumes to follow, do not (and will not) share a common theme. In fact, the chapters will continue to be specifically selected for this series because they address issues that are unique and only tangentially related. Although the topics are highly relevant for leaders in the Canadian Forces (CF) they are too finely focused to warrant a full volume with a single theme. Second, this volume demonstrates CDA's continuing commitment to the education and professional development of CF leaders.

This exciting new series, *From the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's Research Files*, will offer the flexibility required to broadcast professionalism and leadership knowledge in a timely and efficient manner. The approach also provides a mechanism to present a range of highly relevant topics under one cover. Taken as a collective whole, the volumes will present a broad body of knowledge throughout the CF. The effort to provide the broadest coverage of critical issues possible has been exerted on behalf of the members of the CF; for they will benefit the most from it. Those who occupy positions of authority will be able to finely tune their leadership skills, while followers throughout the CF will profit from having leaders who are more proficient, more capable, and more attuned to their needs.

Volume 1 of this series contains Canadian, American, and Israeli examples of military leadership. It includes both operational and

FOREWORD

non-operational scenarios. It covers diverse topics such as the way of the warrior, professionalism, human rights, culture, and insights into how a single dishonourable act can have far reaching repercussions. It provides leaders with guidance on how to become more adaptive, how to understand social structures, and the manner in which attitudes can influence behaviour. The volume will no doubt trigger discussions, debates, concurrence, and disbelief. Nevertheless, if it provides CF members with a reason to think critically about these issues, then we will have succeeded in our aim.

Major-General P.R. Hussey
Commander, Canadian Defence Academy

PREFACE

The Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) is proud to release its latest book - *Dimensions of Military Leadership*. This volume is part of our Strategic Leadership Writing Project, which is designed to create a distinct and unique body of Canadian leadership literature and knowledge to assist leaders at all levels in the Canadian Forces (CF) in preparing themselves for operations in a complex security environment, as well as to inform the public in regards to the contribution of CF service personnel to Canadian society and international affairs.

Normally, we target research, authors and material for books on specific topics or issues. However, as part of our normal pursuit of cutting edge concepts, issues and research related to leadership and professionalism, we often come across valuable work that is timely and relevant, but may not fit into one of our established series or volumes. As such, we have created yet another series, *From the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's Research Files*, which takes research papers written by academics, scholars, researchers and military personnel on topics of military leadership or professionalism that would be of interest and value to the profession of arms.

This book represents the first volume in that series. The editors, Lieutenant-Colonel, Dr. Allister MacIntyre and Lieutenant-Commander (retired) Karen Davis have assembled a number of papers that span the entire spectrum of military leadership from the warrior ethos to military culture and behaviour. Collectively, the different articles provide a rich volume of diverse leadership material that will be of great value to readers of all ranks, as well as those outside the military itself.

In closing, I wish to reiterate the importance of this volume and those that will follow in the series. The information contained

PREFACE

therein provides insight, ideas and knowledge that impact leadership and the profession of arms. As such, all military members have a responsibility to ensure they continue to develop professionally through education, training, experience and self-development. As always, we welcome your feedback and comments.

Bernd Horn
Colonel
Director, CFLI

CHAPTER I

Dimensions of Military Leadership: An Introduction and Overview



Allister MacIntyre and Karen D. Davis

As part of its mandate, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) has an ongoing commitment to contribute to the body of knowledge associated with military leadership. The *Strategic Leadership Writing Project* is one example of the approach taken by CFLI to achieve this objective. The project includes diverse book titles like: *From the Outside Looking In: Media and Defence Analyst Perspectives on Canadian Military Leadership*; *In Harm's Way: On the Front Lines of Leadership, Sub-Unit Command on Operations*; *Military Disobedience*; and *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Context and Concepts*. It is easy to discern two aspects of interest from the subject matter explored within these publications. First, each of the volumes has been developed, from the outset, with a unified theme in mind. Second, the themes span a broad array of topics and are not limited to just senior leadership or viewpoints that are limited to authors selected from within the military family.

This volume, *From the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's Research Files*, represents a dramatic departure from the approach that has been adopted by CFLI for the *Strategic Leadership Writing Project*. The genesis for this book stems from a recognition within the institute that topics will periodically arise that are highly relevant to military leaders, yet more limited in scope. As such, these topics are not likely to be released with

CHAPTER I

full book coverage and devotion to a single theme. Nevertheless, because the topics are germane, and associated with military leadership, CFLI remains motivated to ensure that the information is disseminated. Hence, it becomes easy to appreciate the rationale for the *Volume 1* annotation that has been included on this publication. There is every reason to expect that, as CFLI continues to identify topics of interest, future volumes in the *From the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's Research Files* series will be forthcoming. The *Dimensions of Military Leadership* subtitle has been included to reflect the content of *Volume 1*. Future editions will include unique subtitles to capture the essence of the particular volumes.

Despite the fact that a number of different topics are addressed, there are some unifying sub-themes within this book. In addition to this introduction, there are twelve distinct chapters. The chapters have been grouped into four parts, with each one containing three papers on a common theme. In reality, there are numerous themes threading their way throughout this volume. For example, the first theme, *Leadership and Culture*, could arguably have been used to link together every chapter in this publication. After all, leadership and culture are two concepts that are important at every level within an organization. A similar argument could be made for each of the other themes appearing in this book. An effort has been made to identify the chapters that best highlight the themes selected for each part of the volume. The second theme, *Changes in the International Security Environment*, explores issues associated with military leadership at an international/coalition level. The third theme, *Leadership and Transformation*, examines the role that leaders can play as agent in a transformational process. The final theme, *Organizational Approaches to Military Leadership*, delves into the social scientific approaches of leadership as it is exercised within organizations.

Within Part I, the authors all address issues that are associated with leadership and culture. For example, the cultural aspects

related to professionalism and the Senior NCO Corps are examined in detail. The ideas expressed in Part I include broad, pervasive, and prevailing historical military cultural characteristics, as evidenced by the exploration of warrior ethos, as well as more narrowly defined, unique, and specialized sub-group cultures such as the use of adaptive skills for leadership success in special operations.

In the first chapter of Part I, *Leadership and Culture*, Colin Magee examines the “warrior ethos.” He explores what the term “warrior” means and examines whether this construct is useful for today’s military. He starts his exploration by stressing the importance of first gaining an understanding of what the term warrior means and secondly by digging even deeper to appreciate what ‘being a warrior’ means. According to Magee, the modern interpretation of the term warrior has been expanded to encompass more than just fighters in the conventional sense. In his opinion, the term warrior is no longer reserved for those who fight, but has expanded into the business world. Furthermore, he argues that the term is becoming so accepted as commonplace as a means to empower an individual to overcome obstacles that it is almost meaningless in its traditional form. As a consequence of this shift in how the term is applied, Magee acknowledges that the validity of the warrior ethos, what it means to be a warrior, in the modern military continues to be questioned.

Following a comprehensive investigation, Magee concludes that, by definition, a warrior is a fighter, and a person of action, a specialist in meeting and resolving conflict and challenge. He also concedes that being a warrior means more than just saving lives. It even means more than dying with honour. It means living with honour as well. It is a state of mind. This heroic version of a warrior is not unlike the conventional view of a warrior as a skilled fighter with a noble cause.

Magee presents the warrior ethos as a concept that has developed over time, and he incorporates a view that encompasses the values

CHAPTER I

of the culture and society from which the warrior originates and serves as a protector. He contends that the 21st Century warrior ethos contains both physical and mental aspects. The warrior must possess the physical skills to protect society and must be fit enough to operate for extended periods and overcome the stress and strain of the modern battle space. The warrior must also be mentally robust and possess the capacity to kill. Magee reasons that the emotional ability to kill another human as being essential if the warriors are to fulfill their duty to society and to fellow warriors. In his concluding comments, Magee suggests that the idea of duty or service to others, in combination with a high level of moral integrity, will ensure that warriors will use their martial skills for the benefit of society rather than against it.

The next chapter, by Allan English, tackles the theme of professionalism and the senior non-commissioned officer (NCO). He argues that the status of non-commissioned members (NCM) in the CF has increasingly been questioned as roles of officers and NCMs have changed within the military. Additionally, changes in Canadian social demographics have contributed to higher levels of education levels among NCMs with a result that, in some cases, they are as well educated as officers. He highlights the fact that *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* has incorporated into doctrine the recognition that all regular force members of the CF, regardless of rank, are members of the profession of arms.

Despite this acknowledgment of professional status, English points out that *Duty with Honour* recognizes a distinction between officers and NCMs based on how responsibilities and expertise are distributed between the officer and NCO corps. In the manual, officers are presented as being in possession of knowledge of a more general nature. In particular, this knowledge is applied to marshal forces and direct their employment. Conversely, NCMs are said to apply specific expertise in the accomplishment of explicit tasks. As a consequence, commissioned officers come to identify themselves as potential

commanders and leaders while NCMs are viewed as being more focused on effectively and efficiently accomplishing tasks and as being concerned with the welfare of their subordinates.

As part of the discussion, English examines the nature of military professionalism in the Canadian context and focuses on the professional status of the senior NCO corps now and in the future. He concludes that a new model of military professionalism is required to accommodate the context in which NCMs operate currently and will operate in the future within the Canadian profession of arms. He also calls for a re-examination of the doctrinal manual *Duty With Honour*. While he presents *Duty with Honour* as a very useful articulation of the nature of the profession of arms in Canada, he feels that its reliance on classic works to describe the concept of military professionalism has perpetuated the limitations in these works. English views the main limitations as being the use of Anglo-American concepts of professionalism and concepts of professionalism derived from other countries' historical experience, particularly the American experience. He contends that the different Canadian historical experience, the recent dramatic changes in the nature of professionalism, and the distinct role of NCOs in the CF all point to the notion that a new conceptual model needs to be developed to properly explain the role of the Senior NCO Corps in the CF in the context of professionalism. In his opinion, it will be then, and only then, that the CF is able to clearly understand the role of its Senior NCO Corps now and in the future.

In the final chapter within Part 1, Steven Cronshaw and Damian O'Keefe contend that Special Operations Forces (SOF) leadership, or leadership in any context, is built on a scaffolding of adaptive skills. Their chapter presents a definition of adaptive skills and shows how these skills can be measured. They also demonstrate that adaptive skills are directly analogous to broader conceptions of CF unit effectiveness, particularly as described by Quinn's competing values model of organizational effectiveness. This approach is consistent with recent CF doctrinal publications on leadership.

CHAPTER I

The authors present Adaptive Skills Modeling (ASM) as an approach that should be effective for SOF leaders. The ASM contains three components that are oppositional in nature yet held in balance by the adaptive individual. The first ASM component is the *Locus* of the CF members' involvements in their role as it contributes to mission success (these aspects include physical, informational, and social elements). The second ASM component is inward- versus outward-directed *Focus* and the third component is agentic versus accommodative *Purpose*. People can respond to situations in either an *agentic* (i.e., striving and achieving in the work situations) or *accommodative* (i.e., being open to the experience of others as well as to the immediacy of prevailing environmental conditions) manner.

The authors explain that the ASM does not ask leaders to choose between transformational and transactional styles of leadership. Either approach can be effective, depending upon the situation and the followers. Even coercive leadership may be appropriate under some circumstances in SOF operations. They claim that the stereotyping of a leader as being either transformational or transactional, or as having a particular personality, is not a useful strategy for the Canadian military. In their approach, the critical element is whether soldiers can lead and take the necessary actions as demanded by circumstances.

Cronshaw and O'Keefe assert that true leadership is probably a rare commodity, achieved by relatively few individuals even under the most favorable conditions of life and occupational experience. It will be rare to find, and difficult to develop. Individuals who can constructively assert the full range of adaptive skills required for leadership across all possible SOF operational involvements are needed. The promise and optimism of current leadership theories and measurements need to be tempered with the reality of leadership as a skill that is exceedingly difficult to acquire and master.

Part II, *Changes in the International Security Environment*, brings together three disparate yet connected themes. Each chapter addresses an approach that has been developed to enhance the effectiveness of military intervention within the context of a changing security environment. Whether strategic or tactical, planned or spontaneous, the authors raise questions related to the potential positive and negative aspects of response to change. The leadership challenges explored include the cultural suitability of Canadian naval officers to command international operations, the potential impact of United Nations doctrine contained in *The Responsibility to Protect* document, and the adaptability of junior officers in the Israeli Defence Force during increasingly frequent low intensity conflict scenarios.

In the first chapter, Richard Gimblett presents an assessment of the Canadian naval involvement in Operation Apollo. From December 2001, until the end of October 2003, senior Canadian naval officers exercised the unique responsibility of commanding a multinational coalition fleet gathered in the Arabian Sea. Operation Apollo was part of the initial stages of what has become an on-going war against terrorism.

Gimblett asserts that it may never be possible to completely determine the military effectiveness of this particular operation, because none of the coalition ships under Canadian protection were attacked. Furthermore, the Coalition fleets apprehended fewer than a half-dozen suspected members of Al-Qaeda. He adds that the Canadian naval success in Operation Apollo has gone generally un-remarked and remains poorly understood even amongst credible defence analysts.

Nevertheless, he contends that Operation Apollo stands as a remarkable achievement in another respect. Specifically, for an extended period Canadian naval commanders exercised a most efficient coordination of the at-sea employment of a range of surface, air and sub-surface forces from a disparate collection of navies. Some of the navies were not typical allies and a great

CHAPTER I

many were from very different cultural backgrounds. Gimblett does cite at least one recent study that points to Operation Apollo as providing the grounds for a recognition of what could be termed a Canadian naval command style.

Gimblett's chapter offers a deep exploration of the nature of the Canadian Navy's coalition command role. He argues that a useful model for understanding this role is the unifying framework of the environment-technology-culture triad, where the three factors of environment, technology, and culture are taken to be the most important factors that impact on naval command styles.

The author presents the appointment as Warfare Commander for the Arabian Sea theatre of operations, Commander Task Force 151(CTF 151), as being the first true exercise of operational-level command by a senior Canadian officer since the Second World War. Plus, the Canadian naval command presented a non-threatening compromise option that was critical for maintaining the integrity of the coalition. The various elements of the environment-technology-culture triad came together to great effect for the Canadian Navy with the dispatch of a naval task group to the Arabian Sea in the fall of 2001.

Gimblett argues that the key to success was effective employment of networked links with the USN, for which the prerequisites were access to the American communications channels and possession of SATCOM to ensure reliable connectivity. He concludes that the coalition command role exercised by the Navy was a great success, and a useful model for understanding its nature is the unifying framework of the environment-technology-culture triad.

The subsequent chapter in Part II, by Steve Nolan, provides an analysis of the 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the *Responsibility to Protect*. Beginning with the premise that the *Responsibility to Protect* seeks to avoid an increase in interventions by stressing that the international community must develop better predictive

abilities, thus allowing corrective action to be initiated sooner, he contends that this policy will be very difficult to implement. The current predictive capabilities, he argues, are weak, and there is no impetus for the international community to dedicate any more resources towards these capabilities. Further, countries targeted for predictive assets and inspection would not likely allow their sovereignty to be breached let alone the international community's lack of resolve to breach a country's sovereignty on the suspicion of impropriety.

Nolan asserts that once a human rights transgression is detected, *Responsibility to Protect* offers a prescription for their prevention; however, implementation of *Responsibility to Protect* will most likely cause more discord in international relations than it seeks to correct. In fact, *Responsibility to Protect* allows regional actors to intervene if it is felt that the United Nations is not acting fast enough. As the number of scenarios that warrant interventions increase, Nolan argues that there is a greater possibility that more interventions will occur. Finally, the implicit return to an imperialist type of occupation, one that initially sets out to alleviate human suffering, but is then required to set up governance structures and help the targeted country to develop and support itself, will mean an extension of military intervention and occupation, and an obvious expansion of the original mandate. These prescriptive aspects of *Responsibility to Protect* need to be expanded upon prior to implementation.

Taking these factors into account, Nolan argues that it is clear that Canadian foreign policy, which supports military intervention on the basis of stopping human rights abuses through the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine, skews the issue of military intervention from a force of last resort to a force of choice.

In the concluding chapter in Part II, Sergio Catignani presents a case study analysis of the leadership challenges faced by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in low-intensity conflict operations since the late 1980s. He uses the term low-intensity conflict to cover a wide

CHAPTER I

gamut of scenarios, including insurgency and counter-insurgency, terrorism and counter-terrorism and peace enforcement, which are situated on the higher end of the spectrum of low-intensity violence. Peacekeeping and humanitarian aid and disaster relief operations are located on the lower end of the spectrum of low-intensity violence. The salient point about low-intensity conflicts is that they fall short of all-out, high-intensity war.

Given the fact that the IDF have been involved extensively in low intensity conflict, Catignani uses the case study of the IDF in order to highlight the leadership challenges that military organizations face whilst conducting such operations. He also argues that the IDF case study is appropriate, because the IDF, overall, has been able to cope remarkably well with the difficulties, dilemmas and uncertainties stemming from the ongoing low-intensity conflict with Palestinian insurgents since the late 1980s. He attributes this success to the IDF's well-developed and exceptional junior officer leadership cadre.

Far from being perfect or from having resolved the conflict altogether, the IDF's conduct, particularly at the lower levels of command, has stabilized a conflict that is not only very politically sensitive, but also morally ambiguous. The fact that IDF soldiers and their leaders are able to carry out their mission with professionalism and zeal despite such difficult circumstances attests to the reality that small-unit leadership in the IDF plays a great part in maintaining high levels of motivation and professionalism and in pursuing mission success after all.

Part III of the volume addresses the various roles that leaders play in influencing change associated with organizational transformation. For example, the Israeli experience demonstrates the potential challenge in adapting to increasing frequency of low intensity conflict given the historically pervasive influence of *bitsuism* on cultural approaches to tactical leadership. The relationship between tactical blunders and organizational strategy is further demonstrated in discussions of the United

States (US) experience with indiscipline and the watershed Canadian incident during operations in Somalia in 1993.

In the initial chapter of Part III, Leadership and Transformation, Eitan Shamir and Sergio Catignani explore whether or not the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have been successful in integrating and applying the operational principle of mission command to its doctrine and style of command since its establishment. In particular, they examine if command has been employed effectively by the IDF during its involvement in the low-intensity conflict (LIC) scenarios of the first and *Al Aqsa Intifadas*. Taking into account the IDF's major cultural ethos of *bitsuism* (performance-oriented initiative), the discussion considers if its organizational culture of hyper-activism within combat command echelons has either strengthened or weakened its ability to fully apply the principle of mission command when fighting wars or conducting low-intensity operations.

The discussion explains how the IDF, since the first *Intifada*, tried to re-institute the mission command principle and *bitsuist* cultural norm within its ranks given the extreme complexity the IDF had found itself faced with during that period of conflict. Although the IDF has made significant reforms in order to encourage the full understanding and implementation of mission command principles among its ranks and despite the fact that certain missions have displayed positive evidence of certain units' adherence to such principles, the complexities imposed by the LIC environment continue to challenge the ability of the IDF to fully implement the principles of mission command on a daily basis.

In the following chapter, Kenneth Allard provides a timely discussion, given recent imperatives of military transformation, on how military organizations might deal with the age-old problem of indiscipline among military personnel. He relies on the recent experiences of the United States (US) Army, including some of his personal experiences, to provide insight into this challenge. Even the well-intentioned, Allard notes, are not immune to becoming

CHAPTER I

part of the problem, as incidents of exploitation and even abuse in various UN peacekeeping contingents have demonstrated. Such incidents are a timely reminder of why a fresh look at potential sources of indiscipline is always a wise move.

Allard opens his discussion with a reminder that soldiers in the armies of Western democratic nations are free. While such soldiers can be unruly, they also have a hidden advantage that makes all the difference. Citing Victor Davis Hanson, this difference is summarized as freedom of action, improvisation, spontaneous action, and audit by peers. Precisely because free speech and open debate are the essence of this politico-military tradition, Hanson points out that they are also integral to the collective wisdom that is the cornerstone of command itself. Hanson, notes Allard, prompts us to remember how powerful the idea of freedom really is. Noting that most discussions of transformation tend to focus on technology or on how one might rearrange traditional military structures, Allard asserts that there are ample reasons to focus on the more fundamental issue of how these things actually affect the behavior of soldiers in the field.

Allard concludes that while the investigation of 'indiscipline' is often guided by probing questions related to the sources of disobedience, the American Army found from their own experience that they could not solve this problem in isolation from the other factors outlined throughout his chapter - that to address disobedience, they had to aim much higher, and to deal with the basics of values, vision, means, training and leader development.

In the concluding chapter of Part III, Bernd Horn offers an analysis of the CF response to the 'Somalia affair' - the beating and torture of a 16-year-old Somali teenager, resulting in death, at the hands of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt) in Somalia in 1993. Noting the subsequent attempts to cover up this heinous act, by both unit personnel and later mandarins in the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa, Horn describes how this incident, and in particular the response of

senior CF leadership in its aftermath, drove the reputation of the CF and its leadership to a historic low ebb. The Somalia incident and the ineffective response of leadership, he asserts, showcased a fundamental flaw in the Canadian officer corps' understanding of leadership, professionalism and the military ethos. As such, he describes Somalia as the catalyst for the start of the transformation of the Canadian Officer Corps.

In the face of change, Horn asserts that the CF was caught off guard. In the early 1990s, the chaos that erupted with the collapse of the Cold War era soon engulfed Western nations, including Canada. The new environment was ambiguous, complex, volatile, constantly changing, and dangerous in an immediate way not experienced by many during the Cold War. Officers, senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers trained in the Cold War model of conventional forces against a predictable and templated enemy were frequently unprepared for belligerents that were more often than not loose rag-tag armies led by warlords, para-military groups or criminals.

The historical experience of the Cdn AB Regt, Horn argues, contributes to our understanding of how the events in Somalia could happen as well as why the CF leadership response proved to be overwhelmingly ineffective. The Cdn AB Regt paratroopers, who for the greatest part of their existence represented the best of the nation's warriors, were largely disliked within the military and virtually ignored in civilian circles, at least until the horrific killing in Somalia in 1993. The Canadian attitude to airborne forces, according to Horn, has always been schizophrenic and driven by political purpose rather than by doctrine and operational necessity.

The chapter provides a presentation and analysis of events leading up to and following the Somalia crisis, providing a persuasive claim that the demands of a changing security environment, a bankrupt professional officer corps, and the 'roller coaster existence' of the Cdn AB Regt since its formation as a

CHAPTER I

Canadian parachute battalion in 1942, ultimately led to the conditions that allowed the killing to occur, as well as the ultimate demise of the Cdn AB Regt itself.

The final portion of this volume, Part IV, *Organizational Approaches to Military Leadership*, captures a variety of ways in which the behavioural sciences can play an effective role in influencing military leadership and performance. The common theme that binds these chapters together is the notion that leadership issues can be addressed with guidance from the social scientific disciplines of anthropology, sociology, and psychology. To illustrate, anthropology provides a mechanism for understanding social structures in military units, sociology offers illumination with respect to appreciating the influences associated with culture and climate, and psychology helps leaders to appreciate how they can have an impact on the attitudes held by others and how these attitudes, in turn, can play a significant role in how people think, feel, and behave.

In the opening chapter, Charles Kirke, a military anthropologist, introduces a new way to approach the subject of leadership in the setting of a military unit. He provides a novel means of describing and analyzing the exercise of leadership at regimental duty through the use of social anthropological techniques. He indicates that the initial attempt to create such a model of social structure in British combat arms units was difficult because people behaved differently in different contexts. By way of example, he presents the case of officers on first name terms in the context of the officers' mess, followed moments later by interactions where they would stand stiffly to attention and call each other by rank.

In his model, Kirke presents the *formal command structure*, as the mechanism whereby a soldier at the bottom receives orders from the person at the top. It is embedded in the hierarchy of rank, formal arrangements, contains the mechanisms for the enforcement of discipline, and provides the framework for official

responsibility. The *informal structure* incorporates the unwritten conventions of behaviour in the absence of formal constraints, and includes behaviour off-duty and in relaxed duty contexts. The *loyalty/identity structure* is a nested series of different sized groups which are defined by opposition to and contrast with other groups of equal status in the *formal command structure*. The *functional structure*, includes attitudes, feelings and expectations connected with being a soldier and properly carrying out soldier-like activities. Where groups are formed to carry out such activity, they might exactly reflect the *formal command structure* or they might be independent of it.

Kirke's model emphasizes the importance that must be placed on the consideration of the balance between these *social structures*. He argues that it is self-evident that if the members of the unit are encouraged to put one of them before all else then their military life becomes impoverished in some way. He reports his research findings as demonstrating one consistent result. If units regularly exercised the conventions of all four *social structures*, in whatever balance was felt to be appropriate by its members to the context it was in, then it was likely that the units would have high morale and military efficiency.

In the subsequent chapter, Karen Davis explores the relationship between culture, climate and leadership in the CF with a particular focus on the experience of the CF in trying to understand culture and climate through research and measurement. In the case of culture, the review reaches back to 1967, with a particular focus on a study of values and attitudes in the army in 1979 and projects undertaken or initiated since 1997. Climate research in the CF is traced from a 1988 proposal to measure the human dimensions of combat readiness to the current Human Dimensions of Operations survey, which is administered to soldiers deployed in operational theatres.

Typically, culture has been understood as the more enduring and stable aspects of an organization, while climate is often viewed as

CHAPTER I

the more volatile characteristics. However, climate measures monitored across different contexts and over time have the potential to inform our understanding and awareness of integrated and enduring characteristics of CF culture. Within the context of transformation and the emphasis on joint CF approaches to operations, it will be increasingly important to develop ways to increase understanding of unique CF sub-cultures, make relevant comparisons across CF sub-cultures, and understand how various aspects of culture become embedded within various sub-cultures, as well as across the institution.

Davis concludes that there is clearly room to continue pursuing culture and climate research from unique *and* integrated perspectives using various methodological approaches in seeking greater understanding of the relationships between CF climate, culture, leadership and the five components of institutional effectiveness – ethos, mission success, internal integration, external adaptability, and member well-being and commitment. There is still an overwhelming amount that we do not understand. Regardless of approach, the implications for leadership, leader development and the assumed relationship between leadership and the phenomenon under investigation should be carefully considered.

In the final chapter of Part IV, Allister MacIntyre presents an overview of current attitude theories and provides some explanations for how attitudes can influence behaviour. He focuses on the tripartite model of attitudes, with attitudes being conceived as having three components. These are a cognitive component (everything we know or believe to be true about an attitude object), an affective component (how we feel in the presence of the attitude object), and a behavioural component (the way in which the attitude object makes us want to behave).

MacIntyre explains that our attitudes are nothing more than the subjective experience of our likes and dislikes, our passions and disgust, our obsessions and loathing, our attractions and aversions. In fact, we all possess an unlimited number of

attitudes about virtually every person, place, and thing we encounter during our lives. He argues that leaders must be aware that their own behaviours, as well as the behaviours of their followers, will be influenced by these attitudes. He also contends that even though attitudes are important, they are not the sole determinants of behaviour, and they need not be viewed in a negative manner.

For example, our attitudes enhance our ability to make sense of the world, allow us to express our values, ensure that we maintain effective relationships with those who share similar attitudes, and help to guide our behaviour. Because these purposes can be classified as functions, MacIntyre considers it to be crucial that leaders understand the functional approach to attitudes. It has long been recognized that attitudes are not functionally alike, and they have been extensively studied in the context of the functions they serve. Furthermore, the ability to change an attitude largely depends upon the function the attitude serves.

This chapter covers numerous additional aspects of attitudes and behaviour including: attitude formation, attitude importance, the contact hypothesis, group conflict and cooperation, educational approaches to attitude change, cognitive dissonance, social norms, and stereotypes (the cognitive component of an attitude).

MacIntyre concludes with a message for CF leaders. He asserts that they must first accept that attitudes and stereotypes will exist, no matter what they do to try to change this reality. Their own attitudes will influence their behavioural intentions, and their followers will be similarly swayed by these mostly subconscious drives. Leaders will be able to influence attitudes, but their success in this regard will be obstructed things like by the strength of the attitude, the functions served by the attitudes, and the knowledge/beliefs associated with the attitude object.

In sum, the thirteen chapters in this volume will provide leaders, and prospective leaders, with insights, guidance, and an awareness

CHAPTER I

of how they can function more effectively in their leadership roles. The contents, taken as a whole, provides the reader with a better understanding of the human dynamic at the individual and group level and a span of coverage that stretches from the unit, to national, and international levels.

PART I

Leadership and Culture

CHAPTER 2

The Way of the Warrior: A Warrior Ethos for the 21st Century



Colin Magee

As militaries transform to deal with the new threats that have emerged in the contemporary operating environment, the impact of this transformation affects more than just equipment but has implications for all elements of force design.¹ One aspect of this transformation, that has yet to fully articulated or explored, is the transformation, or perhaps better stated the retransformation, of soldier to warrior.² As Captain Thomas St. Denis points out, “no one serving today in the armies of Canada or the United States is any longer just a soldier. Increasingly, he or she is a warrior.” The difficulty with making such a transformation is not, as St. Denis suggests, the fact that “the warrior model bears no relation to any real warrior of any society at anytime”³ and therefore is of little use in defining modern soldiers; rather it is that there is a lack of clear definition of, and hence a lack of understanding of, the term ‘warrior’. A review of extant Canadian Forces and Army doctrinal publications reveals a desire to reintegrate ‘warrior ethos’ into the Canadian Military lexicon; however, current doctrine not only fails to embrace the term, it fails to articulate what it means to the members of the Canadian Forces.⁴

This lack of focus causes one to ask what the term ‘warrior’ means and, as a result, explore whether this construct is useful for today’s military. In order to answer this question, it is necessary

CHAPTER 2

to examine what is meant by the term ‘warrior’ and perhaps more importantly what ‘being a warrior’ means. Using historical examples, this paper will first examine what the term ‘warrior’ means, and from that, develop a synthesis of what it means to be a warrior, from which it will define an outline warrior ethos.

There is a human fascination with the term ‘warrior’ and with war itself. This appeal can be seen in current over usage of the term. Today, the term ‘warrior’ is no longer reserved for those who fight, but has expanded into the business world. In fact, the term is becoming so commonplace as a means to empower an individual to overcome obstacles that it is almost meaningless in its traditional form. At the same time the validity of the warrior ethos, what it means to be a warrior, in the modern military continues to be questioned.

For many, the warrior is viewed as a heroic and chivalrous figure, whose main role is that of defender of his society⁵. For others, the warrior is seen as interested only in his own glory and that of his caste; concerning himself only with the values of society because they reflected his own values, or more cynically because the warrior needs society, and war between societies, to survive. Yet, for others, the warrior is simply a necessary evil that needs to be controlled. Jack Nicholson’s role as Marine Colonel Nathan Jessep in *A Few Good Men* helps to demonstrate this perspective when in the finale of the movie he addresses the court about the “code red” stating

Son, we live in a world that has walls, and those walls have to be guarded by men with guns. Who’s gonna do it? You? You, Lieutenant Weinberg? I have a greater responsibility than you can *possibly* fathom. You weep for Santiago, and you curse the Marines. You have that luxury. You have the luxury of not knowing what I know -- that Santiago’s death, while tragic, probably saved lives; and my existence, while grotesque and incomprehensible to you, saves lives. You don’t want the truth because deep

down in places you don't talk about at parties, you want me on that wall -- you *need* me on that wall. We use words like "honour," "code," "loyalty." We use these words as the backbone of a life spent defending something. You use them as a punch line. I have neither the time nor the inclination to explain myself to a man who rises and sleeps under the blanket of the very freedom that I provide and then questions the manner in which I provide it. I would rather that you just said "thank you" and went on your way. Otherwise, I suggest you pick up a weapon and stand the post. Either way, I don't give a *damn* what you think you're entitled to!⁶

This statement provides one view of what it means to be a warrior and allows a glimpse into the essential elements of the warrior ethos. However, this paper will show that, while Hollywood has got many of the main elements correct, this is actually a portrayal of a misguided application of the warrior ethos.

The *Oxford Dictionary* defines a warrior as "1. a person experienced or distinguished in fighting. 2. a fighting man, esp. of primitive peoples."⁷ The *American Webster Dictionary* defines warrior as "a man engaged or experienced in warfare; broadly: a person engaged in some struggle or conflict."⁸ Of note is the expansion of the term to include a person engaged in a struggle or conflict, which provides a wider perspective of what a warrior is, as it introduces the notion of cause into the warrior ethos. This idea of cause is an important element in today's warrior and will be explored later. Mike Straw, writing for an American Self-Defence website, states that a Roman General, Hericletus, defined a warrior as more than simply a fighter, he expands on the basic idea, suggesting a warrior is something more. In describing a 'typical century' he suggested that, "of every one hundred men, ten shouldn't even be there, eighty are nothing but targets, nine are real fighters... We are lucky to have them... They make the battle. Ah, but the one, one of them is a Warrior... and he will bring the others back."⁹ Thus a warrior is by definition a

CHAPTER 2

fighter, a man of action, a specialist in meeting and resolving conflict and challenge.¹⁰

Most of the literature surrounding the history of the warrior divides warriors into categories that relate to either timeframe or location. This paper will use six of the major categories – the primitive warrior, the Greek (classical) warrior, the Roman warrior, the Viking/Celtic Warrior, the English Knight, and modern day, in order to provide a common frame of reference with the current literature, while attempting to present the information in logical categories.¹¹ By examining these historical examples of warriors, it is possible to develop a list of desired characteristics that is useful in building a consensus of what it means to be a warrior or of those elements that make up the code of the warrior. Such a synthesis will then be used in order to develop an ethos for the modern warrior.

For many, there is a connection between the warrior and the hunter in that those traits necessary to be a successful hunter are needed to be a successful warrior. William James states that the best qualities of the hunter “ alertness, the skilful use of weapons, courage, endurance, loyalty to the band, the willingness to take risks, to be alone, to wait in silence – foreshadow the best virtues of the warrior.”¹² In fact, most authors draw a direct linkage between the hunting class and that of the warrior class, stating that the warrior caste evolved from the hunter as a natural progression. Though she agrees that pre-civilized warfare was predominantly a rough male sport for underemployed hunters, Barbara Ehrenreich dismisses the ‘hunter turned warrior theory’ as an oversimplification, offering instead the view of early humans as the hunted, not the noble hunter/predator that many suggest. She suggests that it was the “terror inspired by the devouring beast” that lies at the source of the human habit of socializing violence and in doing so offers the “defence hypotheses.”¹³ Ehrenreich argues that the early male role in combat was not with other men but with animal predators and suggests that males deployed in a manner similar to modern day baboons;

to guard the periphery of the main group.¹⁴ In this role, the early human males would have defended against, or at least warned the group of, predators. Given the fact that early humans were more likely to be prey, the periphery guards would have been killed in defence of the main group. This can be seen today, where there are examples of male baboons sacrificing themselves in defence of the group. She suggests that humans sacralized the act of killing or in the beginning being killed, surrounded it with ritual and awe in order to overcome the chaos, grief, depression, and helplessness experienced by the prey. Thus to sacrifice oneself in the defence of the group was considered as an honourable act.¹⁵ In short, it was man's way of dealing with the horror of random victimization. She also argues that the one sure means of overcoming the experiences of being prey was to assume the stance of predator, thus overtime humans transformed from prey to predator. The idea of the weak rising up against the strong is reflected in the cultural heroes of early legends, all of whom are hunters and destroyers of wild beasts. As she points out, there is "enormous prestige attached to the man who could defend his community against the incursion of predatory animals."¹⁶ The identification of the warrior with predator is so nearly universal that Rick Fields argues we may reasonably characterize it as archetypal.¹⁷ Anthropologist Walter Goldschmidt states that the creation of the warrior was neither easy nor natural. He suggests, "if society is to have the advantages of having military personnel, the motivations for warriorhood must be established. It is a matter of great significance that these must be created."¹⁸ Ehrenreich agrees, arguing that there is no need for a basic warlike instinct, as once other groups adopted war; it must by necessity be adopted by all.¹⁹ Based on man's experience as prey and the transformation to predator, humans recognized that creatures that do not fight back mark themselves as prey, therefore as man replaced beasts as predators, the defensive role originally assigned to the hunter-warrior to protect the tribe against wild beasts is transformed into defending against other men, the new predators – other warriors. Keegan and Holmes agree, arguing that the warrior was born of a need to protect

CHAPTER 2

family, territory and possessions against greed and envy of neighbours.²⁰ But Fields warns us that “the fully initiated warrior was also the fully metamorphosed warrior. He had entered an altered or extraordinary state of consciousness, which freed him from the inhibitions (or fear or reluctance) against killing another human being. He underwent a radical change of behaviour....he ceased to be a man, he was the carnivore itself...he had cast off all humanity; in short, he no longer felt bound by the laws and customs of men.”²¹ The transformation from prey to predator, from *homo sapiens* to *homo furens*, required that a safety valve be established to protect society from those designated as society’s protectors. Thus, a code or ethos of the warrior was needed in order to help protect society from the hunter who had become another potential predator – warrior. Fields points out “in most societies, warriors have taken this role quite literally. They seek out battle; fighting is what gives meaning to their lives. In other societies, battle is only a last resort, something to be engaged in only after all other means of resolving conflict have been exhausted.” Notwithstanding the differing views, what is interesting is that the “the figure of the warrior is truly cross-cultural.”²² Based on her research of primitive warrior cultures, Ehrenreich identifies a number of basic tenets of warriorhood. Given the relationship she draws between hunters and warriors, it is not surprising that many of the traits echo those identified by Field as necessary to be a successful hunter – respect for courage, a willingness to stand by one’s comrades no matter what, and a bold indifference to death.²³ As can be seen, the traits desired in a primitive warrior are remarkably similar to those desired in a hunter; skill at arms, a high level of fitness, discipline, loyalty, physical courage, and the protection of the band.

But there is more to being a warrior than killing and martial prowess. The traits found in the classical warrior expand upon those found in the primitive warrior. Plato’s Republic is seen as the depiction of the ideal state; yet even this state was defended by “Guardians,” a warrior class whose members were defined by

spiritedness.²⁴ The differences between the classical and primitive warrior are perhaps best found in *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*. In *The Iliad*, the reader is introduced to two types of warrior. First is Ajax, the more traditional warrior who, like the primitive warrior, is honoured for his sheer fighting abilities. The second can be found in that of Hector and Odysseus. These two literary figures represent a new breed of intelligent warrior; one that has a family he loves and a full life beyond war.²⁵ This is in stark contrast to Ajax who cannot find meaning beyond that of war. This contrast between the two types of classical warriors is useful for framing the desired qualities of modern day warriors, especially in a volunteer force that is augmented by part-time (reserve soldiers), in that it highlights the fact that there are two aspects to the warrior – one as the defender and one as an active part of the society that he is defending, thereby linking the values of the warrior to that of his society. The seventh century Spartan poet Tyrtaeus exhorted the citizen-warrior to defend the city-state to which he owed all the advantages of being free. In the time of the city-states, power shifted from warrior-kings to the free land-owning citizens of the polis. During this period, there is a move away from individual glory, “the hoplites fought for their city and not only for their honor.”²⁶ It is here that we see not only the idea of sacrifice for the group, but the concept of service is introduced into the warrior ethos. Overtime, the classical warrior, like his society, evolved and, like his society, his values changed. The traits desired in a classical warrior include those needed in the primitive warrior, but add the idea of service. Of note with the addition of service to the city-state, the idea of protecting the weak is implied though not clearly articulated.

According to French, stoicism offered an ideal code for the Roman warrior. Marcus Tullius Cicero’s essays emphasize that one can choose to exhibit nobility of character by always doing one’s moral duty.²⁷ “Stoicism insists on just and virtuous dealing, self-discipline, unflinching fortitude and complete freedom from the storms of passion”²⁸ all of which help to describe the ideal Roman legionnaire and reinforce the idea of virtue and moral

CHAPTER 2

duty, thus introducing the notion of right (just) cause into the warrior ethos of the Roman Empire.

Unlike the stereotypical picture of bloodthirsty horned barbarians, Viking and Celtic heroes had a number of traits similar to those found in Odysseus. More than just a martial focus, they became distinguished because of other skills. Good sense, a talent for persuasive speech, an understanding of law and custom, and honesty were all traits found in a number of Viking heroes.²⁹ The warrior-king was not only a strong man; he was also foremost a servant of the gods from who kingship descended. As a servant of the gods, it was expected that the warrior-king would care for and protect both the city and its citizens. Thus, there was more than simply martial prowess expected, and indeed needed, in a warrior-king because it was “his [warrior-king] duty to ‘wage peace’. It was his duty to protect the city from internal danger...to protect the weak – particularly orphans and widows – against the strong.”³⁰ It is here that we see the reintroduction of protecting the weak into the warrior ethos, though it needs to be emphasised that this protection did not extend to the weak outside of the specific band, tribe or alliance. Nonetheless, the Viking warrior, as described through the desired traits of the warrior-king, continues the evolution of the warrior by expanding the notion of service.

The concept of service and duty can also be seen in the English warrior. In addition to his duties as a warrior, the English warrior, generally defined as the knight, was a key element of society and as such was bound by obligations. “The chivalric code arose from the stratified feudal society in which all the members of the same rank, the fighting nobility, monopolized the most powerful weapons, and all recognized and honoured the same code.”³¹ These warriors were expected to defend both farmers and rulers against aggression and force. In return, the knight was given land from which he derived his wealth. The code of knightly behaviour was in reality a code of public service with a responsibility to keep the peace with clear political and judicial

implications.³² In fact, the English word ‘knight’ is derived from an Anglo-Saxon word which first meant “servant” and then evolved to mean “armed servant.”³³ While knights fought individually, they did so as a collective for a greater or higher whole. But it is King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table who reflect the essence of what it was to be a knight. This story, along with the code of chivalry, was more than abstract correctness; it was instructional as it articulated what was expected while being inspirational.³⁴ This generic code of behaviour is reflected in the Round Table Oath that demanded:

...never to do outrageousit nor murdr, and always to flee treason; also, by no mean to be cruel, but to give mercy unto him that asketh mercy, upon pain of forfeiture of their [the knights’] worship and lordship of King Arthur for evermore; and always to do ladies, damosels, and gentlewomen succour, upon pain of death. Also, that no man take no battles in a wrongful quarrel for no law, ne for no world’s good.³⁵

The Oath of the Round Table has a number of qualities that help explain the warrior ethos of the English knight. While some of the qualities required of a knight were physical strength, courage, dexterity, speed, and weapon skill,³⁶ the Oath establishes restraints on when, where and how martial skills can be used, in particular killing. It also constrains the knight to defend the weak and to fight for a just cause. The christianized warrior code, chivalry, also required knights to defend the weak and the church. Ehrenreich argues that Christianity, which was a religion of a defeated people, made it glorious to die in defeat. Thus the cause became important and those who fell in battle could be seen as martyrs, echoing the importance of defending the group³⁷ and the idea of sacrifice in order to do so. The code of chivalry and the Oath of the Round Table, reinforce the desired martial qualities found in the primitive warrior of courage, strength and skill while strengthening the idea of service, protection of the weak, and moral courage. It is by examining the code of the English Knight

CHAPTER 2

that we see the first clear articulation of duty beyond one's own tribe to include a wider and more universal application to defend those who could not defend themselves.

The traditional warrior is seen as an individual, with honours achieved through personal actions. While the 'real warrior' of old sought the intimacy of close combat, the new kind of war ushered in with the introduction of the gun was "less disciplined and more spontaneous"³⁸ converting the warrior into soldier. However, the reality was far less romantic than the word-pictures painted by many authors. Though most agree that the introduction of the gun had a fundamental impact on the warrior elite, the truth is that the ancient warrior was a solo fighter, more due to technology, not necessarily to distinguish himself for honours and rewards. Regardless, one can argue that the desire to excel at war and the individual honour that it brings has not really changed since ancient warfare. Rather, it is the means through which honour is distributed and displayed that has changed over time. Scalps and heads have been replaced with ribbons and medals. In fact, the wearing of ribbons on dress uniforms, along with skill or hazard badges, such as parachute wings, helps a modern day warrior display his skill and, by doing so, establishes immediate credibility with fellow warriors, clearly demonstrating that the ways of the warrior are still with us today.

St. Denis makes a clear distinction between a soldier and a warrior, arguing that there is no place in today's military for warriors. In fact, he goes as far as to argue that the creation of a warrior culture is not only unnecessary, it is undesirable.³⁹ But is there a difference between a soldier and a warrior, or is this simply semantics? In examining the literature on the subject, many authors use the two terms interchangeably, while others state that soldiers are warriors who fight for pay. Jessica Hill defines the tenets of the warrior as courtesy, honesty, integrity, humility, loyalty, spirit and perseverance.⁴⁰ She differentiates between warrior and soldier by focusing on why they fight. According to Hill, the warrior fights to protect family, territory and possessions, while

the soldier fight for pay, and as such is controlled by the state. In short, she argues that soldiers are hired killers who fight as part of a group; not for honour or a cause but rather for the country that pays them. But this definition is too simplistic for a number of reasons. To begin with, nation-states use force or the threat of force (war) as a means of achieving state rather than individual interests, and it is the warrior of that state, the soldier, that is used to apply the force. By definition, the modern state represents the individual and is designed to protect the interests and needs of the individual across a number of areas. Killing and protection, the use of deadly force, are two areas that are common amongst all states regardless of nationality or political leaning. In fact, in order to be recognised as a member of the state, the individual gives up the right to use deadly force, with some exceptions of self-defence, to achieve desired goals. Secondly, Hill's definition of soldier does not differ from that of a mercenary. Miyomato Musashi suggests that the difference between the warrior and soldier is "a mindset", which is that to be a warrior was to embrace a lifestyle, while to be a soldier is simply a job.⁴¹ What is common between the warrior and the soldier is that both are given a mandate by society (tribe/clan/community/nation) to take lives, but only certain lives, in certain ways, at certain times, for certain reasons. It is due to these restraints that the warrior/soldier is seen as "morally superior" to other possible definitions – such as murderer or killer. In fact, a common theme in the cultures and timeframes studied in this paper is that soldiers and warriors kill, they do not murder.⁴² Other authors, such as Rick Linden, writing for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, combine the two stating that military professionals today require the abilities not only of the warrior/soldier, but also of the soldier-diplomat and the soldier-scholar.⁴³ Webster's defines 'soldier' as a noun that is derived from Middle English 'soldier', from Middle French, from 'soulde pay', from Late Latin 'solidus'. It defines a soldier as "a : one engaged in military service and especially in the army b : an enlisted man or woman c : a skilled warrior."⁴⁴ The difficulty with using the definitions found in the dictionaries is that there is little real difference

CHAPTER 2

between warrior and soldier, as the definitions use the one word to help define the other. Perhaps there is more in common with the two terms than many suggest. In fact, a number of recent papers suggest that a warrior is a 'sub-culture' within the larger group called soldier. David Buckingham suggests that the two key elements that characterize the warrior are his location on the battlefield and his task in combat. Building on this differentiation, a soldier would be defined as "one engaged in military service and especially in the army" and that a warrior would be a soldier who is expected to close physically with the enemy and destroy him.⁴⁵ This differentiation is reinforced in Hill's research in which members of the Canadian Army defined a warrior as someone "who is actually there, in the combat arms" and "one who actually fights."⁴⁶ The danger with making such clear distinction between warrior and soldier is that it can lead to feelings of exclusion on the part of those who do not actually have combat roles or those in combat jobs who do not fit the traditional warrior image.⁴⁷ In reality, the preoccupation with making such delineations misses the similarities between the warrior and soldier. As Coolican observes, the modern day soldier has taken many of the warrior's characteristics and combined them with military professionalism resulting in the "professional warrior" who is obedient and abides by the rule of law with a code that espouses social responsibility, virtue and honour.⁴⁸ But perhaps rather than attempting to find differences, the concept of warrior should be replaced with a focus on the warrior ethos and in doing so focusing on the mindset.

As can be seen, while the function of the warrior may have originated with the biological imperative of self-defence, over time how a warrior executed his duties evolved into a code to include the protection of family, band, tribe, class and nation. In each of the categories discussed in this paper, the ideal warrior is considered to be an essential part of society, a protector and source of good.⁴⁹ But in each of these traditions, the warrior is bound by a code, a rule, and a way of life – an ethos. Although the ethos takes different forms in different cultural epochs, the ethos

is a way for society to protect itself from the darker berserker aspects of the warrior while at the same time the ethos serves to define, express, and further the “light” or chivalrous aspects of the warrior.⁵⁰ Overtime, the ethos became the essence of what it means to be a warrior. The warrior ethos can also provide a way of overcoming some of the value differences that exist among people in different jobs, in different components of the military, and at different rank levels, to help build a strong and cohesive military force by providing a common understanding of what is expected of the warrior.⁵¹ While it can be argued that many of the codes, or formalisation of the warrior ethos, were written after the fact and are nothing but an attempt to rationalize or to romanticize the actions of the warrior caste, it does provide insight into those characteristics that are desired in a warrior. Therefore, by focusing on the term ‘warrior ethos’ rather than on the term ‘warrior’ itself, the real value to present day militaries is seen.

Ethos is defined as “the distinguishing character, sentiment, moral nature, or guiding beliefs of a person, group, or institution.”⁵² Thus ethos represents the characteristics, values, behaviours, and attributes that a group develops over time as it finds the best way to get along and its job down. A working group for the Center for Strategic and International Studies has defined the warrior ethos as “a code that expects individuals to aggressively engage and defeat an armed enemy in battle, promoting and valuing traits of moral and physical courage, tactical skills, emotional and physical stamina, loyalty to comrades and determination to accomplish the tactical mission regardless of personal risk”⁵³ As shown above, the warrior ethos is a traditional, ancient, military culture that has evolved over time. It can be construed in a wide variety of ways, but reflects the core values of diverse cultures. The ethos also helps to set the limits of what warriors can and cannot do. French suggests the warrior’s ethos defines “not only how he should interact with his own warrior comrades, but also how he should treat other members of his society, his enemies and people he conquers”⁵⁴ Therefore, in developing a modern

CHAPTER 2

warrior's ethos it is necessary to select and preserve only what is consistent with those values cherished by the contemporary warrior's culture.⁵⁵

Few works actually address the warrior ethos in any detail; instead they focus on desired characteristics. One author who does directly address the issue is Buckingham, who suggests that cohesion, sacrifice, strength and authority are the facets of the warrior ethos that are essential to success on the battlefield, but are distinctive from the society that the military protects.⁵⁶ In examining the modern warrior ethos, the United States has perhaps gone the furthest in actually articulating an ethos for its members, and therefore will be used to frame the modern warrior. The United States Army uses the term 'warrior' extensively, and is one of the few institutions that clearly articulate what it means to be a warrior. Within the US Army, there continues to be an emphasis on instilling the warrior ethos into all ranks and branches within the Army. However, there is no single source document that clearly articulates the ethos that should be followed or, as described by US Army Colonel Frederick Kienle, it is imprinted on the American warrior's soul. Instead, there are numerous values, ideals, principles and beliefs in a number of locations that can be used to define a warrior ethos. In the recently approved Soldier's Creed,⁵⁷ what it means to be an American soldier is clearly stated, and as such may provide the clearest articulation of a single source ethos.

I am an American Soldier. I am a Warrior and a member of a team. I serve the people of the United States and live the Army Values. I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. I am disciplined, physically and mentally tough, trained and proficient in my warrior tasks and drills. I always maintain my arms, my equipment and myself. I am an expert and I am a professional. I stand ready to deploy, engage, and destroy the enemies of the United States of America in close

combat. I am a guardian of freedom and the American way of life. I am an American Soldier.

United States General Freakley, Chief of Infantry and Fort Benning's commanding general, emphasises that a key aspect of the soldier's creed is "I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade." The US Army has also articulated what it means to be a warrior. The Army's leadership doctrine states "the desire to accomplish that mission despite all adversity is called the warrior ethos"⁵⁸ and that "the warrior ethos refers to the professional attitudes and beliefs that characterize the American soldier. At its core, the warrior ethos grounds itself on the refusal to accept failure...The warrior ethos requires unrelenting and consistent determination to do what is right and to do it with pride, both in war and in military operations other than war...In whatever conditions Army leaders find themselves, they turn the professional warrior ethos into a collective commitment to win with honor."⁵⁹ The US Army's modern warrior ethos is another step in the evolution of the warrior. But of note is the focus on mission success, service to country and loyalty to comrades in arms. Of interest is the distinct lack of a clearly articulated need to protect the weak that is found in the Viking and English codes. The US Army's version of the warrior ethos appears to be aligned more closely to that of the Romans.

Table 1 is a synopsis of the characteristics desired in a warrior as identified by the literature. It is interesting to note that there are a number of major traits that appear regardless of age and national origin.

There are a number of the characteristics that may be articulated somewhat differently in some of the literature on the topic. The list found in the table is an attempt to provide a common point for examination and in doing so some interpretation took place. For example, none of the literature actually states that the ability to kill is a desired characteristic, rather terms such as defeating the

CHAPTER 2

enemy or protecting the group from other warriors is used. However, in further examination, the need to kill other humans as a necessary trait becomes clear. Therefore, not only is it necessary to identify which traits are relevant today, but it is necessary to articulate what is meant by each of the chosen traits in today's context.

	PRIMITIVE	GREEK	ROMAN	VIKING	ENGLISH KNIGHTS	US ARMY
Service		X	X	X	X	X
Skill at Arms	X	X	X	X	X	X
Physically Fit	X	X	X	X	X	X
Honesty			X	X	X	X
Moral Courage			X	X	X	X
Disciplined	X	X	X	X	X	X
Loyalty	X	X	X	X	X	X
Kill	X	X	X	X	X	X
Physical Courage	X	X	X	X	X	X
Protect the weak	X			X	X	

TABLE I – a comparison of identified traits desired in a warrior.

The essence of being a warrior is fighting and as such the warrior must be able to kill. While most species have no compunction over killing another species, most hesitate in killing their own. Of interest is the fact that a given percentage of people cannot be made to kill – even to justifiably immediately protect their own lives. This is not surprising as war inverts all that is “moral and right, in that in war one should kill.”⁶⁰ But without the willingness to kill, the warrior is of no use to the society he serves.

Tied to the willingness to kill is the technical ability to kill which is defined as skill at arms. As shown, the warrior must be proficient in the science of war, which for most is described as being proficient with the various weapons that the warrior can employ. But skill at arms is more than the simple martial proficiency of being able to shoot; it includes a broader understanding of the impact of the warrior's use of force in a wide range of situations and the implications of using deadly force in achieving the goals of the nation, society or cause for which the warrior is fighting.

Honesty and loyalty are two traits that appear early in the historical record as being an important part of what a warrior is. A number of authors recognise the importance of loyalty to comrades as an essential component of fighting morale,⁶¹ as honesty and loyalty are essential to establishing and maintaining trust amongst the group of warriors. The establishment of trust within the warrior group is an important factor in developing cohesion and fighting moral. But establishing and maintaining trust and loyalty between the warrior and his society is equally important. This trust and loyalty between the warrior and his society reinforces the idea that the use of force, which is entrusted in the warrior, will be used to protect and preserve society, not against it.

Phil Messina, president of *Modern Warrior*, argues that being a warrior has little to do with war and much to do with causes. It is clear that warriors view themselves as protectors of those they serve and society in general. A common theme is a willingness to sacrifice for those weaker than themselves, even if that sacrifice includes death. Michael Ignatieff agrees, arguing that warriors have always had a responsibility and ability to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, legitimate and illegitimate targets, moral and immoral weaponry, civilized and barbarous usage in the treatment of prisoners and of the wounded."⁶² Huntington expands on this theme stating that social responsibility is an essential element of the military profession.⁶³ Social responsibility can be translated into service. The idea of

CHAPTER 2

service sees the warrior willingly subordinate his personal desires, rights and even life for a greater good.⁶⁴ The idea of cause is discussed as early as the classical warrior and continues to be an important element today. The concept of service when combined with the principles of loyalty and trust is essential in preventing the warrior from turning on his own society, thus the concept of service is also a means of control over the warrior's darker side. This control is essential as it is the possession, use and control of lethal force that gives the warrior such a unique position in society. Service includes sacrifice. The willingness to die for something or someone is essential for success in combat. This element of the warrior's ethos can be found in the idea of the "unlimited liability clause". Warriors are obliged to "carry out duties and tasks without regard to fear or danger, and ultimately, to be willing to risk their lives if the situation requires."⁶⁵ It helps to establish the hierarchy of priority found within many militaries of mission before self.

Throughout history, courage has been an essential part of being a warrior. Courage is displayed in a number of ways. The most commonly recognized form of courage is physical courage, and it is the type of courage that is overtly displayed in combat. Medals and citations often honour physical courage, especially when the odds are against the warrior. These feats are also used in stories to encourage new warriors and to help provide examples of acceptable behaviour. Courage is not the absence of fear, but rather an ability to control the fear while completing the task at hand, and as such is closely connected to discipline. While physical courage is relatively easy to see, moral courage is often more difficult to observe and in some cases may be more important as it is often a true reflection of the warrior's values. While self-discipline relies on doing things right, moral courage relies on doing the 'right thing.'

Being physically fit has been a critical aspect of being a warrior throughout history. While many would argue that this characteristic was of greater importance in the past, that is before

the advent of firearms, the ability to resist strain and stress while continuing to function is essential to success. Fitness combined with courage allows the warrior to act decisively on the battlefield for extended periods of time.

The importance of discipline evolved over time from a discipline that focused on the individual hunter to the discipline required of modern armies that focuses on the subservience of the individual to the good of the group. Individual discipline is controlled behaviour that results from training. As a hunter, the discipline to remain quiet or motionless while waiting for the prey was important. As a warrior, individual discipline evolved to include a range of actions that result in a well-trained warrior who not only demonstrates the self-discipline needed to continuously train but one who can control his emotions (fear, hate, revenge) and perform his tasks in the most extreme of conditions. Most suggest that individual discipline is “doing what one is suppose to be doing, even without supervision – doing things right.”⁶⁶ This controlled behaviour can be seen in soldiers who remain alert while on guard duty, clean their weapons without being ordered to, check and repair their equipment without being told, and maintain a high level of physical fitness to name a few. As the role of the warrior evolved alongside the changing face of warfare, group discipline became equally important. Group discipline is essential to battlefield effectiveness. Group discipline requires the individual to submit to the will and the good of the group. Buckingham suggests that group discipline requires a consistent accountability to the standard. But perhaps more importantly, he argues that the discipline that is essential in the warrior ethos is not simply following rules, but controlled individual and group behaviour in the absence of supervision or orders – doing the right thing. An articulated ethos that clearly expresses the required characteristics of the warrior’s group assists in doing this.

However, being a Warrior means more than just saving lives. It even means more than dying with honour. It means living with honour as well. It is a state of mind. As Linden points out, the

CHAPTER 2

Canadian military has replaced the term 'warrior ethos' with 'fighting spirit'. A paragraph from the new Profession of Arms Manual states that

fighting spirit, because it is a state of mind, applies across all occupations of the Canadian Forces. It is what motivates Canadian Forces members to approach their own particular tasks and responsibilities with a competitive desire and commitment to excellence, while acknowledging the fundamental purpose of the profession of arms⁶⁷

Like the warrior himself, the warrior ethos has evolved over time incorporating the values of the culture from which the warrior came and the society the warrior protected. As seen in this paper, the warrior ethos contains a number of seemingly timeless elements. By examining the characteristics desired in Western warriors, one can develop a list of characteristics that are needed in the warrior for the 21st Century. These characteristics help define what it is to be a warrior, that is, they articulate a modern warrior ethos. The warrior ethos for the 21st Century warrior comprises of two separate but related parts the physical and mental aspects. Physically, the warrior must possess the skill at arms to carryout his duties to protect society. He must be physically fit to operate for extended periods and overcome the stress and strain of the modern battle space. Mentally, the warrior must possess the ability to kill. This emotional or mental ability to kill another human is an essential part of the warrior if he is to fulfill his duty to society and to his fellow warriors. The idea of duty or service to others, combined with a high level of moral integrity or moral strength, ensures that the warrior will use his martial skills for the benefit of society rather than against it; it focuses the actions of the warrior ensuring a just cause.

The contemporary operating environment and its asymmetric enemy, best seen in the Global War on Terrorism, is full of legal and ethical shades of grey. The warrior ethos allows soldiers to

effectively operate in this environment. While Kaplan and Ignatieff are two amongst a growing number of authorities that agree future adversaries will play by the rules less often than present ones, maintaining the moral and ethical high ground is the only way to convince those who have not decided which side to support. But aside from winning the hearts and minds of people in the area of operation, adherence to the values of the warrior's society and a clearly articulated warrior ethos is what distinguishes a warrior from a terrorist or criminal.

Endnotes

1 The Contemporary Operating Environment is the term used by the US Army to define the current and near term environment in which military forces are and will be conducting operations. The main shift is that of the threat from a conventionally armour based peer or near-peer competitor to that of smaller, lightly armed forces often with access to high technology and/or weapons of mass destruction conducting unconventional warfare.

2 Captain Thomas St. Denis, "The Dangerous Appeal of the Warrior," *Canadian Military Journal*, (Summer, 2001), 31.

3 Ibid. , 31.

4 The recently released keystone document *Duty with Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada* mentions the term warrior seven times. In fact section 5 is entitled The Military Ethos and the Warrior's Honour, but fails to define what is meant by this term. Canadian Armed Forces, A-PA-005-000/AP-001, *Duty with Honour*, [online] available at http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/CFLI/engraph/poa/doc/DutyWithHonourLongVers_e.pdf, accessed 25 June 2004.

5 The term society needs to be placed in context. As noted in a number of the references the warrior was concerned first with his immediate group or clan, then over time the idea of society (ones group) changed or rather broadened to included nations, to today when some would argue mankind.

6 Court room speech referring to the code red treatment in *A Few Good Men*. Available at <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/MovieSpeeches/moviespeechafewgoodmencodere.html> accessed 25 June 2004.

CHAPTER 2

7 *Oxford Dictionary* [online]; available from <http://www.bio.vu.nl/thb/users/bvhoute/english/search.cgi?query=warrior&view=1>. Internet; accessed 25 June 2004.

8 *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* [online]; available from <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=warrior&x=10&y=17>. Internet; accessed 25 June 2004.

9 Mike Straw, "What is the Warrior Spirit?"; available from <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/948725/posts>; internet; accessed 25 June 2004.

10 For simplicity the term 'warrior' will be referred to as male, though there is evidence that women can be and in fact have been effective warriors.

11 Much of the literature also includes the Chinese Monks, Japanese Samurai and Sioux Indians. Since the focus of this paper is on identifying and articulating a warrior ethos for Western Militaries these examples have deliberately been left out.

12 William James in Rick Fields, *The Code of the Warrior in History, Myth, and Everyday Life*, (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), 17.

13 Barbara Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites*, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), 47, 53.

14 *Ibid.*, 54.

15 *Ibid.*, 78, 139.

16 *Ibid.*, 78.

17 Fields, 62.

18 *Ibid.*, 29.

19 Ehrenreich, 34.

20 Richard Holmes and John Keegan, *Soldiers: A History of Men in Battle* (New York, N.Y.: Viking Penguin Inc., 1986), 11.

21 *Ibid.*, 63

22 *Ibid.*, 3.

23 Ehrenreich, 147.

24 David Jones, *Women Warriors* (Washington: Brassey's, 1997), 251.

25 Shannon French, *The Code of the Warrior* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003), 60.

26 Fields, 77.

27 French, 66.

28 *Ibid.*, 75.

29 *Ibid.*, 96.

30 Fields, 41.

31 *Ibid.*, 115.

- 32 French, 117.
- 33 Fields, 134.
- 34 French, 117.
- 35 Ibid., 116.
- 36 Shannon Coolican, *Warriors in the Professional Military*, (Kingston: Royal Military College of Canada), 6.
- 37 Ehrenreich, 170.
- 38 Ibid., 227
- 39 St. Denis, 24.
- 40 Hill, 32.
- 41 Jessica Hill, "The Timeless Fascination of the Warrior" (MA diss., The Royal Military College of Canada, 2002), 24.
- 42 French, 1-3. Of note, French reinforces the notion that the concept of murder is universal.
- 43 Rick Linden, *Professions, Professionalism, and the Military*, [online]; available from <http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/cfli/engraph/research/pdf/57.pdf>, Internet, accessed 25 June 2004. 22
- 44 *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* [online]; available from. <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=soldier&x=10&y=14> Internet; accessed 25 June 2004.
- 45 David Buckingham, *The Warrior Ethos*, Newport, RI: Naval War College: 1999. [online]; available from <http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA366676> ; Internet; accessed 25 June 2004, 3-4.
- 46 Hill, 63, 65.
- 47 Linden, 58.
- 48 Coolican, 11.
- 49 It is acknowledged that there are examples that clearly show differences between the actions of a warrior and the code that he may proclaim. These differences are what many historians focus on when examining this area.
- 50 Field, 3, 66.
- 51 Linden, 59.
- 52 *Merriam-Webster Dictionary* [online]; available from. <http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=ethos&x=8&y=18> Internet; accessed 25 June 2004.
- 53 Proposed working definition of the traditional warrior ethos in "Working Paper on the Warrior Ethos Issue" dated 20 October 1998, in Buckingham, 5.
- 54 French, 3.
- 55 French, 232.

CHAPTER 2

56 Buckingham, 5.

57 United States Army, Warrior Ethos; available from http://www-tradoc.army.mil/pao/Web_specials/WarriorEthos/SoldiersCreed.jpg, Internet, accessed 25 June 2004.

58 US Army Field Manual 22-100, Army Leadership [online] available at http://www.infantry.army.mil/taskforcesoldier/content/warrior_ethos.htm, accessed 10 June 2004, Chapter 1, 1.

59 Ibid., chapter 2, 1.

60 Ehrenreich, 12. For greater clarity and explanation on how humans can be trained to overcome this hesitancy to kill, see D. Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (London, UK: Little, Brown and Co, 1995).

61 Glenn Gray, *The Warriors* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1959), 40.

62 Michael Ingotieff, *The Warrior's Honour* (Toronto: Penguin Books Canada Ltd., 1998), 117.

63 S.P Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 11.

64 Buckingham uses the term 'sacrifice' in place of 'service'. 41. 'Service' is used in this paper as it both covers the idea of sacrifice, and is used in a number of other readings on the topic.

65 Canadian Army Publication B-GL-300, *Canada's Army*, [online] available at http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/ael/pubs/300-000/B-GL-300-000/fp-000/B-GL-300-000-FP-000_e.pdf, Internet, accessed 25 June 2004, 33.

66 Buckingham, 22.

67 Linden, 17.

CHAPTER 3

The Senior NCO Corps and Professionalism: Where do we stand?



Allan English

Even though records of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in armies can be found as far back as Roman times, the theme of this paper, the Senior NCO Corps and Professionalism, is a topic that has not been debated widely in the literature.¹ Most Western societies see the officer corps as the repository of professionalism in their armed forces, and non-commissioned members (NCMs)² are usually viewed as tradespersons³ who are not professionals in the traditional meaning of the word. However, the status of NCMs in the Canadian Forces (CF) has been questioned increasingly as the roles of officers and NCMs have changed within the military, and changes in Canadian social demographics have resulted in increased education levels among NCMs so that, in some cases, they are as well educated as officers.⁴ The recently published (2003) cornerstone manual describing the philosophy and practice of the profession of arms in Canada, *Duty with Honour*, has recognized the changing status of NCOs and asserted that “all regular force members of the CF, regardless of rank, are members of the profession of arms.”⁵

Nonetheless, *Duty with Honour* recognizes a distinction between officers and NCMs based on “the current distribution of responsibilities and expertise” between the officer and NCO corps. For example, the manual states, “officers possess knowledge of a more

CHAPTER 3

general nature” which “is used to marshal forces and direct their employment,” and that NCMs apply their specific expertise to accomplish specific tasks or missions. Therefore, commissioned officers are believed to “identify themselves as potential commanders and leaders” while NCMs are more focused on “the effective and efficient accomplishment of all tasks” and “the immediate welfare of individual subordinates.”⁶ However, *Duty with Honour* predicts that because “uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity will increasingly characterize most operations in all environments, the old paradigm that emphasized the decision-making role of the officer and the applied, technical role of the NCM will likely shift.” Based on this assumption, *Duty with Honour* asserts that “[a]uthority will be increasingly delegated and an even greater degree of responsibility assigned to NCOs and warrant officers...” and that “[i]n some cases, officers, NCOs and warrant officers may share these authorities and responsibilities...”⁷ These assertions, at first glance, ring true. A closer look at the profession of arms in Canada, however, may shed a different light on these issues and even call some of the assumptions in *Duty with Honour* into question.

This paper, therefore, examines the nature of military professionalism in the Canadian context focusing on the professional status of the senior NCO corps now and in the future. It concludes that a new model of military professionalism is required to accommodate the context in which NCMs operate currently and will operate in the future within the Canadian profession of arms.

The Current Canadian Model of Military Professionalism

As the first comprehensive official statement of Canadian military professionalism, *Duty with Honour* is a significant document and represents important progress in explaining and defining the Canadian profession of arms. It uses a model of the professions that is based on the “classic works” that “have informed most Western thinking on the nature of the profession of arms and the

concept of military professionalism.”⁸ And the definition of a profession, “synthesized from the scholarly literature,” given by *Duty with Honour* reflects the traditional model of the professions used by English-speaking armed forces:

A profession is an exclusive group of people who possess and apply a systematically acquired body of knowledge derived from extensive research, education, training and experience. Members of a profession have a special responsibility to fulfill their function competently and objectively for the benefit of society. Professionals are governed by a code of ethics that establishes standards of conduct while defining and regulating their work. This code of ethics is enforced by the members themselves and contains values that are widely accepted as legitimate by society at large.⁹

This definition is a useful yardstick with which to evaluate Canadian military professionalism, but the model supporting it is not described in detail. The definition, however, does seem to rely heavily on Huntington’s model of military professionalism,¹⁰ which, while still widely used in Western (especially the American) armed forces, has limitations that may make it inappropriate for use by the CF. For example, in the Huntington model, NCOs are portrayed as having “neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer.” Therefore, because they are specialists in the application but not the management of violence, they are characterized as practitioners of a trade, not as professionals.¹¹ However, Huntington’s interpretation of the professional status of NCOs may be culturally limited by its basis in the US military’s NCO corps and also dated, given both the recent advances in NCO education and the increased responsibility thrust on NCOs by decentralized operations such as peace support and “operations other than war.”

The view that the CF has not fully subscribed to Huntington’s model is reflected in *Duty with Honour*, which describes the profession of

CHAPTER 3

arms in Canada as an “inclusive profession,” and asserts that “[a]ll uniformed personnel fulfilling operational, support or specialist functions are considered military professionals.” They are deemed to be professionals because they meet these criteria:

1. embracing the military ethos;
2. reaching and maintaining minimum first employment standards;
3. pursuing the highest standards of the required expertise; and
4. understanding, accepting and fulfilling all the commitments and responsibilities inherent in the profession of arms.¹²

The manual further states that:

In the Canadian Forces, all non-commissioned members (NCMs), especially non-commissioned officers (NCOs), warrant officers (WOs), chief petty officers and petty officers (CPOs and POs), share leadership responsibilities and are required to master complex skills and gain extensive knowledge of the theory of conflict. Therefore, and in accordance with the criteria listed, all regular force members of the CF, regardless of rank, are members of the profession of arms.¹³

However, *Duty with Honour* recognizes the difference between NCOs and officers in terms of competencies, authority and responsibility, because it states that “[t]hrough their commission, officers are given particular authority and responsibility for decisions on the use of force.” Officers are also described as having “the right and privilege to command,” and more specifically officers in command appointments are held to be “responsible for creating the conditions for a mission’s success, including a clear statement of the commander’s intent, and thereafter for leading

all subordinates to achieve the objective.” Because of these responsibilities, and responsibilities for strategic leadership, the “officer’s scope of responsibility” is described as “broader than that of NCOs and warrant officers and typically gets larger as he or she rises in rank.”¹⁴

The manual also recognizes the necessity of having both an officer corps and an NCM corps because of “the extremely complex nature of the profession of arms and the need to organize and structure the profession to accommodate the many demands that it faces.” It notes that “responsibility and expertise are distributed between officers and NCMs in such a manner as to clearly define each and make the most effective contribution to accomplishing the mission.”¹⁵ This distribution, however, has a long history based on the experience of operations in each of the environments that is not fully accounted for in *Duty with Honour*, as we shall see.

Duty with Honour states that the NCM Corps tends to apply technical knowledge to accomplish a task or mission, but it states that NCMs’ “knowledge and skill have been oriented primarily to the tactical level,” but because the levels of conflict may overlap or be blurred in today’s world, “NCMs, especially NCOs and warrant officers, are increasingly required to be knowledgeable about every level to one degree or another...”¹⁶ The idea that NCMs need to have a more broadly based expertise is often supported by the notion of the “strategic corporal,” where “decisions and actions taken by NCOs, warrant officers and their subordinates can, and often do, have consequences up to and including the strategic and political level.”¹⁷ This is an interesting hypothesis, based largely on the Army’s recent experience, but it is not necessarily supported by the types of work NCMs have traditionally performed or continue to perform in the Navy or in the Air Force.¹⁸

For example, in the Canadian Navy since the Second World War, the responsibility levels of the senior NCMs, the CPOs and POs,

CHAPTER 3

have gradually extended into what were traditionally junior officers' roles in terms of managing the technical aspects of operations, like warfare director.¹⁹ But this extension of technical responsibility by senior POs does not extend beyond the technical realm into the command arena as no NCM is trained for and therefore has the skill to perform officer of the watch or command roles.²⁰

In the Canadian Air Force, there is a clear distinction between NCMs and officers. Most of the aircrew in the Air Force are officers, and even though they are outnumbered by the NCMs, it is the officers that are the warrior class. Most NCMs are in support roles, and this delineation has defined the officer and NCM roles in the Air Force. For example, in the Second World War, while groundcrew out-numbered aircrew five to one, 94 percent of the Royal Canadian Air Force's (RCAF) fatal casualties were aircrew.²¹ By virtue of this hierarchy, aircrew personnel hold most of the senior command positions in the Air Force.²²

Besides the three operational environments (Army, Navy and Air Force) of the CF, there are also many in the CF who, despite their environmental affiliation, could be classed as support or technical personnel (sometimes referred to as "purple" occupations in the CF). Bland notes that many officers and NCOs no longer exercise command, but "manage" technicians "using quite collegial techniques foreign to past generations." This has given rise to what he calls "new-order units" that depend more on technical expertise than hierarchical position to lead.²³ Elsewhere, I have hypothesized that the balance between technical and traditional "heroic" leadership varies according to environment (service) and even by type of unit within a service.²⁴

These examples demonstrate that a comprehension of the differences in leadership among armies, navies, and air forces is critical to understanding the nature of the profession of arms and has become increasingly important in an era where joint and combined operations predominate. *Duty with Honour* recognizes

that changes in the CF and in Canadian society will result in both change and continuity in the relationship between the officer and NCO corps, and that the forces of continuity and change may well be different in the three environments.²⁵ I would add that the so-called “purple” occupations will also be subject to different dynamics. Every environment, and one could argue every occupation in the CF, has different leadership expectations based on that environment’s “mask of command.” Even in the unified CF, where a significant amount of training and education is conducted in a joint environment, leaders spend their most formative years in service cultures that shape their views about what is an appropriate leadership style. Furthermore, there may be a significant difference between leaders, both officers and NCOs, in the technical and support branches of the CF, and even among officers and NCOs in the operational or combat arms branches. This is an area that requires more study before the assertions in *Duty with Honour* about the differences between officers and NCOs can be accepted without reservation.

