Evolving Human Security
Frameworks and Considerations
for Canada's Military

Edited by
Shannon Lewis-Simpson and Sarah Jane Meharg

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Abbreviations

2Rs	Relief and Recovery
3Ps	Participation, Prevention, and Protection
9/11	September 11, 2001
A4P	Action for Peace
ACO	Allied Command Operations
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
AI	Artificial Intelligence
BI	building integrity
CAAC	Children and Armed Conflict
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CASARA	Civil Air Search and Rescue Association
CCMS	Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
CCT	Cross-Cutting Topics
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CJOC	Canadian Joint Operations Command
COIN	Counter-Insurgency Operations
COMEDS	Committee of Chiefs of Military Medical Services
CPI	Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative
CPP	Cultural Property Protection
CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
C-SASE	Contribute to a Safe and Secure Environment
DCDC	Development, Concepts and Doctrines Centre
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DIANA	Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic
DND	Department of National Defence
DoD	Department of Defence

EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
ESCD	Emerging Security Challenges Division
EU	European Union
FABN	Facilitate Access to Basic Needs
GAC	Global Affairs Canada
GBA Plus	Gender-Based Analysis Plus
GSAR	Ground Search and Rescue
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
HQ	Headquarters
HSP	Human Security Program
HSU	Human Security Unit
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICISS	International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IHR	International Health Regulations
IHRL	International Human Rights Law
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
ISAF	Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force
JRCC	Joint Rescue Coordination Centres
LAWS	Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems
MAJAID	Major Aeronautical Disasters
MAJMAR	Major Marine Disasters
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MH	mitigation of harm
MSHT	Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking
NAPs	National Action Plans
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation

NSO	NATO Standardization Office
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PBF	UN Peacebuilding Fund
PME	Professional Military Education
PoC	Protection of Civilians
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
RCAF	Royal Canadian Air Force
RoE	Rules of Engagement
RP	Response Posture
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCSL	Special Court for Sierra Leone
SEA	Sexual exploitation and abuse
SLTRC	Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
SRR	Search and Rescue Region
SSE	Strong, Secure, Engaged
THB	Trafficking in Human Beings
UK MOD	United Kingdom Ministry of Defence
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNTFHS	United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security
VP	Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers (Vancouver Principles)
WHO	World Health Organization
WPS	Women, Peace, and Security Agenda

Foreword

It is with great pleasure that I introduce the first book published by the Canadian Armed Forces' Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security through the Canadian Defence Academy Press: *Evolving Human Security: Frameworks and Considerations for Canada's Military*.

Co-edited by Drs Shannon Lewis-Simpson and Sarah Jane Meharg, this book discusses how human security has been interpreted within conflict and crisis situations as diverse as disaster management and peace operations, and in settings including the United Nations and NATO, and raises important questions about why the Canadian Armed Forces might include a more formalised human security framework in its future operations, whether domestic or expeditionary.

Some will argue that the concept of human security is not new and that the return of great power competition is more deserving of our attention. While it's true that human security has been part of policy and academic discourse for many years, I offer that the ways in which the current operating environment is likely to exacerbate myriad human security pressures – ranging from ideologically motivated violent extremism, the spread of mis/disinformation, cyber-attacks on critical civilian infrastructure, intra-state conflict, and climate change – demand our thought and action leadership. In fact, human security is not removed or separate from great power competition and the undermining of the rules based international order, but rather is nested within and greatly affected by it.

From my view as Canada's Military Representative to NATO, I can attest to the seriousness with which the Alliance is approaching human security, as a means to better comprehend the human environment, and thus the modern security situation. As NATO adopts a human security approach, inclusive of strategic people-centred agendas, it sets a standard through which the CAF can participate and influence. In NATO's backyard, the war in Ukraine has brought this to the fore, galvanising the importance of viewing threats to security beyond state security. The wider view achieved by a human security approach enhances a more robust understanding of the human environment, and what actions could be taken to deepen resilience at the community level.

This book identifies topics and themes critical to militaries involved in establishing peace and stability and examines the protection-or-prevention prioritisation. It raises issues to augment CAF's anticipate

function, which could influence CAF's approach to adapt and act in the most insecure areas of the globe. The authors and editors have considered human security to best situate the approach, identifying trends, and focusing on relevant considerations for adopting a CAF human security framework. The contextual development of human security in policy and doctrinal terms is highlighted through descriptive cases, issues, and themes from which readers can better grasp the scope of this seemingly simple idea: human security.

This book provides a timely opportunity for military members to reflect on theories, frameworks and evolving approaches to human security. It challenges thinking and broadens perspectives by describing why a human security framework complements and reinforces traditional state security and enables militaries to integrate a number of aspects of mission mandates and military tasks into a more comprehensive understanding of requirements. So, too, can it effectively support 'whole of mission' planning and actions by creating a common vocabulary leading to better coordination with other actors. It can assist military commanders and planners to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the context/operating environment and potential courses of action.

To be sure, Canadian Armed Forces operations will continue to be carried out in contexts that require uniformed members to think broadly, indeed differently, about the demanding environment in which they find themselves. I congratulate the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security for its efforts to produce this timely and important contribution to professional military education and the Profession of Arms writ large.

Vice-Admiral Scott Bishop, CMM, CD
Military Representative of Canada to NATO

Introduction

Shannon Lewis-Simpson, Alan Okros, and Stefan Wolejszo

A human security framework is absent from contemporary Canadian and Allied operations. Despite three decades of conceptual and theoretical development since the mid-1990s, human security's steady trajectory was disrupted because of 9/11. Yet, the absence of a codified human security framework has not stopped military members from employing a human security lens. When asked, many Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) members will indicate that they have been doing human security-type work or facets of human security during their time in Afghanistan, on United Nations (UN) missions, or when responding to domestic disasters. Indeed, the archives of CAF operations since the early 2000s do bear this out. A human security lens allows a more complete understanding of the human environment, enabling those planning and making decisions within the military to be better informed, thus leading to optimal outcomes. With a resurgent Russia, a complicated hybrid warfare environment, and potential great power competition, do human security considerations have lesser relevance today, or is there an operational reason to reemphasise human security considering these dynamics?

Human security has continued to mature within international institutions, yet it has not been fully operationalised throughout the CAF. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been advancing work on human security with the topic now incorporated in the 2022 Strategic Concept and with formal articulation of a NATO human security approach and guiding principles.[1] The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UK MOD) has promulgated human security doctrine as part of a multi-year plan to fully integrate the concept in their Human Security Strategy 2020–2032. The UN has advanced the approach to human security with increased emphasis on addressing the insecurities that populations or sub-groups may be facing particularly in contexts of armed conflict. With these advancements in understanding and applying human security frameworks, one would expect to see a maturing doctrinal human security frame to provide Allied militaries the definitions and guidance needed to integrate a comprehensive human security perspective and to prioritise human security tasks. Yet, as Kaileigh Heard and Kristin Thue have noted, "while much progress has been made, more could be done to ensure [NATO] does not merely pay these issues lip service but can deliver on these commitments."[2] The

political arm of NATO supports the military arm in operationalising human security and, like the process taken by the UK, formal implementation and operationalisation can advance. An understanding of these unique and practical ends, ways and means can assist the CAF to anticipate how to support further development of strategic federal human security policy.

Canada's 2017 defence policy *Strong, Secure, Engaged* (SSE) requires Defence to anticipate, adapt, and act.[3] This volume is written to support the first function: to inform defence professionals of recent evolutions of human security frameworks largely informed from the perspectives of the UN, NATO, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The contributors consider whether or when human security may be more formally incorporated in contemporary Canadian and Allied operations.

Anticipate, Adapt, Act

Anticipating in order to adapt and act is the foundation of a 360-degree perspective on human security. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 1994 report, *New Dimensions of Human Security*, was a seminal document and defined human security as a people-centric, context-specific, comprehensive, and prevention-oriented approach to peace and security. The report condensed the many indicators of human security into three central pillars: the aim for all to attain freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity.[4] The pillar of freedom from fear refers to indicators of direct threats to safety, health, physical integrity, and freedom from forms of violence. Freedom from want refers to the people's basic needs, including economic livelihood and environmental dimensions. The third pillar, the freedom to live in dignity, refers to human rights and access to justice, including addressing assaults on human dignity from systemic racism, gender-based inequalities, and other forms of discrimination.[5] The UN Trust Fund for Human Security has outlined best practices and methods for human security application in UN policy and programming.[6] This approach to security centres individuals and communities rather than the nation-state. As a framework of analysis, it supports military understandings of multidimensional and interconnected threats, as well as foregrounds gendered and intersectional perspectives, assisting with approaching security dilemmas from various perspectives and meanings to identify appropriate security solutions. While the contributing authors use the UNDP report's three pillars to frame their analyses, there is less emphasis placed on freedom to live in dignity within the military nexus, and greater emphasis placed on the bifurcation between

freedom from fear – often referred to as the *protection* dimension in a *narrow* definition of human security, and freedom from want – often referred to as the *prevention* dimension in a *broader* definition of human security. Readers may undertake the existence of the third pillar as a subtext supporting notions of a broader definition of human security, particularly in terms of resilience and recovery from conflict or crisis.

Various frameworks and agendas have emerged from the 1994 UNDP report. Each of these has had influence on the CAF and its operations, domestically and internationally, and will continue to do so. Figure 1 contextualises various frameworks and agendas at the foreground of people-centred security. The issue of child soldiers sits inside of the children affected by armed conflict (CACC) agenda, which is nested inside the Protection of Civilians (PoC) agenda, which sits more broadly inside of gender perspective principles and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, which, lastly, is nested inside of the theories and practices of Human Security, both in formalised UN and NATO frameworks, and in *ad hoc* military activities.

Figure 1: Situating the Agendas

Gender Perspectives
& Women, Peace & Security

Child
Soldiers

Children Affected
by Armed Conflict

Human
Security

Protection
of Civilians

This volume draws upon the agendas and frameworks highlighted in Figure 1, supported by NATO's establishment of the October 2022 Human Security Approach, reaffirming the commitment to "an ambitious human security agenda" to be integrated into the Alliance's core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security.[7] NATO's formalised approach draws on the UN's approach which "conceptualizes human security as a multi-sectoral approach to security that identifies and addresses widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of the people."[8]

Further, the *Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers (Vancouver Principles)* are foundational to this volume's analysis.[9] Building on Canada's leadership role in launching the Vancouver Principles, the contributing authors enhance comprehensive understandings of people-centric security, focusing on hybrid dimensions of protection and prevention, rather than one dimension or the other.

NATO's human security approach as well as the new US civilian harm mitigation strategy[10] offer insight into contemporary shifts in protection and prevention discourse. As a framework of analysis, human security contrasts with counter-insurgency operations and traditional stability operations by focusing on insecurities rather than threats. This is notable as today's politics have seen a return to great power competition, deterrence, and conceptualisations of war. To apply a human security approach, the CAF would need to monitor ongoing updates to the concept including the decision to adopt a narrow protection approach or a broader prevention approach. The chosen approach also poses challenges to the traditional view of the state as the sole provider of security and the potential legal and policy ramifications of this. Additionally, as pointed out in the UNDP 2022 report, human security can be used to promote hegemonic interests by states and has the potential to undermine attention to issues of common public good and collective interests.[11] Within this context, this volume provides readers with a timely road map, and perhaps a compass, towards an integration of human security into a formalised anticipatory lens for contemporary operations. It answers salient questions about why NATO and the UN have adopted specific human security frames and what this means for armed forces.

One could ask why we need this volume if aspects of human security are already considered in Canadian military planning and operations? While Canada does consider aspects of human security and indeed has

deep expertise in certain areas, it is the broader perspective on human security that has not been mainstreamed in the CAF's anticipate function. Threats to human security are more diverse and more complex than they were during previous Canadian leadership on the human security file internationally in the 1990s/2000s. It becomes a meaningful update for the CAF to consider how recent approaches and emerging doctrine from the UN, NATO, and some allied nations intersects with current Canadian policies and doctrine, and therefore, provides insights into the anticipate function. According to CANSOFCOM, "the emergence of new forms of long-term strategic competition and a weakening of the international rules-based order are playing out on multiple fronts and across multiple dimensions of power."[12] These developments amplify geopolitical dynamics, while also straining the more traditional ways in which forces anticipate the security *problematique*. CANSOFCOM suggests that the CAF is shifting away from understanding conflict through a *spectrum*, one that typically advances linearly from peace, to competition, to crisis, and then war, towards *systems of conflict*, as shown in Figure 2.

The spectrum of conflict can be viewed as a complex system of conflict which includes intersections and overlaps, further surrounded and shaped by theories of compression, entanglement, and blurring. Lambert's contributions in this volume are based on the merging of the two as a foundation to further understand the environment in which a human security framework could amplify successful operations.

This volume, in its entirety, offers ways to increase the CAF's abilities to anticipate and prevent human insecurities, whether domestically or expeditionary, and how the CAF might be guided in its anticipation to defend domestic interests and further shape the operational space to contribute to longer-term peace and stability. Many of the contributing authors in this volume discuss options available at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, including roles and responsibilities inside these three levels through which a human security approach could be further systematised across the CAF. These three levels are understood throughout this volume using NATO's definitions. The strategic level is that of governments and coalitions and includes military strategy. Military strategy dictates how and why military forces will be employed. It is the remit of a government or coalition but advised by senior military commanders and staff. The operational level undertakes campaigns and major operations to achieve strategic objectives. Authorities at this level ensure that tactical level capabilities and actions support or build towards the strategic level objectives and end state. The tactical level

plans and executes activities, battles, and engagements to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units.[13]

Figure 2: Shifting from Spectrum of Conflict Towards Systems of Conflict.

Source: Canada, National Defence, *Beyond The Horizon: A Strategy For Canada's Special Operations Forces In An Evolving Security Environment* (Ottawa: CANSOFCOM, 2020).

A key purpose of this volume is to consider potential implications for the CAF of adopting a human security approach. In his contribution of how a human security framework might be created for the CAF, David Lambert observes that attention to human security is seen by some as "nothing more than public-affairs opportunism and self-justification."[14] But Lambert counters this by saying that legitimacy must be the foundation of any strategic goal. If the cross-cutting topics or factors of human security are not attended to by armed forces or if armed forces do not take "the most basic actions to protect the non-combatant civilians or, in the longer term, help set the conditions for building human security," this will undermine the actions of and support for military forces. "Thus, it is vital that NATO and its member states have a practical model of human security that allows understanding at the strategic level, planning at the operational level, and execution at the tactical level."[15] When state security and diplomacy are ineffective for security for all, a human security approach to legitimate military action is advisable, as echoed by Rachel Grimes in her contributions to this volume.

For the military, understanding human security with the inclusion of gender perspectives may allow for a greater focus on the protection of civilians (and other protection or support functions) as vital to CAF work. This focus can also promote efforts for long-term stabilisation and to set conditions for peacebuilding processes in contrast to a traditional kinetic military victory. In this sense, a human security frame can assist with identifying indicators and causes of insecurity, and what the military or civilian roles and limitations will be in addressing them. Additionally, the current complex and interconnected global challenges, such as climate change, the Coronavirus pandemic, impoverishment, a re-focus upon great power competition, and violent extremism, require a broadened view of the role of the state and responsibilities under the relevant frameworks, and a deeper understanding of how these issues impact people and communities (a human security viewpoint). A human security frame can help inform CAF thinking to situate itself within these new emerging global threats, and to better identify how or when the CAF will (or will not) have a role, either direct or indirect. This also requires an understanding of how the CAF may anticipate future risks and prevent insecurities. The CAF also needs to understand how its very presence might contribute to human insecurity and what cascading negative impacts military action may have on individuals or communities.

How this Book is Organised

This book is divided into three parts to present the various approaches taken by the authors and to fully articulate the reflection and learning informing the anticipate function. The contributing authors to this volume have addressed human security both narrowly and broadly to describe critical advancements of a human security framework in terms of scope, definition, cross-cutting topics, and how human security relates to other security issues like WPS and great power competition. In the first part, The Rise of Canada's Human Security Approach, three chapters offer a fulsome account of the history and evolution of human security concepts and theories, including their limitations and boundaries within a world refocusing on state-centric security. The second part, Human Security in Practice, includes six chapters that examine issues relevant to incorporating a human security frame into policies, strategies, doctrine, training, and operations for armed forces. The third part, Learning Human Security: Reflection in Action, presents 12 thematic notes from our contributing authors that move through topics such as the challenges of defining human security, other cross-cutting issues such as environmental degradation and cyber security, and domestic human security. These thematic notes offer opportunities for deeper reflection on topics that are seminal to the CAF's future work and are intended as thought-pieces, critiques, learning opportunities, and informal analyses produced by the contributing authors. The concluding chapter offers a continuation of the discussion, raising the notion of the Anthropocene in the context of anticipating threats and insecurities, further shaping domestic and international environments for the security of people.

Contributing Authors

Myriam Denov provides a comprehensive overview of the origins and development of human security as an approach to international relations and peace and security from 1945 to the present. Denov traces UN human security initiatives, both protection-based (freedom from fear) and development-based (freedom from want). She also discusses the development of human security in Canadian theory and practices and illustrates how it has waxed and waned under different elected governments. She discusses some of the critiques of human security, including challenges of definition, *neo-colonial* elements of the approach, the *short-term vision of the concept*, and the absence of a *gendered lens*. In outlining the ongoing setbacks and challenges of human security, Denov argues that the meaningful participation of those affected by armed conflict is a key to a successful peacebuilding strategy.

Clare Hutchinson provides a unique perspective as former NATO Secretary General Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security (SGSR WPS 2018–2021) to explore the evolution of the human security concept and cross-cutting topics within NATO. Hutchinson suggests that Canada is well positioned to influence the people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented responses required to strengthen protection and empowerment of all people and all communities as called for by the UN. She considers how Canada can build on lessons learned and elevate its standing as a champion for human security within NATO and globally, providing ten important elements towards the design of a Canadian human security approach.

Rachel Grimes raises the point that, if you ask any serving CAF member about human security, you will receive a response that this is already being done. In some respects, this is the case. Grimes recognises what has been achieved within the CAF and makes further recommendations for the adoption of a more holistic approach that prioritises a people-centric security, that is collaborative and consultative, and that is grounded in the WPS agenda, to form a third-generation *Women, Peace, and Human Security* approach. Grimes argues that Canada is well positioned to apply such an approach at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, following from perspectives gained through an application of Gender-Based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus). Such an approach will increase the national resilience that NATO expects of its allies and partners.

Wilfrid Greaves, Peter Kikkert, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer consider human security from the specific context of Canadian domestic operations. Greaves argues that, instead of a *broad* human security approach applied by NATO to consider freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live with dignity, Canada has *narrowed* the national human security approach to focus on freedom from fear and, more specifically, "freedom from *violent* threats to people's rights, safety, or lives."[16] In one case study, Greaves suggests this narrow approach "produces gaps which provide an incomplete understanding of the role of the Canadian Armed Forces related to human security."[17] Using human security as a lens on operations, Greaves and Kikkert consider how the CAF conducts domestic disaster relief, while Kikkert and Lackenbauer discuss search and rescue services. Greaves argues that a broader conception of human security is required to embed the military within a whole-of-government framework "that reflects both civilian and military actors and capabilities."[18] In this line of thinking, Kikkert and Lackenbauer address the special human security role of

Canadian Rangers in remote and northern areas of the country, further defining domestic insecurities and the spectrum of influence possible in the North and in isolated communities.

David Lambert offers extensive guidance as to how Canada might go about operationalising human security within defence policies, and to integrate a human security approach as part of its core business. He provides an overview of recent considerations of human security within NATO and within the United Kingdom defence doctrine. Lambert argues that many of the conceptual and practical doctrinal tools for the military's direct involvement in building human security were developed in the first decade of this century. Successful integration of a human security approach is key to success, and he articulates some consequences of a failure to do so which are important take-aways for the CAF decision-makers and leadership.

Whose Security?

A major challenge with the adoption of a CAF human security approach is one of definition of scope. As discussed by Denov in this volume, critics suggest that the two concepts of human development and human security are often used interchangeably by the UN, and that there is a lack of distinction between what constitutes human rights and human security. The wider definition employed by the UN results in a "conceptual overstretch" which results in confusion, leading to "false priorities and hopes", encouraging "military solutions to non-military problems and non-military solutions to military problems."[19] Essentially, people need to be physically secure before all other forms of security can be achieved, and this is why Protection of Civilians remains the key aspect of human security. A distinction has been made between the approach of human security and traditional security frameworks, but, as Chandler notes in terms of the importance of physical protection, "it is very difficult to consistently maintain that there is a struggle between fundamentally differing approaches."[20] Different nations and actors are using the same term human security but attach to it different meanings, objectives, and indicators, but that is to be expected as *human security* means different things for different people dependent on circumstances and context. Thus, rather than rigidly adhering to one specific definition of what constitutes security for all, one can consider that the ambiguous scope of what constitutes human security can be seen as both a strength and a weakness. Canada, as noted by Greaves in this volume, has taken a rather narrow interpretative focus on four key areas of human security. As former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada Lloyd Axworthy has

articulated, "Canada has both the capacity and the credibility to play a leadership role" in alleviating freedom from fear: peacebuilding; anti-personnel landmines; protecting the rights of children; and promoting an international system of rules-based trade as a middle power.[21] This narrow approach based on physical security and freedom from fear has been criticised for disabling the full transformative potential of a human security approach interconnected with development and structural change, and not considering the many emerging threats to an individual or community.[22]

Further to this, freedom from fear tends to securitise human security, thereby emphasising a military role for *protection*, while freedom from want tends to focus attention on *prevention* with more emphasis on Official Development Assistance (ODA) and humanitarian actors. Anticipating a military's strategic, operational, and tactical adaptions and actions in influencing *both* dimensions of security of people as a *frame* is an important activity currently in the CAF's lines of effort across environments. This notion of a frame, or a framework, encourages the establishment of security through concurrent and complementary lines of effort. This is how Clare Hutchinson would visualise the relationship between human security and the Women, Peace and Security agenda, as discussed further in this volume.

In 2008, Chandler erroneously critiqued "the exaggeration of new post-Cold War security threats" such as "drugs, disease, terrorism, pollution, poverty and environmental problems" as being granted primacy in human security discourse.[23] Practitioners and scholars now know the effects of these emerging threats, as well as technological threats, converge with and are intensified by security threats from near peers to create major global insecurity and instability. Indeed, a discourse of *posthuman security* is emerging which would emphasise the security of the environment and biosphere which surrounds us as well as the humans who live within it, and how it is to be human in our emerging technological world, in cyberspace or outer space.[24] This expansion of the human security concept is brought forward in the 2022 UNDP report, *New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene: Demanding Greater Solidarity*.[25] The report calls for a next generation of human security to address security challenges in the greater context of the Anthropocene, the era in which humans and human actions have been the primary factors leading to rapid planetary changes, thus altering our biosphere.[26] A narrow view of security as confined to a state or as solely confined to physical security of an individual or a people cannot adequately conceptualise emerging threats in terms of technology,

climate change, health, and inequalities, and the consequential inequities which can arise as development impacts "planetary processes."[27] A broader consideration of what constitutes human security allows for universally shared understandings to tailor solutions that are context-specific, one of the principles of human security as noted by the UN.[28] There are billions of humans on this earth, living in a multitude of ways: it is logical to allow for more than one definition of what security means to *them*. But how, then, is it possible for them all to be secured? Can universal human security be accomplished? Is this achievable? Is this knowable?

Cross-Cutting Topics of Human Security

With this reaffirmation of a broad human security frame by the UN that includes the three pillars of freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live with dignity, it is very important to have the ability to assign tangible and specific tasks or measures of human security success, military or otherwise, as noted by Lambert and Grimes in their contributions. In this regard, NATO's application of five narrowed cross-cutting topics (CCTs) within joint operations diverges from academic or UN definitions of human security that are more expansive in scope. Lambert has stated in this volume that some of the implicit and explicit tasks associated with these CCTs "do not neatly fall into the realm of military responsibilities and normal tasks – they are certainly not topics for which military forces *generally* train."[29] As noted in the UK's Joint Service Publication *Human Security in Defence*,[30] the ability of military forces to "act within human security policy and aspirations will always be qualified by the unique individual circumstances of each operation, including the legal mandate, mission and tasks, and military resources available at the time."[31] Lambert has noted that NATO has focused practical efforts on the Protection of Civilians, arguably the most important military task, yet the October 2022 *NATO Human Security Approach* now indicates that human security is prevention- *and* protection-oriented. Allied armed forces have been reluctant to include both dimensions of protection and prevention, but the Vancouver Principles bring us to this very nexus. In this volume, Grimes suggests specific tasks at strategic, operational, and tactical levels that all advance a broadened human security agenda that would expand previous Canadian human security policy but is not out of step with current defence policy or emerging threats or a prevention focus. What is missing, Grimes says, is the "institutionalisation of military personnel being willing, resourced, and trained to include the security

of civilian populations in the same way they are trained to engage and render ineffective an adversary."[32] In short, Grimes argues a human security perspective could be mainstreamed in CAF processes similarly to the complementary GBA Plus perspective. Specific actions would not change so much as the rationale and consequent planning to affect any action to be taken.

Not all emerging risks to human security are discussed within this volume. Hutchinson points out that there are other cross-cutting topics that deserve immediate attention, such as climate change, health, and technological challenges including artificial intelligence and cyber. These are further described in her thematic section in Part III. Grimes draws attention to the risks to human beings posed in space and cyber realms and "the responsibility of the military to protect civilians from digital harm."[33] This requires further attention and study.[34]

In the 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO has committed to being prepared to respond to crises resulting from climate change, especially as related to food insecurity.[35] The international advancement of the WPS Agenda, the extension of the Children and Armed Conflict agenda, emerging Youth, Peace, and Security initiatives,[36] and increased attention to issues from conflict-related sexual violence through human trafficking, to cultural property protection are due to, in part, the reframing of security issues following the seminal 1994 UNDP report.

There is a concern, however, that if too many topics are crowded under a human security umbrella, insufficient attention will be paid to any of these. There is consensus from the authors of this volume that this should not be a concern: human security is best viewed as a framework for any number of issues which are more or less important depending on security risk and context and which complement existing lines of effort. A particular concern is that focus will be diffused from the WPS agenda and the ultimate goal of gender equality. Human security complements, and is informed by, WPS in that both protection and empowerment functions are incorporated within a gender-sensitive approach across all military tasks.[37]

As the contributors to this volume have noted, Canada is well positioned to institutionalise a human security framework within its doctrine, planning and professional military education (PME). Indeed, it is appropriate that decision makers are aware of the challenges and opportunities of such an approach to anticipate when and where decisions will be made by allies, and where the CAF could be to meet them, to advance both the human security and WPS agendas and minimise further risk to individuals within communities.

Conclusion

If Canada seeks to increase its influence in the international community, while alleviating human suffering at the operational and tactical levels, it could deploy its resources to train and support a human security framework, a combination of the physical *protection* of people and the *development* of people in dynamic security environments. The CAF has worked for the past three decades training its people to adapt and act in complex human-factor environments, all while representing Canadian values and interests. While resources will have to be re-aligned to develop doctrine, policy, and people, Canada is a naturally capable state to exert influence to shape the security of people across, and inside of, state and national borders, all while contributing to sustainable peace and security.

It is recognised that the CAF has addressed human security topics across a range of missions, however this generally occurs as a secondary outcome arising from primary military tasks focused on delivering state security. The integration of a human security approach and attention to various cross-cutting topics has not been articulated in a systemic way inside the Forces, but rather *ad hoc* across the Force, and predominately at the tactical level. Further, there is no formal doctrine, and limited support for professional development for human security for the CAF, which would form the basis of further education of CAF personnel. With this volume, the contributing authors provide opportunities for reflecting on how human security may be applied by the CAF, and, perhaps more significantly, why. As Canada enters an unprecedented age of insecurity confronted by the states and international organisations supporting a liberal rules-based order, the CAF is well-positioned to more fully *anticipate* human security to *adapt* and *act* over the next decade.

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Part I:
The Rise of Canada's Human Security Approach

Chapter 1: The History and Evolution of Human Security

Myriam Denov

To its supporters, the notion of *human security* has been perceived as many things: a new paradigm, a shift in the orientation and conceptualisation of security, a political campaign, a set of beliefs about the sources of violent conflict, and a guide for academics or policymakers.[1] While it has been the subject of much debate and critique, human security has been viewed as a growing response to a situation wherein the continued prioritisation of military concerns at the state level in traditional discourses and practices of security has served to further individual insecurity and failed to respond adequately to the most pressing threats to individuals throughout the world.[2] This chapter addresses the origins of human security and tracks its historical development and evolution in the academic and policy realms, as well as the surge of attention the issue received in the mid-1990s. In this chapter, the waxing and waning of theorising about, interest in, and application of, the concept of human security will be described, as well as its critiques.

Evolution of Human Security: History and Origins

The development of human security as a concept and as a policy agenda occurred over an extended period of time. A unique aspect of the concept's development lies in its ties to both academia and policymaking, particularly at the UN, which enables it to have conceptual and practical implications.

1945 to 1990: A Focus on State Security and the Origins of Human Security

The focus of security has traditionally been on state security, defined as the "military defense of state interests and territory."[3] From a state security perspective, security threats are assumed to emanate from external sources and state security therefore centres on protecting the state—its boundaries, people, institutions, and values—from external attack. Threats to security are considered those that involve direct, organised violence and coercion by other states and from non-state actors. Proponents of this approach to security argue that the state is the primary provider of security, and if the state is secure, then those who live within it are also secure. In keeping with this perspective, the purpose of a security policy is to defend the territorial integrity and political sovereignty of the state. Responses to security threats

are typically retaliatory force or threats of its use, military means and strengthening of economic might.[4]

State security perspectives long dominated security studies and policy, but a growing movement began to challenge this perspective, emphasising instead the importance of individual well-being, freedom, and rights within the context of security. While the concept of human security and its application gained credence, most prominently in the mid-1990s, the journey toward human security was a gradual one that began almost a century earlier. The introduction of human security was therefore not a sudden lightbulb moment, but rather the outcome of a long process. A few key examples highlight this process. Thérien notes that the roots of human security can be traced to the creation of the International Labour Organisation in 1919, as its constitution explicitly linked peace and social justice, expressing the belief that universal and lasting peace can be accomplished only if it is based on social justice. These roots were strengthened in the 1930s when "a number of national governments adopted policies centred on individual economic security."[5]

Following the Second World War, the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights highlighted key principles and values that contributed to the modern discourse on human security. Moreover, in 1945, the United States Secretary of State articulated the need for "social and economic victory" to ensure freedom from wants and desires.[6] In the early 1970s, the Club of Rome published volumes on the "world problematique" that examined the limits of economic growth stemming from rapid industrialisation and urbanisation afflicting all nations across the globe.[7] These volumes prompted critical reflections into how global systems influence individual life. In 1977, during his time as president of the World Bank, Robert McNamara argued that nations such as the United States were "vastly overspending on military and vastly underspending on non-military means, especially support for international development to strengthen its security."[8] In the 1980s, scholars began to stress the need to broaden the concept of security,[9] and this broader approach to security was embodied in several key reports. For example, in 1980, the Independent Commission on International Development Issues published *North-South: A Programme for Survival*. The report illustrated the so-called Brandt line, the boundary highlighting the global divide in wealth between the North and South. In addition, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, known as the Palme Commission, adopted its first final report entitled *Common Security*. The report argued that no country can ensure security by making unilateral decisions about

its own military deployment. This is because security also depends on the actions and reactions of potential adversaries. Therefore, security must be found in common with those adversaries. The report noted that states can no longer seek security at each other's expense; it can be obtained only through cooperative undertakings.[10] Together, these reports emphasised the importance of global partnership and common responsibility in finding alternatives to the primacy to military defence and national security in response to broader security threats, such as poverty.[11]

It is also critical to note that several key events, as well as the surrounding socio-political context, shaped a changing discourse on security. First, the increase in armed conflicts and atrocities committed against civilians during the 1990s, in contexts like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, emphasised the need to adapt existing security strategies.[12] These conflicts highlighted not only that atrocities were being committed by state authorities against their own people, often in the name of national security or ideology, but also that the international community failed to intervene to protect the lives of millions of innocent civilians. Second, conventional security approaches, which were largely based on the use of military force, were not designed or conceived to address critical concerns like the spread of disease, natural disasters, environmental degradation and unequal income distribution, which creates a critical security gap.[13] Third, globalisation created new vulnerabilities to old threats and a "wholly new (security) context in which conventional institutional remedies fare poorly."[14] The acceleration of information and communications technology and terrorism, and the increase in civil wars demonstrated that security approaches once dominated by game theory, rockets, and nuclear alliances were no longer relevant to the changing global landscape.[15] It is within this context, and in a time of growing optimism and desire for positive change, that the notion of human security was introduced in the 1990s.

