ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND THE CANADIAN MILITARY: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

EDITED BY
P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER
AND
CRAIG LESLIE MANTLE

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FOREWORD

Undeniably, diversity is an operational imperative. As such, the Canadian Forces (CF) prides itself on being a national institution that reflects and promotes the values of a diverse country. This includes Canada's Aboriginal peoples, who have a proud history and tradition of military service extending from the colonial period, through the world wars, to contemporary operations. At present, 1275 First Nations, Inuit and Métis Canadians serve with the CF at home and abroad, representing hundreds of communities, bands and linguistic groups. Aboriginal veterans are also recognized for their significant contributions to Canadian military history on a national level and in their communities, where many play a prominent role in pow-wows and Remembrance Day ceremonies.

As the "Aboriginal Champion" for the Canadian Forces, I am honoured to write the foreword to this landmark volume containing historical perspectives on Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian military. The Canadian Defence Academy conference on "Aboriginals and the Canadian Military: past, present, future," held in Kingston in June 2006, was an important gathering for scholars and policy makers to discuss historical and contemporary relationships between the Canadian military and Aboriginal peoples. Our military ethos is intended to establish the trust that is essential between the CF and Canadian society. The evolving relationships between Aboriginal peoples and the CF, discussed in this volume, reflect shared values of honour, duty, loyalty, integrity, and courage. They also provide a foundation upon which to chart a cooperative course into the future.

On National Aboriginal Day, 21 June 2001, Her Excellency the Right Honourable Adrienne Clarkson, Governor General of Canada and Commander-in-Chief of the Canadian Forces, presided at the unveiling of the National Aboriginal Veterans Monument in Ottawa. "History is important. And history is what this Monument is all about," she explained. "It is about the history of Aboriginal veterans and the places where they served in Canada's uniform with honour and distinction, at home and abroad, in time of war and in keeping the peace. It is about a much unknown, almost ignored, but glorious history.... I want to express on behalf of all Canadians our pride in this history." The words etched on the monument serve as a lasting tribute to Aboriginal peoples' ongoing contributions to Canadian security:

> *They were Allies to the Crown and faithful to the traditions of their forefathers.*
> *They served with honour and distinction in all branches of the Service*
> *and in every rank and appointment from Private to Brigadier.*
> *They fought overseas to defend the sovereignty and liberty of allied nations*
> *in addition to supporting the cause at home.*
> *Hundreds from across Canada gave fully of their lives*
> *so that all Canadians might know peace and inherit freedom.*
> *Their dedication continues in Peacekeeping operations in far away lands.*

FOREWORD

Knowledge and cross-cultural understanding are key to building and fostering sustainable trust relationships with Aboriginal peoples. As the CF continues to evolve as a national institution that accommodates diverse cultures, it is our duty and honour to remember the Aboriginal service personnel – past and present – who have contributed so much to our country. This volume is an important step in that process.

Lieutenant-General Andrew B. Leslie, CMM, MSC, MSM, CD
Chief of the Land Staff

PREFACE

I am honoured to introduce *Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives*, the latest addition to the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's Strategic Leadership Writing Project, an initiative that collects and disseminates relevant leadership lessons and insights to members of the Canadian Forces, international academics, and the general public. Drawing on the success of "Aboriginals and the Canadian Military: past, present, future," an academic conference held in June 2006 at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, this volume, published through CDA Press, examines the ever-changing relationship between Aboriginal peoples and Canada's military over the last four centuries. At times, this relationship has been marked by co-operation and teamwork, whereas at others, ignorance and mistreatment have been the watchwords of the day. What these pages reveal, however, is that Canada's Aboriginal peoples have played a seminal role in the defence of the nation, whether standing fast against foreign invaders or standing alert in the northernmost reaches of the country keeping watch. This volume, like its companion, *Aboriginal Peoples and Military Participation: Canadian and International Perspectives*, also published by CDA Press, seeks to gain a more profound understanding of the trials and difficulties, the successes and victories, of Aboriginal people within a military context. It is my sincere wish that all who read *Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Military* will come away with a greater understanding of and appreciation for Canada's "first warriors."

Colonel Bernd Horn, OMM, CD, PhD
Chairman, CDA Press

INTRODUCTION

P. Whitney Lackenbauer

Over the last 35 years, Aboriginal history has emerged as one of the fastest growing and most dynamic fields in Canadian history. Rather than simply casting Aboriginal peoples as either bloodthirsty savages or as noble, romantic comrades-in-arms, historians have begun to recognize that they have been active agents in shaping the development of Canada rather than simply supporting actors or passive victims of history.[1] The chapters in this volume highlight their important contributions as long-standing allies of the Crown from the colonial-era through to the 20th century. If European "contact" was an ongoing process rather than an "event," demanding a mutual exchange of ideas, technologies and military tactics, so too were evolving alliances between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. The process of mutual learning and engagement continues today and will continue into the future.

In his reflections on postmodernism and Anglo-Western military strength, Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Bondy observes that "the stock of social capital in any society depends on deep-seated cultural assumptions and social habits…. Accordingly, social capital is far from inevitable and is surprisingly precarious. It is generally considered much easier to destroy than to build, and cannot be taken for granted."[2] Remembering past contributions and evolving relationships is essential to determine "best practices" – and to learn from negative experiences – to navigate a common path into the future based on mutual understanding, trust and respect. Just as the study of military history plays an important role in honing a leader's ability to analyze situations critically (Clausewitzian "critik") and to appreciate the subjectivities of combat,[3] sober reflection on historical relationships is essential to fostering an inclusive and adaptable military culture reflective of a multi-cultural, post-colonial Canada. As Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie notes in the Foreword, "Knowledge and cross-cultural understanding are key to building and fostering sustainable trust relationships with Aboriginal peoples."

Many indigenous tribes and confederacies along the St. Lawrence watershed built lasting alliances with New France beginning in the 17th century. The French, living in a small colony dependent on trade, needed Aboriginal allies to survive against the more populous English in North America. The *Canadiens* adapted quickly and adopted the Indian style of combat to prevent English expansion beyond the Appalachians. That strategy was disrupted only after the French were defeated during the Seven Years' War and Pontiac's "Rebellion" failed in the 1760s. For the British, historian Robert S. Allen explained, the Silver Covenant Chain of Friendship, solemnized

with the Mohawks in 1677, served as "the foundation of the British-Indian military alliances" and was eventually extended to include nearly all of the tribes of the Great Lakes. Its purpose was to defend against New France, at least until the Conquest of 1759.[4] In the colonial-era, the New World and its peoples were divided into two rival camps.

Bernd Horn's chapter, "A Necessary Evil?" Indians as Allies in the Struggle for North America, 1754-1760," describes how both European colonizing powers developed a respect – and fear – of the Native way of war and considered Indian support to be critical to wartime success. Nevertheless, both the English and the French complained bitterly about their "fiercely independent, devious, and atrociously unreliable" Indian allies. Horn explains that this negative portrayal reflected differing cultural constructions of warfare. According to European norms, serious combat was conducted by mass armies on open battlefields; Native warriors did not fight in precise formations or hold their ground with the tenacity (and cost) expected of a European soldier. In Europe, soldiers were unlikely to encounter forest ambushes or the assaulting of palisades that was more typical in Aboriginal warfare. Regular officers originally underestimated this unorthodox form of combat ("the skulking way of war"), considering it "cowardly and reprehensible, wholly without honour," but they also recognized, to borrow a phrase, that Aboriginal allies were "a necessary evil." The Indians tended to side with the strongest force, and because neither side wanted to offend their Indian allies, they vied for their allegiance with presents, food and equipment. Despite the frequent complaints levied against the Indians, Horn concludes, "the Natives were an important component of the successful prosecution of war in the colonies. Their participation, or even neutrality, often represented the difference between victory or defeat during campaigns."

After the American colonists rebelled against the Crown in the late-18th century, Britain became the ally of the Aboriginal peoples of the Northeast. Aboriginal warriors fought for their own lands and homes during the American Revolution (1775-1783) and the War of 1812, helping to save British North America from conquest by the armies of the new United States of America. Donald Graves, in his chapter "His Majesty's Aboriginal Allies: The Contribution of the Indigenous Peoples of North America to the Defence of Canada during the War of 1812," provides a general historical background of White-Aboriginal relations in early-Canadian history, highlighting that the War of 1812 was "only the last of a series of conflicts involving competing White nations and the Aboriginal peoples that began shortly after the first Europeans arrived in North America." Like Horn,

Graves stresses that these alliances were vital to the survival of New France, and Aboriginal warriors' pivotal role declined in importance only after greater numbers of European troops arrived in the latter stages of the Seven Years' War. Henceforth, imperial battles for "New World" supremacy became more "Old World" in their operational and tactical orientation. Settlement pressures on the western boundary between the Thirteen Colonies and Aboriginal territory after 1763 pushed the Iroquois League and the Seven Nations of Canada into the British camp before the American Revolutionary War, wherein they won "several notable victories over rebel forces." Although Aboriginal peoples were disappointed with the Treaty of Paris, which made no mention of them whatsoever and led to a feeling of betrayal, as well as the lack of British support for the Northwest Confederacy in the 1790s, their poor treatment by the Americans encouraged many groups to gradually reaffirm their traditional alliance with the British Crown.

Graves' main focus is Aboriginal contributions during the War of 1812, which they conceptualized as an existential fight for their lands and their way of life. Initial clashes between American forces and Tecumseh's followers convinced the Shawnee leader to ally with the British and Aboriginal peoples living in the Ohio Valley seemed anxious to defend the Crown's possessions when the United States invaded Canada in 1812. Those living on Canadian territory were less enthusiastic about fighting, Graves explains. For example, the Six Nations community was divided over fighting for Britain on the eve of the War of 1812, as it also would be over service for Canada during the First World War. Despite a comparatively small number of Aboriginal warriors actually fighting during the War of 1812, their mere presence had a strong psychological impact on the American commanders and troops. Furthermore, the Northwest nations' contributions heavily influenced American strategy. The republic was forced to commit disproportionate resources on the Aboriginal threat in that region rather than on the St. Lawrence lifeline. In the end, Graves sees this as Aboriginal peoples' most significant contribution to the defence of Canada during the war.

While both the Americans and the British/Canadians could claim victory in the War of 1812, "His Majesty's Indian Allies" could not. Shifting demographics decreased the geo-strategic importance of Aboriginal peoples' military role in northern North America after 1815, but the tradition of loyal service continued. Ties were renewed through the 19th century during the Rebellions of Upper and Lower Canada in 1837 and 1838, the Fenian threat of the 1860s and the unrest in the Northwest in the late-1860s and mid-1880s.[5] The military relationship evolved as Aboriginal men were sought out individually for their

specialist skills to serve in defence of Crown interests and with Canadian expeditionary forces far afield. The Nile River Expedition[6] and the Boer War provided precedents for the significant service that Aboriginal soldiers would render to Canadian arms during the two world wars.

During the First World War and Second World War, thousands of Aboriginal men and women voluntarily enlisted in Canada's armed forces. They served in units with other Canadians in every theatre in which Canadian forces participated. More than 500 status Indian servicemen lost their lives on foreign battlefields during the world wars, and the number of casualties – including those injured – was much higher. Their notable contributions to the war efforts became a source of inspiration and self-confidence to themselves, to their communities and to Canadians in general. "Many soldiers of native ancestry shone individually within the various battalions," historian Fred Gaffen concluded, "in keeping with their traditional way of life and culture where individual heroism in battle was held in high esteem."[7]

Scott Sheffield explains in "Indifference, Difference and Assimilation: Aboriginal People in Canadian Military Practice, 1900-1945," that the Canadian Army did not enlist "ethnic" units during either world war. This makes any systematic analysis and generalizations about Indian contributions very difficult. Indeed, the Army, Navy and Air Force were selective in who they chose to enlist. Aboriginal people faced racial barriers to their participation in both world wars, particularly when official policies stipulated that personnel had to be of "pure European descent." Even when official policies were relaxed to facilitate Aboriginal participation in the services, barriers remained because of individual prerogative. In certain areas, despite letters lauding Aboriginal achievements from Ottawa, local recruiting officers were disinclined to take Aboriginal applicants. By placing these uncertain, even contradictory, policies in the context of bureaucratic and popular ideas about Aboriginal peoples, this general overview explains how practices of "exclusion, differentiation and assimilation" operated simultaneously in wartime.

The First World War, or the "Great War" as it was known to its generation, forced nations and empires to mobilize their resources on an unprecedented scale. The Department of Indian Affairs, and in particular Deputy Superintendent General Duncan Campbell Scott (more famous as a "Confederation poet" than a senior bureaucrat),[8] trumpeted the achievements of status Indians at war's end. In his 1919 annual report (reprinted as Interlude I in this volume), Scott explained that, according to official records, more than 4,000 Indians had enlisted for service – approximately

35 percent of all status Indian males of military age. Given the challenges that faced these recruits, he highlighted how remarkable it was "that the percentage of enlistments among the Indians is fully equal to that among other sections of the community, and indeed far above the average in a number of instances." These statistics did not include non-status Indians, Métis or Inuit, and therefore cannot be considered comprehensive: more Aboriginal peoples served in the armed forces than any official record can provide. "It must … be borne in mind," D.C. Scott explained, "that a large part of the Indian population, located in remote and inaccessible locations, were unacquainted with the English language and were, therefore, not in a position to understand the character of the war, its cause or effect." This made the high levels of Aboriginal enlistment even more remarkable.

Canadian officials had contemplated the role of Aboriginal peoples in the war almost from its onset. The initial response in Ottawa was hesitation, but several enthusiastic Aboriginal men made their way to recruiting centres in the fall of 1914 and began their training for overseas service. Some members of Canadian society did not give substantive weight to the worries of differential treatment and were eager to recruit Indians for service. Due to the unique mandate of the Department of Indian Affairs (it was expected to protect the rights of status Indians as well as to act in the interests of the federal government), the roles of Indian Agents in recruiting – and Indian Affairs policies regarding enlistments – from reserves fluctuated during the war. Historian James Dempsey has charted the changing directions and apparent inconsistencies in how government administrators and recruiters applied these rules. In large part, the change to encouraging active recruitment of Indians appears to have been a response to Prime Minister Robert Borden's efforts to replace the increasingly high number of casualties in front-line units. Recruiting efforts, however, did not necessarily bring the desired results. The Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs supported some Indian Councils and local Agents that objected to the tactics used by recruiting officers on their reserves. In one case, when Blackfoot elders requested that 15 enlisted Blackfoot men be discharged from the Army, Indian Affairs instructed the military district's commanding officer to release them.[9]

For the most part, however, recruiting activities tried to encourage rather than coerce Indians to enlist. Looking at Six Nations enlistments from 1914 to 1916, Katharine McGowan and P. Whitney Lackenbauer paint a complex portrait of the largest Indian band in Canada and its attitude toward the Great War. Despite government policy that stated Indians would not be eligible for overseas service, Six Nations men were among the first to volunteer. This reflected the community's proud history of alliance with the

Crown and its members' longstanding participation in the local militia. On the other hand, the Six Nations Hereditary Council rejected a prominent militiaman's proposal to create a Six Nations unit, however, asserting that it would only answer an appeal from King George V directly. Based on past treaties and alliances, the hereditary chiefs considered their people to be a separate nation and thus felt that they were due a formal request from the Crown: from one allied nation to another. This gesture would have had political and legal ramifications, and was not one that the Canadian government could support. Despite this difference of political opinion, Iroquois reserves proved active bastions of support for the war effort: the areas around Brantford (Six Nations) and Tyendinaga (Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte) became the highest sources of Indian enlistment in Canada. Rather than confirming typical depictions of Aboriginal Canadians as uniformly patriotic and supportive of the voluntary war effort, this discussion tries to de-essentialize Aboriginal responses to the war. Internal divisions at Six Nations mirrored those in Canada as a whole, suggesting that many of the common assumptions about Aboriginal patriotism, voluntary service and government coercion should be revisited through careful and systematic study of community relations at the regional and local levels.

In all, more than 300 status Indians from Canada died in the First World War. Hundreds more were wounded, both in body and in mind. Some veterans returned with tuberculosis and other diseases that they had contracted amidst the horrid conditions on the Western Front. When some soldiers returned to isolated communities at the end of the war, they also unwittingly carried with them the deadly influenza that swept the country in 1919. They had made deep sacrifices alongside their comrades from the rest of Canada and remembered their patriotic contributions to victory. "Now that peace has been declared, the Indians of Canada may look with just pride upon the part played by them in the Great War, both at home and on the field of battle," Edward Ahenakew, a Saskachewan Cree clergyman proclaimed in 1920:

> Not in vain did our young men die in a strange land; not in vain are our Indian bones mingled with the soil of a foreign land for the first time since the world began; not in vain did the Indian fathers and mothers see their sons march away to face what to them were understandable dangers; the unseen tears of Indian mothers in many isolated Indian reserves have watered the seeds from which may spring those desires and efforts and aspirations which will enable us to reach sooner the stage when we will take our place side by side with the white people.[10]

For this sacrifice, changes to better the Indian way of life in Canada were necessary.

There was, however, more continuity than change in the government's administration of Aboriginal peoples, and in particular veterans, after the war. "In contrast to the country which made political and economic gains," Gaffen concluded, "the lot of the Indian people remained much the same. The sacrifice of killed and wounded achieved very little politically, economically or socially for them."[11] Historian James Dempsey has described the disappointment felt by many Prairie Indian veterans when they returned home. Their exposure to the broader world had changed them profoundly, but they returned to the same patronizing society that they had left. Although eligible for the vote overseas, they lost their democratic rights after the war. Furthermore, the inequitable eligibility requirements and dispensation of veterans' settlement packages (money and land) disadvantaged many Indian veterans.[12] Although they had fought overseas, their legal status had not changed; they continued to be wards of the Crown. Now armed with increased political awareness, veterans began to organize politically. Frederick Ogilvie Loft from Six Nations spearheaded the establishment of the League of Indians of Canada, the first pan-Canadian Indian political movement, in the early-1920s. "As peaceable and law-abiding citizens in the past, and even in the late war, we have performed dutiful service to our King, Country and Empire," Loft explained, "and we have the right to claim and demand more justice and fair play as a recompense."[13] The treatment of First Nations veterans was amongst the primary concerns of Loft and other Native leaders.

The final years of the war and the return to peace were not easy for the Six Nations community. In 1918, the federal government ordered that all males of military age – including Indians – register so that it could invoke conscription. The Six Nations Council stridently opposed this move, had their anti-conscription resolutions published in local newspapers, and funded the legal case of a local man who refused to register.[14] Concurrently, Six Nations soldiers overseas, who were frustrated with Council's reluctance to support the war effort, lobbied the Canadian government to democratize and modernize band politics. "Led by three hundred returned men from the overseas trenches," historian Enos Montour explained, "the progressives set out to dehorn the chiefs. Previously, a petition had come from those trenches duly censored, signed by the soldiers in France, demanding a more modern, democratic form of council. There was much bitterness, and the Six Nations Reserve was split right down the centre."[15]

John Moses explains in "The Return of the Native: Six Nations Veterans and Political Change at the Grand River Reserve, 1917-1924," that Colonel A.T. Thompson was appointed to investigate the local political situation at Six

Nations in 1923. Given his close relationship with those band members who had served under him during the war, it was not surprising that he proved receptive to their intense lobbying for an elected council and recommended abolishing the Hereditary Council. Moses revisits the infamous 1924 episode in which the federal government deposed the traditional council and installed an elected band system in its place. While typically cast as a draconian measure designed by "external" parties to castrate political opposition at Six Nations and to further the federal assimilationist agenda, Moses focuses on the Six Nations veterans who returned from the First World War and led lobbying efforts for a democratic system. Although the "Dehorner" movement had taken form long before the war, veterans became its strongest proponents in the early interwar years. Moses concludes that the federal government could not have suddenly and unilaterally imposed sweeping changes on the community in 1924 and that "such a change could only occur from within." This research fits with recent literature that questions orthodox depictions of First Nations as homogeneous communities in unified opposition to federal authorities.[16] Indeed, Moses reminds the reader that Six Nations was a complex community before, during, and after the First World War.

Despite the discontent expressed by Aboriginal veterans during the interwar years, there was an undeniable sense of patriotism across Native Canada when the Second World War broke out in September 1939. As the "Phoney War" turned into "total war" after the fall of France, Aboriginal peoples, like other Canadians, were called upon to make sacrifices and contribute to the national crusade to defeat totalitarian aggression. The *Globe and Mail* published a representative article on 4 October 1940, headlined "Indians Go on Warpath, This Time Against Nazis," which trumpeted that:

> Canadian Indians, whose forebears fought against the encroachment of the "paleface" in the conquest of the New World, today are helping their King to defend the Empire against Adolf Hitler and to stop the spread of the Nazi ideology in the New World. Mounted on motorcycles instead of piebald ponies, armed with Bren and Lewis machine guns instead of bows and arrows and tomahawks, and wearing the battle dress of the modern soldier instead of the plume feathers their forefathers wore on the warpath, the "braves" are in Great Britain's front line of defense with "paleface" Canadian troops.

In the 1940 Annual Report of the Indian Affairs Branch, Director H.W. McGill observed: "Always loyal, they were not slow to come forward with offers of assistance in both men and money. About one hundred Indians had

enlisted by the end of the fiscal year and the contributions of the Indians to the Red Cross and other funds amounted to over $1,300." As laudable as this initial participation was, McGill subsequently noted that by 1942 the rate of participation was not as high as it had been during the First World War. Aboriginal men and women were also drawn to high paying war industry employment off-reserve. The 1942 Annual Report indicated an increase in enlistees to 1801. By mid-1943, the number of Indian service personnel grew to 2383, then swelled to 2603 in 1944. At the war's end, the Indian Affairs Branch officially reported that 3090 status Indian had participated directly. As was the case during the First World War, the figure for Aboriginal soldiers was undoubtedly higher because non-status Indians and Métis were excluded from this count. The official number of 3090 represents 2.4 percent of the 125,946 status Indians in Canada based upon census figures available at that time.[17]

Aboriginal soldiers, seamen and airmen were among the casualties at Hong Kong and Dieppe, they fought in Italy and Sicily, served on convoy escorts in the Battle of the Atlantic, and flew with bomber and fighter crews around the world. They landed with 3rd Canadian Infantry Division on D-Day and fought through the campaigns in Normandy and Northwest Europe. The war was a partnership between all Canadians who were willing to sacrifice their lives to restore peace and security to a world in turmoil. A sense of equality once again developed in the Canadian forces, inspired in part by shared training and camaraderie.

Historian Scott Sheffield has shown in his book *The Red Man's on the Warpath* that the media played a pivotal role in shaping how Canadians understood Aboriginal peoples' contributions to the war effort. Such contributions were applauded in hyper-patriotic and boldly symbolic terms: "It helped the dominant society cope with adversity during the war's early years, played a role in defining Canada and what the country was fighting for, and provided an instrument to help motivate and mobilize other Canadians to keep going."[18] Philip Godsell's 1941 article "Red Men Dig Up the Hatchet," which is reprinted here as Interlude II, is a classic example of how journalists blended popular images of the "blood-thirsty" Indians of earlier eras with the displays of patriotism that marked their contributions to the war against Hitler. Godsell, a former Hudson's Bay Company inspector and the author of numerous books on the Canadian northern frontier, introduced readers to individuals like Joe Dreaver, Joe Riel Desmarais and William Semia who carried forward the proud tradition of their Native forefathers.

It was not only Aboriginal men who served. The Indian Affairs Branch's 1944 summary noted "a few Indian girls who enlisted with the Army and Airforce." According to statistics published the previous year, 16 of the 1801 status Indians in military service were women. A postwar government memorandum indicates that a total of 72 Indian women served overseas during the world wars. Although general sketches of Aboriginal contributions to the war efforts often include an anecdote or two about the women who volunteered, and a few collections have gathered Aboriginal women's recollections of the war years,[19] Grace Poulin's discussion "Invisible Women: Aboriginal Servicewomen in Canada's Second World War Military" includes several of their stories. Based upon a series of oral history interviews, Poulin takes a personal look at Aboriginal women's myriad experiences in the armed forces. In their reminiscences, Aboriginal women explain their reasons for joining up (often not very different from those reasons commonly cited by Aboriginal men and other Canadians), which ranged from regular wages to the opportunity to travel. They also talk about their experiences, disappointments and inequitable treatment as veterans. These testimonies serve as a reminder that service personnel of both genders contributed to the armed forces and will prove valuable to future scholars interested in women's contributions to the war.

Aboriginal service transcended generational as well as gender lines. Older men who had seen action in the First World War enlisted for home defence with the Veterans' Guard or the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. In several families, this created a multi-generational commitment of service. For instance, Joe Dreaver from the Mistawasis Cree Band earned a Military Medal at Ypres in the Great War. During that conflict he had lost one brother in action and another who later died from his wounds. In the Second World War, he joined the Veterans' Guard, while three of his sons and two daughters served overseas, as did his younger brother. The McLeod family from the Cape Croker Reserve, on the Bruce Peninsula in southwestern Ontario, also had substantial representation in the military. John McLeod, an Ojibwa, served in the Great War and with the Veterans' Guard of Canada in the Second. Six of his sons and one of his daughters enlisted between 1940 and 1944: two of the boys were killed in action, and two others were wounded. In acknowledgment of her family's sacrifice, Mrs. McLeod was named Silver Cross Mother of the Year in 1972. She was also the first Canadian Indian to lay a wreath on the National War Memorial in Ottawa, on behalf of all mothers who had lost their children to the wars.[20]

The McLeods were not alone in their sacrifices. In October 1943, the *Globe and Mail* reported that the Cape Croker Reserve had 43 men in uniform with

the Army, Navy and Air Force; nine members of the Veterans' Guard; and, seven women with the Canadian Women's Army Corps, out of a total population of 471. These were exceptional numbers. In British Columbia, the interior agencies of Kamloops, Stuart Lake, Williams Lake, Kootenay and the Okanagan had the highest rates of enlistment. In Alberta, where the overall numbers were much lower than the other provinces, the Blood, Lesser Slave Lake, Saddle Lake and the Blackfoot agencies provided the most recruits. Saskatchewan had higher than average representation for the Prairies; the agencies with the highest enlistments were Carlton, File Hills, Crooked Lake and Duck Lake. In Manitoba, Fisher River, Portage la Prairie and Norway House proved to be solid recruiting grounds. In the well-populated province of Ontario, the Six Nations, Manitoulin Island, Parry Sound and Tyendinaga agencies deserve particular mention. Most Indian recruits in Quebec came from the Restigouche, St. Regis and Lorette agencies. On the East Coast, the agencies of South West (in New Brunswick) and Kings (in Nova Scotia) contributed the highest numbers of young men and women to service overseas.

Participation came at a high cost. After the war, the Indian Affairs Branch reported that 200 status Indian soldiers had been killed in action or died in uniform during the Second World War. Fred Gaffen reported the number of Indians at 220, and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples extrapolated that some 500 Aboriginal peoples gave their lives, based on the assumption that there were similar percentages for non-status Indians and Métis. Whatever the actual number, which can never be definitively known, these voluntary contributions – and sacrifices – testified to Aboriginal peoples' support for the war and the ideals and values for which it was fought.

In the last half of the 20th century, new generations of Aboriginal Canadians have donned uniforms and borne arms in support of Canada's domestic and international commitments. They have continued a tradition of service begun by their forebears, in some cases perpetuating a family tradition that spanned several generations. Aboriginal members of the Canadian Forces continue to represent the country's rich diversity and make valuable contributions to our peace and security in an uncertain world.

The onset of the Cold War in the late-1940s drew unprecedented attention to the Canadian North. If the United States and the Soviet Union went to war, the northern approaches to the continent would serve as a likely battleground. In this light, the Canadian military took steps to establish a footprint in northern, isolated and coastal areas. In the penultimate chapter, "Canada's Northern Defenders: Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian

Rangers, 1947-2005," P. Whitney Lackenbauer traces the history of Aboriginal involvement in an unorthodox, part-time, unpaid volunteer force. Armed with only a .303 rifle, an annual allotment of ammunition and an armband, the Rangers acted as "the eyes and ears" of the Canadian Forces in remote regions throughout the Cold War. Given the demographics of the Territorial North, Aboriginal Canadians played an important role as the force spread across the arctic in the 1950s. The military benefited from having Rangers with an intimate knowledge of the local environment and cultures. When the military authorized the formation of companies on Baffin Island in 1951, officials responsible for Eskimo Affairs believed that Ranger service would also be good for the Inuit. One senior official stressed that the Inuit were "reliable, honest and intelligent and would make good Rangers," and recognized that a rifle and bullets were significant assets in a hunting culture. Aboriginal peoples serving with the Rangers guided and advised regular forces on exercises in the north and provided a permanent presence in support of Canadian sovereignty and security.

The importance of the Rangers attracted renewed attention in the early-1970s when arctic sovereignty became a resurgent issue. The military launched initiatives to increase Aboriginal peoples' representation in the armed forces, and the reconstitution of the northern Rangers seemed to represent the most successful of these attempts. Northern Aboriginal persons who served in the Rangers could remain in and serve their communities, while at the same time contributing to national defence. For the Canadian Forces, the Rangers continue to provide a visible assertion of sovereignty at minimal cost. Patrols span the breadth of the arctic and represent every Aboriginal group in the North. The Rangers' interactions with regular and reserve force units also contribute to greater cross-cultural awareness and the sharing of invaluable survival skills. The Canadian Rangers are valuable assets to their communities, to the military, and to Canada as a whole.[21]

In the final chapter, "Moving Beyond 'Forgotten': The Historiography on Canadian Native Peoples and the World Wars," Scott Sheffield and P. Whitney Lackenbauer chart and analyze how writers have portrayed Aboriginal peoples' contributions over the last quarter century. Concurrent to Aboriginal veterans' struggle for recognition and restitution, the "Forgotten Warrior" school sought to rescue the stories of Aboriginal servicemen and women from the historical abyss and to commemorate their contributions and sacrifices. The final report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, released in 1996, devotes a full chapter to Aboriginal veterans, which encapsulated the main tenets of this approach. Over the last decade, scholars have critically analyzed themes such as mobilization and

conscription, the federal government's acquisition of Aboriginal lands during wartime, cultural constructions of the "Indian at War," biographies of individual Native soldiers, and Aboriginal veterans' experiences both individually and as a group. In their final reflection, Lackenbauer and Sheffield suggest future paths for researchers. "Now that authors have established that Aboriginal peoples made significant contributions to the war efforts," they assert, "it is time to move beyond 'forgotten' and enrich our understanding of what the wars meant to Aboriginal peoples and what Aboriginal peoples' contributions meant for the war efforts." They conclude that the Canadian Defence Academy's conference "Aboriginals and the Canadian Military: past, present, future," at which most of the chapters in this volume were first presented, "is another affirmation that Aboriginal peoples' contributions to the military are remembered and are taken seriously, in recognition that the past is connected to the present and to the future."

EDITORS' NOTE

In June 2006, the Canadian Defence Academy, through the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute (CFLI), hosted an academic conference entitled "Aboriginals and the Canadian Military: past, present, future" at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario. Over the course of two days, Aboriginal people, serving Canadian Forces personnel, academics and members of the general public contributed a range of interesting papers that generated dialogue, comment, and fertile ground for future research. This conference succeeded in "building bridges" between the Aboriginal and military communities and providing a forum to discuss relevant issues in a free and open environment. In light of the interest generated by this event, CFLI decided to publish two volumes – one historical with a focus on Canada, the other contemporary and comparative across national boundaries – drawing upon selected papers presented at the symposium. Additional papers previously commissioned by CFLI which dealt with Aboriginal-military relationships were also included to provide broader coverage both chronologically and geographically.

Any study dealing with Aboriginal peoples must invariably grapple with issues of language and vocabulary. Rather than trying to standardize the various authors' submissions to conform to a common terminology, the editors have left them free to decide how they wish to describe the people about whom they are writing, whether Native or non-Native. To provide a common starting point, however, the term "Aboriginal peoples," as defined in Section 35 of the Canadian *Constitution Act* (1982), "includes the Indian, Inuit, and Métis peoples of Canada."

INTRODUCTION

ENDNOTES

Thanks must be given to Jennifer Arthur for vital research assistance and critical editorial feedback, as well as Major Paul Lansey at the Directorate of History and Heritage in Ottawa for permission to incorporate research completed as a contract for DND in 2004.

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[2] Harry Bondy, "Postmodernism and the Source of Military Strength in the Anglo West," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Fall 2004), 39.

[3] For a recent study on the continuing importance of military history, see Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich, eds., *The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[4] Robert S. Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774-1815* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1993), 15-16.

[5] Several sources cover this period, including John Moses with Donald Graves and Warren Sinclair, "A Sketch Account of Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Military" (Ottawa: DND, 2004), available online at: http://www.dnd.ca/hr/dhh/downloads/Official_Histories/sketch_e.pdf (last accessed 2 January 2007) (which is unreliable in places and should be used with caution); Matthieu Sossoyan, "The Kahnawake Iroquois and the Lower-Canadian Rebellions, 1837-1838," Unpublished MA thesis, McGill University, 1999; Rhonda Telford, "The Central Ontario Anishinabe and the Rebellion, 1830-1840," *Actes du Trente-Deuxieme Congres des Algonquinistes* (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba, 2001), 552-570; and, Bill Waiser and Blair Stonechild, *Loyal till Death: Indians and the North-West Rebellion* (Calgary: Fifth House, 1997).

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[7] Fred Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers* (Penticton: Theytus Books, 1985), 24.

[8] On D.C. Scott, see E. Brian Titley, *A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986).

[9] See James Dempsey, *Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1999).

[10] Quoted in Penny Petrone, *First People, First Voices* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983), 148, 151. Also quoted in Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, *Final Report: Volume 1 - Looking Forward Looking Back*, Chapter 12, "Veterans," available online at: http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ch/rcap/sg/sg45_e.html (last accessed 2 January 2007).

[11] Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers*, 33.

[12] Dempsey, *Warriors of the King* and Dempsey, "Problems of Western Canadian Indian War Veterans After World War One," *Native Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1989), 1-18.

[13] F.O. Loft, quoted in J.R. Miller, *Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens*, rev. ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 217.
[14] Six Nations Council Minutes, 20 June 1918 and 3 July 1918, Pt. 9, File 63-32, Vol. 1742, Record Group 10, *Library and Archives Canada*. See also Scott R. Trevithick, "Conflicting Outlooks: The Background to the 1924 Deposing of the Six Nations Hereditary Council," Unpublished MA thesis, University of Calgary, 1998, 74.
[15] Enos T. Montour, *The Feathered U.E.L.'s* (Toronto: United Church of Canada, 1973), 126.
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[17] These statistics were compiled using the Indian Affairs Branch annual reports from 1940 to 1946, which are available online at: http://www.collectionscanada.ca/indianaffairs/index-e.html (last accessed 2 January 2007).
[18] R. Scott Sheffield, "Aboriginal Contributions to Canadian Culture and Identity in Wartime: English Canada's Image of the 'Indian' and the Fall of France, 1940," in D.R. Newhouse, C.J. Voyageur and D. Beavon, eds., *Hidden in Plain Sight: Contributions of Aboriginal Peoples to Canadian Identity and Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 405.
[19] See, for example, P. Gayle McKenzie and Ginny Belcourt Todd, *Our Women in Uniform* (Edmonton: Institute for the Advancement of Aboriginal Women, 2003); Janice Summerby, *Native Soldiers Foreign Battlefields* (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs Canada, 1993); and Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers*.
[20] For more details on these individuals, see Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers*; Summerby, *Native Soldiers*; and the annual reports of the Indian Affairs Branch during the Second World War.
[21] Other studies on Aboriginal participation in the Canadian Rangers include P.Whitney Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Rangers: A Postmodern Militia That Works," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Winter 2005-06), 49-60, and, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, "Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers: Canada's 'Eyes and Ears' in Northern and Isolated Communities," in David Newhouse et al, eds., *Hidden in Plain Sight: Contributions of Aboriginal Peoples to Canadian Identity and Culture, Vol. 2* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).

CHAPTER 1

"A Necessary Evil?" Indians as Allies in the Struggle for North America, 1754-1760

Bernd Horn

The morning stillness was suddenly shattered by the crack of a musket being fired. The British officer, mounted on his horse, looked down at the round blackened hole in his tunic. The scarlet of his uniform was turning a dark crimson red in an ever-expanding rate. As if on cue, as the officer fell dead from his horse, the musket fire from the trees picked up. More men fell. The British soldiers, although somewhat bewildered, formed platoons to respond with volley fire of their own. But the volleys were fired blind because no one could discern the phantoms that were decimating the British ranks seemingly at will. Dead and dying bodies littered the ground. Dense clouds of smoke hung in the forest clearing. The small French party and their Indian allies soon sensed victory. Gliding from cover to cover and well hidden by trees and brush, they continued to pour fire into the enemy. It soon became too much. Deprived of their officers who had largely been killed by the accurate fire of their opponents, the British soldiers became paralyzed by fear. The piercing war cries of the "savages" soon pushed them to panic.

Incredibly, a small French force of 254 colonial troops and Canadian militia, supported by approximately 600 Indians, routed the British force of over 2,000 soldiers, many of whom were regulars.[1] Within a few short hours, the British commander Major-General Edward Braddock was mortally wounded and his army in complete disarray. Those not killed and mutilated by the Indians stampeded to the rear, abandoning all of their equipment as well as their wounded colleagues.

This early morning battle on the Monongahela River on 9 July 1755 had dramatic consequences for the British.[2] In the eyes of the Indians, it reinforced the perception of British ineptness and pushed Natives that were wavering to the French cause. It also reinforced a myth of Indian strength and martial prowess. After all, a small force mainly of irregulars and "savages" had soundly defeated a significantly larger British force composed predominately of regular troops.

This was not the first exposure to the Indian way of war in the forests of North America for either the English or French. Over time, both European colonizing powers developed a begrudging recognition, if not fear, of the Native way of war.

CHAPTER 1

"The Crossing," Robert Griffing, courtesy of Paramount Press

Braddock's army reached the Monongahela on 9 July 1755. It would soon come under fierce attack and suffer considerable loss.

The conventional wisdom held by those familiar with combat in the wilderness of the New World dictated that the support of the Indians, who were masters of hit and run warfare, was instrumental to success. The Indian knowledge of the terrain, their ability to navigate through the dense forests, as well as their guile and tactical ability, made them formidable warriors. Ironically, both the English and the French loathed their Native allies and complained bitterly about them. After all, the Indians proved to be fiercely independent, devious, and atrociously unreliable. Yet, paradoxically, both the English and the French competed fiercely to gain their cooperation, or at a minimum, their neutrality. Faced with this ironic situation, how significant was the contribution of the Indians in the struggle for North America?

Braddock's crushing defeat at the Monongahela River is an appropriate departure point. Major-General Braddock, chosen by the Duke of Cumberland for this particular campaign because of his "courage and military discipline,"[3] set out with a force of approximately 1,200 regulars and 800 provincials to capture Fort Duquesne, a strategic western outpost held by the French. Braddock was extremely confident that his force of regulars could easily accomplish the task. Despite the protests of the resident British Indian agent, George Croghan, as well as the admonitions of George Washington, Braddock's aide de camp, the general did not seek the counsel of the Indian chiefs who were loyal to the British Crown. "We have a General most judiciously chosen for being disqualified for the service he is employed in, in almost every respect," wrote William Shirley, Braddock's secretary, "I am not greatly acquainted myself with Indian

Affairs, tho' enough to see that better measures with regard to 'em might and ought to have been taken, at least to the Southwd."[4]

In the end, Braddock was convinced that his more disciplined and well-drilled force would emerge victorious. "These savages may, indeed, be a formidable enemy to your raw American militia," quipped Braddock to Benjamin Franklin, "but upon the King's regulars...it is impossible they should make any impression."[5] Although Braddock did meet with an Indian delegation loyal to the Crown and received their assurances of support for the campaign, most departed with their gifts and never returned. His haughty manner and failure to elicit their participation or counsel in planning the campaign seemed to alienate his erstwhile allies. When Braddock actually marched on Fort Duquesne, he had only eight Indian warriors with him.[6]

When battle was joined on the early morning of 9 July, the contrast between the European and North American manners of warfare were never clearer. Braddock's steadfast belief that the ill-disciplined, motley opponent that faced his well trained and disciplined regular troops would inevitably break led to his ruin. Once ambushed, the closely packed troops were impossible to miss and they suffered horrendous casualties. Ironically, the provincials, particularly the Virginians, immediately sought cover and began to return fire against their phantom antagonists. Their actions seemed to provide some hope of staving off defeat. Braddock, incensed at this lack of courage and discipline, ordered them back into line using both oaths and the flat of his sabre.[7]

Despite the exhortations of the officers and the discipline of the regulars, as the officers became casualties and the ranks were continually thinned by a steady and deadly fire from a foe that could not be seen, the regulars lost their steadiness and eventually succumbed to an uncontrollable panic. Lieutenant William Dunbar revealed:

> Our Men unaccustomed to that way of fighting, were quite confounded, & behaved like Poltrons, nor could the examples, nor the Intreaties of their officers prevail with them, to do any one what was ordered. This they denied them, when we begged of them not to throw away their fire, but to follow us with fixed Bayonets, to drive them from the hill & trees, they never minded us, but threw their fire away in the most confused manner, some in the air, others in the ground, & a great many destroyed their own Men & officers. When the General came up to our assistance, men were seized with the same Pannic, & went into as much disorder, some Part of them being 20 deep. The officers in order to remedy this, advanced into the front, & soon became the mark of the Enemy, who scarce left one that was not killed or wounded.[8]

“And when we endeavoured to rally them,” recounted George Washington, “it was with as much success as if we had attempted to stop the wild bears of the mountains.”[9] Washington later wrote to his brother, “We have been most scandalously beaten by a trifling body of men.”[10]

Washington’s choice of words, or more aptly the nuance, was misplaced. The “trifling body of men,” although not overwhelming in numbers, were skilled combatants and exacted a heavy toll. The scale of the debacle was enormous. The French lost approximately five percent of their engaged force; the British lost 70 percent of theirs, including 60 out of 86 officers.[11] Arguably, the deciding factor in the engagement was the presence of a large Indian contingent assisting the French. “I am of the opinion that had we had fifty Indians instead of eight,” lamented George Croghan, “that we might in a great measure have prevented the surprise, that day of our unhappy defeat.”[12]

The fact that the French force was predominately Native is not surprising. The Indians had a preference towards the French. After all, a key pillar of the French Canadian strategy was to form strong alliances with the various Indian tribes. This realization permeated the Canadian philosophy from the beginning. Social and economic ties were instrumental in ensuring the survival and growth of New France.[13] As early as 1667, the secretary of state for the colonies, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, instructed the Intendant of New France:

> You must try to draw these [native] peoples, and especially those who have embraced Christianity, into the neighborhood of our settlements and, if possible, intermingle them there so that, with the passage of time, having but one law and the same master [King] they will form thereby a single people of the same blood.[14]

This attitude, bolstered by the large number of *coureur de bois* and soldiers serving at frontier outposts, intermingling and often living with the Natives, fostered an acceptance of and tolerance to the Indians and their culture that did not exist between the British and the Amerindians. The former tended to look down on the latter. One scholar noted that they “paid no heed to Indian laws or customs or traditions; and ruthlessly imposed their own laws, customs, and religious ideas with no apparent thought of their intolerance and injustice. They mostly looked upon the Indians as heathen.”[15]

Furthermore, the Indians were impressed with French military prowess and capability. “Look about you and see!” exclaimed an Indian chief to a British officer, “You have no fortifications; no, not even in Quider (Albany). It is but a step from Canada hither, and the French may come and turn you out of doors....Look

at the French; they are men! They are fortifying everywhere. But you are all like women, bare and open, without fortifications!"[16] The latest catastrophic defeat for the British at the Monongahela River simply reinforced Native perceptions. Indian activity and boldness of attacks increased dramatically in the aftermath of Braddock's crushing defeat.[17]

The question remains: if the Indians were so instrumental to success, why were they consistently castigated by their White allies? Both the British and the French were vitriolic in their condemnation. One reason was the cultural and philosophical divergence in the comprehension of how war was waged. The Indian way of war starkly contrasted with the European emphasis on mass, rigid discipline, and volley fire. Conversely, the Indians placed great reliance on guile, stealth, the use of cover, and especially marksmanship. To the Europeans, this was ghastly – regulars found it cowardly and reprehensible, wholly without honour.

Edward Abbot, a Lieutenant-Governor of Vincennes during the colonial period, remarked that "It is not people in army's that Indians will ever daringly attack; but the poor inoffensive families...who are inhumanely butchered sparing neither woman or children."[18] The memoirs of one French soldier revealed, "Of them [Iroquois] it has been said, they came like foxes, attacked like hares, and fled like birds."[19] Jeffrey Amherst, a senior British officer, assessed, "The cowardice of these barbarians is so great & their little arts in war so easily prevented from taking place, that it is astonishing they should ever have had an advantage over us, as in Mr Braddock's affair." He added that "Their whole dependence is upon a tree or a bush. You have nothing to do but to advance, & they will fly. They never stand an open fire or an attack."[20] Colonel Henry Bouquet agreed. "You may be sure that all the Indians on the continent would not dare to attack you in earnest," he insisted. "Surprise is their only shift, and that will always fail with you."[21] A Jesuit missionary concluded, "None are more courageous when no resistance is offered them, and none are more cowardly when they encounter opposition."[22]

The consistency of the above commentary does not mean it was valid, but it clearly demonstrates a lack of understanding, as well as the deep chasm that existed between European and Native comprehensions of war. It was this cultural and philosophical component that proved to be an irritant for both sides. "Instead of stealing upon each other, and taking every advantage to kill the enemy and save their own people, as we do," explained an Indian veteran, "they [Whites] marched out, in open daylight, and fight, regardless of the number of warriors they may lose!" He added, "After the battle is over, they retire to feast, and drink wine, as if nothing had happened."[23]

From the Native perspective, the quintessential victory was won with the least casualties. Once this was achieved, and the individual warriors, had gained proof of their martial prowess through prisoners, scalps or plunder (which also carried a significant economic benefit), the Indians were satisfied to end the campaign lest they push their luck.[24] Furthermore, they saw themselves as allies and not as levies. Therefore, if they felt a plan or manoeuvre was ill-advised, they simply chose not to participate in it. For the Native warriors "taking up the hatchet," going to war, was largely a personal endeavor to prove a warrior's courage and skill and to obtain prestige through achievement in combat.

The individual Native warrior was subordinate to no other. He saw neither shame nor dishonour in abandoning the field if the odds of easy success were against him.[25] Moreover, if individuals tired of the campaign or simply failed to support a plan of action, their peers seldom condemned their departure.[26] They were not interested in a fair fight, but only one in which they could achieve their aims with a minimum of casualties. Ambush, raids and terror were the preferred methods of conducting war. In short, the Indians practiced what the Europeans contemptibly called the "skulking way of war."[27]

The Indians did not share this view. "The art of war," declared Tecaughretanego, a Kahnawake chief, "consists in ambushing and surprising our enemies, and in preventing them from ambushing and surprising us."[28] Similarly, Jesuit Missionary Father Nau observed that "Their mode of warfare is but stratagem and surprise."[29] Abbe H.R. Casgrain, the prominent 19th century French Canadian chronicler of the Seven Years' War, explained that "For them, withdrawal was not a flight, nor a disgrace, it was a means of falling back to occupy a better position."[30]

Moreover, the Indian definition of success differed from that of the Europeans. For the Indians, a victorious campaign was gauged, as already noted, by the accumulation of tangible trophies. The Natives deemed a campaign successful when a victory, regardless of how inconsequential, was won.[31] "Even if there are three hundred of them & they were to take only one or two scalps," complained Captain Pouchot in his journal, "they would not begin another operation, even were they capable of devastating an entire territory and killing other men."[32] This reality consistently vexed the French commander-in-chief, Lieutenant-General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm. The consistent departure of the Indians after the smallest of victories, Montcalm assessed, ensured that they would never inflict a lasting defeat on their enemy. The British shared this observation. "I have never heard," acknowledged John Campbell Loudoun, the British commander-in-chief in North America in 1756, "of any instance of Indians remaining of either side, after they have either lost any people, or got any booty, but have constantly returned home."[33]

Photo-art composition courtesy of Silvia Pecota

War parties often led by French-Canadian officers of *les compagnies Franches de la Marine* devastated the frontier and placed their English opponents on the defensive.

The European benchmarks of success and victory, as well as acceptable losses, were meaningless to the Indians. Capturing territory, forcing an enemy to abandon a strategic fortification, or postponing an opponent's planned offensive did not resonate with the Indians. Furthermore, casualties were totally unacceptable to the Indians. It was only through tangible actions such as the accumulation of prisoners, scalps, or plunder, that individual warriors could show their achievement in battle. Moreover, these items were also very valuable. For instance, in 1747, bounties set by Massachusetts paid £35 for the scalp of a male Indian or Frenchman and £10 for that of a woman. However, an even higher price was paid for prisoners brought in alive. A male would fetch £40 and a woman or boy under twelve, £25.[34] Almost ten years later, in July 1756, de Lévis offered 150 Livres for an English scalp upon his arrival at Carillon.[35] The French normally paid 30 Francs worth of trade goods for a scalp and provided even larger ransoms to buy back British prisoners.[36] Even Braddock himself issued an order that promised a £5 bounty to any member of his expedition who brought an Indian scalp into camp.[37] Not surprisingly, with these monetary inducements, there was very little incentive to risk one's life for strategic gains of a European power or to fulfil a code of honour that was completely alien to the Indian understanding of war. This was apparently missed by the military commanders who saw Native refusal to participate in attacks or campaigns as a lack of the requisite discipline and courage needed of soldiers. As such, European commanders often perceived the Indians to be cowards and wholly without honour.

But the cultural conflict went beyond the theoretical understanding and practice of waging war. The Whites also railed critically about the unreliability of, and difficulty in controlling, the Indians. Tribalism, the influence of Sachems, superstition, and personal and band rivalry created tensions between the Europeans and their Indian allies. “They gather together in mobs, argue among themselves, deliberate slowly,” complained Louis-Antoine, Comte de Bougainville, a member of Montcalm’s staff. He added:

> Between the resolution made and the action taken there passes considerable time, sometimes one nation stops the march, sometimes another. Everybody must have time to get drunk, and their food consumption is enormous. At last they get started, and once they have struck, have they taken only a single scalp or one prisoner, back they come and are off again for their villages. Each one does well for himself, but the operation of the war suffers.[38]

Similarly, Brigadier François-Gaston, Chevalier de Lévis, the Marquis de Montcalm’s second-in-command, complained to Governor Le Marquis de Vaudreuil in a letter, “Upon leaving, the savages always promised a lot, however, I found that they do not keep their promises.”[39]

European commanders, whether British or French, characterized the Indians as an unwanted burden, if not a nuisance. “They drive us crazy from morning to night,” exclaimed one senior French officer, “There is no end to their demands.” He concluded that “in short one needs the patience of an angel with these devils, and yet one must always force himself to seem pleased with them.”[40] Bougainville bemoaned:

> One must be the slave to these savages, listen to them day and night, in council and in private, whenever the fancy takes them, or whenever a dream or a fit of vapors, or their perpetual craving for brandy, gets possession of them; besides which they are always wanting something for their equipment, arms, or toilet.[41]

In an attempt not to aggrieve the Natives, the most wanton outrages were often accepted. One French officer decried the tolerance shown to their Indian allies. “You could see them running throughout Montréal,” he recorded, “knife in hand, threatening and insulting everyone.”[42] Governors of New France, particularly Vaudreuil, were constantly criticized for their leniency towards the Indians. Of 76 natives accused of disorderly conduct, assault or murder in the Montréal District from 1669 to 1760, only one was actually prosecuted. The rest were released without charge. The rationale was simple, albeit unpalatable for the French and Canadians: the authorities feared that the application of the harsh

justice demanded by the French criminal code would alienate the Indians and cause them to defect to their enemies.[43]

Their behaviour on campaigns was little better. Montcalm confided to his journal, "[the Indians] feeling the need we have of them, are extremely insolent; they wish our fowls this evening. They took with force some barrels of wine, killed some cattle, and it is necessary to endure all."[44] French officers claimed that it proved very expensive to maintain their Indian allies because they "exhausted so much provisions" and "could not be stinted to allowance taking everything at pleasure and destroying three times the Quantity of Provisions they could eat."[45] The Indians had no sense of rationing and would consume a week's allocation of provisions in three days and demand additional replenishment. On the march to besiege Fort William Henry in 1757, the Indians were dissatisfied with the salted meat served them, so they slaughtered all the beasts of burden on the expedition, which slowed down by three days the placement of cannon.[46] One senior French officer complained that the Indians "take all their [French] provisions" and they can do nothing in response. He lamented, "It is necessary to watch them, say nothing, and reduce oneself to bacon and water."[47] Consistently, the Europeans denounced the Natives as disruptive to their campaigns and a drain on valuable resources. "One is a slave to Indians in this country," lamented Bougainville, "[but] they are a necessary evil."[48]

The torture of and cruelty shown to prisoners, whether military or civilian and regardless of gender or age, was a further cause of consternation to the Whites during the French and Indian Wars. Their inability to control the Indians after a battle was fought, or surrender negotiated, permeated almost the entirety of the conflict. Alcohol exacerbated this problem. No exhortations by either the British or the French were entirely effective, but then again, the European entreaties ran counter to the Indians' expectations of waging war. Nor was the brutality and torture that the Indians practiced an aberration of this conflict. The early writings of the Jesuits portray the shock and horror they felt when they witnessed the display of scalps, the torture of victims, and the practice of cannibalism. Champlain's observation in 1609 of his Indian allies torturing and subsequently drinking the blood and eating the hearts of their victims caused him a similar revulsion and horror.[49] These actions continued through the Seven Years' War.[50] "The cruelties and the insolence of these barbarians is horrible," lamented Bougainville, "their souls are as black as pitch. It is an abominable way to make war; the retaliations is frightening, and the air one breathes here is contagious of making one accustomed to callousness."[51] A French priest wrote, "They kill all they meet, and after having abused the women and maidens, they slaughter or burn them."[52] Women were often forced to burn their husbands and watch their babies roasted over slow fires. Prisoners were normally forced to

endure running the gauntlet, beatings, slow death by torture and burning at the stake.[53] Both British and French consistently protested, with an element of truth, that they were unable to control their Indian allies. However, the exploits of the Natives, particularly the terror they instilled in their enemies, undeniably assisted the efforts of their White allies.[54]

As irritating and unsettling as the previous complaints were, a far more serious menace was the duplicity of the Indians. The Natives habitually sided with the power they felt most likely to win the contest. Moreover, they often switched allegiance if momentum or success swung to the opposite side. The noted Canadian historian W.J. Eccles stated that the Indian nations, impressed with the French show of strength, specifically the dispatch in 1753 of 2,000 troops to Lake Erie to build a road to the headwater and a chain of forts at strategic points, began to sever their trade connections with Anglo-Americans.[55] The subsequent success of French arms over then-Major George Washington's force at Fort Necessity in July 1754, and Major-General Braddock's army a year later, merely reinforced the Native proclivity to support the French. In fact, after Braddock's defeat, the Indians rejected British overtures to remain neutral and replied, "It is not in our power to comply with it, for the French & we are one blood, & where they are to dye we must dye also."[56]

These noble sentiments, however, were mere rhetoric. As the fortunes of war shifted, so too did the loyalty of the Indians. "An offensive, daring kind of war," wrote Major-General James Wolfe to his commander, "will awe the Indians and ruin the French." He added, "Blockhouses and a trembling defensive encourage the meanest scoundrels to attack us."[57] He was right. As the British swung to the offensive, bringing their massive advantage in economic, naval and military power to bear, the last sinews of French strength began to wane. The destruction of Fort Frontenac and Fort Duquesne in 1758, representing two of France's most strategic fortifications, was a major watershed in the fealty of the Indians to the French. By the summer of 1759, the Natives actively conspired to assist with the capture of Fort Niagara. For instance, Indian guides deliberately led the French officer responsible for the re-supply of the fort into an ambush. Although they remained neutral during the initial engagement, once the supply column collapsed, the Natives "fell on them like so many Butchers."[58] Furthermore, Captain Pouchot, the commandant of Fort Niagara, was assured by his Indian allies that "if we learn that the Englishman is plotting anything against you, we shall inform you immediately, so that you are not taken by surprise."[59] In little over a month, however, an entire British army passed through the Iroquois territory and appeared without warning before the fortress. To add further insult, once the fort had fallen, the Indians, most well-known to the French garrison, swarmed in to pillage and plunder the contents of the fort, even

attempting to strip the French soldiers, their former compatriots, of their arms and possessions.[60] Indians, wrote one bitter soldier, were "villains, and always side with the strongest."[61]

This proved to be the case. As New France crumbled and the English noose tightened around Québec, those few Natives who remained loyal took advantage of the situation. "The savages…are a scourge for the inhabitants," confided Abbe Jean-Félix Recher in his journal, "...they kill [inhabitants] with impunity and pilfer all types of foodstuffs from their homes, take their animals, especially the oxen, cows, sheep, poultry, and horses."[62] Abbe Casgrain would later write that the Indians were "more to be feared [by the Canadians] than even the enemy."[63] By August 1759, as the English siege of Québec continued, Montcalm wrote "we have a few savages, [we are] almost all alone."[64]

The wavering nature of the Indians' allegiance, however, had other implications that irritated the Europeans. Because no one wished to offend their putative allies, they were given unrestricted access to both camps. The Natives, in turn, used this freedom of movement to spy and report on the preparations and plans of a belligerent to their respective enemy. Braddock was visited by two Mohawk warriors during his approach to Fort Duquesne. Although he was well aware that their intent was to spy, he allowed them to leave. When they departed, Braddock learned that one of his eight Indians had also defected.[65]

The information gained was normally rendered for payment and/or to demonstrate fidelity to a given side. "The Five Nations ambassadors who descended to Montréal," recorded Montcalm in his journal, "…came here as English spies rather than ambassadors."[66] Montcalm's second-in-command, de Lévis, reached a similar conclusion, observing that the ambassadors who came to provide information on British preparations had also likely come to conduct a reconnaissance on those of the French.[67] For this reason, Montcalm and de Lévis consciously disseminated false information and plans among the Indians.[68] Even the Governor of New France, Le Marquis de Vaudreuil, who normally praised the Indians, wrote to the Ministry of Marine and conceded that there was no doubt that the Natives spied on their supposed French allies.[69] The British perspective was no different. Major-General Jeffery Amherst, who was appointed the British commander-in-chief in 1759, wrote, "If the Indians know them [operational plans] the French will have it; it is their business to give intelligence to both sides."[70] Years later he revealed, "My faith in the Indians has always been so small that this behaviour of theirs [uprising in 1763] does not much surprise me."[71]

Despite these constant recriminations, both the British and French vied aggressively for the allegiance of the Indians and both sides showered them with lavish gifts

of equipment and food. Major-General William Shirley, chief of His Majesty's forces in North America in 1755, actively lobbied the War Office to support a policy of luring the Natives to the British or, at a minimum, securing their neutrality. He requested the appointment of commissioners for each of the western provinces and money to defray the cost of the treaty obligations and presents. For instance, he promised to build a fort at Onondago Castle and then was required to pledge the same for the Oneidas, including a garrison and artillery pieces. In addition, the Cayugas demanded men to plough their lands and gunsmiths to repair their weapons. Furthermore, Shirley stipulated that the treaty must ensure that the Natives would be "supplied with arms, accouterments, clothes, provisions and pay...[and] that they shall have besides these a reward for every prisoner or scalp taken from the enemy and every other reasonable encouragement all which to be ascertained to their satisfaction."[72] His order even made allowances for the Indian warriors to bring their women and children who would be fed and protected by the British.

The British efforts to secure the allegiance or neutrality of the Indians were not lost on the French. "The governors of Virginia and Pennslvania," wrote Montcalm in his journal, "put all their efforts in luring the savages [away from the French] and obtaining, at least their neutrality."[73] He further observed that the British used every means possible, including the provision of supplies and alcohol, to win over the Natives. Similarly, Le Chevalier Le Mercier warned the French Ministry of Marine that failure to supply the Indians would result in their deserting the French cause.[74]

Why did both the British and French compete so fiercely for the allegiance of the Indians, even though they both had a litany of complaints against them? Clearly, the Natives were an important component of the successful prosecution of war in the colonies. Their participation, or even neutrality, often represented the difference between victory or defeat during campaigns. There are several reasons for this. The first is answered by Montcalm's rhetorical question, "what good are the savages?" He correctly identified "not to have them against you." It was a simple question of security. Fully cognizant of the Natives' capabilities, colonial governors of New York consistently warned of the danger. One stated that the loss of the Indians as allies would "...tend to the utter Ruin of all the English settlements on the Continent."[75] Another admonished, "the loss of them [Indians] must be the loss of all the King's interest on this continent."[76] One colonial governor in 1754 worried, "Should the Indians of the Six Nations at this conjuncture desert our alliance, and go over to the French how fatal an influence must such an event have upon the English interest."[77] The consequences for the French were similar. "If we can get but the Indians," noted one British assessment, "we shall easily find a method to manage the French."[78] Bougainville concurred, "What a scourge! Humanity shudders at being obliged to make use of such monsters." However, he assessed, "without them the match would be too much against us."[79]

These assessments were based on the Indians' martial abilities on the battlefield. "They are an active hardy People, capable of fatigue, hunger, and cold and know perfectly the use of arms," wrote one officer, "And tho' their number nor their valour may not make them a formidable enemy, their little wood skirmishing, and bush fighting will always make them a very troublesome one."[80] George Washington, in the aftermath of Braddock's defeat, declared, "without Indians we shall never be able to cope with those cruel foes to our country."[81] He maintained that "500 Indians would prove more troublesome on the frontier than ten times as many regulars." He added, "Indians are the only match for Indians; and without these, we shall ever fight upon unequal Terms."[82] John Askin, an expe-



"The Reunion," Robert Griffing, courtesy of Paramount Press

The regular forces of both England and France relied on the prowess of the natives and select woodsmen to assist them navigate the wilds of North America.

rienced frontiersman, declared that in the forests one Native warrior was equal to three White men.[83] "Here in the forests of America," wrote one journalist, "we can no more do with out them [Indians] than without cavalry on the plain."[84]

It was also a question of numbers. Indians provided manpower, particularly for the French. With only a population of 60,000, New France faced the danger of being engulfed by the southern British colonies that numbered approximately 1,500,000.[85] Native allies represented an effective means to make-up this shortfall of combatants. Moreover, they were extremely effective when allowed to practice their style of warfare. As bush fighters they were largely unsurpassed. They were able marksman and possessed remarkable fieldcraft skills such as concealment, mobility and stealth. Casgrain wrote that they "...glide from tree to tree, stump to stump."[86] They would appear as phantoms in either ambushes or in hit-and-run attacks, and despite their small numbers, would often inflict a disproportionately high number of casualties on the enemy. "What can one do against invisible enemies who strike and flee with the rapidity of light?" questioned Bougainville rhetorically. "It is," he asserted, "the destroying angel."[87] The result was an utterly paralyzing effect on the opposing combatants. For instance, after a brief but bloody engagement with Indians, recalled a frontier veteran, "...at night there was a Hundred men upon gard or more for feare of there [Indians] coming a Gain in the Night."[88] Soldiers hated to go into the woods for reconnaissance or foraging because they were afraid of being killed and scalped by the Indians.

