



# **THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO OPERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES**



Edited by  
**Commander Dave Woycheshin, PhD**  
& **Miriam de Graaff**

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**COMMANDER DAVE WOYCHESHIN, PHD  
& MIRIAM DE GRAAFF**



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It is important to recognize the ongoing support of the Canadian Defence Academy and the Canadian Defence Academy Press for this series of publications. In particular, our gratitude and thanks go to Mélanie Denis of the Canadian Defence Academy for her expertise and willingness to work under the time constraints that are required to meet the International Military Leadership Association schedule. We also express our gratitude to the 17 Wing Publishing Office in Winnipeg, Manitoba, for consistently producing a high-quality, professional product.



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# FOREWORD

I am pleased to introduce *The Comprehensive Approach to Operations: International Perspectives*, the eighth volume of the International Military Leadership Association (IMLA) published by the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) Press. Established in 2005, IMLA has provided a forum for military leadership researchers, academics and members of military leadership institutes to collaborate on a wide variety of military leadership projects. The Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) has recently given a positive review of a previous IMLA publication, *Military Ethics: International Perspectives* and has another volume under review. This is clearly testament to our successes in moving forward international literature.

The publication of this volume is timely. While there is much individual expertise in the comprehensive approach to operations, it has not been formally institutionalized as a standard operational procedure. Future military operations will continue to be mandated by international authorities and will likely be multinational endeavours. Any large scale operation is sure to be augmented by non-military aims to reflect nation building and development aspects (i.e., the 3 Ds: defence, diplomacy and development). Future conflict will also likely involve a variety of non-governmental organizations in the operational environment, amidst a country with civil institutions of varying levels of effectiveness and in a vastly different cultural sphere. These are all conditions that require leaders to possess the skills and competencies necessary to operate effectively in the future security environment.

I commend the efforts of the authors, editors and members of CDA Press in the production of this volume. IMLA continues to demonstrate its relevance to the furthering the understanding of the many facets of military leadership. Your comments are, as always, welcomed.

P.J. Forgues  
Major-General  
Commander  
Canadian Defence Academy



# CHAPTER 1

## CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO OPERATIONS

*Bill Bentley, PhD\**

### INTRODUCTION

The Comprehensive Approach to security operations was developed over time to deal with the complex, multi-dimensional conflicts of the 1990s and early 21<sup>st</sup> century. These were the “new” wars so well described by Mary Kaldor in *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*.<sup>1</sup> It is a fairly significant change in both grand strategy and, therefore, military strategy, from the paradigm extant during the Cold War. To fully understand how this new approach evolved, the role of civil-military relations in liberal democracies must be taken into account. This chapter will introduce the concept of civil-military relations in both their theoretical and practical aspects and situate the emergence of the Comprehensive Approach within this governance issue.

Civil-military relations describe the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization established to protect it. Thus, the civil-military relationship involves the interaction among three main actors – the people, the government and the military. If there is a general concordance among these three actors, civil-military relations can be described as healthy or relatively tension free; if not, the relationship will be strained, sometimes to the point of crisis.<sup>2</sup>

More narrowly, civil-military relations describe the relationship between the civil authority of a given society/nation and its military authority. In this case, the civil authority is to be understood as the elected government responsible to the people and to which the military is subordinated, as well as appointed civilian officials with whom the military must work to execute the government’s direction. Although not subordinated to these civilian officials, the fact that these officials represent different jurisdictions (for example, foreign


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\* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of either the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence.

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affairs, finance or development) and have separate reporting chains, only converging at the Cabinet level, can create tensions that are difficult to resolve.

From a military perspective civil-military relations take place at the policy/strategy interface in the General System of War and Conflict as depicted in Figure 1.1.<sup>3</sup> Here, the “strategy bridge” metaphor is an apt one as the military strategist must translate policy goals, which can only be formulated through politics, into objectives which can be militarily achieved in the operational and tactical sub-systems. This can be a very difficult process since political goals are generally ambiguous, transient and opportunistic, subject to shifting and competing value patterns and interpreted through various partisan views as to what “success” in military interventions should look like. Thus, the dialogue that takes place on the strategy bridge must be in-depth, informed and based on mutual respect and trust.



**Figure 1.1. The General System of War and Conflict**



In addition, in the process of dialogue that occurs on the strategy bridge, both the military strategist and the civilian politician need to adjust their preferences so as to meet the demands of the other. A key function of the dialogue is to ensure that the spokespeople for policy and the military power each respect the core integrity of the logic or grammar of the other. The characterization of this dialogue in terms of logic and grammar is derived from the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who defined war and conflict as merely the continuation of policy by other means. For Clausewitz, this meant that the logic of war is determined by the political goals set, whereas the grammar of war is determined by military action at the tactical and operational levels.<sup>4</sup>

## **CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS THEORIES IN PRACTICE**

Civil-military relations theory is concerned with the question of how to reconcile a military strong enough to do anything civilians ask with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize. This formulation takes civil-military relations theory far beyond the issue of direct seizure of political power by the military; that is to say, a military coup. In fact, in stable liberal democracies this is a highly unlikely scenario. However, due to the size of militaries in most democratic states, their impact on the budget and political economy and their relative professional autonomy, the threat to civilian supremacy can come from parasitic militaries, rogue militaries and from issues of simple obedience.

Parasitic militaries are those whose demands for resources become exorbitant based on threat scenarios that are overblown and/or insufficiently assessed by the civil authority. The issue here for both the civilian authority and the military is to realize that although the military can advise on the perceived threat, it is the civilian authority who decides how to respond, or indeed, if there will even be a response at all. An example of at least the potential for the emergence of a parasitic military was the motivation behind President Dwight Eisenhower's warning about the emergence of an overly powerful military-industrial complex in the US in the early 1960s.

Rogue militaries are those whose actions exceed the intention of government or who continue to thwart the direction implied by policy decisions. An example of the former in Canada, in the view of many, including the Prime Minister at the time, John Diefenbaker, was the Canadian military's initial response to the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. In this case, military commanders

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took initiatives such as raising alert status and putting to sea without clear government authority and direction. An example of the latter, thwarting government policy direction, is illustrated by the case of the Canadian government's acceptance of a defence mission in North Norway in 1970. Canada assigned the task to what was called the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST Bde Gp). For over 10 years the military failed to properly prepare for this role, including deliberately avoiding exercising in the region alongside their Norwegian allies and the US Marines. Only after the issue was raised at the political level in Oslo, Washington and Brussels did the government intervene and order a full-scale exercise – Exercise BRAVE LION – which took place in 1986.

The issue of obedience is perhaps less egregious than the case of parasitic or rogue militaries but is, nonetheless, insidious and ubiquitous. One influential civil-military relations theory describes the problem in terms of Principal-Agent Theory, whereby the Principal – the government – gives direction and monitors the Agent – the military – to see that the direction is being followed.<sup>5</sup> Usually, the Agent is responsible and works assiduously toward the objective. However, this is not always the case and the Agent, in the terminology of Principal-Agent Theory, “shirks.” In this case the civilian authority “punishes.” A good example occurred during the Clinton Administration when the American military was directed to accept homosexuals into the military. The military resisted strenuously (it shirked) and the Administration intervened to ensure that its intentions were met. The result for the military was the “don’t ask, don’t tell policy.”

The function of civil-military relations is not only about negative control. In the normal course of events, the products or results of an effectively functioning civil-military process are many and, indeed, essential to a properly functioning polity. In fact, the very structure of the national security community is a product that, over time, results from the dialogue between the government and the military, amongst others. In some states, for example, the army, navy and air force remain separate, largely autonomous, entities whereas in others, such as Canada, they have been unified and integrated. Similarly, the national defence headquarters can be integrated, as in Canada and the US, or, although less common in liberal democracies, can be separate civilian ministries and military headquarters. Security structures evolve over time and change can elicit considerable tension in the civil-military context. Such was certainly the case in the 1960s when the Canadian government under Prime Minister Lester Pearson and his Defence Minister Paul Hellyer directed the Unification and Integration of the Canadian Forces under a single Chief of the Defence Staff.

Clearly, the structure of the national security community has a direct bearing on the question of accountability and responsibility. In most militaries, for example, it is the responsibility of the military to provide military advice to the government, whereas civilian officials are responsible and accountable for the broader realm of defence relationships. This is not a clear-cut boundary and disagreements frequently arise concerning who is accountable in any given circumstance. On reflection this is not surprising, for as Henry Kissinger observed:

A complete separation of military strategy and policy at the highest levels can only be achieved to the detriment of both. It causes military power to become identified with the most absolute application of power and it tempts diplomacy into an over concern with finesse. Since the most difficult problems of national policy are in the area where political, economic, psychological and military factors overlap we should give up the fiction that there is such a thing as pure military advice.<sup>6</sup>

The factors of accountability and responsibility impact directly on the issue of decision-making in the context of civil-military relations. In fact, theorist Rebecca Schiff postulates that there are four key indices that can be used to assess the state of civil-military relations in any polity.<sup>7</sup> These are the composition of the officer corps, the method of recruitment, military style and the decision-making process. Concordance amongst the people, the military and the government on these four indices will result in a high degree of effectiveness in civil-military relations. The decision-making process can, indeed, be contentious and adversely affect good civil-military relations. In one example from the US, a number of factors – operational and structural – led, in the 1980s, to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. This act greatly enhanced the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as the sole military advisor to the Secretary of Defence. This significantly altered the decision-making process both internally within the Joint Chiefs organization and especially with regard to the Secretary of Defence.

A similar phenomenon occurred earlier in a Canadian example from the 1960s. One of the key motivations for the unification and integration of the three Services – Army, Navy and Air Force, into the single Canadian Forces was the role of the three Services in the decision-making process. The Minister felt that direct access to him by the three Service Chiefs overly complicated decision-making and in fact allowed the three Chiefs to play one off the other in their dealings with the Minister. The result, as mentioned previously,

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was the creation of the post of Chief of the Defence Staff which henceforth denied the three Service Chiefs direct access to the Minister.

Last, but certainly not least, a major consequence or product of the process of civil-military relations is the formulation of grand strategy and, for the military, its subset of military strategy. As the renowned historian and strategic theorist Hew Strachan concluded: “Where the primary purpose of effective civil-military relations is national security policy, its output is strategy.”<sup>8</sup>

## CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

It is precisely here that civil-military relations have a direct connection to the evolution and execution of the comprehensive approach to operations in the contemporary security environment. In the first place, two kinds of strategy emerge from the civil-military dialogue that produces national security policy. One strategy pursues the total defeat of the opponent in order for the victor to impose its unfettered will on the defeated opponent. Examples from the 20<sup>th</sup> century are the First and Second World Wars. To be sure, other elements of national power are brought to bear in the course of the conflict but these are provided in direct support and in a subsidiary role to military power.




Figure 1.2. The Bi-Polar Strategy

The second kind of strategy, referred to as the bi-polar strategy, pursues more limited goals, with force being applied, where necessary, on one pole while a wide variety of other instruments of power are applied on the other pole.<sup>9</sup> The two poles act simultaneously or sequentially. The instruments on the non-battle pole include, but are not limited to, diplomacy, information operations, economic actions, humanitarian operations and, of course, peace-keeping. The military can, and does, operate on both poles. This model is depicted in Figure 1.2.

In a recent book, *War from the Ground Up*, Emile Simpson describes the different kinds of strategy in slightly different terms. In one strategy, the military is used to prepare the ground for an ultimate political solution after the military action has been completed. In the second kind of strategy, the military is employed alongside other instruments of power and is an integral component of an evolving political solution.<sup>10</sup>

One aspect of the end of the Cold War was the necessity for a transition from the so-called strategy of annihilation to the bi-polar strategy. The need for the transition was not immediately apparent to all by any means. Achieving effective understanding among the main actors in the international security community in the West was halting and sometimes confused. The 1990s saw a plethora of operations from Haiti to the Balkans, to Africa and Asia which did not fit the pattern of the Cold War at all. After 9/11 the situation became even more complex.

What emerged was a new type of war and conflict. Carl von Clausewitz had argued in his masterpiece *On War* that the nature of war and conflict does not change but its character does. The characteristics of conflict now certainly differed from that of the post-1945 era. In these new conflicts the political objectives were not unlimited and were nuanced in ways not thought of in the Cold War. The utility of force in this new era of what General Sir Rupert Smith called “war amongst the people”<sup>11</sup> was being radically re-interpreted by politicians, strategists and the military alike. Smith’s paradigm of “war amongst the people” can be summarized in four points:

- The ends for which we fight are changing from the hard objectives that decide an outcome to those of establishing conditions in which the outcome may be decided. (Emile Simpson’s point.)
- We fight amongst the people, not on the battlefield.
- Conflicts tend to be timeless, even unending. We fight so as to preserve the force rather than risk all to gain the objective.

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- On each occasion new uses are found for old weapons and organizations which are the products of industrial war.

The significance of this paradigm shift and the difficulty adjusting to it can be illuminated by reference to the concept of strategic culture. Strategic culture refers to the socially transmitted habits of mind, tradition and preferred methods of operations that are, more or less, specific to a particular security community. It is a product of a particular historical experience that has been shaped by a more or less unique, though not necessarily unvarying, geographic context. Each strategic culture is inclined to create what purports to be general theories on the basis of national experiences and circumstances. Strategic culture is defined by Williamson Murray as:

An integrated system of symbols (argumentation, structure, language, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-term strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in political affairs. The strategic culture thus established reflects national preconceptions and historical experience as much as it does purely objective responses to any given threat environment.<sup>12</sup>

Strategic culture is a long-term, slow-growth phenomenon not particularly dependent on specific individuals or even any single significant event. In their book, *The Making of Strategy*, Williamson Murray and his colleagues argue that there are five major factors that contribute to the evolution of a strategic culture<sup>13</sup>:

- **Geography:** The size and location of a nation are crucial determinants of the way policy-makers and strategists think about security and strategy. This, of course, includes all the material resources available to the nation.
- **History:** Historical experience influences strategic culture almost as much as geography.
- **Religion, ideology and culture:** Taken together these three comprise something the Germans have captured in a single word – *Weltanschauung* – a worldview or outlook on the world. The influence of this concept is both elemental and vast.
- **Governance:** The structure of government and military institutions plays a critical role in the development and operation of a strategic culture.

- **Technology:** Relative technological competence is important. The danger, in the West at least, is that short-term technological advantage tends to overshadow the other more profound factors over the long term.

The concept of strategic culture is usually applied to individual nation-states but can also be applied to broader security communities, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Another example would be the European Union (EU). In these cases individual members largely retain their individual strategic cultures but accept that a more inclusive strategic culture is evolving to which their cultures contribute and whose influence alters their individual cultures in turn.

The evolution of the international security environment has impacted the strategic cultures of most, if not all, Western nations. This impact has consequently created a consensus concerning the means to deal with this environment and the utility of force in this effort. To return to civil-military relations, it was and is the dialogue on the strategy bridge that has changed grand, and military, strategy. There is a realization that the types of conflict forecast for the short to medium term were likely to be limited in intensity, though not necessarily in duration, and characterized as civil wars, insurgencies, regime change operations and the consequences of failed and failing states – all involving a variety of non-state actors.

Beginning in the 1990s, governments and militaries began to see that a great deal more cooperation would be required to deal with these conflicts. Military power would not be enough and, in fact, would usually play a supporting role over time. Concepts such as inter-departmental or inter-agency cooperation emerged. In the early days, the phrase most often heard was cooperation among the 3Ds (Defence, Diplomacy and Development). With experience and some theory development, in Canada this phenomenon began to be referred to as the whole-of-government approach to operations. When the concept was taken up by international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), NATO and the EU it was agreed that there would always be a multitude of actors locally, regionally and even globally who would have to be taken into account. These additional actors included nation states, international political organizations, a bewildering array of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the media, as well as the indigenous population in the theatre of operations itself. Hence, the whole-of-government approach was broadened to the construct of the comprehensive approach. In the Canadian case this was defined as a framework within which diverse, situationally aware actors resolve

## CANADA

complex issues through the purposeful coordination and de-confliction of their information, actions and effects.

### **OPERATIONALIZING THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**


Having established the idea at the politico-strategic level, the issue became how to operationalize it at the operational and tactical levels; that is, how to conduct comprehensive operations. This has been accomplished through trial and error, experience, and the development of doctrine. Thus, for example, the concept of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) on the military side and civil-military coordination (CMCOORD) on the civilian side has been developed in most nations and international organizations such as the UN and NATO.

CIMIC has been defined as a military function that supports the commander's mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between the military force and civilian actors in the commander's area of operations. It is, in effect, what the military refers to as a "force multiplier". The significant shift in thinking about the kind of strategy being employed and the evolution in strategic culture should not be underestimated. Less than 15 years ago, for example, the US military's mantra was "we don't do nation-building." In the Canadian case the concept of CIMIC was unheard of until at least the late 1990s. By 2013, however, General Stanley McChrystal would write in his book *My Share of the Task* that:

I saw good people all trying to reach a positive outcome but approaching the problem from different cultures and perspectives, often speaking with different vocabularies. I hoped time working together would create more trust on a common picture.<sup>14</sup>

This observation is notable for two reasons. First, it is indicative of how far the US military had come from the days of "our job is to fight and win our nation's wars" towards an acceptance of the comprehensive approach. Second, however, there is the recognition that the conduct of comprehensive operations continues to pose severe challenges in reality. The same situation can be identified in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia.





**Figure 1.3. CIMIC within the General System of War and Conflict**

## CONCLUSION

What started as a dialogue in civil-military relations at the politico-strategic level had been translated into doctrine and practice at the tactical and operational levels in the field, as depicted in Figure 1.3. But the comprehensive approach remains a work in progress. It is exceedingly difficult to bridge the differences in organizational cultures and worldviews of those individuals who inhabit them. This is especially the case at the strategic level where structural, financial, and frankly, small “p” political (power) factors are deeply embedded in any governance system. In the end, success or failure will depend on the quality of the nation’s civil-military relationship.

# CANADA

## ENDNOTES

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# CHAPTER 2

## THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH, STRATEGY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: AN OVERVIEW AND SOME SUGGESTED FUTURE DIRECTIONS

*Jerry Guo*

*Mie Augier, PhD\**

### INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, we review some of the current definitions of the term “comprehensive approach”, evaluate the academic history of its use, reflect on some of the key insights that seem to motivate current uses, and try to provide some suggestions for future research and uses, appealing to insights from political psychology, organization studies, sociology and economics. Providing more of an intellectual framework to the definition is important because the terms we use have significant influence on how we think about and understand the world. The terms we use are also important in reflecting the societies and social contexts in which they originate and are used. As the military sociologist Hans Speier suggested, society generates new tactics and strategies. Referring to *blitzkrieg*, he argued that all great changes in the history of military strategy and tactics have a social root and are an element in a broader cultural context.<sup>1</sup> In this chapter, we discuss some of the history of the comprehensive approach term and suggest some research avenues to help refine the concept.

The term “comprehensive approach” has gained some attention over the last decade. A simple Google search of the term, in conjunction with Afghanistan, yields 277,000 results. In conjunction with “military,” a search of the term yields 692,000 results. As governments, transnational organizations, and militaries have pushed the use of the term in describing civil-military operations in stabilization and reconstruction (especially in Afghanistan), an understanding of the term’s origins, its usage, and aspects of its definition could inform thinking about strategy and how it might influence the future security environment.

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\* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy of the United States Navy or the Department of Defense.

## USA

The idea of a comprehensive approach with respect to military operations is not new. The term has been used in publications as early as the 1990s.<sup>2</sup> Then, the comprehensive approach in a more organized context begins to appear in the 1990s where the term was given more precise meaning and definition. For example, Rosenthal and Kouzmin, in discussing crisis management, suggest “Aiming for a more comprehensive approach, one that enables an understanding and categorizing of the variety of crisis events, an alternative typology is proposed and presented here”.<sup>3</sup> This refers to thinking about conflict situations in the context of analyzing them – not in managing them. Mockaitis mentions the comprehensive approach in peace missions: “Soldiers, like diplomats and non-governmental organization personnel, must be prepared to do a variety of tasks as part of an evolving peace mission. Clearly classical peacekeeping does not provide any base for such a comprehensive approach.”<sup>4</sup> Such conceptual definitions appear to also be appealing to the comprehensive approach as an organizational phenomenon; one that involves the whole organization in question, across functions, focuses and other specifics.

Throughout the early 2000s, there was less consensus in its use. In fact, one can see opposing trends toward less unifying concepts and more diversity in both definitions and applications. Scholars variously used it to describe implementing disaster relief technology<sup>5</sup>, formation of military service identity<sup>6</sup>, strategy toward terrorism<sup>7</sup>, refugee strategy<sup>8</sup>, human security<sup>9</sup>, biosecurity<sup>10</sup>, homeland security<sup>11</sup>, North Korea<sup>12</sup>, and the Afghan “bazaar economy”.<sup>13</sup> In that sense, the “movement” or set of ideas around the comprehensive approach is far from close to the “normal science” that Thomas Kuhn described.<sup>14</sup>

There is still a relative lack of agreement with respect to definition. From a quick view of the literature, it seems like the terminology refers to crisis management that employs political, military, and civilian instruments. The logic behind the term seems to be the thought that complex security challenges (such as the economic crisis, climate change, as well as wars and conflict) require both political and civilian measures, spanning military as well as stabilization and reconstruction operations. It also implicitly appeals to an organizational approach<sup>15</sup>, requiring understanding of and engagement with different types of organizations and other institutions. It might be useful, then, to look into the dynamics and mechanisms that have been studied in organizations to see how they may apply (or not) to the perspectives around the comprehensive approach.

## **SOME DEFINITIONS**

Among the various definitions of the comprehensive approach, the term is used to refer to issues such as features and functions of individual organizations and features and functions across organizations, aspects of the strategies or policies of organizations, and a framework essential for cross organizational peacekeeping missions.

### **THE UNITED NATIONS**

(S)uccessful peacebuilding is predicated on an effective and an unambiguous division of labour, based on the comparative advantage of different implementing bodies, between all the international partners, including the United Nations system, the international financial institutions, regional and subregional organizations, non-governmental organizations and the wider international community.<sup>16</sup>

The UN Security Council issued this statement related to a comprehensive approach to peacebuilding in 2001, following a Security Council meeting with open debate on the topic. This definition explicitly references peacebuilding as requiring a comprehensive approach, as well as coordination between military and non-military partners. The Security Council further emphasized solutions and approaches that incorporated economic and social dimensions of conflicts.

### **THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION**

The NATO definition appears to be slightly more strategic, in the sense that it is oriented towards strengths and weaknesses:

(E)ffective crisis management calls for a comprehensive approach involving political, civilian and military instruments...The effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all actors to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy.<sup>17</sup>

The NATO conception of the definition suggests equal representation in discussions and what has been termed a “whole of government” approach. The focus in this perspective is not on the end outcomes or effects, but more on

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ensuring that all sectors of government, non-profit organizations, and the military have a role in operations. The emphasis is also on crisis – an explicit reference to stabilization and reconstruction, implying that this usage of “comprehensive” refers to only this type of work. It would not, for example, refer to a comprehensive approach to strategy formulation, development or procurement.

### **THE EUROPEAN UNION**

The EU definition is similar in spirit:

The EU possesses a uniquely wide array of civilian and military instruments for use in response to a crisis. This comprehensive approach to crisis management leads to the need for ensuring within the EU an effective co-ordination of the whole range of such instruments. This approach will have to take into account the fact that these instruments may be subject to different institutional and thus decision-making processes. Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO) in the context of CFSP/ESDP [Common Foreign and Security Policy; European Security and Defence Policy] addresses the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis.<sup>18</sup>

The EU definition, with its emphasis on civil-military coordination, is similar to the NATO approach. It emphasizes “instruments” working together. But coordination does not suggest leadership, and both the EU and NATO definitions seem content with this ambiguity. The ambiguity allows room for working together, but leaves out a more comprehensive strategy to understand and address problems.

### **UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

The U.S. describes its comprehensive approach as “Unified Action”, and defines it as: A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including synchronization of activities with governmental and nongovernmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands.<sup>19</sup>

The comprehensive approach from the US military perspective is explicitly military – although the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not actually contain a formal definition for the term. The above definition is the same definition for “unified action” that appears in FM 1, one of the Army’s two capstone doctrinal manuals.<sup>20</sup> The definition goes on to say that commanders should “synchronize their efforts with those of interagency and multinational partners when possible.” The military perspective, in this approach, has primacy over civilian actors.

## **CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE**

The Canadian Forces (CF) acknowledgement of the need to practise a more coordinated and holistic approach to operations is ever more evident – and also pressing. Accordingly, DND [Department of National Defence] leadership – both civilian and military – is increasingly calling for the adoption of a force that takes a comprehensive approach to operations. Such a force would employ diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial resources, aligned with those of numerous other agencies, coordinated through an integrated campaign plan, and then applied in areas of operations as needed. As such, the approach would entail traditional and non-traditional military activities being carried out collaboratively within a broader context known as the Effects Based Approach to Operations. The result would be greater mission effectiveness.<sup>21</sup>

The Canadian Department of National Defence definition explicitly references diplomatic and development mechanisms in response to operations. But like the other definitions, it does not describe overall responsibility for coordination or the types of operations in question. The impetus appears to be not to have the military coordinate, but to adapt military techniques to the needs of unique operational situations.

## **CONSOLIDATION**

In official descriptions/definitions, the term refers to the employment of a variety of instruments in operations. The definitions are not explicit in reference to reconstruction and stabilization operations (with the exception of the UN definition), but they suggest that these operations should incorporate not only military means, but also civilian, non-profit, economic and political means. Operations are assumed to have greater success with these manifold strengths. They differ on what actors take primacy in coordination,

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but agree that these groups should work together under a unified plan. Little is said however about the processes by which this would work; how intra-organizational and cultural differences might influence things, or how different psychologies of the decision-makers involve may assist (or create barriers to) implementation.