1990 to 1995: The Dawn of Human Security

The concept of human security is rooted in the conviction that the traditional notion of security and its focus on military defence is inadequate to deal with the challenges of the contemporary world, making the case for a new security approach that puts people at the centre of the international agenda.[16] The concept of human security is meant to act as a counterweight to the perspective that the only form of security that mattered was state security. It is meant to complement state-centric security, not replace it. By extending the concept of security

beyond national security, the goal of the human security agenda has been to compel states to pay more attention to the needs of their citizens. For proponents of human security, individual human beings—not states—are the main object of security: "ordinary people who [seek] security in their daily lives."[17] Whereas state security aims to protect territorial boundaries with, and from, uniformed troops, human security includes citizen protection from environmental pollution, transnational terrorism, massive population movements, poverty, hunger, disease, and long-term conditions of social exclusion, oppression and deprivation.[18] Moreover, in an increasingly interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security and human rights must go hand in hand; there will be no development without security, and no security without development.[19] The choice of the term 'security' in human security is meant to persuade governments that the security of citizens is state security and, if citizens are insecure, it follows that states are insecure.

Demonstrating an important shift in perspective, the mid-1990s saw multiple references documenting transformation and change in relation to security studies. The Special Advisor to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Mahbubul Haq, argued that the world was "entering a new era of human security" in which the "entire conception of security will change—and change dramatically…we need to fashion a new concept of human security that is reflected in the lives of our people, not in the weapons of our country."[20] Similarly, former Canadian foreign affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy declared that "the meaning of security is being transformed."[21] With these advances, both domestically and within the international arena, the theory of human security began to develop into discourse followed by policy and action.

The year 1994 is highly significant in the history of human security, as it marked the publication of the UNDP's *Human Development Report*. The report is what scholars and policy makers typically refer to as the spark that led to a flurry of scholarly and policy debate and discussion on the topic and was pivotal in introducing the concept of human security into official UN discourse. The report was at the forefront of a longstanding shift in thinking about security. The report called for "new dimensions of human security" that reinforced the link between development and security.[22] The report argued the following:

> The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of nuclear holocaust. [...] Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives.[23]

The UNDP report paved the way for new ways of thinking about security, development, sovereignty, people, and the role of the state, further shifting discourse towards policy and action.

UNDP Report: Freedom from Fear, Freedom from Want

The 1994 UNDP report defined the basic tenets of human security as freedom in two dimensions—freedom from fear and freedom from want—each reinforcing a different branch of security. That said, these branches are considered two mutually reinforcing paths: one protection-based and the other development-based.[24] The protection-based path, often referred to as the narrow approach to security, calls attention to the security of vulnerable civilian populations, particularly those who are subjected to armed conflict and the mass atrocities of war and genocide. The development-based path, often referred to as the broad approach, centres on prevention rather than intervention, takes a bottom-up approach to prevention as opposed to those that are top-down, and emphasises social, economic, and human development. These two pillars, freedom from fear and freedom from want, are complementary and reinforcing.

The notion of freedom from fear was conceptualised in the wake of intrastate conflicts and mass atrocities that occurred in Rwanda (1994) and the former Yugoslavia (1991–1994), where civilian populations were subjected to horrific war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Importantly, broader theories and concepts of human security do not view these events and threats in isolation, but regard them as strongly associated with poverty, lack of state capacity, and other forms of inequity. Freedom from fear means freedom from direct physical violence and threats to personal and community security. This includes ethnic violence, threats from the state or other states, crime, violence, and child abuse. Reflecting the notion of freedom from fear, the UNDP report articulated:

> Human security is a child that did not die, a disease that did not spread, an ethnic violence that did not explode, a woman who was not raped, a poor person who did not starve, a dissident who was not silenced, a human spirit that was not crushed.[25]

In keeping with the goal of ensuring freedom from fear, proponents of the human security agenda suggest that the international community has an obligation to protect people by intervening to protect citizens' security when their own states cannot provide it. In this sense, human security is a forward defence against common threats to humanity, using new diplomatic tools of coalition building and persuasion, rather than

coercion.[26] Canada was instrumental in promoting the freedom from fear agenda, which will be addressed and expanded upon in more detail in chapter two.

Freedom from want refers to indirect or structural violence against individuals, as well as freedom from socio-economic and environmental threats that consistently or chronically limit people's choices and freedoms. Here, proponents of the human security agenda argue that threats need to be expanded to include hunger, poverty, disease, and natural environment disasters, as they are vital to addressing the root of insecurity and typically kill far more people than war, genocide and terrorism combined.[27] Freedom from want is more broadly related to development, and Japan was instrumental in promoting the concept. The Japanese focus on the "security-development nexus," which many argue was brought forth by the Asian economic crisis of 1997 to 1999, inspired greater appreciation of the link between human security and development.[28]

Promoting a broader concept of security that took into consideration a large variety of threats, the 1994 UNDP report grouped these threats into seven categories of human security. The human security framework maintains, however, that these threats are interconnected, rather than hierarchical, and arise in a context of growing interdependence.

1. Economic security means that individuals should be assured a basic income from productive and remunerative work.
2. Food security assures that all people should have physical and economic access to basic food.
3. Health security ensures a minimum amount of protection from disease and unhealthy lifestyles.
4. Environmental security centres on the effort to protect people from the long-term effects of human-made and natural disasters. Global warming and climate change represent two of the most significant threats to people.
5. Personal security focuses on protecting people from physical violence, whether from the state or external state(s), or from individuals.
6. Community security aims to protect people from the loss of traditional values from sectarian and ethnic violence, particularly in relation to ethnic minorities who are under threat.
7. Political security is concerned with whether people live in a society that honours their basic human rights and freedoms and enables them to pursue their aspirations and desires.

As demonstrated in the content of the UNDP report, the scope of human security, as well as the range of actors involved, is far broader than state security. States are no longer the sole actors. Instead, international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society are key to managing security issues and mobilising to support human rights. By introducing a distinctive conceptual breadth involving a much broader spectrum of actors and institutions, human security is said to be universally applicable and works to complement traditional notions of national security. In moving away from state-centric approaches and putting people at the centre of the international agenda, human security's emphasis on individual sovereignty over state sovereignty ushered in new roles for the international system to step in and compensate for state action.[29] This involved coalition-building, inter-institutional cooperation, and partnership among the international community with civil society and NGOs.[30]

1995 to 2000: The Development of Human Security

In the years following the publication of the UNDP report, the concept of human security gained much traction, both within the UN and within academia. This section highlights the increased interest in the concept within academic circles and, by outlining some of the concept's key strengths, identifies why the concept appears to have captured the attention of academics and policymakers during this period.

The UNDP report was followed by increased scholarly work dedicated to human security. As Paris noted: "the term [human security] has also begun to appear in academic works,"[31] Academic literature addressed and explored the meaning and definition of the concept.[32] The concept was applied to numerous fields and disciplines within academia, ranging from women's studies to space policy, which demonstrated its transdisciplinary nature.[33] Human security was assessed, evaluated and applied to multiple countries in both the Global North and Global South.[34] Literature also addressed the concept's inherent links to government policy and the UN.[35] As a result of this shared interest between academics and policymakers, the concept was addressed and explored in both academic and policy settings, leading to dynamic and collaborative debates, where typically there is little interaction. Human security was also the subject of new research projects at several major universities, which, during this period, included Harvard University's Program on Human Security, the University of Denver's School of International Studies, the University of New South Wales's Asia-Australia Institute, and the University of British Columbia's Institute of International Relations.[36]

The concept is said to have gained traction because of its broad focus and applicability. Amartya Sen, a key proponent of the concept, argued that human security has four key framing features that set it apart.[37] First is the focus on individual human lives. Sen argued that while the state has remained the key purveyor of security, it has often failed to fulfill its security obligations and, at times, has been the very source of the threat to its own people. Shifting focus from the state and external threats, human security takes into consideration members of the general public and how insecurity can shape and form their daily lives. As the UNDP noted in its 1994 Report: "For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event."[38] Human security is thus people-centred, particularly civilian populations vulnerable to direct and indirect violence.[39]

Second, the concept's strength lies in its understanding of individuals within the broader context in which they live. Here, Sen emphasised the role of society and social arrangements in making human lives more secure in a constructive way. The human security agenda considers the transdisciplinary systems of interconnection and the ways in which these systems affect individuals and diverse groups. This focus on interconnection sets the human security agenda apart, offering a holistic and multi-faceted view of people and their surrounding contexts. As Kofi Annan, former secretary-general of the United Nations, noted:

> Human security, in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth, and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment—these are the interrelated building blocks of human and therefore national, security.[40]

In this way, we can begin to witness the broadening of the theory into a wider-scoped perspective on security-beyond-the-state. The third feature is a focus on basic priorities, including life, health, dignity, and the reduction and avoidance of human suffering: "The right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair."[41] These basic priorities demand attention beyond state security and weaponry: "Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity […] it is concerned with how people live and

breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities—and whether they live in conflict or in peace.[42] The fourth feature that gives the concept its strength is that it considers stability and the fulfillment of the most basic of human priorities. The focus of this fourth element is on the intersecting forces that can threaten and disrupt the fulfillment of basic human needs and human rights. These forces demand attention as they can foster downward spirals of disadvantage, of physical, mental, and emotional damage, and disability and death.[43] Gasper and Gomez suggest that these four areas of focus co-exist, further underscoring the conceptual breadth and strength of the concept as a way to understand security when a state-focus is not the sole focus.

2000 to 2020: The Maturation of the Human Security Agenda: Wane, Wax and Critique

While the mid to late 1990s saw important maturation of a human security discourse and related policies and actions, there has been a subsequent wax and wane of interest in the concept, as well as a period of intense critique. The decline in focus on human security occurred in 2001. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11, 2001, marked a return to state-centred security, with the war on terror reversing the momentum for the security of individual human rights.[44] During this period of wane, human security became second to homeland security and put the concept of human security at risk of obsolescence. A dramatic increase in research and attention to terror and state security dominated academic and policy literature in the years following 9/11. Referred to as "the day that changed everything",[45] 9/11 led to a surge in literature on the attack's impact and consequences within the realms of war, security, politics, psychology, education, business, economics, and transportation, to name but a few. That said, the concept of human security did not entirely recede to the annals of history. Christie (2010) argues that the enduring nature of human security, in spite of 9/11, highlights the concept's resilience and malleability. Rather than being dropped as entirely inappropriate, and a full retrenchment of state security, Christie suggests that the human security agenda provided a framework for understanding external threats. He argues that the lack of human security had "fed the global terror machine and created a threat against the North. Human security for people in faraway places became crucial for our security."[46]

The post-9/11 era can be seen as a period of continued interest in human security, leading to ongoing discussion, debate, and critique.

In 2003, a key report entitled *Human Security Now* was published by the UN Commission on Human Security, led by Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate in Economics, and Sadako Ogata, the former UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The Report produced a dynamic yet more precise definition of human security: "the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment."[47] Churruca Muguruza notes that, in defining human security, the report incorporated: (1) protecting fundamental freedoms as freedoms that are the essence of life; (2) protecting people from severe and widespread threats; (3) Using processes that build upon people's strengths and aspirations; and (4) creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that, when combined, give people the building blocks for survival, livelihood and dignity. The 2003 report added to existing discussions through the promotion of two concepts and strategies to achieve human security: *protection* and *empowerment*. *Protection* requires a "concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities."[48] Here, the human security agenda recognised that people and communities are often threatened by events beyond their control, whether a financial crisis, a violent conflict, a global pandemic, pollution, hunger, water shortages, and by "sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life."[49]

Human security helped identify gaps in the infrastructure of protection, including ways to strengthen or improve it. *Empowerment* works to enable people to "develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making."[50] In recognition of people's ability to act on their own behalf, bring stakeholders together to build their communities and solve security-related problems, human security aims to support people's empowerment by providing information so that they can question social arrangements and take collective action. This implies a bottom-up approach aimed at developing the capabilities of individuals and communities to make informed choices and act. For instance, in a post-conflict context, the UN Commission argued that, if developed in full partnership with national and local authorities (and alongside an integrated human security framework that addresses public safety, humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, reconciliation and coexistence, and governance and empowerment) the two strategies have the capacity to achieve greater post-war recovery. It has been argued that this inter-related focus on protection and empowerment makes the human security agenda unique. The Report identified six key areas of insecurity: (1) conflict situations; (2) refugees, migrants, and displaced persons; (3) transition phases between war and

peace; (4) economic security; (5) balanced growth and social safety nets; and (6) access to health care and education. The report also underlined the importance of human security frameworks being complementary with human rights and development frameworks through an integrated approach.

The 2005 World Summit Outcome—adopted by all United Nations heads of state of the UN—endorsed for the first time the concept of human security, a mere four years after 9/11. The acceptance of the "right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair" and of the responsibility of the state and the international community "to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" highlighted the centrality of human security on the international agenda.[51]

The years that followed reflected yet another period of decline in interest in human security, particularly within governments and the UN. For example, 2009 marked the 10th anniversary of the formation of the Human Security Network—a Network of 13 countries that initiated several key human security initiatives, including the Ottawa Treaty, banning anti-personnel landmines, and creation of the International Criminal Court, as well as some measures to control the sale and distribution of conflict diamonds and small arms. Martin and Owen note that the 10th anniversary could be seen as "more of a wake than a celebration" as the Network was blunted by a loss of interest among its leading sponsors, with ministers rarely attending meetings, and sending delegates instead.[52] Perhaps more significant, Martin and Owen note that "the term 'human security' has all but vanished from the reports of the UN Secretary General and high-level panels, and from branch organisation use. The UN, it appears, is moving away from the human security agenda – at least as explicitly named."[53]

Within the academic realm, however, empirical and theoretical literature continued to address multiple aspects of human security, including community security,[54] environmental security,[55] food and health security,[56] war and economics,[57] geography and its colonial origins,[58] and health and violent conflict.[59] The concept continued to be applied to address security issues in various countries and regions across the globe.[60] In its seminal report, the UN Commission on Human Security articulated that human security was centred on four key elements:

1. *People-centred* – the everyday lives of people and communities;
2. *Menaces* – protecting citizens from a range of threats;

1.1: Discussion between Kimpoko's village leader and member of the Task Force Democratic Republic of Congo.

Kimpoko's village leader, Sister Ghislaine, and Major Andre St-Martin, a member of Task Force Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) deployed on Operation CROCODILE reminisce about the projects completed in the village by the Canadian Forces while looking at some photographs of Canadian's that have previously visited the village, March 15, 2011. Kimpoko village, located 45 kilometres east of Kinshasa in the DRC, was established in the year 2000 for roughly 100 war widows and approximately 200 children. A Canadian-funded project built 40 houses in this village between 2008 and 2009 and helped to renovate and refurbish 60 of the original houses that were constructed when the village was founded. Canada also worked with the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO) in 2007 to build two water wells that provide clean drinking water to the village residents.

Operation CROCODILE is Canada's military contribution to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or better known by its French name, the Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo (MONUSCO). The 11-member Task Force Democratic Republic of the Congo (TF DRC) is the Canadian contingent in MONUSCO. It comprises ten staff officers with expertise in fields such as law, information operations and training divided between MONUSCO headquarters in Kinshasa and the forward headquarters in Goma. The eleventh member of the task force is a senior non-commissioned member who handles all national support tasks.

Source: Sergeant Matthew McGregor, Canadian Forces Combat Camera, © 2011 DND-MDN Canada, IS2011-1005-08.

3. *Actors* – the importance of including a broad range of actors in managing security issues;
4. *Empowerment* – enabling people and societies to contribute directly to identifying and implementing solutions to the quagmire of insecurity.[61]

Drawing on these four elements of human security—people-centred, menaces, actors, empowerment—it is made obvious that despite successes, there have been setbacks. These are more fully articulated in Chapter 5 as well as in Part III, Structural Considerations and Meaningful Participation.

Conclusion

Since the original 1994 UNDP report was published, much attention has been paid to the concept of human security, inspiring hope, optimism, debate, deliberation, critique, and policy initiatives. The human security agenda has provided an important roadmap toward securing the lives of ordinary people. Human security as a concept and agenda has lasted and endured for a reason—it has brought reflection, pause, debate, and dialogue. All these elements are essential to meaningful change. The goals of human security—freedom from fear and freedom from want—provide a guiding light toward improving protection and empowerment in people's lives. In theory, the concept offers immense promise and possibility. In practice, however, the challenge lies in the ability and capacity to implement the concept fully and successfully. The quarter century that passed between 1995 and 2020 marked a distinctly separate set of principles, discourses, policies, and related actions from the traditional and historic state-centric security approach. While 9/11 prompted the foregrounding of state-centric security once again, the maturation of differing human security agendas continues within states like Canada, the UK and Denmark, for example, as well as within the international community of liberal rules-based organisations and alliances. The next chapter addresses Canada's influence on human security thinking, and how a human security perspective continues to shape a Canadian approach to the security *problematique*.

Chapter 1 Key Concepts

- The development of human security as a concept and as a policy agenda occurred over an extended period from 1945 to today.
- Human security has ties to both academia and policymaking, particularly at the UN, which enables conceptual and practical implications for military forces.
- The choice of the term *security* in human security is meant to persuade governments that the security of citizens is state security and, if citizens are insecure, it follows that states are also insecure.
- The two dominant perspectives within human security are *freedom from fear* and *freedom from want*.
- These perspectives inform the two dominant dimensions of *protection* and *prevention* important to the *anticipate* function within the CAF spectrum of anticipate, adapt, and act as described in this volume's Introduction.
- State security perspectives have dominated security studies and policy, but a movement began in the 1990s to challenge this perspective, emphasising instead the importance of individual well-being, freedom, and rights within the context of security.
- A dramatic increase in research and attention to terror and state security dominated academic and policy literature in the years following 9/11. This caused a significant pivot away from human security to homeland security and put the concept of human security at risk of obsolescence.
- Human security frameworks continue to be refined by NATO and Canada's allies, including the UK's Ministry of Defence, as accommodating both dimensions of human security as cooperative undertakings between actors, emphasizing partnerships and common responsibility. These advances in thinking provide alternatives to the primacy of military defence and national security in response to broader security threats, such as poverty, that perpetuate human insecurities.
- A human security approach empowers people to act on their own behalf, brings stakeholders together to build their communities, and helps solve security-related problems. It aims to support *empowerment* by providing information so that people can question social arrangements, make informed choices, and take collective action.

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Chapter 2: Canada and Human Security

Myriam Denov

Canada has been an important broker and advocate in championing the concept of human security in both theory and practice. The human security agenda provided an opportunity for Canada to take a leadership role in international relations and this role "contributed to a unique Canadian identity and sense of Canada's place in the world."[1] This chapter explores Canada's role in developing, promoting, and implementing the human security agenda in both theory and practice. It highlights Canada's leadership role in advancing the human security agenda—particularly in relation to the freedom from fear dimension— and traces the relative decline of the human security agenda over time.

Canada's Role in Human Security

Canada defined its place within the human security agenda by promoting both its role as a *coalition-builder*, as well as a key player in the direct development and implementation of human security initiatives. Both roles were particularly predominant under the Canadian Government between 1996 and 2000. As a coalition-builder, Canada maintained the need to rely on wielding a *soft power* approach: "the art of disseminating information in such a way that desirable outcomes are achieved through persuasion rather than coercion."[2] Axworthy noted "the power to influence the behaviour of others" through the use of "ideas, values, persuasion, skill, and technique."[3] A human security approach therefore represented a different mode of diplomatic conduct, which can be described as an unconventional bottom-up approach to diplomacy, in contrast to a classic top-down approach.[4] Coalition building among like-minded states and non-state actors became "one dynamic element of this 'new diplomacy,'"[5] with Canada's diplomatic corps building coalitions among states and actors drawn from transnational civil society that would support the human security agenda. As a middle power, Canada was ideally suited to bring others around to the importance of human security and the need for cooperation and collaboration between governments, NGOs, academics, businesses, and ordinary citizens.

Alongside coalition-building, Canada broadened and deepened its human security agenda in foreign policy and its role as a key player in promoting and implementing the concept through various domestic and international initiatives. In a seminal 1997 article, Axworthy addressed

Canada's role, and its own need to reassess traditional security given that the "end of the Cold War fail[ed] to enhance global stability." This article defined and summarised the importance of the human security agenda:

> Canada and a small number of like-minded countries such as Norway and the Netherlands began to reassess the traditional concept of security in order to identify those variables beyond arms control/disarmament which effect peace and stability. From this reconsideration emerged the concept of "human security" … human security is much more than the absence of military threat. It includes security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights. This concept of human security recognizes the complexity of the human environment and accepts that the forces influencing human security are interrelated and mutually reinforcing.[6]

Similar to discourse at the global level in relation to human security, the Canadian government's emphasis on security focused on the importance of protection for the everyday lives of people, as well as Canada's leadership role in promoting and implementing the human security agenda. As Axworthy noted:

> At the start of this new century, protection of peoples is among the most important issues before us. Peace and security—national, regional and international—are possible only if they are derived from people's security[7]…Canada is well-placed to succeed as a leader in a world where soft power is increasingly important.[8]

The Government of Canada coalesced interest in re-establishing its influence within the international community with an idea whose time had come.

The Evolution of Human Security in Canada

In many ways, the evolution and advancement of the human security agenda in Canada has mirrored what occurred internationally, as described in Chapter One, and within the United Nations, which is further described in Chapter Five. In Canada, a surge of interest and activity in human security took place in the mid to late 1990s, followed by a period of wax and wane. By approximately 2005, the concept had virtually vanished from Canada's foreign policy agenda.

Canada's *heyday* of human security occurred between 1995 and 2000. During this period, a surge of conceptual and policy activities materialised, including a number of papers and reports articulating and theorising Canada's position on human security, as well as outlining the country's human security agenda.

One of the first articulations of human security principles came in the 1995 report *Canada in the World* by the Liberal government led by Jean Chrétien.[9] The report advanced the promotion of the rule of law, good governance, and human rights as hallmarks of Canadian foreign policy.[10] In a later 1999 concept paper entitled *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*, human security was defined as "safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats".[11] The 1999 concept paper argued that the broad UNDP definition made operationalisation of human security into practical policy "unwieldy." The Canadian conception of human security was refined in the concept paper, and described as:

> Human security entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerability and minimize risk, and taking remedial action where prevention fails. The range of potential threats to human security should not be narrowly conceived…a human security approach is not simply synonymous with humanitarian action. It highlights the need to address the root causes of insecurity and to help ensure people's future safety.[12]

In 2000, the Government of Canada released the report *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security*, which defined human security as "freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives".[13] In this report, Canada identified five foreign policy priorities for advancing human security: (1) public safety; (2) the protection of civilians; (3) conflict prevention; (4) governance and accountability; and (5) peace support operations. Following the departure from Government of Axworthy in 2000, another version of *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security* was published in 2002, which established "a new agenda" to address the "challenges of human security." The five areas of priority are outlined briefly and an example of how each was applied in practice is included alongside each priority area.

1. *Public Safety*: This area of priority aimed to build international expertise to counter the threats of terrorism, drug-trafficking and organised crime. The prevention of terrorism was a key area of focus. Canada's Human Security Program, which demonstrated this priority in practice, supported the development of legislation to assist Commonwealth countries implement UN counter-terrorism conventions and the UNSCR 1373. Christie notes that, while Canada was portrayed as a leader in human security, it was also actively engaged in the combat components of the "Global War on Terror," particularly

in Afghanistan.[14] In this sense, Christie argues that Canada's policies can shed light on how the practices of traditional security and human security can co-exist and complement one another.

2. *Protection of Civilians*: This area of focus aimed to reduce the human costs of armed conflict with particular attention to the threats imposed by landmines, the plight of war-affected children and the internally displaced, and the deployment of military personnel in extreme situations to stop atrocities and war crimes. In practice, Canada's Human Security Program worked in partnership with the Economic Community of West African States to establish a Child Protection Unit to monitor the situation of children affected by armed conflict and their rehabilitation. In 2000, Canada formed the Group of Friends of Women, Peace and Security, an informal group of 53 UN Member States. This Group, currently chaired by Canada, shares information on best practices and conducts periodic joint advocacy in the UN context.

3. *Conflict Prevention*: The government aimed to strengthen the capacity of the international community to prevent and resolve violent conflict, with particular attention to small arms and the economic dimensions of civil wars, via sanctions. Canada's Human Security Program supported key research activities on the impact of small arms on children, as well as on conflict diamonds in Sierra Leone, where Canada worked through the UN on the Kimberley Process to break the link between diamonds and armed conflict.

4. *Governance and Accountability*: This priority area sought to foster greater accountability of public and private sector institutions, with particular emphasis on the International Criminal Court (ICC) and promoting the reform of security institutions. In 2002, Canada's Human Security Program and the Commonwealth Secretariat held the Workshop on the Implementation of the Rome Statute for the ICC in Tanzania. The Workshop brought together legislative drafters with ICC experts to analyse the steps needed for each country to ratify and implement the Rome Statute. Four states that participated in the Workshop ratified the Statute shortly thereafter.

5. *Peace Support Operations*: This area of focus aimed to undertake peace support operations, with particular attention to women, peace, and security, and to deploy the appropriate range

of military, police, and civilian experts to support complex missions in war-affected contexts. In practice, Canada's Human Security Program and the UK collaborated in the development of a gender training course for military and civilian personnel involved in peace-support operations. The training addressed gender-sensitive approaches to peacebuilding and peacekeeping, including the gendered dimension of international humanitarian law, sexual violence, and internal displacement.

Further to these priorities and examples, Canada initiated and led several domestic and international policy initiatives that had a long-term impact on the global human security agenda. Some of the most well-known initiatives include the Ottawa Treaty, the creation of the International Criminal Court, and the initiation of the R2P doctrine, all of which are explored in greater detail in this chapter.

Over time, however, Canada shifted away from a human security agenda and direct contributions to human security initiatives decreased. For example, Canada's contribution to peacekeeping saw a steady decline, from thousands of troops contributed in the 1990s, to 112 troops in 2016 and only 68 in 2017.[15] A number of factors appear to have led to the gradual decline in the human security agenda. The appointment of John Manley as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2000 signaled a pivot from human security toward economic issues.[16]

The reality of 9/11 also affected Canada's foreign policy. As Paquin argues, "since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, the foreign and security policies of no other US allies have been more affected than those of Canada."[17] Boucher suggests that the US did not present Canada with a choice to focus on the security of people, rather, a direct focus upon only state-centric security. On September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush made his expectations of other nations clear: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."[18] Chapin notes that, in response, "grudgingly, [Canada's] ministers and officials stopped talking about human security and effective multilateralism and got on with devising a national security strategy, defending the country, and fighting Islamist terrorism."[19] This recalibration further eroded the maturation of human security in policy and practice.

In addition to 9/11, the prominence of Canada's human security agenda diminished in 2006 with the introduction of a new government. Small notes that Canada "dropped out of sight internationally as a promoter of the concept."[20] Similarly, Davis noted in 2009 that

"since taking power…Conservative political staffers have worked to purge the language of the previous Liberal government's much lauded 'human security' policies from the DFAIT lexicon."[21] Under the Harper government, Canadian foreign policy was to be reoriented toward the response in Afghanistan, Canada-US relations, and arctic sovereignty.[22] While a distinctive wane occurred in Canadian human security initiatives from 2000 to 2015, there is some recent evidence of a potential resurgence.

Domestic Human Security Initiatives

Between 2000–2004 the Canadian government invested significant resources to advance and fund programs within Canada. In the academic realm, the government funded the *Canadian Consortium for Human Security*, an academic-based network promoting policy-relevant research on human security. The Consortium's core mission included facilitating the exchange of information and analysis on human security issues, as well as helping to build a human security community in Canada and internationally. The Consortium aimed to foster a generation of junior scholars who would focus on the study and application of the concept.[23]

There were also initiatives that promoted Canadian capacity-building in peacebuilding. An example is the establishment of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative (CPI) in late 1996. Axworthy saw peacebuilding as a vital tool in the provision of human security: "it involves casting a lifeline to…societies struggling to end the cycle of violence, restore civility and get back on their feet."[24]Accordingly, the creation of domestic capacity would enable Canada to respond to such situations. The objective of the CPI was to "to assist countries in conflict in their efforts toward peace and stability; and to promote Canadian peacebuilding capacity and Canadian participation in international peacebuilding initiatives."[25] Originally, the CPI was comprised of the Peacebuilding Fund, which was to be jointly managed by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), though the annual $10-million budget came from a reallocation of existing CIDA resources.[26] The Peacebuilding Fund was designed as a funding mechanism for developing domestic expertise and supporting peacebuilding activities that fell outside the jurisdiction or mandate of existing programs operating in conflict zones.

In 2000, the Canadian government created a five-year, $50 million-dollar Human Security Program (HSP), which had both domestic

and international components. The HSP aimed to invest in "domestic capacity building, diplomatic leadership and advocacy, multilateral mechanisms and country-specific initiatives that increase people's safety from violence…Since its inception in June 2000, the Human Security Program has contributed to over 250 projects around the world."[27] Between 2000 and 2004, the HSP funded 568 projects. Nearly 75 percent of the funded projects were under the core priority areas of the protection of civilians, conflict prevention and resolution, and governance and accountability.[28] Underscoring the success of the program, a 2004 program evaluation found that "a small responsive fund such as the Human Security Program can be very effective."[29]

International Human Security Initiatives

In the mid-1990s, Canada spearheaded several international human security activities. This included the creation of the *Human Security Network*—a Network of 13 like-minded countries that was launched in collaboration with Norway and Japan.[30] Two major accomplishments are said to have emerged from the Network. The first was the Ottawa Treaty, which seeks to eliminate anti-personnel landmines around the world. The second was the creation of the International Criminal Court. Both these civil society movements resulted in large-scale multilateral agreements centred on human rights and embodied the holistic nature of human security.