Native warriors' prowess in the woods also made them adept at flank security, acting as an economy of effort force by creating diversions or pinning down other forces and, most importantly, cutting off the enemy's lines of communication. The Indians were so successful at this endeavor that Montcalm, normally a strong critic of the Natives, praised them. During the attack on Oswego in August 1756, the Indians had isolated the garrison to such a degree that Montcalm called it "brilliant and decisive."[89] Another noteworthy example occurred during the siege of Fort William Henry, when the Indians intercepted a courier with a message for the beleaguered fort commandant. Montcalm subsequently handed it to Lieutenant-Colonel Monro with conditions of capitulation.[90] These examples were not exceptional. British movements were so constrained that they could neither gather intelligence nor ensure communications between their forces. "It is not possible to conceive the situation and danger of this miserable country," deplored Washington, "such numbers of French and Indians are all around that no road is safe."[91]

The Indians therefore developed a fierce reputation among both the White soldiers and colonists. What the Natives lacked in strategic acumen they made-up for in tactical skill. Their abilities in the woods, combined with their brutality and cruelty, terrified their opponents. The mere presence of Indians, or the

sound of their war cry, created a prodigious panic in the enemy's ranks. "We have seen that our regulars do not fight well in woods," conceded one British officer, "The Indian yell is horrid to their ears, and soon throws them into confusion."[92] The Duke of Cumberland was so concerned that he ordered a letter be sent to Braddock to warn him "to be particularly careful that they [regular British troops] be not thrown into a panic by the Indians, with whom they are yet unacquainted, whom the French will certainly employ to frighten them."[93]

His assessment was very accurate. Montcalm counseled his subordinates to ensure that, in the event of a general attack, they have a few Indians everywhere since the British are "devilishly afraid" of them.[94] Governor Vaudreuil reveled in this obvious advantage. "The cries, threats, and hideous howlings of our Canadians and Indians," he boasted, "made them [British] quickly decide [to surrender]." At the prelude to the attack on Fort William Henry, the ambush of a re-supply flotilla met with the same fate. "Terrified by the sight of these Monsters [Indians], their agility, their firing, and their yells," recalled Bougainville, "they [British] surrendered almost without resistance."[95]

The mere thought of battling the "savages" unsettled both the British regulars and the American militia. "The men from what storys they had heard of the Indians in regard to their scalping and Mawhawking," wrote a British officer in his journal, "were so pannick struck that their officers had little or no command over them."[96] George Washington recounted an escort from Winchester to Fort Cumberland: at the first firing from the Indians, he stated, the men broke and ran back to Winchester, with less than half the force stopping to fire a shot.[97] In the immediate aftermath of the defeat of Braddock's army, men in the rear, "hearing of our defeat, were extreamly frightened, so much so, that upon seeing 2 or 3 of our own Indians returning, the greatest part began to run away."[98] Even the stout Highlanders were overcome by the "appalling yells of the Canadians and Indians" at Fort Duquesne in 1758 and broke away in a wild and disorderly retreat.[99] Again, "We have seen that our regulars do not fight well in woods," wrote a British official to the prime minister, "the yell is horrid to their ears, and soon throws them into confusion."[100]

The advantage of Indian allies in the tactical battles for the wilderness was clear, but they performed another essential role. Their unsurpassed skills in the woods, combined with their knowledge of the country, made them indispensable as guides, scouts and gatherers of intelligence. They were often the only people who could penetrate the deep wilderness of the frontier successfully. Vaudreuil often instructed the leaders of his expeditions against the British that if the Indians abandoned the foray, they were to return to Canada without completing the mission.[101] It was equally important to deny similar services to the enemy. The lack of Native allies, or the effectiveness of the opponent's Indians in shut-

ting out hostile reconnaissance parties, had a calamitous effect on the British. "I am ashamed," confided one British colonel, "that they have succeeded in all their scouting parties and that we never have any success in ours."[102] This state of affairs continually blinded the British command and deprived them of intelligence about French preparations or plans. Understandably, this often led to poor and untimely decisions laden with unfortunate consequences, whether the ambush of a British column or the loss of a strategic fort.[103]

The final role that the Natives filled adeptly, and with great import to the successful prosecution of the war for the French in its early stages, was frontier raiding. New France, having endured such a plague during its early years, was fully versed in its effects. "The Iroquois," stated Louis XIV in 1666, "through massacres and inhumanities, have prevented the country's population from growing...."[104] An Iroquois Sachem touted, "We plied the French homes in the war with them that they were not able to go out a door to piss."[105] The French now turned this manner of war against the British colonies to the south. It provided a successful means of diverting British attention and draining resources that if not focused on ensuring their own security would most likely be aimed at attacking Canada. Governor Vaudreuil was very clear on his aim. "Nothing is more calculated to disgust the people of those colonies," he explained, "and to make them desire the return to peace."[106]

A strategy that was carried out year round, it was cost effective and merciless. It was clearly an economy of effort. Small parties of Canadians and Indians, who demonstrated distaste for the European manner of war when led by French or Canadian officers, could make an effective contribution to the war effort.[107] The Indian raids terrorized the frontier and tied down large numbers of troops for rear security. The plight of the settlers and colonists could not be ignored. The incursions into Virginia alone caused the governor there to raise 10 militia companies, totaling 1,000 men, to try and halt the deadly incursions. Similarly, Pennsylvania raised 1,500 provincial troops and built a string of forts from New Jersey to Maryland in an attempt to impede the raiders.[108] Moreover, militiamen were reluctant to undertake campaigns when they felt that their families were at risk.[109] In addition, the barbarity of the raids further fueled perceptions and added to the psychological impact the Natives had on their opposition. Furthermore, their destruction of settlements, farms and livestock, as well as the murder or capture of colonists, ate away at the economy of the Thirteen Colonies. Crops could not be sown or harvested. Grains could not be stored for the winter or to feed the army on campaign. This created privations for both soldier and citizen alike. Simply put, the impact on the frontier was devastating.[110] "The frontier's were laid waste for above three hundred miles long, and generally abut thirty broad, excepting some that were living in forts and many hundreds, or perhaps thousands, killed or

made captives, and horses, and all kinds of property carried off," mourned one British officer.[111] The ferociousness of the raiding created an impression of the Natives that would stain the perception, if not the relationship, between the Whites and Indians for generations to come. Although raiding proved to be an effective strategy for the out-numbered French, it was only successful as a delaying action. It did not, as Vaudreuil had hoped, bring the British to the peace table.

In the end, Natives played a substantial role in the French and Indian War. In many cases, their participation or neutrality in a campaign was the difference between success and failure. Their effectiveness as "bush fighters," compounded by the reputation they earned for cruelty and savagery, inspired fear and panic in their enemies – both British and French alike. They performed critical tasks such as scouting and intelligence gathering, cutting enemy lines of communication, providing support to major attacks through skirmishing and attacks on the opponent's flanks. In addition, they conducted deep penetration raids that inflicted economic, physical and psychological damage on the enemy. As Montcalm accurately assessed, however, they could not impose a lasting defeat on their enemy because of their numbers, their dependence on Whites for technology and war materials (e.g. muskets, gunpowder and lead), as well as their cultural and philosophical understanding of war.[112]

Furthermore, the rigidity of the European method of war slowly seeped into the consciousness of the regular force military commanders. As a result, they adopt-

"Triumphant Return to Fort Duquesne," Robert Griffing, courtesy of Paramount Press

The native propensity to abandon the campaign once a victory, regardless of magnitude, was won created a continual tension with their European allies.

ed a degree of pragmatism. “It is absolutely necessary for his Majesty’s Service,” extolled William Shirley:

> …that one Company at least of Rangers should be constantly employ’d in different Parties upon Lake George and Lake Iroquois [Lake Ontario], and the Wood Creek and Lands adjacent...to make Discoveries of the proper Routes for our own Troops, procure Intelligence of the Enemy’s Strength and Motions, destroy their out Magazines and Settlements, pick up small Parties of their Battoes upon the Lakes, and keep them under continual Alarm.[113]

Similarly, Major-General James Wolfe explained, “…Our troops must be employd in a very different manner from what has been the Practice hitherto.” He added, “They must learn to live in the Woods as the Indians do - keep ‘em in a continual apprehention of being attack’d to acquire a perfect knowledge of the Lakes & Rivers, & Hunting Grounds of the Savages.”[114]

As a result, companies of Rangers, the most famous being Rogers’ Rangers led by the intrepid Major Robert Rogers, were raised as a direct answer to the British lack of Indian allies. In addition, the Royal Americans, 60th Foot, were organized as light infantry in 1756 to provide the British with a means of combating the Natives.[115] The regiment was intended to combine the qualities of the scout with the discipline of the trained soldier. Moreover, uniforms and tactics were adjusted to the reality of the wilderness setting of North America. Musket barrels were made blue or brown to “take off the glittering.” The coats of the light infantry were simple and plain based on the premise that “the less they are seen in the Woods the better.”[116] One of the Highland regiments gave up their kilts for breeches and many officers gave up wearing gorgets and sashes. Some even went to such unheard of extremes as wearing the same tunic as privates.[117]

The change in philosophy was also noted in the manner in which the Europeans adapted their tactics. Rangers and scouts were always included in the advance party of any moving force. Furthermore, Wolfe, in his instruction to his army, embedded many of the lessons learned. He directed that all detachments and outposts fortify their camps by either entrenching or building palisades. Sentries were never to be placed in musket range of woods unless hidden behind rocks or trees themselves and he cautioned his commanders never to halt, encamp or pass through openings without first examining the area for a potential ambush or subsequent attack.[118]

Although slow in adapting, once the Whites adjusted to the Indian way of war, the significance of the Indians as allies and combatants was substantially reduced. Despite the martial prowess and skill of the Native warriors, the superior discipline, organization, and technology of the Whites always prevailed in

the long-term. Although the participation or neutrality of the Natives often impacted the success or failure of a particular campaign, they did not, nor could they, influence the final outcome of the Seven Years' War in North America.

ENDNOTES

1 Some sources vary slightly. The French forces, however, seem to have consisted of 36 officers and cadets, 72 colonial regulars (*Troupes de la Marine*), 146 Canadian militia and 637 Indians. See Paul E. Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1977), 30; George F.G. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers. The Military History of an Unmilitary People* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1960), 65; Noel St. John Williams, *Redcoats along the Hudson. The Struggle for North America, 1754-63* (London: Brassey's Classics, 1998), 76; and, Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 96-97. Brumwell gives the British strength at 1,469. See Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats. The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2002), 16.

2 This battle became part of the Seven Years' War (1756-1763), which was arguably one of the first global conflicts. It was fought in Europe, North America and India, with maritime operations reaching out over the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as well as the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas. At its core, Austria, France, Russia, Sweden and Saxony, deeply concerned over Prussia's growing strength and territorial expansion under Frederick the Great, formed a coalition designed to defeat Prussia. Not surprisingly, England, already involved in a colonial and maritime struggle with France, entered into an alliance with Prussia. In North America, the conflict (often termed the French and Indian War) actually began two years earlier in the late-spring of 1754. The growing competition for the rich lands of the Ohio Valley proved the catalyst for the latest round of conflict between the French and English colonies. Robert Dinwiddie, the Governor of Virginia, concerned with the news that the French and Canadians were solidifying their claim to the Ohio by means of constructing a series of forts, dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel George Washington and a detachment of militia to build a fort of their own on the forks of the Ohio River. A confrontation soon ensued. Washington and his party were subsequently defeated by the French at Great Meadows (Fort Necessity) and pushed back over the Allegheny Mountains. A second attempt by Major-General Braddock was made the following summer, but his force was ambushed near Fort Duquesne at the Monongahela and virtually annihilated. The North American theatre eventually became part of the greater conflict. Initial French victories and English setbacks in the early years of the war were reversed by 1758, due to the British decision to focus their strategy and resources on the wilderness campaign. A virtual naval blockade, in concert with an infusion of more than 20,000 British regulars, turned the tide. The capture of the Fortress of Louisbourg and Fort Frontenac in 1758 forced the French to adopt a defensive posture centered around Québec and Montréal. The deteriorating French condition also resulted in the defection of a large number of their Indian allies. In 1759, the British began to roll-up the remaining French forts on the frontier. One army captured Fort Niagara, and another marched up the Lake Champlain/Richelieu River corridor, while a third invested Québec. The siege ended in September 1759, with the British victory on the Plains of Abraham. The remnants of the French Army, the Canadian militia and remaining Indian allies withdrew to Montréal in hopes of recapturing Québec in the spring. Although almost successful, as a result of their victory in the Battle at Ste. Foy and subsequent siege of Québec in April 1760, the appearance of the Royal Navy forced the French to return to Montréal where they later surren-

dered on 8 September 1760. The war was formally ended by the Treaty of Paris, which ceded virtually all of New France to the British.

[3] Will H. Lowdermilk, *Along the Braddock Road from Cai-uc-cu in 1728 to Braddock's Expedition in 1755* (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, reprint 2005), 100.

[4] Ibid., 129.

[5] See Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 95; Thomas Fleming, "Braddock's Defeat," *Military History Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1990), 90; and, Martin L. Nicolai, "A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and the Canadian Irregular Soldier during the Seven Years' War," *Canadian Historical Review* [*CHR*], Vol. 70, No. 1 (1989), 60. Franklin wrote, "this general was, I think, a brave man, and might probably have made a good figure in some European war. But he had too high an opinion of the validity of regular troops; too mean a one of both Americans and Indians." Quoted in Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela*, 95-96 & 101, and, Major James H. Silcox, "Rogers and Bouquet: The Origins of American Light Infantry," *Military Review*, Vol. 65, No. 12, 65.

[6] See "A Selection of George Croghan's Letters and Journals," in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Journals, 1748-1765* (Lewisburg: Wennawoods Publishing, 1998), 98-99; and Lowdermilk, *Along the Braddock Road*, 27.

[7] Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe* (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 111 and 117-118; Robert Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow. The Saga of the French and Indian Wars* (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1999), 284-285; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 102-103; and, Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela*, 79. Tragically, as the provincials moved forward to take cover and engage the enemy in the woods, they were cut down by volleys from the British regulars, who seeing the smoke of discharges coming from the brush at the side of the road, mistook them for the enemy.

[8] John Keegan, *The Book of War* (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 92-93. Another officer wrote, "Our troops yielded ground, chiefly owing to the consternation the Indian method of fighting threw the British men into, and the want of officers, most of them being either killed or wounded by that time, very soon after giving way, the panic became so great and general, that notwithstanding the utmost effects of the few remaining officers, to rally and return to the charge." Letter from an officer fighting in the Ohio, 25 August 1755, in Armand Francis Lucier, ed., *French and Indian War Notices Abstracted from Colonial Newspapers, Vol 1: 1754-1755* (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books Inc., 1999), 278.

[9] Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 66. See also, Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela*, 70.

[10] Letter reprinted in Lowdermilk, *Along the Braddock Road*, 180.

[11] M. Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War in North America between France and England* (Yverdon, 1781), 82-83; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 105; and, Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 66.

[12] George Croghan's journal to the Ohio, extract reprinted in Winthrop Sargent, *The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne in 1755* (Lewisburg: Wennawoods Publishing, reprint 2005), 408.

[13] Scholar Fred Anderson in his seminal work *Crucible of War* concluded, "France maintained its empire in America for more than a century despite the steady increase of British power and population because the governors of Canada had generally sponsored cordial relations with the Indian peoples of the interior. Trade was the sinew of these intercultural relationships, which in time of war became the military alliances that made the frontiers of the British colonies uninhabitable and rendered a successful invasion of the Canadian heartland impossible." See Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 454.

[14] Quoted in Peter N. Moogk, *La Nouvelle France. The Making of French Canada - A Cultural History* (East Lansing: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 21.

[15] George M. Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philips War* (Boston: The Rockwell and Churchill Press, 1906), 25 and 189.

[16] Extract from response by Six Nations to a speech by the Lieutenant-General of New York, at Albany, 2 July 1755, in Lucier, *French and Indian War Notices, Vol 1: 1754-1755*, 272; and, Pichon's "Memoires du Cap Breton, 1760," quoted in Gerald E. Hart, *The Fall of New France, 1755-1760* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1888), 10.
[17] One letter captured the general sentiment after Braddock's defeat. "We are now in the utmost confusion not knowing what hand to turn to being more afraid of the Indians than the French," wrote one colonist. "Our back settlers are in general fled, and are likely to be ruined for the less of their crops and summer's labour." Letter from Carlisle, 22 July 1755, in Lucier, *French and Indian War Notices, Vol 1: 1754-1755*, 253. See also, Armand Francis Lucier, ed., *French and Indian War Notices Abstracted from Colonial Newspapers, Vol 2: 1756-1757* (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books Inc., 1999), 14.
[18] Jack M. Sosin, "The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re-assessment of Responsibility," *CHR*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (June 1965), 120.
[19] Sylvester K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent and Emma E. Woods, *Travels in New France by J. C. B.* (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), 25.
[20] Jeffrey Amherst, *Journal of William Amherst in America, 1758-1760* (London: Butler & Tanner Limited, 1927), 15-16.
[21] Letter, Colonel H. Bouquet to Lieutenant Blane, 14 June 1763, in Mary C. Darlington, ed., *History of Colonel Henry Bouquet and the Western Frontiers of Pennsylvania 1747-1764* (New York: Arno Press, reprint 1971), 160.
[22] Quoted in William Wier, *Fatal Victories* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1993), 112.
[23] Carl Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 67.
[24] For example, a group of Indians having successfully executed an ambush that yielded both supplies and prisoners without incurring any casualties then decided to return home. "The Master of Life has favoured us," they explained to the French commander, "here is the food, here are the prisoners, let's return." See D.P. MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996), 35-36.
[25] Colonel Bouquet observed, "They seldom expose themselves to danger, and depend entirely on their dexterity in concealing themselves during an engagement, never appearing openly, unless they have struck their enemies with terror, and have thereby rendered them incapable of defence." See *Warfare on the Colonial American Frontier: The Journals of Major Robert Rogers & An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the year 1764, Under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Esq.* Reprinted from an original 1769 edition (Bargersville: Dreslar Publishing, 2001), "Bouquet's Account," 52.
[26] See William R. Nester, *The Great Frontier War. Britain, France, and the Imperial Struggle for North America, 1607-1755* (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 91; Robert F. Berkhofer, "The French and Indians at Carillon," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. 9, No. 6 (1956), 137-138 & 147; MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War*, 21; Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812*, 82; and, Nicolai, "A Different Kind of Courage," 60. Jesuit Missionary, Father Roubaud, asserted that "the Savage is his own Master and his own King, and he takes with him everywhere his independence." Letter, Father Pierre Roubaud, Missionary, 21 October 1757, in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents. Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791, Vol. 60* (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1959), 137. The Indians recognized "only voluntary submission."
[27] For example, Lieutenant-General Jeffrey Amherst described them as "These little skulking men." Amherst, *Journal of William Amherst*, 20. Captain John Knox described them as "these skulking wretches," although he did include that they "are so hardy, that scarce pass one day [in February 1758] without scouring the environs of this fortress."

Captain John Knox, *An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North-America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760, Vol. 1* (London: 1769), 102. See also, Patrick M. Malone, *The Skulking Way of War* (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1991).
[28] MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War*, 34-35.
[29] He added, "Their encounters are mere attempts at assassination. They fight bravely then only when they know that the sole alternative lies between victory or death." Letter from Father Nau, Missionary, in Thwaites, *The Jesuit Relations, Vol. 68*, 275.
[30] H.R. Casgrain, *Montcalm et Lévis - Les Français au Canada* (Québec: Maison Alfred Mame et Fils, undated), 43.
[31] See Nicolai, "A Different Kind of Courage," 59; Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812*, 53; H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm durant ses Campagnes en Canada de 1756-1759* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1895), 374-375; MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War*, 30-31 & 69; A. Doughty, *The Siege of Québec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, Vol. I* (Québec: Dussault & Proulx, 1901), 208-9; H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Guerre du Canada. Relations et Journaux de Différentes Expéditions* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1895), 174; Maurice Sautai, *Montcalm au Combat de Carillon, 8 Juillet 1758* (Paris: Librairie Militaire R. Chapelot, 1909), 13, 18 & 80; H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Lettres du Chevalier De Lévis concernant La Guerre du Canada (1756-1760)* (Montréal: C.O. Beauchemin & Fils, 1889), 21 & 75; Nicolai, "A Different Kind of Courage," 60; Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals. Fort William Henry & the Massacre* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 49-50 & 73; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 151; and, Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 115. In addition, see George F.G. Stanley, "The Indians in the War of 1812," *CHR*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1950), 153; and Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812*, 82 (During the War of 1812, at the battle of Queenston Heights, under fire 50 percent of the warriors deserted, and at the subsequent Battle of Fort George, 70 percent of the Natives deserted); and George F.G. Stanley, "British Operations in the American North-West, 1812-15," *Army Historical Research*, Vol. 22 (1943-44), 95-96.
[32] Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 477.
[33] Steele, *Betrayals,* 126.
[34] See Letter, William Shirley to British War Office, 22 December 1755, New York, Correspondence, 1755-1763, War Office [WO] 1/4, *Public Records Office* [*PRO*]; "John Henry Lydius, Fur Trader at Fort Edward," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. 11, No. 5 (December 1964), 272-273; and, Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812*, 54. See also Proclamation, June 1755, in Lucier, *French and Indian War Notices, Vol. 1*, 197.
[35] Berkhofer, "The French and Indians at Carillon," 157, and, Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 112.
[36] Andrew Gallup, ed., *Memoir of a French and Indian War Soldier* (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 1993), 108.
[37] Brumwell, *Redcoats*, 184.
[38] Hamilton, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 59-60. Bougainville was an aide to Lieutenant-General Montcalm.
[39] Casgrain, *Lettres du Chevalier De Lévis*, 75.
[40] Doughty, *The Siege of Québec, Vol. II*, 202; Canada Archives, *The Northcliffe Collection* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1926), 138; and, Berkhofer, "The French and Indians at Carillon," 146.
[41] Hamilton, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 133.
[42] Louis de Courville, *Mémoires sur le Canada depuis 1749 Jusqu'À 1760* (Québec: Imprimerie de Middleton and Dawson, 1873), 97, and, Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812*, 136.
[43] See Moogk, *La Nouvelle France*, 43-45, and, Gallup, *Memoir of a French and Indian War Soldier*, 142. The Indian perspective on these killings did not assist in their resolu-

tion. They contended that the respective individual was not to blame, rather it was the "alcohol" that caused the offence.

[44] Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 385.

[45] Steele, *Betrayals*, 132-133; Berkhofer, "The French and Indians at Carillon," 156; and, Robert S. Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992), 144.

[46] "Journal of the Expedition Against Fort William Henry," New York Colonial Document, quoted in Berkhofer, "The French and Indians at Carillon," 164.

[47] Hamilton, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 243. See also, Letter, Montcalm to Bourlamaque, Montréal, 14 May 1756, and, Letter, Montcalm to Bourlamaque, Fort St. Jean, 30 August 1757, Bourlamaque Collection, Montcalm Letters, 25 June 1756-22 September 1759, microfilm C-362, *Library and Archives Canada* [*LAC*].

[48] Hamilton, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 171.

[49] Le Comte Gabriél de Maurs de Malartic, *Journal des Campagnes au Canada de 1755 à 1760* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1902), 130; Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow*, 75; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 197; Brigadier R.O. Alexander, ed., "The Capture of Québec. A Manuscript Journal Relating to the Operations Before Québec From 8th May, 1759, to 17th May, 1760 Kept by Colonel Malcolm Fraser," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol. 18 (1939), 141; and, Doughty, *The Siege of Québec, Vol. II*, 200. Jacques Cartier also witnessed scalping in 1535. See Samuel de Champlain, Edward G. Bourne, ed., *Algonquins, Hurons and Iroquois. Champlain Explores America 1603-1616* (Dartmouth: Brook House Press, reprint 2000), 103-105 and 205.

[50] The French and Indian War (1754-1760) was the North American component of the Seven Years' War in Europe.

[51] Hamilton, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 41.

[52] Quoted in Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 168. Although they normally showed no mercy to anyone regardless of age or gender, this description is somewhat misleading. The Indians almost never raped women on campaigns. They believed intercourse enfeebled them and would offend the great spirits. See Robert C. Alberts, *The Most Extraordinary Adventures of Major Robert Stobo* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company Boston, 1965), 152, and, Gallup, *Memoir of a French and Indian War Soldier*, 109.

[53] For a sampling of the abundant documentary evidence see Thwaites, *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents, Vol. 60*; Letter, gentleman in Virginia to friend in Annapolis, 16 January 1754, reproduced in Lucier, *French and Indian War Notices, Vol. 1*, 3; Ross Brian Snyder, "Algonquin Warfare in Canada and Southern New England 1600-1680," Unpublished MA thesis, University of Ottawa, 1972; Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 480; Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow*, 158; "Pierre Roubaud, Missionary Extraordinary," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol.12, No. 1 (March 1966), 67-68; Raymond Scheele, "Warfare of the Iroquois and their Northern Neighbours," Unpublished PhD thesis, Columbia University, 1950, 44; Casgrain, *Les Français au Canada*, 182-183; and, Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela*, 91-92. See also, Fredrick Drimmer, ed., *Captured by the Indians. 15 Firsthand Accounts 1750-1870* (New York: Dover Publications Ltd., 1961), 19; Steele, *Betrayals*; and, Hamilton, *Adventure in the Wilderness*. Although there was an element of entertainment involved with the torture, it also fulfilled a spiritual and emotional need. Torture was often seen a consolation for the death of a relative or a means of quieting the soul of the deceased. It also provided a means of allowing an enemy to display his courage. When an opponent did so in a gallant manner, his heart was often eaten because of a belief that it would render those consuming it more courageous.

[54] "Nothing," wrote Vaudreuil, "is more calculated to discourage the people of these [English] colonies and make them wish for the return to peace." Quoted in Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 72.

CHAPTER 1

[55] W.J. Eccles, *The French in North America* (Markham: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1998), 201, and, "Unrest At Caughnawaga or The Lady Fur Traders of Sault St. Louis," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (December 1963), 155. A similar mentality existed during the War of 1812. The initial British successes at Michillimackinac and Detroit induced a large number of tribes and nations of Indians to rally to the British standard. See Stanley, "British Operations in the American North-West," 93-94; Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies*, 138; and, Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812*, 49.
[56] Theodore Burnham Lewis, Jr., "The Crown Point Campaign 1755," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (December 1970), 37, and, Courville, *Mémoires sur le Canada*, 90.
[57] Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm*, 74-75. The concept of strength is a critical one - the Indians considered weakness, or being a weakling, the greatest of all insults. See Richard A. Preston and Leopold Lamontagne, *Royal Fort Frontenac* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), 206.
[58] Letter from Albany of 6 August 1759, published in *Pennsylvania Gazette,* 23 August 1759, quoted in Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 231. See also Malartic, *Journal des Campagnes au Canada*, 268.
[59] Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 183.
[60] Ibid., 229-231. The capture of Fort Frontenac was similar. Once the fort was captured, the Indians arrived to plunder and scalp. However, Lieutenant-Colonel Bradstreet forbade the killing or scalping of prisoners or wounded. He was able to achieve their agreement by turning over the majority of the booty to the Natives. See *An Impartial Account of Lieut. Col. Bradstreet's Expedition to Fort Frontenac* (Toronto: Rous & Mann Ltd., 1940), 8-9 & 20-22.
[61] See "A Journal of the proceedings of the Seamen (a detachment), ordered by Commodore Keppel to assist on a late expedition to the Ohio, from the 10th of April, 1755," reprinted in Sargent, *The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne in 1755*, 386.
[62] Jean-Félix Récher, *Journal du Siège de Québec en 1759* (Québec: La Société Historique de Québec Université Laval, 1959), 36.
[63] Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm*, 130-131 & 203.
[64] H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Lettres de M. De Bourlamaque au Chevalier de Lévis* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1890), 339. See also Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 231; Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 332; Preston and Lamontagne, *Royal Fort Frontenac*, 269; *Impartial Account of Lieut. Col. Bradstreet's Expedition to Fort Frontenac,* 8-9; and, Sautai, *Montcalm au Combat de Carillon*, 42. During Bougainville's retreat to Montréal through the forests in late-August 1760, he counted on Indians as guides, but they deserted a losing cause and without his guides he lost his way, imposing delay and hardship as the French forces plodded through swamps and trackless forest. See George M. Wrong, *The Fall of Canada. A Chapter in the History of the Seven Years' War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 208.
[65] See Lowdermilk, *Along the Braddock Road*, 127, and, Sargent, *The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne in 1755*, 171.
[66] Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 88.
[67] Casgrain, *Journal Des Campagnes du Chevalier De Lévis*, 174-175.
[68] Casgrain, *Français au Canada*, 63; Berkhofer, "The French and Indians at Carillon," 136 & 141; and, Nicholas Beyard, *Journal of the Late Actions of the French at Canada by Col. Nicholas Beyard and Lieut. Col. Charles Lodowick* (New York: Joseph Sabin, 1868), 41.
[69] H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Extraits des Archives des Ministères de la Marine et de la Guerre A Paris - Canada - Correspondence Générale - MM. Duquesne et Vaudreuil Gouverneurs-Généraux, 1755-1760* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1890), 72-73.

[70] Williams, *Redcoats along the Hudson*, 197, and, Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 188.
[71] Letter, Amherst to Sir William Johnson, 22 June 1763, Amherst Papers, WO 34/38, *PRO*.
[72] Letter, Major-General William Shirley, Chief of His Majesties Forces in North America, to British War Office, 22 December 1755; Letter, Major-General William Shirley, to Principal Secretary of War, 20 December 1755; and, Letter, "Additional Instructions to Major-General William Johnston relative to the Indians of the Six Nations under his care," from William Shirley, 13 January 1756, all Correspondence, 1755-1763, WO 1/4, *PRO*.
[73] H.R. Casgrain, François Gaston Chevalier de Lévis Collection des Manuscrits, *Journal du Marquis de Montcalm Durant Ses Campagnes en Canada De 1756 à1759, Vol. VII* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1895), 335. See also Casgrain, *Lettres du Chevalier de Lévis*, 144.
[74] Casgrain, *Extraits des Archives*, 150.
[75] Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 591.
[76] W.J. Eccles, "Frontenac's Military Policies, 1689-1698. A Reassessment," *CHR*, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1956), 204. Lord Bathurst, the British Secretary of War in 1812, correctly assessed, "If not retained as our friends, they will act against us as enemies."
[77] Governor's Speech to the General Assembly of the State of Massachusetts-Bay, 2 April 1754, in Lucier, *French and Indian War Notices, Vol. 1*, 40.
[78] Letter from a British officer, 21 January 1755, in Ibid.
[79] Hamilton, *Adventure in the Wilderness*, 191.
[80] Canada Archives, *The Northcliffe Collection*, 70.
[81] Silcox, "Rogers and Bouquet," 65.
[82] Letter, Washington to John Robinson, Winchester, 7 April 1756, quoted in Brumwell, *Redcoats*, 209.
[83] Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812*, 64.
[84] Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 241, and, Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 189.
[85] Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 61; W.J. Eccles, "The French forces in North America during the Seven Years' War," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol. III, 1741 to 1770* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), xx; Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow*, 103; and, Doughty, *The Seige of Québec, Vol. I*, 158.
[86] Casgrain, *Français au Canada,* 87.
[87] Hamilton, *Adventure in the Wilderness,* 191.
[88] "Amos Richardson's Journal, 1758," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (September 1968), 278, and, *Governor Murray's Journal of the Siege of Québec, from 18th September, 1759 to 25th May, 1760* (Toronto: Rous & Mann Ltd., 1939), 14. See also Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 252; "Fragments of a Journal in the Handwriting of General Wolfe, 1759" (Wolfe's Journal 19 June - 16 August 1759), held in Royal Military College of Canada Library, Rare Book Collection, 17, 25, and 27 July 1759; Canada Archives, *The Northcliffe Collection*, 216; Thomas Haynes, "Memorandum of Colonial French War A.D. 1758," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (October 1967), 8; Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 118; and, Doughty, *Siege of Québec*, Appendix, Part I, 261.
[89] Casgrain, *Français au Canada,* 91.
[90] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 194, and, Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 250.
[91] Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 168. See also Extract of a letter from Sir William Johnson to General Shirley, 10 May 1756, Correspondence, 1755-1763, WO 1/4, *PRO*. The tight grip on movement was also effective in catching deserters. See Malartic, *Journal des Campagnes au Canada*, 217, and, Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 136.
[92] Letter, Beckford to Pitt, December 1758, quoted in *The Conquest of Canada, Vol. II* (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1850), 153.

[93] A Letter Written by Colonel Napier and sent to General Braddock by Order of the Duke of Cumberland, 25 November 1754, reprinted in Sargent, *The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne in 1755*, 399.
[94] "The yells of our Indians," wrote Montcalm to his mother, "promptly decided them [the English garrison at Oswego]. They yielded themselves prisoners of war to the number of 1,700, including eighty officers and two regiments from England." See Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm,* 35; Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 102; and, Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 207.
[95] Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 241.
[96] Walter O'Meara, *Guns at the Forks* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1965), 147.
[97] Ibid., 177.
[98] Charles Hamilton, ed., *Braddock's Defeat. The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley's Batman; The Journal of a British Officer; Halkett's Orderly Book* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 53.
[99] Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 333.
[100] *Conquest of Canada*, 153. See also, Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm*, 117, and, Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 112.
[101] H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Lettres ... Militarires. Instructions, Ordres, Mémoires, Plans de Campagne et de Défense 1756-1760* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1891), 50, and, MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War*, 25. See also Berkhofer, "The French and Indians at Carillon," 136; Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 476; and, Malone, *The Skulking Way of War*, 84.
[102] O'Meara, *Guns at the Forks*, 85.
[103] "Memoir on the Defense of the Fort of Carillon," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1972), 200-201; Steele, *Betrayals*, 96; and, Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 187.
[104] Quoted documents, display, Fort Chambly National Historic Site of Canada, Chambly, Québec. Accessed 23 August 2001.
[105] Ibid.
[106] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 151, and, Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 214. See also *Conquest of Canada*, 93.
[107] See Bernd Horn, "Marin and Langis: Master Practitioners of *La Petite Guerre*," in Bernd Horn and Roch Legault, eds., *Loyal Service: Perspectives of French Canadian Military Leaders* (Toronto: CDA Press / Dundurn, 2006), Chapter 2, 53-86.
[108] Letter from General Shirley to Major-General Abercrombie, 27 June 1756, Correspondence, 1755-1763, WO 1/4, *PRO*.
[109] This in fact could work both ways. From 1757 to 1759, the British sponsored a series of raids by their Cherokee and Catawba allies against Algonquian towns on the Ohio River. These raids destroyed substantial quantities of food supplies, forced hunters to remain close to their villages to protect their families and left Indian women reluctant to venture into their fields to plant crops. See Matthew Ward, "Microbes of War: The British Army and Epidemic Disease among the Ohio Indians, 1758-1765," in David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson, eds., *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814* (East Lansing: University of Michigan, 2001), 73.
[110] Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 637, and, Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow*, 101. By the spring of 1756, raids by Canadians and Indians organized by Captain Dumas alone had resulted in 700 deaths or captures. By the end of the summer, operations had extended as far south as the Carolinas. One report noted, "All these provinces are laid waste for forty leagues from the foot of the mountains, in the direction of the sea. The number of prisoners in these territories since last April [1756] is estimated at about three thousand - men, women and children, in addition to thirteen hundred horses." See Ian Steele, *Guerillas and*

Grenadiers (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), 97-98. In the spring of 1758, in an approximate three month period, raiding parties delivered to Fort Duquesne alone, 140 prisoners or scalps. Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 357. See also, Letter, William Shirley to Principal Secretary of War, New York, 20 December 1755, Correspondence, 1755-1763, WO 1/4, *PRO*; Casgrain, *Lettres du Chevalier De Lévis*, 75; Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 24; Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 110-111; Malartic, *Journal des Campagnes au Canada*, 52-53; Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela*, 232; O'Meara, *Guns at the Forks*, 161; and, Gavin K. Watt, *The Burning of the Valleys* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 73.

[111] Colonel James Smith, "An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Col. James Smith During his Captivity with the Indians," in Archibald Loudon, ed., *Loudon's Indian Narratives* (Lewisburg: Wennawoods Publishing, 1996), 247. Another officer recorded, "Nothing is to be seen but desolation and murder, heightened with every barbarous circumstance, and new instances of cruelty - They, at the instigation of the French with them, burn up the plantations, the smoke of which darkens the day and hides the mountains from our sight." Letter from an officer, dated Fort Cumberland, 6 October 1755, in Lucier, *French and Indian War Notices, Vol. 1*, 329. One inhabitant wrote, "We are under the utmost fear and consternation, upon accounts of the Indians having again began their murders and massacres in the province of Pennsylvania, upon the River Delaware adjoining to this province...These fresh depredations have so terrified us that we dare not go out to our daily labour, for fear of being surprized and murdered by the Indians." Extract from a letter dated 28 April 1757, quoted in Lucier, *French and Indian War Notices, Vol. 2*, 233.

[112] In the summer of 1758, when William Johnson was asked how he managed to marshal 450 Indians for a campaign, he replied "that it was owing to the French having neither provisions, nor presents to give them." Letter, Mr. Appy to Robert Wood, Albany, 2 July 1758, Colonial Office, 5/50, microfilm B-2113, *LAC*. Similarly, the next summer an Indian chief loyal to the French arrived at Fort Niagara after its capture and incredulously demanded, "We are asking you for gunpowder & shot for hunting, and also for garments," he declared, "but we have not come to form an alliance with you; as we are still under the wing of our father." He conceded, "We are at war with you but necessity forces us to solicit our needs from you." Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War*, 285.

[113] John R. Cuneo, *Robert Rogers of the Rangers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 33.

[114] Canada Archives, *Northcliffe Collection*, Vol. IX, 110.

[115] See Bernd Horn, "La Petite Guerre – A Strategy of Survival," in B. Horn, ed., *The Canadian Way of War* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006), Chapter 1, 21-55, and, Brumwell, *Redcoats*.

[116] "Monypenny Orderly Book," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1971), 170.

[117] Anderson, *The Crucible of War*, 410; Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow*, 309; and, Williams, *Redcoats along the Hudson*, 79 & 143.

[118] *General Wolfe's Instructions to Young Officers: Also His Orders for a Battalion and an Army* (London: J. Millan, 1780), 72-73.

CHAPTER 2

His Majesty's Aboriginal Allies: The Contribution of the Indigenous Peoples of North America to the Defence of Canada during the War of 1812

Donald E. Graves

Aboriginal peoples made an important contribution to the successful defence of Canada during the War of 1812. The origins and course of their participation in that conflict cannot be properly analyzed, however, without a preliminary discussion of the broader historical background of White-Aboriginal relations in early Canadian history since the War of 1812 was only the last of a series of conflicts involving competing White nations and the Aboriginal peoples that began shortly after the first Europeans arrived in North America. To provide the proper context for that war and the role of the indigenous peoples in it, it is necessary to briefly survey the history of White-Aboriginal relations back to the time of the first contacts between the two cultures.

As far as can be established with any certainty, the first Europeans to reach the North American continent were Norse Vikings who arrived in Newfoundland in the 11th century. Norse attempts to establish colonies failed and, although there were intermittent European visits to the continent, it was not until the 16th century that European explorers such as Jacques Cartier began to penetrate the northern part of the continent using the St. Lawrence waterway. The tide of European exploration and settlement quickly gained impetus, impelled by an increasing awareness of the natural wealth of Canada in terms of fish and furs. By the last half of the 16th century, Basque fishermen, drawn by the marine life of the Grand Banks, created seasonal settlements on the coast of Labrador and, in 1608, the first permanent European settlement in what was to become Canada was created at Québec City. In the two following decades, England, Holland and Sweden all established colonies along the Atlantic seaboard.

Even at this early period, two factors became apparent: national rivalries in Europe spilled over into North America, and Canada possessed considerable natural wealth. This was particularly true of the fur trade, which was one of the major commercial enterprises of the 17th and 18th centuries. The fur trade

industry – for that is what it was – ultimately led to conflict between the Huron Confederacy, resident in what is now southern Ontario and Québec, and the Iroquois League, located in the Mohawk Valley and the northern part of what is now New York state, as both these political entities wished to obtain the position of middlemen in this enterprise. The Huron Confederacy, with the assistance of the French, assumed a dominant position and, frustrated, the Iroquois League opened up a trading channel with the Dutch along the lower Hudson River. As the fur trade expanded and flourished, the League watched with envy the increasing wealth of the Huron Confederacy.

Economic rivalry was not the only thing Europeans brought; they also introduced disease and firearms, two elements that had a drastic effect on the social and political stability of the Aboriginal peoples. Between 1634 and 1650, about half of the indigenous population of the Great Lakes basin died from disease. This terrible scourge was particularly fatal to the elderly and the young, and thus removed experience from Aboriginal leadership at the very time it was most needed, leading to political instability while, at the same time, reducing the size of future generations. European weapons were not as dangerous as European diseases, but since those Aboriginals who possessed firearms had a tremendous advantage over potential rivals, they were much sought after. The White colonists were at first reluctant to trade firearms, but gradually commercial rivalry led to both the Iroquoian and Algonkian peoples obtaining such weapons in large numbers. The Iroquois League, with good trade links to the Dutch at Albany and the English in New England, both of whom provided better quality weapons than the French, soon possessed a significant amount of firepower.

This fatal combination of commercial rivalry and political instability created by the fur trade, European colonization, and decimation by disease, boiled over in the early 1640s, when the five-nation Iroquois League, consisting of the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga and Seneca peoples, began a series of attacks on the Huron and their allies that some ethnologists have termed the "Beaver Wars." Within a decade, the League controlled much of what is now Ontario but, inevitably, the triumph of the League led it into conflict with the infant colony of New France. The result was a struggle between the French and the Iroquois League that was intermittently waged for nearly half a century. By the 1660s, the colony of New France was in such desperate straits that the first regular troops were stationed in what is now Canada to defend it.

By the end of the 17th century, both sides, battered and weary, began negotiations and, in 1701, representatives from the Iroquois League and 40 other

indigenous nations stretching from Acadia to the Missouri River came together at Montréal to conclude a peace treaty. The Iroquois promised to remain neutral in any future conflict between France and England. By recognizing the independence of the Aboriginal peoples, the French gained powerful allies against their English rivals on the Atlantic seaboard. In point of fact, the goodwill brought about by the Peace Treaty of 1701 guaranteed the survival of French Canada for nearly six decades. For its part, the Iroquois League created an alliance with the English by transforming an understanding originally made between the Mohawks and the Dutch into a more significant agreement between the League and the English colony of New York.

Another outcome of the French-Iroquois conflict of the late 17th century was that the people of New France, who were beginning to call themselves "Canadiens," began to adapt Aboriginal methods of warfare. There is no doubt that the indigenous peoples – particularly the eastern woodland nations who inhabited much of what is now Canada before the arrival of the first Europeans – had a distinct way of war. Contrary to the myth that in the pre-contact period, the Aboriginal peoples lived in a blessed state of perpetual peace, warfare was actually central to their way of life. There were continuous conflicts or feuds between major groups, subgroups and even kin groups, induced by complex and intertwined causes: to acquire prestige and

"Brothers Of The Forest," Robert Griffing, courtesy of Paramount Press

The Seneca warrior maintained his reputation for military ferocity throughout the colonial period. His close relationship to the forest around him provided a distinct advantage over Europeans who were unfamiliar with his woodland skills and war tactics.

power; to demonstrate courage; to gain or defend territory; to exact tribute or control trade; spiritual matters; and, most commonly, to avenge real or imagined wrongs. These conflicts were essentially a matter of raids and ambushes. Mutual aggression would escalate until an uneasy peace or some violent solution brought hostilities to a close.

Warfare was a predominantly male occupation, and boys learned the necessary skills at an early age because they were identical to those required for hunting. The object was not so much to kill the enemy as to accomplish the objective with as few casualties as possible, and Aboriginal warfare was neither as prolonged nor perhaps as bloody as its European equivalent. Tactics were based on an impressive individual self-discipline grounded on personal honour, not fear of punishment. War chiefs or leaders, who normally differed from peacetime chiefs, were selected on the grounds of experience and courage, but also their record of preserving lives on campaign. War chiefs trained their parties to move fast in small groups, re-assemble at the critical time, take every advantage of ground, and surround the enemy while avoiding being surrounded themselves. Such tactics saved lives but were often misunderstood by White observers, particularly professional soldiers, although one perceptive historian of North American warfare has remarked, "Is it not the best discipline that has the greatest tendency to annoy the enemy and save their own men?"[1]

The warrior's credo of moving fast and light, striking when and where least expected, and withdrawing before a counter-attack could be mounted, is the essence of guerrilla warfare and it was enhanced by his impressive physical endurance, nurtured from an early age by his participation in hunting. For a limited time, war parties could cover 50 or 60 kilometres a day on little or no food, although care was usually taken to prepare or procure provisions before setting out. Mobility was the key to Aboriginal warfare and warriors moved easily on water, paddling lightweight canoes, or over winter terrain using snowshoes. One White commentator concluded that they were born soldiers who "possessed the skills and discipline of modern commandos and special forces, ... who were capable of adapting to whatever situation they encountered."[2]

Aboriginal and White warfare were markedly different. Europeans, with concepts based upon the rigid discipline required to turn civilians into soldiers who would fight in unyielding lines and in the open, regarded Native tactics as "skulking" warfare. Nor could they understand the looser discipline of the warriors who, unlike White soldiers, never rendered up their personal freedom. Major Robert Rogers, the famous Ranger commander who successfully adopted many of these same tactics in the mid-18th century, summed up the White view when he stated that his warrior opponents had:

> no stated rules of discipline, or fixed methods of prosecuting a war; they make attacks in as many different ways as there are occasions on which they make them, but generally in a very secret skulking, underhand manner, in flying parties that are equipped for the purpose, with thin light dress, generally consisting of nothing more than a shirt, stockings and mogasins, sometimes almost naked.[3]

For their part, the warriors were appalled by White methods of warfare. Black Hawk, a war chief of the Sauk who fought in the War of 1812, was scathing about White generals and their methods:

> Instead of stealing upon each other, and taking every advantage to kill the enemy and save their own people, as we do, (which, with us, is considered good policy in a war chief) they march out, in open daylight, and fight, regardless of the number of warriors they may lose! After the battle is over, they retire to feast, and drink wine, as if nothing had happened; after which, they make a statement in writing, of what they have done each party claiming the victory! and neither give an account of half the number that have been killed on their own side.
>
> They all fought like braves, but would not do to lead a war party with us. Our maxim is, "to kill the enemy and save our own men." Those [White] chiefs would do to paddle a canoe, but not to steer it.[4]

Some aspects of Aboriginal warfare shocked Europeans. It was not uncommon for prisoners to be killed and scalping was a practice that predated the arrival of the first Europeans. Much was made of this gruesome aspect of Aboriginal life in the literature of European explorers and settlers, but it was not long before competing White colonies were offering rewards to their native allies for the scalps of their White enemies. White literature exaggerated Aboriginal cruelty, without also noting that many prisoners were also spared and adopted by their captors to replace casualties suffered in battle or those who had died from the White man's disease, and this custom became increasingly prevalent throughout the 18th century.

The population of the infant colony of New France never numbered more than 63,000 souls. It competed against British colonies on the Atlantic seaboard which, by the early-18th century, had a combined population of nearly a million. In the face of such odds, the survival of New France depended on the development of military tactics that were a blend of European and Aboriginal practice. While the major population centres were guarded by garrisons of French regulars and traditional fortifications, offensive operations were car-

ried out by small raiding parties, usually composed of a mixture of regulars, *Canadien* militiamen and Aboriginal allies. Their tactics, a blend of Aboriginal and White as developed by leaders such as Jean-Baptiste Hertel de Rouville and Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville, proved very effective and emphasized moving fast, hitting hard and quickly withdrawing to avoid retaliation. The British response, based on large military and naval expeditions of the traditional European model, was not nearly as successful.

Owing to this combination of effective defence measures and successful diplomacy with the Aboriginal peoples, New France not only survived against the odds, but prospered. During the half century that followed the Great Peace of 1701, France expanded its American possessions into an empire based on the St. Lawrence River system. By the 1750s, French-controlled territory stretched from Cape Breton Island to modern-day Saskatchewan, and from the Great Lakes down the Mississippi to the Gulf of Mexico. A major feature of the success of the colony was the participation of the Aboriginal peoples residing in the St. Lawrence valley. Generally known as the Seven Nations of Canada, these were Iroquoian and Algonkian peoples who were closely integrated with their French allies. The Seven Nations prospered during this period as suppliers of provisions to the European communities, participants and middlemen in the fur trade, and as guides and military partners in time of conflict. Without the support of these indigenous nations, New France could not have existed in the face of the overwhelming numerical superiority of the British colonies to the south. Their effectiveness as military allies also created a psychological fear among the colonists of the "savage red Indian" which was bolstered by exaggerated accounts of Aboriginal atrocities.

By the mid-1750s, the extension of French settlements into the Ohio River valley, claimed by both Britain and France, created tension between the two European powers that ultimately triggered a global conflict. In the opening stages of what later became known as the Seven Years' War, the French were largely successful. In July 1755, nearly a thousand French and Aboriginal combatants, including a contingent of about 230 warriors from the Seven Nations, inflicted a major defeat on a superior force of British regulars and colonial militia at the battle of the Monongahela, a victory largely won by the warriors. For the next three years, the frontier settlements of Virginia and Pennsylvania were subjected to raids by Aboriginal war parties allied with France but, thereafter, the tide began to turn. With the superiority of the Royal Navy at sea, British troops flooded into North America and military operations became larger in terms of scope and, increasingly, more traditional in aspect, revolving around the attack and defence of fortified centres by

large regular armies. One by one, the strongholds of New France were taken: Louisbourg in 1758, Québec City in 1759, and Montréal in 1760.

Although the Native allies of both powers participated in these later campaigns (for example, nearly a thousand warriors helped defend Québec City in 1759), their role became less important with the arrival of European troops in large numbers. Inevitably the newcomers brought disease which devastated the indigenous Aboriginal population, and it has been estimated that in the quarter century that followed the Seven Years' War, at least half of the Iroquois League died from sickness, particularly smallpox, which had a devastating effect on women and children and, ironically, led to an increased preference on the part of the Aboriginal peoples for adopting prisoners as a way of replacing casualties.

In 1763, the Seven Years' War was formally concluded by the Treaty of Paris which saw the secession of all French colonies in North America, with the exception of Louisiana and the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, to the British Crown. But the British victory did not lead to prolonged peace in North America. British authorities, anxious to obtain the goodwill of the Seven Nations of Canada during the difficult period of transition, permitted them to return to their homes without penalty, but the western nations allied with France were treated less generously, which led to resentment on their part. As one of the western chiefs explained to his British counterpart:

> although you have conquered the French, you have not yet conquered us! We are not your slaves. These lakes, these woods, and mountains, were left to us by our ancestors. They are our inheritance; and we will part with them to none. Your nation supposes that we, like the white people, cannot live without bread and pork and beef! But you ought to know, that He, the Great Spirit and Master of Life, had provided food for use, in these spacious lakes, and on these woody mountains.[5]

Sir William Johnson, the Superintendent of the Indian Department, the military organization created in 1755 to supervise relations with Britain's indigenous allies, cautioned senior British commanders to treat the western peoples generously, but his sound advice was disregarded. The result was a new conflict, generally called "Pontiac's Rebellion" by White historians. It was not a "rebellion" as the Ottawa chief, Pontiac, was the leader of an independent nation which could not technically "rebel" because it owed no allegiance to the British Crown. This conflict was yet another in a series of struggles by an increasingly desperate people to preserve their territory, their independence and their culture against White intrusion. It failed in

that sense but, with the assistance of Johnson, a man respected by the Aboriginal peoples, peace was restored.

The removal of the French threat to the British colonies in North America, together with population pressure, led to a westward extension of White settlement in the decades following the Seven Years' War. In 1763, as part of an attempt to provide new boundaries for the various British possessions in North America and to stop unauthorized White encroachment on Aboriginal territory, the Crown issued a Royal Proclamation which established a line from Oneida Lake, in northern New York, southward to the Pennsylvania border and then southwest to and along the Ohio River, as the boundary between Whites and Aboriginals. This measure, actually intended to protect the nations of the Great Lakes and provide for the peaceful advance of the frontier of White settlement, angered the American colonies which regarded it as an arbitrary attempt by Britain to limit their westward expansion. Their resentment, coupled with increased taxation imposed to defray the cost of defending the colonies, resulted in widespread civil unrest in the 1770s. As the American colonies moved toward an outright breach with Britain, which finally occurred in 1775, both sides made efforts to recruit Aboriginal peoples as allies.

These efforts were directed largely at the Iroquois League and, in this respect, Britain was more successful. Although the League attempted to remain neutral, it was inevitably dragged into the conflict and Aboriginal military power became a major consideration for British military leaders in the northern theatre of the American Revolutionary War of 1775 to 1783. Warriors from the Iroquois League and the Seven Nations of Canada were instrumental in delaying a rebel offensive against a weakly-defended Canada in the autumn of 1775 and gained several notable victories over rebel forces.

For the next five years, His Majesty's Aboriginal allies participated in a series of campaigns and raids against the border settlements of New York and Pennsylvania, with little quarter given on either side. Although the focus of the conventional war shifted to the south in 1780, Britain's allies won two of their most notable successes at Sandusky and Blue Licks that year. But the indigenous peoples also suffered fearsome losses. The homelands of the Iroquois League were devastated by an American punitive campaign in 1779, and perhaps the worst depredation on either side during the Revolutionary War was the murder by American troops of more than 100 Christian Delaware men, women and children at the Gnadenhutten massacre of 1782.

When peace was concluded and the new nation of the United States was created by the Treaty of Paris of 1783, the Aboriginal nations which had been

allied with Britain – and this included most of them – were appalled to learn its terms. Negotiated in Europe by European and American statesmen, this treaty did not include a single reference to the indigenous peoples of North America, although it ceded the lands of many nations to the new American republic. As an officer of the Indian Department explained to his superiors in London, the indigenous peoples rightfully felt betrayed by the treaty and:

> look upon our conduct to them as treacherous and cruel: they told me they never could believe that our King could pretend to cede to America what was not his own to give ... they would defend their own Just Rights or perish in the attempt to the last man, they were but a handful of small People but they would die like men, which they thought preferable to misery and distress if deprived of their Hunting Grounds.[6]

Resentment was so strong that for a considerable period of time after 1783, British authorities feared that they would be attacked by their former allies. Fortunately for Canada at least, the Americans treated their unwilling new subjects so poorly that, despite the British betrayal, they gradually returned to their traditional alliance with the Crown. In addition, land in Canada and financial compensation was offered to the Iroquois Loyalists as it was to White Loyalists. Joseph Brant, the Mohawk war chief, led 1,800 Mohawks, Cayuga and other native peoples to a large tract of land on the Grand River while John Deserontyon established a smaller and separate Mohawk com-

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General Burgoyne addressing the Indians at their War Feast in Canada.

munity at Tyendinaga on Lake Ontario. British authorities hoped that these new settlements would provide an active barrier against possible American aggression from the south.

Unfortunately, just had been the case in 1763, the treaty of 1783 did not bring an end to White-Aboriginal conflict in North America. The indigenous peoples who resided in what was now American territory, but who had fought on the British side during the war, suffered from the new republic's attitude that they were conquered subjects and their territory was forfeit. The new nation imposed severe treaties on the Iroquois nations still resident in the United States, forcing them off their traditional land onto reservations. But the republic had less luck with the Algonkian and Iroquoian peoples of the Ohio valley who, being more distant from the centres of White population and more united in the defence of their territory, refused to accept any change in the boundary of the Ohio River established in the 1760s. The nations of the Northwest (the modern states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan and Ohio) formed a confederacy which they called "The United Indian Nations" to defend their land. The American government, caught between a floodtide of settlers who wanted to settle the Ohio and the intractability of the Confederacy who wished to preserve that river as their boundary, was forced into military action after the Confederacy attacked illegal settlements on their side of the Ohio.

In September 1790, American Brigadier-General Josiah Harmar was ordered "to extirpate, if possible," the attackers and led 1,400 regulars and militia to invade the Miami nation.[7] Within three weeks, having suffered more than 200 casualties, Harmar was back at his base, with nothing accomplished but the burning of a few abandoned villages. American hopes for a quick victory were shattered and as one congressman put it: "a horid Savage war Stairs us in the face" as, instead of being humbled by the Harmar expedition, the Confederacy "appear ditermined on a general War."[8]

In the early summer of 1791, Major-General Arthur St. Clair assembled a larger force, consisting of 1,500 regulars and 800 militia, described by one of his own staff officers as "the offscourings of large Towns and Cities; enervated by Idleness, Debaucheries and every species of Vice."[9] In September, St. Clair began to creep forward, accompanied by a lengthy procession of camp followers. Shortly after sunrise on 4 November 1791, as many as 2,000 warriors from the Confederacy attacked St. Clair's camp on the banks of the Wabash River. St. Clair, old, sick and feeble, had neglected to take the proper defensive measures around a badly-sited camp, but even so managed to twice repulse the initial attacks. The battle continued

for an entire day and, when it had ended, 876 were dead or wounded, and the remnants of St. Clair's army were in full retreat. Aboriginal casualties in the engagement were estimated to be 50 killed and wounded. The 1791 battle of the Wabash was the Aboriginal peoples' greatest single victory against the United States.

Following that triumph, the Northwest Confederacy attacked the White settlements on their side of the Ohio boundary for nearly two years but refrained from attacking settlements on the American side of the river. During this struggle, the Confederacy received advice from officers of the Indian Department at Detroit, but the Confederacy's requests for active military support went unheeded. Britain offered to mediate in the contest and suggested the establishment of an independent and neutral Aboriginal state between the Mississippi, the Ohio and the Great Lakes. Not surprisingly, the American government rejected this proposal which it regarded, perhaps with reason, as unwanted meddling in its internal affairs. For nearly three years, Britain, the United States, and the Six Nations of Canada under Joseph Brant tried to end the controversy through a series of conferences, but the peoples of the Northwest would not yield on the key issue, remaining adamant that the Ohio River was the dividing line between their territory and that of the new republic. Their dreams of independence, however, were shattered in 1794 when a new and well-trained American army under Major-General Anthony Wayne advanced into their territory and beat off a series of attacks. This offensive culminated in American victory at the battle of Fallen Timbers in August 1794. When British leaders in Canada refused military aid to the Confederacy, it began to fall apart.

Tensions between Britain and the United States, which had come close to the point of war over the troubles in the Northwest, were ameliorated with the signing of Jay's Treaty in 1794. The British turned over posts they had retained on American territory in return for the stipulation that the Aboriginal peoples could pass freely over the border. For the Northwest Confederacy, the result was despair. Some members fled to Canada, but most signed a general peace treaty with the United States in 1795 that ceded the entire Ohio valley to the new republic. The Northwest peoples' stand against the United States, which had lasted twelve years, had failed. Nevertheless, it had an important effect on the course of Canadian history because it deflected American interest and pressure west and not north, allowing time for the infant province of Upper Canada (which encompassed the southern part of what is now modern Ontario) to take root and prosper.

For nearly a decade, there was relative peace. White settlers flooded into the Northwest and the new American territories (later states) of Illinois,

Indiana, Michigan and Ohio were established. But the Northwest nations had not forgotten their humiliation and paid increasing attention to an impressive young Shawnee leader. Tecumseh wished to create a single native confederacy stretching from the Canadian border to the Spanish ter-

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Tecumseh, the famous Shawnee war chief (c.1768-1813).

ritory in Mexico that would be strong enough to resist the encroachment of the "Big Knives," as he termed the Americans. Tecumseh travelled ceaselessly, spreading this appealing message to native peoples from the Great Lakes to the mouth of the Mississippi River. But while he gave his listeners hope for the future, he also advised them not to engage in warfare with the Americans until the time was right.

Not surprisingly, the popularity of the charismatic Tecumseh worried American frontier officials. Governor William Henry Harrison of the Indiana Territory met twice with him in vain attempts to reduce the increasing tension between the indigenous peoples and White settlers. Harrison was both impressed and concerned, as he reported to Washington:

> The implicit obedience and respect which the followers of Tecumseh pay to him, is really astonishing, and more than any other circumstance bespeaks him one of those uncommon geniuses which spring up occasionally to produce revolutions, and overturn the established order of things. If it were not for the vicinity of the United States, he would, perhaps, be the founder of an empire that would rival in glory [ancient] Mexico or Peru.[10]

In the autumn of 1811, Harrison decided to make a pre-emptive strike against Tecumseh's followers. In early-November, while Tecumseh was travelling to the south, Harrison moved a force of regulars and militia near a village established by Tecumseh's brother, Tenskwatawa or "the Prophet," at Tippecanoe (near modern Lafayette, Indiana). The Prophet was unable to restrain his warriors and sniping between sentries escalated into a pitched battle won by the Americans. Many of the defeated warriors fled to safety in Canada.

When Tecumseh returned early in 1812, he set out to rebuild his Confederacy and took steps to placate American authorities. At the same time, however, he sought the assistance of British officers of the Indian Department who listened to him because they were becoming increasingly convinced that war with the United States was at hand. Although Tecumseh counselled peace to his followers, he believed war was imminent and promised that, if hostilities broke out, his Confederacy would ally with Britain. "If their father the King should be in earnest and appear in sufficient force," he expressed to Indian Department officers, his confederacy "would hold fast by him."[11] For their part, the Indian Department cautioned the confederacy not to attack until war was declared or, as one officer put it, "Keep your eyes fixed on me ... be you ready, but do not strike until I give the signal."[12]

Tecumseh agreed but, in the spring of 1812, with tension between Britain and the United States escalating, he warned the British that:

> If we hear of the Big Knives coming towards our villages to speak peace, we will receive them, but if We hear of any of our people being hurt by them, or if they unprovokedly advance against us in a hostile manner, be assured we will defend ourselves like men. And if we hear of any of our people having been killed, We will immediately send to all the Nations on or towards the Mississippi, and all ... will rise as one man.[13]

During the conflict that had been waged in the Northwest in the last decade of the 18th century, Aboriginal leaders in Canada had done their best to resolve the differences between the Northwest nations and the Americans by peaceful means. The Seven Nations in Lower Canada and the Iroquoian peoples in Upper Canada had seen enough conflict in the previous century and preferred to stay out of Anglo-American quarrels. This desire to remain neutral became difficult, however, as Britain and the United States drifted toward war in the spring of 1812.

The origins of this conflict derived from problems in Europe and North America. Britain had been at war with revolutionary and imperial France since 1793 and both belligerents had adopted restrictive maritime policies, forbidding the ships of neutral nations that traded with one from trading with the other, and these measures severely curtailed American maritime trade. American resentment became exacerbated by the Royal Navy's penchant for stopping American vessels on the high seas and forcibly impressing their sailors into British service. In North America, meanwhile, many Americans suspected that Britain was fomenting trouble in the Northwest by actively supporting Tecumseh's Confederacy.

For her part, Britain, preoccupied with the war in Europe, seemed oblivious to American concerns which added to resentment in Washington. A few weeks after the battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, President James Madison, convinced that war was the only way that his country could resolve its grievances, decided to put the republic "in armour" and prepare for hostilities against Britain. Given the overwhelming strength of the Royal Navy, the United States had only one practical military option – an attack on Canada.

Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of British North America, knew that because of British commitments in Europe, he could not expect major troop reinforcements. Prevost

had about 5,600 regular soldiers in Upper and Lower Canada, backed by some 60,000 militia in the lower province and 11,000 in the upper. Faced by an enemy whose population outnumbered that of the White population of the two Canadas more than ten to one, Prevost's plan was to abandon Upper Canada and retire on Montréal and, if necessary, Québec City, until he could be reinforced from Britain. Major-General Isaac Brock, Prevost's subordinate in Upper Canada, did not approve of this defensive strategy. He believed that the upper province could be successfully defended if the Indian Department supplied the Native peoples in the Northwest and encouraged them to attack American frontier settlements, disrupting the enemy's invasion plans. Brock added: "before we can expect an active cooperation on the part of the Indians, the reduction of Detroit and Michilimackinac must convince that people, who conceive themselves to have been sacrificed in 1794, to our policy, that we are earnestly engaged in war."[14]

During the six months preceding the American declaration of war in June 1812, Indian Department officers worked to organize the Native peoples in both Canadian and American territories. The Department, commanded by a colonel with headquarters in Montréal with a subordinate lieutenant-colonel in Upper Canada, comprised some 150 military officers, interpreters and staff, and was a military organization. Its primary purpose was to ensure smooth relations between Whites and the Aboriginals in time of peace and to secure military assistance from the indigenous peoples in time of war. Departmental officers estimated that, in the event of hostilities, Britain could call on the services of 10,000 warriors from the Canadas and neighbouring American territory. The greater number, 8,410 according to the Department, would come from the western nations resident "on the frontier of the United States extending from Sandusky on Lake Erie to the River Mississippi," who were all expected to take up arms for the British Crown or to be "amicable to the Cause."[15] There were fewer warriors available on Canadian territory. The Seven Nations of Canada were estimated to be only 1040 strong, while in Upper Canada the Iroquois people on the Grand River and at Tyendinaga, and the Mississagas and Ojibwa peoples together, could only contribute 550 men. In making these calculations, the departmental officers also cautioned that the indigenous peoples in the Canadas "have greatly lost their ancient Character."[16]

Their belief was accurate. In contrast to the Northwestern peoples on American territory, many of whom had been resisting the Americans for years and were prepared to fight again, the response of the Native peoples in Canada disappointed British military leaders. This was particularly true of the Grand River nations, the strongest single native force in Canada, who

adopted a neutral stance toward the forthcoming conflict. The Grand River peoples had longstanding grievances against the Indian Department and their position did not change, even when Brock promised to investigate these grievances and, if appropriate, adjust them in their favour. More persuasive was the argument made by a delegation of Cayuga and Onondaga chiefs from American territory who visited the Grand River in June 1812 to advise caution, based on previous history:

> We have come from our homes to warn you, that you may preserve yourselves and families from distress. We discover that the British and Americans are on the Eve of a War, they are in dispute respecting some rights on the Sea, with which we are unacquainted; should it end in a Contest, let us keep aloof:
>
> Why should we again fight.... We know that neither of these powers have any regard for us. In the former War, we espoused the cause of the King, We thought it the most honourable, all our former Treaties having been made with his Representatives. After contending seven years ... we found, that Peace was concluded across the Sea, and that our Enemy claimed our Territory in consequence of the Boundary Line then acceded to.[17]

"Experience," the chiefs warned, should convince the Iroquois people of the White man's "neglect, except when they want us. Why then should we endanger the comfort, even the existence of our families, to enjoy their smiles only for the Day in which they need us?"[18]

This was sound and honest reasoning, and a majority of the peoples along the Grand were disposed to accept it despite the exhortations of a smaller pro-British faction led by John Norton, also known as "the Snipe." The son of a Cherokee father and a Scots mother, Norton had become a respected leader among the Grand River community and by 1812 was a prominent war chief. Norton recorded in the journal he left for posterity, which remains the best eyewitness account of the War of 1812, that few on the Grand River were disposed to listen to the words of an aged warrior who reminded his fellow Iroquois that:

> when our ancestors first saw the English, they took each other by the hand, and became friends; since that time, they have risked in every War, and many have fallen. We are now much reduced in Number, but we are, notwithstanding, determined to conquer or fall in espousing the same cause for which our Ancestors have fought and bled.[19]

The Grand River nations decided to remain neutral and Norton was forced to report to Brock that the community was divided but that, if threatened by American invasion, "I have no doubts they are not so depraved as to be faithless."[20]

On 18 June 1812, the United States declared war on Great Britain. American leaders were confident, former President Thomas Jefferson boasting that "the acquisition of Canada this year will be a mere matter of marching."[21] Instead of initiating military operations against the vulnerable St. Lawrence lifeline at the outbreak of war, the American government placed its main offensive in the Northwest, impelled by urgent requests from territorial governors concerned about the safety of the frontier settlements. Thus, from the outset of the War of 1812 and through much of its course, American strategy was influenced by the need to reduce what was perceived as a dangerous Aboriginal threat in the Northwest, which deflected attention and resources from more vulnerable objectives. This did not markedly change throughout the conflict and was perhaps the major contribution of the Aboriginal peoples to the successful defence of Canada.

In early July, an American army under Brigadier-General William Hull crossed the Detroit River and invaded Upper Canada. Hull had hoped that the native peoples of the upper Michigan peninsula would remain neutral, but the British capture of Michilimackinac – one of the two objectives Brock had regarded as necessary to secure a firm alliance with the Northwest peoples – convinced those nations that the British were in earnest and they began to threaten Hull's supply lines. Forced to withdraw from Canada, Hull took up a defensive position at Detroit where Brock and Tecumseh joined forces in mid-August. The two leaders, fortunately, liked and trusted each other. As Brock wrote to Prevost, "a more sagacious or a more gallant Warrior" than the Shawnee chief "does not I believe exist."[22] Brock told the assembled warriors that he had "fought against the enemies of our great father, the king, beyond the great salt lake, and they have never seen my back." He had come to fight "his enemies on this side of the great salt lake, and now desire with my soldiers to take lessons from you and your warriors, that we may learn how to make war in these great forests."[23] These words met with great applause and when Brock had finished, Tecumseh is said to have pointed at the British general and exclaimed: "Ho-o-o-e: This is a man!"[24]

The combined Anglo-Aboriginal force moved on Detroit where Hull, convinced he was surrounded by superior numbers, lost his nerve. To Brock's amazement, Hull surrendered his entire army without a battle and the only American field force capable of offensive operations marched into captivity.

CHAPTER 2

The twin victories of Michilimackinac and Detroit electrified the White and Aboriginal peoples of Upper Canada, many of whom had expected that the province would succumb to overwhelming enemy strength. The threat had not ended, however.

In late September, American troops began massing on the Niagara frontier. To counter this threat, Brock moved the greater part of his forces to Fort George, at modern Niagara-on-the-Lake. There he was joined by John Norton and a force of Grand River warriors who, buoyed by the victories in the west, had now decided to take an active role in the defence of Canada. By October, however, many had decided to go home. Norton recorded:

> the approach of Winter made them feel the Want of Warm Clothing, and in constant Marching they had worn out their Mocasins. The fall of the Leaf, the season for hunting the Buck, had arrived, & many had gone to the Woods, to supply their Wants by the Chase; -- few would have remained, had not the Love of Glory animated their hearts & inspired Patience to Support them in their Sufferings.[25]

Norton had a small force of warriors under his command when the Americans crossed the Niagara River on 13 October 1812. Nonetheless, they played an important part in the battle of Queenston Heights. This engagement, although an outstanding victory, cost the life of Brock, a loss that, Norton remarked, "threw a gloom over the sensations which this brilliant Success might have raised."[26]

The defeats at Mackinac, Detroit and Queenston in 1812 were major setbacks for the United States. President James Madison's government was particularly concerned about the loss of Detroit, the capital of the Michigan territory, and immediately began planning a counter-attack. William Henry Harrison, governor of the neighbouring Indiana Territory, was given regular army rank and command of a force of 6,000 regulars and militia with orders to break the power of the Northwest nations and retake Detroit. Harrison, an experienced frontier campaigner, took time to prepare for his offensive, first establishing supply depots so that his army would not have to guard extensive supply lines.

Harrison's subordinate, Brigadier-General James Winchester, became impatient and decided to move forward to the British outpost of Frenchtown on the River Raisin, about 40 kilometres southwest of Detroit. The new British commander on the western frontier, Brigadier-General Henry Procter, assembled a force of 550 regulars and militia and about 600 warriors from the Northwest

nations and attacked Winchester on 22 January 1813. British casualties were heavy, nearly a third of the regular troops involved, but the fury of the warriors who harried the enemy flanks terrified the Americans and the British general convinced Winchester to surrender. Procter's victory, however, was tarnished when he neglected to take proper precautions to guard his prisoners and some of the Northwestern warriors murdered about 30 wounded Americans.

This incident, immortalized in American accounts of the war as the "Raisin River Massacre," brings up the subject of alleged or actual Aboriginal atrocities. Although it was conducted on perhaps more civilized grounds than earlier North American conflicts, there was still an element of savagery to the fighting in the War of 1812, particularly in the Northwest, and atrocities were committed by both sides. It should, however, be pointed out that the American frontier militia – who seemed to have adopted the worst aspects of both White and Aboriginal culture – were almost as barbarous in their conduct as their supposedly "uncivilized" opponents. Little quarter was asked or given between them and the Northwest peoples, who rightly regarded the War of 1812 as a struggle for survival.

The cruel nature of the fighting in the Northwest was aptly summed up by Assiginack or Black Bird, an Ottawa chief, in a speech addressed to the officers of the Indian Department who had admonished him for not restraining his warriors' excesses in battle:

> We have listened to your words.... We will now say a few words to you. At the foot of the Rapids last spring we fought the Big Knives, and we lost some of our people there. When we retired the Big Knives got some of our dead. They were not satisfied with having killed them, but cut them into small pieces. This made us very angry.
>
> ... Last year at Chicago and St. Joseph's the Big Knives destroyed all our corn. This was fair, but, brother, they did not allow the dead to rest. They dug up their graves, and the bones of our ancestors were thrown away and we never could find them to return them to the ground....
>
> If the Big Knives, after they kill people of our colour, leave them without hacking them to pieces, we will follow their example. They have themselves to blame. The way they treat our killed, and the remains of those that are in their graves in the west, makes our people mad when they meet the Big Knives. Whenever they get any of our people into their hands they cut them like meat into small pieces.

> We thought white people were Christians. They ought to show us a better example. We do not disturb their dead. What I say is known to all the people present. I do not tell a lie.[27]

John Norton, who had good reason to know, wrote that while there may have been isolated incidents involving Aboriginal atrocities, it "would be useless as well as endless to repeat the number of cruelties that had been asserted, & as bluntly contradicted, without proofs to substantiate either on one Side or the other."[28] Exaggerated accounts of atrocities committed by the warriors, including River Raisin in early-1813, circulated in the United States, instilling a desire for vengeance.

Frenchtown was not the only victory for the defenders of Canada that winter. On the morning of 22 February 1813, a combined British/Canadian force that included 30 Tyendinaga Mohawk warriors crossed the ice of the frozen St. Lawrence and took the American village of Ogdensburg after a short but vicious battle. In the spring of 1813, however, the United States mobilized its superior manpower to launch major offensives. At the end of April, an American amphibious expedition attacked York, overwhelming the defenders who included 40 Ojibway and Mississauga warriors, and captured the capital of Upper Canada. A month later, another successful landing was made at Fort George, at the mouth of the Niagara River, and the British forces in the Niagara peninsula and their Native allies retreated to the area of modern-day Hamilton. For the first time in the war, the homes of the Grand River peoples were directly threatened and their support for the Crown began to waver. A British victory during the night action fought at Stoney Creek on 6 June, however, caused the invaders to withdraw to the fortified camp that they had constructed near Fort George. It was not long before British regulars and Canadian militia, together with their Native allies, closed in around the American position.

The American commander, Major-General Henry Dearborn, responded by mounting an expedition against De Cew's House, the forward supply depot for the warriors harassing his positions. On 23 June 1813 he dispatched a column of 600 infantry and cavalry. It was ambushed early the next day by a British and Aboriginal force, consisting of about 50 regular troops and 450 warriors, at the Beaver Dams, near modern St. Catharines. Contact was made just after dawn on 24 June and, as an Indian Department officer remembered, the warriors' yells terrified the enemy so much that they retired precipitously "into a hollow where they were surrounded."[29] The fighting continued for another two hours. The Americans were running short of ammunition when the senior British officer present, Lieutenant

James Fitzgibbon, appeared under a flag of truce and summoned the invaders to surrender. Knowing the Americans' fear of the warriors, Fitzgibbon informed the enemy commander that he was facing not only warriors from the Canadas, but from the Northwest who were "by no means as easily controlled." They "had suffered very severely they were outrageous and would commence a general massacre" if there was not an immediate surrender.[30] This psychological tactic worked and the Americans immediately surrendered, making Beaver Dams one of the most notable Aboriginal victories of the war.

The successes at Stoney Creek and Beaver Dams blunted the 1813 American campaign in the Niagara peninsula and the war in that quarter degenerated into a stalemate. To the west, meanwhile, Procter and Tecumseh had taken the offensive during the spring and summer of 1813 and driven deep into the Ohio Territory. Without heavy artillery, however, they were unable to overcome the American fortified posts at Forts Meigs and Stephenson. In this type of warfare, Tecumseh's large force of warriors, which at one point numbered more than a thousand, were of limited use; as he said, it was hard "to fight people who live like ground hogs."[31] Procter called off the offensive and retreated to Amherstburg, accompanied by Tecumseh's warriors and many of their families.

The British supply lines in the west depended on maintaining naval control of Lake Erie, which was lost after the American victory at the battle of Put-In Bay. On 8 September 1813, Procter decided to retreat toward Burlington Bay (now Hamilton). He neglected, however, to inform Tecumseh or his followers camped in and around Amherstburg. Their suspicions were aroused when they saw the British dismantling the fortifications of the post and loading supplies and ammunition for a retreat. At a council between Procter and his officers and the Native leaders, Tecumseh delivered a stinging rebuke to his British ally in what later became known as the "yellow dog" speech. Tecumseh castigated Procter by likening him to "a fat animal that carries its tail upon its back; but when affrighted, it drops it between its legs and runs off."[32]

Procter's mind was made up, however, and in late September, his small army commenced a retreat towards Lake Ontario, accompanied by the reluctant Tecumseh and his followers, who remained convinced – with some reason – that they had been betrayed. On 5 October, Tecumseh's old opponent, Major-General William Henry Harrison, caught up with them near the Moraviantown mission on the Thames River. Procter deployed his regular infantry badly and they were run down by Harrison's mounted troops, at which point the British general fled the battle. Tecumseh and his warriors fought well enough to let many of their White allies escape and finally stubbornly retired through the woods. But

Nathaniel Currier, *LAC C-40894*

Tecumseh was killed at the Battle of the Thames in October 1813.

Tecumseh was not with them. Killed during the battle, his warriors spirited away his body to be placed in an unknown grave. The victorious Americans, who included many Kentucky frontiersmen, displayed "peculiar Cruelty to the Families of the Indians who had not Time to escape, or conceal Themselves."[33]

The last months of 1813 brought renewed success to British arms. In October and November, two American armies moving on Montréal were stopped by twin victories at Chateauguay and Crysler's Farm; Aboriginal warriors played a major role in both actions out of all proportion to their size. The disastrous defeat at the Thames, however, marked the end of the military power of the Northwest peoples. Although some of the nations continued to fight on, and achieved some success at Prairie du Chien on the upper Mississippi in 1814, most of the nations either made a separate peace with the United States or fled to British territory where they were reduced to the status of supplicants for the Crown's not very generous welfare.

By 1814, the third year of the war, military campaigns were being waged largely by regular British, Canadian and American troops who engaged in a number of pitched battles in the Niagara peninsula and Lake Champlain valley. Although the indigenous peoples from the Northwest and their allies from the Canadas participated in some of these engagements, they generally served in an auxiliary role as the war was now largely being fought along conventional lines. For many of the indigenous peoples, the war had inter-

rupted their traditional way of life and, unable to procure food for their families either by agriculture or hunting, they were dependent on rations provided by the British authorities. The considerable shortage of foodstuffs in Upper Canada in the latter part of the war meant that many were starving. Little Crow, a chief of the Sioux, informed Indian Department officers:

> Although you give Assistance ... you have too many to care of, before it can reach us. We have of late not had much assistance through you ... [and] one half of our Nation have [sic] died of hunger with shreds of skin in their mouths for want of other Nourishment. I have always thought and do so still, that it arises from no other cause but the troubles you have with the Americans.[34]

Negotiations to end the war began in the Dutch city of Ghent in August 1814. Mindful of the disastrous omission of the Aboriginal peoples from the 1783 Treaty of Paris, the British negotiators demanded that the Aboriginal allies of Great Britain had to be included in any treaty to end the present conflict and that "a definite boundary to be settled for their territory." The British government regarded this matter to be so important that its negotiators informed their American counterparts that "they were not authorized to conclude a Treaty of peace which did not embrace the Indians, as Allies of His Britannic Majesty; and that the [establishment of an] Indian Territory was necessary, to secure a permanent peace."[35] The American delegation was somewhat taken aback when they learned that Britain expected a proposed independent Aboriginal state carved out of American territory. As one of them reported to Washington, "the object of the British government was, that the Indians should remain as a permanent barrier between our western settlements, and the adjacent British province," and neither nation "should ever hereafter have the right to purchase, or acquire any part of the territory thus recognized, as belonging to the Indians."[36] When the American delegation pointed out that a hundred thousand of their citizens lived in the area that the British proposed to form into an Aboriginal nation, and reasonably asked "the intention of the British government respecting them," they got the rather unhelpful reply that "such of the Inhabitants, as would ultimately be included with the Indian Territory, must make their own arrangements and provide for themselves."[37]

It is not surprising that the British position was totally unacceptable to the United States and negotiations stalled. After much discussion, the American delegates suggested that, instead of the creation of an Indian boundary state in the northwest part of the republic, the final treaty should include "a reciprocal and general stipulation of amnesty covering all persons, red as well as

White, in the enjoyment of rights possessed at the commencement of the war."[38] British negotiators rejected this offer but, after consulting with London, they were instructed to drop the demand for the creation of a barrier state and instead to propose the following article for inclusion in the treaty:

> The United States of America engaged to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present Treaty, to hostilities with all the Tribes or Nations of Indians, with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such Tribes or Nations respectively all the possessions, rights and privileges, which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in 1811, previous to the hostilities.
>
> Provided always, that such Tribes or Nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their Citizens, and subjects, upon the ratification of the present Treaty being notified to such Tribes or Nations, and shall so desist accordingly.[39]

This proposed article continued with a parallel engagement on the part of Great Britain, and the diplomatic note in which it appeared stated that it was an ultimatum upon which the continuance of negotiations would depend.

There is little doubt that the Aboriginal peoples contemplated by the authors of the draft article were those who resided on American territory and had fought for Britain in the war, particularly those Northwest nations who had been members of Tecumseh's confederacy. The specific reference to the year 1811 and the battle of Tippecanoe, and not 1812 when the United States declared war on Britain, made this clear. After much discussion the American delegation accepted this proposal which appeared as Article IX of the Treaty of Ghent, signed on Christmas Eve, 1814.

The British government sent a copy of the treaty to Sir George Prevost and drew his attention to those articles relating to the Aboriginal peoples "that may be at war with either of the two contracting parties." Prevost was directed to assure Britain's Aboriginal allies that the Crown "would not have consented to make peace ... unless those Nations or tribes which had taken part with us, had been included in the Pacification." He was to use his "utmost endeavours" to induce the Aboriginal peoples resident in the United States to conclude separate peace treaties with the American government "as we could not be justified in offering them further assistance if they should persist in Hostilities."[40]

When Prevost received these instructions, he immediately ordered the Indian Department to convene a series of meetings with the Aboriginal peo-

ples. On 24 April 1815, he held a council at Burlington Heights to provide information about the Treaty of Ghent to the large contingent of warriors from the Northwest nations and their families who had fled to that place in the autumn of 1813. Members from the Grand River and Six Nations Iroquois, and other Aboriginal nations resident in Canada, also attended. An officer of the Indian Department informed those in attendance that "in making Peace with the Government of the United States of America, your interests were not neglected."[41]

We realize today that those "interests" were indeed neglected. While both Britain and the United States claim to have won the War of 1812, it is certain that the Aboriginal peoples lost it. This war was actually the last in a series of conflicts in Canada involving Whites and Aboriginal peoples over a two-century period. The War of 1812 conflict destroyed the military power of the indigenous nations east of the Mississippi River and in its aftermath came the loss of their former independence and status. In the 1820s, the Indian Department was transferred from military to civilian control and evolved into the prime instrument for the British and later Canadian governments to impose White culture on the Aboriginal people who were shunted aside to the back alleys of Canadian society, from which they have re-emerged only in the last few decades.

LAC C-85127

Studio portrait taken in July 1882 of the surviving Six Nations warriors who fought with the British in the War of 1812. (Right to left) Sakawaraton - John Smoke Johnson (born c. 1792), John Tutela (born c. 1797) and Young Warner (born c. 1794).

The subject of this chapter, however, is the contribution of the indigenous peoples to the successful defence of Canada during the War of 1812, not its sad aftermath. One contribution occurred at the tactical level, particularly when Aboriginal combatants were in contact with White officers (such as Brock) in whom they had confidence. The warriors proved very useful in reconnaissance and screening roles and could be very effective in small-scale actions, particularly if they faced unseasoned and inexperienced troops, as shown by their victory at Beaver Dams in 1813. Concomitantly, the presence of warriors on the British and Canadian side was a potent psychological weapon in light of the traditional American belief in exaggerated and often untrue accounts of atrocities. Even the proximity of small numbers of warriors caused American commanders to become cautious and defensive-minded. For this reason, on campaign and in battle, Aboriginal warriors played a role out of all proportion to their numbers.

Second, the Aboriginal contribution was not based solely on numbers. In 1812, the officers of the Indian Department estimated that as many as 10,000 warriors might assist Britain in the forthcoming conflict, most of them (about 85 %) residing on American, not British, territory. Although these numbers sound impressive, two factors must be noted in conjunction with them. First, not all of these warriors would be available at any given time; in fact, the largest assembly of Aboriginal military force occurred in the Michigan Territory in 1812-1813 when as many as 1,000 warriors came under Tecumseh's direction, but only for very brief periods. Second, although the figure of 10,000 sounds impressive, the White population in Upper and Lower Canada, and contiguous American territory, was nearly a million in 1812. Furthermore, as the war progressed, increasing use was made of conventional military forces. By 1814, Canada was defended by nearly 50,000 British and Canadian regular troops, and long service militia nearly indistinguishable from regulars.

If the Aboriginal contribution was not great in terms of numerical strength, what was their major contribution to the defence of Canada? First and foremost, the nations of the Northwest adversely influenced American strategic planning. Time and again, instead of deploying strong forces against the St. Lawrence, the logistical lifeline of Canada, Washington sent them into the Northwest to counter a perceived Aboriginal threat. In 1812 and 1813, this threat resulted in widespread American offensive operations being mounted in this theatre, which might better have been directed at more vulnerable military objectives to the east. Even in the summer of 1814, after the military power of the Northwest peoples had been shattered by Harrison's victory at the Thames, Washington planned and mounted a major attack to

recapture Mackinac Island. This was done at a time when British reinforcements, available after the end of the general war in Europe that April, were pouring into Canada. The existence of this Northwestern "threat in being" was the most important contribution made by the indigenous peoples to the successful conclusion of the war in Britain's favour.

ENDNOTES

[1] Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 18.
[2] Ibid., 19.
[3] Robert Rogers, as quoted in Ibid.
[4] Frederick Drake, *The Life and Adventures of Black Hawk* (Cincinnati, 1850), 128.
[5] Speech of Minavana, Ojibway chief, 1761, as quoted in Alexander Henry, *Travels and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Territories Between the Years 1760 and 1776* (Toronto, 1901), 44.
[6] McLean to Haldimand, 18 May 1783, B103, Series B, Manuscript Group [MG] 21, *Library and Archives Canada* [*LAC*].
[7] Quoted in Francis Prucha, *The Sword of the Republic. The United States Army on the Frontier, 1783-1846* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), 17.
[8] Senator Rufus Putnam, as quoted in Ibid., 22.
[9] *Diary of Col. Winthrop Sargent, Adjutant General of the United States Army, During the Campaign of MDCCXCI* (Wormsloe, Georgia, 1851), 9.
[10] Harrison to Secretary of War William Eustis, 6 August 1811, as quoted in Benjamin Drake, *Life of Tecumseh, and his Brother, the Prophet* (Cincinnati, 1841), 141-142.
[11] Speech of Tecumseh, Indian Council at Amherstburg, 11 and 13 July 1808, Vol. 11, A4, Record Group [RG] 10, *LAC*.
[12] Matthew Elliott, as quoted in Robert Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies. British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774-1815* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1992), 116.
[13] Speech of Tecumseh, Amherstburg, June 1812, contained in Claus to Brock, 16 June 1812, 147, Vol. 676, RG 8 I, *LAC*.
[14] Brock to Prevost, 2 December 1811, as quoted in Ferdinand B. Tupper, *Life and Correspondence of Sir Isaac Brock* (London, 1847), 125.
[15] List of Indian Warriors as they stood in 1812 at the time war was declared, Montreal 1814, Strachan Papers, *Archives of Ontario*.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Speech of Captain Billy, an Onondaga chief, June 1812, as quoted in Carl Klinck and James Talman, eds., *The Journal of Major John Norton 1816* (Toronto: Champlain Society, 1970), 289. [Hereafter Norton, *Journal*].
[18] Ibid.
[19] Speech of Blind Warrior, June 1812. See Norton, *Journal*, 289.
[20] Norton, *Journal*, 293.
[21] Quoted in Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead: The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814* (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 1997), 11.
[22] Brock to Liverpool, 29 August 1812, 58, Vol. 473, Colonial Office 42, *LAC*.
[23] Speech of Brock, August 1812, in Tupper, *Life and Correspondence of Brock*, 261-262.
[24] Tupper, *Life and Correspondence of Brock*, 262.
[25] Norton, *Journal*, 304.
[26] Ibid., 310.

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[27] Speech of Assignack or Black Bird, chief of the Ottawa, August 1813, as quoted in William Kirby, *Annals of the Niagara* (Niagara Falls, 1896), 198-199.
[28] Norton, *Journal*, 315.
[29] Account of the battle of Beaver Dams by Captain Dominique Ducharme, *La Bibliothèque Canadienne*, December 1826, contained in Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., *The Documentary History of the Campaign upon the Niagara Frontier in the Year 1813. Part II (1813) June to August 1813* (Welland, n.d.), 125-127.
[30] Account of the battle of Beaver Dams, *Montréal Gazette*, 6 July 1813, contained in Cruikshank, *Documentary History of the Campaign upon the Niagara Frontier in the Year 1813*, 118-121.
[31] Court-Martial of Major-General Henry Procter, 381-382, Vol. 243, War Office 71, MG 13, *LAC*. The reference to "people who live like groundhogs" relates to the sieges of Fort Meigs in the spring and summer of 1813. Tecumseh and his native allies were of little use in this type of warfare, which required trained troops and artillery.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Procter to De Rottenburg, 23 October 1813, Vol. 680, RG 8 I, *LAC*.
[34] Speech of Chetanwakanmani or Little Crow, enclosed in Prevost to Bathurst, 18 July 1814, 12, Vol. 157, Colonial Office 42, *LAC*.
[35] American ministers to Monroe, 12 August 1814, in William Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. Canadian Relations, Volume I* (Washington, 1940), 617-623.
[36] American ministers to Monroe, 19 August 1814, in Ibid., 629.
[37] American ministers to Monroe, 19 August 1814, in Ibid., 629.
[38] American ministers to Monroe, 14 September 1814, in Ibid., 629.
[39] American ministers to British ministers, 25 September 1814, in Ibid., 668.
[40] Bathurst to Prevost, 27 December 1814, 80, Vol. 86, RG 7, *LAC*.
[41] Proceedings of Council at Burlington, 24-26 April 1815, pt. I, Vol. 258, RG 8 I, *LAC*.

CHAPTER 3

Indifference, Difference and Assimilation: Aboriginal People in Canadian Military Practice, 1900-1945

R. Scott Sheffield

Aboriginal peoples in North America have had a long and diverse experience with military activity in their history. This relationship has carried on past the era of their independence and into their dealings with first the Imperial government and later the Canadian state. This reality, however, has been little recognised by the military establishment, the academic community, or the general public until the last decade of the 20th century. The drive being made by Aboriginal veterans for recognition and redress of inequities in access to postwar benefits has been responsible for much of this resurgent interest. Both within their own communities and across the broader spectrum of Canadian society and government, Aboriginal veterans' stories are being heard, their experiences remembered and their grievances addressed. This volume is both a product of that growing interest, as well as an effort to extend and expand knowledge and discourse on indigenous peoples' relationships with warfare and military establishments in modern times.

During this last century, in times of peace as well as war, Aboriginal peoples in Canada have sought to enlist or been conscripted. They have served in all of the nation's wars and in every branch of the forces. Hundreds lost their lives, many more suffered wounds, and dozens garnered recognition in the form of medals and advancement in rank. At times, their service has been actively solicited, at others, they have been excluded, but for the most part, Aboriginal men and women have been individually incorporated into the military "in the same manner as other people."[1]

Many Aboriginal communities in the northeast developed a long tradition of alliances, with first the French and later the British colonial entities in North America, during the series of 17th and 18th century wars that concluded with the War of 1812. These traditions of alliance with Imperial forces were renewed once again during the Rebellions of 1837-38.[2] In time, the military relationship was similarly extended to Canadian authorities, specifically to

face the Fenian threat. Further west, the resistance of Métis at Red River in 1870 and again in 1885 would see some indigenous peoples allying themselves with the Canadian military expeditions involved. The precedent of recruiting indigenous personnel for overseas Imperial adventures was established first in 1884-85, when the British commander of the Nile River expedition, Sir Garnet Wolseley, requested a contingent of Canadian river boatmen that included 86 status Indians and an uncertain number of Métis.[3] This clearly was differentiation in practice, meaning that Aboriginal individuals were specifically recruited for, and their service was defined by, culturally and/or racially defined skills and characteristics. In this instance, Wolseley specifically sought their indigenous boat handling skills, which he had experienced first hand in 1870 while leading a Canadian military force to Red River.

Differentiation, however, was not the norm in Canada's militia and fledging regular units prior to the Great War, and certainly never became an institutionalised practice as it did in the United States (US) in this era. The nearly continuous US Army operations against the indigenous nations of the west required extensive use of segregated Indian scout units. Towards the end of the 19th and into the early-20th century, the issue of whether to continue the differentiated service of Native Americans in distinct scouting units or to blend them into the other ranks as general service personnel was a subject of some debate within and beyond the military.[4] At no point at that time did Canadian military circles entertain such a debate. In the first instance, Canada had relatively little for its army to do after 1885, particularly anything that might require the specialised services that most Euro-Canadians believed Indian warriors were suited to provide. The overwhelming majority of Canada's defensive establishment was composed of militia units organised in every rural township and urban centre. In these locales, militia positions were socially desirable and their composition reflected this. Militia units were hardly the likely site for philosophical discussions of this nature. As Stephen Harris makes clear, however, Canada's tiny Permanent Force had far more immediate and complicated concerns, like simple survival in the face of parliamentary indifference and militia hostility, than to engage in such debates.[5] Canadian regular officers were occupied with the pragmatic needs of acquiring or retaining infrastructure, weapons, adequate training and the parochial politics of promotion and postings. Whether Aboriginal men might serve, and in what manner, simply did not register as a noteworthy subject.

The indifference to Aboriginal people became evident when Canada, between 1899 and 1902, sent military aid to support the Imperial cause in the war against the Boers of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. There is

no evidence to suggest that any specific attempts were made to enlist Aboriginal peoples, either as individuals or as distinct units. Nevertheless, there are anecdotal accounts of individual Aboriginal men serving in South Africa.[6]



Canadian Patriotic Fund poster c. 1916-1918.

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The exact numbers will never be known unfortunately. The general accounts of the conflict are silent on the matter of Aboriginal people and no specific research has yet been conducted to determine if, how and why indigenous men enlisted in Canadian units for service in South Africa. Given the racial ideologies of turn-of-the-century Canada and the lingering image of the Indian warrior among English-Canadians, it would be surprising if a number were not recruited. Whatever the reason, it would not be until the outbreak of the First World War that the Canadian military establishment would face the challenge of incorporating substantial numbers of Aboriginal recruits.

The Great War initiated a period of uncertainty, contradiction and experimentation with indigenous service. The initial response of many recruiters in the hectic first days of the war was confusion: could they recruit and should they recruit Aboriginal men for the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF)?[7] With so little prior experience or discussion of this possibility amongst the regular or militia officer corps, there was no body of policy or custom upon which to draw. Inexperience was compounded by contradictory racial ideologies, contemporary notions about the war and military service, and by the chaos introduced into the early stages of mobilisation by Sir Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia and Defence. The result, predictably, was an eclectic mix of differentiation and assimilation for Aboriginal men seeking to enlist in 1914 and 1915.

Canada was a highly racial society in 1914, something that was far from unique to this country. Humanity was divided into many races, distinct biological units whose characteristics and behaviour were believed to be innate and immutable. An individual's intelligence, courage, social and political aptitude, work ethic, morality, sexuality and a host of other characteristics were determined by one's heredity. Anglo-Saxon Canadians, as part of the British Empire, envisioned their world in social Darwinian terms that assigned to each race a clear ranking based on their degree of "civilisation," with themselves at the pinnacle. Yet even within this broad structure, members of the dominant society developed varied and sometimes conflicting ideas about racial others. Aboriginal peoples were a case in point: Canadians' notions of Aboriginal people included great warriors and vicious savages, Indian princesses and lascivious squaws, wise elders and drunken vagabonds, and sometimes all of the above in spite of the contradictions. Virtually all Canadians accepted the "truth" that the Indian was a dying race, diminished in both numbers and vitality. Military officers reflected these diverse ideologies and carried them into their efforts to recruit, train and lead the country's soldiers. What this meant for Aboriginal military service was

a shifting contest between conflicting images of the indigene. On the one hand was the favourable impression of Aboriginal men as natural warriors, well prepared for soldiering by their racial attributes and wilderness skills; on the other, the many negative views of a degraded and inferior race.

When Canadians suddenly found themselves at war in the summer of 1914, they shared with most of the Western world the assumption that the war would be brief. As a result, competition among eager young men for the initial places in the CEF was heavy. Regiments recruiting their quotas could afford to be highly selective, because military service was seen as a privilege. In the war's early stages, enlistment was reserved for men of European, preferably Anglo-Saxon, racial stock. African, Japanese, Chinese or South Asian Canadians met with a cool reception and found themselves blocked from military service; undoubtedly some First Nations and Métis men also ran afoul of such attitudes.[8]

The circumstances governing the enlistment of Aboriginal people, however, were less clear than for other groups. James Walker has noted a Militia Council order in August 1914 forbidding the "enlistment of native Indians on the reasoning that 'Germans might refuse to extend to them the privileges of civilized warfare.'"[9] Although Walker's observation has been oft-quoted, there are reasons to doubt that this directive barring Aboriginal military service had much effect in practice. Many indigenous men managed to enlist successfully in the early stages of the war. Also crucial was the hectic and helter-skelter mobilisation process instituted by the energetic Sam Hughes.

The senior staff of Canada's small regular army had spent much of its time and creative energy prior to the war generating a mobilisation plan for a major war. But the egotistical Minister of Militia and Defence, a champion of amateur militia soldiers, disliked and distrusted his regulars and promptly shelved their plan.[10] In its place, he ordered militia regiments across the country to recruit their allotments of men and begin sending them to the dusty plain of Valcartier, near Québec City. There, Hughes, nearly as constructive as he was destructive, ordered a tent city built within a matter of weeks to house more than 30,000 men and thousands of horses. Hughes' *ad hoc* mobilisation scheme undermined centralised control of enlistment and threw most of the responsibility onto the local recruiting officers of each militia unit. With each regiment being the author of its own personnel selection, the success or failure of would-be Aboriginal recruits was determined by the regimental officers' perceptions of Indians and "half-breeds." Some may well have enlisted Aboriginal men with the assumption that they were natural soldiers and would be a boon to the unit once they had been

assimilated into the regimental traditions. Others may well have assumed that a First Nations or Métis soldier brought specialised skills that would make them useful scouts or snipers, requiring only a few for the battalion. If their views of indigenous people were of a different character, however, then Aboriginal men would have been turned away. Through the war's first 12 to 15 months, the CEF really had no coherent policy in place and First Nations or Métis desiring a place in the ranks faced assimilation, differentiation or outright rejection.

Canada's overseas forces expanded through 1915 with the arrival of the 2nd Division in France and the creation of the Canadian Corps, followed by the 3rd and 4th Divisions before the end of 1916. Feeding this manpower-hungry force would prove increasingly challenging. Even before the end of 1915, the easy supply of volunteers was growing thinner, especially as wartime production began to compete for warm bodies. Recruiting standards loosened and mobilisation strategies shifted to obtain new recruits.[11] This included allowing individuals or groups to organise new battalions. Across Canada, units took on "brand names" and targeted their recruiting efforts toward raising "pals" battalions, sportsmen battalions, Irish battalions, Bantam battalions and a host of others.[12] The result was yet more units competing for men.

At this time, the military flirted with differentiation in regards to the mobilisation of indigenous men, although this was first and foremost a recruiting mechanism for locating fresh recruits. Officers from two of the new battalions received permission in late-1915 to recruit to strength entirely with Aboriginal soldiers. The Ontario-based 114th Battalion and the Winnipeg-based 107th "Timber Wolf" Battalion soon ran into difficulties in obtaining sufficient indigenous personnel to fill their ranks. Part of the challenge arose from the inconsistent support that they received from mobilisation authorities. Both battalions were allowed to seek Aboriginal men outside their designated territories, and in the case of the 114th, a military official sent letters inviting other battalions to transfer their Native personnel to this unit should they be willing. Yet neither battalion was given exclusive access to all Aboriginal recruits in the country and indigenous personnel in other battalions were not compelled to transfer. In the end, both sailed to Britain with Aboriginal soldiers composing a little more than half their strength.[13]

Once the two units joined the CEF establishment in England in 1917, the possibility for Aboriginal soldiers to serve in largely segregated combat units was all but negated. The 114th Battalion was broken up, as were

most of the 200-plus battalions raised under Hughes' mobilisation scheme, and its personnel were posted to replacement depots. From there, they were parcelled out as reinforcements amongst the front line battalions of the Canadian Corps. The 107th Battalion's fate was different. It was re-designated as a pioneer battalion, an unusual hybrid designed to undertake construction duties and simple engineering tasks, but with the expectation that they might also fight if called upon. The unit, still dominated by indigenous personnel, served with distinction at Hill 70 in the summer of 1917.[14] However, when the Canadian Corps reorganised its engineering assets in the winter of 1917/18, the 107th was disbanded and its soldiers were reassigned, being committed to construction and labour duties within the new establishment.

Glenbow Museum NA-2164-1

Blood recruits, 191st Battalion, CEF, Fort Macleod, Alberta, 1916. Left to Right Back Row: George Coming Singer, died overseas, 1919; Joe Crow Chief; Dave Mills; George Strangling Wolf; Mike Foxhead Blackfoot, died overseas, 1919. Left to Right Front Row: Nick King; Harold Chief Moon; Sergeant Major Bryan; Joe Mountain Horse; Mike Mountain Horse.

Many First Nations and Métis also served in non-combatant roles in forestry and railway companies. However, neither in the construction/pioneer capacity, nor in the non-combatant supporting units, was there anything to suggest that Aboriginal men were sought out by the military establishment due to perceptions of beneficial skills or "racial" ability. Essentially, they were there owing to the need for manpower. If anything, negative perceptions among some military personnel, which were reinforced by Indian

Affairs officials, may have undervalued the fighting qualities of Aboriginal men. In this sense, the experience of the 107th, the 114th and the support companies indicate officially sanctioned differentiation in Aboriginal military service. But this was far from a fundamental and widespread policy. Rather, it was at most a brief flirtation, unevenly applied and sustained within recruiting's pervasive patriotic frenzy. Instead, as James Dempsey has argued, the "dominant military opinion remained that Indian soldiers should be integrated with non-Indians."[15] For the overwhelming proportion of First Nations and Métis soldiers in the CEF, assimilation was the norm. Interestingly, anecdotal accounts from Aboriginal veterans suggest that their experience serving as individuals assimilated into the standardised military structures of the army was a positive one.

Nothing occurred in the interwar era to alter this overall pattern. Outside of the armed forces, Aboriginal people remained as invisible as ever to a distracted, indifferent and racist Canadian society. The experience of Aboriginal veterans during this time period indicated that their identity and status as Indians and "half-breeds" trumped their status as veterans. Few received veterans' benefits and they were largely excluded from the soldier settlement scheme. Then, during the Depression of the 1930s, status Indian veterans were denied access to special relief measures for Great War veterans because it was thought that they were already cared for by the Department of Indian Affairs, despite the fact that the Indian Affairs' levels of welfare support were much lower. Within the military establishment, there was no more interest in Aboriginal peoples than elsewhere in Canadian society. In large measure, this was because many of the same conditions that had preoccupied the regular force establishment prior to 1914 once again reared their ugly heads. Economic constraints in the 1930s meant that the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) struggled to retain even the most basic capacities; the RCN briefly hovered on the brink of extinction.[16] The military establishment had other concerns than the status of Indians as soldiers.

In September 1939, the relationship between indigenous people and military service remained opaque. Disparate ideas were still evident in both the public and official realms. Assimilation and differentiation each had their advocates, and exclusion appeared in both official policies and individual practice amongst recruiters. A number of people advocated the creation of segregated Aboriginal combat and non-combatant units, such as Martin Christianson, Inspector of Indian Agencies in Saskatchewan, Colonel Pascoe, the District Recruiting Officer, and D.B. Rogers of the *Regina Leader Post*.[17] They suggested raising several all-Indian platoons to provide

additional impetus to the recruiting campaign in 1941, not unlike the patriotic strategies of 1915 and 1916. Chief Joe Dreaver of the Mistawasis Cree gained significant publicity with his call for an all-Indian battalion in the spring of 1940.[18] Numerous other recommendations for differentiated service developed during the first years of the war.[19] However, none of these came to fruition because of the reticence within the Indian Affairs Branch (IAB), which felt that from "the stand point of the Indian himself and the effectiveness of his service in the Armed Forces, we are not at all sure that an Indian battalion would be of much value."[20] Without their sanction, such units could not be recruited.

Initially, this uncertainty seems to have been more evident among Indian Affairs officials than military recruiting officers. Indeed, IAB records reveal a flurry of correspondence between Indian Agents and headquarters in Ottawa on the matter. The files of the Canadian Army, RCN and RCAF contain little mention of Aboriginal recruits, suggesting continuing indifference. The only mention of the issue came in a letter from the Chief of the Air Staff to the Officer-in-Command (OIC) at the RCAF recruiting centre in Montréal in November 1939, informing him about how to handle a "coloured" applicant. The OIC was advised, "applicants must be of pure European descent with exception of North American Indians."[21] This suggests differentiation, but no rationale was provided in the letter for the specific inclusion of North American Indian recruits with those of European heritage, and none has come to light elsewhere in RCAF records.

As the war went on, each branch of the service developed its own distinctive policies regarding the recruiting and service of non-Europeans generally, and in some cases, of Aboriginal people specifically. The RCAF maintained its racial barrier for recruiting into the fall of 1942 before it was dropped.[22] Regardless of this newfound willingness to accept Aboriginal recruits, the RCAF proved a difficult service for them to enter because it had the highest requirements for education and health. Both of these proved problematic for the majority of young Aboriginal people because of the inadequacies in Indian education and health services throughout the interwar years.[23] Very few Aboriginal men therefore joined the Air Force; only 29 had enlisted by 1942/43.[24] Interestingly, given the small number of indigenous service personnel, the RCAF is the only branch where records exist of an explicit attempt at differentiated and segregated service. In 1942, 421 (Fighter) Squadron was formed and nicknamed the "Red Indian Squadron."[25] The following September, a field directive from the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, RCAF Overseas, pressed for as many "American Indians" as possible to be transferred to this unit.[26] There are no indications that this was actual-

ly enforced; no further documentation was found and the squadron history makes no mention of the policy. Whether this effort had any appreciable impact on the indigenous men serving in the RCAF remains uncertain.

The case of the RCN was more clear-cut: its policy was exclusion. The RCN, like Britain's Royal Navy, maintained a "colour line" that required all potential recruits to be "of pure European descent and of the White Race."[27] The racial barrier was officially removed in 1943 to bring naval policies into line with the Canadian Army and the RCAF. However, a postwar report by the Army Historical Section implied that the RCN subsequently retained its "colour line" in practice.[28] Nevertheless, a tiny number of indigenous men succeeded in enlisting (9 according to the 1942/43 IAB annual report). In the RCN, successful assimilation was a condition of service because they would not have been there had their true identity been known.

By a process of elimination, and perhaps by preference, the vast majority of First Nations men served in the Canadian Army. But indigenous recruiting and service in the army also lacked a coherent, unifying set of policies.[29] A disinterest in racially segregated units remained clear: military authorities seriously contemplated no scheme for segregated service. At a broad institutional level, however, Aboriginal men were not excluded. As the largest service with the greatest demand for personnel, the army was too desperate to be overly selective in their recruiting efforts. Indeed, at least 4,000 status Indians and an unknown number of Métis and non-status Indians served in the army.[30]

Nevertheless, there was some exclusion at the individual and subordinate jurisdictional levels. The IAB received numerous reports of cases in parts of Western Canada and Ontario where status Indians were denied the privilege of applying for service and were informed that the Canadian Army was not accepting Indians. In the spring of 1941, the Indian Agent in Vanderhoof, British Columbia mentioned in passing in a letter to his superiors in Ottawa that "the Recruiting Officer for the District has instructions not to enlist Indians for any branch of the Army."[31] More serious was the decision to refuse the enlistment applications of Aboriginal men in Manitoba. Major Garton, the district recruiting officer for Military District (MD) 10, circulated a District Recruiting Order that read:

> Indians also present a difficult problem. Out of seven Indians who had had six months training and were boarded for a recent draft, six were boarded out for T.B. and had to be discharged. Experience has shown that Indians cannot stand confinement or training, and their application should not be accepted.[32]

By May of 1942, the reticence of MD 10 recruiters to accept applications from indigenous men provoked a memorandum from T.A. Crerar, the Minister responsible for Indian Affairs, to his defence colleague J.L. Ralston. The subsequent investigation revealed that the OIC in MD 10 had given no such orders and was unaware that Indians were being excluded within his command.[33] The response of the Minister and lack of similar episodes across Canada suggests that this incident sprang from local initiative and not from any general policy.

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Portrait of Trooper Lloyd George Moore by Henry Lamb. The former title of this painting was "A Redskin in the Canadian Royal Artillery." Trooper Moore was a member of the Three Rivers Regiment.

CHAPTER 3

While the army had no overarching barrier to indigenous enlistment, it did not actively seek First Nations or Métis men to fill its ranks. The 1944 edition of the recruiting manual included special instructions regarding the "enlistment of Indians and Half Breeds:"

> Care should be taken when accepting applications from or approaching Indians as prospective recruits. Here education standards are strictly adhered to. Experience has shown that they cannot stand the long periods of confinement, discipline and the strenuous physical and nervous demand incidental to modern army routine. On the other hand, some very fine Indians have been enlisted, but these are usually persons who have had their schooling and training in an Indian Residential School.[34]

Institutional reluctance was also apparent in decisions by conscription officials to ignore First Nations and Métis men living in remote rural regions of the country, and the Inuit all together.[35] In this instance, real and imagined challenges involved in notifying, locating, medically certifying, collecting and training such men amplified concerns and provided justification for the policy. At best, Aboriginal men found a lukewarm response when they wanted to enlist in the Canadian Army during the Second World War.

Once they succeeded in entering the army, however, distinctions regarding their ethnic heritage receded. They were assimilated into the military institution as individuals like everyone else. There was no differentiation of service in the army, but it is difficult to know whether differentiation was practised at a lower level. Did squad, platoon or company commanders' racial stereotypes and expectations affect the service of Aboriginal soldiers in the field? Were Indian and Métis soldiers asked to undertake patrols to a greater degree or were they more likely to be assigned dangerous roles as snipers or runners? Did Aboriginal men feel compelled to volunteer for such duties to live up to expectations of their non-native comrades? Unfortunately, there has been no scholarly investigation into how the dynamic of race functioned in the small units at the sharp edge of battle. What has emerged in most of the anecdotal accounts of Indian and Métis men and women service personnel suggests that discrimination in the army was minimal. As Dorothy Asquith, a Métis who served in the RCAF Women's Auxiliary, recalled:

> Discrimination? Everybody was so involved in what was happening with the war that nobody was involved in such pettiness. I don't think you bothered to look at the colour of your buddies' skin, espe-

> cially the guys who were involved in warfare. A couple cousins of mine said, "Who the hell ever stopped to look at colour? We were so gall darned glad that you could get a place to duck into; who gave a damn who's with you? We were there together, two lives. That's my feeling; everything was too serious to think petty like that.[36]

For many Aboriginal veterans, their service during the Second World War would be remembered as the first and, sadly, the last time in their lives when they felt accepted and respected for their abilities on an equal basis to "White" men and women.

Through the first half of the 20th century, Canadian military practice vis-à-vis Aboriginal service personnel was an eclectic and unsystematic mix of exclusion, differentiation and assimilation. The issue of Aboriginal recruiting and service was rarely clearly defined at the institutional level because it did not matter enough to Canada's military establishment. The inconsistencies in policy also reflected the ambivalent and changing racial ideologies of Canadian society. Within the complex structures of cultural "common sense" about race lay all the justification necessary for exclusion, differentiation, assimilation or some combination thereof. Assimilation may have been the default setting for Canadian officers, but this could be altered by intervening ideological and/or practical concerns. Nevertheless, the trend seems to have been toward assimilation. At the beginning of the Second World War, both the RCAF and RCN had racial exclusion clauses in their recruiting policies, but felt obliged to jettison them as the war progressed. Nor was there much enthusiasm for segregated units or other forms of differentiated service in any of the three armed services. It would be too much to say that 1945 marked the end of exclusion or differentiation, but postwar Canadian society certainly touted its respect for human rights, its tolerance and its inclusiveness. It would take decades for the practice to begin living up to the rhetoric.

In more recent times, assimilation has typically been viewed as a bogeyman, particularly when it comes to Aboriginal peoples. Scholars usually discuss the concept in terms of the concerted government program to eradicate indigenous people as distinct cultural entities. It is important to separate assimilation in Canadian military practice from that more common and problematic perspective. All Western military establishments require assimilative conditioning to weld the disparate human material they recruit into a functional unified entity. The Canadian military establishment was a distinctly Anglo-Saxon institution through the first half of the 20th century, and therefore, the cultural distance to assimilate was further for First Nations

and Métis recruits. Nevertheless, in being subjected to the same assimilation process as everyone else, there was also acceptance and respect gained through military service that indigenous men and women rarely, if ever, felt elsewhere in Canadian society. Arguably, this explains why so many Aboriginal veterans retain positive memories of their war service.

ENDNOTES

[1] This was the phrase the Indian Affairs Branch used in scores of letters replying to questions about the liability of status Indians to conscription during the Second World War. More to the point, it reflected the Branch's underlying purpose and hope of assimilating Aboriginal people, a process they hoped military service might further. For more on this, see R. Scott Sheffield, *The Red Man's on the Warpath: The Image of the 'Indian' and the Second World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), especially Chapter 2.

[2] Mary Beacock Fryer, *Volunteers & Redcoats/Rebels & Raiders: A Military History of the Rebellions in Upper Canada* (Toronto: Dundurn Press in collaboration with the Canadian War Museum/Canadian Museum of Civilization, 1987). Canadian War Museum Historical Publication No. 23.

[3] The First Nations boatmen included Salteaux, Ojibwa and Metis from Manitoba and northwestern Ontario, as well as 56 Mohawk from Caughnawaga, including Louis Jackson, who operated as a foreman. See Louis Jackson, *Our Caughnawagas in Egypt* (Montreal: Wm. Drysdale & Co., 1885) and Roy Maclaren, *Canadians on the Nile, 1882-1898* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1978).

[4] Michael L. Tate, "From Scout to Doughboy: The National Debate over Integrating American Indians into the Military, 1891-1918," *The Western Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (1986), 417-437.

[5] Stephen Harris, *Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988).

[6] Fred Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers* (Penticton: Theytus Books, 1985).

[7] James Dempsey, *Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1999), 20-21.

[8] James W. St. G. Walker, "Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1989), 1-26.

[9] Ibid., 4.

[10] Ronald Haycock, *Sam Hughes: The Public Career of a Controversial Canadian, 1885-1916* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1986).

[11] The challenges and transformations in recruiting policies and tactics, as well as their underlying ideological foundations, have been most effectively explored in Ian Hugh Miller, *Our Glory and Our Grief: Torontonians in the Great War* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).

[12] Desmond Morton, *A Military History of Canada: From Champlain to Kosovo*, 4th ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1999), 136.

[13] Indigenous men numbered over 500 of the original 900 soldiers in the 107th Battalion according to Steven A. Bell, "The 107th 'Timber Wolf' Battalion at Hill 70," *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1996), 73. See also Walker, "Race and Recruitment," 14.

[14] Bell describes the battalion's role in this battle.

[15] Dempsey, *Warriors of the King*, 61.

[16] Morton, *A Military History of Canada*, 173-174.
[17] D.B. Rogers to T.H. Crerar, 30 June 1941, Part 2, File 452-6, Vol. 6764, Record Group [RG] 10, *Library and Archives Canada* [*LAC*].
[18] *Saskatoon Star Phoenix*, 5 July 1940, 4.
[19] For more examples, see R. Scott Sheffield, "'...in the same manner as other people': Government Policy and the Military Service of Canada's First Nations People, 1939-1945," Unpublished MA thesis, University of Victoria, 1995, 37-39.
[20] Director to Hill, 19 August 1942, Part 2, File 452-6, Vol. 6764, RG 10, *LAC*.
[21] J.H. Hollies to OIC, RCAF Recruiting Centre, Montréal, Vol. 2, File HQ 282-1-2, Vol. 3307, RG 10, *LAC*.
[22] Scully to Edwards, 27 September 1942, Vol. 2, File 280-1-2, Vol. 3302, RG 10, *LAC*.
[23] Three quarters of the status Indian children who attended school between the wars achieved only a Grade 1 to 3 level of education. See Jean Barman, Yvonne Hébert and Don McCaskill, *Indian Education in Canada, Vol. I: The Legacy* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1986), 18. For a sad statement on the deficient health of the status Indian population, a glance through any edition of the Indian Affairs *Annual Report* will provide a litany of the latest outbreaks of epidemic diseases and the wide prevalence of tuberculosis.
[24] Janice Summerby, *Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields* (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs, 1993), 23.
[25] *421 Squadron History, 1942-82* (Stittsville: Canada's Wings, 1982), 5.
[26] Field Liaison Bulletin No. 17, 1 September 1943, File S.2-1-2, *Directorate of History and Heritage* [*DHH*].
[27] Mclachlan to Camsell, 18 March 1941, File 112.3H1.009/D293, *DHH*.
[28] Historical Section Army H.Q. Report No. 71, 10, *DHH*.
[29] For an indication of the "patch-work quilt" approach developed by the mobilization authorities for conscripting status Indians, see Michael Stevenson, "The Mobilization of Native Canadians During the Second World War," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*, N.S. 7 (1996), 205-226.
[30] The Indian Affairs Branch records showed a total status Indian enlistment of just over 3,000. During the National Round Table on First Nations Veterans Issues in 2000-2001, a cross-referencing of Indian Affairs and Veterans Affairs case files revealed approximately 4,200 to 4,300 enlistments, which are now the best figures available. Non-status and Métis enlistments may have amounted to perhaps half the status number, but this is speculation only and impossible to verify.
[31] Howe to the Secretary, 10 April 1941, Part 4, File 452-20, Vol. 6768, RG 10, *LAC*. There were other reports from this region of BC as well, and perhaps all of Recruiting Area H (Prince George) was affected.
[32] District Recruiting Orders, M.D. 10, 20 February 1942, Part 4, File 452-20, Vol. 2768, RG 10, *LAC*. Military District 10 included Manitoba, northwestern Ontario and the Keewatin district of the North West Territory.
[33] For a more detailed discussion of this episode, see Sheffield, "'... in the same manner as other people,'" 33-36.
[34] *Shoulder to Shoulder: Information for Recruiting Personnel and Civilian Recruiting Advisors, 1944*, File 113.3A2009/D2, *DHH*.
[35] For more on these decisions see Sheffield, "'... in the same manner as other people,'" Chapter 3, and, Stevenson "Mobilizing Native Canadians."
[36] *Remembrances: Metis Veterans: Interviews with Metis Veterans* (Regina: Gabriel Dumont Institute of Metis Studies and Applied Research, 1994), 6.

INTERLUDE I

The Indians and the Great War

D.C. Scott,
Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs
(1919)[1]

In this year of peace the Indians of Canada may look with just pride upon the part played by them in the great war both at home and on the field of battle. They have well and nobly upheld the loyal traditions of their gallant ancestors who rendered invaluable service to the British cause in 1776 and in 1812, and have added thereto a heritage of deathless honour which is an example and an inspiration for their descendants. According to the official records of the department more than four thousand Indians enlisted for active service with the Canadian Expeditionary forces. This number represents approximately thirty-five per cent of the Indian male population of military age in the nine provinces, and it must be remembered, moreover, that there were undoubtedly cases of Indian enlistment which were not reported to the department. The Indian soldiers gave an excellent account of themselves at the front, and their officers have commended them most highly for their courage, intelligence, efficiency, stamina and discipline. In daring and intrepidity they were second to none and their performance is a ringing rebuttal to the familiar assertion that the red man has deteriorated. The fine record of the

LAC C-3187

Duncan Campbell Scott, Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs from 1913 to 1932.

1 Dominion of Canada, *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year ended March 31 1919* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1920), 13-29, 30-31.

INTERLUDE I

Indians in the great war appears in a peculiarly favourable light when it is remembered that their services were absolutely voluntary, as they were specially exempted from the operation of the Military Service Act, and that they were prepared to give their lives for their country without compulsion or even the fear of compulsion. It must also be borne in mind that a large part of the Indian population is located in remote and inaccessible locations, are unacquainted with the English language and were, therefore, not in a position to understand the character of the war, its cause or effect. It is, therefore, a remarkable fact that the percentage of enlistments among the Indians is fully equal to that among other sections of the community and indeed far above the average in a number of instances. As an inevitable result of the large enlistment among them and of their share in the thick of the fighting, the casualties among them were very heavy, and the Indians in common with their fellow countrymen of the white race must mourn the loss of many of their most promising young men. The Indians are especially susceptible to tuberculosis, and many of their soldiers who escaped the shells and bullets of the enemy succumbed to this dreaded disease upon their return to Canada as a result of the hardships to which they were exposed at the front.

ONTARIO

OJIBWA BANDS

The majority of the Indian bands in Ontario belong to the Ojibwa or Chippewa tribe, which is the largest subdivision of the great Algonkin linguistic stock. They are the descendants of the warriors who fought so valiantly in the war of 1812 under their great leader Tecumseh. The enlistment average during the late war was exceptionally high and many of their bands sent practically all their eligible members to the front.

Special mention must be made of the Ojibwa bands located in the vicinity of Fort William, which sent more than one hundred men overseas from a total adult male population of two hundred and eighty-two. Upon the introduction of the Military Service Act it was found that there were but two Indians of the first-class left at home on the Nipigon reserve, and but one on the Fort William reserve. In reference to the Nipigon Indians, it may be mentioned that in 1812 a war party from this reserve paddled the entire length of lake Superior and proceeded to Queenston Heights where it joined the forces of General Brock. The Indian recruits from this district for the most part enlisted with the 52nd, popularly known as the Bull Moose Battalion. Their commanding officer, the late Colonel Hay, who was killed, stated upon frequent occasions that the Indians were among his very best soldiers.

Their gallantry is testified by the fact that the name of every Indian in this unit appeared in the casualty list. The fine appearance of these Indian soldiers was specially commented upon by the press in the various cities through which the battalion passed on its way to the front. One of the Indian members of the 52nd, Private Rod Cameron, won premier honours in a shooting competition among the best marksmen of twelve battalions. He rendered valuable service at the front as a scout and sniper and was subsequently killed in action.

Private Joseph Delaronde, another Nipigon Indian, of the 52nd Battalion, won the Military Medal for gallantry in action. His cousin, Denis Delaronde, who was killed in action, was the first man of the 52nd to enter the trenches of the enemy. Two other members of this fighting Indian family, Charles and Alexander Delaronde, also served with the 52nd. The latter was wounded, returned home, and discharged, re-enlisted and went back to the front. Another Nipigon Indian of the 52nd to be decorated was Sgt. Leo Bouchard, who was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal. Private Augustin Belanger, another Indian member of the 52nd Battalion, who was killed in action, was awarded the Military Medal. Alexander Chief, a Fort William Indian of the 52nd Battalion, returned to Canada after two years' service with no fewer than twelve wounds. Although he was an Indian of remarkably fine physique, he fell a victim to tuberculosis as a result of the hardships he endured and died in December, 1918. The Military Medal was posthumously awarded in the fall of 1917 to Corporal Thomas Godchere, of the 102nd Scottish, a British Columbia battalion, to which he was transferred from the 94th, the unit with which he enlisted at Port Arthur, of the Long Lake band, in the Thunder Bay district, in recognition of his gallant conduct at Vimy Ridge.

The Chippewas of Rama sent thirty-eight men to the front from a total adult male population of 110. The Military Medal was awarded to one of their number, Private Ben Simcoe, for gallant conduct in action. This Indian is the great grandson of John Simcoe, whose Indian name was Windego, a Shawnee brave who served with Tecumseh in 1812. Windego fought at Detroit, Queenston Heights, and Moraviantown, and upon the conclusion of the war was awarded the British Medal. He afterwards served with the Loyalist forces in the rebellion of 1837.

Among the Mississaguas of Rice Lake, forty-three enlisted from a total male population of eighty-two. One of their number, Lance-Corporal Johnson Paudash, of the 21st Battalion, received the Military Medal for his distinguished gallantry in saving life under heavy fire and for giving a warning that the enemy were preparing a counter attack at Hill Seventy; the counter

attack took place twenty-five minutes after Paudash gave the information. It is said that a serious reverse was averted as a result of his action. He enlisted in August, 1914. Like many others of the Indian soldiers, he has a splendid record as a sniper, and is officially credited with having destroyed no less than eighty-eight of the enemy. Upon the introduction of the Military Service Act it was found that not a single man of the class called remained at home among the Chippewas of Nawash, located at Cape Croker. Thirty-one Mississaguas of Alnwick enlisted from a total adult male population of sixty-four. One of their number, Sampson Comego, won distinction as a sniper, having destroyed twenty-eight of the enemy. He enlisted in the fall of 1914, and was killed in November, 1915. Peter Comego, brother of Sampson Comego, also enlisted in 1914, served in the trenches, and was twice wounded. He also distinguished himself as a sniper.