Despite a lack of consensus in definitions, the academic community has consolidated around the term. This section explores the evolution of the comprehensive approach term – defined variously by practitioners – in the academic community. The comprehensive approach term began appearing in peacebuilding/development journals regularly in the early 2000s. In referring to the Red Cross and civil-military relations, Studer notes “[a]mong other things, the report calls for a more comprehensive approach to peacekeeping, one that takes into account the humanitarian aspects of such missions”.<sup>22</sup> And with respect to peacekeeping specifically, Lovelock argued “[t]he experience of Kosovo suggests that the comprehensive approach applied in the counter-insurgency model is also fundamental to contemporary peace support operations. The military role is to provide secure conditions for other actors to create a durable peace. These efforts cannot occur in isolation”.<sup>23</sup>

Similar articles were written starting with security sector reform in Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> As peacekeeping in Afghanistan became more of a priority for the security community, articles on civil-military cooperation became more common. Spence argued “effective implementation of civil-military cooperation will enable the military commander to play his part in a comprehensive approach to the resolution of any crisis and should be seen as helping to create the conditions and local capacity to facilitate the ultimate disengagement of military force.”<sup>25</sup> Capabilities are a priority in these discussions as authors focus on leveraging “complimentary capabilities” in operations.<sup>26</sup>

In describing the comprehensive approach, Biscop states that:

[A] distinctive European approach to security has emerged, which is characterized by a broad, multidimensional or comprehensive notion of security, which starts from the interdependence between all dimensions of security – political, socio-economic, ecologic, cultural and military – rather than just focusing on the latter; hence the need to set objectives and apply instruments in all of these fields.<sup>27</sup>

This is the first reference to the comprehensive approach as a European phenomenon, which was followed up by articles referencing the 2003 adoption of the European Security Strategy (ESS):



The ESS is based upon a comprehensive or holistic approach to security. It states that the EU and its member states will cooperate to tackle their security priorities in a framework that emphasizes multilateral institutions (specifically the UN and regional organizations) and the rule of law (upholding the principle of the use of force as a last resort).<sup>28</sup>

Rieker agreed with a EU focus on Nordic countries.<sup>29</sup> During this time, Petersen and Binnendijk note:

[t]he government of Denmark, with the support of like-minded North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, took the initiative in late 2004 to put the concept of a comprehensive approach on the Alliance agenda, initially under the heading Concerted Planning and Action (CPA).<sup>30</sup>

## **EVOLUTION AND MATURITY**

The term seemed to acquire traction in the 2003-2004 timeframe, and by the middle of the decade scholars began applying the term in earnest. Aguero called for evolution in the social sciences:

The social sciences still maintain separate approaches to study civil-military relations, defense, police and judicial reform, with intelligence vastly overlooked. Nonetheless, out of practical need and recent reflection, these problems have begun to be addressed with concepts such as security sector reform that cut across narrow boundaries and allow for a comprehensive approach.<sup>31</sup>

Kemp and Loorbach called for policy-making to evolve in the context of the comprehensive approach (although this was in respect to sustainable development); they called for “a more evolutionary and adaptive strategy”.<sup>32</sup>

As counter-insurgency became a problem in both Afghanistan and Iraq, work focusing on the comprehensive approach with respect to counterinsurgency (COIN) also emerged.<sup>33</sup> But the primary focus was still civil-military relations in the context of reconstruction.<sup>34</sup> De Coning sums up the comprehensive approach concept: “At the strategic level civil military coordination is used to suggest a multidimensional, whole-of-government or comprehensive approach, where various civilian and at least one military entity are engaged in a joint initiative or mission”.<sup>35</sup>

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There were extensions of the comprehensive approach concept to other issues, including the North Korean nuclear situation:

There is growing consensus among experts that a more comprehensive approach – addressing such issues as conventional military forces, trade, investment, humanitarian aid, energy, and political recognition – will be needed to achieve a long-term resolution of the nuclear question.<sup>36</sup>

The use of the term matured later in the decade. In 2006, NATO formally adopted the comprehensive approach.<sup>37</sup> Some noted in the scholarly literature that the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was not doing enough to enact a comprehensive approach in Afghanistan. The German government's repeated calls for a comprehensive approach that better integrated the civilian and military dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan lacked credibility in the alliance – particularly because German efforts in this respect were no more convincing than those of other ISAF members.<sup>38</sup> While all seemed to agree about the approach in principle, “the implementation of comprehensive or whole-of-government strategies has given rise to debate, controversy and concern in practice.”<sup>39</sup> A *Washington Post* editorial commented: “We cannot just pay lip service to the comprehensive approach. We have repeatedly said that force alone cannot solve Afghanistan's problems.”<sup>40</sup>

Studies began to look at “processes initiated by the EU to see whether it has, in fact, been able to create capabilities that support such a Comprehensive Approach.”<sup>41</sup> Other terms used in conjunction with the comprehensive approach include effects-based operations, whole-of-society, and whole-of-government approach.<sup>42</sup> The United States described it as unified action.<sup>43</sup> By the end of the decade, “[t]o act ‘comprehensively’, or according to the comprehensive approach, is a doctrinal mantra for any military officer that has attended Staff College and any diplomat wanting to work in the world's hotspots.”<sup>44</sup>

## 2010s

Even in 2010, scholars continued to define the comprehensive approach and were calling for the comprehensive approach's implementation. Rasmussen argued “[w]hat we need is a comprehensive approach, where the political, civilian and military efforts are coordinated, and work towards common aims. Where, as much as possible, the military and civilian actors plan together, operate in complementary ways, and support each other.”<sup>45</sup>

Millen<sup>46</sup>, Haugevik<sup>47</sup>, Gavas<sup>48</sup>, de Coning<sup>49</sup>, Dijkstra<sup>50</sup>, Yost,<sup>51</sup> Lindley-French et al<sup>52</sup>, and de Coning et al<sup>53</sup> provided more definitions. There was renewed attention due to the adoption of the NATO Strategic Concept, which was built on the comprehensive approach.<sup>54</sup> But scholars also recognized that:

NATO is a politico-military organization, which deals with one dimension of foreign policy only, i.e. security and defence. Responses to global challenges and relations with third States require a much broader, comprehensive approach that encompasses all of foreign policy, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. While NATO can contribute, it is not equipped to take the lead.<sup>55</sup>

It was suggested the EU would be better equipped to lead.<sup>56</sup>

Analytical papers on implementation appeared around this time. Rotmann considered “the choices that each individual official, agency, ministry, and government faces in whether to invest in a Comprehensive Approach or to satisfy many other political and institutional imperatives.”<sup>57</sup> Authors were interested in “operationalizing” the comprehensive approach.<sup>58</sup> Wendling summarizes the state of the literature:

Both states and international organisations (the European Union, Nato, the UN, the African Union etc) make extensive use of the “comprehensive approach” since the early 2000s, including the terms “multidimensional approach”, or “integrated approach”, and these expressions largely sum up the idea of a better harmonization and coordination of international, local, civilian and military actors when crises occur. In parallel, there is also talk of the “whole of government approach” (WGA or WHOGA), of “interagency approach”, of “networked security”, “multifunctional approach” and of “3D concept (diplomacy-development-defence)”, amongst others.<sup>59</sup>

The term has remained in the civil affairs context for its duration, although there have been occasional forays into other fields.

## **SOME INSIGHTS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES**

Social and political reality, its perception or constitution by the participants of politics (politicians and citizens), is shaped and determined by communication and its means: linguistic expressions provided by the language of public discourse. This language opens

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and restricts, due to the semantic rules of its linguistic signs, the possibilities of constituting symbolic meaning and sense within a range of socially accepted definitions of political and social reality.<sup>60</sup>

The comprehensive approach is an example of terminology, jargon, or what some might call a “buzzword”. To begin integrating lessons from other disciplines into the comprehensive approach, it is worth first understanding what a “term” might mean. Thinking about a “term” is an exercise in understanding semantics. Words can have symbolic meaning beyond their literal definitions; symbolic terms evoke feelings, memories, and modes of thought that give them great influence on thinking. Understanding the influence of terminology on patterns of human thought is relevant when considering the origins of the comprehensive approach concept. Language is foundational to the growth of human society; language “and various systems of symbols more or less directly dependent on language, are not merely the basic technique but even today the framework upon which the superstructure of society is supported.”<sup>61</sup> Considering the study of terminology can help in understanding the effects and effective use of the comprehensive approach concept. Ideas from fields such as political psychology, military sociology, organization theory and economics may be relevant to providing more conceptual underpinnings to the comprehensive approach that in turn may help improve its empirical applications.

Terms and discourse might, in the tradition of Durkheim, be viewed as a form of religion. In this case, religion is not understood in the sense of deism, but in the sense of the “belief of a given social group in certain indisputable truths”<sup>62</sup> These truths are shared by everyone belonging to the group – or at the very least believed in public. “They are beyond dispute and entail various practices on the part of believers who cannot evade them without endangering the cohesion of the group or risking being considered social outcasts.”<sup>63</sup> Terminology – buzzwords included – might become group ideology, and when sufficiently socialized in a community become belief. Similarly, Perry argues that language “orients men to what, for want of a better term, may be called ‘values.’ The patterns of social cooperation and the various types of action which occur in society are not mechanical combinations or aggregations of fixed elements.”<sup>64</sup> Social cooperation arises out of the language in which it is framed – out of shared principles and beliefs.

Terms “define paths of action, containing in their problem-statements certain kinds of solutions.”<sup>65</sup> By adopting terminology, a group constrains its solution set, closing off potential fruitful avenues to pursue an ideology. A

literature has grown around the study of buzzwords in development and the extent to which they constrain or work against actual development goals.<sup>66</sup> Specifically, language matters for development. In the words of Cornwall, “Development’s buzzwords are not only passwords to funding and influence; and they are more than the mere specialist jargon that is characteristic of any profession.”<sup>67</sup> It is especially important in international development because of development’s role in shaping the lives of the people it touches. Eade remarks:

[t]he whole process neatly illustrates Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony, whereby the values of the ruling culture – in this case, the captains of the Development Industry – capture the ideology, self understanding, and organisations of the working class – in this case, those whose lives are most significantly affected by international development policies and by the ministrations of development assistance.<sup>68</sup>

That is, understanding how and why terms arise has an impact on how they are implemented, and how future terms might be developed.

This is an especially important point in academic study. One might delineate between “the common practice of using for social science the same vocabulary and rules of grammar as are used in the society we are studying.”<sup>69</sup> These are two distinct languages; to have that separation in mind while analyzing the use of terminology is important. In the words of Simon, “[w]e must learn to distinguish the various languages with which we are concerned. We must separate the commonsense that is part of our data from the propositions of our science.”<sup>70</sup> The concepts we use become part of the unconscious (and conscious) processes of creating and communicating meaning between and across individuals and organizations; words and concepts also help transmit meanings between organizations and the wider societies of which they are a part.<sup>71</sup>

Military sociology also holds some lessons for thinking about the comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach is predicated upon the assumption that conflict – and reconstruction and stabilization operations after conflict – can only be resolved by incorporating a varied approach to the crisis that addresses its various aspects. Lessons from military sociology – particularly in understanding the effect of conflict on society and militaries – might be fruitful in shaping a comprehensive approach to definitions, strategy, and implementation. Speier suggests war will change society, for

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example, through demographic changes. Speier described the changes occurring in Germany and France contemporaneous to when he was writing, including over two million foreigners working in industry and agriculture in Germany (many of whom were prisoners of war), and an estimated 2.5 million refugees in unoccupied France.<sup>72</sup> Another important aspect Speier notes is war's effect on class distinctions. As Speier notes, "in the face of death, the class distinctions of prewar days lose significance and assume an air of artificiality".<sup>73</sup>

With respect to how the military might interact with other actors in joint coordination, military hierarchy implies rigidity. An early piece in military sociology examined some characteristics of military life that emerged during the Second World War. Brotz and Wilson identified several elements of what they term a "command society" that apply to the military. Power is subtle, information drifts down slowly, procedures are uniform and ordered, and the society is highly stratified. The delineation between officers and enlisted men is in stark and unusual contrast from the rest of American society, which is much more democratic.<sup>74</sup> Military society is also entirely self-contained and an atomizing experience for the individual soldier, meaning soldiers begin to live solely in the present without thought for the future. A push for a long-term, joint perspective that is not led solely by the military, may not be well received in a stabilization and reconstruction operation.

This finding is supported by research in military law. Evan has considered the implementation of due process of law in military organizations. He looks specifically at the Inspector General (IG) system of complaints in the US Army, where all members are able to appeal to the IG to deal with abuses of power and/or injustices. This would seem to directly contravene the chain of command, which "involves the ordering of virtually all the statuses of the Army in a strict hierarchy and specifies that all communication, upward and downward, shall be through channels".<sup>75</sup> The problem is that IG officers who process complaints are temporarily assigned line officers. They have an incentive to uphold the prevailing norms of going through proper channels, which could be detrimental to the effectiveness of the IG. They also probably resent the IG system and enlisted men probably fear the use of the IG system due to perceived future victimization.<sup>76</sup> Due to these factors, it seems that while there may be strong institutionalized factors that lead to due process, with clear structures, there is little internalization among those who would use and operate such a system. This differs from industrial organizations, where there are fewer institutionalized controls, but where there are more internalized norms.

Finally, it can be useful to think of military and civilian agencies in terms of organizational theory.<sup>77</sup> This approach may offer several advantages, including allowing for analysis of behaviours within and between groups. A central insight from organization theory (and organizational economics) is that organizations and individuals are limited in their rationality and will “satisfice”. Satisficing refers to a decision-making strategy that meets a minimum level of acceptability instead of finding an optimal solution. Bounded rationality is related to this concept, suggesting that actors act rationally only within certain limits imposed by time, cognitive ability, or other processes.<sup>78</sup>

Integrating this approach into comprehensive approach thinking could temper unrealistic campaign plans. Instead of wasting resources in searching for optimal solutions, planning around satisficing and bounded rationality may speed up decisions, promote consistent (though sub-optimal) results, and make the decision set more clear. Another insight from organization theory is that of seeing organizations not as being internally consistent with clear goals. Instead, goals reflect the demands of political coalitions, which change as the composition of coalition changes.<sup>79</sup> The comprehensive approach assumes a significant amount of coordination between disparate bodies with differing agendas, but does not offer means or theory behind how to organize cooperation. The comprehensive approach seeks to subordinate disparate groups under a single common vision and generally similar mission. Organizations participating in operations must give up some of their independence for mission success.

When one looks at the behavioural theory of the firm, introduced by Cyert and March<sup>80</sup>, one finds a tradition and perspective that views the firm as a coalition of groups with somewhat disparate goals. Decisions in the group result from coalitional bargaining. The comprehensive approach construct, with the development of an overarching organization for coordination (in Afghanistan’s case, NATO ISAF), in some respects looks like a firm. When thinking about how to allow groups to bargain – and what structures to establish for future operations – lessons from behavioural theory might be useful. Rather than forcing decisions through a chain of command, allowing bargaining to take place – formally or informally – might yield results that benefit the mission’s bottom line. Other thinking from this theory, such as search and organizational learning, would be relevant as well.

The planning and execution of any approach in crisis and peacetime needs to take into account the resources and constraints available.<sup>81</sup> Hitch notes:

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[i]n the private economy we have a price mechanism and a system of incentives which, very imperfectly but pervasively and persistently, promote the selection and survival of relatively efficient methods. In the government, including the military, there is no comparable system.<sup>82</sup>

The planning systems of large public organizations – like those involved in stabilization operations – has been a topic of academic study for decades. Hitch introduced his systems analysis approach<sup>83</sup> to the Pentagon during his term as Assistant Secretary of Defense; the idea became changed by organizational dynamics to the modern Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System currently in use.

These are not the only disciplines where there may be benefits from cross-fertilization. The comprehensive approach deals with real world problems, and these problems exhibit complexity that cannot be reduced to just a buzzword. It stands to reason that to start to understand that complexity – and to make the comprehensive approach a viable development solution – it would be beneficial to begin by identifying the theoretical foundations and building them into a theory of the comprehensive approach. In other words, there might be utility in uniting the literature of the comprehensive approach with other disciplines – for example, military sociology, semantic studies, and economics. By incorporating more conceptual clarity into the comprehensive approach concept, there is the possibility of applying more substance to the term, which would improve implementation, long-term strategy, and could positively influence the future security environment.

## **IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE FUTURE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

This review of the comprehensive approach has shown that the term has penetrated the development and security studies literature. The comprehensive approach and its corollary concepts (whole-of-government) are buzzwords – included in discussions surrounding stabilization and reconstruction, particularly with respect to Afghanistan. Articles are concerned with understanding how the comprehensive approach might be better implemented in operations.

There may also be potential for the comprehensive approach concept beyond operations. However, there are some foundational questions about the comprehensive approach that might be important in thinking about the literature.



Is the goal of the comprehensive approach to be prescriptive – to try to set templates for development solutions? Graduate programs in development sometimes try to offer ready-made solutions to problems. Or is the goal of using a term like this to socialize an idea of whole-of-government approaches for practitioners? If it is the latter, the approach has been relatively successful; the literature is full of references to the comprehensive approach, and there is deep concern with inclusive planning – although operationalizing continues to be a challenge. But that still leaves lots to be done in terms of understanding the scholarly underpinnings and strategic implications of the concept.

Thinking about the comprehensive approach could be improved by building in some awareness about terminology and buzzwords. The literature on buzzwords shows that they rapidly lose meaning, and can even prove harmful. Instead of accepting the comprehensive approach as a buzzword, is it possible to move it toward Durkheim’s view of a religion, i.e., a core value espoused by all practitioners and which is indisputable? By turning it into something that is core, it becomes a concept that is not tacked on as an afterthought, but which shapes the meaning of other disciplines that touch it. One could start by thinking about military sociology (the context for the comprehensive approach), economics (the foundation and execution of the comprehensive approach), and terminology (the socialization and use of the comprehensive approach). Putting together these links could make the comprehensive approach more meaningful.

Adding more intellectual rigor to the comprehensive approach, infusing it with actual theoretical content – perhaps developing a theory of the comprehensive approach – could make its implementation more effective. An improved comprehensive approach could yield a few long-term results. First, in relation to future failed state/peacebuilding security challenges, it reduces a long-term security threat by eliminating one potential cause for international terrorism/resentment toward intervening states. Second, an improved approach strengthens partner states and contributes to regional stability in areas of operation. Third, it allows for more flexibility as a state conducts long-term strategy planning. In an integrated strategy that unites approaches (similar to the comprehensive approach itself), having an effective method for state building opens a state’s options.

## CONCLUSIONS

The comprehensive approach is a term that has risen out of operational lessons learned in Afghanistan, specifically in the NATO ISAF experience in the

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task of rebuilding the country. The term has been popularized among government, military, practitioners, and academics – it is commonly used in the academic literature despite a general lack of clarity over a precise definition. The term gained traction in the early 2000s, but has suffered from a lack of methodological or theoretical grounding. As the concept has been adopted by various multinational organizations and national militaries, its importance and influence has grown.

This chapter has identified some of the origins of the comprehensive approach term in academic literature, the variation in the definitions offered by its users, some prospects for integration with other disciplines, and the possible benefits of adding theoretical rigor to the term. There are a number of future research areas that could be fruitful, including work in sociology, organization science, economics, and semantics.

On the implementation of the comprehensive approach, one could use the influence of simulation gaming on comprehensive approach structuring. Developed at the RAND Corporation and popularized by government contractors like Booz Allen Hamilton, simulation gaming places decision-makers in roles as leaders or commanders, often in teams, working with one another to achieve firm/national goals. Simulations range from explicitly military simulations (tabletop wargaming) to political games based on boardgames like *Diplomacy*. RAND researchers conducting early work on simulations noted that not only were players put through their paces in situations they may eventually find themselves in, “we found that one of the most useful aspects of the political game was its provision of an orderly framework within which a great deal of written analysis and discussion took place.”<sup>84</sup> Simulation gaming might help practitioners think through the coordination problems involved in implementing the comprehensive approach.

One additional benefit the researchers found was “the fact that the game served to suggest research priorities for problems of which we were already aware and to define these problems in a manner that would make the research more applicable to policy and action requirements.”<sup>85</sup> The comprehensive approach (in its current stage) would benefit from thinking about such research priorities. Identifying the problems to be fixed is the first step to improving the term’s effectiveness.

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# CHAPTER 3

## **A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING MULTICULTURAL, MULTITEAM SYSTEMS IN SUPPORT OF A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO OPERATIONS**

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### **INTRODUCTION**

In 2005, Hurricane Katrina, the sixth strongest Atlantic hurricane in recorded history, overwhelmed the levees protecting New Orleans, Louisiana and flooded the city. As it approached, national, state and local governments, as well as non-governmental aid agencies, mobilized to prepare and cope with the aftermath. At the national level, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) engaged the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide advice and logistical support to the state of Louisiana, and the Department of Defense's (DoD) United States Northern Command established Joint Task Force Katrina to assist with regional search and rescue operations. At the state level, the Governor of Louisiana oversaw the state's emergency plan and activated the National Guard. At the city level, the Mayor of New Orleans evacuated the city, stood up emergency shelters, and mobilized the city's first responders. Finally, aid organizations such as the American Red Cross and Oxfam arrived on the scene to assist victims. With so many organizations and resources involved, one might think a successful outcome was assured. Yet this was not the case, as demonstrated by the daily, 24-hour, live coverage of the inefficient and uncoordinated efforts at all levels of government. In fact, the national response to Hurricane Katrina is often referred to as a "failure of leadership"<sup>1</sup> as, for example, FEMA failed to respond to the requests of the state governor, the state's National Guard refused aid agencies access to victims, and the city mayor failed to follow state emergency plans that were, in turn, poorly supported by the state. Ultimately, Hurricane

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\* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Air Force Academy or the United States Department of Defense.

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Katrina, and arguably the inefficient response to it, was responsible for at least 1,833 deaths and an estimated US\$81 billion (in 2005) in property damage.

The case of Hurricane Katrina reflects the United States' intention to use a whole-of-government, or comprehensive approach<sup>2</sup>, to solve a complex national problem, but it also suggests this approach is not guaranteed to produce desired results. At the time of this chapter's printing, the United States (US) is employing a comprehensive approach to achieve national objectives on an international stage, by contributing military forces, diplomats and humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Although America's longest war (over 10 years) has had some successes and failures, it is unclear how history will ultimately judge the effectiveness of the effort. What we do know is that the knowledge, skills and abilities required for a comprehensive approach are challenging for leaders to effectively apply at the team and organizational levels; application at the national and international levels will compound the existing difficulties with issues such as peer leadership, competing objectives, language barriers and multicultural environments.

Put simply, the comprehensive approach is difficult to employ because it is not only handicapped by the usual team and organizational challenges, but also issues associated with leading a "team of teams" and the multicultural (i.e., multiple organizational cultures as well as multiple national, ethnic or religious cultures) membership of those teams. In this chapter, we will explore the multiteam system and multicultural team literature to propose a framework for understanding how leaders of multicultural, multiteam systems can operate effectively in support of a comprehensive approach to operations. Using the case of US involvement in Afghanistan, the framework will explain how multiple national-level organizations (e.g., Department of Defense, Department of State and Non-Governmental Organizations) with distinct missions (e.g., security, diplomacy, humanitarian aid) and cultures should operate cooperatively to achieve a common and valued goal (i.e., to secure and stabilize an independent Afghanistan).

## TEAMS

The nature of work in modern organizations is fast-paced, dynamic, complex and ambiguous. Consequently, the tasks required to achieve organizational objectives or goals are often so physically, cognitively and psychologically demanding, that it is not possible for an individual worker to achieve them alone. For this reason, organizations have turned to teams to achieve their goals.<sup>3</sup> A team is a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact dynamically, interdependently and adaptively toward a common and valued

goal, with each member having a specific role or function to perform within the team.<sup>4</sup> However, team-based work is no panacea; Steiner<sup>5</sup> warned of the potential for process loss, or faulty team processes that can lead a team to perform worse than the sum of its individual members working alone. In an attempt to understand the nature of team performance and increase team effectiveness, team researchers have generated multiple theories and models of team development, processes, and performance.<sup>6</sup> For a newly-formed team to evolve into an adaptive one capable of completing its challenging mission in a dynamic environment, it must develop and master a large number of complex skills, abilities, processes and outcomes such as norms, commitment, cohesion, trust, communication, coordination, helping behaviours, shared mental models, self-management, shared leadership, adaptability and boundary spanning.<sup>7</sup> Despite this growing body of theory and knowledge, team work is difficult, and success is not guaranteed.<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, the nature of warfare has often been characterized as fast-paced, dynamic and complex (e.g., *blitzkrieg* and combined arms), as well as ambiguous (i.e., the fog of war). Teams, as well as larger units of organization, have long been essential to a military's ability to achieve challenging objectives. However, the military operational environment is also changing. Nations and their militaries now find themselves responding to contingencies derived from increasing globalization, failing states and emerging non-state actors<sup>9</sup>, even as they contend with global economic uncertainty, declining defence budgets and the associated reduction in viable military options.<sup>10</sup> Many nations have responded by seeking to leverage their existing capabilities through a comprehensive approach to operations. This approach suggests, for example, that resource-constrained diplomatic, military, economic and humanitarian efforts should be coordinated to maximize the combined potential for a nation's instruments of power to achieve its strategic objectives. In essence, the comprehensive approach attempts to deal with very complex national and international problems by mobilizing a "team of teams" to solve them. After all, if teams are how organizations cope with complex problems ill-suited for individual workers, then could teams of teams (i.e., teams of organizations, departments, ministries, or coalition partners) be a way governments might cope with complex international problems? If so, what problems might this strategy pose, and how should those problems be addressed?

## MULTITEAM SYSTEMS

Mathieu, Marks, and Zaccaro<sup>11</sup> first introduced the concept of a multiteam system (MTS), and defined it as "two or more teams that interface directly

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and interdependently in response to environmental contingencies toward the accomplishment of collective goals.” Each component team within the MTS pursues its own proximal goal(s), but also shares at least one common distal goal with at least one other component team in the MTS. This common distal goal creates an input, process, and outcome interdependency among the component teams, such that the common distal goal is more likely to be achieved if the component teams work interdependently within the MTS. If we apply this concept to the current US presence in Afghanistan, we can distinguish an MTS called “United States Forces-Afghanistan” (USFOR-A). Broadly speaking, the USFOR-A MTS consists of a DoD component team (i.e., military forces), a State Department component team (i.e., diplomats), and a loosely-coupled non-governmental aid component team (i.e., humanitarian aid workers). Each component team has its own proximal goal(s), which it is uniquely qualified to accomplish. For example, the DoD component team’s proximal goal could be “secure the country using military forces employing combat power”, the State component team’s proximal goal could be “create a stable government via diplomats engaging in diplomacy and negotiations”, and the non-governmental aid component team’s proximal goal might be “sustain a healthy population by distributing aid to the neediest populations.” Yet, all component teams are present in Afghanistan in order to achieve a common, distal goal of “securing and stabilizing an independent Afghanistan.” It is this common distal goal that effectively binds the component teams into an MTS.

In comparing the definition of an MTS to that of a traditional team, it is apparent that the relationship between a component team and its MTS is an order of magnitude higher than the relationship between a traditional team member and the member’s team leader (see Table 3.1). Specifically, in a traditional team, individual team members work interdependently with their fellow team members to accomplish their assigned tasks in order to achieve their team goal. Similarly, in an MTS, component teams work interdependently with their fellow component teams to achieve their common distal goal. However, we must remember that an MTS component team is essentially a traditional team with its own proximal goal. This creates a situation in which an MTS, and therefore each of its component teams, “wins” if the MTS accomplishes its common distal goal; however, if the common distal goal is not accomplished, the MTS “loses”, but a given component team might still “win” if it is able to accomplish its proximal goal. Returning to our USFOR-A MTS example, if USFOR-A achieves a secure and stable independent Afghanistan (i.e., the common distal goal), then the MTS returns home victorious, as does each of each of its component teams, because the victory

likely resulted from each component team achieving its proximal goal (i.e., DoD secured the country, State negotiated agreements, and Aid created a healthy population). If, however, USFOR-A returns home after diplomats fail to negotiate a status of forces agreement, Taliban fighters begin a march on Kabul, and diplomats and aid workers flee the country, then USFOR-A and its component teams have failed to achieve its common distal goal, but it is still possible for the Defense component to claim a win, because the country was secure prior to the withdrawal. For this reason, there is always the potential for a component team to turn inward and focus on a proximal win rather than strive for the MTS' more difficult distal win. In such cases, MTS leaders play an important role in maintaining the interdependent engagement of the component teams.

	<b>Traditional Team</b>	<b>Multiteam System</b>
<b>Structure Purpose</b>	Accomplish Team Goal	Accomplish MTS Goal
<b>Base Component</b>	Team Member	Component Team
<b>Component's Self-Serving Purpose</b>	Accomplish Task	Accomplish Proximal Goal
<b>Component's Self-Serving Behaviour</b>	Focus on Member's Needs	Focus on Component Team Needs

**Table 3.1. A Comparison of Traditional Teams and Multiteam Systems**

Since MTSs are composed of teams, MTS leaders operate in a more complex task environment requiring a nuanced application of traditional team and leader skills in order to lead effectively at both the within-team (i.e., component team) and between-team (i.e., MTS) levels. At the within-team level, MTS leaders must function as traditional team leaders when leading their component teams to achieve their proximal goals. Thus, leadership functions are focused on planning and directing actions to achieve proximal goals, maintaining team task and social cohesion in the face of adversity, and scanning the environment to identify opportunities and obstacles to proximal goal achievement.<sup>12</sup> Simultaneously, MTS leaders must function at the between-team level to oversee the MTS's pursuit of its common distal goal. In this case, the traditional team leadership functions are adapted to manage the team-to-team interactions of the component teams. DeChurch

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and Marks<sup>13</sup> suggested MTS leader functions could include acquiring information about component team interdependencies, developing plans to synchronize component team actions, monitoring component team needs and requirements as related to inter-team coordination, and communicating information to component teams to facilitate inter-team coordination. Although the MTS literature is still in its infancy, there is evidence for the emerging MTS construct. Specifically, in a series of MTS studies, Marks, DeChurch, Mathieu, Panzer, and Alonso<sup>14</sup> found between-team processes predicted MTS performance even after accounting for the effects of within-team processes. DeChurch and Marks<sup>15</sup> found that MTS leadership training generally resulted in better MTS coordination and leadership performance, and that MTS leader behaviour and inter-team coordination positively predicted MTS performance.

In sum, team leadership is difficult, and evidence suggests MTS leadership is more challenging than team leadership. DeChurch and Mathieu<sup>16</sup> have described some of these contextual challenges. For example, as a team grows in size, so do the difficulties associated with member coordination. Now, consider that the team must coordinate its activities with multiple other teams. An MTS' component teams are also likely to be geographically-separated from one and other, which introduces many of the communication problems associated with virtual teams,<sup>17</sup> and their coordinative technologies and processes may be incompatible. Finally, the component teams comprising an MTS are likely to be heterogeneous, differing in terms of functional mindsets, organizational cultures, national cultures, languages, and views about the nature of teams, leadership, and even the task at hand. In the following section, we will turn our attention to one of these issues: cultural heterogeneity.