The Traditional Model of the Western Military Professional²⁶

Since *Duty with Honour* does not describe in detail the model that it uses to assess professionalism in the CF, it is necessary to examine some of the “classic works” that have informed *Duty with Honour* and “most Western thinking on the nature of the profession of arms and the concept of military professionalism” before we can decide if the assumptions made in *Duty with Honour* are valid for the CF in the 21st century.

The early work of writers like Huntington and Finer on theories of professionalism hypothesized that civilian control over armed services “was best served by maximizing professionalism” because it “recognized and encompassed” civilian control. Central to Huntington’s (1957) search for an answer to his question of whether or not American liberal ideals of democracy had been compromised by increases in the size of its peacetime armed forces was the concept of professionalism. Military

CHAPTER 3

professionalism, according to Huntington, was the key to civilian control over the armed forces. It was far preferable to use the device of professionalism in the armed forces as an objective method of control rather than by the subjective means of maximizing civilian authority over them, he argued. He believed that with professionalism the armed services themselves would promote military efficiency whilst recognizing their subservience to the state; this was, in his view, better than imposing civilian values and directives on them, which might impair their efficiency. Huntington's ideas were in tune with the "new conservatism" of post-Second World War America where the need for a large and efficient standing army was recognized. The concept of professionalism was embraced to assure that the US armed services would meet both the highest standards of performance and an obligation to serve society. Finer, one of Huntington's severest critics, writing in 1962 noted that in certain circumstances the armed services of a state may be constitutionally required to intervene in government as a measure of last resort and a matter of professional duty. On the other hand, research on Latin American militaries has shown that professionalism alone was not a guarantee of non-involvement in politics as "civilian government tended to be supreme until the military professionalized" and acquired the capacity to usurp civilian control of the state.²⁷ Huntington acknowledged that in some states the prevailing ideology was wholly incompatible with Western concepts of professionalism except in terms of the military being composed of paid experts. However, as we shall see, the universality of Huntington's theory of military professionalism has been challenged because certain ideal conditions, such as a balance between the requirements of the armed forces and the values of society, would have to prevail for it to apply in all cases.²⁸ Feaver notes that in his 1977 revision of *The Soldier and the State*, Huntington does not discuss his earlier characteristics of professionalism, expertise, responsibility, and corporateness, but adopts "the Janowitz's vocabulary of "congruence/convergence."²⁹

Janowitz's (1960) study of the post-Second World War American armed services concluded that, while there had been changes in the professional officer corps and the armed services' organizational structure, the American armed services had maintained their professional distinctiveness and integrity. Their professional ethic, he concluded, was adequate to maintain civilian political supremacy without compromising their professional autonomy.³⁰ Feaver suggests that for all their conceptual differences, Janowitz and Huntington use the same "values-based" mechanism, professionalism, to explain how civil control of military forces can best be maintained in the West.³¹

These other views of the relationship between modern societies and armed forces notwithstanding, Huntington's ideas continue to dominate much of the debate on this topic, in Canada as well as elsewhere.³² His supporters claim that many of his ideas are as valid today as they were when they were written. Noting that *The Soldier and the State* "put the issue of civil-military relations on the map," Robert Kaplan explains that the book was inspired by President Truman's firing of General Douglas MacArthur in 1951 during the Korean War. MacArthur's "political generalship," according to Huntington, "undermined the idea of a professional military." And a professional military, in Huntington's view, is the only way to keep the threat of a military takeover in liberal democracies at bay. For him "the modern officer is a professional, whose job is the management of violence and whose client is the state," and whose advice is "strictly professional" based at all times on the "national interest."³³ While this may appear to be a valid theoretical construct, one challenge might be what is and who defines the national interest. Recent US military operations have shown that this is interpreted differently by the different US services often giving advice to promote the capabilities, and therefore the budget share, of their own service.³⁴

One of the greatest weaknesses of Huntington's work is his methodology. While few would argue with his view that people, events, beliefs and institutions do not fit into "neat logical

CHAPTER 3

categories,” and therefore scholars are forced to generalize if they wish to derive “lessons for broader application,” most historians would take issue with generalizations that are not supported by the facts. Kaplan tells us that Huntington was a political scientist who was comfortable producing *The Soldier and the State* as “a book of relentless empirical generalizations.”³⁵ If one accepts that “empirical” here refers to making generalizations based on observation or experience and not rigorous research,³⁶ then those scholars who have recently taken issue with Huntington’s generalizations appear to have a point.

In “The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*” Coffman gives examples of how a lack of historical data can lead to some of the faulty assumptions that have dominated the debate of military professionalism. Historians have found that, contrary to Huntington’s assumptions, in the late 19th century there “was no great gap between [American officers] and the propertied middle class” and that the “drive for military professionalism” was no different than that found in the civilian professions at the time.” In fact, rather than epitomizing a civil-military gap, the officer corps of the late 19th century American army shared many characteristics with urban reformers in America - they were Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, middle class, educated, and believed in “character, fair play, progress, the betterment of mankind, and the democratic mission of their nation.”³⁷ Furthermore, in the between 1880 and 1920 military leaders “maintained close social and intellectual ties with America’s business, professional, and political elites and shared their outlook.”³⁸ Historical studies have shown that Huntington’s model does not correspond to “the realities of American life” at the time, and in some ways was almost a “literary construct.” American army officers were not “polarized ideologically” from their contemporaries, but “shared the values of the middle class from which they came.”³⁹ This raises the question of how Huntington arrived at his conclusions.

Huntington’s approach to issues of military professionalism, according to Kaplan, can be best understood by Huntington’s

education, experience and national culture. He is described as “someone who combines liberal ideals with a deeply conservative understanding of history and foreign policy.” In his framework, liberalism is a highly idealistic “ideology of individualism, free markets, liberty, and the rule of law,” whereas he believes that conservatism is not an ideology but a practical way of constraining the almost unbounded idealism of liberalism. “Real conservatism cannot aspire to lofty principles, because its task is to defend what already exists,” he asserts. This paradigm led Huntington to conclude that conservatism was the only proper mind set for the military profession. In fact, he believes that liberal values, based on individualism, can “undermine a professional officer corps.” Huntington, however, does not see the military professional as a reactionary; he acknowledges that the professionalization of 19th century European militaries promoted a meritocracy in the officer corps and challenged “the aristocratic basis of society.” He argued that the civil-military dynamic was very different in 19th century America because an isolated officer corps developed an aristocratic ethos. But as we have seen, historians have challenged this view.⁴⁰

Perhaps a better and more widely applicable characterization of Huntington’s views on militaries in the 20th century can be found in his book *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968): “In the world of oligarchy, the soldier is a radical; in the middle class world, he is a participant and an arbiter; as the mass society looms...he becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order.”⁴¹ Yet many of Huntington’s ideas from his earlier work, *The Soldier and the State*, underlie the current debate about the place of the US military in its society. The debate has polarized between those who believe that the US military should maintain what they believe to have been its traditional isolation from the liberal society, thus maintaining its warrior ethos, and those who believe that the military should more closely resemble the society it defends.⁴² This phenomenon is neither new nor restricted to the US. In late 19th century France, “right-wing and conservative groups” saw the discipline and hierarchical authority of the army

CHAPTER 3

as a proper model for civilian society.⁴³ Therefore, the issue of the relationship between armed forces and society is likely to be an integral part of any debate on the military profession's place in society.

Much new scholarly work on professions has been written since the two most influential studies of the military as a profession, Huntington's *The Soldier and the State* and Janowitz's *The Professional Soldier* were written over 40 years ago. Yet, as Burk noted, the implications of this new literature for military professionalism has not yet been fully explored. He goes on to explain that this is an important issue because to "call an occupation 'professional' is usually a positive normative judgment about the work being done and, since we think that professional work is a social good, whatever we call professional work also reveals something about what we believe is required for the well-being of society." Burk argues that the key characteristics of a profession are expertise (mastery of abstract knowledge), control over a jurisdiction to apply expert knowledge, and the legitimacy ascribed to that profession by others.⁴⁴ His views are summarized here because they are one of the few recent treatments of the military profession in the context of the new work being done on the professions and because they capture many of the perspectives on professions that predominate in the militaries of Canada and the US.

Burk tells us that in pre-20th century Britain, professions were those "occupations suitable for a gentleman," and the status of professions often depended more on the prestige of the persons who worked in them than the work itself.⁴⁵ This interpretation has been challenged by Freidson, who argues that the prestige of the professions is due less to the social origins of their members than to their service to society's elites.⁴⁶ Either interpretation could be applied to the profession of arms in Europe, which, although generally held in low esteem because of the social class of those in the ranks and the nature of soldiering, was considered to be respectable in some ways because most of the officer corps

was composed of sons of the nobility who defended, in uniform, the interests of society's elites. However, by the 20th century, a profession's status depended more on the work done than on social standing of the worker. To ensure that the quality of a professional work remained high, people in certain relatively high status occupations organized into associations that trained and tested their members. They also, through mechanisms that varied in time and place, protected their right to practice in a certain domain by excluding outsiders whom they considered unqualified. Intrinsic to this concept was the idea of service. In other words, professionals were doing important work in society and they put the needs of their clients above their own needs. By the mid-20th century, many scholars accepted the idea that professions enjoyed high status because they met important social needs and had risen above the self-serving motives of those, like merchants and businessmen, in non-professional occupations.⁴⁷

This ideal was captured in texts widely used in courses on military ethics and professionalism at Canadian military colleges and American military academies. In one representative essay, Barzun sketches an outline of the history of professions as groups with a monopoly on certain skills for a "distinct practical purpose." He reminds us that, because of this focus on practical outcomes, professions are vulnerable institutions, because, while the role of professions in society may be eternal, a particular profession may disappear or change radically over time, for example the priest-physician or barber-surgeon. Barzun observes that the "tendency of an egalitarian age to turn every occupation into a profession" has complicated the subject of professional ethics. He uses the example of the "profession" of journalism to illustrate this point: there is no body of peers to tell if practitioners are competent, the "professional" has a distant relationship with his/her clients, and there are no specific professional credentials required to become a journalist. This trend is paralleled by the gradual demoting of professions to the level of ordinary trades and businesses. His message for professions is that their one hope for survival is the recovery of their mental and

CHAPTER 3

moral force. It is not enough to have codes of conduct that are policed by professional oversight bodies; professions must also exercise “moral and intellectual leadership” that communicates the message that ethical behaviour is “desirable, widely practiced, approved and admired.”⁴⁸ Or as Lerner puts it: all professions need to “recapture the sense of vocation or calling.”⁴⁹ Barzun’s essay was written in 1978 and Lerner’s in 1975, but the points they made then are still highly relevant today.

In this context, in the late 1990s, a committee advising the Minister of National Defence on the reform of the CF’s officer corps suggested that: “A suitable formal education has become as much of a touchstone of military professionalism as charisma, honour, dedication, courage and a ‘strong right arm.’ Although the essence of war-fighting is today the same as it was in ancient times...It is no longer sufficient for Canadian Forces officers to know which civil or military solutions to apply to problems, it is necessary that they thoroughly understand the nature of the solutions they aspire to use and to be able to adapt or improvise solutions to suit particular circumstances. To do that, they must learn those basic skills of critical evaluation and analysis that will allow them to tackle any problem that may come along. Put simply, they must acquire the thinking skills that a liberal arts education affords as the basis for whatever technical learning they need also acquire.”⁵⁰ This rationale suggests an approach not dissimilar from those used by other professions in training their apprentices for service to society. As Freidson has pointed out, professions require their trainees to be taught the first principles of their work formally in schools because as practitioners they may be required to exercise extensive “discretionary judgment” which demands more of “a firm grounding in basic theory and concepts to guide discretionary judgment than to gain practice” in what otherwise would be a selection from a number of practices established by custom or tradition.⁵¹

The Profession of Arms in Canada⁵²

Similar to many Western armed forces, the CF's leadership has indicated that members of the CF, particularly the officers, practice a profession, and therefore they promoted the idea that a military career is not just a job, but a vocation or a way of life. Members of the CF are expected to possess military virtues and to rely on them to perform beyond what is expected of those in civil society. Some in Canada believe that the CF should serve "as a symbol of all that is best in the national character." However, the Somalia Commission concluded that military professionalism in Canada has been undermined by "a shift toward 'civilianization.'" This has resulted in the infusion of occupational, versus the traditional vocational, values in the CF. The influence of technology, which has forced increased specialization and civilian skills onto Western armed services, plus the reorganization of the CF in the 1960s and 1970s, have exacerbated this trend. The Somalia Commission, citing Cotton, argued that "military service as a calling or vocation, made legitimate by broadly based national values, had given way to" a perception that those in the military were performing civilian type jobs for rewards specified under contracts often seen in the business sector. This has led to reduced standards of accountability among senior officers, who are now unwilling to accept responsibility when things go wrong in their command.⁵³

One of Canada's leading military historians, Stephen Harris, has analyzed the Canadian military in terms of Huntington's professional characteristics of expertise, corporateness, and responsibility. Focusing on the period 1860-1939, he concluded that the Canadian permanent force "had little in common with the professional armies emerging in Europe, in the United Kingdom, and in the United States."⁵⁴ Lacking a professional infrastructure and with commissions often bestowed for political patronage rather than merit, the Canadian military was bereft of most of the basic prerequisites to form a professional body. And unlike Huntington's portrayal of an isolated American officer corps,

CHAPTER 3

the Canadian officer of the period Harris describes was predominantly a civilian in uniform serving in the part-time citizen militia – amateurs in the true sense of the word. Even in the two great wars of the 20th century, the vast majority of Canadian officers were civilians in uniform “for the duration only” of hostilities. However, these amateur soldiers acquitted themselves well compared to their regular force colleagues, who, Harris argues, lacked professional competence. This lack of professional competence was demonstrated in the Second World War by the fact that the performance of regular force officers in command of brigades and other higher formations was often worse than that of their amateur “for the duration only” colleagues.

The Canadian Army generally followed the “this is a profession because it is suitable for gentlemen” model, articulated by Burk, until the mid-20th century. The Royal Military College of Canada’s (RMC) concept of the military as a profession because the officer corps was populated by professional engineers had little impact on the Army until the 1950s, when the regular force supplanted the militia as the main component of the Army. As late as 1952, the *Junior Officers’ Guide* advised young subalterns not to be too concerned with the technical details of their occupation because it would make them look too much like tradesmen. This outlook began to change in the late 1950s when leadership practices based on the “science of management” were introduced as a replacement for the old ideal that officers were gentlemen who instinctively knew how to lead because good leaders were born not made.⁵⁵ If Canadian officers were seen to be professionals in any sense up to this time it was due to their holding the same social status as their professional colleagues. However, their lack of expertise, particularly in the sense of abstract knowledge, marginalized any claims they might make for professional status. The anti-intellectualism of some officers, which persists to this day in some quarters of the CF, precluded them from joining the ranks of the professionals until increased educational standards permitted them to raise their occupation’s status by acquiring expertise based on education in abstract knowledge.

With the creation of large regular military forces during the Cold War, the profession of arms in Canada began to resemble the professional corporate body seen in other armed forces in the Western world.⁵⁶ And, like other professions in Canada, the CF started to control the “education, training, and socialization of its members” with its own institutions, including schools and colleges. There are some notable differences, nonetheless. While the CF does not have a standard ethical code, unlike some other professions, officers “freely enter into a moral and legal contract that imposes professional duties and standards” based on the texts of their commissions and oaths. The Oath of Allegiance is the Canadian service person’s “code of moral obligation.”⁵⁷ However, unlike other professions in Canadian society, the military can be called upon to ensure the very survival of the nation. In executing this function, as well as other military roles, members of the military can be called upon to lay down their lives - sometimes expressed as the concept of unlimited liability.⁵⁸ Another distinction between the military professional and other professionals is that military leaders have the right to sacrifice the lives of their subordinates in order to achieve military objectives.⁵⁹

The Cold War ushered in a period where, for the first time in Canadian history, regular force officers dominated the military establishment. This led to the introduction of “the trappings of professionalism,” such as the principle of merit for promotion and “a formal system of professional military education.” But even as the military became more professional in many ways after Second World War, with its own permanent Staff Colleges and a National Defence College, Harris argues that the unification of the CF in 1968 caused “the armed forces’ status as a distinct profession” to disappear. With what he characterizes as decisions of a professional nature, such as equipment procurement, now being made by civilian bureaucrats on the basis of regional economic benefits and not military merit, he contends that Canadian military professionalism has been gravely eroded. Harris concludes that maintaining a professional military in Canada will

CHAPTER 3

always be difficult because of society's indifference to the military, Canada's geographic isolation, its small population and its dependence on the great powers "as a defender of last resort."⁶⁰

Another major civilianizing effect on the CF is ironically its only military college, RMC, which is the preferred entry-level school for officers in the profession of arms in Canada. A key role of professional schools is to teach the latest professional knowledge and to engage in "research and scholarship designed to codify what is already known", as well as extend the boundaries of professional knowledge as part of the work of expanding a profession's expertise and legitimizing its jurisdiction.⁶¹ Yet throughout its 125 year history, RMC has been primarily a school first for training military engineers and more recently for educating professional engineers. It has in effect been largely a school educating the majority of its students for a profession other than the profession of arms.⁶² A recent review of theses and research projects at RMC shows that while there is some shift towards topics directly related to the military profession, the majority of research being done at RMC is in the fields of science and engineering. Until RMC's primary focus becomes the profession of arms, it cannot properly be described as the CF's professional school.

From a theoretical point of view, the officer corps has generally been identified as the group that should lead change in military organizations because officers are responsible for conceptualizing and leading change in a service culture.⁶³ In the Canadian context, NCOs may also belong to this group of leaders. Unlike some armed forces, Canada's senior NCOs constitute a group that makes the military a career and exhibits many of the characteristics of professionals. Bercuson describes the most senior of them in the army, the Regimental Sergeants Major, as "guardians of the regimental memory" since they often serve in one regiment throughout their careers. This permanence makes the NCO the first level of command so that NCOs are not only able to ensure that officers' orders are carried out, but also often assume an

important leadership role themselves.⁶⁴ To maintain this arrangement, Bercuson endorsed a “Victorian” separation between officers and NCOs as necessary for good order and discipline to prevail in the army.⁶⁵ This separation could be interpreted as an endorsement of Huntington’s model, accepted by many in the US military, where NCOs are portrayed as having “neither the intellectual skills nor the professional responsibility of the officer.” And as practitioners of a trade, not a profession, they are specialists in the application, but not the management, of violence. But Huntington’s interpretation may be dated given both the recent advances in NCO education and the increased responsibility thrust on NCOs by decentralized operations such as peace support.⁶⁶

The classic models of professionalism used by *Duty with Honour* may not be relevant because of differences in historical experience between the CF and other Western countries, particularly the US. Perhaps the greatest difference between the profession of arms in Canada and the US is the difference between the *raison d’être* of military forces in each country. The CF’s mission is described as: “to defend Canada and Canadian interests and values while contributing to international peace and security.”⁶⁷ American commentators are virtually unanimous in asserting that its military forces exist primarily to achieve victory in war even though the military may be getting mixed messages from its political leaders that sound more like Sir John Hackett’s advice that a military professional’s function is the “ordered application of force in the resolution of a social problem.”⁶⁸ The American military professional literature generally supports the assumption that peacekeeping and other similar missions (often referred to as Military Operations Other than War) are corroding the US Army’s “norms of professional behavior.”⁶⁹ In stark contrast to this American self-perception, the Canadian military’s expertise in United Nations peacekeeping has often been used to define its place in the world and to distinguish it from the armed forces of the US.⁷⁰ Peacekeeping has had an important influence on Canada’s military culture beginning with the United Nations

CHAPTER 3

Emergency Force (UNEF) after the Suez crisis in 1956. Forty years later, 100,000 Canadian troops had participated in more than 30 peacekeeping (both UN and non-UN) operations. Despite widespread public support for peacekeeping,⁷¹ some in the CF saw peacekeeping as a diversion from “the big show” in Germany with NATO and a drain on scarce resources. Peacekeeping nevertheless became so integral to the Canadian Army in the public mind that Canadians tended to forget that armies exist to fight wars.⁷²

This brief sketch of the Canadian military shows how different it was from Huntington’s description of the American military of the same era. From the late 19th and up to the middle of the 20th century, most Canadian officers were amateurs who were an integral part of society, unlike Huntington’s portrayal of the isolated American professional officer at that time. In Canada, there was no equivalent to the professional renaissance that the US army experienced in this period; therefore, it can be concluded that the Canadian and American militaries had very different historical formative experiences prior to the Cold War. And since the Second World War, the CF has been defined in many of Canadian public’s eyes by peacekeeping, an activity explicitly rejected by many commentators in the US as an activity suitable for the American armed forces. Therefore, the use of models of military professionalism based on the American experience, like Huntington’s, may not be appropriate for the CF.

Another reason that the model of professionalism currently used by the CF may not be entirely appropriate for the Canadian profession of arms is its reliance on Anglo-American concepts of professionalism. Until fairly recently, in Canada, our understanding of the role of professions in society has been based on Anglo-American concepts of the professions found in the literature. These models of the professions, reflecting a limited historical experience, have a number of deficiencies. Perhaps the most important, in the military context, is that of presenting the professions in terms of those occupations that possess certain

fairly well defined characteristics. The Anglo-American concepts also minimize the effect of the state on the professions. For armed forces, however, this may not be appropriate. The state has always had a significant influence on the profession of arms, from providing its resources to granting commissions to its officers, often in the name of the head of state, as is the case in Canada. In the Continental model of professionalism, professions were often much more closely aligned with the state than in the Anglo-American world, and have been described as a way the state could infuse specialized knowledge into civil society.⁷³ Green goes even further and suggests that the Continental model may be more appropriate to describe the historical evolution of some professions in the United Kingdom (UK) and the US. He points out that one reason for developing centralized educational systems, including some professional schools, not only in 19th century France but also the UK and the US, was the “need to provide the state with trained administrators, engineers, and military personnel; to spread national cultures and inculcate popular ideologies of nationhood; and so to forge the political and cultural unity of burgeoning nation states, and cement the cultural hegemony of their dominant classes.”⁷⁴ The history of Canada’s RMC supports this assertion,⁷⁵ and so the Continental model may be more applicable to the study of the Canadian profession of arms than the Anglo-American model now in use.

The Canadian historical experience provides one more reason why the CF’s current model of professionalism may need to be modified. *Duty with Honour* notes that “the Canadian profession of arms stands out in terms of the roles NCMs have played” because, they have generally been “assigned a greater scope of responsibility than their colleagues in many other militaries.” Similarly, the most senior NCOs have been described as the “custodians” of the CF’s Senior NCO Corps with responsibility “for the good order and discipline of all subordinates.”⁷⁶ The continued use of NCOs in “[b]uilding effective, cohesive fighting teams instilled with the discipline and skill to prevail in all tasks will remain a primary role of NCOs and warrant officers” is

CHAPTER 3

advocated by *Duty with Honour* as a reason to maintain this characteristic of the Canadian profession of arms.⁷⁷ Perhaps new ideas about the evolution of professions in the 21st century can help us better understand the status the NCMs may have in view of their continuing and their changing roles.

The Future Evolution of the Professions – Implications for the Military

Perceptions of rapid change in society at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries have led to a great deal of speculation about how the professions are changing and evolving. In fact, the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada has allocated substantial funding to promote research into how “the increased speed of technological development and the rapid growth of knowledge are creating unprecedented new opportunities for prosperity and growth, as well as contributing to major social, cultural and personal change...It is crucial to understand the complex and wide-ranging factors that are transforming our firms and their workplaces, our institutions, organizations, households, families and communities.”⁷⁸ This change has direct implications for the Canadian military in two key ways. First of all, the CF are composed of many different professions - traditional professions (such as law, medicine, and engineering) and what have been recently termed “virtual” professions (such as logistics and information management), besides the core profession of arms. Therefore, the CF need to understand not only how the core profession of arms might change, but also how change in other professions might affect their role in the CF. Second, these professions have an influence on how the CF themselves evolve and change. For example, the effect of some professions, notably medicine and law, on the CF chain of command has been discussed elsewhere.⁷⁹ Consequently, the CF must understand how the change in the professions might transform the way in which they influence change in the CF.

An emerging trend in the workplace seems to be that the professions are no longer discrete; there are new functions and activities that are creating new professions. Michael Bloom of the Conference Board of Canada has noted that new “virtual” professions are challenging the older guild model of the professions. He noted that the guild professions (like medicine and law) were typical of many of the older service professions today. They are characterized by difficult entry, one-time competence checks, self-regulation, and a legal responsibility for the actions of their practitioners. Bloom argued that the guild professions must change their gatekeeper or entry systems because they are not very responsive to outside change. On the other hand, the new “virtual” professions, while they are not yet clearly defined, are very good at responding to change. These new professions create products as well as services, have no formal accreditation process and are growing rapidly. An example of the new virtual profession is in the financial services sector. It used to be dominated by the profession described as “banking” and it was seen as a rather conservative, stable profession. This sector is now fluid and in constant flux, and there is no single profession that can claim to be providing financial services. Instead we see many different service providers with a multitude of areas of expertise from insurance to stock derivatives. The expertise in this area is resident in the individuals rather than in a database or professional literature, and because the expertise required to be successful in this field is constantly changing, those practising in this field are constantly modifying their skills and competencies to meet the needs of their clients. As recent business scandals have shown, a major challenge for the future will be how to regulate the virtual professions while accommodating their ability to provide value added and innovation to the economy.⁸⁰ Some examples of virtual professions in the military are in the logistics occupation where “the revolution in business affairs” has affected how support is provided to military forces.⁸¹ These new trends in professions suggest that perhaps we should think less about how professions are constituted as discrete entities and more about how expert knowledge is used and how it will affect society and the military profession.⁸²

CHAPTER 3

The profession of arms has undergone many significant changes in the last 100 years. In fact, it could be argued that, since the First World War, the profession of arms has exhibited some of the characteristics of virtual professions and that the successful adaptation to changes in the nature of conflict by military professionals requires the same innovation skills seen in today's virtual professions.⁸³ Key competencies for professionals of the future will include the ability to work effectively as teams; being able to go beyond just performing a particular job or function (the "how") to articulating why things are done a certain way; being able to deal with information streams as opposed to discrete chunks of information; and possessing inter-cultural nimbleness, the ability to bridge culture gaps in performing professional work. The CF has identified many of these competencies and set goals to impart them to CF members in its recent statements on professional military education.⁸⁴ The challenge will be in meeting the goals as some major human resource obstacles hinder the CF's ability to adapt to change.

The current CF personnel production cycle (job analyses-occupation structure revision-recruiting-training), where it takes eight or more years to go from an Occupational Analysis, which identifies a new skill set that needs to be developed, to actually producing the first qualified people with that skill set, is no longer viable in an environment where the required skills change before the first products of the system can be usefully employed.⁸⁵ Furthermore, today's armed forces consisting of officers and NCOs, and still operating under a system defined by rank, deference and pay structures, reflects the industrial age military's pre-occupation with "standardization, specialization, professionalization, synchronization...[and] centralization," are suitable for a bygone era, and are not appropriate for war in the 21st century, Cohen argues.⁸⁶ In 1994, then Chief of Staff of US Army, General Gordon Sullivan, argued that in the future armed forces must be prepared to operate in the information age, and, therefore must re-structure themselves into less hierarchical learning organizations with the network not the pyramid as the model and

knowledge as capital.⁸⁷ What may be needed is a flatter organization with fewer ranks. *Duty with Honour* acknowledges this trend in military organization and states that “[t]eamwork and collegiality will be emphasized over hierarchy” in the CF of the future. Okros supports this assertion and contends that the current hierarchical “stovepipe” CF human resource system based on an internal labour market and predicated on constraints and assumptions from 30 years ago is no longer viable.⁸⁸ Based on these factors, a complete overhaul of existing rank and MOC structures may be necessary. But until the CF human resource system addresses these problems, the aspirations articulated in *Duty with Honour* for more teamwork and collegiality may come to naught.

Majoor’s three-level model is one approach to addressing these problems and it suggests redefining the relationship between officers and NCOs to create a more effective military. His “three-level structure” proposes a leadership level (open to both officers and NCOs), a technical level (to accommodate those who do not aspire to high leadership positions but prefer to work in teams with other experts), and the subordinate level (to include all those new to the CF or to their jobs).⁸⁹ This model addresses one of the frequent criticisms of today’s Western militaries – that, based on the industrial paradigm of the 20th century there are too many rank levels. As Granatstein has observed, “with eighteen ranks between private and general, there are likely six to eight ranks too many. The reason for this structure was well-intentioned: when there was an earlier pay freeze, the only way NCMs could get more money was for them to be promoted. The result was a plethora of master corporals and WOs. The system desperately cries out for rationalization.”⁹⁰ Majoor’s concept is an innovative one that serves as an example of how to address some of the issues raised here.

Other approaches to these problems, such as the idea of tapping into pools of civilian professionals, can be found in our own history. For example, after the Second World War the RCAF

CHAPTER 3

Auxiliary was composed of formed units of part-time aircrew, mechanics, intelligence analysts, air traffic controllers, meteorologists, administrators, medical personnel, etc. who practised their wartime roles on weekends and in the evenings. Organized into 12 flying squadrons, and more than 35 other units (including four intelligence units), they manned everything from seven fighter squadrons (some equipped with jets) to the ground radars that controlled the interceptors. Most Auxiliary units were located near towns or urban centres to ensure a suitable recruiting base. The Auxiliary's wartime role was to augment and where necessary replace regular RCAF units in Canada so that they could be deployed overseas. A modern version of the RCAF Auxiliary might be a reserve information technology (IT) squadron, along the lines of 5001 Intelligence Unit based in Toronto in the 1950s. It could be formed from some of the many IT specialists who live in the Metropolitan Toronto area. The motivation for belonging to such a squadron would not be financial, but perhaps the chance to work in an area (like national defence) that these specialists cannot work in during their normal employment. Other motivators, like the ones that sustained the RCAF Auxiliary in the 1950s and early 1960s, might be the camaraderie provided by belonging to such a squadron, and the chance to be a member of a prestigious "club" with its own distinctive uniform and mess. This approach would have the potential of getting highly prized technical expertise for the CF at a very low cost, and address some of the problems discussed previously, such as the defects in current hierarchical "stovepipe" CF human resource system based on an internal labour market.⁹¹

Another way for the CF to deal with changes in roles and in the profession of arms is through professional development. *Duty with Honour* suggests that professional development:

must take into account the changing division of responsibility and authority in operations, the growing requirement for the development of common intellectual competencies, and the increasing breadth and depth of

specialist and generalist experience required within both corps... Well-developed critical reasoning, creative thinking and the application of sound judgement will be required. There will also be a greater need for the application of generalist knowledge, as well as a greater demand for technical competence, both theoretical and applied. These trends strongly suggest the need for a growing convergence in the professional development of officers and NCMs.⁹²

However laudable these goals might be in theory, in practice, due to force reductions and high operational tempo, there have been significant problems in finding the time for members of the CF to achieve stated professional development goals.⁹³ Therefore, PD goals must be carefully set based on empirical needs assessments to avoid the situation where the study of “subjects and techniques ‘peripheral to the non-commissioned officer’s primary duties to lead and care for soldiers’” might undermine “the long-term health of the non-commissioned officer corps.”⁹⁴

In its cornerstone manual on the profession of arms, the CF has argued that professional development “must anticipate and prepare members for change based on principles that map and anticipate the changing environment.”⁹⁵ I agree with this sentiment, but I would argue that professional development must be based on a clear understanding of the roles of the officer and NCO corps. One important way to achieve this will be through the development and use of a model of the professions that encompasses both the traditional views of the profession of arms and the new emerging professional realities of the 21st century.

Conclusions

There has been very little study of the nature of Senior NCO Corps in the CF, or other Western armed forces, particularly in the context of the professional status of NCOs. Until recently, the status of the NCO Corps has generally been assumed to be that of

CHAPTER 3

tradespersons supporting the professionals in the military – the officers. However, changes in Canadian society and the CF, plus a greater understanding of NCOs' historical role in the Canadian military, have led to a significant change in the CF's official view of the status of NCOs in the armed forces of Canada. In fact, the recently published cornerstone manual for describing the philosophy and practice of the profession of arms in Canada has explicitly stated that all regular force NCMs are members of the Canadian profession of arms.

Nevertheless, *Duty with Honour* recognizes a distinction between officers and NCOs, with officers expected to have more general knowledge that can be applied at all levels from the tactical to the strategic, whereas NCOs are expected to be technical specialists more focused on tasks at the tactical level and on “the immediate welfare of individual subordinates.” Given the increasingly complex and uncertain operating environment for armed forces at the beginning of the 21st century, *Duty with Honour* argues that NCOs have assumed and will continue to assume greater responsibility; therefore, they will be granted the authority to make decisions in areas that used to be the exclusive preserve of the officer corps. This paper has argued, however, that the assertions in *Duty with Honour* about changing roles for NCOs in the CF are based largely on assumptions related to the Army's experience in recent years. Even though *Duty with Honour* admits that this may well be a difference in the relationship between the officer and NCO corps in the three environments, it does not discuss these potential differences in any detail, let alone address the equally important officer-NCO relationship in the technical occupations both inside and outside the Army. Furthermore, a closer look at the Navy, the Air Force, and “purple” occupations in the CF may suggest roles and officer-NCO relationships that are quite different from those described in *Duty with Honour*.

The nature of changes to the roles of NCOs and the officer-NCO relationship in the CF may not be clearly discernable at the moment for a number of reasons. One reason is that the profession

of arms, like many other professions, is rapidly changing at the beginning of the 21st century. Studies of the evolution of the professions suggest that this is a normal process, and that the concept of a profession changes over time based on the social, economic, and historical context in which the profession exists. The continuous evolution of professions in society may therefore permit only the most general definition of the concept. Many scholars agree that a profession is a discrete type of work, but there is disagreement in the literature about how to differentiate it from other kinds of work. This suggests that previous concepts of the military profession, based on older conceptual frameworks, need to be re-evaluated in the light of the latest scholarship on the subject of professions.

While, in general, *Duty with Honour* is a very useful articulation of the nature of the profession of arms in Canada, its reliance on “classic works” to describe the concept of military professionalism has perpetuated the limitations in these works. The main limitations are the use of Anglo-American concepts of professionalism and concepts of professionalism derived from other countries’ (particularly the US) historical experience. The different Canadian historical experience, the recent dramatic changes in the nature of professionalism, and the distinct role of NCOs in the CF all suggest that a new conceptual model needs to be developed to properly explain the role of the Senior NCO Corps in the CF in the context of professionalism. Only then will the CF be able to clearly understand the role of its Senior NCO Corps now and in the future.

Endnotes

- 1 Ronald G. Haycock, “‘The Stuff of Armies’: The NCO Throughout History,” in Douglas L. Bland, ed. *Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Univ. Press, 2000), 11-12; and Douglas L. Bland, “Preface,” in Bland, ed. *Backbone of the Army*, xi.

CHAPTER 3

2 The CF defines "non-commissioned member" as "any person, other than an officer, who is enrolled in, or who pursuant to law is attached or seconded otherwise than as an officer to, the Canadian Forces, and "non-commissioned officer" as "a member holding the rank of sergeant or corporal." Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, Volume I - Administrative, Chapter 1, Introduction and Definitions. However, the three warrant officer ranks are usually included as part of the NCO Corps. See for example, DND, *Duty with Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Kingston, ON: CF Leadership Institute, 2003), 11, 19.

3 The difference between trades people and professionals is that trades persons or technicians use tools without a comprehensive knowledge of how those tools came to be, whereas a professional, because of his/her understanding of how and why the tools were made, is able to adapt the tools for new uses in innovative ways or to modify them to meet unforeseen requirements. D. J. Bercuson, "Defence Education for 2000...and Beyond," in "Educating Canada's Military: Workshop Report, 7-8 December 1998," Kingston, ON: Royal Military College of Canada, Bercuson, 30.

4 For example, in 1999-2000 it was estimated that 40 percent of the individuals enrolled in the RMC Continuing Studies university degree program were NCMs. Camille Tkacz, "The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member Professional Development System," Bland, ed. *Backbone of the Army Backbone*, 107.

5 Members of the primary reserve on "active duty" are "accorded professional status." *Duty with Honour*, 11.

6 *Duty with Honour*, 19-20.

7 *Ibid.*, 75. This view was shared by NCOs attending a Symposium on the NCO in the future army in June 1999, Bland, "Preface," xv.

8 *Ibid.*, 7.

9 *Ibid.*, 6.

10 See *Duty with Honour*, 7-8, especially Figure 1-1 and the use of Huntington's identity-expertise-responsibility triad as the "Theoretical Construct of the Profession of Arms in Canada." Huntington used the term "corporateness" instead of "identity."

11 Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," *Orbis* 43, no. 1 (Winter 1999), 24-5.

12 *Duty with Honour*, 10-11.

13 *Ibid.*, 11.

14 *Ibid.*, 15.

15 Ibid., 11. This view was supported by NCOs attending a Symposium on the NCO in the future army in June 1999, Bland, "Preface," x.

16 Ibid., 19.

17 Ibid., 64.

18 An excellent description of the Senior NCO Corps' role in the Army is found in Bernd Horn, "A Timeless Strength: The Army's Senior NCO Corps," *Canadian Military Journal* 3, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 39-47. No similar description exists for the Navy or Air Force.

19 *Duty with Honour*, 18.

20 Allan English, Richard Gimblett, Lynn Mason, and Mervyn Berridge Sills, "Command Styles in the Canadian Navy," report prepared for Defence Research and Development Canada, draft dated 23 Nov 2004, 131.

21 C.P. Stacey, *Arms, Men and Governments*, 66, 305; and W.R. Feasby, ed., *The Official History of the Canadian Medical Services 1939-1945* (Ottawa: Queen's Printer), 512.

22 The custom of choosing leaders from among pilots was less predominant in maritime patrol and maritime helicopter squadrons where naval traditions had some influence and there was less concern with the occupation of squadron and flight commanders as long as they were aircrew. See James F. Johnson, "Air Navigators and Squadron Command Opportunities," *Canadian Forces Polaris* 2, no. 1 (1973), 40-1. Issues of aircrew leadership also were raised by me in a number of presentations to air force officers starting in 1999 and first published as Allan English, "Leadership and Command in the Air Force: Can Non-Aircrew Command Flying Squadrons?" paper given at the 6th Air Force Historical Conference, Cornwall, ON, 21-23 June 2000. In Office of Air Force Heritage and History, ed. *Proceedings: 6th Annual Air Force Historical Conference*. Winnipeg, MB: Air Force History and Heritage, 2000, 79-86.

23 Bland, "Preface," x. The notion of leadership differences between combat arms and "technical corps" was recognized in the British Army as early as the beginning of the 20th century. Allan English, "The Masks of Command: Leadership Differences in the Canadian Army, Navy, and Air Force," paper given at the Conference on Leadership in the Armies of Tomorrow and the Future, Kingston, ON, 6-7 Feb 2002 and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Kingston ON, 25-27 October 2002, 11.

24 See English, "The Masks of Command" for a detailed treatment of this topic.

CHAPTER 3

25 *Duty with Honour*, 74.

26 These issues are discussed in more detail in Allan D. English, "Professionalism and the Military - Past, Present, and Future: A Canadian Perspective." Paper written for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, May 2002. <http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/cfli/engraph/research/pdf/21.pdf>

27 Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996), 163-4, 177, note 41.

28 Martin Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 79-80.

29 Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 163, 176, note 39.

30 Edmonds, *Armed Services and Society*, 81.

31 Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique," 165.

32 The essence of Huntington's views on professionalism was endorsed by senior Department of National Defence leaders at a 1999 conference on the profession of arms in Canada and are also found in DWH. See General Maurice Baril, "Keynote Address: The State of the Profession of Arms in the Canadian Forces," presented at Conference of Defence Associations Institute XVth Annual Seminar, 1999 - The Profession of Arms in Canada: Past. Present and Future <http://www.cda-cdai.ca/english-frame.htm>; and note 10 above.

33 Robert D. Kaplan, "Looking the World in the Eye," *The Atlantic Monthly* 280, no. 5 (December 2001), 70, 72-4.

34 See Allan English, "The Operational Art: Theory, Practice, and Implications for the Future." Paper written for the Canadian Forces College, March 2003, 18-20 for an overview of this issue.

35 Kaplan, "Looking the World in the Eye," 72.

36 *Oxford English Dictionary*, 6th ed. (1980), 339.

37 Edward M. Coffman, "The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*," *The Journal of Military History* 55 (January 1991), 76-77.

38 American historian James Abrahamson cited in Coffman, "The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*," 78.

39 Coffman, "The Long Shadow of *The Soldier and the State*," 69, 81.

40 *Ibid.*, 71, 73, 82.

41 Huntington cited in Kaplan, "Looking the World in the Eye," 78.

42 See for example Williamson Murray, "Military Culture Does Matter," *Strategic Review* 27, no. 2 (Spring 1999), 32-40; and Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," *Orbis* 43, no. 1 (Winter 1999), 15-26. This debate is discussed in a Canadian context in

Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), chapters 5 and 6.

43 Stephen Wilson, "For a Socio-Historical Approach to the Study of Western Military Culture," *Armed Forces and Society* 6, no. 4 (Summer 1980), 544.

44 James Burk, "Expertise, Jurisdiction, and Legitimacy of the Military Profession," paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Baltimore, MD, 19-21 October 2001 (dated June 2001), 1.

45 British sociologist T.H. Marshall cited in Burk, "Expertise...", 5.

46 Eliot Freidson, *Professionalism: The Third Logic* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001), 103.

47 Burk, "Expertise...", 5-6, 9.

48 Jacques Barzun, "The Professions Under Siege," in Malham M. Wakin, ed., *War, Morality, and the Military Profession* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 124-5, 128, 130, 132.

49 Max Lerner, "The Shame of the Professions" in Wakin, *War, Morality, and the Military Profession*, 138.

50 "Second Interim Report of the Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces," nd [July 1999], can be found at http://www.dnd.ca/menu/press/Reports/monitor_com/eng/leader_e.htm, chapter 5, "observations," np.

51 Freidson, *Professionalism*, 95.

52 These issues are discussed in more detail in English, "Professionalism and the Military."

53 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia [hereafter Somalia Commission], *Dishonoured Legacy: The Lessons of the Somalia Affair* (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1997), Vol. 1, 81-2.

54 It should be noted that our allies have not always maintained the professional standards ascribed to them. For example, in the mid-1990s at a conference on Defence Education in the Americas, General Charles E. Wilhelm, then Commander-in-Chief of the US Southern Command, described US military officers of the 1960s as trades people, proficient in the technicalities of war but uneducated in the social context which must invariably shape the US military. Bercuson, , "Defence Education for 2000...and Beyond," 27.

55 Stephen J. Harris, "Tracking Development of Canadian

CHAPTER 3

Leadership and Practice,” presentation at Conference on Leadership in the Armies of Tomorrow and the Future 6-7 February 2002, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, ON.

56 Much of this section is based on the section on professionalism in English, “Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective.”

57 Somalia Commission, Vol. 1, 80, 83.

58 *Duty with Honour*, 4, 9, 20, 26, 73.

59 Ibid, 26.

60 Stephen J. Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army 1860-1939* (Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press, 1988), 210-1, 215-20.

61 Freidson, *Professionalism*, 97.

62 See Richard A. Preston, *To Serve Canada: A History of the Royal Military College Since the Second World War* (Ottawa: Univ. of Ottawa Press, 1991); and Richard A. Preston, *Canada's RMC* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1969), for a detailed account of this story.

63 Charles B. Breslin, “Organizational Culture and the Military,” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2000), 12.

64 See Horn, “A Timeless Strength,” 44-5 for a description of the NCO's role as a leader.

65 David Bercuson, *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996), 35, 37, 62-3.

66 Snider, “An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture,” 24-5.

67 “Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy for 2020,” The Defence Mission, 2.

68 Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr, *The US Military into the Twenty-First Century* (London: Frank Cass, 1999), ix-x, 24; Hackett cited in Sarkesian and Connor, 19; and Snider et al., *Army Professionalism...*, 18.

69 Don M. Snider, et al., *Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1999), 2, 21

70 J.L. Granatstein, “The American Influence on the Canadian Military,” in B.D. Hunt and R.G. Haycock, eds., *Canada's Defence* (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 132, 134, 137.

71 In 1943, 73 percent of Canadians supported a postwar peacekeeping force even if it meant Canadian servicemen might be killed serving in it. Cited in Alex Morrison and Suzanne M. Plain, “The Canadian UN Policy: An Historical Assessment,” in Hans-Georg Ehrhart and David G. Haglund, eds., *The “New Peacekeeping” and European Security*

(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1993), 167. Twenty years later 75 percent of Canadians supported Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping forces. Cited in John Paul and Jerome Lauglicht, *In Your Opinion: Leaders' and Voters' Attitudes on Defence and Disarmament* (Clarkson, ON: Canadian Peace Research Institute, 1963), 16.

72 Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 58-60.

73 Magali Sarfatti Larson, "In the Matter of Experts and Professionals, or How Impossible it is to Leave Nothing Unsaid," in Torstendahl and Burrage, eds. *The Formation of Professions* (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 44.

74 A. Green cited in Freidson, *Professionalism*, 85.

75 Thirteen of the first 18 graduates of RMC (who started their courses in 1876) "had careers that were primarily civilian." Preston, *Canada's RMC*, 75.

76 *Duty with Honour*, 15.

77 *Ibid.*, 74.

78 Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, "INE [Initiative on the New Economy] Theme: General New Economy Issues," http://www.sshrc.ca/web/apply/background/ine_general_issues_e.asp.

79 G.E. (Joe) Sharpe and Allan English, *Principles for Change in the Post-Cold War Command and Control in the Canadian Forces*, (Kingston, ON: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002) 61-2.

80 Michael Bloom, presentation to Queen's University and Canadian Defence Academy Workshop on work and learning in the professions held in Kingston, ON, 11-12 April, 2002.

81 See for example Norman Williams, "Revolution in Military Logistics," *Military Technology* 21, no. 11 (November 1997), 50-3.

82 Larson, "In the Matter of Experts and Professionals...", 25.

83 See Michael Howard, "Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914," in Paret, 510-26, for an account of innovation in doctrinal development in that war that refutes the myth that this was a static war in intellectual as well as geographical terms.

84 See for example, Vice Admiral G.L. Garnett, VCDS, "Foreward," *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020): Strategic Guidance for the CF Officer Corps and the OPD System* dated 8 Mar 2001.

85 Al Okros, "Into the Twenty-first Century: Strategic Human-Resources Issues," in Bland, ed. *Backbone of the Army*, 40-1.

86 Eliot A Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996), 38, 48.

87 Cited in Stephane Lefebvre, et al., "The Revolution in Military

CHAPTER 3

Affairs': its implications for doctrine and force development within the US Army," in B.J.C. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, eds. *The Operational Art: Developments in the Theories of War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), 179.

88 Al Okros, "Into the Twenty-first Century," 25-46.

89 Arthur Majoor, "The End of the Non-Commissioned Officer Corps?" in Bland, ed. *Backbone of the Army*, 118-19.

90 "Granatstein Report," Minister Young's Letter to the Prime Minister, 27 Mar 1997, <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/Granatstein/gra2main.html>.

91 Allan English, "Personnel for Space Operations," in Dennis Margueratt and Allan English, eds. *Space in the 21st Century* (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2000), 109-12.

92 *Duty with Honour*, 75.

93 This problem is recognized in *The Canadian Forces Non-Commissioned Member in the 21st Century* (NCM Corps 2020) http://www.cda.forces.gc.ca/2020/engraph/ncm/ncm_e.asp, pp. II-15, II-17. The US Air Force recently conducted a major restructuring of its professional development to address this problem. See General John Jumper, "Total Force Development," USAF *Chief's Sight Picture* (6 Nov 2002).

94 Bland, "Preface," xviii.

95 *Duty with Honour*, 75.

CHAPTER 4

Adaptive Skills as a Basis for Leadership Success in the Canadian Military with an Emphasis on Special Operations



Steven F. Cronshaw and Damian F. O’Keefe

Although the topic of leadership has been under investigation for many years, it remains an elusive concept that is still not well understood. Gary Yukl, a well-known, leadership researcher, captures this sentiment with the statement:

... the field of leadership has been in a state of ferment and confusion for decades. The field has been rushed from one fad to the next, but the actual pace of theory development has been quite slow. Most leadership theories are beset with conceptual weaknesses and lacking in strong empirical support. Several thousand empirical studies have been conducted on leadership effectiveness, but many of the results are contradictory and inconclusive.¹

Although as stated above, there have been many studies in leadership, which have proposed numerous models of leader selection and development, theoretical models specific to Special Operations Forces (SOF) units are virtually non-existent.

SOF leaders work in an asymmetric environment in that the organizational structure is much flatter than in conventional

CHAPTER 4

Canadian Forces (CF) operations. Units are much smaller, and soldiers often work independently and without immediate direction from the leader. Indeed, in an SOF environment, the emphasis is placed less on the ability to work within a large organization and more on individual self-reliance. Often SOF soldiers find themselves in situations that are in a high state of flux, and they are unable to wait for orders from superiors. Thus, it is imperative that they use their own initiative.² To this end, SOF soldiers require leaders who are highly adaptive and empowering in that they readily accept input from soldiers and transfer ownership of the mission to the troops, in order to deal with the changing demands of the SOF environment. That is, SOF leaders need to have highly tuned adaptive skills, and be transformational in their leadership style.

We contend that SOF leadership, or leadership in any context, is built on a scaffolding of adaptive skills. This chapter presents a definition of adaptive skills and shows how these skills can be measured. A dynamic model of adaptive skills also is presented, and we demonstrate that this model adds depth and realism to existing thinking about leadership in the CF, especially as it applies to the rigorous physical, informational, and teamwork demands faced by SOF personnel. We also will demonstrate that adaptive skills are directly analogous to broader conceptions of CF unit effectiveness, particularly as described by Quinn's competing values model of organizational effectiveness. Using the adaptive skill concept thereby allows the CF to tightly draw together the concerns of individual soldier readiness and effectiveness with group and unit effectiveness on the larger scale (e.g., platoon, company, and regiment).

Quinn's Model of Competing Values Model of Organizational Effectiveness

The CF effectiveness framework, as presented in the document *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, is based on Quinn's Competing Values model of organizational

effectiveness.³ Quinn characterized organizations as complex, dynamic and contradictory systems.⁴ Indeed, "...a defining characteristic of the Competing Values model is that it assumes contradiction and conflict to be recurring and natural features of organization life".⁵ As such, Quinn's model of effectiveness at the macro or organizational level is similar in underlying approach to the adaptive skill model that will be proposed in this chapter for understanding leadership and individual effectiveness at the micro level of analysis.

Although comprising numerous values, the competing values model has two main dimensions: a Control-Flexibility dimension, and an Internal-External Focus dimension (see Figure 1).




FIGURE 1 - Quinn's Competing Values model of Organizational Effectiveness

CHAPTER 4

Embedded within these dimensions are four opposing quadrants: Human Relations, Open Systems, Rational Goal, and Internal Process. More specifically, the Human Relations quadrant emphasizes flexibility and internal focus. It stands in contrast to the Rational Goal quadrant, which emphasizes control and external focus. The Open System quadrant emphasizes flexibility and external focus, whereas, the Internal Process quadrant emphasizes control and internal focus.⁶ Taken as a whole, the Competing Values model portrays these quadrants as mutually existing within organizations, in that all four quadrants form a model that illustrates the challenges or competing values that occur in most organizations. Most importantly, these major themes play out in the Canadian Forces and the Quinn model provides a powerful conceptual model for understanding CF operations, including the SOF, from top to bottom.

Quinn postulates that the four above approaches coexist in all organizations, and that effective organizations strive to be adaptable and flexible, while at the same time wanting to be stable and controlled. In fact, he argues that highly effective organizations are those who are able to maintain a balance among these competing values.⁷ This is a similar argument in its main features to that made in this chapter concerning the determinants of individual leader effectiveness. When applied to day-to-day operations within an organization such as the CF, Quinn's Competing Values model of effectiveness stipulates that these seemingly contrasting approaches may occur simultaneously and that, in different contexts, effective managers may exhibit contrasting leader characteristics. In other words, in one situation, effective leader performance may require being externally focused and flexible in decision making, while in another context, effective performance may entail being internally focused and more controlling.⁸ Central to this model is the leader's ability to adequately adapt to an ever-changing environment of operations. This adaptability is crucial to leader effectiveness, as well as to the operational effectiveness of the organization as a whole. It captures the essence of adaptive skills, a matter that we will

expand on at some length in the next section of this chapter. We will now present a model of adaptability that we believe is ideally suited to the leadership within the CF and we further illustrate this adaptive skill model by applying it to special operations.

A Competing Values Model of Leader Adaptive Skills

A very important skill set required of leaders, and the one on which all other skill sets are based, is the ability to adapt to a changing environment. Adaptive skills are those competencies that enable the individual to manage the self in relation to conformity and change and accept and adjust to the physical, interpersonal and organizational arrangements present in the work environment.⁹ Cronshaw and his colleagues have presented and tested a dynamic model of adaptive skill that parallels Quinn's model of organizational effectiveness in important respects.¹⁰ It will be useful to review some major points from this work.

The Adaptive Skills Modeling (ASM) is comprised of three components that, although inherently oppositional in nature, are held in balance by the adaptive individual (see Table 1). The first ASM component is the *Locus* of the CF members' involvements in their role as it contributes to mission success. The member is involved with three aspects of the evolving situations that they find themselves in: Physical, Informational, and Social. For the SOF soldier, physical involvements include the handling of weapons, maintenance of equipment, and movement across varying types of terrain. His or her informational involvements include the understanding of operational orders, reading of maps, planning tactical maneuvers, and so on. Social involvements include interactions with fellow team members before, during, and after the mission. When understood as functional skills, these physical, informational, and social involvements are called Things, Data, and People functional skills, respectively, and can be arranged in the functional skill hierarchies given in Figure 2. The levels within

CHAPTER 4

ADAPTIVE SKILLS COMPONENTS	ADAPTIVE SKILL	DESCRIPTION
LOCUS	Physical (Things)	Involves physical interaction with things that are tangibles, such as office equipment, factory tools and machinery, or motor vehicles
	Information (Data)	Involves utilizing information, ideas, facts and statistics
	Social (People)	Involves dealing with the complexity of interpersonal behaviour which occurs in live interaction between people
FOCUS	Inward-Directed	Involves moving away from the external surroundings towards the inner world of thought, feelings, and interpretations (i.e., receiving)
	Outward-Directed	Involves moving away from apprehensions of internal states towards events and conditions of the external world (i.e., seeking)
PURPOSE	Agentic	Involves striving and achieving in the work environment
	Accommodative	Involves being open to the experiences of others as well as to environment conditions

TABLE 1 - Overview of Adaptive Skills

these functional hierarchies are arranged from the bottom to the top of the figure in order of their complexity. As can be seen in that figure, leadership is the most complex People functional skill.

Cronshaw, in his work on the development of leadership, has described how the skills in the People hierarchy (furthest to the right in Figure 2) develop from an early age until they reach their




FIGURE 2 - Functional Job Analysis (FJA) Worker Function Chart
(reproduced from Fine and Cronshaw, 1999)

CHAPTER 4

highest level of complexity in Leadership.¹¹ The typical developmental progression from infancy to old age in People skill is illustrated in Figure 3. It is important to note that this figure represents the progression that will be made in People functional skill complexity if (and only if) the individual eventually reaches the highest level of People skill (i.e., leadership). Many people, in fact most, will not reach the highest levels of People functional skill. Most people will acquire medium levels of People functional skill by old age and will have gone no higher (the same holds for Things and Data functional skill as well). Recent research results by Cronshaw and colleagues show that the constructive assertion (i.e., the highest level of performance, which involves the assertion of oneself into the environment to try to modify, control, and master environmental circumstances)¹² of the adaptive skill needed to resource movement to the highest level of People functional skill is never achieved by most people in our society.¹³ The result is a severe shortage of leadership skills in our society generally, as well as shortages of the highest level Things and Data skills. There are obvious, and crucially important, implications for leadership in the Canadian military.

It is important that we be clear on our definition of leadership, so that the ASM model we are presenting here is not misinterpreted or over-extended in its application. We define leadership, as did Cronshaw and associates, as follows:

Sets forth/ asserts a vision that has an impact upon and defines the mission, culture, and values on an organization; sets direction, time perspective, and organizational structure for achievement of goals and objectives; models behavior that inspires and motivates achievement (distinct from management).¹⁴

There is a tendency and temptation to extend the leadership concept to describe activities that are of only medium People complexity (e.g., lower level managerial or supervisory relationships). The ASM applies perfectly well to understanding




FIGURE 3 - Typical development of People skill

acquisition of People functional skills found in managerial situations, but it is important not to conflate all management and supervision activities with leadership *per se*.

CHAPTER 4

We will now sum up some overall points about Locus as given within the ASM. It contains not just descriptive information about the desirable attributes of leaders, but it shows how adaptive and functional skills (including the People functional skill) develop from early childhood. Furthermore, the ASM is a dynamic model that shows how a changing structure of adaptive skill impels the acquisition of functional skills up to their highest levels of complexity. This rich theoretical understanding of leadership and its development is central to the proper use of the ASM, as this chapter will show.

The second ASM component is inward- versus outward-directed *Focus*. *Inward-directed Focus* occurs when moving away from the external surround towards the inner world of thought, feelings, and interpretations (i.e., receiving), and *outward-directed Focus* occurs when the person moves away from apprehensions of internal states towards events and conditions of the external world (i.e., seeking). This component of the model has an oppositional structure similar to that of External Adaptability and Internal Integration in Quinn's model. Individual adaptability in a specific environment is achieved by balancing the tensions set up between inward- and outward-directed Focus in much the same way that Quinn's Competing Values Model "captures these tensions [External vs. Internal] in its oppositional structure".¹⁵ The expert application of adaptive skills thereby requires the continuous reconciliation and balancing of inward- and outward-directed tendencies.

There is empirical support for the operation of inward-vs. outward-directed Focus. As with the locus component of the ASM, Focus is best understood within the developmental progression of the individual. Cronshaw presented empirical results showing that human personality at work experiences a major tension between inward- vs. outward-directed Focus during the age-twenty cohort.¹⁶ This tension is largely resolved by the time people are in their 30s, but often at a low level of adaptability. Cronshaw's findings parallel those of developmental psychologists who report

high levels of adolescent egocentrism with a “spike” in this egotistic tendency during early adulthood.¹⁷ The pattern found by developmental psychologists is that of self centration – an obsessive preoccupation with one’s own concerns to the exclusion of others. The analogous tendency in the ASM is a predominating inward-directed Focus for people in their adolescent and young adult years, albeit one that often is of a non-adaptive kind. However, there are large individual differences in self-centration, even in early adulthood, and some CF members will have good potential to constructively assert in this adaptive area even in their 20’s (these are individuals that should be targeted by SOF recruitment). For many people, however, negative self-centration will persist as a theme throughout their life course. The prognosis for these individuals as SOF soldiers, especially as leaders, is very poor because they will not be able to achieve the balance between inward- vs. outward-directed Focus that is demanded by the ASM if people are to move to the higher levels of effective People functional skill culminating in leadership. Leadership will be beyond their reach, now and always, because they will lack the adaptive skills needed to resource it.

An example from the SOF context should help to illustrate the operation and importance of inward- vs. outward-directed Focus within the ASM. In this following example, the locus of involvement of the SOF soldier is physical and not primarily interpersonal. As the SOF soldier moves toward the mission objective in the rugged mountainous terrain in Afghanistan, he must constantly maintain an inward-directed Focus by monitoring his energy level and state of physical readiness. If he does not do this, and so becomes exhausted from physical exertion, mission success will be severely compromised even before the objective is reached. However, the soldier also must be vigilant in maintaining an outward-directed Focus on conditions in the external environment: the gradient of the ascent path up the mountain, the load and balance of equipment on his back, the possible appearance of enemy combatants, and so on. The point is that inward- and outward-directed foci are not independent or

CHAPTER 4

mutually exclusive in any way. Both must be maintained at a high level of attention and preparedness. One depends on the other: It is the constant seamless movement back and forth between the foci – the reconciliation of the tensions that naturally occur between internally- and externally-directed Focus that results in excellent performance and mission success. The soldier cannot engage in one to the exception of the other, but must allocate a due amount of attention and effort to each while creatively and effortfully utilizing the tensions that are thereby created to produce unique and highly adaptive solutions to emerging opportunities, problems and challenges during the mission. To take an example: The soldier, closely monitoring his internal energy reserves, realizes that he is reaching the point where his contribution to the mission will soon become doubtful. He informs the other team members (an action requiring outward-directed Focus) of the difficulty and together the team identifies an alternate route to the objective that is less physically exhausting and more economical in using the soldiers' efforts. Without the careful balancing and integration of inward- and outward-directed Focus, individual adaptability to changing circumstances of the physical environment cannot be achieved. The SOF mission may fail as a result.

The third ASM component is agentic versus accommodative *Purpose*. People can respond to situations in either an *agentic* (i.e., striving and achieving in the work situations) or *accommodative* (i.e., being open to the experience of others as well as to the immediacy of prevailing environmental conditions) manner.¹⁸ The concept of agentic (expressiveness) versus accommodative (instrumental) Purpose is also the basis for androgyny theory, which states that people can take a predominantly agentic stance in their relations with others, or an accommodative stance. Agentic people strive and achieve in the work situation, while accommodative people are open to the experience of others as well as to the immediacy of prevailing environmental conditions. Some people take neither an agentic nor accommodative, but an androgynous role, which will be either agentic or accommodative

in behaviour as required by the situational circumstances.¹⁹ Again, the adaptability issue is one of balance between oppositional tendencies of agency and accommodation. Both are needed, but in the right measure for the given circumstances. Opportunities are uniquely capitalized on, and problems creatively solved, when the inherent tensions between agency and accommodation are tackled and reconciled by the SOF soldier as demanded by the specific circumstances of the mission.

Let us again consider the example of the SOF soldier who is trekking, loaded with gear and weapons, with his team on mission through the mountains of Afghanistan. He has informed his comrades of his deteriorating physical condition. An adaptive response by the team leader and his team members will be a complex mixture of agency and accommodation. On the agentic side, the mission must continue, but to insist on the present path through the mountains without accommodating the feedback of the wearied soldier will be an overly-rigid response that probably will result in mission failure. Each of the team members will have to contribute to a solution that is realistic to the facts of the situation. To return to an earlier theme, the team members will have to direct effort inward to resist the temptation to blame or belittle the tired soldier while at the same time directing attention outward to the physical (i.e., geographical) realities of the situation. The optimal solution will lead to mission success while also maintaining the trust and esprit de corps of the team. As the mission evolves, the mix of agency and accommodation that is required will shift on an ongoing basis but, regardless of the relative emphasis on one versus the other, the achievement of mission success will depend on the dynamic, careful, and effortful balancing and reconciliation of these oppositional tendencies.

Although it appears intuitive that adaptive skills would be a critical attribute of a SOF leader, there is little published research on the subject at this point. This is not surprising in that most research on SOF units is usually classified as secret. One paper however, reported on the development of a 3 1/2-day adaptive

CHAPTER 4

thinking course for US SF Leaders.²⁰ The authors defined adaptability as effective change in response to an altered situation, and designed a training program based on a model of adaptability developed by Pulakos and colleagues.²¹ The program was designed to train SF Leaders in four aspects of adaptability: Mental (i.e., critical thinking, problem solving, and decision making), Interpersonal (i.e., dealing with changing social demands of a situation), Physical (i.e., performing changing physical tasks), and Leading adaptable teams (i.e., communication and leadership in a changing environment). The ASM presented here contains similar components to Pulakos et al. (notably the Physical/ Things, Mental/ Data, and Interpersonal/ People aspects) under the locus component, but also it adds additional depth to understanding the dynamic operation of adaptive skill by incorporating the additional components of inward versus outward Focus and agentic versus accommodative Purpose.

In another model, Paulhaus and Martin developed the concept of functional flexibility as a form of adaptive skills, and argued that the more flexible individual is the one who is capable of showing a wider range of situation-appropriate behavioural responses that are both positive and negative in nature.²² The authors developed the Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities (BIC) to assess functional flexibility. The measure assesses 16 different realms that were adopted from a psychological taxonomy of trait-descriptive terms postulated by Wiggins in the early 1970s.²³ These capabilities include; Ambitious, Dominant, Arrogant, Calculating, Cold, Quarrelsome, Aloof, Introverted, Lazy, Submissive, Unassuming, Ingenuous, Warm, Agreeable, Gregarious, Extraverted. The scale asks respondents a number of questions about their ability to adjust their behaviour based on situational demands. For example, in assessing dominance (i.e., the ability to be commanding or forceful when required) items include:

1. How capable are you of being dominant when the situation requires it?

2. How difficult is it for you to be dominant when the situation requires it?
3. How anxious would you feel about being dominant when the situation requires it?
4. How often do you avoid situations where you need to be dominant?

The major shortcoming of this research is that it describes adaptability in terms of individual difference characteristics similar to personality traits. Cronshaw on the other hand defines adaptability as a joint function of the transaction between person and environment.²⁴ He states that adaptabilities can only be properly understood if we know the context (i.e., specific operational parameters and conditions) to which the person is asked to adapt. Knowledge of the individual's adaptability in terms of very general personality "traits" or generalized competencies abstracted from, but ultimately outside of, the gritty realities of SOF soldier (as is done in the other adaptability research described above) are limited as tools for increasing the adaptability and effectiveness of SOF soldiers.

We believe that the greatest advantage of the ASM over the more conventional theories postulated by Pulakos and colleagues and by Paulhaus and Martin is the ability of the ASM to describe the dynamic adaptive processes of people as they transact with changing, but specific, environmental circumstances to achieve important goals. The ASM provides a theoretically grounded, but experientially validated, means to understand how adaptability is developed as people transact with different environments as a normal part of human development. It emphasizes the fact that adaptive skills are foundational to the acquisition and use of all other skills that are used in the expression of leadership, regardless of the expected role (e.g., SOF soldier) and special circumstances (e.g., assaulter on a mission in the Middle East). Further, the ASM reflects the dynamism of adaptive skill

CHAPTER 4

acquisition and use in a way that temporally static models such as those of Pulakos and colleagues, and Paulhaus & Martin cannot. It extends this dynamic approach to understanding the evolution of adaptive and functional skill throughout the individual's life course. The model also achieves the right balance of generality (in terms of adaptive and functional skill) and specificity (in terms of particular environmental circumstances) needed to best understand the source and nature of a CF member's contributions to the overall objectives of his or her unit and organization.

The Relationship of Adaptive Skills to Transformational Leadership

Research into the ideal military officer selection has centered on constructs described in transformational leadership. It therefore will be informative to review the concept of transformational leadership as it is applied in the military, and to explicitly link it to the adaptive skill model proposed in this chapter. The construct of transformational leadership was initially developed by Burns in the 1970s, and was based on his qualitative analysis of various political leaders.²⁵ The essence of transformational leadership, as articulated by Burns, is to transform followers into leaders. In the development of the model, Burns described leadership styles in terms of a transformational and transactional relationship between the leader and follower, and considered these two leadership styles as quite distinct from each other. Advocates of transformational leadership often view transformational leadership as being preferable as a means of influencing followers in all circumstances, a view that (as a universal rule) is contradicted by the adaptive skills model.

Transformational leaders address the followers' motives by encouraging them to consider the moral and ethical consequences of their actions and goals, above and beyond satisfying their self-interest. Generally speaking, the "... transformational leader emphasizes what you can do for your country; [while on the other hand] the transactional leader, [places emphasis] on what your

country can do for you”.²⁶ Transformational leaders inspire others with their own vision, with the goal of getting others to support their mission.²⁷ As one example, cadets at the US Virginia Military Academy described good military leaders as those having strong self confidence, the ability to articulate one’s ideas (charisma), and providing models to be emulated by others (inspiration), concern for the well being of others (individual consideration), and keeping others well informed (intellectual stimulation).²⁸ The transformational leader is thought to serve as a role model for perseverance and self-sacrifice, and by doing so, has a strong and positive influence over followers’ personal values.²⁹ Followers feel trust and respect toward the leader, and are motivated to do more than originally expected of them.³⁰ We will explore this theme of trust further in the next section, in connection with the adaptive skill question.

The CF has recently endorsed transformational leadership as a highly regarded and commendable approach for leaders. “As used in the CF, transformational leadership is rooted in the value systems of the Canadian military ethos ... [and is] especially valuable in an environment of multiple adaptive challenges and where trust and dedication of others are critical to success.”³¹ Indeed, as stated in *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* “... behaviours associated with transformational leadership (exemplary personal commitment to duty, motivating and enabling others through ideas and deeds, individualized consideration of others) are highly congruent with CF institutional values [i.e., Duty, Loyalty, Integrity and Courage], and ought to be cultivated in training and consistently in line units and staff organizations.”³² When exceptionally high levels of adaptive skill are used to resource the pre-eminent People skill of leadership, the result, in some respects and in some situations at least, will resemble transformational leadership.

We noted earlier the belief by many that transformational leadership is the preferable leadership style in all situations. Some top experts contest this view. In the 1960s, Bass reported that no

CHAPTER 4

matter where you put some people they will emerge as leaders; however, their preferred leadership style (for example, transactional vs. transformational) very often depends on the situation.³³ Moreover, Stogdill, in the 1970s, argued that the attributes and skills required of a good leader are largely determined by the demands of the situation in which he/she is to function as a leader.³⁴ For example, when a group is in a hostile environment, using intellectual stimulation to inspire subordinates may not be the most appropriate leadership approach. In fact, subordinates expect the leaders to be more assertive, directive and decisive in crisis situations. In a study conducted on leadership in crisis versus non-crisis situations, in crisis situations, effective leaders (as rated by subordinates) displayed more forceful leadership approaches such as expert power (e.g. knowledge-based), formal power (e.g. position based) and upward influence (eg. ability to influence superiors) and less open consultation (e.g. soliciting feedback from subordinates). Conversely, in non-crisis situations, effective leaders used more open consultation and less forceful leadership behaviors.³⁵

Military troops often find themselves in an unstable, complex and changing environment, where the goal of the mission can be ambiguous. Recent research highlighting the importance of strong leadership in this context postulates the concept of *In Extremis* Leadership, which is defined as giving purpose, motivation and direction to followers when there is eminent physical danger and where followers believe that leader behaviour will influence their physical well-being or survival.³⁶ Tom Kolditz, a US Army Colonel and leadership researcher, describes the *In Extremis* leadership pattern as being characterized by inherent motivation (i.e., the danger of the situation energizes those who are in it), learning orientation (i.e., potential hostility of the situation places a premium on leaders scanning the environment and learning very rapidly), shared risk (i.e., willingness to share the same, or more risk as followers), and common lifestyle (i.e., accepting and embracing a lifestyle that is common to their followers as an expression of values, which becomes part of the

credibility of the leader). According to Kolditz, when operating *In Extremis*, transactional leaders are ineffective, and instead a value-based form of transformational leadership emerges and becomes part of the operating style in this situation.

We believe that Kolditz, although he appears convincing in his assertions that transactional leadership is counterproductive in *In Extremis* situations, makes the same fundamental logical error as those he is criticizing. That is, Kolditz sets out to define the normative leadership pattern that is best in all situations (albeit he limits his discussion to all *In Extremis* leadership situations). The adaptive skill model again shows that the attempt to identify a leadership taxonomy to cover all possible circumstances, even when limited to *In Extremis* situations, is doomed to failure. Any such “law” of human behavior is subject to disconfirmation by a single exception at a single time, and such disconfirmation, cannot be long in coming when Kolditz’s predictions are applied to SOF soldiers on mission. To summarize our basic points and to gain further clarity about the differences between transformational leadership and the adaptive skills model, we make the following two points to close out this section of the chapter:

(1) The ASM does not ask leaders to choose between transformational and transactional styles of leadership. Either may be appropriate, depending on the circumstances facing the leader and followers. Even coercive leadership (which is strongly discouraged by many transformational leadership advocates) may be appropriate under some circumstances in SOF operations. The ASM stresses that leader adaptability requires that the fullest possible range of constructively assertive responses be available to the leader as behavioral repertoires across the full possible range of SOF contexts. Whether these desired actions are referred to as transformational leadership or something else is a labeling exercise that is largely the concern of researchers, not of operational commanders. To preemptively (and presumptuously) stereotype a soldier as a transformational leader or a transactional leader or as having a particular personality of whatever type is not a useful

CHAPTER 4

strategy for the Canadian military. What matters is whether a soldier can lead and take the necessary actions when circumstances of a given kind (and many different kinds) arise. Putting a psychological label (e.g., transformational vs. transactional) on a leader may harm more than help in eliciting the kind of actions and behavior the CF is looking for in a given circumstance.

(2) Burns, the original advocate of transformational leadership, advocated that followers can and should be transformed into leaders. The ASM interjects at this point with a (perhaps cruel) reality check along with a strong caution. Even if we assume that transformational leadership is what we want out of all leaders all the time (a highly doubtful argument in its own right), the ASM points to the extreme complexity of the adaptive skills needed to resource leadership, transformational or otherwise. The upshot is that no guarantees exist that all, or even most, people can be so “transformed” into effective leaders because they will lack the skill scaffolding, especially that of adaptive skill, which is needed to resource this so-called “transformation”. In fact, true leadership is probably a rare commodity, achieved by relatively few individuals even under the most favorable conditions of life and occupational experience. It will be rare to find, and difficult to train from scratch, individuals who can constructively assert the full range of adaptive skills required for leadership across all possible SOF operational involvements. The promise and optimism of current leadership theories and measurements need to be tempered with the reality of leadership as a skill that is exceedingly difficult to acquire and master.

The Relationship of Leader Adaptive Skills to Trust in the Leader and Perceptions of Leader Credibility

Research cited in the previous section suggested that followers have greater trust in transformational leaders. However, it has not been established that transformational leadership is preferred in all situations faced by SOF leaders. That is to say, it remains to be demonstrated that transformational leadership will result in

higher trust in the leader and stronger perceptions of leader credibility in all SOF situations. On the other hand, there is a strong argument to be made (subject to research test and verification) that the SOF leaders who constructively assert the situationally relevant adaptive skills with respect will be consistently viewed as more credible and trustworthy by their followers. The core argument here is one of *competence* as exhibited on task and in the moment. The maximally adaptive SOF leader is the one who best contributes to the success of a given mission and contributes maximally to bringing the team members back to base alive. There can be no basis of leader trust and credibility that is more compelling than the competence of the SOF leader when on mission.