The Ottawa Treaty

Anti-personnel mines are devices designed to explode in proximity or on contact with a human being. Landmines have been used since the Second World War in multiple conflicts around the world, as well as during the Cold War, where they were laid along country borders. Left in place, these landmines continue to kill and maim civilian victims long after armed groups and forces have withdrawn. In 1992, six non-governmental organisations (NGOs) launched an awareness campaign with the goal of banning landmines worldwide. In October 1996, at the first Ottawa Conference, the Government of Canada launched the Ottawa Process, which led to the ratification of the Mine Ban Treaty. In December 1997, 122 states signed the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction*, pledging more than $500 million dollars for demining and supporting victims of landmines worldwide.[31] As a result of the success of the Ottawa Process, the International Coalition to Ban Landmines and its coordinator Jody Williams won the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize, which recognised the Ottawa Process as a "convincing

example of an effective policy for peace."[32] Moreover, the treaty quickly attained the requisite four ratifications and came into force in March 1999. Axworthy concluded that the experience demonstrated that "using human security as a concept and soft power as a toolkit had produced a treaty that set out global norms for the protection of people."[33]

The Ottawa Treaty has been ratified by a total of 164 countries, and 30 countries that were once heavily mined are now considered free of anti-personnel mines. Reflecting Canada's goal and emphasis on coalition-building and the inclusion of civil society, the Ottawa Process marked an important shift in the role and status that NGOs play in diplomatic discussions, again supporting a human security approach to the inclusion of multiple actors and players. While NGOs had traditionally played an advisory role in large part, they became active participants in the conferences, as well as at the bargaining table. Ultimately, the Ottawa Process demonstrated the ability of the Canadian government to assume a leadership position in the promotion of a new legal norm that, reflecting the human security agenda, sought to provide protection to people from the indiscriminate violence of a weapon commonly employed in conflict.

International Criminal Court

Canada played an important role in establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)—the world's first permanent legal body where individuals are tried for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Drawing upon the "soft approach" noted earlier, representatives from Ottawa chaired a coalition of states that advocated for the creation of the court. This "like-minded group" pushed for the ICC and maintained common positions during the negotiation phase, effectively increasing their influence over the ICC's design. In 1998, Phillipe Kirsch, a senior Canadian diplomat, was chosen to chair the Committee of the Whole at the Diplomatic Conference in Rome.[34] As one of the most dedicated advocates of the court's creation, the Minister of Foreign Affairs outlined the importance of the court at the Rome Conference:

> An independent and effective international criminal court will help to deter some of the most serious violations of international humanitarian law. It will help give new meaning and global reach to protecting the vulnerable and innocent. By isolating and stigmatizing those who commit war crimes or genocide, and removing them from the community, it will help to end cycles of impunity and retribution. Without justice there is no reconciliation, and without reconciliation, there is no peace (cited in Wiley 2012, 117).

In its role as a coalition-builder, Canada also lobbied other states to support the ICC, provided financial support to non-government advocates for the court, and was among the first group of states to sign the Rome Statute on December 18, 1998. In June 2000, Canada was the first state to implement wide-ranging domestic legislation in accordance with the Rome Statute. Continuing its lobbying efforts, Canada encouraged other states to ratify the statute, creating a technical manual and as noted earlier, workshops designed to assist other governments in implementing the Rome Statute. The ICC was inaugurated in The Hague in 2003.

The Responsibility to Protect

Canada played a seminal role in leading and promoting the development of R2P. In 2000, the Canadian government established an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), and formally introduced the ICISS to the UN General Assembly in September 2000:

> It is Canada's hope that this new Commission can diffuse the anxiety that surrounds the issues of intervention and sovereignty by building a bridge between our current notions of these concepts, and in so doing, help to define the way ahead for governments and the UN to tackle the most challenging international dilemma of the 21st century.[35]

The ICISS report that emerged from the Commission entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* was endorsed by Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, who described it as "the most comprehensive and carefully thought-out response we have seen to date."[36] Drawing upon its expertise in diplomatic engagement, its global credibility and its tradition of global initiatives, Canada has been considered "R2P's state champion from start to finish…a country strongly committed to UN-centered multilateralism."[37] In an overview of Canada's leadership on R2P, Riddell-Dixon asserted that since the release of the ICISS report "Canada has done more than any other government to generate support for it among UN officials, foreign governments, and the NGO community, both at home and abroad."[38]

Women, Peace and Security

In addition to these advancements of the human security remit, Canada has been a strong proponent of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. Canada voted for UNSCR 1325 when it was a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2000 and has co-sponsored subsequent Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and

Security. In addition, in 2000, Canada formed the Group of Friends on Women, Peace, and Security. This is an informal group of 53 UN member states which shares information and best practices, as well as conducts periodic joint advocacy in the UN context.

Domestically, in 2010, Canada launched its first *National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security* and subsequently produced several annual progress reports in Parliament. The first National Action Plan focused on: 1) strengthening efforts to increase the participation of women and girls in all peace and security efforts; 2) protecting the human rights of women and girls; and, 3) ensuring women and girls have equal access to humanitarian and development assistance. On November 1, 2017, the Government of Canada launched its second National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security for the 2017–2022 period.[39] This National Action Plan has aimed to support women's full participation in peace and security efforts, to prevent, address and fight impunity for conflict-related sexual violence, to consolidate women's and girls' empowerment and advance gender equality, including in the world's most dangerous and complex conflicts.[40]

Children and Armed Conflict

In 1999, UNICEF Executive Director Carol Bellamy addressed the Security Council and urged for greater attention to the specific human security risks of children in situations of armed conflict, proposing "a peace and security agenda for children."[41] This agenda is comprised of multi-pronged initiatives aimed to address key issues such as child soldiers, protecting humanitarian assistance, land mines, protecting children from the impacts of sanctions, the inclusion of children in peacebuilding, impunity of war crimes against children, promoting early warning and preventative action, reducing the availability of small arms, and strengthening peacekeeping personnel compliance with international standards that protect children.

Canada promoted several initiatives to support the plight of war-affected children during this period. During Canada's tenure on the United Nations' Security Council in 1999 to 2000, Canada introduced the first thematic debate on children in armed conflict. In 2000, Canada also hosted the first International Conference on War-Affected Children, which brought together 135 governments, NGOs, and youth organisations in Winnipeg to develop a framework for action. Canada was an early supporter of the UN Office of the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict. Canada established and continues to chair the Group of Friends of Children and Armed Conflict at the

UN, an international network of countries that advocate for continued international attention and action on the issue.

The Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers

The Vancouver Principles were conceived by the Government of Canada in partnership with the Roméo Dallaire Child Soldiers Initiative and developed in consultation with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNICEF, the Special Representative to the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, child protection actors and civil society partners, as well as UN Member States. Introduced in 2017, The Vancouver Principles are a set of political commitments focused on child protection in peacekeeping, including all stages of a conflict cycle. They consist of 17 principles that focus on preventing the recruitment and use of child soldiers by armed forces and groups. The principles are designed to build upon and complement the existing framework on peacekeeping and child protection, most notably the Paris Principles and relevant Security Council Resolutions. The Vancouver Principles seek to prioritise and further operationalise child protection within UN peacekeeping, with a focus on preventing the recruitment and use of child soldiers.

Conclusion

Canada's significant role as an advocate of the concept of human security in both theory and practice provided an opportunity for Canada to take a leadership role within the international community. It used its soft power influence in a way that offered allies their own opportunities to participate in the pivot away from state-centric focused security towards a broader, and more inclusive, perspective on security for people. The next chapter takes up this broader perspective by offering strategic interpretations of the human security agenda's efficacy, advancement and maturation in policy and practice.

Chapter 2 Key Concepts

- Canada defined its place within the human security agenda by promoting both its role as a coalition-builder as well as a key player in the direct development and implementation of human security initiatives. These included the Ottawa Treaty, International Criminal Court, Responsibility to Protect, Women, Peace and Security, Children and Armed Conflict, and the Vancouver Principles.

- Canada applied soft power influence that offered other allies opportunities to participate in the pivot away from state-centric focused security towards a broader, and more inclusive, perspective on security for people.
- Pivotal roles were played by influential policy makers inside the Government of Canada, and key posts were held, such as a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, that further advanced the human security agenda.
- This surge of interest and activity in human security took place in the mid- to late-1990s. By 2005, attention to the concept had diminished in Canada's foreign policy agenda.

Notes

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Chapter 3: Interpreting
Human Security in Policy and Practice

Clare Hutchinson

In recent years, the line between *hard* issues of national security and *soft* issues of human security have blurred. Hard issues of security are directed towards state security, discussed in depth in other chapters, seen as "military defence of state interests and territory,"[1] whereas soft security embodies the everyday security of individuals and communities. In 1994, the United Nations (UN) outlined the objective of human security as wishing to safeguard the vital core of human life from critical pervasive threats, adding seven additional areas of security threats. These included economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political security. This prompted a shift in focus from traditional perceptions of security to new and emerging threats as *insecurity*.[2]

I served as the Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security and Head of the Human Security Unit from 2018–2021, and it is from this perspective that I present my analysis. This chapter explores the evolution of the human security concept in definition, meaning, policy and practice, within NATO and the relevance of this evolution for Canada. With the 2019 establishment of the Human Security Unit in the Office of the NATO Secretary General, and a specific statement on human security following meetings in 2022, it appeared that the Alliance officially embraced the concept and application of a human security approach, but to what extent? And in what form? This chapter provides a background of various definitions and concepts of human security, presents criticisms of progress in human security, and discusses underlying principles relevant to developments at the UN and NATO in Part II of this volume.

Towards a Definition

> International security must rest on a commitment to joint
> survival rather than on a threat of mutual destruction.[3]

Human security is not new. It has a celebrated lineage. Its genesis lightly aligns with the European model of common security which encourages a move away from traditional geo-political conceptions of global security towards a model that embraces economic, social, and political security.[4] As the concept has evolved, different components of human security have resonated with the international community. Depending on the challenges of the day, focus has pivoted across various

protection elements, from women to children, or to the environment. While there have been criticisms that human security has been used by some nations for political expediency to address popular issues of concern but without genuine commitment or investment,[5] the concept of human security has galvanised others to implement genuine reforms in political and military strategy.

As human security has evolved, both as a concept and operational tool, it has provided a foundation for discussions on broader security challenges for the wider international community, including NATO. For the largest defence alliance in the world, the lessons learned from out-of-area operations, primarily drawn from the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), highlighted the necessity of integrating a people-centric security in terms of understanding the human environment, protection of civilians, and a comprehensive approach.[6] The adoption of human security for NATO has deviated from the traditional UN approach, focusing on the human dimension in an operational environment. For many years NATO has referenced broader security challenges and, through its Strategic Concepts and Summit Communiques, has introduced language that gently promotes the concept of human security within its traditional defence posture. For the Alliance it has increasingly become clear that, by understanding local or regional populations, military actors can have a clearer picture of social factors and therefore a better understanding of the operational environment. However, the road to clarity on human security has not been a straight one and numerous challenges continue to encumber the concept and its application within the defence realm.

Definitions and Distinctions

> Human security is like 'sustainable development' – everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means.[7]

Although not a globally accepted definition, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a common framing that stresses the role of Member States "in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to survival, livelihood and dignity of their people."[8] The European Union (EU) also made attempts to define human security and recognised the value of adopting this position into its security and defence policies. But, at the same time, the EU distanced itself from the UN in its application:

> Human Security is about the basic needs of individuals and communities in times of peril. It is about feeling safe on the street as well as about material survival and the exercise of free will. It recognizes that 'freedom from

fear' and 'freedom from want' are both essential to people's sense of wellbeing and their willingness to live in peace.[9]

For the EU, recognition of the importance of human security is implicit in the *Treaty of Lisbon*, which considers a wider approach to security.[10] Although the Treaty does not refer to human security explicitly, the significance is discernable through the strategic aims of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and within the general guidelines.[11]

> Human security means individual freedom from basic insecurities. Genocide, wide-spread or systematic torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, disappearances, slavery, and crimes against humanity and grave violations of the laws of war.[12]

One could argue that the intersection between the EU and NATO recognition of Human Security lies with Javier Solana, who began his advocacy of human security as NATO Secretary General and continued as EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. In 1998, as Secretary General for NATO, Solana created a foundation for human security, stating that

> Humanity means orienting our policies to serve the needs of man [and woman]. Indeed, one could argue that a security policy which is not constructed around the needs of man and humanity will risk the worst fate—being ineffectual.[13]

NATO has ventured carefully into the realm of human security, recognising its essence, if not its full application. A Human Security Unit was established at NATO HQ in 2019, at which time five interconnected areas were recognised by allies:

> [H]uman security is a multi-sectoral approach to security that gives primacy to people and includes topics like combatting trafficking in human beings; protection of children in armed conflict; preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence; protection of civilians; and cultural property protection.[14]

There is currently no accepted standardised definition for human security across NATO bodies, exacerbated by a lack of agreement between NATO Headquarters and the Bi-Strategic Commands.[15] Without a distinct definition, implementation of human security will remain sporadic.[16] Yet, despite the lack of definition and conceptual agreement, there is, however, a principal acceptance across NATO on the importance of human security writ large and its relevance to NATO's tasks.[17] As NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg emphasised:

> Human security is at the heart of who we are and what we do: an Alliance working together to protect our people and our values – freedom, equality, human rights. Taking a human security approach is the best way to achieve lasting peace and security.[18]

Over the last few years some NATO allies have attempted to integrate human security into defence policy. Most notably, in 2021 the UK Ministry of Defence issued a Joint Service Publication which provides guidance to the UK Defence Forces on implementation of the elements under Human Security.[19]

The UK commitment to this agenda went as far as to pledge to establish a Centre of Excellence (COE) on Human Security, which was viewed as the next step to ensuring militaries from around the world better integrate UN Security Council Resolutions linked to human security into military planning and conduct of operations.[20] Instead of a Centre of Excellence, an enhancement of human security capabilities within the Ministry of Defence by means of an established Human Security Unit within Headquarters and a Human Security Cell in 77th Brigade Group, Influence and Outreach has been stood up.[21]

Criticisms of Human Security

> We demand a non-violent world where human security is the basis of our common global security. People have the right to live in a world where the basic needs of all peoples are addressed.[22]

As noted, the conceptual ambiguity and lack of a precise definition of human security draws some criticism. Lakhdar Brahimi, former special representative to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Haiti, stated: "I don't use the term human security because I don't know exactly what I mean, and I worry that someone will come up and contradict me."[23] Many critics not only oppose the definition and scope of human security, but the very utility of it. Some question the necessity of the concept given the collective elements of human security are already present in other forms or agendas. It is argued that human security does not set any definite boundaries and parameters, leaving considerations of security too wide, and as a result, leaves policy makers without direction, or analytical and comparative tools.[24] By expanding the concept of security to encompass many issues, from environmental degradation to economic fragility, there is potential that nothing gets prioritised. On the other hand, it is criticised as inadequate because pertinent and important areas are missing from the concept. A different line of criticism comes from those who contend that states have been able to co-opt the human security narrative to further their own ends or have used human security agenda to cement their own places in the international system.[25]

Certain critics of human security have argued that the human security concept disempowers fragile states: a form of imperialism under a new skin. For the anti-colonial scholar, adoption of human security can be used to justify major power or UN or NATO intervention in matters

which they consider domestic. Much of this criticism has emerged from 'humanitarian intervention' to justify the use of conventional military force. The war in Kosovo provided a precedent for human security, yet there are other critics who favour further military intervention and who argue that the concept is too soft and lacks legitimacy. "Human security is too lofty and ambitious; it is not practical or realistic."[26]

Despite the reservations, the body of support for human security is growing. Human security has gradually seeped into common parlance. Civil society, the military, and the security sector all have roles to play in achieving human security.

> Human security is indeed indivisible. There is no longer such a thing as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring 'in a faraway country of which we know little'… In an interdependent world, in which security depends on a framework of stable sovereign entities, the existence of fragile states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbour those dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain internal order by means of gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere.[27]

In response to the criticism, human security has built on the extant concepts currently used in complex operations and embraces the commonly accepted and agreed international conventions. Indeed, the last two decades has increased awareness and implementation of the cross-cutting mandates in peace operations and promoted stronger coordination between key operational actors, such as political, military, and humanitarian agencies. Protection of Civilians is at the core of peace operations, the application is implicit within the structure of missions and delivery against *imminent threat*. However, human security takes the existing practice further. A human security approach bridges military and civilian, political, and operational spaces, providing a central area for mandates on responsibility to protect and human development to serve as a coherent guiding doctrine.

Recognising that multiple factors can give rise to migratory flows – from conflict to disasters and deprivation – human security aims to proactively and comprehensively address these conditions before they reach a crisis level and result in large-scale movements of people. As such, a focus on human security draws attention to the importance of early warning and early action and emphasises the need for inclusive and sustainable conditions in which migration is a choice rather than a necessity. Thus, human security is not just about developing a culture of coordination and civil-military cooperation it is about an entirely new way of functioning in crises. Human security offers a new language and formulation for addressing contemporary risks and dangers beyond

the traditional concepts of security that are deeply embedded in armed forces and defence corporations.

There is often strong opposition to military engagement in issues considered best approached through non-military means, including terrorism, pandemics, globalisation, and environmental disasters. Yet one can argue that it is not possible to separate complex threats with regards to wellbeing of the individual from state threats. The High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change posits clearly:

> Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given the chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding ground for other threats, including civil conflict. It is a recognition of the interrelated causes of threats, and the interrelated actions required to either prevent them from arising or to control them when they do.[28]

Although human security is clearly an asset both politically and operationally, as it is not yet fully defined, the concept is fraught. NATO has, however, sketched out a solid outline for future work on the integration of human security into defence, an outline that is tailored to suits the needs within NATO. Human security has much further to go, but a foundation has been laid that will provide a solid bedrock for the Alliance to advance its commitments to human security over the next few years. Before we discuss the cross-cutting themes of NATO's approach, it is worth recalling the following common principles of human security which underpin it.

Common Principles of Human Security

> It is, in essence, an effort to construct a global society where the safety of the individual is at the centre of international priorities and a motivating force for international action.[29]

Despite the lack of a universal definition, and the many theories and potential approaches to human security, it is possible to identify a common set of principles.[30]

People centered. This is a transition from state-centered security. A people-centered approach uunderscores the importance of addressing the totality of conditions that impact human beings. Human security allows for a deeper understanding of how individuals and social groups experience different types of threats and risks. For example, women and men have different perceptions of security, and a gender lens must be applied to security dynamics to fully appreciate reasons for insecurity.

Gender-responsive. The importance of gender equality in a human security approach is essential and underlines all activities and initiatives. Without a gender analysis across all aspects of human security, especially in managing complex operations, the approach is flawed. Involvement and partnership with women's groups should be a key component of a human security and the inclusion of a gender perspective from planning to implementation.

Comprehensive. Human security addresses the full range of human insecurities faced by individuals and communities including, violent conflicts, natural disasters, health pandemics, etc. There is no hierarchy of threats as all forms of insecurity can contribute to human insecurity depending on the conditions and variations of threats both real and perceived.

Multilateral. As a multi-dimensional threat analysis, a human security approach calls for a multilateral response. An effective human security approach requires coordination among foreign, development, and security policy initiatives and other multilateral actors, including the United Nations and NGOs. A human security approach is implemented through multilateral action. Multilateralism is closely related to legitimacy and is what distinguishes a human security approach from a neo-colonialist approach.

Coherent. Comprehensive and integrated solutions are found where there is both coherence and coordination across traditionally separate fields and doctrines. A human security approach relies on coordination among many disciplines, including human rights, gender, child protection, and humanitarian action, among others. Preventive and proactive policies cannot be effective if they are isolated and even contradictory.

Preventative. Early prevention can minimise the impacts of threats to populations and engender long term solutions. This includes addressing root causes of crises and impact on human insecurities by helping communities to cope by becoming more resilient. The introduction of early warning indicators and gender analysis can mitigate risks and threats at an early stage. Identifying gaps in the existing security infrastructure are ways to mitigate the impact of existing security deficits. Human security ensures the sustainability of programmes and policies as protection and empowerment are introduced in a systematic and preventative manner with a look to long-term stability.

Resilient. Protection relies on inclusive and participatory processes to reinforce citizens' ability to act on their own behalf. The whole of society approach is a valuable tactic for robust and resilient communities. Human security strengthens the resilience of individuals and communities to respond to insecurity. This is essential in a whole of society defence response.

Bearing in mind these common principles, we can discuss how these have been incorporated into NATO's evolving human security approach, further described in Chapter Six.

Human Security – a Canadian Initiative

> Believing that our interpretation is precisely giving the most added value to the concept of human security – by complementing the existing international agendas that are already dealing with the promotion of national security, human rights and human development.[31]

As noted, Canada was instrumental in developing the concept of human security and in steering its evolution. The introduction of human security has allowed Canada to mobilise around practical responses to human security threats and use a variety of informal mechanisms, including annual ministerial meetings, to discuss and advance the human security cause.[32] Additionally, along with Norway and Austria, Canada established the Human Security Network, an association of 12 countries, charged with the goal of promoting the concept of human security as a feature of national and international policies, within the United Nations, and in cooperation with academia and civil society.[33]

For Canada, human security is ultimately about protecting people from violent threats and permitting several areas of interest to converge under one conceptual framework. This concept has, over the years been refined and adapted to new and emerging threats. The 1999 concept paper *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*, outlined human security as

> a new broad agenda, which includes focusing on the security needs of individuals—in other words, on sustainable human security… safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats.[34]

In 2000, the concept was further refined to include "freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, safety or lives" and five priorities were identified: protection of civilians; peace support operations; conflict prevention; governance and accountability; and public safety, published in 2002 in *Freedom from Fear: Canada's Foreign Policy for Human Security*.[35]

The most striking successes for Canada included leadership on the Ottawa Treaty to ban anti-personnel landmines; the Rome Treaty, establishing the International Criminal Court; the Canadian-sponsored Security Council resolutions mandating the protection of civilians in peace operations; and the Canadian-sponsored and funded ICISS which launched the concept of the Responsibility to Protect in 2006. Canada has also provided leadership to the Women, Peace, and Security agenda which, although not part of the NATO Human Security framework, does weave through all the cross-cutting topics.

For many years Canada used human security as a blueprint for its foreign policy. Canada's foreign policy framework has maintained a distinctive focus on peace, security, development, and international cooperation. The human security agenda has offered a way for Canada to contribute as a leading voice on protection and human-centric security

3.1: Active patrol in the village of Nakhonay, Afghanistan.

   A combined Canadian Armed Forces and Afghan National Defense and Security Forces patrol in the village of Nakhonay, Panjwai district, on second day of OP HAMAGHE SHAY, February 18, 2011. Presence patrols reassured and connected with local populations following combat operations.

Source: MCpl Angela Abbey, Canadian Forces Combat Camera, © 2011, DND – MDN Canada.

by thus embracing longstanding Canadian foreign policy commitments to peacekeeping and human rights. Fundamentally, and aspirational, the concept of human security is closely aligned with the core of Canadian principles: the moral impulse to be a good global citizen. Canada serves the wellbeing of others "aiding the destitute, diseased, displaced, and disoriented people of the world fits the image Canadians hold of themselves as 'helpful fixers and a morally conscientious people.'"[36] These ideals were upheld in Canadian deployments in response to conflict or crisis situations, most notably during the 1999 intervention in Kosovo which was termed a human security emergency. "It was the plight of . . . innocent civilians that compelled our intervention [in Kosovo]."[37]

> To Canadians, it was a classic case of Human Security, where the international community took action, not to protect their state interests, but to address the security of individuals. [T]he use of military force in Kosovo showed that if you want to be involved in providing human security you would be well advised to have the ability to use force, including military force, in your tool kit. "Soft power" and "hard power" can both make critical contributions to the Human Security agenda.[38]

Between 2000–2005 the human security agenda lost velocity, and by 2006 the terminology was shelved, the funding slashed, and Canada dropped out of sight internationally as a promoter of the concept.[39]

Canadian Foreign Policy

While at the heart of Canadian values and ideals, the inclusion of human security in Canadian foreign policy has been criticised for contradicting other commitments and policies. For many, the adoption in June 2017 of Feminist International Assistance Policy stands in direct opposition to the human security approach – especially in the wider protection of civilians. For many in the WPS and feminist movements, human security is bolstering an enlarged and unbridled industrial military framework. The intervention in Kosovo, among others, only militarised human security.

Additionally, concerns have been raised about the embedded assumptions related to the export of Canadian values. That the commitment to the cross-cutting areas of human security, including gender equality, are merely dictating and reinforcing a western value dominance mechanism that resembles colonialism.

> The 'humanist-activist' agenda recalls the essentialist claims of Canadian identity by naturalising the idea of Canadian goodness; thereby it enhances the social control of the

population by masking 'human insecurities' within Canada…
it works ironically as an elitist policy, which endorses an
ideal form of identity and governance in Canada.[40]

Yet, within the international community, Canada still carries political and moral weight promoting many of the component pieces of human security, including Protection of Civilians (PoC), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC) agendas described fully in Chapter Six. The role that the nation has played to strengthen the human security agenda in both the UN and NATO has been successful. There is legitimate reason and a body of evidence illuminating why Canada should continue to advance this agenda and introduce new and emerging risks and threats. Canada has the potential and means to reshape the landscape of human security.

Beyond the Periphery: Integrating a Human Security Approach into the Canadian Armed Forces

We already do human security; we just don't call it that.[41]

The ambiguities of crises have changed how conflict is defined. While war is its ultimate expression, *conflict* is broadened to include other circumstances. Current conflicts are asymmetric in nature, multi-faceted and cross-cultural. Recent conflicts have also shown that any response to the new breed of warfare should incorporate more than a purely military response. This changing nature of conflict is influencing traditional notions of security.

A fundamental aspect of human security is having situational awareness and adapting to integrating *softer* skills, such as cultural awareness training, language skills and the ability to view any situation with a gender perspective – including the ability to conduct gender analysis of the human terrain.

Some critics have argued that human security is better served by other organisations, such as the UN, the EU, and NGOs. However, NATO has an important and unique role to play in implementing human security, and Canada equally has an important role to play within NATO. For NATO its current capacity-building, civilian and cultural protection efforts cross over into human security issues every day. While there is no Canadian comprehensive doctrinal guide or systematic framework for the military on human security, there is an overarching commitment to protection of civilians and to a wider lens on security, strategically and operationally. And, while the aim in operations is to protect civilians and minimise all casualties, this does not suggest that the use of force is to be avoided, writ large. The benefit of a human security approach is that it is *hybridised*, offering contextually focused solutions.

Human security should be made a part of all military activity – in military analysis and planning – to gain relevant insight from a population's perspective within the specific operational context. It also should not be situated in CIMIC – but the concept used in the same vein as gender mainstreaming, whereby it is woven through all military tasks.

Strong Secure Engaged, the Canadian Defence Policy, outlines the Canadian defence priorities which echo human security principles. The Canadian vision for defence considers global stability, rules-based international order, and collective defence, all of which underpin Canadian security and prosperity.[42] The policy also outlines Canada's human security approach to respond to natural disasters, emergencies and search and rescue, securing North America, which depends on the different understanding of security including the changing climate in the Arctic and for Canadian forces to be engaged in the world—through further application of protection of civilians, cultural property and sexual violence in peace support operations and peacekeeping. Subsequently, Canada fulfills an important political role in championing human security as a platform for international dialogue and coordination, and as a NATO Ally can promote the advancement and further growth of human security as a military tool.

Human security, as a concept, speaks to the fundamental desire for survival and human fulfillment. At its core, human security holds the intersection of human rights, peace, and development: it is a bridge between protection and participation. As the 2003 Ogata-Sen report declared,

> protection strategies, set up by states, international agencies, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations] and the private sector, shield people from menaces. Empowerment strategies enable people to develop their resilience to difficult conditions.[43]

Human security builds on the legitimate and overarching need to protect people, while at the same time raising awareness of extensive and pervasive threats to develop resilience within communities, as well as empowering individuals. Resilience has been a central pillar of traditional total defence strategies, a concept developed during the Cold War and encapsulating an all-hazards lens to better protect individuals and communities.

The primacy of a population-centric and resilient approach makes human security distinguishable from traditional state-based approaches. Human security is promoting people-safety from the reach of chronic threats beyond kinetic operations. A human security approach provides

a new way of thinking about the range of challenges the world faces and how to respond to them effectively. It is a multidimensional holistic approach to security that demands a more profound analysis and wider lens on risks and threats to populations and emerging and evolving security challenges. Canada has long been a champion for human security at the UN and NATO. Human security resonates with Canadians because the core of the agenda can be translated into Canadian values that include comprehensive, context-specific, and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people.

Human security remains conceptually inconclusive and amorphous, with critics arguing that "human security is so vague that it verges on meaninglessness."[44] Yet, it is in this flexibility and ambiguity that human security finds its strength and power, and which distinguishes it from other mandates. Human security can be adapted to any circumstance and context. NATO, for example, has adapted the concept to their needs with great finesse.

The war in Ukraine of 2022 has presented conflict through a new lens. This is the first time since the end of the Second World War that Europe has faced direct armed conflict. The response to the Russian aggression is not only causing trauma for the Ukrainian people, but also affecting food, energy, and other supply chains. Sexual violence, attacks on schools, museums, and hospitals, trafficking of women and girls, mass numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, cultural heritage destruction, technological warfare, and environmental harm: these elements have all illuminated the human *insecurity* of war.

The international response has also brought to light a lack of understanding about the role of human security and its application in conflict. There is also a potential challenge that human security could be diminished in the shadow of more traditional defence and deterrence. The increased defence budgets that will be required in the post-Ukraine conflict environment should not be increased at the expense of supporting human security. It is not a zero-sum game. Human security and national security are complementary concepts and need not necessarily contradict each other. Both seek protection against harm. Human security cannot occur without a strong defence, and defence must recognise that new challenges need new responses. They are mutually supportive, bound together by the intrinsic values of Canada, values that are, by their very nature, conducive to security for all humans.

Conclusion

A human security approach provides a new way of thinking about the integration of hard and soft security challenges the world faces and how to adequately respond to them. It is a multidimensional analytical framework which can assist the international community to assess, develop, and implement integrated responses to a broad range of issues. The achievement of human security is predicated on empowering people, especially women, to participate in making choices about how they can be most secure, now and in the longer term. Human security also requires norms and institutions that guarantee basic protections of human progress and safety, such as through good governance, rule of law, and early warning mechanisms.