## MULTICULTURAL TEAMS

Multicultural teams (MCT), like MTs, have emerged out of the necessity and desire to meet the challenges of globalization, ambiguity, and a dynamic world environment. MCTs are defined as “a collection of individuals, small in number, who have representation from more than one national background among them, who are independent and mutually accountable for accomplishing a set of objectives, and who recognize themselves as a team.”<sup>18</sup> This definition of MCTs emphasizes a diversity of national backgrounds within teams; our focus will be on the diversity of component teams within an MTS. For example, USFOR-A is comprised of the branches of the US military operating in Afghanistan. While there are unique cultural distinctions across USFOR-A's component teams (e.g., the DoD component team is a hierarchical

“command and control” organization, while the non-governmental aid component team is a flatter, democratic organization), all components are composed of members who speak a common language and share a national “American” culture.

Now consider USFOR-A as a part of an even larger MTS, called the International Security Assistance Force. This MTS is composed of component teams derived from a coalition of 50 nations committed to a secure and stable Afghanistan. Now we see, for example, that the interaction between the American and Afghan components will be affected by an assortment of cultural factors, not the least of which is language and related communication issues. Thus, “multicultural MTSs” (or more simply, MCMTS) have to overcome the common challenges faced by teams, as well as those that are derived from cultural differences between component teams. We suggest that the fundamental processes of sensemaking and the development of shared mental models can serve to address cultural identity issues across organizational levels and tightly couple component teams around their distal goal(s).

Hofstede<sup>19</sup> and House et al.<sup>20</sup> employ an assortment of dimensions to describe the cultural differences experienced by MCMTSs, including power distance, individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. Power distance has particular salience in MCMTSs, as it addresses how cultures regard and manage inequalities in power and authority, with high power distance cultures valuing and supporting hierarchy and a distinct chain of command and lower power distance cultures preferring a flatter structure and democratic processes. Examining the concept of power distance variability within a MCMTS such as ISAF reveals a very wide variation across member countries. Specifically, Denmark is seen as a very low power distance culture (scoring an 18, which indicates an egalitarian approach) while Malaysia is evaluated as a high power distance culture (scoring a 104, which reflects a preference for an autocratic approach). Further, ISAF is led by NATO. An examination of power distance among its members reveals less variability, ranging from 18 (Denmark) to 73 (Croatia); the US has been rated at 40.

Also noteworthy is the variation between the US and Muslim member countries. The US is rated significantly lower than Muslim countries in power distance (40 and 80 respectively), yet on another cultural dimension, individualism compared to collectivism, the US is rated considerably higher than Muslim countries (91 compared to 38). This variation, left unaddressed, would predict tension regarding relationships, negotiation, and constituencies represented in their decision-making. For example, in American culture,

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it is typical to have a mid-level officer represent higher ranking officials and speak on their behalf. This would run counter to what would ordinarily occur in Muslim countries based on these cultural dimensions. Thus, there are known differences in cultural orientation that can influence the effectiveness of MCMTs.

These cultural differences present unique and identifiable challenges for MCMTs above and beyond those faced by same-culture teams. Behfar, Kern, and Brett<sup>21</sup> identified five specific challenges related to both the core cultural issues members bring to the group as well as the team process issues affected by culture. The first difference relates to violations of respect and hierarchy. As just described, this difference reflects cultural views on power distance and the degree of reverence given to the chain-of-command. The second unique difference reflects differences between group prejudices arising from longstanding or more recent grievances, stigmas, and judgments that affect working relationships. Given that there are 50 countries (at present count) from various parts of the world (many of which have been at war with one another at some point) and who have different governments, economies, and languages, there is certainly a vulnerability for interfering prejudices to be evident between component teams.

A third and related challenge is a lack of common ground. This challenge is influenced by favouritism, a lack of fairness in credit and recognition, and the assumptions and barriers resulting from language differences. Thus, those members of component teams who don't express themselves well run the risk of being marginalized. Again, with 50 countries involved in ISAF and with the US, the United Kingdom (UK), and Canada contributing most of the coalition resources (72.4% at present), the conditions for tension and differences are certainly present. The fourth challenge is also influenced by language; it involves verbal fluency and attributions based on speaking style. Specifically, Behfar and colleagues<sup>22</sup> argue that misunderstandings stemming from heavy accents, word choice and interpretations of particular meanings contribute to judgments that affect inclusiveness or exclusiveness. The final and related factor specifically addresses interpretations of communication regarding agreement and support. Specific features of language and cultural nuances can readily create confusion or mixed interpretations about basic agreement, endorsement for a position, or indecisiveness.

The unwanted effect of these cultural challenges can be a shifting of attention from the common purpose of the distal goal to the cultural differences, cultural identities, and proximal goals that highlight distinctions between component teams. Fortunately, there are several methods to capitalize on the



strength of MCTs and address these common and unique challenges. At the most general level is sensemaking to promote the creation of shared mental models and common understandings in support of an overarching (distal) goal. There are also specific behavioural recommendations regarding the use perspective-taking and negotiation to support MCT effectiveness. These approaches have much in common in promoting the effectiveness of MCMTSs.

Advocates of the sensemaking approach generally agree that the key to MCT effectiveness is in creating a shared workgroup reality to facilitate coordination and cooperation, promote communication, and reduce misunderstandings to develop within- and across-team trust and respect.<sup>23</sup> Shokef and Erez<sup>24</sup> propose that this approach can result in:

...a more macro level meaning system of a global work culture, which is the shared understanding of the visible roles, regulations, and behaviours, and the deeper values and ethics of the global work culture, that is formed outside of the level of national cultures, binds members of multicultural teams.

Sensemaking aids in the understanding and navigation of cultural distance between component teams. Cultural distance is essentially cultural variation that creates a need for knowledge (to establish shared mental models) and contributes to barriers to knowledge flow and coordination between the component team and the larger organization.<sup>25</sup> Low cultural distance reflects more compatible knowledge structures whereas high culture difference reflects less commonality and stronger identity salience with the member's "home" position. Returning to our ISAF MCMTS example, the US, UK and Canada have low cultural distance (scoring 40, 35, and 39, respectively) and years of experience collaborating as allies. In contrast, the working relationships within Muslim countries like Afghanistan would suggest high cultural distance given their score of 80 on power distance.

Consequently, deliberate sensemaking is paramount as culture distance increases to generate clarity about roles, responsibilities, and purpose (the common distal goal). As the shared perspectives and understandings of the component teams increasingly overlap, there will be a corresponding increase in task cohesiveness and a stronger identity with the MCMTS and the common distal goal(s). This overlap supports the development of a hybrid culture – an emergent and simplified set of work rules, actions, capabilities and expectations that are shared and enacted after mutual interaction among team members.<sup>26</sup> This "new" culture provides a system for team members to understand one another and the overarching mission.

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It is important to highlight the emphasis on creating similarity in the realm of tasks and goals but not forcing uniformity around socio-cultural issues. That is, MCTs can be most effective when they strive for greater alignment around mission essentials while preserving some cultural distinctiveness.<sup>27</sup> Bachmann<sup>28</sup> uses terminology about a loosely-tightly coupled system to describe this balance. On the one hand, the task domain should be planned and structured with component teams aligned on the decisions and steps to implement the plan. On the other hand, the cultural domain should be loosely coupled, allowing for flexibility and retention of diversity. Shokef and Erez<sup>29</sup> endorse this balanced approach and argue it supports a “glocal” identity – the ability of component teams to identify with the *global* and distal goals while supporting a *local* identity preserving traditions and customs. In Afghanistan, this is evident at the artifact level of culture where the militaries of each country support the ISAF mission while wearing their distinct uniforms, following each country’s rank, and flying flags that indicate their combined efforts and individual contributions.

To facilitate sensemaking within MCMTs, Burke et al.<sup>30</sup> suggest two essential team skills: perspective-taking and negotiation. Perspective-taking has intuitive application to multicultural settings, so it is pertinent to be able to appreciate and effectively engage the viewpoints of others on the team. Clearly, this is useful in recognizing how others will interpret and respond to experiences differently. As team leaders and members expand their perspectives, they are able to also expand their mental representations, which increases the sharing of mental models. This ability helps to understand, address, and resolve the unique multicultural issues previously described, to include how and why some members and cultural groups would react negatively to power differentials and chain of command issues. Knowing that the western tendency for assertiveness and equal voice could be construed as brash and insubordinate by other allies can be used to prevent offensive behaviours and component team alienation.

Importantly, perspective taking sets the stage for negotiation, the second important skill which serves multiple functions. When there is greater cultural distance, it can be necessary to negotiate, even beyond sharing a perspective, the different attitudes, behaviours, and thought patterns expressed in MCMTs. Indeed, such negotiation can lead to common ground through compromise and agreement about how teams will work together. Further, negotiation can serve as a third-party intervention to help save face and work through some of the prejudice and language issues that can divert focus from common MTS distal goals to component team proximal goals that are more aligned with a cultural identity.

MCMTSs within the comprehensive approach offer strengths and challenges as individuals and agencies draw upon specialized expertise while trying to harness, align, and sequence the talents of teams with diverse compositions around a common distal goal. Effective MCMTSs are able to break through siloed organizations, merge distinct cultures, and bridge organizations around a common objective. An organizing paradigm based on sensemaking that highlights a shared purpose while preserving key elements of cultural identity supports a truly comprehensive approach and integrates domestic government entities with foreign allies and crucial international organizations. Now that we have described the challenges of teams and the greater challenges of MTSs, distinguished between component teams' proximal goals and their shared MTS distal goal, and specifically discussed the challenge of cultural heterogeneity in MTSs, we can propose a framework for understanding how MCMTSs can operate in a complex and modern operational environments.

## THE FRAMEWORK


A comprehensive approach to operations will challenge governments with the complexities inherent in multicultural, multiteam systems. Further, modern military operations are far different than warfare of the past; we have not only changed the way we prosecute war, but also how we enter and leave a conflict. For these reasons, we propose a framework for understanding how MCMTSs can succeed in contexts requiring a comprehensive approach to operations (see Figure 3.1). To introduce and explain this framework, we will continue to refer to our MCMTS example of ISAF in Afghanistan and use notional data to populate Figure 3.1.

Consider the mission of ISAF in Afghanistan:

In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population.<sup>31</sup>

Clearly, the ISAF mission goes beyond defeating the insurgency, to securing, developing, stabilizing, and securing the country and government. This expanded view of warfare has been conceptualized as the Secure, Stabilize,

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Framework.<sup>32</sup> In turn, we view the components of this framework as the major milestones on the path toward achieving the common distal goal of the ISAF MCMTS. This constitutes the “Distal Goal Phases” dimension depicted on the x-axis of Figure 3.1. It is important to note that while these components appear to be discrete steps, they are best viewed as overlapping phases, such that as one phase is winding down, a subsequent phase is ramping up. Also, the framework does not indicate the amount of time spent in each phase; some phases will take longer than others to accomplish for any number of reasons (e.g., political sensitivity, insurgent action, insufficient resources, lack of popular support). Finally, the successful completion of one phase does not mean that it could not be revisited as a cunning insurgency successfully counters ISAF efforts.



**Figure 3.1. A Notional MCMTS Framework**

The y-axis of Figure 3.1 represents the “Resource Investment” dimension, or the expected resource investment required by the MTS in order to achieve its distal goal of securing, stabilizing and transitioning a reconstructed Afghanistan to GIRoA. In other words, how much money, manpower, equipment, supplies, and advice must be expended in order to accomplish the distal goal? The three lines at the intersection of these two dimensions represent the resource contribution of each of the component teams to the MTS over phases of the distal goal. As indicated by the rise and fall of the investment lines, these are not fixed investments. In general, a component team’s investment is dictated by the phase of the SSTR Framework and the relative importance of that component team’s proximal goal to that phase of the distal goal. For example, when ISAF first arrived in Afghanistan, security and stability were

important to the work of all component teams (i.e., soldiers, diplomats, and aid workers). For this reason, the defence component team contributed the majority of resources to achieving the distal goal as it pursued its unique mission of using combat power to achieve its proximal goal of securing the country.

As ISAF succeeds and draws down in Afghanistan (i.e., the Transition and Reconstruction phases), we would expect the defence component to contribute fewer resources to secure a country that is more secure than it was upon ISAF's arrival. In fact, the defence team's resource contribution may take the form of military trainers and advisors to develop the Afghan National Security Forces, rather than soldiers engaged in security and kinetic operations. Meanwhile, the diplomatic and non-governmental aid component teams may be investing greater resources to the distal goal of transition and reconstruction, as they negotiate agreements and strengthen communities and support GIROA.

This framework further highlights the challenges of a comprehensive approach to MCMTS operations. Aside from the difficulties inherent to a multicultural component team (e.g., NATO forces), the phase transitions indicate the need for effective communication and coordination of the component teams as they pursue their respective proximal goals and collectively pursue the distal MTS goal. In essence, MTS leaders must simultaneously oversee their multicultural component teams while coordinating with other multicultural component teams. This will require them to apply their within-team and between-team leadership and team skills, but with a sensitivity toward the cultural dimensions present in a multicultural team. For example, as the defence component team coordinates the transition from a stabilization phase to a transition phase with the diplomatic and aid component teams, the defence component team leader may have to contend with a subordinate military commander who resists the idea of allowing a Pakistani tribal aid agency into a recently secured area, even as a diplomatic or aid component team leader asserts that school reconstruction and humanitarian aid are key to the success of the transition phase. The key to resolving apparent conflicts in component team proximal goals in order to make meaningful progress toward a common distal goal is for the MTS leaders to uncover the roots of the conflict through sensemaking, and then resolve the conflict through perspective taking and negotiation. Failure to do so may lead component team leaders to focus on their own proximal goals at the expense of the MTS goal.

We believe this framework can benefit MTS leaders in several ways. First, it emphasizes to all MTS members, regardless of component team or cultural

identity, that they all share a common distal goal. Instead of creating a competitive environment where each component team member is focused on their proximal goal (often at the expense of the distal goal), this framework allows the MTS to leverage the differences and diversity of its members to accomplish the more challenging distal goal. Second, it leverages the strength of the component teams at the right time, while still allowing each component the opportunity to meaningfully contribute to the distal goal over time. Third, it provides a shared mental model of how all members of an MTS, regardless of component team membership, should coordinate their activities both within their component teams and with other components.

Put simply, the framework suggests that a good MTS leader must know when and how to yield power and influence to another MTS leader for the benefit of their common distal goal. It effectively solves a leadership challenge by encouraging the component team with the more salient proximal goal and greatest associated resource investment to take the lead, while still coordinating with other component teams with more peripheral proximal goals and a lower level of resource investment in the immediate phase. Finally, it encourages component team leaders to propose and negotiate their proximal goals, resource investments, and power and influence transitions over phases or milestones of the distal goal. Such early planning is important in determining how the distal goal will be met as well as minimizing the potential for turbulent transitions.

## CONCLUSION

Given the increasing rate of technological growth, forces of globalization, competition for resources, and rise of non-state actors and failed states, modern operational environments are likely to become more dynamic, complex, and challenging to governments. In recent years, the preferred solution has been to employ a comprehensive approach to operations, often involving an international coalition and multinational action. Predictably, these solutions impose great demands on our government and military leaders as the need to master MTS and cross-cultural skills is added to team and organizational skills. Through our framework for understanding MCMTSs, we hope to provide some clarity regarding how leaders can leverage the science of MTSs and MCTs to effectively lead their component teams to achieve national objectives in an international environment.

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# CHAPTER 4

## FACTORS THAT CONSTRAIN THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

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### INTRODUCTION

There is a widely held understanding in the peace and security policy community that the lack of coherence among the diverse international and local agents that populate a typical post-conflict system has resulted in, amongst others, interagency rivalry, working at cross-purposes, competition for funding, duplication of effort and less than optimal economies of scale.<sup>1</sup> This lack of coherence, and its effects, is understood to contribute to an overall poor success rate, measured in the lack of sustainability of the systems that came about as a result of these international interventions.<sup>2</sup>

In order to address these shortcomings and in an attempt to improve the overall success rate of these international interventions, various agencies, governments, and organizations have started experimenting, independently from each other, with a range of models and mechanisms aimed at improving the overall coherence, cooperation and coordination of their interventions. All these initiatives have similar objectives, namely to achieve greater harmonization and synchronization among the activities of the different international and local agents. The overall goal is to bridge the security-development divide and to integrate the political, security, developmental, economic and other dimensions assumed to ensure a system-wide response to any specific conflict system.<sup>3</sup> Although there have been a number of different initiatives and competing concepts, the most general term that has emerged to refer to these efforts is the “comprehensive approach”.

The comprehensive approach aims to address the coherence dilemma, i.e., the gap between the value and role ascribed to coherence at the policy level and the limits of coherence experienced at the operational level by practitioners. At the policy level, coherence is viewed as a critically important approach

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\* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

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that works to improve effectiveness and sustainability. At the operational level, the feedback from the practitioners is that despite their best efforts over many years, and despite having tried various approaches, models and tools to enhance coherence, it remains an elusive and unattainable goal. This chapter attempts to improve our understanding of why practitioners find coherence so challenging to achieve by exploring some of the factors that seem to limit, inhibit or constrain the ability of practitioners to achieve coherence.

There are two ways of responding to this gap between policy and practice. The first approach would be to argue that the gap is caused by poor or insufficient policy implementation.<sup>4</sup> If that is the case, we should be able to improve the coherence deficit by increasing or improving our efforts to implement existing policy. This can be addressed by investing in more and better coordination, by focussing on more and better training, and by improving the organizations, systems and processes that we use to manage and support coherence.<sup>5</sup> It is probably fair to say that this has been the most common and prevalent policy response to date, and that most of the policy developments and operational experiments discussed in this chapter are examples of the kinds of efforts that have been attempted over the last decades to try to further improve our ability to achieve coherence. However, despite rigorous and sustained efforts over this period, the persistent feedback from the field is that achieving coherence remains as elusive as ever.

An alternative approach could be to argue that the gap is caused by inherent contradictions in the mandates, interests and value systems of the organizations that undertake international interventions. For instance, Paris and Sisk<sup>6</sup> argue that peacebuilding should be understood as inherently contradictory, with competing imperatives facing the internal and external actors, both between and among them, and that these tensions constitute “vexing policy dilemmas”. These dilemmas require trade-offs between multiple mandates, needs and priorities without any obvious solutions. As a result, the agencies that are responsible for programs and campaigns may often have to settle for “second best” or “partially coherent” solutions in order to establish a workable foundation for cooperation.<sup>7</sup> Paris and Sisk<sup>8</sup> argue that as a result of these inherent contradictions and the policy dilemmas they create, peacebuilding agents may have to settle for a kind of good-enough or “compromised peacebuilding” result.

Both these two approaches may have some value and may, in different contexts, complement each other. In some contexts it may be possible to enhance the level of coherence by working harder to find common ground. However, there may be other contexts where achieving more coherence is

simply not possible. To understand these nuances better, and in order to recognize the contexts within which we may have to accept that more effort will not yield more coherence, we need to take a closer look at some of the factors that limit, inhibit or constrain the scope for coherence. In this chapter we explore three such factors: impact/output tensions; conflicting values, principles and mandates; and the degree to which a specific context is conducive, or not, to coherence.<sup>9</sup>

## **LONG-TERM IMPACT VERSUS SHORT-TERM OUTPUT CONSIDERATIONS**

Peacebuilding agents have to manage competing demands and try to balance multiple considerations. When the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India evaluates its engagement in the peacebuilding process of, for example, South Sudan, it is likely to make that assessment at two levels. On the one hand the Ministry will consider the long-term impact India's engagement had, or is having, on the peace process, i.e., whether, from an overall and long-term perspective, their contribution had, or is having, the intended effect. In reality, such assessments are rarely made, except perhaps by historians. It is extremely difficult to make such assessments with any clarity, except long after the fact. However, the idea that such a level of assessment can be made is important, because it is the macro-theories of change that inform the specific policies of a peacebuilding agent in a given country. It is only by evaluating how these assumptions have played out in specific contexts that peacebuilding agents will adjust their theories of change.

As stated, in reality such evaluations are rarely attempted, especially whilst such missions are still ongoing. However, in some cases, especially when a specific mission or initiative seems stalled, seems to be taking longer than anticipated, or is facing some crisis of trust, peacebuilding agents have attempted to undertake assessments that question whether the right strategy is in place, and whether the existing strategy is having the desired effect or not. However, in most cases long-term impact is simply assumed and continuously re-framed as an aspirational goal.

On the other hand, a peacebuilding agent like the Foreign Ministry of India is likely to actively monitor and evaluate the actual programs and initiatives India is supporting and undertaking in Southern Sudan. These actual programs are typically assessed on an annual basis when continued funding has to be approved. In other words, success is measured in the context of whether a specific budget has been spent and on whether specific programs are being

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implemented as planned, for example, in terms of how many people have been trained.

The policy level approach to coherence in the comprehensive approach assumes that organizations are motivated by the long-term impact perspective, but the empirical evidence suggests that their short-term output considerations are much more important in influencing decisions that impact on coherence. This difference should not really matter if we assume that the short-term outputs cumulatively build up to generate the long-term impact. This aggregated effect is assumed in most theories of change, i.e., that the aggregated effect of all the peacebuilding programs and activities collectively and cumulatively contribute to building momentum towards the larger and longer-term peacebuilding objectives.

However, the *Utstein* report<sup>10</sup> found that there is a significant gap between most of the peacebuilding programs and activities, and the larger strategies they are meant to pursue. In other words, in practice many of those that are implementing the programs and activities are not aware of, or directed by, longer-term strategies. Instead, their day-to-day decisions are informed by, or overshadowed by, more immediate concerns, namely how best to achieve the goals and results on which they will be evaluated in the short-term, i.e., on a weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual basis.

The following quote by Peter van Buren is a good example of the kind of negative consequences that can be generated by this short-term decision-making culture. Van Buren was a United States Foreign Service Officer who served in Baghdad during the American occupation of Iraq.

We were never able to do things on a large enough scale to make a difference, because the thinking was never long term. Everyone in Iraq was there on a series of one-year tours, myself included. Everyone was told that they needed to create accomplishments, that we had to document our success, that we had to produce a steady stream of photos of accomplishments, and pictures of smiling Iraqis, and metrics of charts. It was impossible under these circumstances for us to do anything long term... We rarely thought past next week's situation report.<sup>11</sup>

As this quote reminds us, from the perspective of a peacekeeping officer or a peacebuilding program manager in the field, a week or a month can feel like a long time. An annual plan or evaluation, or budgeting for the next year, can, in the context of the pressures of a results-based management approach and

the urgent pace of this kind of field operations, feel like long-term planning. However, if we consider that many peacekeeping missions are deployed for five to ten years, and that most peace processes require decades of sustained engagement before they can be considered to have become sustainable, we can gain a more realistic time perspective. In the context of this chapter, short-term refers to the immediate program window, perhaps not longer than 12 months, medium-term refers to the current phase of engagement, perhaps not longer than 24 to 36 months, and long-term refers to the time it is estimated to take for a peace process to be consolidated and eventually to be self-sustainable, i.e., from one to several decades.

The short-term decisions of those responsible for managing specific programs are informed by trying to demonstrate immediate gains that can be used to report that their programs are producing results within a given reporting period, typically quarterly and annually. They are concerned with spending an annual budget within the allocated time and according to plan. From this perspective, it is often more important to spend all the money that has been allocated than ensuring that it has been spent sustainably. The short-term incentives encourage spending the money to demonstrate output. Those responsible know that they will be evaluated against whether the budget has been spent and the outputs achieved. The question as to whether it has been spent meaningfully can only really be answered in the long-term. Program managers are thus understandably more concerned about those aspects they know that they will be assessed against in the short-term. The longer-term aggregated effect is perhaps assumed to be factored in at the overall program and campaign designing and planning level, and thus not the concern of the manager implementing the program in the field. All they have to demonstrate is that they are following the plan, applying the guidance and policy direction, and achieving the immediate goals set for them. The longer-term impact is the responsibility and concern of those who make the policies and longer-term plans.

The basic tenets of the results based management approach are well meaning and have laudable objectives from a public auditing perspective. However, these well meaning intentions have negative consequences when they result in a management culture that rewards short-term and self-reflective gains that amount to increasing the influence, recognition and market-share of their respective agencies. In other words, when not directed strategically, bureaucracies tend to revert to the fail-safe fall back position of self-preservation – making yourself and your organization look good – as evaluated in the short-term, i.e., within a given reporting period.

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In a peacebuilding context, where the objectives are peace consolidation and sustainable peace, as measured in terms of the given society emerging out of conflict over many years (and not in terms of the success of the external agency), the results of this kind of short-term results based management approach can often be perverse. In order to spend the annual budget according to plan the agency is under pressure to forge ahead even if the conditions are not conducive for that kind of programming. For instance, those responsible may realize that ideally they should have taken more time to consult their local counterparts or to coordinate with other external actors to avoid overlap, but the pressure to spend the budget in the given timeframe may be such that the money has to be spent now, with the hope that downstream coordination can correct and refine impact. The result may be a well-executed program that meets all the output deliverables but that is in reality poorly aligned with the needs of the people it was intended to benefit. Some may even have a perverse effect on the very people it is meant to assist. For instance, the net effect may be that the rate of delivery overwhelms the ability of the local community to absorb the assistance, and this may have negative unintended consequences, such as fuelling corruption.

The overall effect may actually undermine the ability of the society to develop the self-resilience necessary to manage its own peace consolidation process. The pressure on short-term gains tends to generate dependency on substitution measures, rather than investing in long-term local capacity.<sup>12</sup> For instance, in order to achieve the results sought by the external agencies, a large proportion of the educated and experienced local work force typically end up working for the external agencies, rather than in local institutions. Similarly, in order for the external agencies to show results, the bulk of the foreign assistance is likely to flow through these agencies, as opposed to through local institutions. The end-result is a system that enables the external agency to show that it has carried out a range of activities in Country X, i.e., that show how successful the external agency has been and how much good it has done. In fact, the intended impact was to generate local capacity, so that the society transitioning out of conflict is able to generate and maintain its own self-sustainable peace consolidation process.

As an example, a study of Norway's engagement in Afghanistan found that in the absence of a clear strategy, Norway's diplomats, policy advisors and military personnel fell back into a "make Norway look good" mode.<sup>13</sup> Instead of concentrating their efforts on one or two areas where their relatively small contribution could have made an impact, they chose to spread themselves across the widest possible range of activities. This had the desired effect of creating visibility for Norway across the largest possible range of initiatives,

but lessened the impact their actions could have had on the peace process in Afghanistan. Short-term, output-driven programs and activities that are not directed by a long-term strategic vision can thus actually undermine the long-term intent. The long-term goal of making a contribution to the sustainable peace was the stated goal of the Norwegian intervention, but the short-term objectives of making sure Norway was seen to be effective and efficient in making such a contribution became the driving force that determined which activities were engaged in and on what money would be spent. The activities and their immediate outcomes are valued in the short-term and result in measurable outputs and outcomes that can be used to explain and motivate the expenditure to the auditor general. The long-term benefit is assumed, but in reality it is not considered because the effect is so long-term that it will not have an impact on the decision-making process that directs the funding during the short-term intervention cycle.

In the context, or timeframe, within which decisions are being taken on specific programmatic interventions, one can thus conclude that the incentives to generate short-term and self-reflective outputs and outcomes are strong and persuasive, whilst the incentives to act in the long-term sustainable interest of the affected society are weak and unsupported. If this is the effect this long-term impact versus short-term output tension has on the actions of one agent, and in the context of one program, imagine the aggregated effect this tension is having on all the peacebuilding agents and all the programs they undertake. Is it surprising then that, despite sustained engagement over decades and billions of dollars of foreign assistance, these societies remain fragile and risk lapsing into violent conflict?

This tension is further aggravated by the problem that the overall effect of the combined activities of all the peacebuilding agents are observable only from a system-wide impact perspective and that its sustainability can only be measured over the long term, and in hindsight. The interdependence among the actors, and the benefits of improving coherence among them, are thus not immediately obvious to the agent at the program or output level. Those measuring progress at the systems or impact level and those measuring progress at the program or output level are disconnected. They operate at different levels and in different time frames. By the time the longer-term impact evaluations are undertaken, those who have had to take the day-to-day and year-to-year decision about what to fund and how to best undertake their respective programs have long since moved on to other positions and concerns.