Assessing Leader Adaptive Skills on the Individual level: The Performance-Oriented Interview

The matter of values is explicitly linked to leadership in the latest CF policy, as stated in the *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*. These values are embodied in the actions that CF members undertake when they are being constructively assertive toward the achievement of mission success. In turn, these actions – both as directed inward toward the self and outward toward others and the external environment – can be identified and captured through a straightforward process called *skills modeling*. Bringing together a group of several individuals who are highly experienced and capable in their CF roles can contribute to the development of a skills model. A facilitator assists these individuals in writing a series of skills models to capture the adaptive skills required for mission success across the broadest range of contexts those personnel will operate within. An example of a skills model is given in Figure 4. This model was developed for a non-CF position that requires high levels of leadership.

The skills model in Figure 4 consists of two main components: (1) The *context statement* comes at the problem of adaptive skill from the perspective of the environment (in other words, what

CHAPTER 4

type of environmental demands does the person have to adjust to?); and (2) The *actions* the person undertakes under three different degrees of mission success. An examination of the skills model in Figure 4 shows actions carried out by the individual at different levels of mission success. At the highest levels of adaptive skill (level 5), the individual is *constructively assertive* with respect to all the relevant elements of their environment, whether that environment is internal or external, demanding of an agentic or accommodative personal style, or requiring a physical, mental, or interpersonal response. Constructive assertion is the optimal response in the given context or set of circumstances. It is the very best that can be done. It is, to use Quinn's terms, the right balance of oppositional forces managed and brought to bear at the right time and in the right measure. It is organizational effectiveness embodied and made flesh in the performance of the individual.

CONTEXT STATEMENT:

This quality is manifest in any interaction with stakeholders who have resources, information, and power that could impact the short-term and/or long-term operation of the company. The specific goal is to keep stakeholders (Board of Directors, clients, company staff) committed to and increase buy-in to the vision and mission of the company.

Leader Actions Required Under Three Levels of Individual/ Organizational Effectiveness:

Outstanding Effectiveness

- Understands and is sensitive to the motivations, preferences, needs, and concerns of individual stakeholders (e.g., checking stakeholder perceptions)
- Proactively seeks and identifies the relevant stakeholders, stakeholder entities, and key individuals through examination of historical records, documents, and by asking appropriate questions
- Has the ability to identify the differential levels of stakeholder power
- Has the ability to identify the needs and preferences of stakeholders
- Recognizes when to make short-term compromise in favor of long-term relationship

- Skillfully utilizes the governance mechanism to secure significant agreement of stakeholders (e.g., ensuring successful political capital through building a reputable and consistent track record with each shareholder entity)
- Has the ability to build personal trusting relationships with relevant entities by meeting with (through informal or casual encounters) key individuals in order to better understand the pressures, constraints, needs, interests, and roles.
- Has the ability to create and take advantage of opportunities for informal interactions in order to validate and corroborate perceptions and opinions with knowledgeable persons
- Anticipates and prepares strategies to effectively deal with political games
- Manages own emotional state effectively including when tired, stressed, or in conflict
- Remains focused on the current issue without making reference or being influenced by previous or unresolved issues
- Carefully considers political issues before responding (e.g., has confidence to tell stakeholder time is required before response and/or removes self from emotional situation in order to make a decision if necessary)

Acceptable Effectiveness

- Aware of stakeholder and political environment, but is less able to discern subtle motivations (e.g., can recognize obvious political stakeholder issues and concerns)
- Recognizes the political implications of decisions, but occasionally prioritizes operational needs over political concerns due to logistical constraints and vice versa
- Does not anticipate or prevent political issues; therefore, occasionally must resolve them
- Understands the need for relationships and builds contacts with important stakeholder entities, but may favour some relationships over others
- Does not pursue informal opportunities to build relationships
- Manages emotional state under ideal conditions; however, may momentarily lose composure or appear upset in very stressful or high conflict situations, able to regain control quickly
- Intends to achieve political goals, but may overemphasize one or more stakeholder groups or aspects of the governance mechanism, even when reliance on additional stakeholders would make it easier to achieve goals

CHAPTER 4

- Able to deal with political maneuvers or gains as they occur, but may not anticipate or have an advance strategy for doing so
- May not immediately recognize political nuances but will make efforts to identify and manage them once he/she becomes aware

Very Poor Effectiveness

- Is naive about political motivations or issues (e.g., inability to recognize key stakeholders)
- Is easily manipulated
- Assumes everyone is supportive and acting in their best interest or vice versa
- Unable to read motivational cues of stakeholders and/or consistently ignores cues
- Takes the path of least resistance (passive) and avoids potential for conflict
- Responds in an angry or vengeful manner
- Engages in political game playing
- Manages personal negative emotional state poorly, especially when the stakeholder is also in a poor emotional state
- Is easily distracted from the current issue
- Does not possess internal political road map to identify the unfolding of political issues
- Misses key turning points in processes
- Negatively reacts to problem issues when they arise
- Plays one stakeholder against another (i.e., manipulation)
- Either fails to recognize mistakes or recognizes mistakes, yet neglects problem solving after a major political mishap
- Maintains acrimonious, or toxic, long-term relationships with stakeholder(s)

FIGURE 4 - Skills Model for the Adaptive Skill of Political Acumen for Senior Leadership Position in a Canadian Company

Operational Implications of the ASM for the CF

Adaptive skills develop over very long periods of time and are only minimally impacted by short-term training and development efforts. Let us consider the example of the SOF leader during an operational mission in a combat zone. Interpersonal communications with other team members in this situation will need to be terse, direct, and specific with little opportunity for the niceties of social intercourse common in the everyday world of business and management, or even in garrison life. In other words, the adaptive skill of interpersonal communication in that setting will be People in locus, outward-directed in Focus, and highly agentic in Purpose. A person who is habitually accustomed to, and most comfortable with, polite and conflict-avoidant communication will be very poorly suited to the SOF combat role. In the highly stressful *In Extremis* situation of combat, the individual will tend to revert back to his or her habitual behavioral patterns. This is the nature of adaptive skill – These are highly ingrained tendencies acquired through the sum total of life experience that can be suppressed or overridden only to a limited extent through temporary expedients such as skills training. A training program in “assertive communication style” or the like will put a temporary gloss over an ineffectual communication style that will give the appearance of effective functioning as long as the situation is not too stressful or dangerous. But the training will fall away all too easily in situations of extreme adaptive demand, and the result may be catastrophic for mission success and the welfare of the mission team. The upshot of this understanding of adaptive skill is that the premium must always be placed on the identification and selection of individuals with the right adaptive skills into the role and the adaptive potential to move into still more complex roles. The individual must be able to constructively assert with respect to adaptive skill within the full range of possible situations he or she will face as an SOF leader. Especially during combat, reactivity to the aspect of the situation, be it physical, informational, or social, is not an option. SOF leaders must be 100% reliable in constructively asserting the needed adaptabili-

CHAPTER 4

ties at high levels of functional complexity and under highly demanding environmental circumstances. This is a very tall order to fill.

The CF should place a premium on the identification and selection of the SOF leaders who have the right profile of adaptive skills for the likely situations they will encounter in such a demanding role. Standardized selection tests, although a useful starting point to assessing functional skills (especially those related to use of Data, e.g., cognitive ability tests), will be of very limited use in assessing adaptive skills. A considerable amount of time and effort will be required to assess adaptive skills through more “qualitative” means, especially rigorous and extensive interviewing. Cronshaw and colleagues present examples of this type of interview process for assessing adaptive skill.³⁷ With the right people in place, the CF can then make provision for further training and development that will further challenge and enhance the highly effective adaptive skills that the SOF leader already has in place from a lifetime of previous practice and experience. Overreaching in the matter of adaptive skills likely will yield disastrous results for SOF soldiers as well as seriously damage the success and reputation of the CF.

Conclusion

We began this chapter with a quotation from a well-known leadership researcher, Dr. Gary Yukl, who lamented the state of a field in which several thousand studies have been conducted on leadership effectiveness with many contradictory and inconclusive results.

Having opined thusly, these researchers then plough ahead with business as usual. Is the goal to be able to say in fifty years that we now have in hand tens of thousands of additional contradictory and inconclusive studies about leadership? This chapter suggests a different path forward on leadership in the military, one that is fundamentally grounded in theory and experience,

rather than in research design, quantitative methodology, and statistics. Leadership is inseparable from the efforts of growing and developing human beings to adapt their changing circumstances in a positive and constructively assertive way on behalf of themselves, others, and the world as a whole. The means of studying leadership should be just as adaptable and multifarious as the leadership phenomenon itself. Because leadership is of a piece with life itself, its essentials are no more or less difficult or esoteric to study and understand than any other area of human inquiry and endeavor (with the possible exception of Wagnerian opera). However, the study of it must begin and end in the human condition, in the raw stuff of everyday experience, from whence leadership evolves and culminates in a life journey of the talented and lucky few. Leadership is always there to seen, understood, and appreciated in the moment - nothing about leadership is hidden (at least in principle) from the astute, curious, and informed individual. If the reader takes home this single message, then our chapter will have served a useful purpose and might offer an alternative and more productive way to study leadership, and apply the results of leadership research, in the military.

Endnotes

- 1 Gary Yukl, *Leadership in organizations* (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1988), 493.
- 2 W. H. McRaven, *SPEC OPS; Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996).
- 3 Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (Ottawa: DND, 2005).
- 4 R. E. Quinn, H. W. Hildebrandt, P. S. Rogers, and M. P. Thompson. *The Journal of Business Communication*, 1991, 28(3), 213-232.
- 5 Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Ottawa: DND, 2005), 33.
- 6 See D. Lamond, "The value of Quinn's competing values model in an Australian context". *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 2003, 18(1), 46-59. See also Quinn, et al. *Journal of Business Communication*, 1991, 28(3), 213-232.
- 7 See Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

8 See Ibid.

9 Fine, S. & S. F. Cronshaw, *Functional job analysis: A foundation for human resources management* (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999).

10 See S. F. Cronshaw, "Developmental dynamics of workplace adaptive skills". *Psychological Reports*, 2005, 96, 1066-1094. See also S. F. Cronshaw, S.F., and S Jethmalani, "The structure of workplace adaptive skill in a career inexperienced group". *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, 2005, 66, 45-65.

11 S. F. Cronshaw, "Development of leadership as the pre-eminent People skill" (Chapter 8). In J.P. Boyer (ed.), *Leading in an upside-down world: New Canadian perspectives on leadership* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2003).

12 Constructive assertion is the highest level of performance and differs from *Reactive engagement* that involves a more passive approach, whereby the person largely accepts the prevailing environmental arrangements, but exerts efforts to work within those arrangements; and *Disintegrative disengagement* that is the lowest level of performance and involves reactions to the environment where the person typically seeks to avoid the circumstances (either physically; absenteeism: psychological; lack of attention: or interpersonal; blaming others).

13 S. F. Cronshaw, P. Y. Ong, and D. B. Chappell, D. B. *Worker adaptive skill resources the expression of Things-Data-People functional skill in the workplace*. Paper submitted for publication, 2005. (Available on the first author's personal website which can be accessed at <http://www.psychology.uoguelph.ca/>).

14 See Fine and Cronshaw, *Functional job analysis: A foundation for human resources management* p. 248.

15 See Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces; Conceptual Foundations*.

16 See Cronshaw, *Developmental dynamics of workplace adaptive skills*.

17 K. D. Frankenberger, "Adolescent egocentrism: A comparison among adolescents and adults". *Journal of Adolescence*, 2000, 23, 343-354.

18 See Cronshaw, *Developmental dynamics of workplace adaptive skills*.

19 Ibid.

20 S. S. White, R. A. Mueller-Hanson, D. W. Dorsey, E. D. Pulakos, M. M. Wisecarver, E. A. Deagle, and K. G. Mendini, "Developing adaptive proficiency in special forces leaders". *Research Report 1831*,

(Arlington, Virginia; U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 2005).

21 E. D. Pulakos, S. Arad, M. A. Donovan, and K. E. Plamondon, "Adaptability in the workplace: Development of a taxonomy of adaptive performance". *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 2000, 85, 612-624.

22 D. L. Paulhaus, and C. L. Martin, "Functional flexibility: A new conception of interpersonal flexibility". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1987, 55(1), 88-101.

23 J. S. Wiggins, "A psychological taxonomy of trait-descriptive terms: The interpersonal domain". *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 1979, 37(3), 395-412.

24 See Cronshaw, *Developmental dynamics of workplace adaptive skills*.

25 J. M. Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

26 B. M. Bass, "Two decades of research and development in transformational leadership". *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, 1999, 8 (1) 9.

27 B. M. Bass, *Leadership and performance beyond expectations* (New York: Free Press, 1985).

28 L. E. Atwater, A. W. Lau, B. M. Bass, B. J. Avolio, J. Camobreco, & N. Whitmore, "The content, construct and criterion-related validity of leaders behavior measure. *Research Note 95-01* (Alexandria, VA: US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1994).

29 D. I. Jung, and B.J. Avolio, "Opening the black box: An experimental investigation of the mediating effects of trust and value congruence on transformational and transactional leadership". *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 2000, 21, 949-964.

30 G. Yukl, "Managerial leadership: A review of theory and research". *Journal of Management*, 1989, 15 (3) 67-78.

31 See Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 70.

32 See Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, 24.

33 B. M. Bass, *Leadership, Psychology, and Organizational Behavior* (New York: Harper & Row, 1960).

34 R. M. Stogdill, *Handbook of Leadership: A survey of theory and research* (New Year: Free Press, 1974).

35 M. Mulder, L. Koppelaar, R. D. deJong, and J. Verhage, Power situation, and leaders' effectiveness: An organizational field study. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 1986, 71 (4) 566-570.

36 T. A. Kolditz, "The In Extremis Leader". *Leader to Leader*. (New York: John Wiley, & Sons, 2005).

CHAPTER 4

37 See Cronshaw and Jethmalani, “The structure of workplace adaptive skill in a career inexperienced group”. See also Cronshaw, Ong, and Chappell, *Worker adaptive skill resources the expression of Things-Data-People functional skill in the workplace*. See also G. A. Chung-Yan, S. F. Cronshaw, P. Y. Ong, and D. B. Chappel, *The conceptualization and measurement of adaptive skill*. In S.F. Cronshaw (Chair), Theoretical Advancement Symposium presented at the 20th Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Los Angeles, CA, 2005.

PART II

Changes in the International Security Environment

CHAPTER 5

Command of Coalition Operations in a Multicultural Environment: A Canadian Naval Niche? The Case Study of Operation Apollo



Richard H. Gimblett

For the better part of two years – from December 2001 until the end of October 2003 – senior Canadian naval officers exercised the unique responsibility of commanding a multinational coalition fleet gathered in the Arabian Sea for the initial stages of what has become an on-going war against terrorism. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, the American codename for the struggle) continues, but Operation Apollo (as this phase was known in Canada) is over, and it is useful to begin assessing the “lessons learned”.

It may never be possible to determine the military effectiveness of the operation: none of the coalition ships under Canadian protection were attacked, while the Coalition fleets apprehended fewer than a half-dozen suspected members of Al-Qaeda. Was it because of the known effectiveness of the Coalition forces that the terrorists never attempted to attack or to escape by sea? Did the fleeing terrorists manage to elude detection, or were they just never there in any appreciable numbers? Answers to these questions require access to highly classified intelligence material, making them beyond the ability of this paper to pursue.

CHAPTER 5

For a public audience, there is an added dimension to this inability to quantify results: it encourages a tendency to overlook the broader import of the operation. The Canadian naval success in Operation Apollo has gone generally un-remarked and remains poorly understood even amongst credible defence analysts. If the impact of such benign neglect was only the minor damage done to professional pride, it could easily be dismissed; however, when partial or incomplete analysis (even when undertaken with no malicious intent) is used as the basis for determining long-term defence policy, an informed and accurate analysis becomes absolutely crucial.¹

Quite apart from the standard operational assessments, however, it is possible to determine other “lessons learned”. Operation Apollo stands as a remarkable achievement in quite another respect: the fact that for an extended period Canadian naval commanders exercised a most efficient coordination of the at-sea employment of a range of surface, air and sub-surface forces from a disparate collection of navies – some of them not typical “allies” and a great many from very different cultural backgrounds (in the military as well as political and social senses). The apex was the designation of a Canadian commodore as Commander Task Force 151 (CTF 151) from February through June 2003, including the complex period covering separate American-led action resulting in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein – Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

At one level, it is possible to categorize this command role as just another amongst similar coalition activities over the years, and indeed through the course of Operation Enduring Freedom. After all, a Royal Australian Navy (RAN) commodore exercised command of multinational forces in the Northern Persian Gulf in the early days of OEF, as part of the continuing enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime.² Later, at the same time that CTF 151 was established, another coalition task force (CTF 150) operated in the Horn of Africa region commanded in rotation by continental European Union

allies. However, the scope of the Australian command did not extend so broadly as CTF 151, while CTF 150 was not as effective in closing off regional traffic; neither command enjoyed the same level of “seamless connectivity” with the United States Navy (USN) as did the Canadian. Interestingly, neither of the other senior Coalition partners – Britain and France – exercised a multinational command.³

Something clearly was different in the Canadian performance of multinational coalition command. Closer analysis suggests that it was undertaken in a fashion that is “quintessentially Canadian”.⁴ Indeed, one recent study points to Operation Apollo as “the realization of what can be termed a ‘Canadian [naval] command style.’”⁵ Essentially, as a medium power navy with limited resources, the Canadian Navy has sought “command parity” with its larger allies (the US and Great Britain) so as to ensure its operational independence from them; but as an essentially small-ship navy with limited power projection capabilities, it has had to compensate through technical and tactical innovation, much of which results from a unique level of interoperability with the USN. At the same time, what can be styled the “values” behind Canada’s increasing multicultural diversity, and what seems to be a national pre-disposition for multilateralism, have been internalized by the senior commanders of the service making them uniquely sensitive to the fostering of coalition operations. The authors of that study concluded:

One could argue that Canada’s national culture with its traditions of bilingualism and multiculturalism; Canada’s military culture with its history of alliance and UN operations; and Canadian naval culture based on operational and command competence, enlightened leadership and management techniques, and a judicious exploitation of available technology make the Canadian Navy’s command style a model for coalition operations.

CHAPTER 5

Subsequent research developing certain aspects of this “command style” theme as part of an examination of “networked capabilities” points to a conclusion “reinforcing the validity of an approach that balances the human and technological factors... [in] developing... network-enabled systems and procedures.” It specifically refers to the success of Operation Apollo in arriving at that conclusion:⁶

Fundamentally, human-centred networks are the basis of the Canadian naval command style: primarily in the pre-disposition to engage the widest variety of coalition members in task force composition, and then to ensure their effective participation in any operations.

Canadian command of the multinational naval coalition in the Arabian Sea was not pre-ordained. Rather, it was the logical culmination of a variety of factors over a long period of gestation. Certain elements of these can be discerned as coalescing in recent years, but it was not until Operation Apollo that they were all to combine to noteworthy effect.

This paper will undertake a deeper exploration of the nature of the Canadian Navy’s “coalition command” role. It will argue that a useful model for understanding it is the unifying framework of the “environment-technology-culture triad,” where the three factors of environment (the sea), technology (a major control mechanism for exercising command), and culture (service, organizational, and national) are taken to be the most important factors that impact naval command styles.⁷ It will follow with a detailed discussion of each of those factors in the Canadian context, allowing for the fact that there is some iterative overlap amongst them. The paper will conclude that the case study of Operation Apollo demonstrates how, in this era abounding with arguments that the Canadian Forces must specialize in areas of strategic effect,⁸ these factors have combined in a special permutation that makes coalition naval command a “niche” role for which our Navy is ideally suited.

Environment

A number of factors work to determine the precise fleet mix of the Canadian Navy, but its general structure is largely the result of the physical environment in which it must operate. The Navy is required to patrol a vast offshore estate on two separate coasts (the Atlantic and the Pacific), with operational responsibility for a third (the Arctic), and none of the regular operating areas close to either of the two principle ports (Halifax and Esquimalt). The combination of distances and the most challenging spectrum of sea conditions in the world demands a basic fleet composition of vessels with long range to deploy and patrol for a useful period between fuelling, and with good sea keeping ability to provide a stable platform from which to operate with reasonable effectiveness. The further budgetary demands for economy have driven the compromise solution to adopt the frigate as the basic hull type best satisfying those purposes: to prove the point, the smaller corvettes of the Second World War are generally accepted as having been relatively ineffectual, while the *St. Laurent*-class “destroyers” that constituted the bulk of the fleet through the Cold War are now recognized to have actually been “frigates” in all but name; only lately have frigates such as the *Halifax*-class topped over 5000 tonnes, mostly due to the requirements of crew comfort (habitability).⁹ The specialized function of command and control demands a larger vessel (such as the true destroyer type) with more internal space for the additional communications equipment and task group staff needed to deliver the capability. Finally, to round out the mix, an underway fleet replenishment capability assures operational independence and the ability for a force to remain at sea for extended periods. The end result is a fleet capable of oceanic ranges and possessing a balanced trinity of general-purpose warfighting capabilities: command and control (C2, as presently epitomized in the DDG-280 class of destroyers); operational depth (frigates, submarines and attached aircraft, both helicopter and fixed-wing); and integral sustainment (an operational support ship). The consequence of meeting these national requirements just for domestic defence,

CHAPTER 5

therefore, is that the Canadian Navy is also remarkably suited to overseas deployments.

The adaptability of such a fleet mix – and the implications for coalition command – were first impressively demonstrated in the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, when the Canadian Navy found its operating environment literally turned on end, from a focus on Cold War North Atlantic anti-submarine operations to tropical inshore anti-air and anti-surface operations in a new era of uncertainty. The transition was effected relatively easily in part due to the technical and cultural points that will be discussed below. In large measure, however, it was because the long Cold War patrols and exercises to the far reaches of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans had made the Navy entirely comfortable in deploying over long distances for prolonged periods with minimal external support. Since then, over the course of the 1990s and now into the 21st century, the South West Asia theatre of operations has become naturalized as a second home for the Canadian Navy: between the frigate deployments with USN carrier battle groups through the 1990s and the effort of Operation Apollo, practically every major surface vessel has seen service in the region, and it is rare to find a sailor who has not been there at least once (and many on several occasions); these latter ranks include a significant proportion of current senior naval commanders.

The Navy's operating environments over the past half-century, primarily through Cold War operations and exercises with our allies, but more recently through growing involvement in peace support operations, have seen extended deployments around the Pacific Rim (from MARPAC – Maritime Forces Pacific – on the west coast), into European and Caribbean waters with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO; from MARLANT – Maritime Forces Atlantic – on the east coast), and around South America (from both coasts). A not-unrelated consequence is that the Canadian Navy has established direct relations and close operational ties with practically every navy (and in their own

home waters) over which it would exercise coalition command in more recent years: in the first Gulf War (Operation Friction, 1990-91); off Haiti (Operation Forward Action, 1993-94); in the Adriatic (in command of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, SNFL, 1993-94 and 1999-2000); off East Timor (Operation Toucan, 1999-2000); and the second Gulf War (Operation Apollo, 2001-03).¹⁰

Technology

The greatest driving factor in the realm of technology has been the Navy's quest for "communications interoperability" (sometimes referred to as "connectivity") with the USN. In a uni-polar geopolitical context where interoperability with the USN is the goal to which all navies aspire, it usually goes unnoticed that the Canadian Navy has enjoyed this for a long period and at a privileged level not possible for any other allies, due to Congress-imposed constraints on the sharing of US technology that has been mitigated only to facilitate the shared responsibility for the defence of North America. For most of its existence, this "very special CAN-US relationship" was culturally driven, going back to the drafting of the Basic Defence Plan in 1940 in preparation for defence against an apparently triumphant Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and its continuation into the postwar period for defence against an attack by the Soviet Union. Through the Cold War, the relationship tended to be construed as an exclusively air force role, in the form of NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defence Command), but there was always an important naval dimension, demonstrated most visibly when the Canadian Navy sailed during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 to its assigned stations in accordance with established plans and procedures. For the most part, however, operations between the two navies tended to be coordinated at a higher level with little direct interaction amongst ships at the tactical level.

In the 1980s, however, the changing Canadian naval operating environment added impetus to our involvement in what would

CHAPTER 5

prove to be a revolutionary technological change that has become the focus of interoperability, the advent of what is known as “network-enabled operations” or NEOps. The development of the Canadian Patrol Frigate program, and more specifically the introduction of new passive towed array sonar (TAS) sensor technology that promised detection ranges in the order of hundreds of miles, allowed open-ocean Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) to be waged most effectively with widely dispersed formations. On a basic technical-procedural level, the exchange of contact information required over-the-horizon communications beyond the capability of the standard line-of-sight ultra-high frequency (UHF) Link-11 tactical datalink (inter-ship computer-to-computer communications), but the alternative longer-range HF link was not only too unreliable for high data-rate flows but also too easily intercepted by enemy direction finding. The solution developed by the USN was satellite communications (SATCOM), at UHF and higher frequencies (all beamed into space and returned on a narrow undetectable line-of-sight “footprint”). An additional improvement came from the fact that the Canadian version of the TAS processor was demonstrating significantly greater detection ranges over the USN version, leading American commanders to invite TAS-fitted Canadian ships to participate in the strategic ASW prosecution of Soviet ballistic missile nuclear submarines off the shores of North America. Initially, this involved the older steam destroyers experimentally fitted with TAS in anticipation of production of the Canadian Patrol Frigates (CPFs), but it soon led to the establishment of Canadian exchange officer positions on the staffs of both the USN Pacific and Atlantic fleet commanders. Additionally, this role required connectivity between Canadian and USN ships at a much higher level than had ever existed, even through the tactical datalinks, resulting in the fitting initially of the JOTS (Joint Operational Tactical System) digital display and eventually its web-based successor, GCCS-M (Global Command and Control System, Maritime), for the exchange of detailed positioning information.¹¹ The stipulation of SATCOM and JOTS/GCCS-M as standard fits on the CPF was soon broadened for it to be included as part of the

TRUMP (Tribal Update and Modernization Program) package aimed in part at transforming the aging *Iroquois*-class destroyers into proper command and control flagships. Fundamentally, this meant not only privileged Canadian access to these revolutionary communications developments, but also that every ship in the fleet was a potential command and control platform (this came to include also the replenishment vessels, which were outfitted as alternate command ships for overseas deployments).

Brought together, these technical developments had significant implications for the nature of command in the Canadian Navy. Previous notions of command and control optimized for close-in ASW no longer were appropriate. At the ship level, individual commanders discovered a new independence, requiring greater emphasis on their initiative and technical competence. Operational level commanders found their tactical horizons broadened significantly beyond the immediacy of close-in convoy escort to responsibility over ranges literally oceanic in breadth. At about the same time, the USN was finding the management of modern naval warfare increasingly complicated, and began to promote the concept of sub-dividing the responsibility of the overall “Composite Warfare Commander” among “Subordinate Warfare Commanders” for each of the anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface and strike duties, who would “command by negation” within the scope of the principle commander’s general guidance (that is, juniors are authorized to operate within a pre-planned broad scope of action unless over-ridden by senior commanders).¹² By the late-1980s, with their new technical anti-submarine and command and control capabilities, Canadian task group commanders increasingly found themselves assigned the major warfare responsibility of ASW Commander in NATO and allied exercises.¹³ During the first Gulf War, when US Navy commanders looked for a subordinate warfare commander to oversee the Coalition Logistics Force (CLF), they turned naturally to the Canadian Task Group Commander – who became the only non-US officer to hold such a high warfare coordinator’s position in that conflict.¹⁴

CHAPTER 5

The 1990s witnessed the accelerated pace of the technical aspects of networking as it is understood today, with the incorporation of personal computers and the development of a classified internet on which web-based formats have become the norm. The Canadian Navy again enjoyed privileged access to USN developments, including witnessing the introduction by the Commander Task Force 12 (CTF 12, the Pacific theatre ASW commander based in Pearl Harbor) in the mid-1990s of the “WeCAN” (Web-Centric Anti-Submarine Warfare Net) as a real-time theatre and tactical level information sharing capability for Under-Sea Warfare collaborative planning and execution. This eventually served as the model for the lower classified COWAN (Coalition Wide Area Network) employed in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises, of which Canada was a major participant. From about the mid-1990s, the Canadian Navy began deploying its new frigates to the Persian Gulf to assist in the enforcement of United Nations sanctions against Iraq. By special agreement between the head of the Canadian Navy (the Commander of Maritime Command, then-Vice-Admiral Lynn Mason) and the US Chief of Naval Operations (Admiral Mike Boorda), these ships were fully “integrated” into their respective carrier battle groups.¹⁵ This higher level than mere tactical coordination required the Canadian ships to have full communications connectivity, including access to the more complex and classified SIPRNET system (the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, a US Department of Defence managed system to allow the sharing of classified information among military personnel, with multiple levels of access). The concept proved a great success, and over the course of several years, the bulk of Canadian Navy ships thus came to be fitted with the hardware and crews familiarized with network concepts. Future Canadian commanders gained additional exposure to the developing concept of “network-centric warfare” (NCW) through participation in the high level annual USN Global War Games, after Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the leading proponent of the concept, became president of the Naval War College in 1998.¹⁶

In the wake of the Al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001, Canada deployed a task group to support the global war on terrorism (Operation Enduring Freedom / Apollo). The Canadian Navy was the first major non-American force to arrive in-theatre, and quickly found itself charged with the significant undertaking of exercising overall command of other Coalition naval forces as they arrived in the Arabian Sea (four Canadian commodores served in succession over the eighteen-month period from November 2001 through June 2003). The appointment as Warfare Commander for the Arabian Sea theatre of operations, CTF 151 was arguably the first true exercise of operational-level command by a senior Canadian officer since the Second World War.

It could not have been accomplished as successfully or as professionally as it transpired but for the employment of networked operations. The full range of network-enabled capabilities in Operation Apollo comprised: the “secret” level COWAN, with its cross-linked web pages, e-mail and “Sametime Chat” features; MCOIN III (the most recent web-based version of the Maritime Command Operational Information Network, a classified national wide area network similar to the American SIPRNET, with COWAN residing on it); and the Link-16 and Link-11 tactical datalinks, as well as GCCS-M to maintain the “recognized maritime picture”. The level of Canadian communications interoperability with the USN was unparalleled; in the words of Commodore Eric Lerhe, “The Task Group Commander embarked in a Canadian destroyer enjoyed a level of C3I (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence) unmatched outside of a USN cruiser.”¹⁷ As will be discussed below, they put it to even better effect, by working hard to expand the technology net to include those outside of it. Indeed, the Canadian Navy has recognized its “force multiplier” potential by acting in a “Gateway C4ISR” (C4ISR = Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance) capacity between the USN and less well-equipped coalition members.¹⁸

CHAPTER 5

The challenge remains the ability to maintain the pace being set by the USN. As observed by a senior Canadian naval officer, “Technological solutions are being developed to overcome these obstacles, however a restrictive information sharing culture in the US is proving to be as difficult as the technical one. Until these problems are resolved, the Canadian Navy’s necessary vision of seamless technological procedural interoperability with the USN will remain highly problematic.”¹⁹

Yet another dimension of the growing technology gap between the USN and prospective coalition partners is providing additional rationale for the Canadian role in command of coalition forces. Increasingly, the transformation of the United States Navy is focused upon the acquisition of larger and more technologically advanced power projection warships that are beyond the capacity of most medium-sized navies, such as nuclear powered aircraft carriers, Aegis cruisers and destroyers, and nuclear attack submarines (even the smaller “Littoral Combat Ship” is likely to prove prohibitively expensive for others to acquire in sufficient numbers to warrant employment according to its concept of operations); meanwhile, the bulk of the older ships being retired by the USN are the frigates and smaller destroyers that perform the myriad fleetwork tasks of scouting and interdiction farther afield from the carrier battle groups. This fleetwork gap, therefore, is tending to be filled by other coalition partners, the majority of their medium-sized navies being composed largely of frigate-type vessels. As discussed in the “environment” section above, that also has been the traditional structure of Canada’s navy, giving us a good understanding of the range of mid-level tasks inherent in those types of operations; what with our unique level of communications interoperability with the USN, that situates us ideally to command coalition fleetwork operations. Indeed, in private conversation, USN admirals will candidly admit that the Canadian Navy manages the frigate navies of other nations better than they could hope to.²⁰ The reasons for that will be developed in the following section.

Culture

As discussed in the environment section, one consequence of Canadian naval operations spanning the globe is that practically every member of the various coalitions in which we have participated was a known quantity well in advance of actual operations. This naval “reach” is in direct correlation to the number of multilateral organizations to which Canada belongs, chief among them being NATO, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, the OAS (Organization of American States), APEC (the Association for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), and of course the United Nations. In short, the Canadian multilateralist instinct that is presumed to exist primarily at the political level is equally at play at the military level.

The bigger allies (the United States, Britain and France) also are broadly represented in these forums, but Canada has never been in a competitive power relationship with any of the other junior countries – in other words, to put it bluntly, our participation comes without the “imperial baggage”, making our command role less problematic for many of them. The “coalition of the willing” that gathered in the Arabian Sea in late 2001 and through 2002 at various times included (in rough order of appearance) British, French, German, Dutch, Greek, Italian, Spanish, Australian, Japanese and New Zealand forces (the list comprised 21 nations in total²¹) – a multinational *mélange* far more complex in its makeup than its ostensibly “western” appearance might indicate. Simple matters of *realpolitik* meant that very few of them could have worked comfortably under the direct command of any of the others, especially as competing national objectives came to the fore into 2003 in the debate over what action to take against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. As will be discussed below, Canadian naval command presented a non-threatening compromise option that arguably was critical for maintaining the integrity of the coalition.

CHAPTER 5

The reasons why our naval leadership should be acceptable are several, and go deeper than any purely political attempts at objectivity. Indeed, they spring from a national military makeup that reflects cultural origins in common with the political. In the case of the Canadian Navy, there is very good evidence to suggest the realization of the old adage, that the military should reflect the values of the nation which it serves. Just as the Navy has broadened its French-English representation beyond the old stereotype of the RCN as a bastion of Anglo-Saxon prejudice, so too in recent years it has come to include evolving post-Charter social norms and the multicultural diversity of many new immigrant communities. It is not a perfect proportional representation – the low number of visible minorities serving in the Navy attest to this (even if they are no lower than the other services)²² – but recent operational experience demonstrates that modern naval commanders have internalized the values associated with our multicultural makeup: an ease of working with others who are different, and a desire to foster inclusiveness. This statement from a Canadian government web site, responding to its own question “What is Multiculturalism?”, applies with only minor variations to the approach of Canadian naval commanders in the Arabian Sea, if the terms “all citizens” and “Canadians” are replaced with “Coalition members”:²³

Canadian multiculturalism is fundamental to our belief that all citizens are equal. Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and discourages ghettoization, hatred, discrimination and violence.

Through multiculturalism, Canada recognizes the potential of all Canadians, encouraging them to integrate

into their society and take an active part in its social, cultural, economic and political affairs.

Another dimension to the spirit behind this desire for inclusiveness is motivated by the place Canada sees for itself in the world. But the willingness of others to defer to Canadian command is granted not just to satisfy our desire; it comes also in recognition of our competence to act in that capacity. The notion of middle power functionalism is falling out of favour amongst political science theorists, but in the real world of practical military application it remains very much an animating impulse. Over the years, it has been witnessed in our own quest for “command parity” with the navies of our bigger allies, originally the Royal Navy and more lately the USN, to ensure our operational and hence political independence from them. Command parity was first realized during the Second World War with the establishment of the Canadian Northwest Atlantic area, the only theatre of war ever to be commanded by a Canadian, in recognition of the vital role being played by the RCN in the Battle of the Atlantic. The subsequent experience of the Korean War, during which Canadian ships were divided amongst American and British task groups, convinced Canadian commanders that however operationally sound such measures were the political impact of the deployments had been diminished; thereafter it has been “practically an article of faith” for Canadian naval commanders that warships on operational deployments should be kept together as a recognizable national naval task group.²⁴ Being able to offer a viable task group to an exercise or operation – complete in all the constituent elements of command and control, sufficient units to ensure operational depth to accomplish a variety of fleetwork tasks, and integral sustainment – consequently legitimized the expansion of our national groups to bring within their control the vessels of other nations that were either surplus to their requirements (as with the USN) or which could not support such an independent group (most smaller European powers with a regional focus).

CHAPTER 5

Where the benefit to less capable nations should be obvious, what is truly significant in this respect is the willingness of the USN to assign their warships to act under Canadian command in recent operations. This recognition is a demonstration of the confidence and trust that they extend only sparingly to other national services in peacetime exercises, and is practically unprecedented in an active combat zone. Indeed, it was underscored from the very beginning of Operation Apollo, which saw the Canadian task group assigned responsibility immediately upon arrival in theatre in November 2001 for the close protection of the US Marine amphibious ready groups operating off the coast of Pakistan. To assist in that task, and others that developed from it, the USN generally also assigned at least one Aegis-class destroyer and one or two other frigates to act under Canadian command.²⁵

Bringing the matter back full circle, there is something about Canadian naval culture that drives our commanders to take more particular care to seeing to the needs of coalition partners in the interest of obtaining their most effective operational employment. Bigger allies tend either towards the expectation that contributors to an operation will do so in full compliance with previously agreed commitments as required to undertake the mission, or towards discounting forces with obvious technological handicaps as little more than an obstruction to the efficient conduct of the mission; such tendencies miss the range of nuances between coalition partners having very different political objectives, and their very real desire to participate meaningfully despite acknowledged capability shortcomings. The very different Canadian approach again probably stems from our own desire to be recognized and appreciated by our senior partners. Within NATO, the Canadian Navy has always strived to “punch above its weight”. Even in the 1980s, when the aging fleet of steam destroyers was the butt of media disdain as “the rust bucket fleet”, Canadian commanders endeavoured to make our ships meaningful participants (within their capacity) in NATO exercises, and Canadian staff officers were especially influential within the NATO command structure, with for example a vice-admiral

serving as Chief of Staff to SACLANT (the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic) coordinating the staff efforts of that headquarters, many members of which were Canadian exchange officers. That disproportionate dominance in SACLANT was borne as much from the desire to participate as from the professional competence that earned such positioning, and it contributed to significant developments, such as the CONMAROPS (Concept of Maritime Operations) that was to shape NATO naval developments through the 1980s.²⁶

This has been reflected in recent operations by our own commanders paying special attention to the technical capabilities and limitations (caps & lims) of coalition members, to ensure their best operational employment, while also taking account of their political direction and aspirations. The examples are legion, but two will suffice to demonstrate that this is not an isolated phenomenon. In the first Gulf War, the Canadian task group commander had among the multinational members of the Combined Logistics Force under his command a Danish warship with very restrictive ROE (rules of engagement) that prevented its captain from aggressively patrolling his assigned sector to take pre-emptive action against potential threats; recognizing this, the Canadian commander purposely stationed the Dane up-threat, so that it might legitimately invoke its “inherent right of self-defence” to protect the supply ships he was escorting further down-threat.²⁷ Another example in the more recent Arabian Sea operations involved all Canadian commanders going to great lengths to include the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces (JMSDF) operating in the area. The JMSDF was the only other nation to undertake the deployment of a potent task group similar in composition to our own (typically comprising one of their newer-generation Aegis-class destroyers, an older destroyer or frigate, and a supply ship), but their employment was guided by the significant constitutional restriction of not being able to engage directly in combat operations. As such, each of the Canadian commodores in turn made frequent personal visits to their Japanese counterparts and invited them to the Canadian

CHAPTER 5

flagship to share information and discuss procedures, always mindful not to compromise the national direction to which the Japanese commanders were responsible. From all accounts, it was an arrangement that was mutually and professionally beneficial: although their constitutional imperatives were never compromised, on many occasions the JMSDF provided information that was critical to compilation of the recognized maritime picture.²⁸

This cultural disposition practiced by Canadian naval commanders is captured nicely in the observation that, “Overall, the maintenance of a deep-seated foundation of professional values inherited from the Royal Navy (RN), with an overlay of Canadian social values, and to a lesser extent Canadian naval experiences, has resulted in an operational culture that is distinctively Canadian.”²⁹ The true measure of how deeply this national propensity for multilateralism and the notion of middle power functionalism has been inculcated in the Canadian Navy is that our naval commanders appear to understand political objectives of coalition naval operations better than our elected governments. This was evident in the first Gulf war, when the Canadian theatre commander, then-Commodore Ken Summers, realised that our national headquarters should be located in Bahrain (from where the USN was directing the UN-mandated sanctions effort) as opposed to Riyadh (from where US Central Command was directing the more controversial coercive action against Iraq); the result was that our task group was more effectively positioned to participate in the Coalition embargo effort. This thinking again animated the approach to Operation Apollo, which saw the Navy able to convince the government that a bold naval deployment (both in terms of the maintenance of a fairly sizable force, and of the range of missions it was authorized to perform) was the best means of achieving the delicate balancing act that Prime Minister Chretien was attempting to perform in keeping his distance from the Bush administration while contributing effectively to our more general security. In both cases, the naval role ensured Canadian military participation in a Coalition context, serving as a counterweight to US dominance; and command of those

operations was the ideal expression of the government's geopolitical objectives, while the effective exercise of that command worked ultimately to the operational and strategic benefit of all.

Environment-Technology-Culture in Operation Apollo

The various elements of the environment-technology-culture triad came together to great effect for the Canadian Navy with the dispatch of a naval task group to the Arabian Sea in the fall of 2001. The ability to deploy a significant combat force capable of working with the USN immediately upon arrival in theatre demonstrated the inherent adaptability of the fleet stemming from its domestic environmental conditions. Along with the gateway C4ISR technical capabilities resident in the task group's flagship, the obvious professional competence of the Canadian sailors and their commanders in a variety of warfare skills, and a cultural pre-disposition to act in concert with others, a succession of Canadian commanders very quickly earned and maintained a command role over other coalition forces as they came and went. The ability to sustain that command for the better part of two years, as the operation evolved through different phases, including the enormous strains of conflicting national sentiments over operations in Iraq, is testament to the notion that command of coalition forces is a role for which the Canadian Navy is ideally suited.

The exercise of that command was raised to a particularly high level through the constant interplay of various environmental, technological and cultural factors. The ranges of the area of Canadian responsibility, spanning from the longitude of the Indo-Pakistani border in the eastern reaches of the Arabian Sea, well south of the Arabian Peninsula to the Horn of Africa, and then north into the Persian Gulf, presented enormous challenges to the command and control of the operations. The key to success was effective employment of networked links with the USN, for which the prerequisites were access to the American communications channels and possession of SATCOM to ensure reliable

CHAPTER 5

connectivity. For a variety of reasons, Canadian commanders enjoyed the highest entry levels to both of those prerequisites: on one hand, USN commanders are constrained from sharing access too widely even with other close allies; on the other hand, other forces were unable to invest fully in the expensive proposition of obtaining the required hardware and maintaining the several associated satellite channels on a continuous basis. To extend the connectivity throughout the task force, the Canadian task group commanders undertook a variety of initiatives to gain as many other coalition members as possible to adopt COWAN (the Coalition Wide Area Network), if only on a limited basis. Eventually a modest short-range network was established for the non-SATCOM fitted coalition members, through the mediums of High Frequency (HF) Battle Force E-mail (BFEM) and Link-11 tactical datalink (TADIL).

Although such efforts as maintenance of the networks were necessary for effective tactical mission performance, they served also to reinforce a feeling of inclusiveness amongst other coalition partners. The strategic benefits arose when the US embarked upon the invasion of Iraq and very few other member governments were willing to go along with them. The existence of CTF 151 facilitated the continued engagement in the war against terrorism of those coalition members, presenting a clear separation of activities between the overt warfighting of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the picture compilation and maritime interdiction of the on-going Operation Enduring Freedom. It is possible to postulate that, without a Canadian naval commander able to exercise such a command, coalition solidarity would have been fractured, delivering at least a moral victory to the enemy.

If only for that, Operation Apollo warrants more detailed examination, as setting the standard for future coalition naval operations. More specifically, the coalition command role exercised by the Navy was a great success, and a useful model for understanding its nature is the unifying framework of the

environment-technology-culture triad. Because the geography of our environment will not change (the possibilities of global warming notwithstanding), future Canadian fleets will continue to incorporate a balanced set of capabilities in vessels able to deploy over long distances for sustained periods. The shared responsibility with the US for the defence of North America will continue to require our investment in such technology as networked capabilities for maintaining effective command and control with the USN, in what is likely to remain a privileged if not unique relationship, positioning us to continue acting as a gateway C4ISR between the USN and other navies. It is to be expected that our national cultural predisposition for multilateralism will continue to be translated through the professional competence of our senior naval officers into their ability to take command of the forces of other nations in a collegial fashion to obtain the most mutually beneficial operational employment.

Because each of these factors involves some quality that is uniquely Canadian, and their future combination as in Operation Apollo is entirely possible, it is not unreasonable to argue that command of multinational coalition forces is something for which the Canadian Navy is uniquely qualified.

Endnotes

1 For example, Joel Sokolsky, *Guarding the Continental Coasts: United States Maritime Homeland Security and Canada* (Montreal: IRPP, 2005), notes Op Apollo as having encompassed “all twelve frigates integrating with USN carrier battle groups”, when in fact only one did, with the rest remaining under Canadian higher command for a variety of other operations. However, overlooking the Canadian command role leads Sokolsky to argue that the Canadian Navy should be constituted for a primarily homeland defence role as opposed to expeditionary.

2 Commodore (Royal Australian Navy) James Goldrick, “In Command in the Gulf,” *US Naval Institute Proceedings* (December 2002), 38-41; Greg Nash and David Stevens, *Australia's Navy in the*

CHAPTER 5

Gulf: From Countenance to Catalyst, 1941-2006 (Silverwater, NSW: Topmill, 2006).

3 Iain Ballantyne, *Strike from the Sea: The Royal Navy & US Navy at War in the Middle East, 1949-2003* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004), underplays the role of other coalition members, in an attempt to buttress the author's claim for a special RN-USN relationship.

4 Richard Gimblett, *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age of the Canadian Navy in the War Against Terrorism* (Ottawa: Magic Light, 2004), 133.

5 Allan English, Richard Gimblett, Lynn Mason and Mervyn Berridge Sills, *Command Styles in the Canadian Navy* (DRDC Toronto Contract Report CR 2005-096, 31 January 2005, at http://pubs.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/pubdocs/pcow1_e.html), 108-111.

6 Allan English, Richard Gimblett, and Howard Coombs, *Beware of Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Network Enabled Operations as a Canadian Approach to Transformation* (DRDC Contract Report CR 2005-212, Toronto, 19 July 2005, available at http://pubs.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/pubdocs/pcow1_e.html), 40 and 100.

7 As developed in English et al, *Command Styles in the Canadian Navy*, 3 and passim.

8 Government of Canada, *Canada's International Policy Statement. Defence: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* (Ottawa: April 2005, available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/dps/index_e.asp).

9 On the notion of frigates in the Canadian Navy as the embodiment of classic "cruiser" employment, see Kenneth P. Hansen, "Kingsmill's Cruisers: The Cruiser Tradition in the Early Royal Canadian Navy," in *The Northern Mariner / Le Marin du nord*, XIII:1 (January 2003), 37-52.

10 A useful overview of these and other operations is Laura Higgins, *Canadian Naval Operations in the 1990s: Selected Case Studies* (Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 12, 2002).

11 Background on the development of JOTS through the follow-on system of JMCIS (Joint Maritime Command Information System) to the current GCCS-M can be found at: <http://www.fas.org/irp/program/core/jmcis.htm>

12 The Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept is described succinctly in an unclassified format in United States Navy, *Multinational Maritime Operations Doctrine Manual* (Norfolk, VA,

Naval Doctrine Command, 1999), 3-21 and 22.

13 Eric Grove (with Graham Thompson), *Battle for the Fiords: NATO's Forward Maritime Strategy in Action* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), is an account of the NATO Exercise Teamwork 1988, including a good description of the part played by the Canadian Task Group.

14 Richard Gimblett, "MIF or MNF? The Dilemma of the 'Lesser' Navies in the Gulf War Coalition," in Michael Hadley, Rob Huebert and Fred W. Crickard, *A Nation's Navy: In Quest of Canadian Naval Identity* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), 190-204. One of the few instances of a Canadian naval commander telling his own story at full-length is Duncan Miller and Sharon Hobson, *The Persian Excursion: The Canadian Navy in the Gulf War* (Clementsport, NS: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1995).

15 Interview Vice-Admiral (Canadian Navy, ret'd) Lynn Mason, with Dr. Richard Gimblett, Halifax, NS, 12 May 2005.

16 Vice Admiral (United States Navy) Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, 124:1 (January 1998).

17 Interview Commodore (Canadian Navy, ret'd) Eric Lerhe with Dr. Richard Gimblett, Halifax, NS, 13 May 2005. Lerhe was the second task group commander, from April through September 2002, and was instrumental in establishing the Arabian Sea communications networks.

18 Canadian Navy, *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (Ottawa: National Defence Headquarters/Chief of Maritime Staff, 2001, at http://www.navy.dnd.ca/leadmark/doc/index_e.asp), 163-4. C4ISR is an expansion of the old "command and control" (C2), and stands for: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

19 Captain (Canadian Navy) Paul Maddison, "The Canadian Navy's Drive for Trust and Technology in Network-Centric Coalitions" (unpublished Canadian Forces Command and Staff College paper, at <http://wps.cfc.dnd.ca/papers/amsc/amsc7/maddison.htm>).

20 Gimblett, *Operation Apollo*, 135.

21 See the Central Command listing at: <http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/joint.htm>.

22 DND News Release, "Defence Advisory Groups promote diversity, Employment Equity," Canadian Forces Personnel Newsletter, Issue 1/05 - 26 January 2005, at: http://www.forces.gc.ca/hr/cfpn/engraph/1_05/1_05_dags_e.asp.

CHAPTER 5

23 Government of Canada, Department of Heritage, Multiculturalism and Human Rights Branch, http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/progs/multi/what-multi_e.cfm.

24 Jean Morin and Richard Gimblett, *Operation Friction: The Canadian Forces in the Persian Gulf, 1990-1991* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1997), 179.

25 Gimblett, *Operation Apollo*, 47 and passim.

26 Peter T. Haydon, "Evolution of the Canadian Naval Task Group," in Ann Griffiths, Peter Haydon and Richard Gimblett (eds.), *Canadian Gunboat Diplomacy: The Canadian Navy and Foreign Policy* (Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2001), 95-129. This role remains with the shift in NATO command structure that saw SACLANT re-organized as Allied Command Transformation, although with an army lieutenant-general currently in the COS position.

27 Miller and Hobson, *Persian Excursion*, 163 and 173.

28 Gimblett, *Operation Apollo*, 49, 133 and passim.

29 English et al, *Command Styles in the Canadian Navy*, 102.

CHAPTER 6

The Prominence of Military Intervention to Support Human Rights in Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: *The Responsibility to Protect*



Steve Nolan

The United Nations' International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) has developed the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine, which codifies the belief that human rights supersede sovereignty rights. Proposed and supported largely by the efforts of the Canadian government, *Responsibility to Protect* deals with the broad spectrum of the global human security environment. The main thrust of the report is that each sovereign nation is charged with the responsibility of protecting the fundamental human rights of its citizens. A failure to protect these rights gives impetus for the international community to intervene and correct the injustice. The focus of the report on prevention, scaled intervention with military intervention as a last resort, and finally a re-building phase, would leave one believing that this policy will lead to a more stable world. A careful analysis of this policy shows that this is not necessarily the case. The main tenet of the section dealing with intervention is a list of guiding principles for potential military interventions.

CHAPTER 6

The concepts of determining when an intervention is justified, authorization of the mission and scope of the intervention are all laid out. Although it is clearly stated in *Responsibility to Protect* that military intervention is the last option to be considered, adopting this policy may mean that this option will be used in ever increasing frequency. There are three key reasons for suspecting that if the United Nations (UN) or Canada implements the recommendations of *Responsibility to Protect*, military interventions will increase, vice the stated intent of only using them as a last resort. First, historical precedents of how sovereign nations interact with each other in a self-interested way have created friction. If 'responsibility to protect' weakens the current system of non-intervention and the sovereign rights of nations, then more friction, not less, will occur. Second, the prescriptive flaws in the policy; specifically the lack of available, efficient and acceptable preventive mechanisms, as well as the onerous approval process for these types of non-military interventions, will lead to situations where downward spiralling human security concerns cannot be stopped because of slow administration and ineffectual reactions from the international community and its governing bodies. In turn, this will devolve into a situation where only military intervention can ameliorate humanitarian concerns. The occurrence of more military interventions, and the strains on the international system of sovereignty, would mean greater international instability that may affect the human security environment. Third, there is a need in these cases for a complete regime change in order for the cessation and prevention of further humanitarian abuses. Although *Responsibility to Protect* states that only a minimum amount of intervention will be attempted to correct the humanitarian transgressions, the fact of the matter is that if a nation has forfeited its sovereignty because it has not adhered to the UN humanitarian standards, and is subsequently subject to a military intervention, then that country will require a completely new governance structure. Taking these factors in to account, it is clear that Canadian foreign policy, which supports military intervention on the basis of stopping human rights abuses through the *Responsibility to Protect*

doctrine, skews the issue of military intervention from a force of last resort to a force of choice. This chapter seeks to analyze the Canadian policy within the context of the *Responsibility to Protect*, examine the historical precedents leading to this position, and determine the policy implications for Canada as it furthers the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine throughout the international community.

Historical Precedent, Sovereignty, and Human Rights – Prediction

It is important to understand the tension between *Responsibility to Protect* and how it affects the sovereignty of nations. Essentially, *Responsibility to Protect* can be seen as a natural evolution in international relations and has significant historical support in both policy and convention. The idea of international governance in the field of human rights is by no means new. Thomas Gillespie established a timeline that includes the treaty of Westphalia as a supporting document for addressing the human security agenda. This treaty is a document used to uphold the concept of a non-interventionist sovereignty of nations. He writes:

The Treaty of Westphalia which established the nation-state system that continues today undertook ‘to protect specific groups within states from inhuman treatment’ further demonstrating the reach of international standards into domestic jurisdiction prior to 1945 was the abolition of the slave trade by nineteenth century treaties, the prescription for the treatment of war related human suffering by the Geneva Convention of 1864 and other such agreements.¹

The idea that human rights can be legislated across borders by international convention has historical precedence. This tradition is further revealed by the operation of the UN:

CHAPTER 6

The UN system has generated more than fifty formal human rights statements is evidence of a general belief in human rights principles among its membership.²

Although the international community has long held a belief that human rights should be protected, it has often relied on individual states to self-regulate their behaviour.

Intervening in the internal affairs of another sovereign state for the sole purpose of ameliorating a human rights injustice is a relatively new concept. Jack Donnelly, a noted author on the subject, defined the concept as follows:

Humanitarian intervention can be defined as intervention (in the narrow sense of coercive interference in the internal affairs of another state) in order to remedy mass and flagrant violations of the basic human rights of foreign nationals by their government.³

The *Responsibility to Protect* puts forth the idea that the predictive analysis abilities of the international community need to be improved, expanded and widely employed in order to identify threats to human security as early as possible. This is easily stated, but would become problematic in practice for several reasons. First, the countries conducting the prediction and analysis have to carry out these actions in a selfless manner. Second, the international community would have to deem the analysis, and consequent recommendation for an intervention, as correct and bereft of any economic or political benefit to the nation conducting the analysis and requesting the intervention. Lastly, the country that is potentially being analyzed would have to allow this action to occur in the first place. This initial act of a sovereign nation giving up some degree of its sovereignty to allow predictive analysis or inspection is not likely to occur in many cases. Even the ICISS report acknowledges this as a hurdle to its proposal:

States are becoming reluctant to accept any internationally endorsed preventative measures at all – even of the softest and supportive kind. Their fear is that any “internationalization” of the problem will result in further external interference and begin down the slippery slope to intervention.⁴

In order for *Responsibility to Protect* to be adopted by the UN or Canada, the predictive portion of the doctrine needs to be worked out. The ability of the international community to identify and analyze the existence of weapons that pose a threat to humanity is a good example of just how weak and malleable the predictive and analytical aspect of international relations really are. The current international mood, and the general opposition to intervention because of the United States’ invasion and occupation of Iraq, will remain a hurdle for *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine and the likelihood of being implemented by the UN. The prediction section of the *Responsibility to Protect* report remains the weakest portion. A greater examination of the predictive abilities, and *Responsibility to Protect*’s reliance on them, needs to be completed. The lack of credible international predictive abilities will continue to be a challenge to the success of *Responsibility to Protect*.

The Prescriptive Flaws of Responsibility to Protect – Intervention

The ICISS report concentrates the majority of its focus on proposing preventative measures designed to stop human rights abuses by garnering international awareness, followed by support for a spectrum of preventative measures including, in extreme cases, military intervention. A recurring theme throughout the report, which is used to highlight the need for *Responsibility to Protect*, is the genocide in Rwanda. The call for effective response by the international community gained real momentum because of this incident. It was seen that:

CHAPTER 6

The United Nations Security Council knew that officials connected to the government in Rwanda were planning genocide, and credible strategies were present to prevent or at least to greatly mitigate the genocide that followed. However, the Security Council refused to take the necessary action. That was a failure of international will.⁵

The *Responsibility to Protect* uses this example to develop a model on how the international community should act towards countries that have, or are appended to have, a grave human rights situation within its borders. The committee determined a broad spectrum of intervention:

The full continuum of conflict prevention tools includes positive inducements, such as development assistance to promote good governance, human rights, and the rule of law, mediation, and the use of good offices and diplomatic envoys, but also encompasses more robust forms of diplomacy including enforcement measures such as sanctions. In extreme cases, prevention can also involve the preventative deployment of military assets/ troops to mitigate or staunch an ongoing crisis.⁶

These types of missions are seen to be preventative measures designed to avert a possible conscious-shocking event or series of events. The *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine sees prevention as the primary effort. Even though *Responsibility to Protect* goes into detail about how prevention must be the focus of the international community and how a military intervention can only be used as a last resort, the majority of doctrine comprises a set of principles for military intervention. The amount of attention the document pays to military intervention belies its stated intent of concentrating on prediction and non-military intervention. The real focus of the report is on the use of a military intervention to stop extreme cases of human rights abuses. Understandably, military interventions – be they for humanitarian or economic reasons – are the pre-eminent topic

of international relations. Therefore, the main thrust of *Responsibility to Protect* can be seen in the four principles for military intervention: just cause threshold; the precautionary principles; the concept of the right authority; and finally the operational principles, all of which define how military missions should be conducted.

The just cause threshold is what appears to be the primary decision-making consideration for the use of military force in a humanitarian mission. It explains the boundaries of what types of actions constitute crimes that would warrant a military intervention to be considered. It states:

...there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind: large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.⁷

Although no one would argue with the portion descriptive of a large-scale loss of life, some may be concerned with the section that includes the state's inability to act. If a state suffered a large-scale loss of life even though there was no genocidal intent, and the state was unable to respond to the aftermath of the crisis, the state would be open to an intervention by a predatory neighbour or regional group. In a related vein, the use of the term 'apprehended' gives a lot of room for interpretation. It is in line with the attempt to prevent these crimes, but it could be subverted by any number of international or non-state actors to bring about a change of government or the like. Although these scenarios are seemingly far fetched, they are used to illustrate that *Responsibility to Protect* would perhaps inhibit the international system of law. *Responsibility to Protect* may make

CHAPTER 6

the world of international relations even more difficult. The intent of *Responsibility to Protect* is to reduce human suffering across the globe. If it creates more instances of chaos and strife by breaking down the norms of international law, and giving some justification to the predatory actions of certain states, then it may find itself doing more harm than good despite the best intentions of the policy.

Responsibility to Protect recommends military interventions because a state's inability to act or because of an appended threat. This expanded list of qualifying scenarios may lead to an increase in military interventions. Canadian Defence policy outlined in the *1994 White Paper on Defence* indicates that Canada will support military intervention into "failed states" although the type of support is kept vague. The policy uses the term "humanitarian" generally only disaster-type missions, and offers up medical and engineering resources for short-term humanitarian efforts. However, it does give an indication that the CF could be deployed for missions that:

address genuine threats to international peace and security (as for example in the Gulf or the Former Yugoslavia) or emerging humanitarian tragedies (such as the situations in Somalia and Rwanda).⁸

Canada's military policy has been supportive of the preventative aspects of *Responsibility to Protect*, and because of the enlarged list of possible missions – including humanitarian intervention – has seen its number of deployments increase significantly since this policy was adopted in 1994. The increase in military interventions carried out by the CF in the last ten years is an indication that if the UN adopts *Responsibility to Protect*, the number and scope of military interventions may increase.

Responsibility to Protect has developed four precautionary principles used to caution decision makers when an intervention is being considered: the right intention; last resort; proportional

means; and reasonable prospects. The right intention states that the military intervention must be completely about humanitarian rights and have no benefits – economic, political, or otherwise – to the intervening force. It goes on to state that a multilateral operation that is supported by regional opinion is the best way to assure that the intervention adheres to the principle of “right intention.” Ironically, this then would support a regional organization, such as NATO, authorizing and conducting the intervention. This is contrary to what the *Responsibility to Protect* states in a subsequent section that deals with the authority to approve such missions. These competing sub-sections add room for debate, adding possible delays to the approval process and possibly allowing the concept to be subverted for national interests.

The final principle, the principle of “proportional means”, explains how the military force must be the minimum size necessary to achieve a reversal in the human rights transgression it was sent to correct. The scale of the force and the length of the intervention are again open to debate. An analysis of the *Responsibility to Protect* report shows that any country that requires an intervention has failed in its responsibilities to its citizens, and is therefore a “failed state.” This extension could broaden the definition of failed state and require that any military intervention stop at nothing less than a complete regime change. Moreover, this interpretation would lead to larger and longer deployments of military forces:

When military forces are employed they are trained and equipped to support regional peace and security in ways that do not escalate violence and distrust and without resorting to attempts a militarily forced global engineering that ignores the transformative social, economic, and political conditions that are essential to durable peace and security.⁹

Forcing or engineering change may represent the Achilles heel of the intervention for human rights policy. Even the best

CHAPTER 6

re-construction policy or plan does not account for the huge cultural and normative changes, which are required for an enduring peace and for the entrenchment of the human rights that initiated the intervention and are now trying to be protected.

The precautionary principle, entitled “reasonable prospects” outlines a seemingly obvious concept that the military intervention should first have a reasonable chance of success, and that the intervention should not cause consequences greater than the intervention is trying to stop. If there will be a greater use of military forces with larger forces deployed for regime change and re-building, the caveat of reasonable prospects may mean that in the future only the easy missions will be attempted. Conversely, this may mean that the really dire cases can be discounted as not falling within the “reasonable prospects” envelope, and thus never receive the international community’s attention at all.

Alluded to earlier, the “right authority” principle, proposes an approval process for potential military interventions. This principle states:

There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has.¹⁰

Even though it appears to support the UN process, the policy really spells out a recipe for reform, and goes so far as to say that if the UN Security Council does not support a proposed action to relieve human suffering then, “concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation.”¹¹ The tacit approval of how states are justified in acting without the consent of the United Nations Security Council is problematic for two reasons. First, it relates to progressive nature of interventions encouraged by the *Responsibility to Protect*. Measures undertaken

by the international community evolve towards a military intervention, generally starting with much lesser measures, such as monetary inducements, sanctions, and escalating towards the threat of military intervention. This progression may take a significant amount of time. That amount of time, combined with the arduous approval process of the UN acknowledged by the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine, would give one the perception that by the time a conscious-shocking event, such as genocide or ethnic cleansing is believed to be imminent, the UN-approved response time would be so long into the event that by the time it actually occurs, military intervention will be the most likely, and perhaps the only option remaining for the international community. The Canadian Defence Policy is surprisingly supportive of this, and in a very prescient way, has supported this policy for quite some time. The 1994 White Paper states that the military could be deployed for:

the protection of civilian populations and refugees, national reconstruction, upholding international law and opposing aggression. Nevertheless, Canada will remain prepared to contribute forces to such operations, whether they are authorized by the UN, or as part of the efforts of regional organizations such as NATO or the CSCE.¹²

A second problem encountered when adhering to the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine is that no time is stipulated between the requests to the UN and when a nation or group can act on its own. In cases of humanitarian intervention, a mere appeal to the UN on day one and then an armed intervention on day two can occur with the injunction that 'lives were at stake' as the rationale. This is another instance of how this doctrine's noble principles can be subverted. The problem is not that this policy can be subverted, as it is recognized that all policies can be the core issue it is that it opens the justification of military actions for debate, yet again, based on age-old arguments of self-interest versus peace and order in international relations. The fact that *Responsibility to Protect* does not address this aspect may make it

CHAPTER 6

no better than the current system of international order. However, it is likely that *Responsibility to Protect* will severely weaken the current, albeit limited, system of international order centred on the UN, and replace it with a system where regional groupings, nations and even non-state actors can theoretically justify any of their actions using the policy.

The approval process for an intervention is so lengthy and complex that once a potentially conscience-shocking event is identified the time available for prevention is limited, and thus an intervention will be the most likely course of action. Conversely, the extended approval timelines in situations such as this may relegate the international community to a more punitive role using the international court, vice a preventative role using predictive and less-than military interventions, in order to further the cause of human security: “When the international community has decided to intervene its efforts have been too late, its mandate insufficient, and its resources and commitment lacking”.¹³ Another potentially contentious aspect of “right authority” is that it gives implicit authority for regional and sub-regional organizations to act on their own if the Security Council “rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options are action within area of jurisdiction... under Chapter VII of the Charter.”¹⁴ This policy opens the debate about regional actors, territoriality, regional jurisdiction and its similarity to colonialism.

The *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine favours a human security agenda over the traditionally held views of sovereignty laid out in the UN Charter. The concept of a hierarchical precedence for which countries can enjoy sovereignty is not new. Mohammed Ayoub puts forth the idea that if the structures of sovereignty are not equally spread throughout all nations then it may lead to anarchy, or at best, unmitigated hegemony. Specifically, he cites the historical example of Europe in the post Westphalian era as a period when sovereignty was only enjoyed by the stronger European nations. Sovereignty was essentially given out to those countries

that were of a like-mind; all other countries were not considered sovereign and this allowed for the proliferation of colonialism. This system of selective sovereignty or “standard of civilisation”:

... was the prevailing political policy in Europe until the end of the 19th century and was based on the concept that only those countries that had reached a certain standard of civilised behaviour had the right to attain sovereign status.¹⁵

Obviously, this raises the question of a return to colonial times. *Responsibility to Protect* has the potential to divide the world into zones of sovereign and un-sovereign nations, based entirely on the western ideal of human rights. Perhaps the only way to avoid repeating history is to ensure that the governing authority for enforcing human rights rests solely with a recognizable international authority. Regional actors and alliances may pose the greatest threat to the effectiveness of this system.

Noted Canadian author and member of the ICISS panel responsible for the *Responsibility to Protect* report, Michael Ignatieff, sees this return to imperialism as a necessary step in international relations to affect some change to the way the human security agenda is handled:

This suggests that a liberal interventionist foreign policy may be a contradiction in terms: principle commits us to intervene and yet forbids the imperial ruthlessness required to make intervention succeed.¹⁶

These views suggest a return to imperialism, where ‘peace, order, and good government’ policies of the sovereign country ruled the non-sovereign nations with a firm self-interest.

Although the aspects of *Responsibility to Protect* that are open to interpretation, such as the state’s inability to act, how a potential humanitarian transgression can be appended, and the like, are not

CHAPTER 6

necessarily strong arguments for not accepting *Responsibility to Protect*, they do have a cumulative affect in that they raise more questions than answers in international law.

One of the key problems with *Responsibility to Protect* is that it allows regional actors to justify military interventions. The list of causes that can be used to justify a military intervention would encompass more scenarios and would in turn lead to more missions. This fact, coupled with the implicit return to imperialism and the need to lengthen military interventions and expand them to include regime change, would give grave concern to the international community if *Responsibility to Protect* were to be adopted by the UN.

The Means Justify the End – Re-building

In the post intervention country, there will be a need to implement a system of governance to replace the governance structure that allowed the human rights violations in the first place. This theoretically will lead to greater global stability. Along with the cultural problems that re-building a nation entails there also exists the problem of whether or not the coalition or regional actor that is conducting the re-building is doing so free of economic, military, or political gain. The reality is that nations will act in their self-interest, and that will always bring questions about the justification of the intervention in the first place, especially if it means greater economic gains from re-building contracts or trade agreements. Countries will only engage in an intervention if there is some gain for them in the long run, more specifically: "...the threshold of pain for states undertaking humanitarian intervention in which their national interests are not substantially involved will be low".¹⁷ Analysis of the re-building section of *Responsibility to Protect* indicates that the only interventions to occur are not ones based on humanitarian need, but ones that satisfy another country's greed. Countries that offer no economic or political gain for the intervener are not likely to gain the necessary support to allow full *Responsibility to*

Protect intervention and re-building efforts. *Responsibility to Protect* states that it does not aim to conduct regime change but to aim its policies specifically at the human rights problems. This view is somewhat shortsighted because: "... in the past intervention for humanitarian purposes was targeted at a specific behaviour, the new objective... must be to replace the offending regime".¹⁸ This is what is truly meant when it is said that a country loses its right to sovereignty when it engages in human rights abuses. Re-building cannot be completed unless it ensures a future stable environment where human rights are protected, unless it removes the governance structure that was responsible for the human rights transgressions or was unable to prevent the aforementioned crimes. Again, this means a larger military force, a greater commitment by the international community in terms of resources, and an increase in time for these interventions in order to affect some aspect of required regime change.

The final chapter of the report that is dedicated to military intervention gives a prescription on how military interventions should be conducted, the types of missions they should be given, and the operational constraints that should be placed upon them. One of the key principles that the *Responsibility to Protect* report tries to put forth is that: "...the objective being the protection of a population, not the defeat of the state".¹⁹ As shown earlier, this objective is contradictory to many of the other key aspects of the *Responsibility to Protect*. Countries that warrant a human rights intervention have essentially given up their right to be treated as a sovereign nation. Under the program prescribed for these countries, every effort would have been attempted to prevent crimes against humanity before long-term military intervention or regime change would occur. This is seen in Canadian Defence policy that describes missions that are not limited in scope but have far reaching effects. Missions that are not solely about military objectives, but concern themselves with the macro view of supporting real change, allow for future stability. The *1994 White Paper on Defence* describes these missions and states that: "They must not become ends in themselves; they must be part of a

CHAPTER 6

comprehensive strategy to secure long term, realistic, and achievable solutions".²⁰ Again, it is seen that the somewhat idealistic intentions of *Responsibility to Protect* cannot be physically replicated in the real world without some definite changes. The implicit need for regime change once an intervention has begun is one example of this.

Another example comes from the apparently conciliatory and idealistic notion that *Responsibility to Protect* has altered the international dialogue on human rights, by suggesting that the paradigm be changed from the right to intervene to the *Responsibility to Protect*. This shift is intended to place the onus on countries to ensure they adhere to the international standard of human rights or else they may lose their sovereignty. Previously, the discussion was about whether or not outside coalitions or regional actors had the right to intervene in a sovereign country's domestic affairs. This left some room for discussion in the international community.²¹ An unintended consequence of this paradigm shift towards responsibility is that the *Responsibility to Protect* is also placed elsewhere. When it is a *Responsibility to Protect*, the international community would be required to intervene – in some way – each and every time. Obviously, this supports the point that *Responsibility to Protect* will increase the overall number of interventions.

The re-building policy put forth by *Responsibility to Protect* is essentially a sound concept for moving towards a more stable world, where human rights is brought to the forefront of how to achieve global security. It does, however, suffer some failings when the policy is analyzed. First, the fact that countries will be seen to be acting in a self-serving way, regardless of their true motivations, will give cause for suspicion and approval problems when an intervention is proposed. Second, there will be a need for a complete regime change once an intervention is undertaken. Finally, there is a subtle shift in the applicability of *Responsibility to Protect* not only in domestic but international affairs as well. All of these concerns are limiting factors for the successful implementation of *Responsibility to Protect*.

Conclusion

In the field of international politics, there exists a growing belief that certain states have the responsibility to intervene in order to stop governments from inflicting harm on their citizens. The belief that the defence of basic human rights is, in and of itself, reason enough to broach the sovereignty of nations. This ideal although, commendable and apparently a self-evident truth amongst many in western democracies, is contrary to current international laws and conventions that uphold the global order.

Historically, intervention to ameliorate human rights transgression is not new. *Responsibility to Protect* seeks to avoid an increase in interventions by stressing that the international community must develop better predictive abilities, allowing corrective action to be initiated sooner. This policy would be very difficult to implement. The current predictive capabilities are weak, and there is no impetus for the international community to dedicate any more resources towards these capabilities. Further, countries targeted for predictive assets and inspection would not likely allow their sovereignty to be breached let alone the international community's lack of resolve to breach a country's sovereignty on the suspicion of impropriety.

Once a human rights transgression is detected, *Responsibility to Protect* offers a prescription for their prevention. Implementing *Responsibility to Protect* will most likely cause more discord in international relations than it seeks to correct. In fact, *Responsibility to Protect* allows regional actors to intervene if it is felt that the UN is not acting fast enough. As the number of scenarios that warrant interventions increases, there is a greater possibility that more interventions will occur. Finally, the implicit return to an imperialist type of occupation, one that initially sets out to alleviate human suffering, but then is required to set up governance structures and assist the targeted country in developing and supporting itself, will mean an extension of military intervention and occupation, and an obvious expansion

CHAPTER 6

of the original mandate. These prescriptive aspects of *Responsibility to Protect* need to be expanded upon prior to implementation.

The subtle change to the *Responsibility to Protect* would seemingly be a step forward, however, the reality is that not only is the *Responsibility to Protect* applied domestically, but it is also applied internationally. If the international community is responsible to protect human rights globally, then this can only result in a dramatic increase in military interventions and a further strain on international order.

Taking these factors in to account, it is clear that Canadian foreign policy, which supports military intervention on the basis of stopping human rights abuses through the *Responsibility to Protect* doctrine, skews the issue of military intervention from a force of last resort to a force of choice. Although it does not resolve the tension in international politics between the cardinal principle of non-interference and the concern for human rights, *Responsibility to Protect* is closer to solving the polemics of the debate. It currently does not give a clear solution to the problem but does present a way forward that should guide the international community towards a system of international law based more on morality than on territory.

Endnotes

1 Thomas R. Gillespie, "Unwanted Responsibility" *Peace & Change*, 8 (3, Jul 1993): 225.

2 Ibid., 232.

3 Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law, Morality, and Politics" *Journal of International Affairs*, 37 (2, Winter 1984): 311.

4 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). Chapter 3, Section 34.

5 Ibid., Chapter 1, Section 1.

- 6 Foreign Affairs Canada. "Canadian Non-Paper on *The Responsibility to Protect* and the Evolution of the United Nations' Peace and Security Mandate: Submission to the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change" (Ottawa, April 2004) p. 8 [Online] Available from http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/un_reform-en.asp.
- 7 ICISS Report. Chapter 4, Section 19.
- 8 Department of National Defence. *1994 White Paper on Defence* . (Ottawa, 1994) Chapter 6 [Online], Available from http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Minister/eng/94wpaper/white_paper_94_e.html
- 9 Ernie Regher, "Canadian Defence Policy Framework" *Ploughshares Monitor*, (Spring 2004), 2.
- 10 ICISS Report. Chapter 8, Section 2.
- 11 Canadian Non-paper, 2004: 7.
- 12 *1994 White Paper on Defence*. Chapter 6.
- 13 Lloyd Axworthy, *Human Rights*. Vital Speeches of the Day, 07/15/2000, 66 (19): 580.
- 14 Canadian Non-paper, 2004: 8
- 15 Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty", *International Journal of Human Rights*. 6 (1, Spring 2002): 83
- 16 Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honour*. (Toronto: Penguin, 1998): 98
- 17 Ayoob, 2002: 83
- 18 Gillespie, 1993: 219
- 19 ICISS Report. Chapter 8, Section 8.
- 20 *1994 White Paper on Defence*, Chapter 6.
- 21 Donnelly, 1984: 315.