The Indian bands located on Manitoulin Island, on the northern shore of Lake Huron, sent about fifty men to the front. One of their number, Frank J. Sinclair, received the Military Medal, and another, Francis Misiniskotewe, was awarded the Russian Medal.

Another Indian member of the 52nd Battalion to be decorated was Dave Kisek. He is said to have been the tallest man in the regiment. He came through the war without being wounded, although two bullets went through his tunic. During the heavy fighting around Cambrai he unstrapped a machine gun from his shoulder and advanced about 100 yards to the German position, where he ran along the top of their trench, doing deadly execution with his machine gun. He single-handed took thirty prisoners upon this occasion. This Indian came from the remote regions of the Patricia district.

About twenty Indians enlisted from the Parry Sound district. One of their number, Corporal Francis Pegahmagabow, won the Military Medal and two Bars. He enlisted in 1914 with the original 1st Battalion. He distinguished himself signally as a sniper and bears the extraordinary record of having killed 378 of the enemy. His Military Medal and two Bars were awarded for his distinguished conduct at Mount Sorrell, Amiens, and Passchendaele. At Passchendaele, Corporal Pegahmagabow led his company through an engagement with a single casualty, and subsequently captured 300 Germans at Mount Sorrell. Corporal Pegahmagabow presented an address on behalf of his people to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales upon the recent visit of the latter to Parry Sound.

Forty-two Moravians of the Thames went to the front from a total adult male population of seventy-nine. One of their number who won fame as a sniper, Private George Stonefish, of Moraviantown, was tendered a civil reception

LAC PA-3831

Non-Commissioned Officers, 1st Battalion, CEF. The individual at the extreme left of the group is Corporal Francis Pegahmagabow, a sniper of considerable renown. Indians did not fight in segregated battalions, but served alongside their non-Native comrades in regular CEF units.

by the city of Chatham on his return to Canada in recognition of his exceptional services. Another of their number, Corporal Robert Tobias, also was awarded the Military Medal. He is the son of ex-Chief Walter Tobias, who was killed at Ypres. Two other sons of ex-Chief Tobias also served with the expeditionary forces. One of the Moravian Indian soldiers, Private Roy Snake, enlisted at the age of sixteen with a forestry unit. He was afterwards transferred to the infantry and participated in the battle of Cambrai.

Among the other Ojibwa bands in Ontario that have notable enlistment records are the Chippewas of Saugeen, who sent forty-eight from a total adult male population of one hundred and ten; the Chippewas of Georgina and Snake Islands, who sent eleven from a total adult male population of twenty-three; the Chippewas of the Thames, who sent twenty-five from a total adult male population of one hundred and ten; the Chippewas and Pottawatomies of Walpole Island, who sent seventy-one to the front from a total adult male population of two hundred and ten; the band located at Sturgeon Falls, which sent thirty-five from a total adult male population of one hundred and three; the bands in the Chapleau district, which sent forty from a total adult male population of one hundred and one; the Mississaguas of the Credit, located near Hagersville, who sent thirty-two from a total adult male population of eighty-six, and the Munsees, of the Thames, who sent eleven from a total adult male population of thirty-eight.

INTERLUDE I

Special mention must be made of the remarkable response to the call to arms among the Mississaguas of Scugog. This little band has only thirty of a population, and when the war broke out but eight of these were adult males. These eight men all enlisted without exception, thereby establishing what is probably an enlistment record unequalled in the annals of the great war. Another outstanding case is that of the Algonkins of Golden Lake, who sent twenty-nine soldiers to the front, leaving only three men on the reserve.

IROQUOIS BANDS

There are a number of populous Iroquois bands in Ontario, and these also like those of the Ojibwa race have a proud record in the great war. They are the descendants of the loyal Mohawks, Senecas, Onondagas, Cayugas, Oneidas and Tuscaroras, who came to Canada from the state of New York in 1776 under the leadership of Captain Joseph Brant, Tyendinaga, the great Mohawk chieftain whose name is perpetuated in those of the city of Brantford and the county of Brant. The largest band of Iroquois is the Six Nations of Brantford. This band sent two hundred and ninety-two warriors to the front, of whom twenty-nine were killed in action, five died from sickness, one is missing, fifty-five were wounded, and one was taken prisoner of war. Those of their number who were decorated were Captain A.G.E. Smith, who was awarded the Military Cross; Ignace Williams, who was awarded the Military Medal, and Austin Horse, who was awarded the Military Medal. Captain A.G.E. Smith is the son of a Six Nations chief. He went overseas with the 20th Battalion and was three times wounded. Upon his return to Canada he was made adjutant of a Polish battalion at Camp Niagara.

The great majority of these Six Nations soldiers enlisted with the 114th Battalion, which was organized in the fall of 1915, under the command of Colonel E.S. Baxter, of Cayuga, then commanding officer of the Haldimand Rifles, a well known militia battalion. Colonel Baxter died in 1916 and was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Andrew T. Thompson of Ottawa. Colonel Thompson had also for some years commanded the Haldimand Rifles, the left half of which was made up of Six Nations Indians. Colonel Thompson is an honorary chief of the Six Nations Indians and his position at the head of the battalion did much to stimulate recruiting among the Indians. Many Indians from other bands also joined this unit, among whom were a large number from the Caughnawaga and St. Regis bands, in the province of Quebec, which also belong to the Iroquois race. Two entire Indian companies were formed in the 114th Battalion, and the majority of the officers of these companies were also Indians. In recognition of the fact that among its Indian members were many who were descendants of warriors who fought at the battle of Queenston

Heights under General Brock, the battalion received the name of Brock's Rangers, and the device of two tomahawks became part of the regimental crest. A singularly beautiful regimental flag was worked for the Rangers by the Six Nations Women's Patriotic League. This is adorned with figures symbolic of various tribal legends and has been the subject of much comment and admiration. The 114th regimental band, composed almost entirely of Indians, toured the British Isles for recruiting and patriotic purposes. Three Indian officers of this battalion, Captain J.R. Stacey of Caughnawaga, and Lieutenants Moses and Martin, of Ohsweken, were transferred to the Royal Flying Corps. Captain Stacey was killed in an accident and Lieutenant Moses was among the missing. Through a strange coincidence the first man from Brant county to be killed in action in the great war was Lieutenant Cameron D. Brant, a great-great-grandson of the famous Captain Joseph Brant. Lieutenant Brant enlisted with the 47th Battalion and was killed at the second battle of Ypres while gallantly leading his men against the trenches of the enemy. Two of the lineal descendants of Captain Joseph Brant, Corporal Albert W.L. Crain and Private Nathan Montour received severe wounds at the battle of Ypres. The present head of a distinguished old Iroquois clan or family, the Bearfoot Onondagas, is Mrs. Elijah Lickers. Four of her sons, two grandsons, and a son-in-law served with the expeditionary forces, of whom a son and grandson were killed in the field. One member of this family, who served with the original 48th Highlanders of Toronto, was taken prisoner in April, 1915, and was kept in Germany until the end of the war. Another Six Nations woman, Mrs. Catherine General, had a husband, four sons, and two sons-in-law with the overseas forces.

The other Iroquois bands in Ontario are the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte, and the Oneidas of the Thames; both these bands have an exceptionally high enlistment record. Eighty-two Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte enlisted from a total adult male population of three hundred and fifty-three, and forty-eight Oneidas of the Thames enlisted from a total adult male population of two hundred and twenty. The Military Medal was awarded to one of the soldiers of the Bay of Quinte named Corby.

QUEBEC

The Indians of Quebec were well represented in the expeditionary forces. The historic Iroquois village of Caughnawaga, near Montreal, sent forty-three men to the front with the 114th Battalion, Brock's Rangers, which, as has been mentioned in connection with the Indians of Ontario, contained two full battalions *[sic]* of Indians. One of their number, Captain John R. Stacey, was transferred to the Royal Flying Corps, after his arrival in England, and was subsequently killed in an accident. The famous Colonel Bishop, V.C., the great

Canadian ace, stated that Captain Stacey was a flier of exceptional promise. He had been selected by Colonel Bishop to be a member of one of the latter's famous "fighting circle," but the accident which caused his death occurred before he was able to take his place in that renowned organization. In civilian life Captain Stacey was a successful customs broker in Toronto. He was untiring in his efforts to stimulate enlistment among the Iroquois both by able recruiting work and financial assistance. Captain Stacey went overseas as a lieutenant, but was soon promoted as a result of his exceptional abilities.

Sergeant Clear Sky, another Canghnawaga Indian of the 114th Battalion, was awarded the Military Medal for one of the most gallant and unselfish deeds that is recorded in the annals of the Canadian forces. During a heavy gas attack Sergeant Clear Sky noticed a wounded man lying in "no man's land" whose gas mask had been rendered useless. Clear Sky crawled to him through the poisonous fumes, removed his own mask, and placed it on the wounded man, whose life was in consequence saved. Sergeant Clear Sky was himself severely gassed as a result of his heroic action. He is a graduate of the well known Carlyle Indian University, and prior to his enlistment, was a professional vaudeville entertainer. He was very popular at the front owing to his ability to entertain the troops with his singing and dancing.

The excellent record of the Caughnawaga Indians in this war is reminiscent of their loyalty upon former occasions. During the rebellion of 1837-38 these Indians rendered important service to the Government. On Sunday, November 4, 1838, a body of rebels attempted a surprise attack upon the village of Caughnawaga. A squaw warned the Indians, who were attending divine service at the time. They quickly and signally defeated the insurgents and made seventy prisoners, who were handed over to the authorities upon the following day. Their gallant conduct upon this occasion was specially mentioned in a despatch from Lord Glenelg to Sir John Colborne.

The St. Regis band of Iroquois sent twenty-six of their warriors to the front. One of their number, Private Philip McDonald, won exceptional distinction as a sniper. He enlisted in August, 1914, and served with the 8th Battalion, more particularly known as the Little Black Devils of Winnipeg. He was killed in action after having destroyed forty of the enemy by his deadly sharpshooting.

Delphis Theberge was awarded the Military Cross in recognition of his gallant conduct during the attack on the Canal du Nord.

Private Willie Cleary, a Montagnais Indian of Lake St. John, who served with the illustrious 22nd Battalion, was decorated with the Military Medal

by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales at Lafontaine Park, Montreal, on October 28, 1918, for conspicuous gallantry in an important trench raid. He was severely wounded.

Another Indian member of the 22nd Battalion, Private Joseph Roussin, of Oka, was awarded the Military Medal.

MARITIME PROVINCES

All the Indians of the Maritime Provinces belong to the Micmac tribe, which is a subdivision of the Algonkin linguistic stock, with the exception of the Maliseets of New Brunswick, who form a separate branch of the Algonkin race.

The Nova Scotia reserves are not very thickly populated, and in consequence the number of recruits secured upon them was numerically small. In a number of instances, however, the enlistment record in proportion to the population was very high, for example, from among the Micmacs of Sydney every eligible man went to the front. The Micmacs of Colchester county sent nine men from a total adult male population of twenty-five; the Micmacs of Hants county sent six from a total adult male population of sixteen; the Micmacs of Lunenburg county sent eleven from a total adult male population of nineteen; the Micmacs of Pictou county sent ten from a total adult male population of forty; the Micmacs of Shelburne county sent three from a total adult male population of eight; the Micmacs of Yarmouth county sent three from a total adult male population of twelve, and the Micmacs of Digby county sent six from a total adult male population of twenty-four. One of these Nova Scotia Indians, Private Joseph W. Morris, was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Military Medal. He was three times wounded.

From among the Micmacs and Maliseets of New Brunswick, sixty-two went to the front out of a total adult male population of one hundred and sixteen.

The Micmacs of Prince Edward Island have an exceptionally fine enlistment record. The total number of adult males among these Indians was sixty-four, of whom thirty went to the front, or practically every eligible man. They earned the highest praise for their exceptionally gallant conduct in action, and particularly distinguished themselves in the great battle of Amiens. One of their number, Private James Francis, received the Military Medal. A curious incident is recorded with regard to two Micmac brothers named Cope, from Kings county, Nova Scotia. These two young Micmacs enlisted in different battalions, and did not see each other until they met quite by chance in the thick of the fighting at Vimy Ridge. They were so

begrimed as a result of the hard day's fighting that they had at first failed to recognize each other. The elder of these boys was afterwards killed at Passchendaele, but the younger came through the war safely and proceeded with the army of occupation into Germany.

MANITOBA

Some of the Manitoba bands have an excellent enlistment record. Notable among these is the Peguis band, which sent twenty men to the front from a total adult male population of one hundred and eighteen, eleven of whom were killed in action, four wounded and gassed, three wounded, and one taken prisoner. Two of these Indians were with the Serbian forces. The Pas band sent nineteen men to the front from a total adult male population of ninety-two. The St. Peter's band sent thirty-three men to the front from a total adult male population of one hundred and twenty-seven, seven of whom were killed in action, eight wounded, and one gassed. The Sioux Indians located at Griswold sent twenty men to the front from a total population of eighty-four. They are descendants of refugees who came to Canada half a century ago, after the famous wars betwen the Sioux Indians and the American Government.

SASKATCHEWAN

In previous reports reference has been made to the model agricultural community at File Hills, which is composed of ex-pupils of Indian schools, and which was organized by the department some sixteen years ago. As a result of this experiment these progressive young Indians are now on a wholly self-supporting basis and are ranked among the most competent farmers of the province. They fully appreciate the advantages that have been brought to them by civilization and were ready at the critical time to defend them against the menace of a foreign enemy. Twenty-four of their number enlisted from a total adult male population of thirty-eight, and this remarkably high percentage is emphazised by the fact that the majority of them were married men. One of these Indians, Alexander Brass, was awarded the Military Cross for conspicuous gallantry in action. He is the bandmaster of the File Hills Indian Colony brass band, a well known organization which rendered excellent assistance at recruiting meetings and other patriotic gatherings throughout the province.

The Coté band, whose reserve is located in the vicinity of old Fort Pelly, one of the earliest Hudson Bay posts established in the province, sent twenty-two men to the front from a total adult male population of forty-three.

LAC PA-66815

Recruits from Saskatchewan's File Hills community pose with elders, family members and a representative from the Department of Indian Affairs before departing for Britain during the Great War.

One of the Saskatchewan Indian soldiers, Joe Thunder, of the 128th Battalion was awarded the Military Medal for a feat of arms of an exceptionally dramatic character. He was separated from his platoon and surrounded by six Germans, each of whom he bayoneted. He received a severe wound in March, 1918, and now wears a scarf pin made from a bone that was removed from his leg as a result of this wound.

Two Indians of the Mistawasis band, Joe Dreaver and N.G. Sanderson, were awarded the Military Medal.

ALBERTA

That the present generation of Alberta Indians had not lost the intrepid spirit of their ancestors, the warlike riders of the plains and hunters of the buffalo, is demonstrated by the fact that they were well and gallantly represented in the Canadian Expeditionary Force.

One of their number, Albert Mountain Horse, a Blood Indian, who held a commission as lieutenant, and who enlisted as a private in August, 1914,

particularly distinguished himself. He was badly gassed upon three different occasions as a result of which he afterwards contracted consumption and died in November, 1915. The military funeral that was held for him at Calgary will long be remembered as one of the most impressive ceremonies that ever took place in that city. So many desired to attend the service that it was necessary to issue tickets of admission to the church.

Another Alberta Indian who won fame at the front was Lance-Corporal Norwest, who came from the vicinity of Edmonton and enlisted with the 50th Battalion of Calgary. He was one of the foremost snipers in the British army and was officially credited with one hundred and fifteen observed hits. He carried a special rifle fitted with a telescopic sight. He was killed by a German sniper in August, 1918, while endeavouring with two companions to locate a nest of enemy sharpshooters who had been causing a considerable amount of trouble to the advance posts of the Canadian front line companies. He won the Military Medal and Bar.

BRITISH COLUMBIA

The British Columbia Indians are somewhat less warlike in character than those of the plains and in the eastern provinces, and are by nature adverse to leaving their homes upon any unfamiliar venture. They nevertheless sent several hundred good soldiers to the front, and a number of them have very distinguished records.

Although the Military Service Act did not apply to the Indians, a record of those enlistments was compiled upon the introduction of the measure. It was found that among the Indians of the Head of the Lake band in the Okanagan district every man who came within the description of the first call had already enlisted. This is a record of which any community might well be proud. One of these Indians, Private George McLean, received the Distinguished Conduct Medal in recognition of the performance of a feat which was of an extraordinary character even for the great war. Private McLean single-handed destroyed nineteen of the enemy with bombs and captured fourteen. He was himself severely wounded upon this occasion.

A number of the British Columbia Indians served with the Mesopotamian forces. One of these, David Bernardan, of the Oweekayno band, in the Bella Coola agency, commanded a motor transport vessel on the Euphrates river. An Alert Bay Indian, Edwin Victor Cook, received the Distinguished Conduct Medal. He was wounded twice, and was finally killed towards the end of the war. Dan Pearson, an Indian of the Metlakatla band, which is

located near Prince Rupert, was awarded the Military Medal. He afterwards died of pneumonia.

PATRIOTIC AND OTHER WAR FUNDS

From the outset of the war the Indians, both as bands and as individuals, have been very generous in proportion to the means at their disposal in contributing to the Patriotic, Red Cross, Belgian Relief, and other war funds, their donations in all making a total of $44,545.46.… Special attention should be drawn to the amount of $8,562 subscribed to the various funds by the Indians of File Hills, Sask., an especially good showing when it is considered that their population is about 362. The munificence of their contribution in proportion to their numbers is a pleasing commentary upon the success of the measures taken by the Government for their advancement. The patriotic spirit of these Indians was evidenced from the outset of the war, and as early as 1914 each man in the colony pledged himself to give the value of 50 bushels of oats and a number of the older Indians contributed a load of wood apiece each month, a procedure which was also followed by the Stony Indians in Alberta.

RED CROSS WORK

The Indian women on many of the reserves formed Red Cross societies and Patriotic leagues. These organizations corresponded to similar societies in white communities. They carried on their work with energy and efficiency and were successful in the accomplishment of excellent results. They made bandages and provided various comforts for the soldiers, knitted socks, sweaters and mufflers, and also raised money for patriotic purposes by holding card parties, bazaars, and other social entertainments. The making of baskets and beadwork is a native industry among the Indians, and the Indian women found a novel and very successful means of securing funds for war needs by the sale of these wares.

The first of these organizations of the nature above mentioned to be formed on a reserve was the Six Nations Patriotic League, which was organized in October, 1914, and continued in operation with great success until the conclusion of the war. Upon the mobilization of Brock's Rangers, a battalion which has been hereinbefore mentioned, another women's patriotic society was formed on the Six Nations reserve under the name of the Brock's Rangers' Benefit Society. The purpose of this society was to provide for the needs of the Indian companies of this battalion. The society was very painstaking in its work and no Indian member of the battalion failed to benefit as a result of its efforts.

The Indian women of the Oneidas of the Thames, another Iroquois band, which sent a large number of its members to the front, also formed a patriotic league in 1916 in order to provide comforts for their soldiers. In the first year of its existence this society sent twenty-five boxes overseas; in 1917, one hundred and four, and in 1918, seventy-four up to the signing of the armistice. Each of these boxes contained thirty pairs of socks and twenty-four khaki sweaters.

A Red Cross society was formed by the Chippewas of Saugeen to provide comforts for the members of the band who were at the front. This organization raised more than $400 for the benefit of their soldiers by holding a series of box socials.

A branch of the Red Cross society was also formed by the women of the Rolling River band in the province of Manitoba, and the particularly fine quality of the beadwork which they sold for the benefit of the fund was the subject of special comment.

The women of the File Hills Colony, in Saskatchewan, formed a branch of the Red Cross Society in 1916, and in the fall of the same year there was also organized a branch of the Patriotic society at the colony. Branches of the Red Cross were also formed by the women of the Indian bands located at Qu'Appelle and Pelly, Sask., and the head office of the Saskatchewan Provincial Branch of the Red Cross stated that the sewing and knitting work of these Indian societies was unsurpassed in quality and workmanship by any received from any part of the province.

Similar activities to those above mentioned were carried on throughout the period of the war by the women on a great many of the reserves in all parts of the Dominion….

GENERAL REMARKS

There were more than five hundred Indians on the roll of the 107th Pioneer Battalion, which was commanded by the late Lieut.-Col. Glen Campbell, of Winnipeg, formerly Chief Inspector of Indian Agencies. Among these there were representatives of many different Indian tribes, including Crees, Saulteaux and Sioux from the north and west; Mohawks, Onondagas, Oneidas, Tuscaroras, Delawares and Chippewas from Ontario, and Micmacs from the Maritime provinces. The excellent services rendered by these Indians in pioneer work was particularly commented upon, and especially their ability to adapt themselves to bad weather and awkward circumstances without com-

Glenbow Museum NA-1395-1

Stoneys at Armistice Day celebration, High River, Alberta, 1918. Left to Right Back Row: Bessie Hanna; Paul Amos Stoney; Paul Daniels Stoney; Red Cloud Stoney; Phil Weinard. Left to Right Front Row: Peter Ear Stoney; Peter Bearspaw Stoney; Mrs. H. Baines, senior; David Bearspaw; Enoch Rider Stoney; Moses Wesley Stoney.

plaint. Several of these Indians qualified for commissions after their arrival in England, and two of them, Private O. Barren and A. W. Anderson were awarded the Military Medal for gallantry in action. The Indian company of the 107th particularly distinguished itself by its coolness and efficiency in continuing at work under heavy fire during a terrific bombardment of Hill 70 near Lens.

Three of these Indians, Tom Longboat, Joe Keeper and A. Jamieson were well known in athletic circles as long distance runners, and another, John Nackaway, before enlisting had been a runner for the Hudson's Bay Company in the far north. These Indian athletes rendered invaluable service as despatch carriers.

About one hundred Indian recruits were secured in the remote regions of the Hudson Bay and Patricia districts. Many of these first came into contact with civilization as a result of joining the forces and a number of them were unable to speak a word of English. It is remarkable how rapidly these Indians became smart, well-disciplined soldiers and how well they adapted themselves to surroundings that were entirely new to them.

INTERLUDE I

John Campbell, a full-blooded Indian who lived on the Arctic coast, travelled three thousand miles by trail, canoe and river steamer in order to enlist at Vancouver.

Many of the Indian soldiers were hunters in civil life and in consequence were expert marksmen. As a result of this experience they were able to render excellent service as snipers at the front and in this branch of fighting they were unexcelled. It is claimed that the Indians did much towards demoralizing the entire enemy system of sniping. They displayed extraordinary patience and self-control when engaged in this work and would sit hour after hour at a vantage point waiting the appearance of the enemy at his sniping post. The Indian snipers recorded their prowess by the picturesque method of notching their rifles, for every observed hit. Three famous Indian snipers of the 8th Battalion, McDonald, an Iroquois; Riel, a grandson of the famous rebel, Louis Riel; and Ballantyne, a western Indian, had forty, thirty-eight and fifty-eight notches, respectively, on their guns. The two former were killed in action, but the latter survived the war and is now taking a course in gas engineering.

Many interesting letters were received from Indians at the front wherein were displayed keen powers of observation and exceptional descriptive ability.

Many of the Indian bands during the course of the war prepared memorials expressive of their loyalty and desire to assist to the utmost extent of their ability in the prosecution of the war, which were either forwarded to His Majesty King George V or to His Excellency the Governor General of Canada.

A large number of Indians have invested their savings in victory bonds, in a number of cases the amount invested by individual Indians exceeding $1,000. Chief Baptiste George, of Inkameep, in the Okanagan valley, B.C., purchased bonds to the amount of $21,000, and was presented with a victory bond flag upon two occasions.

The Indian returned soldiers have been tendered enthusiastic receptions by their fellow countrymen upon their return to the reserves. On some of the reserves suitable memorial tablets have been erected in honour of the members of the band who fell in the war. The return of so many Indian soldiers who have been broadened and inspired by contact with the outside world and its affairs is bringing about radical and progressive changes in the life of the reserves.

CHAPTER 4

Competing Loyalties in a Complex Community: Enlisting the Six Nations in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, 1914-1917

P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Katharine McGowan

"Supplying this evidence of loyalty, [the Six Nations] Indians have recruited a corps of militiamen and an exceedingly good military brass band," E. Pauline Johnson told readers of *Harper's Weekly* in 1894. "They hold annual drill, and in all probability, if the country required their services, they would be among the first to go into action. But a few years more and the ancient Iroquois will be a people of the past, and perhaps the most conclusive argument in favor of civilizing the red man is a glance at the Six Nations of the Grand River."[1] The Six Nations participation in the peacetime militia, embracing one of the institutions of late-19th century Canada was, in Johnson's opinion, not only a sign of the end of the band's distinction from Canadian society, but also their success in this new world.

Twenty years after Johnson penned those words, this celebrated Aboriginal poet was proven correct when Six Nations men were amongst the first Canadians to go into action during the Great War. At the end of the war, the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, Duncan Campbell Scott, applauded the "proud record" of the band, including its contribution of 292 "warriors." They had inherited and perpetuated the loyal tradition of Joseph Brant in this modern conflict.[2] Yet Scott implied that the strong Aboriginal contribution to the war effort was an affirmation of their readiness to be assimilated into Canadian society. Indian participation in general demonstrated that the two communities were becoming one. Enos Montour also celebrated this wartime union in his book, *The Feathered U.E.L's*, where "the reserve and the nearby town drew perceptibly closer together, as comrade Loyalists should. Both groups had boys over there and the townspeople stopped the reserve parents on the streets to ask how the boys were doing and of the latest news from somewhere in France. They were companions in sacrifice and, sometimes sorrow."[3]

The Six Nations' participation in the Canadian war effort, however, was not a simple and universal expression of loyalty, nor was it a signal of the

band's acceptance of assimilation. The Hereditary Council's caution in (and resistance to) supporting the Canadian war effort reflected particular community dynamics, principally differences between the reserve's Christian and Longhouse followers and political perceptions of Six Nations place vis-à-vis the Canadian and British states. All of these local dynamics made recruiting on the reserve problematic: in 1914, the band council rejected Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Merritt's proposal for a uniquely Six Nations unit, and in late-1915 and 1916, Lieutenant-Colonel E.S. Baxter's 114th Overseas Battalion, with Iroquois recruiting officer Charles Cooke, did not reach its goal of raising two companies from the reserve. Barbara Wilson concluded her brief sketch of Ontario Indians and the war with the Six Nations enlistment campaign's unsatisfying result: "In spite of the best efforts of Scott and the recruiting officers, the 114th, like so many other battalions, never reached full strength and on its arrival in England in November 1916 was broken up."[4]

While existing literature intimates that the 114th Battalion's inability to raise two companies of Indian soldiers was a recruiting failure, the more than 200 men recruited at Six Nations – in the face of entrenched opposition – suggest a modest success. As Robert Rutherdale has recently noted, historians of the war need to respect "hometown horizons:" to narrow the focus to local cultural spaces to interpret how the war affected Canadians, while acknowledging the "often reciprocal and fluid exchanges" between citizens and "distant decision-making centres."[5] Between observers' descriptions of unbridled patriotism and insurmountable opposition, examining the recruiting efforts on the reserve suggests a complex and divided community that responded to the war effort in different ways. Even on the intensely local level, characterizing the "Aboriginal" response to the war as a monolithic voice or experience would be as fallacious as imposing such uniformity on Canada as a whole.

There has been a surge of interest in Great War recruiting and the home front experience over the last decade. Rutherdale, Paul Maroney, Ian Miller, Nik Gardner and others have provided new insights into the ideologies of recruiting, coercion and embarrassment tactics and local influences on enlistment patterns.[6] Nevertheless, the existing literature on recruiting has a strong emphasis on government perfidy and local shortcomings. Common examples include the (incorrect) assertion that a Protestant was appointed chief recruiter in Québec, the heavy-handed tactics in cities like Berlin (later Kitchener), Ontario, and the racist ideologies that underlay early wartime recruiting efforts. James Walker, in his important article on the enlistment of visible minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), observed that the Canadian military privileged white soldiers and

often relegated non-white volunteers to non-combat service battalions: "a set of presumptions about their abilities … dictated the role they were to play and … limited the rewards they were to derive." In the early war, recruiting officers rejected applications by non-white volunteers including Indians who were allegedly forbidden to enlist on the grounds of official policy.[7] By contrast, the literature on Aboriginal soldiers uniformly suggests that reserve residents answered the call to arms in remarkably high numbers, given their persistent "warrior ethic," longstanding loyalty to the Crown, and their search for equality in a racist society. While authors suggest that Aboriginal peoples' loyalty and patriotism during the world wars was beyond reproach, their wartime experiences were marred by government coercion and ignorance.[8] Systematic research is therefore needed to test these generalizations about First Nations recruiting.

The Six Nations of the Grand River provides an ideal test case to analyze military efforts to recruit Indians into the CEF given the high rates of enlistment in the community and the political intrigue that complicated planning and recruiting on the local level. Barbara Wilson, in her brief overview of Ontario Indians' contributions during the First World War, observed that:

> Throughout the war the council of the Six Nations steadfastly adhered to the principle that any appeal for assistance must come directly from the King. Traditionally, regular chiefs or sachems had nothing to do with the conduct of war; this was the function of war chiefs, who were appointed only when war was declared directly by the Six Nations as a body. Within these limits, the council encouraged the Six Nations' war effort, but felt it could not assist directly in recruiting or in raising money for the Canadian war effort. It voted $1,500 for 'patriotic purposes' on 15 September 1914, but stipulated that the money be spent in England…. At the same time it offered the services of Six Nations' warriors, provided the request for their services came from the King. The council's attitude did not discourage enlistment or patriotic work among women of the Six Nations, who organized a Women's Patriotic League in October 1914. They formed the Brock Rangers Benefit Society in February 1916 to provide comforts for Indians in the 114th Battalion and raised the necessary money by means of garden parties and tag days.[9]

While Wilson's description mentions the competing responses to war at Six Nations, it does not reconcile these complications, nor explain how loyalty and nationalism can both coexist and contradict themselves. How did the

Six Nations Council's reticence to assist with recruiting affect local mobilization efforts? Apart from Walker's brief survey, historians have devoted remarkably little attention to recruiting efforts on reserves. This case study of recruiting at Six Nations from 1914 to 1916 reveals that the process was not dominated by Indian agents, nor was recruiting conducted by "outsiders" wandering into unfamiliar territory: William Hamilton Merritt, E.S. Baxter, Charles Cooke and Andrew Thompson all enjoyed close connections with the community. Segments of the Six Nations population opposed active participation for various political reasons, however, and recruiters recognized that they had to deal with a heterogeneous Indian community.

The Six Nations had a history of being allied with the British Crown for more than a century-and-a-half prior to the First World War. The traditional territories of the Iroquois Confederacy (or Six Nations) did not lay in present-day southern Ontario, but the Finger Lakes region of upper New York State, where their economy consisted of horticulture, hunting, fishing and gathering. The Iroquois' sophisticated socio-political organization, military prowess and finely honed diplomatic skills placed the Six Nations in an advantageous position as European rivalries engulfed the St. Lawrence watershed during the 17th and 18th centuries. The Confederacy often held the balance of military power and diplomatic influence between European powers. Consequently, the British sought out the Six Nations as military allies in their struggle for continental supremacy against the French. During the American Revolution, the Six Nations tried to maintain a shaky neutrality, but each individual was free to decide whether or not to fight, and, if so, on what side. Some continued to openly support the British Crown, while others sympathized with the Americans, and others still remained neutral. The Confederacy fractured. The Americans' ultimate victory sealed the fate of their traditional lands, which fell within the new republic's borders.[10]

In 1784, in recognition of "their spirited and zealous exertions and by the bravery of their conduct," King George III gifted two parcels of "Indian lands" to the Six Nations who had remained loyal to the British. The largest segment of the Six Nations followed Mohawk peace chief Henry Tekarihogen and war chief Joseph Brant to occupy a tract of land six miles deep along each side of the Grand River, totalling two million acres. By the following year, 1,843 Indians had settled in villages along the river, forming (in Carl Benn's words) an "abbreviated version of the old Iroquois Confederacy that once had spanned so much of New York." These "Feathered U.E.L.'s" (United Empire Loyalists) then set to work clearing the land and building roads, schools and churches.[11]

CHAPTER 4

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Iroquois Chiefs from the Six Nations Reserve reading Wampum belts, 1871. Left to Right: Joseph Snow, Onondaga; George Henry Martin Johnson, father of Pauline Johnson, Mohawk; John Buch, Onondaga; John Smoke Johnson, father of George Henry Martin Johnson; Isaac Hill, Onondaga; John Senaca Johnson, Seneca.

The Six Nations' tradition of loyal service as "His Majesty's Indian Allies" continued through the War of 1812, the Upper Canadian Rebellions of 1837 and the Fenian Raids of the 1860s, but shifting geo-political realities diminished their military relevance to the continued survival of British North America after 1815. The Six Nations land base shrunk through a series of disputed land sales in the early-19th century, which continue to cause significant controversy to this day.[12] Nevertheless, the Grand River Reserve, comprising 72 square miles by century's end, remained the largest in eastern Canada. External and internal forces precipitated changes to existing systems of Mohawk governance and organization. Christian missionary activities, challenges to traditional political hierarchies through Mohawk military leaders acting as *de facto* tribal leaders, and various internal dynamics contributed to the development of factions within the various communities. Concurrently, the early trickle of Loyalists into Upper Canada became a torrent by mid-century and the non-Native population increasingly outnumbered the Native residents, lessening their importance to the colonial government. Yet the Six Nations community maintained their historical alliance with the Crown. Many members took pride in their shared identification as UELs, using it to promote their own political agendas at a time when such identification continued to hold significant weight in English Canadian cultural and political thought.[13]

CHAPTER 4

On the eve of the First World War, the Six Nations of the Grand River boasted the largest population of any Indian community in Canada, numbering 4,606 in 1916. A positive natural rate of population increase, impressive incomes derived from farm products and wage labour, and flourishing volunteer associations all served as a source of encouragement for the future prospects of the reserve. The Six Nations Agency had 15 churches, 12 schools and four longhouses, accommodating a diverse population. Eighty-one percent declared themselves Christian: 34% Anglican (1,585), 17% Methodist (780), 21% Baptist (951), 9% other Christians (397), while 19% (871) adhered to "Aboriginal beliefs." Just over half the population was male (2,370), 1,100 of whom were "able bodied." 431 were engaged in farming and 390 in other occupations. "The Indians are generally industrious, progressive and law-abiding," Indian Superintendent Gordon Smith reported in March 1914. "If work cannot be obtained on the reserve, they seek employment off; many have taken up land in the West, others have regular employment in Brantford, Hamilton, and other cities and towns." More than half of the 4,000 English-speaking residents were literate and all were described as wearing "civilized clothing."[14] The rural homestead settlement pattern on the reserve and its close proximity to Brantford meant that the residents were well integrated into the local economy and often into its social networks as well.[15]

Many members of the Six Nations were also active members of the pre-war militia. Speaking to the Canadian Military Institute in 1909, Six Nations band member Frederick Onondeyoh Loft "proclaimed that his people were 'instinctively soldiers' and that their traditions of 'chivalry' could make a valuable contribution to the Militia if more were encouraged to join." Indeed, they did join. Historian Mike O'Brien discovered:

> Over 200 'chiefs and warriors' from Six Nations Reserve were present in the ranks of the 37th Haldimand Rifles at Niagara Camp in 1908, making up over half the regiment's active strength…almost all the second- and third-year men in the unit, and Captain J.S. Johnson, one of the company commanders, was a member of Six Nations.[16]

Large numbers of Six Nations men also joined the 26th Middlesex Light Infantry, comprising half of the regimental baseball team. Historian Andrew Iarocci has compiled statistics on Six Nations enlistments during the war, which suggest that at least 152 of the 293 (52 %) volunteers he documented had militia experience.[17] The pre-war military establishment certainly did not shun men from the Six Nations. Nevertheless, although Six Nations members did participate in high numbers, O'Brien asserts that the

militia remained a non-Native social institution in character regardless of its Native contingent, that "unlike the Scots, the cultural distinctiveness of aboriginal recruits was not formally embraced by the Militia."[18] This would prove telling at the outbreak of war in August 1914.

Overviews of Native Canadian service in the First World War begin with the Militia Department's "official policy" regarding Indian enlistments for overseas service. "While British troops would be proud of their association with their Indian fellow subjects," the Adjutant-General wrote on 8 August 1914 to Colonel L.W. Shannon, the commander of Military District 1, "Germans might refuse to extend them privileges of civilized warfare. Therefore it is considered … that they had better remain in Canada to share in the protection of the Dominion."[19] There is no evidence that this message was sent to any other division, nor that it was widely applied.[20]

In practice, Indians began volunteering for the CEF immediately after the declaration of war. At least eight had enlisted by 19 August 1914, including seven men from the Six Nations Reserve.[21] The Six Nations Council also was outwardly supportive of the war effort, contributing $1,500 to the Canadian Patriotic Fund in late September 1914. Nonetheless, the subtleties of the Council's approach to the war and the Canadian government foreshadowed the future discord between both governing bodies. The chiefs asked the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) to give this money "to their brother Chief Ka,rah,kon,tye the Duke of Connaught Governor General of Canada, who will forward the same to the Imperial authorities as a token of the alliance existing between the Six Nations and the British Crown. They also expressed their willingness to offer their warriors to help in accordance with their ancient custom if their services should be required." The Deputy Superintendent General, Duncan Campbell Scott, explained that the Canadian government administered the general Patriotic Fund, and therefore it would not be possible for the Six Nations to make a direct payment to imperial authorities, but he acknowledged and accepted their generous contribution. In reply, local Indian Affairs Superintendent Gordon Smith clarified that the Six Nations "do not belong to Canada and wish to make their contribution direct."[22] The Council asserted its sense of sovereign authority, but the records indicate that the payment never went through.[23]

Native enlistment in the first two months of the war stimulated local interest in forming a distinct Six Nations unit. In October, the *Brantford Expositor* informed readers about patriotic addresses at a recruiting meeting held at the Council House, which suggested forming a company of 100, comprised entirely of Indians. Gordon Smith hoped to assume command and mobilize

them immediately.[24] Lieutenant-Colonel William Hamilton Merritt, the president of the Canadian Defence League, promptly offered £5,000 to raise and equip two Indian companies for overseas service. Born in St. Catharines in 1855, Merritt was an ardent imperialist and distinguished mining engineer who had twice run as a Conservative candidate in the federal riding of Haldimand. Although he was defeated both times, he polled a majority of the local Native vote in 1886 (this was the first election in which Indians received the franchise) and the Cayuga of the Six Nations Reserve made him a honourary chief. His first love was soldiering and Merritt rose in rank to command the 1st Cavalry Brigade in the militia's 2nd Division until 1913. But "Merritt was no mere parade-square soldier," his biographers note, "and he never turned down the opportunity to see active duty," from the Northwest Rebellion to South Africa. After the Boer War, he became a leading defence commentator promoting Canadian preparedness for war based upon "the principle of patriotic, unpaid, and universal naval or military training." Although 59 years old when the Great War broke out, "his devotion to empire and his restless energy had not dissipated one whit."[25] Because the Six Nations had long trumpeted their loyalty as British allies, Merritt fully expected the community to support the war effort and was eager to outfit an Indian unit. He failed, however, to consult them first.

Merritt's offer did not receive the welcome reception that he had anticipated. It posed a political dilemma for the Six Nations chiefs: they considered themselves to be a separate nation, allied to the British Crown, but not within or under the authority of the Canadian federal government that had been encroaching on their political affairs for decades. At the Council meeting on 3 November, the chiefs postponed making a decision about his offer because "the source of the proposition is not in accordance with the customs of their forefathers and their friend the British Government."[26] For his part, Superintendent Smith was incensed by their "petty" response during Great Britain's time of need.[27] While awaiting the Council's decision, however, local recruiting efforts continued unabated. On 5 November, military staff from the divisional headquarters in Toronto held a recruiting meeting at the Six Nations Council House and advised potential recruits that they could enlist at Chief Johnson's office and mobilize at Cayuga. The *Brantford Expositor* suggested that the meeting originated with Major-General F.L. Lessard, the district commander, who believed that Indians had a "special relationship" with the Crown and thus would be eager to enlist.[28] This "special relationship," however, did not translate into political support for the *Canadian* war effort.

The Six Nations Council decided to call a special meeting for 26 November, where the chiefs rejected the offer to mobilize a distinct Six Nations regiment.

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Six Nations Council, Ohsweken, Ontario 1910.

As allies to the Crown, they asserted, they would only respond to a direct request from King George V. Otherwise, working through the Canadian government would tacitly acknowledge its jurisdiction, which would "affect their status."[29] Indeed, this was not the first time that the Six Nations Council had opposed the formation of a unit on their reserve on the grounds of upholding traditional political legitimacy. In February 1896, Chief Isaac Hill protested the decision to create a Six Nations regiment because the chiefs had been unable to reach a unanimous consensus and "they not want to reject the ancient way of consulting on that affair."[30] In the case of Merritt's proposal, the Council's rejection was not a repudiation of the war as much as a defence of their perceived status as Britain's sovereign allies. "By making their acceptance conditional upon recognition of their independent political status," historian Scott Trevithick observed, "the Chiefs hoped to force the government to make a concession. When the government did not, it provided a further affront to Six Nations nationalism."[31]

For his part, Merritt was upset when he learned of the Council's resolution and relentlessly sought a favourable decision. In late-December he appealed to Lieutenant-Colonel E.A. Stanton, the Military Secretary in Ottawa, stressing the Indians' central role in Canadian history and requesting that the

Governor General "appeal to His Majesty ... [to] condescend to ask the Six Nations Council for aid to the Empire." Senior military officials rejected his plea, so Merritt modified his offer and begged them to reconsider:

> If it cannot be conceded that the past services to the Crown of the Six Nations Indians warrant the exception being made of a unit bearing their name, it would seem that possibly our Indians as a whole have proved themselves worthy of some consideration, and therefore, if it is desired that the offer of a contribution made 21st Sept. should be modified please allow it to stand as follows, namely, that £5000 will be placed at the disposal of H.R.H. [His Royal Highness] for two companies to be composed of members of the Six Nations Indians, as a Centenary tribute to them for their vital aid in helping to save Canada to the Crown in 1812-14, provided the other two companies of the Battalion to which they are posted are also composed of Canadian Indians.[32]

In a follow-up letter to Stanton, Merritt heightened the patriotic appeal:

> It has always been our boast that the just treatment of our Indians by the British Government has led to happy results & relations, and if, as a reward, they were now to be given recognition as a race, in a unit of their own, along-side their white fellow-subjects it would undoubtedly be welcomed with a thrill of gratitude and appreciation by all of the scattered bands, whose number and isolation render it impossible to give them individual consideration.

It would be easy to raise such a unit, he suggested, and would further demonstrate the "justice of Britain's rule." To his dismay, the Military Secretary informed Merritt that "under no circumstances" did the government contemplate asking "the Canadian-Indians to furnish a contingent for war service in Europe."[33]

Superintendent Smith's annual report, submitted in early 1915, downplayed local opposition. "The great war found the Six Nations as usual loyal," Smith reported. "The council voted $1,500 for patriotic purposes and many young men have enlisted for active service, of whom three are officers."[34] On the local level, military representatives continued to try to raise interest on the reserve. Fred Ogilvie Loft was a Toronto accountant born at the Grand River Reserve with seven years militia experience. On 28 March 1915, Loft visited the Six Nations Council to try to secure the chiefs' consent to Merritt's earlier proposition. The Council did not rescind their

opposition to an organized Six Nations unit under Canadian command. "Mr. Loft laid the matter very fully before the Chiefs and warriors who were present in large numbers," Superintendent Smith observed, but the chiefs "did not deem it proper to ask the Government to allow the formation of these companies, as the Indians already had an opportunity of enlisting through the 37th Haldimand Rifles." As the Council minutes noted, the 37th Battalion already had a strong membership from the reserve and was "standing ready to respond when called to do so by the Department of War."[35]

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Superintendent Gordon J. Smith in his office at the Six Nations Indian Agency, Brantford, Ontario, c. 1912.

Six Nations volunteers who had already answered the call and joined the first Canadian contingent found themselves on the Western Front in early-1915. Perhaps the most famous was Cameron Brant, a great-great-grandson of the famous Mohawk war chief Joseph Brant (Thayendanegea). Brant was born into a successful farming family on the New Credit Reserve on 12 August 1887. "From a young age he loved all things military," historian Donald Smith has explained, "and he avidly read books about war. Shortly after graduating from high school he attended the military school at Wolseley Barracks in London." He served with the 37th Regiment for six years until he moved to Hamilton to work in a sheet-metal shop. At the outbreak of war in 1914, he immediately signed up as a private. He was commissioned as a lieutenant at Valcartier and departed overseas with the first contingent in October. By February 1915, Brant and his unit were in France, where he earned respect as a "quiet and unobtrusive" officer who enjoyed the full confidence of his men. He proved his bravery and courage

during the Battle of Second Ypres in late April 1915 where he was killed leading his men in an advance on the German lines. His body was never recovered, but his gallantry and sacrifice – as the first Indian and first Brant County man killed in action during the war – were not forgotten.[36] Furthermore, the experience of William Lickers, a Six Nations volunteer who served in the 15th Battalion, validated the government's concern about potential German ill-treatment of Indian soldiers. Lickers was captured during the same battle and allegedly beaten by his German guards to see if Indians felt pain. He was paralyzed for the rest of his life.[37]

Despite the Council's opposition to involvement in the Canadian war effort, the Six Nations soldiers' sacrifice did not go unrecognized on the reserve. Mrs. A.M. Garlow, the Secretary of the Six Nations Women's Patriotic League, included the following in a letter to D.C. Scott in Ottawa on 15 May 1915:

> It gives me some degree of pride and satisfaction to know that there are some Six Nations blood [sic] being shed again although I was very much disappointed when the council turned down Col. Merritt's proposition who I honestly believe has the interest of the Six Nations at heart. My late father Josiah Hill who was yet Secretary for the Council when the matter was first brought up tried his best to convince the chiefs what it would mean to the Six Nations if they accepted and also if they refused. Another letter came after my father was dead and as the Executrice I opened it and at the next Council took it over to the chiefs but some of the chiefs who were always on the opposite side to Josiah Hill's views certainly turned us down roughly and I really believe the thoughtless way they tried to tear into my father's will was a vengeance for the part he took in patriotic interests.[38]

Her statement suggested that the whole issue of the war had become deeply politicized on the reserve and that the differences of opinion among the community's political leaders was causing tension at the Confederacy Council. D.C. Scott, in thanking Garlow and the other members of the Women's League for the comforts that they had provided to the Indians on active service, chose to simply ignore opponents on Council. He reaffirmed that he was "proud to know that the Six Nations are well represented at the front, and I am sure that the boys will uphold the traditions of their race, and give a good account of themselves in defence of the Empire."[39]

By the spring of 1915, any illusions of a glorious, short little war had been crushed: the boys had not returned home for Christmas and the Western

Courtesy of the Woodland Cultural Centre

Lieutenant Cameron Brant, the great-great-grandson of Joseph Brant, killed at the battle of 2nd Ypres in April 1915.

Front was mired in perpetual deadlock. The Canadians' "baptism of fire" at Second Ypres demonstrated that great courage and determination could lead to victory, but the casualty lists also reinforced that this was going to be a long and costly struggle. As the federal government's war aims evolved, Prime Minister Robert Borden also saw Canada's contributions as a way to leverage influence within the British Empire. The authorized strength of the CEF rose accordingly: to 150,000 in July 1915, to 250,000 in October 1915, and to 500,000 in January 1916. The military adopted a grassroots recruiting policy, authorizing enterprising individuals and communities to raise battalions independent of the militia.[40] F.R. Lalor, then Member of Parliament for Dunnville, was one such patriotic individual. He appealed to Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia and Defence, in November 1915: he and Lieutenant-Colonel Edwy Sutherland Baxter wanted to raise a battalion of 500-600 men from Haldimand County in southern Ontario. As a local militia commander, Baxter was known in the reserve community. The *Brantford Expositor* described Baxter as "one of the most popular men in the opinion of the Indians" when he visited the Council House to begin recruiting for the 114th.[41] Baxter "thinks he would have no trouble in raising that number of men, if permitted to use 200 or 250 Indians from the Reserve," Lalor explained. "He states that these men are good soldiers, and many of the best of them belong to the volunteer forces." Militia Headquarters approved the battalion, but made no mention of recruiting First Nations, which would have violated existing policy.[42]

When the 114th Battalion began recruiting, voluntary enlistment was reaching its climax. New enlistments peaked in the last quarter of 1915 and then quickly plummeted. Without an effective, centralized authority to manage the increasing number of units trolling their designated areas of the country

in search of recruits, competing units often reverted to desperate methods to raise the necessary number of new soldiers, including targeting men in other battalions' recruiting areas.[43] In the fierce competition, Baxter, who was from Cayuga and had commanded Indian militiamen in the 37th before the war,[44] believed that he had a largely untapped resource in the form of Six Nations men. He soon expressed frustration at outside officers poaching Indian recruits from the area assigned to the 114th. "As you know, I am depending largely on my four Indian companies" to organize the 114th, Baxter told his superiors in Toronto. The Assistant Adjutant-General reminded him that since the onset of the war, official policy discouraged Indian recruiting. Baxter knew that this policy had hardly been respected and he argued that Minister Hughes had given Lalor verbal permission to recruit Indians. On 6 December 1915, Baxter finally received formal authority to recruit on Six Nations "owing to the large number of applications for enlistment of Indians." This set an official precedent and the military soon sent word to battalions across the country to openly recruit Indian men.[45]

Major George Williams, the Toronto-based divisional recruiting officer, had high hopes for the potential Native soldiers. Baxter had commanded "companies of Indians in his old regiment for many years and is therefore well acquainted with their habits and dispositions, thereby constituting him particularly fitting to command these men." He also anticipated difficulties in recruiting to full strength on the reserve.[46] Indeed, securing government approval to recruit on Six Nations was only the first of Baxter's hurdles in raising two First Nations companies for his battalion. Although both he and Brigadier W.A. Logie had assured their superiors of the Six Nations men's eagerness to enlist, this celebrated enthusiasm failed to produce the necessary number of soldiers in practice. His first recruiting meeting, hastily arranged in late-1915, yielded only 35 recruits, far short of the 200-250 men Baxter anticipated.[47] If he was going to recruit two companies from Six Nations, he needed help.

Baxter made his case for recruiting directly to D.C. Scott, acknowledging that raising soldiers from the reserve proved more difficult than he had anticipated. Haldimand County's non-Native population was mostly Germans, farmers' sons and other people who were "certainly rendering us no assistance and are not furnishing any recruits." He needed the Six Nations' population to compensate for the otherwise lacklustre recruiting possibilities in the region. Baxter's supposed popularity on the reserve had not translated into high numbers of recruits and his officers described the reserve as "a most difficult constituency" for their enlistment appeals. In response, Scott expressed particular interest in this case and promised to "make some special effort" to ensure the 114th had two entirely Indian companies.[48]

Scott looked within his own department to help with Six Nations enlistment. Charles A. Cooke (née Thawennensere), an Iroquois fluent in English and several dialects of Iroquoian, had joined the DIA in 1893 and served as a clerk in the research branch.[49] He seemed an ideal candidate to support recruiting efforts amongst the Six Nations, according to the military's regional Adjutant-General, because he was "well known in all the Indian Reserves." Cooke's service fostered close cooperation between the DIA and the Department of Militia and Defence: he took orders from the district recruiting officer, while Scott paid his salary and travel expenses while he was recruiting.[50] Further blurring the lines between departments, Cooke became a temporary lieutenant with the 114th in February 1916 and began wearing an infantry officer's uniform, which he claimed, "had a wholesome influence with the Indians in winning them over to the cause of my mission."[51]

After an inspiring meeting with Lieutenant John Stacey, another Indian recruiter who believed that their shared background and cultural awareness would allow them "to reach the Indians where no white man could appeal to them,"[52] Cooke went to work enlisting men for the 114th. He spent the first week of February meeting with military and DIA officials, including Brantford Indian Agent Joseph McGibbon and Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter. McGibbon told Cooke that "the boys at Ohsweken [the reserve's main city] are still enlisting briskly," and he assured the DIA clerk that recruiting would only improve when Cooke began his campaign. Major Williams gave Cooke a course in the basics of recruiting work and indicated that he was "anxious to draw as many recruits from the Six Nations as possible." Cooke returned to Six Nations on 5 February and assessed the situation.[53]

The Six Nations Reserve southeast of Brantford had several population centres. Ohsweken was the reserve's unofficial capital and included the Council House, the doctor's residence, the Post Office, the No. 2 School, the Orange Hall, two large stores, a lumber mill, a small hotel, and the Six Nations Agricultural Exhibition Hall and Fair Grounds.[54] Soldiers with the 114th who had enlisted from the reserve were dispersed among four of the battalion's five details and billeted with local families. When Cooke arrived, the Ohsweken Detail had 74 soldiers from the reserve's central and western regions, the Caledonia Detail included 35 Six Nations from the eastern portion of the reserve, the 25 recruits of the Hagersville Detail came from both the New Credit Reserve and the adjacent southern area of the Six Nations, and the Cayuga Detail housed 20 Six Nations recruits. The Exhibition Hall right across from the Council House provided a focal point for local military activity. It served as a barracks and training ground for daily parades and drills, and every Thursday night featured free concerts by local acts like

the Grand River Indian Brass Band, who led the soldier and civilian audiences in patriotic songs. Cooke reported to Scott about the superb quality of the reserve's enlistees. The captain of the Ohsweken Detail praised the recruits, asserting they were "behaving themselves excellently…they are helping to keep order on the reserve and are always ready to give their services to any one needing some help."[55]

Cooke's recruiting effort began in earnest in early February 1916 with a busy schedule of meetings, speeches and concerts. The reserve's Christian denominations played a central role in Cooke's recruiting drive. To introduce himself to the community, Cooke attended Anglican, Methodist and Baptist church services on the reserve, spoke to the various congregations in both English and Mohawk, and performed two solos for the parishioners. He held recruiting meetings at five local churches in the days ahead, which included patriotic speeches by military and religious representatives, including Anglican Reverends Lee and Strong, Captain Reverend McPhail, and Methodist Missionary Private Shields. Local schools and the Agricultural Exhibition Hall also hosted major recruiting meetings. Cooke believed that the weekly soldiers' concerts at the Agricultural Exhibition Hall "have been responsible for much of the wholesome recruiting that has been made so far." These regular shows drew crowds in the hundreds, providing their organizers with large audiences for recruiting and patriotic messages. At the concert on 10 February 1916, for example, 400 people gathered in the Hall to listen to speeches from the 114th's chaplain, a private from the reserve, and Cooke. They sang along with soldiers in uniform to the Grand River Indian Brass band. Despite the general merriment of the evening, at the end, Cooke only recorded three new recruits.[56]

Cooke's recruiting campaign faced several major obstacles. Southern Ontario's February snowstorms wrought havoc on the reserve's mostly unpaved roads, making sleighing treacherous and extreme cold frequently impeded attendance at rallies.[57] But the greatest impediment to enlistment was human, not meteorological. Some men avoided meetings out of fear of being forced to enlist, so Cooke brought his appeals to them: he prepared a list of the individuals of military age so that sergeants and soldiers could go door-to-door looking for enlistees. Those wanting to avoid the roving recruiters still managed to do so. When an eligible young man spotted a soldier, he would run into the woods or brush to hide.[58]

Unlike the spontaneous individual evasions, Cooke's campaign met two organized opposition groups on the reserve. Religious divisions long predated the war, affecting social and political life in the community. In DIA's

1914 report, 871 Six Nations residents held "Aboriginal beliefs" (Longhouse followers) compared to 3,735 Christian parishioners, and although the two groups often made comfortable and friendly neighbours, they strictly avoided the others' social events.[59] The Confederacy Council provided the primary meeting ground for the Christian and Longhouse followers, and although the Council avoided favouring one or the other religious group, the chiefs openly fell into one faith group or another, lending the religious division a political element.[60] Cooke did not follow the Council's example of non-partisanship. Aware that Longhouse members were "very much opposed to any of their people going to war," Cooke attributed the low turnout at a recruiting meeting at Christ Church to the large number of Longhouse followers in the area. If the Longhouse members refused to attend Cooke's meetings, he would reciprocate their disinterest. The Lower Cayuga Longhouse invited the recruiting officer to their New Year celebration, but Cooke decided not to attend after learning that the participants intended to stop their ceremony when he arrived to protest recruiting on the reserve. Cooke denied the Longhouse members the opportunity to voice their opposition, claiming that he preferred "unsullied dignity to wounded pride."[61] Nonetheless, the recruiting officer acknowledged the Longhouse anti-war stance was hurting his effort to raise troops from the reserve.

Cooke met additional opposition to his mission from the Hereditary Chiefs; their attitudes varied significantly. Some favoured enlistment, while others declared themselves not only opposed to enlistment, but also to helping the Empire in general. Pro-enlistment chiefs A.G. Smith, J.S. Johnson, J.C. Martin and Joseph Montour accommodated Cooke and soldiers with the 114th. In fact, Johnson's son billeted troops from the Ohsweken Detail and Smith's son was a lieutenant who spoke with Cooke at recruiting rallies.[62] These supporters, however, did not represent a majority of Council members. Most of the reserve's 70 chiefs were indifferent or hostile to enlistment and Cooke believed their negative attitude had "given the indifferent some excuse to stay away from the recruiting stations, and has made our work doubly hard."[63] A controlling faction still insisted that they would only support enlistment if their ally Great Britain asked them. Cooke called this attitude "ridiculous," but he advised his superiors, "as these Chiefs have a certain following whom we are desirous to get, I am inclined to recommend that the Chiefs be pampered, in this instance, by acting along the lines suggested by them."[64]

A few chiefs went beyond indirect interference in the recruiting campaign. Cooke identified William Smith, Chauncey Garlow and Harry Martin as "openly pro-German." Baxter had observed the same hostility towards the war effort before Cooke's arrival, attributing the men's allegedly pro-German

assertions to the work of German agents on the reserve.[65] This bold assessment was not shared by the Militia Council, which issued a memorandum offering, "the deposed chiefs are more likely…to be actuated by personal spite than to have been corrupted by German gold."[66] Although not necessarily treasonous, Cooke condemned the Council's actions as contrary to their expressed alliance with Britain, not a defence of that position: "The much boasted loyalty of the nation to the British throne from the stand-point of the chiefs is more of a myth than a fact."[67] Cooke's connection with Indian Affairs meant that he could materially punish those who most ardently opposed his mission. For example, at Cooke's suggestion, Scott replaced anti-war William Smith with the pro-war A.G. Smith as an official interpreter on the reserve, rewarding support for enlistment with a salaried and influential posting.[68]

The community Cooke visited was unquestionably divided along religious and political lines. The recruiting campaign did not cause these divisions, but provided a focal point along which these conflicting groups might express themselves – the war was a new way to argue old points or entrench old positions. Cooke's much-touted ability to reach First Nations as an Iroquois himself could not overcome entrenched opposition in the Six Nations community. Reverend Edwin Lee, who spoke alongside Cooke at several recruiting meetings, wrote a letter of thanks to Scott on 28 February. Lee furnished a more positive assessment of Cooke's character than of his success at recruiting on the reserve, describing him as "a splendid man personally…. He has had a strenuous time since coming" to Six Nations. Indeed, Cooke's DIA credentials determined the types of relations he formed locally. In Lee's opinion, many people cooperated with Cooke for fear of potential consequences from Indian Affairs, of which many had "a wholesome dread." Otherwise people were inspired to work with Cooke to obtain "some special favours." Regardless, Lee wanted Cooke, who was then touring other reserves in Ontario, to return to Six Nations and resume local recruiting efforts.[69]

To the world outside the reserve, however, the opposition Cooke and Lee faced was either unapparent or inconvenient given the popular image of Indian patriotism and support for the war effort. The *Globe and Mail* celebrated Cooke's work only days after he arrived at Six Nations, claiming his "personal appeal has been very successful" in obtaining troops from the reserve for the 114th because, as the *Brantford Expositor* explained, Cooke understood "thoroughly…the ways and the way of thinking of the Red Indian of the northern part of this continent."[70] The newspaper, like Baxter and Scott beforehand, believed that Cooke could tap into the First Nations' community and draw its potential soldiers as non-Indian recruiting officers had failed to do. In the case of the

Six Nations, the local press lauded the community's material expression of loyalty. Even the 114th Battalion's nickname, the Brock Rangers, harked back to the War of 1812, where Six Nations warriors under Joseph Brant "contributed greatly to the crushing defeat inflicted on the enemy."[71] The *Brantford Expositor* declared that the Six Nations Reserve "has been most generous in men and money" for the war effort as part of a pan-Canadian First Nations' loyalty, displaying "the love the red man has for freedom."[72]

Cooke himself, who visited many reserves across Ontario and Québec during the war, credited his success to both his ethnicity and his connection to the DIA. Cooke privileged the DIA as "the only source of authority with the Indians" and therefore the only government body that could encourage enlistment; he identified himself as uniquely qualified to lead the recruiting campaign as "the only male Indian employed in the Service at Ottawa and conversant with the languages of two of the leading Indian Nations."[73] Placing his recruiting campaign within the broader Indian-government relationship, Cooke considered himself a good will missionary: "my visits have done much to reconvince the Indians that our Government is willing to recognize its wards by honouring them in having one in its service."[74] Back in Ottawa, Cooke was denied leave to go overseas with the 114th. Instead, to fulfil his "sense of duty to my country" and to ensure he did "something more manly than I am doing to further the cause of the Empire," Cooke presented himself to the Minister of Militia to engage in "systematic and aggressive work in stimulating recruiting among the Indians."[75] Cooke wanted to continue his work for the war effort, offering to others the experience of going overseas that he could not have.

Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter could not help with recruiting from February onwards: he fell ill with "la grippe" and did not recover. Eighty-five Six Nations men who had enlisted in the battalion paraded with their non-Native comrades at his funeral on 17 February 1916. Despite the sombre circumstances, Cooke took pride in the Indian soldiers' conduct and presentation, relating to Scott the divisional officers' praise of the "splendid appearance and behaviour of our boys."[76] Despite the opposition that recruiting officers faced within the community, those who volunteered impressed military officials as excellent soldiers. In life, Baxter believed that Six Nations men made excellent soldiers: hopefully he would take comfort in being vindicated as the Native recruits paid their respects to their fallen commander.

Andrew Thompson took up the reigns of the 114th after Baxter's death. Described by one historian as a "typical CEF commander," Thompson had been born in Cayuga, was a lawyer, a member of the Rideau and Ottawa

CHAPTER 4

Courtesy of James Moses

An old Moses family photograph: this is a photo-postcard, dated 29 July 1917, sent from France by Lieutenant Jim Moses back to his father Nelson Moses on Six Nations. Moses felt it worth noting the ethnicity of his brother officers: an interesting commentary in view of the rising sense of Canadian national identity in the months following the battle of Vimy Ridge. Apparently Moses does not see any contradiction in the maintenance of strong ethnic identities within the context of an overarching Canadian national identity: one could claim "Canada" as their country, while still claiming "Delaware" as their nation.