This understanding of human security has evolved over time. At its core, it remains anchored to the critical concept of *people-oriented* security, and it should be seen as complementary to state security. While security of states remains a necessary condition for overall security, it has become clear that national security as the protection of territorial integrity is insufficient on its own. Lessons learned from Afghanistan and other crisis areas have intensified the need to address a broader understanding of security that goes beyond military response. Additionally, the UN and other security bodies recognise the need to apply a gendered lens as an essential element of a human security approach, and all activities and initiatives in complex operations. Human security also considers different types of security and risks, interconnected across many disciplines and threats, including terrorism, transnational crime, pandemics, environment, technologies and cyber, among others.

This chapter aimed to describe policies and definitions to better understand the ways in which Canada could adopt a more formalised approach to human security. This chapter offered ways in which Canada might build upon NATO's approach towards the development of a possible human security framework for the Canadian Armed Forces. Mirroring NATO's human security progress and given Canada's history as an early proponent of human security and of deployment in international peace operations, the Government of Canada is in a good position to lead the design and further implementation of the concept. Canada can build on lessons learned and elevate its standing as a champion for human security in NATO and globally, gaining traction and greater international legitimacy by developing a comprehensive human security policy. By leading by example as change-makers in a climate of ever-increasing insecurity, both for states and their people, the

Canadian Armed Forces can pivot from strategy to application, further integrating what has remained beyond the periphery. This is aligned with developments at the United Nations, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter 3 Key Concepts

- NATO established the Human Security Unit in the Office of the NATO Secretary General in 2019, and fully adopted the concept and application of a human security approach in 2022.
- Lessons learned from out-of-area operations, primarily drawn from the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), highlighted the necessity of integrating a people-centric approach to security in terms of understanding the human environment and protection of civilians. From this people-centric comprehensive approach to security, military actors can clarify social factors and can achieve a deeper understanding of the operational environment.
- Multiple organisations have developed definitions for human security, yet lack of clarity regarding strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities within the human security approach may have hampered military actors and hindered consistent implementation.
- Despite the lack of definition and conceptual agreement, there is a principal acceptance across NATO on the importance of human security writ large and its relevance to NATO's tasks.
- Critics argue that broad definitions of human security eliminate the possibility to prioritise, while narrow definitions ignore important agendas and issues.
- A human security approach bridges military and civilian, political, and operational spaces, providing a central area for mandates on responsibility to protect and human development to serve as a coherent guiding doctrine.
- Human security offers a new language and formulation for addressing contemporary risks and dangers beyond the traditional concepts of security that are deeply embedded in armed forces and defence corporation discourse.

- Human security considers different types of security and risks, interconnected across many disciplines and threats, including terrorism, transnational crime, pandemics, environment, technologies and cyber, among others.
- The dominant and common principles directing a human security approach are people-centric, gender-responsive, comprehensive, multilateral, coherent, preventative, and resilient.
- While there is no Canadian comprehensive doctrinal guide or systematic framework for the military on human security, there is an overarching commitment to protection of civilians and to a wider lens on security, strategically and operationally.

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Part II:
Human Security in Practice

Chapter 4: United Nations and Human Security

Myriam Denov

Human security has been firmly entrenched in the language and policy of international affairs. This is, in no small measure, a result of the United Nations (UN), which has played a vital role in advancing and enforcing international norms placing the individual—not the state—at the core of modern understandings of international security.[1] Uniquely positioned at the nexus of human security and development, and as a global mosaic of nation-states, the UN has championed the notion that although humans may be divided by differences in language, culture, ethnicity, religion, and political beliefs, to name but a few, they share core aspirations. These include the desire for physical security, economic opportunities, religious freedom, and fair and equitable treatment. The UN has been critical in creating ideational change as an "incubator of key aspects of human security thinking," as well as in using its authority to define new norms of state responsibility.[2] The UN has advanced the broad conceptualisations of human security: the rights of individuals and communities during war and violent conflict (freedom from fear), and the rights of individuals and communities experiencing hardship because of a natural disaster, disease, and factors outside of their control that threaten their survival (freedom from want). Through its General Assembly forums, Security Council Resolutions, and by encouraging that human security principles be embedded into national law and policy, the UN has played a key role in advancing the human security agenda.[3]

This chapter outlines how human security has shaped and framed UN initiatives, particularly in relation to the two human security dimensions: freedom from fear and freedom from want. This chapter also discusses the role of the UN and its contributions to advancing the human security agenda, particularly through two dimensions: freedom from fear and freedom from want. The chapter explores the major human security initiatives advanced by the UN within each of the two security dimensions: one protection-based and the other development-based.

UN Initiatives: Freedom from Fear

Several key UN initiatives and responses have reflected the desire to respond to the freedom from fear aspiration, focusing on securing the moral and legal rights of individuals directly affected by war and violent conflict, as well as providing assistance to those in need as a

4.1: Interactions with local children, Haiti.

Warrant Officer Eric Dugas from 2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment, interacts with local children during a dismounted presence patrol in Port-au-Prince, Haiti during Operation HAMLET on September 13, 2013. Presence patrols are an important element of peacekeeping operations to assure, deter and, if necessary, respond, thus directly contributing to protection of civilians.

Source: MCpl Marc-André Gaudreault, Canadian Forces Combat Camera, © 2013 DND-MDN Canada IS2013-2002-054.

result of ongoing hostilities. In the realm of freedom from fear, the UN has spearheaded peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives, introduced the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and launched the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda.

Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding

Throughout its history, the UN has actively engaged in conflict prevention. Premised on the importance of re-establishing peace following violent conflict, as well as consent, impartiality and the limited use of force, peacekeeping is arguably the most visible UN human security activity. The increase in peacekeeping initiatives grew significantly following the introduction of the human security agenda in the 1990s. During the 40-year period between 1948 and 1988, there were only 13 UN peacekeeping missions. Reflecting the onset of the human security agenda, over the course of the 21-year period from 1988

to 2019, there were 63 UN peacekeeping missions.[4] More specifically, between 1989 and 1994, during the "dawn" of human security, the UN Security Council authorised 20 new operations, raising the number of peacekeepers from 11,000 to 75,000.

UN peacekeeping, however, has faced many setbacks. In the mid-1990s, the success of earlier missions raised expectations for UN Peacekeeping beyond its capacity to deliver. In Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, the Security Council was not able to authorise sufficiently robust mandates and peacekeepers were not provided adequate resources or political support. As civilian casualties rose and hostilities continued, the reputation of UN Peacekeeping suffered. This led the Security Council to limit the number of new peacekeeping missions and begin a process of self-reflection to prevent such failures from recurring. At the turn of the century, the UN undertook a major exercise to examine the challenges to peacekeeping.

In the mid-1990s, in an attempt to move beyond peacekeeping, both peacebuilding and conflict prevention came to be viewed as key instruments of human security. Peacebuilding was viewed as particularly relevant in situations where fragile peace had been negotiated but was not yet consolidated. In his report entitled *Agenda for Peace*, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali articulated the need to "consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people."[5] He suggested that the UN "has an obligation to develop and provide…support for the transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for strengthening democratic institutions."[6] In 2005, the UN General Assembly and Security Council established the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the first body of its kind. The UN Peacebuilding Support Office was established to assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission, manage the related UN Peacebuilding Fund, and provide coordination peacebuilding activities within the broader UN system. Peacebuilding initiatives, unlike peacekeeping, focus on the underlying causes of conflict, and seek to entrench peace processes. To attain the goal of freedom from fear, the UN has recognised that human security will remain a threat unless the underlying causes of violence are addressed through ongoing peacebuilding efforts, such as in the context of Sierra Leone, discussed below.

Case Study: Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone, a country that endured a brutal, decade-long civil war (1991 to 2002), provides an example of a UN peacekeeping mission that eventually led to a peacebuilding mission. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which lasted from 1999 to 2006, was

created by the UN Security Council to assist with the implementation of the *Lomé Peace Accord*, an agreement intended to end the Sierra Leonean civil war. UNAMSIL was mandated to, among other things, protect civilians under immediate threat of violence, assist in the implementation of the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration plan, and provide support for upcoming elections. UNAMSIL expanded in size several times in 2000 and 2001, eventually concluding its mandate at the end of 2005. However, peace in the country remained fragile and precarious. Becoming one of the first states of the UN Peacebuilding Commission, the peacebuilding mission in Sierra Leone was conceived and executed as a model of integration, coordinating 18 UN agencies and related organisations under one "Joint Vision for Sierra Leone." Active between 2008 and 2014, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL) sought to provide support to the Government of Sierra Leone in identifying and resolving tensions and threats of potential conflict, monitoring and promoting human rights, and consolidating good governance reforms. Sierra Leone received significant funding from the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) toward the execution of projects that fell under the freedom from want dimension. These included youth empowerment and employment, good governance, access to justice, and gender equality, among others. In 2007, for instance, Sierra Leone received approximately US$35 million from the PBF to address issues of youth empowerment, job creation and capacity building under its *Peacebuilding Priority Plan*.[7]

The peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in Sierra Leone highlight the desire to address both branches of the human security agenda in practice—addressing both freedom from fear through peacekeeping, and later freedom from want through peacebuilding—and demonstrate that one cannot exist without the other.

The Responsibility to Protect

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was conceived as a response to calls to define, prevent, and punish the crime of genocide. Despite the growing hope that the end of the Cold War would bring human rights and international cooperation, the realities of genocides and atrocities committed in Rwanda and Srebrenica, as well as the mass killing and ethnic cleansing in Angola, Bosnia, Burundi, Croatia, Timor-Leste, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and DRC sullied and tainted any such hope. These realities exposed not only the limits of legal mechanisms of accountability for perpetrators of atrocities, but also that the international community was ill-prepared to respond effectively and

protect vulnerable civilians. In the case of Rwanda, for example, despite evidence of atrocities, genocide and ethnic cleansing being committed, the international community failed to intervene. Alongside these global realities was a growing public intolerance for grave human rights abuses committed around the world.[8] R2P emerged at a time of increasing attention and importance afforded to the concept of human security. Within a ten year- period, R2P transformed from a concept proposed by an International Commission to a common feature of international responses to genocide and mass atrocities.

In 2000, at the initiative of the Canadian government, an independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established. The ICISS mandate was to build a broader understanding of the problem of reconciling intervention for human protection purposes and state sovereignty. The ICISS report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, was released in 2001. It stipulated that the involvement of international institutions in protecting civilians from violence were key elements of the human security agenda.[9] Yet, the ICISS argued that states were best placed to protect their own citizens. However, with the right of sovereignty comes a state's responsibility to protect its citizens. The ICISS argued that the international community bore collective responsibility for citizen protection. The R2P report articulated that the international community is justified in taking military intervention when states fail to protect their citizens from large scale loss of life that is a product of deliberate state action, neglect, or the inability to act in the context of a failed state or ethnic cleansing.[10] Under R2P, there are three core pillars of responsibilities:

Pillar One – the protection responsibility of the state – asserts that each state has the responsibility to protect its populations from four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. This responsibility includes the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement.

Pillar Two – international assistance and capacity building – asserts that the wider community (the UN, regional organisations, governments, and civil society) has the responsibility to encourage and assist individual states in meeting that responsibility.

Pillar Three – timely and decisive response – maintains that if a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take appropriate collective action, in a timely and decisive manner and in accordance with the UN Charter.

Prevention is a central element of R2P, with other measures contemplated only when prevention fails or is thought likely to fail by the UN Security Council. As the UN has indicated in relation to R2P:

> It is a charge of responsibility that holds States accountable for the welfare of their people…The duty to prevent and halt genocide and mass atrocities lies first and foremost with the State, but the international community has a role that cannot be blocked by the invocation of sovereignty. Sovereignty no longer exclusively protects States from foreign interference; it is a change of responsibility where States are accountable for the welfare of their people. This principle is enshrined in article 1 of the Genocide Convention and embodied in the principle of 'sovereignty as responsibility' and in the concept of the Responsibility to Protect.[11]

Following six years of advocacy and negotiation, R2P was unanimously endorsed by the 2005 World Summit, the largest-ever gathering of Heads of State and government. The *Outcome Document* of the Summit was later adopted as a *UN General Assembly Resolution* the same year. In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's report *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect* was released. R2P has since been invoked in more than 80 UN Security Council Resolutions concerning crises in Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, as well as thematic resolutions concerning the prevention of genocide, prevention of armed conflict and restricting the trade of small arms and light weapons. R2P has become part of regular diplomatic language and has been implemented in multiple contexts of conflict and civil unrest. The cases of Libya and Côte d'Ivoire provide important examples.

Case Studies: Libya and Côte d'Ivoire

In March 2011, the UN Security Council responded to the unfolding crisis in Libya, where leader Muammar Gaddafi responded to citizen uprisings with brutality and threats reminiscent of the terms used to incite the Rwandan genocide 20 years earlier. When the Gaddafi regime failed to comply with the Security Council's demands, the Council took the unprecedented step of authorising the use of force against a state to protect civilians from imminent danger, enforced a no-fly zone, as well as an arms embargo. In Libya, the Security Council had for the first time in its history authorised the use of force for human protection purposes without the consent of the recognised government.

The intervention in Libya in 2011 has been hotly debated and critiqued. Concerning the bombing campaign with little follow-up

in peacebuilding efforts, scholars have argued that the "the form of intervention in Libya was highly imperfect, that it delivered indirect and patchy protection at best, and that it placed the region's long-term stability in the hands of fractious rebels."[12] Similarly, Curtis notes that "the West's war in Libya spurred terrorism into 14 countries," leading to increased violence.[13] Again, the question of implementation—in what form and under what circumstances—continues to be highly contested.

In the context of Côte d'Ivoire, in late 2010, Laurent Gbagbo lost the presidential election to Alassane Ouattarra, and yet Gbagbo refused to stand down. Following consultations with international elections monitors, the Security Council authorised the use of force to protect the civilian population. Drawing upon the UN peacekeeping force already stationed in the country, alongside French forces, the 2011 intervention addressed the escalating violence and civil unrest in the country. The intervention removed Gbagbo, allowing the president elect to take his place at the head of the new government.

Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)

In 2017, Secretary-General António Guterres launched *Action for Peacekeeping* (A4P) and proposed reforms in the UN peace and security architecture, in the UN's management system and structures, and in the UN development system to strengthen capacity to effectively manage and sustain field operations.[14] A4P aims to promote collective action by all peacekeeping stakeholders, including Member States, the Security Council, the General Assembly, financial contributors, Troop and Police Contributing Countries, intergovernmental and regional organisations, and the UN Secretariat. A4P seeks to fulfill 45 mutually agreed commitments in eight areas that are reminiscent of a human security approach: (1) politics; (2) women, peace, and security; (3) protection; (4) safety and security; (5) performance and accountability; (6) peacebuilding and sustainable peace; (7) partnerships; and (8) the conduct of peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations.

Women, Peace, and Security

The experiences of women and girls of violence and insecurity differ considerably from those of men and boys, underscoring the need for a gendered security response.[15] Gender is a significant and unique dimension of security-related experiences and shapes the ways in which security is envisioned, ensured, and experienced.[16] Women and girls suffer from a range of harms during conflict, including sexual and gender-based violence, the loss of family, livelihoods, and personal autonomy. In transitional and peacebuilding periods, women

and girls continue to be marginalised and excluded from peacebuilding processes. As Hansen and Olsson claim, "security is gendered through the political mobilisation of masculine and feminine identities that are linked to practices of militarism and citizenship."[17] Acknowledging gender as a noteworthy component of security not only allows for more individualised conceptions of security, but also may foster more authentic articulations of security that shed light on relations, experiences, needs, dynamics, variances, and negotiations of security and insecurity.[18]

Scholars called for a redefinition of international norms on security in order to better capture how gender shapes the type of threats and harms and forms of violence experienced by humans. Human security offered an important opportunity. With its emphasis on individuals and communities, particularly women and children, and the notion that a threat can be construed as any menace to the quality of life of the individual, the human security agenda had great potential to raise the status of war-affected girls and women and address the challenges and fears that they may face, both during and post-conflict. As Fox notes, the approach has the capacity to provide a forum in which the current and future plight of war-affected girls "can be recognised as a security concern, where rights abuses against them would be considered an insecurity problem and a threat to established norms."[19]

In October 2000, the UN Security Council endorsed United Nations Security Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS).[20] UNSCR 1325 was a response to the myriad lessons learned over the previous decade on peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The WPS agenda has been instrumental in addressing the gendered impacts of war and the disproportionate effects on women and girls. According to True, the WPS agenda reflects "the most significant international normative framework addressing the gender-specific impacts of conflict on women and girls."[21] The WPS agenda rests on four pillars: prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery. Importantly, UNSCR 1325 was designed not for any one type of development or conflict context, but for all contexts—applying equally to so-called *stable* countries that may need to address issues of violence against women. The UN's WPS agenda is "both expansive and ambitious; it seeks both the radical reconfiguration of the gendered power dynamics that characterize our world and a properly [*sic*] global commitment to sustainable and positive peace."[22]

In the years since the adoption of UNSCR 1325, the UN Security Council has adopted nine more resolutions on women, peace, and security. These resolutions aim to provide more guidance on specific

aspects of war and its impact on women, addressing issues such as sexual and gender-based violence, and the gendered aspects of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and conflict resolution. The resolutions also place emphasis on women's participation and the meaningful inclusion of women in peace and security governance at all levels and call for more meaningful civil society participation within the UN systems. Below are some of the core issues addressed within the resolutions.

Sexual Violence

Sexual violence during armed conflict is one of the most recurring wartime human rights abuses. Incidents of sexual violence have been documented with increasing regularity in contemporary armed conflict, transcending countries and contexts, and serving as a weapon of war to intimidate the enemy, terrorise local populations, and serve as a form of gendered power relations, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.[23] The protection and support of victims of sexual violence, the prevention of sexual violence, and the creation of tools to combat impunity for perpetrators of sexual violence have been core themes in six of the nine Security Council Resolutions within the WPS agenda.[24] In addition, UNSCR 2272 (2016) provides measures to address sexual exploitation and abuse in peace operations.[25]

Peacebuilding, Peacekeeping, and Conflict Resolution

There is increased recognition of the critical role of women in post-conflict peacebuilding and conflict resolution. UNSCR 1889 (2009) includes a strategy for increasing the number of women included in peace talks and calls for the development of global indicators to measure the implementation of UNSCR 1325 by UN and member states. A set of 26 indicators have been developed to track and account for implementation and have been organised into the four pillars of prevention, participation, protection, and relief and recovery, as noted above. UNSCR 2122 (2013) sets in place stronger measures to improve women's participation and representation in conflict resolution, especially through leadership positions. It reaffirms that gender equality is central to achieving international peace and security. It also sets out the need for humanitarian aid to ensure access to sexual and reproductive health services. UNSCR 2242 (2015) focuses on women's roles in countering violent extremism and terrorism.

The human security agenda, and the focus on the protection and empowerment of women and girls, can also been seen in several key post-conflict UN initiatives. The prosecution of the crime of forced marriage within Sierra Leone's Special Court provides a key example of this.

Case Study: Forced Marriage and the Special Court for Sierra Leone

In the aftermath of Sierra Leone's decade long civil war (1991 to 2002), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) was created in 2002 jointly by the government of Sierra Leone and the UN to try those persons who bear *greatest responsibility* for serious violations of international humanitarian law and the laws of Sierra Leone during the conflict. At the time of the court's establishment, the SCSL represented a *new* model of international justice, often referred to as a *hybrid tribunal*, which is staffed by both internationals and Sierra Leoneans rather than by an entirely international staff.[26]

It can be argued that the principles of human security—specifically, the protection and empowerment of war-affected women and girls—and accountability for perpetrators of sexual violence were an integral part of the court's work. In recognition of the rampant sexual and gender-based violence that occurred throughout the conflict, for the first time in the history of international law, under the SCSL, acts of forced marriage were to be prosecuted as an "inhumane act"—a crime against humanity.[27] In fact, crimes against women and girls were at the core of almost all the indictments issued by the Prosecutor's office. These include rape, sexual slavery, and mutilation. The words of Prosecutor David Crane reflect the importance of recognising and addressing the insecurity that women and girls faced during the war:

> These additional charges of crimes against humanity reflect the fact that women and girls suffered greatly during the war, including through widespread forced marriage…The Office of the Prosecutor is committed to telling the world what happened in Sierra Leone during the war, and gender crimes have been at the core of our cases from the beginning. These new charges recognise another way that women and girls suffered during the conflict.[28]

The SCSL's desire to ensure the protection and empowerment of Sierra Leoneans, key principles of human security, is clearly illustrated in the following quote by Prosecutor David Crane to a group of students:

> This is your Court. I encourage you to watch the trials closely. This is a truly historic moment, not just for your country, but for all of West Africa. Together, we will send a signal, regionally and internationally, that impunity for gross violations of human rights will no longer stand in Sierra Leone.[29]

This specific example of a post-civil war transitional and peacebuilding period brought women and girls to the centre of the process, forever eliminating the historic and egregious marginalisation and exclusion of women and children from peacebuilding processes.

UN Initiatives: Freedom from Want

The UN has given freedom from want concrete expression. That said, Peou notes that many proponents of the human security agenda tend to pay more attention to the freedom from fear dimension than the freedom from want dimension.[30] Nonetheless, the UN has promoted the development path of human security through the creation of its Human Security Unit, the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals, and more recently, the Sustainable Development Goals. What is key to the freedom from want dimension is that development is seen as a security issue.

The Human Security Unit

In 2004, the UN established the Human Security Unit (HSU) within the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The objective of the HSU was "to integrate human security in all UN activities," promoting the concept, as well as making the concept tangible through "concrete activities."[31] Thérien notes that the genesis of the HSU was closely tied to the concerns of Japanese diplomacy.[32] Moreover, the Japanese government donated US$4.2 million to create the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS), which is regarded as the first effort toward practising human security in the field. At the Millennium Summit in 2000, the Japanese government announced a donation of US$100 million to the UNTFHS to address "conflicts, human rights violations, poverty, infectious diseases, crime and environmental destruction."[33] By the end of 2009, the UNTFHS had granted US$323 million to 187 projects in 60 countries.[34]

The Millennium Development Goals

At the beginning of the new millennium and in line with a human security framework, world leaders gathered at the UN to shape a broad vision to fight poverty in its many dimensions. That vision, translated into eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which remained the overarching global development framework between 2000 and 2015. Reflecting the many security threats inherent to human security, the MDGs sought to achieve the following goals: (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and the empowerment of women; (4) reduce mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development. While many saw these goals as a successful initiative toward enhancing human security in the

Global South, they have also been criticised for omitting key elements, such as democracy and human rights.[35]

Although significant achievements were made, progress was uneven across regions and countries, leaving significant gaps with many being disadvantaged because of their gender, age, disability, ethnicity, or geographic location. The MDG report in 2015 identified key areas that required further attention and action. These areas included the persistence of gender inequality, the large gaps between the poorest and the richest households, the millions of people living in poverty and hunger without access to basic services, and climate change and environmental degradation undermining progress achieved (whereby the poor and marginalised suffer the most). Moreover, it was recognised that conflict remains the most significant threat to human development, leading to displacement and poverty.

The Sustainable Development Goals

Key critiques emerged challenging the MDG's silence on the grave impacts of conflict and violence on development.[36] In response, the MDGs later evolved into the UN's post-2015 development agenda, which added greater consideration to the devastating effects of war and conflict on development.[37] On September 25, 2015, the UN General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A total of 193 Member States of the UN endorsed *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. The agenda provides a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and into the future. The agenda lays out 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are a call for action by all countries—developed and developing—in a global partnership. Addressing five *Ps* (People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace, and Partnership) and reflecting the freedom from want human security agenda, the UN summarises the SDGs as follows:

> The 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets which we are announcing today demonstrate the scale and ambition of the new universal Agenda. They seek to build on the Millennium Development Goals and complete what they did not achieve. They seek to realize the human rights of all and to achieve gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls. They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental…the goals and targets will stimulate action over the next 15 years in areas of critical importance for humanity and the planet.[38]

Despite the two decades that have passed since the inception and acceptance of the MDGs, they remain relevant, as well as aspirational, in today's context. From the SDGs, we see the further centralisation of people-focused security supported by the protection *and* development dimensions of human security theory.

Conceptualising Human Security

The strong theoretical contributions of the concept of human security highlight the strengths associated with the shifting lens toward the individual, as well as the importance and success of including multiple actors to work collectively to achieve greater security.

People-Centred

On a conceptual level, human security has successfully made the individual count. The concept has provided a framework for the inclusion of diverse individuals and communities to discuss issues of security in ways that were not possible when security was understood to relate solely to the state. The human security agenda has put front and centre the notion that while security is a political issue, it is also a deeply personal experience, which has legitimised individual experiences of security and insecurity.[39] This *trickle-up* approach has enabled some of the most marginalised populations to be prioritised in security concerns. This has highlighted the realities of women and children and the unique ways in which they are affected by insecurities such war, educational marginalisation, lack of access to health care, and violence.[40] The concept of human security has provoked global attention to the plight of people and their security issues, advocating for individual and community protection, empowerment, and their links to policymaking. The concept has shifted the lens of security and highlighted that individuals and their daily experiences should matter. This is a significant global achievement in a context where militarism and state concerns prevailed.

Actors

In discussing the range of actors involved in human security, the *UN Commission on Human Security* underscored the importance of including not just the state, but regional and international organisations, NGOs, and civil society to address and tackle the complexity of security issues. This theoretical shift from a top-down approach to a more inclusive framework is not only a noticeable change, but also has led to important and positive strides toward achieving security. As the example addressed in Chapter Two demonstrated, the Ottawa Process and Ottawa Treaty highlighted the ways in which a range of actors—government, NGOs,

and members of civil society—can successfully collaborate to address a key human security issue from start to finish, ultimately enabling a more secure future and protection for people. Moreover, the inclusion of a broad range of actors in the process, particularly from civil society, exemplified the empowerment of those who rarely have an opportunity to have their voices heard during high level policy discussions. The Ottawa Process demonstrated the way in which both protection and empowerment were realised.

Human Security in Practice

While the lens of human security provides sound direction and a solid conceptual roadmap, in practice, the human security agenda has been an ongoing challenge to implement. Drawing on the core human security objectives of freedom from fear and freedom from want, the next section traces some of the challenges and setbacks inherent to the implementation of key human security initiatives.

Protection from Menace: Freedom from Fear

Protecting citizens from key menaces and threats is a core objective of human security. Protection requires a "concerted effort to develop norms, processes and institutions that systematically address insecurities"[41] In response, multiple initiatives have been put forth to address freedom from fear, including peacekeeping missions, the R2P doctrine, an agenda for children in armed conflict, and the introduction of the International Criminal Court, whose implementation is explored further in this chapter.

Peacekeeping

The UN has highlighted the complexity of contemporary peacekeeping:

> Today's multidimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon not only to maintain peace and security, but also to facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law.[42]

Such complex human security mandates are often difficult to achieve in contexts of protracted conflict, increasingly dangerous environments, and rising peacekeeping fatalities. Peacekeeping missions have ultimately seen checkered success. For example, in a number of recent missions, including those in the DRC and Chad, sexual violence appears more prevalent after years of deployment than at the outset.[43] Even more disturbing is the sexual exploitation and abuse of civilians by

international peacekeepers themselves. Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) by UN peacekeepers and personnel has been reported since the 1990s, particularly in the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, DRC, Timor-Leste, Guinea, Haiti, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and South Sudan. Reports have uncovered peacekeepers demanding sex from children in exchange for food, money, hygiene products, cell phones, perfume, rides in NGO vehicles, and being granted access to entertainment venues.[44] Despite a UN zero tolerance policy aimed to eradicate SEA, allegations have continued. Most recently, more than 50 women have accused UN personnel and humanitarian aid workers of sexual abuse and exploitation during the Ebola outbreak from 2018 to 2020.[45] A UN report identified this issue as "the most significant risk" to the public legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations.[46] These highly disconcerting realities challenge the very heart of the notion of civilian protection and human security, illuminating the complexities and challenges of implementation.

Responsibility to Protect

R2P began as a human security concept introduced at an international commission and was ultimately transformed into a doctrine drawn upon by the international community via the UN to support the lives of civilians in contexts of violence and unrest. The R2P doctrine has provided a framework for direct action to protect the threats inherent to violent conflict and safeguard human life from profound violence and inhumanity. However, R2P is not without controversy, as noted above.

Children and Armed Conflict

The human security agenda underscored the need to examine the lives and experiences of children during and in the aftermath of conflict to ensure that their security is an international concern and responded to effectively. Yet, the rise in armed conflict in Ukraine, Syria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, South Sudan, Mali, Nigeria, Yemen, and Afghanistan represents the highest level of human suffering since the Second World War. In 2020, 420 million children worldwide were living in a conflict zone, where they continue to be killed, injured, orphaned, separated from family, sexually assaulted, and recruited into armed groups—representing one in six of all the world's children.[47] In 2019, 70.8 million people were forcibly displaced as a result of war, with more than half being children.[48] According to a UN report, "the world is witnessing the highest level of displacement on record."[49] Ultimately, human suffering as a result of war continues unabated with devastating intergenerational consequences, highlighting the limits of implementing international protections for children.

International Criminal Court

Many saw the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as a means to ensure perpetrator accountability, and to help end armed conflicts and mass atrocities, or at the very least, deter them—all core elements of the human security agenda. In 2001, Canada's former Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote that "the court is a significant new international institution in the battle against war crimes and genocide, a major step toward real international accountability."[50] In reality, however, the ICC has not led to significant effects on the political regimes that have violated human rights or threatened the lives of their own people.[51] Moreover, questions have been raised regarding who is being held accountable by the court and who is not. Some have suggested that, as an institution, the ICC has been overly focused on conflicts and accountability in Africa. A vast majority of ICC's prosecutions have involved African conflicts, and the continent's initially strong support for the court's creation has in recent years notably weakened.[52] Moreover, while there is little doubt of the powerful symbolic and pragmatic importance of the ICC, the court cannot guarantee protection or "justice" for the lives of members of the general public. As an example, the ICC's focus on ensuring accountability for a few key perpetrators of war crimes may not bring "justice" to victims of the conflict, nor will it necessarily mean the end to violence, insecurity, and assure post-war recovery.[53]

Empowerment

Empowerment aims to enable people to "develop their potential and become full participants in decision-making."[54] The UN Commission on Human Security maintained that the human security model can empower individuals and communities, promote change, recast social, political and economic bases of power, and provide "opportunities for including the excluded, healing fragmentation and erasing inequalities."[55] The following section assesses the implementation of such goals in relation to the women, peace and security agenda, as well as the notion of peacebuilding.