Pursuing coherence thus makes sense in hind-sight, from the long-term impact level perspective, but it does not drive the day-to-day decisions of

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most of the peacebuilding agents. This tension between long-term impact versus short-term output is thus an integral part of the internal dynamics of the agencies that undertake peacebuilding. It is one of those factors that are inherent in how our systems function, and it will thus always limit coherence and constrain the comprehensive approach. This finding also means that agency coherence is much more of a significant challenge than generally acknowledged. While most studies dealing with coordination focus on the relations between organizations, the coherence dilemma caused by the inherent tension between long-term impact and short-term output resides principally within each agency. There is a lack of coherence between those parts of the agency that control the activities of the agency based on short- to medium-term feedback processes and those parts of the agency that set long-term goals.<sup>14</sup>

### **CONFLICTING VALUES, PRINCIPLES, AND MANDATES**

The values, principles and mandates of some of the agents in a peacebuilding system are inherently incoherent.<sup>15</sup> Each peacebuilding agent comes from, or has their roots in, a specific discipline and paradigm, be it humanitarian, military, human rights, development, law enforcement, private sector, diplomacy, etc. They have been educated and have developed their career experiences steeped in the values, principles, world views and theories of change specific to that discipline or profession.<sup>16</sup> These different educational and professional paradigms are further reinforced by different institutional and bureaucratic traditions and approaches.

In the UN context, for instance, the political and security dimensions are associated with the Security Council and the Secretariat, whilst the humanitarian and development dimensions are associated with the UN's agencies, programs and funds. In the national context, there are typically considerable cultural and professional differences between those working in the military, police, diplomatic and development sectors, and these differences are even more enhanced when we add the private sector and non-government organizations to the mix.

These multiple parallel paradigms result in different institutions and agents, with different values, principles, and mandates, working side-by-side, but each with their own rationale and theories of change. The result is that the various agents have different approaches with regard to how best a given peace process should be supported, and these differences typically manifest



in different ideas about which aspects to prioritize, what forms of coordination are appropriate, and how to measure success.<sup>17</sup>

In general, those who operate in a political and security paradigm may prefer to, or be specifically mandated to, prioritize stabilizing a situation before dealing with social justice and human rights issues. This may result in them giving priority, at least in the short-term, to regime security and negotiated agreements that are likely to generate stability, rather than to addressing human rights violations and bringing persons accused of crimes to justice. For the same reason, they are typically less enthusiastic, again at least in the short-term, about dealing with issues such as corruption, black-market trading, racketeering or narcotics, especially if the actors they perceive to be key to stabilizing the situation are also suspected of being responsible for human rights atrocities or criminal behaviour.<sup>18</sup>

Those agents for whom rule of law and human rights is their primary paradigm are likely to have a directly opposing view. They are likely to argue that enforcing national and international laws and safeguarding human rights will have a far greater stabilizing effect, and that any delay in introducing and addressing human rights will simply serve to further undermine peace consolidation. Furthermore, they also have a longer-term or system-wide argument: by ensuring that justice is seen to be done in any given case will also have a deterrent effect on others in future conflicts. Law breakers will realize that they are likely to be punished, nationally or internationally, for their crimes and abuses.<sup>19</sup>

Even among the actors engaged in security there are often differences in the emphasis that is placed on state security versus human security. The latter is often seen as “soft” security since it focuses on individuals and the civilian population, and has therefore traditionally enjoyed lower priority among peacekeepers or stabilization forces.<sup>20</sup> Advocates of state security, by contrast, often stress that sustainable peace can be achieved only by focusing on the needs of the population, including their security needs as they perceive them, and that any security operation which fails to take this into account is likely to fail in the end. The security actors may thus agree on the end-state, but those that are influenced by a state security approach will have different theories of change about how to get there, and different measures of effectiveness, than those with a human security approach. The former gives priority to regime stability and the latter to the protection of civilians.<sup>21</sup> One would think that the two should be compatible, but our experiences in countries like Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) over the last decade have shown how the prioritizing of the one over the other can easily result in a winning-the-battle-but-losing-the-war syndrome.<sup>22</sup>

### **Conflicting Mandates**

In some cases, the timetable of one actor may be in conflict with the principles of another. One case in point is the elections timetable in Liberia that motivated those responsible for the elections to encourage the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Monrovia to return to their original communities in 2005 to be registered there to vote. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) put pressure on those agencies responsible for reintegration to persuade the IDPs to return and to start offering them reintegration support in their communities of origin. However, these agencies disagreed with the return timetable proposed by UNMIL because their assessments informed them that conditions were not yet conducive to sustainable returns. This situation caused serious tension between the political and developmental/humanitarian actors because their respective mandates and their respective operating values and principles brought them into direct opposition with one another.<sup>23</sup>

The differences highlighted in the Liberian example (see box) reflect fundamental differences in the mandates, value systems and principles of some of the actors engaged in peacebuilding. It would be naïve to assume that these differences can be resolved through coordination on the assumption that all the agents share the same overall goals.<sup>24</sup> In the end such differences will need to be negotiated and trade-offs agreed in each specific context.<sup>25</sup> These case-specific trade-offs cannot resolve the fundamental underlying differences. In fact, this type of negotiated cooperation often leaves the specific actors less tolerant towards each other than before they were forced into the situation that required them to enter into such a transaction. The outcome typically ends up favouring those with more leverage and political clout, and whilst the outcome may be an agreed way forward, the end-result is not greater coherence, but increased tension and resentment.<sup>26</sup> Such trade-offs are necessary, in a given situation, to overcome a practical impasse and find a workable solution that can enable the actors to move on and continue to carry out their respective mandates. Such ad hoc tactical transactions should not be confused with strategic coherence, which aims to achieve a common understanding of a situation as well as a common strategic response to it.

Sometimes the mandates of the different partners are inherently irreconcilable, and thus significantly limit the potential for coherence. Donini points out, for instance, that there is a deep underlying tension between those agencies that derive their mandate from international treaties and agreements

that are universally applicable, such as those on human rights, the rights of the child, refugees and the laws of armed conflict, and those that are mandated to act on the authority of the Security Council in a specific case. He argues that:

...when the crunch comes, expedient politics nearly always trumps universal principles. It is unlikely that the tensions among the international actors that derive their legitimacy from time-bound Security Council resolutions and those who claim their legitimacy from international treaties and international humanitarian law will evaporate like morning mist anytime soon.<sup>27</sup>

Donini is referring here especially to the tension between political and security actors, such as a UN peacekeeping mission, and humanitarian actors like the UN refugee agency (UN High Commissioner for Refugees; UNHCR) or a humanitarian non-governmental agency like Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières; MSF). Humanitarian relief organizations constitute one particular set of actors that operate under a different mandate than all the others. International humanitarian law and the humanitarian Code of Conduct<sup>28</sup> stress the independence, neutrality and impartiality of humanitarian actors. As a result of this principled approach and operational framework, humanitarian actors have resisted attempts to integrate them into a comprehensive approach. Humanitarian actors have no wish to be “coherent” with the political and military dimensions of peacebuilding interventions, both because of their different priorities and because of their need to remain neutral and impartial. A blurring of these distinctive identities and roles undermines the operational framework of the humanitarian community and impacts negatively on their security.<sup>29</sup> Humanitarian actors therefore resist being made part of a comprehensive approach arrangement, and react strongly if other actors (the military in particular) claim to be engaging in humanitarian activities.<sup>30</sup>

This is not to say that it is impossible for there to be a meaningful relationship between humanitarian actors and peacebuilding agents. Such a relationship will need to be built on the recognition of each other’s different roles and not on any preconceived notions of the inherent value of coherence or the comprehensive approach. For the humanitarian actors, the humanitarian principles of independence, neutrality and impartiality are non-negotiable fundamental principles, while coordination is something pragmatic and tactical, and therefore context specific. For peacebuilding actors, on the other hand, coherence and comprehensiveness are increasingly becoming core operational principles, because they perceive them to be intrinsically linked to

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the successful achievement of their end-state. These two different approaches to the value of coherence further contribute to the tension between these two communities.

To conclude this discussion on the role that fundamentally different values, principles and mandates play in limiting the scope for coherence, we quote Bruce Jones, who says that “managing such trade-offs is an inherent challenge – perhaps the inherent challenge – in managing the implementation of peace agreements or managing regime consolidation in transition”.<sup>31</sup> There are thus fundamental differences in the values, principles and mandates of some of the peacebuilding agents, as well as other stakeholders, such as humanitarian actors, that act as an inherent constraint on the degree to which it is possible to achieve coherence in the comprehensive approach.

## CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO COHERENCE

There is an assumption in the policy community that more coherence leads to more effective and thus more sustainable peacebuilding outcomes. In this section we challenge that assumption and argue that the correlation that has been observed between the degree of coherence and the relative sustainability in some peacebuilding contexts is not indicative of a causal link.

Our argument is that contexts where there is a low level of volatility, or low risk of a relapse into violent conflict, are conducive to greater coherence.<sup>32</sup> In other words, the context determines the scope for coherence. In those peacebuilding systems that can be characterized as less volatile, where violent conflict has ended and where the likelihood of a relapse into violent conflict in the short- to medium-term is low, for example the 2007-2011 post-conflict “UNMIL period” in Liberia, a relatively high degree of coherence can be attained. In contrast, in more volatile peacebuilding systems, for instance, Afghanistan, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where some degree of violent conflict is still ongoing, and where the likelihood of a lapse into large-scale violent conflict cannot be ruled out, we observe that despite significant efforts to improve coherence, the results have been marginal, at best.

This is surprising because the pressure from the political and policy levels to achieve coherence seems to peak during the periods when the peacebuilding systems are most volatile. As a result, these are the periods during which the most effort, in terms of resources, time and political will, seems to be invested in improving coherence at all levels, perhaps especially in

whole-of-government and interagency coherence. The lack of coherence recorded in these contexts is thus not due to a lack of effort. This observation suggests that systemic or contextual influences – the degree to which a system is conducive to coherence – may be a more important factor in determining the degree of coherence that is likely to be achieved, than the intensity of the effort or the coherence model that is applied. Simply put, certain contexts may be more conducive to coherence than others. This would imply that in those cases where more coherence has been achieved, for instance in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Burundi, the result is not necessarily linked to the intensity of the coherence effort or the specific model employed, but rather to the favourable environment and the prevailing attitude of the principle stakeholders, especially the local actors.<sup>33</sup>

The tensions caused by differences in mandates, values, and principles addressed in the previous section tend to become even more acute when the security situation is volatile. If security forces are engaged in combat operations against spoilers or insurgents, it is likely to have at least short-term negative effects on the space for progress in other parts of the system, for instance in the political, governance, humanitarian and developmental domains.<sup>34</sup> If the situation is so volatile that the military component needs to use force to prevent or manage an outbreak of violent conflict, it signals a degree of risk and uncertainty that will impact all the other dimensions of the peace process. Civilian casualties, displacements that generate refugees and IDPs, and destruction of livelihoods and infrastructure are all typical consequences of the use of force. Actors engaged in humanitarian relief operations or development programs may therefore be outraged by the human suffering and destruction generated by the military action, even if those actions are intended to improve the protection of civilians.

### **Effects of Use of Force**

A useful example is the action taken by the armed forces of the DRC and the UN Mission (*Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo*; MONUC) to forcefully disarm those militias that did not voluntarily join the disarmament campaign and that continued to destabilize and harm civilians in North and South Kivus.<sup>35</sup> These militias were not party to the peace process and committed atrocities against the local population. The intention was to improve the protection of civilians by removing the threat posed by these militias. However, the government's military campaigns, supported by MONUC, resulted in the displacement of the local population, and the armed forces of the DRC also abused the communities in the areas that they gained controlled.<sup>36</sup> The net result was more instability, violence and abuse, and a greater risk to the civilian community. The UN mission was, at first, taken aback by the negative reaction of the humanitarian community because it found it difficult to accept that their action, which was intended to increase the protection of civilians, had the opposite effect. Over time, however, the negative impact of the armed forces of the DRC became obvious. The UN Security Council refined the mandate of the mission and linked UN support to a strict monitoring and compliance regime. This experience demonstrated, however, that even the well-intentioned use of force has a negative effect on the scope for coherence.

We can thus conclude that coherence will be negatively affected once there is an outbreak of violence, especially if the use of force becomes necessary to prevent or manage such an outbreak of violent conflict (see box). The use of force and violent conflict has a polarizing effect, regardless of the motive. A serious lapse into conflict tends to undermine whatever strategic coherence may have been achieved. Under such pressure, the coherence the peacebuilding system may have achieved is likely to collapse, and to be re-configured into smaller clusters or factions that have like-minded values, principles and operational cultures. The levels of coherence in these smaller factions may increase because their positions crystallize for, or against, the use of force, but the overall or system-level coherence between these sub-systems are likely to decrease, and in severe cases the peacebuilding system may collapse, and will thus have to be regenerated once a new peace agreement has been negotiated.

If we survey recent conflicts we can observe that situations like those in Somalia, Darfur, Eastern DRC and Afghanistan, where some level of ongoing

conflict is present, produce highly challenging coherence experiences. In comparison, in those situations where violent conflict has come to an end, and where there is a low likelihood of a relapse into violent conflict in the short- to medium-term, as in Liberia, Burundi and Sierra Leone, the scope for coherence is high. This is demonstrated by the type peacebuilding frameworks and related agreements achieved and the degree to which a broad range of peacebuilding agents are cooperating to implement these agreements.

If the scope for coherence in situations where violent conflict is imminent, or where there has been an outbreak, is more limited than in situations where there is a low risk of violent conflict, this would mean that the degree of coherence that can be achieved in a given context cannot be expected to change independently from the degree to which the system dynamics are conducive to coherence. This inter-linkage between the degree of volatility in the system and the scope for coherence may thus explain why trying different models of coherence, and why intensifying coherence efforts have had little effect in highly volatile environments such as Afghanistan, Darfur and the eastern DRC.<sup>37</sup> In these contexts attempts to increase the investment in coherence seems to have had little effect on the quality of the interactions among the agents, and thus ultimately on the degree of coherence achieved. This may be one of the underlying reasons why, despite vigorous efforts, these actions have not resulted in generating a greater degree of coherence.

It would seem that in those contexts that we have termed more favourable, the local and international peacebuilding agents may be more willing to enter into a longer-term cooperative approach because there has been sufficient momentum and progress to generate confidence in the process underway and because their assessments indicate that there is low likelihood of a short- to medium-term relapse into violent conflict. As their level of confidence in a peaceful future grows, and as the likelihood of a relapse into violent conflict fades, both international and local peacebuilding agents become more confident in their own ability to prevail, and have less to lose in cooperating with each other. Under such circumstances they are more likely to recognize their interdependence on each other and the added value of investing some of their effort in pursuing common peacebuilding objectives. The more likely a successful outcome, the less concerned they are about their core values and principles being challenged, and the more likely they are to be pragmatic about dealing with the remaining challenges. They are more likely to recognize the value of their interdependence on others and more willing to give up some of their freedom of movement for the sake of the benefits of cooperating in a larger community of actors.

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In contrast, the more volatile the context, the more agents are likely to value their independence. They feel better equipped to manage the uncertainty if they retain the maximum freedom of movement to make their own assessments and make decisions informed by their own values, principles and approaches. In contexts that are volatile and where there is still a likelihood of a lapse into conflict, local and international peacebuilding agents have much to lose and they are thus likely to be more cautious about entering into relationships that may limit their ability to act independently. They are more likely to group around other like-minded agents and to seek stability and reassurance by sticking to safe and tested principles and approaches, and by associating themselves with others that have similar belief systems and operational principles and approaches.

The observation that context may be a more significant determining factor for coherence than the type of coherence model or the intensity of the effort to achieve coherence has important implications for coherence policy. It implies that investing more effort in achieving a degree of coherence is unrealistic, and in certain contexts will be wasteful. More attention needs to be invested in understanding what levels of coherence are realistic in a given context. It is also likely that different types of coherence seeking tools will be more effective in different contexts. For instance, coherence mechanisms that are based on the recognition of the independence of the participating agents and that are limited in ambition to sharing information may have more success in volatile situations.

On the basis of these observations we argue that the correlation between coherence and effective peacebuilding observed by the policy community has been misinterpreted. The correlation does not imply that there is a causal relationship between coherence and effectiveness, but rather that the systems that have achieved relative stability, and that we may thus associate with effective peacebuilding, are also conducive to greater coherence.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter we set out to identify and consider some of those factors that limit, inhibit or constrain our ability to achieve coherence in the comprehensive approach. Three factors were discussed, namely the tension between long-term impact and short-term output, conflicting values, principles and mandates, and the context-specific scope for coherence.

We argued that persistent evidence-based feedback from the field indicates that at the operational and tactical levels, many of the assumptions about



coherence are, at best challenged, and at worse, flawed. Peacebuilding efforts appear to be challenged by enduring and deep-rooted tensions and inherent contradictions between the various peacebuilding dimensions and among the different peacebuilding agents.

We argued that the tension between impact and output, between what is good for the system as a whole as measured over the long-term, and what is in the best interest of the individual agent, as measured in the short- to medium-term, consistently undermines coherence. We pointed out that some peacebuilding agents have inherently contradictory values, principles and mandates, and these typically manifest in fundamentally different theories of change and thus disagreements with regard to, for instance, prioritization and how to measure progress. We argued that the context within which peacebuilding unfolds, and especially the degree of volatility in the system, determines the scope for coherence.

Based on these observations we conclude that there are inherent limits and constraints to the degree to which coherence can be achieved in the peacebuilding context. The exact limits are context-specific, and will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis. But not recognizing and addressing that these limits exist, by pursuing an idealized or maximum level of coherence blindly, regardless of context, is likely to result in such efforts ultimately generating perverse effects.

The overall finding of this chapter is that whilst pursuing coherence is an integral part of the comprehensive approach, the commonly held causal assumption that more coherence will automatically result in more efficient, and thus more sustainable, peacebuilding operations, is flawed. There seems to be a threshold beyond which pursuing more coherence seems to yield little additional benefit, and that pursuing even more coherence starts having perverse effects.

The commonly held assumption in policy circles that one can improve coherence by manipulating the coherence model and/or by increasing the intensity of the effort ignores the very important influence that the context has on the potential scope for coherence. The three factors that limit or constrain coherence discussed in this chapter are examples of the kind of factors that have to be taken into account when considering what an appropriate level of coherence may be in any given comprehensive approach driven campaign.

Based on these findings, we argue that the correlation between coherence and effective peacebuilding observed by the policy community has been

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misinterpreted. The correlation does not imply that there is a causal relationship between coherence, effectiveness and sustainability, but rather that the systems that have achieved greater levels of peace consolidation, and that we may thus associate with effective and sustainable peacebuilding, are also at the same time conducive to greater coherence.

Having analyzed these three factors, we can conclude that there are inherent dynamics in peacebuilding systems that limit, inhibit and constrain the degree of coherence that can be achieved in the comprehensive approach. These constraints are not sufficiently recognized and are discounted at the policy level.<sup>38</sup> The result is that the policy debate is setting itself overly ambitious expectations for the comprehensive approach that are impossible to achieve in reality.

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# CHAPTER 5

## THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH – DOCTRINAL OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDISH MILITARY LEADERSHIP

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### INTRODUCTION

Sweden has a long history of nonalignment in military alliances. Most notably, it is not a member of NATO. There is, however, an ongoing effort in Sweden to develop the national armed forces in a direction which is compatible with the standards of NATO and the requirements to take part in operations led by the UN and the EU. Therefore, it is of vital interest to investigate how the understanding of the comprehensive approach by leading international organizations relates to the Swedish situation. This can be illuminated from a number of different perspectives. The present text focuses on military leadership and the compatibility of the current Swedish model of military leadership with demands posed by a comprehensive approach.

This chapter is divided into five parts. The first is based on a literature review and attempts to answer the following question: what doctrinal and conceptual basis regarding the comprehensive approach exists within NATO, the EU, the UN and in Sweden? The remaining four parts build on this review of the literature. The second part is devoted to an analysis of leadership challenges that follow from a comprehensive approach. Part three identifies desired competencies and skills to meet these challenges. Then, in part four, the desired competencies and skills are related to the current leadership model of the Swedish Armed Forces. The fifth and final part presents a summary, conclusion and suggestions for further research.

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\* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Security, Strategy and Leadership at the Swedish National Defence College or the Swedish Armed Forces.

## SWEDEN

### **METHODOLOGY OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW**

The literature was collected from multiple sources. Specifically, the organizational doctrines and core concept documents were downloaded from the following organizations' websites:

- NATO: <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm>
- EU: [http://europa.eu/index\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/index_en.htm)
- UN: <http://www.un.org/en/>

The comprehensive approach literature was collected through the electronic database of the Anna Lind Library at the Swedish National Defence College. The material was sorted into different categories for review: doctrine from each organization, articles related to each organization, articles relating to Sweden and other Nordic countries, and articles that reviewed the concept of the comprehensive approach. A considerable number of doctrine and core concept documents were found from each organization. Regarding leadership, some doctrine and core principle documents were more relevant than others; references to those particular documents are listed within the text.

### **PART I: DOCTRINAL AND CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW**

The end of the cold war, from a European perspective, has led to new challenges for military forces. The threat against a country's own territory is generally considered as minimal, while most conflicts have been of a domestic character. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions have been a focus. These kinds of missions have generally been characterized by more challenges than security and by tasks that demand more than traditional military means. While there is a need to keep belligerent parties apart and to sometimes defend oneself against violence from hostile groups, there is also a need for humanitarian efforts and (re-)building functional societal institutions. This, in turn, has led to the emergence of concepts like the comprehensive approach.<sup>1</sup>

There is, however, a lack of a clear definition of the comprehensive approach concept. It generally refers to different mixtures of military and civilian effort and to solving problems that are both military and civilian in nature. The comprehensive approach is neither a specific method nor a specific strategy

to follow when organizing a mission. As its name implies, it is more of an approach to handle the complexities which encompass the new types of missions that are prevalent today. Most definitions include the idea that the comprehensive approach is a culture of cooperation between multitudes of actors involved in handling a crisis situation. Within this area there are several concepts that are more or less synonymous with the comprehensive approach. Examples include Integrated Missions (IM), and the whole-of-government approach. The latter concept refers mainly to a coordinated effort at the national level.<sup>2</sup>

The contexts where the comprehensive approach should be applied are often broad and varied in nature. Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq are a few examples of the countries that are most frequently discussed in the current literature which have had international missions using a comprehensive approach. These types of missions differ in several ways. First, they differ in security standards and in what the host nation may need from the international community for support. Second, they differ in the kinds of strategy and tactics that could be expected to be successful. Third, they differ in the kinds of civilian organizations that could be of help. Accordingly, there are different kinds of comprehensive approach strategies that need to be applied in different contexts.

The concept of a comprehensive approach has been debated and also, to some extent, criticized. Some have noted that it has a reputation as a “catch-phrase of little consequence”.<sup>3</sup> Others have highlighted the need for operationalizing the concept and many have questioned its effectiveness.<sup>4</sup>

An issue that needs to be addressed regarding implementation of a comprehensive approach is the consequences and development opportunities for leadership. Leadership, like the comprehensive approach, is a broad concept with a lack of consensus on how exactly to define it. The definition presented here is based on an interactive theoretical model that is further discussed below.

### **THREE PERSPECTIVES ON THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH**

This section will focus on three of the biggest multi-national organizations, NATO, the UN and the EU, and their history and progress in developing a comprehensive approach within their doctrinal frameworks. It will also emphasize the challenges they have encountered while developing the comprehensive approach so that it can be later tied to leadership.

### **North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

Currently, NATO has not successfully integrated the comprehensive approach into its doctrine. It is currently focusing on developing the comprehensive approach as an operational concept based on its Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO). Essentially, NATO is a military alliance and therefore can only be deployed as such.<sup>5</sup> It is not built in a manner to implement a comprehensive approach on its own. Therefore, after the 2008 Bucharest Summit, it was declared that NATO's role within the comprehensive approach is only that of a contributor due to the lack of civilian capabilities within its organization.<sup>6</sup> However, de Coning and Friis state that because NATO is a contributor to efforts led by the EU and UN in international affairs, it can be considered to be adopting a comprehensive approach as a form of policy coherence.<sup>7</sup>

#### ***Problems/Challenges***

There are several challenges for NATO concerning the comprehensive approach. There is a lack of political consensus within the organization about what ambitions to have. Some members want more and some want less of the comprehensive approach.

NATO has no civilian component. The organization lacks a civilian culture and civilian procedures. This implies, among other things, that the specific tasks in comprehensive approach operations are unclear. There seem to be two possibilities for NATO as a military organization. One is to include civilian components within the organization itself and the other is to cooperate with external civilian organizations, like NGOs. Presently, it seems that the latter is mainly the case, e.g., in Afghanistan. This, in turn, will demand that NATO be a good partner for the other actors. It also demands that there be a way of handling possible conflicts between military and civilian efforts.

Conflicts between NATO and civilian counterparts could, for instance, stem from the concern that humanitarian workers should be neutral in relation to the military. If humanitarian efforts are mixed with military actions there could be a credibility problem. A related problem is that NATO may be perceived as controlling the NGOs. This may cause frustration within the NGOs since military institutions may be perceived less favourably by public opinion. Thus, the perception of military control may also negatively affect political support for the whole mission.



It has also been proposed that there may occasionally be a rivalry between NATO, the EU and the UN. NATO does not always have the same agenda as the UN and/or the EU. One main reason for this is that these organizations have different members. The membership of strong nations like Russia and China may cause the UN to have quite different agendas when compared to NATO.

## **The European Union**

Over the past ten years, the EU has made considerable progress in its efforts to establish a better functioning comprehensive approach. The ESS was adopted in December 2003 and has been their core doctrine for a unified European approach toward security challenges. According to Gross, this document came as a result of the EU's involvement in Iraq.<sup>8</sup> It was an attempt to create a coherent culture within the EU member states to repair damage done from conflicting views regarding their involvement there. The ESS also discusses the need for civilian and military components to coordinate more effectively.<sup>9</sup> Since 2003, a *Security Strategy Update* has been released, which refers to the Lisbon treaty regarding development and changes that the EU should make in developing their comprehensive approach.<sup>10</sup> Another core document, which includes civil-military components, is the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); this was formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy. This document focuses on its crisis management capabilities and the actors involved in the process.

The EU often uses the acronyms CMCO and CIMIC when discussing civil-military coordination efforts. According to Wendling, CIMIC usually deals with operational and tactical support issues and CMCO is related to the civil and military affairs within the political and strategic level. The use of the terminology within the organization has also led to an actual policy created to reflect these components, the Civilian-Military Coordination Policy. This policy was created to coordinate the elements in field operations and it addresses the need to strengthen the coordination with all actors regarding the planning and follow-through of operations.<sup>11</sup>

## **Problems/Challenges**

Although the EU has many policies, doctrines and acronyms for the civil-military actors involved within their international missions, the breadth and scope of the effectiveness of its policies remain unknown in a crisis management theatre thus far. De Coning and Friis point out that the EU has currently not deployed a mission incorporating all of their capacities in

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one integrated forum.<sup>12</sup> They have been involved in parallel missions, even within the same country, but the true test of effectiveness will come within a unified endeavour.

One of the biggest challenges that the EU has faced regarding creating more advanced doctrines and planning has been that the civilian and military committees have had a difficult time working together. This includes disagreements over the text that should be included for their comprehensive approach concepts. An example of this includes the civilian committee preferring the term “mission” and the military committee wanting to use the word “operation”.<sup>13</sup> Although this example appears to be purely a disagreement over semantics, it highlights the difference in the views of the separate committees and the challenges that they have faced in attempting to plan together.

Another difficulty the EU is facing is whether or not member states within the EU will adopt the whole-of-government approach at the national level and then later connect that to a comprehensive approach at a multinational level. There are many parties involved that must agree on the concept and follow through with implementing it in their own countries before it can be successful for the organization as a whole.

Having a civilian reserve readily available for missions is yet another problem that the EU faces. They currently have a database system in order to find qualified personnel but the quantity and quality of the civilians needed for missions is limited and many of the reserves are also shared with NATO, which naturally could cause a problem if they both become involved in missions simultaneously.

## United Nations

Out of all three of the organizations, the UN has the most developed comprehensive approach to combining civil and military components into their missions. They have, however, strategically chosen to call their approach by other names in order to differentiate themselves from other organizations. The UN often uses the name Integrated Approach (IA) when referring to their method of handling complex military-civil tasks. They also have an Integrated Mission, which was first implemented in 2004/2005. The UN’s secretary general released a *Note of Guidance on Integrated Missions* in 2006 stating:

An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of program interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process.

Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximize its contributions towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.<sup>14</sup>

They have also implemented an Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP), which is an organized and systematic way to include all of the actors involved during a crisis, including all of the local actors in the host country and those involved at the UN headquarters.