Clubs, an editor of the *Military Gazette*, and president of the Ottawa Canadian Club. He was elected to Parliament in the 1900 federal election as the Liberal member for Haldimand, a seat that his father had held for many years. Like his predecessor, Baxter, he had also been an officer in the 37th Haldimand Rifles before the war.[77] Thompson also continued Baxter's effort to recruit First Nations' soldiers for the 114th, both sending his own officers out to different Ontario reserves and continuing the battalion's joint recruiting effort with the DIA. Lieutenant Jim Moses from Six Nations travelled north recruiting on reserves such as Christian Island and Thompson relayed his reports on "the Northern Campaign" back to Scott.[78] To help Cooke's own campaign, Thompson covered $75 of the $100 for the officer's uniform Cooke wore to impress potential recruits.[79] Once in uniform, Thompson sought to help the Indian soldiers enjoy the same benefits as their non-Native comrades. When the battalion's paymaster raised concerns over whether Native troops could support their claim for Separation Allowance with documents of their marriage, Thompson appealed directly to Scott to ensure that the potential bureaucratic confusion did not hurt the soldiers' wives and families.[80] In short, the change in leadership of the 114th did not alter the unit's emphasis on enlisting First Nations soldiers.

Scott and Thompson maintained a positive relationship in their united effort to recruit members of the Six Nations and other First Nations generally into the 114th. In recognition of Scott's contribution to his unit, Thompson invited the Deputy Superintendent to visit their camp. He stressed that the Indian soldiers were "a really fine lot" and both he and the Indians in his battalion would appreciate his presence. Thompson even made Scott an honourary member of the battalion's mess.[81] Scott returned the compliment and supported the unit's goal of recruiting from reserves beyond Six Nations. In his instructions to Indian Agent R. J. Lewis of Manitowaning, which were designed to facilitate enlistment efforts, Scott described Thompson as "a splendid officer" who led a "fine battalion."[82] The men cooperated to maximize enlistments for the good of the war effort, but also because Scott believed that the war would be good for the Indian soldiers themselves. Foreshadowing postwar political struggles in Six Nations, Scott believed "that any Indian who joins it [the 114th] will be well treated and that his association with the battalion would be a credit to him in the future."[83]

Despite Scott's assertions, opposition from the Longhouses, which represented the majority of the chiefs and the Council itself, frustrated recruiting officers on the Six Nations Reserve, whether military or civilian, Native or non-Native. The failure of the 114th to recruit two full companies from Six Nations, as Baxter had originally planned, seems to prove that local opposi-

tion to enlistment was successful. While government documents expressed similar disillusionment – one from early-1917 going so far as to claim that "no large number [of Indians] have enlisted"[84] – the level of voluntary enlistment at Six Nations by the end of 1916 was remarkable, given entrenched opposition on the reserve. The 114th was able to raise at least 200 men from Six Nations, the majority of whom enlisted between December 1915 and May 1916, when the 114th left for training at Camp Borden, Ontario.[85] Although initial recruiting projections proved overly optimistic and failed to appreciate the local dynamics on the reserve, to conclude that the exercise was a complete failure overlooks the men who defied community leaders and joined the CEF. Recruiting on Six Nations was neither a complete failure nor an unmitigated success, but a complicated story reflecting the complex nature of the community itself.

This case study reinforces that First Nations cannot be adequately theorized as a monolithic group, neither on the national nor local levels. While the literature on Aboriginal peoples' contributions to the world wars tends to draw sweeping conclusions based on anecdotal evidence from communities across the country, this chapter demonstrates that Six Nations was a complex community with competing political and military priorities that demands careful attention and belies easy generalization. During the First World War, recruiters needed to be aware that they were not speaking to a single "Indian" constituency, but to a diverse community replete with internal factions that could inhibit recruiting efforts. Furthermore, high rates of voluntary enlistments reinforce that the Hereditary Chiefs did not embody all "popular opinion" in the community: most of the chiefs opposed enlistment, but several hundred Six Nations men enlisted nonetheless. Many of the Six Nations men who served overseas and returned to the community at war's end were at the forefront of a political movement dedicated to replacing the Hereditary Council with an elected body.[86] The politics of war were not a unifying force at Six Nations any more than they were in Canada at large.

ENDNOTES

Thanks to Richard Holt and Andrew Iarocci for sharing research data with us, and to Jennifer Arthur, Geoff Hayes, Simon Palamar and Scott Sheffield for comments. A St. Jerome's University Faculty Research Grant facilitated newspaper and archival research in the fall of 2006 and made this study possible.

1 E.P. Johnson, "The Iroquois of the Grand River," *Harper's Weekly*, New York, 23 June 1894.
2 D.C. Scott, "Indians and the Great War," *Report of the Deputy Superintendent General for Indian Affairs* (Ottawa: 1920), 16.
3 Enos Montour, *The Feathered U.E.L.'s: An Account of the Life and Times of Certain Canadian Native People* (Toronto: United Church of Canada, 1973), 97-8.

[4] Barbara Wilson, ed., *Ontario and the First World War, 1914-1918* (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1977), cxii.
[5] Robert Rutherdale, *Hometown Horizons: Local Responses to Canada's Great War* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), xiii-xiv.
[6] A few examples include Paul Maroney, "'The Great Adventure': The Context and Ideology of Recruiting in Ontario, 1914-1917," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 77, No. 1 (1996), 62-98; Ian Miller, *Our Glory and Our Grief: Torontonians and the Great War* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1999); Rutherdale, *Hometown Horizons*; and, Nikolas Gardner, *The Great War and Waterloo County: Raising the 118th Battalion C.E.F.* (Wilfrid Laurier University Faculty of Graduate Studies Cognate Essay Series, 1994).
[7] James W. St.G. Walker, "Race and Recruitment in World War 1: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (March 1989), 3.
[8] On the Canadian experience in the First World War, see for example Fred Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers* (Penticton: Theytus Books, 1985); "Canadian Indians and World War One," *The Tomorrow File*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (30 November 1983) reprinted in *Saskatchewan Indian Federated College Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1984), 65-72; L. James Dempsey, "The Indians and World War One," *Alberta History*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1983); L. James Dempsey, *Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1999); Walker, "Race and Recruitment," 1-26; and, Janice Summerby, *Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields* (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993). For more on the historiography, see Lackenbauer's and Sheffield's chapter in this volume.
[9] Wilson, *Ontario and the First World War*, cxii-iii.
[10] The Six Nations are a confederacy of Indian peoples established in the late-16th century. The confederacy originally included the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga and Seneca (the Five Nations). The Tuscarora joined in the early-18th century. See Charles M. Johnston, *The Valley of Six Nations: A Collection of Documents on the Indian Lands of the Grand River* (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1964), xxviii. On alliances, see Barbara Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1962) and Robert S. Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies: British Indian Policy in the Defence of Canada, 1774-1815* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1993). For solid introductions to the Six Nations, see Sally Weaver's chapters in E.S. Rogers and D.B. Smith, eds., *Aboriginal Ontario* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1994), 167-272; Daniel K. Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); and Sally M. Weaver, "Six Nations of the Grand River, Ontario," in Bruce C. Trigger, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians, Volume 15: Northeast* (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978).
[11] Quotations from Carl Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998) and Montour, *The Feathered U.E.L.'s*, 73. See also, Graymont, *The Iroquois in the American Revolution*, 285, and Weaver, "Six Nations," 525. The actual text of the Haldimand proclamation reads: "Whereas His Majesty having been pleased to direct that in Consideration of the early Attachment to His Cause manifested by the Mohawk Indians, & of the Loss of their Settlement they thereby sustained, I do hereby in His Majesty's name, authorize and permit the said Mohawk Nation and such other of the Six Nations as wish to settle in that Quarter to take Possession of & Settle upon the Banks of the River commonly called Ouse or Grand River." While the Six Nations believed that they owned the land in fee simple as sovereign allies of the Crown (and not its subjects), the British maintained that legal title (which they had purchased from the Mississauga Indians) was vested in the Crown.
[12] The recent land dispute over development at Caledonia is a prime example of this.

[13] Norman Knowles, *Inventing the Loyalists* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 86-8, 116-25 and 147-50, and Carl Berger, *The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism 1867-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), 78-108.
[14] Department of Indian Affairs [DIA], *Annual Report*, 1914, 34, 81 and 103, Part II, 15. Longhouse adherents who practiced "Aboriginal beliefs" focused on retaining the traditional customs and ritual cycle, Iroquois languages, the Confederacy form of government, traditional social structure and healing practices. Their philosophy was based upon the moral teachings of Handsome Lake. See Weaver, "The Iroquois," 196-7 and 214-17.
[15] See, for example, Weaver, "The Iroquois," 218-23; the DIA *Annual Reports* from the early-20th century; and Rolf Knight, *Indians At Work: An Informal History of Native Labour in British Columbia, 1848-1930*, rev. ed. (Vancouver: New Star, 1996).
[16] Mike O'Brien, "Manhood and the Militia Myth: Masculinity, Class and Militarism in Ontario, 1902-1914," *Labour/Le Travail*, Vol. 42 (Fall 1998), 124.
[17] Presented as Andrew Iarocci, "Six Nations Volunteers in the First World War: A Statistical Portrait," Tri-University History Conference, University of Guelph, November 2006.
[18] O'Brien, "Manhood and the Militia Myth," 124.
[19] File 593-1-7, Vol. 1221, Record Group [RG] 24, *Library and Archives Canada* [*LAC*], as quoted in Wilson, *Ontario and the First World War*, cx. On its popular acceptance, see Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers*; Thomas Britten, *American Indians in World War I* (Albequerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997); Walker, "Race and Recruitment"; Summerby, *Native Soldiers*; and Frances Henry et al., *The Colour of Democracy: Racism in Canadian Society* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace, 1994), 68.
[20] While Walker and others hold this policy up as an example of simple racism, it was careful to proclaim that British soldiers would welcome serving alongside Indians. Thanks to Richard Holt for his valuable insights on the supposed "prohibition" policy, based upon his careful review of the Alexander Emerson Belcher Fonds at the *Archives of Ontario* and other previously unexplored archival sources. Reaffirmation of this exclusion policy can be found in Deputy Minister [DM], Department of Militia and Defence [DMD], to DM, DIA, 22 October 1915, file 452-13, Vol. 6766, RG 10, *LAC*.
[21] Wilson, *Ontario and the First World War*, cxi, and, File 452-124-1, Vol. 3180, RG 10, *LAC*. *Warriors: A Resource Guide* (Brantford: Woodland Indian Cultural Education Centre, 1986), 17, lists the following men from the Six Nations and New Credit Reserves as enlisting in August: Cameron Brant, Alfred Styres, Albert Crane, William Monture, Elgin Brant, Frank Monture, Nathan Monture, Thomas Secord, Sherman Thomas and Charles Thomas.
[22] Copy from minute book by Josiah Hill, Secretary, Six Nations Council, Oshweken Council House, 15 September 1914; D.C. Scott to Gordon J. Smith, 21 September 1914; and Smith to Scott, 26 September 1914, File 452-2 pt. 1, Vol. 6762, RG 10, *LAC*. Scott noted on the latter document that the Six Nations "think" they do not belong to Canada, obviously indicating his disagreement.
[23] The Six Nations Council insisted on forwarding the $1,500 directly to imperial authorities in England, but a DIA memorandum on Indian contributions to the various war funds circulated on 10 December 1915 indicated that the Canadian government never received the Six Nations' 1914 offer. See Gordon Smith to D.C. Scott, 26 October 1914, File 452-2 pt. 1, Vol. 6762, RG 10, *LAC*; J.D. McLearn to the Canadian Facts Publishing Co., attachment "War Donations," 10 December 1915, Ibid.
[24] "Company of Indians," *Brantford Expositor*, 29 October 1914, 7. The *Toronto World*, on 14 November 1914, reported that 12 "Indian Braves" from the 37th Regiment had enlisted with the 19th Battalion. Thanks to Richard Holt for sharing this source.
[25] Merritt served in the 1885 Northwest Rebellion, sought permission to see active service with a British regiment during the Boer War and, when his request was denied, paid his own way

to South Africa where he was given a commission in Brabant's Horse, a corps of irregulars organized to combat Boer commandos, and served as a staff officer. In late-1900, he offered to raise a regiment of dominion irregulars (to be called the Canadian Rangers) for service in the war, but Ottawa blocked his offer because it no longer favoured private recruiting schemes at that point in the conflict. Nevertheless, he became second-in-command of the 2nd Regiment, Canadian Mounted Rifles, tried to revive his proposal to form a battalion of "Canadian Rangers," and subverted the authority of his commanding officer. An accident – Merritt was thrown from a mule and remained in a convalescent camp until the regiment left for home in June 1902 – saved him from formal censure. See Paul Maroney and Stephen Harris, "Merritt, William Hamilton," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* [online], www.biographi.ca.

26 Wilson, *Ontario and the First World War*, cxi; Six Nations Council Minutes, 3 November 1914, File 218, 222-181 Vol. 3015, RG 10, *LAC*.

27 Scott R. Trevithick, "Conflicting Outlooks: The Background to the 1924 Deposing of the Six Nations Hereditary Council," Unpublished MA thesis, University of Calgary, 1998, 72.

28 *Brantford Expositor*, 5 November 1914, 6. Thanks to Richard Holt for sharing this source.

29 Wilson, *Ontario and the First World War*, cxi; Six Nations Council Minute, 17 November 1914, File 452-13, Vol. 6766, RG 10, *LAC*; Superintendent, Brantford to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 26 November 1914, Ibid. For a classic statement of Allied status, see Ononadaga Chiefs [33 signatures], Ohsweken Council House of the Six Nations Indians, to Hon. D. Laird, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 17 August 1876, File 6897, Vol. 1995, RG 10, *LAC*.

30 File 894, Vol. 91,394, RG 6, *LAC*.

31 Trevithick, "Conflicting Outlooks," 72. In the 1823 case of *The King v. Phelps*, the Court of King's Bench for Upper Canada ruled that Indians were subjects of the Crown, not its allies. Since *Calvin's Case* of 1608, British law held that the Crown's jurisdiction is co-terminal with the boundaries of the country and there could not exist "a sovereign state within a sovereign state." Donald J. Bourgeois, "The Six Nations: A Neglected Aspect of Canadian Legal History," *Canadian Journal of Native Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1986), 260-1.

32 Merritt to Stanton, 2 January 1915, File 14071F, Vol. 549, G21, RG 7, *LAC*, reprinted in Wilson, *Ontario and the First World War*, 172; also see Ibid., cxi and 172-73.

33 Wilson, *Ontario and the First World War*, cxi and 173.

34 DIA *Annual Report*, 1915, Part II, 16.

35 Asa R. Hill and Chief J.S. Johnson, Six Nations Council, 24 March 1915, File 452-13, Vol. 6766, RG 10, *LAC*; Superintendent, Brantford to Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 28 April 1915, Ibid.

36 Donald B. Smith, "Brant, Cameron Dee," *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* [online], www.biographi.ca. On the 4th Battalion at Second Ypres, see Andrew Iarocci, "The 'Mad Fourth': The 4th Canadian Infantry Battalion at War, 1914-1916," Unpublished MA thesis, University of Western Ontario, 2001, 24-32.

37 Desmond Morton, *When Your Number's Up* (Toronto: Random House, 1993), 220.

38 Mrs. A.M. Garlow to D.C. Scott, 15 May 1915, File 452-5 pt. 1, Vol. 6763, RG 10, *LAC*.

39 Scott to Garlow, 22 May 1915, Ibid.

40 R.C. Brown & D. Loveridge, "Unrequited Faith: Recruiting the CEF 1914-1918," *International Review of Military History*, Vol. 51 (1982), 59. For an accessible overview of Borden's policies, see John English, "Political Leadership in the First World War" in David MacKenzie, ed., *Canada and the First World War: Essays in Honour of Robert Craig Brown* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), and R.C. Brown, "Borden, Sir Robert Laird" in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography* [online], www.biographi.ca.

41 "Recruited 35 Men on the Reserve, Recruiting Meeting at Ohsweken for Haldimand was Successful," *Brantford Weekly Expositor*, 10 December 1915, 1.

[42] F.R. Lalor to Sir Sam Hughes, 3 November 1915, and Adjutant-General [AG] to General Officer Commanding [GOC] 2nd Division, 9 November 1915, Vol. 8, File 593-6-2, Vol. 1397, RG 24, *LAC*. Thanks to Richard Holt for sharing this source. As the demand for men outstripped voluntary supply, recruiters sought to change the Militia Council's stance towards enlisting First Nations. Between 9 October and 11 October 1915 alone, three Ontario men, Methodist Missionary J.C. Nethercott of Moraviantown, J.E. Armstrong of Petrolia, and Indian Agent W.R. Brown of Port Arthur, wrote to the AG or to the DIA inquiring as to whether the Militia Council had reversed their decision about enlisting Indians. See AG to J.E. Armstrong, 18 October 1915; AG to J.C. Nethercott, 18 October 1915; and W.R. Brown to D.C. Scott, 9 October 1915, Vol. 1, File 593-1-7, Vol. 1221, RG 24, *LAC*. On 2 November 1915, the *Brantford Daily Expositor* published a rumour circulating within "military [circles] in Ontario" that the CEF was considering organizing an entirely Native overseas battalion. See "Military Matters: For Local Indians," *The Brantford Daily Expositor*, 2 November 1916, 6.

[43] Brown and Loveridge, "Unrequited Faith," 60.

[44] Box 518 – 9, Accession 1992-93/166, RG 150, *LAC*.

[45] GOC 2nd Division to Secretary Militia Council, 23 November 1915 and 27 November 1915, File 593-1-7 pt. 1, Vol. 1221, RG 24, *LAC*; AG to GOC 2nd Division, 6 December 1915, Ibid.; DM, DMD to Assistant Deputy and Secretary, DIA, 9 December 1915, File 452-13, Vol. 6766, RG 10, *LAC*.

[46] Officer-in-Charge, Divisional Recruiting Headquarters, Toronto, to Minister of Indian Affairs, 27 January 1916, File 452-13, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.

[47] Ibid. See also Lieutenant-Colonel E.S. Baxter to D.C. Scott, 21 January 1916, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.

[48] Baxter to Scott, 21 January 1916, Ibid.; D. C. Scott to Brigadier General W.A. Logie, 22 January 1916, Ibid.

[49] Cooke was born in Oka, Québec in 1870 and attended the reserve's Methodist Mission school until his family moved to the Gibson reserve where Charles went to Mount Elgin residential school and then the Gravenhurst public school. After brief stints as a teacher on the Gibson reserve and a clerk with the Georgian Bay Lumber Company, Cooke joined Indian Affairs. See B. Edwards, "An Aboriginal intermediary and print culture: Charles A. Cooke (Thawennensere) and Indian Affairs in Canada, 1893-1926," paper presented to the Symposium on Book History and Print Culture, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, 2 June 2004; Canada, *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended 30th June 1897*, 482; Canada, *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended 30th June 1901*, pt. II, 230.

[50] Officials at the DMD's Ottawa headquarters interviewed Cooke in Ottawa on 26 January 1916. See Temporary Pass to Charles A Cooke to Department of Militia and Defence, Ottawa, 26 January 1916, Vol. 1, File 593-1-7, Vol. 1221, RG 10, *LAC*. See also AG to GOC 2nd Division, 31 January 1916, Ibid., and D.C. Scott to Major G.H. Williams, 5 February 1916, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.

[51] Cooke to Scott, 4 April 1916, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Cooke to Scott, 1 February 1916; Cooke to Scott, 3 February 1916, 1-2; Report for the Week ending 12 February 1916, 1, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.

[54] Weaver, "The Iroquois," 231.

[55] Report for the Week ending 12 February 1916, 2 and 4-6, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*. By 1916, the Exhibition building and grounds included a large exhibition hall, dining rooms, cattle sheds and a horse race track. See Weaver, "The Iroquois," 221-22.

[56] Report for the Week ending 12 February 1916, 4, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*. See also, Report for the Week ending 19 February 1916, Ibid.

[57] Ibid.
[58] Report for the Week ending 12 February 1916, 2, Ibid.; Report for the Week ending 19 February 1916, 1, Ibid.
[59] DIA *Annual Report 1914*, Six Nations of Grand River; Weaver, "The Iroquois," 213-18.
[60] Weaver, "The Iroquois," 214.
[61] Report for the Week ending 12 February 1916, 3, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.
[62] Cooke to Scott, 4 March 1916, 1, Ibid.
[63] Report for the Week ending 12 February 1916, 6, Ibid.
[64] Cooke to Scott, 4 March 1916, Ibid.
[65] Ibid. See also Lieutenant-Colonel Baxter to Major George Williams, 15 December 1915, Vol. 1, File 593-1-7, Vol. 1221, RG 24, *LAC*.
[66] Memorandum, DMD, 28 December 1915, Ibid.
[67] Report for the Week ending 12 February 1916, 6, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.
[68] Cooke to Scott, 4 March 1916, and Scott to Chief William Smith, 7 March 1916, Ibid.
[69] Reverend Erwin Lee to Scott, 28 February 1916, Ibid.
[70] Ibid. See also, "90 Indians Join 114th Battalion," *Globe and Mail*, 8 February 1916, and "Indians Respond Splendidly to Call of Empire with Men and Money," *Brantford Weekly Expositor*, 22 June 1916.
[71] "'Brock's Rangers' an Appropriate Title for Six Nations' Indians," *Brantford Weekly Expositor*, 13 April 1916, 4.
[72] Utica Globe, "Loyalty of the Indians," *Brantford Weekly Expositor*, 29 June 1916, 7.
[73] Cooke to Minister of Militia, 15 December 1916, File 593-1-7, Vol. 1221, RG 10, *LAC*.
[74] Cooke to Scott, 4 April 1916, 5, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.
[75] Cooke to Minister of Militia, 15 December 1916, 2, File 593-1-7, Vol. 1221, RG 10, *LAC*.
[76] Cooke to Scott, 3 February 1916, 1, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*; Report for the Week ending 19 February 1916, 1, Ibid.
[77] Maroney, "The Great Adventure," fn.13.
[78] Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson to Scott, 20 April 1916, File 452-7, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.
[79] Cooke to Scott, 4 April 1916, Ibid.
[80] Thompson to Scott, 10 March 1916, and Scott to Thompson, 13 March 1916, Ibid.
[81] Thompson to Scott, 13 April 1916, Ibid.
[82] Scott to Indian Agent R.J. Lewis, 30 May 1916, Ibid.
[83] Ibid.
[84] DM, DMD to Deputy Superintendent General, DIA, 11 January 1917, File 452-13, Vol. 6765, RG 10, *LAC*.
[85] "City & Vicinity," *Brantford Weekly Expositor*, 18 May 1916, 12.
[86] See Trevithick, "Conflicting Outlooks," and E. Brian Titley, *A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986) for overviews of the postwar political movement, as well as John Moses' chapter in this volume.

CHAPTER 5

The Return of the Native: Six Nations Veterans and Political Change at the Grand River Reserve, 1917-1924

John Moses

In 1924, the traditional Council of Confederacy Chiefs at the Six Nations of the Grand River Indian Reserve in southern Ontario was replaced as the officially recognized governing body of that reserve by an elected band council system organized as per *Indian Act* regulations. Prevailing ideology on the reserve today, and elsewhere, maintains that this change occurred as an arbitrary and unilateral intervention of the federal government in order to speed assimilation of this Native community.[1] The historical record, however, reveals other forces at work relating directly to the participation of Six Nations veterans of the First World War.

Were these veterans the vanguard of a new warrior elite, galvanized by their wartime experiences overseas, who in the aftermath of the Great War spearheaded a grassroots movement for political change? Or were their efforts instigated and co-opted by other pre-existing bodies, locally or federally, within the framework of a larger national agenda for Native assimilation? The thesis posited here is that the 1924 implementation of elected band council government on the Six Nations of the Grand River Reserve occurred at the instigation of a small but vocal minority of Six Nations residents themselves, not as the result of unilateral government intervention to speed assimilation, and that newly returned Six Nations veterans of the Great War constituted an elite body at the forefront of this movement for profound political change. As with groups of Great War veterans elsewhere across the country who felt a disconnect between the magnitude of their wartime sacrifices overseas and the political, economic and social prospects to which they returned in peacetime, so too did Six Nations veterans of the Great War return to an environment that they found unresponsive to their needs and aspirations.

Although always known historically as the Six Nations Reserve, the membership list actually incorporates 13 distinct bands.[2] Additionally, over the span of the generations since the reserve's founding, there has been signifi-

cant intermarriage with non-Natives and with other Native groups from across southern Ontario. Also, at the time of its founding, smaller remnant bands of other nations were present including Tutelo, Nanticoke and Delaware, although following the first two or three generations of intermarriage into the larger bands, with the exception of the Delaware, these had ceased to exist as separate entities.

The Six Nations of the Grand River Territory was established by the terms of the Haldimand Deed, dated 24 October 1784. The land grant occurred as compensation for traditional Six Nations lands which were lost to the Americans during the Revolution. The original terms and conditions of the Haldimand Deed were later confirmed in the Simcoe Patent of 14 January 1794. The original extent of the Haldimand Tract itself was but a portion of a larger area purchased from the Mississauga by the British Crown on 22 May 1784, in accordance with principles and procedures articulated in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.

From the time of its founding until the major political change that occurred in 1924, Grand River residents were governed by a Six Nations Council of Confederacy Chiefs, according to principles and procedures articulated in the *Kayanerenhkowa* (the Great Law or the Great Peace) which incorporates both the origin narrative and oral constitution of the original Five Nations Confederacy of Iroquois. The Great Law, the inception of which predates European contact, allows for the appointment of 50 male hereditary chieftanships overall, based upon the maternal clan affiliation of representatives from the various national groups comprising the five original nations: the Seneca, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida and Mohawk. The Tuscarora joined the Confederacy by 1720, thus creating the Six Nations proper. Like other dependent groups at Grand River, however, they had limited say and representation within the Confederacy Council beyond matters relating directly to their own members. Vacancies for chieftanships were filled at the recommendation of clan mothers, acting on behalf of each clan within each nation. On a limited basis, other adult males could be delegated as non-hereditary "pine tree chiefs" with limited authority, usually in recognition of their oratorical skills and knowledge of Confederacy lore and protocol. All decisions involving important matters of state were to be achieved through consensus. While undeniably compelling in concept and design, in its practical implementation, such a system was prone to duplication and oversight. Surviving records from Grand River throughout the 19th century indicate that the number of claimants for the 50 hereditary chieftanships available varied between 57 recorded in 1847, to 62 in 1899, with a high of 76 recorded in 1895.[3]

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From the 1790s to the 1840s, the original extent of the Grand River Tract (six miles deep along either bank of the Grand River from its mouth to its source) was dramatically reduced as the Confederacy Chiefs transferred lands to non-Native ownership; sometimes Crown officials or other Indians claiming to act with the chiefs' endorsement were themselves responsible for such transfers. During the 1830s and 1840s in particular, major land transactions and failed business investments utilizing band funds eroded the land base even further. The reserve had assumed what remain its present boundaries by 1847. All of these land transactions and failed business ventures had occurred while the reserve was under the management and jurisdiction of the Confederacy Chiefs. As a consequence, by 1861, an organized reform movement had emerged on the reserve among a minority of Six Nations band members themselves, calling for nothing less than the replacement of the Confederacy Chiefs with an elected band council system.[4] The people at the forefront of this reform movement were predominantly non-Five Nations band members, mainly Christianized Tuscaroras and Delawares. For the most part, these reformers were increasingly prosperous farmers and small business owners who, under the organizational structure of the traditional system, had little likelihood of ever wielding any political influence within council. Insofar as their reform efforts were metaphorically aimed at removing the deer antler headdresses or "horns" which distinguished the headgear of hereditary Confederacy Chiefs, these reform activists came to be called the Dehorner Party. The Dehorners felt that in view of its poor record of business investments and land transactions, the Council of Confederacy Chiefs had to be replaced for the greater good and future prospects of the community as a whole.

By the second half of the 19th century, the reserve population thus included two major groups: one oriented toward Christian (Protestant) religious affiliation, which supported a democratically inspired but non-traditional form of government, and the other with a more conservative Iroquoian Longhouse outlook, which supported the hereditary form of leadership under the Confederacy Chiefs. Allegiances between the groups were fluid, however, and depending upon the issues at hand, individual persons might espouse support for the Confederacy Chiefs on some matters, while supporting the Dehorners on others. Christian religious affiliation, moreover, did not automatically equate to support for the Dehorner movement. Another influential group during this era was the Mohawk Workers, whose members were Anglican in religious affiliation, but staunch supporters of the Confederacy Chiefs in terms of their politics. Thus, from the 1860s to the 1920s, a sometimes bewildering plethora of petitions and counter-petitions, and delegations and counter-delegations, is visible, as respective supporters of the

Confederacy Chiefs, or the Dehorners, or the Mohawk Workers, presented their claims and counter-claims before government. In some instances, these were directed to the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, in others, to the Governor General. In yet other instances, they were directed to the British sovereign at Buckingham Palace or, following the Great War, to the League of Nations and the International Court of Justice at Geneva and The Hague.[5]

LAC PA-120204.

Delegates to the Six Nations Conference, Ottawa, Parliament Hill, 31 March 1910.

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The research presented here charts the course by which the sons and grandsons of the original Dehorner Party became active in the Dominion militia movement, volunteered for service with the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) during the Great War against the wishes of the Confederacy Chiefs, and manifested a Dehorner ideology while overseas with which they returned to the reserve in 1919. In the hyper-nationalistic and patriotic environment of postwar Canada, these newly returned Six Nations veterans capitalized upon their status as Dominion Great War veterans and the ideal of the warrior tradition within orthodox Iroquois culture, something which neither the Confederacy Chiefs nor their non-combatant supporters of military age could claim legitimately. Although during the early decades of its existence the Dehorner movement received little support from the federal government because they were a minority voice on the reserve, the status of veterans in postwar Canada could not be ignored. Their numbers notwithstanding, their concerns had to be addressed by the federal government. In effect, the Six Nations veterans of the Great War constituted, in sociological terms, an elite.

Aboriginal support for Canadian military involvement during the Great War, as extensive as it ultimately was, was by no means universal.[6] The cultural, political, legal and economic pressures for Native peoples to participate, or not participate, were extreme. Before the war ended, these dynamics served to divide communities and families. Some spokespersons maintained that prior treaties or other agreements with the Crown, combined with the force and effect of the federal *Indian Act* legislation of that era, effectively exempted their band members from any legal or moral liability for military service. Others felt that their participation in the war effort would enhance their claims toward full citizenship and legal equality in Canada come peacetime.

At the outbreak of war, the Confederacy Chiefs made it known that until such time as the British sovereign formally approached the Six Nations with a request for military aid, or until such time as Germany herself declared war upon the Six Nations Confederacy of Iroquois, the chiefs were compelled under Iroquois customary law to maintain a stance of diplomatic neutrality. Any enlistments by Six Nations band members, they said, were personal decisions and would receive no endorsement, support or recognition from the Confederacy Chiefs. As an indication of the chiefs' waning influence over band members, and in defiance of this stance, out of a total reserve population of approximately 4,500 in 1914, 292 men and one woman voluntarily attested for service overseas, the majority of whom enlisted in the largely Native 114th and later the 107th Battalions of the CEF. Of these, 29 were killed in action, five died of wounds or illness, one became a prisoner of war and one was reported missing in action.[7]

These two battalions were unique in Canada's Great War military establishment in that they were filled with large numbers of status Indians from reserves in Ontario, Québec and the Prairie provinces. The 107th Battalion was raised in Winnipeg at the instigation of Indian Affairs Branch official A.G. Campbell, while the 114th Battalion was raised in Brant and Haldimand counties (which encompassed the Six Nations Reserve). The latter was disbanded soon after its arrival in England, with its members being assigned as reinforcements to other battalions already at the front. The bulk of these soldiers were transferred to the 107th Battalion. It was while serving with this unit that the Six Nations troops undertook their agitation for political change back at the Grand River.

While the Six Nations troops were overseas, a number of events unfolded on the reserve that served to invoke the soldiers' ire with respect to the war stance of the Confederacy Chiefs. Principal among these was the chiefs' negative attitude toward recruiting on reserve lands and the application of the *Military Service Act*; their unwillingness to provide financial assistance to soldiers' families using band funds; and, the chiefs' vow that come peace-time, they were not prepared to see reserve lands given over in fee simple ownership to returning Six Nations veterans, as per the terms of a proposed *Soldier Settlement Act*. Many of the Six Nations troops were the sons and grandsons of original reform agitators in the Dehorner movement. A few of the older soldiers had themselves been active in the movement before the war. In response to the chiefs' attitude, these frontline troops soon coalesced as a distinct reform movement in their own right and as an adjunct to the existing Dehorners. Their first petition is dated France, 8 August 1917, just days before the 107th Battalion's involvement in major fighting for Hill 70 near Lens and Vimy. Its preamble reads:

> We the undersigned soldiers in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, and members of the Six Nations Indians, of the Grand River, regret very much that circumstances have made it so, we can no longer look on our present council with respect and confidence, and we therefore sign this as an agreement, to do all in our power to rid our nation of the said council, and in its place to establish a government representative of the people, whereby we as Six Nations Indians, in general, may be intelligently represented, and that our public affairs and national spirit may be properly looked after. (56 signatures)[8]

The conduct of the war on the Western Front was of course the main preoccupation of the Six Nations soldiers. This was the only petition they were to submit from the front, and in the following days, weeks and months, a number of the original signatories paid the supreme sacrifice.[9]

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On 1 September 1919, soon after their repatriation back to Canada and their return to the Six Nations Reserve, the surviving Six Nations veterans regrouped and submitted the following petition to Duncan Campbell Scott, the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs in Ottawa. The petition, which contains 34 signatures, begins:

> We, the undersigned members of the Six Nations Indians, loyal soldiers of H.M. [His Majesty] the King, veterans of the World War, of the Township of Tuscarora in the county of Brant do most humbly implore and petition you Sir to hearken and consider our cry for deliverance from our present system of government and hereditary councillorship, and to institute a change whereby we may have a council, elected by, and representative of the people, and we hope and pray that, the "Canada", for which our friends and comrades fought and died, and the same "Canada", we fought and gladly suffered for, may see fit to grant us this change.[10]

Admittedly, the Council of Confederacy Chiefs and its supporters had a legitimate claim of special status with respect both to the British Crown and the Dominion of Canada. In testimony of this unique relationship, a group of Six Nations clan mothers submitted a petition on 31 January 1917 directly to King George V. They protested the enlistment of five underage Grand River band members, demanding that he release them forthwith from his military service. The premise of their grievance, which includes reference to the historic Covenant Chain and Two Row wampum accords between the British Crown and the Five Nations Confederacy, appears clearly in their final three points, paraphrased here as follows:

> 1. And the Six Nations shall not Rule over the British Nation.
>
> 2. And the British Nations shall not Rule over the Six Nations.
>
> 3. And the following names are enlisted under age in Your Majesty's army [therefore send them home].[11]

By the early 1920s, a handful of Six Nations sovereigntists had emerged from among the Confederacy Chiefs to advocate the cause of Six Nations independence before an international audience. Principal among these was the charismatic Deskaheh, or Levi General, who had been installed by his clan mother as one of ten Cayuga hereditary chiefs in 1917. In 1923, Deskaheh and his American non-Native lawyer George Decker traveled to Geneva and attempted to state the case for Six Nations independence as a

sovereign state and thus eligibility for membership in the League of Nations. Their manifesto, entitled *The Redman's Appeal for Justice*, reads in part:

> The Six Nations of the Iroquois, being a state within the purview and meaning of Article 17 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, but not being at present a member of the League … crave therefore invitation to accept the obligations of Membership of the League….[12]

Deskaheh and Decker had been emboldened by the League's own "spirit of Geneva" ideology, which embraced the autonomy of small nations, the recognition of new states and the rise of a new global political order. They were at least initially successful in obtaining the tacit endorsement of a select, if unlikely, group of League member states, including the Netherlands, Estonia, Panama, Persia and the Irish Republic, to press for a hearing of their case before the League. Various procedural delays, however, and behind-the-scenes lobbying by both the British and Canadian delegations, prevented the matter from being formally presented before the League's General Assembly.[13]

Although ultimately unsuccessful, Deskaheh's activities were an obvious embarrassment and irritant to the Canadian government which, having just received an increased measure of its own autonomy as a function of its Great War participation, was unwilling to entertain the notion of any competing sovereignties on Canadian soil. In a succinct refutation of key points in Deskaheh's claim of Six Nations sovereignty posited before the League of Nations, the Department of Indian Affairs, on behalf of the Canadian government, stated:

> The Six Nations are not now, and have not been for many centuries, a recognized or self-governing people but are, as aforesaid, subjects of the British Crown residing within the Dominion of Canada. The statement that the Six Nations have treated with the Dominion of Canada is incorrect. The Dominion of Canada has at no time entered into any treaty with the Six Nations, or recognized them as having any separate or sovereign rights … it may be pointed out that the various Acts of the Imperial Parliament establishing successive measures of autonomy in Canada … do not exclude the Six Nations or their reserve lands or treat them in any way otherwise peculiar.[14]

Concurrently, Indian Affairs Deputy Superintendent General Duncan Campbell Scott had appointed Colonel Andrew Thompson, former commanding officer of the 114th Battalion and a strong advocate on behalf of the Six Nations veterans, to head a special commission to investigate the affairs

of the reserve. Thompson submitted his report late in 1923.[15] His own findings on the matter of Six Nations governance were equally succinct:

> 1. The people as a whole have no voice in the selection of their councillors.
>
> 2. The present Council is absolutely unwieldy. It consists of some sixty chiefs, charged with the conduct of the business of less than five thousand people.
>
> 3. Owing to the method of appointment a great many of the chiefs are … unable … to read and write, and … [are] incapable of transacting business.
>
> 4. The present Council is unnecessarily expensive. An expense allowance is made to each chief for attendance at Council meetings, the aggregate [of which] is said to amount to at least $1,000 per annum.
>
> I am convinced that those advocating a change in the system of government have fully established their contention, and that an elective system should be inaugurated at the earliest possible date.[16]

Based on Thompson's findings, and notwithstanding the federal government's previous policy of non-involvement in Six Nations governance issues from the 1860s onward, the Department of Indian Affairs acted decisively in 1924. It supported the Dehorners and their military wing, the returned Six Nations veterans, by withdrawing Canadian recognition of the traditional Council of Confederacy Chiefs as the official governing body of the Six Nations of the Grand River. In its place the government instituted an elected band council government, as per the terms of the *Indian Act*. The reserve was divided into six electoral districts, each represented by two councillors, with the 12 councillors so elected voting among themselves to designate one of their number as chief councillor. Two of the first 12 elected councillors, Lieutenant Frank Montour and Sapper Joseph Hill, were veterans.

By 27 November 1924, the Department of External Affairs, in the Canadian government's final communication to the League of Nations on the Six Nations sovereignty issue, advised:

> An election was held on the 21st October, 1924, and the new elected Council is now in office having replaced the former hereditary

> body. It is believed that this change to a more modern political system will have a good influence on the reserve and act as a stimulation to progress and advancement among the Six Nations.[17]

Through to the 1960s, Six Nations veterans of the Great War remained active in band council government. Since 1924, voter participation in band elections has ranged from 20 to 40 per cent of eligible members.[18] This low-to-moderate turnout reflects a combination of voter apathy by some and a continued allegiance to the Confederacy Chiefs by others. In any event, the Dehorners and the veterans had achieved their aim: they had introduced the concept of "one person, one vote" in the selection of political leadership on the Six Nations of the Grand River Reserve.

In conclusion, there was a long history of organized opposition to the traditional form of Confederacy government on the Six Nations of the Grand River Reserve by a minority of band members. The political change finally occurring in 1924 was neither an arbitrary nor unilateral intervention of the federal government. The adoption of Dehorner ideology by Six Nations soldiers of the CEF (eventually Dominion veterans of the Great War), and

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Members of the first Elective Council of the Six Nations Reserve near Brantford, Ontario. (Not in order) Archie Russell, John R. Lickers, Fred. F. Johnson, Welby Davis, Frank Miller, Frank Montour, William Jamieson, Archie Lickers, Joseph Hill, William F. Powless, Colonel Morgan (centre front row), Hilton M. Hill, William Smith and David General.

increasingly strident declarations of sovereignty by the Confederacy Chiefs, were the final acts in persuading the federal government to move decisively, to remove the Chiefs, and to introduce elected band council government. Having itself just received increased autonomy within the British Empire as a function of wartime contributions, the Dominion of Canada was ill-inclined to entertain the notion of a competing sovereignty within its recognized boundaries. When precisely such a challenge arose from within the traditional Council of Confederacy Chiefs, Canada acted swiftly in common cause with band members – including the Six Nations veterans – by advocating the implementation of an elected system within parameters set by federal legislation. For those Six Nations who had fought overseas, this new system was an appropriate reward for their wartime service.

ENDNOTES

1 McMaster University media release dated 25 May 2006, "The conflict surrounding the Henco development at Douglas Creek," 2. "This Confederacy was brutally suppressed by the federal government when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police invaded Six Nations territory in 1924."

2 These are: Upper Cayuga, Lower Cayuga, Upper Mohawk, Lower Mohawk, Walker Mohawk, Bay of Quinte Mohawk, Bearfoot Onondaga, Clear Sky Onondaga, Konadaha Seneca, Niharondasa Seneca, Oneida, Delaware and Tuscarora.

3 Sally M. Weaver, "The Iroquois: The Consolidation of the Grand River Reserve in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 1847-1875," in Edward S. Rogers and Donald B. Smith eds., *Aboriginal Ontario: Historical Perspectives on the First Nations* (Toronto: OHSS / Dundurn, 1994), 192.

4 Records of the first reform movement begin with a December 1861 petition circulated by Mohawk band member Isaac Powless that garnered 167 signatures. See Ibid., 201-02.

5 For an overview of these petition and claims, see Scott R. Trevithick, "Conflicting Outlooks: The Background to the 1924 Deposing of the Six Nations Hereditary Council," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Calgary, 1998, and, E. Brian Titley, *A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of Indian Affairs in Canada* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986), 111-35.

6 See, for example, the chapter by Lackenbauer and McGowan in this volume, and, P.W. Lackenbauer, "'Pay No Attention to Sero': The Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte and Imperial Flying Training during the Great War," *Ontario History*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Autumn 2004), 143-69.

7 Dominion of Canada, *Annual Report of the Department of Indian Affairs for the Year Ended March 31, 1919* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1920), 16. For the complete Six Nations Honour Roll, including all who served and those who were killed in action or died of either wounds or illness, in addition to the missing and wounded and those taken prisoner, see F. Douglas Reville, *History of the County of Brant*, Vol. II (Brantford, 1919), 618-20.

8 Petition, File 1-5, C169, MG30, Indian Affairs, Record Group [RG] 10, *Library and Archives Canada* [*LAC*]. Original spelling, punctuation and grammar retained.

9 One of these was Lieutenant Jim Moses who in September 1917 transferred from the 107th Battalion to the Royal Flying Corps (RFC). He was subsequently reported missing on 1 April 1918 while serving as an air observer with 57 Squadron RFC. In an interesting historical footnote, as the Royal Air Force (RAF) came into being on that day, being the result of the amalgamation of the RFC and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS), Moses, a Canadian Indian from the Six Nations Reserve, remains one of the RAF's first battle casualties.

10 Petition, File 32-32 Pt. 2, Vol. 7930, RG 10, *LAC*.

[11] Petition, File 452-15 Pt. 1, Vol. 6767, RG 10, *LAC*.

[12] From Deskaheh's manifesto, *The Redman's Appeal for Justice*, quoted in Joelle Rostkowski, "Deskaheh's Shadow: Indians on the International Scene," *European Review of Native Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1995), 2.

[13] For a brief biography of Levi General, see Donald B. Smith, "Deskaheh (Levi General), 1873-1925," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, 1921 to 1930*, Vol. XV (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), 86-87. For a fuller discussion of his activities before the League of Nations, see Joelle Rositkowski, "The Redman's Appeal for Justice: Deskaheh and the League of Nations," in Christian F. Feest, ed., *Indians and Europe: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays* (Aachen: Edition Herodot with Rader-Verlag, 1987), 435-53.

[14] See "Statement Respecting the Six Nations Appeal to the League of Nations, Department of Indian Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, December 27, 1923," quoted in Laurie Meijer Drees, "Nationalism, the League of Nations and the Six Nations of Grand River: Introduction to Documents One through Five," *Native Studies Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1995), 86-87.

[15] Dominion of Canada, *Report by Col. Andrew T. Thompson, B.A., LL.B., Commissioner to investigate and enquire into the affairs of the Six Nations Indians, 1923* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1924).

[16] Ibid., 12.

[17] See "The Canadian Government's Final Statements on the Six Nations' Claim, Department of External Affairs Canada, Ottawa, 27th November, 1924," quoted in Laurie Meijer Drees, "Nationalism, the League of Nations and the Six Nations of Grand River," 88.

[18] Sally M. Weaver, "The Iroquois: The Grand River Reserve in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 1875-1945," in Edward S. Rogers and Donald B. Smith eds., *Aboriginal Ontario: Historical Perspectives on the First Nations* (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society / Dundurn, 1994), 249. Weaver's writings remain the best-published sources on the political history of the Six Nations of the Grand River.

INTERLUDE II

Red Men Dig Up The Hatchet[1]

Philip H. Godsell

The red man's on the war path!

From the longhouses of the once mighty Six Nations, ancient allies of the "King George Men"; from the prairie lodges of tall and stately Blackfeet west to the Rockey Mountain haunts of nomad Stonies, and north to the smoke-stained tepees of caribou–hunting Chipewyans and Dog-Ribs in the Land of Little Sticks, the moccasin telegraph has carried word that the children of the Great White Father are threatened by the mad dog Hitler and his iron-hatted braves. That the time has come for the red men to dig up the hatchet and join his paleface brother in his fight to make the world safe for the sacred cause of freedom and democracy. And Canadian Indians, whose forebears fought encroaching palefaces in their conquest of the New World, are rallying around the Great White Father to protect embattled Britain and stop the spread of Nazism to the shores of North America.

The memory of the visit of the King and Queen, still fresh in their minds, Indians from the storm-battered shores of the Atlantic to the sunny slopes of the Pacific are beating the war drums and displaying the same shining patriotism as did their fathers when the Kaiser shook his mailed fist and unloosed the first Great War upon the world.

At Ohsweken, present-day capital of the Six Nations Indians on the Grand River reservation, near Toronto, sachems of the tribes who rallied to the support of King George III under the famous Chief Brant during the Revolutionary war, and were driven from their ancestral homes in the Mohawk valley by victorious Americans, assembled in solemn council. Around the sacred fire that still burns as it did in the palisaded capital of Onondaga when Iroquois war parties carried terror over a third of the continent, they deliberated how best to aid the cause of democracy and donated a thousand dollars from tribal funds to the Red Cross.

At Moose Lake, in the dark pine forests of northern Manitoba, coppery Crees went into a huddle and commenced a Red Cross drive. And was the Rev. Arthur Scrace, Anglican missionary at this backwoods settlement, surprised when broad-

1 This article first appeared in *Winnipeg Free Press,* Magazine Section, 24 May 1941, 5.

LAC PA-130065

Lieutenant-General (later Field-Marshal) Bernard Montgomery awards the Military Medal to Corporal Huron Brant of the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte, Italy, 1943.

backed squaws and sinewy hunters invaded his log home without warning with ermine skins, moccasins and cash donations to aid in Canada's war effort. Two dripping boxes of ice-packed white-fish, a haunch of frozen venison, and birch-bark and beaded novelties made by patriotic squaws around their lodge fires were added to the mounting pile of offerings on the floor of the mission house.

Not to be outdone in displaying their loyalty to King and country, 600 tawny Crees at Nelson House promptly notified the Indian department at Ottawa that they'd get along without the usual relief supplies so that the saving could be added to Canada's war chest.

From the smoky wigwams of moose-hunting Cree and Saulteaux at Island Lake, God's Lake, Oxford House and Norway House, hub of the forested

District of Keewatin, have come more donations – not in familiar greenbacks, but in glossy pelts of beaver, mink and silver foxes, the currency of the Silent Places, which already have totalled well over $3,000. And, in northern Saskatchewan, red men refused King George's treaty money. "Let the Great White Father keep the money to help fight Hitler" they told the astonished Indian agent. "We will live on the game in the woods and the fish in the lakes given us by the Great Spirit and which our treaty with the paleface chiefs still allows freedom to hunt and gather."

Imbued with the same patriotic spirit, a thousand Cree Indians under Chiefs Tom Bull, Panny Ermineskin and Samson gathered at Hobbema reserve, 60 miles south of Edmonton, and voted to donate an ambulance to the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps. The money will come from interest on funds owned by the bands which would otherwise be distributed amongst the tribesmen. Other Indians of the great plains, bound by the pact of 1876, that made the "Red men and white men brothers", converged on a reserve near Onion Lake to hear a plea from the chief of the Mistawasis Crees for the formation of an all-Indian battalion to aid Canada fight the foe.

From the length and breadth of the land gifts are pouring in to show the red man's heart is in the right place. From Chief Jimmy Big Stone, of the Carlyle Crees of Saskatchewan, came the gift of a cow, which realized $54 for the Red Cross. From the tepees of tribesmen at Touchwood Hills has come a donation of a thousand dollars. Cree Indians of the Mistawasis band of Carlton Agency, whose fathers fought the whites when Big Bear and Poundmaker hit the war trail, have already sent many of their sons overseas again, and presented an ambulance to the Red Cross.

Descendants of Chief Piapot, whose fiery warriors camped athwart the Canadian Pacific Railway tracks and dared the palefaces to push the hated fire-wagon trail further into Cree buffalo pastures 50 years ago, invested a thousand dollars in war savings certificates, and requested the government to convert all interest accruing from tribal funds into war savings certificates for the duration. And their neighbours, the Kahkewistahaw band of Crooked Lake have contributed $2,500 to Canada's war chest.

Thus have the red people given the lie to Hitler's propaganda organ, the Voelkisher Beobachter which, a couple of years ago, carried stories of frightful atrocities allegedly committed by Canadian authorities against the Indian population, held "prisoners" on Indian reserves. Thus too have the red men replied to Nazi fifth columnists attempting to sow discord and suspicion among the tepees of the tribesmen.

INTERLUDE II

In their bark lodges and log-walled homes in the forests of New Brunswick Abenakies, Micmacs and Malecites, numbering over 600, have been busy on war auxiliary projects since the outbreak of the war. Inspired by the actions of paleface sisters, dusky mothers and daughters have formed patriotic societies and sewing circles of their own. Waxing enthusiastic over Red Cross work they've established groups and branches at Kingsclear and Oromocto reserves, and by the red glow of their wigwam fires they are turning out socks, mitts and mufflers for our boys in khaki with yarn bought from their slender earnings. Nearly every man of military age on the reserves has volunteered for service. Now great-grandsons of Abenaki and Micmac warriors who fought with Roger's Rangers are serving in England in the front line of the battle for democracy.

Red riders of the plains, the restless blood of buffalo-hunting fathers still stirring in their veins, were quick to take up Hitler's challenge. Hardly had war drums sounded ere a big green truck bristling with flags and draped with patriotic bunting was driven at reckless speed by a dusky driver into Saskatoon. From nearby reserves tumbled a score of brawn braves, whooping defiance at Hitler, all seeking the nearest recruiting office. Many had the yen to join the air force, to get behind the controls of a thunderbird and help blast Hun cohorts from the skies, but succumbing to the persuasion of their buddies, signed up with the infantry instead.

Leading this dusky delegation was Chief Joe Dreaver. "My father was chief of the Mistawasis Crees," he told the recruiting office. "I was with the Third Canadian Engineers in the last war…three of my brothers fought at Vimy. One was buried there, another died when he returned to Canada. It was my great grandfather," he added proudly, "who led the peace movement when Chief Big Bear took to the war path, and persuaded the tribes to bury the hatchet at Fort Carlton."

Last word of Joe Dreaver came from over-seas, where the chief and his khaki-clad tribes-men were seen playing baseball on a village green in England.

Hard on the heels of this addition to Canada's red recruits came another sprightly aspirant for the khaki of the King. Signing himself as Joe Riel Desmarais he explained he was the grandson of Louis Riel, leader of the Métis and Plains Indians when they fought the soldiers of the Great Mother, Queen Victoria, back in the stormy days of '85.

Jumping international boundaries, enthusiasm to join in the fight against Hitler has spread to tribal tepees in the States. Along with the Newburyport

INTERLUDE II

LAC C-68913

William Semia, the young Indian who walked from Cat Lake to the railway line in order to enlist for duty in the Second World War.

Turnpike, near Topsfield, Mass., state troopers saw a tired figure trudging eastward. The weary traveller was a full-blooded redskin, descendant of Powhatan tribesmen who welcomed the Pilgrim Fathers to the New World from the Mayflower. He was on the last lap of a hike from Oklahoma to visit friends in New Brunswick and join up. “Me,” he explained to a sympathetic trooper, “I heard that Hitler was killing women and children, and that the Indians in Canada were going over to fight. So I think I’ll go over and help fix that mad dog too.” As he trudged on down the dusty road they did a little figuring and decided that when he reached his destination he’d have hiked a couple of thousand miles to fulfil his self-appointed duty.

Which recalls the epic 5,000-mile journey made by John Campbell, full-blooded Louchoux Indian from the Polar outpost of Herschel Island to Vancouver to join up in the last war. Donning his snowshoes, he trudged across the saw-toothed Rockies in the depth of Arctic winter, his footsteps lighted only by the glittering stars and the ghostly scintillations of the Aurora. At Rampart House, on the rock-walled Porcupine, he crossed the Alaskan border. Frost-scarred, starving and emaciated, he mushed a week later into Fort Yukon without a dollar in his jeans. Cutting wood, mushing dogs and working as a deck-hand on a stern-wheeled steamer, he earned enough to carry him the remaining 4,000 miles – and six months after leaving the Polar Sea he donned the khaki of the King.

From distant Osnaburgh post on the fir-fringed shores of Lake St. Joe came a youthful moose hunter, William Semia, who’d never heard the whistle of a locomotive. Five hundred long white miles he trudged on snowshoes over blizzard-lashed lakes and through primeval forests deep in the mantle of shimmering snow-impelled by a single thought. He was going to cross the Gitchee Gumnmee to the land of the Shagonash to fight for the Great White Father. At Fort William a puzzled recruiting officer shook his head when the dishevelled red man voiced his wishes in a torrent of guttural Ojibway. For William Semia, reared in the birchbark wigwams of his hunter folk deep in the goblin-haunted forests, couldn’t speak a word of English. An Ojibway soldier of the famed Bull Moose battalion came to the rescue and William blossomed forth next day, proud as a peacock, in glittering buttons and khaki.

Again sinewy young warriors from the rocky shores of Huron and Superior, in the land of Longfellow’s Hiawatha, are flocking to the colours. There are Ojibway descendants of the painted and bedizened tribesmen who followed Chief Pontiac upon the war-path and raised their tomahawks to stem the advance of English soldiers in the hunting grounds of the west. There are braves of the Ottawa tribe who once laid siege to Detroit and penned the

garrison within its stockaded walls for a year and a half. There are Pottowatamies whose grandfathers helped to capture and lay in ashes Michillmackinak and the frontier forts that linked the Great Lakes with the East. All former foes, they now stand shoulder to shoulder with those against whom painted forbears wielded tomahawk, torch, and war club.

Even the Shawnees, whose fierce warriors gave to Kentucky the name of The Dark and Bloody Ground, and fought with Daniel Boone and Simon Kenton, are over there in the front line – targets of Nazi bombs. And with them is Joseph Stonefish, full-blooded Shawnee from Moraviantown, Ontario, direct descendant of the great chief Tecumseh, who for the second time has gone overseas to do his bit for the country his forefather served so well.

With war drums throbbing, the fighting blood of the Iroquois, Britain's allies for two centuries, has also been aroused. Warriors of the Mohawk, Seneca, Cayuga, Tuscarora and other tribes familiar to readers of Fennimore Cooper, are all over there in the C.E.F. [Canadian Expeditionary Force, sic], awaiting a chance at the scalps of Hitler's invading Huns. Others – according to Chief Little Valley, hereditary sachem of the Cayugas – whose war disability and greying locks prevent them from fighting in the front rank are engaged in border patrol and other work.

Little Valley would like to be over there among bursting bombs with a rifle in his hand again. "Wah! Wah!" he told me when I dropped into his log cabin on the Six Nations reserve, "those were good days we had in France. Those Germans, they were sick men when we sneaked into their lines at night and knocked them in the head." Something of the predatory spirit of warrior ancestors who skulked through the forests with shaven heads and wampum-bedecked scallop-locks shone in his beady black eyes as he told how he and his tribesmen stalked the Huns within their own lines as they stalk the deer and moose in the woodlands of Ontario. Of how the clubs of the Ho-de-nau-saunee – the People of the Long-House – would descend with a thud on the shaven pates of unsuspecting Huns; how they'd ease them over their own parapets, wrap their legs around the necks of their gagged and helpless victims and drag them through the muck and mire of no-man's-land with their elbows to the British lines.

Their fighting blood stirred by the scenes of carnage, amazing deeds were performed by these wilderness hunters, whose placid existence beside their northern lakes had been so suddenly disrupted. Deeds that sent apprehensive shivers through German ranks. There was Private George McLean. Whipped into a frenzy by the fury of the fighting, he performed a deed of

valour at Vimy which brought him the [Distinguished Conduct Medal], and in the old days would have added many scarlet-tipped eagle feathers to his war-bonnet. Seriously wounded, he tackled a machine-gun nest single-handed. Hurling a bomb with the accuracy of a tomahawk-throwing forebears, he wiped out 19 Germans, rounded up 14 prisoners and marched them back to the line.

When their Majesties visited Winnipeg there came with the Ojibways of Lake of the Woods the genial giant, Chief David Keesick. Six-foot-six in his moccasins, and strong as a bull, he refused to talk, or explain how came to be hidden beneath his aboriginal finery of buckskin fringes and ermine tails, a Distinguished Conduct Medal.

One of his paleface buddies, Tom Ellicott of Winnipeg, who was with the chief at Cambrai when he won his medal, told the story. "B company of the 52nd battalion, under Captain Clarence Smith, had suffered a terrible strafing," he explained. "The company was reduced to a mere handful, and even the bandsmen were given rifles and pushed into the front line. At dawn came the order to attack. Less than 50 men were left to go over the top. The chief, an ox of a man for strength, picked up a Lewis gun, I grabbed the ammunition, and he bounded forward. The machine-gun emplacement was just ahead. The chief dropped in the mud. From the shell-hole I watched him crawl stealthily forward. With a war-whoop on his lips he rushed the emplacement, stuck the Lewis gun over the top and let out another whoop. Without a shot that German gun crew surrendered. Out of a dug-out came more Germans till 87 stood there, shivering with up-raised hands. A wounded Canuck escorted the prisoners back to the line. Why the Chief didn't get the Victoria Cross I can't figure out. He was the bravest man I ever saw."

Now the red men are on the war-path once again. But Fennimore Cooper would rub his eyes if he could see the khaki-clad warriors of the Mingo, Mohawk, Seneca and Shawnee tribes advancing in single-file through the hedge-covered byways of the English countryside. Still more would he wonder to see sons of buffalo-hunting Crees and Blackfeet mounted on snorting motorcycles instead of galloping pintos…armed with Bren guns in place of tomahawks and bows and arrows…and wearing the tin hat and tunic of the modern soldier in place of the war-paint and dancing eagle feathers of former days.

CHAPTER 6

Invisible Women: Aboriginal Servicewomen in Canada's Second World War Military

Grace Poulin

When informed of my topic, Second World War Aboriginal servicewomen, people frequently responded, "I didn't know there were any." Yet Aboriginal women did volunteer for military service, often for the same reasons as non-Aboriginal women: a sense of duty; to free men for combat; a chance to leave home; to travel; to further their education; because others in the family or their friends had enlisted; and, most importantly, for economic reasons.[1] The lack of historical records concerning Aboriginal women's lives, especially in regards to their military service, underscores the fact that their contribution to the history of Canada has been neglected. This long disregard of Aboriginal peoples in the Second World War is beginning to be addressed however and this chapter contributes to the process by chronicling Aboriginal women veterans' stories, as much as possible in their own voices, before they are irretrievably lost.[2] As their stories indicate, Aboriginal women who served in the armed forces shared many of the same experiences as their non-Aboriginal sisters. My research also uncovered differences, including racial discrimination, in policies and practices regarding veterans' benefits.

Women Served that Men may Fight

The Second World War found many Canadian women working outside their homes in munitions factories, in war plants and in industry. They volunteered in organizations such as the Red Cross and assisted in war bond drives, salvage drives and service canteens for enlisted men. Women also formed unpaid paramilitary groups across the country and heeded the call to enlist for various reasons. This study set out to discover and chronicle the stories and experiences of Aboriginal women who served in Canada's military during the Second World War and to interpret these experiences in light of subsequent historical scholarship. I searched primary documents and secondary literature on the subject and, most important, talked to Aboriginal servicewomen themselves. The Department of National Defence (DND), the *Library and Archives Canada* (*LAC*), Department of Veterans

Grace Poulin

Aboriginal Servicewomen. Left to Right Top Row: Marion Miller, Joan Martin, Peggy Stonechlid (L) and Mary Greyeyes (R), Jannett Foulds, Edith Gordon. Left to Right Middle Row: Natalie DeLaronde, Teresa Dion, Mamie Wetelainen, Margaret Pictou LaBillois with Granddaughter, Margaret Bruyere, Nellie Blankenship (with beret). Left to Right Bottom Row: Dorothy Bellerose, Edith Anderson, Gertrude Fraser, Mary Ann Mirasty Legault (excerpt from Hairdressing graduation). Centre: Aboriginal Veterans Medal. Lower Right: CWAC Athena cap and collar badges.

Affairs (DVA), and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) offered no assistance because their materials did not list Aboriginal veterans apart from other veterans.[3] I eventually uncovered 25 names of Aboriginal women veterans and 18 participants were involved in this study: 14 Aboriginal women

graciously consented to dialogue personally; the family members of two others; another person by telephone; and one by written submission.[4]

Aboriginal women enlisted from all across Canada, from rural reserves, from farms and from urban settings. Those from reserve communities during the war period still came under the authority of Indian agents who were supposed to apprise the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) of enlistments from bands in their respective territories. Sometimes men and women had left the reserves to work in urban areas, however, and the appropriate Indian agent no longer had contact with them. Nor did families always inform Indian agents of enlistments. Consequently, enlistment records of some Aboriginal people (status, non-status, Métis and Inuit) do not exist. This lack of records has caused confusion about the actual number of Aboriginal service personnel. We do know, however, that like their male counterparts, the majority of Aboriginal women recruits enlisted in the Army, with its lower requisite educational level. Of the 18 Aboriginal women who participated in this project, 15 enlisted in the Canadian Women's Army Corps (CWAC), two in the Royal Canadian Air Force Women's Division (RCAF WD) and one in the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service (WRCNS, commonly called Wrens).[5] Prior to enlistment, their sundry occupations had been clerical jobs, nursing student, paper mill worker, dishwasher, domestic servant, waitress, farm worker, cook's helper and any other available odd jobs. Because of the Great Depression, most had no experience of paid work but had plenty of familiarity with unpaid domestic work within their families.