CHAPTER 7

Leadership in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Example of the Israel Defence Forces



Sergio Catignani

This chapter examines the leadership challenges that military organizations face when conducting low-intensity conflict (LIC) operations. Without falling into the trap of trying to define in minute detail what LIC is, given the fact that such a term is contested both by academics and by security professionals, this chapter contends that the term low-intensity conflict covers a wide gamut of scenarios. These include insurgency and counter-insurgency, terrorism and counter-terrorism, and peace enforcement, all of which are situated on the higher end of the spectrum of low-intensity violence, whereas peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and disaster relief operations are located on the lower end of the spectrum of low-intensity violence. The salient point about low-intensity conflicts is that they fall short of all-out, high-intensity war.

Given the fact that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) has been involved extensively in relatively similar low-intensity conflict scenarios envisaged above, this chapter uses this case study in order to highlight the leadership challenges that military organisations face whilst conducting low-intensity conflict operations. The IDF case study will be used because, in the author's opinion, the IDF has been able to cope overall very well

CHAPTER 7

with the difficulties, dilemmas and uncertainties stemming from the ongoing low-intensity conflict with Palestinian insurgents since the late-1980s due to its well-developed and exceptional junior officer leadership cadre.

Despite the fact that, for example, the USA, Canada, Nigeria, Pakistan and many other states have participated mainly in peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations where their neutrality was well-defined and, for the most part, maintained – after all, they were not one of the belligerent factions – the IDF's experiences during the first *Intifada* (1987-1993) and current *Al-Aqsa Intifada* (2000-Present) conflicts as a modern conventional military organisation directly involved as a belligerent in low-intensity warfare are still pertinent to other military organisations. This is particularly the case when looking at the similarities that the current situations in Afghanistan and Iraq present. Such relevance is due to the fact that the ethical dilemmas, operational uncertainty, and the strategic effect of tactical operations carried out by junior commanders and soldiers, *inter alia*, are the same issues that military personnel from other states deal and have dealt with during their LIC operations abroad.¹

Hence, the similarity of issues experienced by disparate forces involved in low-intensity conflicts around the world and by the IDF in the West Bank and Gaza Strip together with the IDF's effective response to the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, in particular due to its reliance on the initiative and resourcefulness of the IDF's outstanding junior command leadership, makes the choice of the IDF as a case study relevant to other military organisations. This is especially the case when many security experts and officers agree that one of the most important contributing factors of a successful outcome in low-intensity conflicts is the development of forward-thinking, flexible, charismatic leaders who are able to instil in their unit members the right motivation to get the particular mission accomplished even if the military-strategic rationale for such a mission is not clear-cut.² In this respect, military leadership can be defined as “the art of direct

and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for organisational success to accomplish missions effectively”.³

Before looking at the particular way the military leadership of junior commanders is developed within the IDF and how such a leadership method is successful in creating leaders capable of dealing with the ambiguities of the low-intensity conflict theatre of operation, the chapter broaches the specific characteristics, issues and predicaments that low-intensity conflicts in the post-Cold War era pose to military organisations in general, and to small-unit commanders and soldiers in particular.

The Complexities of Low-Intensity Conflicts

A State of Ambiguity

During the Cold War, and in the IDF’s case during the pre-*Intifada* years, military organisations prepared their combat forces primarily for high-intensity warfare, which, despite its context-specific problems, entailed nonetheless quite straightforward objectives from the strategic down to the tactical levels of warfare as both the nature (e.g., easily identifiable military personnel and materiel), doctrine (e.g., high-intensity, conventional and symmetrical warfare) and strategic objective (e.g., from the destruction of armed forces to the occupation and control of land) of their own armed forces and that of their enemies were well-known and to a certain extent stable throughout this whole period. Such clarity is not readily present in contemporary low-intensity conflicts. For example, when comparing his patrol experiences with the IDF, one Israeli paratrooper stated, “You know it’s not so clear-cut. I did patrols on the Syrian border, I did patrols over the Lebanese border; it’s much easier to digest. It’s not the same thing as policing activities you do in the territories”.⁴

The question, indeed, of what determines victory is quite a salient one in the context of low-intensity conflicts. Whereas in high-intensity conflicts the defeat of a clearly defined enemy

CHAPTER 7

determines victory, today in low-intensity conflicts lowering the level of violence determines a mission's accomplishment. In other words, to what level of violence must peacekeeping, peace-enforcement or counter-insurgency forces reduce before their mission is deemed successful?

The use of any force in low-intensity conflict scenarios to reduce the level of violence may sometimes prove to be very problematic, if not, counter-productive. For example, retaliatory actions in particular may have the opposite effect of deterring further attacks or civil disturbances and, consequently, of reducing the level of violence. This is due to the fact that the force of the military operation and the damage that it may cause – no matter how much caution is exercised whilst conducting such an operation – work on the “sensitivities of the enemy in a manner opposite to its intention and heightens the circle of violence”.⁵

Notwithstanding the IDF's involvement since the early 1950s in '*batash*' – that is, 'current security operations' – such as the interception of guerrilla and terrorist combatants during border patrols, retaliatory operations and cross-border punitive strikes,⁶ the IDF's main pre-occupation until very recently has been the threat of high-intensity warfare from the states bordering it and, thus, its focus both in terms of order of battle and training of military staff has been geared towards conventional, high-intensity conflict.^{7,8} In fact, the IDF's current Gaza Brigade Commander, Brigadier-General Aviv Kohavi, stated in early 2003 that in the IDF's case, at the start of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* in September 2000 “there were no relevant doctrine and techniques for LIC combat in urban populated areas”.⁹ Armies all over the world, particularly, those belonging to NATO states, have also been caught unprepared for LIC missions due to their continued focus over the last decade on conventional warfare.

In fact, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of low-intensity conflicts as the main conduct of warfare the challenges that conventional armies have faced over the last fifteen years as a

result have been manifold and rather more complicated. In this new era of low-intensity conflicts, the distinction between “‘front’ and ‘rear’ and ‘war’ and ‘peace’” has definitely become more blurred.¹⁰ Consequently, the conventional differences between ‘combatant’ and ‘non-combatant,’ between ‘battle-ground’ and ‘civilian quarters’ have also become confused.

Legitimacy

Moreover, given the equivocal nature of low-intensity conflict threats to the core national interests of the specific state or states intervening in a conflict, the legitimacy of the use or threat of military force in order to stabilise and impose order over a particular theatre of operations has become paramount not only from a legal point of view,¹¹ but also from an ethical standpoint.¹²

More than ever before, leaders involved in contemporary low-intensity conflicts have to deal with the moral misgivings that may arise amongst both their soldiers and themselves. Thus, such leaders have found themselves continually trying “to build an internal credibility for their operations” and “to constantly respond to a sensitive civilian environment ... in order to construct an external legitimacy for their actions”.¹³ In fact, LIC missions necessitate an improved stress on “meaning management”¹⁴ for deployed armed forces in terms of internalising the purposes and mission of a particular operation due to the missions’ inherent ambiguities. It is the task of the leader to provide such ‘meaning’ to his subordinates. According to attributional theory,¹⁵ in fact, when confronted with ambiguous situations, individuals ascribe to leaders the understanding of what needs to be achieved, the course of action to take, of how and what to prioritise; “briefly, the ability to ‘make sense of things’ in chaotic environments”.¹⁶

During the War in Lebanon, IDF psychologists conducted a major survey and found that “when legitimacy of war [and by extension, low-intensity conflicts] declines, as it did in soldiers fighting in

CHAPTER 7

Lebanon, overall morale can remain high if soldiers maintain trust in their commanders".¹⁷ Past Israeli studies have shown that the unit members' trust in their commander is based on the commander's "professional capability, his credibility as a source of information and the amount of care and attention that he pays to his men".¹⁸ Such trust has also played a large part in maintaining soldiers' motivation high during the current *Al-Aqsa Intifada*.

The question of legitimacy when using military force in low-intensity conflicts is particularly crucial not only for internationally mandated military intervention, but also for low-intensity conflicts conducted on the basis of self-defence as in the Israeli case. Israel, in fact, is one of the belligerent parties of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* and has participated in clearly aggressive armed skirmishes with well-equipped and well-trained Palestinian combatants since early 2001.¹⁹ Yet even at the higher end of the spectrum of such low-intensity violence, the IDF Head of Doctrine for the Ground Forces Command, Colonel Roye Elcabets, plainly stated that, "we know that the legitimacy of our struggle is a major thing and every act of any soldier might on occasion harm the battle of the narrative".²⁰

One would think, in fact, that the principle of self-defence would be adequate to justify the use of force in Israel's specific case. For clashes such as low-intensity conflicts – which are objectively not perceived as being existential threats despite Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's and other top IDF officers' remarks to the contrary – the issue of the narrative of the conflict becomes an important aspect for legitimising and creating a consensus on the use of force and in defining the strategic intent of any force used.²¹ Consequently, it seems that even in the Israeli case, where the level of violence is especially high and the target of such violence are clearly Israeli civilians and military units, "this lack of consensus leads ... to an inherent controversy on the question of defining strategic objectives" and that "the lack of clarity regarding the greater objectives makes it harder to clarify the means for achieving them".²²

The Media

The growing involvement of the media in military operations as well as the media's increased effectiveness in diffusing information in real-time regarding a particular armed forces' handling of a specific military operation have also posed serious challenges to the operational effectiveness of such armed forces. Notwithstanding the fact that the greater presence of the media in the military operational theatre has made the soldier on the ground more accountable and, thus, less prone to carry out abusive or illegal behaviour, the ambiguous nature of certain images may lead to the misinterpretation of the soldier's or the unit's legitimate conduct during his or their mission. For example, one sergeant from the *Nahal* Infantry Brigade voiced his concerns regarding the way the media had portrayed IDF operations he had participated in during Operation 'Defensive Shield' in April 2002:

They were firing at soldiers coming down one of the alleyways. How do you explain to someone that the only way that you can take out a heavy machinegun – which is armour-piercing – is that you have to call in a helicopter and it has to be a pinpoint strike at that building? So you hit that top floor. Just the top floor is damaged and the people on the middle floor are fine. But a cameraman comes and shows that building. And suddenly it's a destroyed building and you are accused of having killed people.²³

Indeed, the issue of the legitimacy of the use of force has become very relevant as the media can easily weaken such legitimacy by exposing operational blunders or even abuses carried out by their armed forces and, thus, influence heavily international and domestic public opinion. The exposition of such operational errors and abuses has also become easier to monitor, as local civilians increasingly have been able to acquire relatively inexpensive video and digital recorders and use them to their advantage. When commenting on the Palestinians' ability to use the media in

CHAPTER 7

order to strengthen their cause for national self-determination in the international arena, one IDF infantry reserve company commander stated,

This is the thing that the Palestinians know how to do 10,000 times better than us. I remember when they started the second *Intifada*, the first thing they did was all the households bought small video cameras. In every house you can find a camera and they took pictures all the time. In this field we lost, we lost big time, big time.²⁴

Thus, the need by forces on the ground to avoid tactical mistakes, which may have extraordinary strategic consequences²⁵ due to pervasive media coverage and due to the overall greater political and diplomatic stakes involved in low-intensity conflicts – which can be subject to greater political interference from the government sanctioning the use of the military in a particular mission in the first place – will sometimes stop them from actually carrying out or, at least, modifying the most suitable military operation.

This would mostly be due to the fear of operational failure that would get highlighted on the media almost immediately whether or not that operational mistake would come in the guise of suffering own casualties, inflicting civilian casualties, causing collateral damage, demonstrating ‘excessive force’ and so on. In fact, “the presence of the news media is a primary reason for the increasing link between tactics and strategy”.²⁶ Such a linkage has become so strong that it has led armed forces like the IDF to factor in the media when planning missions at the operational and tactical levels. Thus, at a symposium held in mid-2002 on the IDF and the press, then Chief of Staff designate Moshe Ya’alon stated:

The media is indeed a strategic consideration both in preparing for battle and during and after battle. It must be a consideration within the military from the chief of staff to the last soldier.... We schedule helicopter

operations for after dark so they cannot be photographed easily.... Such considerations are already second nature to us.²⁷

Civilian Omnipresence

Furthermore, the responsibilities involved in peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and even in counter-insurgency operations within heavily-populated civilian urban arenas tend to be much more complicated than 'conventional' military tasks due to the large presence of civilians in the armed forces' theatre of operations. Tasks, such as humanitarian aid distribution, cooperation/coordination with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations may prove difficult for military organisations to deal with given major differences in each party's ethos, objectives and attitudes to the crisis. Major-General Amos Gilad, former Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, underlined the IDF's difficulty in distributing humanitarian aid due to the Palestinian terrorist organisations' opportunism:

It is very difficult to solve this contradiction between terror, on one side, and humanitarian assistance on the other. For example, to ease the daily life of Palestinians we must open the roads between cities but the moment we do that we are hit with terrorist attacks.²⁸

In the Israeli case, for example, the extensive presence of Israeli and international human rights organisations, such as *B'Tselem*, *Machsom Watch* (set up specifically to monitor abuses at IDF checkpoints), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees as well as the presence of pro-Palestinian solidarity activist organisations, such as the Palestine Solidarity Committee and the International Solidarity Movement, have on numerous occasions caused significant tensions and occasional clashes between the armed forces and unarmed local activists.

CHAPTER 7

In addition, the constant contact with the – possibly hostile – local civilian population, which may turn against such forces very abruptly or find itself in the cross-fire should a fire-fight burst out, may prove to be for the soldier carrying out policing duties too equivocal to cope with effectively. The conventional soldier who is trained, in effect, to be a warrior, but who finds him/herself carrying out constabulary, ‘public relations’ and/or negotiation and mediation tasks may struggle to adapt to such sensitive duties without the correct psychological and professional skills that they entail. One IDF paratrooper voiced stoically his frustration regarding his expectations of what his military duties would entail by saying, “I did not join the Paratroopers to check passports, but again, if that is what they need me to do, then that is what I am going to do”.²⁹

Interoperability and Rules of Engagement

Moreover, the disparate armed forces and units that are used in low-intensity operations have also challenged the ability for such forces to both coordinate and cooperate with civil and military functions across service branches. Even in combat scenarios, which various inter-service units have trained and prepared for in order to carry out joint operations as well as to increase their forces’ interoperability, there has been some difficulty coordinating different units because of the very different terrain, physical and social structure of the urban domain. Thus, a common language and standard of operation need to be implemented for contemporary unconventional low-intensity conflicts in order to reduce the uncertainty that the forces on the ground may face. Consequently, the IDF has, over the last three years in particular, set up joint operational planning groups and facilitated joint learning in order to better equip its forces involved in civilian areas of operation by creating, “common insights, a common language and by enforcing understanding and coordination”.³⁰

Moreover, the fact that rules of engagement (ROE) in LICs tend to be on occasion unclear, severely restrictive or changed quite often on the basis of ever-changing political expediency frustrates military units on the ground that have to face the reality of violence even in the most peaceful of scenarios. In an interview, Sergeant-Major Yossi underlined this reality by affirming that when facing armed violence from Palestinian insurgents guarded by ‘human shields,’ “I felt that we were not allowed to do enough. I felt restricted. I wanted to shoot more. The Palestinians were not afraid of us and we could do nothing”.³¹

One Israeli soldier aptly explained how difficult it is to sometimes follow clear operational guidelines at IDF checkpoints due to ‘humanitarian cases’ and the personal unease/misgivings their enforcement brings about:

The orders are very clear about what you are and are not allowed to do, but it’s also very hard for them, because a sergeant at a roadblock has fifteen moral dilemmas a day, even more. [For example,] if someone has a strange ID card, are you going to wait for an answer and set them aside for four hours or are you going to let this person through?³²

Decentralisation of Command

Another challenge that military organisations have been facing during LICs has been the greater dispersion of forces due to the nature of the theatre of operations as well as the tasks inherent in such operations. In fact, military forces involved in LICs have had to operate increasingly in the urban arena, which limit the command, control, communication and intelligence (C3&I) capabilities of the higher echelon command structure (albeit, efforts by the U.S. Army and the IDF at establishing a digital 3C&I integrated network have been ongoing).³³

CHAPTER 7

Notwithstanding the fact that the greater sensitivity and cost of operations in LICs entails the natural reaction for higher echelon commanders to control units on the ground³⁴ in order to avoid unintended strategic outcomes by the so-called “strategic corporal”,³⁵ “the very nature of these operations precludes effective centralisation of decision-making”.³⁶ The IDF Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-General Moshe Ya’alon reiterated this reality at the IDF’s LIC in 2004:

Traditionally, the level of major tactical decision-making and leadership in combat was that of brigade and battalion commanders, at times company commanders. In contrast, due to the decentralised characteristics of LIC combat, battle commands during a mission are made by commanders at team, squad and platoon levels.³⁷

Thus, leaders as well as their subordinates within the lower ranks, from squad to company level, which are situated on the ground need to have the ability to correctly assess the second-order and third-order effects of their tactical decisions. Leaders, in addition, need the capability to clarify the rationale for their unit’s mission to their subordinates, in view of such second- and third-order potential effects. “Units, without any explanation or understanding of why they are there and why there are doing this, will have no chance in accomplishing the mission.”³⁸ This is particularly the case when soldiers on the ground cannot recognise any major national interest to be defended by carrying out a particular mission such as in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement scenarios.³⁹

The Role of the Leader in Low-Intensity Operations

Mission Command

In order to effectively deal with the numerous complexities and ambiguity of contemporary low-intensity operations, armed forces need to develop leaders who are able to adapt to fluid

situations that entail ethical and professional flexibility, and leadership by example. The IDF has had a very strong tradition of developing leaders who have been able to take the initiative and adapt effectively to the circumstances with which they and their units have been confronted without great interference from higher-echelon commanders.

This, however, was not the case during the first *Intifada*, given the fact that the IDF had never dealt with a massive civilian uprising before. The IDF's inexperience and the political maelstrom that enveloped it led the IDF leadership to overextend its control of military operations in the Territories, but without really knowing how to deal with the situation on the ground. Even so, the operational mishaps were blamed on the actual soldiers carrying out their commanders' orders. This lack of backing and trust as well as the consequent interference from the IDF upper echelons ultimately cost the IDF a lot during the first *Intifada* years as the lack of initiative, or '*rosh katan*' (i.e., "small head") syndrome became rife. The harsh lesson of needing to provide support to soldiers on the ground, even if personally or politically costly, was learned and applied during the current *Intifada*: "In this *Intifada*, our [superior] commanders give us backup, they support us, they trust us, not like it was in the first *Intifada*, because in the first *Intifada* nobody knew what was happening; it was chaos."⁴⁰

In any case, the IDF has coped significantly well, providing 'meaning' and purpose to its units involved on the ground due to its traditional 'mission command' ethos, which was developed by the *Palmach* (a pre-state elite striking force), Units 101 and 202 (retaliatory special forces units developed by Ariel Sharon in the 1950s) and which over time was adopted by the rest of the ground forces. Mission command is essentially "a decentralised style of command relying on initiative, the acceptance of responsibility and mutual trust.... The underlying requirement [for mission command] is the fundamental responsibility to act, or in certain circumstances to decide not to act, within the framework of the commander's intent."⁴¹

CHAPTER 7

Mission command relies on mutual understanding in that subordinates need to have a lucid insight into their commander's intent so that when situations, which have never been envisaged or trained for before deployment, arise in the field, his subordinates are able to carry out the task without necessitating further guidance from their commanding officer or aborting the mission altogether. Ultimately, it is the task of the leader to clearly establish what constitutes mission success. This is particularly important in the case of LICs at the lower end of the spectrum of violence, as it is often in such settings that troops find it difficult to comprehend what it actually is.

Mission command also depends on the delegation of responsibility from a superior to his subordinates when making crucial decisions during an operation. Without such delegation of responsibility, continuous interference by the commander in the execution of the particular mission in order to reduce the risk of making an operational error may damage his subordinates' self-confidence and, consequently, may stifle his subordinates' initiative. Responsibility, likewise, "increases when soldiers believe they have personal control over their mission performance ... rather than simply following orders".⁴² Obviously, a leader can only allow such delegation if he has been able to equip his subordinates with the appropriate tools to obtain the mission's objective. Hence when commenting on such delegation and the need to trust his subordinates, Lieutenant-Colonel Ilan Malka explained:

We trust them more, we give them more space to think, more actions and decisions to take on their own. We just give them the principles and the reason [for the particular mission]. You know your people, you know your commander, they think like you do. You tell them what to do, but not how to do it. The how is up to them.⁴³

Finally, mission command entails the acceptance of risk. Mistakes will happen and unless they are due to gross negligence,

commanders should allow for them and not punish their subordinates for acting on their leader's intent, despite the risks involved in taking such an intrepid course of action. Without allowing for mistakes and the risk and acceptance of making mistakes there can be no improvement as "a necessary condition for learning is an atmosphere of openness to change, patience towards mistakes, encouragement of initiative and passing on the responsibility to the operational forces".⁴⁴

Moreover, making sure that their soldiers receive the "proper training for LIC missions" and see "a clear connection between the mission and [their] soldier's professional development"⁴⁵ will augment their motivation to serve and their propensity to take on the greater responsibility and risks that such service demands in LIC scenarios.

Consequently, armed forces, which expect to conduct operations other than war, must show that they value the training and preparations for LIC operations if they are to convince their troops that such missions are just as strategically important and esteemed as high-intensity conflict missions are within their organisation. In other words, allocating enough time to prepare troops for LICs and providing them with the tools and aptitudes to deal with the complexity and ambiguity involved will convince and help them accept their new role as not only warriors, but also as peace enforcers.

Personal Leadership

Furthermore, mission command is based on the fact that leaders require their soldiers to internalise the values of the unit in particular and of the army in general; it also requires that leaders impart to their soldiers a high awareness and identification with the mission. In order to teach and propagate the organisation's values and the mission's objectives, leaders are to lead by example as well as be able to influence their subordinates on a personal and group level.

CHAPTER 7

Hence, the leader's main source of influence and power is "referent power", which depends on his relationships with platoon members, his image as a 'fighter,' and personal qualities such as initiative, courage and independence".⁴⁶ This form of power is exercised normally by 'transformational' or 'charismatic' leaders who, according to Etzioni 1961, are able "to exercise diffuse and intensive influence over the normative and ideological orientations of others".⁴⁷ That is, charismatic or transformational leaders⁴⁸ are leaders who can best provide 'meaning' to subordinates in highly ambiguous LIC scenarios.

Such leadership is exercised more effectively in small units (i.e., at most up to battalion level, but usually at company and platoon levels) as it is an interpersonal process and works effectively in units that have high cohesiveness. Leadership as an interpersonal process within the IDF has been facilitated by the fact that the social and professional distance between commanders and their subordinates is purposefully minimised. Difference in rank is not emphasised, because operational experience and know-how are deemed more important than status. The small, if non-existent, age difference between small unit leaders and their shared experiences helps, furthermore, frank and open discussion between commander and subordinates, which enables him more easily to persuade and influence his subordinates.

Furthermore, leadership, at this level is usually defined as 'direct leadership', and is where soldiers and their units fulfil tasks in support of "higher level objectives".⁴⁹ Indeed, "it is not the large unit that provides belonging and meaning, but a small number of individuals".⁵⁰ A high level of cohesiveness also enables the leader to impose "strong normative control of the behaviour of unit members and, hence, a high level of unit discipline," which are required in politically and ethically sensitive low-intensity conflict operations.⁵¹ This leads to more effective control and oversight as it is exercised by the commanders on the ground who are

directly involved in the situation rather than by the upper command echelons in the rear.

In order for the unit leaders to exercise such referent power, a strong level of mutual trust must have been developed between such leaders and their unit members as the “nurturing of trust enhances the power of a leader.”⁵² According to the head of training for the *Givati* Infantry Brigade, “trust is very, very important in leadership. It gives the commander the good feeling that what he has decided, that will be”⁵³ and such trust has been shown in various surveys to depend “upon the commander’s professional capability, his credibility as a source of information and the amount of care and attention that he pays to his men.”⁵⁴ According to one reserve company commander of the IDF Paratroopers Brigade:

A good commander is very proficient in what he does; from small arms to tactics, he has to know his stuff [i.e., professional capability]. He is able to analyse a situation very quickly. He is not afraid to take control and responsibility in situations where the higher level commanders are f*cking up [i.e., credibility]. A good commander has to walk a really fine line between getting the job done and getting his men home alive [i.e., care of subordinates].⁵⁵

Leadership Development

Within the IDF efforts at creating professional, competent, credible and caring leaders, whether commissioned or non-commissioned officers, has been very successful due to the unique way the IDF fosters its leaders. Officers and NCOs are actually not commissioned, but come up through the ranks and are selected for officer or NCO training around 15 months after having enlisted. “Following the example of the *Palmach* and the *Haganah* ... the best soldier on the team will become the team leader and the best among the team leaders will become an officer.”⁵⁶ The IDF, in addition, has relied especially on the

CHAPTER 7

leadership of its commissioned officers as it does not have a long-term NCO cadre in the traditional sense. The platoon commander usually carries out traditional NCO functions, such as training and maintaining discipline and troop preparedness, the provision of moral support, etc. Moreover, all officers come up through the ranks and, thus, do not only have combat and operational experience by the time they become second lieutenants, but also understand very well their subordinates' needs and experiences given the fact that they too started off and served as soldiers and NCOs within the same platoon before attending the IDF's School of Officers.⁵⁷

Due to the fact that commissioned officers and NCOs usually return to the platoon in which they served previously as soldiers, their bonds with former unit members are very close. Their previous experiences with the same unit allows them to command it more easily in that they already know and understand the way their subordinates work, how they think, and what motivates them at the end of the day. This has permitted the IDF leadership cadre to better adapt to changing realities on the ground given their direct involvement in recent LIC operations.

Adapting to LIC Scenarios

And yet, the IDF has had to implement dramatic changes to its training regimen in order to prepare its leaders and soldiers to deal with moral and operational dilemmas they have faced over recent years in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, particularly due to the fact that quite a few instances of abuses and cases of excessive force were reported since the first *Intifada*.⁵⁸

The IDF School of Military Law, for example, has set up an ethical code of conduct, which sets out 11 major rules of behaviour. The code is taught to both regular and reservist ground units through courses, which provide extensive role-playing exercises that deal with the typical dilemmas a soldiers or post commander will confront whilst on duty at a checkpoint.⁵⁹ Tackling

ethical problems has been the main focus of the IDF over the last few years as it is precisely ambiguity in LICs that leads to cases of excessive force or abuse. Colonel Elcabets states, in fact, that:

There has been quite an impressive advancement in this area. In the officer course we have just developed principles on how to lead in complex situations. We have also developed a lot of lessons and examples of bad and good behaviour. They are dealt with in moral and professional terms.⁶⁰

The IDF School of Leadership also holds residential workshops for combat units who would like to discuss their moral misgivings in a sheltered environment between operational deployments. Such discussions reduce the tensions and stress that build up during their missions in the Territories. The head of the IDF School of Leadership, Lieutenant-Colonel Timna Shmueli, explains the crucial role that such sessions play in the professional development of combat units:

I think that our main role is to help them, to facilitate them. We convince commanders to take a break, to sit with the soldiers and talk about all the issues that during the war they cannot talk about. Because if you sit here for three days and think about it and analyse it, how you make your mission and let the soldiers speak out their dilemmas, their conflicts and so on, most of the time, they have the solution.⁶¹

Although, the IDF has focused heavily in the past on the professional and tactical competency of its small-unit leaders, clearly dealing with the two *Intifadas* has led to a realisation that the commander's ability to deal creatively with ambiguous situations in low-intensity conflicts is important. One IDF field psychologist emphasised this point by stating,

You have to deal with civilians and your actions are really not a function of how well you deal with your

CHAPTER 7

weapon or how good your tactical thinking is. It is mostly understanding complex situations and being able to see two steps ahead, thinking innovatively and creatively.⁶²

In fact, in low-intensity conflicts soldiers must make quick judgment calls that cannot be drilled into them through traditional training methods. “To maximise military effectiveness [in terms of achieving the mission], leaders must empower soldiers to make morally informed decisions”.⁶³ According to a former instructor of the IDF combat squad leaders’ course:

The whole moral code, moral conduct, is something that is inserted into training programmes from day one. As a young soldier we talked about it and we had lessons for it and as a commander I passed it onto my soldiers.⁶⁴

Conclusion

In conclusion, the IDF’s efforts over the last few years to reduce the level of violence in the Gaza Strip and West Bank have been successful, albeit complicated given the operational and moral complexities involved in LICs.⁶⁵ Despite the greater level of violence involved, the IDF was used in this paper as a clear example of what traditionally conventional armed forces come up against when operating in operations that fall substantially short of high-intensity warfare.

After having seen the difficulties and ambiguities that armed forces face in this new era of low-intensity warfare, the paper focused on what leadership qualities and abilities are needed in order to conduct operations effectively on the ground through small units that, given the decentralisation of command inherent in LICs, require forward-thinking, strategically-astute leaders who are able to provide ‘meaning’ to their subordinates in order to motivate them to serve – not always as a combatant, but often in a constabulary role – in very ambiguous scenarios.

The IDF's traditional stress on the 'mission command' ethos and emphasis on charismatic leadership based on close interpersonal relationships and leadership by example, have enabled it to develop leaders capable of providing sense and meaning out of the missions they and their subordinates have been involved in during its low-intensity conflict with the Palestinians over the last few years. The IDF has, furthermore, developed specific training courses and workshops that are centred on solving the human and ethical dilemmas that LIC operations present as it is quite aware that preparing their leaders and soldiers for LIC warfare, particularly in terms of its human and ethical aspects, will enhance their overall abilities, self-confidence and, ultimately, motivation to serve.

Far from being perfect or from having resolved the conflict altogether, the IDF's conduct, particularly at the lower levels of command, has stabilised a conflict that is not only very politically sensitive, but also morally ambiguous. The fact that IDF soldiers and their leaders are able to carry out their mission with professionalism and zeal despite such difficult circumstances attests to the reality that small-unit leadership in the IDF plays a great part in maintaining high levels of motivation and professionalism and in pursuing mission success after all.

Endnotes

1 There are currently 16 United Nations peacekeeping operations being conducted in all regions of the world and involving over 65,000 military personnel and civilian police. See: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/bnote.htm>.

2 Boas Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari, "Challenges of Military Leadership in Changing Armies", *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2000): 43-59; Paolo Tripodi, "The Complexities of Peacekeeping: An Initial Discussion on Peacekeepers" Ethical Challenges with some Consideration of Training and Mindset,' *Low Intensity and Law Enforcement*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (Autumn 2001): 47-62; and Eric Ouellet, "Low-Intensity Conflicts and Military

CHAPTER 7

Leadership: The Canadian Experience,” *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*, 10 (Autumn 2001): 63-88.

3 Charles F. Hawkins, “Toward a Theory of Military Leadership”, August 2002. Available at: <http://www.militaryconflict.org/leader.htm>. Accessed on 21 February 2005.

4 Captain (Reserve) Eitan Shamir, Field Psychologist, Department of Behavioural Sciences, (served in the Paratroopers Brigade whilst a conscript and also in Infantry Reserve Brigade 5 whilst a reservist), interview with author, 23 June 2004, London, UK.

5 Ze’ev Drory, *Israel’s Reprisal Policy 1953-1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation*, (London: Frank Cass, 2005).

6 Jonathan Shimshoni, *Israel and Conventional Deterrence: Border Warfare from 1953 to 1970*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Drory. *Israel’s Reprisal Policy 1953-1956*.

7 Ariel Levite, *Offence and Defence in Israeli Military Doctrine*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); Eliot A. Cohen et al, *Knives, Tanks, and Missiles: Israel’s Security Revolution*, (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998); and Tal, Israel, *National Security: The Israeli Experience*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000).

8 Some middle-ranking officers in the IDF accuse the General Staff of still preparing the armed forces for another *Yom Kippur* War. See: Sergio Catignani, “The Israel Defence Forces Organizational Changes in an Era of Budgetary Cutbacks,” *The RUSI Journal*, 149 (October 2004): 72-76.

9 Aviv Kohavi, “Learning in a Changing Reality” (PowerPoint Presentation), *First International Low-Intensity Conflict Warfare Conference*, 22-25 March 2004, Tel Aviv, Israel [CD-ROM].

10 Shamir and Ben-Ari, “Challenges of Military Leadership in Changing Armies”.

11 Alan Baker, “Legal and Tactical Dilemmas Inherent in Fighting Terror: Experience of the Israeli Army in Jenin and Bethlehem”, in *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*, Vol. 34, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004).

12 Amos Yadlin, *Ethical Dilemmas in Fighting Terrorism*, Vol. 4, No. 8 25 (Institute for Contemporary Affairs, November 2004). Available from: <http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief004-8.htm> [20 January 2005].

13 Boas Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari, “Leadership in an Open Army? Civilian Connections, Interorganisational Frameworks and Changes in Military Leadership,” in *Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the*

Twenty-First-Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organisations, eds J.G. Hunt et al, (Stamford, CT: JAI Press, 1999), 22.

14 Eric Ouellet, "Low-Intensity Conflicts and Military Leadership", 80.

15 Victor E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning*, (New York, NY: Pocket Books, 1963).

16 Micha Popper, "Leadership in Military Combat Units and Business Organisations: A Comparative Psychological Analysis," *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, 1996, 17.

17 Gregory Belenky et al., "Battle Stress, Morale, Cohesion, Combat Effectiveness, Heroism and Psychiatric Casualties: The Israeli Experience" in ed Gregory Belenky, *Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry*, (London: Greenwood Press, 1987): 15.

18 Reuven Gal, "Unit Morale: From a theoretical Puzzle to an Empirical Illustration – An Israeli Example," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 16 (1986), 558.

19 It is generally accepted that the first five weeks of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* the main articulation of Palestinian violence was in the form of popular uprisings, thereafter, urban guerrilla warfighting and terror attacks became the norm.

20 Colonel Roi Elcabets, Head of Doctrine and Training, IDF Ground Forces Command, interview with author, 26 August 2004, Tel Aviv, Israel.

21 In June 2000, for example, then Coordinator of Operations in the Territories, Maj.-Gen Amos Gilad, declared that 'the purpose of the IDF's campaign was to reduce the level of terror, which in the scope and depth of its damage has become a strategic threat, with the **first signs of threatening our existence in terms of our quality of life**' [Author's emphasis]. Colonel (Res.) Yehuda Wegman, 'Israel's Security Doctrine and the Trap of "Limited Conflict"', *Jerusalem Viewpoints* No. 514, (1 March) 2004 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, available at <http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp514.htm>.

22 Baruch Nevo and Yael Shur, *Morality, Ethics and Law in Wartime*, (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2003), 20.

23 Sergeant-Major (Reserve) Sean Sachs, Squad Leader, IDF *Nahal* Brigade, interview with author on 11 August 2003, Tel Aviv, Israel.

24 Captain (Reserve) 'Khaim,' Company Commander, IDF Infantry Brigade 5, interview with author, 12 August 2004, Jaffa, Israel.

25 David R. Segal and Diana P. Eyre, *U.S. Army in Peace Operations at the Dawning of the Twenty-First Century*, (Adelphi, MD: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioural and Social Sciences, May 1996).

CHAPTER 7

- 26 Kenneth A. Romaine, "Developing Lieutenants in a Transforming Army," *Military Review*, 84 (July-August 2004), 74.
- 27 Baruch Nevo and Yael Shur, *The IDF and the Press during Hostilities*, (Jerusalem: The Israel Democracy Institute, 2003), 83 and 85.
- 28 Amos Gilad, "Inside the Maelstrom," *The Review*, 27 (December 2002), 13.
- 29 Sergeant-Major (Reserve) Mike Dacks, Squad Leader, Reserve Armoured Reconnaissance Unit (Paratroopers Brigade whilst serving as a conscript), interview with author, 2 August 2004, Tel Aviv, Israel.
- 30 Aviv Kohavi, "Learning in a Changing Reality", Some results of that process of creative a new common language that is able to deal with the rise of LIC operational difficulties is discussed by Colonel Gal Hirsh, Head of the IDF Officer School in Hirsh, Gal, "On Dinosaurs and Hornets: A Critical View on Operational Moulds in Asymmetric Conflicts," *The RUSI Journal*, 148 (August 2003), 60-63.
- 31 Sergeant-Major (Reserve) 'Yossi', Sniper, IDF Paratroopers Brigade, interview with author, 5 August 2004, Tel Aviv, Israel.
- 32 Lieutenant 'Joshua,' Deputy Company Commander, 7th Armoured Brigade, interview with author, 24 August 2004, Nebi Musa, Israel.
- 33 "The UN estimates that half of the world's people will live in urban areas by 2007 and nearly two-thirds by 2030", Kim Burger, "Fighting in the Streets" *Jane's Defence Weekly* 38 (20 November 2002), 23.
- 34 Jeffrey W.S. Leser, "Initiative: The Power Behind Intent", *Military Review*, 77 (September-October 1997), 59-64; Anthony R. Garrett, "Information superiority and the future of mission orders" *Military Review*, 79 (November-December 1999), 61-69; and Ad L. W. Vogelaar, "Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Operations" *Armed Forces and Society*, 30 (Spring 2004), 409-431.
- 35 Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Threeblock War" *Marine Corps Gazette*, 83 (January 1999), 18-22.
- 36 Segal and Eyre, *U.S. Army in Peace Operations at the Dawning of the Twenty-First Century*, 43.
- 37 Moshe Ya'alon, "IDF Chief of Staff Address" (Speech Transcript) *First International Low-Intensity Conflict Warfare Conference*, 22-25 March 2004, Tel Aviv, Israel [CD-ROM].
- 38 Lieutenant-Colonel Ilan Malka, Head of Training, *Givati* Brigade, interview with author, 9 August 2004, Qiryat Gat, Israel.
- 39 Canada, *Debrief the Leaders Project* (Officers) (Department of National Defence, May 2001).

- 40 Lieutenant-Colonel Ilan Malka, interview with author.
- 41 Jim Storr, "A Command Philosophy for the Information Age: The Continuing Relevance of Mission Command," *Defence Studies*, 3 (Autumn 2003), 119.
- 42 Thomas W. Britt, "Responsibility, Commitment and Moral," *Military Review*, 78 (January-February 1998), 79.
- 43 Lieutenant-Colonel Ilan Malka, interview with author.
- 44 Aviv Kohavi, "Learning in a Changing Reality".
- 45 Thomas W. Britt, "Responsibility, Commitment and Moral", 79.
- 46 Boas Shamir et al. "Differences in Company Leadership Between Infantry and Armour Units in the Israel Defence Forces," *Military Psychology* 12 (2000), 53.
- 47 Dana Yagil, "Charismatic Leadership and Organizational Hierarchy: Attribution of Charisma to Close and Distant Leaders" *Leadership Quarterly* 9 (Summer 2005), 165.
- 48 Bruce J. Avolio and Bernard M. Bass, "Transformational Leadership, Charisma, and Beyond" in *Emerging Leadership Vistas*, (Eds.) Hunt, James G. et al, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 29-50.
- 49 Leonard Wong et al "Military Leadership: A Context Specific Review" *Leadership Quarterly*, 14 (December 2003), 677.
- 50 Robert J. Rielly, "Confronting the Tiger: Small Unit Cohesion in Battle," *Military Review*, 80 (November-December 2000), 62.
- 51 Boas Shamir, "Correlates of Charismatic Leader Behaviour in Military Units: Subordinates' Attitudes, Units Characteristics, and Superiors' Appraisals of Leader Performance" *Academy of Management Journal* 41 (August 1998), 390.
- 52 Mark D. Rocke, "Trust: The Cornerstone of Leadership" *Military Review*, 72 (August 1992), 32.
- 53 Lieutenant-Colonel Ilan Malka, interview with author.
- 54 Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier*, London: Greenwood Press, 1986), 558.
- 55 Captain (Reserve) Shahar Amit, Platoon Commander, IDF Paratroopers Brigade, interview with author, 20 August 2004, Tel Aviv, Israel.
- 56 Reuven Gal, *A Portrait of the Israeli Soldier*, 116.
- 57 Before becoming officers, individuals will have normally undergone basic and advance training, the squad leader's (NCO) course and will have conducted routine security operations before being selected and sent off to the IDF's Training Base No. 1 (known in Hebrew

CHAPTER 7

as, 'Bad Echad') to become second lieutenants. Thus, officer candidates in the IDF will have served for around two years before becoming a commissioned officer at least within the same battalion they served as a soldier.

58 To see reports and testimonies regarding IDF cases of abuse and excessive forces go to: *B'Tselem*, <http://www.btselem.org/English/index.asp> and *Breaking the Silence*, http://www.breakingthesilence.org.il/index_en.asp.

59 Amos Guiora, "Balancing IDF Checkpoints and International Law: Teaching the IDF Code of Conduct" *Jerusalem Issue Brief*, 3 (19 November 2003) [Online], Institute for Contemporary Affairs. Available from: <http://www.jcpa.org/brief/brief3-8.htm>. Accessed on 11 November 2004.

60 Colonel Roi Elcabets, interview with author.

61 Lieutenant-Colonel Tamna Shmueli, Head of IDF School of Leadership Development, interview with author, 19 August 2004, Netanya, Israel.

62 Major (Reserve) Danny Gal, Field Psychologist, Department of Behavioural Sciences, interview with author, 12 August 2004, Herzliya, Israel.

63 Peter Kilner, "Military Leaders' Obligation to Justify Killing in War" *Military Review* (March-April 2002) 29.

64 Captain (Reserve) Shahar Amit, interview with author.

65 For recent Palestinian terror and assault statistics go to: <http://web.israelinsider.com/Articles/Security/4752.htm>.

PART III

Leadership and Transformation

CHAPTER 8

Mission Command and *Bitsuism* in the Israeli Defence Forces: Are They Complementary or Contradictory in Today's Counter-Insurgency Campaign?



Sergio Catignani and Eitan Shamir

This chapter looks at whether or not the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have been able to integrate and apply the operational principle of mission command to its doctrine and style of command since its establishment. It examines in particular if command has been employed effectively by the IDF during its involvement in the low-intensity conflict scenarios of the first and *Al Aqsa Intifadas*. By taking into account the IDF's major cultural ethos of *bitsuism* (performance-oriented initiative), the chapter will consider if its organizational culture of hyper-activism within combat command echelons has either strengthened or weakened the ability to fully apply the principle of mission command when fighting wars or conducting low-intensity operations.

An analysis is provided, first by exploring what mission command and *bitsuism* mean, and what the required elements for mission command to be successful in a military organisation are. This is followed by an overview of how mission command and *bitsuism* developed in the IDF and how the cultural tradition of *bitsuism* affected the proper operationalisation of mission command within the Israeli army.

CHAPTER 8

What is Mission Command?

Mission command, or as it known under its original German name, *Auftragstaktik*, is a command philosophy that demands and enables decisions and action in every echelon of command where there is an intimate knowledge of the battlefield situation. It calls for subordinates to exploit opportunities by empowering them to use their initiative and judgment as long as their decisions serve the higher intention communicated to them prior to the mission by their superiors. It is based on the belief in the ability of an individual to act creatively in order to solve a problem without having to resort to a higher authority.¹

Mission command aims to avoid the drawbacks of centralized systems, which normally suffer a lack of flexibility and responsiveness. It also helps avoid the usual shortcomings of decentralized systems, that is, the lack of coordination and control. Through the use of the higher intent as a coordination mechanism, it goes beyond simple decision delegation and empowers subordinates; it provides a flexible framework that allows the exploitation of opportunities while maintaining the overall purpose of a military operation. A key element for the success of this approach is the articulation and communication of the commander's intent. It is an approach designed to deal with complex systems, large amounts of information and an ever-changing environment. It is not simple to understand or to carry out and its implementation might run contrary to basic existing organizational cultures.

Mission Command shares a few basic underlying assumptions on the nature of warfare and human behaviour:²

- What Clausewitz identified as *fog of war*, *friction* and *uncertainty* will forever be an integral part of warfare.
- Commanders are leaders of complex systems; their mission is to understand how complex systems work

through the idea of the higher intent and, thus, be able to optimise sub-units to produce the best result to support the system as a whole.

- Time is a critical factor in low tactical levels: The commanders must act within a very short time frame. Thus, decision-making cycles are quick. There is no point in waiting for instruction from higher levels of command.
- Span of control is limited. The best commander has a limited capacity for information processing, therefore, it is necessary for him to share the burden with his trusted subordinates.
- Better motivation and commitment is gained through active participation and an individual sense of putting into practice one's own ideas and plans.

The modern approach of mission command was adopted from the original German concept of *Auftragstaktik*, which was developed within the German military.³ In the German *Auftragstaktik*, a commander would specify to his subordinates what had to be accomplished, but not how to do it. More than just giving a mission to a subordinate and allowing him the latitude to execute it, it was the superior's duty to specify the objective, resources and constraints within which the subordinate had to accomplish the mission.

In the framework of *Auftragstaktik*, the commander's responsibility was to provide all resources required to carry out the mission, while the successful outcome of the mission itself became the subordinate's responsibility and dependent on his skills, creativity, and commitment to the overall mission objective. In this context, lack of initiative was regarded as a fundamental error that was worse than taking a wrong decision. Thus, *Auftragstaktik* is not merely a technique of issuing orders, but a type of leadership that is "inextricably linked to a certain image of men as soldiers", that

CHAPTER 8

is, not of robots but of thinking human beings capable of making independent judgments.⁴ The exercise of *Auftragstaktik* is considered to be a major contributing factor to the Prussian-German Army's high military effectiveness and tactical excellence.⁵

Mission Command gained prominence in the West from the mid-1980s, following its adoption in the United States (US) Air-Land doctrine, which was designed as a response to Soviet conventional superiority. In the US army, it was officially recommended in FM (Field Manual) 100-5 in 1986 as part of the manoeuvre Land-AirLand battle doctrine. It was adopted also in the German Army through Regulations 100/100, and eventually it was adopted as official NATO doctrine in the 1990s.⁶ In the late 1980s, the IDF also adopted mission command as part of its doctrine.

Cultural Preconditions for Mission Command

Mission command is a process that is based most of all on cognitive understanding between commander and subordinate and is translated into decisions and behaviours on the basis of such mutual understanding. As such, it has to be embedded in the military culture of the military organization, which according to James Wilson, can be defined as a “persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization” and how such thinking is reflected in human behaviour.⁷

There is general agreement in the literature regarding the cultural elements necessary for mission command to be successful. David Schmidtchen finds that mission command requires the following characteristics: “mutual trust” and “...respect between commanders and subordinates” as well as “...understanding, acceptance of responsibility and acceptance of risk”. Mutual trust is achieved through “developing leaders with self-confidence who would not hesitate to exercise their initiative.” Schmidtchen rightly argues that implementing mission command can foster creativity and innovation, yet this argument can be also turned

around: mission command is largely dependent upon a culture that encourages creativity and innovation. Therefore, the question of cause and effect remains unsolved.⁸

Ad Vogelaar and Eric-Hans Kramer contend that mission command is based on “autonomy of action, clarity of objectives, adequacy of means to accomplish the mission and mutual trust”⁹. Similarly, Walter von Lossow emphasizes “uniformity of thinking and reliability of action”, which he argues can only be established through a long common goal-oriented education and training process.¹⁰ Antulio Echevarria identifies the German military culture that enabled *Auftragstaktik*. This culture included such characteristics as strong emphasis on “initiative, aggressiveness and subordinate freedom of action” under the assumption that subordinates will act responsibly. Another important requirement is good judgment. Such judgment is viewed as being driven by the military profession and can be achieved through training and education. The assumption is that education leads to professionalism and trust between subordinates and commanders.¹¹ John Silva has also emphasized the importance of “simple commonly operational concepts”.¹²

These characteristics reflect the challenge posed by mission command to maintain a balance between the freedom to act versus some kind of behavioural control in order to avoid chaos. The key mechanism, therefore, is a common understanding of the higher intent. Higher intent, in turn, provides a rational framework that requires effective communication and ongoing dialogue between different organizational echelons. Comprehension of the higher intent is dependent upon a broad base of shared education and experiences. This should culminate, ultimately, in professional trust and mutual understanding, and ultimately enables commanders into providing subordinates with the necessary freedom of action to carry their mission *independently*. On the other hand, subordinates need to be motivated and capable of taking the initiative, while both commanders and subordinates alike should be willing to accept the risk of failure.

CHAPTER 8

Cultural norms that support and reward behaviours that reflect the following values: professionalism, education, risk taking, initiative, feedback and learning are, therefore, crucial for mission command success.

The IDF's Organizational Culture of *Bitsuism*

Bitsuism is derived from the Hebrew verb *Levazea*, which means simply 'to do'. A person who is a '*bitsuist*' (a performer) is a doer who is capable of carrying out and completing many tasks swiftly and successfully.

A dominant aspect in the IDF's military culture is *Bitsuism*. This cultural feature emerged as a result of Israel's fragile strategic situation and as a result of a doctrine that emphasized qualities such as aggressiveness, initiative and a high operational tempo. Throughout its history, even when not engaged in full wars, the IDF has been consistently fighting and acting in numerous 'current security' operations, that is, low-intensity operations. Unlike many other armies around the world, it has never enjoyed long periods of calm when it could purely concentrate on force development and training. As a result, IDF commanders developed the habit of focusing on "the concentration of effort on pressing day-to-day problems" whereby commanders are not really "troubled by the war to come", but find themselves instead in a position where they want to be everywhere, to decide everything, to invest the maximum in whatever engages them.¹³ The continuous need to carry out a growing number of operational missions – often at the expense of training and other activities – made the actual ability to carry them out a dominant organizational value in the IDF.¹⁴ Gradually, this value became detached occasionally from objective environmental pressures, thus, leading to the execution of some missions that in reality were not necessary. Carrying out many missions became a dominant value in itself, and if missions were not the result of external threats, the unit itself, often initiated them. One battalion commander, for example, stated that in 2003 alone, he planned and executed 240 missions throughout the year.¹⁵ Moreover, an IDF field

psychologist admitted in an interview: “When I got my education in officers course, the most central value that you are educated on is ‘complete your task’”. There is nothing more important than completing your task. Now this is one of the ten principles of war: maintenance of mission. However, the full commandment is maintenance of the mission in light of the higher objective, but Israel tends to forget the second half.¹⁶

At a first glance, it seems that the *bitsuist* value, which corresponds with initiative and risk-taking, is exactly what is needed for mission command to be realized. However, mission command is the function of a delicate balance of ingredients. If one is taken out, the whole system may fall apart. The opposite side of initiative in the mission command equation is the capacity to learn, plan, reflect and adapt creatively. The intellectual capacity to decide whether or not to abort, change or continue a specific mission within the larger context under ever-changing circumstances is a critical capability subordinates and commanders alike must possess. Shimon Naveh argues that Soviet military theory differentiates between initiative, which is required of tactical commanders and creativity, which is required of operational commanders. Creativity is, in fact, required in order to “assemble the numerous tactical events into a coherent contingency, leading to the achievement of the aim”.¹⁷

True to the German tradition, the IDF in its heyday of conventional manoeuvre warfare regarded a lack of initiative, which could have resulted in ‘sitting and waiting’, as worse than taking the initiative and making the wrong decision. A former head of the IDF officer candidate school (*Bad-Ehad*) stated, in fact, that, “An officer in general is a term that is related to performance...an officer is a person who makes things happen”.¹⁸ However, as we shall see below, due to the very different nature of contemporary low intensity conflict (LIC) the *bitsuist* ethos is reducing the IDF’s capability to exercise mission command effectively. Moreover, the *bitsuist* tendency has had serious effects on the strategic outcome of mere tactical operations.

CHAPTER 8

Mission Command and *Bitsuism* in the IDF – Historical Overview

Between 1948 and 1973, quite a few military historians and analysts described the IDF as the one military that was able to demonstrate continuously the same legacy of combat excellence as that of the *Wehrmacht*. Julian Thompson, a British brigade commander during the Falklands War wrote: “The IDF came to be regarded as the most effective fighting force in the world; paradoxically its closest rival in fighting power in the Twentieth Century is the *Wehrmacht*”.¹⁹ While historian Robert Citino has noted that the “IDF has shown that it became the mobile force *par excellence*, and irony of ironies, the heir to the German *Wehrmacht*”.²⁰ Nevertheless, despite similarities in their strategic position and operational conduct, the origins and traditions of the IDF are based on different premises than those of the *Wehrmacht* in some key areas.

The origins of the IDF were drawn from two separate traditions; both can be traced to the period prior to its formal establishment. The first source was the *Palmach* (‘strike companies’), which were the elite units of the *Haganah*, the underground Jewish defence force prior to the establishment of the state of Israel that later became the IDF. The second source was the British professional tradition, which Jewish officers who served with British armed forces during World War II brought with them to the IDF. The special blend of these two traditions resulted in an approach in which military problems were approached in an intellectual and open way. Pre-operation orders were open to debate where rank was regarded as less important than the experience and innovative problem-solving of any member of the IDF. Moreover, discipline was based more on obedience based on internalized values than on external coercion and formal rank.²¹

During the War of Independence, key principles of the IDF emerged: the principles of decentralized command and maintenance of the objective.²² These principles left the planning details

of an operation to lower-level commanders so long as such commanders were deemed able to reach the mission's objective, that is, uphold maintenance of the objective.²² This enabled the commanders to take the risks necessary for bold and aggressive operations without having to sacrifice creativity and unconventional actions. The role model for such a commander was Yigal Allon, who led some of the key operations in the War of Independence²³ brilliantly. Dayan was another legendary figure, although his actions were geared more towards demonstrating initiative and risk-taking rather than creativity, imagination and outsmart planning.²⁴

In the early 1950s, Moshe Dayan became Chief of Staff of the IDF. During his years in office, he made a considerable impression through his charisma and uncompromising fighting spirit. During the very early 1950s, the IDF poorly performed a series of reprisal raids. Not only did IDF perform inadequately on missions, but in some cases they also retreated to their bases before even trying to complete them.²⁵ Dayan's reaction was to re-establish certain values, most importantly that of 'maintenance of objective'. Dayan was to set the standard for future military operations when he stated that no officer was to suspend an attack on penalty of dismissal unless his unit suffered a casualty rate in excess of fifty percent.²⁶ He demanded the abandonment of the 'indirect approach' in favour of aggressive frontal attacks.²⁷

Dayan's next move was to establish Unit 101 under the leadership of Ariel Sharon. This unit was to set a standard for the rest of the IDF through their daring raids. They succeeded in boosting morale and in considerably improving the combat standards of the IDF.²⁸ When Sharon's Unit 101 went beyond – and sometimes against – the goals set out by his superiors, Dayan's preference for aggressiveness and initiative on the battlefield made sure that Sharon's unit was left off the hook even in cases of excessive force. For example, following a raid that had caused substantial collateral damage, Dayan defended Sharon's unit by stating: "Depending upon the instance, I prefer excessive

CHAPTER 8

initiative and action, even if it involves some mistakes here and there, to the passivity of 'sit and do nothing' and covering yourself with paper and seven authorizations for an operation before its execution".²⁹ From 1953 to 1956, units under Sharon's command conducted more than 70 reprisal operations. The majority of those missions undertaken were originally suggested by Sharon himself, despite the fact that he was only a battalion commander at the time.

During the 1956 Suez War, Sharon conducted an unauthorized operation into the Mitla Pass; this move resulted in a major military blunder. Dayan, nevertheless, did not criticize Sharon and defended him by stating again: "I regard the problem as grave when a unit fails to fulfil its battle task, not when it goes beyond the bounds of duty".³⁰ This reaction was consistent with another unauthorized operation during the same campaign by the Seventh Brigade. Dayan famously responded by affirming that it was "better [to] be engaged in restraining the noble stallion than in prodding the reluctant mule".³¹

The Suez campaign was not conducted on the basis of detailed plans; the forces were unleashed by Dayan to fight their way independently in the general direction of the Suez Canal. The plan was sacrificed in favour of the element of surprise and there was no attempt to coordinate forces.³² The aim was not to annihilate the enemy, but rather "bring about its collapse".³³ In many ways, the problems of the Sinai campaign were caused by Dayan's decision to give units on the field too much leeway and, thus, cause too little control and coordination; this decision was a reflection of Dayan's style of command.³⁴ These deficiencies, however, were improved in the 1967 Six Day War.

Haim Laskov, who succeeded Dayan as chief of staff, was a former British officer who made an important contribution to balance *bitsuism* and the practice of mission command in the IDF.³⁵ Furthermore, Yitzhak Rabin who became the Chief Of Staff (COS) after Laskov's successor, Zvi Tsur, continued this approach and

developed the officer corps' professionalism.³⁶ It was Rabin who, as head of the IDF training division, revised and brought together the IDF doctrine into a unified structure, bringing all the disparate training and doctrinal methods into one coherent whole. This enabled a common professional language, which is very important for mission command to succeed.³⁷ Rabin continuously emphasized the need for quick decision making and the ability to simultaneously plan and issue orders while on the move, a necessary capability for manoeuvre warfare and mission command.³⁸

When war broke out in 1967, in contrast to Dayan's command method used in 1956, Rabin chose to stay in his Tel Aviv HQ and issue orders to the units in the front. At the time, the IDF exercised a much better balance between detailed planning and improvisation, independence and control; operational plans were devised on the move and were changed according to opportunities as they presented themselves.³⁹ Only the first day of the campaign in the Sinai was planned, while the remaining three relied on the pure improvisation of battlefield commanders.⁴⁰

Following the decisive victory of 1967, the basic strategic situation of the IDF altered dramatically. The new borders made it more difficult to use internal lines of communication. The newly found strategic depth also gave the IDF the opportunity to rely on a purely defensive strategic doctrine.⁴¹ The War of Attrition that broke out shortly after the Six Day War, found the IDF concentrating on routine current security operations along its extended borders. These operations consisted of unimaginative routine duties, such as long patrols and the manning of static observation posts. At the time, the commando and paratrooper units, however, did perform a string of daring special operations, but contrary to conventional manoeuvre warfare, these operations emphasized detailed and time-consuming planning based on accurate intelligence. They, therefore, contradicted by nature the open-ended Clausewitzian perception of the battlefield filled with friction, the fog of war and uncertainty.⁴² Another source of problem was that the self-confidence of the IDF and feeling of

CHAPTER 8

superiority over the Arab forces following its decisive victory in 1967 led it to neglect continuously the need to continue the development of a combined arms strategy. It stuck, instead, to an all tank doctrine – what one historian called ‘*tankomania*’.⁴³

Following the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal at the outset of the 1973 *Yom Kippur* War, the IDF in effect carried out a counter-attack on 8 October with two divisions on the basis of its newly revised doctrine. This resulted in one of the worst disasters of the IDF fighting history.⁴⁴ The attack was repulsed with a cost of high casualty rates and it did not achieve any of its set objectives. Despite the obvious failure in doctrine and high command, the IDF was saved by the sacrifice, initiative and maintenance of objective by small unit commanders, who fought stubbornly in order to defend their precarious battlefield positions.⁴⁵ Towards the end of the war, the reserves (mostly veterans of Six Day War) were able to adapt to the battlefield situation and demonstrated some brilliant manoeuvres, such as the crossing of the Suez Canal.⁴⁶

However, some of the more important lessons of the war, specifically those relating to failures in the IDF command culture, were never learned.⁴⁷ Following the traumatic experience of being outnumbered during the initial stages of the *Yom Kippur* War the IDF engaged in a massive build up.⁴⁸ Technology and numbers were to compensate for the shortcomings exposed in the war. As a result, the IDF became a complex bureaucratic machine with over-inflated staff and support units, in stark contrast to the agile lean organization it had been before the war.⁴⁹

The outcomes of these trends were demonstrated in the 1982 ‘Peace for Galilee’ campaign in Lebanon. The IDF enjoyed complete superiority quantitatively and qualitatively and acted according to a plan that was devised and rehearsed months before the operation had begun. Except for the Israeli Air Force, which had performed brilliantly, the ground forces had mediocre achievements, as units repeatedly failed to meet their respective

objectives.⁵⁰ Part of the mixed performance can be explained by the political controversy surrounding the aims of the war and by the sensitivity towards casualties in a war that was not seen as being one of *'ein briera'* ('no choice'). However, according to some IDF analysts, these reasons were also used by the IDF leadership as an excuse for the lack of professionalism among senior commanders at the brigade, divisions and corps level who failed to understand, communicate and delegate their intent to lower echelon commanders.⁵¹

Mission Command and *Bitsuism* in the LIC Environment

Since the Lebanon War in 1982, the IDF has continuously experienced LIC scenarios. The IDF faced guerrilla type warfare in Lebanon, where it proved slow to adapt. It then experienced the *Intifada*, a large-scale civil uprising, between 1987 and 1993. This new type of conflict had caught the IDF by total surprise in terms of its knowledge and ability to deal with such a complex situation. Operating within the civilian quarters of the West Bank and Gaza Strip was particularly problematic for the IDF in that the potential for causing collateral, injuring innocent civilians and being subject to continuous media scrutiny increased exponentially. Moreover, the highly political nature of the LIC of the two *Intifadas* also challenged all of the IDF's command echelons to understand that the conflict could not be won solely through military means and that even low-level tactical command decisions could bring about (often negative) strategic results.

Given the mass involvement of the Palestinian civilian population in relatively non-violent demonstrations and riots, which at most entailed barricades, rock-throwing and the sporadic use of *Molotov* cocktail bombs and of light firearms (towards the latter years of the uprising), the IDF was not able to cope effectively. The IDF's tradition of fighting major conventional warfare and conducting special forces operations became irrelevant as it found itself embroiled in having to chase and arrest rock-throwing youths, to force the opening and closure of Palestinian shops and

CHAPTER 8

businesses on strike, and to enforce closures and curfews through the establishment of stationary checkpoints scattered all over the Territories, amongst other things.

Almost overnight, the IDF had turned into a police force whose objective was to control the lives of dissenting civilians instead of defeating a real enemy threat. The constant IDF contact with the civilian population obviously led to friction and cases of abuse, as well as dehumanization. Most of these cases were triggered by the IDF soldiers' and commanders' confusion and frustration regarding the IDF rules of engagement (ROE) as well as the overall strategic objective required of them during their missions in the Territories.

Many soldiers and commanders on the ground, in fact, felt abandoned to their own devices and judgment. No clear rules of engagement were enunciated. Moreover, those that were referred to were changed repeatedly. This was particularly the case when soldiers on the ground committed operational blunders. These errors frequently produced negative strategic outcomes in that they were reported in the media, were scrutinised heavily by domestic and international opinion, and often galvanised rather than limited Palestinian, domestic and international opposition of the continued control of the Territories by Israel.

Given the IDF's desire to portray that it was continuing to uphold the *'tohar haneshek'* ('purity of arms') principle, the IDF Advocate General was not averse to investigate and, indeed, indict IDF troops accused of abusing local Palestinians during their policing operations. The indictments, however, had quite a detrimental effect on the morale of IDF soldiers and local commanders. Rather than rectifying their behaviour, the fear of being prosecuted for carrying out orders that lacked clear rules of engagement created the *'rosh katan'* ('small head') phenomenon. Soldiers and low-level commanders, in fact, very often decided to opt out of carrying out orders and missions that were seen as being risky of a legal point of view. One soldier recounted his

experiences regarding other soldiers' fears of avoiding carrying out orders:

'There were people saying, "Why the hell should I shoot right now? I can get into a lot of trouble, so I won't shoot. They [stone throwers] would run away, nothing happened and then I would be able to finish my shift and go back to sleep or whatever'.⁵²

The IDF became occupied in policing a type of operation which it was not prepared or trained for. Conflicting instructions and a lack of sense of clear guidance resulted in frustration that led to instances of brutalization and sheer violence.⁵³ The most important assets of the IDF, its prestige as a moral military and its cohesiveness and trust among its troops were badly damaged.⁵⁴

It was also the time when the IDF had to learn to take into account not only its immediate rival, but also other powerful actors such as the media, NGO's, international observers, Jewish settlers, and public opinion. Hence, the situation gave rise to what Charles Krulak calls the 'strategic corporal' phenomenon whereby mere low-ranking soldiers on the ground could, through their tactical decisions, cause strategic outcomes.⁵⁵ Moreover, changing civil-relations since the early 1980s within Israel led to growing transparency of and open criticism towards IDF commanders by the press and other public figures. It no longer enjoyed the same aura and sacred immunity it had enjoyed until then. Haim Heffer, a poet and famous veteran of the *Palmach* wrote, "The IDF will not be the same IDF if in the wake of every accident or mistake officers became so afraid of parents that they begin to jeopardize their unit's main characteristics: initiative; the willingness to take risks; comradeship and ingenuity."⁵⁶

As seen above, in order for mission command to have success in a military organization, it is the superior's duty to specify the objective, resources and constraints within which the subordinate has to accomplish the mission. However, the *Intifada* showed that

CHAPTER 8

IDF objectives were not clearly defined (only a generic objective of the need to 'lower the level of violence' was given to the IDF), were subject to debate, and were hard to achieve from a military point of view. The constraints were significant in that the ROE were changed often according to political circumstances. This led to growing instances of lack of initiative and distrust, given the legal prosecution of individuals and units that had acted outside the month's, or even worse, the week's ROE. Moreover, resources were lacking in that both IDF equipment and its training regimen were really only geared towards conventional high-intensity conflict scenarios.

Re-establishing the *Bitsuist* Ethos and the Principle of Mission Command in the LIC Scenario

During the 1990s, military analysts and historians within and outside the IDF severely criticized its continuous deterioration.⁵⁷ Some of the critique was focused on two major areas: The IDF's lack of professionalism and the deterioration of a flexible, decentralized creative command process that so much typified the IDF in its first three decades of existence.⁵⁸ It seemed like the IDF had lost some of its fighting power, while at the same time, *bitsuism* and mission command practices were losing ground. These criticisms, in light of the US military's impressive demonstration of its AirLand battle doctrine during Operation 'Desert Storm', challenged the IDF to reassess its command and operational doctrine. The assessment that the Oslo process would lead to another cycle of violence with the Palestinians reinforced the sense of urgency and determination not to repeat past mistakes in LIC scenarios.⁵⁹

Since the 1990s, the IDF tried to re-emphasize maintenance of objective and mission command within its combat and command echelons. Firstly, it officially incorporated mission command into its doctrine in 1993.⁶⁰ Another important development was a move towards professionalism.⁶¹ These efforts, together with the re-equipping and training respectively of units with LIC-related

materiel and tactics, were carried out due to the fact that the IDF were well aware that the most probable conflict scenario regarding the Territories in the near future would be that of a terrorist (since the early-1990s) and guerrilla (since the Hasmonian Tunnel riots in September 1996) nature within the urban battlefield.

Efforts during the late 1990s to revive and strengthen the IDF *bitsuist* ethos and tradition of mission command had mixed results though, as has been seen during the current *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, which erupted in September 2000 following Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount. The *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, as it was coined internationally, was anything but an uprising similar to the one conducted by the Palestinians between 1987 and 1993. Apart from the first five weeks of its inception, the present *Intifada* was characterised by the extensive use of guerrilla and terror tactics by not only organizations such as *Hamas* and Islamic *Jihad*, but also by the members of the Palestinian Authority (PA) such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) *Fatah Tanzim*. The Palestinian terror campaign against civilian targets, particularly within the Green Line, was overwhelming and relentless as of December 2000.

The lethality and persistence of the Palestinian guerrilla and terror campaign led many Israelis to perceive the conflict with the Palestinians as a full-blown war and, more importantly, as an existential threat. The perception of being under siege and at war led the political echelons to let loose the IDF in order to win the war on terror. This was especially the case after the Passover Night suicide terror attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya on 27 March 2002 when 30 civilians were killed and 140 injured.⁶² Thus, the IDF under the leadership of Sharon, Mofaz and Ya'alon set out to "burn into the Palestinian and Arab consciousness that terrorism and violence will not defeat us [*i.e.*, Israel]".⁶³ It also led to statements such as those uttered by Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Moshe Ya'alon who avowed in August 2002 that, 'the only solution is to achieve an unequivocal victory over the Palestinians' and that such a victory would not come at a low price or immediately.⁶⁴

CHAPTER 8

Although the current *Intifada* has been much more violent than the previous one, involving guerrilla and terror attacks, the fact that the IDF has again been in constant contact with the Palestinian population – most of whom just wanted to get along with their everyday lives – once again created friction, frustration and quite a few cases of excessive force and collateral damage. While special missions, such as search and arrest operations and targeted assassinations, were thoroughly planned for and often carried out by elite units that were disciplined enough to stick to the missions' objectives without exceeding mission orders, daily routine security operations carried out by regular infantry and other ground forces units (*e.g.*, armour and artillery corps units) often exceeded their mission objective. These resulted, consequently, in cases of excessive force and collateral damage.

The tendency for regular units to perform beyond their sanctioned orders, which were clearly set out to achieve the IDF's overall mission objective of lowering the level of violence in the Territories, was often due to the *bitsuist* influence on ground level commanders stationed around and within the Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Often, such commanders wanted to show their superiors that their unit was contributing concretely to the IDF war on terror. They were aware of the fact that their unit's reputation and prestige would be bolstered in the eyes of their commanders and 'rival' units with their participation in 'special' operations. Often, commanders also sought extra 'special' missions in order to maintain or increase the morale of their unit members. Such tactics were, indeed, needed due to the fact that the majority of regular and reserve ground forces were involved mostly in *batash* operations such as patrols, mind-numbing checkpoint duties, enforcement of curfews and other duties similarly carried out during the first *Intifada*.

Compared to the special operations that elite units, such as the reconnaissance (*Sayeret Golani, Givati, Nahal, Tzanhanim*) and special forces units (*Sayeret Matkal, Egoz, Shaldag, Shayetet-13*) were conducting, these *batash* duties were quite tedious and

uninspiring. Hence, the need for finding new missions and things to do that simulated special operations became paramount for regular units in order to maintain their units' combat motivation and readiness. One company commander stated that "participation in operations sweetens the pill ... because in their absence, there is a feeling of you're not doing anything meaningful".⁶⁵ Another reserve company commander of the infantry corps also explained:

If you go to a settlement and guard the settlement or if you are guarding buses or kids or stuff like this, you can do these things, yes, but then you have to do other missions. You have to create the sensation that something will happen all the time. Even if you don't have the information that a group of terrorists will come, you go to them. You create tension and then you create a mission.⁶⁶

Thus, regular units often conducted operations without the proper preparation and without the understanding that doing more would actually escalate the conflict and bring about negative strategic outcomes whenever their actions resulted in the harming of innocent civilians or in the damaging of civilian infrastructures that terror and guerrilla groups had used opportunistically for their own protection.

Furthermore, the *bitsuist* tendency in combat personnel often led units to carry out their orders with excessive 'enthusiasm' and often in disregard to the actual consequences of their actions. For example, whenever firearm attacks were perpetrated by Palestinian guerrilla/terrorists from sheltered positions, such as buildings or olive groves, the IDF would respectively raze and uproot them in order to avoid similar incidents in the future. However, the order to remove such sources of protection for Palestinian gunmen would often involve the removal of areas much larger than what was operationally justified or required. The head of the Civil Administration in the West Bank, Brigadier-General Dov Tzadka recounted the frequent infringement by soldiers on the ground of IDF 'stripping policy' orders in the

CHAPTER 8

Territories: “They are given explicit orders, but when I reach the place, I find the forces in a state of hyperactivity. The soldiers and the commanders get carried away”.⁶⁷

The IDF’s determination to win and perform successfully in its area of operations also led often to extensive collateral damage and civilian deaths. This was particularly the case during the IDF’s major offensive operations into the Palestinian terror and guerrilla nerve centres. Operations ‘Defensive Shield’, ‘Rainbow’ and ‘Days of Penitence’ saw, in fact, many cases in which the IDF used excessive force.⁶⁸ Although the IDF was effective in eliminating guerrilla fighters and terrorists as well as destroying their infrastructure during these operations, many innocent civilians were killed and civilian buildings were destroyed as a result of such operations. Such destruction and death obviously galvanised Palestinian opposition as well as international – and to a certain degree domestic – condemnation.

The extensive use of targeted assassinations, even during times of relative quiet, was also another symptom of the IDF’s culture of *bitsuism*. Although the assassination of ‘ticking’ suicide bombers was a necessary self-defence tactic, the timing and lethality of such attacks often caused a strategic backlash on Israeli policy. For example, during the *hudna* (‘ceasefire’) amongst Palestinian factions, which significantly lowered the level of violence used in early January 2002, the IDF assassinated Raed Karmi, a senior member of the PLO’s *Fatah* faction. Rather than deterring further attacks, the assassination led to further escalation in the conflict.⁶⁹ Furthermore, other assassination attempts, particularly those carried out by the Israeli Air Force, caused extensive collateral damage. For example, an F-16 missile strike in July 2002 on Salah Shehade, a Hamas leader, resulted in the killing of 14 civilians, including nine children and an official – and awkward – apology on the part of then IDF Chief of Operations, Major-General Dan Harel.⁷⁰ The assassination brought about strident international condemnation and domestic disapproval particularly through media channels.⁷¹

Thus, by late 2003 Lieutenant-General Ya'alon, in fact, had come publicly to the conclusion that, "in our tactical decisions, we are operating contrary to our strategic interests".⁷² Indeed, whereas the *bitsuist* ethos had been fully applied within the LIC environment of the Territories, the necessary ingredients for the successful implementation of the mission command philosophy were still lacking. The IDF, in fact, had shown time and again during the current *Intifada* initiative, courage and aggressiveness. It clearly struck a severe blow to the Palestinian terror and guerrilla infrastructure through its targeted assassinations, the destruction of weapons factories and suicide bomb-making workshops, the mass arrest of terrorist suspects and terror organization activists. It did so also through its small-scale special operations as well as large-scale 'invasions' into the terrorist guerrilla fighter safe havens of the PA-controlled areas, and through the construction of the security fence.

On the other hand, the vital elements necessary for the application of the mission command way of carrying out operations and orders had yet again gone amiss. The overall mission objective handed down once again to the IDF by the political echelons was generic and confusing. Winning the war in a limited conflict situation could not be achieved by military means alone. Yet, many within the upper echelons of the military and politics believed that it could be attained. Thus, until Ariel Sharon's decision in December 2003 to implement the 'Road Map' peace plan through Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip and some areas of the West Bank, the IDF was left to win a low-intensity war within the political, ethical and international constraints that LICs generally entail.

Consequently, the IDF's rules of engagement issued down the chain of command were once more subject to public debate and scrutiny, as well as subject to change on a periodic basis. However, whereas in the first *Intifada* confusion regarding ROE frequently led to the avoidance of responsibility, initiative and

CHAPTER 8

the dereliction of duty by certain units, in the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, soldiers and low-level commanders often erred on the safe side (given the more violent and dangerous nature of the conflict) by exceeding them and, thus, by using excessive force.