After comparing several organizations, including EU, UN and NATO, Wendling stated that the “UN remains the international organization with the longest experience of the multidimensional approach through its integrated approach”.<sup>15</sup> Overall, this organization has an advanced doctrinal plan to address civilian-military unified endeavours even though it is labelled differently than the other organizations.

### ***Problems/Challenges***

Despite their advanced planning and doctrine, the UN has also encountered difficulties when actually attempting to implement a comprehensive approach in peacekeeping missions. According to de Coning, UN peacekeeping missions have had a poor rate of sustainability thus far due to a “strategic deficit”, which is defined as a lack of coherence at the strategic level.<sup>16</sup> He has also found that the UN has experienced difficulties implementing the comprehensive approach in the field level due to lack of flexibility in constantly changing situations. More specifically, there has been an inability to successfully cooperate in the field with other organizations regarding resources in the early stages of a conflict. This is mainly due to strict policy rules/regulations regarding use of resources and equipment and therefore can be a difficult challenge to rectify unless it is addressed at the operational and strategic levels.

## **THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH AND SWEDEN**

Sweden does not currently have a comprehensive approach of its own but has a variation of the whole-of-government approach. Grönberg states that in March 2008 the Swedish government presented a national strategy for Swedish participation in international peace support and security building operations to the Swedish Parliament. It included Swedish support for combined civil and military actors. Grönberg further elaborates that combining these two sides has been challenging for Sweden in the past since civilian and military efforts are often separate. Previously, the Swedish military and civilian

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agencies have had different mandates and priorities which have resulted in difficulties when working together. The national strategy presented in 2008 recognizes that contributions must include both civil and military capabilities in order to be successful.<sup>17</sup>

Within the national strategy, Swedish involvement is to support UN and EU peace efforts while also achieving Sweden's overall national objectives.<sup>18</sup> This recognition appears to support the idea that Sweden is moving towards the ideology of a comprehensive approach in an international arena even though it has not been fully established at this time within its doctrine. According to the Swedish Defence Research Agency, the Swedish approach is a "concerted action" of grouped support and the overall level of ambition is for collaboration. The Swedish approach is a variant of a whole-of-government approach and is not part of an international system at this time.<sup>19</sup>

There is not currently a unified Nordic approach, although it has been suggested by researchers as a possible beneficial collaboration in the future. Each Nordic country has its own policy and certain countries are more developed than others in the process of implementing a comprehensive approach into their doctrines. Friis and Rehman reported that Sweden has stated its willingness to use a whole-of-government approach when it participates in international crisis management.<sup>20</sup> They state that the main role that Sweden appears to have when implementing a comprehensive approach at this time is to help by contributing to larger actors who are also using the approach in the international arena. Small actors, such as Sweden, will usually contribute to the larger actors within a mission with "plug-in" capabilities depending on the needs of the mission. "Plug-in" capabilities are specific skills that a country can contribute. Friis and Rehman conclude by saying that the effectiveness of the ability to use a comprehensive approach can be measured in terms of interagency coherence in the field with key actors such as the UN, the EU, NATO and other large contributors.<sup>21</sup>

## **PART II: CHALLENGES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR OPERATIONAL/ TACTICAL LEADERSHIP**

As described, the UN, EU and NATO, differ on how far they have developed relevant doctrines. They also differ in their ability to come to a political consensus. The reason for the differences could be related to two important aspects. First, the three organizations differ in the number of member countries. It is reasonable to expect that there would be more difficulty with a larger number of member countries, since members may differ in their

political and cultural traditions and in the interests they may have. Second, the three organizations differ in the number of responsibilities they have to deal with. The greater the amount of responsibility, the harder it may be to focus on a specific issue, like the comprehensive approach. NATO would, therefore, theoretically have the best opportunities for a unified approach, but even on this level there seems to be problems with internal consensus.

Generally, there seems to be a risk for conflicting goals and an imprecise approach at the strategic level. From a leadership perspective this may, among other things, highlight the importance of the specific operation/mission to have clear goals. Several of the challenges identified that could affect leadership are discussed below, specifically at the tactical and operational level.

## ***DISTAL CHALLENGES***

### **Complexity of the Task**

The task for a comprehensive approach mission/operation is normally complex and possibly one of the more complex tasks a military leader faces. The end-state of the operation, peace, democracy, and functional societal institutions, are normally a result of a long term, historical process which is hard to accelerate. The perception of injustice in different population groups may be an obstacle, but this is also a process that may need time to change. The injustice may, however, feed radical and violent views and encourage ideologies that are less optimal from a democratic point of view. Accordingly, these are structural problems behind the leadership challenges that, in the short run, are hard to affect.

There are more factors that contribute to this complexity, like different and parallel political agendas, as well as cultural differences both within the organization and in relation to the host nation. Cultural differences will be addressed more extensively under proximal challenges.

There is also an emotional complexity. The comprehensive approach is normally exercised in a context of conflict, which in itself is emotionally provocative. In addition, there may be an emotional aspect related to the use of and the distribution of power. The local population of the host country may be cooperative in varying degrees, some more so than others. This has been the experience from several Swedish operations. Examples of this have been found in both former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, where some groups of civilians opposed foreign involvement, which made the achieving the goals of the mission more difficult. There may also be divergences between the

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multiple actors involved that may put pressure on leadership. Combined with other environmental stressors, this means that there is a constantly ongoing demand on military leaders to handle multiple balancing acts.

### **Political Understanding**

Some of the problems encountered by multinational organizations appear to be that the origin of the comprehensive approach is at the political and strategic level and that there may be a lack of consensus between different members. It would, of course, be better if there was such a consensus, but this is a political problem rather than a leadership issue. At the tactical and operational levels, a commander has to accept the results of political processes, even if he/she does not find the outcome optimal from a military point of view. However, a commander would benefit from an understanding of the political processes behind the decisions.

### **Complex Decision-making**

Decision-making on different levels may differ considerably in what kind of leader qualities they demand. On lower levels the decisions may be more short-term and involve fewer alternatives and circumstances to balance. Higher levels within a hierarchal scheme simply involve more complex decisions. It could be argued that the increase in complexity seems to be more exponential than linear. As a commander moves up to the international and intercultural level, there are more circumstances to balance when making decisions. He/she must have the competence to identify these circumstances, judge their importance, search for relevant information and decision support, analyze data and compare alternatives.

## **PROXIMAL CHALLENGES**

### **Cultural Competence**

Several types of cultural competencies are important in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. In international operations, leaders first need an understanding of the culture of both the host nation and the participating nations. Typically, the countries in which comprehensive approach missions are conducted have very different cultures, and a leader needs to be aware of the differences as well as have a level of diplomacy on how to handle differences in a respectful way. Even small cultural offences can be disadvantageous when trying to get the local people and the diverse participating actors to work with you on a task, rather than against your efforts.

Because the use of the comprehensive approach involves many different actors and organizations, it also demands a competence for dealing with different organizational cultures. This is, however, a complex issue. The organizational culture could often mirror the kind of tasks the organization has, as well as its past history. Organizations that have their origin in fighting wars will have a different culture than organizations that were founded specifically to work on humanitarian issues. To add to the complexity, an organization (whether it is military or civilian) does not have one uniform culture, but rather several subcultures within itself.

One of the biggest challenges is for both the military and civilian actors to have a mutual respect for what each has to offer to the comprehensive approach process. It can often be felt within the organizations that either side has a hard time relating to the other's perspective and they can often think that their own side's contribution is worth more than the others. These types of issues can affect leaders in many ways when it is necessary to work together on missions. Therefore, it is important for military leaders to accept the value that the civil actors have to contribute as well as give them an opportunity to be a valuable part of the process.

## Time

Often, in situations where the comprehensive approach will be used, time is of the essence at the beginning of a mission. It is usually critical that an organization or actor be involved as soon as possible when a situation develops to prevent it from worsening. Further complicating the situation is that given all the different committees that need to be involved, the decision and planning stages often take time before the mission can commence. According to the United Nation's document, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping, Integrated Approach and Integrated Missions*, a faster deployment to mission sites is critical in the beginning stage of the comprehensive approach.<sup>22</sup> This needs to be accomplished at the strategic level by establishing a mission headquarters on site so that the prioritization of tasks can be sequenced and begun within a shorter period of time. The document also mentions the need for leaders to be able to do "scenario-planning" in the field in order manage and respond to crisis situations in a timely fashion.

After decisions and plans are made, there is a short turnaround time for units to be assembled and then deployed to begin the tactical stage. This can be a challenge for tactical unit leaders because the units that are put together often have no experience working with each other prior to the mission. The leader has to be able to build a relationship and a sense of trust with his/her subordinates along with team building within the group in very short time period.

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### Resources

Short preparation time also has a direct effect on the resources that can be accessible at the mission site when beginning a mission. The operational level must be able to get orders for the resources that are needed and be able to get them to the mission site in a timely manner so that the mission can begin as soon as possible. This can be a challenge as necessary resources often come later than anticipated. This leaves units and leaders in an awkward position on how to begin their tasks.

Receiving resources in a timely manner is not context-specific to the comprehensive approach, as it can happen in other types of missions as well. However, something that can be specifically challenging to the comprehensive approach is the need to share resources with other agencies that are also involved in the same task at the mission site. This is the true essence of the comprehensive approach: the ability to work together with different agencies in order to complete a similar goal. This can be a challenge because each agency has its own policies, rules, and regulations that it must follow regarding resources. The delay that can occur for an agency to have approval to share resources with another agency/agent is crucial time that could be spent on the mission itself. One of the main goals of the comprehensive approach is to “work smarter, not harder”, so to speak, avoiding duplicating work within agencies in order to help complement each other’s abilities in the mission.

### Environment

As would be expected, being involved in missions within unstable countries poses challenges. It makes the working environment a volatile one that requires a huge amount of flexibility from a leader’s perspective. The plans and orders that are passed down from a strategic level should allow for a good amount of flexibility for the leaders at the operational and tactical levels to make changes based on the continuously changing environment. Leaders should be seen as the “expert” in their own domain because they are the ones that have the most relevant and current knowledge upon which to base decisions.

This, of course, takes a special type of individual, equipped with many different abilities and skill sets to make decisions in this type of environment and to bear the responsibilities that follow along with it. The next section examines the abilities, skills and competencies that were identified in the comprehensive approach doctrine and literature.



## **PART III: DESIRED COMPETENCIES/SKILLS AND BEHAVIOURS FOR OPERATIONAL/TACTICAL LEADERSHIP**

### ***DESIRABLE LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES/SKILLS***

Before looking at specific competencies and skills, the difference between the terms *skill* and *competency* is defined for clarity. The Oxford Dictionary defines a skill as “the ability to do something well; expertise”. There are many different definitions of competency but most definitions include the core concepts of a person’s combination of knowledge, applied skills and behaviour related to the competency. Some even include the person’s attitude. Therefore, a skill is a subset of being competent in something. To illustrate, social competency can be regarded as a broad concept that includes skills such as giving and receiving feedback constructively and being able to adapt words and body language to different cultures and peoples.

Within the comprehensive approach doctrine and literature there were several skills and/or competencies that were identified as important for implementing the approach within peacekeeping operations. Those skills/competencies were interpreted for what would be specifically important for a leadership role when implementing the comprehensive approach. They were chosen based on their high frequency of occurrence within several documents. Some of the factors identified are general skills that would be important for other types of leaders in missions that are not related to the comprehensive approach while others are more specific to this context.

### ***GENERAL SKILLS/COMPETENCIES***

#### **Communication Skills**

Communication skills often include a person’s ability to express ideas to others through written, oral and non-verbal ways. Therefore, the effectiveness of a person’s ability to express his/her ideas depends on how good he/she is at communicating. “Leaders should be effective communicators, both locally and globally. Effective communication of the mission’s role and functions to local actors is essential” (United Nations document: *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping*).<sup>23</sup> Specific to the comprehensive approach, this document emphasizes the importance for leaders to have good communication skills when working on Integrated Approach and Integrated Missions. It should be a leader’s focus with all of the

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actors involved within a mission, including subordinates, the leader's superiors, other leaders, and civilian and actors.

Specific to communication, an important task that leaders should be involved in for the comprehensive approach is internal/external meetings for planning and receiving of information. This helps coordination and collaboration efforts with the other actors involved. Everyone has the opportunity to work towards a shared goal and it gives a shared situational awareness within the mission. The EU emphasizes the importance of leaders being specifically involved in consultative meetings with other international organizations in the field that are involved in crisis resolution.<sup>24</sup> This also helps improve communication between the actors.

Another important form of communication is interaction with the media. Wong, Bliese and McGurk noted that, previously, interaction with the media was a restricted, bureaucratic activity for higher officials within confined settings. With the current trends of increasing real-time reporting and advances of technology, public relations training is now being added to all levels of leadership education.<sup>25</sup> With its growing accessibility, the media can be present for many different critical activities at all levels; leaders should be prepared and skilled in handling the task of dealing with the media. The United Nations emphasizes the importance of clear communication with regards to the media and the need for "well designed and smooth communication strategy to increase confidence in the peace process and build trust among parties in the conflict".<sup>26</sup>

### **Social Skills**

Current research often links leaders' social skills and ways of interacting with people as a defining concept of being a successful leader. Yukl emphasizes the importance of the need for leaders to be skilled with dealing with people as well as with current issues.<sup>27</sup> An important aspect of effective social skills is the ability of a leader to change their technical language depending on who he/she is speaking with so that the ideas communicated are easily understood by the recipient. An example of this would be to use terminology that civilians understand rather than using military terminology when having meetings that include civilian participants.

Another social aspect specific to the comprehensive approach that should be considered is the leader's ability to accept and give value to other contributors, including all actors within a mission. This means that he/she openly tries to include other actors within coordination efforts. The leader should

be aware of the value that other actors have to offer and, within efforts to coordinate all actors, give them credit for their ideas, a chance to be heard and have an openness to implement ideas decided upon together. This skill is specifically important due to the challenges that the military and civilian/local actors have felt when trying to coordinate together. More specifically, challenges have existed regarding not giving actors outside of the military an appropriate sense of value within a mission, despite the demands for their competences within the comprehensive approach.

### **Stress Tolerance Skills**

Due to the volatile environment and the demand for a leader to be able to handle complex decision-making on short notice, a leader should have well-developed stress tolerance skills. In general, this type of person should have a naturally high stress threshold to begin with and also have skills to handle stressful environments. This of course, is a general skill since it is an asset for many types of missions.

## **SPECIFIC SKILLS/COMPETENCIES**

There are several identified skills/competencies that are also general skills for leaders but have more importance when implementing the comprehensive approach. These types are listed below.

### **Conflict Management Skills**

This is particularly important because of the many different actors involved in the implementation of the comprehensive approach. As we have discussed earlier, there are many different cultures involved in these types of missions (local cultures, interagency cultures and intra-agency cultures) therefore, this is an environment naturally conducive to conflict. It is important that a leader involved in these types of missions is skilled in the area of conflict management. This is a skill that can be learned and improved.

According to the United Nation's *Peacekeeping Operations (Capstone Doctrine), Principles and Guidelines*, conflict management and leadership are very important skills for a start-up of a mission since most of the international staff have not worked together previously.<sup>28</sup> Pertaining to leadership, the document adds that strong leadership is especially important during the start-up phase when new procedures are being established. Confusion at this stage can be problematic because missions usually develop quickly directly after initial start-up. The start-up and ending of a mission are critical times of change, in

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which roles are defined and many parties are involved, which can also lead to a higher risk of conflicts. These types of events should be anticipated and dealt with immediately so that they do not hinder the mission's goals.

### **Cultural Competence**

According to Martin and Vaughn, cultural competence refers to a person's ability to interact effectively with people from different cultures.<sup>29</sup> It is comprised of four components:

1. Awareness of one's own cultural worldview;
2. Attitude towards cultural differences;
3. Knowledge of different cultural practices and worldviews; and
4. Cross-cultural skills (which include communication skills).

Due to the multiple nations involved and the inherent differences in culture, religion, language, etc., cultural competence is a very valuable asset for leaders. They will not only use it for their own tasks but it will be of value to help educate and advise their subordinates, who are often in contact with the local people within the mission areas.

The UN discusses the "social impact" of the military on the local country in their *Capstone Doctrine*.<sup>30</sup> This specifies that leaders should be aware of their unit's impact on the host country. For example, the mixing of genders in societies that uphold strong traditional gender roles (e.g. limiting the mixing and socializing between genders while employing women) along with other activities that may be unacceptable, such as gambling and drinking, may cause friction within the host country. Leaders must be aware of the social and cultural norms within the host countries and be respectful of their views since these can work against the agenda of working together towards a similar goal within a mission.

### **Emotion Management Skills**

This concept is interpreted as an important skill for leaders given the volatile and stressful environment they often work in. This is not a new concept within academia but it has gained popularity within the last ten years in connection to leadership. Emotion management is defined as "the management of feeling to create a publically observable facial and bodily display".<sup>31</sup> The ability of leaders to control their own feelings in order to match the feelings that are appropriate for the situation is a skill that is especially important

when dealing with tasks in emotionally taxing environments. Emotion management has been shown to be a central characteristic of effective leaders, both with regulation of their own emotions and the regulation of others.<sup>32</sup>

Within the realm of emotion management, an idea that has gained interest within the psychology and management fields is the concept of emotion regulation (ER). Gross describes ER as a “process by which we influence which emotions we have, when we have them, and how we experience and express them.”<sup>33</sup> He describes emotion regulation as a conscious process that can involve increasing, decreasing or maintaining emotions.

Regulation of one’s own emotions is referred to as *intrinsic regulation*. This is more of a general concept that would be important for most actors within an international mission. *Extrinsic regulation* refers to the skill of helping others regulate their feelings. This concept has led to emotion regulation strategies, which are skills that can be learned in order to regulate one’s own emotions and/or help others with the regulation of their emotions in a given situation. There are specific cognitive regulation strategies that leaders can learn and practice, which can be used both intrinsically and extrinsically. These strategies would be particularly important for leaders to use when encountering emotionally charged situations, such as a crisis, to help themselves or others to decrease their own emotions in order to keep calm to fulfil a task.

Blascovich and Hartel discuss the importance of how emotions are communicated from person to person within different cultural settings and how misunderstandings can easily happen based on the cultural interpretation of the event (often resulting from non-verbal behaviour).<sup>34</sup> They indicate that as the military increasingly trains and conducts missions abroad within multi-cultural environments, knowledge of the cultural difference (specifically emotional aspects) will be important to mission success. They bring up intriguing questions such as what gestures do people from particular cultures find threatening or comforting and what signifies respect.

## **Desirable Leadership Behaviours**

Within the comprehensive approach doctrine and literature there were also several behaviours or ways of being that were described as being beneficial in implementing the comprehensive approach. All of these aspects can be seen as both general leadership abilities and as abilities specific to the comprehensive approach. They are often found in other international military situations that are not specific to the comprehensive approach. Their importance

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specifically related to the comprehensive approach is explained under each sub-category.

### **General Leadership Behaviours**

#### ***Highly Adaptive/Flexible***

Due to the complex and constantly changing comprehensive approach environment, a focus on increased flexibility for leaders at the operational level is necessary so that they have the ability to adapt and adjust accordingly.<sup>35</sup> Both tactical and operational leaders need to be flexible to plans changing at short notice and be able to change plans themselves when they find the current plan is not working. The EU's *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* discusses the importance of increased flexibility in order to be successful when implementing the comprehensive approach.<sup>36</sup> They correlate the need for higher flexibility with the heightened complexity of the task. The document is also specific about the need to have personnel who have the flexibility for short notice deployment.

#### ***Inspire/Motivate Others***

This behaviour is valuable for making subordinates feel motivated to complete necessary tasks within the mission. More specifically, it is important that the leader be open with information that is necessary for subordinates to have an accurate idea and motivation behind their own tasks. This creates meaning to their work rather than a checklist of tasks to fulfill without the understanding of why.

#### ***Trust***

Leaders should have trust in the people that they are working with. It is counter-productive in a changing environment to try to be in charge of every aspect within a given mission. Just as leaders want trust from their subordinates in order to lead them, it is equally important that they also trust their subordinates to follow through with the tasks they have been given. This helps create a culture of trust within the unit and makes it possible for more to be accomplished in a short amount of time. With time being such a critical issue in the comprehensive approach, trust is imperative.

#### ***Cooperation/Coordination***

Due to the complexities of the tasks involved in these types of missions, it is important for leaders to have accurate situational awareness and to draw on the expertise of others to face complexities. The EU states that “in

integrated missions, leaders should have the capacity to assess progress, draw on specialized expertise to identify critical gaps, and to work with a range of partners to meet peacebuilding needs”.<sup>37</sup>

In order to be more adequately prepared, leaders should receive education and training that is context-specific for the types of challenges that they are likely to face in the field, including working with other actors. It is stated in the *UN Capstone Doctrine* that this is vital for the preparation of leaders.<sup>38</sup> Training exercises should include civilian actors so that coordination feels natural in the field. More training, including training with international actors, should be encouraged. This should help with the coordination and cooperation endeavours that seem to be problematic at the field level.

Prior to a new mission, contact time for leaders should be provided so that they have a chance to get to know others who will be involved in the mission. Establishing these relationships can facilitate cooperation later. *The UN Capstone Doctrine*<sup>39</sup> refers specifically to this in regards to leadership, emphasizing the importance of leaders being able “participate in the mission planning, briefings on the situation and to meet and work with their colleagues in mission leadership”.<sup>40</sup>

### **Feedback**

The ability to give feedback is paired closely with a leader’s communication ability. It is very important that a leader give feedback to those he/she is working with. They need to know at an evaluative level how they are doing individually and as a team in order to feel fulfilled and to develop themselves further. It is also important that they are aware of the plans that may be developing and changing and how they may be affected.

### **Role Model**


A leader should behave in a way that portrays the way he/she wants others also to behave. A great deal of leadership research, especially in popular leadership theories such as transformational leadership, stresses the importance of a leader acting as a role model to his/her subordinates. There is, of course, a balancing act of responsibilities. Everyone involved in a mission is ultimately responsible for their own behaviour. The organizational rules and regulations should be the defining norm for how an individual should act. However, a leader also has an opportunity to exemplify the appropriate behaviours expected in the organization.

## **PART IV: IMPLICATIONS FOR SWEDISH MILITARY LEADERSHIP AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS**

Based on the existing doctrinal and conceptual texts on the comprehensive approach, we have tried to deduce challenges implied from a leadership perspective, and, following from this, to identify leadership skills/competences and behaviours that are desirable to meet these challenges. We will now turn to an analysis of what these desirable leadership skills/competencies and behaviours mean for Swedish military leadership. In order to maximize the generalizability of this of reasoning, we will use a theoretical model of leadership as a road map in this analysis.

Since 2003, the Swedish Armed Forces has used “Developmental Leadership” as its official leadership model.<sup>41</sup> Recently, two further developments of this model have been made. First, the contextual portion has been expanded, allowing for more situation-specific applications of the model.<sup>42</sup> Second, aspects from the authentic leadership model<sup>43</sup>, and from the indirect leadership model<sup>44</sup>, have been integrated with the developmental leadership model.<sup>45</sup> A simplified version of this integrated model was presented by Larsson et al.<sup>46</sup> and this version will serve as the basis of the present text. The model is shown in Figure 5.1.





**Figure 5.1. Theoretical model of leadership (modified from Larsson & Eid)<sup>47</sup>**

The leadership model implies that a number of individual and contextual characteristics interact and shape a military commander's appraisal or sense-making of a given situation. This meaning, which applies to what is taking place, in turn generates a number of leadership behaviours, which, to a greater or lesser degree, affect the outcome.

In the following, a selection of key aspects of each box in the model will be discussed. The selection was guided by an attempt to focus on aspects of relevance to military leadership at the operational and tactical levels within the framework of a comprehensive approach.

## **INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS**

Beginning with "Basic requirements" in the developmental leadership model, nothing new emerged in the present analysis. This means that favourable physical, psychological and view-of-life related resources are also assumed to be relevant in the case of operational/tactical leadership within a comprehensive approach framework.

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Continuing with “Desirable competences” in the developmental leadership model, once again, nothing contradicts the four competences defined in the model: task-related competence, management-related competence, social competence and capacity to cope with stress. However, in the context of the comprehensive approach, some important addenda were noted. In particular, the following three competences/skills were highlighted: conflict management, cultural competence and emotion management. All three reflect important aspects of military leadership in a comprehensive approach context and deserve more attention in selection and education processes.

In terms of the developmental leadership model, the three addendums can be seen as special cases of the existing concepts as follows: (1) conflict management can be looked upon as a part of “Social competence”; (2) cultural competence can be regarded as a special case of “Extra-organizational management competence”; and (3) emotion regulation can be seen as part of the “Capacity to cope with stress”.

### **CONTEXTUAL CHARACTERISTICS**

The contextual side is covered in a somewhat summary fashion in the developmental leadership model. The recent elaboration to the model previously mentioned is mainly based on well-established organization- and group-level theories and does not fully capture the specific aspects identified in the present study.<sup>48</sup> Taking the presented model (Figure 5.1) as a point of departure, nothing was found in the present analysis which contradicts the aspects mentioned in the model. However, the comprehensive approach context implies an increased emphasis on the following: the complexity of this kind of military task, the need for political and cultural understanding, a frequent lack of time and resources and, therefore, a situation characterized by highly complex decision-making.

An example of this is that comprehensive approach operations/missions are carried out in parts of the world where the political situation is complex. Accordingly, a comprehensive approach commander may have to deal with weak societal structures, corruption, and violence on a frequent basis. There is also the challenge of how to reach the end state and to hand over different responsibilities to local institutions that may be too weak to handle them. At the same time, comprehensive approach missions are not supposed to be everlasting.

There are differences in comprehensive approach tasks compared to Cold War military tasks. Modern crisis management implies a broader range of demands. There are political dimensions included, where poverty and

justice may affect the security situation. There is a need to integrate immaterial aspects such as actions of influence to win hearts and minds. There is also a financial aspect, in that the comprehensive approach may demand resources for infrastructural investments.

Generally, decision-making in the comprehensive approach may require balancing several different goals and there may be several aspects and interests that have to be aggregated. This implies that the perfect solution may often not be at hand and that there may be a need to communicate the pros and cons of what is decided. It is accordingly important to have reasonable expectations for the outcome. Otherwise, there will be too much pressure put on the individual commander. The possible solutions are not exclusively at the individual level. Success cannot solely be dependent on the competencies of the individual commander. If an aspect of the task is identified as inherently complex, the possible solutions would include the finding of effective and relevant management routines. This implies that recruiting a suitable leader is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the comprehensive approach to be successful.

### **INTERPRETATION OF TASK**

There are several problems/challenges tied to interpretation. One of particular importance from a leadership perspective is the lack of consensus on how to define the comprehensive approach. There are also other kinds of definitional problems, for example the unclear differences between peace-keeping and peacebuilding. There is also the need for further development of doctrines and a common vocabulary in organizations that could potentially work together.

These structural aspects represent one side of the coin. The other side is constituted by individual differences between military leaders in how a given context and task are appraised. Generally speaking, the more clear-cut the environmental aspects, the more likely it is that different military leaders will interpret the situation similarly. The opposite of this, obviously, is that highly complex and ambiguous environments and tasks are prone to being interpreted differently.

### **LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOURS**

The analysis of desired leadership behaviours in a comprehensive approach context identified the following: highly flexible/adaptive, inspirational/motivational to subordinates, an emphasis on trust and feedback and on being

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a favourable role model. All these aspects can be found in the theoretical model. However, it should be noted that the need to be highly flexible/adaptive appears to be more emphasized in the complex and dynamic comprehensive approach environment. At the individual level this may once again have selection and education consequences.

### **OUTCOMES**

The overall outcome in a comprehensive approach operation is to reach a defined end state. This is often formulated as a political goal, where peace, security, and democracy are important values. Of course, there are task solutions at lower levels with more short-term and restricted goals. The success of these could be related to the other parts of the model. However, this is not the purpose with the present study but rather a subject for future research.