Proof of age was not always strictly verified at the time of enlistment. For example, Edith Merrifield, Peggy Stonechild and Mary Ann Legault admitted to lying about their ages but were accepted without proof regardless. When Edith applied for Canada's Old Age Security, the government did not have a birth registration for her because the Indian agent had not bothered to register her birth. She discovered that she was actually a year older than she thought, so she had not lied about her age when enlisting.[6] Another woman informed me of enlisting with her friends at the age of 16. Only one of her friends was of legal age to enlist, but all were accepted into the Army. The daily newspaper in her community printed the names of new enlistees each day and, unfortunately, a neighbour saw the names and told her father, who immediately visited the recruiting office and had her discharged. Her Army experience was over before it began. What bothered Agatha McCall most was that all her friends were able to stay in the Army for the duration and, much to her chagrin, they would send letters saying how much fun they were having.[7] These common experiences validate the claims by both males and females, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, that many lied about their ages on enlistment to become members of the military.

CHAPTER 6

Women and Recruiting Propaganda: Inclusions and Exclusions

Another common and shared experience with non-Aboriginal women was gender discrimination.[8] Initially, the military recruited only men. As the war escalated and the need for more personnel grew, politicians in the House of Commons debated the suitability of women for military life. Only when England's Royal Air Force wanted to send members of their Women's Auxiliary Air Force to work at air training schools did the Canadian government act to save itself from the embarrassment of having no women in the military. Canadian women had voluntarily formed paramilitary groups at the onset of war, but it was not until 1941 that the government began to discuss seriously the involvement of women in branches of the armed forces.[9]

Furthermore, career military men did not readily accept women enlistees.[10] Nellie Rettenbacher confirmed the attitudes of some male servicemen:

> The guys didn't like the women in the Army; that was for sure. [They] used to say awful things to us. We used to talk back and they got used to it. Officers were quite pushy towards us. They thought that we had to do what they wanted. Some of the guys would make a noise like a duck when we walked by to make fun of us.[11]

"The Commanding Officer at Centralia couldn't stand WDs" in the air force, Natalie Coates reported. "He had them parading in winter in the snow-belt – 'happy, happy!' We wore over-stockings in the cold, and the glad boots were high."[12] According to Merrifield, "The general public passed remarks to us on the street like 'you are just in the Army to make the men happy.' Civilian girls would pass remarks on the street in Kingston, but not in Ottawa." Both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal women shared this in common. In a declaration revealing this gender discrimination, one Aboriginal enlistee confirmed:

> Gender discrimination did exist. Senior officers in the canteen would grab women wherever they [men] wanted, including the genital area. They figured the women were there to service the men. I used to get catcalls from servicemen because I was a woman in the Army. There were no teachings on morality in the Army and naïve girls were given no instruction about birth control or men.[13]

Gender discrimination carried over into the lower rates of pay for female enlistees compared to that of men and evoked comment and questions in the House several times throughout the war years.[14] In July 1943, DND finally

announced increases in servicewomen's pay from two-thirds to eighty percent of men's pay, allowances could now be paid to dependent parents or siblings but not to husbands or children, and servicewomen were now allowed to keep the service-wives' allowances that they may have been receiving prior to enlistment. But with a pay rate less than the servicemen and a "whispering campaign" that maligned the morals of enlisted servicewomen, recruiting suffered.[15]

The recruiting program intensified through radio broadcasts and advertising, posters and National Film Board (NFB) films shown in movie theatres that appealed to emotion and sentiment.[16] A search of recruiting literature indicates that the target population was White, middle-class women.[17] Some evidence from the early war years shows that Aboriginal women who wanted to contribute to the war effort were channelled into ghettoized employment seen as "appropriate" for them. One example is found in an archival file entitled "Enlistment of Indian Girls in War Service" that contains correspondence between Indian agents on behalf of Indian girls volunteering for service. The reply from the Superintendent of Welfare and Training was incredulous:

> It is noted that while these girls can read and write, their instructions had been somewhat limited. I know of no branch of the War Service at this date in which they could serve their country. There appears to be an acute shortage of labour, however, throughout the country, and I feel confident that if these girls had a little training they would experience little difficulty in getting positions as domestics. They might be persuaded to accept positions in white homes for a nominal wage until they receive the training necessary to qualify them for more remunerative positions.[18]

How more experience as domestics would prepare these young women for service was never outlined. Another example has an Indian agent inquiring about employment in factory war work for "certain Indian girls." The reply from Indian Affairs in Ottawa repeated the military authorities' explanation that "girls, to qualify for any of the auxiliary services, require high school education, and there appears to be little demand, if any, for unskilled girls."[19]

I discovered only two references to Aboriginal women in any general publications about the war. One was a CWAC officer asking whether "a member of the Indian race would be objected to for enlistment"[20] and the other was a pin-up image of a swimsuit clad, leggy young woman with a headband around her forehead. The caption reads: "No, it ain't Red Wing! … Her

name is Princess Acquanette and she is an honest-to-goodness Indian."[21] This characterization in a *Khaki Newsletter* portrays a combination of both racism and sexism.

Despite the recruiting propaganda aimed at non-Aboriginal women, Aboriginal women enlisted and their experiences in basic training varied according to the women themselves, their previous life circumstances and the time of year. While some recruits passed-out on parade in the cold, others coped with the training, particularly when they were used to hard work on the farm. Rettenbacher, who did her CWAC training at Vermillion, remembered:

> Basic was hard at first. It was so strict. There was little make-up; skirts were long and we couldn't hitch them up. We had to go with the rules or couldn't leave the base. Marching and parading were tough. We had to be up early in the morning and on parade. With only four or five irons in barracks, it was so hard to keep uniforms just so. We did our own personal laundry but sent our uniforms to the cleaners, paid for by us. We got $30 every two or three months for personal underwear. Everything else was supplied. There was strict curfew, we had to be in by eight pm. Once posted, we could get permission [for staying out later] every once in a while.[22]

Commenting on her trepidation, Coates said that she took her RCAF WD training in Rockcliffe and was "very frightened in Basic, where they take your life and turn it upside down, because I didn't know what they [the Air Force] would do if I didn't do it right." Her cousin Joan Hogan, who worked as a waitress before enlisting in the CWAC, also found that "Basic [was] tough in Red Deer with female instructors. We were up early in the morning on the parade square. No kidding, it was cold, but Winnipeg and Shilo in Manitoba were no different." Although Mamie Dunlop previously worked in a paper mill, four weeks of CWAC basic training in Vermillion was very hard. She suffered "bleeding and blistered" feet and echoing Joan's recollections of the cold prairie weather. Jannett Generous also found basic training rough in Regina's November. "It was COLD!"[23]

Others did not consider the training too difficult. Jannett's sister, Zella Foulds, did not mention the cold and reminisced more about the early curfew. She felt

> …okay about Basic Training because everybody was doing it. We had good times but strict discipline. We had to be in by ten-thirty.

> It was hard. We had to get up early, had to work. It wasn't just play. I didn't mind it. I didn't mind having to be in early because everybody did. We got one late pass a week until twelve o'clock. It wasn't particularly tough.[24]

Alice Petit Samuel, who had grown up in the prairie town of Duck Lake, was more cavalier and commented that "basic training was different but not too hard, [it was] just exercise. Everybody was young." Marion Hill had been working on a tobacco farm when the Army arrived on her 18th birthday. She had tried to enlist at age 17, but was told to go home and wait. When she finally joined, she found "basic not so hard. I was used to hard work on a farm. I looked after cattle, and cut wood on the reserve, and had to do chores. Marching wasn't difficult." Again, commenting on the weather (a significant factor on the prairies), Teresa Dion recounted her basic training in Vermillion in the springtime snow. The training itself was alright, "just another life experience." She noted that she had been used to hard work and walking long distances when she lived on a farm.[25]

Aside from basic training, how did these women adjust to life in the service? Not knowing anyone initially was daunting, but it did not take long to become acquainted with other women. Showering was a challenge in Kitchener where 100 women (one platoon) lived in a hut of two bunks to a room. In contrast, the Red Deer barracks had no partitions, just dorm rooms with rows of beds. The girls were uneasy when undressing in front of anyone, but they "soon learned how to do it comfortably." The mess was in another building, so it necessitated getting up early to prepare. Joan Hogan got up at 4:30 a.m. in order to shower and walk to the mess hall. Facing these new routines left some women awestruck. Commenting on her initial reactions, Coates stated:

> Take this girl from a little town and send her to Rockcliffe. I did nothing but cry for two months, asking myself 'What have I done? What HAVE I done?' It was a real culture shock.... There was no coddling. There were male officers on the Parade Square because they could yell louder, otherwise there were female officers.[26]

These young women experienced obvious depersonalization and had mixed feelings about their basic training experiences. On one occasion, there was a necessary two-week quarantine because one of the girls contracted measles or chickenpox. They could not eat in the dining room until everyone else was finished and they were billeted to a male barracks without doors on the lavatory. The first night there "the girls tried to hang a curtain for privacy."

Being young and naïve, they washed their underwear in the "long metal sink." They "didn't know that it was a urinal – [we] had no idea!"[27]

Some girls were naïve about sexuality and men and needed to be prompted during interviews before broaching the subject of contraception or any sexual teaching received in the military. Rettenbacher remembered, "I wasn't too naïve. I had learned a lot on the ranch and my parents had instructed us in the facts of life prior to enlistment. There were quite a few lectures on VD [venereal disease] but no contraception was supplied to the girls."[28] Conversely, Generous stated there was "very little teaching about VD and no condoms were given or mentioned."[29] The incidents of girls hanging a privacy curtain, learning how to undress in front of others, not recognizing a urinal or not attending social functions all underscore their timidity and naïveté.

Timidity could not be an issue for runners who delivered coded messages because their job required fortitude. These women were sworn to secrecy and found their situations stressful. Working under daunting conditions affected the women, as Dion who was posted to an Experimental Station in Suffield, Alberta, described:

> These were all coded stations – all secret. I had to sign a secrecy affidavit. They were experimenting in gases and ammunition. I would have loved a job in the lab but I hadn't finished high school. We were immediately dispersed to jobs. They stressed all the time that if you said anything to anybody you would be jailed. I was uncomfortable because I had never been in that kind of situation.[30]

Likewise, Gertie Pratt had a similar experience with secrecy:

> I was assigned to go out to a high secret wireless station and had to sign a secrecy affidavit. There were three Wrens per shift – two were responsible for the locked steel box containing codes and two drivers took turns driving about 70 miles at 40 miles per hour, and there was no power steering in those days. Sometimes parts of the letters home were blacked out. We couldn't tell anything about what we were doing.[31]

Constrained from climbing the ranks due to a lack of education, or possibly too short an enlistment time, most of the women that I interviewed had served as privates, with three being corporals, one a lance-corporal and one a staff-sergeant. While their education level was an important variable, residential schools offered a substandard education compared to mainstream

institutions. The rigidity of the regulations administered in residential schools, however, did provide for an easier transition into military life for the women who had attended them. Commenting on her education (or lack thereof), Merrifield recounted:

> I just reached Grade Four. You stayed there [residential school] until nineteen. They [Army] took me. Now I was in a mess because I didn't have Grade Eight and if you're sworn in and you don't tell the truth, then you're in trouble. So, I phoned my Indian agent, and he said, 'Oh, I'll straighten that up. I'll be there first thing in the morning.' So he made one [Grade Eight certificate] out for me. I was seventeen and under age too. I just said I was eighteen. They never kept records in the Lebret school anyway, or Indian Affairs didn't seem to bother. But did I have it rough with no education – just Grade Four! I couldn't advance. I just stayed a private. All I was qualified for was waitress and general duties. I applied for, and took, a course in military policing. I got a lot of help from the girls.[32]

Rettenbacher, who had worked in the sergeants' mess for a while, also asked to go on courses for military policing. She recalled:

> I wrote a test and was sent to Camp Borden in Ontario for six weeks training. The training was pretty tough. The male instructors treated us rough. We had to hold up our end of it. [With only Grade Five] I worked for the rank of corporal. [I] had to have higher rank than the other girls. Another girl and I got 100 per cent on the final test. I thought that I may as well make the best of it while I was there and I took good notes.[33]

The training for Military Police (MP) was daunting, especially for a recruit with little education. There were courses in military law, how to handle people and jujitsu. Shift work duties included checking to see if girls met curfew, picking up problem girls off-base or from out-of-bounds locations, putting them to bed if inebriated and meeting trains to check passes and uniforms. The female MPs dealt with female recruits only while their male Army drivers controlled any problem men.

The lack of education did not impede Mary Greyeyes, Canada's most publicized Aboriginal female enlistee, who came from Muskeg Lake Indian Reserve. Located near Leask, Saskatchewan, this reserve had the highest enlistment during the Second World War. One participant in my study, Josephine Greyeyes, still resides there. Coming from a family of nine and

CHAPTER 6

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An “Indian Chief” blesses Mary Greyeyes after she enlists in 1942.

with no work on her reserve to perform, Mary and her brother left home to seek some form of employment. Mary had received only a Grade Eight education at residential school but, always one with an eagerness for knowledge, she acquired extra tutoring. This reality contradicted the stereotyped image of female Indians.[34] Her son, Stephen Reid, commented:

> [Mary] was the first Indian girl to enlist in Canada. Her brother, David Greyeyes, was the Army's first [Non-Commissioned Officer] NCO among Indian volunteers. [Mary] saw the Army as an opportunity to learn and expand her knowledge. While sitting in the recruiting office, twenty-two girls went in ahead of her only to be rejected. Being the last one to be interviewed, [Mary] didn't hold out much hope of enlistment. However, she was accepted into the CWAC as a cook and was posted overseas to England in the Laundry Unit.[35]

Perhaps because her name sounded typically "Indian" to them, Greyeyes captured the imagination of the media. Even in England, a newspaper columnist commented on her.[36] A photograph of Mary appeared in the *Winnipeg Tribune* with the caption, "Blessings on Warrior." The column below the image states:

> Councillor Harry Bull, of the Piagut Indian community near Regina who lost a leg at Vimy Ridge in the Great War gives his blessing to PTE. MARY GREYEYES of the Muskeg Lake Reserve, near Leask, Sask. Pte Greyeyes --- with the Canadian Women's Army Corps at Regina, has three brothers in active war service --- Councillor Bull, in the Canadian Army photo above, holds a pipe of peace and stranded wheatgrass [sic], traditional tribal symbols of friendship over the girl's head.[37]

Reinforcing stereotypical imagery, an article entitled "Khaki Replaces Indian Girl's Tribal Garments" states:

> The honour of being the first Indian girl to enlist in the Canadian Women's Army goes to dark-haired Mary Greyeyes, 21 of Leask, who recently shed her tribal garments in favour of the khaki uniform the women in Canada's army wear. A full-blooded Cree, she left Muskeg Lake reservation to come to Regina and sign up as a cook, and so she afterward happily exclaimed, 'I was taken.'[38]

Besides Mary, newspaper publicity was given to a few Aboriginal female enlistees in newspaper articles and photographs, but always emphasizing their race.

This may have been one way that Aboriginal women became aware of the war and the opportunity to enlist. A photograph and story headlined "Cree Indian Girl Serves in Auxiliary Air Force" states:

> Airwoman Gladys Dreaver, a Cree Indian girl from a Saskatchewan Reservation and a member of a family that has served the Empire for generations, is with the Canadian Women's Auxiliary Air Force at No. 6 Service Flying Training School, RCAF, and is pleased in the job she is doing. Airwoman Dreaver is well educated and before her enlistment was an assistant in an Indian hospital in Saskatchewan.[39]

Further exposure was given to Aboriginal women's enlistment in an article showcasing five Aboriginal enlistees under the headline "Many Indian Maidens Serve in Army Corps, Air Force: Canadian Girls Lend Support to Brothers." The article stated in part:

> In every branch of the armed service, Canada's Indian[s]… Cree, Mohawks, Black-feet, Senecas, Cayuga, Wyandots, all of them are fighting and in Canada's Women's Army Corps and the Women's Division of the Royal Canadian Air Force, the maidens and the tribes have taken their places …. The day when the Indian maiden remained at home to look after the tepee fire is long past.[40]

Continuing with a history of the male members of each girl's family, the caption under the photographs reads: "Indian maidens are on the warpath with their brothers fighting for the United Nations. Among those in uniform are, Airwoman Dorothy Montour of the Delaware, Corporal May Cunningham and her sister, Airwoman Yvonne Cunningham, Alberta Indians, and Airwoman Delma Capton of the Cayuga." A separate column entitled "Tuscarora Indian Girl Enjoys Life in RCAF" was dedicated to Grace Beaver, describing her as the first of the Six Nations girls to enlist and serve overseas. Again, the article mentions Grace's brother overseas with the Army. "When we left we had no idea what we were getting into," Grace explained.[41]

A small article entitled "Indian Girl Enlists" mentioned 18-year old Dorothy Montour (Six Nations) who had joined the RCAF WD as a switchboard operator.[42] Another, "Indian Enlists With W.D.'s," read:

> Answering the call of her native land, AW1 Rosalie Burnham, the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Edward Burnham, Ohsweken, one of the

> oldest families on the Mohawk Reserve, enlisted with the Royal Canadian Air Force (Women's Division) at Hamilton on Thursday, August 1, and left for Rockcliffe Manning Depot Friday, August 6. AW1 Burnham attended Brantford … and played on the interform sports team and was a member of the Six Nations Young People's Association. AW1 Burnham has a brother in the RCAF, another in the U.S. Army National Corps and two cousins in the U.S. Army Air Corps. Enlisting as a switchboard tradeswoman, AW1 Burnham will be…training in one of the many trades in which airwomen are serving.[43]

These media representations of Aboriginal women volunteers are patronizing owing to their stereotypical portrayal of "Indian maidens," mentioning the women in relation to their male family members and constantly alluding to their race/ethnicity. The articles appeared to praise the women's patriotism, but simultaneously caricatured them as Pocahantas-like "maidens" and as inherently "warlike" people who were always on the "warpath." This recruiting propaganda targeted Aboriginal women, as R. Scott Sheffield argues in *The Red Man's on the Warpath*, by "applauding Native war involvement and thereby assuring Canadians that 'Indians' were doing their bit for the cause."[44]

Initially, the RCAF WD and the Army offered only nine trades to women, but training expanded to over 50 trades or occupations by war's end, and women acquired skills that previously had been confined only to males.[45] Being the first from her Eel Bar Reserve to have graduated from high school, Margaret Pictou LaBillois left nursing school and enlisted in the RCAF WD as a photographer. She wanted something different from the regular postings. Marion Hill also wanted something different. She wanted to become a driver:

> You told the Army what you wanted to be and then they administered a test and told you if you were eligible. One officer wanted me to be an officer, but I wanted to be a driver. She told me that I was too short. The requirements were five feet, five inches, but I was only five feet, three. The officer put me through anyway. I drove trucks, jeeps, staff cars, and station wagons. I had to change tires and do the weekly service by myself, and I weighed only 113 pounds going in and coming out.[46]

Some male leaders used salty language, sent the women on wild goose chases or all-night vigils and challenged the women to produce where men had failed.

Many tasks were humdrum and routine, but the women accepted them in order to release men for active duty. Women accepted this. As Merrifield commented, "The Army would put you where they needed you. They trained women to replace the men." Margaret LaBillois concurred: "I had two brothers overseas, and I went into the Air Force to help assist them to come home quicker."[47] Dunlop also accepted the authority of the Army to place her where they wanted: "I wanted to be a truck driver but was assigned to cook," she explained. "It was heavy work with huge pots. The kitchens were mixed with men because of the heavy pots. Women were so tired they just slept on their days off. Sometimes cooks had to get up in the middle of the night to feed a troop train that came through."[48]

Work gave these women a sense of self-worth and reinforced their notions of contributing to the war effort. The ultimate goal for many women was an overseas posting but, except for the nursing sisters, only one woman in nine got there.[49] Several respondents had this ambition, only to face disappointment. Dunlop "dreamed of going overseas but was posted to Fort Garry [Winnipeg]," and for Jannett Generous, "My sister was overseas and I hoped to go there too, but I was too young." Her older sister Zella, who served overseas, stated:

> I volunteered to go overseas at age 21. I sailed over on the Mauritania, a big ship, and returned on the Queen Elizabeth. People in England went through so much and were very, very good to us. They were exceptionally good to us because we were over there to help them. Accommodations in England were cold. We got one bucket of coal a night so went to bed with our coats on to keep warm. That was nothing compared to what the boys overseas were going through, or the English people. It was terrible over there, rationed far more over there, and families appreciated the rations we gave them. Meals were so bad that we couldn't eat them.[50]

Coates recounted her experience applying for overseas duty: "I tried to go overseas. I wrote to my brother overseas to ask him to write to my Commanding Officer to get me over there. He wrote to my CO alright and said that he didn't want to see me over there, ever! 'Thanks, Johnny!'"[51]

Not everyone wanted to go overseas. An eastern respondent expressed: "I didn't want to be posted out west because I didn't want to go too far from Mother who was getting on in age. I would come home every chance I could get."[52] Clerical workers went overseas first, followed by laundresses and then the Canadian Army Show. Known as "Quacks" in the British press,

slightly more than 5,000 women went overseas in all three services, to the envy of their comrades left in Canada.[53] Four participants were amongst these women: Zella Foulds, Mary Greyeyes, Dorothy Bellerose and Alice Petit Samuel. Zella, who had taken a typist's course in Edmonton following basic training, was stationed in Aldershot, England and was present during the "Aldershot riot" by recuperating Canadians who had been wounded. Zella related, "They smashed everything and so were sent home. They were wounded and being held there and wanted to get home. All of us were CBed [confined to barracks]."[54] One of the men with whom she served overseas remains a friend to this day. Mary was posted overseas to the Aldershot Base Laundry as a cook.[55] Having obtained a business school education after high school, Dorothy secured a posting to England in 1944 where she worked at Canada House in Trafalgar Square; she subsequently married in London. Alice was one of those sent to England to repatriate Canadian soldiers at war's end.[56]

These women fulfilled the dream of going overseas, but the others also had their chance to travel. Every one of the women participants was posted far from home, except for Margaret Pictou LaBillois who wanted to remain as close to her mother as possible. The long distance was evident in their references to saving money for the train fare home when on leave and, in Alice's case, "I didn't have money to send home. I had to save for three months to come home. We were allowed seven days every three months."[57] Likewise, Hill from the Six Nations community near Brantford reported: "I went home at Christmas and on furlough in the summer. It was a long train ride – two days and two nights. I stopped in Montreal station. They had rooms for service people. I had an eight-hour stay one time and slept all the way through it. On one trip, I slept all the way from Montreal to Toronto."[58]

If some women spent their savings by travelling home, how did the others manage their money? No servicewomen, Aboriginal or otherwise, were allowed to contribute to a Dependent's Allowance early in the war. That stipulation changed in July 1943 when women were allowed to divert their pay to dependent parents or siblings, but not to husbands or children.[59] Some of the informants in this study participated in that program. Foulds informed me that "I signed money home to my parents and my sister signed money over to our other sister. Children helped their parents in those days." LaBillois affirmed, "I can't remember my pay but whatever money we got, I shared with my family." Josephine Greyeyes also sent money home. When asked about entertainment, Merrifield replied, "I didn't go out very much. I sent half of my wages to Mother who also got a Dependent's Allowance. I got $30 a month and sent $15 a month to Mother." Likewise,

Gertie Pratt "signed over $20 a month to Mother when [I] enlisted." Like some of her comrades, Dion also received "$30 a month and sent money home."[60] Foulds sold the free carton of cigarettes allocated to each recruit to male smokers and Margaret Bruyere made a little extra income by pin-curling her comrades' hair.

With scarce finances, how did the women employ their free time and what entertainment did they enjoy? Entertainment depended on where the women were posted. Following her MP training at Camp Borden in Ontario, Rettenbacher spent the duration of the war in Vancouver. She reminisced:

> I would go to Los Angeles at the USOs [United Service Organizations] down there. Kay Kaiser was one of the main entertainers there and they would get me up on stage because I was the first Canadian girl they had seen in uniform. I didn't want to get up on stage in front of that mass of American soldiers as far as you could see. I thought I could go to the bathroom and sneak out but he saw me and said, 'Oh come here, you're just the one I want to see. Now this Canadian girl here, you guys see that she is going to have a good time.' Boy, they did! I had a good time. I would go to civilian dances when I was home on leave. We weren't allowed to wear civilian clothes, we had to wear our uniform all the time. We worked all year and then got fourteen days off. I'd get a ticket to see how far I could go and then come back. I went down to California and Mexico. We couldn't stay past twelve o'clock at night in Mexico and we'd have to be back into California. So I got quite a bit of travelling in.[61]

For Hill, entertainment was shared by a special friend and together they "would go to hockey games [and] tour the city on time off." These were simple, inexpensive activities. When Foulds was overseas in England, they "had dances in [their] own barracks, [but] didn't go to public ones. We didn't have wet canteens, only officers did. Women weren't allowed in the beer parlours and then when first opened to women, they were on one side and the men on the other." For Coates in Rockcliffe, the "canteens were always open and had the best Canadian bands playing for dances. [They] had good entertainment for service people. The only time you got into trouble it was your own fault." Being next to Canada's capital might have offered better entertainment opportunities than other places. Hogan's entertainment in Winnipeg consisted of "canteens on base, a movie, or a weekend pass to Brandon." A furlough for 14 days once a year enabled her to visit home (Nipigon) by train.[62] Likewise, Margaret Pictou LaBillois, who was con-

cerned about her mother, "only went shopping" and she did not attend social gatherings. According to Margaret, "Some [girls] were very sociable – would get dressed and powdered up, dye their hair. We made fun of them. One girl when she dressed and powdered up, we wouldn't know her."[63]

Edith Merrifield, who sent home half her pay as well as a Dependent's Allowance, attended only "dry canteens in Ottawa barracks." These were more economical than wet ones, but perhaps she also felt the stinging barbs of women on the streets of Kingston. Mamie Dunlop, whose posting to Winnipeg involved sexual harassment as well as gender discrimination, "didn't go to canteens." Staying away may have been the path of least resistance. Mamie's experiences at Winnipeg's Fort Garry base differed from those of Joan Hogan, who felt no discrimination whatsoever. Posted to the east, Jannett Generous reported that she "went to movies and church while in Toronto. There was nothing much else to do. We went to Detroit for weekends. [In contrast], the USO paid for everything – meals, beds, dancing. We were treated royally, but didn't drink alcohol because [I] was under 21."[64]

As with most of the participants, Samuel went to dry canteens: "You had to go to town if you wanted to drink. Some girls got around but [I] didn't associate with them."[65] Peggy Stonechild related that she attended "dry canteens [but] didn't go to dances." The negative stereotyping of the CWACs, combined with the negative images of women who imbibed alcohol, of Aboriginal women drinking, and sexual immorality, may all have played into their decision not to drink. When Gertie Pratt was posted to Ottawa, the girls were "bused to dances for boys being shipped out" where they drank punch. However, when she was posted to Halifax, Gertie did not "attend dances, just dry canteens on base." Hogan, in Winnipeg, also "went to the dry co-ed canteens for a pop, to play cards, or just to chat with the girls. Once in a while [we] went to wet canteens for a beer."[66] Some of the participants in this study did imbibe, although not excessively. Hill attended Service Club dances and those at the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA), but there was not a great deal of drinking. "We went to hockey games and sometimes took a mickey [a small bottle of alcohol] but not often. There were lots of places where Army girls weren't allowed. MPs could tell if we were Army girls but let us in anyhow."[67]

Questions of women's morality were omnipresent during the war. Natalie Coates' mother heard "whispering campaign stories and asked whether men shared the same barracks." Natalie's tongue-in-cheek reply was "I wish!"[68] Generous explained, "Rumours made it very bad – if in the services you were no good. The only place we were shunned was in Kitchener.

Easterners were very cold but not as bad as Kitchener. We wore our uniforms to civvies dances and were treated like a silver platter."[69] Both Alice Petit Samuel and Peggy Stonechild were treated fine by the public and Alice felt that her "Mother [was] not aware of a 'whispering campaign.'" But "rumours that girls were just there for the guys upset [Teresa's] Mother very much. I tried hard to make her understand that it was not the case."[70] Evidently, women's treatment varied according to location.

But if women encountered negative remarks and views because of their uniform, how did these experiences correlate with their Aboriginality? Greyeyes said that there was no racial discrimination while she was in the Army, but did remark on experiencing it "years later." Bellerose, who had worked for two-and-a-half years for the Alberta government before enlisting, wrote in her letter that she felt "no discrimination – [I] was just part of the gang for those four years." Marion also reported no prejudice, gender or racial, nor did Foulds, who served in England. "I worked in Records and was the only girl there. All the men were very, very good to me."[71] Nellie Rettenbacher personally experienced racial discrimination, although not during her time in the service, but she did witness discrimination directed towards the Black enlistees who she defended. As she declared:

> The experience changed me. I got to see how other people lived, other parts of the country, and [it] took me away from people who were prejudiced against other nationalities. I had experienced racial discrimination from some people who didn't know that I was Indian. There were quite a few coloured girls where I was and I knew how people felt about them. Once, when a coloured girl came into the Army and was put in a certain room, her roommate asked for the coloured girl to be removed because she didn't like her. I told the roommate to collect her blankets and go to another room because I had assigned that room to the coloured girl. The coloured girl came down crying because the other was so mean to her. The coloured girl stayed and the other one left the room. There was some racial discrimination but I didn't experience it, mostly [it was] gender discrimination.[72]

Racist and sexist practices and attitudes are very often "invisible" to those who experience them, becoming internalized as "normal" and therefore are hidden.[73]

Although Natalie Coates had experienced "racial innuendos when growing up, especially from those who were jealous and possibly [because I was] from a single-parent family and poverty," she reported encountering no gen-

der or racial discrimination while in the Air Force. Likewise, her cousin, Joan Hogan, also reported no discrimination in the Army. Joan was "surprised because [she] expected it. We all worked together and they were a nice bunch of girls. There were other Native girls in there and there were no racial slurs."[74] Had Joan expected discrimination because of her previous experiences with it? LaBillois concurred with the other participants that she felt no racial discrimination while serving as an Air Force photographer. Unlike Joan, she "never found any other Native woman in the service," although she had thought she would. No one suspected that Margaret was Mi'maaq; Mamie Dunlop was taken (or mistaken) for Ukrainian or French because of her "lighter skin;" Mary Ann Legault was "taken for French, Jewish, Spanish;" Natalie stated, "I don't look Aboriginal. I have light eyes and skin;" and Gertie Pratt passed as French. The silence about Aboriginal identity on the part of some participants may indicate an internalization of their shame. Another explanation may be that the women may have taken the line of least resistance in not wishing to prompt prejudice, thereby protecting themselves from any discrimination. This possibility underscores the importance of being able to "pass" as White, thereby avoiding racial tension. Coming from a western reserve community, Edith Merrifield confessed to having experienced racial discrimination from people when "working close to home before enlisting" and again after discharge when a "boss in [the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)] passed derogatory remarks about Natives" in her presence, but she did not experience it while in the military.

Discrimination definitely existed for Mamie Dunlop because of her gender, especially in the canteen, and came from senior officers who "figured the women were there to service the men." The racial "name-calling" that she experienced at school did not persist in the Army. It is interesting that neither Joan nor Mamie, both posted to Winnipeg, were exposed to racial discrimination, especially in view of the recruiting officers' negative attitudes toward Aboriginal and Black enlistees. The family of Margaret Bruyere stated that she did not feel discriminated against while posted to Regina. Alice Petit Samuel "never heard any negative comments" while posted to Calgary, but she did say, "They hated to see a girl running the place."[75] Obviously there were negative comments about gender. Pratt said that she "joined up as Canadian" and felt "no discrimination whatsoever" as a Wren, but Teresa Dion remembers debating what nationality to put on her CWAC enlistment papers because Métis was not accepted then. Although she saw many Métis women in the service, Teresa "knew only one fellow that had any discrimination against Aboriginal people. [He was] not respectful and [was] ignorant towards a First Nations CWAC,"[76] so she assumed that he felt

that way about all Native people. Legault, however, stated that she experienced some discrimination because "when people knew I was Indian, they acted differently." She did not elaborate.[77]

War's End and Beyond

There exist some scholarly works about the lack of benefits granted to Aboriginal veterans, but they deal only with men.[78] Attempting to put Aboriginal veterans on an equal footing with non-Aboriginals, Parliament passed an amendment to the *Veterans' Land Act* (VLA) in 1945 for Indian veterans. Indian Affairs put great effort into informing agents about all the options available to Indian veterans by circular letters, conferences and articles in Indian periodicals. Nevertheless, the mismanagement and poor administration of the VLA that occurred on a local level was a source of enduring hardship and perceived discrimination for many veterans.[79] The Indian agent's control was enhanced by this process, and some funds vanished either through bad administration or fraud. Peggy Stonechild related:

> My brother received a tractor and plough given to him through a deal made by the Indian agent and a dealer who claimed it was worth $2300, but it may not have been worth that. The difference was split between the Indian agent and the dealer. They didn't even ask him if he wanted it. They just gave it to him. I received a grant. The Indian agent said I needed a house and the documents stated what it was worth. It was a deal between the Indian agent and the dealer.[80]

Indian agents consistently undervalued Indian capacity, scorned their ideas and failed to interpret benefit plans to their advantage. "My husband was told that there was no land available to grant him," Gertie Pratt explained. "He ended up leasing land on the Muskoday Reserve."[81] Indian veterans had no access to Veterans Affairs administrators and to almost none of the Royal Canadian Legion branches or newsletters that might have made them cognizant of other veterans' benefits. Status Indians were also barred from participating in Legions because they served alcohol.[82]

The Aboriginal women participants in this study experienced differing treatment following discharge. Josephine Greyeyes stated that "the Army helped to find jobs" and would recommend military life for the youth of today. Mary Greyeyes receives a DVA pension, but it is unclear whether she was eligible because of her overseas duty. She also received a government compensation package in 2003. Marion Hill had acquired a dressmaking course

paid for by the DVA and, upon seeing an advertisement in the *Legion Magazine*, Marion applied for and received a 2003 compensation package "to make up for what we didn't get." She was the only female recipient from her Six Nations community because the other women would not apply, fearing that it would not be awarded to them. Marion was "happy about the amount. It was a big relief and paid off my house. Now I can pass it on to my family."[83] She definitely would repeat the experience and has a grandson in the US Marines.

Conversely, Zella Foulds, who obtained a typist course while in the Army, did not receive a pension even though she was posted overseas. She has some misgivings because her husband, who served for five years, also did not receive a pension. Zella feels that she has been discriminated against by Veterans Affairs for being female. Being Métis, Zella was not eligible for the 2003 compensation. However, the Métis National Council is lobbying on behalf of its veterans for a compensation package similar to the

Margaret LaBillois

Oil painting of Margaret Pictou LaBillois from a recruiting poster.

one for status Indians.[84] Despite not collecting an Army pension, Nellie Rettenbacher did receive the 2003 compensation package immediately because she had "regained [her] Status by that time."[85] Natalie did not apply for the compensation package because she did not know about it, nor did she receive an Air Force pension. Similarly, her cousin Joan Hogan had also regained her status but did not apply for the compensation package. Although she had read about it in the *Aboriginal News*, she thought it was only for those living on-reserve. The confusion hinges on the fact that women lost their status upon marriage to a non-Indian and were not allowed to live on-reserve. Joan was apprised of benefits upon discharge and does receive an Army pension, but the pension did not begin immediately.[86]

Margaret Pictou LaBillois did return to a reserve community. As a RCAF WD photographer, she lamented, "It was all cement floor in the printing room, my feet used to be sore from the cement. We worked sometimes ten hours depending on how fast they wanted the film."[87] Today she suffers from arthritis. Margaret mentioned the discharge clothing allowance, but could not remember the amount. She did not receive an Army pension because "my husband was getting it. Indian Affairs looked after us. The Indian agent in Restigouche looked after Indians from the service and told me there was no money for me. My husband had $2,300 given to him which gave us a shell of a home."[88] Nonetheless, Margaret applied for and did receive the 2003 compensation package. Regrettably, when Edith Merrifield approached Indian Affairs for assistance, she was told, "You can't get anything because you signed your Treaty rights away when you joined the Army."[89] She is the only woman to mention involuntary enfranchisement. Edith waited until 1986 to reclaim status but was refused compensation "because I did not go back to the reserve immediately. I was pretty upset. I didn't join the Army for Pasqua First Nation, I joined for the Canadian government … even if I did [return to the reserve] my husband wouldn't have been allowed."[90] She has engaged legal counsel to seek redress.

Unlike others, Mamie Dunlop applied for compensation, even though she had not returned to her reserve community. Mamie's status was lost by her grandmother and mother marrying-out and it took almost four years to regain (after Bill C-31 in 1985) because her mother's records were lost in a Kenora school fire. It took years for many women to reclaim their status, and some still have not done so because of missing records or bureaucratic red tape. Still, the military did approve some benefits for Margaret Bruyere. According to her daughter, Margaret was "deemed a ward of the government, so did not receive any military pension, but the Army paid for a ten

month business school course. Then she lost her status by marrying-out, along with the benefits of housing, et cetera." Margaret, who had "turned down a promotion so that someone in the field could have it because there were only so many promotions per year, was angry in later life about the treatment."[91] Her family applied for the compensation package but was ineligible because Margaret had passed away ten years before the deadline. Peggy Stonechild had received a house grant as mentioned earlier, but did not recall any clothing allowance. She did, however, apply for and receive the compensation package. Jannett Generous used her clothing allowance and length of service gratuity to buy furniture when she married, but she collected no pension from the Army. Under the VLA, both she and her brother tried to get farmland but were turned down. Jannett wistfully admitted that she also had applied for assistance with living but was not qualified because she "had to be in the service from 1939-1945 and was short by about a month." What a disappointment that must have been. Being Métis, Jannett and her sister Zella may benefit from further compensation for Métis veterans.

Likewise, Alice Petit Samuel may benefit from a Métis settlement. She remembered initially receiving "$300 clothing allowance and was able to buy boots and coat, and maybe a dress." She did not recall any mention of continuing education or training. Also, there was no pension at first, but she has "one now due to a disability that came about in the Army." After discharge, Alice required surgery and another veteran sent for her file to find out if the disability had been recorded earlier. Like Hogan, the Army had not informed her, but "put up no argument when it was pointed out to them." As with others, being Métis and without benefit from an Army pension, Dorothy Bellerose may later be a beneficiary of any forthcoming Métis compensation package. Gertie Pratt stipulated that she does not collect a Navy pension. She "thought they would provide one if [she was] eligible." From what has been reported, the military was not particularly forthcoming in providing benefits, so certainly there is room for scepticism in that statement. As with so many others, no education or retraining was offered to Gertie, but the DVA did pay for a skin graft due to a condition she obtained while in the service and did provide return train fare from Saskatoon to Vancouver. Although she self-identifies as Métis and has registered for the Métis veterans' compensation, Gertie has "just received Status after a lengthy process."

Self-identifying as French Métis, Teresa Dion "never thought it was anything special to join up" and did not receive any pension. She stipulated that neither she nor her brothers were aware of military benefits, and when she applied for the 2003 compensation package, she discovered it was only for First Nations veterans. Mary Ann Legault, who lost her status when she

married a non-Indian, illustrates another disappointing example. In her case, she was told that because the Army had paid for a hairdressing course ($100 with a living allowance of $60 per month for a six month course) she did not qualify for the compensation package. She has "resorted to legal avenues since being refused compensation." Interestingly, Mary Ann's friend, Edith, whose circumstances were identical, was told she did not qualify because she did not go back to her reserve immediately. Only ten females out of 1849 names (two of these could be construed as male names) appear on a *Summary of VLA Aboriginal Conditional Grants* as of 31 May 2000.[92]

Despite the lack of financial rewards, these women still remember their service with great pride. Married life, caring for a husband and children, and possibly working outside of the home as well, kept women very busy. Unless there were other female veterans in proximity, there was little or no opportunity to reminisce about their wartime experiences. Besides, Shelley Saywell found that women veterans "do not talk about war as much as the male veterans."[93] Mary Ann Legault found the Army experience gave her "more confidence. It was exciting for a teenager [and] it took courage to move away from the reserve."[94] The physical act of leaving home, particularly into the foreign milieu of the military, would strengthen and build character, perhaps even more so for an Aboriginal person raised in a different culture.

War's End and Beyond II

Some of the participants recounted how difficult it was to settle down following their discharge from the military, while others did not recall any difficulty. All the women but one married, raised families (very large families in some cases), and got on with the daily lives of motherhood. Some attended Legions; others did not. Some worked for a period before marrying and settling down. Of the 18 women, only one had a family member in the military, although most said that they would recommend it for the youth of today. Many are now Legion members and attend Remembrance Day ceremonies alongside their non-Aboriginal counterparts.

The women in this study are now elders in their communities and have risen to new responsibilities. While Dorothy Bellerose has been mentioned in two publications, *Forgotten Warriors* and *Our Women in Uniform,* currently she is "desperately trying to write my own ancestral history." Being part of only three Métis families in the district of St. Albert, near Edmonton, she "more or less lived a life of [a] 'white.'" Indicating pride in her heritage, Dorothy wrote to me: "My great or great-great grandfathers were those courageous voyageurs who came with the fur trade to these western parts of

Canada, married first nations or metis women and now have many descendants roaming the whole of Canada. There are members of the Clergy, judges, lawyers, doctors, nurses, businessmen, farmers, labourers, and many who served in both world wars."[95] Marion Hill is involved in the Six Nations community and conducts tours of Her Majesty's Chapel of the Mohawks on the banks of the Grand River.[96] As a member of the Legion for 48 years, and having served ten years as President, Marion attends Remembrance Day ceremonies. She has traveled to "the Legion get-togethers on Mother's Day weekend for a parade, service and pancake breakfast." Following her discharge, Nellie Blankenship Rettenbacher spent three tours of duty in Germany with her soldier-husband who was in the regular force for 28 years until retirement. She quipped, "With my time and my husband's time, I spent more than half my life pressing uniforms, shining buttons and shoes!"[97] The couple spent ten years overseas with the forces in Germany, Cyprus, Spain and Italy. Nellie, who raised three children and adopted four grandchildren, still believes in traditional spirituality and is a proud matriarch with nieces who are lawyers and one who is the first Aboriginal woman to receive a PhD in Canada.

Following her marriage, Natalie DeLaronde Coates also travelled with her Army husband to postings in Winnipeg, Kingston, Portage La Prairie and Terrace Bay, but she felt that she needed stability and went on her own to make a life for herself and her children. After her children were grown, she transferred to Toronto for 17 years and retired to Thunder Bay until her death in May 2003. Margaret Pictou LaBillois raised 12 children and one grandson and received the Order of Canada in 1994 for her work in restoring Native culture. In the 1980s, she had returned to university to refresh her Mi'maaq language in order to teach her community's youth. Today she tends a large vegetable and flower garden and travels the Atlantic and Québec pow-wow circuit each summer weekend displaying her handicrafts. Edith Gordon Merrifield took upgrading at university in Regina and joined the Commissionaires. After nine years, she is still with them and, at the age of 82, is with RCMP security. Mamie Wetelainen Dunlop has raised six children and today cares for some of her grandchildren in Winnipeg. She has become involved in the revitalization of traditional life by receiving her "Indian" name and colours from a medicine man.

Although Margaret Bruyere passed on in 1990, she remained active in Remembrance Day ceremonies and attended a Winnipeg CWAC reunion in 1951. Jannett Foulds Generous raised six children and, like her sister Zella Foulds, suffers from health problems. Alice Petit Samuel also raised six children and manages self-sufficiently. Margaret "Peggy" Stonechild "went

into nursing after discharge" and practiced for five years. Although she does not attend the Legion, she does go to Remembrance Day ceremonies and speaks at schools about her wartime experiences. Peggy is traditional and "attends pow-wows now and then." Gertie Fraser Pratt attended her first pow-wow as a status Indian member of the Mistawasis Band and as a veteran. Prior to retirement, she worked 17 years in a nursing home and remains an active member of the Legion where she is currently the Auxiliary President. Gertie was part of the Veterans Honour Guard that attended the opening of the Veterans Highway in Saskatchewan and served proudly in the Veterans Honour Guard for Saskatchewan's Centennial in 2005. During this celebration, His Royal Highness Prince Philip shook Gertie's hand and spoke with her, later presenting these veterans with Saskatchewan's Centennial Medal. Teresa Dion's military experience broadened her vision of the world politically. With a husband, children and a home, she stated that she did not always have the time, but today she is very interested in politics. She has "more understanding of the broader picture of life itself" and is active in a Métis association. Jannett Foulds Generous wrote to me saying that she had been to "Holland in May/June [2005] for the big 60th celebration" and that "it was great." Although some live with family, most of the women veterans that I interviewed live alone and are self-sufficient.

The self-sufficiency displayed by these amazing women may reflect their courage and daring to leave their home communities and venture into the unknown world of the military. Their stories demonstrate that they volunteered to free up men for combat, to allow for the quick return of brothers or uncles, for travel and adventure, and for economic reasons. They were praised, along with other women, by the Canadian government: "The reputation the womenfolk in the armed forces have gained, and the splendid work they have performed should not go unnoticed by a grateful country and parliament."[98] The Aboriginal women who participated in this study gave freely, humbly, and unselfishly of their time and remembrances. They definitely relayed a sense of pride in participating and serving in Canada's military. I commend all of them for being so courageous, forthright and sharing.

Conclusion

According to a glossy brochure produced in 1999 by DND to target the Aboriginal population, Aboriginal women made important contributions to the Canadian forces in the Second World War. On the cover are pictures of traditional Aboriginal symbols: an Inuit inukshuk, an eagle and the infinity symbol of the Métis. Also on the cover is the famous photograph of the first Aboriginal woman to enlist in the military: Mary Greyeyes being blessed by

her "chief."[99] The brochure states that "at present, twelve hundred and seventy-five First Nations, Inuit, and Métis Canadians make up one and a quarter per cent of the Canadian Forces."[100] Comparing the experiences of female veterans in the secondary literature with those of the Aboriginal women who participated in this study shows they experienced similar conditions and experiences. They felt the trepidation upon enlistment, experienced the physical difficulties of basic training, faced separation from family and friends, withstood the discipline of regulations, enjoyed the comradeship of new friends, bore the snide remarks of males and the general public, and took pride in their uniforms and contributions to Canada's war effort.

There were both similarities and differences between the treatment of male and female Aboriginal veterans in this study. Women who married non-status Indians not only lost their military benefits, but also those associated with their Band rights. A few men received land grants, but the one female participant who applied was refused. Some men received $2,320 in VLA grants available to on-reserve Indians, but only one participant received this grant. Just as Aboriginal male veterans faced unequal treatment in receiving benefits, so it was with the women. Furthermore, there is inconsistency in terms of eligibility for the 2003 compensation package. Both Edith Merrifield and Mary Ann Legault were denied compensation, ostensibly because they had received a hairdressing course and/or had not returned to their reserve communities upon discharge. However, Marion Hill received the 2003 compensation, even though she had received a dressmaking course. Peggy Stonechild was granted $2,320 for a house after the war, but also received the 2003 compensation package. Mamie Wetelainen Dunlop received compensation, even though she had not returned to her reserve community. These inconsistencies defy comprehension.

Aboriginal cultures, in the main, are still oral cultures. Therefore, it is appropriate to give voice, to appreciate, and to document Aboriginal women's wartime experiences. As Zella Foulds wrote, "It's so nice to know someone cares about the women who were in the armed forces. We are forgotten souls."[101] While the participants in this study may not have stressed their Aboriginal heritage to others in the military, today it has become a source of pride. It is long past due to express gratitude for their contribution and to render them *visible.*

ENDNOTES

[1] Although the term "Aboriginal" was used as early as E. Pauline Johnson (1861-1913) in her writings, it became entrenched in modern Canadian discourse with the Canadian

Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35, which defines "Aboriginal" as Indian, Métis and Inuit. Throughout this chapter the terms "Indigenous" and "Aboriginal" are used interchangeably, except where the legally defined "Indian" is appropriate, when quoting from an original author or the participant is self-defined. Only one participant used the term "Indigenous" when talking about her people. Personal preference capitalizes these descriptive terms, as well as the non-Aboriginal, White, descriptor.

[2] On the literature about Indian contributions to both world wars, see chapter 8 by P. Whitney Lackenbauer and R. Scott Sheffield in this volume.

[3] Andrew Horrall, *Library and Archives Canada* [*LAC*] archivist for Record Group 24 (Department of National Defence) commented on 2 December 2004: "Many stories are 'hidden' in archives because the historical questions we are asking of the records, do not match the file titles that were given to the records by their creators. Records were created to organise and manage programmes, activities and organisations, not for historical use … [R]ooting out hidden stories as a researcher is to try to understand the organisational and administrative context in which records were originally created." Bill Russell, former archivist for RG 10 (Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), stated on 30 November 2004 that documentation in RG 10 is much weaker for the Second World War than for the First and access to the military files for individual Aboriginal servicewomen are subject to the *Privacy Act*. Some archival records are still restricted, requiring application for Access to Information. Due to time constraints, I settled for one file instead of the twelve requested. It was delivered 18 March 2005.

[4] A full discussion of my methodology and ethical debates are found in Grace Poulin, "'Invisible Women': Aboriginal Servicewomen in Canada's WWII Military," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Trent University, 2006, 32-52.

[5] The following is a list of participants, their rank, where they now live and the dates of their interviews: Mamie Wetelainen Dunlop (CWAC Private), Winnipeg, 12 November 2002; Joan Martin Hogan (CWAC Private), Red Rock, Ontario, 21 November 2002; Agatha Bannon Johnson McCall, Fort William Reserve, Thunder Bay, Ontario, 25 November 2003; Natalie DeLaronde Coates (RCAF WD Leading Airwoman), Thunder Bay, Ontario, 28 January 2003; Heather Crowe (daughter), Janet Lee (daughter) and Rozan Shearer (sister) of Margaret Bruyere Crowe (CWAC Private), Fort Frances, Ontario, 3 May 2003; Dorothy Bellerose Chartrand (CWAC Staff Sergeant), Edmonton, Alberta, 12 May 2004, written submission; Marion Miller Hill (CWAC Private), Six Nations, Ohsweken, Ontario, 26 July 2004; Margaret Pictou LaBillois (RCAF WD Lance Corporal), Eel River Bar Reserve, New Brunswick, 5 August 2004; Teresa Dion Ewachewski (CWAC Private), Surrey, British Columbia, 23 August 2004; Zella Foulds Krilow (CWAC Private), Surrey, British Columbia, 23 August 2004; Jannett Foulds Generous (CWAC Corporal), Vernon, British Columbia, 25 August 2004; Nellie Blankenship Rettenbacher (CWAC Corporal), Vernon, British Columbia, 25 August 2004; Stephen Reid, Vancouver, British Columbia, 29 August 2004, son of Mary Greyeyes (CWAC Private); Josephine Greyeyes (CWAC Private), Muskeg Lake Reserve, Saskatchewan, 13 October 2004, by telephone; Gertrude (Gertie) Fraser Pratt (WRCNS), Birch Hills, Saskatchewan, 21 October 2004; Alice Petit Samuel (CWAC Private), Duck Lake, Saskatchewan, 21 October 2004; Edith Gordon Merrifield (CWAC Private), Regina, Saskatchewan, 23 October 2004; Margaret (Peggy) Stonechild (CWAC Private), Regina, Saskatchewan, 23 October 2004; Mary Ann Mirasty Legault (CWAC Private), Ottawa, Ontario, 10 December 2004.

[6] Edith Gordon Merrifield; Margaret (Peggy) Stonechild; Mary Ann Mirasty Legault, interviewees.

[7] Agatha Bannon McCall, interviewee.

[8] See Ruth Roach Pierson's various studies: "Ladies or Loose Women: The Canadian Women's Army Corps in World War II," *Atlantis*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1979), 245-266;

"The Double Bind of the Double Standard: VD Control and the CWAC in World War II," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. LXII, No. 1 (1981), 31-58; "Canadian Women and Canadian Mobilization During the Second World War," *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire*, Vol. 51 Edition Canadienne (1982), 181-207; *Canadian Women and the Second World War* (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1983); and, *"They're Still Women After All": The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986). For anecdotal records, see Jean Bruce, *Back the Attack: Canadian Women During the Second World War – At Home and Abroad* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1985); Carolyn Gossage, *Greatcoats and Glamour Boots: Canadian Women at War (1939-1945)* (Toronto: Dundurn, 1991); Shelley Saywell, *Women in War* (Markham: Viking, 1985); and, Ruth Tierney, *Petticoat Warfare* (Belleville: Mika, 1984).

[9] Ralston in Canada, *House of Commons Debates*, 19 March 1941, 1697; Graydon in *Debates*, 1940, 106; Pierson, *"They're Still Women After All,"* 95. For government reaction to women organizing into paramilitary groups, see Graydon in *Debates*, 14 November 1940, 107. See also Green in *Debates*, 21 November 1940, 292.

[10] *Debates*, 14 February 1944, 529. A 1943 *Globe and Mail* article attempted to assuage public angst by reporting: "There have been two major obstacles to overcome in the enlistment of women. One is the competitive appeal of the war industries. In addition, there are such personal considerations as higher pay and more freedom off the job. The most important obstacle, however, is rooted in the home. This prejudice would not be so strong were it not for the malicious gossip and rumour about sordid influences to which the women in uniform are subjected."

[11] Nellie Blanenship Rettenbacher, interviewee.

[12] Natalie DeLaronde Coates, interviewee.

[13] Mamie Wetelainen Dunlop, interviewee. For a thorough discussion regarding the policy on VD, see Pierson, "The Double Bind," as well as, Pierson, "Ladies or Loose Women."

[14] On this subject, see *Debates*, 13 May 1942, 990, 2148, 2394, 2395 and 14 February 1944, 529. See also Pierson, "Canadian Women."

[15] Pierson, "Canadian Women," 191-192. See also Pierson, "Ladies or Loose Women," 250-251.

[16] Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) radio broadcasts in the recruitment genre included *Comrades in Arms: The Women Who Serve that Men May Fly*, 23 October 1942. *Girl Guides Prepares Women for Service* was broadcast on National Girl Guides' Day, 31 October 1942. This program attempted to recruit for the CWAC and RCAF WD by using the Girl Guide pledge and it explicitly compared Guiding to the discipline of the military. Other programs included *Dames in the Navy*, 11 December 1942; *Comrades in Arms: The Wrens Are Here*; *RCAF Women's Division*, 11 December 1942; *Mary Churchill Speaks*, 22 August 1943; *Mirror for Women: They Do the Job*, 1 November 1943; *CBC News: Canadian Women Serve Overseas*, 20 December 1943. Examples of war posters can be found in Marc Choko, *Canadian War Posters, 1914-1945* (Laval: Méridien, 1994). NFB films included *Careers and Cradles: Women at War*, 1942; *Proudly She Marches*, 1943; and, *Wings On Her Shoulders*, 1943.

[17] Tina Davidson, "Hemlines and Hairdos: Body Management for the Feminine Ideal in the Canadian Women's Army Corps," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Lakehead University, 1999, 20; Tina Davidson, "'A Woman's Right to Charm and Beauty': Maintaining the Feminine Ideal in the Canadian Women's Army Corps," *Atlantis*, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2001), 45-54; "Mademoiselle in Khaki," *Khaki: The Army Newsletter*, 6 November 1944, 2; and, *CWAC Newsletter*, August 1944, 1, 9.

[18] April 1941-May 1944, Vol. 1, File 452-49, RG 10, *LAC*.

[19] Ibid., 27 January 1942.

[20] Gossage, *Greatcoats and Glamour Boots*, 40.

[21] *Khaki: The Army Newsletter*, 8 December 1943, 2, 5.
[22] Nellie Blankenship Rettenbacher, interviewee.
[23] Natalie DeLaronde Coates; Joan Martin Hogan; Mamie Werelainen Dunlop; Jannett Foulds Generous, interviewees.
[24] Zella Foulds Krilow, interviewee.
[25] Alice Petit Samuel; Marion Miller Hill; Teresa Dion, interviewees.
[26] Natalie DeLaronde Coates, interviewee.
[27] Teresa Dion, interviewee.
[28] Nellie Blankenship Rettenbacher, interviewee.
[29] Jannett Generous, interviewee.
[30] Teresa Dion, interviewee.
[31] Gertie Fraser Pratt, interviewee.
[32] Edith Gordon Merrifield, interviewee.
[33] Nellie Blankenship Rettenbacher, interviewee.
[34] R. Scott Sheffield, *The Red Man's on the Warpath: The Image of the 'Indian' and the Second World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press 2004); Kim Anderson, "The Construction of a Negative Identity," in Kim Anderson, ed., *A Recognition of Being: Reconstructing Native Womanhood* (Toronto: Sumach Press, 2000), 99-112. See also Sarah Carter, *Capturing Women: The Manipulation of Cultural Imagery in Canada's Prairie West* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997). This topic was approached as early as 1892 by E. Pauline Johnson whose article "A Strong Race Opinion: On the Indian Girl in Modern Fiction" first appeared in the *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 22 May 1892, and reprinted in Carole Gerson and Veronica Strong-Boag, eds., *E. Pauline Johnson: Tekahionwake* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 177.
[35] Stephen Reid, interviewee. Mary also states this in Carol Geddes et al, *Forgotten Warriors*.
[36] File 083 REID, Vol. 1, RG 10, *LAC*.
[37] File 452-49, Vol. 677, RG 10, *LAC*. Interestingly, the article focuses on Mary's brothers and the First World War veteran, without mentioning that Mary Greyeyes was the first Indian woman to enlist in the CWAC. The same photograph appeared in the *Winnipeg Tribune* and in Hugh Conrod, *Athene Goddess of War: The Canadian Women's Army Corps* (Dartmouth: Writing and Editorial Services, 1983) where Major Helen K. Rankin remembers Mary Greyeyes "as a lovely young woman, fluent in English, who spent much of her time reading and studying literature," 80-81. This photograph is presently gracing a glossy DND brochure targeting Aboriginal recruitment (Department of National Defence, *Aboriginal Honour, Proud Military Traditions,* RIA 207-99(E)/ 99CS-0413).
[38] *Winnipeg Free Press*, 14 August 1942. Further discussion on Aboriginal stereotypes can be found in Daniel Francis, *The Imaginary Indian* (Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 1992).
[39] *Globe and Mail*, 30 January 1942. The *Saskatoon Phoenix*, on 21 October 1944, paid further tribute to Gladys' family history of involvement in both wars: "The day that war was declared Chief Joe Dreaver of the Mistawasis Indian Reserve between Leask and Mont Nebo, arrived in Saskatoon with all the boys of military age on the reserve, 14 of them, among them his three sons, to enlist in the Canadian army. Chief Dreaver, who has an outstanding military record from the First Great War and who is now a member of the Veterans' Guard of Canada guarding Nazi prisoners of war at Medcine Hat, is meeting with … his daughters Myrtle of the CWAC and Gladys of the RCAF (WD)."
[40] *Toronto Globe and Mail*, 5 January 1943.
[41] See undated clipping in File 452-49, Vol. 677, RG 10, *LAC*.
[42] *Ottawa Evening Journal*, 11 February 1942.
[43] *Montreal Gazette*, 11 August 1943.
[44] Sheffield, *The Red Man's on the Warpath*, 71. Another example of this was seen in an

edition of *Khaki*, 18 September 1944, 20, that portrayed a stereotypical photograph of "Sergeant Buck Tahamont, Redskin of the Abenaki nation," in full regalia including feathered headdress, distributing candies to children. This photograph was obviously orchestrated by the Army, because it is a stretch of the imagination that the sergeant had that headdress on hand in his foot-locker. However, even if he did carry it with him, it was for personal reasons, not publicity.

[45] Gossage, *Greatcoats and Glamour Boots*, 87 and 149. See also Barbara Dundas, *A History of Women in the Canadian Military* (Montreal: Art Global, 2000).

[46] Marion Miller Hill, interviewee.

[47] Edith Gordon Merrifield; Margaret Pictou LaBillois, interviewees.

[48] Mamie Wetelainen Dunlop, interviewee.

[49] Gossage, *Greatcoats and Glamour Boots*, 87.

[50] Zella Foulds Krilow, interviewee.

[51] Natalie DeLaronde Coates, interviewee.

[52] Margaret Pictou LaBillois, interviewee.

[53] Gossage, *Greatcoats and Glamour Boots*, 153.

[54] Zella Foulds Krilow, interviewee.

[55] Pierson, "*They're Still Women After All*," 113.

[56] Colonel C.P. Stacey notes, "Following Germany's surrender women were sent abroad in increasing numbers for administrative duties. CWACs were employed at HQ First Canadian Army. The peak [was] in August 1945." See C.P. Stacey, *Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific*, Vol.1 (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, Queen's Printer, 1966).

[57] Alice Petit Samuel, interviewee.

[58] Marion Miller Hill, interviewee.

[59] Pierson, "Canadian Women and Canadian Mobilization," 181-207.

[60] Zella Foulds Krilow; Margaret Pictou LaBillois; Edith Gordon Merrifield; Teresa Dion; interviewees.

[61] Nellie Blankenship Rettenbacher, interviewee.

[62] Marion Miller Hill; Zella Foulds Krilow; Natalie DeLaronde Coates; Joan Martin Hogan; interviewees.

[63] Margaret Pictou LaBilllois, interviewee.

[64] Jannett Foulds Generous, interviewee.

[65] Alice Petit Samuel, interviewee.

[66] Joan Martin Hogan, interviewee.

[67] Marion Miller Hill, interviewee. Marion must have been speaking of times when they did not wear their uniforms to civilian dances. The interviews revealed some conflicting stories about whether the women wore their uniforms at all times. Zella, who reported not going to civilian dances and thus never having any problem, declared, "We had to wear our uniform except when on leave." Nellie said, "You lived in your uniform. We were allowed in free to civilian dances and were treated very well. My parents were very proud of me. They may have heard rumours a little bit here and there but they knew me." While Zella's family was "aware of [the] 'whispering campaign,'" she commented, "Some girls might have been [immoral] but most girls were from good families." Zella Foulds Krilow, interviewee.

[68] Natalie DeLaronde Coates, interviewee. Margaret Pictou LaBillois reported "no problem with civilians while in [WD] uniform." Perhaps this was because the WDs, with their higher educational level (a minimum equivalent to second year high school), were considered not as "loose" as the Army girls who needed only Grade Eight equivalent.

[69] Jannett Foulds Generous, interviewee.

[70] Teresa Dion, interviewee.

[71] Zella Foulds Krilow, interviewee.