The general notion of mission command, which calls for commanders and soldiers to understand the higher order intent and consequences of their actions, was often lacking. This frequently led to actions that escalated rather than limited the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In other words, IDF tactical actions in many instances had the opposite operational and strategic effect of reducing the level of violence.

Nonetheless, the IDF did demonstrate some successful examples of mission command during its major offensive within densely-populated urban areas in Operation 'Defensive Shield'. Having experienced heavy casualties and failures in past urban campaigns, such as in the battle for Jerusalem in 1967 or Suez City in 1973, the IDF was wary of the option to attempt to seize Palestinian towns and refugee camps. However, once the decision was taken, the forces made preparations and fought largely in adherence to mission command principles.

The Paratroop and *Golani* Brigades captured the dense centre of the Nablus *Kasbah*, which at first had seemed almost impossible to infiltrate. Whilst suffering only one fatality, the IDF killed 70 Palestinian gunmen and captured hundreds. The paratroopers penetrated the *Kasbah* from multiple directions, a manoeuvre that caused confusion and chaos among the Palestinians.⁷³ This highly complicated operation required high coordination and understanding of the mission's overall operational concept and intent. The forces were given great latitude for independent planning and execution. High synchronization was maintained through the constant, clear and concise communication of intent among every echelon of command. Commanders made sure that all units understood the intent and operational concept of the mission, through clear communication, prior to initiating any operations.⁷⁴

The same principles were used in other successful battles based in Tulkarem and Ramallah. Maintenance of objective was emphasized only after missions were independently planned and discussed in light of the higher intent.⁷⁵ Because of this, missions went according to plan and did not deviate from the higher intent. They also resulted in fewer civilian casualties than those suffered during the mission conducted, for example, in Jenin.

Furthermore, although in current security operations and special missions the opportunity for initiative and great freedom of manoeuvre was given to lower-level commanders, this was not the case in instances following major incidents in which Palestinians had carried out some form of attack against IDF forces in the Territories (*e.g.*, snipe attack, detonation of explosive devices, mortar or rocket attacks). During such 'operational incidents' in a particular sector, senior commanders had a natural inclination to intervene directly, consequently diminishing the authority and responsibility of junior commanders on the ground. One company commander described the situation quite eloquently:

As soon as commanders come to the scene of the incident – the brigade commander becomes a platoon commander, a division commander becomes a company commander, platoon and squad commanders get their orders straight from the battalion and brigade commanders while leapfrogging, and then the company commander has no control over who his subordinates are.⁷⁶

Learning while Doing

In any case, even during the current conflict the IDF tried to rectify these weaknesses by learning its lessons and, consequently, by trying to increase within its ranks the understanding and application of mission command to the LIC scenario. The officers advanced course program (POM) had already been redesigned, and included many more hours of military studies in the form of doctrine, general staff work and mission command.⁷⁷ An academy

CHAPTER 8

for field junior officers was established in 2000 and two research institutes were created, dedicated to the study of the operational and tactical level warfare. These institutes served as a platform for field officers to detach themselves from the day-to-day reality of continuous activity on the field. Within these institutes they could take a pause, reflect and conceptualize their experiences as well as develop theoretical principals to the dilemmas they had face while on missions. It set out to establish an intellectually friendly environment, which until then had been quite foreign to IDF culture.⁷⁸ In addition, in 2004, the Ground Forces Head Quarter (*MAZI*) began a tradition of holding an annual international conference on the subject of LIC that discussed the IDF's major doctrinal, technological and operational innovations.

All these measures were taken as part of an attempt to balance the typical IDF *bitsuist* officer, who for years had been educated on the virtues of *doing* at the expense of reflecting and looking at the higher order consequences of one's actions before acting on them. The LIC environment had certainly proved that such qualities are necessary even more than in the conventional manoeuvre warfare.⁷⁹ This attempt to change the IDF's organisational culture had succeeded to some extent and had a serious impact on officers' view of leadership based on mission command principles.⁸⁰

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at how mission command and the organisational culture of *bitsuism* have interacted during the IDF's multifarious missions since its establishment in 1948. It did so by explaining the concepts of mission command and *bitsuism*, and then by showing how *bitsuism* influenced the ability of commanders to conduct their mission according to the strategic and operational aims of such missions. The chapter showed how, since the first *Intifada*, the IDF tried to re-institute the mission command principle and *bitsuist* cultural norm within its ranks given the extreme complexity it had encountered during that period of conflict. Although the IDF has made significant reforms in

order to encourage the full understanding and implementation of mission command principles among its ranks and despite the fact that certain missions have displayed positive evidence of certain units' adherence to such principles, the complexities imposed by the LIC environment still challenge the IDF's ability to fully implement them on a daily basis.

Endnotes

- 1 Ad L. W. Vogelaar and Eric- Hanskramer, 'Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions', *Armed Forces and Society*, 30 (Spring 2004), 409-431.
- 2 See also: Hanan Schwartz, *The Essence of Mission Command and its Relevance* MA Theses, IDF Staff and Command College (POM) in Hebrew, (August 1994), 82-84.
- 3 Antulio J. Echevarria, 'Auftragstaktik In Its Proper Perspective', *Military Review*, Vol. 66, No. 10 (October 1986), 50-56.
- 4 Werner Widder, 'Auftragstaktik and Innere Führung: Trademarks of German Leadership' *Military Review*, 82 (September-October 2002), 6.
- 5 See for example Trevor N. Dupuy, *A Genius For War, The German Army and General Staff 1807-1945* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice – Hall, Inc.,1977), 268, 307.
- 6 David M. Keithly and Stephen P. Ferris 'Auftragstaktik or Directive Control in Joint and Combined Operations', *Parameters*, 89 (Autumn 1999), 118-133
- 7 James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 91.
- 8 David Schmidtchen, 'Developing Creativity and Innovation Through the Practice of Mission Command' *Australian Defence Force Journal*, No. 146, (January-February 2001), 11-17.
- 9 Ad L. W. Vogelaar and Eric- Hanskramer, 'Mission Command in Dutch Peace Support Missions', *Armed Forces and Society*, 30 (Spring 2004), 409-431.
- 10 Walter von Lossow, 'Mission –Type Tactics versus Order Order-Type Tactics', *Military Review*, 57 (June 1977), 87-81.
- 11 Echevarria, 'Auftragstaktik'
- 12 John Silva, 'Auftragstaktik: Its origin and Development', *Infantry*, Vol. 79, No. 5 (September-October 1989), 6-9

CHAPTER 8

- 13 Yaakov Hadai, "Doers' and 'Thinkers' in the IDF,' *The Jerusalem Quarterly*, No. 24 (Summer 1982), 16-18.
- 14 The inclination to perform and do things, according to a recent psychological study carried out by the IDF Behavioural Sciences Unit, was deemed as a symptom of workaholism. See: Michal Leizerovitz and Refael Snir, 'Workaholics as an Organizational Culture in Combat Units in the IDF' *Military Psychology IDF*, No. 3 (2004), 107-154.
- 15 Lieutenant-Colonel A., *Golani* Brigade, Interview with the author, Shrivenham, England, 23 June 2004.
- 16 Major (Res.) Danny Gal, IDF Organizational Psychology, interview with the author in Hertzlia, Israel, 12 August 2004.
- 17 Shimon Naveh, *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory*, (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 86
- 18 Haim Biny'amini as quoted in, Haim Lapid and Hagai Ben Zvo 'Leadership Concepts and Training of Commanders, a Development Over Time Among Commanders of *Bad-1*'. in Micha Poper and Avihu Ronen (ed.), *On Leadership: Theory of Leadership in the IDF, Leadership Development*, (Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense, December 2001) in Hebrew, 159.
- 19 Julian Thompson, 'Foreword' in Martin van Van Creveld, *Moshe Dayan*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 2004), 11.
- 20 Robert M. Citino, *Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare*, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 6.
- 21 Luttwak and Horowitz, 54, 81.
- 22 *Ibid.*, 54.
- 23 *Ibid.*, 55.
- 24 Martin van Van Creveld, *Moshe Dayan*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2004), pp. 60-2. A description of the charge on Ramala headed by Dayan reveals a simple head on cavalry charge. According to Van Creveld this was Dayan's typical approach, Dayan was convinced that against Arab armies it would suffice.
- 25 Luttwak and Horowitz, 106-7.
- 26 *Ibid.*, 108.
- 27 Van Creveld , *The Sword*, 132.
- 28 Luttwak and Horowitz, 116-7.
- 29 Cited in: Zeev Drory, *Israel's Reprisal Policy 1953-1956: The Dynamics of Military Retaliation* (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 31.
- 30 Van Creveld , *The Sword*, 150.
- 31 Luttwak and Horowitz, 160.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 144, 146.

- 33 Ibid., 142.
- 34 Ibid., 162-3.
- 35 Ibid., 172-3.
- 36 Ibid., 181. See also: Van Creveld, *The Sword*, 169.
- 37 Efraim Inbar, *Rabin and Israel's National Security*, (Washington: Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 88-90.
- 38 Efraim Inbar, Rabin, 94
- 39 Van Creveld, *The Sword*, 170.
- 40 Martin van Van Creveld, *Command in War*, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1985) p.200.
- 41 Van Creveld, *The Sword*, 203.
- 42 For details on these raids see Gunther E. Ruthenberg 'Israeli Defence Forces and Low Intensity Operations' in David A. Charts and Maurice Tugwell (ed.), *Armies in Low Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis*, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1989), 67.
- 43 Van Creveld, *The Sword*, 185, 241.
- 44 A detailed description of this offensive in Van Creveld, *Command*, 203-26.
- 45 On small unit leadership and its role in the Golan see: Oakland McCulloch, *The Decisiveness of Israeli Small Unit Leadership On the Golan Heights in 1973 Yom Kippur War*, (MA thesis, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois, 1987).
- 46 Van Creveld, *The Sword*, 232.
- 47 On the lack of proper lessons learned in the IDF see: Emanuel Wald, *The Wald Report; The Decline of Israeli National Security Since 1967*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) Chapter 4.
- 48 See: Van Creveld, *The Sword* 253.
- 49 Wald, Chapter 5.
- 50 Ibid., 72-79.
- 51 See: Hanan Schwartz, 'Training Generals', PhD Dissertation, Hebrew University Jerusalem, (1996) in Hebrew, 14-23, 39 and Wald,.
- 52 Sergeant-Major (Res.) Aviram Shemer Armoured Corps.. Interview with author, Tel Aviv, Israel, 28 August 2003.
- 53 A detailed discussion on IDF's helplessness in the first Intifada see: Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada*, (Tel Aviv: Shoken Publishing House, 1990) in Hebrew, 128-67.
- 54 According to Van Creveld between 1987 and 1994 there were '300 officers and men who [were] investigated, subjected to disciplinary action or put on trial.' Van Creveld, *The Sword*, 349.
- 55 See: Charles C Krulak 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the

CHAPTER 8

Three Block War', *Marine Corps Gazette* 83 (January 1999), 18-22.

56 Quoted in Stuart A. Cohen, 'The Israel Defense Force: Continuity and Change', in Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (ed.) *Armed Forces in The Middle East Politics and Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 2002) 180.

57 See for example: Ed Blanche, 'Is the Myth Fading for The Israeli Army? – Part One', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 8 (December 1996), 547-550.

58 For example scholars, Uri Milstein and Martin van Creveld or ex-career officers turned academics such as Imanuel Wald, Hanan Shawartz and Shimon Naveh.

59 On the IDF readiness for another round of fighting see: Amos Harel and Avi Isacharoff, *The Seventh war; Why We Won and Why We Lost in the War With the Palestinians*, (Tel Aviv:, Miskal Chemed Books, 2004) 62-5, 74-5 in Hebrew.

60 Lieutenant-Colonel Dori Pinkas from IDF's doctrine department indicated that mission command was officially incorporated in 1993 in an FM titled *TORAT HALECHIMA VAVODAT HAMFAKED* (Warfare doctrine and General Staff procedures- author's translation) a new version is currently in progress. Lieutenant-Colonel Dori Pinkas interview with the author, Hakiryia Tel – Aviv, Israel, 13 February 2005.

61 On trends towards IDF professionalism see: Stuart A. Cohen, 'The Israel Defense Force: Continuity and Change', in Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (ed.) *Armed Forces in The Middle East Politics and Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 2002) 164-6, 168-170.

62 See: 'Eyewitness: Netanya bombing', *BBC Online News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1897940.stm 28 March 2002.

63 Ari Shavit, 'The Enemy Within,' *Ha'aretz*, 29 August 2002.

64 Rami Hazut, 'The Palestinians Are an Existential Threat: Iraq Is Not', *Yedioth Ahronoth*, 23 August 2002, *Israel Resource Review*, <http://israelvisit.co.il/cgi-bin/friendly.pl?url=Aug-23-02!IDF>, 14 March 2003.

65 Cited in: Vered Winocur-Chair and Yotam Amitai, 'The War of the Junior Command in the Prolonged Confrontation in the Gaza Strip', *Ma'arachot*, 389 (May 2003), 34.

66 Captain (Res.) Khaim, Company Commander, Brigade 5. Interview with author, Jaffa, Israel, 12 August 2004.

67 Cited in: Yoram Peri, *The Israeli Military and Israel's Palestinian Policy: from Oslo to the Al Aqsa Intifada*, *Peaceworks* No. 47

(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, November 2002), 39.

68 See: David Eshel, 'The battle of Jenin', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 14 (July 2002), 20-23.

UNRWA Gaza Field Assessment of IDF Operation Days of Penitence, http://www.un.org/unrwa/news/incursion_oct04.pdf, 20 October 2004; 'Israel "pauses" Rafah operation', *BBC News*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3744533.stm, 25 May 2004.

69 On the statistical correlation between Israeli assassinations and Palestinian terror attempts see: Edward H. Kaplan, 'What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model', *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 28 (May-June 2005), 225-235.

70 See: Pierre Klochendler, 'Israeli General Apologises for Civilian Deaths', CNN, 23 July 2002, <http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/07/23/hamas.assassination>, 10 August 2003.

71 See: 'Israel takes heat for Gaza airstrike', CNN, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/07/23/mideast/index.html>, 23 July 2002.

72 Quoted in: 'Israel Needs Yaalon', *Foreign Report* (6 November 2003), <http://frp.janes.com>, 23 June 2004.

73 See Harel and Isacharoff, 'The Seventh War', for an account of the battle, 251-3.

74 Lieutenant-Colonel Dori Pinkas, IDF Doctrine Division, Interview with the author, Hakiryia Tel-Aviv, 13/02/05.

75 See the account on Golani by battalion commander Lieutenant-Colonel Ofek Bochriss, 'Command and Leadership in Defensive Shield Operation', *Ma'arachot*, 388 (July 2003), 32-37.

76 Cited in: Vered Winocur-Chair and Yotam Amitai, 'The War of the Junior Command', 34.

77 The number of hours dedicated purely to doctrine was increased from 7 to 70 according to Hanan Schwartz, who was one of the new program's designers. Hanan Schwartz. Interview with the author, Tel-Aviv, 11 February 2005.

78 Colonel Moshe Shamir, research fellow at the Combat Studies Institute, Hertzliya. Israel. Interview with the author, Hertzliya, 14 February 2005.

79 For example *Ma'arachot* article by Lieutenant-Colonel Saar Raveh and Captain Maya Peker-Rinat 'To Win and to Remain Human: The Challenges of Leadership in LIC', *Ma'arachot*, 385 (July 2002), 20-25. Written by two IDF military psychologists, this is an attempt to deal with the Strategic Corporal phenomena. They advocate

CHAPTER 8

systemic thinking, knowledge in having to deal with the media in a professional manner and the motivation of subordinates in complex and undefined situations.

80 Harel and Isacharoff , *The Seventh war*, 58-9.

CHAPTER 9

Setting Things Right: Some Lessons From American Reform



Kenneth Allard

The word – “transformation” – is of course most closely associated with the incumbency of Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, where even before the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11) it had become the new shorthand for military reform, eclipsing the neologism of “the revolution in military affairs” or RMA with surprising speed. Whether transformation or RMA, this experiment goes on even as we speak. Therefore, it is timely to examine the question of how, in the midst of transformation, military organizations might deal with the age-old problem of indiscipline among military personnel. Some recent experiences of the United States (US) Army provide some insight into this challenge.

Most discussions of transformation tend to focus on technology or on how one might rearrange traditional military structures. But there are ample reasons to focus on the more fundamental issue of how these things actually affect the behavior of soldiers in the field. The first is the continuing problem of adapting the institutions of the nation-state to the growing list of trans-national problems and trans-national actors. Many of the lessons learned about peacekeeping and nation building during the last decades of the 20th century came from the example of the Canadian Forces, a humanitarian adaptation of military power with a continuing relevance that some in my country might have found

CHAPTER 9

surprising. One of the only rays of hope in the biblical tragedy of the Asian tsunami of 2004 came from the rapid and efficient dispatch of naval, air and amphibious rescue teams to survivors on all sides of that continent. Yet United Nations (UN) aid officials tell us that tragedy persists as well on the African continent, with deaths from ethnic and religious strife – in the Congo alone – amounting to the equivalent of “one tsunami every six months.”¹ Even the well-intentioned are not immune to becoming part of the problem, as incidents of exploitation and even abuse have been reported in various UN peacekeeping contingents sent to that region.

Such incidents are a timely reminder why a fresh look at potential sources of indiscipline is always a wise move. Trans-national problems are constantly generating new military missions – and new missions have a paradoxical way of forcing a return to basics. We are, after all, Western armies: Western values are part of our common military culture and are imprinted within us like DNA. As that most provocative of military historians, Victor Davis Hanson, reminds us: the Western fighting man is above all else a free man. While this means that “Western armies...are often unruly,” it also means they have a hidden advantage that makes all the difference:

...freedom of action...pays dividends in battle. Soldiers and sailors improvise and act spontaneously... Their energies are not diverted to hiding failure in fear of execution. Free men fight openly with the trust that later inquiry and audit by their peers will sort out the cowards from the brave.²

Precisely because free speech and open debate are the essence of this politico-military tradition, Hanson points out that they are also integral to the collective wisdom that is the cornerstone of command itself.

My reason for introducing our topic in this way is that Hanson prompts us to remember just how powerful the idea of freedom really is. The armies drawing upon that ideal simply fight much better than those which do not; and in *Carnage and Culture*, he surveys battlefield outcomes from Salamis to Midway that compellingly illustrate this point. However, his final example is one that brings painful recollections for any American soldier: the Vietnamese “Tet Offensive” of 1968. It was certainly not the first time the phrase, “won the battle but lost the war,” was an apt summation: but it was in the aftermath of that defeat that the American Army³ began its long dark night of the soul. Hanson concludes his work with the observation that the Army began a long period of “audit, scrutiny and self-critique” which was in the highest Western military tradition – and his comment is true enough.⁴ But as someone who was there, who served in that Army as it was undergoing that long and painful self-examination, I can think of no better example to commend to a study of the sources of indiscipline.

Want to know how bad things were? Rick Atkinson, the eminent *Washington Post* reporter and Pulitzer Prize-winning author, characterized the Army after Vietnam as “an institution in anguish....beset with the anarchy of drugs, racial strife and utter indiscipline.”⁵ This was the Army I joined in West Germany as a young intelligence officer in early 1972. Its problems were evident from the first moment. For ten years, the Army in Europe had been little more than a way station for officers and soldiers en route to Vietnam. Units often had two or three commanders in the course of a year – or even more if one of those officers was unfortunate enough to be relieved for cause. Off-duty soldiers with test-the-limits haircuts and sideburns returning drunk or stoned from rock concerts often boarded the wrong trains back to their camps – and were expelled a day or so later by bemused East German border guards.

During my first tour as battalion staff duty officer, one of our commanders was arrested for the attempted murder of a

CHAPTER 9

prostitute (he later claimed to be investigating whether she was actually a spy with a *really* good cover story). During the second, I was deployed in direct support of a military police unit that went into one of our neighboring kasernes to break up a “disturbance” that to my naïve eyes seemed indistinguishable from simple mutiny. A military police Sergeant later explained the underlying complexities: the basic tension was racial and there were “issues” between the black and white soldiers that sometimes flared up. Fortunately, there was also the moderating influence of the drug dealers – the “good guys” who could speak to both sides. That bizarre example was still on my mind eighteen months later when the 1973 Arab-Israeli War brought about a sharp confrontation between the US and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In its aftermath, the superpowers brought their respective armies in Europe to a full-fledged nuclear alert.⁶ American combat intelligence units were exceedingly primitive back then: but as we dutifully headed out to our tactical alert positions, I remember wondering how we could possibly take on the multi-echeloned formations of the Group of Soviet Forces Germany when our own units were effectively at war with themselves.

That same thought must have occurred to other people as well, because the 1973-1974 “winter of our discontent” turned out to be our nadir. The gloomy characterization by Rick Atkinson referred to above came in an address that he made to West Point Class of 1991 on the eve of their graduation and their commissioning into an Army that had changed dramatically since 1973. Indeed: only months before, that Army under Norman Schwarzkopf had achieved a stunning feat of arms in the First Persian Gulf War, a victory so brilliant that in retrospect it looked easy. Atkinson’s response must still be remembered by those cadets, many of whom are serving today in our Second Persian Gulf War:

There is a tendency now to believe that the victory in the Persian Gulf War was easy and cheap...(But) the seeds of this victory were planted more than twenty years ago in

the jungles of Vietnam. The officers who were brigade, division and corps commanders in this war commanded platoons, companies and battalions in Vietnam. They stayed the course after Vietnam...They remained true to the profession of arms and set out to make things right, to develop the doctrine, the training methods, the standards of professionalism that evolved in the outstanding force which you will formally join tomorrow. In this sense, the Persian Gulf War didn't last for forty-two days, it lasted for twenty years. And it was not easy.⁷

No it wasn't. No turn-around worthy of the name ever is. But some lessons from that experience might be useful in contemplating the challenges of maintaining the certainties of military professionalism in a most uncertain era. The American Army's re-birth over almost twenty years was a sustained cycle of reforms in which five distinct but closely related factors can be identified:

1. Values: defined as those characteristics of a military culture in which the organization or institution has great emotional investments;
2. Vision: the determination of future possibilities allowing an organization to re-define, articulate and execute its key missions (for the Army, often indistinguishable from doctrine);
3. Means: the combination of people, equipment and technology required to execute vision and doctrine;
4. Training: the systematic, repetitive refining of people, equipment and technology into battle-ready capabilities;
5. Leader Development: the first responsibility of leaders is to create other leaders throughout the organization, where their involvement, commitment and inspiration constantly helps refine basic values - and begins the cycle all over again.

CHAPTER 9

It should be emphasized that these things were: all parts of a repetitive cycle that came to fruition only after operating for more than two decades; that they were continuous and reinforcing rather than strictly sequential; but that for present purposes, it may be most useful to locate each element in its own historical context.

Values

It is common in the world of business for values to be used interchangeably with “ethics.” Such is the moral and intellectual confusion of our business school faculties that there are even serious questions raised about whether it is appropriate for them to instruct future executives in the moral dimensions of leadership. The irony of course is that this debate persists in the faculty clubs even as legislatures imposing an ever-tightening web of regulation after each new revelation of corporate irresponsibility. The fact is that values are all about ambiguities and conflicts or else they are not really values at all, but meaningless slogans.

While we sometimes fall into those same traps, military organizations are qualitatively different from our commercial counterparts when it comes to values. In part this difference reflects closer proximity to the harsh realities of life and death, something that encourages the search for moral certainty in inherently ambiguous situations. As a Vietnam-era draftee, I was introduced to the laws of land warfare by a stern-faced Judge Advocate General (JAG) who inveighed against the My Lai massacre and explained our duty to disobey illegal orders. However, the end of his class was promptly followed by more informal - but much more pointed - instruction by combat-hardened drill sergeants, who explained how things really worked in battle. My fellow trainees shared my confusion: because there was some irreconcilable conflict between the values of survival and humanity. But precisely because there was a conflict, these were values, not just empty mottoes or slogans.

That same class was repeated several more times before the Army finally consented to transform this unlikely draftee into a commissioned officer. Along the way, the realization gradually dawned that values are essential parts of the moral and intellectual compass of the organization and the soldier. Values help the organization answer the fundamental question: *who are we?* And for each of its members, they similarly frame the question: *who am I?* Much later in my career, I was privileged to join the West Point faculty, where there was no hesitation whatsoever about teaching values. In their purest form, those values were articulated by General Douglas MacArthur in his farewell address to the Corps of Cadets, “Duty, Honor, Country” – a classic of 20th century rhetoric and still required reading for Army officers. More practically: the United States Military Academy honor code provided a standard of everyday conduct that was simple and absolute: “A cadet does not lie, cheat, steal or tolerate those who do.”

With that heritage, imagine the profound sense of dislocation when the Army finally came to realize how far it had wandered from its moral underpinnings during the Vietnam War. Body counts were only the most notorious symbols of problems camouflaged as progress. Careerism manifested itself in “ticket-punching” (minimum-duration combat assignments) and grossly inflated officer efficiency reports. In the insular institution of the officer corps, it was impossible to confine the damage to Vietnam. In Europe, the strain of supporting a decade of warfare in another theater had produced shortages of personnel and equipment that were becoming ever harder to conceal. It was common for unit readiness reporting – the Army’s most basic measurement of its fitness for war – to be subverted by bogus transfers and other accounting subterfuges that allowed career-conscious commanders to perpetuate the fiction of “zero defects.” Eventually the Army began to suspect that something was wrong and, predictably, sent a team out from Washington to investigate. An old friend was on that team and he gleefully recounted the candid comment of a necessarily anonymous staff officer:

CHAPTER 9

“If you guys were really serious about straightening out the readiness accounting nightmare, you oughta start by shooting General _____ [the local corps commander].”

The first response of the Army leadership was simple and instinctive resistance to the notion that it had a pervasive institutional problem. But by 1973, General Creighton Abrams – himself a World War II hero who became Army Chief of Staff after leading the troops in Vietnam – began the long process of Army reforms. Significantly, he began those reforms with a thorough examination of Army values. A study he chartered to examine the moral and ethical climate of the officer corps was the sum of most fears: cynicism and dishonesty were widespread, with favoritism and self-serving careerism constituting a general institutional malaise. As a first response, regulations, institutional training and command literature soon began reflecting a noticeable re-emphasis on values like candor, commitment and courage. These measures were accompanied by examples of “leaders taking units back to values” during seminars, unit training and individual counseling. Officer efficiency reports began requiring assessments of professional ethics, including integrity, selflessness and moral courage.⁸

It was certainly possible to be cynical about such injunctions – but they were accompanied by several systematic “reductions in force” in the early-to-mid 1970’s that often left confirmed cynics on the outside of an increasingly Darwinian officer corps. Such purges not only separate the wheat from the chaff: but they also confirm the importance of values as essential touchstones in determining what the organization really is – and who its people really are. Nor do those lessons quickly fade away. Twenty years later, one of Abrams’ successors as Army Chief of Staff confronted similar turbulence as Army roles and missions again shifted. His reflections:

Values give an organization a self-ordering quality, a kind of organizational ballast, which provides direction

and stability in periods of turmoil, stress and change. They give both leaders and followers a basis for looking more confidently beyond the issues of the day...Effective leaders understand that core values rooted deeply within the people who make up an organization are the essence of its...culture and an enormous source of its strength.⁹

Vision

Second only to the importance of Values – *who are we?* – is the closely related question of Vision: *where are we going?* The trauma of the Army's first defeat was quickly followed by another harsh realization: that while the service had been exhausting itself in the jungles of Vietnam, its principal Soviet adversary had stolen a march. The conventional balance of forces in Europe had always rested on the qualitative edge of American ground and air forces to offset the great quantitative edge always ceded to the armies of the Warsaw Pact. But the October, 1973 clash between Israel and the Soviet-supplied forces of Syria and Egypt was deeply unsettling. The Israelis had eventually emerged from the war victorious – but only just. A decade of sustained modernization had resulted in advances in armor, air defense, electronic warfare and the first examples of precision guided munitions that now made Soviet forces or their surrogates more formidable than ever before. While Israeli training and adaptation under fire had eventually reversed early losses to the Arab armies, the new Soviet qualitative edge – added to their long-standing numerical advantage – created disturbing implications for the defense of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) territory.

Like the prospect of being hanged, the specter of a Soviet armored juggernaut charging across West Germany's Fulda Gap and rapidly crossing the Rhine River was a nightmare that wonderfully concentrated the Army's best minds. As he had with the renaissance of Army values, General Creighton Abrams acted decisively to absorb the lessons of the Yom Kippur War. In the

CHAPTER 9

Army as in the Catholic Church, visions of the future – however compelling – are little more than pipe dreams unless codified into doctrine. Three generals with distinguished Vietnam command records – William DePuy (the newly named head of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, or TRADOC) Paul Gorman and Donn Starry became the legendary triumvirate who kicked off a doctrinal debate that lasted for most of the next ten years. Starry – commander of the Army Armor Center – had seen the aftermath of the epic Israeli-Syrian tank battle on the Golan Heights while the wreckage still smoldered. While the Army would wrestle with many important questions over the next decade, there was no doubt about the recent war’s central insight. Despite a history of losing most of its initial engagements, “The Army would very likely have to fight and win the first battle of the next war. That would have to be the departure point for the Army’s new doctrine, and Starry and Depuy both knew that it changed everything.”¹⁰

With the 1976 edition of its capstone manual, *Operations* or Field Manual (FM) 100-5, the Army catalogued its initial reactions to the Arab-Israeli War:

Arabs and Israelis were armed with the latest weapons, and the conflict approached a level of destructiveness once attributed only to nuclear arms...*In clashes of massed armor such as the world had not witnessed for 30 years, both sides sustained devastating losses, approaching 50 percent in two weeks of combat.*¹¹

Not only was weaponry more destructive than ever before, but with improvements in munitions and electronic reconnaissance, there had also been unprecedented advances in range and accuracy. In briefings, manuals, and throughout Army service schools, a new principle was being taught, hammered out of the revolution caused by this first wave of precision-guided munitions: *What can be seen can be hit. What can be hit can be killed.*

The first trial balance of the new doctrine promptly stirred up old controversies. At least since World War I, with the steady growth in the numbers, calibers and lethality of artillery, a recurring controversy has existed over whether firepower or maneuver should be the battlefield strategy of choice. Those alternatives now framed the growing debate over which competing vision of the future gave the Army its best chance for winning that critical first battle of the next war. At first glance, the new technological developments seemed to favor the advocates of firepower: not only would centralized command centers play a critical role in allocating priorities for fire control and deep strikes, but concentrating massed firepower seemed to be the surest way to blunt the overwhelming Soviet edge in numbers. That philosophy also suited the traditional preference for victory through attrition, the inelegant but effective grinding-down of an opponent that had served the Army well since Grant faced Lee. Attrition warfare was also linked to even larger assumptions. Throughout most of the twentieth century, the industrial age had driven mobilization policies that might take months or years to put trained manpower and vast amounts of assembly-line equipment “over there.” Once in place, however, the slow wheels of attrition warfare had always ground America’s enemies into dust.

The Vietnam and Yom Kippur Wars were powerful challenges to that status quo: Vietnam represented the Army’s first strategic defeat while the War of Atonement suggested that its preferred models of industrial age warfare and mobilization were no longer valid. “Long before the country could bring its industrial might to bear on a future war in Europe, the American commander...was likely to face a decision between being run off the continent or escalating to the use of nuclear weapons.”¹² The “maneuver critique” of FM 100-5 was not long in coming, its advocates pointing out that the new doctrine was mechanistic, lacked offensive spirit and under-emphasized the mobility of Army weapon systems. Rather than simply concentrating firepower to meet Soviet formations head-on, maneuver theorists argued that

CHAPTER 9

the attackers should be allowed to make shallow penetrations of NATO's defenses – even as friendly armored formations circled into vulnerable Soviet rear areas. Instead of organizing the battlefield into progressively more lethal “kill zones,” maneuver advocates offered a more dynamic view of territory – as something to be gained or traded for tactical advantage.¹³

The debate transfixed the Army over the course of two more re-publications of FM 100-5: but with the 1986 version of the manual, a new synergy was in place between the concepts of maneuver and attrition. Long-range firepower would be directed toward deep strikes aimed at interdicting key targets in enemy rear areas and second echelons; maneuver forces were expected to fight the “close-in battle” through fast-moving aggressive attacks. Not only would these attacks be synchronized in “time, space and purpose” to achieve maximum combat power on the ground, but coordinating deep strikes also required entirely new levels of joint teamwork with the Air Force – so much so that the capstone Army doctrine now took the name of Airland Battle.¹⁴ While doctrinal disputes might seem like “inside baseball” even to a military audience, some of those ideas may seem vaguely familiar. They may be better-known as the operational components of the famous “Hail Mary” maneuver executed by General Schwarzkopf during the first Gulf War or as the “Shock and Awe” campaign carried out during the second. In both cases, these battle plans had their origins in the doctrinal scribbling of previous decades. Though sewn in moments of desperation and even despair, they became the dragon's teeth of a new Army that carefully sorted out its vision of future combat – and then systematically dominated its enemies. Both Hanson and the Greeks he writes about so well would understand this ferment of values and vision – because they would instinctively recognize such seeming disorder as the first and most essential steps of a truly western army putting its house in order.¹⁵

Means

Western armies often find it easier to deal with questions of means rather than ends: but as the questions of values, vision and doctrine were thrashed out, it became progressively easier to narrow basic choices about means as well. When the maneuver critique prompted adjustments in future doctrine, those decisions carried real meaning for the development of future weapons systems – even if they were mere “drawing board exercises” given the austere defense budgets of the late 1970’s. When hostages were taken at the U.S. Embassy and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in late 1979, the concepts moved quickly off the drawing boards and closer toward reality. Two questions now needed immediate answers: what types of equipment needed to be procured to offset the great gains of Soviet battlefield modernization; and what sorts of soldiers would be needed to man the modernized force thus created?

Both the assiduous study of Soviet equipment and its performance in the Yom Kippur War had given the American combat developers a reasonably precise idea of the answer to the first question. Via the microchip, the next generation of Army combat systems would feature advances in range, lethality and mobility that were intended to turn the dream of AirLand Battle into a reality. After 1981, the increased defense budgets under the incoming Reagan Administration meant that five major weapons systems were approaching full-scale production:

1. The Abrams M-1 Main Battle Tank: The Cadillac of modern tanks, the M-1 featured 40 mph cross-country speed, state-of-the art armor, a 120mm main gun, laser range-finding and the ability to shoot on the move. Fast, silent and with embedded night fighting systems, the M1 would eventually defeat Soviet armor at ranges in excess of three kilometers – often before the victims even knew they were being targeted.

CHAPTER 9

2. M2/3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle: One of the classic problems of modern combat was enabling the infantry to keep up with fast-moving armor – something the Soviets had solved with their famous ‘Bronevaya Maschina Piekhota’ (BMP) infantry fighting vehicle. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) provided the US response – an armored vehicle that a squad of mechanized infantry could use not only to keep up with the tanks but also to fight while mounted. With cannon and tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command link guided (TOW) missiles, the BFV also packed a potent offensive punch of its own.
3. Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS): Updating a classic Soviet design of World War II fame, the MLRS employed space age technology and a family of submunitions to combine the pinpoint accuracy of traditional cannon artillery with the thorough devastation of an area weapon. Able to out-range most long-range cannons, MLRS instantly became the preferred counter-battery weapon to attack Russian artillery, the “Red God of War,” as well as putting at risk targets throughout the enemy rear area.
4. Attack Helicopter (AH)-64 Apache Attack and Utility Helicopter (UH)-60 Blackhawk Helicopters: Vietnam had confirmed the Army’s reliance on the helicopter as the linchpin of Army aviation. The advent of helicopter gunships there had spurred subsequently imitators – the Soviets deploying the fearsome Hind in Afghanistan. The Apache was the next step in this evolution. With organic state-of-the-art electronic targeting, its missiles and chain guns made it a tank killer as well as a constant threat to targets well behind enemy lines. Fast and lethal, it was meant to provide the same kind of armed escort to Army helicopters that fighters typically provide to bombers. In the 1980’s the backbone of Army utility helicopters would be the new UH-60 Blackhawk – a

replacement for the famed UH-1 “Huey” of Vietnam fame and a complete upgrade in every facet of airworthiness.

5. Patriot Air Defense Missile: Although it became best known during the first Gulf War as an anti-missile system, the Patriot was originally developed as an air defense weapon to counter the steady development of Soviet tactical aviation. Although the Hawk missile had provided effective low level air defense since the 1960's, the Patriot was meant to intercept and destroy marauding Soviet aircraft at high altitudes and extended ranges – well before they could launch their arsenal of bombs and rockets.¹⁶

More than twenty years later, even an abbreviated listing of the Army's new weapon's systems inevitably takes on the orotund phrasing of an official pamphlet. But the deployment of these new technologies would be of little use if the right sorts of soldiers were not recruited and trained to handle the new equipment. To an Army that had only recently abandoned the draft (and then under protest) as its principal source of manpower, the all-volunteer force had proven to be a dismal disappointment. In 1979, the force was more than 15,000 soldiers short of authorized strength because of recruiting shortfalls. Even worse, “On standard military aptitude tests between 1977 and 1980, close to half of all the Army's male recruits scored in the lowest mental category the service allowed...(and) thirty eight percent were high school dropouts.”¹⁷ This sort of mentally challenged force would never be able to handle the new wave of equipment, let alone the think-on-your feet, do-the-right thing demands of the new doctrine. As its new chief – General Maxwell Thurman – tartly informed the Army Recruiting Command: “We need trout but you guys are fishing for carp.”

What was needed was the rapid welding of this low-rent gaggle of volunteers into a highly motivated professional force – a transition that became forever linked with General Thurman's name

CHAPTER 9

and career. In many ways, the Army had not yet made the mental leap required to raise a force that now depended on free-market mechanisms: raising recruiting levels as well as individual competencies demanded a better set of incentives. With rising international tensions, Congress was suddenly in a mood to cooperate – an essential step in the American constitutional system where the Congress is specifically empowered “to raise and support Armies.”¹⁸ The result was that, beginning with the 1981 defense budget, a combination of enlistment bonuses, across-the-board salary increases and other entitlements raised military pay by a third in just over two years. Educational bonuses for Army enlistees effectively provided “scholarships” amounting to over \$20,000 per recruit. Finally, Congress also acted to limit the proportion of new recruits who were either in the lowest mental category or were high school dropouts.¹⁹

In the American system, the power of the Constitution is rivaled only by the power of good advertising – a vital component in the image-building underlying free market choices, for the Army or anyone else. James Kitfield’s definitive history of the Army during this period memorably recounts the hands-on approach of General Thurman, whose motto was, “When in charge, take charge.” The general carefully supervised every detail of the Army advertising campaign intended both to profile the new pay and educational incentives – while also showcasing the kind of new soldier the Army was trying to recruit. Almost as an afterthought, the Manhattan advertising agency in charge of the campaign was told that the video needed a catchy theme song to go with it. As the new advertising video was screened, it was also the first time that anyone had ever heard the new jingle. “*Be!...All that you can be!*” – which subsequently became a familiar fixture of American pop culture. Oddly, however, General Thurman remained silent. “Even after the screening was over his darkened silhouette remained still. Only when the lights came up did the others in the room realize that the man many considered to be one of the toughest and most dispassionate generals in the Army had tears streaming down his face.”²⁰

Training

The Army ad campaign, together with the new compensation and educational benefits packages, was so successful that unit commanders throughout the service quickly began noticing marked improvements in the quality of new soldiers. Together with the first deliveries of the Big Five weapon systems, the Army was rapidly making strides at addressing its most pressing manpower and equipment issues. But like nested Russian dolls, each improvement simply raised a host of underlying or unsuspected problems. One of the most immediate questions was how to train smarter (and therefore more easily bored) soldiers on complicated (and therefore more dangerous) new weapon systems. From World War II through Vietnam, Army training had been built around the assumption that rote learning and repetition were the fastest and most reliable ways to indoctrinate a captive audience of draftees – who would thereafter escape the military just as soon as their “obligated terms of service” might allow. Such instruction produced predictable gaps in performance; Army units were constantly forced to spend time organizing remedial training on their own, usually featuring even more repetition.

A professional force was another animal altogether. Throughout the 1970's, the Army had been stressing more realistic training through the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) to assess unit combat readiness: but in the 1980's, the Army engineered a training revolution that was in many ways the most significant achievement of its twenty-year turn-around story – and a legacy possibly even comparable to classical Roman methods. This revolution, as Caesar himself might have pointed out, consisted of three parts:

Combat Training Centers: In their Top Gun and Red Flag exercises, the Navy and Air Force had demonstrated the value of realistic simulation in honing the skills of their combat pilots. The rule was: the closer the simulation to actual wartime conditions,

CHAPTER 9

the better. With improvements in video, computers and computer-aided graphics, there was little room for argument between pilots over who lived and who died – or over which maneuvers worked and which did not. Such simulations had an obvious ability to help the Army come to grips with the nuts-and-bolts of AirLand Battle tactics. But translating the exactitude of aerial combat to the messier and more cluttered environment of the soldier was a much tougher proposition: not only was “terrain masking” a basic feature of any such contest, but cover, concealment, dust, smoke and fog were as well. While a hundred or more planes might commonly participate in the exercise “fur-ball,” tracking individual infantrymen or combat vehicles might easily involve more than ten thousand separate targets. Common battlefield features like artillery, minefields or other obstacles might not be easy for a computer to replicate or integrate into combat scenarios.

However, the potential of a true instrumented combat laboratory for testing doctrine and units outweighed any difficulty; and by the early 1980’s – thanks to the leadership of General Paul Gorman – the Army opened the National Training Center (NTC) – its “Top Gun for Tanks” – on the edge of the Mojave Desert at Fort Irwin, California. The Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES) was attached to every gun while a master computer managed the hierarchy of weapons, their effects, vehicle movements and battle outcomes. At Fort Irwin’s nerve center,

Elaborate data-processing equipment provided instantaneous information on unit locations, troop concentrations, heavy weapons positions, number of shots fired by caliber (as well as) hits and misses. Remote-control cameras mounted on mountaintops provided total video coverage of the battle area.²¹

As impressive as these technological achievements were at the time, what made the NTC into an emotional event for visiting units was the OPFOR – or opposing force. The OPFOR was a cadre of U.S. soldiers permanently assigned to Fort Irwin, organized

and equipped like a Soviet motorized rifle regiment and charged with the mission of being the Aggressor force that put regular Army units through their paces.

With the OPFOR eagerly awaiting its chance to pounce and with the chain of command eagerly anticipating those results, regular Army units had strong incentives to perform well. Their rotations were organized so that – on average – a unit commander could look forward to having his turn “in the box” at least once during his tour of duty. While individual engagements were not supposed to influence fitness evaluations or future assignments, the fact was that the NTC was a compelling test of a unit’s overall competence. The only way to do well on that test was to have engaged every soldier in that effort; increasingly at the NTC and in the Army as a whole, the approved way to do that was the After Action Review, or AAR. The AAR was a free-ranging, self-directed critique – and from the lowest rifle squad up through platoon, company and battalion levels, and every leader was held responsible for conducting AARs at whatever level he commanded. Every training action in preparation for the NTC, and all events while there, were graded using the AAR matrix. While captains and colonels may have found it somewhat painful to confront their failures or shortcomings in the presence of the very soldiers they were commanding, the shared commitment to honesty created other bonds: so too did the common reference to sustained improvement in combat readiness and professionalism.

Battle Command Training Program (BCTP): Many considered the BCTP as the closest that higher level commands and staffs could come to the NTC experience. The governing assumption closely paralleled that of the NTC: if sergeants needed to experience the learning curve of battle to execute their rather straight-forward tasks, then surely generals needed similar practice in managing the stress of higher-level complexities. This mission was given to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth Kansas which organized the BCTP as a way to insure that senior officers were up to the challenge of organizing and moving their units on the

CHAPTER 9

battlefield. Rather than taking staffs to the Mojave Desert, division and corps staffs were exercised *in situ* – only now they confronted exercise controllers wielding a computerized version of the OPFOR. “To put as much of the fog of battle into the BCTP...the war game (was) played using the tested division’s headquarters staff and communications equipment. Whenever possible, (the) controllers would exercise the division’s existing war plans.”²²

If the NTC was daunting, then the BCTP was positively devilish. As General Robert Scales points out, it was one thing to criticize colonels in the free-swinging give-and-take of an AAR: quite another to do the same thing to generals. Not only were their egos more fragile, but in the clear light of day after a set-to with the computer-driven OPFOR, there was literally no place to hide. Eventually, tact and decorum were preserved by bringing in a group of retired four-star generals – of which there was always some profusion – to insure things did not get out of hand. Despite the tensions, the Army Chief of Staff declared that the program would continue – and for a very simple reason. There was simply no better way to evaluate either real-world combat readiness or future fitness for promotion than by using the BCTP. And if there was to be a single standard for training the Army, then simple fairness demanded that it apply equally to all levels of command.²³

Training Philosophy: Stress can be a great teacher if you survive the experience; and with the NTC, the BCTP, and AARs, acronyms and stress-levels abounded. But some important lessons about training had been learned as well, especially about harmonizing the entire effort. Organizational and management theorists understand this problem as *alignment*, because improvements in one part of the organization can throw the entire enterprise into disequilibrium – and make matters even worse than before. Instead, the trick is to insure that improvements *here* are matched over *there* so that the organization as a whole (rather than just its parts) makes steady improvements that reinforce one another

rather than canceling them out. As the Army made similar progress in improving teamwork at brigade, division and joint headquarters, it became necessary not only to think big, but also to insure that the entire organization was “on the same page.”²⁴

In late 1988, the Army published its capstone training manual, FM 25-100, that summarized what had been learned – and now made it directive. Focused on the brigade combined arms team, the manual stressed the need for training management of combat and combat support units – maneuver battalions through engineers and signal units, for example. Those ideas were not new: however, the methodology for achieving it was. Unit commanders, particularly at battalion and brigade levels, were held responsible for being able to execute the wartime battle plans for which they and their units were responsible. Out of those battle plans they were to derive a Mission Essential Task List (METL) detailing the specific tasks required to execute those responsibilities. The METL was then further evaluated to determine how well (or poorly) each unit could perform each subordinate task that might be required. Deficiencies between the unit’s current capabilities and the standard required to execute its combat tasks would drive the unit’s training schedule – itself a progression of tasks, conditions and standards – until the required level of performance was achieved. At every training event and at every level within it, after action reviews would help to insure that soldiers at every level – not just the leadership – were taking responsibility for the unit’s combat effectiveness.²⁵

Aficionados of the management sciences will be quick to point out that what the Army had put in place was a rather elementary “process improvement model:” true enough – but no less effective for being simple. At the very least, the new methodology was a huge leap forward for an institution that always assumed that “training hard” was its own reward, regardless of whether or not there was any payoff in increased readiness for war. But with higher quality soldiers, better and more demanding equipment, a compelling vision of the future and the uncertainty of a serious

CHAPTER 9

and determined adversary, there was good reason to use better and smarter training as the pathway to disciplined improvement. And yet there were some occasions on which, in the words of the ancient parable, the seeds fell on stony ground. It was my privilege for some years to serve as special assistant to the Army chief of staff, General Carl Vuono, who probably more than any other man was responsible for the development of the new training philosophy during stints commanding the Combined Arms Center and TRADOC. When he became Chief, it was naturally a matter of some interest to him to see how those ideas were now being implemented in the force. One day, we traveled together to an encampment where a number of Reserve generals had joined their units for annual training. General Vuono began by inquiring, pleasantly enough, “How are you fellas training nowadays?” Back came the immediate and vigorous reply: “Well, sir, we’re training very hard.” Wrong answer: because General Vuono simply assumed that they were in need of a tutorial. Which he was only too happy to supply – then, there and at some considerable length.

Leader Development

One of the distinguishing features differentiating the worlds of war and business is that western military institutions have well-organized systems of leader development. Beginning in places like the Royal Military College of Canada, the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, United Kingdom, and the United States Military Academy at West Point, officers are initiated into the profession of arms, a basic education that is subsequently reinforced at various career points by staff colleges, war colleges and even post-graduate fellowships. The American Army, during the period under discussion, also set up a comparable system for non-commissioned officers, culminating in the prestigious Sergeants Major Academy at Fort Bliss, Texas. Whether his training was acquired at Harvard University, McGill University or the School of Hard Knocks, the businessman enjoys no comparable system; any leader development occurs only as the incidental by-product

of a graduate course, a caring mentor or the odd assignment with a particularly well-run company. While the profit motive normally solves a host of lesser problems, difficulties arise whenever the institution is thrown into confusion – as has recently been the case with the corporate governance scandals plaguing the American business community. Whether dealing with such scandals or – as we have seen here – even more fundamental challenges to missions and institutions, there is no substitute for a well-developed system of leader development.

Although it had fallen on hard times, the Army already had such a system and, unlike its commercial counter-parts, had no need to invent one. At each of the stages examined in this brief study – from values through training – the institution simply tapped into the existing leader development process at various points during the long road to reform. Clearly that process was itself improved and reinforced by those reforms: the reassertion of values, the injection of fresh intellectual and human capital, the investment in technology and the assignment of responsibilities from the highest to the most junior soldiers. Because the military is a closed caste system, there is simply no possibility for lateral entry. In either the enlisted or officer ranks, apprenticeship begins strictly at the bottom rung of the ladder: the only way to produce leaders is to grow them one step at a time. Consequently, there is little disagreement about the basic leader development formula: a firm grounding in institutional values, reinforcement by education, accountability for self-improvement and testing by a career progression that steadily expands competencies and responsibilities.

The process is circular because it begins and ends with values. For the Army, one of the principal crossroads in that progression is the Pre-Command Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas – where battalion and brigade commanders are groomed one last time before taking charge of the units which they have been chosen to lead. During his tenure, General Vuono sacrificed whatever time was required in order to reinforce, in dramatically personal terms,

CHAPTER 9

the message of the Army training philosophy to *each one of those classes*. His successors have followed suit. One of them, General Gordon Sullivan, has written that the time was well spent because it allowed him to influence a future generation of Army leaders. His message to those leaders is worth repeating here:

You must be men and women of your time, living in the world as it is and as it is becoming, not as it was for your mentors...Our job is to grow the people who will lead the organization when we are gone, and we begin that by instilling the kind of values that we want our organizations to reflect in the future.²⁶

Exactly: because values are the touchstones of the past as well as boundary markers for the present. And, for good or ill, an azimuth for the future.

Conclusions

1. Generational change works. One of the great paradoxes of military organizations is that time is both a disadvantage and an advantage: changes rarely occur in an instant and the process of reform can often be frustratingly slow. However, military innovations grounded in long-term cultural changes can be extraordinarily powerful. Indeed, it is striking that the innovations over the twenty-year period outlined here correspond generally with key insights from the historical record during the period between World Wars I and II. One of the foremost analysts of that era, Williamson Murray, writes: “Evolutionary innovation depends on organizational focus over time rather than guidance by one individual for a short period. Military leadership can affect the process through long-term cultural changes rather than short-term decisions.” In illustration, Murray cites examples of armored warfare innovation in both Britain and Germany – examples that closely parallel the Army’s experience in gradually

working out the sometimes upsetting dynamics of AirLand Battle. Successful military innovations are only rarely an overnight success: more often, they are the result of trial, error and time.²⁷

2. So does feedback: The history of the inter-war period also contains a number of chastening examples where military innovation failed in armies that began with apparent advantages, notably in technology, structure and incentives. One of the key discriminators was institutional rigidity, and an “institutional bias against feedback,” especially in matters of doctrine. Instead, maneuvers rather than being a testing ground, “aimed at inculcating revealed truth into units – not at adapting doctrine to real life. There was little learning since the high command had all the answers.”²⁸ While their impulses were almost certainly instinctual rather than historical, the Army’s contrasting history during the period examined here suggests an institution that was fluid rather than rigid. Despite the very real potential for disruptive change, all the indicators flow in that direction: the doctrinal debate pitting maneuver versus attrition; the commitment of time and other resources to the “Top Gun for Tanks” at the NTC; and, most profoundly, a training regimen in which operational feedback – the AAR’s – was not only encouraged, but demanded. While receptiveness to feedback may not ensure the success of military innovation, its absence certainly seems to guarantee failure.

3. The quality of the soldier is fundamental to everything else. When General Thurman first suggested to his recruiters that they were fishing for the wrong species, the Army was not sure it agreed. Quantity rather than quality had been the familiar institutional strategy for several generations, and the insistence on a mass Army of draftees is a hardy perennial in the Washington policy arena down to the present day. But because the American

CHAPTER 9

draft would always be out-numbered by Soviet conscription, the US Army had to re-learn a salutary lesson that no western military organization should ever have forgotten. As Hanson reminds us so powerfully, volunteers are better soldiers because they are smarter and adapt better to the inherent uncertainties of combat. The Army put in place to deal with a rising Soviet threat never faced its intended adversary on the plains of Europe. Instead it had to adapt rapidly to a high-intensity war in the desert: having done that, its next stops would be in places like Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, where the mission had shifted to peacekeeping. The lieutenant-colonels lectured in their pre-command courses by Generals Vuono and Sullivan are now generals themselves in the war on terror: they presumably understand better than anyone else that victory in combat goes to the warrior who adapts faster than his adversary. And that the quality of the soldier governs how fast and how well those adjustments take place.

4. Leadership is good: leader development is better. The professional schooling of military officers has customarily consisted of “blocks of instruction” in leadership. Normally the catechism features detailed studies of the lives, campaigns and aphorisms of history’s great commanders: Lee, Jackson, Patton and – for all I know – Wolfe and Montcalm. These studies can often be salutary and even entertaining – witness the normal programming of the new Military and Military History Channels. It may be slightly more difficult – but potentially more rewarding – to focus instead on leadership at other levels of the military organization. Certainly, the Army’s experience in setting up a comprehensive system for educating its non-commissioned officers was important to successful reforms throughout the institution. There is abundant evidence, for example, that Soviet officers understood, envied, but could in no way duplicate the role of either

the American or the British sergeant major – positions that in the armies of the worker’s paradise could only be filled by officers.²⁹ As western armies take on new and more unconventional missions, surely the focus of leadership should be on seeking lessons and gaining insights from leaders at deeper levels in their organizations. If “top-down” has been a traditional focus, then maybe leadership from the “bottom-up” is an important corollary for the future.

5. Whether it is called AirLand Battle, transformation or RMA, no reform ever solves the problems of warfare in perpetuity. The fast-forward progression of 9/11, Afghanistan, the war on terror and the continuing struggle to overcome the Iraqi insurgency have inevitably led military historians to re-examine the Army’s response to the defeat in Vietnam. Not surprisingly, a revisionist critique has arisen that views AirLand battle as a kind of “anti-Vietnam,” less a doctrinal reform than a simple determination simply to avoid fighting revolutionary wars – rather than figuring out how to prevail over the guerilla or insurgent. The doctrinal struggles over FM 100-5 are seen as hi-tech orchestrations of the preferred conventional war across the plains of Central Europe – and an implicit rejection of vicious but lesser conflict in odd places with strange-sounding names against natives who had a nasty way of negating western technological advantages. Worst of all: fighting those kinds of wars implicitly reversed the Reagan-era Powell and Weinberger doctrines mandating highly specific, publicly defensible goals, the use of overwhelming force and, above all, swiftly concluded engagements. In a widely-noted monograph published just a year after 9/11, Army War College historian Conrad Crane showed how markedly things had changed by concluding: “The American Army can no longer run away from Vietnam. For it has found it in Afghanistan, Colombia and the

CHAPTER 9

Philippines.”³⁰ True enough – but one could sense the quest for new visions and the re-formulation of old values beginning all over again.

While the investigation of ‘indiscipline’ is often guided by probing questions related to the sources of disobedience, the American Army found from their own experience that they could not solve this problem in isolation from the other factors outlined here; that to address disobedience, they had to aim much higher, and deal with the basics of values, vision, leadership and all the rest. My hope is that Western militaries will face less daunting future challenges: but if fate and fortune decree otherwise, then may the experience of the American Army prove to be of some value in setting things right.

Endnotes

1 Jan Egeland, UN Relief coordinator, as quoted by William F. Buckley, Jr., “Human Butchery: What to do?” *National Review Online*, March 15, 2005.

2 Victor Davis Hanson, *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power*, (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 53-54.

3 Hereafter, I will use the term Army to denote the United States Army, unless otherwise indicated.

4 *Ibid.*, 433-439.

5 Rick Atkinson, remarks to the USMA Class of 1991, West Point, New York. Reprinted in Prologue, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict: Interim Report to the Congress*, July 1991.

6 See London Sunday Times, *The Yom Kippur War*, (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 399-420.

7 Atkinson, *op. cit.*

8 General Gordon R. Sullivan & Michael V. Harper, *Hope Is Not a Method*, (New York: Random House, 1996), 57-60.

9 *Ibid.*, 62-63.

10 James Kitfield, *Prodigal Soldiers*, (Washington: Brassey's, 1997), 155

11 U.S. Army, FM 100-5, *Operations*, (Washington: Headquarters, Dept. of Army, 1 July 1976) p. 2-2. Emphasis in the original.

- 12 Kitfield, op. cit., 154.
- 13 For a further discussion of this point see the author's, *Command Control and the Common Defense*, rev. ed (Washington: NDU Press, 1996) 176-181; and Paul H. Herbert, *Deciding What Has to be Done: William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5*, Leavenworth Papers Number 16, (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: July, 1988) esp. Chap. 4.
- 14 U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5, *Operations* (Washington: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 1986), 10-17.
- 15 For an overview of this period and the maneuver-attrition debate, see John Romjue's invaluable monograph, *From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of Army Doctrine 1973-1982* (Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC Historical Monograph Series, June, 1984).
- 16 Historical purists may well object to my listing of these systems because, as originally formulated by General Abrams, the "Big Five" consisted of the Blackhawk and Apache helicopters, the M1 tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the Patriot missile. The MLRS was added later in the mid-70's when the artillery community reluctantly came to accept that an area weapon was the only way to "service" the truly overwhelming number of Soviet artillery units that the counter-battery mission required.
- 17 Kitfield, op.cit., 207.
- 18 Constitution of the United States, Article I, Section 8.
- 19 Kitfield, op.cit., 228.
- 20 Ibid., p. 214.
- 21 Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. "Forging A New Army," chapter in *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War* (Washington: Brassey's: 1997) 21.
- 22 Ibid. 23.
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 For a general statement of alignment theory, see Peter Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, (New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990); and Allard, *Business As War*, (New York: Wiley's, 2004), Chap. 9.
- 25 U.S. Army, FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, (Washington: Department of the Army, November, 1988), esp. Chapters 1-2.
- 26 Gordon R. Sullivan, op. cit., 213.
- 27 Williamson Murray, "Innovation: Past and Future," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, No. 12 (Summer, 1996), 52.
- 28 Ibid., p. 57. For the definitive work on this subject, see Williamson Murray and Allen R. Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in*

CHAPTER 9

the Interwar Period, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

29 E.g., see Scales, op. cit. 23-24.

30 Conrad C. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia*, SSI Monograph, September 2002, U.S. Army War

CHAPTER 10

An Absence of Honour: Somalia – The Spark That Started the Transformation of the Canadian Forces Officer Corps



Bernd Horn

We are coming out of a decade of darkness.

Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, Chief of the Land Staff, May 2003¹

The Canadian Forces' new (2003) doctrinal manual *Duty with Honour – The Profession of Arms in Canada*, provides the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the profession of arms and clearly articulates what it means to be a Canadian military professional. The manual has earned accolades internally within the Department of National Defence (DND), as well as from the nation's politicians, scholars and military analysts. It has also received attention and praise from our allies and other international military institutions. This should be no surprise since the manual is a seminal work that has application for all military professionals, as well as their defence institutions.

Unfortunately, the road to *Duty with Honour* was not one of anticipation, insight, intellect or professionalism. Rather it was crisis and arguably the implosion of the Canadian officer corps in

CHAPTER 10

the 1990s that fuelled the renaissance in Canadian military professionalism and leadership. It was the result of what the commander of the Canadian Army described as “a decade of darkness.” The Canadian Forces (CF) has a long distinguished legacy and enviable warfighting record in two world wars and the Korean conflict. Its image and credibility throughout the Cold War as a member of NATO, as well as a prominent global participant in peacekeeping operations maintained both its domestic and international appearance as a strong vibrant military organization. However, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the bipolar threat paradigm, represented by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, created a tumultuous geo-political environment that caught most, if not all countries by surprise. The predictability, simplicity and comfort of the Cold War were shattered. Seemingly overnight, fundamental assumptions held by military institutions and their leaders were defunct. Dramatic changes in the geo-political environment, coupled with demands for a peace-dividend, a vaunted revolution in military affairs, as well as a national fiscal crisis concomitant with a major shift in societal expectations and demands, created a crisis that revealed the fissures in the Canadian officer corps. These cracks became glaringly evident during the “Somalia scandal” that centred around the torture killing of a captured teenaged Somali while in Canadian custody during Operation Deliverance in March 1993. The subsequent attempts to cover up this heinous act, by both unit personnel and later, mandarins in the National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa, drove the reputation of the CF, and particularly its leaders to a historically low ebb. It also showcased a fundamental flaw in the Canadian officer corps’ understanding of leadership, professionalism and the military ethos. As such, Somalia became the catalyst for the start of the transformation of the Canadian Officer Corps.

The Collapse of the Cold War Paradigm

It is not a revelation to state that we are all prisoners of our own experience. It is exactly for this reason that it often becomes

difficult to realize that the institution that has nurtured, guided and provided its keepers with advancement and promotion can be flawed. How could it? Those who are responsible for ensuring its effectiveness and approving changes to its structure, policies, doctrine and strategies are the very same individuals who have been recognized by that system as particularly meritorious and capable. Alas, how can a system that recognizes their brilliance be flawed? Furthermore, as the well-known strategist Basil Liddel-Hart lamented, “There are over two thousand years of experience to tell us that the only thing harder then getting a new idea into the military mind is to get an old one out.”

Not surprisingly, it was not until the post Cold War era that the sanctity and security of the old conventional wisdom that held true for almost half a century was shattered. Overnight, the carefully prepared plans for the defence of Germany became irrelevant. Gone was the familiar and carefully templated Soviet enemy.² Senior officers, whose entire careers were rooted in, and defined by, the comfortable predictability of the Cold War were faced by a brave new world. Conflict had become exponentially more complex and unpredictable.³

As a result of this new international turmoil, many Western nations, including Canada, embarked on peace support operations that no longer resembled the classic peacekeeping model of simply juxtaposing a force between two belligerents who had agreed to a third party presence to monitor a mutually agreed cease fire. In a clear rejection of the concept of sovereignty embedded in the West since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the West now selectively embarked on peace enforcement operations. Moreover, the tempo of operations increased dramatically. During the nineties, the CF underwent a threefold increase in missions compared to the previous four decades.⁴ Military leaders raised and bred in the Cold War environment were unprepared for what the new era brought.

CHAPTER 10

But conflict was not the only change that military leaders had to deal with. Dramatic scientific and technological developments paralleled the transformation of conflict. These developments, combined with globalization, introduced the concept of a “knowledge economy” and “post modern world.” They also fueled what many believe to be a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Digitization, data fusion, precision guided munitions and cybernetic devices were but a few concepts that were put forward as evidence of a new epoch of warfare.⁵ Amazingly, added to the dramatic and tumultuous changes in conflict, the geopolitical landscape and technology was yet another cataclysmic alteration that caught the CF and its leaders totally by surprise. The revolutionary shift in societal expectations and values, described by Canadian author, Peter C. Newman, as a wholesale movement from public deference to authority and government to one of defiance, was profound and frankly, caught the CF flat-footed.⁶ Disclosure, transparency, fair treatment of its personnel, quality of life, and accountability by those at the controls were simple and reasonable concepts in theory, but alien in practice and comprehension to those who had navigated through the seemingly “threat laden” and uncensored Cold War. For over 40 years the menacing Soviet hordes, depicted by graphic displays of missile gaps and charts that dramatically showed the Soviet advantage in conventional forces, were enough to ward off censure or examination of Western defence institutions. Unaccustomed to justifying their actions or their existence, the Departmental and CF leadership clung to their myopic and very narrow understanding of the world around them. A belief that they were untouchable and could simply ignore criticism of their actions seemed to prevail.

Quite simply, the Canadian Officer Corps had lost its way. Bereft of a solid military ethos or understanding of the requirements of professionalism, the CF was caught unprepared for the post Cold War era. “The Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence [DND],” wrote General Maurice Baril, the former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), “like many other Canadian institu-

tions, have not always been quick to anticipate and react to these new transitions.” He conceded that “...some of our slowness to change was because of prevailing institutional attitudes and cultures.”⁷

Old truths and prejudices, such as the almost exclusive reliance on experience for advancement and a deeply rooted anti-intellectualism that deemed higher education as unnecessary and irrelevant to serious soldiering, which had endured for almost fifty years, now exposed its bankruptcy. Quite simply, the mindset embraced training (a predictable response to a predictable situation) to the virtual exclusion of education (a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation – i.e. critical thinking in the face of the unknown).⁸ In addition, the reliance on the traditional military concept that leadership is a top-down hierarchical action that depends on unit command and staff appointments, specifically experience, as the mechanism to prepare individuals for higher command at the strategic level failed to imbue the officer corps with leaders of vision and strength to navigate the CF through the changes that were thrust upon them. As a result, they endured a stormy decade that in the end eroded the trust of both the public and the government in their military.⁹

Decade of Darkness

“Undeniably,” acknowledged General Baril, “the 1990s represented the first strong test of the contemporary Canadian officer corps and we found part of it was broken.” He added, “experience in and of itself was not enough.”¹⁰ This should not have been a revelation. Thirty years earlier, another former CDS had already eluded to the danger. “It matters little whether the Forces have their present manpower strength and financial budget, or half of them, or double them,” warned General Jean V. Allard, “without a properly educated, effectively trained, professional officer corps the Forces would in the future be doomed to, at the best mediocrity; at the worst, disaster.”¹¹

CHAPTER 10

His prophecy came true. There was a serious flaw in the CF understanding of the profession of arms. Although they viewed themselves as warriors on the ramparts of western industrialized society defending the ideals of democracy against the pagan Soviet masses, and they rightfully felt that their tactical warfighting skills in the context of heavy mechanized forces in land air battle were second to none, they had lost the wider understanding of their role in, and responsibility to, their society. Moreover, their fervent anti-intellectualism denuded the officer corps of individuals capable of, or willing to undertake, analysis, critical thinking, reflection and visioning in the larger geopolitical and societal context. The inherent conservative and traditional military mind frame, compounded by its hierarchical, authoritative and closed structure fed a system that not only ignored, but actively closed itself to, outside thought and criticism. As a profession, the military argued they were not only fully capable of, but quite frankly the only ones competent enough to, regulate themselves. Not surprisingly, this argument was accepted for the longest time. But this changed.

In the early 1990s, the chaos that erupted with the collapse of the Cold War era soon engulfed Western nations, including Canada. A new epoch of stabilization operations changed the nature of peace support missions. The new environment was ambiguous, complex, volatile, constantly changing, and dangerous in an immediate way not experienced by many during the Cold War. An ever-present media reported events in virtual real time and often turned tactical actions on the ground into strategic issues. Officers, senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and soldiers trained in the Cold War model of conventional forces against a predictable and templated enemy were frequently unprepared for belligerents that were more often than not loose rag-tag armies led by warlords, para-military groups or criminals. In this environment, the true failing of the CF and its officer corps, namely to ensure the existence of a strong military ethos (i.e. the values, beliefs and expectations of military service that reflect core Canadian values and the imperatives of professionalism) seeped to the surface.

In March 1993, in a hot and torpid bunker carved out of the sandy earth in Belet Huen, Somalia, the anguished cries of a captured sixteen-year-old Somalia thief pierced the air of the camp of 2 Commando, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (Cdn AB Regt) as he was systematically beaten to death. Although the screams were heard by a large number of soldiers, NCOs and officers - no one bothered to investigate and halt the torture. Days later, this incident would set off a series of events that would transform the CF, particularly its officer corps.

The Canadian Airborne Regiment – A Symptom and Symbol of a Systemic Problem

The crime was perpetrated and abetted by a couple of paratroopers of the Cdn AB Regt. Worse yet, it was allowed to transpire over several hours because of an environment that was seemingly devoid of professionalism. Although many senior officers and politicians tried to pass off the incident as the actions of a “few bad apples,” the truth is the Cdn AB Regt was a symptom and became the symbol of a systemic problem. To understand that, one must briefly review the Canadian airborne experience.

The Canadian airborne experience has always been a paradox. The paratroopers, that for the greatest part of their existence represented the best of the nation’s warriors, were largely disliked within the military and virtually ignored in civilian circles, at least until the horrific killing in Somalia in 1993. The Canadian attitude to airborne forces has always been schizophrenic and driven by political purpose rather than by doctrine and operational necessity. The failure to properly identify a consistent and pervasive role for airborne forces led to a roller coaster existence, dependent on the personalities in power and political expedients of the day. This approach ultimately led to the conditions that allowed the killings to occur, and for the ultimate demise of the Cdn AB Regt itself.¹²

CHAPTER 10

An examination of the evolution of the country's airborne organizations over the past 50 years has demonstrated that the national political and military leaders consistently took an irresolute and confused approach to the requirement for airborne forces. During the early years of World War II, the decision to establish a Canadian parachute capability was initially rejected because no clear role for these special troops was visualized. The concept was later accepted but only with the caveat it be kept at a very low and decentralized level. The growing American and British interest in airborne forces during the war provided the catalyst for the establishment of a Canadian parachute battalion in 1942, which served with distinction throughout the rest of the conflict but was quickly disbanded at its end.¹³

In 1946, the post-war planners failed to see a place for paratroopers in Canada's dramatically scaled down peacetime army. Traditional anti-military sentiments within the government, compounded by its enormous war debt, fuelled a drive for economy instead of the creation of a comprehensive military operational capability that some of the soldiers wanted. Moreover, the Canadian Government was responding to voters' preference for social programs in their desire to return to ordinary pursuits after six long years of war. As a consequence, the Liberal administration approved only a skeletal military force designed to provide the framework for mobilization of a citizen's army in time of crisis and little else.

The mercurial change in technology during World War II, particularly jet aircraft and nuclear weapons, shattered the dependence of many nations on geography for security. For Canada, this predicament was exacerbated by the emergence of two rival superpowers that sandwiched the Dominion between them. Of even greater concern, was the realization that the Americans viewed Canada as an exposed flank. American apprehension for the security of the North was matched only by Ottawa's concern over Canadian sovereignty, especially in the northern reaches. To keep the Americans out of Canada's North,

the Government realized it must show not only intent, but also a capability of guarding the back door. An ill-defined threat to the North, a paranoid giant to the South, and a tight-fisted government that traditionally held the military in disdain, created the quintessential marriage of convenience.

The Canadian Government quickly perceived airborne forces as a political solution to their dilemma. To politicians, paratroopers represented a convenient viable force that was capable of responding to any hostile incursion into the Arctic that threatened Canada, or more importantly the United States. However, for the government, they also represented an inexpensive means of safeguarding the nation's sovereignty.

And so in the immediate post war period, the reconstitution of an airborne force, now called the Mobile Striking Force (MSF), was rooted in this political reality. Official DND statements described the MSF as a 'coiled-spring' of lethality. The truth, however, was substantially different. In the acid test of the real world, it became evident that the MSF was a 'paper tiger.'

The Army leadership consciously maintained this state of affairs. Perhaps realizing that the government was supportive of airborne forces not for the sake of their operational effectiveness but rather for the perceived capability that paratroopers represented, some in the Army leadership who were themselves not enthusiastic about parachute troops began to redirect the MSF from its original mandate. Throughout its existence, the MSF was chronically starved of qualified manpower, supporting aircraft, and training exercises. Furthermore, its units were habitually confronted with different priorities, ones that were not ideally suited to the efficient use of airborne forces. Activities such as preparing recruits for the Korean conflict or conducting 'all-arms combined training' for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) European battlefield consistently took precedence over the stated purpose of the MSF which was the "Defence of Canada."

CHAPTER 10

By the early 1950s, the actual military and political indifference to Canada's airborne forces became even more evident with the changing threat to the North. The Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) radically transformed the nature of the menace to North America. The eclipse of the manned bomber threat over the polar icecap changed the importance of the Canadian North for the United States to merely strategic depth. Predictably, American interest in the Canadian Arctic swiftly dissipated. Canadian activity and concern in the North died almost as quickly.¹⁴

The effect of this techno-strategic shift on the nation's airborne forces was immense. Already neglected and starved, the airborne capability went into a hiatus in the form of decentralized parachute companies. These were maintained only within the various infantry regiments. The skill was being kept alive, but just barely.

This reorganization from "Airborne Battalions" to "Jump Companies" in 1958, represented the official demise of the MSF. Collectively, the respective parachute sub-units were now designated the Defence of Canada Force (DCF) to underline their "special" role. The continued charade of maintaining a force of paratroops was simply a function of the existing joint security arrangements between Canada and the United States for the defence of North America. For Canada, airborne forces remained the sop to keep the Americans appeased. For many in the government and in the conventional circles of the military the facade of existence is what mattered. Their ability to respond to a threat, which was largely chimerical in any case, was not deemed important. For them, airborne forces represented a classic political expedient.¹⁵

As the northern threat in Canada receded, a new menace emerged elsewhere in the world. The late-fifties and early-sixties witnessed an international explosion of nationalistic movements and political unrest. "Brush-fire" conflicts, insurgencies, and wars of

national liberation flared-up around the globe. The concept of rapid deployable forces under United Nations (UN) auspices captured the imagination of the Canadian Government that was still euphoric about its new-won international role caused by its diplomatic and military success in the outcome of the 1956 Suez Crisis. Four years later, the emergency in the Belgian Congo reinforced the apparent need for international forces that could deploy quickly to avert the potential escalation of regional conflicts into superpower confrontations.

At the same time, as a result of the changing international security environment, the Americans embarked on a program to better address the 'spectrum of conflict' that they now faced. The Americans realized that their existing force structure was not adequate to deal with "limited wars" in distant lands. As a result, the Pentagon now stressed greater strategic mobility, the expansion of Special Forces to deal with the proliferation of guerilla type conflict, and the development of an airmobile capability.

The Canadian political and military leadership followed suit. By 1964, the blueprint for a revitalized Canadian Army was based on the concept of a truly mobile force capable of quick reaction and global reach. Instrumental to this envisioned force was an airborne element that could provide the country with a strategic reserve capable of quick reaction and worldwide deployment.¹⁶

In 1968, this showcase unit became known as the Cdn AB Regt. It started out as a very privileged organization. It was given formation status with direct access to the Army Commander and it was spared the tedium of national taskings such as providing manpower to run Reserve training or to act as instructors at CF or Army training establishments. Although its creation was characterized by great passion and high ideals from some commanders and politicians, by the late 1970s it suffered from the same ailment of its predecessors. The larger military establishment and the Army in particular, never fully accepted the designated role given to the Cdn AB Regt.