#### **Outcome Example**

The “Outcome” box of the leadership model (Figure 5.1) contains the aspect of functional task solution. A common response from former Swedish force commanders in Afghanistan concerns difficulties in defining and measuring what is meant by the task solution “end state.” A typical interview response:

*I’m commanding this force for six months. It’s predictable that there will not be peace, security and democracy within this time frame. So what could a part end state look like in my case? How do I know if we have done a good job?*

Examples of partial goals regarded as more or less measurable and meaningful by a sample of former Swedish commanders in Afghanistan include:

- Support from the host country population
- Number of opened schools, health care institutions, etc. in the host country
- Amount of money spent (Swedish tax money)

## SUMMARY OF LEADERSHIP IMPLICATIONS

The present analysis can be summarized as follows. First, all aspects of the theoretical leadership model have been interpreted as being also relevant in a comprehensive approach context. Second, some additional aspects, not mentioned in the existing model, were identified. Additional attention to the aspects summarized in Table 5.1 is highly recommended as an addendum to the present praxis.

Desirable leader competencies/skills	Practical consequence
Conflict management Cultural competence Emotion management	Selection and education
Contextual characteristics	
Highly complex task Need for political understanding Need for cultural understanding Lack of time and resources Highly complex decision-making	Development of relevant and effective management routines
Interpretation of task	Selection and education
Inter-individual variation due to ambiguity of environment and task	
Leadership behaviours	Selection and education
Being highly flexible/adaptive	

**Table 5.1. Comprehensive Approach-specific Aspects not Mentioned in the Existing Leadership Model of the Swedish Armed Forces.**

## SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RESEARCH SUGGESTIONS

The results of this literature-based study can be summarized as follows:

1. The UN, EU and NATO differ on how far they have developed comprehensive approach doctrine and core conceptual documents.

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2. Sweden does not currently have a comprehensive approach of its own but seems to be headed in that direction. Small actors like Sweden can mainly contribute to the actions of larger actors within a mission with “plug-in” capabilities depending on the needs of the mission.
3. The comprehensive approach context can be assumed to put an increased emphasis on the following leadership challenges: highly complex military tasks, a need for political and cultural understanding, a frequent lack of time and resources, and, following from this, highly complex decision-making.

Because the present study was literature-based, there is a strong need for empirical studies in military contexts. We following are two complementary suggestions for future research.

1. *A quantitative questionnaire-based study.* It should be focused on the operational/tactical level where a satisfactory number of participants can be found.
2. *A qualitative interview-based study.* We propose an interview study with informants from the strategic level, that is politicians and high-level civilian and military officers.

Examples of research questions of relevance to both suggested studies include the following:

- What is the relative importance of the different model factors to the outcome?
- How can selection procedures and training be improved?
- How can management routines be improved?
- What are the critical leadership challenges when it comes to handling cultural differences, conflicts and emotions?
- What are the critical leadership challenges when military and civilian organizations have to cooperate towards a common goal?
- How can the comprehensive approach concept “end state” be operationalized to assist military commanders at different organizational levels?

From a leadership perspective, particularly at the operational and tactical levels, this leads to the following conclusion. The present leadership model of the Swedish Armed Forces – Developmental Leadership – holds up well against the new challenges. However, it needs to be complemented with the following competencies/skills: conflict management, cultural competence, emotion management and an increased attention on flexibility and adaptability. The practical consequences following from this can be divided into two broad areas. The first is individual-related and calls for improved officer selection and education. The second is organization-related and implies a need to develop comprehensive approach-relevant and effective management routines.

We opened the chapter by pointing to a duality in the Swedish situation. On one hand, there is a long history of non-participation in military alliances. On the other hand, there is an ongoing trend to make the national armed forces more NATO compatible. The present analysis indicates that the Swedish model of military leadership is highly compatible with demands posed by multinational missions within a comprehensive approach framework. Given the long Swedish tradition of strong freedom of governmental agencies (more than 400 years), we predict that further development of the comprehensive approach in Sweden will depend more on political decisions than on military leadership.

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# CHAPTER 6

## THE DUTCH APPROACH: LEADERSHIP LESSONS FROM MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAMS

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### INTRODUCTION

First, whether you like it or not, international cooperation is a fact. It is reality. International cooperation follows directly from our shrinking defence budgets. Being a small country with a reduced budget, you are soon faced with the reality of having to get rid of capabilities that you actually need. This creates dependence on partners. But there is also a more positive reason why we should aim for more cooperation, and this is operational reality. We can spend a long time talking about cooperation here, but to our junior leadership, that is just everyday reality.<sup>1</sup>

The Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Army stated the above about cooperation with non-military parties in 2012. Since the Lisbon Summit of 2010, NATO has underlined the necessity of cooperation between political, civilian and military parties in the so-called “comprehensive approach”. For the Dutch forces, this means that during deployment they will be cooperating with other parties, like police (which occurred in the policing mission in Kunduz, Afghanistan), other government departments and non-governmental organizations. However, at home in the Netherlands this cooperation is an everyday reality, since teams are becoming more and more multidisciplinary and fluid.

Leadership is a topic of interest in literature and academic research. However, this research is surprisingly silent on leadership in multidisciplinary teams in contrast to single-culture team research.<sup>2</sup> Until now team research

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\* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Royal Netherlands Army or the Netherlands Ministry of Defence.

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focused on leadership within commercial and profit-oriented organizations. Moreover, multidisciplinary leadership in a governmental or non-profit sector has not yet been fully elaborated. In the military, leadership within multidisciplinary teams is an increasingly important issue for three reasons.

First, commanding officers are sent abroad for peace missions and humanitarian relief operations carried out by multidisciplinary and even multinational teams, as alluded to in the opening quote by the Dutch Commander in Chief.

The second reason for interest in multidisciplinary leadership is due to strategic choices made by the Ministry of Defence over the past years. National safety tasks are becoming more important in the employment of military resources. In 2011, the military carried out over 2000 national tasks related to homeland security.<sup>3</sup> In 2012 the military was asked for assistance about three times a week.<sup>4</sup> Over 15,000 servicemen are occupied 24/7 with taskings such as surveillance, security services to the royal household, police assistance, explosive clearance, border control, and security at sea and in the air. In these teams, servicemen need to cooperate with other operational teams, for example, from the police.

The third reason for the increasing attention to multidisciplinary cooperation can be explained by the cut-backs in all Dutch governmental departments (also mentioned by the Commander in Chief). All departments are forced to intensify their cooperation, not only on an operational level, but also on the strategic and political levels. During operations abroad servicemen are confronted with political and humanitarian focused organizations and with armed forces from other nations. During national operations, servicemen cooperate in teams with members from organizations such as law enforcement, border control and the police. Consequently, under such circumstances servicemen are already participating in multidisciplinary teams as leaders or as subordinates.

In this chapter we focus on leadership in multidisciplinary and multinational teams. What makes multinational teams even more complex is the existence of different cultures, which can hinder communication and cause different preferences in leadership behaviour. Gerstner and Day<sup>5</sup> presented evidence that diverse leadership prototypes, with different traits, exist across countries. They concluded that, “those traits considered to be most (as well as moderately and least) characteristic of business leaders varied by culture”. Brodbeck and colleagues<sup>6</sup> research about prototypical leadership styles in Europe found similar results.

It is relevant to take notice of leadership in multidisciplinary teams. This way of operating will probably become more important in the coming years due to the increasingly complex assignments for the military, globalization, financial cutbacks and reorganizations in Dutch governmental departments. Moreover, leadership lessons drawn from traditional war fighting missions are not always applicable to leadership in a multidisciplinary team. The reason for this is that there are important differences between these multidisciplinary teams and traditional combat units<sup>7</sup>:

1. lack of familiarity, i.e., the members of these operational teams do not necessarily know each other;
2. different working procedures;
3. different Rules of Engagement and legal permissions.

These differences pose a challenge to the leader of such teams: how to reach the goal when there is actually no real “team” to work with? The leader needs to cope with the fact that the team has not yet gone through the maturation stages of team-development<sup>8</sup>, therefore team characteristics that are valuable in complex situations, such as trust and loyalty, may be lacking.

The goal of this chapter is to provide insight into leadership in multidisciplinary teams. In order to do so, we conducted interviews with leaders and members of Dutch multidisciplinary teams that operate on a regular basis in different lines of operations in the military. In this chapter, we describe the most relevant lessons members of these teams have learned, using the perspectives of both leaders and subordinates. Before addressing the leadership lessons learned from multidisciplinary operations, we briefly describe the background of multidisciplinary operations in the Netherlands. We also describe the strategic choices that were made in recent years, resulting in the so-called “Dutch Approach”. We will focus on leading teams dealing with: 1) national disaster relief, 2) intercultural differences in the Caribbean Coast Guard and UN observer missions, and 3) countering organized crime. We conclude the chapter by giving practical recommendations for improving military leadership in multidisciplinary teams.

## **STRATEGIC CHOICES IN THE DUTCH MILITARY**

In 2010, the Dutch Defence organization conducted a prospective study to examine the opportunities for defence in relation to global and national development.<sup>9</sup> This study formed the foundation for the “military strategic

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vision”. Among other things, this vision states that increased attention will be paid to the defence organization’s assistance operations and cyber-activities (both nationally and internationally).<sup>10</sup> Internal and external security are increasingly intertwined. These developments have practical implications for the work and training of Dutch soldiers.<sup>11</sup>

Out of these explorations four policy options emerged. The first policy option focused on **protecting** national, NATO and EU interests. In this option, the Defence organization focuses more on national tasks in addition to the already existing partnerships in the civil domain (such as police and customs). Operations in this option are especially defensive and reactive. Operations far beyond national borders (such as in Asia or Africa) only take place when the Kingdom of the Netherlands and its interests are at risk. The second policy option emphasized **intervention**. This involves maintaining, and when necessary, enforcing international law and defending the Kingdom of the Netherlands. In this option, it is vital for the Armed Forces to seek military technological superiority, which allows rapid intervention in crisis situations (whether individuals, groups or nations are concerned). The third policy option involved establishing security abroad, i.e., **stabilization**. Unlike the second option, the Dutch defence organization provides assistance to security organizations in fragile states and regions (so-called “post-conflict areas”). It may involve training missions, observation missions or providing a “buffer zone”, however proactive actions and interventions are not carried out in this option even though the scope of operations is not limited to the homeland.

The fourth policy option focused on preserving the **operational capability** or **multi-deployability** of the Armed Forces. This means that the forces can be flexibly deployed in any manner mentioned in the first three options. This option is an extension of the policy adhered to after the fall of the Berlin Wall in the 1990s. In cooperation with allies, diverse tasks are performed. Ultimately, this option was chosen as the leading policy<sup>12</sup> and was brought into practice in 2010. Bringing this policy of multi-deployability into practice requires a considerable amount of direct and indirect cooperation with other nations, governments, and security services. This type of operation confronts the military leader with new leadership challenges.

## THE DUTCH APPROACH

When addressing the comprehensive approach in the Dutch military context, the so-called “Dutch Approach” must be discussed. The Dutch forces broadly applied this approach in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan province. Even

though internationally the comprehensive approach was put into practice in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, the Dutch approach of dealing with COIN impressed international partners worldwide. The Dutch approach is a method built on the Dutch philosophy that winning the hearts and minds of the local population contributes more to security than using force and violence.<sup>13</sup> Therefore, the use of force is a last resort. Even though other western countries also make use of COIN strategies, the Dutch approach differs by making “cultural awareness” the main feature in all actions. The Dutch approach astonished the coalition forces in Afghanistan to some extent: the British newspaper *The Times*, for example, stated that the Dutch “aim to beat *Taliban* by inviting them round to tea” in a “Qala-like compound” (Qala is Pashtu for house)<sup>14</sup>, whereas their British colleagues hide out in their forts.<sup>15</sup>

The Dutch approach has its origin in policing. The Moluccan train hostage incident in 1977 was the first time the military used “talking” as an intervention instead of repressive actions and force. The plan was to talk until the Moluccan hijackers would surrender. This plan was carried out effectively, leading to international praise. Even though people were killed and injured during the event, the “talking” strategy presumably prevented a worse outcome.<sup>16</sup> Thus, the Dutch approach was born. For the Dutch servicemen in modern day military operations, this means that respectful interaction with the local population and the insurgents is most important. Therefore, the Dutch troops encourage friendly contact and interactions by making themselves accessible (e.g. by building compounds that resemble Afghan houses, by going bare-headed and by driving in so-called “soft-top-vehicles”). Although this accessibility builds trust, it makes the Dutch troops vulnerable to their surroundings. Since 2006, the Dutch approach has been official policy. This requires aligning politics, security and development, forcing the three responsible Ministries, Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Development, to cooperate.<sup>17</sup>

## LESSONS DRAWN FROM REAL-LIFE MILITARY EXPERIENCES

In order to gain insight in the challenges and situations leaders of multidisciplinary teams confront, we selected six Dutch teams in which both civil and military parties operate. The teams are those that, despite their fluid make up, are formed and operational on a regular basis and follow the fourth strategic policy option of the “multi-deployability” of the Armed Forces. For the purpose of this chapter we interviewed several commanding officers who led such teams in order to distinguish the demands of this type of leadership. The

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following paragraphs examine lessons drawn from real-life military experiences in multidisciplinary operations.

### **TRUST, RESPECT AND FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT**

It is important to gain trust of your team-members, regardless of their cultural background. As a leader you need to respect the fact that other traditions, communication styles and working procedures are present. In the Caribbean<sup>18</sup> for example, people are more verbal than in the Netherlands, asking a question and getting the answer you long for takes more time than in the Netherlands. You need to show interest in the other party and make some small-talk before saying what you want, for the Dutch this is quite a challenge since we are (even for the European continent) very direct.

In order to make sure cooperation flourishes you have to show trust in your subordinates from the first time you meet them by giving them “space” to operate in the manner they believe which is appropriate. Things may not go the way you think to be “normal”, but when the goals are reached... then, what’s the big deal? You need to let go of the arrogance to think that the way WE do things is THE best way.

*Commander of the Caribbean Coast Guard  
of the Royal Netherlands Navy*

### **INNOVATION, COMMON INTENT AND COMMON LANGUAGE**

In the National Coordination Centre [for] Disaster and Crisis different parties participate in several multidisciplinary sections. The well-known military hierarchy is almost not present in these teams. This is both positive and negative. Positive in that this way of cooperation creates a “safe” working environment, consequently leading to actually getting feedback on your performance. So, critical points of improvement in the process or the interpersonal relation are discussed and people receive respectful feedback. Moreover, new initiatives are stimulated. For example, we now use social media in order to discuss ongoing matters in the projects we are involved in. Those media work faster than the traditional media, and that is useful for our business. Stimulating new ideas is something we can use more in our “traditional” organization. A negative consequence of this kind of cooperation is that there is a lack of vigour, there are so many interests at stake that a decision is not always made in time. It is therefore important to



create a common language (you really need to understand the other even when your background and jargon are different) and shared vision about the end state (you need to know what direction we're aiming for, otherwise no decisions are made).

*Representative of the Royal Netherlands Air Force in the National Coordination Centre Disaster & Crisis Team*

## **ADAPTATION AND CULTURAL AWARENESS**

You have to face the fact that sometimes the cultural differences are too large to overcome. Especially as a woman. You cannot change different cultural perspectives on women's rights in only a few months' time. You need to adapt, make sure that you create a workable environment, for yourself and the other. Constant awareness of the mission goal and questioning what behaviour is most effective to reach this goal is vital in these situations. You need to acknowledge that your own principles are not always met. Holding on to your own principles or even pushing them through will not be as effective as you could be when adapting to local cultural norms.

*Representative of the Royal Netherlands Air Force as a UN Observer in Sudan*

## **FAMILIARITY, PROFESSIONALISM AND EQUALITY**

Our department/unit is occupied with special interventions. For example in case of terrorist attacks or hijacking activities: the so-called "hot-interventions". Our teams consist of members from the Military Police, the Marine Corps and SWAT [Special Weapons and Tactics] teams. These three organizations are alike, but still, there are differences in culture and working-procedures. What is absolutely vital in our operations is trust, after all: there is much at stake when we intervene. In order to establish trust familiarity needs to be created. A team matures through shared experiences (e.g. interventions), sleeping in the same room in severe circumstances, training and discussing differences and conflict situations. Moreover, in our line of business professionalism is absolutely necessary. This means that we need to know our personal strengths and faults/weaknesses and that we need to be clear about them to our team-members. You can never say you will do something you can't possibly do; then you put your colleagues at risk! On the other hand, this means that we need to be a professional team in which expertise means more than rank. We

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have to accept from each other that in a certain situation the corporal is the expert. The higher ranking officer has to listen to and act on the advice of the corporal.

*Commander of a Unit of the Brigade Special Security Operations*

### **DIALOGUE, SETTLE AGREEMENT AND CLEAR RESPONSIBILITIES**

Our unit is specialized in Advanced Search, this means we can find things no one else can. This specialization mainly developed because of our deployment experience in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, due to the presence of IEDs [improvised explosive devices] and booby-traps. In our homeland, we support police and the justice department in counter-organized-crime interventions. The tasks we perform are similar to those in the mission area, the context however differs substantially. Where being deployed means thousands of miles away from home, we are now operating in our own backyard, so to speak, with the local media following every move. Our expertise is our greatest strength, but is also a pitfall. After all, we know what our capabilities are, but in the Netherlands we (the military) are not in command. We need to follow the instructions of our partners, e.g. the police, even when we have to cooperate with teams we have never met before. Therefore, it is my duty as a commander to restrain the eagerness of my men, since it is not “our call” to make decisions. A wrong decision made by one of my men can have major consequences for our entire organization. So it is important to keep communicating, to settle agreement with our partners, my own commanding officers, and my subordinates. We all need to know what my platoon can and cannot do.

*Commander of an Army Advanced Military Search Platoon*

### **RESILIENCE, UNDERSTANDING, RESPECT AND HELICOPTER VIEW**

Since The Hague is the ministerial capital and the residence of the International Criminal Court of the Netherlands, teams consisting of differing departments (such as police and defence) are formed on a regular basis. Multidisciplinary teams are, for example, constituted when a coronation of our King (or Queen), or a funeral of a member of the Royal Family has to be strategically thought out and planned.

Thus, these are not operational teams, but more strategic planning groups. It is vital to acknowledge that every department brings its own goals, procedures and culture. We all have our own “scripts” about how to act in the event, however they are all from only one perspective: thus we need to integrate these perspectives by taking a helicopter view. Dilemmas are part of our daily routine, so you need to acknowledge that you cannot arrange everything beforehand: a checklist always proves incomplete. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary for these teams to trust in the professionalism of the differing departments, and to train the operational elements in adaptability and resilience instead of solely in fixed drills and procedures.

*Assistant Head Commander Fire Department The Hague*

## **SOME THOUGHTS ON LEADERSHIP IN MULTIDISCIPLINARY TEAMS**

Even though the stories, the work-contexts, and even the preference of personal leadership style differ between the leaders who were interviewed, there appears to be a common thread in these cases. All servicemen agree that “social skills” are vital under such complex circumstance. They discuss communication skills (since reaching an agreement is necessary in reaching the goals), cultural awareness and features of group-dynamics (such as respect and familiarity). Interestingly, these are also the main features of the Dutch Approach: in order to be effective, you need to understand and be respectful towards all parties in the context, even the “enemy”. Moreover, in multidisciplinary teams a high level of team maturation<sup>19</sup> seems desirable. However, due to time pressure and the short period of time that such units are operational this condition is not always met. The military leader needs to balance between the level of maturation that is a precondition for operating under such circumstances and the level that is actually attainable.

A recent study conducted within operational units on missions, the Combined Arms Teams, showed that within military units trust is extremely important for cooperation and mission completion. This was especially relevant when units are tailor-made and consist of members from different arms of service (so-called “joint operations”).<sup>20</sup> Therefore, it seems logical that trust is similarly necessary for civil-military cooperation, where cultures differ even more and “agendas” might be quite different.

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Another element that appears in almost all of these stories seems quite obvious and logical. All servicemen state that the leader needs adaptability to appropriately deal with the complexity of multidisciplinary teams. Thus, as a consequence, leaders need to adapt their leadership style to the cognitive level, emotional well-being, and needs of the individual team members, the team as a whole, and to the context in which they are working as a leader. It is a mistake to enforce your rules as leader (i.e., your culture behaviours, your protocols) to your team without compromise. There does not seem to be one “best way” in leadership, even though this is suggested by management and leadership gurus. This lesson is in line with the actualized leadership philosophy of the Dutch defence organization.

The new Dutch leadership philosophy will be announced and implemented in the summer of 2013. As part of this new philosophy, the slogan “Being, Doing, Learning: That is what leadership is about, now and in the future”<sup>21</sup> was formulated. Under this philosophy, leaders have characterizing features and values, they *are* a leader. Leaders are not black boxes that can be filled with skills and ‘tricks’: they bring their own personality and experience. It is through the leader’s attitude and behaviour that the values of the Dutch defence organization are demonstrated. Leaders *do*: they act, take the lead, and adapt their behaviour to the context and environment. As a leader, different skills are required in order to be effective. They need to fulfill the role of a leader, a manager, a coach and an expert.<sup>22</sup> Leaders need to be aware of their preference in leadership style and need to be able to switch between roles depending on the situation. Sometimes declaring protocols is important, in other situations social skills must dominate. In addition, leaders of the armed forces need to learn constantly.<sup>23</sup> Only adapting to the situation and being flexible would be too reactive. Leadership is about adapting and learning. The key feature for learning is the capacity to reflect on one’s self, the team and the context.

Leaders need to gain experience with the complexity of multidisciplinary teams. To be successful leaders in complex situations, such as during operations in multidisciplinary teams, they also need to learn from the experiences of others. We offer four practical recommendations – in line with the Dutch military leadership philosophy – that can contribute to the further development of leadership competency in complex multidisciplinary operations.

## **Dutch Leadership Philosophy 2013**

### **Being. Doing. Learning.**

#### **That is what leadership is about, now and in the future.**

Deployable for peace and security anywhere and at all times. Doing a good job, connecting with your personnel, while continuously striving to improve the organization: this all requires customized leadership. Both in the peacetime organization and during deployments. Especially in today's society. The work of the Defence organization is becoming increasingly complex and uncertain, and is requiring more and more cooperation with other parties. In addition, the way people work nowadays and the new generation of personnel call for a different emphasis in leadership. To an increasing extent, we are electing to inspire rather than monitor, to listen rather than speak and to unite rather than persuade.

Today's leaders have both character and skills. They are able to adjust their style of leadership quickly, effectively and consciously to the requirements of any given situation. They are also aware of the limitations of their particular leadership style and they continue to learn, both from their own experiences and from others.

Character forms the basis for good leadership in the Defence organization. You need a robust personality. It requires honesty, responsibility, courage and the will to serve. But these characteristics alone are not enough. You have to do these things in practice too, based on your knowledge and skills. In your dealings with other people as well as in your own tasks. Your role is not only that of a leader — your men and women need you to be a coach and a manager as well. And you set an example when it comes to getting the job done properly: you are a professional.

Your task is to improve the effectiveness of your unit continuously. On the one hand by taking a good look at yourself, and on the other hand by using feedback from other people to your advantage. For yourself, for your team and for the wider context. If as a leader you continue to learn from your own experiences and from others, you will not only successfully contribute to the mission of the Defence organization, you will also improve the Defence organization itself.

In other words, DO your task and LEARN, but above all... BE a leader!

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### ***1. Learning together***

A problem stated by most of the interviewees is the lack of time to share experiences with other commanders and teams. It is often not clear who has recent relevant experience. Typically, when the next operation is presenting itself, there is no time for reflection on previous operations. The defence organization needs to embrace a learning culture, in which feedback is shared and challenges are confronted instead of being considered as a threat. In order to contribute to this learning culture, leaders who have faced challenges should be encouraged to pass on their newly learned lessons by informing other leaders in a network. The organization should recommend that their commanders spend time in consultation with their predecessor and leaders in comparable situations about the lessons learned, in order to share both positive and negative lessons.

### ***2. Reflection in times of complexity***

Almost all interviewees agreed that since the complexity of operations demands a lot of the military leaders, they need to be able to communicate well. Moreover, they need to be able to reflect upon their own behaviour. Therefore, we suggest personal coaching and other tools for personal development should be further developed. Becoming conscious of one's own preferred leadership style, one's strengths and weaknesses as a leader and being able to switch between leadership styles in an effective way (with the help of reflection and dialogue) can be stimulated through education and other training opportunities. The leadership philosophy states:

The work of the Defence organization is becoming increasingly complex and uncertain, and is requiring more and more cooperation with other parties. In addition, the way people work nowadays and the new generation of personnel call for a different emphasis in leadership. To an increasing extent, we are electing to inspire rather than monitor, to listen rather than speak and to unite rather than persuade.<sup>24</sup>

### ***3. Team coaching***

The interviewees considered trust to be a vital feature for operating in multi-disciplinary teams. Team coaching is a tool that can be of great use, especially in teams with members who have little familiarity with each other. Team coaching focuses on enhancing communication and cooperation within a team. For teams that are combined ad hoc, for example, in UN Monitoring missions, team coaching might be an effective tool to overcome internal miscommunication and conflict escalation.

#### 4. Cultural Awareness

Teams may only exist for a short period of time or may be stood up within only a few hours or days. In these cases, team coaching is not suitable. However, a better understanding of the other parties is still desired in such teams. Cultural Awareness Training is used for units that are sent abroad for military missions. For example, when a unit is sent to Afghanistan, its commander is advised to implement cultural awareness training into the pre-deployment training. However, due to time pressures, cultural awareness training is often not conducted. We suggest the organization focus more on this “soft side” of operations. Cultural awareness training is not only relevant in missions abroad. We suggest executing comparable sessions even when the other parties seem quite similar, such as is the case in cooperation between police and military.

Being a leader is not simple, heroic, or sometimes even nice. However, leadership is most needed in complex situations to create unity and to create a team. This is especially important when different parties who are not familiar with each other need to cooperate and the stakes are high. Team performance can be greater than the sum of the contribution of individual team members. Former Commander in Chief General Peter van Uhm stated in his speech on 4 May 2013 (Dutch Remembrance Day): “Not from the focus of ‘I’ and ‘them’, but from ‘we’, will good things arise. History has taught us that. We need to remember, we need to keep dialoging, with ourselves and with each other.”<sup>25</sup>

## ENDNOTES

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7. In these Combat Units, different elements of the Armed Forces can take part, for example, infantry, engineering and medics. This type of operation can be considered multidisciplinary,

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however, we consider this type of cooperation as “joint”, meaning the units are part of the same “mother-organization”. Therefore, we leave this type of unit out of consideration and focus on units in which elements from different organizations are forced to cooperate.

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9. Ministerie van Defensie, *Toekomstverkenningen*, (Den Haag: Ministerie van Defensie, 2010).
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14. The Dutch compound was made out of mud walls and designed to resemble traditional Afghan architecture.
15. Moeler, 2009.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Since the 1950s, the Kingdom of the Netherlands is organized as constituent countries, comprising three countries in the Caribbean (the former colonies Curacao, Bonaire and Sint-Maarten) and one in Europe (the Netherlands proper).
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23. Ibid.
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25. Peter van Uhm, *Saamhorigheid*. Speech for National Remembrance Day May 4th 2013, retrieved from <[http://www.4en5mei.nl/documenten/4%20mei/toespraak\\_peter\\_van\\_uhm\\_nh\\_2013.pdf](http://www.4en5mei.nl/documenten/4%20mei/toespraak_peter_van_uhm_nh_2013.pdf)>.



# CHAPTER 7

## THE COMPREHENSIVE VERSUS THE TERRITORIAL APPROACH: CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE INDONESIAN ARMY CONTEXT

*Colonel Eri Radityawara Hidayat, PhD\**

*“Soldiers are not a grouping outside of (civil) society, nor a caste that stands above them. Soldiers, no less no more, are one part of society that has certain obligations”.*

*General Soedirman  
Commander of the Indonesian Defence Force  
New Year Speech for the newly established  
Indonesian Defence Force, Yogyakarta, 1 January 1946.<sup>1</sup>*

### INTRODUCTION

The comprehensive approach to military operations was first brought up in the spring of 2006 by military thinkers from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This approach was based on the lessons learned from its operations during the post-Cold War period, particularly experiences in Afghanistan, where new concepts of civil-military cooperation had to be adapted in order to gain mission success.<sup>2</sup> As mentioned by the current NATO Secretary General, Mr. Anders Rasmussen,

What we need is a comprehensive approach, where the political, civilian and military efforts are coordinated, and work towards common aims. Where, as much as possible, the military and civilian actors plan together, operate in complementary ways, and support each other. This may seem like common sense. And it is. But on the ground, and at the political level, there are all sorts of reasons, good and bad, why this doesn't happen. Which, speaking very openly, means our military operations often operate in a vacuum.<sup>3</sup>

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\* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the TNI or the TNI AD.

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This statement clearly shows that even though military means are paramount, they are not enough on their own to meet the complex challenges in modern international military operations, especially where conventional warfare is not the norm.