[72] Nellie Blankenship Rettenbacher, interviewee.
[73] Paolo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (New York: Penguin, 1999); R. Bruce Shepard, "Plain Racism: The Reaction Against Oklahoma Black Immigration to the Canadian Plains," *Prairie Forum*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1985), 365-387. Some pre-First World War attitudes toward Blacks carried forward to the Second, especially in Winnipeg where the recruiting officers accepted no Blacks. The *Winnipeg Registrar* was in favour of racial exclusions although Blacks, like Indians, were not on a list of racial minorities deemed unacceptable for military service. Michael D. Stevenson, "The Mobilization of Native Canadians During the Second World War," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association*, NS 7 (1996), 226. So if Black men were not accepted, there may not have been too many Black women in the services.
[74] Joan Martin Hogan, interviewee.
[75] Alice Petit Samuel, interviewee.
[76] Teresa Dion, interviewee.
[77] Mary Ann Mirasty Legault, interviewee.
[78] See, for example, R. Scott Sheffield, "A Search for Equity: A Study of the Treatment Accorded to First Nations Veterans and Dependents of the Second World War and the Korean Conflict," *National Roundtable on First Nations Veterans' Issues* (April 2001), 1-63; P. Whitney Lackenbauer, *The Treatment of Aboriginal Veterans After the Second World War: Application and Administration of the Veterans Land Act* (Waterloo, 1996); Canada, *Final Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* [*RCAP*], 1996, 1 and 12; Janet Frances Davison, "We Shall Remember: Indians in World War II," Unpublished MA Thesis, Trent University, 1993; Kate Fawkes, *The Veterans Land Act: Its Application with Regard to Indian Veterans* (Ottawa, 1993); Carol Geddes, Michael Doxtater, Jerry Krepakevich, producers, *Forgotten Warriors: The Story of Canada's War Veterans* (videocassette, National Film Board of Canada, 1996).
[79] R.Scott Sheffield, "'In the Same Manner as Other People…:' Government Policy and the Military Service of Canada's First Nations People, 1939-1945," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 1995, 10; R. Scott Sheffield, "'Of Pure European Descent and of the White Race'": Recruitment Policy and Aboriginal Canadians, 1939-1945," *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1996), 8-15; Davison, "We Shall Remember," 37. See also *RCAP*, 1 and 12.
[80] Peggy Stonechild, interviewee.
[81] Gertie Fraser Pratt, interviewee.
[82] Davison, "We Shall Remember," 9.
[83] Marion Miller Hill, interviewee.
[84] The Métis National Council issued a Media Advisory via Canada NewsWire Ltd., dated 27 June 2003, with a by-line of Winnipeg, titled "Métis Veterans excluded by Canada" and sub-titled, "Métis National Council demands action and assistance for Métis Veterans." The article begins: "The Métis National Council called for the federal government to treat Métis Veterans with respect and fairness in light of last week's announcement. Last Friday, the Government of Canada announced a compensation package for Aboriginal Veterans. However, Métis Veterans were specifically excluded in this program that is not geared for Aboriginal Veterans but rather for First Nation Veterans."
[85] Nellie did remark about a $200-$300 discharge allowance, but not the amount of a clothing allowance.
[86] Upon discharge, an initial x-ray showed a spot on Joan's lung, although the Army did not notify her of it. It was uncovered by her family physician and another veteran sent for her records to discover that the Army had noted it upon discharge.
[87] Margaret Pictou LaBillois, interviewee.

[88] Ibid.
[89] Edith Gordon Merrifield, interviewee.
[90] Ibid.
[91] Heather Crowe, daughter of Margaret Bruyere Crowe, interviewee.
[92] This list was provided by Peggy Stonechild's partner, Victor 'Boss' Daniels, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 23 October 2004.
[93] Saywell, *Women in War*, 306.
[94] Mary Ann Mirasty Legault, interviewee.
[95] Dorothy Bellerose Chartrand, letter from Edmonton, Alberta, 12 May 2004. Dorothy was interviewed by the Aboriginal Peoples' Television Network (APTN) on 4 November 2005 for the National Year of the Veteran remembrances.
[96] Built in 1785, it is the first Protestant church in Ontario, if not the first church, and contains Queen Anne Silver with the inscription "The gift of Her Majesty Anne … to her Indian Chapel of the Mohawks."
[97] Nellie Blankenship Rettenbacher, interviewee.
[98] Graydon in *Debates*, 14 February 1944, 451.
[99] According to Mary's son, Stephen Reid, the Army orchestrated this photograph of Mary Greyeyes Reid. The man in the photo was neither Chief nor Councillor of her Reserve and the Army provided trappings. He was paid $25.00 for posing and the Army paid for Mary's dinner. Actually the man was saying, "I wish they would hurry up and take the picture. The mosquitoes are eating me alive!" to which Mary replied, "What do you think it's like for me down here?"
[100] Canada, DND, Brochure, RIA 207-99 (E) / 99CS – 0413:1, *Aboriginal Honour: Proud Military Traditions.* See also Janice Summerby, *Native Soldiers: Foreign Battlefields* (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs Canada, 1993), 20.
[101] Zella Foulds Krilow, written "Thank you" note, 15 September 2005.

CHAPTER 7

Canada's Northern Defenders: Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers, 1947-2005

P. Whitney Lackenbauer

"The Centre of Gravity for [Canadian Forces Northern Area (CFNA)] is our positive relationship with the aboriginal peoples of the North," CFNA commander Kevin McLeod highlighted in 2003. "Deploying out on the land, conducting patrols, training and supporting the youth … and being involved in the local communities, are why we are here, and this must not be forgotten."[1] It is a daunting task, given that the CFNA's mission is to defend the Canadian Territorial North: the 3.8 million square kilometres represent forty percent of Canada's land mass and comprise one of the largest areas of military responsibility in the world. Northern Area encompasses five topographical regions – from the desolate peaks of the high Arctic and the desert-like terrain of the Arctic lowlands, to the forested mountains of the Western Cordillera – and is home to a culturally and linguistically diverse population totalling less than 100,000 people. For decades, this geographical breadth and demographic diversity has perplexed defence policy-makers who have in turn often chosen to simply ignore the region, which is now an irresponsible and dangerous choice given the increasing interest in the northern most reaches of the country. To be Arctic-capable and Arctic-tough, the Canadian Forces (CF) must be "credible, professional and capable of conducting operations in the North."[2] Given that the vast majority of Canadians live south of the treeline and are unfamiliar with their country's northern inheritance, these capabilities are dependent upon relationships with northern residents and, in particular, indigenous peoples.

Part of CFNA's mandate to reinforce Canadian sovereignty is fulfilled through the Canadian Rangers. This unique force is designed to serve as the "eyes and ears" of the armed forces in isolated, northern and coastal regions of the country which cannot be practically or economically covered by other elements of the CF. Created in 1947, the Rangers survived a course of waxing and waning interest over the ensuing four decades. During the last 20 years, however, the Rangers have become an entrenched component of the military's northern strategy and have elicited significant media attention. There are currently 4,000 Rangers in 168 patrols across the country and

1,500 Rangers in 58 patrols fall under the administrative control of 1 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group (1 CRPG) headquartered in Yellowknife. Their unorthodox military approach in northern communities represents military accommodation and acceptance of cultural diversity in a practical form. Through the Canadian Rangers, the CF encourages indigenous practices, while promoting the participation and leadership of Aboriginal community members in defence activities. Military training and operations allow the Rangers to exercise their unique skills and increase the collective capabilities of their patrols.

Based on extensive archival research and a series of interviews conducted with 1 CRPG personnel from 2000 to 2004, this chapter assesses military-indigenous relationships in the Canadian Arctic since the late 1940s. Recognizing that the standard approach used to train and exercise Regular and Reserve Force units would not work in northern communities, the military has developed a flexible, culturally-aware approach that intertwines differentiation, accommodation and acceptance. Ranger instructors who are willing to acclimatize and adapt to the ways and needs of diverse northern communities learn to teach and build trust relationships with patrols in an adaptive manner that transcends cultural, linguistic and generational lines.[3] In turn, the Rangers serve to strengthen northern indigenous communities by encouraging traditional land- and sea-based activities and local capacity-building. By extension, the Rangers' positive role in northern life means that military training supports the health and sustainability of their communities and cultures.

Theoretical and Conceptual Considerations

There are few images more captivating to the southern Canadian imagination than the lone Inuk hunter, crossing the sea ice by snow machine, heading to an historic hunting ground. As Franklyn Griffiths reminds us, the "arctic sublime" continues to haunt the national psyche.[4] Viljalmur Stefansson painted a portrait of the "friendly arctic" filled with untapped riches, but most southerners saw their distant inheritance of ice and snow (they always thought of it in winter) as forbidden and dangerous. As a result, benign indifference marked the federal government's approach to northern policy (including sovereignty and security issues) through most of the 20th century. Furthermore, until recently, northern indigenous peoples were treated as foreign "objects" rather than potential actors. Nevertheless, the extension of military development into their homelands had profound effects on their cultures and their lives. In recognition of these impacts, federal policies over the last three decades have emphasized the importance

of accommodating northern indigenous perspectives and interests and allowing these people to play a meaningful role in the national project. The conclusion of land claims and self-government agreements, the establishment of the Arctic Council and the appointment of a Canadian Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs (filled to date by prominent Inuit leaders) indicates an acceptance that northern indigenous peoples are now partners in shaping the government agenda.

While the existing literature on Aboriginal-military relations has paid little attention to the Canadian Rangers, scholars have provided useful frameworks to understand the shifting contexts in which this unique force has operated. For example, Kenneth Eyre has outlined three “surges” of military interest in the Canadian Arctic during the Cold War. He revealed that the federal government’s varying appreciation of security and sovereignty threats had a direct correlation with military priorities for and activities in the region.[5] Since the end of the Cold War, however, Arctic security issues have undergone a significant transformation. The leading scholar of these changes, political scientist Rob Huebert, has explained that the effects of military operations on northern peoples and ecology have become central considerations. Sovereignty, rather than traditional forms of military security, is now the primary focus of Canadian defence activities in the Arctic.[6] As the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs observed in 1997, “the security of individuals and the environment in the Arctic is now placed above traditional state sovereignty and defence issues that dominated throughout the Cold War.”[7] This has a clear effect on the way the military can accomplish its mission in the North in the 21st century.

Scholarly literature on civil-military relations also intersects with the northern security agenda. One school of interpretation sees the CF as a positive contributor to Canadian development, both domestically and internationally. In the context of the Arctic, the extension of military communications systems, transportation and activities into the North have served to open and connect it to the rest of the world.[8] The second school sees the military as a coercive and dominant threat to Canadian values and to the environment. Using examples like low-level flying, environmental contamination from CF operations and direct confrontations between Aboriginal peoples and the army, such as Goose Bay, Oka, Gustafsen Lake and Ipperwash, the military is characterized as a coercive hegemon.[9] Indeed, policy scholar Frances Abele has argued that “sovereignty and security policy decisions, in their immediate impact, have been and continue to be disproportionately costly to northern indigenous peoples.” Inuit spokesperson Mary Simon has added, “Too often, military projects are centralized undertakings that are unilaterally imposed on

indigenous peoples and their territories. Such actions are inconsistent with the basic principles of aboriginal self-government."[10] In short, military activities and northern indigenous worldviews and life-paths are incompatible.

The institutional emphasis of most civil-military relations theory and scholarship tends to neglect issues of culture. This chapter recognizes that values, attitudes and symbols inform not only the nation's view of its military role, but also the military's own view of that role. Concordance theory, Rebecca Schiff explains, highlights dialogue, accommodation and shared values amongst the military, political elites and society. Rather than assuming a sharp separation between civil and military institutions, she encourages research drawing upon additional elements of society that affect the role and function of the armed forces. How do citizens interact with the military? Is there agreement over the role of the military in society?[11] The paucity of research on the social integration of the military in Canada *writ large* demands more attention, as do specific relationships like those shared with Aboriginal groups.[12]

This chapter focuses on Aboriginal peoples' service in what is now 1 CRPG (which spans the Territorial North). It explores evolving military perceptions about contributions that Northern Aboriginal peoples can make to national defence. The documentary record suggests that the Canadian military historically possessed conflicting ideas about the role and utility of Aboriginal peoples in the Rangers – and the CF more generally. By the late 1970s, however, new sovereignty and security discourses encouraged the military to integrate Aboriginal peoples into the CF in culturally appropriate ways. Officials saw operational value in traditional skills and the military has grown in its awareness that diversity can serve as a "force multiplier" rather than a liability. Over the last two decades, this understanding has allowed the Rangers to flourish in the north, and attract significant positive media attention for the military and support self-governing and sustainable northern communities.

Several qualifications are necessary to note at the onset. First, this chapter does not purport to speak from an Aboriginal viewpoint. Although I have interviewed Aboriginal Rangers over the last five years, most direct quotations are taken from archival documents and published primary sources. Second, I have relied heavily on interviews with Ranger instructors who have worked with Rangers in the North. Although these testimonies reveal as much about the instructor as they do about the people they are describing, these professional soldiers bring a unique perspective given their experience with numerous Ranger patrols and their knowledge of military culture. Furthermore, my conclusions are somewhat essentialist. Aboriginal voices and experiences are, of course, plural. As Alan Cairns explains,

Esquimalt Naval and Military Museum

Cover of the *Ranger Magazine*, January 1945.

"'Aboriginal' covers not only the obvious diversity of Indian, Inuit and Métis but multiple internal distinctions – men's voice and women's voice, modernizers and traditionalists, urban Aboriginals in Toronto and their relatives on isolated northern reserves."[13] Future studies will determine whether the general comments that I offer are applicable to Rangers across the North and across the country more generally.

Historical Overview: The Search for a Role, 1947-69

Although I have charted the growth of Aboriginal participation in the Canadian Rangers elsewhere,[14] the historical evolution of the force warrants reiteration given that it remains the least known formation in the CF. The Rangers were officially established as a component of the Reserves in 1947, based on the template of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers (PCMR) created in British Columbia during the Second World War.[15] Rather than requiring

the government to station Regular Force troops in northern and isolated areas, the Rangers represented a cost-effective solution to Cold War sovereignty and security concerns that drew upon existing human resources in local areas. Civilians, pursuing their everyday work as loggers, trappers or fishermen, could thus serve as the military's "eyes and ears" in areas where demographics and geography precluded a more traditional military presence. The plan was to recruit individuals who would not appeal to other units for age, health or employment reasons and thus would remain in their local area in both war and peace. With little training and equipment, the Rangers could act as guides and scouts, report suspicious activities and – if the unthinkable came to pass – delay enemies using guerrilla tactics. The only equipment issued to Rangers was an obsolescent .303 Lee Enfield, 200 rounds of ammunition annually and an armband. (This has since grown to include a sweatshirt, ball cap, t-shirt and a trigger lock.) From the onset, the force structure was decentralized and variations in roles, location and terrain made it impossible to create a "standard establishment." Each Ranger platoon was operated and administered on a localized basis.[16]

The question of Native Canadian participation in the Rangers generated conflicting opinions in the early postwar period. Members of coastal Native communities in British Columbia had played a significant role in the wartime PCMR and received heroic tributes in newspaper reports. They also embraced this form of wartime service that did not obligate them to serve overseas. "All the Indians of these parts are strongly and enthusiastically … for the Ranger organization," PCMR instructor Brendan Kennelly reported of the Kinconlith unit in 1943. "They see in it their opportunity to do their bit & to be prepared to help in home defence in country … and in terrain & surroundings with which they were familiar and in which they would be most useful."[17] While it seemed obvious to some military officials that indigenous peoples would make similar contributions to the Canadian Rangers, not everyone was caught up in the hype. In late 1946, Brigadier S.F. Clark, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, cautioned that:

> folk-lore attribute many qualities to outdoor people and especially to natives (such as Indians and Eskimos) which, in fact, they do not possess. It is common belief that Indians and Eskimos, and to a lesser degree trappers, in our Canadian hinterlands possess special qualities of sense of direction and as such would be extremely valuable as guides to Military parties during operations. One of the most experienced Arctic travellers, Vilhjalmur Stefansson, states that invariably he found that Indians and Eskimos were reasonably good guides in country with which they were familiar but

> that as soon as they were taken into unfamiliar country, they displayed no “sixth sense of direction” but were, in fact, less able to find their way about than an experienced Anglo Saxon.[18]

Nonetheless, the Rangers were intended to serve in their local areas. Given this fact, the question remained whether Native peoples could have a role to play in the new force.

Major-General Chris Vokes, who oversaw Central Command, did not think so. He discouraged the formation of Ranger units in northern Ontario because the population was largely Cree. First, he felt that there really was no need for such organizations: “Nothing goes on in the James Bay area which is not quickly known through the natural curiosity of the natives. The Hudson Bay factor and the missionaries plus the RCMP pretty well know everything which goes on … through the mocassin telegraph and their private wireless.” Furthermore, Vokes explicitly dismissed the Aboriginal population as worthwhile contributors to Canadian defence:

> The population is for the most part Cree Indian, some with Scottish names and blue eyes who exist by trapping and guiding for goose and duck hunters in the Autumn. They are most indolent and unreliable and born lazy. Hunger is the only motivating force, plus the propagation of their race, at which they are very adept…I doubt the value of these Indians in a para military organization.[19]

If Ottawa insisted on a presence in the region, he would turn to White locals to establish small units at Moosonee, Moose Factory and Fraserville. He clearly did not believe that indigenous residents would have anything to contribute, despite impressive Native participation rates from the region during the world wars. In Vokes’ opinion, Indian traits precluded effective military contributions. Exclusion, not accommodation, was his preferred option.

Québec Command also foresaw limited prospects for the integration of northern indigenous peoples into military activities. During the summer of 1948, an intelligence officer surveyed the areas around northern trading posts and recommended that recently-established Ranger company headquarters should remain dormant until an emergency. Officers had been appointed and platoon recruiting was well underway, but there were no strength returns because communications were limited. The General Officer Commanding, Major-General R.O.G. Morton, surmised that “it would never be easy to keep in touch with the other ranks, many of whom were Indians and Eskimos of migratory habits.” In contrast to Vokes, however, Morton saw indigenous

traits and lifestyles as appropriate to the force. After all, "the Eskimos and Indians living in isolated communities were excellent marksmen and probably would use the annual 100-round allotment of ammunition (the only remuneration they received) for hunting seal and reindeer."[20] Rather than fixating on negative stereotypes like his Ontario counterpart, Morton perceived the potential, mutual benefits of integrating Native peoples with an intimate knowledge of the land and northern survival skills into the Rangers.

As the Rangers took shape in the late 1940s and early 1950s, their expansion into the Far North reflected evolving geo-strategic appreciations. The Arctic, now sandwiched between rival superpowers, would be the front line in any future world war. In 1947, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) developed an intercontinental bomber, bilateral weather station agreements were sealed with the US, and American forces returned to the Canadian North. Two years later, the Soviets exploded their first nuclear weapon and the threat of a continental attack became more ominous than ever before. Yet "neither the United States nor Canada looked on the North as a *place* to be protected because of some intrinsic value," Kenneth Eyre astutely observed. "It was seen as a *direction*, an exposed flank."[21] This posed a series of important questions for defence and foreign policy makers:

> Did Canada have the resources to guard that front line to the satisfaction of its powerful ally, the United States? It was obvious, almost from the start, that it did not. But could Canada allow the United States to mount that "long polar watch" alone, from Canadian territory? Would this not be an admission that whatever sovereignty Canada claimed in the polar regions was weak at best and nonexistent at worst?[22]

Options were limited. Canadians had to "defend against help." If Canada was neither able nor willing to defend the northern approaches to the continent, the Americans would be compelled to take unilateral measures to defend themselves and could thus become a security threat. The dilemma remained: how could Canada help protect the continent against the Soviet Union while, at the same time, protect the Canadian North against the United States?[23]

Demographic, political and financial realities dictated that the Canadian military could not feasibly station large numbers of regular soldiers in the North. Mobilizing northern residents could bolster Canadian sovereignty and security in the region. Staff officers began to note the importance of "Eskimos" to national defence by 1950. Ironically, the Soviet Union provided the precedent: for decades, the Russians had devoted considerable

attention to developing their Arctic areas and assimilating natives into their future plans. The Soviet Institute for the Peoples of the North trained members of Soviet native groups so that they could return to the Arctic with skills as doctors, teachers, meteorologists and aircraft technicians – "and also thoroughly indoctrinated with the Red virus of future world domination." In contrast, a Canadian briefing paper observed, "both Canada and USA have been almost standing still where the Eskimo is concerned." It noted the "most regrettable condition" in which a few were engaged in the armed forces "to do jobs of a menial nature." The paper continued:

> Anyone who has knowledge of the Eskimos knows them to be most ingenious, of outstanding integrity, loyalty, patience and industrious far beyond the average whiteman in the arctic. Given half a chance the Eskimos would prove beyond any doubt the ideal race for staffing Armed Service Units, meteorological stations, hospitals, schools, and scientific bases in the far North.[24]

This would be a long-term project, with pitfalls. Government and Mission schools proved "of little value to the Eskimo at the moment as it forces them … to forsake their trapping grounds … and [to forget] most of his native ways and [he] must learn these all over again when he returns home." A much better solution, this officer reflected, would be to encourage Eskimos of "promising ability" to work "in a useful capacity in their own country after graduation."[25] Flight Lieutenant S.E. Alexander noted in a 1950 memorandum that there was no reason why Eskimos could not be trained to assume most military duties in the Arctic. The expense would be minor compared to paying for "unclimatized personnel, who for the most part, are bitter and unhappy with their postings and consequently not too concerned in carrying out their duties." It was cost-effective and would contribute to their acculturation. "This matter of utilizing the Eskimos to the fullest extent both for their own advancement and the good of their native land has been discussed many times with those who know the Arctic. There has never been a dissenting voice."[26]

Defence officials embraced this logic. Ranger units, their ranks filled with northern indigenous peoples, began to spread across the Arctic.[27] An intelligence officer with the army's Western Command established Ranger platoons in the Western Arctic at Coppermine, Bathurst Inlet, Cambridge Bay, King William Land, Read Island, Holman Island and Aklavik in 1949.[28] Similarly, the military authorized the formation of companies on Baffin Island in 1951. Senior officials in Ottawa responsible for Eskimo affairs stressed that Ranger service would be good for the Inuit. One policy-maker noted that the Inuit were "reliable, honest and intelligent and would make good Rangers," but he

wanted to make sure that rifles issued to them were not "free handouts." After all, a rifle was "a major asset to an Eskimo and something he had to earn by hard work" and bullets for hunting cost significant money.[29] His underlying message: the federal government had to inculcate the Inuit with proper values to succeed in a capitalist world. To most government officials, however, the weapon and ammunition provided to the Rangers was a *quid pro quo* – they served their country and this was the remuneration that they received. They used them to great effect in their subsistence economy. "Nobody has ever attempted to calculate, or could if one wanted to, the number of caribou, moose, and seal that fell to Ranger marksmen," Kenneth Eyre noted in hindsight.[30] The .303 Lee Enfield was a reliable weapon, even in Arctic conditions, and the number was undoubtedly substantial.

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Along The Trail. The old and new modes of transportation meet along the northern trails during Exercise "Bulldog II" in Churchill, Manitoba. The Rangers with their dog team pause to pass or receive information from the army personnel in their Penguin. Left to Right: TooToo (Eskimo Ranger of Churchill), Lieutenant Dan Loomis and Sergeant Sid Fairhurst.

Annual re-supply and training visits by Regular Force Ranger Liaison Officers (RLOs) provided opportunities for cross-cultural contact. The experiences of Ambrose Shea, the RLO for Eastern Command, are representative. His first forays into the Baffin region were a culture shock. Over time, however, he developed a familiarity with the Rangers in the northeastern Arctic. He visited them in their remote camps, ate and fished with them and developed a strong respect for their knowledge and skills.[31] Distance and weather inhibited regular contact, so the RLOs relied upon training bulletins to keep the Rangers up-to-date. Amongst northern indigenous Rangers, however, it would appear that few training activities actually took

place. The Rangers were simply given their annual allotments of ammunition and "practiced" on the land by hunting. There was little sustained contact. Reverend John R. Sperry, the Anglican missionary at Coppermine (Kugluktuk), was a Ranger lieutenant from 1950 to 1969. The administration of his platoon was very informal. Sperry held no meetings, provided no specific instructions or training to the Rangers and received no visits from a liaison officer. "We just knew that if an aircraft went down we should look for it," Sperry later reflected. If someone was lost, the RCMP also passed along the information and community members went out to look for them. "All the men were going out anyway," he explained, so search and rescue activities were not viewed as "Ranger" activities.[32]

By 1960, Shea became disillusioned with the military's disregard for the 550 Rangers in Newfoundland, Labrador and Baffin Island. After expanding into indigenous communities, he lamented:

> the Army seemed to stand aghast at its own temerity and from then on, and in an increasing degree, the attitude of Higher Command towards the Rangers can be best summed up in the words of the old ballad:
>
> > "Mother, may I go out to swim?"
> > "Yes, my darling daughter,
> > Hang your clothes on a hickory limb
> > But don't go near the water."

The message Shea had repeatedly received: "the Rangers may exist but under no circumstances must they do anything." This logic reflected a broader devaluation of part-time soldiering more than it did racism against Aboriginal peoples, highlighting the establishment's predisposition towards fully assimilated, professional forces. For his part, Shea was responsible for organizing and maintaining eleven Ranger companies scattered over 8,000 miles of coastline. Liaising with the Baffin Island Rangers alone consumed three months of his year, and while he enjoyed positive relationships with the Rangers themselves, his impact was limited. "It is doubtful if some of the Rangers really understand what the whole business is about," Shea explained,

> and for various reasons it is difficult to explain it to them. The Eskimoes [sic], in particular, have no real word for "soldier" ("Unataktik," that is, "one who fights," is as near as they get) and look upon warfare as a species of insanity peculiar to the white man. "I hear that the white men are fighting like dogs again," was one man's comment on the Suez affair. Furthermore, it is the RLOs

> belief that some of the Eskimoes [sic] think that he is the entire Canadian Army and that, as such, he is an eccentric but benevolent dispenser of free rifles and ammunition. The name given the RLO in certain localities "Kokiutit angayak'ok", "Rifle Chief" or "Boss of the Rifles", is sufficient indication of this.[33]

The cultural divide could not be bridged without more sustained contact and without greater clarification of what the Rangers were supposed to actually do.

Despite these various shortcomings, Shea still saw a place for the Rangers – and Eskimo Rangers in particular. "The idea of arming a local population and asking them to take a hand in defending their own locality is an ancient one and eminently sensible," he wrote. "It does not become out-dated, even in this atomic age." The Rangers had amassed considerable military intelligence over the previous decade, including topographical detail, submarine and ship sightings and reports of suspicious individuals. They had reported unexplained bomb-drops on Northern Baffin Island, producing bits of the bombs to verify the veracity of their report, and had provided evidence of guided missile activity. In an emergency, it would be useful to have an

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Nietook, an elderly Eskimo Ground Observer at Churchill, Manitoba, reports his observations to Royal Canadian Air Force personnel stationed there. Left to Right: Don J. Moyce, Nietook and Flight Officer B.J. Hopkins.

organized body like the Rangers in communities and they were different from the "highly-organized and extensively staffed" Ground Observer Corps (GObC), a purely civilian group. If intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) made the GObC obsolete, the Rangers would always be useful as "'friends on the ground' so long as the Canadian Army continues to exist."

Perhaps most importantly, the Rangers were obviously and keenly interested in the organization. Baffin Island's Eskimo Rangers had a "distorted" idea of their role, but they took it seriously:

> An extreme example of this occurred three years ago when a Ranger in North Baffin Island began, but fortunately did not complete, a single-handed attempt to capture the US Coast Guard Cutter "Staten Island". He realized that she was not a Canadian ship, jumped to the conclusion that she was a Russian, and felt that it was his duty as a soldier to take some action.

Although the Northern Baffin Eskimo were "cut off from the world in many respects," Shea found that they were "vividly aware of the Russian threat; so much so that the RLO has sometimes wondered whether they may not have had some personal contact with the Russians with which they are afraid to reveal." He found them "intelligent, adaptable and intensely practical" – like the Gurkhas – and naturally took to military training given their hunting lifestyles. "If trained in arms," the officer added, they could prove "extremely effective guerrillas. It is a pity that there are not more of them." Indeed, few white men could navigate the Arctic without their assistance, making them "good people to have on our side."

In Shea's final assessment, it made sense to retain the Rangers, but to reduce their present organization to a more "workable size." Their organization into "companies" and "platoons" fed distorted notions that they could exist and function in a conventional military manner. "Nothing could be further from the truth," Shea explained. "A 'Company' of Rangers is a collection of rugged individualists who may be scattered over a hundred miles of coastline and in twenty different settlements." They were untrained and only existed as a "unit" on paper. His final flourish reminded his superiors that they had formed a trust relationship with northern peoples that had to be maintained:

> A small quantity of obsolescent equipment is issued to them in the same spirit that an engagement ring is issued to a prospective bride: as a token of engagement. Their main virtues are that they are willing to serve the Army voluntarily in the capacity of 'friends

> on the ground' to the best of their ability, which is often considerable, and to the best of their local knowledge which is likewise. Their cost is negligible. These are virtues which are becoming increasingly rare and which deserve encouragement.[34]

By the end of the 1950s, the Rangers factored little into Ottawa's defence plans for the North. The Soviet threat was decidedly airborne and northern residents with armbands and rifles could scarcely fend off hostile bombers with nuclear payloads. Defence officials turned to technological marvels like the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line to protect the continent. Officials seemed to conclude that even if their value was negligible, so too was the Rangers' cost. It was their "cheapness," not their indigenous knowledge and contributions, which ensured the force's survival through the 1960s. They were left to "wither on the vine," with little direction, sporadic re-supply and no training.[35] Nevertheless, the few popular articles that did appear on the Rangers were laudatory. Larry Dignum told readers of *The Beaver* that the "Shadow Army of the North," functioning as civilians and carrying out their duties in conjunction with their "regular jobs," quietly performed valuable duties to defend Canada and maintain law and order in isolated areas. The Rangers' mystique shone clear:

> When on duty they wear a scarlet armband with the three maple leaves of the Canadian Army superimposed on a crossed rifle and axe. They have no uniforms, receive no pay, seek no glory, but these men of known loyalty, Indian, Eskimo and white, take pride in standing on guard in the empty and remote parts of Canada with vigilance and integrity, and in silence.[36]

In contrast to Vokes' pessimistic appraisal of potential Aboriginal contributions to the Rangers, the *Beaver* article and another in the *Star Weekly Magazine* highlighted the vital importance of Indian and Inuit cooperation. "Some of [the Rangers] can't read their own names but they are the real scholars of this country when it comes to reading signs on the trails of the north," the latter article stated. It continued, "Eskimos, Indians, whites and all the mixtures of these races, they are united in one task: Guarding a country that doesn't even know of their existence." They were not only "the least expensive military force any nation has today," but a useful source of reports on suspicious activities.[37]

Were they actually useful? Perhaps, but in the late 1960s, a military struggling to discern its role in a changing world, and reeling from the cultural implications of Unification, had largely forgotten about the Rangers' exis-

tence. John Diefenbaker, former prime minister and longstanding proponent of a "northern vision," lobbied in 1969 for an "Arctic Force," revealing that he had no knowledge of the Rangers. He wanted units of 20 to 30 men in sensitive areas to "preserve for Canada the greatest undeveloped frontier," "provide new vistas of opportunity for the Eskimo," and "provide for youth a new challenge to a worthwhile life." At first the force would have to be officered by the Regular Force, but with training, it would reach "100% Eskimo membership."[38] He was oblivious to this proposal's striking resemblance to the existing Rangers. Journalist Scott Young made the connection, noting that Canada had had "a force precisely of this nature for nearly 22 years." When Young spoke with defence officials, they were reserved in their revelations about the force. "They don't get any training – but then they're born with most of the training they need," one colonel explained. "I think we give them a few rounds of ammunition, but that is about all I know about them."[39]

Defence officials again questioned their utility as the decade drew to a close. Major W.K. Stirling visited 17 communities with Ranger platoons in the summer of 1970 to assess levels of activity and interest, but found that nearly all were moribund. Stirling concluded that northern Canadian society was no longer a place where the Ranger organization would find solid ground:

> Perhaps the most important piece of general advice I received was that southern Canadians should rid themselves of their romantic concept of the North. The Arctic has become a rather sophisticated social environment. Hunting and trapping, although still carried on are not the main pursuits of the indigenous people. Eskimos are being collected into permanent settlements such as Frobisher, Cambridge Bay and Tuktoyaktuk where they are provided with houses and to a large extent live on welfare. The young Indian and Eskimo is being well educated in modern schools at Inuvik, Yellowknife and Frobisher. When they complete their education they will be trained to take their place in modern society and not on the Arctic ice or the trap line.

In short, modern communications, transportation and economics had overtaken the northern indigenous lifestyle that had made them useful Rangers. "Certainly there are still people in the North who hunt, trap, fish and prospect and one hopes there always will be," Stirling continued, but they were now the exception, not the rule. "The people who know the North best are the RCMP, bush pilots, certain members of the Territorial Government, some prospectors and the missionaries." Unfortunately, these were not categories of people upon which to base the organization. "The type of people

envisaged by the DND [Department of National Defence] planners in 1946 on which to develop the Canadian Ranger concept simply no longer exist in sufficient numbers." He thus recommended that the Rangers be disbanded and regular military forces take over their roles in the Canadian Arctic.[40]

Indigenizing the Northern Security Discourse, 1970-94

The year 1969 rekindled concerns about Canadian sovereignty in the North. Although the Trudeau Government was less favourably disposed to military commitments than its predecessors, the surveillance of Canada's territory and coastlines and the protection of sovereignty now assumed primary political importance. In 1970, the government established Northern Region Headquarters (NRHQ) in Yellowknife, but placed no operational units under its direct command. The Rangers were the exception, numbering – on paper – 700 members in 36 northern communities. Despite Cabinet and parliamentary recommendations to upgrade the program, the numbers did not rise.[41] Like the Trudeau administration's whole approach to sovereignty protection, the promised commitment to expand the program was more symbolic than tangible.[42]

Nevertheless, the fact that the Rangers already existed as an "officially constituted" element of the CF, and asserted sovereignty at a minimum cost, were important considerations at a time when the government was unwilling to commit men and money to military matters. Ranger patrols spanned the breadth of the Arctic, from the most easterly patrol at Broughton Island, to the most westerly at Aklavik, and represented every Aboriginal group in the North (although the majority of members were Inuit). A Northern Region briefing book trumpeted the Rangers' involvement:

> It is significant also that the Ranger concept capitalizes on those attributes of native northerners that they themselves espouse as their traditional way of life – their knowledge of their environment, their ability to live and survive on the land, their hunting instinct. In sharing an important defence commitment, the Canadian Rangers fulfil a role no less important than any other component of the Canadian Armed Forces, and have a justifiable pride in doing so.[43]

The new language was telling. The focus was on northerners making a contribution to their country. Their inherent knowledge of the land and their natural instincts – in short, differentiation – made them useful participants in the armed forces.

After 1970, there were no further recommendations for disbandment, but a

number of very detailed proposals for reorganization or revitalization of the Rangers were not implemented. The main problem seemed to be "the lack of a clearly defined role and tasks not adapted to the realities of Canada in 1970's." Nearly everyone said they could perform a useful military function, but few suggested what precisely their tasks should be. In the 1970s, Northern Region conducted training for groups of up to 25 Inuit and Dene Rangers. These activities proved "highly popular in small Arctic communities, provides us a nucleus … of Rangers in these communities, gives us a permanent contact group in many locations and provides a source of guides and advisors" for army units exercising in the North. Questions remained, Major R.S. McConnell explained in 1978:

> During these training sessions, a constantly recurring question is 'what are we to do? what is our purpose?' The book roles do not go far in convincing the native northerner that he is indeed a valuable member of the Canadian Forces. Though he is dedicated, and immensely loyal to the Crown, he is somewhat suspicious that we come and give him two weeks training, for which he is paid, and then walk away and leave him with a rifle and 300 rounds of ammunition, which we promise to replenish annually. To the Ranger, this is the entire incentive to join and his sole motivation to remain a Ranger.

Why not use them for search and rescue, McConnell asked, and give them a practical role? "The point is constantly made that if a light aircraft is missing, even if only one person is aboard, no expense is spared in trying to locate it," he explained, "whereas a party of hunters who are overdue from a trip get no attention at all. This, to the natives, is inexplicable and to some degree tied to their perception of 'the white man looks after his own and to hell with the natives.'" Given the Rangers' training, they seemed ideal candidates to conduct ground search and rescue in the region. They would also ensure that indigenous peoples played a role in northern operations.[44]

A new Northern Development focus, based on a multifaceted concept of security and sovereignty, accompanied these trends during the 1970s and 1980s. Broad political, legal and social forces prescribed that the federal government's relationship with northern peoples assume a higher profile. In 1972, Jean Chrétien, the Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND), announced an integrated federal policy in *Northern Canada in the 70's*. Among its seven goals were the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty and security in the North, as well as the maintenance and enhancement of "the northern environment with due considera-

tion to economic and social development." This overarching framework meant that individual departments, including DND, could no longer pursue specific objectives without due respect for the government's broader strategic vision. The notion of a fiduciary duty of trust and respect, with which the federal government must conduct all dealings with Aboriginal peoples, was established in law in 1980 and further guided federal policy. Therefore, legal and moral issues propelled the idea that the CF needed to be more inclusive and exclusion and differentiation predicated upon perceived indigenous "inferiority" no longer fit with an emerging political discourse celebrating multiculturalism. Nonetheless, differentiation factored heavily in the discourse on the Rangers, who were clearly "others-at-arms." This needed to be spun in a positive way.

Because northern participation in the Canadian Rangers was not considered a "real" military contribution, the growing presence and tempo of operations in the Arctic also led to "embarrassing difficulties" for the CF. The military had not made any efforts to recruit northerners into the Regular Force before the 1970s, Ken Eyre's explained, and very few northerners displayed any interest. Given the military's resurgent involvement in the region, Defence Minister Leo Cadieux promised a major effort to "increase (Eskimo) participation in the armed services." The ensuing recruiting programs revealed that the military failed to appreciate northern realities. The few young northerners who enlisted in a special military trades program in 1971 "experienced extreme stress in coping with the often conflicting demands of military and traditional culture" and the rare individuals who remained were transferred to southern bases rather than being posted in the North. One senior officer proclaimed that the Eskimo would make good soldiers because "he has his own culture but is the sort of man who could become Western very easily, become one of us." There was little consideration that very few would actually want to join mainstream, southern society. Another officer's perspective highlighted the contributions that Eskimos could make to northern defences if posted at Arctic bases. "The ones we're looking for are mobile and have a self-navigating capability and roam a lot," Major-General R.A.B. Ellis told the *Globe and Mail*. "They have an ability to find themselves and get to a pre-determined location. They can take a trip of 800 or 1,000 miles and know exactly where they are … with no gear, maps or charts."[45] The Inuit were now being constructed as superhuman, a tendency on the part of non-Aboriginal commentators who mythologized the "other-at-arms." Not only were the military's expectations ridiculous, they failed to question whether traditional forms of professional service would appeal to northerners.

CFJIC ISC88-314

Canadian Rangers in traditional winter clothing and a Ranger instructor reading a map in a snow house (igloo).

Eyre has pointed out that the military's expectations displayed a profound naïveté. An individual cannot "know" the breadth of the North akin to a southern city and certainly could not be expected to know the area around Alert in which no Inuit had lived. More fundamentally, if any 18 to 23 year-old northerner had the basic education qualifications to join the CF, they could not have pursued "the traditional nomadic life wherein these much-vaunted skills would have been learned." Older Eskimos who possessed these skills would not have sufficient formal education and were unlikely to speak English. With poignant insight, Eyre suggested that had the military actually met its goals and recruited 60 research communicators from a total Eskimo population of less than 25,000, the results could have been disastrous:

> One could honestly ask if Eskimo communities could afford to lose their best educated young people to serve in the Forces. The matter would have been particularly acute when one considers the developing set of Inuit priorities of that period. There was a perception that Eskimos should produce their own lawyers to argue their land claims, their own administrators and politicians to run their communities, their own businessmen to run their coopera-

> tives, their own teachers to instruct their children. Surely, in terms of the federal government's northern goal of meeting native peoples' aspirations these latter professions should have taken precedence over military service that would have taken Eskimo soldiers out of the mainstream of Inuit life. In this sense it is fortunate for the North as a whole that few Eskimos have come forward asking for a military career.[46]

This serving officer's sober assessment demonstrated that not all military officers were blinded by southern Canadian preconceptions. Initiatives like the Northern Native Entry Program (NNEP) failed to attract many volunteers and most who did enlist could not overcome the cultural shock and dropped out.[47]

By contrast, the Rangers enjoyed strong Aboriginal support in northern communities. But this posed issues for command and control. Traditionally, non-Native officers were appointed in communities to act as cross-cultural interlocutors. Indeed, official policy in the 1950s and 1960s dictated that Eskimos would not be allowed to serve as Ranger officers. Differentiation meant that northern indigenous peoples could contribute to the military, but they were unsuited to lead it, even on a local level.[48] As a 1986 study report noted, this idea was challenged by the 1970s:

> Early research in Northern Region indicated a lack of trust of the Canadian Forces by the indigenous people. In addition, it was pointed out that the old practice of automatically appointing the "white" token resident in the community as the Ranger leader had failed and that the military idea of leadership is not easily translated into a concept native peoples can comprehend, let alone work with.[49]

As a result, Northern Region units were re-organized as individual "patrols" of 10 to 20 Rangers, each commanded by a Ranger sergeant and his second-in-command, a master corporal. These positions were elected by the communities. Furthermore, the renewed focus on the Rangers in Northern Region also meant more sustained contact. Most Rangers received, at the very least, basic military training and many had also attended a refresher course. Training exercises provided an opportunity to re-supply each patrol with ammunition and to ensure that their rifles were still serviceable. "This annual contact has led to an excellent rapport between the Rangers and the Regular Force staff," an optimistic appraisal noted.[50] The road to mutual respect was indeed taking shape.

Other contextual considerations increased the attractiveness of the Rangers. The military had a role in national development, from northern environmen-

tal protection to community relations, and NRHQ' mandate to "serve as a link between [the CF] and the northern settlements in which they operate and exercise"[51] obliged military authorities to balance traditional, military-based security needs with socially and environmentally responsible programs. Even commentators who saw little military value in the Rangers acknowledged the connection they offered with northern communities. The editor of *Canadian Defence Quarterly* proclaimed that the "native hunters and trapsmen" could "hardly [be called] … a military organization," but noted the socio-political relevance of their presence:

> Even if it were not for the regrettable gradual urbanization of the Eskimo (in the sense that they are becoming increasingly dependent on the services provided in industrial society), the military value of the Canadian Rangers would be minimal. The main benefit lies in the ties that membership in the organization forges between the native population and the apparatus of the state, still somewhat foreign to them.[52]

At most, this viewpoint revealed a begrudging acceptance that accommodation had a civic utility; it was hardly a tribute to the Rangers' practical contributions to defence.

The transit of the Northwest Passage in 1985 by the American icebreaker *Polar Sea* precipitated another flurry of interest in the Arctic. Again, it was an American challenge to Canadian sovereignty, not a traditional military threat, which elicited cries for a bolder Canadian presence in "our north." External Affairs minister Joe Clark's statement on sovereignty to the House of Commons encapsulated the growing concern and linked it directly to the northern peoples:

> Canada is an Arctic nation. … Canada's sovereignty in the Arctic is indivisible. It embraces land, sea and ice…. From time immemorial Canada's Inuit people have used and occupied the ice as they have used and occupied the land…. Full sovereignty is vital to Canada's security. It is vital to the Inuit people. And it is vital to Canada's national identity.[53]

By mobilizing indigenous peoples' historic occupancy and use to bolster Canada's claims to the region, the federal government's position also raised a legal, moral and practical reason to encourage direct indigenous input into defence activities. Indeed, security and sovereignty discussions became intertwined with broader themes of militarization and indigenous survival.

Low-level flying controversies, persistent environmental concerns and public appeals by Aboriginal leaders to demilitarise the region transcended traditional, realist understandings of state-centred security and sovereignty. Georges Erasmus, the National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations, saw "no *military* threat in the Canadian North," only a threat to the cultural survival of indigenous peoples posed by a military build-up. Inuit Circumpolar Conference President Mary Simon also stressed that military activities "justified by the government on the basis of defence and military considerations … often serve to promote our *insecurity*." Inuit ties to the environment and a collective social order meant that, for them, "Arctic security includes environmental, economic and cultural, as well as defence, aspects."[54] In short, a holistic strategy was needed to accommodate and accept indigenous peoples' physical welfare, their homeland and their cultural survival.

Mention of the Canadian Rangers was notably absent from indigenous leaders' arguments for demilitarizing the Arctic. Obviously, and significantly, this force was not perceived as a threat to the environment and cultural survival. In fact, it appeared to represent just the opposite – an opportunity for cooperation. The broadened security debates bolstered rather than detracted from their attractiveness in an era when military and Aboriginal interests seemed to diverge. The Rangers received praise from Inuit leaders across a wide spectrum of issues. Mark Gordon, representing Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), felt that the Inuit had "a valuable contribution to give" to northern security and praised the Canadian Rangers for acting as "the eyes for the Armed Forces." He highlighted that the Rangers provided "valuable services to our communities, such as search and rescue," as well as "help[ing] our communities a great deal in providing us with food." Aboriginal autonomy and self-government were now part of the political discourse and the Rangers seemed the most viable answer to Inuit communities' security paradox: that while the military was needed to protect Inuit interests, the communities could not withstand massive influxes of outsiders and had to be able to "feed [them]selves." In essence, what Gordon suggested was an Inuit version of "defence against help:" a military presence in the North was required to protect Inuit interests, but they did "not want the guy who comes in to protect us to run us over either."[55] The Rangers, "who in most instances are the most experienced and the best hunters of the communities and the most knowledgeable of the area surrounding their communities," already represented a "vehicle" for constructive dialogue between the military and the local populations.[56]

Rhoda Innuksuk of the ITC envisioned security as a concept that transcended both military and non-military realms and she advocated a more inclusive

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Canadian Rangers and Inuit elders John Akana and Andrew Anaktak put to good use their markmanship skills during a four-day Canadian Forces Ranger exercise on the ice-covered Lake Aptalok, approximately 70 kilometres east of Kugluktuk, Nunavut. They are members of Kugluktuk's 30-strong Canadian Ranger Patrol.

policy-making process that allowed for Inuit participation "to minimize the disadvantages and negative impacts of this activity and to maximize the benefits and opportunities it may present." She saw the Inuit and the military as partners who could work together for mutual advantage:

> Inuit understand Arctic conditions. National Defence has demonstrated the importance of this fact to Arctic operations too by training Canadian troops in Inuit survival techniques and through the Canadian Ranger program, a program we would like to see expanded. We feel Inuit have more to contribute....[57]

Northern operations were inherently different, she suggested, and "this is itself an opportunity for innovation." As active participants, and not just observers, the Inuit could assist the military in protecting sovereignty and security, "as well as non-military interests." The reception by the parliamentary committee was very favourable. Not only were the Rangers cost-effective, they ensured a military presence and offered a direct role in defence for permanent northern residents. A member of parliament grasped the essence of the message that would be integrated into the future expansion of the Ranger program: "it is not a matter of the people accommodating the old way of life to the military necessity; ... it is a matter of accom-

modating the military necessity, not to the old way of life but to the people who are here now with some old knowledge and some new knowledge."[58]

Accommodating and Embracing Diversity: The Rangers in 1 CRPG, 1987-present

In 1987, with backing by such strong advocates within the local indigenous populations, a new Defence White Paper, in addition to senior political and military officials, indicated that the northern Ranger program would be both continued and enhanced. The minister of national defence promised to improve the level of equipment and training for the Rangers, highlighting their "important expression of sovereignty" and anticipating an increased role as military activities expanded in the North.[59] The Standing Committee on National Defence reported the following year:

> The Rangers are now given a limited amount of training and are expected to receive some new equipment, including a new rifle to replace their Lee Enfields, and communications equipment. By 1995, total Ranger strength in the Northern Region is expected to rise to about 1,000 with the formation of new patrols in several communities.[60]

In fact, the expansion was more rapid and numerous than expected. By 1992, there were 1,362 Rangers in Northern Region. Although the end of the Cold War and growing federal deficits prompted the Conservative government to cancel or scale back most other Arctic initiatives that it had promised in the White Paper (such as nuclear submarines and the number of Forward Operating Locations), the Ranger program fared remarkably well. In this particular case, accommodation and acceptance fit with government austerity. The Rangers were cheap and inclusive – a winning recipe in the political environment of the 1990s.

Enhancement seemed appropriate in this context. After all, articles in the media continued to treat the Rangers as remnants of a bygone era, using obsolete weapons to counter late-20th century threats. "Certainly no one in this kinder, gentler age is about to attack an international good guy like Canada," Mary Williams Walsh wrote in a 1993 article, first published in the *Los Angeles Times* and reprinted in the *Toronto Star*. "So what is Johnny Pokiak doing, standing guard here by the frozen waters of the Beaufort Sea, armed with a World War I-vintage Lee Enfield rifle, 200 rounds of ammunition and orders to make tracks for the nearest phone and ring up army headquarters, collect, should he spy something funny – say, the coning tower of

a nuclear submarine poking up through the ice?" Pokiak explained that he was "protecting the Canadian sovereignty" – there was no invasion force waiting to invade, but Canada still needed to show the flag to remind our neighbours that this was our land.[61]

Although the 1994 federal budget gave a clear indication of the declining commitment to Canadian defence, a parliamentary committee recommended that the capabilities of the Rangers be augmented, especially "North of 60." The subsequent Defence White Paper announced that the program would be "expanded and enhanced." Defence officials, especially Colonel Pierre Leblanc (the Director General Reserves and Cadets and soon-to-be Commander of CFNA, the new name for NRHQ), recognized that this new focus allowed "some current deficiencies to be addressed with an opportunity for expansion into some communities where the Rangers can make a significant contribution to the social fabric."[62] The Rangers Enhancement Program (REP) followed with an overwhelmingly northern focus. Nine more patrols were created in CFNA (and two more on the shores of Hudson Bay in northern Québec – Nunavik) and the Rangers received distinctive red Ranger sweatshirts and t-shirts in 1997.[63] The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves recommended these initiatives and "heard evidence that supports the value of the Canadian Rangers program from an operational aspect and for its importance to isolated communities." Its 1996 report highlighted the cost-effectiveness and "significant" contribution the program made "in enriching the social fabric in remote areas." Several recommendations were made, generally in the areas of command and control, improvements in equipment and funding and the official adoption of community-based Ranger "patrols" as the primary unit rather than a company-platoon structure. The Committee wholeheartedly recommended continued support for the Rangers' growth in the years ahead.[64]

By the end of the 20th century, every community that could demographically sustain a patrol in the Territorial North had one. As of 31 December 2004, 1 CRPG had 58 Ranger patrols with a strength of 1,575 Rangers (1,310 male and 263 female). Although no official statistics on the Rangers' ethnicity are available, the 1 CRPG patrols are representative of the diverse ethnic composition of the North. The majority of Rangers in the Yukon are "White," while the patrols in the Northwest Territories reflect the geographic and linguistic dispersion of northern peoples. Most of the Rangers patrols south of the treeline are comprised of members of Gwich'in, Dene, Métis and "White" communities. North of the treeline, most of the patrols are Inuvialuit. In Nunavut, the Rangers are almost entirely Inuit, and many if not most operations are conducted in Inuktitut. As a result, in communi-

ties like Talaoyak or Pangnirtung where a high proportion of Rangers do not speak English, Ranger instructors must work through interpreters. This slows down training, military officials explained, but is a practical reality that must be accepted.[65]

"Canadian Rangers have a tremendous impact on the lives of people in their local communities," boasts the official DND website. "Many Rangers hold leadership positions in their communities, such as mayors, chiefs or Ranger sergeant. They are active community members who have a positive influence on their peers and are often held up as role models for their youth." This statement is telling: the military trumpets not only the Rangers' military contributions, but also their contributions to local communities. The days of the Ranger as peacetime "guerilla" soldier standing ready to engage and contain a small-scale enemy invasion are gone. The recent disavowing of this former role reflects a more sober assessment of the practical realities of the Rangers' potential contributions.[66] After all, Canadian Rangers are an atypical volunteer militia. To join the force, the only formal requirements are that an individual be at least 18 years of age, be in sufficient physical health to undertake activities on the land, have a good knowledge of the local area around his or her community (or be willing to learn) and have no criminal record. They are distinct from other military units in salient respects. The average entry age is 30 (and is frequently over 40) in the North because potential recruits must await the departure of their elders for an open position. Furthermore, there is no upper age limit, and as long as an individual can still perform their duties, they can remain a Ranger. Some anecdotes are truly amazing: 74 year-old Ranger Peter Kuniliusie of Clyde River, Nunavut, retired in November 2004 after *fifty-two years* of continuous service.[67] Indeed, it is accommodation and acceptance of social diversity and experience that makes the Ranger concept unique.

The Rangers' operational tasks remain centred on the basic premise that low-cost, localized, "citizen-soldiers" help to assert sovereignty and security in remote and isolated areas. Official tasks in support of sovereignty include reporting unusual activities, such as unusual aircraft and unusual ships or submarines, and unusual persons in the community; collecting local data in support of Regular Force military operations; and conducting surveillance and/or sovereignty patrols (SOVPATs) in accordance with CFNA's surveillance plan.[68] Most of the time, therefore, the Rangers are accomplishing their mission while they are out on the land in their "civilian" lives. Each patrol's sector of operations comprises an area with a radius of 300 kilometres, centred on the patrol's home village. Furthermore, SOVPATs allow the CF to put "footprints in the snow where they are not normally

put," former CFNA commander Colonel Norris Pettis explained.[69] For example, 30 Rangers from all three Territories participated in Operation Kigliqaqvik Ranger I in April 2002, which ventured 1,000 kilometres across the frozen tundra and sea ice from Resolute to the magnetic north pole off Ellef Ringes Island. Two years later, Rangers on Operation Kigliqaqvik Ranger III (the northernmost patrol ever conducted by the CF) covered 1,800 km from Resolute to Eureka to Alert. These patrols allow the Rangers to operate in unfamiliar environments, share skills, develop relationships with other members from across the North and serve as confidence-building measures for participants.[70]

Within their capabilities, the Rangers directly assist CF activities in a number of ways: providing local expertise and guidance; advising and instructing other CF personnel on survival techniques, particularly during sovereignty operations (SOVOPs); providing a locally-based and inexpensive means of inspecting and monitoring the North Warning System (NWS); supporting the Junior Canadian Rangers program (discussed below); and providing local assistance to both Ground Search and Rescue (GSAR) and disaster relief activities. SOVOPs allow southern-based units to receive practical Arctic warfare training, while the Rangers are afforded the opportunity to teach them traditional survival skills. For example, Rangers teach Regular Force personnel how to hunt and skin animals in the Arctic and how to erect snow houses. These interactions encourage cross-cultural awareness and understanding and Regular and Reserve Force soldiers' laudatory assessments of Aboriginal people in the Rangers solidify military bonds and reaffirm their important contributions to defence.[71] Perhaps the most visible, high-profile activities conducted by the Rangers on a consistent basis are GSAR operations. In 1999, the Chief of the Defence Staff awarded a Canadian Forces Unit Commendation to the members of 2 CRPG for their efforts in response to the avalanche at Kangiqsualujjuaq in northern Québec.[72] That same year, Rangers from 1 CRPG took part in 164 volunteer search and rescue operations, one medical evacuation and one emergency rescue.[73] Although the media tends to refer to all GSARs involving members of Ranger patrols as "Ranger" operations, units are usually not tasked by the RCMP or the CF and therefore are not "official" activities. This line has little bearing on Ranger participation – most volunteer first and foremost as members of their northern communities.

The final Ranger task is the most general and basic – to maintain a CF presence in the local community. This is fundamental, given the reductions in northern military operations over the last several decades and DND's commitment to having a "footprint" in communities across the country. The

CHAPTER 7

Rangers represent more than 90 percent of CF representation north of the 55th parallel and provide a special bond with their host populations. They are far more than the military's "eyes and ears;" they are an organized group that communities can turn to for numerous activities. Unorthodox roles, such as breaking the Yukon Trail for dog mushers, ensuring that polar bears do not attack unsuspecting trick-or-treaters in Churchill and welcoming dignitaries, bring favourable media attention. Their participation in Remembrance Day parades reinforces the intimate and continuing military presence in Canadian life. They are simultaneously citizen-soldiers and citizen-servers, intimately integrated into local community activities, ensuring that the CF is not socially isolated or structurally separated from northern indigenous societies.[74]

In a 1992 article on militarization and Aboriginal peoples, Mary Simon explained that military activities cannot be allowed to erode or curtail the Inuit right to self-government. "If the future of our Arctic homeland is to be safeguarded," she asserted, the Inuit had to have a direct role in decision-making.[75] The Rangers are designed to acknowledge that leadership should not be externally imposed. The structure of an individual patrol is rooted in the community and operates on a group basis. Each Ranger patrol is led by a sergeant, who is seconded by a master corporal, both of whom are elected by the other members of the patrol and one of whom (at least) must be able to speak English.[76] Patrol leaders are the only members of the CF who are *elected* to their positions by the patrol. As a result, Ranger non-commissioned officers (NCOs) are directly accountable to the other members of their military unit in a unique way. Rank is not achieved but held on a democratic basis. Patrol elections, held in the community on an annual basis, exemplify the self-administering characteristics of the Ranger force. Furthermore, Ranger activities are reported annually to the various land claim administrations in the North to fulfill legal requirements under these agreements.

The Rangers' mission focuses less on warfighting and more on low-intensity humanitarian missions, which are planned in partnership with local peoples. Furthermore, the Ranger force is "inter-national" and accommodates different cultural groups.[77] The Rangers are valued for what they bring as "differentiated" individuals, rather than what they could offer if assimilated and conditioned through the regularized training regimes. In the case of the Rangers, differentiation no longer assumes that northern Aboriginal peoples inherently "possess" innate navigation, shooting or survival skills that lay at the heart of the Ranger concept; "biological" assumptions have been discredited. Instead, over the last quarter century, military officials have raised concerns that changes in the North may erode cultural skills amongst

the Rangers that are vital to successful military operations. "An emerging development that could impact on future Ranger operations is a noticeable decline in the transfer of skills necessary to live on the land," the 2000 Arctic Capabilities Study reported:

> It is becoming gradually apparent that younger members of the Canadian Rangers are less skilled than older members in some aspects of survival in the Arctic wilderness. The reason for this can perhaps be found in cultural changes in the aboriginal communities but the impact for CFNA today, and into the future, is an increasing training requirement for the Rangers if they are to remain effective.[78]

This issue is significant. The problem is not that indigenous members of the Rangers are difficult to acculturate into military culture. It is the opposite: that an erosion of Aboriginal skills may jeopardize their contribution. If traditional survival skills are allowed to atrophy, Rangers skills will weaken and the CF's ability to operate in the North will suffer. "Given the minimal activity by southern-based units in the arctic," the CFNA commander noted in 2003, "this trend has disturbing implications for the CF if it hopes to fulfill its mandate to operate effectively in all parts of the country."[79]

The creation and rapid expansion of the Junior Canadian Rangers (JCR) over the last decade is the boldest example of the military's commitment to supporting traditional indigenous practices. Like the Canadian Rangers, the JCR program is a unique initiative in its flexibility and decentralized-focus. Officially established in 1996 to provide "community-based, structured, and supervised youth activity free of charge in remote and isolated communities," the JCR is open to all 12 to 18 year-olds in participating communities. It is an inclusive rather than an "elitist" capacity-building program. Drawing upon the resources of local Ranger patrols, it is designed to help "preserve the culture, traditions, and activities that are unique to each community." JCR training is much less standardized and more local in orientation than the southern cadet program and the community is heavily involved in curriculum development. An adult committee, composed of eight volunteers who have been approved by the community authorities, as well as two community elders, work in partnership with the local Ranger patrol to set curriculum. Sixty percent is at the community's discretion (including subjects such as local language, making shelters and bannock, singing and dancing), and the CF directs the remaining forty percent. Rangers instruct and supervise the "Ranger Skills component," which includes leadership and field exercises, first aid, map reading and navigation and weapons safety and use – critical

skills in a hunting society. This structure supports community involvement in decision-making to build human capacity amongst youth.

The program seems to work. "The participants of this youth program have shown greater self-esteem, increased responsibility, and a better understanding of, and connection with, their communities," a DND backgrounder boasts. This claim seems to be borne out by anecdotal testimonials about the JCR, as well as its meteoric growth and popularity in northern Canada.[80] These considerations are very important given social trends in the region. The northern Canadian birth-rate is much higher than the national average, and consequently, the population is much younger. This demographic reality compounds many social problems amongst northern youth (including disturbingly high suicide rates) that are exacerbated by feelings of hopelessness and isolation.[81] DND saw that it had a constructive role to play and the JCR represents the only program for youth in many northern communities. Additionally, the shared uniform, Ranger name and summertime camps that gather JCRs from various communities provide teenagers with a "feeling of belonging to the rest of the country." Although only a decade old, the strength in the Territorial North has risen to 1,050 Junior Canadian Rangers (573 males and 477 females) in 33 patrols (as of 31 December 2004).[82]

The Canadian Rangers serve a vital function in the North that transcends military, socio-political, economic and cultural realms. The existing organization, managed on a community level, embraces the indigenous knowledge of its members, rather than "militarizing" and conditioning them through the regularized training regimes and structure of other CF components. This flexible, cost-effective and culturally inclusive part of the Reserve Force represents a significant example of one military activity in the North that actually seems to contribute to sustainable human development amongst northern peoples. In military terms, it represents a democratic approach to supporting Aboriginal peoples as direct actors in asserting Canadian sovereignty and security. Positive relationships and mutual respect have produced high levels of trust, cohesion and morale between the Rangers and other components of the Canadian Forces.

Conclusions

In *Who Killed the Canadian Military?*, historian Jack Granatstein lamented policies introduced by the Canadian military to make it an inclusive force at the expense of combat effectiveness. Advisory boards set "ridiculous standards" for levels of immigrants and Native Canadians in the ranks, founded on a racially-based quota system, and this "race-based" logic "would do

Hitler proud." In the end, Granatstein concluded that "the policy of quotas makes clear that the Canadian government does not view its military as a fighting force that must be efficient, effective and well-trained … but more as a social acculturation agency designed to replicate the Canadian population and make everyone welcome in shared tolerance and equality."[83]

Sergeant Frank Hudec, CFJIC IS2004-2126a

Canadian Rangers in Pangnirtung waiting to take part in a joint patrol during Exercise "Narwhal" on the Cumberland Peninsula of Baffin Island, August 2002.

The Canadian Rangers, however, demonstrate that the acceptance of cultural differences can serve as a force multiplier. The Rangers in 1 CRPG represent a "success story" in military accommodation and acceptance on several levels. First and foremost, Ranger patrols provide a cost-effective sovereignty presence. Contrary to the common conception that decentralized, community-based partnerships with northern indigenous peoples are prohibitively costly, the Rangers are very inexpensive compared to other conceivable military programs in the North. They embody an investment in local skills with few capital requirements. For communities, they bring money and resources that support and encourage traditional and subsistence activities. Furthermore, the Rangers do not threaten the environment or northern ways of life – they depend upon them. Ranger and JCR patrols actually facilitate the trans-generational transfer of traditional knowledge and skills, rather than seek to assimilate indigenous peoples into orthodox military culture.[84]

"Canadian Forces Northern Area is committed to earn the respect of the people of Nunavut, the Northwest and Yukon Territories," the 2003 Commander's Direction explains, "demonstrating the attributes of a highly professional formation of the Canadian Forces that can be trusted to safeguard their sovereignty and security interests through the projection of a credible military presence."[85] The tempo of military operations in the North has been increasing in recent years and the federal government's 2005 defence policy statement affirms that it will continue in the future. Climate change raises the potential for increased shipping activity in the region; resource development initiatives, foreign tourism and commercial overflights are expanding; and the potential for terrorists, organized crime, illegal migrants and contraband smugglers to operate in the region have all highlighted the need for a greater military focus on the North. The CF must maintain a positive working relationship with the people of the North in order to conduct sustained operations, and trust and credibility are essential.