Women, Peace, and Security

Female empowerment and participation have been important aspects and goals of the WPS agenda. When assessing the WPS agenda, Kirby and Shepherd suggest "a mixed but generally disappointing record."[56] An example is the participation and integration of gender into security policy. As an example, the WPS agenda promotes female participation in peace agreements, and post-conflict peacebuilding. However, women's participation in peace agreements since the introduction of the WPS

agenda has risen yet remains problematic. A 2012 study found that women comprise under 10 percent of peace negotiators and under 4 percent of signatories of peace agreements.[57] The meaningful participation of women has also been called into question. As Radhika Coomaraswamy and her colleagues observed: "The present programmes put forward by the international community tend to be extremely narrow: just to bring a female body to the table."[58] While the WPS agenda has successfully highlighted the disproportionate effects of war on women and girls, there have been several shortcomings and limitations in its implementation.

When considering empowerment, the question of "who is being empowered" is important. There has been some criticism of the WPS agenda for its focus on women. There is now a growing understanding that non-binary people and members of the LGBTQIA2S+ community also face distinct vulnerabilities during conflict. Moreover, researchers have highlighted that the realities of men and boys are often neglected in war-induced migration and refugee research and intervention.[59] As a result, it is increasingly being argued that these realities should be reflected in a broader framing of the WPS agenda, to include the empowerment of a broader range of people, and that the agenda should be renamed *Gender, Peace and Security*.

Conclusion

Since the original 1994 UNDP report, much attention has been paid to the concept of human security, inspiring hope, optimism, debate, deliberation, critique, and policy initiatives. The human security agenda has provided an important roadmap toward securing the lives of ordinary people. Human security as a concept and agenda has lasted and endured for a reason—it has brought reflection, pause, debate, and dialogue. All these elements are essential to meaningful change. The goals of human security—freedom from fear and freedom from want—provide a guiding light toward improving protection and empowerment in people's lives. In theory, the concept offers immense promise and possibility. In practice, however, the challenge lies in the ability and capacity to fully and successfully implement the concept, in other words, moving from theory to practice. Peou suggests that, after 25 years, the global vision for human security as a concept and a policy commitment remains unfulfilled in most parts of the world.[60] Similarly, Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy state that "despite the commissions, resolutions, reports, declarations and multi-million-dollar Trust Fund, and despite the consensus of like-minded countries on the protection of people, human security is far from having been achieved, or even adopted as a global— let alone national—goal."[61]

Ultimately, the theoretical strength of the human security agenda continues to advance, but its practical application by stakeholders underscores its limitations, even setbacks, in achieving the goals of freedom from fear and freedom from want within everyday practice. Both chapters Three and Six further examine themes from this chapter, describing the development of NATO's human security approach relevant to the Canadian Armed Forces.

Chapter 4 Key Concepts

- Denov explores the major human security initiatives advanced by the UN within each of the two security dimensions: one protection-based (freedom from fear) and the other development-based (promoting freedom from want).
- The UN has been engaged in conflict prevention and protection during conflict with several key initiatives: peacekeeping and peacebuilding, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, and the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda.
- Peacebuilding initiatives, unlike peacekeeping, focus on the underlying causes of conflict, and seek to entrench peace processes and prevent further insecurity.
- As an example, the peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions in Sierra Leone addressed both freedom from fear through peacekeeping, and later freedom from want through peacebuilding, demonstrating that one dimension cannot exist without the other.
- Because of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the international community is justified in taking military intervention when states fail to protect their citizens from large scale loss of life that is a product of deliberate state action, neglect, or the inability to act in the context of a failed state or ethnic cleansing.
- The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda seeks a radical reconfiguration of gendered power dynamics and a global commitment to sustainable and positive peace through prevention, protection, full participation, relief, and recovery.
- The UN's Sustainable Development Goals have centralised people-focused security supported by both the protection and development dimensions of human security theory. Both are needed for humans to be secure.

- There have been challenges in implementing human security in terms of the practicalities of fulfilling complex security mandates, the negative actions of peacekeepers which contribute to insecurity, the continued intergenerational impact of children and armed conflict, a lack of impact of the International Criminal Court, and a continued lack of participation of women and girls in peace processes.

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Chapter 5: NATO and Human Security: Political and Strategic Developments

Clare Hutchinson

As the Secretary General's Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security and Head of the Human Security Unit from 2018–2021, I am able to share my perspective of the development of NATO's human security approach. This chapter examines the possibility of a new vision of security that integrates soft and hard issues. It tracks the evolution of the human security concept in NATO, and the development of various cross-cutting topics relevant to its Human Security portfolio, including the Protection of Civilians (PoC); Trafficking in Human Beings (THB); Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC); and Cultural Property Protection (CPP), by presenting a detailed account of NATO's current approach to a human security framework.

5.1: Search techniques and demining, Poland.

Canadian Armed Forces sappers from 1 Combat Engineer Regiment partner with Polish and United Kingdom Armed Forces to instruct Ukrainian soldiers on search techniques and demining of personnel and occupied buildings in South-Western Poland on February 22, 2023. These skills contribute to protection of civilians over time.

Source: Master Sailor Valerie LeClair, Operation UNIFIER, Canadian Forces Combat Camera, DND-MDN Canada.

Over the last few years NATO allies and partners have advocated for and supported the development of elements of a Human Security agenda. Beginning with Protection of Civilians,[1] NATO military authorities have drafted doctrine and guidance on different strands of human security implemented in North Atlantic Council approved missions, operations, and activities. As different concepts of human security take root across the Alliance, the language to describe it becomes more ubiquitous, resulting in some confusion and resistance on the application of the concept.

Allied Security Policy

With the 1991 *Strategic Concept*, the Alliance began, in varying degrees, to embrace policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and a robust market economy. The Allies agreed through the Concept that Security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements, as well as the indispensable defence dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, co-operation, and the maintenance of a collective defence capability.[2]

Allied leaders adopted a new Strategic Concept in 1999, coinciding with NATO's 50th anniversary, this Concept committed members to common defence and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It introduced a more malleable construct of security which recognised the importance of political, economic, social, and environmental factors in addition to the defence dimension. It identified the new risks that had emerged since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. The Concept called for the continued development of the military capabilities needed for the full range of the Alliance's missions, from collective defence to peace support and other crisis-response operations.[3]

The following Strategic Concept, issued at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, reaffirmed NATO's values and purpose and revolved around three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. It provided a collective assessment of the security environment at the time and drove NATO's Strategic Adaptation. The Concept offered a strategic map for NATO in the 21st century and outlined the capabilities and policies needed to ensure that NATO's deterrence and defence, as well as crisis management abilities, were

equipped to face new and emerging threats including terrorism, cyber-attacks, and other technological and environmental threats.[4] Following the summit, and recognising the changes in the political and economic environment, as well as the emerging security hazards on the horizon, in 2010, the North Atlantic Council agreed to the Secretary General's proposal to establish an Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD). The new Division was mandated to research and a growing range of non-traditional risks and challenges in a hybrid threat environment such as terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, cyber defence, and energy security.[5]

The Alliance's Broad Approach

Over the years NATO has developed a much broader understanding of security and, while not explicitly cited, human security has been implicit in foundational documents. NATO national delegations have become increasingly favourable to human security and have impelled NATO to develop a consistent and cohesive approach to the concept, both politically and militarily. There has been restructuring within NATO as to where elements of human security are located. For example, the Protection of Civilians Unit was relocated physically and in reporting line from the Operations Division to the Office of the Secretary General's Special Representative for WPS (SGSR WPS) in 2017. A few years later the author, as SGSR WPS, called on NATO allies to support the establishment of a Unit dedicated to Human Security that would allow a distinct and separate identity from WPS. In 2019, the Human Security Unit was established in the Office of the Secretary General to absorb the policies that were not included in the Emerging Security Challenges Division portfolio under one collective space, such as Protection of Civilians and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.[6]

While no agreement has yet been reached on a standardised NATO definition for human security,[7] allies did accept that a people-centered approach to foreign and defence policy is important for the Alliance. Although there has been some disagreement on what should be included in the overarching concept, with several allies pushing for climate change to be included, the current consensus is that human security should include the following five cross cutting topics under its remit: Protection of Civilians (PoC); Trafficking in Human Beings (THB); Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC); and Cultural Property Protection (CPP). Of note, NATO does not include Women, Peace, and Security in its human security aegis, although the Human Security Unit is still physically and ideologically located under the SGSR WPS.

NATO allies have been unequivocal in their pledge to advance human security, reflected in the language within the 2021 Summit Communique, the first time that such strong language has been included regarding human security or WPS. In the Communique, NATO reaffirmed its commitment to continue to work with its partners, international organisations, and civil society to advance the Human Security agenda, and develop robust policies and clear operational guidelines.[8]

At the Madrid Summit in June 2022, a revised *NATO Strategic Concept* was adopted by the NATO Heads of State and Governments. The new Concept provides a blueprint for the Alliance for the next decade.[9] NATO's vision for the new Strategic Concept is stay strong militarily, be united politically, and take a broader approach globally.[10] Under the new strategy, NATO has set out its three core tasks – deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security— and, for the first time in the history of the NATO strategic concept, the document includes robust references to both human security and Women, Peace, and Security.

Allies have realised that both human security and gender are imperative to NATO. NATO commanders, in particular, understand that winning the war is not achievable without addressing vital "hearts and minds" issues like human security, economic recovery, and social advancement, and they accept the idea that the traditional dividing line between *hard* issues of national security and *soft* issues of human security has become blurred. As Secretary General Stoltenberg said,

> Taking a human security approach is the way to achieve lasting peace and security. We know that when communities have suffered from human trafficking, from conflict-related sexual violence, or from the destruction of cultural property, an end to conflict is harder to achieve. And peace is more fragile.[11]

Cross-Cutting Topics

NATO has outlined five cross-cutting topics as relevant to its Human Security portfolio: Protection of Civilians (PoC); Trafficking in Human Beings (THB); Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC); and Cultural Property Protection (CPP). The five grew out of the extant UN Security Council mandates on Protection of Civilians and Women, Peace, and Security. While Allied Command Operations and Allied Command and Transformation have developed robust doctrine, training, and capacity building on PoC related areas, as well as CAAC, CPP, and Human Trafficking, there was little recognition at NATO Headquarters of the benefit of bringing the cross-cutting topics into the political fold.

Initially the individual cross-cutting portfolios at NATO HQ were positioned under different Divisions. Trafficking in Human Beings was situated under the Political Affairs Division and PoC and CAAC were placed under the Operations Division until 2017, when the mandate was moved during restructuring under the responsibility of the SGSR WPS. Cultural Property Protection was primarily advanced by Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and military staffs and supported by NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, located within the Emerging Security Challenges Division.

In 2019, calls for the establishment of the Human Security Unit intensified, with an aim to establish a hub for the collective cross-cutting topics, but to emphasise the delineation between Women, Peace, and Security and Protection of Civilians. In 2022, the Human Security Unit has become a stand-alone unit, with a NATO Staff Officer heading the Unit. I shall return to the debate about the inclusion of gender into this framework in the section "What About Women, Peace, and Security."[12] A separate Human Security Unit would allow both mandates of human security and WPS to evolve independently. Other elements of human security are placed under the Emerging Security Challenges Division. This partially adds to confusion about human security for the Alliance and external actors.

Protection of Civilians

Legitimacy for human security in an operational capacity comes from its relation to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) agenda. The Responsibility to Protect report from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 laid the foundation for the endorsement and norms of human security as part of a security concept.[13] At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO leaders adopted the NATO *Policy for the Protection of Civilians* (PoC). NATO's definition of PoC includes both the "efforts taken to minimise and mitigate the negative effects on civilians from NATO and NATO-led military operations" as well as the need "to protect civilians from conflict-related threats of violence."[14]

The link to the overarching PoC agenda has become a critical element of peace operations but has generated some confusion within the human security framework. Within NATO, PoC is a foundational element of human security, focused on reducing the risk to civilians in the context of armed conflict. For NATO the principal vision for Human Security is as an enabling construct for PoC that can provide both conceptual and practical approaches for protection beyond an

operational perspective, and beyond immediate physical protection to include the other two pillars used by the UN, "protection through dialogue and engagement" and creation of a "protective environment." Presently, NATO PoC has four objectives:

1. Understand the human environment, including culture, history, demographics, strengths and vulnerabilities;
2. Safeguard civilians from harm by belligerents;
3. Facilitate access by the population to basic needs and services; and
4. Contribute to a safe and secure environment through support to the local government and its institutions.

Human security can thus serve as the overarching conceptual structure for identified PoC activities within NATO, mutually reinforcing rather than at odds with each other. In recent years, the Alliance has made considerable progress in implementing the PoC policy at both the political and military levels through tailored training, including with partners, integrating PoC into NATO exercises, and by ensuring the integration of PoC into NATO's doctrine and planning.

While states have the responsibility to protect the security of all people within their borders, if a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens against threats like crimes against humanity, genocide, ethnic cleansing or other threats to their dignity, the international community should intervene in accordance with obligations under international law. PoC is thus a moral, political, legal, and strategic priority for all military operations.

Future integration of PoC into a robust human security agenda will need to include further guidance on how to better protect civilians and not just mitigate threat. The integration of risk analysis on broader aspects of security and how a more sweeping lens on PoC can be adapted to the human security framework would be beneficial. As the world faces shifting and evolving risks, PoC will continue to have relevance for NATO nations and national militaries.

NATO allies have made clear their commitment to PoC. At the 2021 Summit they reiterated that the Alliance must also consider transnational threats such as terrorism, trafficking, and maritime piracy as part of the protection of civilians.[15] New threats are emerging, posing unprecedented challenges to governments. The new Strategic Concept will include and strengthen the scope of human security and possibly extension of PoC to include Article V operations on an ally territory, where protecting civilians may either be critical to success or the main

goal of the operation. PoC must be incorporated into standing defense plans as well as into dynamic planning.

The role of PoC is essential to respond to today's conflicts and is ultimately the foundation for human security. It is an area that needs more attention and given the recent situation in Ukraine urgently requires strengthening. Additionally, a human security approach to PoC must be viewed through a gender perspective. In order for a PoC agenda to be comprehensive and successful, the unique risks faced by women must be mitigated through the development of gendered early warning indicators for better prevention of sexual violence in conflict, the use of sex-disaggregated data in hot-spots to design robust protection responses, and the general oversight of gender-responsive protection from strategic to tactical.

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence

Sexual violence is a severe human rights violation that has been identified as a *tool* or *strategy* of war.[16] Since the Rwandan genocide and the conflict in the Balkans, attention to sexual violence in armed conflict has grown. The political engagement and donor interest to the conflict-related sexual violence agenda has been considerable. The adoption of Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) links the key elements related to rape and sexual violence in conflict situations to the use of rape as a weapon of warfare. The further adoption of UNSC resolutions on sexual violence[17] has elevated the topic to the highest political level.

Protection is at the core of human security. Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) is a tactic of war. Rape is often used as a weapon to destroy communities, intimidate and terrorise populations, and as a strategic tactic for displacing people. The conflict in Ukraine has further illuminated the heinous use of sexual violence in conflict and reaffirmed that sexual violence in conflict and crisis is ongoing and a global phenomenon.

Even after wars have ended, sexual violence often goes unaddressed or underreported. For NATO, the core of effort to combat sexual violence lies in the recognition that CRSV generates destructive effects on entire communities and consequently significant impacts to global peace and security. Rape and other incidents of sexual violence are likely to occur when there is an absence of rule of law. Incidents of CRSV have a long-term impact on communities, stalling any meaningful peace and destabilising areas. Combatting sexual violence in conflict and focusing on operationally effective responses to this appalling abuse is critical.

At both the Chicago (2012) and Wales (2014) Summits, the Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their commitment to responding to sexual violence, recognising that:

> Widespread sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations, the lack of effective institutional arrangements to protect women, and the continued under-representation of women in peace processes, remain serious impediments to building sustainable peace.[18]

NATO developed a series of military doctrine on addressing sexual violence in conflict,[19] in particular the Military Guidelines on prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence, which reaffirms the Alliance commitment to combatting sexual violence in out-of-area operations and calls on Commanders to act within their mandate to prevent and respond to CRSV.[20]

NATO's heightened attention to addressing CRSV culminated in the endorsement by NATO Heads of State and Government of the first Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence.[21] On the eve of the adoption of the Policy Secretary General Stoltenberg reaffirmed his personal conviction to addressing this issue:

> [A]dvancing this agenda will make NATO even stronger and fit for the future [...] We must all do everything we can stop this intolerable violence used against so many women and men, boys and girls.[22]

Despite the growing awareness that sexual violence is rooted in gender inequality, NATO separates its policy and response to CRSV from broader issues of gender-based violence (GBV), as does the UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO). This is in part due to expediency given the resistance to the concept of gender, but more importantly because the response to CRSV is different than that of GBV.

Gender-based violence encompasses various and entrenched patriarchal sanctioned conduct directed at persons because of their gender. Gender-based violence is, itself, a manifestation of the human rights violation of discrimination based on sex. Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) can amount to a serious violation of International Law, including International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL)[23] and can constitute a war crime, a crime against humanity, or an act of genocide. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in order to qualify as a crime against humanity, an act must be part of a "wide-spread or systematic attack" against a population.[24] Sexual and gender-based violence does not qualify as systematic since the framework within which gender-based violence occurs often tends to be implicit rather than explicit.

While the military guidelines make use of the term SGBV, policy negotiations addressed the language that framed the Policy and NATO response. NATO focuses on CRSV because NATO collectively can only address out-of-area incidences, which usually means conflict environments. Given the overall NATO tasks and the permissible channels of response for NATO, the Operations Policy Committee decided to stay faithful to the original UN definition of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence as posing significant threat to global peace and human security for its long-term destructive effects. NATO now uses the term SGBV but does recognise the broader concept of gender-based violence as an obstacle to peace, stability, and democracy.

While the language appears to be an irrelevant separation, in terms of application and accountability, it is essential. Defence forces should not replicate the role of police or justice in addressing domestic violence or national gender-related violence. This is not only above their mandate it is a dangerous precedent to set. Domestic issues, including those of violence, should be addressed by the appropriate national authorities. Military forces can support host nation authorities but not become a surrogate for domestic response. CRSV is an international peace and security issue, whereas SGBV also includes domestic violence and gender-based violence.

A separate but interlinked issue to CRSV is sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). This involves the inverse power dynamic between peacekeepers and humanitarian/aid staff and the local population. Sexual exploitation is often found in conflict and post-conflict situations where resources are limited and exchanged for sex. It has been a plague for the UN, but also observed across all organisations and with humanitarian sectors as well as civilian and military peacekeepers. Sexual exploitation and abuse run counter to NATO's principles. An incident of sexual exploitation and abuse damages the image and integrity of the Alliance, erodes trust and confidence, and can place the Alliance and its troop deployments at physical and also reputational risk.

NATO prides itself on being a gold standard organisation and a community of values. By 2018, the Alliance recognised that, in order to maintain its gold standard, there was a need to develop a stand-alone policy on combatting sexual exploitation and abuse. According to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, the policy is "another practical way in which we show our commitment to our principles and core values, including respect for human rights."[25]

NATO's Policy on Preventing and Responding to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) reinforces the commitment to hold the Alliance to the highest standards of behaviour. However, the SGSR WPS insisted that the issue of SEA in NATO is not addressed under the Human Security framework, despite being negotiated and promoted by the SGSR WPS. Although gender inequality is at the root of SEA, SEA is not an international legal issue in terms of response. SEA is primarily related to conduct of which some elements can be prosecutable, especially sexual violence or sexual harassment, but at a domestic level. Additionally, SEA is a whole of mission and/or organisation issue that needs to be addressed by all entities.

For NATO, SEA is not contained within either Human Security Unit or Women, Peace, and Security. SEA and other forms of misconduct are a whole of Alliance issue that should be handled by legal experts at the highest level.

Cultural Property Protection

In 2015 the UN Security Council addressed looting and illicit trafficking of antiquities as a source of terrorist financing and as an impediment to security, adopting the first resolution on the protection of Cultural Property under the heading "Maintenance of International Peace and Security."[26] Additionally, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution which highlighted "the increasing number of intentional attacks against and threats to the cultural heritage of countries affected by armed conflict as well as the organized looting of and trafficking in cultural objects, which occurs on an unprecedented scale today."[27] Finally, in 2016, the International Criminal Court (ICC), for the first time, delivered a conviction for the war crime of intentionally destroying cultural property.[28]

NATO recognises Cultural Property Protection (CPP) as an essential consideration in the military environment and a critical indicator of community security, cohesion, and identity. As demonstrated by the conflicts in the Western Balkans in the 1990s, the destruction of cultural symbols or cultural heritage can have significant political dimensions and become a tactic used to weaken affected communities. The lack of protection can also impact the success of a mission.

CPP is an important aspect of NATO's human security approach and a valuable component of NATO's efforts to build peace and security. CPP is also enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty which states that the Alliance is "determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples."[29]

The escalating focus at national levels on heritage and its importance to collective memory and community identity further underpins NATO's human security approach. Heritage is increasingly promoted as a force of good. Preservation policies are firmly integrated into the bureaucracies of many modern states, but as local, national, and international activities are seen as building upon each other they are also linked through a plethora of international and non-governmental institutions.[30]

NATO forces' performance in Operation Unified Protector in Libya was identified as a good practice, whereby staff at HQ Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) Strategic Plans and Policy Branch believed that NATO's successful efforts at Cultural Property in Libya could form the basis for strengthening NATO's approach to CPP for future operations.[31] The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) was therefore tasked to produce a review on Cultural Property Protection in the Operational Planning Process (2012).[32] The review led to the further development of the 'Bi-Strategic Command Directive on CPP in NATO operations and missions', which outlines the legal principles, roles and responsibilities in relation to cultural property for NATO.[33]

Despite the increased attention to the task of cultural property protection, NATO still faces challenges at the strategic level. Some within NATO question the role of NATO in protecting cultural property, believing that the Alliance should return to its core tasks. "NATO does not have to be everywhere doing everything."[34] However, in the recent Strategic Concept the Alliance has made clear its commitment to CPP. "Pervasive instability results in violence against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence, as well as attacks against cultural property and environmental damage."[35]

Additionally, the generic phrasing of *cultural property* as opposed to *cultural heritage* has often been central to confusion and concern. Classification of cultural heritage is variable depending on the nation or organisation: for some, property is tangible, and heritage is not. NATO considers property to be quite separate from culture, but the opinion is not common among all allies, especially as the linkage between conflict and trafficking of cultural property is becoming increasingly evident. ISIS is the most striking example of exploiting looted cultural property as a significant source of funding. While the estimates of revenue from theft and trafficking of artefacts vary (from several million to more than $100 million each year) ISIS looting stood out because of its organised nature.[36]

Children and Armed Conflict

The nature of contemporary warfare has increased the level and intensity of threats against children. Protecting children from the effects of armed conflict is both a moral imperative and an essential element to break cycles of violence. Protecting children in conflict today prevents conflicts of the future. The changing nature of modern warfare and the exposure of NATO forces to complex security environments, where children are potentially both victims and perpetrators of armed violence, including among opposing forces, illustrates the importance of the issue of Children and Armed Conflict for the Alliance.

The plight of children in unstable areas is central to the human security agenda. The changing nature of threats against children, has brought a new sense of urgency to the human security debate. The dimensions of children's security are highly interdependent; therefore, the diverse elements of human security portfolios all intersect with children, sexual violence, trafficking, directly and dramatically impacting the lives of children in conflict and post-conflict.

Children in conflict zones are frequently recruited by either national armies or militias. They are recruited to perform a variety of jobs. Children who are forced into these roles often suffer from severe physical or psychological trauma. If they can return home, they are often ostracised--this is especially true of girls. More than one in five children worldwide are affected by armed conflict, directly or indirectly. [37] Many children are recruited as combatants and sexually exploited during the conflict. Children are separated from family, living in unsafe conditions, suffering starvation due to food shortages or lack of access, long-term health issues, and denial of education, as well as being residual victims of violence/intergenerational trauma from many years of conflict.[38]

The concern of the international community related to children in areas of conflict has grown exponentially since the conflicts of the 1990s. In 1997, the Cape Town Principles defined a child soldier as anyone under the age of 18 who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force in any capacity. This was also one of the first narratives to highlight a gendered approach to conflict, calling for particular attention to be paid "to the special needs of girls, and appropriate responses should be developed to this end."[39]

In 1999, the United Nations Security Council recognised the key threat to international peace and security posed by children and armed conflict and the specific requirements to protect children. The adoption of the landmark resolution 1261 on Children and Armed Conflict

condemned targeting of children in situations of armed conflict, urged parties to armed conflict to take into consideration protection of children and set in motion an architecture of protection mandates for civilians, children, and women over the years.

Within NATO, the topic of children and armed conflict was first addressed by Heads of State and Government at the 2012 Chicago Summit. A decision was taken to develop practical, field-oriented measures to address violations against children during armed conflict. *The Military Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict* were endorsed later that year, outlining a broad framework to integrate United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612 into NATO training.[40] Soon thereafter, the North Atlantic Council also appointed the Assistant Secretary General for Operations as the Senior NATO Focal Point on Children and Armed Conflict, in charge of maintaining a close dialogue with the UN on this topic (later transferred to the SGSR WPS). Further expanding on international attention to CAAC, Heads of State and Government during the Wales Summit in 2014, requested that NATO draft a policy document *The Protection of Children in Armed Conflict-Way Forward* to give additional guidance to military doctrine, education, training, and exercises.[41]

In recent years, a series of political initiatives have called further attention to the persistent abuse of children in situations of armed conflict, with the aim of encouraging stronger collective efforts to protect children. In particular, the Paris Commitments[42] and associated Paris Principles (2007),[43] building upon the Cape Town Principles,[44] outline guidelines for protecting children from recruitment and use by armed forces and armed groups, and the Safe Schools Declaration (2015)[45] calls on states to protect schools and universities from military use during armed conflict. The *Kigali Principles*[46] establish a set of commitments on the protection of civilians in peacekeeping operations and most recently the *Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers* which "take an assertive stance on preventing child recruitment in the context of peacekeeping operations, specifically with regard to early warning and the active prevention of recruitment."[47]

As modern warfare changes, child protection issues on the battlefield also change. It is important to regularly examine policies, training, and actions to adapt to the strategic and operational risks related to children and armed conflict. Soldiers unprepared for encountering children in theatre can pose risks to their unit and task, as well as suffer moral

injury. Additionally, the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict highlights the risk that more children could be pushed into joining armed groups in conflict zones as their families face increasing poverty due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting challenges to food supply.[48]

Canada has not only endorsed all international protocols for CAAC but has also been a champion of the agenda – introducing the first thematic debate in the United Nations' Security Council and hosting the first International Conference on War-Affected Children in 2000. Additionally, Canada established and continues to chair the Group of Friends on Children and Armed Conflict at the United Nations in New York and at NATO.

Trafficking in Human Beings

Human trafficking is a global phenomenon and affects millions of people around the world. UNODC reports that nearly every country in the world is affected by human trafficking, as a point of origin, transit, or destination.[49] Human trafficking is defined in the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol, which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, as

> the recruitment, transport, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person by such means as threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud or deception for the purpose of exploitation.[50]

The impact of human trafficking is felt disproportionately in war-torn and crisis areas and has implications at the individual, community, and national scale. Armed conflict creates increased flows of displaced people putting them directly at risk to crime networks and human smugglers. A few years after the war in Syria started, UNODC data noted a rapid increase in the number of identified victims of trafficking from Syria in the Middle East, Turkey and in European countries.[51]

The crime of trafficking in human beings constitutes a serious abuse of human rights, especially affecting women and children. Over the last two decades recognition of the connection between Human Trafficking and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) mandate has expanded. References to trafficking and gender have increased in UN Security Council Resolutions and National Action Plans (NAPs) on UNSCR 1325, including in NATO, with heightened calls to address the gendered aspect of trafficking an its risk to women and girls.

Since the conflict in the Balkans, NATO allies have been acutely aware of the risks of incidences of human trafficking on mission reputation and effectiveness. This awareness led to allies requesting the

development of a Policy on Trafficking in Human Beings.[52] The policy was endorsed at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004 by the members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The policy reinforces the commitments undertaken by NATO nations in the *UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children*, supplementing the *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime*[53] to which NATO member states are signatories.

The relationship between armed conflict and human trafficking is one of the reasons for NATO, as a military and political alliance, remains involved in addressing trafficking. The Alliance also remains committed to exploring how it might adapt new approaches to countering human trafficking in an evolving security environment. This will be particularly important as part of NATO's human security approach to operations and missions.

While NATO does not see itself as the primary organisation to combat trafficking in human beings, the policy commits both allies and partners to reinforce measures to prevent and fight trafficking, including through increasing training and awareness of all military and civilian personnel and contractors taking part in NATO-led operations and missions. Much of the responsibility for implementing the Policy was assigned to NATO's Military Committee given that it is troops who are the most likely to encounter trafficked individuals and trafficking rings. Guidance was then issued by the Strategic Commanders.

Prior to COVID-19, 50 per cent of detected victims were trafficked for sexual exploitation and 38 per cent for forced labour, while six per cent were subjected to forced criminal activity and more than one per cent to begging. Women continue to be particularly affected by trafficking. In 2018, for every 10 victims detected globally, about five were adult women and two were girls. About one third of the overall detected victims were children.[54]

Since the pandemic the resulting chronic social and economic conditions have further exacerbated trafficking of children and adults from disadvantaged and marginalised communities, including refugees and migrants. Traffickers adapted their existing tactics to take advantage of the unique circumstances of the pandemic and targeted the growing number of people unable to build resilience against the worsening economic and social effect. Business owners and landlords pressured individuals to take out loans in exchange for cheap labour or commercial sexual exploitation. Additionally, traffickers sought to re-exploit survivors who became financially unstable and vulnerable to

revictimisation. Reports from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay illustrate that landlords forced their tenants (often women) to have sex with them when the tenant could not pay rent. In Haiti, Niger, and Mali, gangs operating in IDP camps took advantage of reduced security and limited protection.[55]

Moreover, against the background of an increasingly unstable global security environment and the war in Ukraine, many people have become more vulnerable to trafficking including through widespread human, material, and economic losses; hampered ability of families and communities to provide for their basic needs; negative coping mechanisms adopted by those affected by the crisis; erosion of the rule of law; and the breakdown of social safety nets and other social protection systems.

Human trafficking is a security issue because it is linked to other criminal activities that disproportionately affect women and girls such, as conflict related sexual exploitation and the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation of small arms and light weapons. Large scale internal and cross-border movements caused by crises also create vulnerable populations that can become victims of trafficking. Additionally, as the second largest criminal industry worldwide and a fast-growing transnational organised crime, there is an innate correlation of national security and human security. Human trafficking can undermine human security and exacerbate conflict, and so it has significant implications for the planning and conduct of military operations and associated conflict-related stabilisation activities.

As the war on Ukraine continues, the risks of human trafficking for Ukrainian women and children are likely to increase. United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres exclaimed on twitter, "For predators and human traffickers, the war in Ukraine is not a tragedy, it's an opportunity. And women and children are the targets."[56] Canada was among the first countries to ratify the United Nations *Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons*. There is robust commitment to preventing and combatting trafficking to protect victims of human trafficking, bring perpetrators to justice, and build partnerships domestically and internationally. More could be done by Canada to bring attention to the relationship between the WPS agenda and human trafficking, given these are both areas that the nation has shown moral leadership and commitment.