The basis of the comprehensive approach first proposed by NATO stems from the fact that, in the Western sense, civil-military cooperation historically is framed in the concept of military professionalism first espoused by Samuel Huntington in his seminal book, *The Soldier and the State*. Huntington argued that in order for a liberal democracy to survive and live together with a strong military, there must exist a professional officer corps, which is controlled by civilians.<sup>4</sup> In fact, during the Cold War, the separation of military and civilian authorities became permanent in all NATO countries.<sup>5</sup> Consequently, the ideal professional military officer in the West was formed in the image of a warrior who is proficient in conducting purely military functions, so much so that General John Shalikashvili, the former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States once famously said, “Real men don’t do Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).”<sup>6</sup> This image lasted until the deployment of the US led multinational coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003, when the strict division of work between military and civilian functions began to show serious deficiencies.<sup>7</sup>

Due to its history, the Indonesian National Defence Force (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia*; TNI) and especially the Indonesian National Army (*Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat* (TNI AD) have a different concept about the role of its armed forces in society. In terms of civil-military cooperation, this concept is closely related to the so called Territorial Doctrine. This chapter will explain the history and conceptual development of the Territorial Doctrine, and how this alternative form of civil-military cooperation can become a “lessons learned” for Western readers who are formulating their comprehensive approach concepts.

<b>Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)</b>	Indonesian National Defence Force.
<b>Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI AD)</b>	Indonesian National Army.
<b>Manunggal</b>	Meaning “becoming one,” it is the objective of the TNI’s territorial doctrine in which the soldier and the people in a territory must become one and inseparable.
<b>Territorial Doctrine</b>	A defensive doctrine of the TNI based on the “Total People’s Defence,” in which the TNI, with the help of the entire population in a territory, will engage in a territorial warfare against an invader.
<b>Territorial Command</b>	Territorial Command Structure of the TNI AD that corresponds closely to the civilian government territorial structure. Hierarchically it consisted of Regional Military Command (Komando Daerah Militer or Kodam), Sub-regional Military Command (Komando Resor Militer or Korem), District Military Command (Komando Distrik Militer or Kodim) and Village NCO (Bintara Pembina Desa or Babinsa).
<b>Territorial Capacity Building (TCB)</b>	All efforts, both through the TNI’s own initiative, or through working together with other government apparatus and other component of the nation, which aims to prepare the defence of a territory, by preparing the defensive space and its supporting forces, and by creating oneness between the soldier and the people in the territory.

**Table 7.1. Indonesian Terminology**

## THE TERRITORIAL APPROACH

### **WHY THE TERRITORIAL APPROACH?**

The demise of the Berlin Wall signalled the end of the construct of conducting only conventional warfare similar to that conducted during the two World Wars. While armed conflicts were still abundant, they were mostly in the form of low intensity conflicts and asymmetric warfare, which were often conducted in populated civilian areas.<sup>8</sup> In addition, the military's function had also been expanded, so that it was now engaged in the so-called MOOTW, which includes conducting humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations, counter-terrorism, and other activities that require coordination and engagement with non-military elements such as Non-Governmental Organizations, the media, and local governments.<sup>9</sup>

Since these activities require military units to engage simultaneously in military and non-military activities, in the early 1990s NATO formulated the concept of CIMIC to create a military function that could deal with civilian organizations, such as when conducting humanitarian tasks during a peacekeeping operation.<sup>10</sup> However, after more than two decades performing as a tool to support military missions, as the operation in Afghanistan clearly showed, CIMIC was too limited in scope to help the military accomplish its mission.<sup>11</sup> For example, without any comprehensive approach to develop a conflict area, where civilian actors are not prepared to go, there is no way that the military can win the hearts and minds of the people in the area. And this fact goes back to the original debate over CIMIC's relations with the wider concept of Civil-Military Relations (CIMIR), in which CIMIC, as traditionally understood from the Western perspective of CIMIR, limits the military's responsibility to military-related tasks, and prescribes strict criteria for taking on any activity of a non-military nature.<sup>12</sup>

Against this background, NATO's leaders saw their soldiers as lacking in doctrine, experience, training, and competencies to effectively conduct operations involving non-military duties, especially when they must be implemented in a foreign culture. This led to the development of the comprehensive approach. This is where the TNI can provide an alternative discourse on civil-military cooperation, namely the territorial approach. Sebastian argued that in comparison to the peacekeeping approaches taken by the US in Somalia, which boxed the locals into "good guys versus bad guys" and subsequently triggered the Battle of Mogadishu in 1993, the TNI, through its

territorial approach, is required to build good relationships with all sides of a conflict.<sup>13</sup> Since TNI's territorial commanders must put significant emphasis on the local geography, culture and social systems in their operational doctrine, in overseas peacekeeping duties, their soldiers are required to develop person-to-person interaction with the local people.<sup>14</sup> In order to further understand the territorial approach, the next section discusses its origins and conceptual development.

### **THE ORIGINS OF THE TERRITORIAL APPROACH**

Unlike armies from Western countries, as an entity that came into being during the Independence War with the Dutch, the Indonesian Army came from a different mould. The embryo of the Indonesian Territorial Army was formed on 22 April 1943, when the 7<sup>th</sup> Japanese Army Headquarters in Saigon announced that Indonesian youth were able to individually join the Japanese army as a *Heiho* (auxiliary soldiers).<sup>15</sup> With the looming Allied Forces in mind, the Japanese felt it was necessary to have native auxiliary military forces. To achieve this objective, they asked Indonesia to form a total defence system that ranged from big cities to remote areas, in effect organizing Indonesian settlement much like in Japan at that time. This resulted in the creation of the so-called PETA (*Pembela Tanah Air*, or Defenders of the Motherland), which was specifically trained in guerrilla warfare by Japanese instructors.<sup>16</sup> PETA eventually grew to 77 battalions in Java, Madura and Bali, and 55 companies in Sumatra.<sup>17</sup>

After the defeat of the Japanese by the Allied Forces, Indonesia declared its independence on 17 August 1945. Its constitution, which since has been called the 1945 Constitution, states that the Unitary States of the Republic of Indonesia (*Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia* or NKRI) is based on the national ideology *Pancasila* (Five Pillars), which guide Indonesians by the five following principles: belief in one God Almighty; humanity; unity of Indonesia; democracy guided by consensus; and social justice.<sup>18</sup> *Pancasila* is considered a social contract that binds together the more than 200 million people who come from approximately 19,000 islands, are descended from over 200 native ethnic groups and races, speak 742 different languages, and follow one of the five official religions.<sup>19</sup>

The Dutch attempted to re-establish their rule in Indonesia and tried to use a federated union as a “divide and conquer” strategy to woo minorities and outer islanders who might be wary of the dominant ethnic and religious groups. Citizen militias sprang up all over Indonesia from every ethnic and

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religious persuasion, with former Indonesian PETA officers forming the core of the Indonesian freedom fighters.<sup>20</sup> Although some native Indonesians did serve in the Royal Dutch Colonial Army (*Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger* – KNIL) in the East Indies, PETA was originally formed specifically as territorially-based guerrillas to confront the more technologically advanced invading forces.<sup>21</sup> At that time, the newly established TNI did not possess heavy weaponry. As a result, Indonesian officers with a KNIL background, who were more familiar with conventional defence methods, soon lost out. The TNI AD subsequently adopted a “Territorial Army” doctrine based on the “total people’s defence” concept, along with a core identity (*jati diri*) as “a people’s army, a fighter army, and a national army” that pledged itself as the guarantor of the existence of NKRI based on *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution.<sup>22</sup>

After the civilian government capitulated to the Dutch, the TNI refused to surrender. In November 1948, the venerated Supreme Commander of the TNI, General Sudirman, a former PETA officer, issued an order called *Surat Perintah Siasat* (Strategy Order) No. 1, which established a system of military districts called *Wehrkreise* (adapted from the German system used during the Second World War). In this approach, the whole army would abandon linear defence and retreat to the countryside in order to conduct guerrilla warfare.<sup>23</sup> With this regional defence system, each commander received the full authority to operate against the Dutch forces by utilizing the resources available in the territory under his command.<sup>24</sup> Consequently, soldiers were required to live and unite with the people in the territory, so that the people would be willing to supply them with the necessary logistical support, as well as provided information on the movement of the Dutch soldiers.<sup>25</sup>

Realizing the potential political trap that this system might produce, General Nasution fine-tuned this doctrine further.<sup>26</sup> Nasution was one of the greatest thinkers that the TNI has ever had. As a graduate of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy (*Koninklijke Militaire Academie* – KMA), he was one of the few ex-KNIL officers able to rise in the TNI leadership, and became its Chief of Army. Undoubtedly influenced by his Western concept of military professionalism, he helped create an Indonesian version of a guerrilla warfare doctrine that excluded the political function from the people’s army doctrine that existed in communist countries such as China.<sup>27</sup>

After the War of Independence was over in 1957, due to political and religious differences, especially between the communists, the national secularists, and the Islamists, Indonesia’s civilian government was increasingly weakened by infighting. The government became very unstable, so much so that on average cabinets lasted for only about a year.<sup>28</sup> This prompted the TNI, under

the leadership of General Nasution, to formulate the so-called Dual Function (*Dwi Fungsi*) doctrine, which stated that the Indonesian military would assume a middle ground between the politically-oriented Latin American armed forces and the apolitical western European armed forces.<sup>29</sup> On 5 July 1959, with the support of General Nasution, President Soekarno produced a decree that declared Indonesia would return to the 1945 Constitution, which did not favour any one religion or ethnic group, and the five pillars of *Pancasila* would become the unifier for the diverse Indonesian nation.<sup>30</sup>

In the process, the Dual Function doctrine cemented the Territorial Doctrine further, as the Territorial Commanders were given additional tasks to ensure the political stability of the territory under their command.<sup>31</sup> This choice of doctrine is, in fact, in line with the so-called Concordance Theory proposed by Rebecca Schiff, who argued that the Institutional Theory of Civil-Military Relations put forward by Huntington is more applicable to the individualistic culture and values which existed in the United States. According to Schiff, the separation of civilian and military function should be negotiated according to the cultural landscape of each country.<sup>32</sup>

Unfortunately, when General Soeharto rose to power after the failed communist coup of 1965, he abused the Dual Function doctrine, especially in the later part of his three decades of rule. He used the Army's territorial structure to support his New Order (*Orde Baru*) regime.<sup>33</sup> After the collapse of the New Order in 1998, Indonesia entered the so-called "Reformation Era", and the TNI finally abandoned the Dual Function doctrine.<sup>34</sup> The TNI also added another identity as a "professional army", which reflected the growing demands from sections of the Indonesian civil society who were influenced by Huntington's concept of military professionalism.<sup>35</sup> Presumably, as a result of these changes, the TNI was praised by Western experts who were more comfortable with this notion of professionalism, which demands that the TNI focus on improving its war-making capabilities against external enemies, instead of dabbling in internal politics.<sup>36</sup>

## **CURRENT STATE OF THE TERRITORIAL DOCTRINE**

After the Reformation Era, the TNI returned to the territorial concept in its original meaning, namely a total defence doctrine, whereby territorial commanders are responsible to manage all available resources in their territory solely for the purpose of national defence.<sup>37</sup> To achieve this objective legally, the TNI successfully worked together with lawmakers to include it in the Indonesian Bill of Laws Number 34, 2004. It states that the empowerment of

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the territorial zones for land defence through Territorial Capacity Building (TCB) is one of the main duties of the TNI AD.<sup>38</sup>

It is true that in the early part of the Reformation Era some voices considered the existence of Territorial Command as anathema to democracy.<sup>39</sup> In essence, they wanted to emulate the concept of Huntington's military professionalism that exists in Western countries and demanded the abolishment of the Territorial Command, or at least that it be scaled down.<sup>40</sup> For them, the Territorial Command is the *raison d'être* for the involvement of the TNI in politics and hence the root cause of the lack of military professionalism as seen through Western eyes. While it was not surprising that, given the abuse of the Territorial Command by the New Order government, only a minority of the public surveyed supported the involvement of the TNI in politics. The same survey, by an independent institution, also showed that a solid majority of the people saw territorial operations in a positive light and therefore supported the continuation of the Territorial Command.<sup>41</sup>

## TERRITORIAL CAPACITY BUILDING<sup>42</sup>

### **OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL CAPACITY BUILDING**

Based on the Decree of the Chief of Army Number 98, dated 16 March 2007, on the implementation of the TNI AD's operational doctrine, there are three main functions of the TNI AD. These are the combat function, the strength capacity building function, and the territorial capacity building function. The territorial capacity building function (TCB; *Pembinaan Teritorial* or *Binter*), is related to all efforts and activities to build the territorial capacity of the TNI AD through the planning, establishing, developing, mobilizing and controlling of all potential territory resources, so that they can become assets for land defence. As this doctrine requires TNI AD officers to be able to interact and coordinate with non-military elements, a method was formulated to enable them to perform this function, which was subsequently called TCB. In essence, this means that territorial officers must be able to build, maintain, improve and stabilize the relationship between the TNI AD and the people in the territory, so that TNI AD soldiers and the people can, in the Indonesian word, *manunggal*, or become one.

TCB has certain characteristics that make it unique. First, it consists of two main groupings of activities. One is related to the defence of the country and the other is activities to help alleviate hardships faced by the people in



the territory. The second group of activities is important in that it is the essence of TCB, which is to form a bond between the soldiers and the people, i.e., *manunggal*. Second, TCB is composed of coordinated activities that are cross-sectoral, related and integrated. This means that while TCB activities can be conducted independently by the TNI AD, or jointly run with other elements in the territory, they must be coordinated with the relevant civilian authorities and other actors in the territory such as NGOs or the media. Consequently, TCB activities must be implemented in an integrated manner.

There are four objectives of TCB. The first is the existence of a formidable defensive space (*ruang juang yang tangguh*). This is in the form of a land-based defensive space which is ready for operations and can support the operational needs of the units operating in the territory, so that the TNI AD can win in any expected land warfare. The focus of TCB for this first objective is the geographical area in the territory, in which the natural resources in the area should be utilized as a source of logistical support for defending the territory. The second objective is the presence of strong fighting units (*alat juang yang tangguh*), which are ready to be used as force multipliers for the TNI AD as the main combat element in winning land warfare. The focus of TCB for the second objective is the demographical aspects that can be prepared as supporting elements, in the form of an organized reserve (*Bala Cadangan*) and support components. The third objective is the creation of a strong fighting condition (*kondisi juang yang tangguh*), in the form of support of the people in the territory as part of society, nation and state. This should be observable in attitudes and behaviours which show support for NKRI and a willingness to serve the nation and the state. The last objective is the establishment of a strong bond between the TNI and the people (*kemanunggalan TNI-Rakyat yang tangguh*) in the form of a solid relationship and a unity between the TNI and the people. For the third and fourth objective, the focus is on the creation of social resilience for the people in the territory, in the form of a society based on *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution.

## **IMPLEMENTATION OF TCB**

To achieve the aforementioned objectives, the territorial doctrine states that there are several activities that must be conducted. The first, in accordance with the total defence system, is to help local governments in the early preparation to turn defence potential into land-based defensive forces. This encompasses defensive zones and supporting elements, so that they are ready to conduct military operations for war, based on the defensive needs of the country. For example, territorial commanders and their staff can provide

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inputs to the related local government apparatus on how to implement development programs that will not obstruct the creation of the defensive space in the area. The second grouping of activities, based on the national service law, is to help the national government in conducting basic military training for citizens. For instance, the Army has established training centres in every regional command that are responsible for providing basic leadership and military training for non-military members, such as university students, so that they can be mobilized in times of need, such as when war or natural disaster occurs. The third set of activities is to help the government in empowering the local people as supporting elements. In this, the territorial command can provide opportunities for certain professions, such as the medical profession, to use their skills in military operations. Consequently, the implementation of the second and third grouping of activities should lead to the creation of force multipliers for the TNI AD.

The fourth cluster of activities is designed to help the government in conducting MOOTW. These include humanitarian operations, disaster relief operations, and other activities to solve the problem of refugees, infrastructure, strikes, and community conflicts. The last group of activities aims to build, maintain, improve, and stabilize the bond between the TNI AD and the people. For instance, territorial commands often conduct community based events such as cultural performances, musical events, youth related activities, and religious ceremonies that can draw support from the local citizens. The last two activities are aimed at achieving the third and fourth objectives of TCB, which are the creation of a conducive fighting condition based on the solidarity between the soldiers and the people in the territory. Through real action in the field, in which TNI AD soldiers help to solve the people's problems, it is believed that the people would be more willing to support national objectives and that the soldiers and the people can become one.

Several actors are responsible for implementing the TCB. First and foremost are the Territorial Commands, from Regional Military Command (*Komando Daerah Militer* or *Kodam*) at the highest level to the Village Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO; *Bintara Pembina Desa* or *Babinsa*) at the lowest level. These commands are responsible to conduct TCB continuously, on their own or together with the corresponding institutions and other components of society, as stipulated by law. Basically, the territorial command structure closely follows the civilian government administrative structure that exists in Indonesia (see Table 7.2).<sup>43</sup>

LEVEL OF AUTHORITY	
Civilian Government	Territorial Command
Provincial Government ( <i>Provinsi</i> )	Regional Military Command ( <i>Komando Daerah Militer or Kodam</i> ) and Subregional Military Command ( <i>Komando Resor Militer or Korem</i> )
District/Municipality Govern- ment ( <i>Kabupaten/Kota</i> )	District Military Command ( <i>Komando Distrik Militer or Kodim</i> )
Subdistrict Government ( <i>Kecamatan</i> )	Subdistrict Military Command ( <i>Komando Rayon Militer or Koramil</i> )
Village ( <i>Desa</i> )	Village NCO ( <i>Bintara Pembina Desa or Babinsa</i> )

**Table 7.2. Level of Authority of Local Government and Territorial Command**

In this structure, personnel assigned to territorial duties in each command are responsible for collecting data about the geography, demography and social conditions in their territory, and then analyzing and developing them for the purpose of territorial defence. To achieve this objective, they have to work together and coordinate their effort with their counterpart in the local government. In the Indonesian version of the Total Defence System, in the event of war, the military combat units are considered the main component of the system, while civilians are grouped together as supporting components in the form of guerrilla units headed by the territorial commanders.<sup>44</sup> As it is assumed that the central government would not be able to fund a protracted warfare, all resources in the territory, including private companies, NGOs and the media, must be mobilized to support the struggle to defend the country.<sup>45</sup>

The next level of authority is the non-Territorial Commands such as the Army's Combat Units, Combat Support Units, Administrative Units, and Headquarter Units, both at the National Level and at the Regional Command Level. These non-territorial units are also responsible for conducting limited TCB, in accordance with the discretion of the Army's Commanders. The lowest level of authority is the individual soldier. All TNI AD soldiers, on their own, are responsible for conducting TCB in its simplest form, which is

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displaying behaviours that do not violating the Eight Military Pledges of the TNI (*Delapan Wajib TNI*). These detail the moral standards and ethics that must be upheld by TNI AD soldiers when dealing with fellow Indonesian citizens. It is expected that if the individual soldier can follow this obligation, he/she can create the bond between the TNI AD and the people.

There are several methods to implement TCB. The first is called Social Communication (*Komunikasi Sosial*). This includes all efforts, tasks, and activities conducted by TNI AD units that aim to communicate their thoughts related to the empowerment of the territorial area for land defence, and to build, improve and maintain the unity of the TNI AD and the people. The second method is social development and rehabilitation programs (*Bhakti TNI*). These include all efforts, tasks, and activities conducted by TNI units that aim to help both the national and local governments and other elements. This is accomplished through humanitarian assistance and other social programs, whether as stand alone activities or as coordinated operations with other elements of society. The third method is the so-called Area Defence Development (*Pembinaan Perlawanan Wilayah*), which includes all efforts, tasks, and activities conducted by TNI AD units that aim to create strong land defence forces. This includes supporting components from all walks of life who possess the ability, skills and motivation to be able to defend the country and to stop any threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of NKRI.

To ensure territorial commanders and their staff are doing their job properly, they have to submit an annual budget for TCB activities. This budget must be approved both by the local and national parliament. For non-territorial units that also implement territorial activities, they must budget for them based on funding allocations from the Army HQ. For territorial units, the TNI AD's Territorial Centre (*Pusat Teritorial Angkatan Darat*) evaluates the implementation of these activities along with a behaviour-based performance appraisal system for the commanders of the Sub-regional (*Komandan Korem* or *Danrem*) and District Military Commands (*Komandan Kodim* or *Dandim*).<sup>46</sup> The performance appraisal system is conducted in a 360-degree feedback manner, in which superiors, subordinates and clients, such as local government officials and local leaders (religious and community leaders), are asked to evaluate the behaviour of these commanders and the performance of their units. Each year, at the end of the evaluation period, the Centre will announce the best territorial commands in the whole TNI AD and the Commander will receive a trophy from the Chief of Army. The result of these evaluations will then be used as a basis for promotion in the territorial commands.

## LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE APPLICATION OF TCB

### **INTERNAL APPLICATION OF TCB**

There are many lessons that can be learned from the application of TCB in both domestic and international operations conducted by the TNI AD. Internally, the TNI AD conducts territorial operations on two fronts, in peaceful areas and in conflict zones. In peaceful areas, TCB is implemented mostly in the form of social development and rehabilitation programs. This includes disaster relief assistance, public work projects, such as building dams, places of worship, and irrigation systems, or educational assistance in the form of soldier-teachers in isolated border areas.<sup>47</sup> As Indonesia's defence doctrine hinges upon the idea that the people and the TNI AD will defend the country together, in essence these operations are conducted so that the people in the territory will support the TNI AD, the state ideology, and the government's development plan. If the area is peaceful and developed, in the long run there is no need for the military to send combat troops to prevent social unrest, separatist rebellions or external threats.<sup>48</sup>

In conflict zones, including areas where there is support among the populace for subverting the state ideology, where separatist rebellion is taking place or where there is social, religious or ethnic conflict, TCB would be implemented together with intelligence and combat operations, depending on the area and the state of the conflict.<sup>49</sup> One example of the implementation of TCB in conflict zone in modern times is Operation *Moris Diak* in the former East Timor in the early 1990s. Meaning Operation "Love", the objective of the operation was to win the hearts and minds of the East Timorese so that they in turn would support the government and choose to become part of Indonesia. Soldiers belonging to territorial units from the TNI AD implemented TCB by building churches, schools, roads and hospitals, becoming teachers in schools, supervising farmers, training sports teams, developing the arts, and assisting and rehabilitating former East Timorese guerrillas so that they could live a normal life.<sup>50</sup> It was so successful that the pro-independence East Timorese elements became concerned and attempted to disrupt the operation.

By deliberately conducting a fatal attack on the vice commander of an airborne combat unit, they were able to provoke its members to retaliate against the local people. With the help from mostly Western-based NGOs, they were able to cleverly exploit it in the international media. This unfortunate event

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then made the implementation of the territorial approach untenable. Subsequently, *Moris Diak* was terminated and changed into a full-scale combat operation called Operation Finished (*Operasi Tuntas*).<sup>51</sup> The changing nature of these operations in turn created a wedge between the TNI AD and the people, and undoubtedly in the long run contributed to the final separation of East Timor and Indonesia. The experience from *Moris Diak* taught the TNI AD an important lesson in asymmetric warfare. First and foremost is that the gains made through years of territorial operations to win the hearts and minds of the people can be erased by an opposing side determined to provoke violent reactions from soldiers.

### **INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION OF TCB**

Internationally, the implementation of TCB can be observed in the United Nations-based Peacekeeping Operations conducted by the TNI. A good example is the peacekeeping mission under the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was considered as one of the most successful peacekeeping mission conducted by the UN.<sup>52</sup>

John Haseman, who studied the performance of the Indonesian Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia, found that this success was in no small part the result of the dominant role played by the TNI peacekeepers who belonged to the Garuda XII contingent.<sup>53</sup> According to Haseman, with around 3,400 soldiers, and two Indonesian brigadier-generals serving as Chief of Staff of UNTAC military components, not only was Garuda XII the largest contingent in the mission, but its implementation of TCB also became a significant factor that contributed to the acceptance of UNTAC by the warring parties. In fact, this observation is in line with the argument put forward by TNI HQ on the explanation of why the Garuda Contingents were successful in most of their mission, which is namely the implementation of Territorial Operations.<sup>54</sup>

Garuda XII, with four army airborne infantry battalions plus combat support and combat service support units, consisted mainly of personnel from elite combat units from the TNI. However, Haseman argued that because the career path of TNI AD officers requires them to spend part of their time in territorial units or conduct territorial operations, they became ideal candidates for overseas peacekeeping missions, as they have the experience and training to interact and coordinate activities with the local population.<sup>55</sup> Even though there were major differences in language and religion (local Cambodians were Buddhists, while the majority of the multi-faith Indonesian

peacekeepers were Muslims), Indonesian commanders asked their soldiers to concentrate on similarities, emphasizing local culture and traditions. For instance, they jointly celebrated local religious holidays and ceremonies with the Cambodians.

Through TCB, TNI AD members focused on winning the hearts and minds of the people. They conducted territorial activities at the platoon level and lower, opening up their camps to locals, where they fraternized with TNI soldiers without any barrier. Junior TNI commanders utilized their social communication skills to conduct informal contacts in coffee shops with village elders and the various faction commanders, including the feared Khmer Rouge, and helped mediate local disagreements. Consistent with the territorial doctrine, instead of a rear area supply system more common with other contingents, daily logistical needs of the Garuda contingent were sourced from local suppliers. Haseman concluded that TCB was able to produce the desired results. Unlike other contingents, Garuda peacekeepers could come and go to any area controlled by any of the factions. In fact, in a hostage taking incident by the Khmer Rouge, the helicopter that carried an UNTAC negotiator could not land because it was fired upon. After the UNTAC Force Commander asked the Indonesians to intervene, Garuda officers then went to the Khmer Rouge and conducted the negotiations in a friendly but firm manner, without giving in to the Khmer Rouge's demands, resulting in the release of the hostages.

Research by the author on the TNI peacekeepers from the Garuda XXVI-B1 Contingent, who served on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) mission, also showed the effectiveness of TCB.<sup>56</sup> Similar to the Cambodian situation, the majority of the multiethnic and multireligious TNI peacekeepers were Sunni Muslims, with a strong presence of Christians. They were deployed in mostly Lebanese Shiite areas, who are known to be hostile towards their Sunni Muslim countrymen. Through observations and interviews, the author found that TNI peacekeepers received greater acceptance from the local Shiite populace, in comparison not only to peacekeepers from culturally and religiously different contingents, but also from peacekeepers from other Sunni dominated contingents. For this, the TNI peacekeepers gave credit to TCB.

Similar to the behaviour of the Garuda XII Contingent members, peacekeepers from Garuda XXVI-B1 Contingent approached CIMIC activities, which were implemented at UNIFIL as part of its humanitarian mission, not from the perspective of a project orientation as most other peacekeepers did, but through the lens of the territorial approach. This meant becoming one with

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the people in order to win their hearts and minds, so that these people in turn were willing to support UNIFIL's objectives. Garuda peacekeepers participated in wedding ceremonies conducted by the local people, learned the popular local dance and drove around in Smart cars that functioned as mobile libraries for the local children.

After the initial suspicion from the local religious authorities on the sincerity of the Garuda peacekeepers, in deference to local religious sensibilities, the Sunni Muslim peacekeepers consciously avoided displaying ritual and theological differences with the Shiites. The Indonesian Contingent drew the line, however, when the local Shiite militias wanted Garuda to support them during a border clash with the Israelis. This caused the local media to accuse Garuda of doing nothing in the face of Israeli attack. Later on, Garuda officers were able to convince the Shiites that UNIFIL troops had to be impartial in their work and could not choose sides under any circumstances. The Garuda contingent were so successful that when other contingents wanted to conduct CIMIC projects, they would often request Garuda officers to become part of the advance team in approaching and convincing the locals to accept and work together for the projects.