CHAPTER 10

The paratroopers' mandate was as elusive as it was inclusive. There existed a wide variance in its stated purpose. Military briefings and official DND press releases described the unit's role as everything from an international "fire-brigade," a national strategic reserve, a stop-gap to buy time for heavier mechanized reinforcements to deploy to Europe, to a UN ready force. As an afterthought, political and military planners also claimed that the Canadian Airborne Regiment was ideally suited for Defence of Canada Operations (DCO). The fact that each one of its multiplicity of roles for the Airborne was mutually exclusive was simply ignored by nearly everyone.¹⁷

In the end, the inability to fully rationalize the role, structure, and relevancy of the Cdn AB Regt led to its eventual demise. During the seventies, its existence was marked by changing priorities in both relevancy and role. It went from an independent formation tasked as the national strategic reserve to simply another "conventional" unit within an existing brigade. It became the target of continual malevolent debate within the Army and the hostage to the individual impulse of those in power. As a result, its strength, both in terms of manpower and organizational integrity, was insidiously whittled away.

By the 1980s, the lack of a clear, credible and accepted requirement for Canadian airborne forces proved to be a difficult obstacle to overcome. As Canada's role in the world turned away from Europe and toward different goals of foreign policy, the CF underwent a self-definition crisis. This was manifested by shrinking budgets and declining manpower levels. The Cdn AB Regt found it difficult to convince its political and military masters of its relevance. Furthermore, the more its advocates (those commanders who had been young subalterns in the early days and had now percolated to the senior echelons) attempted to prove its utility by assigning it new tasks or reinitiating old ones, the more they highlighted its greatest weakness. It had no credible or consistent role that made it indispensable. The eventual erosion of organizational status and support was

paralleled by a decrease in postings to the Regiment of the vital experienced leaders and soldiers from the other regiments who were responsible for feeding the Cdn AB Regt with talent. The Regiment now received young soldiers, some right out of basic infantry training. An inability to recruit the necessary number of senior NCOs willing to volunteer for airborne service necessitated keeping those who were willing, but individuals who were not always the cream of the crop – their agreement to serve meant a promotion they most likely would never have otherwise received. Worse yet, the feeder infantry regiments saw in the Cdn AB Regt a home for their malcontents and trouble-makers. An Army study revealed that the Cdn AB Regt had to “rely almost exclusively on the good will of the parent regiments for troop replacements.” Simply put, this meant that the Cdn AB Regt reflected the army as a whole.¹⁸

As if this was not bad enough, the appointment of the Regimental Commander became a “political” issue – command being rotated not to the best individual available, but rather the choice of the regimental senate of the feeder infantry regiment whose turn it was to provide the commander. Often, it became a consolation prize for an officer who was not deemed worthy to become a commanding officer of one of the conventional infantry line battalions. All this was transpiring in an environment devoid of a deep-rooted understanding of professionalism – and a questionable grasp of military ethos. The end result was nothing less than the demise of the Regiment itself.¹⁹

By the mid-1980s, there were severe disciplinary problems in the Cdn AB Regt. Disobedience, insubordination, assaults, weapon thefts, linkages to criminal motorcycle gangs were just some of the manifestations. Just as disturbing was a distinct non-sanctioned airborne ethos and culture, which was being promoted by some elements within the Regiment’s NCO Corps, centred on an elitist, macho, renegade attitude. Loyalty was defined in terms of the airborne itself, often to a particular clique therein. Moreover, airborne service became an end in itself. Service to Canada and

CHAPTER 10

the public, appreciation for national policy, and the concept of the greater good was rejected. Outsiders were shunned and considered only worthy of contempt. Authority, especially the chain of command outside of the Regiment, was a target to be defied. The cancerous attitude that the unofficial chain of command attempted to perpetuate was nothing short of a renegade warrior cult. But this rejection of a healthy sound military ethos was only a reflection of the larger malaise.²⁰ By the summer of 1985, the problem in the Army had reached such a state that the Chief of the Defence Staff agreed to the commission of an investigation titled the *FMC [Force Mobile Command] Study on Disciplinary Infractions and Antisocial Behaviour with FMC with Particular Reference to the Special Service Force and the Canadian Airborne Regiment*. This probe became known informally as the “Hewson Report.” Its aim was to review disciplinary infractions within the Army and investigate the factors that led to the excessive antisocial behaviour. The Terms of Reference, guidelines and investigative team was left to the Army, who in turn entrusted the inquiry to a group of “loyal” Army officers and staunch airborne supporters who not surprisingly, were anything but critical of the Army or the Cdn AB Regt.²¹

The Hewson Report had no real effect. Left unaddressed, by the early 1990s, disciplinary problems once again raised their ugly head. This time, they would not be so easily brushed aside. By the summer of 1992, Canada’s decision to participate in a UN mission to Somalia, which eventually evolved into the American led peace-enforcement operation known in Canada as Operation Deliverance, allowed senior Army officers in influential positions within the CF hierarchy to pull strings to ensure that the Cdn AB Regt would be the unit sent to fulfill the Canadian commitment. Although the paratroopers were not the ideal unit to deploy (i.e. they were already scheduled to undertake a Cyprus rotation and had no light armoured vehicles) they received the nod anyway – quite simply because their benefactors wanted them to have the choice operational mission.²² However, the storm clouds began to gather as the Regiment began its preparatory training.

Discipline problems, a lack of Regimental standard operating procedures (SOPs) and overly aggressive behaviour by 2 Commando raised some concerns. However, these problems were largely just waved away by senior military commanders.²³

In theatre overall, the Cdn AB Regt performed superbly for the most part and earned the praise of United States Commanders, UN envoys and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) representatives for their efforts and success at both securing their sector and delivering humanitarian aid.²⁴ However, there was also a dark side. Once in Somalia, many of the concerns about discipline and professionalism that were raised during the predeployment preparations rose to the surface. Undeniably, the flaws were attributable to poor leadership at the NCO and officer level. This was a direct outgrowth of the problems that had been identified earlier but not corrected. Very quickly, it became evident that some elements within the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (Cdn AB Regt BG) were mistreating Somalis who were captured while illegally entering the Airborne compounds to steal.²⁵ The frustration of the paratroopers is unquestionable. The Somali population was not always appreciative of the soldiers' efforts on their behalf. The paratroopers were exposed to rock throwing, shootings, protests, spitting and constant thievery. The Cdn AB Regt BG compounds became natural targets; night after night, looters and thieves would slip through the razor wire barrier and steal anything and everything. Those thieves who were apprehended were turned over to local authorities, only to be released without sanction. For the paratroopers the incessant ingratitude and hostility, from the very people they were there to assist, was difficult to understand and accept.²⁶ Nonetheless, the reaction of many, seemingly condoned by the officer and NCO corps was unacceptable.

Through the course of the whole operation Canadians killed four Somali nationals and wounded numerous others. Some of the deaths were unquestionably avoidable. One such killing occurred on 4 March 1993. Increased security at one of the Cdn AB Regt BG

CHAPTER 10

camps resulted in gunfire as two would-be thieves attempted to escape. Initially, the shooting was termed justifiable within the Rules of Engagement by a unit-controlled investigation. However, continuing allegations by one of the contingent's medical officers, who professed that the death of one of the interlopers was the result of a deliberate execution style killing eventually raised some disturbing questions.²⁷ Although these allegations have never been conclusively proven or refuted, the shootings themselves have been declared unjustifiable. The carefully planned ambush operation obviously was "designed to send a strong message to would-be infiltrators that any attempt to penetrate the perimeter of Canadian installations would be met with gunfire."²⁸

As disturbing as these allegations are, they are not the only ones. Mixed messages reverberated through the Airborne compounds in Somalia. Not only was a questionable shooting very quickly dismissed and the participants praised, but there existed a perception that abusive behaviour was ignored and not punished. This outlook became prevalent in some elements of the Cdn AB Regt BG. This was due in part to the fact that mistreatment of prisoners was condoned by some officers and NCOs within the Canadian contingent. In sum, this laid the groundwork for the defining moment of the Somalia mission

On the night of 16 March 1993, an apprehended teenaged looter, Shidane Arone, was systematically beaten to death while in the custody of 2 Commando. What made this tragedy even harder to understand is the fact that throughout the beating which lasted several hours, numerous soldiers, Senior NCOs and officers either heard the cries or actually dropped by the bunker and witnessed the beating in progress; yet, no one stopped it until it was too late.²⁹

Initially, the death was explained away as due to injuries sustained during capture. However, the sergeant leading the patrol that apprehended Arone refused to accept that

explanation. Subsequently, one of the guilty individuals, Trooper Kyle Brown brought forward evidence and explained what had happened. The other perpetrator, Master-Corporal Clayton Matchee, was subsequently arrested. The matter was kept low-key. To that point, no word was released to the public and senior political and military decision makers felt they could control the situation. Top officials in DND learned of the death within 48 hours of the event, yet it appeared that a decision to contain rather than disclose information was taken.³⁰ The Chief of Staff for Kim Campbell, then the Minister of National Defence, acknowledged that he was informed of the death only hours after it occurred and Campbell herself stated she was briefed around 17 March.³¹ This was no surprise. As early as 22 January 1993, and again on 1 March 1993, due to the expected leadership candidacy of the Minister of National Defence for the position of Prime Minister, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Robert Fowler, had reminded members attending the Daily Executive Meeting that it was necessary to exercise “extreme sensitivity in all matters relating to public statements, speeches, press releases.”³² However, while in custody, Matchee attempted to commit suicide and a reporter who witnessed his transfer for medical treatment very quickly learned the full story. A storm was about to hit DND like never before.

Post Somalia

As the incident became national news, an overwhelming wave of enmity, by both the public and other military personnel, swept over the paratroopers. Mistreatment of Somalis by other military international contingents later caused scandals in countries such as Belgium, Germany and Italy. Allegations included mental and physical abuse, beatings, as well as the killing of captured thieves. Relative to the other contingents in Somalia and elsewhere, the Canadian cases of mistreatment and killings may have appeared minor.³³ But in the context of Canadian society and the self-conception of Canadian soldiers its impact reverberated through both society and the military institution.

CHAPTER 10

The impact was enormous. Even those senior military commanders who for years showed preferential treatment towards the Cdn AB Regt and who had previously dismissed sins by Regiment members with a “boys will be boys” attitude now abandoned the Cdn AB Regt fearing for their own careers.³⁴ Falling back to their comfort zone of their Cold War experience, they attempted to stone-wall the media and public and simply reassure them that they would handle it. In fact, when the killings took place, the Canadian Joint Headquarters in Somalia reported the incidents promptly to NDHQ. In Ottawa, Colonel Haswell, then a staff officer in the Director General of Public Affairs (DGPA), later testified that “we recommended that we should get this information out as quickly and completely as possible because the Public Affairs branch felt that early disclosure would reduce the negative impact on DND.” But he revealed that the overriding concern at the moment “at very high levels in the Department [was] that nothing be done to interfere with the leadership run.” This affected the release of information.³⁵

But, times had changed, and this approach was as bankrupt as the understanding of professionalism and the military ethos. As a result, the events in Somalia unleashed a chain of events that engulfed the senior leadership of DND well beyond the Regiment and embarrassed the government. Moreover, the revelations about the Airborne and how the attending events were handled in Ottawa showed plenty of other problems at NDHQ and elsewhere. To careerist bureaucrats and political sycophants, both in and out of uniform, the fact that their discomfort originated from actions attributed to the Cdn AB Regt was not easily forgotten. Not surprisingly, the Regiment was disbanded in disgrace two years later.³⁶

Nonetheless, the media now put DND and the CF under a microscope, and the result was shattering. That single event itself was numbing, and the failure of so many to do anything to stop the beating, remains inexplicable. Incredibly, the tragedy magnified. The appearance of an attempt to cover-up the incident outside as well as inside the Regiment spoke volumes about serious failures

in the military and political chain of command at DND. The attempts to simply ignore the crisis are laughable. A better movie script could not have been written. A brutal killing, an evident breakdown of military leadership, a cover-up, and a Minister of Defence who was the acknowledged front-runner in the national Progressive Conservative leadership race. Somalia had finally dragged DND and its officer corps into the post-Cold War era. As General Baril conceded – “part of it was broken.”

Digging into their old repertoire of tools, the military leadership decided to deal with the continuing criticism by formally establishing The *Board of Inquiry (BOI) - Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group* (informally named the de Faye Commission after its Chairman, Major-General Tom de Faye) to “investigate the leadership, discipline, operations, actions and procedures of the Airborne Battle Group.”³⁷ The Board presented its Phase I Report in late-summer 1993, and much like the Hewson Report, indicated that there was no real cause for alarm. In fact, the CDS, Admiral John Anderson wrote,

I am heartened by the overriding conclusions of the report which state that the ‘efforts and accomplishments of the Canadian Forces personnel in Somalia, in general, and the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) in particular, were truly outstanding and that there has been no evidence presented to the Board which would indicate any systemic problem within the Canadian Airborne Regiment which should, in any way, limit its usefulness or employability.’”³⁸

However, this failed to placate critics within or outside of DND.³⁹ The disciplinary and leadership problems evident in the Airborne in the early-nineties and specifically during the pre-deployment period and during the unit’s time in Somalia from October 1992 to May 1993, were reminiscent of problems identified as early as the beginning of the 1980s. Moreover, the increased scrutiny of DND now revealed other disturbing problems.

CHAPTER 10

Quite simply, the Cdn AB Regt's problems were a direct reflection of the larger long-term failure in the Army and the CF. Specifically, the inability, or reluctance, to take the necessary steps to make hard decisions ensuring the stability of the institution. The CF officer corps placed a priority on acquiescence instead of critical thought, on a tolerance for the secretive machinations of Regimental Councils who provided largely individual and unaccountable services, as well as providing the government with politically acceptable solutions instead of sound military advice. All of these, added to the anti-intellectual officer corps that was unable to realize and react to the changing social and geo-political environment, led to a collective abrogation of responsibility and strategic impotence in regards to correcting the problems that were evident in the Cdn AB Regt and the CF long before Somalia. Peter Desbarats, one of the Somalia Inquiry Commissioners, noted that the "Airborne was only the most brutal manifestation of the disease. Amputating it did nothing to resolve the real problems except to allow the leadership to pretend that they had cured it." He summarized that "this was more dangerous than doing nothing."⁴⁰

Even though the institutional decision became one of portraying the current crisis as a specific problem with paratroopers, the truth was clearly different. A report by the Special Service Force (SSF) pointed out that the demise of the Cdn AB Regt was "due not to operational deficiencies but to a failure in application of the personnel system" over the long run.⁴¹ During a telephone interview with the editor of the *esprit de corps* magazine, Lieutenant-General Reay made reference to the Regiment's poor disciplinary record. The editor quickly challenged him on singling out the Cdn AB Regt. As a result, Reay had to concede that if any of the other Army "regiments were held up to the same microscopic scrutiny it would produce the same damning results."⁴²

This was the element that was ignored. The Cdn AB Regt was not an aberration. It was not different. It was representative of other

Army units in regard to discipline. During the Somalia mission, the Canadian SSF Commander reported, “historical records and comparative records of disciplinary problems showed no disturbing trends, certainly nothing worse than other Infantry and Combat Arms units.”⁴³ Similarly, the de Faye Commission also concluded, “in terms of numbers of disciplinary infractions, the state of discipline in the Canadian Airborne Regiment was similar to that of other infantry units.”⁴⁴ Colonel Wells, a former Director General of Security at NDHQ indicated that the number of incidents reflected in Military Police Reports “compared favourably to those of its [Airborne Regiment] sister infantry battalions in the Special Service Force, and that its disciplinary rate was consistent with the other infantry battalions in the Army.”⁴⁵ Moreover, Colonel Walter Semianiw acknowledged that the Commander’s Investigation, initiated as a result of hazing videos that were made public in January 1995, similarly documented that the Regiment’s record was “normal, no worse than any other unit.”⁴⁶ Furthermore, Major-General Gaudreau testified before the Somalia Commission in October 1995, that the problems faced by the Cdn AB Regt were in fact typical of those faced across the entire military structure of Canada.⁴⁷ This in turn was reinforced by an internal Land Forces Command report that acknowledged that “every regiment has at least one serious incident in its history which has discredited the honour of the [respective] regiment.”⁴⁸

Statistical analysis also challenged the myth that all airborne units are worse behaved than other units. An examination of the record of Summary Trials for numerous National Defence Act (NDA) offences, for all LFC infantry units, from 1988 to 1993, revealed that the Regiment was never the unit with the highest number of trials / offences. In fact, it was well within the average for each given year.⁴⁹

Furthermore, other Canadian military units deployed overseas also had a plethora of problems that were conveniently overlooked as a result of the controversy swirling around the Cdn

CHAPTER 10

AB Regt. For example, many of the Canadian contingents that deployed to the Former Yugoslavia experienced disciplinary difficulties, particularly in relation to drunkenness. Examples abound: 2 Service Battalion had their Commanding Officer and Regimental Sergeant-Major and numerous soldiers returned during their tour in Yugoslavia for proven malfeasance or alleged misconduct; and soldiers in the Royal Canadian Dragoons (RCD) gave their unit the nickname "ChargeBat" due to the high number of charges which had been laid against soldiers for disciplinary infractions. Elsewhere, serious questions were raised about lost equipment and vehicles during tours; and another national scandal erupted in 1994 as the result of the questionable behaviour of 60 Canadian peacekeepers at the Bosnian Bakovici mental hospital. Cambodia and Haiti were equally fraught with incidents of scandalous and unprofessional behaviour that included black market activity, corruption, drunkenness, and prostitution. This brief overview is not comprehensive by any stretch of the imagination. Neither is it designed to be a condemnation, nor exoneration, of the military or its personnel. It is, however, a reminder that the Airborne was not an aberration.⁵⁰

The operational scandals overseas were matched at home by scandals of unethical behaviour, particularly the misuse of public funds, as well as opulent spending practices by senior military officers at a time when the country faced a financial crisis as a result of its burgeoning national debt.⁵¹ An officer corps whose efforts at responding to questions in regards to Somalia were "characterized by inconsistency, improbability, implausibility, evasiveness, selective recollection, half-truths, and plain lies" compounded this. In fact, they were accused of letting undue loyalty to their regiments or military institutions, as well as "naked self-interest," take precedence over "honesty and integrity."⁵² In addition, one report commissioned by the inquiry reported that "Somalia is seen as a sign or symbol of a crisis in command, as the result of a weakened, corrupted military ethos." It went on to say that senior commanders are held to have been corrupted and distanced from their soldiers...preoccupied by

careers and perks, they are seen as having abandoned traditional values, ideals, and loyalties.”⁵³ Not surprisingly, the Canadian public came to perceive that misconduct and leadership failing were widespread if not endemic. “The confidence of Canadians in the Forces,” conceded Doug Young, the MND, “has been shaken.”⁵⁴

The MND’s observation was correct. The continuing scandals, intractable officer corps and seeming failure of the CF to provide clear and complete answers to many of the questions that still lingered in regards to the Somalia Affair, left the Government with no choice but to appoint a separate independent commission to determine the truth. Sadly, for DND, the reality was that politicians and many in the public domain no longer trusted the military to investigate itself. As a result, in the spring of 1995, it established the “Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia” in an attempt to finally bring resolution and transparency to the issue.⁵⁵ The Commission, frustrated by a seemingly obdurate, if not at times dishonest, officer corps produced a scathing report. Of the 160 recommendations contained in the Somalia Commission Report, 112 were leadership and management related. In sum, the Somalia Commissioners found that “a failure of military values lies at the heart of the Somalia experience.” Of the 160 recommendations contained in the Somalia Commission Report, 132 were accepted for implementation by the MND. All told, he endorsed some 250 recommendations for change. These originated from his own *Report to the Prime Minister, the Somalia Commission, and recommendations from the Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigative Services; the Report on the Quasi-Judicial Role of the Minister of National Defence; and the Report of the Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*. The accepted recommendations covered virtually all aspects of the functioning of DND.⁵⁶ To add insult to injury, and just in case the nuance was lost on the CF officer corps, the government also established a “Minister’s Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National

CHAPTER 10

Defence and the Canadian Forces” (MMC) to “monitor progress with respect to the implementation of change....”⁵⁷

The Canadian officer corps had reached a low point in its history. It was unable to foresee, adapt or even realize that the world no longer fit its archaic Cold War paradigm despite the substantial and significant geo-political and societal changes that occurred around them. It was unwilling, or perhaps unable, to realize this. Moreover, as is incumbent on all professions it was also unwilling, or unable, to maintain its professionalism (i.e. responsibility – special duty to Canada; expertise, identity and vocational ethic). This last failing, specifically its inability to maintain a healthy military ethos (i.e. the values, beliefs and expectations that reflect core Canadian value and the imperatives of military professionalism) was catastrophic.⁵⁸ Due to their failing, the Government and people of Canada no longer trusted them to regulate themselves.

Forced to Change

This message although resisted for too long, finally sunk in. “The Army was forced to change,” conceded Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffrey, “I mean forced.” He added, “The challenge is not to forget those institutional failures took place. We had significant failures.”⁵⁹ This message has not been lost. The tragedy in Somalia sparked a virtual reformation of the CF officer corps and the institution itself. The 250 recommendations have been, or are in the process of being instituted. Fundamental to the transformation was a CF ethos statement put out in 1997, which outlined three key principles: respect the dignity of all persons; serve nation before self; and obey and support lawful authority. This statement was incorporated into all recruiting, training and professional development.

In addition, new appraisal systems and succession planning processes have been undertaken, which importantly diluted the influence and power of unofficial “Regimental councils.” Moreover, DND established a *Canadian Military Journal* to

provide a forum for professional discourse, discussion and debate and has undertaken a public affairs policy that is based on transparency and accuracy and has put increasing emphasis on its obligations under access to information. It also undertook a multitude of change initiatives that addressed issues from employment equity, soldier and family quality of life, to more fiscally responsible management practices.

Additionally, due to its strategic failure, DND has also put greater emphasis on adaptation, change and proactive vision. As such, it promulgated a number of strategic vision documents such as *Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020*, in June 1999; *Canadian Officership in the 21st Century* and *People in Defence Beyond 2000*, both in May 2001.⁶⁰

But arguably, one of the critical reforms, which was vehemently resisted initially but that has since taken root, was the recognition and support for an intellectually sound officer corps. After all, “a lack of intellectual discipline in the past,” acknowledged former Army Commander Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffrey, “has got us where we are today.”⁶¹ As such, the MND directed that beginning in 1997, a university degree was a prerequisite to commissioning as an officer. Moreover, professional development (PD) was extended to include senior officers, including generals. Moreover, formal military PD and staff college courses evolved to include a greater academic content, particularly an emphasis on the humanities and social sciences. University study, especially at the graduate level, was accepted and actually encouraged. And rightfully so. The many tenets of scholarship, including precision, detailed research, communications, breadth of knowledge, placing events in a proper economic, political and social context, drawing conclusions and discerning themes from various materials are important skills. The formal articulation of such analysis in a way that others will also learn and understand is a key skill for military officers.

CHAPTER 10

Moreover, a greater breadth of knowledge, tolerance to alternate interpretations and ideas, a comfort with critical debate and discussion, and the honing of analytical skills, as well as the exposure to complete new bodies of literature and thought that expand the mind, significantly enhance the capabilities and professionalism of officers (i.e. it is an important component of “expertise,” which cannot reside exclusively with technical warfighting skills and acumen). “Officers need to have the right mindset to change and evolve the profession,” argued one former CDS, “knowledge must be valued as a key ingredient to our growth as individuals and as a profession.”⁶³

Importantly, a Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) was established to coordinate all PD for the officer and senior NCO corps. Its organization included a Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) that is responsible for research, and the creation and promulgation of doctrine and concept development in regards to leadership and the profession of arms. In short, it is the national centre of excellence for military leadership. It was in fact, CFLI that produced *Duty with Honour*.

And so, we have come full circle. *Duty with Honour* is a seminal document that captures the theoretical and philosophical underpinnings of the profession of arms and clearly articulates what it means to be a Canadian, or for that matter, any, military professional. Unfortunately, we did not reach this apex through insight or a higher level of professionalism or intellect. Rather, it was an absence of honour, in the widest sense, that put us on the path to producing this capstone doctrinal manual. It was in fact the anguished cries of Shidane Arone in the dust storm, an incident that has come to be known as the Somalia Affair, which sparked the transformation of the Canadian officer corps. That one event acted as a catalyst that exposed the deficiencies that existed in DND, the CF and specifically the officer corps. In the end, that crisis and the painful self-reflection that ensued have created a stronger, more professional and capable military institution for Canada. In the end, *Duty with Honour* is a beacon

for Canadian and other military professionals. Hopefully, others can learn from these failings and avoid the tragedy and loss of honour that befalls those military professionals who fail to adhere to a strong, sound military ethos.

Endnotes

1 Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, quoted during the Combat Development Board, 12 May 2003.

2 In 1987, Georgi Arbatov, advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev, announced to the West, “We are going to do to you the worst thing imaginable – We are going to deprive you of your enemy.” Pascal Boniface, *The Will to Powerlessness. Reflections on Our Global Age* (Kingston: Queen’s Quarterly, 1999), 37.

3 This is easily explained. The often tense but always stable stand-off between Superpowers in Europe and elsewhere in the world was housed within a framework where players were clearly delineated and rules universally understood. The Cold War, in many respects, artificially divided much of the world into two distinct camps aligned with one or the other Superpower. As such, states were often artificially propped-up and maintained through economic and military assistance. These tools were both the carrot and stick used to keep proxies and allies in line. However, with the fall of “the Wall” in 1989-90, many of these states were abandoned, and thus, they drifted towards total collapse. The resultant chaos transformed the international security environment. Where conflict in the Cold War was based on an inter-state paradigm, it now took on an intra-state posture. Failed states spiraled into anarchy, creating a vacuum of power that was often filled by warlords, paramilitary gangs and criminal organizations. The civil wars and unrest that ensued were incredibly savage and frequently threatened to spill beyond their borders. In 1995, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the Secretary General of the United Nations wrote, “the end of the cold war removed constraints that had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere...[There] has been a rash of wars within newly independent States, often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving unusual violence and cruelty.” Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace 1995, 2nd ed* (New York: United Nations, 1995), 7.

CHAPTER 10

4 From 1989-2001 the CF deployed on approximately 67 missions compared to 25 missions during the period 1948-1989.

5 To those who place an unbridled faith in technology, war now became depicted “as a predictable, if disorderly, phenomenon, defeat a matter of simple cost / benefit analysis, and the effectiveness of any military capability a finite calculus of targets destroyed and casualties inflicted.” (Paul van Riper and Robert H. Scales, “Preparing for War in the 21st Century, *Parameters*, Autumn 1997, 5). This phenomenon, at the very least, forced the CF to re-examine the manner in which it fulfilled its mandate and conducted its operations.

6 Peter C. Newman, *Canadian Revolution 1985-1995: From Deference to Defiance* (Toronto: Viking Press, 1995).

7 General M. Baril, “Officership: A Personal Reflection,” in *Generalship and the Art of the Admiral*, eds. Bernd Horn and Stephen Harris (St. Catharines: Vanwell Ltd., 2001), 138.

8 See Lieutenant-General Robert W. Morton, Chairman, *Report of the Officer Development Review Board for the Chief of Military Personnel* (Ottawa: DND, August, 1995). See also John A. English, *Lament for an Army. The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism* (Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 62-64.

9 The state of officer education was simply lamentable. Only 53.3 percent of officers had a Bachelor’s degree and only 6.8 percent had post graduate training. The issue of higher education was an important one for as Professor Albert Legault argues, “the better [the CF member] will understand his role as a citizen soldier.” Albert Legault, *Report to the Prime Minister. A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Professor Albert Legault, Laval University* (Ottawa: DND, March 1997), 40. Dr. Jack Granatstein stated, “the CF has a remarkably ill-educated officer corps, surely one of the worst in the Western world.” J.L. Granatstein, *A Paper Prepared for the Minister of National Defence by Dr. J.L. Granatstein Canadian Institute of International Affairs* (Ottawa: DND, 1997), 19. In 2004, almost the reverse is true.

10 Baril, “Officership a Personal Reflection,” 140.

11 Major-General Roger Rowley, chairman, *Report of the Officer Development Board*, Vol 1 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, March, 1969), iii.

12 For a complete account of the Canadian airborne experience see Bernd Horn, *Bastard Sons. An Examination of Canada’s Airborne Experience, 1942-1995* (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2001); and Bernd

Horn and Michel Wyczynski, *In Search of Pegasus – The Canadian Airborne Experience, 1942-1999* (St Catharines: Vanwell Publishing, 2000).

13 See Bernd Horn and Michel Wyczynski, *Paras versus the Reich. Canada's Paratroopers at War 1942-45* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2003); and Bernd Horn and Michel Wyczynski, *Tip of the Spear – An Intimate Portrait of the First Canadian Parachute Battalion, 1942-1945* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2002).

14 See David Bercuson, *True Patriot: The life of Brooke Claxton* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993); Bernd Horn, "Gateway to Invasion or the Curse of Geography? The Canadian Arctic and the Question of Security, 1939-1999," in B. Horn, ed. *Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience* (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishers, 2002), 307-334; "A Military Enigma: The Canadian Special Air Service Company, 1948-49," *Canadian Military History*, Vol 10, No. 1, Winter 2001, 21-30; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapters 3 & 4.

15 See Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapters 3 & 4.

16 See Lester B. Pearson, "Force for U.N.," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol 35, No. 3, April 1957; Lieutenant-Colonel R.B. Tacaberry, "Keeping the Peace," *behind the headlines*, Vol 26, No. 1, September 1966, 7; "Appreciation and Proposed Options for the Structure of the Canadian Army Field Force 1965-1970 Period," 5 April 1965, 2. Directorate of History and Heritage (henceforth DHH), File 112.11.003 (D3) - Box 3; Canada, *Rationale For Canadian Defence Forces* (Ottawa: DND, 14 May 1968), 29. DHH, File 90/452; General Jean V. Allard, *The Memoirs of General Jean V. Allard* (Vancouver: The University of British Columbia Press, 1988); Paul Hellyer, *Damn the Torpedoes. My Fight to Unify Canada's Armed Forces* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart Ltd., 1990); and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapter 5.

17 See DND Message, "CANMOBGEN 098 Comd 2549", dated 022030Z December 1966; DND Message, "CANCOMGEN 022", dated 111600Z April 1968, *Organization Mobile Command*; "Approval of MOBCOM Forces Structure Concept." Library and Archives Canada [Henceforth LAC], RG 24, Vol 23491, File 1901-2, Part 1; Canada, *CFP 310 (1) - Airborne, Volume 1, The Canadian Airborne Regiment* (Ottawa: DND, 1968); "Formation of the Canadian Airborne Regiment – Activation and Terms of Reference," 15 May 1967, 2. Colonel (ret'd) Michael Barr Personal Papers; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapter 5.

18 Mobile Command (FMC), *Mobile Command Study – Report on Disciplinary Infractions and Antisocial Behaviour with particular*

CHAPTER 10

reference to the SSF and the Canadian Airborne Regiment [henceforth Hewson Report], September 1985, 46; and Major-General Tom DeFaye, Board of Inquiry, - Cdn AB Regt BG, Phase I, Vol XI, K.

19 See Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapters 6 & 7.

20 See Peter Desberats, *Somalia Cover-Up. A Commissioner's Journal* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1997); David Bercuson, *Significant Incident* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996); Donna Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment. A Socio-Cultural Inquiry Society* (Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997); and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapter 7.

21 See Hewson Report and Covering Letter. For additional details see Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 172-174.

22 See Horn, *Bastard Sons*, Chapter 8.

23 See *Ibid.*, 193-195.

24 See Berel Rodal, *The Somalia Experience in Strategic Perspective in a Free and Democratic Society* (Ottawa: Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 1997), 1; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 198-201.

25 Letter, Brigadier-General E.B. Beno to Colonel J.S. Labbé (Commander Canadian Joint Task Force Somalia), 8 April 1993. See also, "General Urged Troops to Lighten Up." *Globe & Mail*, A6; Allan Thompson, "Wider Airborne Violence Revealed," *Toronto Star*, 6 October 1996, A1; and Beno, "Treatment of Somalis in the Custody of the Canadian Airborne Battle Group," Brigadier-General E. Beno personal files and records [henceforth Beno Papers].

26 Canada. *Dishonoured Legacy. The Lessons of the Somalia Affair. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia* [henceforth *Somalia Commission Report*], Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, Vol 7, 23 October 1995, testimony of Dr. Menkaus (academic specialist on the Horn of Africa), 1266-1352; and Peter Worthington, "Private Brown," *Saturday Night*, September 1994, 34.

27 According to the report of Major Armstrong, "the deceased had been first shot in the back and subsequently 'dispatched' with a pair of shots to the head and neck area. Major Armstrong considered that the wounds were consistent with the Somali being shot as he lay wounded on the ground." *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia CD ROM of evidence, testimony and documents [henceforth *Information Legacy*], Executive Summary – Mission Aftermath, Record

2874. Master-Corporal Petersen testified that he observed that “the dead Somali’s neck was blown out, his head was gaping open at the back of the skull and his face was sagging to one side.” *Ibid.*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 1 - March 4 Shooting, Record 2871.

28 *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 5, 4 March - Findings, Record 9569. The Commission was scathing in its comments of the handling of the incident. It asserted that actions both within theatre and by the command structure in Canada were negligent in ensuring a proper investigation was conducted. See also Sherene H. Razack, *Dark Threats & White Knights* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 120; and Jocelyn Coulon, *Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order* (Toronto: U of T, 1994), 97.

29 Peter Worthington, *Scapegoat. How the Army Betrayed Kyle Brown* (Toronto: Seal Books, 1997), 116-135; Worthington, “Private Brown,” 35-36; Brian Bergman, “A Night of Terror,” *Maclean’s*, 28 March 1994, 26-28; and “Brutal Allegations,” *Maclean’s*, 7 March 1994, 13. Major Seward the OC of 2 Commando later wrote in his diary, “it is my intention to openly and readily state that I did order Somali intruders to be abused during the conduct of apprehension and arrest.” *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 1, Record 3026. See also George Shorey, “Bystander Non-Intervention and the Somalia Incident,” *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol 1, No. 4, Winter 2000-2001, 19-28; Razack, 93, 98-99; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 196-198.

30 See *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 1, “MGen Boyle’s Analysis of the De Faye Report,” Record 3160 and Hearing Transcripts, Vol 95, testimony of Colonel Haswell 18480-18555.

31 See Luke Fisher, “On the Defence,” *Maclean’s*, 26 July 1993, 16; David Pugliese, “HQ in Somalia Coverup,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 June 1997, A1; D’Arcy Jenish, “What did He Know?” *Maclean’s*, 15 April 1996, 17-18; “Colonel cites politics in delay over Somalia,” *Globe & Mail*, 14 September 1996, A1; and David Pugliese, “Military hid murder to shield Kim Campbell, inquiry told,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 September 1996, A1/2.

32 *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 1, Passage of Information about the March 4th Incident, Record 2888.

33 See Andrew Duffy, “Now its Belgian Soldiers,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 12 April 1997, 1; Raf Casert, “Somalia scandal sparks Belgian review,”

CHAPTER 10

Ottawa Citizen, 18 April 1997, A10; "Now Belgium rocked by Somali scandal," *Toronto Star*, 12 April 1997, A18;" Burns, shocks given Somalis Italian says," *Toronto Star*, 7 June 1997, A21; and Vera Haller, "Italy's Somalia scandal grows," *Ottawa Citizen*, 15 June 1997, A5. See also Razack, 51-55; and Coulon, 98-99.

34 See Rodal, 1 & 70; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 226-227 & 253-255.

35 See Luke Fisher, "On the Defence," *Maclean's*, 26 July 1993, 16; David Pugliese, "HQ in Somalia Coverup," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 June 1997, A1; D'Arcy Jenish, "What did He Know?" *Maclean's*, 15 April 1996, 17-18; "Colonel cites politics in delay over Somalia," *Globe & Mail*, 14 September 1996, A1; David Pugliese, "Military hid murder to shield Kim Campbell, inquiry told," *Ottawa Citizen*, 14 September 1996, A1/2; and Brigadier-General G.E. Sharpe, *Croatia Board of Inquiry. Leadership (and other) Lessons Learned* (Kingston: Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2002), 4.

36 The issue of the torture murder never fully disappeared. Courts martial and ongoing commentary kept the subject alive. Moreover, on 15 January 1995, the CTV television network broadcast excerpts from a homemade video, made by soldiers of 2 Commando during their tour in Somalia, on the nightly news. Several members were shown making racial slurs and behaving in an unprofessional manner. Media reaction was sharp, as was the subsequent political furor. Once again, the recurrent Somalia issue catapulted the Cdn AB Regt into the public and political spotlight. The mortal blow, however, came three days later when another amateur video depicting a 1992, 1 Commando "initiation party" was aired. The tape exhibited 1 Commando paratroopers involved in behaviour that was degrading, disgusting, and racist in nature. Its release embarrassed the government and the CF. It also completely destroyed whatever was left of the Cdn AB Regt's image. The question of public trust evaporated. The enormity of the crisis was clear. As a result, the Minister of National Defence announced the disbandment of the Cdn AB Regt in disgrace, on 23 January 1995. CBC and CTV Nightly News, 18-21 January 1995; *Somalia Commission*, Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, Vol 49, 20 February 1996, testimony of General De Chastelain, 9917-18; Taylor, *Tested Mettle*, 207; Luke Fisher, "Canada's Shame," *Maclean's*, 30 January 1995, 14; Dave Rider, "Video Outrage," *Ottawa Sun*, 19 January 1995, 4; and Horn, *Bastard Sons*, 228-237.

37 The Board was established on 28 April 1993. After running off course, over budget and over time, the MND shut the Commission

down in March 1997. *The Board of Inquiry (BOI) - Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group* (henceforth BOI Cdn AB BG), Phase I, Volume XI, Appendix 3 to Annex A, 1/5.

38 BOI Cdn AB BG - Phase I, Vol XII, CDS Comments, 15/30.

39 The Board of Inquiry, unlike the Hewson Report, did not placate the critics in or out of the military. An internal DND review considered the final report as flawed. Major-General Jean Boyle, then the Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy and Communications) and Chairman of the NDHQ "Somalia Working Group" conducted an assessment of the study which pointed out in July 1994 that "a close reading of the de Faye board's report, comparing it with information from courts-martial testimony, would reveal that there were weaknesses and, more important, significant discrepancies in the de Faye board's findings and recommendations, on which the CDS was basing a number of reforms." He further noted that certain conclusions did not appear to be borne out by the actual testimony heard. Moreover, Boyle felt that there had been enough evidence before the de Faye board to suggest that leadership problems reached up the chain of command right to the Canadian Joint Force Somalia Command. In addition, Boyle then also acknowledged that there were documents that indicated direct attempts to cover up facts behind the 4 and 16 March 1993 incidents. He finished by concluding that the most pressing issue regarding the Canadian Airborne Regiment was leadership. *Information Legacy*, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, Vol 1, "Major-General Boyle's Analysis of the De Faye Report, Record 3160. 40 Desbarats, 3. See also Bercuson, *Significant Incident*, 242; Winslow, 8; and *Information Legacy*, Letter Commander LFCA to the CDS / MND, "Report Fact Finding Mission Into the Canadian Airborne Regiment," 22 January 1995, 2. Lieutenant-General Foster, a former Regimental and Army Commander, also thought that the Airborne Regiment's problems were really a manifestation of those in all of the Canadian Forces. Moreover, he blamed the Army for failing to deal with the flaws at the root of the Airborne's demise. Interview with author, 6 June 1998. Similarly, Lieutenant-Colonel Lorne O'Brien, a long-serving Army officer and former paratroop commander, said what many were too frightened to admit. He declared that if in fact there was a problem in the Airborne, then there was also a problem in the entire Regimental System. O'Brien pointed out that by its very nature the airborne was the sum of the component parts of the line infantry regiments. Interview with author, 14 April 1997.

CHAPTER 10

41 Brigadier-General N.B. Jeffries, "Future Airborne Capability," 30 January 1995, 3.

42 Editorial, *esprit de corps*, Vol 4, No. 2, 9. See also Peter Worthington, "A blind eye to a regiment's sins," *Ottawa Sun*, 1 August 1996, 11.

43 Beno, "The Somali Affair," 2. Beno Papers.

44 BOI Cdn AB Regt BG, Phase I, Vol XI, Annex C, C-5/8.

45 Canadian Airborne Forces Association (CAFA) Written Submission Number 2 to the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, February 1997. Beno Papers.

46 Interview with author, 1 December 1997. Lieutenant-Colonel Ferron also attested that the Regiment did not have a reputation worse than anyone else in the Brigade prior to the hazing video. Interview with author, 8 April 1998. See also *Information Legacy*, Letter Commander LFCA to the CDS / MND, "Report Fact Finding Mission Into the Canadian Airborne Regiment," 22 January 1995, 2.

47 *Information Legacy*, Hearing Transcripts, Vol 3, 5 October 1995, testimony of Major-General Gaudreau, 560.

48 Land Force Command (LFC), "Estimate of the Impact to Re-Establish 1 Canadian Parachute Battalion," 28 February 1994, 2 -3.

49 *Information Legacy*, Evidentiary Exhibits, "Summary of Court Martial Offences, Period 1 January 1988 - 31 December 1992, Document Control No. 000226, DND Document No. 200146. As with all statistical data, there is a degree of unreliability due to interpretation. For instance, the data given contains an inherent danger. Often a high number of trials are viewed as a sign of ill-discipline and a unit out of control. However, the converse is likely. It could be demonstrative of good control and a no-tolerance approach. Conversely, a low number of charges could be indicative of a lax, *laissez-faire* approach where the leadership is weak and reticent to alienate its subordinates. The use of this data must be weighed in conjunction with the other evidence. Further indications of the scope of problem was evidenced in a former SSF Commander's observation during the period 1992-1993. He observed that in regard to drug problems, the soldiers returning from Germany were the prevalent concern in Petawawa. Beno, "Attitudes and Values," 2. Beno Papers.

50 See "Court Martial Held Without Public Notice," *Globe and Mail*, 9 Jul 1997; *Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Command, Control and Leadership of CANBAT 2*, dated 15 Nov 1996; Scott Taylor and

Brian Nolan, *Tarnished Brass* (Toronto: Lester Publishing Ltd., 1996) and *Tested Mettle* (Ottawa: esprit de corps books, 1998); “Shamed In Bosnia,” *Maclean’s*, 29 July 1996, 10-12; Worthington, *Scapegoat*, 314-315; Desbarats, 4-5; and Winslow, 72-74. *Esprit de Corps* magazine also ran a running critique of any and all foibles present in the CF in virtually every issue of its publication from 1993 to the present.

51 For example, see DND News Release NR-96.111, 27 Dec 1996; “The Rise and Fall of an Officer,” *Ottawa Citizen*, 10 April 1998, A4; Jack Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: HarperFlamingoCanada, 2004), 155; John A. English, *Lament for an Army* (Concord, ON: Irwin Publishing, 1998), 7, 64-65; and Scott Taylor and Brian Nolan, *Brass* (Toronto: Lester Publishing Ltd., 1996); Major Robert Near, “Devining the Message: An Analysis of the MND and Somalia Commission Reports,” in Bernd Horn, ed., *Contemporary Issues in Officership: A Canadian Perspective* (Toronto: CISS, 2000), 65-91; and previous endnote.

52 *Somalia Commission Report*, Executive Summary, S-4. See also Desbarats, 3-4.

53 Rodal, 73. See also Canada. *Debrief the Leaders Project* (Officers) (Ottawa: DND, 2001); and Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture. A Canadian Perspective* (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press, 2004), 104-108.

54 Doug Young, MND, *Report to the Prime Minister on the Leadership and Management of the Canadian Armed Forces* [henceforth *MND Report*] (Ottawa: DND, 1997), 1. In the DND commissioned Pollara survey titled *Canadians’ Opinions on the Canadian Forces (CF) and Related Military Issues*, dated December 1998, only 52% of respondents agreed with the statement “The quality of leadership among CF senior officers is high.” Only 35% agreed with the statement “The CF leadership is honest when making statements to the public.”

55 *Somalia Commission Report*, Transcript of Policy Hearing, Vol 2, 19 June 1995, 281-282. See “Canadian Troops Don’t Need Enemies,” *London Free Press*, 28 July 1999, and “Military Cover-up Inquiry Sounds Like Somalia Mess,” *The Guardian (Charlottetown)*, 28 Jul 1999; and James Cudmore, “Cogs in the Military,” *National Post*, 31 July 1999. See also editorial, 28 July 1999, *Toronto Star*, and editorials 30 July 1999 editions of the *Globe and Mail*, and *Hamilton Spectator*, all of which questioned the ability of the CF to conduct a fair and impartial inquiry.

CHAPTER 10

56 *Somalia Commission Report*, ES-46; Vol 5, 1450. Of the 65 recommendations contained in the MND Report, 22 dealt with military leadership.

57 Canada. *Minister's Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces*. Final Report 1999 (Ottawa: DND, 1999), iii.

58 See Canada. *Duty with Honour. The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Ottawa: DND, 2003), 6-7 & 25.

59 Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffrey, Keynote Address, Commanding Officer Course, 21 June 2001.

60 See MND Report, *Leadership and Management of the Canadian Forces*, 7-39; MND Report, *Compendium of Changes in the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence*, 1-12; and MMC, Final Report 1999.

61 Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffrey, Keynote Address, Commanding Officer Course, 21 June 2001. The initial resistance was such that the MMC wrote in 1999, "There remains a lack of demonstrated commitment on the part of the CF that an educated officer has a military or operational value." MMC, Final Report, 11.

62 See Bernd Horn, "Soldier / Scholar: An Irreconcilable Divide?" *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, Vol 4, No. 4, Winter 2001-2002, 3-7.

63 General Maurice Baril, covering letter, "Canadian Officership in the 21st Century (Officership 2020) Launch Implementation, 2 May 2001, 3.

PART IV

Organizational Approaches to Military Leadership

CHAPTER 11

The Organizational Cultural Approach to Leadership: 'Social Structures'— A Tool for Analysis and a Way Ahead



Charles Kirke

This chapter introduces a new way to approach the subject of leadership in the setting of a military unit. The cynical might say that every modern academic approach to leadership that is advertised as 'new' is in fact heavily informed by previous work in the various schools – such as the 'trait' school¹, the 'behaviour' school², the 'contingency' or 'contextual' school³ and the 'task-centred' or 'functional school'^{4 5} – and this is of course partially true of this chapter. However, what is presented here is different from much of the earlier academic literature because it provides a novel way of deriving practical leadership measures in the special case of the military unit.

As well as academic work on leadership, much has, of course, been written about practical leadership in the military context by military practitioners, as exemplified by the works of individuals such as Oliver, Newman, Kala and others⁶. Is this chapter just another example of that genre?

It is not. The author has credentials both as an academic and as a soldier, and what is offered here is a bridge between the academ-

CHAPTER II

ic approach and the approach via military experience. It proposes an aspect of leadership theory, but in a way created exactly to fit a particular military situation. It is a new approach, the novelty lying in the combination of military experience, academic rigour, and the introduction of a new discipline into the military leadership arena: Social Anthropology.

The author is one of a small but growing number of military anthropologists. Military Anthropology is a sub-area of Social Anthropology, which, in essence, is a social science centering on the study of small-scale human groups of a few hundred people⁷ (as opposed to the larger societies that are the traditional area covered by Sociology⁸). Military units are exactly this size, and are therefore suitable subjects for the application of social anthropological techniques. Depending on their operational role, for example, infantry battalions are between six and seven hundred strong, artillery regiments⁹ are between four and six hundred, and armoured regiments are around five hundred.

The work underpinning this chapter was carried out in the British Army between 1974 and 2003, but most intensively between 1993 and 2003, involving participant observation, interview, and literature research. It resulted in a social anthropological model of unit life, built upon the experience of members of the British Army, which can be used to investigate a number of aspects of soldiers' daily life, including leadership. In the sense used in this chapter, the term 'soldier' refers to any member of a military unit regardless of rank (thus private soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), warrant officers and commissioned officers are all 'soldiers').

The primary readership of this book is, however, Canadian, not British. The question must be asked: is a model built in the British Army context applicable to the Canadian Forces (CF)? It is a particularly pertinent question in this case because one of the tenets of Social Anthropology is that it is usually dangerous to treat one human group as 'the same' as any other unless there is

good evidence that cross-inference is justified. In this case, however, somewhat to the author's surprise, the model has been well received as a useful, relevant, and practical approach by a number of Canadian officers, mostly within the forum of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS) but also among the Canadian Contingent at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham, UK. It is offered here as a follow-up to many discussions and interchanges of ideas.

This chapter, therefore, provides a novel means of describing and analysing the exercise of leadership at regimental duty¹⁰ by the use of a model developed using the techniques of Social Anthropology. First, this model is explained, and then we use it to analyse leadership exercised by junior officers and unit commanding officers (CO) in the British Army. The pairing of junior officer and CO was chosen because it indicates how the model can be used to address appropriate issues at two very different stages in an individual's career. Whereas a typical CO has nearly twenty years of military experience and a wide set of responsibilities in the unit, the average junior officer has virtually no experience and a narrow span of command and responsibility. There is, in fact, no reason why the model might not be applied at any level of leadership, and if there had been space we could also have considered leadership by junior NCOs, senior NCOs, middle-ranking officers and so on. It is best thought of as a tool to be used in any appropriate context.

Although the author was a serving officer in the British Army for over thirty years, it must be said that this paper contains his personal views only and does not necessarily reflect official opinion or thought.

The Model: British Army Organizational Culture at Unit Level

This work comprises one of very few models aimed at describing British Army organizational culture, exemplified by the work of Stewart¹¹, Hockey¹², and von Zugbach¹³. As far as academic

CHAPTER II

discipline is concerned, it can be located in a vanishingly small body of social anthropological literature on the British Army, exemplified by previous work by the author and Killworth¹⁴.

The first version of this model was generated during a British Army Staff College project in 1981, an edited version of which was published in the *RUSI Journal* in 1988¹⁵. A more refined version appeared in the author's Defence Fellowship thesis in 1994¹⁶ with a summary in Strachan's *The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*¹⁷ in 2000. The latest appeared in a paper on the human implications of the digitization of military command and control in 2004¹⁸. The fullest version so far is in the author's PhD thesis¹⁹.

The research which gave birth to this model was mainly carried out with members of what are called here the 'combat arms' of the British Army, a term that was current when the research began but is no longer in official use in the United Kingdom Armed Forces. In the sense in which it is used here, it identifies those elements in the Army that train to face the enemy in formed units in the contact zone in conventional war, as distinct from those who operate either as formed units out of the contact zone or as detachments with combat arms units. The 'combat arms' therefore comprise the Household Cavalry and Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, Royal Signals, Army Air Corps, and Infantry.

It is worthy of note that whenever the model has been presented to audiences within the British Army - to individuals, to small group discussions and in lectures to larger audiences - it has been hailed as a convincing portrait of every-day life at regimental duty regardless the rank of the speaker. It is clear that it connects with British soldiers' attitudes and expectations and that it captures the norms and conventions that they know.

The central concept in the model is 'social structure', though in a way that is specific to this study and unlike that used by earlier social anthropologists of the Structural-Functional School.

Following the nineteenth century French social scientist Durkheim²⁰, they appeared to treat the concept as if it was a separate entity, a vital ingredient of 'society' that was greater than the sum of its individual human parts. This position has been attacked successfully in more recent times by those like Giddens²¹ whose analytical frameworks are the individual agent and the processes of everyday life. In essence, consideration of agency and process conceptually liberates the social scientist from any idea that the members of a human group are pawns compelled by the overarching pressures of 'society'. They could always 'have acted otherwise'²².

Currently, those who stress the independence of the individual from 'society' are considered to be in the ascendant, but this is not the end of the debate. It is undeniable that there are frameworks of stated and unstated rules that inform people's behaviour and these look very like the pressures depicted by Durkheim in his concept of society. On the other hand, it is also undeniable that nobody is a slave to them, but can choose how much attention to pay to them.

This need not leave us in a hinterland between rules and freedom – between social structure and agency. It is particularly true in the military that frameworks of rules are important. Most soldiers know what the formal rules are and wish to 'fit in' by observing the informal ones (following the social structure), but many of them have a sufficiently independent streak to bend or break them from time to time (exercising agency). There is a way of taking account of both.

In the sense used in this paper, 'social structure' is put forward as a model, not an empirical reality, representing a shared body of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour, which informs groups of people or individuals how to organize and conduct themselves vis-à-vis each other. The concept is therefore a way of modelling the background to, and framework for, daily life. However, individuals go their own way through their lives, using social

CHAPTER II

structure as a reference. A useful metaphor is that of a walker using a map: the map can be likened to 'social structure', capturing as it does the main features of the terrain over which the walker intends to go; the walker can be likened to the agent, free to make his or her own choice of routes on the map or even to disregard the map entirely; and the act of walking can be likened to the agent's progress through his or her daily life. In making that progress, therefore, the agent navigates as he or she chooses through the social terrain depicted as 'social structure'.

The initial attempt to create such a model of social structure in British combat arms units was fraught with difficulty because the individuals' behaviour appeared to differ markedly in different contexts. For example, officers who were on first name terms at one moment in the context of the officers' mess, with every appearance of warm and friendly interaction, a few moments later stood stiffly to attention and called each other by rank and name in the context of summary jurisdiction. Similarly, individuals from different sub-units who lived in close proximity in the barrack block would spend time and effort scornfully expressing their differences but would co-operate strenuously and cheerfully in a unit sports team.

The analytical problem was resolved by modelling more than one social structure. All the contexts encountered appeared to cluster in four major categories, and these were treated as separate but contiguous social structures, each with its own set of attitudes, expectations and behaviours as follows:

1. The *formal command structure*²³, which is the structure through which a soldier at the bottom receives orders from the person at the top. It is embedded in and expressed by the hierarchy of rank and the formal arrangement of the unit into layer upon layer of organizational elements. It contains the mechanisms for the enforcement of discipline, for the downward issue of orders and instructions and for the upward issue of

reports, and it provides the framework for official responsibility. It also determines, through the formal Unit Establishment document, the exact position of each member in the organization.

2. The *informal structure*, which consists in unwritten conventions of behaviour in the absence of formal constraints, including behaviour off-duty and in relaxed duty contexts. An important element in this structure is the web of informal relationships within the unit which we explore below. Individuals come into personal contact with other people within the unit, of any rank, and establish inter-personal relationships with them. Although it might appear at first sight that the quality and intensity of such relationships are determined by free choice on the part of the individual (because they are informal), the network of a soldier's informal relationships is for the most part constrained by his or her rank and position in the unit.
3. The *loyalty/identity structure*, which is manifested most obviously in a nesting series of different sized groups which are defined by opposition to and contrast with other groups of equal status in the formal command structure. This nesting series consists in the various organizational levels from the small to the large that are the structure of all military units. A British infantry private soldier, for example, has full membership of his fire team, his section, his platoon, his company, his battalion and (above battalion level) his Regiment. The level at which he exercises his membership at any particular moment depends on level of comparison. This same infantry soldier would express his identity as a member of his platoon and feel loyalty to it in competition with other platoons of the same company. However, where his company is in competition with other companies, these attitudes and feelings would be transferred to the

CHAPTER II

company, rather than the platoon, and this process is continued up to levels beyond the unit (and down to those below the platoon). The *social structure*, the 'body of ideas, rules and conventions of behaviour', consists in the attitudes, feelings and expectations of soldiers towards these groups and their membership. These attitudes and feelings can be effectively captured in the concept that 'we are the best', at whatever organizational level the 'we' is placed.

4. The *functional structure*, which consists of attitudes, feelings and expectations connected with being 'soldierly' and properly carrying out 'soldierly' activity. Where groups are formed to carry out such activity, they might exactly reflect the *formal command structure* (which provides an easy and quick means of creating any size of group within a unit) or they might be independent of it. For example, an infantry platoon (a basic element in the infantry command structure) tends to carry out military functions on exercise and operations as a formed body. In contrast, a 'rear party' which remains in barracks while the rest of the unit is away (perhaps on leave or on an operational tour of duty) is usually made up of soldiers from all over the unit, brought together into an *ad hoc* functional grouping.

An important feature of the model is that an individual only operates in a single social structure at any one instant, although he or she may transit from one social structure to another (sometimes very rapidly). Thus, for example, when a group of soldiers maintaining a vehicle take a 'smoke break', they move from the *functional structure* (working on the vehicle) to the *informal structure* (relaxing and chatting). Similarly, a group of soldiers on morning parade (*formal command structure*), transit to the *functional structure* when they are dismissed to begin their morning's work. This social structure of the moment is called the *operating structure* in the model.

These four social structures can be depicted in the following diagram:

<i>Formal Command Structure</i>	<i>Informal Structure</i>
<i>Loyalty/Identity Structure</i>	<i>Functional Structure</i>

FIGURE 1: The Four *Social Structures*

-
- NOTES. 1. Distinct sets of behaviour are appropriate to each of the *social structures*.
 2. An individual or group can only operate in one structure at any one time (the *operating structure*).
-

An important consideration is the balance between these *social structures*. It is self-evident that if the members of the unit are encouraged to put one of them before all else then their military life becomes impoverished in some way. For example, if the *functional structure* is permanently dominant, they would be unable to exercise the identity of the different organizational levels to which they belong or enjoy informal social interaction. If permanent dominance is given to the *informal structure* their ability to function as soldiers would suffer. If the *loyalty/identity structure* is always supreme then they would conceive that anything they did was 'better' than anybody else could do (regardless of its actual standard) and that the preservation of the unit was the only thing that mattered, and so on.

An initial hypothesis was that an even balance of *social structures* would be the best situation for any unit, but the research showed

CHAPTER II

that each unit has its own particular 'appropriate' balance in a particular context and time. For example, in some units researched there was a feeling that operational function deserved more attention than formal parades, whilst for others the opposite was true. Similarly, some spent more effort on celebrating their identity than on the enforcement of formal discipline and the smart appearance of their dress. It was therefore concluded that the permutations provided by the detailed realization of the conventions modelled in the four *social structures* are sufficiently numerous to provide each unit with a unique assemblage of attitudes and expectations and a unique balance. The members usually perceive this balance as 'appropriate' and 'right' for their particular unit.

Although this theoretically allows for extreme imbalance between the *social structures*, this is very seldom encountered: the defining distinctions of balance are usually fine and subtle. The one factor that seemed to be permanently present was that if a unit regularly exercised the conventions of all four *social structures* (in whatever balance was felt to be appropriate by its members to the context it was in) then it was likely that this unit had high morale and military efficiency.

The model has been extended in various ways, one of which is very important for consideration of leadership. This extension addresses the range of social relationships encountered in the *informal structure*. At first sight, it might be deduced that informal relationships are a matter of free choice as they are not subject to formal rules, but it was found that there is a distinct and generally accepted set of conventions in this area that are seldom broken. These can be captured by breaking down the range of informal relationships into five categories. These categories were given special terms in the model and, as with all the other special terms in this chapter, are printed in *italics*.

1. *Close Friendship*. This relationship consists of a durable bond that transcends the military environment, where

there is a large measure of trust and respect between the parties and few barriers to discussion of highly personal matters. In interviews with soldiers of all ranks it was established that, for virtually every one, a useful test to identify *close friendship* would be to determine whether the relationship would survive unchanged if one of the parties was prepared to shed tears in the presence of the other. It is a rare and special relationship. In the words of a warrant officer in an infantry battalion "I've maybe made only two or three close friends in my career, though I've had plenty of military friends." This rarity is an important feature. It is sufficient to recognise the existence of the relationship, but we must also acknowledge that it is sufficiently scarce that it is not a regular feature of regimental life for many individuals.

2. *Friendship*. The term '*friendship*' is used specifically in the model to refer to a less intense relationship, which is frequently found to exist between soldiers within the *informal structure*. It can have all the appearance of *close friendship*, in that individuals constantly seek each other's company, will help each other if they are in trouble, and will be prepared to share almost anything if the need arises, but it falls short of the depth and intensity of the other relationship. Thus, during an interview one soldier said of his particular circle of mates that he would be more than prepared to help any one of them: if a mate was feeling unhappy then his friends would naturally take him out drinking to cheer him up. However, if the same mate wanted to discuss deeply personal matters then he "would not want to know!" Bonds of *friendship* are usually formed within narrow bands of rank. Although there are no formally stated regulations, which proscribe *friendships* growing up between people of widely diverse rank, such relationships are frowned upon because they are held to be potentially compromising for discipline.

CHAPTER II

3. *Association*. It is often found that two soldiers separated by rank distance wide enough to exclude *friendship* between them will come into regular contact and will form an informal bond of mutual trust and respect that falls short of *friendship* as defined above, but is nevertheless an important bonding feature. Such a relationship will probably arise, for example, between an infantry platoon sergeant and his platoon commander, and an adjutant and his or her chief clerk or between an artillery battery sergeant major and his or her battery commander. This relationship was given the name '*association*' in the study.

4. *Informal Access*. It is recognised, though not officially laid down, that each individual has a right to speak informally and without a formal appointment with certain other people who are at a certain degree of structural distance (superiors in his chain of command for instance), even though a link of *association* does not exist between them. Thus a recently joined junior officer can expect to be able to have '*informal access*' to his sub-unit commander from the beginning, as a private soldier can to his platoon or troop commander. Similarly, any member of a sergeants' mess can expect to have opportunities to approach the Regimental Sergeant Major informally.

5. *Nodding Acquaintance*. The term '*nodding acquaintance*' encompasses all the informal relationships, which are not encompassed by the other terms. In essence, it is a relationship where the parties know each other by sight, but not necessarily by name, and they acknowledge each other's existence and common participation in the same segment of the *formal command structure*. The relationship may remain as it is, or it may grow into any one of the others listed above.

These five relationships are depicted in Figure 2 as follows:




FIGURE 2. Informal Relationships.

- NOTES.
1. 'EGO' is an individual of no particular rank, who has superiors and subordinates. He or she might be, for example, a sergeant or a lieutenant. This case was chosen because it illustrates relationships with peers, subordinates, and superiors. For someone at the top or bottom of the rank structure (lieutenant colonel or private soldier) the diagram would be redrawn to show peers and **only** subordinates or superiors.
 2. The boxes show the areas (rank/closeness) where relationships are expected to fall.
 3. The gaps between the boxes are voids to separate the boxes for clarity only.
 4. The different relationships have different conventions of behaviour.

An important variable is the strength of the relationship. This is captured in Figure 2 by the horizontal dimension of each box: on the principle that a line is an infinite number of points, each horizontal line represents a very large range of possible degrees of warmth or intensity in the relationship.

It should be noted that this model does not seek to capture romantic or sexual relationships. This is a separate area, which deserves further study.

CHAPTER 11

Illustration

The following case study illustrates the use of the model, showing how it can provide both a means of expressing processes that are hard to describe any other way, and a system for analysing complex situations.

Case One: A Difficult Company Commander

This case is taken from a description by a British soldier of his time as Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) in an infantry battalion that was on a two-year operational tour in Northern Ireland. Battalions in this position had a 'reserve' role and were called upon to reinforce troops on shorter-term deployments as necessary. It was the practice on such a tour to give the soldiers as much time off as possible because no one knew when they would be required to work at full stretch or for how long. A newly arrived company commander had begun his tour by working his soldiers excessively hard:

"...his own ideas of how to run his company was a little bit... SAS-ish shall I say."²⁴

Such was the impact on the soldiers' morale (and consequently on their performance) that his company sergeant major (CSM) attempted to advise the company commander to ease up,

"The guys were meeting themselves coming off [exercise]. There was no social life happening at all. It was all, bloody well cut and thrust and 'Let's go!' and people were performing badly because they weren't having time to recover... It was just bumping on from one bloody crisis to another. The company sergeant major advised him, and spoke to him about it but no, the company commander wasn't having any of it. He was having it the way he wanted it. If the platoon commanders weren't performing they were chopped off at the knees and thrown into the waste pile and get someone else along."

Having failed to convince the company commander, the company sergeant major then approached the RSM and made him privately aware of what was going on. He first approached him in the sergeants' mess and subsequently came to see him in his office.

“And then I [the RSM] went to the Commanding Officer the following day. I left it for a day, and went in to see the CO the next day rather than going in from now, straight into his office with the sergeant major going that way and the company commander getting called up there. [*i.e., the RSM left a time interval before going to the CO so that nobody would connect the visit of the CSM with the RSM's subsequent visit to the CO*]. . . The Commanding Officer . . . played it quite correctly, so he then left a time, and then, either in the office or in the mess, whatever, he spoke [to him].”

A little later the company commander became less intense in his requirements of his soldiers.

Analysis:

By over-stressing function, the company commander was not allowing enough time for the *informal* and *loyalty/identity structures* to be exercised, and the soldiers' morale was dropping.

The CSM was able to approach his company commander both because he was directly subordinate to him in the *formal command structure* and because he would have had at least *informal access* to him, if not a developing relationship of *association*. He also had responsibilities within the *loyalty/identity structure* for the reputation of the company within the unit, and within the *functional structure* for the efficiency of the soldiers.

CHAPTER II

Once he had failed to convince the company commander, the CSM brought the matter indirectly to the company commander's formal superior, the Commanding Officer. He did so by exploiting an informal relationship with the RSM (approaching him first in the sergeants' mess), knowing that the RSM could approach the Commanding Officer either formally through his position in the *formal command structure*, or informally, using the relationship of *association* with him. The CSM thus used the informal structure to overcome what he saw as a barrier in the *formal command structure*. As the CSM had hoped, the RSM saw the Commanding Officer about the problem after a discrete interval.

Whatever happened next is not recorded: the correction of a senior member of a unit is a delicate matter because, if handled badly, it can undermine his position in all four social structures. In any case, it would have taken place in private. However, it is clear that it had the effect that the CSM desired because the training pressure was lifted from the soldiers in his company. It should be noted that all this took place without the need for a public confrontation at any stage.

This analysis clearly shows the usefulness of the model to identify the influences in this difficult situation and to show the workings of the various means of communication available through the informal relationships in the *informal structure*. Interestingly, it also shows us why the speaker, the RSM, saw no disloyalty on the part of the CSM in complaining about his superior. It was simply accepted between them that a part of the soldierly functions (*functional structure*) of warrant officers was to put the collective interests of the soldiers above the wishes of the company commander when those interests had become unnecessarily threatened.

The Application of the Model to the Analysis of Leadership

We can now turn to leadership within a military unit. Before we begin this next section it is important to note that there is a significant overlap in the British Army between the conceptual terms 'leadership' and 'management'. Together they encompass the practical skills and theoretical knowledge that are required to handle personnel in associated military tasks and environments. To this extent, the word 'leadership' incorporates a significant element of 'management', and it will be used in this sense in the remainder of this paper.

This section demonstrates how the elements of the model can be used as an analytical means to draw out simple rules of conduct for a leader at regimental duty. We will first examine the case of a young officer, and then the case of a unit commander. In both cases, to avoid the continuous gender-sensitive circumlocution 'he or she', the male personal pronoun is used, but it should be understood that this analysis applies equally to both genders.

For young officers, rules of conduct can be derived from the model as follows:

Formal Command Structure

The junior officer should be able to issue orders clearly and authoritatively, to listen to reports from below, and to understand and obey orders from above. His appearance and behaviour should be consistent with the disciplinary customs of the unit. He should understand that each soldier has a unique place in the unit with which that soldier identifies.

Informal Structure

He should know the qualitative differences between informal relationships, and build appropriate ones. Examples would be *association* with the senior NCOs in his sub-unit (and

CHAPTER II

especially any under his command), *informal access* with his private soldiers, *friendship* with his follow-subalterns, and *association* or *informal access* with his sub-unit commander. He should be prepared to allow relationships of *association* to develop with his junior NCOs and private soldiers over time.

On the other hand, he should not attempt to achieve, or encourage the development of, inappropriate relationships such as *friendship* with his NCOs or privates.

Loyalty/Identity Structure

He should take an active part in supporting the *loyalty/identity segment* that he commands, both during events where pride and prestige are at stake (such as competitions) and during celebrations of his segment's identity (such as parties).

Because of the *loyalty/identity structure's* flexibility, he should also take an active part in supporting the segments above the one he commands, such as the sub-unit and the unit. He should also acknowledge his soldiers' membership of the segments below the one which he commands and encourage them in exercising it.

He should learn the details of his unit's and sub-unit's history and traditions and be seen to identify with them.

He should support all sporting occasions that any of his *loyalty/identity segments* partake in, and should participate in as many as he can.

Functional Structure

He should perform his own function well, showing both personal (soldierly) skills, special-to-arm skills, and the ability to exercise professional military command effectively.

He should show that he recognises good performance and congratulate those who show it, and give encouragement to those who fall short but in his judgement are trying to perform well.

He should show concern for the maintenance and improvement of individual and collective training standards.

These are deductions from the model to give general guidance. The model can also be used in another way to analyse real cases. The three short examples which follow are all taken from interview material with soldiers and are analysed using the model.

Case Two: A Corporal's Opinion

Interviewer, to infantry corporal: "What mistakes do junior officers make?"

Corporal: "Being arrogant. Being ignorant. Talking down to your troops. Not walking round and talking to your troops, finding out what courses they want."

Analysis:

This reflects a lack of informal relationships between the young officer and the soldiers. There is an absence even of *informal access*.

Case Three: A Disastrous Platoon Commander

An ex-platoon sergeant talks about one of his platoon commanders, an individual who was not a success and subsequently transferred out of the battalion: "He was impatient, and why not? Having done [so many months] at Sandhurst they are impatient, and he wanted to command his platoon. And he did. And he more or less took over but he

CHAPTER 11

was ... he was weak in as much as... How can I put it? He just didn't command... naturally command respect. That's the only way I can put it. The platoon, the NCOs in particular, thought little of him too quickly, they gave him very little chance. ... There was his age, anyway. I mean he was young. He was young, he was small, and he was overweight. Or he appeared to be overweight. He used to trivialise, would make light of a life far too often. He never seemed to take it too seriously, but he wasn't good either. He wasn't good in the field. Now, a platoon commander who's laid back but is good in the field can carry that. He can get away with it. [This one] couldn't.

Analysis:

This young officer was not using his place in the *formal command structure* effectively by taking proper command of his platoon. By being overweight and not being good in the field, he was weak in the *functional structure*. He undermined his position in all four *social structures* by trivialising things too often. Because his men did not respect him, it seems likely that he had a poor set of informal relationships as well. Whatever the *operating structure*, therefore, he was in weak ground as a leader. It is not surprising that he failed.

Case Four: An Excellent Platoon Commander

The same interviewee cites another example in complete contrast: "... this was *his* platoon, and he very much looked upon [it as] that ... he was involved in everything that we did. He was always there... He was there as an officer [rather than 'one of the boys']. There was always that definite difference between him and everybody else. He would call boys by their nicknames, but he was a 'hands-on' man and he rather stood out amongst the other platoon commanders as being that. [There was] a lot of work to be done on the discipline front, and just day-to-day standards."

Analysis:

This platoon commander joined in the platoon's identity (*loyalty/identity structure*), maintained an effective set of relationships with his soldiers (*informal structure*), and was effective in imposing an appropriate level of discipline and standards (*formal command structure*). His activity in things related to the *functional structure* is not mentioned, but it may be assumed to be at least up to a reasonable standard or the interviewee would have mentioned it.

So much for the use of the model in the case of a young officer. We now increase the span of leadership considerably by turning to Commanding Officer. The same principles apply, though on a different scale, as follows.

Formal Command Structure

The Commanding Officer should make his disciplinary and command policies clear to his chain of command and be able to issue orders clearly and authoritatively. He should ensure that reports from below reach him. He should ensure that all members of his chain of command are capable of understanding his orders and instructions, exercising formal authority, and paying attention to reports from below. He should ensure that each member of his unit understands that he or she has a unique place in the unit and can identify with it.

Informal Structure

He should know the qualitative differences between informal relationships, and build appropriate ones. He should not attempt to exercise or build *friendship* with anybody in the unit because he has no peers. However, he should take every opportunity to exercise *association* with those with whom he has already established that relationship and build it with as many others as he can. He should be on close terms of

CHAPTER II

association with his RSM, and should ensure that he has, or develops, a relationship of *association* with the key members of his staff with whom he will need to communicate (the second-in-command, his sub-unit commanders, the adjutant, the quartermaster, the medical officer, and the electrical and mechanical engineering officer).

Loyalty/Identity Structure

He should take an active part in supporting the unit, both during events where pride and prestige are at stake and during celebrations of his unit's identity.

He should ensure that all the segments in his unit have the opportunity to exercise and celebrate their identity.

He should ensure that all his officers and other key personnel know the details of the history and traditions of the unit, and any larger organization that it belongs to, particularly those that are celebrated.

He should support all sporting occasions in which his unit is involved.

Functional Structure

He should perform his own function well, showing both personal (soldierly) skills, special-to-arm skills, and the ability to exercise professional military command effectively. He should show that he recognises good performance and congratulate those who show it, and give encouragement to those who fall short but in his judgement are trying to perform well.

He should ensure that all key personnel take an active part in the maintenance and improvement of individual and collective training standards.

So far we have looked at the personal stance of the Commanding Officer within the unit, as we did for the junior officer. However, there is a considerable difference between them, apart from the size of their spans of command, in that it lies within the Commanding Officer's power to influence the balance of the *social structures* within the unit as a whole. We have seen above that members of a unit feel that there is an appropriate balance of structures to their particular case, and a successful commanding officer manages this balance in a way that does not rupture his soldiers' expectations.

The following case study gives an example of an unbalanced situation, and shows how the model can be used to describe and analyse it.

Case Five: A Tyrannical Commanding Officer

In a particular unit the Commanding Officer was an uncomfortable man to serve under. His priorities and *modus operandi* clashed with what the members of the unit felt was an appropriate balance of *social structures*. He rigidly and persistently dominated the *formal command structure* by openly instilling fear in his subordinates. He over-emphasised the *functional structure* by setting unrealistically high standards of military achievement and becoming furious at any failure to attain them. He sought also to dominate the *informal structure* at all levels in the unit by stressing the importance of personality (his own personality was a dominant one and he had plenty of energy with which to exert his dominance). During his two and a half years in command, the majority of the officers felt ill at ease and were delighted when their time came to be posted out of the unit. An impermeable clique of key personnel, including the RSM and the adjutant, grew up around the Commanding Officer and those outside this circle trusted each other less and less. The unit became fragmented as the sub-unit commanders cut themselves off from the Commanding Officer as far as

CHAPTER II

they could. In spite of all his efforts, military performance standards fell.

Analysis.

The personal influence of the Commanding Officer was increased at the expense of the *social structures*:

- The other officers' positions in the *formal command structure* were undermined by Commanding Officer's public domination of them.
- The *informal structure* developed impermeable fences between the Commanding Officer's clique and the other key personnel. These outsiders also found themselves building partial barriers around themselves because they were no longer certain that they could trust their fellows. Informal communications in the unit were therefore poor.
- The *loyalty/identity structure* became ossified within the unit, becoming sharply focused on subordinate levels as sub-unit commanders cut themselves off from the Commanding Officer as far as they could.
- The *functional structure* became at least partially diverted into avoiding trouble from the Commanding Officer at the expense of carrying out the military job in hand. There was general frustration, and some fear, in the area of military function because it was so difficult to satisfy the Commanding Officer.