Conclusion

There was, and remains, some unease, especially within the PoC community, that to the detriment of their efficacy, the cross-cutting topics are bundled together, and they are overseen and overshadowed by WPS. The establishment of the NATO Human Security Unit was intended to remedy these concerns. Recognising that the mandates should be separate but equally resourced and positioned, the SGSR created a structure that would see the move of PoC from WPS oversight. The intent was to make human security a notable and adequately resourced concept within the NATO structure and to divide the lines of responsibility between WPS and other mandates. In the following chapter these structures and dividing lines will be analysed with a military lens.

Chapter 5 Key Concepts

- NATO has developed its human security approach as a new vision of security that integrates soft and hard issues, focused on the development of five cross-cutting topics: Protection of Civilians (PoC); Trafficking in Human Beings (THB); Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC); and Cultural Property Protection (CPP). These topics originated from the Security Council's PoC and WPS mandates.
- These topics are interconnected and complement the WPS agenda.
- The development of human security as a concept has progressed naturally and is inherent in the foundational documents of the Alliance and subsequent strategic concepts. The 2022 Strategic Concept set out three core tasks of deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security, specifically referring to both human security and Women, Peace, and Security in the execution of these tasks.
- NATO's cross-cutting topics for human security are task-oriented and practical and can be implemented across all levels of military action, strategic, operational, and tactical.

Notes

1   NATO, *NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians*, July 9, 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133945.htm.

2   NATO, *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council* (1991; last updated July 1 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23847.htm.

3   NATO, *MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy* (Brussels: NATO, 1999).

4   NATO, *MC Guidance for the Military Implementation of the Alliance Strategy*.

5   NATO, "New NATO division to deal with Emerging Security Challenges," NATO Press Release (August 4, 2010), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_65107.htm.

6   BI-Strategic Commands recognized human security much earlier, developing doctrine and training on human security elements.

7   A working definition was approved in an Operational Policy Committee format at HQ in 2021 and discussions are ongoing as to an officially agreed definition.

8   NATO, *Brussels Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 14 June 2021* https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm.

9   NATO, *NATO Strategic Concept, Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid 29 June 2022*, https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.

10 NATO, *NATO Strategic Concept*.

11 NATO, "NATO to step up work on Human Security Approach, Digital Dialogue on Human Security" Press Release (February 25, 2021), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_181798.htm.

12 See Hutchinson, "What About Women, Peace, and Security", this volume.

13 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, Foreign Affairs, 2001), https://www.idrc.ca/en/book/responsibility-protect-report-international-commission-intervention-and-state-sovereignty.

14 NATO, *NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians*.

15 NATO, "NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians: Fact Sheet," NATO Public Diplomacy Division, accessed March 7, 2022; https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160705_1607-protection-civilians-en.pdf.

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Chapter 6: NATO and Human Security from a Military Lens

David Lambert

In examining the development of human security for military forces, a focus on NATO is warranted given that, for purposes of interoperability and commonality, the NATO Standardization Office (NSO) produces doctrine that is ratified and adopted by its member states. In short, it sets a common denominator for all NATO members. The development of the human security concept within NATO and its constituent military forces remains a work in progress, yet it has begun to appear in the most recent edition of NATO capstone level doctrine.[1] Since 2016, and in the wake of the Afghan campaign, NATO has adopted and sought to incorporate in policies and directives many of the constituent aspects of human security, often as they have been identified and promoted by the United Nations. These subjects have included Women, Peace and Security, children and armed conflict, combating the trafficking of human beings, prevention of conflict-related sexual violence, protection of civilians, and cultural property protection.[2] This chapter examines the Alliance's military-focused efforts in developing its human security approach in order to analyse the ways in which Canada has and will develop Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) doctrine focused on a human security approach to operations. These analyses will be discussed at length in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine.

NATO's Conceptual Approach

On the heels of many of these new initiatives, policies, and directives, and with an increased focus on security being defined in terms of populations rather than only nation-states, NATO has adopted the overarching concept of human security; however, NATO has not adopted human security in the broad form devised by the UN. Indeed, NATO sees it as a clear and direct extension of many of these previously declared policies regarding the protection of vulnerable groups affected by conflict.[3] These constituent aspects of human security have come to be known as cross-cutting themes (CCTs) and will of course vary with the operating environment, the threats, and the affected populations in the given strategic situation.[4]

There is no clear definition of what a cross-cutting theme actually is. It is certainly a popular term within the world of academics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and is seen to some extent as a means to make proposed projects more appealing to potential donors in that the outcomes of the proposed project will touch upon many

aspects related to the main aim.[5] In terms of how it is used in NATO texts, cross-cutting themes appear to be simply a facet or dimension of a larger issue or concept. For example, the protection of children in conflict and the prevention of conflict-related sexual violence and exploitation would be facets or elements of the larger effort to achieve human security, and the presence of these threats and others like them will vary with each operating environment.

Starting in 2019 and flowing through the following two years, NATO, and in parallel efforts by the UK, worked to develop their understanding of human security and to build a human security approach.[6] In the process of conceiving of human security in more specific terms of threats, which likely stems from the nature of military forces, both NATO and the UK have generally grouped a series of cross-cutting themes under the heading of human security. The exact list of cross-cutting themes varies slightly across different references, but generally include the following:

- protection of civilians;
- children affected by armed conflict and their protection;
- countering of trafficking in human beings and modern slavery;
- women peace, and security;
- prevention of conflict-related sexual violence;
- cultural property protection;
- prevention and countering of violent extremism; and,
- building integrity and countering corruption.[7]

Based on the nature of these cross-cutting themes, it is clear that most, and perhaps all, do not fall neatly into the realm of military responsibilities and normal tasks – they are certainly not topics for which military forces generally train. As noted in the British military's Joint Service Publication *Human Security in Defence*,[8] the ability of military forces to act within human security policy and aspirations "will always be qualified by the unique individual circumstances of each operation, including the legal mandate, mission and tasks, and military resources available at the time."[9] Thus, reflecting these limitations and focusing on what can be done in practical terms by military forces, and what is expected by the terms of International Humanitarian Law, NATO has focused its efforts on the "protection of civilians" aspect of human security.

Protection of Civilians

NATO's perception of its role in the protection of civilians is certainly not something new and has developed and matured over the past thirty years, for not just NATO as a whole but also amongst

its member nations through their own experiences. The idea of using military forces in a primary role to protect civilians at the tactical level began in recent history during operations in the former Yugoslavia. Many militaries involved under the UN-led campaign in the early 1990s were frustrated by UN rules of engagement that instructed forces to only observe and report the direct targeting of non-combatants vice becoming directly involved to stop it. This direction to not interject with force to protect vulnerable non-combatants has led to cases of post-traumatic stress disorders amongst soldiers, often termed moral injuries.[10] Interestingly, the British battalion deployed to Bosnia in 1993 ignored this UN directive and made a habit of inter-posing their own armoured vehicles between the targeted civilians and the belligerent force, thus becoming the target themselves and allowing them to return fire.[11] Thus, the moral requirement to protect vulnerable civilians certainly comes naturally to military forces and is seen as the right thing to do. The transition to a NATO mission at Christmas 1995 to enforce the Dayton accords specifically saw a direct role for military forces in the protection of non-combatants as a practical tactical task. The employment of military forces in this region culminated in the 1999 Kosovo campaign which saw NATO employing forces in the protection of civilians as a strategic objective.[12]

This theme of protection of civilians continued throughout the Afghan campaign, across all three levels of command, tactical, operational, and strategic. The decision to remain and help build a stable society following the ouster of the Taliban clearly evokes the concept of protecting the civilian population and building aspects of human security as a strategic outcome. At the operational and tactical levels, it became inherent in the counter-insurgency nature of the campaign. Indeed, one might see these efforts as going beyond the direct protection of civilians and seeking to fulfil the broader elements of human security envisioned by the United Nations. Certainly, the counter-insurgency doctrine developed at this time reflects these themes.[13]

The concept of Protection of Civilians being a direct undertaking for NATO forces had matured by the time of the 2016 Warsaw meeting of the North Atlantic Council, and resulted in a formal policy and framework, endorsed by the heads of state attending. The breadth and significance of the policy is nicely encapsulated in this framework statement:

> Protection of Civilians (persons, objects and services) includes all efforts taken to avoid, minimize, and mitigate the negative effects that might arise from NATO and NATO-led military

operations on the civilian population and, when applicable, to protect civilians from conflict-related physical violence or threats of physical violence by other actors, including through the establishment of a safe and secure environment.[14]

There are several key aspects of this policy that are vital to mention in understanding NATO's policy and actions with respect to human security, and protection of civilians in particular.

First, the policy includes more than just persons, but also objects and services. This is taken to mean that the protection of civilians also includes the protection of important objects (such as centres of cultural importance), infrastructure vital to survival, and essential services. Second, it goes beyond the legal requirements of International Humanitarian Law (also termed Law of Armed Conflict) that requires military forces to take precautions to minimise civilian casualties; instead, it commits NATO forces to taking *all efforts* to avoid or minimise negative collateral effects on civilian populations. In keeping with the first point, this includes avoidance of collateral damages to key infrastructure and cultural property.

Third, and of greatest significance, is the extension of protection of civilians to mean the protection, even defence, of civilians from threats by other actors, even to the point of establishing a safe and secure environment, which is a fairly broad objective. It thus ensures protection of civilians is a focus at all levels of command/conflict: strategic, operational, and tactical.[15]

While this emphasis on protection of civilians may be seen as an outcome of the Bosnian and Afghan experiences, the 2019 shift of strategic focus back to collective defence in the face of potential peer adversaries does not in any way negate the importance of protection of civilians. It remains a vital consideration for NATO, in term of both strategic policy/guidance, and a centrality to military operations. Indeed, going back to first principles, a focus on the protection of civilians stems in good measure from the classic Clausewitzian Trinity: the three-way relationship between states, their peoples, and their militaries. Furthermore, the emphasis on population targeting for influence and perception places an even greater emphasis on protecting populations.[16]

Operationalising Policy and Concept

Adoption of a policy and concept for the protection of civilians inevitably leads to a question as to how the concept has been operationalised for the NATO military forces themselves; that is, how it is to be manifested and implemented on the ground by tactical forces

faced with the challenges of operating amongst populations. Most specifically, NATO has produced the Allied Command Operations (ACO) *Protection of Civilians Handbook*, issued post-2020, following the 20th anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution 1265 on the Protection of Civilians in armed conflict.

The handbook itself seeks to build a mind-set across NATO commands that will implement NATO's policy and concept for the Protection of Civilians during operations, as the protection of civil populations is a "fundamental requirement to achieving long-lasting peace."[17] It notes that the Protection of Civilians concept incorporates the two broad approaches noted above: protection from the actions of NATO forces and protection from threats posed by other actors. It then notes four broad aspects of the PoC framework to each of which it dedicates a complete and detailed chapter:

- understanding the human environment, including the population's perception of threats, safety, and security, in that the civil population is a key element of the overall operating environment and central to achieving operational and strategic objectives. This understanding comes to shape operations in terms of planning and execution;
- mitigation of harm, in that NATO makes all efforts to avoid civilian casualties while actively protecting civilians from other actors that directly target civilians, as a given in any campaign, whether explicitly implied in strategic objectives or simply assumed. To achieve this, military forces will use influence, threat of force and force (lethal or non-lethal) to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to situations where civilians are targeted. Measures will be both passive and active;
- facilitation of access to basic needs, in that NATO forces will look, as needed and where possible, to facilitate access of civilians in need of basic services and sustainment, including vital infrastructure needed for survival. If necessary, this includes protection of key sites for aid and infrastructure, close coordination with other agencies, local authorities, and delivery of humanitarian aid; and
- contribution to a safe and secure environment, in that NATO forces will undertake actions that build local government and institutions and their capabilities, through such means as training and advising, ideally in conjunction with other agencies.

In short, the handbook offers detailed prescriptive direction to operationalise the NATO policy and concept at the operational and tactical levels. It does not restrict POC to any one type of campaign and recognises that the responsibilities and envisioned means are applicable across the spectrum of conflict.[18]

The emphasis that the required assessments and actions receive in terms of overall operations will depend upon the overall strategic direction for the military commitment, the nature of the threats and their aims and methods, the nature of the campaign and the capabilities of the military forces. The handbook provides direction that applies to both the operational and tactical levels. At its most prescriptive level, the manual even provides direction as to how NATO forces are to interpose themselves between belligerents and targeted civilians in order to protect the civilians, thus addressing the dilemma from the early Bosnia deployments. Furthermore, the handbook realises that some threats to civilians may come from non-adversarial elements such as criminal gangs or even allied or host nation forces, and in these cases, too, NATO forces are expected to intervene, either directly or indirectly, such as through education and training if the source is host nation.[19] Clearly, this addresses the issue found in Afghanistan where host nation forces were often found to be sexually abusing local boys, when in some cases NATO commanders at the lower level begged off from intervening, attributing the issue to one of culture, which sadly has left psychological scars on not only the victims of this violence, but on those who knew they should intervene.[20] Now they have clear direction as to how to act in this handbook.

Cross-Cutting Topics

In terms of the relationship between Protection of Civilians and the other cross-cutting topics[21] that NATO and other authorities see as related to human security, the handbook clearly places the other themes as subordinate to the Protection of Civilians. As it notes, the Protection of Civilian concept

> provides an overarching frame of reference for NATO Cross-Cutting Topics, such as Children and Armed Conflict (CAAC), Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), Women, Peace and Security (WPS), Cultural Property Protection (CPP), and Building Integrity (BI).[22]

Thus, the manual is pragmatic and applicable at the operational and tactical levels in terms of placing the Protection of Civilians concept as a larger context of more specific but closely related elements and

providing prescriptive direction. It calls primarily for a shift in mindset across all ranks regarding the role and obligation of military forces in the protection of civilians.[23] It sees the Protection of Civilians as not only a tactical measure to meet international laws and expectations, but as a real part of campaign planning in order to protect and build the credibility and legitimacy of NATO, and to be a key factor in NATO's strategic communications. Indeed, a Protection of Civilian line of operation in any NATO campaign will greatly build what Canadian Army doctrine terms "campaign authority;"[24] that is, the total perceived legitimacy of a military force and its campaign, thus giving the force a strategic and psychological advantage over any adversary.[25]

The development and issue of *Protection of Civilians Handbook* has been a highly positive development in putting actual tactical direction and capability towards realising a key aspect of human security, and it has received praise for its concept and prescriptive measures from external authorities focused on civilian protection.[26] However, large and important issues remain. The handbook has been developed by Allied Command Operations rather than the NATO Standardization Office (NSO), which indicates that it has simply been issued through the NATO command structure and has not made its way to the member nations. The manual is not formally edited, gives no publication date, nor distribution list. Thus, it has not been issued to the nations for their own education, training, and implementation.

NATO develops and issues doctrine through a rigorous system in the NSO, in which national representatives, under a specific custodian, write doctrine manuals that are approved by the appropriate Service branch within the NSO, are ratified by the nations and promulgated, with nations indicating how they will adopt and implement the doctrine. For NATO this is the key means for both standardisation across NATO and interoperability within NATO. This has not happened with respect to this ACO *Protection of Civilians Handbook*. To understand how human security and its constituent elements have been formally adopted by NATO member nations, one must examine NATO-ratified doctrine.

While the ACO handbook on Protection of Civilians was being developed, NATO was undertaking a concurrent re-write of its series of the central land doctrine publications. An examination of the capstone doctrine is particularly important given the military-strategic level addressed in the manual, and the land operations keystone doctrine is vital to review as land forces will be the forces primarily involved in human security issues, particularly the protection of civil populaces.

Given that this doctrine development was running concurrent with the production of the ACO handbook, one would hope that human security issues, particularly that of the protection of civilians, would be covered in detail, given that representatives from NATO operational headquarters (and thus recipients of the ACO handbook) routinely attend these writing teams. The capstone manual's "summary of changes" page notes that it introduces the notion of human security, however the subject is not addressed in the main text, but only as an adjunct to an annex titled *Cross-Cutting Themes*. This annex of the publication addresses cross-cutting topics and lists those that are generally considered in NATO and other lists. However, it fails to describe what these topics cut across, or how they are related to one another. A generous reading of the annex's introduction would lead the reader to assume that the topics cut across all campaigns and operations, but that is not no means clearly stated, and thus each nation is free to interpret the relevance and context of the topics in their own manner.

The annex provides details on each topic, but, generally, in isolation with little connection between them. It provides most details for the Protection of Civilians topic, based on NATO's 2016 policy, and is reflective of the four-part framework given in the ACO handbook. In addressing human security though, the material is confused and contradictory to other sources. Although listed under cross-cutting topics, the text declares that human security "is distinct from the responsibility to protect and does not entail the threat of the use of force or coercive measures."[27] It fails to make human security the overarching concept as it is articulated in recent UN, NATO, and UK key documents, and conflicts with the work commissioned by the British military's Development, Concepts, and Doctrines Centre (DCDC) and its Joint Service Publication.[28] Of additional concern is that this concept of human security as not involving the protection of civilians appears to conflict with the opinion of the NATO Special Representative for Human Security.[29] Clearly a disconnect exists in NATO's understanding of human security, and with this document being promulgated across NATO member nations, the confusion will be widespread.

While Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) is mentioned amongst the cross-cutting topics, it also has its own annex. Although much of the material is very general, it is again not tied to human security specifically. Although the material largely repeats the generalities of the WPS agenda, it does interestingly stress a *gender* lens in understanding and analysing the operating environment.[30]

Challenges

Although the various disconnects discussed here pertain to the understanding and articulation of human security, one should be sympathetic to the writers. One can imagine the issue: NATO policy makers telling the NSO and members of doctrine writing teams (who may be from NATO commands but are generally national representatives) to incorporate newly adopted policies and resolutions that have been drawn from the UN, with no clear context, linkages, and articulated purposes. The material has not been fully incorporated into NATO doctrine, but piled into an annex, perhaps with the hope that it will be better understood and incorporated in due course, yet still meeting the direction of policy makers to incorporate their newest declarations.

Likewise, the *Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations* or "land doctrine" most recently developed by NATO fails to properly articulate human security and POC-related material. The senior land operations doctrine does not mention human security as a guiding concept and only mentions protection of civilians as a key characteristic and capability of land forces. It does, however, note that failure to protect civilians will have "direct negative effects on the legitimacy of the mission, attainment of the end state and long-term stabilization."[31]

The tactical level land NATO land doctrines, also promulgated in early 2022, mention the protection of civilians and infrastructure as a principle when integrating operations and activities into a concept of operations, and as a consideration in rear area security and stability.[32] The lowest tactical doctrine for land forces only mentions the protection of civilians as a consideration in terms of protection from NATO's own actions, rather than as a broad effort of protection from all threats.[33] The lack of focus in this latter manual is of particular concern, for this is the publication in which land forces undertake that set of tactical responsibilities, known as stability operations and activities, which are meant to have a focus on the security and control of the civil populace.

Although NATO sees human security as largely a civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) area of interest and thus a J9 staff branch responsibility, it is in fact a command responsibility, be it a major strategic objective of a campaign or simply a tactical necessity driven by immediate facts on the ground. Although intelligence staff must indicate threats to human security and J9 staff provide advice and support the commander, the protection of civilians is an operation, not a staff function. There are challenges at the strategic level of NATO to visualise the centrality of human security. Currently, the NATO

Human Security Unit has been placed under the Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security, thereby obscuring the prominence of human security and placing it in the realm of policy rather than at the centre of operations, where it also resides.[34]

Conclusion

To summarise NATO's efforts in the realm of human security and protection of civilians, the situation continues as a work in progress. Currently, confusion and even discord exist, demonstrated by the inability to properly incorporate human security and its constituent elements into doctrine in a logical relationship. Those complimentary of NATO's efforts are concerned that the addition of yet another concept such as human security will only "create more confusion than it will bring clarity, political and strategic focus and resources to better prevent, mitigate and respond to civilian harm."[35] Furthermore, NATO is even charged by critics as having co-opted the language of human security to alter its meaning and give it a greater focus on protection of civilians, a practice they claim that is driven by a public diplomacy agenda in order to improve its image and legitimacy.[36] Within NATO, the issues of human security and protection of civilians have become confused as noted. Despite a fairly solid concept and handbook for the latter issue, the two issues have become confused with a list of cross-cutting topics, that vary between sources, and seemingly have been lumped into the formal doctrine publications without a logical construct and link to the three levels of command (strategic, operational, and tactical). At the lowest land force tactical doctrine level, any link to those tactical operations and tasks that seek civil stability, have only mentioned the issue in passing.[37]

Clearly, work is needed under an accepted authority to better define and harmonise the concept and elements of human security in order to allow it to firstly be better understood, then better visualised as part of operations, and then better implemented. The three key elements identified – human security, protection of civilians as adopted by NATO, and the varying list of cross-cutting topics – need to be placed in proper and supporting relationship to each other, in a harmonised manner that will give NATO and its member nations a doctrinal framework that integrates the strategic to tactical levels of command in the realisation of human security. Only in this way, can the operational art[38] be exercised to ensure that human security becomes an understood, consistent, and practical aspect of NATO planning and operations from the strategic to the tactical levels.

Chapter 6 Key Concepts

- The UK and NATO consider human security in terms of threats, with a view to operationalise cross-cutting themes within military action.
- The NATO *Protection of Civilians Handbook* places as subordinate all other cross-cutting topics; the principal task is the protection of human life.
- The Protection of Civilians is a tactical measure to meet international laws and expectations but is also a real part of campaign planning to protect and build the credibility and legitimacy of NATO. Legitimacy is a key factor in NATO's strategic communications.
- A Protection of Civilian line of operation in any NATO campaign will strengthen *campaign authority*, that is, the total perceived legitimacy of a military force and its campaign.
- There are gaps in NATO's land doctrine, particularly at the higher tactical level, which need to be addressed if human security is to be fully operationalised.
- Human security is not an aspect of operations that will vary with the nature of the campaign and operating environment and should be viewed as a central concern of alliance business.
- The NATO Human Security Unit has been placed under the Special Representative for Women, Peace, and Security, which obscures the prominence of human security and places it in the policy realm rather than at the centre of operations, where it also resides.
- Human security and its constituent elements need to be incorporated in doctrine in a logical relationship. Work is needed under an accepted authority to better define and harmonise the concept and elements of human security to allow better understanding, better visualisation in operations, and better implementation.

Notes

1   That is, the highest-level doctrine: NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 01(F) Allied Joint Doctrine, Ed F, Version 1. (Ratification Draft)* (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2022) https://nso.nato.int/nso/home/main/home.

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18   Spectrum of conflict: the full range of relationships between states or groups, reflecting the frequency and intensity of violence: Government of Canada Termium Plus - Defence Terminology Standardization Board.

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21   NATO refers to cross-cutting topics rather than themes, but the meaning is deemed to be the same.

22   NATO, *Protection of Civilians – Allied Operations Command (AOC) Handbook*, 11.

23   NATO, *Protection of Civilians Handbook*, 7.

24   Campaign authority: in operational design, the recognised authority of a force to conduct a campaign, based upon its legitimacy as perceived by affected audiences: Government of Canada Termium Plus – Defence Terminology Standardization Board.

25   Canada, National Defence, *B-GL-300-001/FP-003 Land Operations* (Kingston, ON: Director of Army Doctrine, 2008), 6-1; David Lambert, *Campaign Authority as a Framework in Operational Design*, JADEX Papers 4, NDID-B-GL-900-J01/JP-004 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2011).

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27   NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 01(F) Allied Joint Doctrine*, A-7.

28   United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *NATO, the MoD and Human Security*; United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Human Security in Defence*. Interestingly, the conflict within UK doctrine exists despite the custodian for AJP-01(F) being the DCDC office. (This chapter's author was the Canadian Head of Delegation to the NATO Land Operations Working Group from most of 2005 to 2021, routinely attended NATO doctrine writing teams at the land and joint levels, and at various periods he worked closely with DCDC.) Further, it is also insightful to track how the United Kingdom has worked to build the human security concept within its own Ministry of Defence (MoD) and forces, based on its development of published policy, an MoD Human Security Steering Group and the announced intent (yet to be realised) of the creation of a human security centre of excellence, and the human security unit within the Army's 77th Brigade. It is also an interesting intersection that the custodian for both NATO capstone and land operations doctrine (where forces will most likely encounter human security) is a staff officer within the Development, Concepts and Doctrines Centre (DCDC) of the British military where doctrine for human security would be developed.

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30   NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 01(F) Allied Joint Doctrine*, B-1.

31 NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations, Edition B, Version 1* (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2022), 22, https://nso.nato.int/nso/home/main/home.

32 NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 3.2.1.1 Conduct of Land Tactical Activities, Edition C, Version 1* (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2022), 74, 88, https://nso.nato.int/nso/home/main/home.

33 NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 3.2.1.1 Conduct of Land Tactical Activities*, 2-10.

34 Carbery, "Interview with Clare Hutchinson."

35 Center for Civilians in Conflict, "NATO's New "Human Security" Umbrella."

36 Richard Reeve, "NATO and Human Security: Obfuscation and Opportunity," *NATO Watch* (February 2021): 9-12. https://natowatch.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/peace_research_perspectives_on_nato_2030.pdf.

37 NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 3.2.1.1 Conduct of Land Tactical Activities*.

38 *Operational art* is defined as the employment of forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles: Government of Canada Termium Plus – Defence Terminology Standardization Board; NATO Term database.

Chapter 7: Creating a Human Security Framework for the Canadian Armed Forces

David Lambert

A more practical, organised, and logical concept and framework are needed to ensure that military forces of NATO and its member states can meet the Alliance's expectations in support of human security. NATO cannot be seen to usurp the concepts of human security for its own public image, nor should it be simply adding to the confusion.[1] As a doctrinal lead authority for its member states, NATO must create a model for human security that will allow clear lines of executive responsibility and authority, logical objectives in relation to strategic direction, and tangible tactical actions that can achieve the strategic objectives, all clearly articulated in doctrine, practised in training, and employed on operations. This will enable Canada to better formulate an appropriate human security framework for its own military force.

Situating Human Security in the Hierarchy

The first step in this process is to identify the place of human security in the hierarchy of military organisation and authorities. Militaries and coalitions like NATO function at three levels:

- the strategic level, which is that of governments and coalitions and includes military strategy. The latter dictates how and why military forces will be employed. It is the remit of a government or coalition, but advised by senior military commanders and staff;
- the operational level, which is that level at which campaigns and major operations are undertaken to achieve strategic objectives. Those authorities at this level ensure that tactical level capabilities and actions support or build towards the strategic level objectives and end state. This is a good part of the essence of what is termed the operational art. The other aspect of the operational art (which is often unrecognised) is the requirement for senior commanders to ensure that strategic authorities only set objectives that are achievable by the tactical capabilities;[2] and,
- the tactical level, which is the level at which activities, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. In the end, all plans must result in something at the tactical level, that is, an action or set of orchestrated actions of some sort.[3]

Although much of the NATO policies, news releases and publications briefly mention why human security is important to NATO, it should be better explained in strategic terms; that is, why is human security important to NATO and how can NATO and its member militaries support it?

In understanding the relationship between the military and human security, one must return to first principles. Military roles are often defined specifically in the context of *the defence of Canada*, but the unique role of military forces is the legitimate application of violence in support of strategic objectives.[4] Aside from this primary application of legitimate violence, military forces can use their inherent capabilities for a variety of actions or tactical undertakings that may have little or even nothing to do with violence, but simply occur in high-threat situations. A wider variety of tasks may be undertaken in fragile, threatening, and instable situations, often where other actors cannot operate. This is important to keep in mind as one looks at the interface of the military with human security and where the military is the only legitimate authority able to function. The establishment of a strategic condition where people feel secure, a condition of human security, is an expectation of the strategic authorities, hence its adoption by the UN. Furthermore, much of contemporary conflict is in fact based on strategic competition that relies on narratives and the gaining of strategic advantage.[5] Obviously, the actor that can build and support human security will have an advantage over its adversary, and this is of course nothing new to anyone who has studied counter-insurgency doctrine. As recent historical operational examples show, a military force's failure to not only counter an adversary but to protect civilians from collateral threats, shelter them from the actions of others, and to generally create a broader environment in which the civil populace is secure, is seen as a failure at all levels, but the strategic level in particular. It fails to meet legal and moral standards that are inherent on human security, particularly the Protection of Civilians (PoC), and fails to meet the expectations of nations and their populations.[6]

Beyond physical PoC, other immediate needs in human security have to be met such as access to humanitarian relief and basic needs, in order to meet expectations and even legal requirements. There will be an expectation to create the conditions for enduring stability, for the broader concept of human security requires civil stability and effective civil governance. Failure to use military capabilities to at least build towards such a situation will be seen as a failure at the strategic and operational levels and will undermine the strategic legitimacy of any

nation or coalition. Thus, in an immediate sense, active promotion of human security is a strategic concern for NATO and its members.

Critics and cynics will quickly claim that such emphasis on and efforts towards human security are nothing more than public-affairs opportunism and self-justification.[7] This is far from accurate. At the heart of any strategic undertaking and campaign will be perceptions of legitimacy.[8] Failure to support human security and at least take the most basic actions to protect the non-combatant civilians or, in the longer term, help set the conditions for building human security, will undermine the legitimacy of the commitment of military forces and in turn undermine popular support, by all affected audiences. Furthermore, it factors significantly into the narratives that are at the centre of competition and conflict between strategic authorities. Thus, it is vital that NATO and its member states have a practical model of human security that allows understanding at the strategic level, planning at the operational level, and execution at the tactical level.

Strategic Importance

If human security is of such strategic importance to NATO, a logical model must be built from top down. One should start with the higher concept and then build to the lower-level elements. In building a military concept and framework for human security there is no benefit in diverging from the accepted construct of human security that the UN has created. It will only create further confusion, disagreement, and disharmony with those other agencies in which the military is likely to engage in a theatre of operations, and who will certainly be seized by the issue of human security. As noted, then, human security in the UN consists of the three elements of freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity. It is clearly a strategic condition or objective to be created. In examining the UN concept and guidance for building human security, it is clearly a multi-agency effort, but it does recognise that the most immediate threats to a civil population sit within the realm of freedom from fear in that civilians require protection from violence and other immediate physical threats.[9] It is the freedom from fear condition where military forces can thus have a significant impact through the lens of PoC, using their inherent capabilities and ability to operate in high-threat environments. Thus, within a framework of human security, the primary focus for military forces will naturally be one of PoC.

What of the Cross-Cutting Topics?

The UN has not limited its model of human security to specific cross-cutting topics, although numerous resolutions concerning or related to elements of human security have been made by the UN which have been subsequently been adopted by NATO and have come to be identified as NATO human security cross-cutting topics.[10] Although the exact list of topics varies slightly with the NATO source, they have come to be generally grouped under an overarching topic of PoC.[11] Thus, the cross-cutting topics of countering conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), protection of children and armed conflict (CAAC), building integrity (BI), countering human trafficking (CHT), protection of cultural property (CPP), and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda have all been seen as components of the Protection of Civilians concept within NATO. These topics are not the only aspects of protection of civilians. In any conflict, civilians will be vulnerable and thus should be considered for protection as the situation demands. But as the cross-cutting topics indicate, certain groups will always require close consideration and specific actions.