Apart from the territorial doctrine, the author also found that one of the advantages for Indonesian peacekeepers who are deployed in international peacekeeping missions is their diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. The quantitative part of the research that the author conducted on cross-cultural cognitive competency found that Indonesian research participants were able to use their cultural intuition (i.e., using an experiential thinking style) to predict more accurately the decision chosen by peacekeepers from different cultural backgrounds.<sup>57</sup> It turned out that Indonesian peacekeepers who have high meta-cognitive cultural intelligence (CQ) were able to choose the appropriate cultural strategies when they experienced intercultural exchanges with peacekeepers from different cultural backgrounds. They experienced an expanded cultural cognition, and this then became the sources of their cultural intuition.<sup>58</sup> The author believes that this is an important lesson to be learned because many researchers who attend the annual conferences of the International Military Testing Association (IMTA) propose CQ as a necessary psychological construct to be considered for selecting and training soldiers who will be deployed overseas.<sup>59</sup>

Since CQ is considered as a state-like personality construct that can be developed through training and experience, the author believes that it is here that the Indonesian peacekeepers might have an advantage in intercultural assignments.<sup>60</sup> As discussed previously, not only is Indonesian society



multicultural by nature, the state ideology of *Pancasila*, and the value system of the TNI, such as the Seven Fundamental Commitments (*Sapta Marga*, which explain the responsibility of a soldier as a member of the TNI as well as a citizen of NKRI), specifically command a TNI soldier to be a multiculturalist who must respect other people's faith, customs and traditions. This is especially true for TNI's officers, who, upon graduating from their career courses, are usually placed in units that are different from their ethnic, religious or geographical background. This is also especially true for elite units that formed the backbone of the peacekeeping contingent, in that these are national units, in which personnel come from all corners of Indonesia, bringing with them their different ethnic, religious and social status.

Undoubtedly, these conditions allow for plentiful intercultural exchanges in every TNI unit and form the basis of the development of CQ. The soldiers' intercultural skills will be developed further when their units conduct TCB, either in their home base or when they are deployed to conflict areas. More often than not, the soldiers will have to interact with the local people who have different cultural backgrounds than their own. Formal pre-deployment training on cross-cultural awareness and area information becomes "icing on the cake" in their development of their CQ.

Based on the above examples, and similar to Haseman's assessment, in general the author found that the territorial experience and the training that TNI soldiers received enabled them to perform well in international peacekeeping missions. It is therefore imperative for foreign observers to study TCB from a military competencies framework. This is where the territorial approach can enhance the formulation of a more effective comprehensive approach, especially in complex international military operations involving various non-military actors.

## **SELECTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF TERRITORIAL COMMANDERS**

### **POSITION COMPETENCIES ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (PCAP)**

While all TNI AD soldiers receive training on territorial topics, especially TCB, in the many courses that they have to take throughout their career in the TNI AD, in order to become Territorial Commanders such as *Korem* and *Kodim* Commanders, TNI AD officers must undergo rigorous selection processes. For example, almost all of the candidates for *Kodim* commanders

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are graduates from the Staff and Command School and the majority have experience as Battalion Commanders in combat units. Similarly, for *Korem* commanders, most have Joint Staff and Command School qualifications and have previously commanded Brigade level troops, and were former *Kodim* commanders. In addition, not only do they have to pass academic tests on territorial subject matters, they also have to undergo physical fitness and psychological tests.

In terms of psychological tests, starting in 2004, the Psychological Service of the Indonesian Army (*Dinas Psikologi Angkatan Darat – DISPSIAD*), designed competency-based profiles for certain target jobs in the TNI AD, including Territorial Commanders. Through the use of the Assessment Centre method, DISPSIAD attempts to measure the behavioural competencies and psychological potentials of the candidate by running the Position Competencies Assessment Program – PCAP (*Program Penilaian Kompetensi Jabatan*).

Certain behavioural competencies required of the territorial commanders are universal and not much different to the requirement for military commanders everywhere, such as strong leadership abilities, decisiveness, tolerance for stress and strong interpersonal skills. There are specific competencies that potential territorial commanders must possess. For example, in the PCAP, candidates for *Korem* and *Kodim* commanders must have social sensitivities, the ability to work cross-functionally, and the ability to develop strategic networks. Candidates who do not possess these competencies can be predicted to have a harder time adjusting to the role of a territorial commander. Territorial commanders must be able to work with people from all walks of life, and coordinate development projects with non-military elements in the territory under their command.

### **COMPETENCIES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM**

Candidates who pass the PCAP tests attend short courses designed to prepare them for the target job. These courses cover technical competencies related to territorial management which are delivered by instructors from the Territorial Training Centre (*Pusat Pendidikan Teritorial – Pusdikter*). Territorial Commanders also give briefings on lessons learned in the territory under their command. In addition, DISPSIAD is responsible for developing the candidates' behavioural competencies, which are classified into two clusters, namely leadership and territorial competencies. For the territorial competencies, candidates will learn about the required behaviours for dealing effectively with the people in their territory.

## CONCLUSION

With the end of the Cold War, military operations have become more complex and challenging, involving non-military actors and service in foreign cultures. Consequently, a comprehensive approach is necessary. The existing military doctrine in Western countries puts strict separation between warfighting functions and non war-related functions. As a result, this limits the capability of military units that must operate in the non-war area of operations. On the other hand, Indonesia has a different operational doctrine for MOOTW, which in the Indonesian Army context is called the Territorial Approach.

There are several lessons that can be learned from the Territorial Approach. First, one should be careful in considering the universal application of a military doctrine. Like any other human endeavour, it is a social construction of reality reflecting the cultures and social norms of the people who created the doctrine.<sup>61</sup> Since it can be predicted that most military engagements in the future will not happen in an area of operation characterized by the individualistic culture of the West, military doctrine that was formulated in other cultures, such as the TNI AD's territorial doctrine, can become a legitimate alternative. Second, the complex operational features of modern warfare require soldiers to be able to conduct seamless civil-military cooperation in many fields. Whether the soldiers must perform the civilian functions themselves or work with their civilian counterparts, they must understand this new reality and be trained in it. Modern warfare is also about winning the hearts and minds of international public opinion. A weaker opposing force that can use the media can, in the long run, wipe out the gains that come from the efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people in the field. Lastly, future military operations will be more international in nature. This means cross-cultural competency should become the norm and not the exception. Consequently, military units that are more competent culturally will have an advantage over those that come from more homogenous culture and are not trained to work in different cultural settings.

In conclusion, one can say that militaries of the future must prepare their soldiers not only to become warriors, but also for a whole range of other roles. On this note, it is good to remember what has been said a long time ago about peacekeeping, which is equally applicable to any other non-war operations: "Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only soldiers can do it" (Dr. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary General of the United Nations, 1953-1961).<sup>62</sup>

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57. Hidayat, *ibid.*, 110. In this research the author used Novak and Hoffman's Situation-Specific Thinking Style inventory for measuring the participant's thinking style. See Thomas P. Novak and Donna L. Hoffman, "The Fit of Thinking Style and Situation: New Measures of Situation-specific Experiential and Rational Cognition," *Journal of Consumer Research*, No. 36 (2009), 56-72.
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Expanded Cultural Cognition as Antecedents for Global Leadership,” Paper presented at the *Academy of Management Annual Meeting*, August 9 2010, Montreal, Canada and for meta cognitive cultural intelligence, see Linn Van Dyne, Soon Ang, Kok Yee Ng, Thomas Rockstuhl, Mei Ling Tan and Christine Koh, “Sub-Dimensions of the Four Factor Model of Cultural Intelligence: Expanding the Conceptualization and Measurement of Cultural Intelligence,” *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2012), 295-313. Although further research is necessary, it can be assumed that people who are using the more dominant thinking style in their culture, can have better performance then when they use a thinking style that they are not familiar with. In this case, the use of intuition in Asian culture is more prevalent, while analytical decision-making is more common in the West (See Elke U. Weber and Christopher K. Hsee, “Culture and Individual Judgment and Decision Making,” *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2000), 32-61). For experience as the source of intuition, see Seymour Epstein, “Demystifying Intuition: What It Is, What It Does, and How It Does It,” *Psychological Inquiry*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (2010), 295-312.

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61. Michael Mosser. “The Social Construction of Operational Military Doctrine: A Comparison between the US Army and EU Military Staff.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of *The Theory vs. Policy? Connecting Scholars and Practitioners*, February 17, 2010 at the New Orleans Hilton Riverside Hotel, New Orleans, LA.
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# CHAPTER 8

## BRANDING SINGAPORE THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES AND ITS LEADERS

*Lieutenant-Colonel Psalm B.C. Lew\**

### INTRODUCTION

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century security landscape, there is increasing clarity that military coercion and war are not the only means to fulfil policy objectives. For example, Nye<sup>1</sup> describes power as “one’s ability to affect the behaviour of others to get what one wants.” He goes on to describe three types of power: first, hard power, which employs threats and economic rewards as its *modus operandi*; second, soft power, which uses the allurements of a country to solicit preferred outcomes; and third, smart power, which is a strategic combination of hard and soft power to fulfill policy objectives.<sup>2</sup> Here, soft power is frequently associated with national branding and many authors like Anholt<sup>3</sup> have written about the tools and strategies that determine how a country’s image is projected outwards. In the context of smart power, planned national branding is clearly an endeavour that requires multi-agency collaboration and it is presumptuous to assume that the military should lead such an effort. However, in countries like Singapore, where the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) runs the National Service (NS), the country’s most extensive nation-building effort, the military is certainly one of the leads in the whole-of-government approach to national branding.

This discussion on national branding will be based on the framework of national identity as a collective self-schema versus national image as the social schema people project onto another country. The juxtaposition of national identity and national image are important because the inward and outward views of a country are different. For example, the image of a country to its people creates “confidence in their own status in the world” whereas to foreigners it increases its prestige.<sup>4</sup> Between these inward and outward views of a country, national branding as described by Anholt<sup>5</sup> is a flow or a circulation

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\* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Singapore Armed Forces.

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of images and text that conveys elements of national identity to be projected as a national image in the eyes of people in another country. Using the national identity-national image framework, this discussion illustrates how SAF leaders at different levels contribute to national branding and how effective military leadership in its conscripted armed force strengthens Singapore's national identity and in turn shapes its national image abroad.


### IMAGINING COUNTRIES

Our discussion begins with a review of what is the image of a country. For example, ask a Formula 1 racing fan what he thinks of Singapore and the image of the Marina Bay street circuit may come to his mind. The feelings he attaches to it will probably depend on the performance of his favourite team. In another example, many Japanese describe Singapore as an exciting destination, especially in the last two years. This has been attributed to the Apple iPhone commercial starring Japanese boy band SMAP at the giant infinity pool straddling the 57<sup>th</sup> floor of the three towers of the Marina Bay Sands resort.<sup>6</sup> In both examples, people have formed a vivid image of Singapore without once visiting the place. In general, people construct images of countries simply because they are necessary social schemas. Schemas<sup>7</sup> are "cognitive structure[s] that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relationship amongst those attributes." A country's national image or brand is a schema since it "comprises the outside world's ideas about a particular country."<sup>8</sup> The images of countries serve an important social function because when people think of them together with representations of the Self, it enables a group identification of "us" versus "them", thus creating feelings of belonging or opposition.

### NATIONAL IDENTITY

Social identity theory argues that people's self concept is derived from group identification.<sup>9</sup> Here, research has shown that religious<sup>10</sup> and racial<sup>11</sup> schemas facilitate group identification when individuals adopt similar schemas. For example, when 93% of Singaporeans say they get upset when they see the Singapore flag being burnt, they have activated similar social schemas with regards to Singapore.<sup>12</sup> National identity is therefore a legitimate, collective type of self-schema because many individuals do adopt similar schemas with regards to their country, and this facilitates group identification (see Figure 8.1). Here, research by authors like Frosh and Wolfsfeld<sup>13</sup> has shown that national identity is strengthened through the mediated discourse about the

country. In other words, a constructive discourse about Singapore can help Singaporeans with a lower sense of identification to the country become clearer about what it means to be a Singaporean, thus strengthening their sense of belonging. The SAF, as a nation building institution, should leverage the opportunities presented by its NS system of compulsory conscription to sustain a positive discourse about Singapore amongst its people. This is because a strong sense of national identity has more elements that can be communicated overseas as part of a positive national image.



**Figure 8.1. Illustration of National Identity as a Collective Self-schema**

## **NATIONAL IMAGE**

Although national image is the social schema of a country, it is not a stereotype because whilst “stereotypes tend to be rigid, a schema is dynamic and subject to revision”.<sup>14</sup> This also means that the way people think about Singapore changes with time and circumstances. In terms of shaping national image, Anholt<sup>15</sup> has identified the following six national branding activities: government policy; interaction with the people; solicitation of inward investments; sports or cultural events; tourism promotion; and exports or services. Anholt<sup>16</sup> suggests that with a better coordination of messages through these six activities, the reputation of a country improves. There is empirical evidence to support this as schemas can be developed from exposure to new information.<sup>17</sup> For example, recent information about Singapore’s political


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activism has improved perceptions about its people and culture.<sup>18</sup> A country's national image as a social schema is an evolving constellation of forms across a globalized world as different peoples respond differently to new information about it. States and their militaries therefore need to constantly be engaged in national branding to ensure that the country has a positive image.

### **CONVEYING POWER THROUGH NATIONAL BRANDING FLOWS**

Whilst Anholt's model has described the means of shaping a national image, he is vague on what branding should convey.<sup>19</sup> This chapter argues that national branding should convey power. Power in this sense refers to "the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social actors in ways that favour the empowered actor's will, interests and values."<sup>20</sup> It is not about power in the tradition sense of military domination. National branding should convey power which is "smart" because it involves state and non-state actors using soft power or attraction to achieve national aims whilst reserving coercion to when it is required.<sup>21</sup> Many countries like Estonia<sup>22</sup> and Poland<sup>23</sup> have been using soft power to improve their image through their economic attractiveness. Serbia has been using traditional folk music to soften the harsh social-political image it acquired from being the centre of a long period of violence.<sup>24</sup> Clearly, countries do communicate power and they do so in many ways through many channels.

In this regard, Mann<sup>25</sup> has identified ideological, economic, military and political power as the four sources of social power. Ideological power fulfills the need for meaning, norms and rituals; economic power is concerned with production; military power involves the deployment of force against threats; and political power comes from the legislation of state services.<sup>26</sup> These four sources of social power are experienced by global publics in different weights across Anholt's national branding activities. The communication network for power is Castell's space of flow<sup>27</sup>, which is a global social order organized around flows or "expressions of processes dominating our economic, political and symbolic life." Here, Mann's ideological, economic, military and political power that are embedded in Anholt's national branding activities become national branding flows that "radiate" across Castell's global space of flows. As flows of national branding conveying social power reach a foreign audience, they provide information that enables the development of social schemas and thereby allow the shaping of a country's national image (see Figure 8.2).



**Figure 8.2. Illustration of the Social Schema Model of National Identity and Image**

For example, last year the *Mail Online* carried a report about a British man who faced a jail term and caning for pinching a woman's buttocks at a night spot in Singapore.<sup>28</sup> The best-rated comment on this news, with 1348 positive ratings, came from an anonymous Canadian who said, "He knew the rules going in. It's refreshing to see there are still countries who value decency ... give him ALL he deserves."<sup>29</sup> In this case, the online readers experienced Singapore's ideological power as a country that has a very strict legal system. The national branding activity is exposure to Singapore's policy of corporal punishment whilst the national branding flow was carried on global Internet penetration of the *Mail Online*. As this flow reaches the global publics, it provides new information for people to adjust their schema about Singapore. In this case, the resulting national image of Singapore for some people is a country "valuing decency".

There are two important points to be raised about this example. First, national branding as shown is a form of schema development and it takes place even without state intervention. Thus, every Singaporean citizen becomes an agent for national branding, not just SAF servicemen who carry the country's name on their uniforms. Second, this example represents only one national branding flow. In reality, a country's national image in another country is a schema derived from an aggregated experience of its social power via numerous national branding flows. State efforts at national branding, such as through tourism promotion videos, form a small portion of the possible national branding flows originating from a country. A foreign public's image

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of Singapore is the aggregate of their experience of Singapore from various touch points including face-to-face interactions with Singaporeans. As such, the national branding efforts by state actors such as the SAF can be easily and very quickly negated by the actions of non-state actors such as news about individual Singaporeans, especially those who are seen to be representatives of the state. Therefore, given this context, the actions of all SAF personnel, both the regulars and even the lowest ranking National Servicemen (NSmen), can unintentionally become a negative national branding flow and counteract the effects of the government and the SAF's branding efforts.

### **PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE MILITARY**

State efforts to increase positive national branding are not merely an advertising campaign, they are a reconfiguration of the country.<sup>30</sup> In a world defined by Castell's space of flows<sup>31</sup>, branding by governments is "a shift in political paradigms, a move... to the postmodern world of images and influence."<sup>32</sup> As a state coordinated effort, public diplomacy is the "work aiming to inform and engage individuals and organisations overseas, in order to improve understanding of and influence for [a country] in a manner consistent with governmental medium and long term goals."<sup>33</sup> The SAF, working under the Ministry of Defence and in collaboration with other national institutions such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries, is an important part of public diplomacy.

The SAF's role in public diplomacy is enshrined in its mission, which is "to enhance Singapore's peace and security through deterrence and diplomacy, and should these fail, to secure a swift and decisive victory over the aggressor."<sup>34</sup> Deterrence in this case is contingent on the national image of Singapore from the perspective of the global publics. A positive image of Singapore as an economically, socially, psychologically and militarily strong country with civil preparedness along its five pillars of total defence will create deterrence and support diplomacy.<sup>35</sup> As such, branding Singapore is no longer just the mission of the Singapore Tourism Promotion Board and a social charity performed by the SAF. Branding Singapore is clearly an integral part of the SAF mission. As it stands, the SAF has 350,000 Active and NS servicemen.<sup>36</sup> This becomes Singapore's unique edge over many countries because through NS approximately 10% of the country's national population could be developed to be ambassadors of national branding regardless of whether they are in or out of uniform.

## **NATIONAL BRANDING THROUGH THE ARMED FORCES**

For the SAF, the three most relevant national branding activities of the six described by Anholt are organizing national events such as the National Day Parade, experience of the SAF's services to Singapore and the international community, especially in overseas missions, and interaction with SAF servicemen. With the aim of projecting a positive image of Singapore, the national branding flows originating from the SAF cannot just focus on a sense of security originating from military power. The SAF has to communicate other aspects of social power as identified by Mann, such as ideological, economic and political power in its national branding effort. This, therefore, means that the national image being branded by the SAF needs to consider Singapore holistically as a country. For example, the SAF's NSmen need to rise up and be the spokesmen for NS, describing how it epitomize the ideological power of Singaporean manifestos like the national pledge of coming together "regardless of race, language or religion" in the service of the country.

## **BRANDING SINGAPORE THROUGH SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES LEADERS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL OF LEADERSHIP**

At the strategic level, SAF leaders already work directly with the political and civilian leadership of the Singapore government in many areas. Of the many national branding activities described by Anholt, the organization of international and national level events has seen the most active participation from the SAF in the whole-of-government efforts to brand Singapore. This has extended beyond security tasks to activities that directly shape the image of Singapore being communicated. For example, in the Singapore Inaugural Youth Olympic Games (YOG) 2010, senior SAF commanders like Brigadier-General Ishak Ismail were in charge of staging the show for the Opening and Closing ceremonies.<sup>37</sup> These strategic leaders' vision of a socially and economically strong Singapore as it materialized during the show at the ceremonies is the very same image being imprinted in the minds of audiences around the world.

### **BRANDING SINGAPORE THROUGH SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES LEADERS AT THE ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL OF LEADERSHIP**

Although the leaders at the organizational level, such as unit Commanding Officers (COs), enable events like the YOG to happen, they are arguably less involved in visioning and directing national level events. Of the six national branding activities described by Anholt, the one that is most pertinent to leaders at this level involves branding Singapore through the “services” of the SAF. Realistically, the SAF does not generate any product, but its participation in international missions with other armed forces is arguably an export of its security services. For example, just as Singapore is branded by the service of Singapore Airlines, to the other militaries operating in the Gulf of Aden, Singapore is also branded by the performance, experiences and learning attitudes of its servicemen combating piracy in Combined Task Force 151. Similarly, Singapore is also branded during bi-lateral exercises. Here, using Gallwey’s Performance-Experience-Learning (PEL) Triangle<sup>38</sup> as a principle, unit COs should maximize the performance of their units by maximizing their servicemen’s Experience and Learning. An image of the SAF being formed by units that learn and with soldiers that think is a powerful branding of Singapore as a psychologically and militarily strong country.

### **BRANDING SINGAPORE THROUGH SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES LEADERS AT THE DIRECT LEVEL OF LEADERSHIP**

Even at the direct level of leadership, SAF leaders are not devolved from the national branding activities mentioned earlier. However, like the leaders at the organizational level of leadership, they only execute major national branding events. At best they contribute feedback but do not influence the visioning of such activities. Although these leaders are important actors when we consider a unit’s Performance-Experience-Learning triangle<sup>39</sup>, the art of managing unit climate is a command function and still resides with the unit CO. However, due to the face-to-face manner in which they lead, the leaders at this level are thus the catalyst of the experiences of their men. They lead at the “last mile” in the long link between the senior commanders and the soldiers on the ground. As such, when the SAF’s NSmen are well led by these last mile leaders and have enjoyed a positive experience, they will in turn shape others’ perception of Singapore when they meet people outside of the military. In the effort to brand Singapore through the SAF, these last mile leaders are the key terrain and they have three key contributions.



First, SAF's last mile leaders, contribute to national branding by strengthening their men's sense of national identity by inculcating and role modelling SAF's values, especially Loyalty to Country. Peterson<sup>40</sup> defines values as "beliefs about desirable moral goals" and as schemas they represent cognitive structures that provide a guide to universal human principles. Values determine the attitudes people adopt and subsequently their choices and actions forming the Values-Attitudes-Behaviours Hierarchy.<sup>41</sup> When all SAF leaders and their men are aligned to the SAF Core Values such as Loyalty to Country and Professionalism, we can then be confident that they will become sources of positive national branding as their speech and actions would reflect a national identity that is socially and psychologically strong.

Second, these leaders contribute to national branding by creating positive memories of NS as a uniquely Singaporean experience through storytelling. Today, many authors such as Appadurai have come to the conclusion that in a world of globalized cultures, the nation is an imagined abstract construct which thrives on the discourse about it.<sup>42</sup> Here, Featherstone describes heroes, myths, events and memories as part of a country's ethnic core<sup>43</sup> and that processes such as storytelling are "an essential part of the nation-building process in which the nation-state actively encourages the cultivation and elaboration of the 'ethnie' or ethnic core." Therefore, if all last mile leaders could create defining moments for their men's NS experience and be able to tell compelling stories about SAF Core Values, then the SAF could potentially uplift the entire ethnic core for Singapore. More importantly, when all the SAF servicemen, who represent 10% of Singapore's national population, have positive memories and stories to share about the SAF's values or the NS experience, there will be an exponentially greater amount of positive national branding flows. These do not just occur during national branding events or SAF overseas missions; they happen in everyday life as the NSmen interact with foreigners they meet locally and overseas.

Third, these leaders also need to engage in storytelling in new media. Today, one of the unique features of social media sites is that the user is also the producer, creating what Bruns describe as the "produser".<sup>44</sup> Hence, other than relying on the SAF's official corporate communications foothold in new media sites, the SAF leaders at the direct level of leadership can be mobilized to exponentially increase the volume of positive narratives about Singapore in cyberspace through their social networks. Recent research conducted by Alexander has also demonstrated the potential for digital storytelling to positively influence elements like the sense of belonging for both the story teller and audience.<sup>45</sup> Therefore, encouraging and providing means for the SAF's

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last mile leaders to participate in storytelling on SAF pages in social media such as Facebook sustains or increases their commitment whilst increasing the positive image of Singapore online.

## CONCLUSION

In conclusion, whether we consider Singapore's image as a schema or an imagination, the fact remains that this image in the eyes of foreign publics is being shaped daily by various national branding flows. Therefore, SAF's strategic level leaders need to continuously check that their vision for the armed forces or a national event reflects a country that is socially, economically, psychologically and militarily strong to reinforce deterrence. SAF's unit commanders at the organizational level of leadership need to create units with a learning climate that can adapt to shifting perceptions about Singapore. At the broadest base of the SAF, the last mile leaders need to live out the SAF's values and be ambassadors of the Singaporean national identity, thereby adding positive national branding flows to the public sphere and new media each day to offset negative ones. Ultimately, national branding for Singapore is not an option. Not only has it been a key part of the country's success in a globalized world saturated with moving images, branding Singapore is integral part of nation building and of survival.<sup>46</sup> As the nation building institution that could mobilize the most national branding ambassadors, the SAF is clearly an indelible part of branding Singapore.

## ENDNOTES

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3. See Simon Anholt, *Brand New Justice: The Upside of Global Branding* (Oxford, UK: Butterworth-Heinemann. 2003), 122.
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# GLOSSARY

<b>3Ds</b>	Defence, Diplomacy and Development
<b>ACUNS</b>	Academic Council on the United Nations System
<b>ANSF</b>	Afghan National Security Forces
<b>BABINSA</b>	<i>Bintara Pembina Desa</i> (Village NCO)
<b>CAST Bde Gp</b>	Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group
<b>CDA</b>	Canadian Defence Academy
<b>CF</b>	Canadian Forces
<b>CFSP</b>	Common Foreign and Security Policy
<b>CIMIC</b>	Civil-Military Cooperation
<b>CIMIR</b>	Civil-Military Relations
<b>CMCO</b>	Civil-Military Coordination
<b>CMCOORD</b>	Civil-Military Coordination
<b>CO</b>	Commanding Officer
<b>COIN</b>	Counterinsurgency
<b>CPA</b>	Concerted Planning and Action
<b>CQ</b>	Cultural Intelligence
<b>CSDP</b>	Common Security and Defence Policy
<b>DHS</b>	Department of Homeland Security
<b>DISPSIAD</b>	<i>Dinas Psikologi Angkatan Darat</i> (Psychological Service of the Army)
<b>DND</b>	Department of National Defence
<b>DoD</b>	Department of Defense
<b>DRC</b>	Democratic Republic of the Congo
<b>EBAO</b>	Effect-Based Approach to Operations
<b>ER</b>	Emotion regulation

# GLOSSARY

ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HQ	Headquarters
IA	Integrated Approach
IDP	Internally displaced person
IED	Improvised explosive device
IG	Inspector General
IM	Integrated Mission
IMPP	Integrated Missions Planning Process
IMLA	International Military Leadership Association
IMTA	International Military Testing Association
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KMA	<i>Koninklijke Militaire Academie</i> (Royal Netherlands Military Academy)
KNIL	<i>Koninklijk Nederlands-Indische Leger</i> (Royal Netherlands East Indies Army)
KODAM	<i>Komando Daerah Militer</i> (Regional Military Command)
KODIM	<i>Komando Distrik Militer</i> (District Military Command)
KOREM	<i>Komando Resor Militer</i> (Sub-Regional Military Command)
KOTER	<i>Komando Territorial</i> (Territorial Command)
MCMTS	Multicultural multiteam system
MCT	Multicultural team
MONUC	<i>Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo</i>
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War

## GLOSSARY

<b>MSF</b>	<i>Médecins sans frontières</i> (Doctors Without Borders)
<b>MTS</b>	Multiteam system
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
<b>NCO</b>	Non-Commissioned Officer
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental organization
<b>NKRI</b>	<i>Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia</i> (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia)
<b>NS</b>	National Service
<b>NSmen</b>	National Servicemen
<b>PCAP</b>	Position Competencies Assessment ( <i>Program Penilaian Kompetensi Jabatan</i> ; PPKJ)
<b>PEL</b>	Performance-Experience-Learning
<b>PETA</b>	<i>Pembela Tanah Air</i> (Defenders of the Motherland)
<b>PPKJ</b>	<i>Program Penilaian Kompetensi Jabatan</i> (Position Competencies Assessment Programs; PCAP)
<b>PUSDIKTER</b>	<i>Pusat Pendidikan Teritorial</i> (Territorial Training Center)
<b>SAF</b>	Singapore Armed Forces
<b>SSTR</b>	Secure, Stabilize, Transition, and Reconstruction
<b>SWAT</b>	Special Weapons and Tactics
<b>TCB</b>	Territorial Capacity Building ( <i>Pembinaan Teritorial or Binter</i> )
<b>TNI</b>	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia</i> (Indonesian National Armed Forces)
<b>TNI AD</b>	<i>Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat</i> (Indonesian National Army)
<b>UK</b>	United Kingdom
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>UNHCR</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
<b>UNIFIL</b>	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
<b>UNMIL</b>	United Nations Mission in Liberia
<b>UNTAC</b>	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

## GLOSSARY

<b>US</b>	United States
<b>USFOR-A</b>	United States Forces-Afghanistan
<b>WGA</b>	Whole of Government Approach
<b>WHOGA</b>	Whole of Government Approach
<b>YOG</b>	Youth Olympic Games

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