Thanks to the Rangers, there is no impermeable wall between the military and civilian sectors in the Canadian North. Instead, their presence ensures that the CF is already well integrated into northern society and that Aboriginal peoples have – and will continue to have – an opportunity to participate in the armed forces without sacrificing their cultural identities. They are representative of a cross-section of the civilian population in the North and therefore are not estranged from civil society. Instead, a decentralized structure rooted in local communities links the civilian and military sectors through the Rangers' individual social networks. As identities are being recognized and created through political changes and self-government in the North, it is imperative that the CF and northern communities are con-

structively engaged and maintain a spirit of mutual cultural awareness. After all, Canada's sovereignty claims in the North rely partially – if not most credibly – on indigenous peoples' historic and contemporary use of the land and sea. As Franklyn Griffiths pointed out in a recent article, it is hypocritical to do this without giving these people a say and a meaningful role in exercising control and enforcement in the Arctic. They reside there, have an immediate and superior knowledge of the environment, are on the front lines of changes that affect the North and have practical daily attachments to the land and sea. As a result, northern indigenous peoples need to be partners directly engaged in practical stewardship.[86] They already are in the Canadian Rangers.

In his important book *Citizens Plus*, political scientist Alan Cairns argues that future Aboriginal/non-Aboriginal relations lay in forging a meaningful "middle ground," recognizing "that those who share space together must share more than space." A sense of communal belonging and commitment is integral to the core principle of cross-cultural acceptance. Cairns believes that the notion of "citizens plus," stressing the virtues of full, common citizenship while reinforcing salient differences, is the most mutually beneficial and responsible way to further Native-Newcomer relations in Canada.[87] Aboriginal peoples' participation in the Canadian Rangers serves as an example of how difference can be accommodated and accepted within the armed forces. Rangers are "citizens plus" in their communities. They are also "citizens plus" in the military.

ENDNOTES

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4 F. Griffiths, "The shipping news: Canada's Arctic sovereignty not on thinning ice," *International Journal* 58, 2 (Spring 2003), 257-82, and, Ibid., "Pathetic Fallacy: That Canada's Arctic sovereignty is on thinning ice," *Canadian Foreign Policy* 11, 3 (Spring 2004), 1-16.

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[6] Rob Huebert, "Canadian Arctic Security Issues: Transformation in the post-cold war era," *International Journal* 54, 2 (Spring 1999), 203-29; P.W. Lackenbauer, "Indigeneity and Redefinition of the Arctic Security Discourse: The Case of Canada, 1950-2005," paper delivered at the Centre for International Governance Innovation / Norman Patterson School of International Affairs Conference "Canadian Foreign Policy Under Review," Waterloo, Ontario, November 2005.

[7] Report of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, *Canada and the Circumpolar World: Meeting the Challenges of Cooperation into the Twenty-First Century* (April 1997), 100. This reflected the recommendation made by parliamentarians from Arctic states to "broaden Arctic security issues from a predominantly military focus to the development of collective environmental security that includes the values, life styles, and cultural identity of indigenous northern societies."

[8] These themes are well introduced in Morris Zaslow, *The Northward Expansion of Canada: 1914-1967* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988); Eyre, "Forty Years;" and K. Eyre, "Custos Borealis: The Military in the Canadian North" (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London King's College, 1981).

[9] See, for example, P. Armitage and J.C. Kennedy, "Redbaiting and Racism on Our Frontier," *Canadian Review of Anthropology and Sociology* 26, 5 (1989), 798-817; D. Ashini, "David Confronts Goliath: The Innu of Ungava versus the NATO Alliance," in B. Richardson, ed., *Drumbeat: Anger and Renewal in Indian Country* (Toronto: Summerhill, 1990), 45-70; Marie Wadden, *Nitassinan: The Innu Struggle to Reclaim Their Homeland* (Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 1991); C.H. Scott, ed., *Aboriginal Autonomy and Development in Northern Québec and Labrador* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia [UBC] Press, 2001); Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples [RCAP], *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,* Vol. 1, *Looking Forward, Looking Back* in *For Seven Generations: An Information Legacy of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples* [CD-ROM] (Ottawa, 1997); Donna Goldleaf, *Entering the Warzone* (Penticton: Theytus, 1995); Peter Edwards, *One Dead Indian* (Toronto: Stoddart, 2001); and, Sandra Lambertus, *Wartime Images, Peacetime Wounds* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press [UTP], 2004).

[10] F. Abele, "Confronting 'harsh and inescapable facts,'" in E. Dosman, ed., *Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic* (London: Routledge, 1989), 189; Mary Simon, "Militarization and the Aboriginal Peoples," in F. Griffiths, ed., *Arctic Alternatives: Civility or Militarism in the Circumpolar North* (Toronto: Samuel Stevens, 1992), 60.

[11] Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance," *Armed Forces & Society* 22, 1 (Fall 1995), 12-3.

[12] The rare exception is Terry Willett, *A Heritage At Risk: The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

[13] Alan Cairns, *Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian State* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000), 6.

[14] P.W. Lackenbauer, "Aboriginal Peoples in the Canadian Rangers: Canada's 'Eyes and Ears' in Northern and Isolated Communities," in David Newhouse, ed., *Hidden in Plain Sight: Contributions of Aboriginal Peoples to Canadian Identity and Culture*, Vol. 2 (Toronto: UTP, forthcoming 2006).

[15] On the PCMR, see "History – Pacific Coast Militia Rangers," file 322.009 (D298), Department of National Defence [DND], *Directorate of History and Heritage* [*DHH*], and, Kerry Ragnar Steeves, "The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, 1942-1945" (Unpublished MA Thesis, UBC, 1990), with whom I am collaborating on a forthcoming book entitled *B.C.'s Guerilla Army: The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, 1942-45*.

[16] J. Mackay Hitsman, "The Canadian Rangers," DND, Army Headquarters, Historical Section, Report no. 92 (1 December 1960).

[17] Kennelly to SO Rangers, 28 February [1943], file 169.009 (D94), *DHH*. I have explored Aboriginal peoples' involvement in the PCMR in "Aboriginal Peoples" and in "Guerillas in Our Midst: The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, 1942-45," paper delivered at the Canadian Historical Association, London, Ontario, May 2005. In 1942, some coastal peoples did not volunteer for the PCMR because they feared it was a mechanism to draw them into the Army and send them overseas against their will. This exclusion was self-imposed rather than external.
[18] DCGS(B) to DMO&P, 1 November 1946, vol. 1, file 2001-1999/0, vol. 321, Record Group [RG] 24, *Library and Archives Canada* [*LAC*].
[19] Vokes to Foulkes, 9 December 1948, vol. 2, file HQC 604-18, *DHH*.
[20] Morton to CGS, 17 December 1948, Ibid.
[21] Eyre, "Forty Years," 294.
[22] David Bercuson, "Continental Defense and Arctic Sovereignty, 1945-50," in K. Neilson and R.G. Haycock, eds., *The Cold War and Defense* (New York: Praeger, 1990), 154.
[23] See P.W. Lackenbauer, "Right and Honourable: Mackenzie King, Canadian-American Bilateral Relations, and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest, 1943-1948," in John English, Kenneth McLaughlin and P.W. Lackenbauer, eds., *Mackenzie King: Citizenship and Community* (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2002), 151-68. On military activities during this era, see also Eyre, "Forty Years," and, LCol (now Col) Bernd Horn, "Gateway to Invasion or the Curse of Geography? The Canadian Arctic and the Question of Security, 1939-1999," in Bernd Horn, ed., *Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience* (St. Catharines: Vanwell, 2002), 307-32.
[24] F/L SE Alexander to AMOT, 7 January 1950, file S-15-24-60, vol. 5205, RG 24, *LAC*.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ranger units along the West and East coasts, which were formed in this same era, tended to be non-Aboriginal in their composition and therefore will not be described in this chapter. My forthcoming book on the history of the Rangers will provide a fuller picture of the Canadian Rangers' development in these regions.
[28] Maj. C.R.R. Douthwaite, "Survey of Western Arctic by SGO II (Int), Western Command, 14 April–1 May 1949," 25 October 1950, file 9105-25/0, box 399, accession 83-84/215, RG 24, *LAC*.
[29] Maj. F.B. Perrott to DMO&P, 11 July 1951, vol. 2, file 2001-1999/0, box 321, Ibid.
[30] Eyre, "Custos Borealis," 178.
[31] See, for example, Capt. A.J. Shea, "The Two Camps: Extract from the Journal of a Ranger Liaison Officer," *Canadian Army Journal* 10, 2 (April 1956).
[32] John R. Sperry, *Igloo Dwellers Were My Church* (Calgary: Bayeux Arts, 2001), 21-32; personal interviews, 17 December 2003 (telephone) and Yellowknife, March 2004.
[33] Capt. A.J. Shea, "An Appreciation of the Situation of the Canadian Rangers in Eastern Command," 23 February 1960, file 323.009 (D 261), *DHH*.
[34] Ibid.
[35] On this period, see Eyre, "Forty Years," 292-99.
[36] Larry Dignum, "Shadow Army of the North," *Beaver* (Autumn 1959), 22-4.
[37] Robert Taylor, "Eyes and Ears of the North," *Star Weekly Magazine*, 22 December 1956, 2-3.
[38] "Northern Armed Force" and "n.g.g." memoranda for Rt. Hon. J.G. Diefenbaker, re: proposed arctic force, 3 April 1969, file Arctic-The North [1967-74], XI/B/221, *John G. Diefenbaker Archives* [*JDA*].
[39] Scott Young, "The shadowy force on guard in the Arctic," clipping, XI/B/22-2, *JDA*. Young reported that an interdepartmental study group was reviewing the military presence

in the North and would look at "the role and organization of the 1,683 man Canadian Rangers, volunteer Eskimos, Indians, Metis and Whites."

[40] Maj. W.K. Stirling, "The Canadian Rangers: An In Depth Study," 5 August 1970, NR 5323-2 (SSO(L)), 1 CRPG HQ.

[41] John Kirton and Don Munton, "Manhattan Voyages," in F. Griffiths, ed., *Politics of the Northwest Passage* (Kingston & Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), 73-5; R.J. Orange, House of Commons, *Debates*, 21 May 1971, 6065.

[42] Cloutier and Admiral John A. Charles, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence [SCEAND], *Proceedings and Evidence*, 29 May 1973, 16:15-16.

[43] Canadian Forces Northern Region, *Northern Region* Information (n.d.), 16-18, CFNA file NA 1325-1 (PAffO).

[44] Maj. R.S. McConnell, SSO Rangers & Cadets to Commander, Canadian Forces Northern Region, 7 November 1978, CFNA file (copy in possession of author). See also, Northern Region Headquarters, Untitled Historical Booklet, entries 31 July 1971, 18 November 1971 and 13 January 1972, CFNA file NA 1325-1 (PAffO).

[45] Eyre, "Custos Borealis," 287-88; House of Commons, *Debates*, 17 April 1970, 5991; *Globe and Mail*, 23 September 1971.

[46] Eyre, "Custos Borealis," 288-89.

[47] LCol J.M.M. Savard, Acting Director of Recruitment and Selection, Recruitment Directive 10/90: Northern Native Entry Program [NNEP], 30 January 1990, DND file 5675-4 (DRS).

[48] Newfoundland Area: Operational Plan – Canadian Rangers, *circa* Fall 1964, file 323.009 (D 261), *DHH*.

[49] Maj. S.J. Joudry, "Study Report - Northern Region Canadian Rangers," 27 May 1986, 8. Acquired under Access to Information.

[50] Ibid.

[51] MGen David Huddleston in Thomas Berger, ed., *The Arctic: Choice for Peace and Security: Proceedings of a Public Inquiry* (Vancouver: Gordon Soules, 1989), 179. See also, G.G. Bell, "The Armed Forces and the Civil Authority: 2 Aiding National Development," *Behind the Headlines* XXXI, 7-8 (December 1972).

[52] J. Gellner, "The Military Task," in E.J. Dosman, ed., *The Arctic in Question* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1976), 93.

[53] House of Commons, *Debates*, 10 September 1985, 6462-4.

[54] G. Erasmus, "Militarization of the North: Cultural Survival Threatened," *Information North* (Fall 1986), 1; M. Simon, "Security, Peace and the Native Peoples of the Arctic," in Berger, *The Arctic*, 36, 67.

[55] SCEAND, 17 September 1985, 48-9.

[56] Ibid., 28:56-7.

[57] Ibid., 28:50-1.

[58] Dan Heap to SCEAND, 17 September 1985, 28:55.

[59] House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence [SCND], *Proceedings and Evidence*, 26 November 1987, 17:29-30.

[60] House of Commons, *The Reserves*, Report of the SCND (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, June 1988).

[61] Mary Williams Walsh, "Keeping Alert to poachers on Arctic turf," *Toronto Star*, 16 January 1993, C5.

[62] Memorandum, "Project P9175: Canadian Ranger Enhancement Project," DGPC to PCB, 1 July 1995, DND file 3136-5-P9175 (DDAS 9); P. Leblanc, DGRC for CDS, "Canadian Rangers Enhancement Project," 30 May 1995, 1, DND file 1901/260/4 (DGRC).

[63] *CFNA Historical Report* 1995, 3; Fax, "Rangers Enhancement Program," C Res & Cdts to DGAA, 30 November 1995, 14-5; DND Backgrounder BG-96.043, "Update on Restructuring of the Reserves," 21 November 1996.

[64] DND, Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves Report, http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/vcds/cres&cdt/scrr/report/e-p3-c09.html (last accessed 12 January 2005).

[65] *CFNA Annual Historical Report* 2004; interviews, Pierre Leblanc, Don Finnamore and Sgt D. McLean, 22 March 2000; MWO G.R. Westcott, 26 February 2004; Backgrounder, "Canadian Rangers in Nunavut." See also, linguistic profiles at Reserves & Cadets, VCDS, DND, "Canadian Rangers: Statistics," available at http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/rangers/stats_e.asp.

[66] Col. T. Tarrant, Briefing Note for DGRC, "Future Role, Mission and Tasks for Canadian Rangers," 15 October 2003.

[67] Capt. J. Campbell, "Saying Goodbye to a Canadian Ranger," *Maple Leaf*, 1 Dec 2004, 3.

[68] See Rangers website at www.rangers.dnd.ca (last accessed 29 Dec 2006).

[69] Quoted in Adrian Humphreys, "Canada's Troops to Reclaim Arctic," *National Post*, 25 March 2004.

[70] CFNA FY 2004/05 Level 1 Business Plan, 27 October 2003, 21; Nathan VanderKlippe, "Trek enforces sovereignty on 'the edge,'" *Edmonton Journal*, 17 April 2004. The author had the opportunity to meet with the Rangers on Op Kigliqaqvik Ranger I at Cape Isaachsen on 18 April 2002.

[71] On these themes, see DGRC, "CAN RAN 2000: A Review of the Canadian Rangers and of the Junior Canadian Rangers," 27 January 2000 [CAN RAN 2000] and *CFNA Annual Historical Report* 2002, 3-4; Maj. G.L. Couch, "Northern exposure for southern soldiers," *The Maple Leaf* 3, 13 (March 2000), 6.

[72] On 1 January 1999, members from 11 Canadian Ranger patrols of the 14 Nunavik patrols in 2 CRPG arrived in Kangiqsualujjuaq in response to the massive avalanche. Additionally, food and emergency material was also provided from as far as the Coral Harbour Patrol (NWT) whose members harvested and shipped fresh caribou to the disaster site. This extraordinary co-operation by the Rangers resulted in the awarding of the commendation. DND Backgrounder, BG-00.005, "The Canadian Rangers," 8 February 2000.

[73] CAN RAN 2000, 11. See also, P.W. Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Rangers: A Survey of English-Canadian Media Coverage, 1995-2004" (2004), 102-53. Copy available from the author.

[74] See, for example, "Patrol protects trick-or-treaters from polar bears," *K-W Record*, 26 October 2004; Dan Davidson, "Nourish respect for veterans, mayor advisers," *Whitehorse Star*, 13 November 2001, 4; and, Lackenbauer, "English-Canadian Media Coverage."

[75] Simon, "Militarization and the Aboriginal Peoples," in Griffiths, *Arctic Alternatives*, 60, 63.

[76] In 1999, the rank of Ranger Corporal was added for two reasons. It allowed for the creation of patrols with representation in several communities or "detachments." It was also created out of Junior Canadian Ranger program requirements; at a minimum, the corporal looks after this program in a community.

[77] P.W. Lackenbauer, "The Canadian Rangers: A Postmodern Militia That Works," *Canadian Military Journal* 6, 4 (Winter 2005-06), 49-60. Whereas Ranger instructors in the other patrol groups are Reservists, in 1 CRPG they are Regular Force sergeants in the combat arms who volunteer to work in the North and have identified the region as a posting preference with their career managers.

[78] Commander's Assessment, CFNA FY 2004/05 Level 1 Business Plan, 27 October 2003, 1-2.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Backgrounder, "The Junior Canadian Rangers Programme," 17 March 1999. The JCR have grown from 1,620 in 54 patrols in FY 99/00 to 2,893 in 102 patrols in FY 03/04, representing an increase of 79 % in four years. DRes, CAN RAN 2000 Annual Report #4, FY 03/04, 11.

[81] A Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade discussion report on the Arctic offered the following on the "Alleviation of Community Social Problems" in the North: "Most northern communities in Canada suffer from crippling social problems: poverty, high youth suicide rates, teenage pregnancy, alcohol and substance abuse, crime and domestic violence. These are a persistent legacy of the period when colonial governments imposed their ways on Canada's Aboriginal peoples. Through the Statement of Reconciliation in Gathering Strength, the Government has indicated its commitment to working with territorial governments, Aboriginal peoples and northern organizations in support of social change contributing to strong communities." See "Toward A Northern Foreign Policy For Canada: A Consultation Paper" (September 1998). Governments have recognized the need to promote understanding and problem solving at the community level, using government and local resources. See RCAP Special Report, "Choosing Life: Special report on suicide among Aboriginal people," on Libraxus, "For Seven Generations."
[82] *CFNA Annual Historical Report* 2004, 2; Maj. R.G. Bell, "Proposal to Trial a Junior Canadian Ranger Program," Briefing to the Chief of Reserves and Cadets, 23 March 1994, CFNA 1085-0-1, 16 April 1996, 1.
[83] J.L. Granatstein, *Who Killed the Canadian Military?* (Toronto: Harper Flamingo Canada, 2004), 145, 196.
[84] These conclusions are derived from P.W. Lackenbauer, "The Eyes and Ears of the Canadian Forces: The Canadian Rangers as a Human Solution to Northern Sovereignty and Security," presentation to Ocean Management Research Network Conference, Ottawa, November 2003.
[85] Commander's Direction, CFNA FY 2004/05 Level 1 Business Plan, 27 October 2003, 25.
[86] Griffiths, "The shipping news."
[87] Cairns, *Citizens Plus*, 6-9.

CHAPTER 8

Moving Beyond "Forgotten:" The Historiography on Canadian Native Peoples and the World Wars

P. Whitney Lackenbauer and R. Scott Sheffield

The indigenous warrior has long captivated the imaginations of Western societies. As vicious savages impeding the march of civilization or loyal allies fighting alongside imperial powers or noble colonists, the North American Indian has added colour to depictions of the continent's rich military past. Indeed, such a vision became entrenched in the popular consciousness: the "Indian" as a be-feathered Plains warrior astride a horse, the image romanticised nostalgia for a vanished, or vanishing, race. During the world wars of the 20th century, governments and journalists would resurrect these images in a modern guise for the national cause. But their interest proved fleeting, and for decades after the conflicts ended, Aboriginal soldiers receded into the hazy irrelevant past, forgotten warriors once more.

The scholarly literature on indigenous peoples and military history has aided and abetted this process. While the intersection of Aboriginality and conflict interested historians in Canada and the United States, it was understood within the broader framework of the national meta-narrative. In Canada, Aboriginal peoples virtually disappeared from this narrative after the War of 1812, when their military and political potency faded. The Northwest Rebellion in 1885 always warranted commentary, generally as an example of the triumphant application of control and order to the Western frontier and the suppression of misguided violence provoked by a delusional leader. By the 20th century, when Aboriginal peoples had made the transition from "allies" to "wards" or "dependent nations" of the Crown/state, they no longer fit within the national story as "warriors." Until the late-1970s and 1980s, Canadian historians did nothing to counter the broader societal neglect of Aboriginal peoples' contributions to the national war effort.

Fortunately, this situation has changed over the last 25 years with a flurry of scholarly and other literature on the First Nations' and Métis' role during the world wars. Aboriginal veterans have themselves driven the agenda as part of the broader indigenous cultural and political resurgence witnessed since the 1960s. Aboriginal veterans have struggled for recognition and

compensation for unequal treatment compared to their non-Native compatriots. Generally speaking, these struggles have borne fruit, garnering notice within veterans' own communities and later governments, media and the scholarly community. This context has meant that the rediscovery of Aboriginal veterans and their experiences has been deeply politicized and much of the Canadian writing has emerged through government-sponsored research, parliamentary reports and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP). This present volume is yet another example of this recognition and rediscovery. It is no longer accurate to say that Aboriginal peoples who fought in the world wars are forgotten warriors/soldiers. Yet most commentators still do.

We feel it is the right time for reassessment and self-reflection. This chapter sets out to critically survey the Canadian historiography on Aboriginal peoples in the world wars and to offer some suggestions for future research. Now that authors have established that Aboriginal peoples made significant contributions to the war efforts, and that these contributions are mentioned in mainstream textbooks, it is time to move beyond "forgotten" and enrich our understandings of what the wars meant to Aboriginal peoples and what Aboriginal peoples' contributions meant for the war efforts.

Forgotten Warriors

Most of the existing literature on the subject falls within a dominant thematic tradition that might collectively be termed the "Forgotten Warrior" school. Through this approach, commentators, authors and historians have sought to salvage the unknown story of Aboriginal servicemen and women from historical anonymity. Not surprisingly, the main rationale has been to recognise and commemorate service and sacrifice. The progenitor of this tradition was the Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, who wrote in the immediate aftermath of the Great War:

> In this year of peace the Indians of Canada may look with just pride upon the part played by them in the great war both at home and on the field of battle. They have well and nobly upheld the loyal traditions of their gallant ancestors who rendered invaluable service to the British cause in 1776 and in 1812, and have added thereto a heritage of deathless honour which is an example and an inspiration for their descendants. According to the official records of the department more than four thousand Indians enlisted for active service with the Canadian Expeditionary forces. This number represents approximately thirty-five per cent of the Indian male population of

> military age in the nine provinces, and it must be remembered, moreover, that there were undoubtedly cases of Indian enlistment which were not reported to the department. The Indian soldiers gave an excellent account of themselves at the front, and their officers have commended them most highly for their courage, intelligence, efficiency, stamina and discipline. In daring and intrepidity they were second to none and their performance is a ringing rebuttal to the familiar assertion that the red man has deteriorated.[1]

Duncan Campbell Scott, the poet and bureaucrat much maligned in most Native history for his strident assimilationist mission, had his own particular reasons for championing the high enlistments, battlefield prowess and courage of Aboriginal service personnel. Strangely, the themes that he highlighted remain dominant features of the Forgotten Soldier genre today.

It is overly simplistic to say that Aboriginal soldiers were immediately forgotten at the end of the First World War. According to acclaimed historian Jonathan Vance, "no factual account [of the Great War] was complete without a salutary reference to the gallantry of Canada's 'braves at war.'"[2] But memories had certainly faded before the Second World War again brought the military service of Aboriginal men and women to the attention of Canadians. The media avidly publicized news of indigenous contributions, as one *Globe and Mail* photo-essay did in 1943:

> Cape Croker's Chippewa Indians have gone to war. Without fanfare or trumpets or even a mild sort of war-dance, practically every able-bodied Indian man - and nine of the women - are in the uniform of one of the armed forces. And those that are staying behind are doing their bit toward making their little world a better place in which to live.[3]

Furthermore, the memory of Aboriginal contributions to the war efforts did not die in the immediate postwar period. Scott Sheffield and Yale Belanger suggest that various Indian delegations made reference to their wartime experience and included some First Nations veterans to authorize their voice before the Special Joint Committee on Indian Affairs in the late-1940s.[4] Through the 1950s and 1960s, however, these voices were pushed to the margins and largely ignored. This was not just amnesia regarding First Nations and Métis: Canadians made few efforts to recall the heroics of any of its world war veterans, and world war veterans in general, both Native and non-Native, seemed reticent to share many of their experiences. Little military history was produced through these decades, apart from official histories and laudatory "drums and trumpets" regimental histories. In both

cases, Aboriginal servicemen and women were not a subject of particular interest. Concurrently, the history of Native peoples in the post-Confederation era was largely neglected until the 1970s. With little writing in either field, indigenous soldiers, sailors and airmen certainly constituted "forgotten warriors."

During the 1970s and 1980s, it was Aboriginal veterans themselves that seized the initiative to publicize their own experiences. Stories began appearing in a host of Aboriginal newspapers and magazines, including the *Indian News*, *Tekawennake*, *Windspeaker* and *The Saskatchewan Indian*.[5] The Federation of Saskatchewan Indians led the charge, funding the first substantive research on the subject of Indian veterans' issues. The "Sweeney Report," completed in 1979, focused on veterans' legislation and its applicability to First Nations veterans, especially the *Soldier Settlement Act* and the *Veterans' Land Act*.[6] This report and other research solicited by Saskatchewan Indian veterans, combined with their increasingly effective political and legal campaign through the 1980s and early-1990s, drew national attention.[7] It also helped to lay the political groundwork upon which the experiences of Aboriginal service personnel have been constructed in subsequent years.

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Major G.A. Flint, of the 2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, points out the next objective to Sergeant Tommy Prince on 11 March 1951.

D. Bruce Sealey and Peter Van De Vyvere's biography of Sergeant Thomas George Prince (1915-1977), published as part of the *Manitobans in Profile* series in 1981, gave this struggle for recognition a human face.[8] Prince was one of the most decorated non-commissioned officers in Canadian military history, awarded eleven medals including the Military Medal (MM) and U.S. Silver Star. It is thus understandable that Prince had become the quintessential "Indian at War:" the archetype of Aboriginal contributions to the wars.[9] In biographical terms, his story is tragic: that of a soldier whose commitment to his people and his country was never matched by his country's support for him. Overseas he was a bold, audacious and courageous warrior. At home, he was a "fallen hero," fated to spend his final years as an alcoholic on the streets of Winnipeg. This interesting, descriptive overview traces his life from the Brokenhead reserve to his dramatic exploits with the First Special Service Force in Italy and France in the Second World War, to his tours in Korea and his return to a life of alcoholism and poverty on the streets of Winnipeg, a forgotten warrior left to an ignominious fate. Prince has become Canada's version of Ira Hayes – the American Indian soldier immortalized in Johnny Cash's famous ballad.

Collective stories of Six Nations service were presented by local authors. Enos T. Montour's *The Feathered U.E.L.'s* stressed that the Six Nations' contributions to the First World War demonstrated a continuation of "Feathered Loyalism" that had existed for centuries. "Time after time they have taken their place under the Union Jack beside the Loyalist British forces," Montour explained, intertwining stories of individual soldiers, such as Cameron Brant, Tom Longboat and Oliver Martin, with developments on the reserve. He suggested that the war drew the Six Nations and nearby Brantford communities "perceptibly closer together, as comrade Loyalists should," based upon their shared sacrifices and sorrows. He also found Six Nations veterans to be "typical of Canada's returned men, many of them Loyalist descendants, who did not find their postwar homes a place fit for heroes to live in, but adjusted to the ways of peace and tried to forget the blood and horrors of modern war."[10]

If the veterans had tried to forget the wars, the Woodland Indian Cultural Education Centre believed that it was time to make sure that they were remembered in its 1986 publication *Warriors*. Indeed, the Forgotten Warrior motif was nowhere more explicit than in executive director Joanne Bernardi's preface:

> A little known and distorted history; we have seldom heard from the First Peoples…. Others spoke in their name, those who exploited them, feared and despised them. So it is with their warriors. Other warriors of the land were praised for their courage, celebrated for

> their achievements, commemorated for their sacrifices. Of the Indian warrior they are silent. The children see little of their deeds and victories in the books of learning. The communities pay silent tribute.
>
> This book is not the voice of those in power who by their silence have spoken volumes. It tells the tale of warriors forgotten and unsung. It sings for them the song of valour, dedication, honour and glory. It tells of history and deeds great and small, solemn and humourous. It speaks of those at home and those in battle. It is not a book of the glories of war but of the glories of the people; our people. To these soldiers, men and women of our Reserve Communities, who sacrificed for this land and fought the fight for freedom; this story is for you. To you we offer our honour, glory, joy, sorrow. We celebrate you; we commemorate you.[11]

Tracing Six Nations service from the War of 1812 through to the Korean War, this short book introduced several main themes: Six Nations sovereignty, the alliance with the British Crown, "white" ideas about Indian warriors and impacts of war on women and the community. Using anecdotal information, the source succeeded in its local commemorative purpose, including a list of Six Nations men and women who served in the various conflicts.[12]

Military historian Fred Gaffen's important book *Forgotten Soldiers*, published in 1985, made a similar contribution, but on a national scale. Essentially writing into a historiographical void, Gaffen began to sketch the historical skeleton of indigenous military contributions, both on the battlefields and the home front, during the world wars. For this reason, his work remains influential today. Commemoration was part of his express purpose:

> It is not surprising that some Indian veterans of both World Wars should harbour resentment. On the one hand they had been actively recruited and encouraged to volunteer for overseas service; yet many found, when they returned home, that their lot had not improved and their contribution was already forgotten…. They knew this country was at war and they wanted to serve. If necessary, they were willing to lay down their lives…. We who enjoy the benefits of living in Canada and those countries that they helped defend and liberate are forever indebted to them. Let us hope that their sacrifice will not be forgotten.[13]

To that end, Gaffen's focus was largely anecdotal stories about individual Aboriginal soldiers, sailors and airmen. Only a small (but competent) portion was dedicated to policy and administrative issues such as conscription

and veterans' benefits. Much of the material was drawn from medal citations and the experiences of prominent Aboriginal soldiers such as Francis Pegahmagabow and Tommy Prince, but he succeeded in capturing a wide range of voices and raising a host of central issues. Unfortunately, subsequent scholars have displayed tendencies to generalize and essentialize the Native soldiers' experience based on a few of the decorated soldiers that he mentioned who serve as the quintessential examples of the native soldier on foreign battlefields.[14]

Yet, these early efforts began to win some recognition within academe, attracting graduate students in the late-1980s and early-1990s. The first was James Dempsey, whose fine MA thesis on Prairie Indians and the First World War falls within the Forgotten Warrior school, but adopted a more scholarly tone. Most impressive was the author's effort to ground the military service of Plains First Nations soldiers in their pre-war cultural environment. Dempsey's treatment of the soldiers' wartime experiences demonstrates that anecdotal evidence, whatever its limitations, can profoundly humanise an otherwise surreal historical process. Ground breaking when it first appeared in 1987, it was unfortunately not significantly updated when it was published as the short monograph *Warriors of the King* in 1999. Nevertheless, this book remains the starting point for students looking to learn about Aboriginal soldiers in the Great War. Furthermore, Dempsey became one of the most active scholars in the field with numerous articles and book chapters on both world wars that, alongside Gaffen, laid the groundwork for much of the Forgotten Warriors literature.[15]

Janet Davison produced another noteworthy MA thesis in 1992, entitled "We Shall Remember Them: Canadian Indians and World War II."[16] Based on a range of archival sources and interviews with several First Nations veterans from Ontario, her work explores a remarkable breadth of issues to demonstrate that Aboriginal peoples, who contributed to the war based on intense loyalty, became victims of "confusion, manipulation and maladministration."[17] As Davison's title makes clear, this study has a commemorative purpose; indeed a significant proportion of the thesis explores indigenous veterans' long battle for recognition and respect. The further she gets from the end of the war, the more she takes on the role of political advocate for the Native veterans' political agenda. At times, assertions drawn from limited evidence and a polemical tone undermine the scholarly veracity of her assertions. Nevertheless, within the context of the Forgotten Soldier approach, and especially in the politicised 1990s, when veterans' lobbying efforts for recognition began to pay dividends, "We Shall Remember Them" made its mark and its point.

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By the mid-1990s, Aboriginal periodicals, graduate student theses and eclectic publications were not the sole venues for the genre: it became mainstream with the National Film Board's documentary *Forgotten Warriors*.[18] Combining historical archival material with filmed interviews with Native veterans of the Second World War brought the added impact of evocative visual imagery and the immediacy and humanity of the veterans themselves. Perhaps more important, through its repeated play by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the Aboriginal Peoples' Television Network, and in school and university classrooms over the years, the film has extended knowledge of this subject to a far broader audience of Canadians. In so doing, *Forgotten Warriors* has benefited from Canada's more general rediscovery of its veterans and the growing television coverage of commemorative events like Remembrance Day and the 50th and 60th anniversaries of D-Day and Victory-in-Europe (VE) Day. The combined attention to the subject of Aboriginal veterans at long last began to draw the ear of the federal government.

First to turn to the issues was the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, which conducted hearings across the country on the treatment of Aboriginal veterans in 1994. The representations before the Committee revealed persistent concerns about the forced/coerced enfranchisement of status Indians, inequitable benefits, improper administration and a burning frustration and disillusionment among indigenous veterans. Its final report observed:

> What is clear … is the pride and dignity of the veterans, feelings that have been tried and tested by their long time sense of neglect. Perhaps our most important task is to ensure that the valuable contribution of the veterans and their families is fully recognized and acknowledged. As the years pass, the number of veterans grows fewer and fewer and the need for a resolution of the issues more urgent.

It also recommended a host of commemorative measures to acknowledge the contributions made by veterans and suggested a number of new processes and funding to support Aboriginal veterans and their organizations. Most boldly, it argued that the federal government should recognize their contributions and hardships and "apologize to Aboriginal veterans for the inequities and insensitive treatment they experienced after their return from these wars."[19]

The Final Report of the RCAP in 1996 drew even more attention to Aboriginal contributions during Canada's wars. An entire chapter in the first volume is devoted to Aboriginal veterans, which consolidates the main elements of the Forgotten Soldier school into a clear and potently political depiction of the past. First and foremost, Aboriginal peoples are said to

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Glenbow Museum NC-10-47

Nick King in victory dance costume near Fort Macleod, Alberta, 1918.

have enlisted in the armed forces in greater numbers per capita than any other ethnic group in North America and these soldiers, in turn, earned a reputation for gallantry and tactical ability overseas. On the home front, Indian communities, which were amongst the poorest on the continent and oppressed by paternalistic federal authority, gave generously of their money and their labour. The historical narrative uniformly stresses that Aboriginal loyalty and patriotism during the world wars was beyond reproach. Nevertheless, the relationship between Aboriginal groups and the federal government was severely tested when authorities tried to conscript Indian males for military service. Backed by treaty promises and a committed sense of their identity and special status, Aboriginal opposition to compulsory mobilization plans succeeded in convincing federal officials to retreat from their position. For those Aboriginal men and women who volunteered to serve overseas, the experience was characterized as a "coming of age" whereby individuals first breathed an air of equality with their non-Native comrades. However, when the wars ended and the soldiers returned home to their native continent, they found previous social, economic and political inequities unchanged and faced unequal treatment as veterans. As written in the RCAP, the Forgotten Soldier was raised to its highest pitch in order to justify strong recommendations (see Appendix 8.1) for recognition and restitution for inequities faced by Aboriginal veterans.[20]

Over the last decade, this expressed desire seemed to bear fruit. Perhaps most importantly, there was some resolution to the issue of veterans' benefits for Aboriginal veterans. The Departments of Veterans Affairs, Indian Affairs and National Defence came together with the Assembly of First Nations and numerous First Nations veterans associations to form the National Round Table (NRT) on First Nations Veterans Issues in 1999. Pooling their research resources, the NRT produced a consensus report in 2001 which provided a rationale for a government apology and offer of compensation in 2003 for inequities in the administration of their benefits. Presently, the Métis National Council and National Métis Veterans Association have a funding arrangement with Ottawa to conduct research and produce a report on their veterans' access to benefits. Beyond compensation, there has also been important progress made towards inclusion of Aboriginal veterans in national commemorations for Remembrance Day, the return of the Unknown Soldier and overseas tours linked to the anniversaries of D-Day and VE-Day. In addition, special consideration and recognition has been evident in the National Aboriginal Veterans Memorial, erected in a prominent downtown Ottawa location, beside the National War Memorial. This last winter, a major Aboriginal expedition of veterans and students made a trip to Europe for a ceremonial calling home of the spirits of warriors buried far from their home lands.

All of this groundbreaking work on Aboriginal peoples and the world wars served its original function: to ensure that these "forgotten warriors" received recognition for their contributions, sacrifices and inequitable treatment. Indeed, the urgency and general observations introduced by the Forgotten Warrior school are reflected in a steady stream of derivative work produced by authors who reiterate the same points without returning to the original sources nor asking any new questions.[21] Fortunately, several more focused studies have helped to ensure that the subject does not succumb to a form of interpretative orthodoxy based solely on accepted generalizations and predictable anecdotal evidence.

Among these was an article published in 1989 exploring the mobilization of Aboriginal peoples for wartime service in "a white man's war." Historian James Walker examined how the dominant society's stereotypes shaped recruitment policy and military service for men of Aboriginal, African and Asian descent during the First World War, as well as how those various visible minority communities responded. Walker focuses on the desire of minorities to enlist as an effort to win respect, the rights of citizenship and equality in a Canadian society organized along racial lines that would not otherwise accept them. This argument fits the case of Asian and African Canadians more effectively than that of the First Nations and Métis, who sought respect but were less desirous of the franchise and citizenship. Nevertheless, it is important to consider the experience of Aboriginal peoples within the broader context of race, because as Walker notes in his conclusion, "Canadians participated in the Western ideology of Racism," and this profoundly shaped Aboriginal experience of the Great War. In the end, Walker argues convincingly that visible minorities failed to win the recognition that they had sought for themselves and their communities, in spite of their loyalty and idealism.[22]

Several historians have examined government policies surrounding recruiting and conscription during the Second World War. Scott Sheffield's 1995 MA thesis concentrated on the formation and application of policies related to First Nations voluntary enlistments and their liability to conscription under the *National Resources Mobilization Act* (1940). His research revealed different recruiting policies in the armed services, which included explicit racial barriers in the Air Force and Navy that helped channel Aboriginal recruits into the Army.[23] He also noted that national registration provoked a diverse reaction amongst Native peoples: some bands participated willingly, some individuals simply refused to register or show up for medical examinations, while other bands and individuals protested vehemently against compulsory service.[24] His main focus was on opposition,

including a study (later published with Hamar Foster) of Aboriginal responses to conscription that raised issues related to Indian legal status.[25] In the end, however, Sheffield saw Aboriginal peoples as victims of government policies that were "dominated by indecision, bureaucratic bungling and short-sighted decision making."[26]

Michael Stevenson's work on the mobilization of Native Canadians also describes a fractured, decentralized and ultimately lax application of National Selective Service policy during the war. The failed attempt to conscript Natives revealed that the government's basic approach was marked by "inconsistency, indifference, and neglect, compounded by prejudice, geography, and profound cultural differences."[27] He also challenges the accepted notion that Aboriginal volunteers enlisted in high numbers, noting that by war's end, only 3,090 from an estimated Native Canadian population of 126,000 served in the military. "While traditional historical accounts trumpet the enthusiastic support for Indian recruitment from virtually all sectors of the Native community," Stevenson commented, "they belie a harsh historical reality in light of the detailed government records that exist pertaining to the issue."[28]

Another interesting policy issue relates to Aboriginal lands and the wars. Sarah Carter examined how Prairie Indian land was appropriated for "greater production" during the war, and how the Soldier Settlement Board (SSB) permanently alienated over 85,000 acres of reserve land for non-Aboriginal soldier settlement immediately after the war, "constituting a significant erosion of the lands remaining to Aboriginal people."[29] Robin Brownlie's study of Ontario Native veterans paints a similarly disconcerting picture about the erosion of reserve land bases.[30] Whitney Lackenbauer has focused more specifically on the military's use of Indian reserve lands for training. The RCAP drew attention to this subject, pointing to the 1942 appropriation of Stony Point Indian reserve and the unjustified postwar retention of Camp Ipperwash as the prime example of government perfidy and callous disregard for Native rights. Helen Roos drew the same conclusions in her thesis on the subject.[31] While Lackenbauer has painted a similar (but more nuanced) picture of the Ipperwash case, he cautions that the government's draconian measures cannot be generalized to other land use arrangements. For the most part, agreements were reached with Indian bands whose lands were requested for training purposes. There were cases of individual opposition – the Sero family's determined stand at Tyendinaga during the First World War and the Mohawk Workers' opposition to an airbase at Six Nations in 1940 (which forced the government to take its plans elsewhere) – but the overall pattern was inconsistent. Lackenbauer suggests that the existing literature is too prone to generalizing and narrating

Aboriginal-military relations as tragedy and should embrace the contradictions and complexities that marked relationships across time and space.[32]

In a different vein, Scott Sheffield found rich complexity in war and cultural impressions of indigenous people. His book, *The Red Man's on the Warpath*, explores the impact that the Second Word War and much-publicised Aboriginal contributions to the war effort had on the dominant society's image of the "Indian." During the drive to win the war and the later drive to win the peace, Native military service, loyalty and patriotism forced English-Canadians to reassess their image of the "Indian," as well as themselves. The result helped pave the way for postwar Indian policy reform and the democratic philosophical ground upon which future Aboriginal rights battles would be fought. Yet at the same time, English-Canadians were able to reaffirm their faith in assimilation as the end goal for Aboriginal people, clothed subsequently in the rhetoric of citizenship and equality.[33]

Aboriginal experiences are also revealed in biographies. For example, Parry Sound journalist Adrian Hayes has told Francis Peghamagabow's story in a wonderful short biography that weaves together his early life, his motivations for enlistment, his wartime service and his postwar leadership and tribulations. "Peggy" received the MM and two bars as a sniper who claimed 378 kills, but apparently suffered neuro-psychiatric troubles and faced appalling treatment by Indian Affairs officials after he returned to Canada.[34] Robin Brownlie's studies on Georgian Bay Indian agents construct Pegahmagabow as postwar political activist – a role that flowed from his military experiences and return to a prejudiced society. John Steckley and Bryan Cummins argue that Ojibwa culture must be factored into the story of his life and that his political activism and ethnographic contributions cannot be divorced from his wartime experiences.[35]

Courtesy of the Woodland Indian Cultural Centre

Corporal Francis Pegahmagabow, MM and two bars (1891-1952)

Short but insightful biographies of First World War soldiers Cameron Brant, Albert Mountain Horse, Henry Norwest and John Shiwak have been published in the latest edition of the *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*.[36] Biographical literature on the Second World War is sparse, but includes Murray Dobbin's dual portrait of "Métis patriots" and political leaders Jim Brady and Malcolm Norris.[37]

"Tommy Prince exemplifies the many frustrations and struggles facing the returning veteran," Janet Davison noted her 1993 thesis. Although the heroic story of Tommy Prince serves as the quintessential anecdote for Aboriginal military prowess in 20th century wars, his overall life journey is a more tragic tale. The 1999 documentary film *Fallen Hero* encapsulates its perspective in the title and does not shy away from the darker side of Prince's experiences: Prince the soldier broke down in Korea, a casualty of physical injuries and psychological trauma, and returned home a "broken man."[38] Whitney Lackenbauer picks up this narrative thread and makes the case that Prince suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. Acknowledging that Prince ended up a psychological casualty, however, does not diminish his heroism or his courage. Instead, his story serves as a reminder that operational stress can prey upon even the most committed soldiers. How one chooses to prioritize Prince's identities – as Native soldier or a soldier who was Native – influences the way that historians explain his difficult experiences: either as a victim of racism and inequitable power structures preying upon Aboriginal peoples, or the lamentable neglect of veterans who bore the psychological scars of war. In Prince's case, it was probably both.[39]

Taken collectively, Aboriginal veterans have also been the subject of specific attention, which is not surprising given their central place in the story and their role in publicising their grievances. Most of the research on the subject has focused on two issues: 1) the unique legislation and administrative arrangements governing the distribution of veterans' benefits to Aboriginals, and; 2) the oral histories of veterans themselves which suggest a legacy of discrimination and malfeasance. The starting place for benefits issues is the NRT final report, *A Search for Equity*, which focuses on status Indians and their access to Dependents' Allowance and the Veterans Charter. Based on some oral testimonies, Veterans Affairs Canada personnel files and substantial archival research, it provides the most broad-based examination of the issues to date, and was accepted by all parties involved in the NRT process.[40] Overall, it fulfils an important role as a foundation for better understanding Aboriginal veterans' experiences, but it is only a starting point. There is so much more about the veterans' experience that remains a mystery.

The gap between the legislation, government records and oral histories remains a challenge for historians seeking to understand the past on its own

terms. Robert Innes' excellent work on Saskatchewan veterans is very encouraging by demonstrating that the topic can be pursued as serious scholarship rather than simple advocacy for a legal cause. Innes challenges generally-accepted assumptions about Aboriginal veterans, who are often depicted returning to heroes' welcomes and leadership roles in their communities. He argues that this is a "one-dimensional portrait of Aboriginal peoples' response to returning veterans that serves to obscure the diversity of experiences." Relying on oral interviews with Métis and First Nations veterans across the province, Innes concludes that the "myth" of the returned soldiers immediately assuming postwar leadership positions and spearheading the push for Native rights is unfounded. Despite their early postwar passivity, however, "by the 1960s veterans were in positions of significant influence. This is highlighted by the fact that all leaders of the Union of Saskatchewan Indians during the 1960s, which had by that time changed its name to the Federation of Saskatchewan Indians, were Second World War veterans."[41] This also helps to explain the politicization of veterans' issues in the last quarter of the 20th century.

A more fundamental problem persists. There has been little study of Canadian veterans in general, which make comparisons between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal veterans' experiences difficult. Highlighting discrepancies between the postwar support offered to Indian and non-Indian veterans has been essential to those individuals and groups seeking recognition and restitution from the federal government over the last half century. Fortunately, the acknowledgement and compensation package offered to First Nations veterans and their families means that scholars can now explore the stories of these particular people on their own terms, without the compulsion to make a political case.[42] Métis veterans, however, continue to seek recognition and restitution for their hardships, and access to their stories, which were not segregated out from non-Aboriginal Canadians in Indian Affairs files like the First Nations, is more difficult, particularly on a collective basis. More systematic interviews with individual Aboriginal veterans, along the lines of Innes' pioneering work, are sorely needed.

The publication of collections containing Aboriginal veterans' stories and community accounts help to ensure that "forgotten" histories are also preserved in the participants' own words. *Remembrances: Métis Veterans*, an important collection of transcribed interviews with 33 Métis veterans conducted by the Gabriel Dumont Institute in Saskatoon, provides valuable insights into why some individuals enlisted, because of poverty and alienation, and others, for a sense of adventure or out of a sense of patriotism. The storytellers are allowed to speak for themselves, without the imposi-

tion of a scholarly apparatus and share battlefield experiences and personal struggles after the war. Many paint a portrait of lamentable neglect at the hands of Canadian society after they returned home.[43] Although generally understudied, the experiences of eight Aboriginal women who served in the Royal Canadian Air Force (Women's Division) and Canadian Women's Army Corps have been narrated in *Our Women in Uniform*, published by the Institute for the Advancement of Aboriginal Women in Alberta based upon interviews conducted in that province. This fascinating book, conceived "to show the dreams of these young women to defend their country" and "the romance and toughness of it all," explicitly sets up these women as "brave and courageous" role models "with an indelible pioneer spirit." Their stories, told in their own words, offer intimate insight into wartime service on the home front.[44] Grace Poulin's 2005 MA thesis, which contains a wealth of testimonies from 16 Aboriginal servicewomen (and which has served as the basis for her contribution to the current volume), also chronicles Aboriginal women veterans' stories "before they are irretrievably lost."[45]

Keith Carlson's work with the Sto:lo exemplifies what can be accomplished by focusing on a particular cultural group and listening to oral histories presented on their own terms. After establishing the context of the wars and racial discrimination vis-à-vis recruiting, Carlson explains the complex and varied reasons for which more than 100 Sto:lo men enlisted in the Second World War and the "insult" suffered by veterans after the war from unequal benefits to enfranchisement to alienation from their reserve. Most interesting, Carlson challenges the stereotype of the "Indian warrior," which he argues has clouded perceptions of Aboriginal personnel and their reception in their communities after the war. No veteran that he interviewed mentioned that they joined because they saw themselves as a "warrior" or desired to be one. Once they enlisted, however, *Xwelitem* (non-Sto:lo) soldiers expected them to live up to the stereotype of the Native "warrior" – a role that actually compromised Sto:lo values. Rather than bolstering their status in Sto:lo society, veterans returned to communities suspicious and even fearful of their service. Sto:lo veterans were ostracized by their own people as a result.[46] This local cultural dimension reaffirms that simple generalizations, made on the basis of anecdotal research that skims over the incredible diversity of Canada's Aboriginal peoples, can be misleading.

The Road Ahead

This appraisal of the historical literature on Native peoples and the military begs the question of what remains to be done. Indeed, despite the volume of

material that has ensured that Aboriginal contributions to the world wars are no longer "forgotten," the field remains rich for potential scholarly harvest.

In recognition that Aboriginal peoples do not constitute a monolithic group, their contributions to the world wars also invite regional and local study. In a critical appraisal of Canadian military historiography, Laurel Halladay recently lamented that few full-length studies of the war years have emphasized regional experiences.[47] Many cultural groups and individual Aboriginal communities cry out for systematic study, including some that are the subject of chapters in this volume. Others might include communities with extremely high rates of enlistment, like the Fort William First Nation, Cape Croker Ojibwa, Kootenay and Mistawasis Cree. More generally, the literature on home front contributions remains surprisingly limited. Systematic studies of Aboriginal contributions to industry, patriotic funds and home defence activities are sorely needed. The role of Aboriginal women during the war years, from paid work to participation in voluntary organizations from the Red Cross to local sock-knitting groups, also warrants academic attention. Scholars have stressed the vehement response to conscription, but have provided less insight into recruitment efforts, reasons for *voluntary* enlistment and the actual role of band councils and Indian agents in framing Aboriginal responses to the war effort. More work on these subjects would help to refine our understanding of the motivations behind contributions, as well as the reactions that changing wartime contexts and government policies provoked in local and regional contexts.

Although biography has fallen out of favour amongst scholarly historians, it is a wonderful vehicle for exploring the world wars. As much as war is a national experience, it is also a deeply personal one, and biography's narrow focus accommodates attention to diversity. More biographies of Native soldiers, such as Joe Dreaver, Fred Loft, O.M. Martin and Gilbert Monture, are needed. That numerous Aboriginal veterans went on to become prominent political figures also makes their stories important to document for future generations.

Finally, and perhaps foremost, the Canadian experiences invite comparison with other countries, and in particular, other "British settler societies" such as the United States, Australia and New Zealand. In all four of these countries, large indigenous minorities, living in very different circumstances, chose to participate in both world wars, sometimes spectacularly so. By broadening the lens to situate and compare the experiences of Aboriginal peoples in Canada with other indigenous peoples around the world, this field of scholarship can contribute to the international historiography on war and society and shed light on commonalities and differences across national lines.

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This appraisal of the historiography indicates that Aboriginal contributions to the world wars are no longer forgotten. A bold Aboriginal veterans memorial stands in Confederation Park in downtown Ottawa, in close proximity to the National War Memorial. Tommy Prince's name adorns a barracks at Canadian Forces Base Petawawa, a drill hall in Wainwright, a cadet corps in Winnipeg and an army training initiative introduced in 2000 to increase the number of Aboriginal people serving in the combat arms. The headquarters of 3 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group at Canadian Forces Base Borden is named after Francis Pegahmagabow. The June 2006 conference "Aboriginals and the Canadian Military: past, present, future," held by the Canadian Defence Academy, is another affirmation that Aboriginal peoples' contributions to the military are remembered and are taken seriously, in recognition that the past is connected to the present and to the future.

We have written this survey because we do not want the literature on Aboriginal peoples and the world wars to become an entrenched "drums and feathers" orthodoxy akin to the old style, uncritically heroic "drums and trumpets" approach to military history more generally. We should be challenging longstanding mythologies, penetrating beyond the comfortable assumptions and asking thoughtful questions. We should be embracing contradictions, inconsistencies and encouraging people to think across disciplinary and topical boundary lines that have for too long impeded a richer understanding of indigenous contributions to the Canadian military experience and the myriad impacts of war on Canada's Aboriginal peoples.

LAC PA-7439

Lieutenant F.O. Loft.

Appendix 8.1: RCAP Recommendations about Aboriginal Veterans

To maintain an honourable bond with the veterans who have served their country well, it is essential that the government of Canada undertake immediate remedial measures.

The Commission recommends that the Government of Canada

1.12.1

Acknowledge, on behalf of the people of Canada, the contribution of Aboriginal people within the Canadian Armed Forces during the wars of this century (the First World War, the Second World War and Korea) by

(a) giving a higher profile to Aboriginal veterans at national Remembrance Day services;

(b) funding the erection of war memorials in Aboriginal communities; and

(c) funding the continuing work of Aboriginal veterans' organizations.

1.12.2

Agree to Aboriginal veterans' requests for an ombudsman to work with the departments of veterans affairs and Indian affairs and northern development and national and provincial veterans' organizations to resolve long-standing disputes concerning

- Aboriginal veterans' access to and just receipt of veterans benefits; and

- the legality and fairness of the sales, leases and appropriations of Indian lands for purposes related to the war effort and for distribution to returning veterans of the two world wars.

1.12.3

Hire Aboriginal people with appropriate language skills and cultural understanding in the department of veterans affairs to serve distinct Aboriginal client groups.

1.12.4

Establish and fund a non-profit foundation in honour of Aboriginal veterans to promote and facilitate education and research in Aboriginal history and implement stay-in-school initiatives for Aboriginal students.

CHAPTER 8

ENDNOTES

[1] D.C. Scott, “Indians and the Great War,” Department of Indian Affairs *Annual Report* (1919), 13. See Interlude I for complete text.
[2] Jonathan Vance, *Death So Noble* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997), 247.
[3] Jack Hambleton, “Their Braves Gone to War, Cape Croker’s Indian Women and Children Carry On,” photo collection, *Globe and Mail*, 23 October 1943, 15.
[4] R. Scott Sheffield, *The Red Man's on the Warpath: The Image of the 'Indian' and the Second World War* (Vancouver: UBC Press 2004), and, Yale Belanger, “Seeking a Seat at the Table: A Brief History of Indian Organizing in Canada, 1870-1951,” Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Trent University, 2005.
[5] No Author, “Canadian Indians in the Wars,” *Indian News*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (October 1979); No Author, “Canada’s Indians in the Wars: A Tribute,” *Tekawannake* (7 November 1980); Dianne Parenteau, “Battles, Friendships from War Remembered by Métis Vet,” *Windspeaker*, Vol. 7, No. 36 (10 November 1989); and, No Author, “The Dreavers of Mistawasis: A Saga of Service,” *The Saskatchewan Indian* (December 1972).
[6] Alistair Sweeney, *Government Policy and Saskatchewan Indian Veterans: A Brief History of the Canadian Government’s Treatment of Indian Veterans of the Two World Wars* (Saskatchewan Indian Veterans’ Association, November 1979). See also, Kate Fawkes, “The Veterans Land Act: Its Application with regard to Indian Veterans,” Unpublished research paper, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Ottawa, 1980.
[7] An additional report was produced in 1979 by the Native Law Centre at the University of Saskatchewan, entitled, “Indian Veterans’ Rights.” Other publications from this era that warrant mention include No Author, “Canadian Indians and World War One,” *The Tomorrow File*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (30 November 1983), reprinted in *Saskatchewan Indian Federated College Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1984), 65-72.
[8] D. Bruce Sealey and Peter Van De Vyvere, *Manitobans in Profile: Thomas George Prince* (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers, 1981).
[9] See, for example, Janice Summerby, *Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields* (Ottawa: Veterans Affairs Canada, 1993); RCAP, *Final Report*; Salim Karam, “Aboriginal Day at NDHQ,” *The Maple Leaf*, Vol. 5, No. 25 (26 June 2002), 3. He is also featured on the cover of R.S. Sheffield, *A Search for Equity: A Study of the Treatment Accorded to First Nations Veterans and Dependents of the Second World War and Korea* (Ottawa: National Round Table on First Nations Veterans’ Issues, 2001). On the “Indian at war,” see R.S. Sheffield, *Red Man’s on the Warpath*. Bill Twatio also called him “the ultimate native warrior” in “Bitter legacy for brave native soldiers: out of uniform they were ‘just another poor goddamn Indian,’” *Toronto Star*, 11 November 1994.
[10] Enos T. Montour, *The Feathered U.E.L.’s* (Toronto: United Church of Canada, 1973), 97-8 and 100.
[11] Woodland Indian Cultural Education Centre, *Warriors: A Resource Guide* (Brantford: Woodland Indian Cultural Education Centre, 1986), 5.
[12] Other local histories that deal with the First World War include Mike Mountain Horse, *My People the Bloods* (Calgary: Glenbow-Alberta Institute, 1979), 138-44 (“Our Warriors Die”).
[13] Fred Gaffen, *Forgotten Soldiers* (Penticton: Theytus Books, 1985), 80.
[14] A prime example of this was another much-quoted publication by Summerby,

Native Soldiers, Foreign Battlefields. This pamphlet, issued as a short commemorative booklet for the public, has become a staple source in scholarly studies.

[15] L. James Dempsey, *Warriors of the King: Prairie Indians in World War I* (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 1999); Dempsey, "The Indians and World War One," *Alberta History*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1983), 1-8; Dempsey, "Problems of Western Canadian Indian War Veterans after World War One," *Native Studies Review*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1989), 1-18; Dempsey, "A Warrior's Robe," *Alberta History*, Vol. 51, No. 4 (2003), 18-22; and, Dempsey, "Alberta's Indians and the Second World War" in Ken Tingley, ed., *For King and Country: Alberta in the Second World War* (Edmonton: Reidmore Books, 1995), 39-52. For detailed reviews of *Warriors of the King* by the authors of this article, see P.W. Lackenbauer in *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* (Winter 2000/Spring 2001) and R.S. Sheffield in *University of Toronto Quarterly*, Vol. 71, No.1 (Winter 2002).

[16] Janet Davison, *We Shall Remember Them: Canadian Indians and World War II*, Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Trent University, 1992.

[17] Ibid., 60.

[18] Film - *Forgotten Warriors: The Story of Canada's Aboriginal War Veterans*. Director: Loretta Todd. Producers: Carol Geddes, Michael Doxtator and Jerry Krepakevich. 51 min. National Film Board of Canada. 1996. Videocassette.

[19] "The Aboriginal Soldier After the Wars," 22 March 1995, Ninth Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 1st Session, 25th Parliament, 1994-1995, 5 and 37.

[20] Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples [RCAP], *Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples*, Vol. 1, *Looking Forward, Looking Back* (Ottawa, 1996), Chapter 12, Veterans, 545-98.

[21] A host of subsequent authors have summarized the existing literature in brief articles, seldom pushing beyond the original research completed in the Forgotten Warriors school. See, for example, John Moses, "Aboriginal Participation in Canadian Military Service: Historic and Contemporary Contexts," *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin: Canada's Professional Journal on Army Issues*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 2000), 14-18, and, Maureen Simpkins, "The sniper in the shadows," *Beaver*, Vol. 78, No. 4 (1998), 17-21.

[22] James W. St.G. Walker, "Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (March 1989), 1-26.

[23] R.S. Sheffield, "'Of Pure European Descent and of the White Race': Recruitment Policy and Aboriginal Canadians, 1939-1945," *Canadian Military History*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1996), 8-15.

[24] R.S. Sheffield, "'In the Same Manner as Other People…:' Government Policy and the Military Service of Canada's First Nations People, 1939-1945," Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 1995, 63.

[25] R.S. Sheffield and H. Foster, "Fighting the King's War: Harris Smallfence, Verbal Treaty Promises and the Conscription of Indian Men, 1944," *UBC Law Review*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1999), 53-74. See also, Hugh Shewell, "Jules Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism in Canada, 1943-44," *Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1999), 211-42.

[26] Sheffield, "In the Same Manner," 97, 113 and 114.

[27] Michael D. Stevenson, *Canada's Greatest Wartime Muddle: National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources during World War II* (Kingston

and Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), 38. See also his earlier article "The Mobilisation of Native Canadians during the Second World War," *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* N.S. 7 (1996), 205-26.

[28] Stevenson, *Canada's Greatest Wartime Muddle*, 38.

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GLOSSARY

AG	Adjutant-General
CB	Confined to Barracks
CDA	Canadian Defence Academy
CEF	Canadian Expeditionary Force
CF	Canadian Forces
CFLI	Canadian Forces Leadership Institute
CFNA	Canadian Forces Northern Area
CHR	*Canadian Historical Review*
CRPG	Canadian Ranger Patrol Group
CWAC	Canadian Women's Army Corps
DCM	Distinguished Conduct Medal
DEW	Distant Early Warning
DHH	Directorate of History and Heritage
DIA	Department of Indian Affairs
DIAND	Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
DM	Deputy Minister
DMD	Department of Militia and Defence
DND	Department of National Defence
DVA	Department of Veterans Affairs
GObC	Ground Observer Corps
GOC	General Officer Commanding

GLOSSARY

GSAR	Ground Search and Rescue
HM	His / Her Majesty
HQ	Headquarters
HRH	His / Her Royal Highness
IAB	Indian Affairs Branch
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INAC	Indian and Northern Affairs Canada
ITC	Inuit Tapirisat of Canada
JCR	Junior Canadian Rangers
JDA	John G. Diefenbaker Archives
LAC	Library and Archives Canada
MD	Military District
MG	Manuscript Group
MM	Military Medal
MP	Military Police
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NFB	National Film Board
NNEP	Northern Native Entry Program
NRHQ	Northern Region Headquarters
NRT	National Round Table
NWS	North Warning System

NWT	Northwest Territories
OIC	Officer-in-Command
PCMR	Pacific Coast Militia Rangers
PRO	Public Records Office
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RCAF WD	Royal Canadian Air Force Women's Division
RCAP	Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RCN	Royal Canadian Navy
REP	Rangers Enhancement Program
RFC	Royal Flying Corps
RG	Record Group
RLO	Ranger Liaison Officer
RNAS	Royal Naval Air Service
SCEAND	Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence
SCND	Standing Committee on National Defence
SOVOP	Sovereignty Operation
SOVPAT	Sovereignty Patrol
SSB	Soldier Settlement Board
UBC	University of British Columbia

GLOSSARY

UEL	United Empire Loyalist
US	United States
USO	United Service Organizations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UTP	University of Toronto Press
VD	Venereal Disease
VE	Victory-in-Europe
VLA	Veterans' Land Act
WO	War Office
WRCNS	Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association

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The historical relationships between Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian military have evolved over the last four centuries. This unique volume traces the development of these associations from the early days of New France to the 21st century Arctic and highlights the important roles that Aboriginal people have played in the defence of the nation: from valued allies, to "specialist" fighters, to forgotten veterans, to defenders of Canada's north. Remembering past contributions and evolving relationships is essential to determine "best practices" in order to navigate a common path into the future that is based upon mutual understanding, trust and respect. This volume is an important step in that direction.

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