In looking at these cross-cutting topics that currently constitute a significant part of PoC, the WPS agenda is something different and unique amongst them. All the cross-cutting topics less WPS are based on stated or implied transitive verbs. In other words, for military forces, they translate into actionable tactical tasks that can be planned and executed, alone or as part of a greater concept of operations. The WPS agenda is something else.

Based on the UNSCR 1325 and NATO's 2009 adoption of it[12] and eventual operationalisation of it, the WPS agenda within NATO consists of three distinct elements:

- gender equality, and specifically ensuring full participation of women in military commands, planning and operations;
- a gender perspective that is to be applied to all objectives and plans; and
- the countering of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV), both of which disproportionately affect women and girls.[13]

Yet, across the body of NATO-related policies and doctrine regarding human security and the WPS agenda, the focus has clearly been on creating gender equality and ensuring a gender perspective on all issues. Generally, the aspect of countering specific threats to women and girls has been met and blended with the cross-cutting topic of countering

7.1: Making friends with children in the field, Haiti.

Capt Shawn Courty, a Reserve Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Officer with the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment (2RCR), helps a young boy shoot the first basket on a basketball net that his team had just installed at a local orphanage in Port au Prince, June 21, 2004.

Source: MCpl Paul MacGregor OP HALO HAITI 2004 Canadian Forces Combat Camera © DND-MDN Canada, IS2004-6022a.

CRSV.[14] Even the NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security (SGSR WPS) in a 2020 interview focused on only those first two other aspects of the WPS agenda when discussing gender and human security.[15] This is in fact a logical development, given that CRSV is not limited to just women and girls and NATO forces must be aware of, and deal with, the issue irrespective of the victim's gender. For example, experiences from Afghanistan provide ample evidence that a vulnerable group other than women was the main target of sexual exploitation there.[16]

A Closer Look at Women, Peace and Security

One must ask what the relationship is between the WPS agenda and human security, particularly given the pervasive focus on gender perspectives and equality. The aspect of equal representation in structures and operations is a policy issue that is implemented throughout a system and is in fact applicable to many inequalities. Second, as noted, the aspect of sexual exploitation is covered by other cross-cutting topics. Hence, it is the emphasis on gender perspective that truly indicates the unique place of WPS. This gender perspective in fact raises WPS above the list of mere cross-cutting themes: it is something greater and more encompassing. It is in fact a lens through which all aspects of human security must be envisioned, planned, and executed. In other words, it provides a frame of reference or viewpoint that must be used to ensure planned objectives and related actions will create the desired human security-related situation, notably enduring stability and safety that is appropriate for all people including the unique aspects of women. WPS thus sits above and around the whole human security framework and concept, guiding and bounding the envisioning and building of human security, for human security will only be enduring if it ensures it is applicable to, and fully supportive of, women.

Hence, the perspective and equality aspects of WPS are removed from the list of cross-cutting topics, while the aspect of protecting women and girls from exploitation and sexual violence is naturally assumed by other cross-cutting themes and similar aspects of the overarching protection of civilians. It removes a gender silo and allows these security issues to be applied to men and women, girls, and boys as applicable.

Harmonisation

In building a logical human security framework, the existing variances in the list of cross-cutting topics need to be harmonised to include the various aspects of the PoC concept. Over time, lists have grown or changed to incorporate specific threats to civil stability found

in operational theatres. Specifically, cross-cutting topics have come to include in some references the countering of violent extremism (given its threats to civil stability) and building integrity, in terms of avoiding local corruption in military contracting and other aspects of civil cooperation.[17]

If there is a desire for the CAF to move towards a more integrated model of human security, observers note that there is much merit in retaining the sound model of PoC developed by NATO.[18] One has the three broad aspects within the PoC concept: mitigation of harm (MH); facilitation of access to basic needs (FABN); and contribution to a safe and secure environment (C-SASE). While focusing upon the direct protection of civilians, these three aspects of PoC also support the other major pillars of the UN human security model (freedom from want and freedom to live with dignity).

Under NATO's three elements of PoC (MH, FABN and C-SASE) may be placed the very tactical level cross-cutting topics, harmonised from various references, and written as stated or implied transitive verbs or gerunds (and thus easily translated to tactical tasks):

- protection of children affected by armed conflict (CAAC);
- countering modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT);
- building integrity and countering corruption (BI);
- protection of cultural property (CPP);
- preventing and countering violent extremism (CVE);
- countering and protecting against conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV); and,
- countering and protecting against sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).

Clearly, the list of cross-cutting topics to be actioned will vary with each operating environment encountered by NATO forces. The key issue for operational and tactical understanding is the overall remit to do what is required to protect civilians in a broad sense to include the basic needs for survival, and at least contribute within capabilities to a secure environment and enduring stability.

With this hierarchy of human security and the related elements established, one can exploit the positive work already developed in NATO and establish a new, and clearly nested model for human security that results in tangible tasks for military forces. It may be summarised as follows:

- Human security is an issue that applies across the spectrum of conflict and sits at the highest level. It has a broad remit of

three facets as developed under the UN (freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity).

- The focus for NATO and military forces on PoC most properly sits under the freedom from fear aspect of human security, for it exploits military capabilities to remove, pre-empt or mitigate the most immediate threats to a civil population, and includes the requirement for all efforts to be made to avoid negative effects of military operations on the civil populace and to protect it from threats by others. Realising that military forces are limited in their ability to build all aspects of human security, but must seek to set the conditions for it, the protection of civilians covers three aspects as articulated in the relevant NATO handbook: mitigate harm, facilitate basic needs, and contribute to overall security and stability (see Chapter 6).

- The various cross-cutting themes identified by NATO and other sources as elements of human security are best placed as components of the PoC concept. These in turn become tangible actions that can be executed by capabilities, be they military, police, or some other authority.

- The WPS topic is removed from the other cross-cutting topics and given the prominence and ubiquity that it deserves – its gender perspective aspect becomes the context or lens through which all elements of human security are envisioned and a principle by which human security is actioned, while its focus on countering sexual violence is covered by the related cross-cutting topics.

A Model of Human Security

With this construct in mind, a framework for human security is presented in Figure 7.1 and indicates a logical and harmonised construct of the elements of human security that reflects both UN and NATO requirements. Furthermore, it gives the WPS agenda its proper place as a guiding principle through which human security is envisioned and implemented. Although the PoC aspect clearly supports the freedom from fear pillar, in that it counters direct, violent threats to individuals and groups, the other aspects of the NATO model for protection of civilians – meeting basic needs and building a safe and secure environment – set conditions for, or build towards, the other two main pillars in the UN model, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity.

Figure 7.1: A Framework for Human Security.

With this logical construct for human security, one may now apply military capabilities and limitations to it, to ascertain the most suitable role for military forces in supporting human security at all three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. As will be outlined in the following chapters, we may consider how military planners, decision makers, and operators may routinely conceptualise human security as a normal part of day-to-day business at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, leading to a fuller appreciation of early warning mechanisms and threats leading to destabilisation. The above harmonised model will allow NATO and national planners and commanders to better visualise human security and its place within their operations and the strategic objectives. In so doing, a human security approach could ultimately reduce harm to civilians and human rights' violations and maintain the legitimacy of the force.[19] How might this be applied in relation to the

CAF and other military forces? The next chapter offers some specific examples at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to further interrogate military planning and action with the goal of harmonising with a human security approach.

Chapter 7 Key Concepts

- A more practical, organised, and logical concept and framework are needed to ensure that military forces of NATO and its member states can meet the Alliance's expectations in support of human security.
- Active promotion of human security is a strategic concern for NATO and its members. A military force will be more successful at all levels, and particularly strategic, if it can counter an adversary *and* protect civilians from collateral threats, shelter them from the actions of others, and create a broader environment in which the civil populace is secure.
- Within a framework of human security, the primary focus for military forces will naturally be one of protection of civilians.
- WPS is not a cross-cutting theme for NATO: it sits above and around the whole human security framework and concept, guiding and bounding the envisioning and building of human security, for human security will only be enduring if it ensures it is applicable to, and fully supportive of, women.
- Human security is an issue that applies across the spectrum of conflict and sits at the highest level. It has a broad remit of three facets as developed under the UN (freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity).
- The focus for NATO and military forces on Protection of Civilians most properly sits under the freedom from fear aspect of human security, for it exploits military capabilities to remove, pre-empt or mitigate the most immediate threats to a civil population, and includes the requirement for all efforts to be made to avoid negative effects of military operations on the civil populace and to protect it from threats by others.

- Realising that military forces are limited in their ability to build all aspects of human security, but must seek to set the conditions for it, the protection of civilians covers three aspects as articulated in the relevant NATO handbook: mitigate harm, facilitate basic needs, and contribute to overall security and stability.
- The various cross-cutting themes identified by NATO and other sources as elements of human security, are best placed as components of the Protection of Civilians concept. These in turn become tangible actions that can be executed by capabilities, be they military, police, or some other authority.
- The WPS topic is removed from the other cross-cutting topics and given the prominence and ubiquity that it deserves – a gender perspective is the context or lens through which all elements of human security are envisioned and a principle by which human security is actioned, while its focus on countering sexual violence is covered by the related cross-cutting topics.

Notes

1 Richard Reeve, "NATO and Human Security: Obfuscation and Opportunity," NATO Watch (February 2021): 9-12. https://natowatch.org/sites/default/files/2021-02/peace_research_perspectives_on_nato_2030.pdf.

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15   Carbery, "Interview with Clare Hutchinson, NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security."

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Chapter 8: Challenges in Applying Human Security at the Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Levels

Rachel Grimes

Military planners face a conceptual challenge as they are being asked "to think about international security as something more than the military defense of state interests and territory."[1] They are requested to apply a mind-set that is alien to their education and, to many, is viewed as *soft* power which detracts from *hard* warfare.[2] Although much is made about the flexibility and adaptation of militaries to wield tools of soft power, it is the threat of, or direct application of, force which is most exercised by armed forces. In response to Condoleezza Rice's remark that the 82nd Airborne was not in the business of "taking kids to kindergarten", General Klaus Reinhardt, former commander of the Kosovo Force, has suggested that "it is the business of the military to escort children to school, if that makes people in conflict situations more secure."[3] It takes considerable time to develop any changes into military strategy, doctrine and tactics, and even longer for units in the field to adopt them as ingrained operational principles and techniques.[4] As traditional ideas die hard in the military, it will take time before military planners reflexively consider a population-centric approach and even longer before they use sex and age disaggregated analysis models to improve operational campaigns in the broader context of human security.

An additional mental challenge may be the proclivity for military staff to associate human security with peacekeeping operations only, as something to be done to the *other*. But with armed conflict raging in Europe at the time of writing, it is possible that the NATO Alliance might be involved in operations within a NATO member state and will have to ensure human security within the alliance.[5]

Research is nascent on human security in the domains of space and cyber and the responsibility of the military to protect civilians from digital harm. While this chapter agrees that "cyber security is entwined with human security"[6] as it is in the Maritime and Air domain, the focus of this chapter is within the Land component, noting it is military personnel deployed amongst populations who have the greatest opportunity to implement the women, peace, and human security related policies. The institutionalisation of human security into the DNA of deployed personnel requires a formal cascading of direction

from the strategic through to the tactical level with clear direction on how different functions and staff in the military can implement human security in support of national objectives. While this requires better alignment between GAC and DND, this chapter argues that, above all else, there is a requirement for a formalised chain of command bridging WPS and human security within the CAF. This would form a third-generation human security building on the earlier work of Mary Kaldor and Christine Chinkin.[7]

Through mapping the different inferences of human security to the military strategic, operational, and tactical levels, this chapter describes how CAF is currently applying a human security perspective and suggest how this can be enhanced with some practical recommendations. The chapter will highlight that human security can be applied to domestic operations and is not just something Western militaries "do" to others in out-of-area missions. NATO's seven benchmarks on resilience will be used as a case to consider how human security could be applied to an operation in a NATO European Member State.[8] For the purpose of this chapter the military strategic level will focus on how CAF supports Canadian national policy and its international long-term objectives, the operational level will be looked at using the Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, and Personnel model (DOTmLP)[9] and the tactical level will be focus on the physical execution of plans.[10]

"We're Already Doing This"

In considering a human security approach, military personnel may note similarities with the Comprehensive Approach, the whole of government approach and the Civil-Military Cooperation "Joint 9" function. Legal Advisors will also see elements of International Human Rights Law in third-generation human security. For those who equate human security and the WPS agenda with International Humanitarian Law and Rules of Engagement, they may perceive human security as the emperor's new clothes. The Gender Advisor would be correct to recognise that the human security approach overlaps with their own job description. As Vincent Curtis suggests, even though a task is not explicitly labelled as human security, this does not mean that human security is not being done.[11] Stability operations, "three block warfare"[12] and even "clear, hold and build" have been described as being, or including, human security. This mutates into the conviction that human security is already being "done" in an institutionalised manner.

Human Security – Ends, Ways or Means?

Perhaps the most testing aspect of human security for any military planner is to understand what the term means. As fully articulated in Part I of this volume, human security means different things to different people,[13] fora, and organisations. Invariably it is referred to as an approach,[14] a set of principles,[15] a component,[16] a condition,[17] a regime, or an agenda.[18] It can be considered in three ways: human security can be an *ends* or an objective at the strategic level, a *way* or an approach at the operational level, and a *means* or how human security is performed at the tactical level.

Table 8.1: Evolution of military contribution to human security.[19]

Generation	Events	Observations
1st Generation Human Security	**1989 onwards**—Cold War *dividend* creating a rejection of state-centric security, nascent norms on liberal politics develop. NATO non-Article 5 military operations in the Balkans—evolving civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).	Basic shift from security of the state to awareness of insecurity of populations within states. International Humanitarian Law the mainstay for military operations.
2nd Generation Human Security	**1994 onwards**—Obligation to protect civilians raised, ink with development and acknowledgement that in the absence of an inter-state war, civilians are still at risk of harm. NATO members operate with the UN in Rwanda and Sierra Leone. They return to their nations with a more sophisticated analysis of the impact of conflict on civilians[20] and broader expectations for the military role in contributing to human security.	Protecting populations forming normative discourse, Responsibility to Protect is introduced at the political level. Shift to International Human Rights Law but human security as an approach still lacking a gendered perspective. NATO operations within a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) context–seeking to gain the consent of the population. Beginning to consider.
3rd Generation Security	**Required for ongoing and future operations.** NATO establishment of a Human Security Unit, more emphasis on sex and age disaggregated data. Flurry of NATO policies concerning the security of women, men, girls, and boys. Acceptance that the global North also faces insecurities. Policy implementation yet to be tested and will require a " cosmopolitan military".[21]	The Women, Peace and Security agenda shapes how civilians are included in future military planning and conduct of operations. Emphasis on engagement with Civil Society. Military willingness to move beyond International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and seek to protect women, men, girls, and boys from criminal threats such as human trafficking as well as conflict-related sexual violence and the 6 Grave Violations against children. Military policy more integrated with Foreign Affairs policies. The training of military personnel is expanded to consider specific threats to civilians.

Military organisations would enrich their approach to any operation, including conventional warfare focusing on state and territorial integrity, if third-generation human security,[22] predicated on a gender perspective (or "Women, Peace and Human Security"), was institutionalised. This perspective would have military staff analyse threats to civilians with the data refined and disaggregated in terms of age and gender/sex. This builds on the evolution of the military contribution to human security over two generations of military operations, see Table 8.1.

Combining the human security agenda with the Women, Peace and Security agenda, which acknowledges the importance of women's participation in achieving peaceful outcomes, preventing conflict, and protecting women and girls from conflict-related sexual violence, would create a more inclusive terminology. This encourages all staff to consider how civilians are impacted by conflict in their military roles. Such an approach would see a senior officer held accountable for alignment between military operations and Global Affairs Canada (GAC) objectives to strengthen national policy goals. These policy norms would be cascaded to each level of military planning and operations. The Department of National Defence (DND) would host regular meetings with I/NGOs, Civil Society and the diaspora representing the operational area of responsibility to ensure a wider understanding of the context.[23] Formalising a bottom-up approach would lead to a more sophisticated population-centric perspective: operational and tactical level HQs would consistently meet with I/NGOs, Civil Society, and local communities to consider various aspects of human security and factors leading to insecurity. Women, youth, and other underrepresented groups would be formally invited to participate in unclassified planning meetings. Ground-level perspectives and suggestions from the community would then be fed to the strategic level to inform decision making and planning. This would represent best practice for the human security approach.

Absence of a human security definition can be viewed as an opportunity, not a weakness. The CAF can perhaps savour the dismissive analogy made by Keith Krause that human security is "nothing more than a shopping list; it involves labelling as threats to human security a wide range of issues that have no necessary link to each other,"[24] and instead take the opportunity to "tick off" items from The Shopping List using a gendered lens, as shown in Table 8.1. Reflecting on CAF's military overseas operations and circumstances where they assisted other governmental departments in domestic responses to COVID-19, floods, and fires, CAF is already contributing to human security.

Furthermore, the nexus between "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want" would suggest that, for the military, this is not an either/or choice as unemployment and poverty are drivers of conflict and insecurity.[25]

Table 8.2: Human Security Shopping List.

1941: Franklin Roosevelt's 4 Freedoms (worship, speech, want, fear)		1948: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt	1994: UNDP 7 Securities	2005: UN World Summit	2003: Commission on Human Security	2018: NATO Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security & Human Security Unit Policy Areas
Freedom from Indignity	Freedom from Fear	30 Articles including: All born free & equal A right to life, liberty and security of person Freedom from torture Freedom from slavery No unfair detainment Freedom to move Right to protest and gather as a group Responsibility to protect the freedoms and rights of others	Physical security Community security Political security	Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	The freedom to live in dignity respecting the basic principles of democracy, rule of law and human rights and freedoms	Women, Peace & Security Participation of women, prevention from harm, protection from conflict related sexual violence Children and Armed Conflict Recognise and respond to the 6 Grave Violations Against Children Countering Trafficking of Human Beings Protection of Civilians Cultural Property Protection
	Freedom from Want	Right to food & shelter Right to own property Right to education Right to marry who you want	Economic security Food security Health security Environmental security		Protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment	

The application of third-generation women, peace and human security expands upon the request of Chinkin and Kaldor for military personnel to think and act more like international police officers.[26] It uses the 3P's (Participation, Prevention and Protection) and 2Rs (Relief and Recovery) of UNSCR1325 as a foundation. The participation of women (which includes increasing the number of women in uniform and increasing engagement with women affected by crisis) will be central to expanding engagement and interaction with often overlooked groups. The prevention of conflict and protection from conflict related sexual violence,[27] and relief and recovery measures (e.g., responding to refugees or considering how to sustain efforts supporting women, men, girls, and boys when a mission leaving an area) will be given equal consideration with neutralising adversaries and own force protection.

Third-generation Women, Peace, and Human Security will develop CAF's evolution into an organisation capable of providing additional focus on civilians within traditional physical settings and being adaptive enough to contribute to developmental insecurities.

Applying Human Security at the Strategic Level

"Do as I say, not as I do"

> It is commonly acknowledged that human security has policy relevance. Many would even concede that, with the banning of landmines and the establishment of an International Criminal Court, it has policy impact.[28]

Historically, Canada has been closely associated with human security. Lloyd Axworthy connected the foreign policy objectives of human security with overseas military operations, justifying them as contributing to national security.[29] This trend was fortified by counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism operations where the root causes of poverty and unemployment were seen as drivers for the recruitment of the likes of the Taliban and ISIS. The attachment between freedom from want and freedom from fear has been a central tenet in the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada department – now GAC – outlook and, to a lesser extent, the Department of National Defence (DND). There has been no shortage of politicians or commentators pushing Canada's human security credentials. In 2003, during the annual Couchling Institute on Public Affairs talks, Bill Graham, a former Minister of Defence, endorsed human security as encapsulating both freedom from fear and freedom from want, declaring that Canada's "current human security approach emphasises five priorities: 'Public safety, the protection of civilians, conflict prevention, governance and

accountability, and peace support operations.'"[30] The following section explores how GAC and DND, by publicly sharing similar human security goals at the strategic level, could enhance the operational level approach to conflict and crisis leading to more sophisticated tactics.

Canada's international and political leadership on human security at the grand strategic level is without doubt. Its role as a norm entrepreneur within the realms of banning landmines and establishing the concept of Responsibility to Protect[31] demonstrates how Canada exemplifies a nation earnest about achieving human security through its work in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council. Canada and Norway jointly established the Human Security Network in 1998 further moving the focus onto the security of individuals.[32] Its military has contributed to various humanitarian missions (Bosnia, Haiti), R2P operations (Kosovo, Libya), and peacekeeping missions (Congo, South Sudan, Mali). Norms on Children and Armed Conflict and WPS have been disseminated globally and Canada leads the UN Group of Friends on both thematic areas in New York. Its contribution to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict adopted by the General Assembly in 2000 and various UNSCRs seeking to prevent violations against children demonstrate consistent commitment. Canada also puts its money where its mouth is, establishing the Dallaire Centre of Excellence for Peace and Security in 2020 and announcing it will host a NATO Centre of Excellence on Climate in 2022. Canada published its first National Action Plan on WPS in 2010, and, in 2017, introduced the Vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers (VP), which take a more robust position on preventing child soldiers. In 2017, Canada also launched the Elsie Initiative which is based on the premise that increased meaningful participation of women peacekeepers will enhance the operational effectiveness of the UN through increasing engagement with women in local communities. This simultaneously gives servicewomen the same opportunities as their male colleagues.

At the strategic level, Canada has overwhelmingly embraced the shopping list of human security. Yet, harnessing different government departments toward common goals "proves problematic unless all the organisations already possess similar goals when working toward a common goal."[33] A lack of a comprehensive whole-of-government approach, while not the focus of this chapter, can be seen as influencing the human security solution space confronted by the CAF.

The Velvet Glove

Externally, Canada is addressing the *freedom from want* component of human security while linking its work to preventing *freedom from fear* drivers through a gendered lens.[34] Canada's Feminist Foreign Affairs Policy (2017) and Feminist International Assistance Policy (2021), both based on the premise that "all people should enjoy the same human rights and opportunities to succeed,"[35] is woven into all aspects of the government's work. Canada "will continue to address humanitarian crises and support countries at risk of natural disasters and climate change while applying its feminist approach."[36] Through "providing international assistance to promote human rights, gender equality and the rule of law," GAC sees Canada as "contributing to inclusive economic development; advancing conflict resolution, stabilisation and humanitarian efforts; supporting democracy; and working to counter terrorism and violent extremism."[37]

While the Global Affairs Canada Departmental Plan does not mention the exact phrase *human security*, each page contributes to the shopping list in Table 8.1, eradicating poverty, encouraging economic growth, supporting nascent democracies, promoting human rights, supporting health facilities (especially reproductive health), mitigating the impact of climate change, preventing conflict, and protecting communities and individuals through engagement with Civil Society. Human security is a strategic end state for GAC. In light of the many pages in GAC's plan devoted to explaining how GAC engages with other partners, the absence of any engagement with DND is puzzling and perhaps undermines the principled plan. Within 79 pages, the Canadian Armed Forces is referred to only twice, as indicators of measuring how effective Canada is in projecting itself beyond its borders.[38]

The Iron Hand

DND's *Departmental Plan* (2020–2021) and *Strong, Secure and Engaged: Canada's Defence Policy* (2017) do not use the exact phrase *human security*.[39] They do however highlight how CAF is contributing to "a more stable, peaceful world, including through peace support operations and peacekeeping, addressing the threat of terrorism and the actions of violent extremists" and is "bolstering its ability to respond to severe natural disasters at home and abroad."[40] The core mission of the CAF infers that, at the strategic level, the forces prepare to respond to multiple threats to human insecurity:

> Detecting, deterring and defending against threats to Canada and North America; providing assistance to civil authorities/law

enforcement in support of national security; assisting and in some cases leading forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), coalition and United Nations peace operations; contributing to global stability and security, as well as engaging in capacity building; responding to domestic and international disasters; and conducting search and rescue operations.[41]

Strong Secure and Engaged (SSE) goes on to make clear linkages between freedom from want and freedom from fear positioning CAF's deep involvement in human security:

> We live in a time when economic growth has lifted billions from poverty but fragile and conflict-affected states have been excluded from many of these gains and economic inequality is rising which has brought with it rising instability. Canada is not immune from these concerns, and we must be part of the solution.[42]

SSE's overt explanation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda and CAF's introduction of the Gender Based Analysis Plus (GBA Plus) programme into military planning and operations is impressive and possibly a first for any Defence policy. GBA Plus directs the Defence Team to recognise that "conflict, natural disasters, and humanitarian crises affect people differently" and that, accordingly, the Defence Team must integrate GBA Plus into the planning and execution of operations "as a means to both improve operational effectiveness and meet the needs of those who are disproportionately affected by conflict and crisis."[43] This direction supports a third-generation human security approach and parallels GAC's strategic aims.

Hand in Glove?

Sarah Sewell noted the importance of governmental departments being closely aligned to see effect on the ground:

> It's become vogue to cite a lack of interagency cooperation and civilian capacity in Iraq and beyond, yet the prior failing is conceptual. It's difficult to codify process or build capacity in the absence of a universal doctrinal framework. Even the extant military doctrine is on shaky ground when broader governmental assumptions, principles and requirements remain unknown or ad hoc.[44]

On twelve occasions the DND Departmental Plan refers to areas of work where it supports GAC objectives. SSE postures that:

> Canada… has the capacity to help those who live under the threat of violence [and be] a force for stability in the world…. [using] whole-of-government coordination– military capabilities working hand in hand with diplomacy and development.[45]

Similarly, SSE and the DND Plan both vocalise the importance of engaging with I/NGOs and Civil Society – a key attribute within third-generation human security. SSE notes that "while states remain the most important entities, a diverse range of non-state actors add complexity to the operating environment and can change the scope and nature of military operations." Furthermore, SSE highlights the operational impact that non-state actors can have and the importance of including them in dialogue.

> NGOs, philanthropic foundations, and religious communities can play positive roles that promote peace and address the needs of vulnerable populations. States must learn to better partner with and leverage the benefits NGOs can bring to international affairs.[46]

8.1: Aeromedical evacuation, Mali.

Members of Operation PRESENCE-Mali conduct their eleventh aeromedical evacuation mission, treating two civilian contractors involved in an IED attack before transferring the casualties to a MINUSMA Role 2 hospital in Gao, near Camp Castor on August 16, 2019.

Source: Corporal Richard Lessard Task Force-Mali Canadian Forces Combat Camera © DND-MDN Canada, TM03-2019-0007-002.

As a result of recent counterinsurgency operations, government departments are developing collaborative working relationships and the observation by Curtis that "coordination of policy between two government departments is in the first instance the responsibility of the cabinet and especially of the prime minister"[47] is too draconian, there are several examples of DND and GAC working together. To achieve third-generation women, peace, and human security however GAC and DND may wish to consider joint planning teams, regular working groups which include I/NGOs and civilians. Although this will impact on the classification of meetings it will provide a broader contextual understanding of threats and solutions. Junior military personnel will benefit from meeting GAC staff and *vice versa* to enhance this joined up approach and develop their cross-government education.

Chief of Defence Staff Directives – the Conduit to Applying Human Security in the Military

The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Directive is the document which generates operational planning. It is unclear if the CDS Directives on Operations NABERIUS (Niger), KOBOLD (Kosovo) or PRESENCE (Mali) provide a human terrain picture that emphasises the level of conflict-related sexual violence and the recruitment of child soldiers in Niger and Mali or the prevalence of human trafficking both of women and girls for the sex trade and also of boys and young men for the illegal labour market. Guidance for subordinate commands on what the strategic cross-government approach is to these mission areas would guarantee more sophisticated planning at the operational level. The following questions might be asked:

- Is Canada working with the UN Special Representative on Preventing Conflict Related Sexual Violence?
- Does Canada have a memorandum of understanding with the International Criminal Police Organisation or the UN Office for Drugs and Crime?
- Are CDS Directives drafted with GAC subject matter expertise and the opinions of civilians from the countries CAF will deploy to?

Although the SSE states that the CAF "employs either a full-time Gender Advisor, or a part-time Gender Focal Point to assist commanders in applying gender perspectives within their operating environment" for each named operation,[48] it is difficult to establish if the strategic directives include a gender perspective or provide guidance

for subordinate commands such as the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) on human security objectives.

As threats to civilians in Canada and overseas become more complex and hybrid in nature, "it will become imperative that the organizations representing the instruments of national power share similar goals referenced through a common operational language."[49] Institutionalised cross-government liaison and a consistent bottom-up approach involving engagement with Civil Society and members of the Diaspora from CAF areas of operation would enhance situational awareness at all levels.

The military strategic level within third-generation women, peace and human security would have goals consistent with the desired national policy, draft directives and orders with cross-government staff and consult with civilians, it would prepare the way for its personnel to support aspects of law enforcement, (as it did in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan), have medical and police staff trained and prepared to respond to survivors of conflict related sexual violence, which would include being able to gather evidence in the absence of local staff or I/NGOs, and create a network of organisations present in Canada but operating in the field.

Applying Human Security
at the Operational Level: What Good Looks Like

At the strategic level, GAC has clear objectives relating to human security. Although DND's list of current operations does not explicitly refer to human security, there is reference to applying a gender perspective, engaging with I/NGOs and Civil Society, and contributing to security beyond the application of force. What is not clear is how these aspects are institutionalised and/or personality driven. This section uses NATO's conceptualisation of human security while looking at the operational context. By using the DOTmLP model, this section identifies where the NATO policies on CAAC, CHTP, PoC and CPP could be institutionalised at the operational level, shown in Table 8.3. Of note, NATO policy on preventing and responding to CRSV was published in 2020. It sits within NATO's approach to human security as a stand-alone policy and part of the stand-alone policy within POC and is also a component of the WPS agenda. This thematic section will thus concentrate on the other NATO human security cross-cutting themes.

International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and the Rules of Engagement (RoE) are embedded in CAF through the Legal Advisor. The WPS agenda is nominally mainstreamed across CAF by the Gender Advisor

network. Topics which tend to fall by the wayside and lack a spiritual home are CAAC, Combatting Trafficking of Human Beings, PoC, and CPP. CPP, which looks at protecting cultural heritage, buildings, and artefacts from our own and others' actions, would be well placed in the Joint Fires and Targeting Cell. Rather than employing staff unfamiliar with the collateral damage estimate, etc, extending the education of *targeteer* staff officers would be more efficient and keep the topic of CPP in the J3/5 planning area.

Table 8.3: NATO Human Security Unit Policy Area Responsibilities.