Military standards fell as a result of the barriers arising within the system of *social structures* and because they were unbalanced in favour of the *functional structure*. This imbalance took two forms: it was too often the *operating structure* and its importance was over-emphasised at the expense of the other three *social structures*.

At first sight, this case and that of the 'Difficult Company Commander' appear to be very similar (although they were in completely different units). Both the company commander and the Commanding Officer stressed function over the other culturally important areas, and both witnessed a decline in functional effectiveness, to their fury. However, there are certain important differences between the cases which reflect the differences in position within the unit of a Commanding Officer and a sub-unit commander, and which illustrate some of the unique features of the leadership required by a Commanding Officer. First, and most significantly, the situation was restored in *Case One* because the informal communications were working well and the overall unit balance of *social structures* (over which the company commander had no control) was right for the battalion. In contrast, as we have seen, in this case the Commanding Officer made the mistake of insisting on a balance of structures that clashed with the attitudes and expectations of this soldiers: it felt wrong to them, and they reacted against it. Instead of being restored, the situation deteriorated, even when he took yet more energetic action. Secondly, his policies caused a fragmentation of the informal communications networks in his unit, and he appears to have lacked any significant penetration down into the sub-units to discover how their members were feeling about the situation that he had created. In this respect, the RSM appears not to have established the sort of strong relationship of *association* with his sub-unit sergeant majors as we saw in *Case One* because of the existence of the impermeable fences around the sub-units. Similarly, the Adjutant isolated himself from the unit's officers. The Commanding Officer did not therefore have two very important conduits for informal contact.

Conclusion

We have reviewed the model, seen how it can be used to describe and analyse aspects of organizational culture at unit level in the British Army, and applied it specifically to provide outline guidance for leadership at junior officer and Commanding Officer

CHAPTER II

level. We have also analysed a case study of leadership at sub-unit commander level. In all cases, the model has been shown to provide a coherent explanation of events and useful and practical guidance for successful leadership. Furthermore, both the explanation and the guidance are in harmony with the organizational culture – the attitudes and expectations of British soldiers.

There are indications that this model of *social structures*, including the typology of informal relationships, resonates with the experience of soldiers from other armies, and the CF in particular, though the precise ingredients of the ideas, rules, and conventions of behaviour may not necessarily be exactly similar. It is therefore recommended to those who study and manage leadership in the CF as a useful axis for analysis and development of leadership training. It offers a novel, intuitive, and effective way forward.

Endnotes

1 See, for example, Ralph Stogdill, “Personal factors associated with leadership”, *Journal of Psychology*, 25 (1948), 35-71.

2 See, for example, Andrew Halpin and Ben Winer, “A factorial study of the leader behaviour descriptions” in *Leader Behavior: Its Description and Measurement*, ed. Ralph Stogdill and Alvin Coons, 39-51 (Ohio: Ohio State University, 1957).

3 See for example, Fred Fielder, “The contingency model and dynamics of the leadership process”, in *Advances in Social Psychology*, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press, 1978).

4 See, for example, John Adair, *Action-Centred Leadership* (London: McGraw Hill, 1972).

5 A useful summary of the various typologies, taxonomies, theories, and models about leadership appears in Bernard Bass’s book *Bass & Stogdill’s Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research and Managerial Applications* (Third Edition) (London: The Free Press, 1990), 21-55.

6 Dave Oliver Jr., *Lead On! A Practical Approach to Leadership* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1992); Aubrey Newman, *Follow me, the Human Element in Leadership* (Novato: Presido Press, 1997); H.B

Kala, *Demystifying Military Leadership* (New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2003). Other examples are James Pendry, *The Three Meter Zone: Common Sense Leadership* (Novato: Presido Press, 1999), Karel Monto *et. al.* (eds.) *Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience*, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1998), and Roger Nye, *The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence* (Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing Group Inc., 1986).

7 This interest in 'small scale' human groups is fundamental to Social Anthropology. See, for example, John Beattie, *Other Cultures: Aims, Methods and Achievements in Social Anthropology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1966), 40, and Lucy Mair, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 7.

8 The nature of Sociology as the social science that focuses particularly on 'advanced' or modern societies is defined, *inter alia*, in Anthony Giddens, *Sociology, 4th Edition* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), 699, and in Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1986), xvi-xvii. See also David Lewis, "Revealing, Widening, Deepening? A Review of the Existing and Potential Contribution of Anthropological Approaches to 'Third Sector' Research", *Human Organization*, 58 (1999), 73-81.

9 The use of the word 'regiment' in British military parlance can be confusing to outsiders. In some cases, it means a formed unit commanded by a lieutenant-colonel (equivalent to an infantry battalion), and in others it means the wider entity to which all soldiers wearing the same capbadge belong (equivalent to the infantry 'Regiment' or 'Corps of Royal Signals' or 'Corps of Royal Engineers'. In this chapter, the lower organizational level will start with a lower case 'r', while the larger entity will start with an initial capital. Thus, the Cheshire Regiment has a single regular battalion, the Corps of Royal Signals has a number of regiments, and the Royal Regiment of Artillery has a number of regiments.

10 'Regimental duty' means on the strength of a formed unit.

11 Nora Stewart, *Mates and Muchachos: Unit cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War*, (New York: Brassey's (US) Inc., 1991).

12 John Hockey, *Squaddies: Portrait of a Subculture* (Exeter: University of Exeter, 1986).

13 Reginald von Zugbach, *Power and Prestige in the British Army*. (Aldershot: Avebury, 1988).

14 Paul Killworth, *Culture and Power in the British Army*:

CHAPTER II

Hierarchies, Boundaries and Construction, (PhD, Cambridge University, 1997), and Paul Killworth, "The British Army in Northern Ireland: Internal Security Operations, Training, and the Cease-Fire", *Cambridge Anthropology* 20, no. 3 (1998), 1-20.

15 Charles Kirke, "Social Structures in the Peninsular Army", *RUSI Journal* (Summer 1988), 65 -71.

16 Charles Kirke, *Social Structures in the Combat Arms Units of the British Army*: (MOD Defence Fellowship, 1994).

17 Charles Kirke, "A Model for the Analysis of Fighting Spirit in the British Army" in *The British Army, Manpower and Society into the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Hew Strachan, 227-241 (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

18 Charles Kirke, "Organizational Culture – the Unexpected Force", *Journal of Battlefield Technology* 7, no. 2 (2004), 11-15.

19 Charles Kirke, *Social Structures in the Combat Arms Units of the British Army: a Model*, (PhD Cranfield University, 2002)

20 See, for example, Emile Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method* ed. George Catlin, trans. Sarah Solovay and John Mueller (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1938).

21 See, for example, Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, 1-40, 163-164.

22 Anthony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method* (London: Hutchinson, 1976), 75.

23 Words printed in *italics* are specific technical terms in the model, used in an exclusive sense.

24 This means that he considered that the soldiers were being worked as hard as if they were 'special forces', being asked to perform well above the pace and capabilities of conventional infantry.

CHAPTER 12

Culture, Climate and Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Approaches to Measurement and Analysis



Karen D. Davis

Military forces, including the Canadian Forces (CF), measure leadership in numerous ways and for a variety of reasons. Often, the measures used are explicit, for example, measuring the leadership performance of a candidate on training and evaluating the leadership performance or potential of an individual for selection or promotion purposes. Other measures, such as the study and measurement of culture and climate, are less direct but nonetheless provide valuable information about the relationships between culture, climate and leadership.

This chapter begins with an overview of the CF leadership doctrine that provides the conceptual framework within which leadership, and related phenomena such as climate and culture in the CF, have been viewed and will be guided in the future. A summary of current and past approaches to the measurement and understanding of culture, climate and leadership in the CF follows. In closing, comments regarding some potential implications of the research approach in understanding the relationship between leadership, climate and culture in the CF are provided.

Canadian Forces Leadership Doctrine

Throughout the 1990s, the CF faced continuous public scrutiny as a result of issues such as CF personnel actions in Somalia,¹ the quality of life of CF personnel and their families, and harassment, assault and career discrimination against women.² As a result of such significant challenges, CF leadership came under intense criticism and demands – sometimes legislated demand – for change. Senior leadership needed to react. As a result, the culture of the CF has changed in the past decade. Military sociologist, Franklin C. Pinch notes that the current CF has become “more democratized, liberalized, civilianized, and individualized.”³ Indeed, new doctrine that simultaneously reinforces the traditional military values of duty, loyalty, integrity and courage, and that also re-conceptualizes various aspects of leadership and the nature of the profession of arms in Canada, has recently been developed and disseminated throughout the CF.⁴

Today, leadership is defined in the CF as “directly or indirectly influencing others, by means of formal authority or personal attributes, to act in accordance with one’s intent or a shared purpose”.⁵ In addition, CF leadership doctrine makes a distinction between leading people and leading the institution: “*leading people* involves developing individual, team, and unit capabilities to exercise tasks and missions”, whereas “*leading the institution* is about developing and maintaining the CF’s strategic and professional capabilities and creating the conditions for operational success.”⁶ Importantly, CF doctrine explains that neither type of leadership is about the conventional ideas of the heroic individual leader and the isolated efforts of one leader, but “is about sharing responsibilities of leadership, vertically and horizontally within teams, units, formations, and the CF as a whole.”⁷ The second key principle of CF leadership is that it is values-based, meaning “leaders are to be guided in their decisions and actions by the institutional values that define CF effectiveness.”⁸ The five core institutional values are described as accomplishing the mission, contributing to and acting as part of a co-ordinated and cohesive

team, developing and looking after CF members, anticipating and adapting to change, and exemplifying and upholding the ideals of conduct inherent in the military ethos.⁹ These values map directly onto the CF institutional effectiveness model that is driven by mission success as the primary outcome, along with three essential contributing outcomes: internal integration, member well-being and commitment, and external adaptability. The military ethos, which includes military values, Canadian civic values, legal values, and ethical values,¹⁰ provides the glue that binds and integrates these four outcomes.

In conjunction with recent transformations to the CF's understanding of leadership, new CF doctrine defines culture as:

A shared and relatively stable pattern of behaviours, values, and assumptions that a group has learned over time as an effective means of maintaining internal social stability and adapting to its environment, and that are transmitted to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and act in relation to these issues.¹¹

This conception of culture is heavily influenced by the works of Edgar H. Schein, who places outcome related to culture firmly in the domain of leadership:

Culture and leadership are two sides of the same coin in that leaders first create cultures when they create groups and organizations. Once cultures exist, they determine the criteria for leadership and thus determine who will or will not be a leader. But if cultures become dysfunctional, it is the unique function of leadership to perceive the functional and dysfunctional elements of the existing culture and to manage cultural evolution and change in such a way that the group can survive in a changing environment.¹²

CHAPTER 12

These new concepts of leadership and culture represent a fundamental values shift in the CF that impacts, theoretically at least, individual beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. Not surprisingly, CF doctrine holds senior leaders, as leaders of the institution, fully responsible for shaping CF culture within the values-based model of institutional effectiveness. Organizational climate is not defined or explicitly addressed in CF doctrine; however, a comparison of the major leadership tasks for leading people and leading the institution, does imply that the establishment of effective climate within a unit or organization is a leading people function.¹³

Doctrine provides the guidance for leadership and leadership responsibility in the CF. Practical 'how to' documents reflecting doctrine have also been developed to guide leaders.¹⁴ However, doctrine and 'how to' guidance cannot provide leaders with feedback concerning the extent to which they are developing the conditions that will contribute to mission success. Military ethos, internal integration, member well-being and commitment, and external adaptability are conditions that are significantly influenced by the climate of CF units and the culture of the CF.

It is important that CF leadership have an understanding of how culture is shaped and the extent to which dysfunctional long held beliefs and assumptions have been challenged. When change is forced by circumstances as dramatic as those that impacted the CF in the 1990s, it is difficult to determine which aspects of change will endure, and alternatively, the extent to which some aspects of change may be a short term adjustment to unusual circumstances, and thus at risk of reversion to previous beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. For example, public scrutiny and internally and externally mandated changes in the 1990s resulted in several changes in the way that the CF addressed various issues: senior leadership expressed increased commitment to human rights and diversity; leader development strategies were developed to enhance the professionalism of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps; and policies were developed

to strengthen the social contract between CF members and the organization.

The extent to which such changes in strategy and policy become fully embraced across the CF, and thus embedded as enduring aspects of institutional culture, is difficult to quantify. However, it is important to understand the relationship between climate and culture, as well as the relationship between climate, culture, and CF doctrinal leadership values. For example, at what point is a behaviour or attitude understood to be a measure of climate, and how is it determined that those same indicators represent embedded and enduring behaviours, values and assumptions that have been learned over time? Considerable research has been conducted on climate and culture in the CF; however, for the most part such projects and approaches are focused uniquely on culture *or* climate. The discussion below provides an overview of culture and climate research in the CF, while underscoring the need to increase awareness and understanding of the relationships between culture, climate, and measures of leadership.

Organizational Culture

Academic studies of the culture of organizations first appeared in the 1950s with book length ethnographies such as E. Jacques 1951 book, *The Changing Culture of a Factory*.¹⁵ Cultural perspectives in organizational studies, employing both qualitative and quantitative measures, started taking shape in the early 1980s.¹⁶ Based upon the symbolic interaction and social construction perspectives, the organizational culture literature generally reflects the assumption that “the individual cannot be systematically separated from the environment and that the members of social systems are best regarded as being agents and subjects simultaneously.”¹⁷ Culture, as a key concept in understanding change in military organizations, started to gain momentum in the late 1990s, and continues to grow rapidly.¹⁸

CHAPTER 12

Defence studies of aspects of military culture in Canada reach back to at least 1967 with a review of the relationship between sub-culture (English and French) influences and attitudes toward military service.¹⁹ However, it was the findings of the 1979 'Cotton Report', based upon survey data analysis, which caught the attention of military leaders and served as a place marker for army culture in the CF. The research presented in the Cotton Report was informed by significant changes occurring in the military at the time; specifically, the increasing number of non-combatant occupations, general trends toward growing bureaucratic complexity, increasing similarity between military and civilian skill structures, and the increasingly minority position of combat soldiers. Following the work of American military sociologist, Charles Moskos, Cotton's research contrasted the 'occupational' model of the military organization with the traditional concept of the military as a unique institution with its own values, symbols and practices – the 'vocational' model. Survey data was collected from over 1,600 CF members in both support and combat trades, to measure numerous dimensions of values and attitudes toward military service, including military role obligation (using a military ethos scale); trade satisfaction and self-image; support for the regimental system; willingness to enter combat; commitment to the CF; leadership instability²⁰; and identification with the army environment.²¹

Cotton's research was intended as "a beginning baseline study of the character of the Army in Canada,"²² and his findings claimed to "provide support for the image of an army characterized by cleavages in basic values and assumptions about structure and process in military life."²³ In comparing attitudes toward military service across combat and support roles, and junior and senior non-commissioned soldiers and officers, Cotton's study revealed a significant gap between combat arms officers and junior combat arms soldiers; that is, a very small percentage of junior personnel in the combat arms supported the vocational ethos that was supported by their officers, and which their officers expected them to support. In addition, junior combat arms soldiers

expressed dissatisfaction with the excessive turnover of leaders – over 65 percent reported that they had changed direct leaders four or more times in the past two years.²⁴ Although this research was not explicitly identified as a study of organizational culture, in the sense that it was a study of attitudes claiming to reveal basic values and assumptions, it did measure values and attitudes – two key components of organizational culture.

In 2004, the CF published an annotated bibliography of papers, presentations, and publications related to culture in the CF.²⁵ This bibliography includes over 170 references, dating from 1967 to 2004, close to 120 of which were written, published or presented in 1997 to 2004. A substantial proportion of the references are papers developed to satisfy the course requirements of senior officers attending the CF Advanced Military Studies, National Security Studies, and Command and Staff courses and papers presented at Canadian and International military and defence related conferences.²⁶ Well over 100 of these references focus directly on ethics, ethos, the military as a profession/military officers as professionals, civil-military relations, leadership/management, and/or culture change in the CF. A recent update to the culture bibliography, expanded it to include the international literature and, more specifically, focused on those sources discussing military culture, military organizational culture, organizational culture, or culture change. Just 16 sources, that directly address Canadian military culture, were identified.²⁷

Donna Winslow's 1997 publication, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry*, represents perhaps the most comprehensive study of the culture of a single CF unit ever conducted. From a social anthropological perspective, and based upon theories of identity formation, culture in this context is understood as the collective values found within a group or a society that continue to exist even after changes within the group dynamic occur. This cultural inquiry is informed by over 50 in-depth interviews with airborne soldiers, several focus groups with soldiers and some family members, visual

CHAPTER 12

records (e.g. photos, videotapes), personal records (e.g. letters written home by soldiers, first hand accounts written by Somali journalists), official documents (e.g. court martial proceedings), testimonies from the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, and a review of studies on the deployment of United States (US) military troops to Somalia.

The goal of Winslow's research was to explain how the culture of the regiment was formed and to what extent that culture affected the behaviour of Canadian soldiers in Somalia.²⁸ She concludes that several factors contributed to the events in Somalia, including tension between the combat and modern bureaucratic paradigms in the CF, unit identity and socialization processes, frequent rotation of officers contributing to a non-commissioned soldier sub-culture and authority system, and situational challenges in Somalia.²⁹ Winslow's research was exclusively qualitative and guided by the reasoning of inductive analysis and an exploratory research process to examine the various levels of culture,³⁰ including the visible organizational structures and processes, the espoused values, and the basic underlying 'taken-for-granted' assumptions that guide human behaviour.

Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective, conducted by Canadian military historian, Allan English, is noteworthy as an isolated example of a cultural analysis of the CF as an institution. English asserts that previous concepts of military culture are based predominantly on the US military experience and the related literature is largely rhetorical and focused on the traditional 'warrior' in military culture. He uses secondary sources to develop an analysis of Canadian military culture within the context of Canadian society, including an examination of the roots of Canadian military culture, the contributions of the air, land and sea subcultures, ethos, and professionalism. Observing that military culture is shaped by influences other than leadership, including civil-military relations, an argument is developed to support a multi-disciplinary

organizational behaviour approach to the study of Canadian military culture. In conclusion, English warns against reliance on a single approach to understanding military culture, specifically the framework established by Edgar Schein that many U.S. military studies have relied upon, as he believes it will limit understanding of Canadian military culture.³¹

The most recent CF culture research, initiated by the annotated bibliographies discussed above, is currently underway. Initial project reports have defined culture within the social psychological paradigm offered by Edgar Schein. Indeed, despite English's caution, the work of Edgar Schein has been effectively applied to military organizations, including the CF. In addition, this project acknowledges the complexity of culture, noting that the culture of an organization is more than the logo, the mission, or the chain of command. It also includes symbols and symbolism, relationships, behaviours, and values, some of which operate at both conscious and unconscious levels. Culture, the research warns, should not be confused with 'climate', which refers to "members perceptions of organizational features such as decision-making, leadership, and norms about work."³² Nor should culture be portrayed as synonymous with organizational structure as neither concept captures its full meaning.³³

The current CF research project design proposes an environment scan of culture in the CF, international comparisons, an historical study of organizational culture/and CF culture change, and a coordinated and consultative review of CF joint culture, army, navy and air force sub-cultures, reserve sub-culture, and corporate/institutional culture.³⁴ Early data collection includes in-depth interviews with executive level leaders in the Department of National Defence (DND) and the CF, under the auspices of a 'senior decision-makers project' as well as a preliminary review of work that contributes to the current understanding of CF culture.³⁵ The overall goal of this project is to inform current understanding of culture in the CF, determine what aspects of CF culture need to change and how to satisfy the

CHAPTER 12

requirements of the future in a way that is coherent with ongoing CF transformation, and to determine an appropriate model for culture change. In essence, the project seeks to answer three basic, but incredibly complex, questions – where are we now, where do we need to go, and how do we get there?

The culture research reviewed here does not include the substantial body of data and literature that the DND/CF has accumulated under a range of labels, each potentially comprising an element of culture (and culture change), since approximately 1980. This internal research spans numerous themes including the integration of women, incidence of harassment, ethical decision-making, quality of life, conditions of service, sexual orientation, gender integration, diversity, employment equity, mechanisms of voice, attrition, and retention. Studies such as these frequently make reference to the need for cultural change or the responsibility of leadership to take positive action, influence attitudes and behaviour, etc. Research explicitly focused on the culture of the CF, and linked to leadership influence, particularly that conducted within DND/CF, is sparse relative to the focus that has been placed on ‘organizational climate’ research in the past 20 years. The research on organizational climate, discussed below, while substantively linked to leadership, is to date limited, for the most part, to the army/land environment of the CF.

Organizational Climate

The research on organizations from a ‘climate’ perspective is rooted in studies of experimentally created social climates, first published by Kurt Lewin and others in 1939.³⁶ For the following several decades, climate research was characterized by quantitative survey measurements of various dimensions of organizational environments based on the perceptions of members of the organization. Within the Lewin tradition, “The ‘agents’ of an organizational system, such as management [and leadership], are often assumed but seldom studied directly. They create the climate that others work in. The ‘subjects’ of that system, most often

the employees, workers, or subordinates, are the primary objects of study.”³⁷ Importantly, climate research, in its beginnings, was not concerned with the process by which social environments are constructed, including the role and contribution of individual members in its construction. Instead, the predominant focus was on defining organizational conditions and individual reactions to those conditions or dimensions. For example, a 1968 study defined climate in terms of nine dimensions: structure, responsibility, reward, risk, warmth, support, standards, conflict, and identity.³⁸ Concurrent with the rebound of research on organizational culture in the 1980s, climate research evolved to include both objective measures of organizational dimensions and subjective reporting of individual perceptions. In addition, climate researchers became more concerned with the question of where organizational climate comes from.

The CF research on unit climate parallels the development of academic work on organizational climate. It builds upon the very early work of Lewin in the 1930s, which focuses on human behaviour as a function of the interplay of personality and the environment, and it also includes later developments in the field which concentrate on the environment.³⁹ The result is a focus that integrates organizational and psychological approaches to climate research.⁴⁰

Unit climate research in the CF originated in 1988 with a proposal for studying the human dimensions of combat readiness, including aptitude, combat proficiency (professional knowledge, professional skill, physical skills), understanding of task (knowledge of mission, evaluation of the enemy), the motivational environment (personal morale, professional morale, ideology, small group morale, cohesion, stability), motivation, and leadership.⁴¹ Conducted within the context of army operational units, the focus of such research is on determining the relationship between human factors, (through the measured response of soldiers in their units), leadership, and unit operational effectiveness.

CHAPTER 12

The 1988 proposal on human dimensions of readiness provided the foundation for the development of the Human Dimension Combat Readiness Index - Experimental (HDCRI-X), which was initially administered to 251 non-commissioned infantry soldiers in 1989. Analysis of the data provided validation of measures of morale/cohesion, leadership skills, ideology, professional morale, and confidence in leadership at Section Commander, Platoon Warrant, Platoon Commander, and Company Commander levels. As a result, the conceptual model of combat readiness first proposed in 1988 was supported. This early work established measures of confidence in CF leadership as integral to the overall measure of combat readiness. In addition, the military values and socialization measures of the ideology component further supported the work done by Cotton in 1979, thus indicating the existence of a distinct military ethos.⁴²

Since 1989, the foundation work on the HDCRI-X has been further developed, evolving into the current Human Dimensions of Operations (HDO) project which consolidates the unit climate profile to include measures of stress and coping.⁴³ In 1995, for example, focus groups were conducted with two Canadian Battle Groups to identify categories of stress experienced by CF personnel on operations to inform the development of a stress in military operations questionnaire. This work identified 'leadership and political support' as one of 12 categories of stressors which included: organizational stressors; personal control, well-being and adaptation; family separation; unit operations; cultural issues; logistical support and personnel resources; threats to personal safety; work scheduling; training and preparation; work relationships; and threats to safety and well-being of others. In the context of this work, 'leadership and political support' include things such as the slow passage of information through the chain of command, lack of clear direction to carry out a mission, and lack of trust or confidence in superiors. 'Cultural issues' referred to concerns expressed by soldiers in focus groups about day-to-day interactions with local civilians and military personnel, such as feeling unwelcome

or unappreciated by those they were trying to help and trying to understand local culture and customs.⁴⁴

The HDO has been administered in various forms since 1996 to deployed army units in Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti, Eritrea, and Afghanistan. Various versions of the survey have been used to include different subscales, addition and deletion of items, and to accommodate changes in terminology. In addition, the HDO has been administered in conjunction with the Military Equal Opportunity Climate Survey, the Multicultural Attitudes Survey, and the Gender Integration Survey.⁴⁵ Typically, the subscales of the HDO itself include the unit climate profile (including morale, cohesion and confidence in leadership), stress in military service, signs of stress, coping and a background questionnaire.⁴⁶ Generally, army leadership has been receptive to the HDO survey recognizing the value of gaining information related to the readiness and related effectiveness of soldiers in operational environments.

Overall, analysis of unit climate data in the CF has facilitated greater understanding of the relationships between morale, task cohesion, social cohesion, confidence in leadership, experience of stress, and effective coping strategies.⁴⁷ Historically, military leaders have placed significant emphasis on high morale and unit cohesion as essential elements of mission success; however, research in several nations suggests that leader perceptions of soldier morale, unit cohesion, and confidence in leadership are frequently inaccurate – in fact, the greater confidence leaders expressed in these regards, the greater the discrepancy between perception and reality.⁴⁸ Analysis of HDO data confirms that Canada is not an exception to this general observation.⁴⁹ Recent CF data also suggests that strain tends to be higher among junior officers, widowed and older members; morale, cohesion and confidence in leadership is highest among younger soldiers; however, women express significantly less confidence in leadership than do men.⁵⁰ The availability of such information allows leaders to address such issues and thus enhance their capacity as a leader and the effectiveness of the unit.

CHAPTER 12

The HDO is an effective tool for leaders; however, its application is specific to combat arms and combat service support personnel serving in an operational theatre. As a result, the CF has developed the Unit Morale Profile (UMP) to examine the human dimensions of military effectiveness across the broader military environment. The UMP, so named in recognition that morale is a composite of many psychological factors, measures 14 dimensions of unit climate: role stress; work motivation; job satisfaction; psychological distress; quality of life; leadership style; confidence in leadership; cohesion; communication; climate⁵¹; preparedness for deployment; perceived organizational support and organizational commitment; job performance; and retention/attrition intentions.⁵² Research has also been conducted to adapt the UMP for application within a civilian-military integrated Maritime environment,⁵³ and the air force environment.⁵⁴

The recognized value of this climate research, most recently represented under the auspices of the HDO, has increased since its initial application in 1996. Although the administration of the HDO has been mandated, CF leadership is becoming increasingly motivated to put the information to practical use. In addition, the demand for the UMP in garrison settings is increasing. The demand is such that the CF 'Personnel Selection' branch, comprised of military officers who practice various aspects of organizational psychology in the CF, has initiated training in the theory, statistical analysis, and practical application of the HDO.⁵⁵

The HDO is under continuous revision to ensure that it remains relevant, including a recent review to incorporate elements of the new CF leadership doctrine, such as 'leading people', and 'leading the institution'. The HDO seeks to improve organizational effectiveness by enhancing leadership understanding of numerous dimensions of organizational climate. While early climate research in the CF focused almost exclusively on operational readiness, the HDO has developed to incorporate a broader range of factors influenced by the changing social, political and security environment. In addition, the measurement of climate is

understood to provide conceptual links between organizational analyses and analyses of the individual, the interaction between the individual and their environment, and an understanding of how those interactions influence behaviour and motivation. Finally, the measurement of organizational climate in the CF assumes numerous guidelines, including the identification of enduring aspects of the organization and limited ability to compare across organizations due to 'intrinsic' factors such as ethos and traditions.⁵⁶ Clearly, the measurement of climate in the CF has evolved from the original Lewin tradition to include aspects of organizational culture. The discussion below provides an overview of the similarities, differences and evolving trends in the measurement of organizational climate and culture.

Culture and Climate

Overall, the work on culture and climate that developed throughout the 1980s and 1990s became virtually indistinguishable.⁵⁷ Not surprising, culture is often confused with climate.⁵⁸ In investigating this confusion, Daniel Denison summarizes the relationship between culture and climate as follows:

On the surface, the distinction between organizational climate and organizational culture may appear to be quite clear: Climate refers to a situation and its link to thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of organizational members. Thus, it is temporal, subjective, and often subject to direct manipulation by people with power and influence. Culture, in contrast, refers to an evolved context (within which a situation may be embedded). Thus it is rooted in history, collectively held, and sufficiently complex to resist many attempts at direct manipulation. The two perspectives have generated distinct theories, methods, and epistemologies as well as a distinct set of findings, failings, and future agendas.⁵⁹

CHAPTER 12

A recent study of climate, culture and socio-cultural attitudes and values in the Canadian army⁶⁰ defines culture within the social psychological paradigm offered by Edgar Schein, and is thus parallel to CF doctrine in its definition – characterized by symbols, rituals, values and beliefs shared by members of an organization. Importantly, this research also notes that culture “determines how and why certain things are done in the organization.”⁶¹ Organizational climate, along with its relationship to culture is defined within this context as:

...how people feel about their organization. Satisfaction with leaders, pay, working conditions, and co-workers are all aspects of climate. Oftentimes, climate is influenced by the underlying values and beliefs that comprise culture. Similarly, changes to climate can result in changes to the culture over time.⁶²

Climate is defined in relation to culture, just as the analysis presented in the 2005 army report integrates the findings of the climate and culture surveys. The climate survey component of this study builds upon previous measures used in the CF, including the 1979 Cotton research and CF climate research previously discussed, to measure a range of dimensions: individual attitudes and opinions in reference to the role of the army; mission accomplishment and troop safety; workload; ethics; institutional/occupational role orientation; careerism; professionalism; willingness to enter combat; discipline; confidence in skills and ability; leadership culture; perceptions of immediate leadership; right of association; learning organizational culture; acceptance of gender integration; acceptance of diversity; attitudes toward language requirements; communication; and locus of commitment.

The socio-cultural survey component of the army study measures individual attitudes and values on 67 trends determined to be of interest to the army, including personal achievement and development, importance of the individual, adherence to institutional

leadership, attraction to intensity, sense of duty and need for accomplishment, social conscience, and conservatism. While this research clearly comprises components of measuring culture and measuring climate, the report of the integrated findings is identified as “an important first step in defining and describing the organizational military culture that exists in Canada’s army today.” The report further summarizes military culture as “how we do things around here.”⁶³ Finally, this research includes measures of army attitudes and opinions that are used to compare ‘how it is’ with ‘how it should be’ in relation to the espoused ethos in CF leadership doctrine, *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*.

The Canadian army research described above provides an example of an integrated culture and climate approach to understanding the culture of an organization. This seems to mirror the findings of Daniel Denison in his quest to clarify the distinctions between culture and climate research. When Denison compared individual studies within the distinct bodies of culture and climate literature, he found that

... the underlying similarity of the two research topics has led a number of culture researchers to apply the quantitative, comparative and Lewinian approaches associated with climate research, whereas several climate researchers have studied the evolution of social contexts from a social constructionist point of view that makes it difficult to distinguish from culture research.⁶⁴

While, as noted earlier, culture and climate are clearly understood to be unique phenomena, the differences are often muted in the actual conduct of research.

With the exception of the recent army culture/climate study, ‘culture’ and ‘climate’ research in the CF domain have generally remained in separate methodological corners. Culture research, including the current CF culture project, has largely focused on

CHAPTER 12

qualitative approaches, while climate research, such as the HDO, has relied upon survey methodology and psychometric analysis of data. One exception is, of course, the 1979 survey measurement of attitudes and values in the army.⁶⁵ However, this research, as well as components of the climate research and the integrated army culture/climate research, purport to measure attitudes, values, and assumptions regarding military ethos and military service. The potential implications of culture and climate research on the leadership of the CF are discussed below.

Discussion

Research on culture and climate in the CF is in its infancy. While the debates have raged in the academic literature around the relative merits of qualitative and quantitative approaches to climate and culture, very little work has been done to integrate the theoretical approaches and assumptions to determine how culture and climate research can contribute to a greater understanding of the CF as an institution, as well as the relationships among the sub-components of the organization. When all is said and done, it is likely that the methodological approach chosen will have less impact on outcome than will a careful consideration of the implications of the different theoretical foundations.

Daniel Denison identifies three key areas in this regard: the capacity of climate and culture perspectives to explain the evolution of social processes over time; the potential to compare across different contexts and settings in the organization, and the relationship of each perspective to the ideology of managerialism, which is most relevant to leadership in the military context. Culture research typically assumes that the concept of social construction is valuable for understanding social evolution on a case-by-case basis and understands that value systems are impacted by various stakeholders, power groups and subcultures. However, cultural approaches are not well suited to making comparisons across different settings. Climate research, with its

roots in Lewinian field theory, is useful for understanding the impact of social context, making comparisons across different contexts (albeit at a relatively superficial level), and accepts that there is a distinction between the creators (managers/leaders) of social context and the non-managerial employees that are affected by the context.⁶⁶ Within the current context of the CF, it is important to understand social processes/social evolution to inform cultural change and transformation. It is equally important to understand similarities and differences across units and sub-cultures to inform integrated and lasting change across the CF. There is considerable potential for leveraging the outcome of both climate and culture research in the CF to increase overall understanding of the organization in regard to both social processes and distinctions across various settings and sub-cultures.

Perhaps the most important assumptions identified above are those that inform the relationships between leadership and the culture or climate. Without question, climate research, in particular, has served to inform and measure leadership in the CF. Clearly, the assumed role of leaders in evolving and sustaining climate and culture has significant implication for the CF. CF doctrine posits leadership as a shared responsibility which exists "... vertically and horizontally within teams, units, formations, and the CF as a whole."⁶⁷ This key feature of CF leadership implies interactive relationships between CF leaders and the individuals who become socialized as members of the CF. How we define and characterize leadership and the relationship between leaders and followers at different levels of the organization has obvious implications for how we develop leaders in the CF.

After his review of the literature, Daniel Denison concludes that the climate and culture research traditions "should be viewed as differences in interpretation rather than differences in the phenomenon." He argues that there is thus strong rationale for the integration of the two approaches.⁶⁸ One way in which we may

CHAPTER 12

be able to build upon Denison's suggestion is to view climate and culture as two elements of a common construct or phenomenon. Within the CF, culture has been most frequently understood as the more enduring and stable aspects of an organization, while climate is often understood as more volatile. Furthermore, culture research is often designed around qualitative and exploratory methods, while climate measures are based exclusively on psychometric analysis of survey data. From this perspective, climate is truly more like the weather and subject to daily and weekly variations. However, climate measures monitored across different contexts and over time have the potential to inform our understanding and awareness of integrated and enduring characteristics of CF culture. Culture research, on the other hand, has the potential to identify processes and phenomena for inclusion in 'climate' questionnaires that can be measured over time, across units, and contribute to leadership development.

Leaders can have a tremendous impact on the climate of the workplace, and need to be aware that even subtle changes to working conditions can greatly influence climate aspects like morale, cohesion, satisfaction, and commitment. Naturally, leaders can also influence culture by the policies they implement, the social norms they endorse, and the personal characteristics they display, but change will be a slow growth phenomenon and susceptible to alterations as group leaders are replaced by the system. However, it is also important to understand other influences on climate and culture. For example, what are the limits on leader control and influence and how can they best negotiate those influences? Finally, within the context of transformation and the emphasis on joint CF approaches to operations, it is increasingly important to develop integrated and complementary research strategies to enhance understanding of unique CF sub-cultures, to make relevant comparisons across sub-cultures and to increase understanding of how various aspects of culture become embedded within various sub-cultures, as well as across the institution.

There is clearly room to continue pursuing culture and climate research from unique *and* integrated perspectives, while applying various methodological approaches to seek greater understanding of the relationships between CF climate, culture, leadership and the five components of institutional effectiveness – ethos, mission success, internal integration, external adaptability and member well-being and commitment. There is still an overwhelming amount that we do not understand. However, regardless of approach, the implications for leadership, leader development and the assumed relationship between leadership and the phenomenon under investigation should be carefully considered.

Endnotes

1 For an overview of this issue and impact on change in CF see Franklin C. Pinch, “Canada: Managing Change With Shrinking Resources” in Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams and David R. Segal (eds.) *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); for detailed analysis of CF response to Somalia, see Bernd Horn, “An Absence Of Honour: Somalia – The Spark That Started The Transformation Of The Canadian Forces Officer Corps” ch. 10 in this volume, Allister MacIntyre and Karen D. Davis (eds.) *From the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute’s Research Files: Dimensions of Military Leadership*.

2 For overview of these and other issues as they impact change in CF see Pinch, “Canada: Managing Change With Shrinking Resources”

3 Ibid.

4 Canada. *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003), Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* (Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), and Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005). All available on-line at: <http://www.cda-acd.forces.gc.ca>

5 Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*.

6 Canada. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 5

CHAPTER 12

- 7 Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*, p. 7.
- 8 Ibid., p. 11.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 19-21.
- 11 Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 129.
- 12 Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992) cited in *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 117.
- 13 For example, “Establish climate of respect for individual rights & diversity” is identified as a leading people function that contributes to the effectiveness dimension of military ethos. Canada. *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, 49.
- 14 Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading People and Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, in progress, 2006).
- 15 E. Jacques cited in Daniel R. Denison, “What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate? A native’s point of view on a decade of paradigm wars” *The Academy of Management Review* 21 (1996), 619-654.
- 16 Daniel R. Denison, “What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate? A native’s point of view on a decade of paradigm wars” *The Academy of Management Review* 21 (1996), 619-654.
- 17 Ibid., 635.
- 18 Allan D. English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004).
- 19 W. R. Kelley, *A Study of Attitudes Toward Military Service: Sub-cultural Influences* (Willowdale, Ontario: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, Research Note 67-2, 1967).
- 20 Leadership instability was concerned with the rate of individual leader rotation. The report noted “the stability of individuals in unit leadership roles, and thus the relationship between the leaders and the led is critical to the development of trust and confidence” Ibid., 37.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 C. A. Cotton, *Military Attitudes and Values in the Army in Canada*. (Willowdale, Ontario: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, 1979), 6.
- 23 Ibid., 9.

- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Shannen Murphy, *Annotated Bibliography: Culture in the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa, Canada: National Defence, Director Strategic Human Resources Research Note 04/04, 2004).
- 26 For example, Conference of Canadian Defence Associations, Conference on Ethics in Canadian Defence, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.
- 27 Sam Alvaro, Samantha Urban, Brian McKee and Sarah A. Hill. *Military and Organizational Culture: An Annotated and Secondary Bibliography of Literature from the Past Ten Years* (Canada: Defence R&D Canada, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis Technical Memorandum 2005-43, 2005).
- 28 D. Winslow, *The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-cultural Inquiry*. (Ottawa: Ministry of Public Works and Government Services, 1997).
- 29 As the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) drew their members from combat arms units across the CF, the extent to which the problems were isolated to CAR has been debated. See, for example, Bernd Horn, "An Absence Of Honour: Somalia – The Spark That Started The Transformation Of The Canadian Forces Officer Corps".
- 30 For discussion of 'Uncovering the Levels of Culture' see Edgar H. Schein. *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 16-27.
- 31 English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective*.
- 32 M. I. Harrison and A. Shikom, *Organizational Diagnosis and Assessment*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1999) cited in Brian McKee, *Organizational Culture: Basic Concepts and Ideas* (Ottawa, Canada: National Defence, Director Strategic Human Resources & Social Science Operational Research Team Research Note 08/04, 2004), 5.
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Brian McKee, *Organizational Culture: Towards the Development of a Strategy for the Study of Cultural Change within the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa, Canada: National Defence, Director Strategic Human Resources & Social Science Operational Research Team Research Note 10/04, 2004).
- 35 Brian McKee and Sarah A. Hill. *The "How To" of Organizational Culture Change in the CF* (Canada: National Defence, Centre for Operational Research and Analysis, In Progress).
- 36 K. Lewin, R. Lippit & R. White, "Patterns of aggressive behaviour in experimentally created social climates" *Journal of Social*

CHAPTER 12

Psychology, Vol. 10, 271-299 cited in Daniel R. Denison, "What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate?"

37 Denison, "What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate?", 634.

38 G. Litwin and Stringer. *Motivation and organizational climate* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968) cited in Daniel R. Denison, "What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate?"

39 B. F. Johnston et al. *Measuring Organizational Climate in the Canadian Forces*. (Ottawa, Ontario: Director Human Resource Research and Evaluation, Conference Paper 2002-04 presented at the 44th Annual Conference of the International Military Testing Association, 22-24 October 2002).

40 Denison, "What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate?"

41 W. Wilde, *Proposal for studying the human dimensions of combat readiness*. (Wilowdale, Ontario: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, Technical Note 5/88, 1988).

42 D. T. Reeves and R. J. Hansen. *Development of the Human Dimension Combat Readiness Index-Experimental (HDCRI-X)* (Wilowdale, Ontario: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, Technical Note 10/89, 1988).

43 B. F. Johnston, J. A. M. Bernard, K. J. Brown, A. K. Cole and S. Aggarwal, *Measuring Organizational Climate in the Canadian Forces*. For information specific to the development of measures related to stress and coping see P. J. Murphy and K. M. L. Farley, "Morale, cohesion, and confidence in leadership: unit climate dimensions for Canadian soldiers on operations" in *The Human in Command: Exploring the Modern Military Experience*, C. McCann and R. Pigeau, (eds.) (New York: Kluwer Academic Plenum Publishers, 2000) and K. M. L. Farley, *A Model of Unit Climate and Stress for Canadian Soldiers and Research* (Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 2002).

44 K. M. J. Farley, *Development of the Canadian Forces Stress in Military Operations Questionnaire* (Wilowdale, Ontario: Canadian Forces Personnel Applied Research Unit, Technical Note 15/95, 1995).

45 For a detailed summary of the versions of the HDO, see K. J. Brown, *Human Dimensions of Operations Survey: Revision and Two Year Validation* (Ottawa, Ontario: National Defence Headquarters,

Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation, Technical Note 2004-10, 2005).

46 K. J. Brown, *Human Dimensions of Operations Survey: Revision and Two Year Validation*; B. F. Johnston et al. *Measuring Organizational Climate in the Canadian Forces*.

47 Kelly M. J. Farley, *A model of unit climate and stress for Canadian soldiers on operations*. (Ottawa, Ontario: Carleton University, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 2002).

48 Kelly M. J. Farley and Jennifer A. Veitch. "Measuring Morale, Cohesion and Confidence in Leadership: What are the Implications for Leaders?" *The Canadian Journal of Police & Security Services* 1 (Winter 2003).

49 K. J. Brown, *The Leadership Calibration Scale* (Ottawa, Ontario: National Defence Headquarters, Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation, Conference Paper 2003-04 presented at the 45th International Military Testing Association, Pensacola, Florida, 3-6 November 2003).

50 R. J. A. Izzo, M. Lapointe, M. Villeneuve and D. Coulombe cited in Kelly M. J. Farley and Jennifer A. Veitch. "Measuring Morale, Cohesion and Confidence in Leadership: What are the Implications for Leaders?"

51 Includes dimensions of involvement, consideration, efficacy and fairness of rules; quality of feedback; autonomy and recognition/encouragement derived from a questionnaire developed to examine perception of Officer Cadets of the organizational climate at the Royal Military College of Canada. See M. Villeneuve and C. Gingras, "Report of the study of Officer Cadet's perception of the organizational climate at the Royal Military College of Canada" *American Journal of Community Psychology* 13, 693-713.

52 M. A. Riley, *Measuring the Human Dimension of Unit Effectiveness – The Unit Morale Profile* (Ottawa, Ontario: Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation Conference Paper 2002-01 presented at the 38th International Applied Military Psychology Symposium, 20-24 May 2002).

53 Johnston et al. *Measuring Organizational Climate in the Canadian Forces*.

54 Allister Tompkins MacIntyre, *The interrelationships among small group constructs: Towards the development of a unified model* (Kingston, Ontario, Canada: Queen's University, Unpublished doctoral dissertation, 2001).

CHAPTER 12

55 J. A. J. Bernard and K.J. Brown. *Enhancing Leadership through Assessments of Organization Climate and Leadership* (Ottawa, Ontario: Director Human Resources Research and Evaluation Conference Paper 2004-02 presented at the 40th International Applied Military Psychology Symposium, 24-28 May 2004).

56 Ibid.

57 Denison, "What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate?"

58 Peter Alexander Hausdorf and Lynda Zugec, *Designing Effective Leader Assessment/Feedback Systems: Integrating Organizational Culture, Stages of Change, and Goal Setting*. (Guelph, Ontario: University of Guelph, Paper commissioned for the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute).

59 Denison, "What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate?", 644.

60 Mike Capstick, Kelly Farley, Bill Wild and Mike Parkes. *Canada's Soldiers: Military Ethos and Canadian Values in the 21st Century* (Ottawa, Ontario: National Defence, Director General – Land Capability Development, Land Personnel Concepts and Policy, 2005).

61 Ibid., 70.

62 Ibid., 70.

63 Ibid., 2.

64 Denison, "What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate?", 645.

65 Cotton, *Military Attitudes and Values in the Army in Canada*.

66 Denison, "What is the difference between organizational culture and organizational climate?"

67 Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine*. Ibid., 7.

68 Ibid., 645.

CHAPTER 13

Attitudes and Behaviour : A Primer for Military Leaders



Allister MacIntyre

. . . social attitudes among Canadians have become more liberal and individually focused, largely as a result of social legislation, continuing upward trends in educational attainment, and improved access to information. One parallel development is that trust in public institutions and deference to authority are down, while independent judgment and awareness of individual and minority rights are up. Taken together, these changes mean that, to be effective in building individual commitment and teamwork, leaders will have to demonstrate strong interpersonal skills, a willingness to be open and candid with their subordinates, and behaviour that is both mindful of differences in maturity and conscientious in addressing individual and group concerns.¹

The above quote, extracted from *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations*, is presented as an illustration of the importance of attitudes for military leaders at all levels in the Canadian Forces (CF). Our attitudes are nothing more than the subjective experience of our likes and dislikes, our passions and disgust, our obsessions and loathing, our attractions and

CHAPTER 13

aversions. As a society we love to talk about attitudes. It is not uncommon to hear someone say that Bob has a good attitude, Bill has a bad attitude, and George needs an attitude adjustment. The irony in statements such as these is that there is an implicit suggestion that a person's "attitude" is a singular construct. The reality is that we all possess an unlimited number of attitudes about virtually every person, place, and thing we encounter during our lives. But how can we possibly know so much about Bill's attitudes and Bob's attitudes? After all, as an internal state, an attitude is not readily observable. Nevertheless, attitudes can be inferred if we pay specific attention to how people react on an emotional level both in terms of what they say and how they behave. Of particular importance for effective leaders is the need to recognize that attitudes will play a significant role in how followers will react, feel, and behave in the presence of an attitude object.²

The fact that our behaviour towards others is determined in part by the impressions and expectations we hold about them has been well documented.³ The manner in which these attitudes and stereotypes (the cognitive components of attitudes)⁴ are formed has also received considerable attention. An understanding of the role these factors play in guiding, and influencing, human behaviour is a crucial element in the study of social psychology. Leaders must also be aware that their own behaviours, as well as the behaviours of their followers, will be influenced by these factors. Furthermore, it is worth noting that although these components are important, they are not the sole determinants of behaviour.

As indicated earlier, attitude is an internal state, which predisposes one to respond to an object, setting, or person in a favourable or unfavourable manner.⁵ As such, attitudes are viewed as being either positive or negative, and estimates of the intensity (from extremely positive to extremely negative) of attitudes are often formulated. Although we cannot physically view an attitude, it has been argued that our attitudes are exhibited in our beliefs, feelings or expressions of our intended

behaviour. This perception fits in well with the tripartite model of attitudes, which holds the view that attitudes are comprised of three relatively enduring components: a cognitive component, an affective component, and a behavioural component. The cognitive component represents the particular information and beliefs one has regarding the attitude object (the schema or stereotype), the affective component refers to the emotions aroused by the attitude object, and the behavioural component provides an indication of what actions might be associated with the attitude in question.

Functions of Attitudes

Understanding the structure of an attitude is just a first step toward understanding behaviours associated with attitudes. But this does beg the question; do attitudes serve any sort of practical function? In fact, the attitudes that we hold are more than just a collection of beliefs, feelings, and behavioural intentions; they serve several useful purposes. For example, they enhance our ability to make sense of the world, allow us to express our values, ensure that we maintain effective relationships with those who share similar attitudes, and help to guide our behaviour. These purposes can be classified as functions. It has long been recognized that attitudes are not functionally alike, and they have been extensively studied in the context of the functions they serve.⁶ The five major functions performed by attitudes are: first, a knowledge function (indicating an individual's need to categorize the world in a meaningful and consistent fashion); second, an instrumental function (reflecting an attempt to maximize rewards and minimize punishments, as expressed in behaviouristic learning theory approaches); third, an ego-defensive function (for coping with anxieties generated by intrapsychic conflict, or providing protection against acknowledging basic truths about oneself); fourth, a value-expressive function (indicating an expression of values which are important to one's self-concept, or attitudes which are appropriate to one's personal values); and fifth, a social adjustment function (used to mediate one's interpersonal relations).

CHAPTER 13

Daniel Katz, a well-known attitude theorist and researcher, was one of the first psychologists to propose a functional approach to attitudes. As stated by Katz, “the functional approach is the attempt to understand the reasons people hold the attitudes they do. The reasons, however, are at the level of psychological motivations and not of the accidents of external events and circumstances.”⁷ Other theorists have expanded upon this conceptualization by arguing that, because attitudes are not functionally alike, the ability to change an attitude largely depends upon the function that the attitude serves.⁸ This is one of the most critical concepts that leaders must understand about attitudes. Effective leaders will place an emphasis on both understanding the attitudes held by followers, and using influence and persuasive techniques to shift attitudes to ensure that they are aligned with group and organizational ideals. A sound understanding of the function, or functions, served by an attitude⁹ will guide the leader to employ the most effective technique to influence, or change, attitudes.

For example, altering the rewards and punishments associated with the attitude can change instrumental attitudes relatively easily. By way of illustration, consider the issue of second language training. Many serving members of the Canadian Forces (CF) express positive attitudes toward second language training and actively seek opportunities to enhance their second language abilities. After all, bilingualism is an important consideration for promotions, and selection for particular postings and positions. If the CF were to amend current policies, and discontinue placing an importance on bilingualism, one would expect that those whose attitudes were purely instrumental would experience a shift in how they perceive, and publicly endorse, second language training. However, for those whose attitudes are intrinsically based (without the need for external rewards), a shift would not be expected. Similarly, correcting misinformation about the attitude object can adjust knowledge attitudes relatively easily. However, leaders must understand that ego-defensive and value-expressive attitudes are the most difficult types of attitudes to

change. These types of attitudes are highly resistant to change because they require a restructuring of one's self-conception and a change in one's basic values and/or beliefs respectively. Nevertheless, CF Leaders can have a dramatic impact on value-based attitudes by embodying the military ethos and ideology as espoused in the doctrinal manual *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada*¹⁰ and by reinforcing the core values of duty, courage, loyalty, and integrity in all that they do.

It is equally important for leaders to appreciate that when attitudes are based upon ego-defensive needs, then a threatened individual will either avoid an unpleasant situation, or exhibit hostility. An ego-defensive attitude functions as a defense mechanism (such as denial, projection, or repression) to protect one's self-concept from either internal or external threats. For example, it has been suggested that prejudice may stem, for some people, from a sub-conscious projection of feelings of inferiority on other people. Daniel Katz states that the "usual procedures for changing attitudes and behavior have little positive effect upon attitudes geared into our ego defenses. In fact they may have a boomerang effect of making the individual cling more tenaciously to his emotionally held beliefs. . . . punishment is threatening to the ego-defensive person and the increase of threat is the very condition which will feed ego-defensive behavior."¹¹ The implication here is that a traditionally transactional style of leadership, with its basis in rewards and punishments, will not be an effective approach for altering ego-defensive attitudes. Daniel Katz does offer three factors that may be instrumental in changing ego-defensive attitudes. First, a necessary condition is the removal of threat; second, an opportunity for catharsis or the ventilation of feelings is required; and third, the individual must acquire insight into his own mechanisms of defence. Although Katz offered this advice to therapists, and it was not couched in leadership terms, the discerning reader will be able to appreciate that someone with a transformational leadership style would most effectively use the approach.

CHAPTER 13

While ego-defensive attitudes serve to prevent people from revealing their true nature to either themselves or others, value-expressive attitudes serve the function of providing positive expression to one's central values and to the type of person one conceives oneself to be. Katz offered two conditions as being relevant to changing value-expressive attitudes: first, some degree of dissatisfaction with one's self-concept or its associated values can lead to fundamental changes; and second, dissatisfaction with old attitudes as being inappropriate to one's values can also give rise to attitude change.¹² These conditions sound similar, but there are conceptual differences. In the first case, the change originates in a shift in one's value system; in the second condition, a change does not occur in the value system, rather the attitudes held are assessed as being inconsistent with the existing value system.

Katz illustrated one method of actively transforming value systems by describing the brainwashing techniques of Chinese Communists in Korea.¹³ A crack in an individual's belief system must be found, and then it is exploited by using appropriately directed influences. Although one might question the reality of brainwashing effects, there is no questioning the fact that hundreds of allied soldiers cooperated with their captors and twenty-one American prisoners of war chose to remain even though they were given permission to return home.¹⁴

Value self-confrontation has also been employed to effect changes in behaviour. The conceptual basis for this approach rests in the theory that a person's value system is organized in a hierarchy from most important as a guiding principle (e.g., cognitions about one's competence and morality), to least important (e.g., values associated with beauty and giving to charities). The self-confrontation technique involves confronting individuals with objective feedback concerning inconsistencies between their own values and those held by a significant, positive, reference group. Results using this procedure have been mixed, with self-confrontation demonstrating some success as an aid to weight

loss,¹⁵ but ineffectiveness as a tool to change the values and behaviours of infantry officers.¹⁶ Furthermore, S.H. Schwartz and N. Inbar-Sabin point out that, of the 16 published applications of which they were aware, only half have resulted in significant behaviour changes; of these, only two studies addressed (inconclusively) whether the changes in behaviour were in fact associated with corresponding changes in value priorities. In fact, people are more likely to find that their attitudes are inappropriate (inconsistent with current values) than they are to change their value systems.¹⁷

Attitude Formation

If leaders expect to be successful in their endeavours to change attitudes, they must ensure that they have a sufficient grasp of how attitudes form in the first place. Many researchers have focused on attitude formation as a developmental process resulting from either direct behavioural experience with the attitude object or, alternatively, without the benefit of such direct behavioural experience.¹⁸ Empirical findings suggest: that attitudes produced through direct behavioural experience are more clearly, confidently, and stably maintained than attitudes resulting from more indirect means; but greater attitude-behaviour consistency is demonstrated by subjects with direct prior experience with the attitude object; and that attitudes formed without personal experience with an attitude object appear to be fundamentally different from those formed as a result of direct experience.

Russell Fazio and Mark Zanna offer two possible ways of explaining research results indicating that attitudes formed through direct behavioural experience are held more confidently than attitudes formed through indirect experience.¹⁹ They suggest that more information might be available for those with direct experience or that an information processing difference may exist between direct and indirect experience. They investigated these alternate explanations by presenting two groups of subjects with the same amount of information (a videotape of a person solving

CHAPTER 13

problems), but manipulated the salience of the behavioural information by instructing the experimental group to empathize with the person in the videotape. The results supported the prediction that direct behavioural experience affects the attitude formation process by altering the manner in which the available information is processed. Evidence is also available which suggests that attitudes based on direct behavioural experience are more persistent over time than those based on indirect experience and the more committed that individuals are to a given attitudinal position, the more resistant to influence that attitude will be, even when they are exposed to a later counter-communication. This evidence with respect to attitude formation through direct behavioural experience argues convincingly for the stability of attitudes, which have developed through contact with a distinct social group.

Attitude Importance

Once formed, some attitudes are more resistant to change than others. One critical aspect that needs to be considered, and understood, by all leaders, is the degree of importance associated with a given attitude. This notion has not escaped the attention of researchers interested in attitudes, and numerous empirical studies have examined the relationship between attitude importance and the resistance of attitudes to change. Explanations as to why attitudes which are considered important to people are more resistant to change include: first, important attitudes are associated with other attitudes, beliefs and values, and these elements exert a stabilizing force; second, important attitudes are normally accompanied by large stores of relevant knowledge which can be used to counter-argue discrepant information; third, people tend to be attracted to, and to be associated with, others with similar important attitudes, hence these attitudes are reinforced by social norms; lastly, people are more likely to commit themselves in public to attitudes they consider important, which increases their resistance to change.²⁰ The contention that important attitudes are less likely to change over time than

unimportant attitudes has been supported by recent research findings.²¹ Furthermore, Jon Krosnick points out that the demonstrated stability of important attitudes has interesting implications with regard to the manner in which people resolve attitude inconsistencies. He states that because "important attitudes are unlikely to change, inconsistency between an important attitude and an unimportant one is likely to be resolved by bringing the latter in line with the former."²² In other words, it can be argued that attitude change follows the line of least resistance.

Contact Hypothesis

If we accept the notion that attitudes formed through direct experience will be stronger, and appreciate that the importance of an attitude is influenced by things like the amount of knowledge we possess about an attitude object, then one might think that increasing direct contact with an attitude object should have an influence on attitudes. Furthermore, the change in attitude could be in either a positive or negative direction, given the nature of the interaction. This approach to the study of attitude change can be found in the contact hypothesis, as conceptualized by Israeli theorist Yehuda Amir.²³ The contact hypothesis is based on the premise that increased contact with members of an outgroup will result in an improved understanding of the group and, hence, greater tolerance. The weaknesses in this argument can be demonstrated by the mixed results of racial-integration experiments, as well as the results of empirical research. For example, it has been pointed out that "the desegregated classroom has not produced many of the positive results initially expected by social scientists some 25 years ago."²⁴ Yehuda Amir and Rachel Ben-Ari add that contact, as a tool to improve intergroup relations, must be strongly qualified by individual and situational factors.²⁵ Furthermore, it has been argued that an individual's improved attitude toward contact-group members will not necessarily generalize to the entire group.²⁶ In fact, outgroup members who are eventually accepted are perceived as exceptions to the group from which they come. Finally, Yehuda Amir has cautioned that attitude change

CHAPTER 13

following intergroup contact may not be in the anticipated direction.²⁷ Favourable conditions may lead to an improvement in attitudes, but unfavourable conditions might actually increase negative attitudes. Additionally, any changes produced by contact may not be a change in direction of attitude, but may be a change in the intensity of the attitude.

Yehuda Amir presents some of the favourable conditions that tend to reduce prejudice (a specific type of attitude): first, equal status between the members of the contact groups; second, contact is with higher status members of the minority group; third, an “authority” and/or the social climate are in favour of and promote the intergroup contact; fourth, the contact is of an intimate rather than casual nature; fifth, the intergroup contact is pleasant or rewarding; and sixth, the members of both groups in the contact situation interact in functionally important activities or develop common goals that are higher in ranking in importance than the group individual goals.²⁸ Amir also presents the unfavourable conditions that tend to strengthen negative attitudes. These are: first, the contact situation produces competition between the groups; second the contact is unpleasant, involuntary or tension laden; third, the prestige or status of one group is lowered as a result of the contact situation; fourth, the members of a group or the group as a whole are in a state of frustration (may lead to scapegoating); fifth, the groups in contact have moral standards which are objectionable to one another; and sixth, when the contact is between a majority and minority group and the members of the minority group are of a lower status, or are lower in any relevant characteristic than the members of the majority group.

These are extremely important considerations for leaders in general because they have the greatest amount of control over situational factors and conditions that can either lead to reductions or increases in prejudicial attitudes. Furthermore, the conditions are especially germane for military leaders interested in ensuring the cohesiveness of their followers. CF leaders are constantly

called upon to command serving members from diverse backgrounds and must work closely with leaders from other elements, other government departments, and other nations. Leaders can use their influence to ensure that minority group members are viewed as having at least equal, if not higher status. As an authority figure, they must convey that they are in favour of and promote the intergroup contact. They can ensure that the working relationships extend beyond a superficial level and contain some elements of reward. Finally, they can influence the nature of the activities being performed so that they are viewed as being functionally important and imbued with common goals that are that are higher in ranking in importance than the individual goals. Naturally, an effective CF leader will also make an effort to reduce or eliminate competition between the groups; make sure that the prestige or status of the group members is not lowered as a result of the contact situation; and take necessary steps to reduce frustrations and tensions.

Group Conflict and Cooperation

The preceding discussion of contact between groups leads naturally to the consideration of whether different groups cooperate or experience conflict. Countless studies have been conducted in the areas of group conflict and, more importantly, group cooperation.²⁹ Social psychologists usually differentiate between “in-groups,” a social unit that we either belong to or identify with, and “out-groups,” a social group that we either do not belong to or do not view as being relevant to our self-concept or identity.³⁰ Competition and conflict between groups is normal and expected because of the differing group norms and perceptions held by members of a group towards members in other groups. The term “ethnocentrism” has been used to label the progression from perceived competition among groups to perceived hostility. Some of the facets of the syndrome of ethnocentrism are: members of an in-group viewing themselves as being virtuous and superior; a tendency to cooperate with other in-group members; an imposition of sanctions against violations of in-group

CHAPTER 13

norms; and, a willingness to fight for the in-group. Conversely, in-group members tend to: view out-groups as being contemptible and inferior, and perhaps immoral; maintain a social distance from out-groups; approve hatred of out-groups; and, distrust and fear out-groups.

Conflict between groups is normal, but it has been demonstrated that, with the introduction of superordinate (common) goals, cooperation is promoted.³¹ This ties in nicely with one of the favourable conditions required to foster a reduction in prejudice in contact groups, specifically, the development of common goals that are higher-ranking than individual goals. With cooperation between groups, there tends to be a concomitant reduction in hostility and conflict between groups.³² However, this stance must be tempered by the fact that, depending upon the circumstances, intergroup relationships do sometimes result in increased negative attitudes. Furthermore, if the conflict between the groups has progressed to a point of ethnocentricity, then even the pursuit of superordinate goals may not result in an ameliorative attitude change.

Education and Attitude Change

In military settings, the mindset tends to focus on education and training whenever a need to exercise some degree of influence is identified. When it comes to intergroup relations this approach seems to be grounded in the assumption that, if we educate people, then prejudice will disappear. In terms of racial bigotry, James Vander Zanden points out that the opinion of most specialists in race relations is that, despite numerous decades of research into factual instruction, the only conclusion is that it tends to mitigate some of the more extreme expressions of prejudice³³. There are weaknesses in the arguments in favour of education to improve attitudes towards out-groups. First, in a study of attitude change through the use of audiovisual programs, differences between groups (of undergraduate students) were found immediately following the viewing of videotapes, but a follow-up

assessment five weeks later showed no significant differences.³⁴ This suggests that improvements in attitudes as a result of education may only be short term. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that those who hold strong opinions on complex social issues are more likely to be biased when examining relevant empirical evidence. Confirming evidence will be accepted at face value, while disconfirming information will be subjected to critical evaluation.³⁵ Charles Lord and his colleagues illustrated this fact by presenting two purported, and opposing, studies regarding the deterrent efficacy of the death penalty to subjects either supporting or opposing capital punishment. The effect of this treatment was to increase attitude polarization. Although this assertion would be extremely difficult to demonstrate in an empirical setting, if the social issue involved is one on which researchers hold strong opinions, then the research itself would be biased and the actual significance of the results could not adequately determined.

Cognitive Dissonance and Attitude Change

If education and training appears to fall short as an effective means to change attitudes, then another approach might be warranted. One such alternate approach, which offers some hope of being able to change attitudes, involves the theory of cognitive consistency and dissonance first developed by Leon Festinger almost half a century ago.³⁶ This theory argues that one of the most powerful motives in human life is the drive for cognitive consistency. When two cognitions are in conflict, the individual experiences the opposite of cognitive consistency, namely cognitive dissonance.³⁷ The reaction to dissonance (discomfort, tension) is to immediately attempt to resolve the dissonance by altering one cognition to fit the other. An example of this kind of behaviour can be found in the habitual use of artificial sweeteners. When faced with evidence that the sweeteners may cause cancer, the reaction might be to rationalize that not enough of the product is consumed for this to be a real threat, or one might argue that they would rather die of cancer than obesity. In either

CHAPTER 13

case, the information that is inconsistent, or dissonant with the current behaviour would be resisted/rationalized.

Dissonance also occurs when there is a psychological inconsistency between internal attitudes and overt behaviour.³⁸ Hence, in practice, one attempts to change attitudes by concentrating on behaviour change. By applying cognitive dissonance theory, it might be argued that there is no need to change attitudes towards out-groups, only a need to change behaviour towards out-groups. Where this overt behaviour is inconsistent with internal attitudes, the result will be dissonance and the resolution of the dissonance may well be a change in attitudes towards the members of the outgroup. Most military leaders are in possession of a degree of position power that allows them to direct and control their followers' behaviour. As a consequence, they are in a favourable position to implement type of approach for changing behaviour, and influencing attitudes.

However, there are fundamental weaknesses in this argument as well. Individuals will only experience dissonance if their behaviour cannot be explained by reference to demands external to oneself. Conversely, as stated by Clay Hamner and Dennis Organ in their classic text on organizational behaviour, when a behaviour "is fully justified by external circumstances (for example, the avoidance of pain or the acquisition of rewards), little or no dissonance is aroused by inconsistency between that behavior and the person's attitude."³⁹ Joel Cooper and Russell Fazio refer to this personal or internal attribution of causation as the assumption of "personal responsibility," a necessary link leading to cognitive dissonance. They add that dissonance is typically avoided in one of two ways. Firstly, a person can deny responsibility for the unwanted event; and secondly, the unwanted outcome is assessed as being an unforeseeable consequence of their behaviour.⁴⁰

Social Norms and Behaviour

Although the importance of attitudes as a determinant of behaviour should never be underestimated, it can also be readily argued that behaviour is only partly determined by attitudes, values, and other intrinsic attributes. Individual behaviour is also influenced and regulated by social norms and other factors constituting one's psychological environment. Generally speaking, social norms typically involve some form of social sanction for members of a group who violate an accepted norm, and rewards for those who comply.⁴¹ One of the more famous illustrations of this contention, within the social psychological literature, is the theory of reasoned action as conceptualized by Martin Fishbein and Icek Ajzen and later refined by Ajzen⁴² as the theory of planned behaviour.⁴³ In both of these approaches, attitudes are viewed as just one of the possible predictors of one's "intention" to behave in a particular manner. The second prime contender for influencing behavioural intentions is our perception of subjective norms (i.e., our assessment of the typical behaviour that would be expected within our reference group). In his refined model, the model of planned behaviour, Icek Ajzen incorporates perceived behavioural control (i.e., our assessment of how much real control we can exert in a given situation) as another predictor of behavioural intention.

However, conflicting norms are possible, especially when one is participating in more than one reference group. This is particularly evident within an organizational setting where the norms defined by the hierarchy may not be in agreement with peer norms. George Homans argues that "a member is more likely to conform, the more valuable to him are the rewards he receives from other conforming members, relative to those he receives from alternative actions."⁴⁴ For example, someone who conforms to a management norm, despite the fact that he does not believe in the norm, is described as a "skeptical conformer."

CHAPTER 13

Attitudes - Summary

In summary, because of the conditions required to effect a change in functional attitudes, a change in attitudes based upon the functional approach is not likely. Contact with out-groups may just as easily lead to increased negative attitudes, and the pursuit of superordinate goals may not make a measurable difference. The education argument is weak because of the lack of generalizability of studies using college students and, in any case, the positive effects may only be short term. Finally, conforming to a social norm need not be accompanied by a concomitant change in attitude.

Stereotypes

It is important to keep in mind that no two people will hold the identical attitude about a target group, object, or place because our life experiences are not necessarily identical.⁴⁵ Similarly, the cognitive component of our attitudes will vary from person to person depending upon our experiences or values. Nevertheless, there will still be some shared aspects, and these aspects will be discussed in greater detail in the discussion on stereotypes. That said, the question of where stereotypes fit into this equation remains to be answered.

At the beginning of this chapter, the tripartite model of attitudes was presented. Within this conceptual model, attitudes are comprised of affective, cognitive, and behavioural components. Although leaders can use their position to control behaviour, real attitude change must be initiated within the cognitive facet of an attitude. Affective changes will follow and behavioural intentions will become internalized. The cognitive component contains everything we know, or believe to be true about an attitude object. This type of mental representation is known as a schema, and the aspects of our schema that tend to be shared by others within our group (i.e., there is a tendency for others to believe these things to be true as well) comprises the stereotype for a given out-group.

Indeed, the word stereotype is widely used by lay people and researchers alike. A journalist, Walter Lippmann, introduced the term itself in 1922.⁴⁶ Walter Lippmann was fascinated by the fact that different people could observe the same event in dramatically different ways. He adopted the printing industry's term "stereotype" (a metal plate for making duplicates) to capture the notion that our preconceptions influence how we perceive events. Although the term schema is much older, with roots that can be traced back to an ancient Greek word⁴⁷ for "form," "shape," or "figure," its use as an everyday word is not as common.

Because we are unable to know every other member of society on an individual basis, the attitudes formed towards others are often based on the stereotypes held (e.g., social, ethnic, religious, racial, gender or cultural) for the group in which we categorize individuals. A stereotype is a set of widely shared broad generalizations about the characteristics of a group of people. We classify others on the basis of their membership in a group and automatically assume that they possess a number of traits that are associated with that group.⁴⁸ Stereotypes do not necessarily result in prejudice, or pejorative attitudes. In fact they can reflect positive traits about people just as easily as negative ones. For example, as a result of commonly held stereotypes it may be assumed that an Asian person will have a strong work ethic or that Canadians are polite. Neither of these stereotypes have negative connotations. Steven Penrod has even suggested that stereotypes are "essential for organizing the multiplicity of experiences we have from infancy through adulthood."⁴⁹ However, it is evident that Penrod also acknowledges the negative side to stereotypes. He adds that, "when our stereotypes are so rigidly maintained that no new information can modify them, they no longer contribute to our understanding of the world, but in fact insulate us from reality."⁵⁰

Despite the fact that everyone seems to have their own appreciation of what a stereotype is, there is a continuing debate amongst theorists with respect to the nature and defining characteristics of

CHAPTER 13

stereotypes. This may be, at least in part, a consequence of the fact that stereotype research has been conducted in many diverse fields including clinical, experimental, and social psychology, as well as sociology.⁵¹ For many years, stereotypes were viewed as being “bad” and they have even been treated from time to time as “bizarre or pathological phenomena.”⁵² In keeping with this image, stereotypes have been described as: unjustified generalizations made about an ethnic group, rigid impressions that conform very little to facts, exaggerated beliefs, inaccurate and irrational overgeneralizations, and clusters of preconceived notions.⁵³

Current attitudes regarding stereotypes are less harsh. There is virtually total agreement that stereotypes are cognitive constructs, and generally wide spread consensus that “an ethnic stereotype is a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of the members of a particular social category.”⁵⁴ As stated more recently by Don Taylor and Fathali Moghaddam, the current “trend is to view stereotyping as a basic cognitive process that is neither desirable nor undesirable in and of itself.”⁵⁵ We have even progressed to a point where it is accepted that stereotypes are universal constructs that are used by everyone as an aid in processing information about our social environment and stereotypes are both inevitable and usually quite functional for effective social interaction.⁵⁶

Stereotypes could be considered bad if our adherence to them was so rigid that we were unable to differentiate between individual members of a social group. However, according to John Duckitt, there “is no evidence indicating that stereotyped beliefs are any more rigid, over generalized, or incorrect than any other widely held category-based generalizations.”⁵⁷ Furthermore, Jussim, McCauley, and Lee assert that although “people often perceive differences among groups, we are not aware of a single study identifying a single person who believed that all members of a social group had a particular stereotype attribute.”⁵⁸ Although beyond the scope of this paper, the numerous ways through which stereotyping can be viewed as a useful construct have been identified elsewhere.⁵⁹

The underlying process that is considered to be responsible for stereotyping is categorization. When we encounter someone new we tend to search for salient features that may provide some clues with respect to how this person might be categorized. Some of the more obvious indicators are gender, skin colour, articles of clothing, and language. Once we succeed in categorizing someone, our stereotypes for whatever group(s) we have selected become activated. As stated by Patricia Devine, the “the target’s group membership activates, or primes, the stereotype in the perceiver’s memory [which makes] other traits or attributes associated with the stereotype highly accessible for future processing.”⁶⁰ In this manner, stereotypes offer faster access to meaningful associations and they facilitate subsequent inferences.⁶¹

In the CF, the categorization process can be extremely rapid because of the uniforms worn by serving members. When CF members walk into a room filled with other CF members, they are able to quickly pigeonhole all of the people in the room. One broad category in use is officers versus non-commissioned members, and another, almost equally broad categorization, stems from Army, Navy and Air Force. We can readily discern experience (using ribbons and medals, including a rough estimate of years of service) and occupation (using hat badges and other accoutrements). All of these categorizations carry with them an associated stereotype and, if we delve even deeper, we will discover that two male, Army infantry officers can generate distinct stereotypes simply because they belong to two different regiments. These stereotypes, in turn, will influence how we behave in the presence of these colleagues, superiors, and subordinates.

Russell Fazio states that when one encounters “a target person who is categorizable in multiple ways, people do not necessarily “see” the same person. Yet, how the target is categorized will determine what stereotypes, attitudes, and expectations are activated and, ultimately, influence judgment and behavior.”⁶² This is true to a degree, we can certainly view the same person and

CHAPTER 13

have divergent categories come to mind. However, it is also possible that, even with the use of identical categories, and the activation of the same stereotype, our attitudes will differ. In fact, it is almost self-evident that the attitudes that we hold for a particular group will influence or shape how we interpret the consensual stereotype that we hold for the group. In other words, the knowledge and beliefs aspects of the stereotype may be consensual but dependent upon our independently held related attitudes, the final judgment of the attitude can differ. Consequently, how people within a given target group may be judged can range from stingy to frugal, arrogant to confident, or indecisive to prudent. The essence of this notion is captured in the following passage:

Many of the terms in a stereotype seem to have the same denotation, but vary in connotation. Thus, the Japanese who were considered intelligent before World War II became sly during the war. The Jews are now intelligent, but were formerly thought to be shrewd. Changes in a group's stereotype seems to move along an evaluative dimension, while the denotative aspect remains similar. This shift along the evaluative dimension provides the possibility of predicting the content of a group's stereotype in the event of a shift in attitude.⁶³

In summary, stereotypes and attitudes are closely linked concepts, with stereotypes constituting the cognitive component of an attitude. While a stereotype is simply a mental representation that we have for a particular group of people, attitudes are more emotion-laden, are described as being either positive or negative, and are often the consequence of stereotypes. Even though stereotypes may be convenient, they tend to lack accuracy because, as generalizations about people, they are unscientific and hence unreliable.⁶⁴ According to James Calhoun and Joan Acocella, stereotypes are basically false because they exaggerate "the differences between groups (for example, Irishmen are drunks; Jews are sober), and they take no account of the millions

of individual differences within groups.”⁶⁵ In any case, whether true or false, stereotypes do help to account for behaviour and should not be ignored.

Stereotyping exists because we have a drive for unity and consistency in our understanding of reality. We fill in the assumed content, and structure information around a central theme. Here the central theme is the person's membership in a specific group. The stereotypes formed are largely the result of socialization, (such as children engaging in role playing), and these stereotypes are reinforced by our contemporaries, by school and employment systems, and by the media. As a result of persistent stereotypes, we have a tendency to ascribe characteristics to someone simply because we learn that he/she is a member of a specific group (whether ethnic, religious, cultural, or otherwise). Although it may be pleasing to think otherwise, by definition, it would be extremely rare to find a fully functioning individual who does not engage in stereotypical thinking and behaviour. The only exceptions that come to mind are young children who are still lacking in their cognitive development, or others who are suffering from some mental impairment or handicap. Furthermore people can only have negative (or positive) attitudes towards a generic group as a result of stereotypes formed for that group.

Stereotypes are subject to change. However, as with attitudes, this is neither a common nor easily rendered occurrence. A key impairment to changing stereotypes is the fact that the stereotypes themselves act as “cognitive filters” through which “we select what information to use, what to ignore, and how to interpret it.”⁶⁶ As a result of this filtering, disconfirming information about stereotypes is assimilated less easily than neutral or confirming information. Amir's contact hypothesis can be invoked as evidence for change but, once again, the circumstances required for a measurable change to take place are difficult to attain. Furthermore, Amir himself suggests that our theoretical understanding of what contact involves as a potential agent of

CHAPTER 13

change, and what the actual underlying processes are, is very limited.⁶⁷ Additionally, Myron Rothbart and Oliver John state that the effects of intergroup contact on stereotypic beliefs is dependent “upon (1) the potential susceptibility of those beliefs to disconfirming information and the degree to which the contact setting ‘allows’ for disconfirming events, and (2) the degree to which disconfirming events are generalized from specific group members to the group as a whole.”⁶⁸ In other words, members of an out-group who are observed behaving in other than stereotypical fashion may still be considered as exceptions to the rule. On the more negative side, as already presented, these exceptions may even be viewed more disfavorably because they do not adhere to the stereotype.⁶⁹

Additionally, a common source for information on which we can form stereotypes is the news media (as well as other media such as television and movies). News stories tend to resort to sensationalism, thereby leading to erroneous information and faulty generalizations. It is difficult to fault this argument. Newspaper editors and the directors of television news shows are in the business of attracting readers and viewers respectively. If a story can be made more exciting, by appealing to stereotypical views, then the stereotypical presentation of out-groups will continue, and this will continue to reinforce the perceptions already held by viewers.

Conclusion

Not only do we all possess a rich network of attitudes and stereotypes, but these factors play a major role in how we behave in social settings, and in how we perceive our world. In fact, because of the cognitive filtering effect of these factors, our perceptions may be distorted without our even being aware that we are tampering with reality. Furthermore, once developed, we cling tenaciously to these attitudes and stereotypes. Change occurs only under very specific circumstances, and even then not without considerable psychological resistance. Despite the apparent distortions they cause, attitudes and stereotypes play a

valuable role in our day-to-day lives. They permit categorical thinking, which in turn allows us to cope with the enormous influx of perceptions impinging upon our senses. We simply do not have the capacity (or time) to examine every experience as a unique, special occurrence.

The message here for CF leaders is that they must first accept that attitudes and stereotypes will exist no matter what they do to try to change this reality. Their own attitudes will influence their behavioural intentions, and their followers will be similarly swayed by these mostly subconscious drives. Leaders will be able to influence attitudes, but their success in this regard will be obstructed by things like the strength of the attitude, the functions served by the attitudes, and the knowledge/beliefs associated with the attitude object. In short, it is impossible for people to not have attitudes and stereotypes, and therefore, it is equally impossible for people to not be prejudiced to some degree. Nevertheless, leaders also need to realize that attitudes are only one possible determinant of behaviour. Social norms can have a strong influence on actual behaviour. Thus, even if followers experience pejorative feelings about members of a particular outgroup (e.g., another country, race, or culture; gender; or military element) the attitude should not translate into behaviour changes in the presence of strong leadership. The CF leader's responsibility in this regard is to ensure that the behavioural norms for their subordinates are consistent with the military ethos and values.

Endnotes

1 Canada, *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* (Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2005), xiv.

2 An attitude object is any person, place, or thing that generates an attitudinal response.

3 R.H. Fazio and M.P. Zanna, "Direct experience and attitude-behavior consistency," *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 14 (1981), 161-202.

CHAPTER 13

4 The tripartite view of attitudes holds that an attitude is comprised of three components. The cognitive component contains everything we know, or believe to be true, about the attitude object. The affective component refers to our emotional response to the attitude object – how the person, place, or thing makes us feel. Finally, the behavioural component makes us want to act a certain way in the presence of the attitude object.

5 See J.E. Alcock, D.D. Carment and S.W. Sadava, *A textbook of social psychology* (Prentice-Hall: Scarborough, Ontario, 1988); and L.A. Penner, *Social psychology: Concepts and applications* (New York: West Publishing Company, 1986).

6 For additional information on this aspect of attitudes, see G.M. Herek “Can functions be measured? A new perspective on the functional approach to attitudes” *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 4 (1987), 285-303; D. Katz “The functional approach to the study of attitudes” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), 163-204; and K.G. Shaver. *Principles of social psychology* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1987).

7 D. Katz, “The functional approach to the study of attitudes,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), 170.

8 See K.G. Shaver, *Principles of social psychology* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1987).

9 The function that an attitude serves can differ from person to person, even though the attitude itself may be identical in all practical aspects.

10 Canada, *Duty With Honour: The Profession of Arms in Canada* (Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2003).

11 Katz, “The functional approach to the study of attitudes,” 182.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 D.G. Meyers, *Social Psychology* (third edition) (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990).

15 See S.H. Schwartz and N. Inbar-Sabin, “Value self-confrontation as a method to aid in weight loss” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54 (1988), 396-404.

16 See R.J. Pleban, F.N. Dyer, A. Fenigstein, and R.E. Hilligoss, “Self-confrontation as a means of changing the values and behavior of new infantry officers” (U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Research Report 1343, 1983).

- 17 S.H. Schwartz and N. Inbar-Sabin, N., "Value self-confrontation as a method to aid in weight loss" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54 (1988), 396-404.
- 18 An expansion of this concept can be found at: R.H. Fazio and M.P. Zanna, M. P., "On the predictive validity of attitudes: The role of direct experience and confidence" *Journal of Personality*, 46 (1978) 228-243; R.H. Fazio and M.P. Zanna, "Direct experience and attitude-behavior consistency" *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 14 (1981) 161-202; R.H. Fazio, M.P. Zanna, and J. Cooper, "Direct experience and attitude-behavior consistency: An information processing analysis" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 4 (1978), 48-51; D.T. Regan and R. Fazio, "On the consistency between attitudes and behavior: Look to the method of attitude formation" *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 13 (1977), 28-45; and C. Wu and D.R. Shaffer, "Susceptibility to persuasive appeals as a function of source credibility and prior experience with the attitude object" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52, (1987), 677-688.
- 19 R.H. Fazio and M.P. Zanna, "On the predictive validity of attitudes: The role of direct experience and confidence" *Journal of Personality*, 46, (1978) 228-243.
- 20 J.A. Krosnick, "Attitude importance and attitude change" *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 24, (1988) 240-255.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Ibid., 252.
- 23 See Y. Amir, "Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations" in *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, E. Weiner (Ed.), (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1998), 162-181; and Y. Amir and R. Ben-Ari, "International tourism, ethnic contact, and attitude change" *Journal of Social Issues*, 41 (1985), 105-115.
- 24 E. Aronson and D. Bridgeman, "Jigsaw groups and the desegregated classroom: In pursuit of common goals" *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 5 (1979), 438.
- 25 Y. Amir and R. Ben-Ari, "International tourism, ethnic contact, and attitude change" *Journal of Social Issues*, 41 (1985), 105-115.
- 26 S.W. Cook, "Interpersonal and attitudinal outcomes in cooperating interracial groups" *Journal of Research and Development in Education*, 12 (1978), 97-113.
- 27 Y. Amir, "Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations" in *The Handbook of Interethnic Coexistence*, E. Weiner (Ed.), (New York: Continuum Publishing, 1998), 162-181.

CHAPTER 13

28 Ibid.

29 W.C. Hamner and D.W. Organ, *Organizational behavior: An applied psychological approach* (Dallas, Texas: Business Publications, Inc, 1978); and M. Sherif, O. Harvey, B.J. White, W.R. Hood, and C.W. Sherif, *Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The robbers cave experiment* (Norman: Institute of Group Relations, University of Oklahoma, 1961).

30 E. Aronson, *The Social Animal* (9th ed.) (New York: Worth Publishers), 2004.

31 Sherif et al, *Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The robbers cave experiment*.

32 Amir, "Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations".

33 J.W. Vander Zanden, *Social Psychology* (New York: Random House, 1977).

34 R. Goldberg, "Attitude change among college students toward homosexuality" *Journal of American College Health*, 30 (1982), 260-268.

35 C.G. Lord, L. Ross and M.R. Lepper, "Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 37 (1979), 2098-2109.

36 L. Festinger, *A theory of cognitive dissonance* (Evanston, Ill.: Row-Peterson, 1957).

37 J.F. Calhoun and J.R. Acocella, *Psychology of adjustment and human relationships* (New York: Random House, 1978).

38 W.C. Hamner and D.W. Organ, *Organizational behavior: An applied psychological approach* (Dallas, Texas: Business Publications, Inc, 1978).

39 Ibid., 115.

40 J. Cooper, and R.H. Fazio, "A new look at dissonance theory" *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 17 (1984), 229-266.

41 See J.M. Levine, "Reaction to deviance in small groups" in P. B. Paulus (Ed.), *Psychology of group influence* (Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1980).

42 M. Fishbein and I. Ajzen, *Belief, attitude, intention and behavior: An introduction to theory and research* (MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

43 I. Ajzen, "The theory of planned behavior" *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 50 (1991), 179-211.

44 G.C. Homans, *Social behavior: Its elementary forms* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 1974), 103.

- 45 S.P. Marshall, *Schemas in problem solving* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- 46 D.L. Hamilton, S.J. Stroessner, and D.M. Driscoll, "Social cognition and the study of stereotyping" in P.G. Devine, D.L. Hamilton, and T.M. Ostrom (Eds.), *Social cognition: Impact on Social Psychology* (New York, NY: Academic Press, 1994), 291-321.
- 47 S.P. Marshall, *Schemas in problem solving* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- 48 J.F. Calhoun and J.R. Acocella. *Psychology of adjustment and human relationships* (New York: Random House, 1978).
- 49 S. Penrod. *Social psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1983), 394.
- 50 Ibid., 394.
- 51 R.D. Ashmore and F.K. Del Boca, "Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping" in D.L. Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1981), 1-35.
- 52 Ibid., 10.
- 53 See D.M. Taylor and F.M. Moghaddam, *Theories of intergroup relations: International social psychological perspectives* (Second Edition) (New York: Praeger, 1994).
- 54 R.D. Ashmore and F.K. Del Boca, "Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping" in D.L. Hamilton (Ed.), *Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior* (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1981), 13.
- 55 D.M. Taylor and F.M. Moghaddam, *Theories of intergroup relations: International social psychological perspectives* (Second Edition) (New York: Praeger, 1994), 161.
- 56 J. Duckitt, *The social psychology of prejudice* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992).
- 57 Ibid., 16.
- 58 L.J. Jussim, C.R. McCauley, and Y. Lee, "Why study stereotype accuracy and inaccuracy?" in Y. Lee, L.J. Jussim, and C.R. McCauley (Eds.), *Stereotype Accuracy: Toward appreciating group differences* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1995), 7.
- 59 For a comprehensive review, see S.T. Fiske, "Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination" in, D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey (Eds.), *The handbook of social psychology, Volume II* (Fourth Edition) (New York: NY: McGraw-Hill, 1998), 357-411.
- 60 P.G. Devine, "Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and

CHAPTER 13

controlled components" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56 (1989), 7.

61 S.M. Anderson, R.L. Klatzky, and J. Murray, "Traits and social stereotypes: Efficiency differences in social information processing" *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59 (1990), 192-201.

62 R.H. Fazio, "Further evidence regarding the multiple category problem: The roles of attitude accessibility and hierarchical control" in R.S. Wyer, Jr. (Ed.), *Stereotype activation: Advances in social cognition, Volume XI* (Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, 1998), 107.

63 N.R. Cauthern, I.E. Robinson, and H.H. Kraus, "Stereotypes: A review of the literature 1926-1968" *Journal of Social Psychology*, 84 (1971), 119.

64 J.W. Vander Zanden, *Social Psychology* (New York: Random House, 1977).

65 J.F. Calhoun and J.R. Acocella, *Psychology of adjustment and human relationships* (New York: Random House, 1978), 240.

66 J.E. Alcock, D.D. Carment and S.W. Sadava, *A textbook of social psychology* (Prentice-Hall: Scarborough, Ontario, 1988), 198.

67 M. Rothbart and O.P. John, "Social categorization and behavioral episodes: A cognitive analysis of the effects of intergroup contact" *Journal of Social Issues*, 41 (1985), 81-104.

68 Ibid., 81.

69 See also, M.D. Storms, "Attitudes toward homosexuality and femininity in men" *Journal of Homosexuality*, 3 (1978), 257-263.

CONTRIBUTORS

Colonel (ret'd) Dr. **Kenneth Allard** is a well-known commentator on ethics, leadership, and international security issues. His military career as an operational intelligence officer included service on the faculty of the United States Military Academy, as special assistant to the Army Chief of Staff, and as dean of students at the National War College. A command and control expert, Colonel Allard served in 1996 on special assignment with the U.S. 1st Armored Division in Bosnia. He is the author of *Business as War, Battling for Competitive Advantage* (Wiley December 2003), *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, and *Command, Control and the Common Defense*, which won the 1991 National Security Book Award. Colonel Allard holds a Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and an M.P.A. from Harvard University.

Dr. **Sergio Catignani** is a Lecturer in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. He recently completed his Ph.D. on the Israel Defence Forces during the two Intifadas. His main research areas include ethical and leadership issues, COIN, terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. He has published various articles in journals such as *Terrorism & Political Violence*, *Parameters* and the *Journal of Strategic Studies*. Dr. Catignani holds as well an M.A. (Hons) degree in Political Studies and an M.Litt (Res) degree in International Relations from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland.

Dr. **Steven Cronshaw** has been on faculty with the University of Guelph since 1986 and since then active in the development and running of graduate programs in Industrial and Organizational (I/O) Psychology since 1986. He holds a doctoral degree in I/O Psychology from the University of Akron. He has written and published on a number of topics related to management including leadership and worker adaptability. He founded a consulting

CONTRIBUTORS

firm, Organization and Management Solutions, which presently operates from the University of Guelph. His detailed biographical sketch is published in Marquis' *Who's Who in the World*.

Lieutenant-Commander (ret'd) **Karen Davis** is the senior defence scientist at the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, holds a Master of Arts in Sociology from McGill University and is a Ph.D. candidate at the Royal Military College of Canada. She has conducted research in the Canadian Forces for 15 years on a range of human resource related issues including strategic human resources and gender integration. Karen is currently editing a volume on the experiences of women in leadership roles in military operations, conducting research on measures of leadership in organizations, the relationship between cultural intelligence and leadership capacities, and is a contributing writer to *Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution* (in press).

Dr. **Allan English** is an Adjunct Associate Professor of History at Queen's University where he teaches a graduate course in Canadian military history. He also teaches at the Canadian Forces College, Toronto. His book *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* (2004) is published by McGill-Queen's University Press. He is a co-editor of *The Operational Art - Canadian Perspectives: Context and Concepts* (2005) and the editor of *The Operational Art - Canadian Perspectives: Leadership and Command* (2006), both published by the Canadian Defence Academy Press.

Dr. **Richard Gimblett** served for 27 years in the Canadian Navy prior to becoming an independent historian and defence policy analyst. Having participated in operations in the Persian Gulf during the war of 1991, he subsequently co-authored the official Canadian Forces account of that conflict. His last appointment was to the Directorate of Maritime Strategy, as lead writer of *Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 2020* (DND, 2001). The paper in this volume is a development of themes explored in his recent *Operation Apollo: The Golden Age of the Canadian Navy in the*

War Against Terrorism (Magic Light, 2004). Besides assisting in writing the Official History of the Royal Canadian Navy, his various affiliations include President of the Canadian Nautical Research Society, Adjunct Professor of History at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario, and Research Associate with CFLI.

Colonel, Dr. **Bernd Horn** is the Director of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI). He is an experienced infantry officer with command experience at the unit and sub-unit level. He was the Commanding Officer of 1 RCR (2001-2003); the Officer Commanding 3 Commando, the Canadian Airborne Regiment (1993-1995); and the Officer Commanding "B" Company, 1 RCR (1992-1993). He is also an Adjunct-Associate Professor of History at the Royal Military College of Canada.

Lieutenant-Colonel (ret'd) Dr. **Charles Kirke**, is one of a very small number of Military Anthropologists active in the United Kingdom. He retired from the British Army (Royal Artillery) in 2004, having gained his Ph.D. a year earlier. His first degree (1974) was in Archaeology and Anthropology at Cambridge University and ever since that time he has used the techniques of Social Anthropology to study, formally and informally, the Organizational Culture of the British Army. This study has embraced the every day lives of soldiers in British military units both past and present, and includes such themes as leadership, the human element of combat power, gender integration, rule-observance or rule-bending, and informal resistance to authority. He currently works for Cranfield University at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, as a lecturer in Human Factors Integration.

Lieutenant-Colonel, Dr. **Allister MacIntyre** has been with the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute since 2001. He completed his Ph.D. and Master's degrees in Psychology at Queen's University. From 1993 until 1996 he served as the Chair of the *Psychology in the Military* section of the Canadian Psychological Association. He is presently an adjunct professor at Carleton

CONTRIBUTORS

University, as well as the University of Guelph, where he was also recently appointed as an Associate with the Centre for Studies in Leadership. He will be leaving the military in 2006 to take up a position as an Associate Professor at the Royal Military College in Kingston, Ontario.

Lieutenant-Colonel **Colin McGee** is currently a member of the faculty at the Canadian Forces College in Toronto, Ontario. He is an experienced infantry officer, affiliated with The Royal Canadian Regiment, with command experience both in Canada and overseas, most notably during Operation Deliverance in Somalia, 1992-1993. He also holds a M.A. in War Studies from RMC.

Captain **Steve Nolan** completed a Bachelor of Arts at the University of Western Ontario in 1993, and graduated from the Canadian Land Force Command and Staff College in June 2004. A commissioned officer in the CF since 1993, he has served with the Canadian Forces on numerous operations including three deployments to the Former Yugoslav Republic, and contributed to the identification and implementation of new capabilities in support of the Army's transformation efforts as a member of the land combat development staff. Steve is a regular contributor and an associate editor with the *Canadian Army Journal*, and is pursuing a Master's degree in Public Administration with the School of Policy Studies at Queen's University.

Major, Dr. **Damian O'Keefe** has 26 years experience in the Canadian Forces, which includes 8 years as a non-commissioned member and 18 years as an officer. He completed his undergraduate degree in Applied Military Psychology at Royal Roads Military College, his Masters degree at Saint Mary's University, and his Doctoral degree in Industrial/Organizational Psychology at the University of Guelph. He has several years experience conducting applied personnel selection research, which includes two years with Canada's Special Operation Forces, and three years on exchange with the Australian Defence Force. His research interests include personnel selection, occupational personality, ethical climate, and ethical decision making.

Eitan Shamir is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. His PhD thesis compares the doctrine and practice of mission command across the US Army, British Army, and the IDF Ground Forces. His research interests are command and leadership issues, sources of military change and military culture. His military experience includes service in the IDF's paratroops brigade and a commission as a reserve officer in the IDF Field Psychology Unit. Prior to his Ph.D. studies, he spent most of his career as a management consultant working internationally with Pricewaterhouse and KPMG consulting on large scale organizational transformation. He holds a B.A. degree in Political Science from Tel Aviv University, Israel, and a Master's in Organizational Behavior (MOB) from Brigham Young University, Provo UT, USA.

GLOSSARY

AAR	After Action Review
APEC	The Association for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARTEP	Army Training and Evaluation Program
ASM	Adaptive Skills Modeling
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
BFEM	Battle Force E-mail
BFV	Bradley Fighting Vehicle
BIC	Battery of Interpersonal Capabilities
BMP	Bronevaya Maschina Piekhota
BOI	Board of Inquiry
C3&I	Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence
C4ISR	Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance
CDA	Canadian Defence Academy
Cdn AB Regt	Canadian Airborne Regiment
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CF	Canadian Forces
CFLI	Canadian Forces Leadership Institute
CO	Commanding Officer
CPF	Canadian Patrol Frigate
CLF	Coalition Logistics Force
COWAN	Coalition Wide Area Network
CSM	Company Sergeant Major
CTF 12	Commander Task Force 12

GLOSSARY

CTF 150	Commander Task Force 150
CTF 151	Commander Task Force 151
DCF	Defence of Canada Force
DCO	Defence of Canada Operations
DGPA	Director General of Public Affairs
DND	Department of National Defence
DoD	Department of Defence
FMC	Force Mobile Command
GCCS-M	Global Command and Control System, Maritime
HDCRI-X	Human Dimension Combat Readiness Index
HDO	Human Dimensions of Operations
HF	High Frequency
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDF	Israeli Defence Force
IUS	Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society
JOTS	Joint Operational Tactical System
JMSDF	Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces
LIC	Low-Intensity Conflict
MARPAC	Maritime Forces Pacific
MARLANT	Maritime Forces Atlantic
MAZI	Ground Forces Head Quarter
MCOIN III	Maritime Command Operational Information Network
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MILES	Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
MLRS	Multiple Launch Rocket System
MND	Minister of National Defence
MSF	Mobile Striking Force

NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCM	Non-Commissioned Member
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NCW	Network-Centric Warfare
NDA	National Defence Act
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NEOps	Network-Enabled Operations
NORAD	North American Aerospace Defence Command
NTC	National Training Center
OAS	Organization of American States
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OI	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OPFOR	Opposing Force
PA	Palestinian Authority
PD	Professional Development
RAN	Royal Australian Navy
RCD	Royal Canadian Dragoons
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RN	Royal Navy
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific
RSM	Regimental Sergeant Major
SACLANT	Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SIPRNET	Secret Internet Protocol Router Network
SNFL	Standing Naval Force Atlantic
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SSF	Special Service Force

GLOSSARY

TADIL	Tactical Datalink
TAS	Towed Array Sonar
TOW	Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided Missile
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
TRUMP	Tribal Update and Modernization Program
UMP	Unit Morale Profile
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USN	United States Navy
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WeCAN	Web-Centric Anti-Submarine Warfare Net

Index

- Ability 4, 11, 17, 35, 37-40, 68, 82, 84, 85, 94, 95, 97, 98, 102, 103, 106, 113, 117, 123, 131, 133, 141, 161, 163, 166, 168, 175, 185, 186, 190, 195, 197, 208, 209, 227, 232, 254, 279 notes, 291, 300, 304, 325, 326, 339, 340, 352
- Abrams M-1 Main Battle Tank 227
- Acocella, Joan 356, **362-364** notes
- Adaptive Skills 3, 5, 6, 81, 82, 84-86, 90, 91, 93-96, 99-101, 105, 106, **108** notes, **109** notes
- Adaptive Skills Modeling/ASM 6, 85, **371** gloss.
- Affective Component 16, 339, **360** notes
- Afghanistan 91, 93, 158, 227, 228, 241, 323
- After Action Review/AAR 233-235, 239, **371** gloss.
- Auftragstaktik* 186-189, **209** notes, **210** notes
- Agentic 6, 86, 92-94, 102, 105
- Airborne 13, **78** notes, 251-260, 262-266, **272-274** notes, **277** notes, **278** notes, 317, **333** notes, 367, **371** gloss.
- Air Force 49, 50, 72, **75** notes, **80** notes, 119, 196, 204, 223, 226, 231, 319, 324, 355
- Ajzen, Icek 351, **362** notes
- Al-Aqsa Intifada* 158, 160, 162, **179** notes, 201, 206
- Al-Qaeda 7, 113, 123
- Allard, General Jean V. 249, **273** notes
- Amir, Yehuda 345, 346, 357, **361** notes, **362** notes
- Amnesty International 165
- Anarchy 148, 217, **271** notes
- Anderson, Admiral John 263
- Anthropology 14, 284, 285, **309** notes, **310** notes, 367
- Anti-Intellectualism 60, 250
- Anti-Submarine Warfare/ASW 120-122, **371** gloss.
- Arabian Sea 7, 8, 113, 116, 123, 125, 126, 129, 131, **135** notes
- Arctic 117, 253, 254, **273** notes
- Army 12, 21, 32, 34-36, **41** notes, **44** notes, 49, 50, 60, 63, 64, 68, 72, **73-75** notes, **78-80** notes, 98, **109** notes, 167, **178-180** notes, 188, **209** notes, **212** notes, 215, 217-219, 221-242, **243** notes, **244** notes, 246, 252, 253, 255-258, 264, 265, 268, 269, **272** notes, **273** notes, **275** notes, **277** notes, **279** notes, **280** notes, 284-286, 299, 307, **309** notes, **310** notes, 316, 319-321, 323, 326-328, **332** notes, **336** notes, 355, **360** notes, 365-369, **371** gloss.

INDEX

- Army Chief of Staff 222, 234, 236, 265
Army Training and Evaluation Program/ARTEP 231, **371 gloss.**
Arone, Shidane 260, 270
Asian tsunami 216
Association 125, 278, 294, 297-300, 303, 304, 307, 326, **334 notes**,
335 notes, **363 notes**, 367, **371 gloss.**
Atkinson, Rick 217, 218, **242 notes**
Attitude(s) ii, 13-18, 35, **79 notes**, 165, **181 notes**, 249, 251, 257, 258,
262, **278 notes**, 286, 289, 290, 292, 307, 308, 314-317, 320, 323, 326-
328, **332 notes**, **336 notes**, 337-346, 348-359, **360-362 notes**, **364 notes**
Attitude Formation 17, 343, 344, **361 notes**
Attitude Importance 17, 344, **361 notes**
Attitude Polarization 349, **362 notes**
Attributes 10, 33, 90, 98, 312, 351, 354, 355
Attrition 195, 225, 226, 239, **243 notes**, 320, 324
Authority i, 34, 48, 52, 55, 70, 72, 143, 145, 146, 148, 149, 186, 201,
207, 248, 258, 268, 303, 312, 318, 337, 346, 347, 367, **373 gloss.**
Ayooob, Mohammed 148, **155 notes**
- Bahrain 130
Baril, General Maurice **76 notes**, 248, 249, 263, **272 notes**, **280 notes**
Barzun, Jacques 57, 58, **77 notes**
Battle Command Training Program/BCTP 233, 234, **371 gloss.**
Behaviour(s) ii, iii, 15-17, 26, 28, 29, 33, 38, 39, 58, 86, 93, 94, 97, 98,
140, 149, 151, 163, 172, 174, 175, **181 notes**, 186, 188, 190, 198, 258-
260, 266, **273 notes**, **276 notes**, 283, 287-291, 295, 299, 308, 313-315,
318-321, 325, **334 notes**, 337-339, 342, 343, 349-352, 357, 359
Behavioural 14, 17, 94, **178 notes**, **180 notes**, **182 notes**, 189, **210 notes**,
339, 343, 344, 351, 352, 359, **360 notes**
Behavioural Component 17, 339, 352, **359 notes**
Belief(s) 33-35, 53, 97, 126, 137, 140, 153, 186, 248, 250, 268, 313, 325,
338, 339, 341, 342, 344, 354, 356, 358, 359, **362 notes**
Ben-Ari, Rachel **177 notes**, **178 notes**, 345, **361 notes**
Bercuson, David 62, 63, **74 notes**, **77-79 notes**, **273 notes**, **274 notes**,
277 notes
Berlin Wall 246
Bitsuism 11, 185, 190, 192, 194, 197, 200, 204, 208
Blackhawk 228, **243 notes**
Blitzkrieg **210 notes**
Bloom, Michael 67, **79 notes**

- Board of Inquiry/BOI 263, **274 notes**, **276-278 notes**, **371 gloss**.
- Bradley Fighting Vehicle **243 notes**, 278, **371 gloss**.
- Brainwashing 342
- British Army **75 notes**, 284-286, 299, 307, **309 notes**, **310 notes**, 367, 369
- Brown, Trooper Kyle 261, **274 notes**, **275 notes**, **334-336 notes**
- Burk, James 56, 60, **77 notes**
- Burns, J.M. 96, 100, **109 notes**
- C3&I 167, **371 gloss**.
- C4ISR 123, 131, 132, 135 *notes*, **371 gloss**.
- Caesar 231
- Calhoun, James 356, **362-364 notes**
- Campbell, Prime Minister Kim 261, **275 notes**, **276 notes**
- Canada 4, 5, 13, 21, **41 notes**, **43 notes**, **44 notes**, 45, 46, 48, 53, 56, 59-67, 70, 72, 73, **74-76 notes**, **78 notes**, **79 notes**, **107-109 notes**, 113, 115, 123-127, **133 notes**, **134 notes**, **136 notes**, 138, 139, 141, 144, 147, **155 notes**, 158, **181 notes**, 236, 245, 247, 250, 252-254, 256-258, 265, 268, 270, **272-276 notes**, **279 notes**, **280 notes**, 312, 316, 323, 327, **331-333 notes**, **335 notes**, **336 notes**, 341, **359 notes**, **360 notes**, 366-368, **372 gloss**.
- Canadian i-iii, 1, 2, 4-9, 11, 13, 14, 21, 31, 32, 40, **41 notes**, **44 notes**, 45-51, 57-66, 72, 73, **74-80 notes**, 81, 82, 84, 88, 97, 100, 101, 104, **107-109 notes**, 113-133, **134-136 notes**, 137-139, 144, 147, 149, 151, 154, **155 notes**, **178 notes**, 215, 245, 246, 248-256, 258-263, 265-270, **272-280 notes**, 284, 285, 311-313, 317-319, 326, 327, **331-336 notes**, 337, 340, **359 notes**, **360 notes**, 366-368, **371 gloss**, **373 gloss**.
- Canadian Airborne Regiment/Cdn AB Regt 13, 14, 251, 255-260, 262, 263-265, **273 notes**, **274 notes**, **276-278 notes**, 317, **333 notes**, 367, **371 gloss**.
- Canadian Defence Academy/CDA ii, **41 notes**, **43 notes**, **79 notes**, 270, **331 notes**, **332 notes**, **359 notes**, **360 notes**, 366, **371 gloss**.
- Canadian Defence Policy 147, **155 notes**
- Canadian Military Journal **41 notes**, **75 notes**, 268, **275 notes**
- Canadian Forces/CF i-iii, 2, 4-6, 12, 13, 15-17, 21, 31, 40, 45, 47, 48, 50, 51, 58-66, 68-73, **74-80 notes**, 82, 84, 85, 91, 97, 100, 101, 105, 106, **107-109 notes**, 116, **135 notes**, **136 notes**, 144, 215, 245, 246, 248-251, 254-256, 258, 262-264, 267, 268, 270, **272-274 notes**, **276-280 notes**, 284, 308, 311-331, **331-336 notes**, 337, 340, 341, 346, 347, 355, 359, **359 notes**, **360 notes**, 366-368, **371 gloss**.
- Canadian Government 252-254

INDEX

- Canadian Navy 8, 49, **75 notes**, 115-119, 121-124, 126, 128, 130, 131, 133, **134-136 notes**, 366, 367
- Canadian Patrol Frigate/CPF 120, **371 gloss**.
- Careerism 221, 222, 226
- Categorization 355, **364 notes**
- CF doctrine 312-314, 236, 329
- Chaos 13, 25, 144, 169, 189, 206, 250, 271
- Characteristics 3, 16, 24, 32-35, 39, 40, 52, 54, 56, 59, 62, 65, 68, 84, 95, 159, **181 notes**, 188, 189, 199, 219, 330, 353, 357
- Chivalrous 22, 33
- Chivalry 29
- Citino, Robert 192, **210 notes**
- Clausewitz 186
- Clausewitzian 195
- Climate 14-16, 222, 311, 314, 315, 319-322, 324-331, **332 notes**, **334-336, notes**, 346, 368
- Close Friendship 292, 293
- Coalition 2, 7, 8, 113-118, 121-126, 128-133, **134 notes**, **135 notes**, 150, 152, **371 gloss**
- Code 22-24, 26-30, 32, 33, 35, **41-43 notes**, 44, 47, 61, 174, 177, **182 notes**, 221
- Cognitive 16, 17, 106, 188, 338, 339, 349, 350, 352, 354, 356-358, **360 notes**, **362-364 notes**
- Cognitive Consistency 349
- Cognitive Dissonance 17, 349, 350, **362 notes**
- Cognitive Filters 357
- Coercive Leadership 6, 99
- Cohen, Eliot 68, **79 notes**, **178 notes**, **212 notes**
- Cohesion 34, 37, **179 notes**, **181 notes**, **309 notes**, **321 notes**, 322-324, 330, **334 notes**, **335 notes**
- Cohesiveness 172, 199, 346
- Cold War 13, 61, 64, **79 notes**, 117-119, 159, 160, 246-248, 250, 262, 263, 268, **271 notes**, **331 notes**
- Combatant 37, 91, 160-162, 177, 316
- Command 1, 7, 8, 10-12, 15, 48, 50, 51, 59, 60, 62, 66, **75 notes**, **77 notes**, **79 notes**, 113-125, 127-133, **134-136 notes**, 158, 162, 167-171, 173, 174, 176, 177, **179 notes**, **181 notes**, 185-192, 194-197, 199-202, 205-209, **211-213 notes**, 216, 222, 224, 225, 228, 229, 233, 234, 237, 239, 240, **243 notes**, 249, 257, 258, 263, 265, 266, **273 notes**, **275 notes**, **277 notes**, **278 notes**, 285, 286, 288-291, 294, 297-306,

- 309 notes**, 317, 319, 322, **334 notes**, 347, 365-369, **371-374 gloss**.
- Commander ii, iii, 8, **77 notes**, 114, 121-123, 129, 130, 132, **134 notes**, **135 notes**, 160, 162, 164, 170, 172-176, **179-181 notes**, 187, 188, 190, 192-194, 203, 207, **212 notes**, 222, 224, 225, 233, 246, 255, 257, 265, 269, **274 notes**, **277 notes**, **278 notes**, 294, 296-303, 307, 308, 322, 366, **371-373 gloss**.
- Commander Task Force 151/CTF 151 8, 114, 115, 123, 132, **372 gloss**.
- Commanding Officer/CO 170, 257, 266, **280 notes**, 285, 297, 298, 303, 305-307, 367, **371 gloss**.
- Commitment i, 1, 16, 35, 40, 97, 148, **181 notes**, 187, 219, 222, 233, 239, 258, **280 notes**, 313, 314, 316, 324, 326, 330, 331, 337
- Communication 94, 105, **107 notes**, 167, 186, 189, 195, 207, 298, 324, 326, 344, **371 gloss**.
- Competence 60, 67, 71, 101, 115, 121, 127, 129, 131, 133, 342
- Competing Values 6, 82-85, 90, **107 notes**
- Competition 289, 346, 347
- Comrades 26, 33, 35, 37, 93
- Confidence in Leadership 322-324, **334 notes**, **335 notes**
- Conflict 3, 7, 10, 11, 17, 23, 24, 26, 48, 49, 68, 83, 103-105, 121, 142, 157-162, 168, 171, 173, 177, **178-180 notes**, 185, 191, 197, 200, 201, 203-207, 209, **211 notes**, **213 notes**, 220, 224, 241, **242 notes**, 246-248, 252, 253, 255, **271 notes**, 321, 339, 347-349, **362 notes**, 365, 366, **372 gloss**.
- Congress 119, 230, **242 notes**
- Congo 216, 255
- Constitution 230, **243 notes**, **309 notes** **310 notes**
- Contact Hypothesis 17, 345, 357, **361 notes**, **362 notes**
- Cooper, Joel 350, **361 notes**, **362 notes**
- Cooperation 17, 125, 165, 347, 348, **362 notes**, **371 notes**
- Cotton Report 316
- Counter-Insurgency 10, 157, 160, 165, 185
- Counter-Terrorism 10, 157
- Courage 24, 26, 29, 30, 33, 36, 38, 39, 58, 97, 172, 205, 222, 312, 341
- Creativity 187-189, 191, 193, **209 notes**
- Credibility 30, 99-101, 161, 162, 173, 246, **361 notes**
- Crisis 14, 64, 98, 119, 142, 143, 165, 245, 246, 252, 255, 256, 263, 264, 266, 270, **276 notes**, 296
- Chretien, Prime Minister 130
- Cronshaw, Steven 5, 6, 81, 85, 86, 88, 90, 95, 106, **108-110 notes**, 365
- Cuban Missile Crisis 119

INDEX

- Cultural 3, 7, 8, 11, 25, 26, 33, 65, 66, 68, 114, 115, 118, 126, 127, 130, 131, 133, 146, 150, 185, 188, 190, 209, 238, **274 notes**, 283, 313, 315, 217, 318, 320, 322, 326, 328, 329, **332 notes**, **333 notes**, 353, 357, 366
- Cultural Inquiry 317
- Cultural Norms 11, 190, 209
- Culture(s) ii, iii, 2, 3, 4, 8, 11, 14-16, 26, 30-34, 40, 51, 55, 62, 63, 65, 68, **74 notes**, **76-78 notes**, 88, 115, 116, 124-126, 128, 130, 131, 133, 185, 186, 188-190, 196, 204, 208, **210 notes**, 216, 217, 219, 223, 230, **242 notes**, 249, 257, **279 notes**, 285, 307, 308, **309 notes**, **310 notes**, 311-321, 325-331, **332-336 notes**, 359, 366, 367, 369
- Culture Change 317, 319, 320, **333 notes**
- Dayan, Moshe 193-195, **210 notes**
- de Faye Commission 263, 265
- Decade of Darkness 245, 246, 249
- Defence of Canada Force/DCF 254, **372 gloss.**
- Defence of Canada Operations/DCO 256, **372 gloss.**
- Denison, Daniel 325, 327-330, **332 notes**, **334 notes**, **336 notes**
- Deployment **77 notes**, 129, 130, 142, 229, 259, 263, 267, **274 notes**, **278 notes**, 318
- Desbarats, Peter 264, **277 notes**, **279 notes**
- Desert Storm 200, **210 notes**
- Devine, Patricia 355, **363 notes**
- Director General of Public Affairs/DGPA 262, **372 gloss.**
- Discipline 14, 15, 26, 38, 39, 55, 63, 65, 172, 174, 192, **243 notes**, 259, 263, 265, 269, **278 notes**, 284, 286, 288, 292, 293, 302, 303, 326
- Discrimination 126, 312, **363 notes**
- Diversity 115, 126, **135 notes**, 314, 320, 326, **332 notes**
- Doctrine 4, 7, 9, 11, 13, 21, 35, **79 notes**, **80 notes**, **97**, **107 notes**, **109 notes**, **134 notes**, **135 notes**, 137, 139, 141, 142, 147, 148, 154, 159, 160, 162, **178 notes**, **179 notes**, 185, 188, 190, 195, 196, 200, 208, **212 notes**, **213 notes**, 219, 224-227, 229, 232, 239, 241, 247, 251, 270, **280 notes**, 311-314, 324, 326, 327, **331 notes**, **332 notes**, **336 notes**, 369, **374 gloss.**
- Duckitt, John 354, **363 notes**
- Duty 4, 5, 14, 15, 27, 28, 30, 39, 40, **41 notes**, 45-52, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, **74-76 notes**, **78-80 notes**, 97, 175, 187, 194, 199, 206, 217, 220, 221, 223, 245, 268, 270, **280 notes**, 285, 286, 289, 290, 299, **309 notes**, 312, 327, **331 notes**, 341, **360 notes**
- Duty With Honour* 4, 5, **41 notes**, 45-51, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73,

- 74 notes, 75 notes, 78-80 notes, 245, 270, 280 notes, 327, 331 notes, 341, 360 notes**
- East Timor 119
- Economic 61, 73, 125, 127, 140, 142, 145, 150, 269, **271 notes, 371 gloss.**
- Education i, iv, 4, 45, 47, 51, 55, 58, 61, 63, 68, **74 notes, 77 notes, 189-191 236, 237, 249, 272 notes, 348, 349, 352, 361 notes**
- Ehrenreich, Barbara 24-26, 29, **42-44 notes**
- Elcabets, Col Roye 162, 175, **179 notes, 182 notes**
- English, Allan 4, 5, 45, **75-80 notes, 134 notes, 136 notes, 279 notes, 318, 319, 332 notes, 333 notes, 366**
- Environment iii, 2, 7, 8, 11, 13, 14, 21, 40, 41, 50, 51, 68, 71, 72, 81, 82, 84-86, 88, 90-92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 101-103, **108 notes, 113, 116-119, 124, 125, 131, 133, 137, 138, 151, 161, 175, 186, 197, 205, 208, 209, 232, 246, 247, 250, 251, 255, 257, 264, 271 notes, 292, 313, 315, 316, 319-321, 324, 325, 351, 354**
- Eritrea 323
- esprit de corps* 93, 264, **278 notes, 279 notes**
- Ethical Code 61, 174
- Ethics 47, 57, **179 notes, 220, 222, 317, 326, 333 notes, 365**
- Ethnocentrism 347
- Ethos iii, 3, 4, 11, 13, 16, 21-24, 26-29, 32-35, 38-41, **42-44 notes, 48, 55, 97, 165, 169, 177, 185, 191, 200, 201, 205, 246, 248, 250, 257, 262, 268, 271, 313, 314, 316-318, 322, 325, 327, 328, 331, 332 notes, 336 notes, 341**
- European Union 114
- Expertise 4, 45, 46, 48-50 52, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 67, 70, **74 notes, 77 notes, 268, 270**
- External Adaptability 16, 90, 313, 314, 331
- Failed State(s) 143-145, **271 notes**
- Fazio, Russell 343, 350, 355, **359 notes, 361 notes, 362 notes, 364 notes**
- Fear 26, 38, 39, 141, 164, 198, 216, 305, 306, 348
- Feaver, Peter 52. 53, **76 notes**
- Festinger, Leon 349, **362 notes**
- Fishbein, Mark 351, **362 notes**
- Focus i, 6, 12, 15, 21, 28, 32, 34, 35, 39, **42 notes, 43 notes, 57, 62, 83, 84, 86, 90-92, 94, 105, 118, 120, 127, 137, 141, 142, 160, 175, 215, 238, 240, 241, 317, 320-322**
- Fog of War 186, 195

INDEX

- Follower(s) i, 6, 17, 96-101, 223, 239, 338, 340, 346, 350, 359
Force Mobile Command/FMC 258, **273 notes**, **372 gloss**.
Formal Command Structure 15, 288, 290, 291, 294, 298, 299, 302, 303, 305
Fort Irwin 232
Fort Leavenworth 233, 237
Fowler, Deputy Minister of National Defence, Robert 261
Friendship 292-294, 300, 303
Functional Structure 15, 290, 291, 297, 298, 300, 302-306
Functions of Attitudes 339
- Gaudreau, Major-General 265, **278 notes**
Gaza Strip 158, 174, 176, 197, 202, 205, **212 notes**
Genocide 141, 142, 147
Geo-Political 246, 264, 268
German 125, 186-189, 191, 192, **209 notes**, 217
Germany 64, 119, 217, 218, 223, 238, 247, 261, **278 notes**
Gilad, Major-General Amos 165, **179 notes**, **180 notes**
Gillespie, Thomas 139, **154 notes**, **155 notes**
Golani Brigade 206, **210 notes**
Goldschmidt, Walter 25
Group 8, 17, 25, 27, 29, 31-33, 36, 37, 39, **41 notes**, 47, 62, 82, 98, 101, **108 notes**, **110 notes**, 117, 121, 123, 238, 127-132, **135 notes**, **136 notes**, 143, 147, 172, 203, 218, 234, 258, 259, 263, 267, **274 notes**, **277 notes**, 284, 286, 287, 290, 291, **309 notes**, 313, 317, 321, 330, **335 notes**, 337, 340, 342, 344-347, 351-358, **362 notes**, **363 notes**
Group Conflict 17, 347
Group Dynamic 317
Guerrilla 160, **179 notes**, 197, 201-205
Guild 67
- Hackett, Sir John 63, **78 notes**
Haiti 119, 266, 323
Haganah 173, 192
Hamner, Clay 350, **362 notes**
Hanson, Victor Davis 12, 216, 217, 226, 240, **242 notes**
Harassment 312, 320
Harris, Stephen 59-61, **77 notes**, **78 notes**, **272 notes**
Heffer, Haim 199
Hegemony 65, 148

- Hewson Report 258, 263, **273 notes**, **277 notes**
- Higher Intent 186, 187, 189, 207
- Hillier, Lieutenant-General Rick 245, **271 notes**
- Homans, George 351, **362 notes**
- Honesty 28, 30, 36, 37, 233, 266
- Honor/Honour 3-5, 23, 27, 30-32, 35, 38, 39, **41 notes**, **44 notes**, 45-51, 58, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 72, 73, **74-76 notes**, **78-80 notes**, 155, 221, 245, 265, 270, 271, 280, 327, **331 notes**, **333 notes**, 341, **360 notes**
- Horn of Africa 114, 131, **274 notes**
- Huey 229
- Human Dimension Combat Readiness Index/HDCRI-X 322, **334 notes**, **372 notes**
- Human Dimensions of Operations/HDO 15, 16, 322-324, 328, **334 notes**, **335 notes**, **372 gloss.**
- Human Relations 84, 188, **362-364 notes**
- Human Rights ii, 9, **136 notes**, 137-142, 145, 146, 149-154, **155 notes**, 165, **178 notes**, 314
- Humanitarian 10, 138, 140, 142-145, 147, 150, 151, **154 notes**, **155 notes**, 157, 165, 167, 215, 259
- Hunter-Warrior 25
- Huntington, Samuel 37, **44 notes**, 47, 51-56, 59, 63, 64, **74 notes**, **76 notes**
- Hussein, Saddam 114, 125
- Identity 15, **74 notes**, **135 notes**, 268, 289, 291, 292, 297, 300, 303, 304, 306, 317, 318, 321, 347
- Ignatieff, Michael 37, 41, 149, **155 notes**
- Inbar-Sabin, N. 343, **360 notes**, **361 notes**
- Influence ii, 11, 16, 17, 59, 63, 65, 66, **75 notes**, **78 notes**, 97, 98, **134 notes**, 159, 163, 172, 202, 218, 233, 238, 268, 305, 306, 320, 325, 330, 340, 344, 345, 347, 348, 353, 355, 356, 359, **362 notes**
- Informal Access 294, 297, 300, 301
- Informal Structure 15, 289, 290-293, 298, 299, 303, 305, 306
- In-Groups 347
- Institution 16, 33, 217, 219, 221, 235, 237, 239, 240, 247, 261, 264, 268, 270, 312, 314, 316, 318, 324, 328, 330
- Instrumental Function 339
- Insurgency 10, 157, 241
- Integrity 4, 8, 30, 40, 53, 97, 125, 222, 256, 266, 312, 341
- Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile/ICBM 254, **372 gloss.**
- Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society/IUS **75 notes**,

INDEX

- 77 notes, 285, 333 notes, 372 notes*
Intergroup 345-348, 358, **362-364 notes**
Internal Integration 16, 90, 313, 314, 331
Internal Process 84
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty/
ICISS 8, 9, 137, 140, 141, 149, **154 notes, 155 notes, 372 gloss.**
Interoperability 115, 119, 120, 123, 124, 166
Intervention(s) 7, 9, 137-154, **155 notes, 162, 275 notes, 372 gloss.**
Inward-Directed 86, 90, 91
Iraq 122, 125, 130-132, 141, 158, **212 notes**
Israeli Defence Force/IDF 7, 10, 11, 157-169, 172-177, **178-182 notes,**
185, 188, 190-209, **210-214 notes, 369, 372 gloss.**
- Jacques, E. 315, **332 notes**
Janowitz, Morris 52, 53, 56, **76 notes**
Japanese Maritime Self Defence Forces/JMSDF 129, 130, **372 gloss.**
Jeffrey, Lieutenant-General Mike 268, 269, **280 notes**
Job Performance 324
John, Oliver 358
Just Cause 29, 40, 143
- Kaplan, Robert 41, 53, 54, **76 notes**
Katz, Daniel 340-342, **360 notes**
Kitfield, James 230, **242 notes, 243 notes**
Knowledge Economy 248
Knowledge Function 339
Kolditz, Tom 90, 99, **109 notes**
Kohavi, Brig-Gen Aviv 160, **178 notes, 180 notes, 190 notes**
Korean War 53, 127
Kosovo 240, 323
Krosnick, Jon 345, **361 notes**
Krulak, Charles **180 notes, 199, 212 notes**
- Leader(s) 6, 12, 14, 16-18, 35, 46, 51, 54, 61-63, **75-79 notes, 81, 82,**
84, 85, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96-101, 105, 106, **108 notes, 109 notes,**
158, 159, 161, 168-177, **178-182 notes, 186, 188, 204, 219, 222, 223,**
233, 236-238, 240, 241, 246-249, 252, 257, **279 notes, 299, 302,**
308 notes, 312-314, 316, 317, 319, 323, 324, 326, 329-331, 332 notes,
335 notes, 336 notes, 337, 338, 340, 341, 343, 344, 346, 347, 350,
352, 359

- Leader's Intent 171
- Leadership 6, 7, 10, 11, 13-16, 31, 35, **44 notes**, 48-51, 58-60, 63, 69, **74-76 notes**, **78 notes**, **79 notes**, 81-83, 85, 86, 88-91, 94, 96-101, 106, 107, **108 notes**, **109 notes**, 115, 126, 157-159, 168, 169, 171-177, **178-182 notes**, 187, 193, 197, 201, 208, **209-214 notes**, 220, 222, 232, 235, 238, 240, 241, 246, 248, 249, 253, 255, 259, 261-264, 267, 270, **276-280 notes**, 283-285, 292, 299, 303, 307, 308, **309 notes**, 311-324, 326-331, **332-336 notes**, 337, 341, 359, **360 notes**, 365-367, 369, **371 gloss**.
- Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Conceptual Foundations* 82, 101, **107 notes**, **109 notes**, **331 notes**, **332 notes**, 337, **339 notes**
- Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine* 97, **107 notes**, **109 notes**, **331 notes**, **332 notes**, **336 notes**
- Lebanon 161, 162, 196, 197
- Lerner, Max 58, **77 notes**
- Lessons Learned 113, 114, **221 notes**, 215, **276 notes**, 365
- Lewin, Kurt 320, 321, 325, **334 notes**
- Liddel-Hart, Basil 247
- Lippmann, Walter 353
- Locus 6, 85, 86, 90, 91, 94, 105, 326
- Lord, Charles 349, **362 notes**
- Low-Intensity Conflict/LIC 11, 157-161, 168, 171, 172, 174-177, **178-180 notes**, 191, 197, 200, 201, 205, 208, 209, **214 notes**, **372 gloss**.
- Loyalty 15, 23, 24, 30, 33, 35-38, 97, 257, 266, 289, 291, 297, 300, 303, 304, 306, 312, 341
- Loyalty/Identity Structure 15, 289, 291, 297, 300, 303, 304, 306, 291
- MacArthur, General Douglas 53, 221
- Majoor, Arthur 69, **80 notes**
- Malka, Lt-Col Ilan 170, **180 notes**, **181 notes**
- Maritime Forces Atlantic/MARLANT 118, **372 gloss**.
- Maritime Forces Pacific/MARPAC 118, **372 gloss**.
- Martial 4, 26, 28, 29, 37, 40, **276-278 notes**, 318
- Mask of Command 51
- Matchee, Master-Corporal Clayton 261
- Member Well-Being 331
- Mechanized Forces 250
- Media 1, 129, 163, 164, 197-199 205, 214 *notes*, 250, 262, **276 notes**, 357, 358
- Microchip 227

INDEX

- Military i-iv, 1-15, 21, 22, 25, 30-35, 37, 40, **41 notes**, **43 notes**, 45-48, 51-73, **74-80 notes**, 81, 88, 96, 97, 106, 107, 113-115, 122, 125-127, 130, 137-139, 141-148, 150, 151, 154, 157-167, 169, 174, 177, **178-182 notes**, 185-194, 197, 199, 200, 205, 208, **209-211 notes**, **214 notes**, 215-221, 226, 229, 230, 231, 236-241, **243 notes**, 245-259, 261-271, **272 notes**, **273 notes**, **275-277 notes**, **279 notes**, **280 notes**, 283-287, 289-293, 299, 300, 304-306, **309 notes**, 311-319, 322, 323-324, 327, 328, **331-336 notes**, 337, 341, 346, 348, 350, 359, 365-369
- Military Anthropology 284
- Militia 60
- Mission 6, 10, 11, 16, 33-35, 49, 54, 63, **78 notes**, 82, 85, 88, 91, 92, 93, 95, 97-99, 101, 102, 105, 128, 130, 132, 138, 143, 158, 160, 161, 163, 164, 168-171, 175, 177, **180 notes**, **181 notes**, 185-192, 194, 195, 197, 199, 200-203, 205-209, **212 notes**, 233, 240, **243 notes**, 258, 260, 265, **274 notes**, **277 notes**, **278 notes**, 312-314, 319, 321-323, 326, 331, 369, **372 gloss.**
- Mission Essential Task List/METL 235, **372 gloss.**
- Mission Success 6, 10, 16, 35, 85, 92, 93, 101, 102, 105, 170, 177, 313, 314, 323, 331
- Mobile Striking Force/MSF 253, 254, **372 gloss.**
- Moghaddam, Fathali 354, **363 notes**
- Moral(s) 4, 27, 28, 30, 36-38, 40, 41, 58, 61, 96, 32, 161, 167, 174-176, **181 notes**, 199, 220-222, 346
- Morale 15, 37, 162, **179 notes**, **193 notes**, 198, 202, 292, 296, 297, 321-324, 330, **334 notes**, **335 notes**, **374 gloss.**
- Moskos, Charles 316, **331 notes**
- Motivation 10, 70, 98, 158, 162, 171, 177, 187, 203, 321, 324, 325, **334 notes**
- Multilateralism 115, 130, 133
- Multinational 7, 113-116, 125, 129, 133, **134 notes**
- Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System/MILES 232, **372 gloss.**
- Multiple Launch Rocket System/MLRS 228, 243, **372 gloss.**
- Nation Building 215
- National Defence Act/NDA 265, **373 gloss.**
- National Defence College 61
- National Defence Headquarters/NDHQ 13, **135 notes**, 246, 262, 265, **277 notes**, **335 notes**, **373 gloss.**
- NATO 64, 118, 121, 125, 128, 129, **135 notes**, **136 notes**, 145, 147, 160, 188, 223, 226, 246, 253, **372 gloss.**

- Navy 8, 49, 50, 72, **75 notes**, 114-119, 121-124, 126-128, 130-133, **134-136 notes**, 231, 319, 355, 366, 367, **373 gloss.**, **374 gloss.**
- NCM 4, 5, 45, 46, 48-50, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, **74 notes**, **80 notes**, **373 gloss.**
- NCO 3-5, 13, 45-51, 62, 63, 65, 68, 69, 71-73, **74 notes**, **75 notes**, **78 notes**, 173, 174, **182 notes**, 257, 259, 260, 270, 284, 285, 299, 300, 302, **373 gloss.**
- Network-Centric Warfare/NCW 122, **135 notes**, **373 gloss.**
- Network-Enabled Operations/NEOps 120, **373 gloss.**
- Newman, Peter C. 248, **272 notes**
- Nodding Acquaintance 294
- Non-Combatant 37, 161, 315
- Non-Intervention 138, 139, **275 notes**
- North American Aerospace Defence Command/NORAD 119, **373 gloss.**
- Nuclear Weapons 225, 252
- Oath 29, 61
- Officer(s) 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 45-51, 53-56, 58-65, 68, 69, 71, 72, **74 notes**, **75 notes**, **77-80 notes**, 96, 113, 120, 121, 123, 124, 128, 129, 133, 158, 162, 170, 173-175, **178 notes**, **180-182 notes**, 191-195, 199, 208, **212 notes**, 217, 219, 221-223, 236, 237, 240, 241, 245-251, 257-260, 262-264, 266-270, **272 notes**, **277 notes**, **279 notes**, **280 notes**, 284, 285, 288, 294, 297-299, 301-307, 314, 316, 317, 323, 324, **331 notes**, **333 notes**, **335 notes**, 343, 355, **360 notes**, 365, 367-369, **371 gloss.**, **373 gloss.**
- Open Systems 84
- Operating Structure 290, 291, 302, 306
- Operation Apollo 7, 8, 113-116, 118, 119, 123, 128, 130-133, **134-136 notes**, 367
- Operation Enduring Freedom/OEF 113, 114, 123, 132, **373 gloss.**
- Operation Forward Action 119
- Operation Friction 119, **136 notes**
- Operation Iraqi Freedom/OIF 114, 132, **373 gloss.**
- Operation Toucan 119
- Organ, Dennis 350
- Organizational Commitment 324
- Organizational Effectiveness 6, 82, 83, 85, 102
- Organizational Support 324
- Out-Groups 347, 348, 350, 352, 258
- Outward-Directed 6, 86, 90-92

INDEX

- Palestinian 10, 158, 162-165, 167, 177, **179 notes**, **182 notes**, 197, 198, 200-206, **213 notes**, **373 gloss**.
- Palestinian Authority/PA 201, 205, **373 gloss**.
- Palmach* 169, 173, 192, 199
- Paratrooper(s) 13, 159, 166, 173, **178 notes**, **180 notes**, **181 notes**, 195, 206, 251-253, 256, 258, 259, 261, 264, **273 notes**, **276 notes**
- Patriot Air Defence Missile 229
- Peace Enforcement 10, 157, 158, 247
- Peacekeeping 10, 12, 63, 64, **78 notes**, **79 notes**, 157, 158, 160, 165, 168, **177 notes**, 215, 216, 240, 246, 247, **275 notes**
- Penrod, Steven 353, **363 notes**
- Pentagon 215, 255
- Persian Gulf 114, 118, 131, **136 notes**, 218, 219, 366
- Persian Gulf War 118, 218, 219
- Personnel Selection 324, 368
- Policy 9, 55, **78 notes**, 101, 114, **134 notes**, **136 notes**, 137-139, 144-149, 151-154, **155 notes**, **178 notes**, 204, **210 notes**, **213 notes**, 239, 256, 258, 269, **277 notes**, **279 notes**, 315, **336 notes**, 366, 368
- Policing 159, 166, 198, 199
- Political 8, 10, 13, 29, 31, 49, 53-55, 59, 63, 65, 96, 103, 104, 114, 119, 125-131, 140, 145, 149, 150, 164, 167, 169, 172, 177, 197, 200, 201, 205, 246, 248, 250-257, 261-264, 268, 269, **276 notes**, 322, 324, 365, 369
- Post Modern World 248
- Power 27, 98, 102, **109 notes**, 115, 124, 125, 127, 130, 172, 173, **180 notes**, 192, 200, 215, 226, 230, **242 notes**, 251, 256, 268, **271 notes**, 305, **309 notes**, 325, 328, 350, 367
- Precautionary Principles 143
- Predator 24-26, 143, 144
- Prejudice(s) 126, 249, 341, 346, 348, 353, 359, **363 notes**
- Profession iii, iv, 4, 5, 40, **41 notes**, 45-51, 56-68, 70-73, **74 notes**, **76 notes**, **77 notes**, 189, 219, 236, 245, 250, 270, **280 notes**, 312, 327, **331 notes**, 341, 360
- Profession of Arms iii, iv, 4, 5, 40, **41 notes**, 45, 46, 48-51, 56, 59, 61-66, 68, 70-73, **74 notes**, **76 notes**, 219, 236, 245, 250, 270, **280 notes**, 312, 327, **331 notes**, 341, 360
- Professional i, 4, 5, 14, 34, 35, **43 notes**, 46, 47, 51-65, 67, 68, 70, 71, **74 notes**, **78 notes**, **80 notes**, 114, 129-131, 133, 162, 166, 169, 171-173, 175, 189, 192, 195, **214 notes**, 222, 229, 231, 240, 245, 249, 268-270, 300, 304, 312, 321, 322, **373 gloss**.

- Professional Development/PD i, 70, 71, **74 notes**, **80 notes**, 171, 175, 268, 269, **373 gloss**.
- Professionalism i-iii, 3-5, 10, 13, 32, **43 notes**, 45-47, 51-54, 56-59, 61, 63-65, 73, **76-79 notes**, 177, 189, 190, 195, 197, 200, 201, **212 notes**, 219, 233, 245, 246, 248, 250, 251, 257, 259, 262, 268, 270, **272 notes**, 314, 318, 326
- Proportional Means 144, 145
- Protection 7, 26, 28, 30-32, 113, 128, 146, 147, 151, 203, 339
- Psychological Distress 324
- Psychology 14, **107-110 notes**, **179 notes**, **181 notes**, **210 notes**, **308 notes**, 324, **334-336 notes**, 338, 354, **359-364 notes**, 365, 367-369
- Public Relations 166
- Public Scrutiny 312, 314
- Purpose 6, 13, 40, 57, 86, 92, 94, 98, 105, 107, 140, 146, 169, **179 notes**, 186, 226, 251, 253, 254, 312
- Qualitative 96, 106, 196, 223, 229, 303, 315, 318, 328, 330
- Quality of Life 312
- Quantitative 107, 223, 315, 320, 327, 328
- Quinn, Robert 5, 82-85, 90, 102, **107 notes**
- Rabin, Yitzhak 194, 195
- Rational Goal 84
- Reasonable Prospects 145, 146
- Regiment 13, 62, 82, 233, 251, 256-259, 262, 263, 265, **273 notes**, **274 notes**, **277 notes**, **278 notes**, 289, **309 notes**, 317, 318, **333 notes**, 367, 368, **371 gloss**.
- Revolution in Military Affairs/RMA **79 notes**, 215, 241, 246, 248, **373 gloss**.
- Responsibility 7, 9, 137-145, 147-154, **155 notes**, 170, **181 notes**
- Responsibility to Protect 7, 9, 137-145, 147-154, **155 notes**
- Retention 320, 324
- Right Authority 143, 146, 148
- Rothbart, Myron 358, **364 notes**
- Round Table 29
- Royal Canadian Dragoons/RCD 266, **373 gloss**.
- Royal Military College of Canada/RMC **43 notes**, 60, 62, 65, **74 notes**, **79 notes**, **335 notes**, 366-368
- Rules of Engagement/ROE 129, 166, 167, 198, 200, 206, 260, **373 gloss**.
- Rumsfeld, Donald 215

INDEX

- Rwanda 141, 142, 144
- Satellite Communications/SATCOM 8, 120, 131, 132, **373 gloss.**
- Satisfaction 316, 326
- Schein, Edgar H. 313, 319, 326, **332 notes, 333 notes**
- Schema 339, 352, 353
- Schmidtchen, David 188, **209 notes**
- Schwartz, S.H. 343, **360 notes, 361 notes**
- Schwarzkopf, General Norman 218, 226
- Second Language Training 340
- Security iii, 2, 7, 14, 63, **78 notes**, 126, 130, **133 notes, 134 notes**, 137-140, 142, 144-146, 148, 149, 152, **155 notes**, 157, 158, 160, **178 notes, 179 notes, 182 notes**, 190, 195, 202, 205, 207, **211 notes**, 247, 252, 254, 255, 259, 265, **271 notes, 273 notes, 310 notes**, 317, 324, **335 notes**, 365
- Semianiw, Colonel Walter 265
- Service iii, 4, 27-29, 31, 32, 35-38, 40, **44 notes**, 50-53, 56-59, 61, 62, 67, 115, 116, 118, 166, 171, 223, 224, 229, 231, **243 notes**, 250, 257, 258, 265, 266, **273 notes**, 316, 320, 323, 324, 328, **332 notes**, 255, 365, 369, **373 gloss.**
- Skeptical Conformer 351
- Social Structure ii, 14, 15, 166, 286-288, 290-292, 298, 302, 305-308, **310 notes**
- Socialization 61, 318, 322, 357
- Systemic Problem 251, 263
- Sharon, Prime Minister Ariel 162, 169, 193, 194, 201, 205
- Shock and Awe 226
- Shmueli, Lieutenant-Colonel Timna 175, **182 notes**
- Sinai Campaign 194
- Six Day War 194-196
- Skill 7, 26, 29, 30, 36, 37, 40, 49, 50, 65, 68, 82, 83, 85, 88, 90, 91, 94-97, 99-102, 105, **108 notes, 110 notes**, 159, 254, 269, 316
- Skills Modeling 6, 85, 101, **371 notes**
- Social Adjustment Function 339
- Social Anthropology 284, 285, **309 notes**, 367
- Social Contract 315
- Social Norm(s) 17, 126, 330, 344, 351, 352, 359
- Society iii, 4, 21, 22, 25-28, 31-34, 36-38, 40, 41, **44 notes**, 47, 51, 52, 55-59, 61, 62, 64-67, 72, 73, **75 notes, 76 notes**, 88, **110 notes**, 127, **180 notes, 209 notes**, 250, 261, **274 notes**, 285-287, **309 notes, 310 notes**, 317, 318, **333 notes**, 338, 353, 367, **372 gloss.**

- Sociology 14, **177 notes**, 284, **309 notes**, 354, 366
- Somalia 11-14, 59, **77 notes**, **78 notes**, 144, 240, 246, 251, 258-268, 270, **274-280 notes**, 312, 317, 318, **331 notes**, **333 notes**, 365, 368
- Somalia Commission 59, **77 notes**, **78 notes**, 265, 267, **274 notes**, **276 notes**, **279 notes**, **280 notes**
- South America 118
- Sovereign Nations 138, 149
- Sovereignty 9, 137-140, 148, 149, 152, 153, **154 notes**, **155 notes**, 247, 252, 253, **372 gloss**.
- Soviet(s) 119, 120, 188, 191, 218, 223, 225-229, 232, 240, **243 notes**, 247, 248, 250, **271 notes**, **374 gloss**.
- Span of Control 187
- Special Operations Forces/SOF 5, 6, 81, 82, 84, 85, 91-93, 95, 99-101, 105, 106, **373 gloss**.
- Special Service Force/SSF 258, 264, 265, **273 notes**, **278 notes**, **373 gloss**.
- Standard of Civilisation 149
- Standing Naval Force Atlantic/SNFL 119, **373 gloss**.
- Stereotype(s) 17 99, 126, 338, 339, 352-357
- Stereotypical 28, 357, 358
- Stereotyping 6, 354, 355, 357, **363 notes**
- Stogdill, R.M. 98, **109 notes**, **308 notes**
- Strategic Corporal 49, 168, **180 notes**, 199, **212 notes**, **214 notes**
- Strength 18, 29, 34, 40, **75 notes**, **78 notes**, 223, 229, 249, 256, 295, **309 notes**, 359
- Stress 4, 39, 40, 161, 175, 177, 223, 233, 234, 287, 322, 323, **334 notes**, **335 notes**
- Stressors 322
- Sub-Culture(s) 16, 32, 316, 318, 319, 329, 330
- Subordinate(s) 5, 38, 46, 49, 61, 65, 69, 72, 98, 121, 161, 168, 170-174, 176, 177, **181 notes**, 186-189, 191, 200, 207, 214, 235, **278 notes**, 295, 297, 305, 306, 321, 337, 355, 359
- Suez 64, 194, 196, 206, 255
- Sullivan, General Gordon 68, 238, 240, **242 notes**, **243 notes**
- Superordinate 348, 352
- Tactical 7, 11, 33, 49, 72, 85, 115, 119-123, 132, 158, 164, 168, 175, 176, **178 notes**, 187, 188, 191, 197, 199, 205, 206, 208, 218, 226, 229, 250
- Tactics 164, 173, 201, 202, **209 notes**, **210 notes**, 232
- Taylor, Don 354, **363 notes**

INDEX

- Technology 8, 12, 30, **41 notes**, 59, 70, **79 notes**, 115, 116, 119, 120, 123, 124, 131, 133, **135 notes**, 196, 215, 219, 228, 237, 239, 248, 252, **272 notes**, **310 notes**
- Terrorism 7, 10, 40, 113, 132, **134 notes**, 157, **178 notes**, 201, **213 notes**, 365, 357
- Terrorist(s) 41, 113, 160, 165, 201, 203-205
- Tet Offensive 217
- Theory of Reasoned Action 351
- Theory of Planned Behaviour 351
- Thompson, Julian 192, **210 notes**
- Thurman, General Maxwell 229, 230, 239
- TOW 228, **374 gloss.**
- Towed Array Sonar/TAS 120, **373 gloss.**
- Training iv, 12, 39, 47, 51, 55, 58, 61, 62, 68, 94, 97, 105, 106, 160, 171, 173, 174, 176, 177, **178-180 notes**, **182 notes**, 189, 190, 194, 195, 200, 201, **210 notes**, **211 notes**, 219, 222-224, 231-239, **243 notes**, 249, 253, 255, 257, 258, 268, **272 notes**, **280 notes**, 298, 301, 304, 308, **310 notes**, 311, 322, 324, 340, 348, 349, **371 gloss.**, **373 gloss.**
- Training and Doctrine Command/TRADOC 224, 236, **243 notes**, **374 gloss.**
- Trait(s) 24, 26-28, 33, 35-37, 94, 95, **109 notes**, 353, 355
- Transactional 6, 96, 98-100, **109 notes**, 341
- Transformation 2, 10-13, 16, 21, 25, 26, 100, 124, **134 notes**, **136 notes**, 215, 241, 245, 246, 248, 268, 270, 320, 329, 330, **331 notes**, **333 notes**, 368, 369
- Transformational 2, 6, 82, 96-100, **109 notes**, 172, **181 notes**, 341
- Treaty of Westphalia 139, 247
- Tripartite Model 16, 339, 352
- Truman, President 53
- Trust 37, 38, 93, 97, 100 101, **109 notes**, 128, **135 notes**, 162, 169, 170, 173, 188, 189, 199, 216, 249, **276 notes**, 293, 294, 306, **322 notes**, 337
- Tzadka, Brigadier-General Dov 204
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/USSR 218, **374 gloss.**
- Unit Morale Profile/UMP 224, **335 notes**, **374 gloss.**
- United Kingdom/UK **44 notes**, **77 notes**, 59, 65, **178 notes**, 236, 285, 286, 367
- United Nations/UN 7, 9, 12, 63, 64, **78 notes**, **79 notes**, 114, 115, 122, 125, 130, 137-142, 144, 146-148, 150, 153, **155 notes**, 165, **177 notes**, **180 notes**, 216, **242 notes**, 255, 256, 258, 259, **271 notes**, **275 notes**, **374 gloss.**

- United Nations Security Council 142, 146
- United States/US 12, 21, 34-36, **41 notes**, **44 notes**, 47, 52, 53, 55, 59, 63, 65, **272 notes**, **77 notes**, **78 notes**, **80 notes**, 94, 97, 98, **109 notes**, 115, 119, 121-125, 127, 128, 130, 132, 133, **134 notes**, **135 notes**, 141, 188, 200, **213 notes**, 215, 218, 221, 228, 236, 240, **242 notes**, **243 notes**, 253, 254, 259, 318, 365, 369, **374 gloss.**
- United States Navy/USN 8, 115, 118-124, 127, 128, 130-133, **134 notes**, **135 notes**, **374 gloss.**
- Unlimited Liability 38, 61
- Value(s) iii, 4, 6, 12, 15, 17, 22, 27, 33, 34, 38, 40, 41, 47, 52-55, 59, 63, 67, 82-85, 88, 90, 97-99, 101, **107 notes**, **109 notes**, 115, 126, 130, 171, 190-193, 216, 219-223, 226, 227, 231, 237, 238, 242, 248, 250, 267, 268, 270, **278 notes**, **280 notes**, 312-319, 322-324, 326, 328, **332 notes**, **336 notes**, 339-344, 349, 351, 352, 359, **360 notes**, **361 notes**
- Values-Based 53, 312, 314
- Value-Expressive Function 339
- Vander Zanden, James 348, **362 notes**, **364 notes**
- Vietnam 217, 219-225, 228, 229, 231, 241, **244 notes**
- Virtue 28, 32, 50
- Vision 12, 88, 97, 102, 124, 219, 223, 225-227, 242, 249, 269
- Vocational 59, **108 notes**, 268, 316
- Vuono, General Carl 236, 237, 240
- Warrior Ethos iii, 3, 4, 21-23, 27-29, 32-35, 39-41, **42-44 notes**, 55
- Warfare 8, 23, 24, 30, 39, **41 notes**, 50, **78 notes**, **107 notes**, 120-123, 131, **134 notes**, **135 notes**, 158-160, 176, 177, **178 notes**, **180 notes**, 186, 191, 195, 197, 208, **210 notes**, **212 notes**, 220-223, 225, 238, 241, **371 gloss.**, **373 gloss.**, **374 gloss.**
- Warfighting 117, 132, **179 notes**, 250
- Warsaw Pact 223, 246
- Web-Centric Anti-Submarine Warfare Net/WeCAN 122, **374 gloss.**
- West Bank 158, 174, 176, 197, 202, 204, 205
- White Paper 144, 147, 151, **155 notes**
- Wilson, James 188, **209 notes**
- Winslow, Donna 274, 317, 318, **333 notes**
- Ya'alon, Moshe 164, 168, **180 notes**, 201, 205
- Yom Kippur War 196, 227

INDEX

Young, Doug 267, **279 notes**

Yugoslavia 144, 266

Yukl, Gary 81, 106, **107 notes**, **109 notes**

Zanna, Mark 345, **359 notes**, **361 notes**

This volume is the first in an exciting new series released by the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI) and the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA). The series, entitled From the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's Research Files, provides a means through which specialized and highly focused topics in military leadership and professionalism can be addressed and disseminated for a wider audience. The impetus for this book was generated by an acknowledgment within CFLI that, even though critical topics needed to be explored in depth, some of these issues would not demand a full book treatment.

The subtitle selected for Volume 1, Dimensions of Military Leadership, effectively captures the notion that the chapters have a military focus, represent a range of facets or elements, and should be of interest to anyone remotely interested in leadership. The chapters themselves are clustered into four broad conceptual areas. In Part I, Leadership and Culture, there are chapters devoted to the warrior ethos, professionalism, and adaptive skills for leadership success. Part II, Changes in the International Security Environment, contains explorations into coalitional and multinational operations, military interventions to support human rights, and leadership in low-intensity conflicts. Part III, Leadership and Transformation, includes such topics as Bitsuism and Mission command in the Israeli Defence Forces, lessons learned from American Reform, and the absence of honour in Somalia that triggered wide scale transformation in the Canadian Forces. Finally, in Part IV, Organizational Approaches to Military Leadership, there are examination of social structures, culture, climate, attitudes and behaviour.

Watch for future volumes in this new series.



CANADIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY PRESS