Countering Human Trafficking[50] in Persons (2004)	Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict (2016)	Protection of Civilians Policy (2016)	Cultural Property Protection
Internally focused – linking the presence of peacekeepers and other militaries to the increase of human trafficking; Encouraging Member States to sign up to national obligations to the UN Conventions and its Protocol.	NATO personnel are to recognise the 6 Grave Violations against children; NATO personnel to know how to refer and report instances of the 6 Grave Violations using the Monitor and Reporting Mechanism.	Applied across multiple military functions; understand the human environment; mitigate harm (from NATO's own actions – IHL/RoE, collateral damage) and the actions of others (CRSV, human trafficking, human rights violations); facilitate access to basic needs; contribute to a safe and secure environment.	NATO will: protect and support cultural property and services in its AOR; Protect cultural property and services until the security situation improves and responsibility is handed over to the responsible entity.[51]

To achieve third-generation WPHS, the NATO policy points above should be included to enhance the following doctrinal publications:

- Joint Intelligence – this doctrine is vital for informing the Commander about threats women, men, girls, and boys could face in their Area of Responsibility (AoR); directing patrols to be mixed (women and men) and to engage with women in the AOR as well as men. This can be presented to the Force as a method of enhancing situational awareness as well as matching the national Feminist Foreign Affairs Policy. There is a tendency to only engage with male leaders which can lead to a one-sided intelligence picture.
- Joint Operations / Joint Operations and Plans – these publications should bring together all the J functions and describe how they could support the NATO polices. Early

warning indicators of threats to civilians would be given the equivalent attention as the adversary which might lead to different plans. A civilian risk assessment should be conducted simultaneously to analysing the adversary. The question should be asked "if we can't protect the civilians then why are we here?"

Urban Warfare and Human Security Doctrine

Acknowledgement that conventional and hybrid battles are now contested in the urban environment will position human security as a central component to any doctrine linked to multidomain operations and urban warfare: "Populations reside in the land domain, and thus land forces are key to engaging with and protecting them through physical presence."[52] IHL and RoE should be used as a springboard and not a ceiling when planning and conducting urban operations.

> Command accountability—at all levels—is necessary to ensure consequence assessment and legal obligations. Engineers; geospatial mapping specialists (employing visualisation and GeoINT); as well as embedded urban operations specialists to provide expert analysis of population movement, critical infrastructure and lifelines, medical facilities and capabilities, and civil defense capacity (including urban search and rescue and firefighting resources) are needed to assess conditions and evaluate potential courses of action. This includes prioritising humanitarian precautions during sieges, evacuations, and urban warfare in general.[53]

Supporting Joint doctrine such as Joint Domestic Ops/ Expeditionary Ops and Special Ops could also benefit from understanding the different ways civilians experience conflict and crisis. All doctrinal publications would institutionally incorporate third-generation women, peace and human security using sex and age disaggregated data to inform the human terrain analysis while the empowerment of the local population to contribute ideas and opinions on how best to achieve security would provide a wider perspective and reduce group-think.[54] To a military reader this may sound idealistic,[55] but civilian communities understand threats better than anyone and can provide a 360-degree perspective on situations. Doctrine should not be written in isolation of external subject matter experts from across government or the I/NGO community. Specific Land component doctrine, for example Urban Warfare, would be more sophisticated if it took as its premise the protection of civilians as opposed to the neutralisation of the adversary, noting that civilians mainly live in urban areas.[56]

Organisation

By resourcing Gender Advisors and Gender Focal Points, CAF is in a strong position to see operations and plans mainstream the threats facing women, men, girls, and boys. This is a heavy burden of work for one individual to ensure that CAAC, human trafficking and PoC elements are the responsibility of this one post. There is merit in expanding the Gender Advisor's team both at the strategic and operational levels – perhaps creating a Women, Peace, and Human Security Office? This may assist in the institutionalisation of human security related policies.

Training

If exercises are not designed with human security objectives or scenarios, then the audience being exercised will never be tested to think about wider aspects of security. Almost all exercises have the obligatory *humanitarian assistance* scenario where staff consider how to support a convoy of food/or maintain a corridor for people, but it is rare to find an exercise that asks a Commander how to respond to evidence of CRSV or the possibility that child soldiers are in the military that CAF is mentoring. To gain this additional perspective, it would be useful to include I/NGOs in the development of exercises and conduct joint military planning exercises with them. This could enable mid-level staff officers to develop their understanding of the I/NGO community.

Materiel

Logistical supplies are vital for civilians in crisis, in peacetime military engagements, and also in warfighting scenarios. In addition to the routine necessities of water and food, logistic planners should consider also sending specific items for women and babies. This is nothing new – during the Second World War nutritionists designed calorific food specifically for these particular groups. Nappies/diapers and hygiene products are also overlooked when preparing supplies for civilians in crisis.[57]

Leadership

Until an understanding of human security is embedded in the DNA of a military, its application will be reliant on senior officers being held accountable for making it happen. Norm entrepreneurs at junior ranks will always seek to make change but, for institutionalisation to take place, senior officers need to be aware of the different policies and hold their own staff to account to implement these. Leaders may benefit from participating in a Human Security Mentoring programme where either Gender Advisors, SMEs from across-government or I/NGOs meet

senior staff and together identify how and where they could include human security in their activities. Olsson and Bjorsson observed the Gender Force Coaching Programme developed in Sweden:

> For about twelve months, the program provides senior leaders with access to a personal [WPS] coach and participants take part in a series of [WPS] seminars. Finally, participants formulate an individual development plan [for their] the organization. The aim is to … enhance the leaders' [ability to introduce] change and to make more effective use of their gender experts.[58]

Personnel and Education

In third-generation Women, Peace. and Human Security actions, CAF could have a through-life education on Women, Peace, and Security, annual refresher training and interaction with IOs and NGOs to prevent group-think. The employment models of reservists in the United States and the United Kingdom may also offer options for CAF to better integrate a human security perspective throughout the force. Jockel and Sokolsky suggest that the "US military is better suited to promote a human security agenda because it can draw upon the non-military skills of its large reserve forces, who bring to any operation specialties in a wide variety of civil-support functions."[59] Human security is not an *officer-only* activity. Training the Senior and Non-Commissioned Officer ranks is vital to see human security successfully implemented on the ground, domestically and internationally.

Applying Human Security at the Tactical Level: What Good Looks Like

Deployed military personnel acting in the Land component have the biggest influence applying women, peace, and human security to their operations. Yes, the Air component can provide *no-fly-zones* contributing to the protection of civilians, the Royal Canadian Navy has supported refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean.[60] However, overwhelmingly, human security will be applied by the *boots on the ground*. Increased urbanisation and the rise of mega-cities in parallel with warfare being contested in urban environments means that civilians and military personnel will continue to share the same space.

At the tactical level, it is apparent that CAF personnel already implement a human security lens through various actions that contribute to enhancing the security of women, men, girls, and boys: compliance with the Geneva Conventions, IHL, and Rules of Engagement; civil-military cooperation; key leader engagement; and crisis response. While the author has confidence that the majority of CAF personnel would

respond to human rights violations such as child soldiers, victims of human trafficking, or survivors of CRSV, the absence of this in-depth aspect of human security in military doctrine and training is a weakness. If a human security approach is not institutionalised in CAF or other NATO Armed Forces, women, peace, and human security will be overlooked or treated as an add-on at best when conducting capacity building, mentoring, and Security Sector Reform.[61]

During COIN operations, winning hearts and minds through engineering projects and medical outreach programmes became second nature. Such examples would support third-generation women, peace, and human security if they were conducted in partnership with local communities and had a longer-term impact, rather than as a way of gaining tolerance from the local community.[62] The concept of courageous restraint, introduced by General McChrystal in 2010, is another example of military personnel at the tactical level considering human security. The General demanded that soldiers deployed in Afghanistan considered what the consequences would be of applying the use of force or of restraining to use force if the outcome of kinetic operations would harm civilians.[63] In short, he required military personnel to consider second-, third-, and fourth-order effects to actions, demanding deeper thinking to support decision making.

The NATO policies within the Human Security Unit can be applied in any spectrum of conflict from Peacetime Military Engagements (PME), Peace Support Operations, Counterinsurgency, to major warfare. The policies encourage personnel to use IHL as a foundation for providing human security. At the tactical level, third-generation women, peace, and human security would see the following actions being carried out in support of national objectives:

- Recognise human rights violations (including the 6 Grave Violations, instances of human trafficking or CRSV);
- Know how to respond appropriately without creating further harm or trauma;
- Know who to refer victims to (e.g., UN agencies or NGOs);
- Know that there are UN mechanisms that seek to end impunity of child abuse and CRSV (the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism and the Monitoring Analysis and Reporting Arrangements) and know how to pass information on to HQ for them to forward:
- Deploy in mixed teams and when possible, with police or trained civilians;

- Identify unit/patrol personnel to establish and foster links with local I/NGOs (ideally networking with them before arriving in theatre);
- Conduct key leader engagement and other less formal engagements which include women as well as men.
- Be prepared and resourced to repair vital infrastructure (damaged by NATO troops or adversary combatants);
- Clear/mark minefields that prevent access to hospitals/markets/schools;
- Train medics and military police to respond to survivors and if necessary, collect evidence to support future prosecutions.
- Be prepared to protect cultural property and services.

The application of human security is easiest to talk about at the strategic level and most complex to enact at the tactical level. Yet credibility to strategic aspirations and pronouncements will be gained through tactical actions. The Land component remains the key interlocutor between the military and the civilian population. With some minor additions to training and genuine leadership in this area, CAF, at the tactical level, could create something that looks like "a [team] of all-round 'human security workers', each of whom is capable of carrying out both protection-from-fear and protection- from-want tasks.[64] Any interface to civilian populations in conflict or crisis will benefit from third-generation human security being embedded in their DNA. A women, peace, and human security lens is vital for enhancing operational effectiveness and maintaining a moral and ethical position. Applying human security is what distinguishes NATO allies from autocratic states. As stated in the NATO human security approach:

> The notion of human security directly links NATO's common values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law to NATO practice. A human security approach provides a heightened understanding of conflict and crisis.[65]

The tactical application of women, peace and human security is also necessary when responding to domestic crisis, as is articulated in the examples within this volume.

Conclusion

In some ways, this chapter has been at odds with human security scholars such as Edward Newman and Roland Paris in that it posits the state has to be involved in the security of individuals.[66] There is no Cold War dividend whereby the individual trumps the state. Instead, and in line with Mary Kaldor, the paper agrees that the military needs to look

different.[67] The state needs to have a covenant to protect both its own citizens and other nations' civilians, and the military has a key role in this. While Galtung would argue that human security has been entirely absorbed and emasculated by the state security concept it was designed to contest,[68] this chapter has proposed measures the military can take to be more human-centric in its application.

This chapter also noted the various interpretations of human security and mapped the relationship between the freedom from fear and freedom from want dimensions of security. Exploiting the absence of any formal definition of human security led to the proposal that the military, especially the CAF, are capable of addressing both security and development aspects of human security. Combining the *freedoms* with NATO's umbrella term of human security which encapsulates the protection of children, civilians and cultural property, human security was presented as an end, ways and means in parallel with the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. This chapter introduced the author's own concept of *third-generation women, peace, and human security* to build on the work of CAF by further institutionalising human security across the DOTmLP model with particular emphasis on sex and age disaggregated data and regular dialogue with I/NGOs, Civil Society and civilians. The creation of mixed patrols, including Reservists with particular skill sets including responding to survivors of CRSV, violations against children, and engineering skills supporting civilian infrastructure was recommended.

As war rages on in Ukraine with civilians bearing the brunt of Russia's invasion, schools and hospitals have been targeted by the Russian military, as well as buildings of cultural significance. There is depressing information about how Ukrainian civilians are being treated in Russian-held territory, humanitarian corridors are being attacked within hours of being designated as *safe*, human trafficking is being reported on the border of Poland and Ukrainian civilians are being illegally driven into Russia. I/NGOs have shared comments made by the Ukrainian military that they regret not training more with civilian first-responders highlighting the importance of CIMIC and national resilience. This must be the moment, a turning point for Armed Forces everywhere, to see human security as a centre of gravity for planning and conduct of operations.

Chapter 8 Key Concepts

- The institutionalisation of human security requires a formal cascade of direction from the strategic through to the tactical level with clear direction on how different functions and staff in the military can implement human security in support of national objectives. This requires better alignment between GAC and DND and a formalised chain of command bridging women, peace, and human security within the CAF in a *third-generation* human security.
- A top-down formal cascade of direction as well as bottom-up collaborative and comprehensive approach are necessary to fully institutionalise human security.
- Institutionalised cross-government liaison and policy alignment and a consistent bottom-up approach involving engagement with Civil Society and members of the Diaspora from CAF areas of operation would enhance situational awareness at all levels.
- To apply human security at the operational level the concepts of human security should be included in joint doctrine publications, specific personnel need to be assigned to implement the agenda, training needs to incorporate human security concepts, and leadership needs to lead this enhancement.
- Human security is not an *officer-only* activity. Training the Senior and Non-Commissioned Officer ranks is vital to see human security successfully implemented on the ground, domestically and internationally.
- The application of human security is easiest to talk about at the strategic level and most complex to enact at the tactical level. Yet credibility to strategic aspirations and pronouncements will be gained through tactical actions, in other words, theory in practice.

Notes

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45 DND, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, 49.

46 DND, *Strong, Secure, Engaged*, 51.

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Chapter 9: Operationalising
Human Security for the Canadian Armed Forces

David Lambert

With the human security framework model in Figure 7.1 in Chapter Seven, and concrete examples provided in Chapter Eight, one may begin to better articulate military roles and functions in relation to human security, keeping in mind the primary role of military forces and their limitations. In short, an important question is: how is human security to be operationalised in a military context so that it becomes a standard aspect of military commitments and a feature of the normal military mindset? This chapter focuses on answering this question.

The first aspect to examine is the strategic level. As noted, human security will always be a strategic concern: it helps ensure the legitimacy of the commitment; it seeks to build enduring stability to avoid future conflict; and, in a battle over influence of affected populations, it will be a key element in any strategic and operational narrative. As noted in the NATO *Protection of Civilians Handbook*, such efforts must be tied to strategic communications.[1] Support of human security also helps ensure the force protection of the deployed elements working amongst the local population in that they see the benefit of military commitments.[2]

Human security may indeed be the military strategic objective of a commitment of military forces. Such was the case in March 2004 when Canada committed military forces to Haiti (Operation HALO) following civil strife, in order to bring stability to the nation and preserve life, to facilitate the delivery of aid, and to assist the Haitian police in the maintenance of law and order.[3] In other strategic context, the military may be only part of a larger commitment to an overall strategic aim of development, that is, the broad concept of human security with other national elements of power working in fields other than security, such as the Canadian national commitment to Ukraine.[4] The strategic objectives of a commitment may shift over an extended period of time, as government priorities change, or situational awareness alters at this strategic level. During the decade-plus commitment to Afghanistan, the strategic objectives shifted as the situation changed and government goals altered and thus, so did the nature of the campaign. Apart from combat operations to defeat the Taliban, the Canadian military and other NATO forces were also providing security to all Afghans to rebuild and delivering programmes and projects to support economic recovery and development. Eventually, the forces even undertook training of

Afghan security forces and the development of their governance in order to build legitimate and effective forces. A total of six Canadian government agencies in addition to the military were involved at various times.[5] Thus, apart from direct offensive operations against the Taliban, all other military actions in theatre were aimed to advance some aspect of Afghan human security.

As a reflection of this practice, Canadian and NATO doctrine has adopted the concept of the comprehensive approach, which Canada defines as:

> a philosophy according to which military and non-military actors collaborate to enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation. Note: The actors may include joint or multinational military forces, Canadian government departments and agencies (whole of government), other governments (foreign, provincial and municipal), international organizations (NATO, UN), non-governmental organizations (CARE, OXFAM), private sector entities or individuals.[6]

In simple terms, this concept means that strategic authorities identify the root causes of instability and apply the best agencies to provide enduring solutions. As noted in Canadian Army doctrine, various levels of interaction and integration can occur amongst these agencies, but in most cases the military will be in a supporting role, ideally providing security space in which other agencies, best suited to tackling governance and development issues, can operate freely.[7] Keeping in mind that human security can only be created and maintained in an environment of stability, Canadian Army doctrine notes that, in certain campaigns,

> the strategic concept and direction will include the need to create enduring stability and thus to address the root causes of violence and instability within the society across the various elements of a society. Military forces have very limited capabilities to undertake such work and thus, to do this successfully, the right non-military agencies will be required. Their objectives and actions will have to be closely integrated (in planning and conduct) with those of military forces to ensure complementary approaches.[8]

The concept of comprehensive approach has been adopted by NATO as well, again noting that integration between agencies will vary with the situation and the agencies involved.[9] Thus, at the strategic level, the concept of military forces being employed to support or even build elements of human security, is well established in both recent practice and doctrine.

A great deal of caution is required in the commitment of military forces. As noted early, the operational art is practised by commanders at appropriate levels to ensure tactical actions support a given strategy. One lesser recognised aspect of the operational art is the need for senior military commanders to inform and influence strategic authorities to ensure they do not create objectives that the military cannot support with its tactical capabilities. A failure to ensure the appropriate scoping of strategic objectives assigned to the military will lead directly to failure at all levels of command and disappointment, particularly amongst those civil populations in need of human security. Military forces are extremely limited in their abilities to build the enduring elements of human security, beyond the direct protection of civilians. Failings in human security stem from governance – many of the issues with which the military is expected to deal, those cross-cutting themes of protection of civilians, are in fact symptoms of much larger governance issues. While military forces may counter those symptoms through operational planning and tactical actions, those forces are not experts in governance, economic development, and social well-being. The advantage of military forces is that given their inherent capabilities, they may operate in high threat environments where other agencies cannot and therefore can meet some basic needs beyond immediate protection, but the ability to build enduring stability through social, governance and economic development is well beyond the scope of military forces. As noted in the comprehensive approach doctrine, the military is best suited for a supporting role in the creation of stability, to ensure other agencies more suited to governance and development issues can operate. It is incumbent upon senior military commanders to ensure strategic authorities understand these military limitations and thus issue strategic direction that can indeed be supported by military capabilities.

Regardless of the need for caution, the formal employment of a military role in supporting human security has been established at the strategic level, exemplified in the strategic direction provided in past campaigns and through the development of the doctrinal concept of the comprehensive approach in Canadian Army doctrine and the highest level of NATO doctrine.[10] Since the comprehensive approach sees the military working in close coordination and even cooperation with other agencies, such direction must be instigated at the strategic level. Although the highest level of Canadian Armed Forces joint doctrine only mentions the comprehensive approach in passing it does list is as a *strategy*, thus reinforcing the idea that it and its relationship to human security already sit at the highest level of authority.[11] Furthermore,

in line with the levels of doctrine, the comprehensive approach, as a philosophy, is well established with lower level supporting doctrine in the form of guiding principles and prescriptive practices for its implementation, albeit largely in Army doctrine.[12]

If the strategic level idea and doctrine for the application of military capabilities to build elements of human security already exist, then one must ask about the mechanisms and conceptual means that exist at the operational level to support the military's involvement with building human security. In conducting campaigns and major operations to support a strategy, the operational level identifies objectives and groups them into logical and thematic lines of operation or lines of effort.[13] Given the international focus on human security, its articulation in the UN, its adoption by NATO at the highest levels, and the recent strategic expectations for the building of human security in any military commitment, it stands to reason that an operational design and its campaign plans should by default include objectives and lines of operation that speak to human security issues. The amount of emphasis and efforts that are put towards such a line of operation will vary with the strategic objectives, the adversarial threats and their aims and methods, and the overall start-state for the host nation. Although doctrine recommends avoiding use of template campaign plans with fixed lines of operation, particularly for campaigns in which the protection and civil capacity of the host nation population constitute major objectives, many template campaign plans include lines of operation focused on civil-related themes such as *governance* and *reconstruction*. Even lines of operation dealing with security focus on protection of the civil population.[14] In line with this, what has been termed a human security approach may be doctrinally adopted at the operational level in two manners.[15]

First, a human security approach may be assumed as a guiding philosophy in line with a number of other philosophical approaches that dictate military doctrines and are listed in Canadian Army capstone doctrine.[16] These include an ethical application of combat power, mission command philosophy, the manoeuvrist approach to gaining a psychological advantage over the enemy, and a comprehensive approach (as detailed above). Given the enduring strategic expectations that military forces will be employed to support human security, a philosophy of a *human security approach* can logically be added to the list as a means to guide the commitment of military forces. Given that the comprehensive approach speaks to the integration of military forces with other elements of power and actors to address root causes

of instability, which in turn threatens human security or prevents it from being established, there is no doubt much in common between a human security approach and a comprehensive approach. Future work should look to blend or harmonise these two approaches, perhaps into a single philosophy. Regardless of the end result in doctrine, a working definition for a human security approach can be drafted, while noting its link to the comprehensive approach:

> a philosophy according to which military operations continually seek to contribute to human security, in line with strategic direction, operational demands, situational requirements, and available capabilities. Note that a human security approach should be complemented with a comprehensive approach to ensure the elements of human security beyond military capabilities are suitably addressed to achieve enduring stability.

Such a definition provides clear meaning for the military contribution to human security, while respecting inherent military limitations. As a *philosophy* it places a human security approach at the highest levels of doctrine, thus making it a constant feature of all campaigns and operations that must be considered in any planning and execution. The development of supporting principles will ensure that a gender perspective is listed as a key principle for assessing and building human security and is not forgotten. The definition uses the term *contributes* rather than *creates* or some other similar verb, thus indicating that a military force cannot create the broader aspects of human security. Supporting doctrine should clearly indicate that given the military's inherent capabilities, the main effort for military forces in building human security will likely be on the direct protection of civilians and other agencies in a theatre of operations, as much doctrine already highlights.[17] Finally, this proposed definition places parameters on the military's contribution to human security. It notes that it must be in line with strategic direction, in that is in direct support of strategic objectives. Reference to *operational demands* allows a military commander to prioritise support to human security appropriately. Hence, for example, if the more pressing concern is the offensive operations of an adversary, then the efforts put towards human security are accordingly adjusted. Reference to *situational requirements* gives a commander authority and expectation to act in line with the moral, legal, and practical requirements of the given situation. Thus, even when strategic objectives related to human security are not a stated part of the mandate, in a situation in which civilians are directly and immediately threatened, there is still the requirement to act. Finally, the reference to *available capabilities*

notes the limits of military forces to build human security in an enduring sense.[18]

This doctrinal philosophy is universally applicable. Note only will it support commitments when there is clear strategic direction to build human security but will also be applicable to those commitments where no stated expectation exists, but a need arises. For example, limited military interventions such as a non-combatant evacuation operation will not have any stated or implied objectives related to human security for the host nation, yet this philosophical approach will still expect military commanders to act where there is an immediate threat to vulnerable civilians. In fact, it compliments other martial philosophies already in doctrine such as the ethical application of combat power.[19]

The second way a human security approach may be incorporated into the operational level is the adoption of a human security line of operation as a standard feature of operational designs and resulting campaign plans. The objectives placed along this line of operation will vary with the strategic direction and operating environment. This proposed human security line of operation could incorporate direction in terms of support to governance and essential services and infrastructure. It is also along this line of operation where integration with other agencies – those more suited to the enduring elements of human security – may be envisioned and planned. As noted earlier, it will be commanders practising the operational art that will help ensure this line of operation is properly envisioned, articulated and executed to ensure strategic direction is met, but also to ensure that strategic expectations do not exceed military capabilities. Like other aspects of military support to human security, this can be clearly articulated in related doctrine.

Critics of a human security approach for the military will cite two major concerns with the military's role in building human security. First, some will charge that human security is not the remit of military forces, and some of those charges will come from actors who specialise in humanitarian aid. Indeed, they and others innocently will use the expression *non-military tasks* to describe the military's involvement in human security related undertakings. However, as one can see from recent commitments and a body of supporting work, there is certainly an expectation by western governments and by other agencies that supporting human security, at least in the protection of civilians concept, is a moral and legal requirement of military forces, in line with International Humanitarian Law and other resolutions and treaties.[20] There is also the realisation, well-articulated in doctrine and evidenced

in operations, that at times, a military force is the only actor, given its inherent capabilities to operate in austere and high-threat environments which can support the rudimentary aspects of human security, to protect the most vulnerable from threats and to meet, to whatever extent possible, basic needs. But apart from these legal and practical issues that justify a military force's involvement in at least some basic elements of human security, there are larger strategic and philosophical reasons for direct contributions to human security. In the strategic environment highlighted not only by conflict but by varying levels of competition, narratives and perceptions of legitimacy are key to strategic success.[21] Thus, a failure of military forces to support human security when possible and where needed will only undermine the credibility and thus the legitimacy and narrative of NATO and its member nations. Additionally, the martial philosophy of the manoeuvrist approach seeks to gain a psychological advantage over the adversary.[22] In building human security as part of a campaign, a military force will certainly build its perceptions of legitimacy and thus gain a psychological advantage over adversaries. To this end, an ability – both intellectual and physical – of a military force to contribute to human security will be a centre of gravity for that campaign.[23] In short then, a military force's contribution to human security – where needed and however possible within the stated limitations – is indeed core military business and complementary to other aspects of military commitments. If the military is doing something, it is indeed a *military task* and the practice of the operational art will ensure that the task will support stated and implied objectives, even those related to human security.

The second concern possibly raised regarding the commitment of military forces to human security is one of over-tasking. Even in the best of situations, military forces are often lacking sufficient capabilities to meet stated objectives. In the face of combat operations against a conventional military threat, there simply will not be the resources to dedicate to supporting aspects of human security. While a valid concern, there are mitigating issues. Firstly, one can look at the spectrum of conflict, the various campaign themes and the range of tactical operations and activities that are predominate at any given time.[24] Here, an operational equilibrium can be seen in that where military operations are dominated by combat (largely offensive and defensive operations and tasks) there will be little focus on human security. Vulnerable groups will either shelter in place or evacuate and the military's attention to human security will largely be limited to legal requirements to mitigate harm. There will be no possibility and no

expectation of military forces committing resources to broader security or development aspects of human security. As the situation moves along the spectrum of conflict to the range of less violence, and the nature of the situation and campaign changes, there will be less of a requirement to focus on combat operations. Not only will more time and resources be available to contribute to human security, but the importance of human security – that of protection civilians, meeting basic needs and creating a secure environment – will become central to any campaign and key to primary objectives, as can be seen in the doctrines for counterinsurgency and peace support.[25] This equilibrium must be reinforced however, for resources will always be short and in high demand. Expectations for human security at both strategic and local levels must be carefully shaped to that audiences understand the military's constant limitations. Indeed, the management of expectations is a key aspect of campaign authority, that is, the perceived legitimacy of a military force and its operations.[26]

The above discussion has shown that the concept of building human security already exists at the strategic level and can be reinforced at the operational level through the adoption of a human security doctrinal philosophy and the standardisation of a human security line of operation to operational designs and campaign plans. The final level of concern for the military's role in support of human security is of course the tactical level – that level of command that directs the use of military forces in combat designed to contribute to the operational level campaign plan.[27] An examination of extant NATO and Canadian Army doctrine will indicate that, like the comprehensive approach, the tactical operations and tasks needed to support human security have been articulated since 2008 with the full intent that these would support situational aspects identified as elements of human security.

As articulated in UN guidance, human security relates to three broad aspects, freedom from fear, freedom from want, and the freedom to live in dignity.[28] Clearly, and as noted, these aspects are tied to governance and problems in these areas are largely symptoms of broken or problematic governance structures and practices. Fixing them is well beyond the central remit and capability of military forces. Additionally, the NATO *Protection of Civilians Handbook* also takes a broad view of that concept to include countering and mitigating threats and harms to civilians, facilitating access to basic needs, and contributing to a safe and security environment.[29] From the wording in this handbook, it is clear that military forces rarely lead in these endeavours but are seen as playing a role in facilitating or contributing to them. Hence, the need

to work in close cooperation with other agencies to address root causes, as articulated under the comprehensive approach philosophy. But well before these sources were written the body of tactical operations and tasks through which human security can be realised was already detailed in NATO and Canadian Army doctrine, beginning in early 2005.

By late 2004, based on issues and problems that had been identified in the US-led Iraq campaign, a gap was observed in understanding the full spectrum of tactical requirements existed in military thinking and doctrine. As a result, doctrine developers within the American, British, Canadian and Australian Armies Program and NATO Land Operations Working Group (often the same personalities) began to examine gaps in the conceptual understanding of operations. The main gap realised was the requirement for military forces to undertake a series of tactical operations and tasks that focused on the security and well-being of the civil population, regardless of the nature of the main strategic objectives and campaign at hand. These operations and tasks were of course nothing particularly new and actions like them had been undertaken in various theatres such as Bosnia in previous decades. But there was no body of doctrine – and thus likely a gap in training and education and mindset – that incorporated these tactical responsibilities and undertakings as part of a greater conceptual whole. As noted in Canadian Army doctrine, this gap was clearly revealed in an observation by an allied officer during the 2003 advance to Bagdad: "Look, the locals are looting the museum. I wonder who is supposed to prevent that – not me, I'm busy with the offense."[30] Clearly, such a situation demanded any moral authority present, with the capability and opportunity, to act in such a way as to mitigate harm, and coincidentally, meet the specific cross-cutting theme of protecting cultural property.

Up until that time, military doctrines generally envisioned three phases of war or types of operation: offensive, defensive, and enabling (those such as a withdrawal that led to another type of operation), and the spectrum of conflict was divided between operations and operations-other-than war. The concepts were focused on countering a conventional enemy threat. But reality was clearly different. In looking at the operations and campaigns occurring at the time and in the past, the conceptual gap was one that focused on the security and well-being of the civil population, particularly when no other authority was present. While the idea certainly existed at the strategic level as noted earlier, there was definitely a gap at the tactical level. This was particularly the case as enemies changed or altered their methods and began to purposely target civilian populations. Thus, the aim of these

operations and actions that needed articulation at the tactical level seemed to be stability, in terms of providing immediate security, access to emergency aid, the return of essential services and some help with governance particularly where none existed.

Thus, the new group of tactical operations and tasks came to be given the term stability operation, defined in Canadian doctrine as: a tactical activity conducted by military and security forces, often in conjunction with other agencies, to maintain, restore or establish a civil order.[31] In turn, it came to be articulated in doctrine, in both Canada and NATO, that all campaigns and operations anywhere on the spectrum of conflict consisted of the same set of four tactical operations and tasks (offensive, defensive, enabling and stability), with their execution and the balance across them dependent upon the nature of the campaign and situation at hand.[32] The spectrum of conflict was now articulated as a continuum of operations (no longer a false divide between war and other operations) that ebbed and flowed depending upon the myriad of factors within the operating environment but guided by strategic objectives and the philosophies and principles inherent to the nature of the campaign in question. In fact, getting this balance right across the mix of tactical operations and tasks to meet the principles of a particular campaign type and strategic objectives is seen as part of the operational art and necessary for campaign success.[33]

In order to operationalise the idea of stability operations and tasks, they were then classified along four main lines, the first being security and control. Under this classification, forces would undertake direct security and protection of the civil populace and undertake tasks such as presence patrols, movement control, crowd confrontation duties, and cordon and searches, all to disrupt, pre-empt and deter threats to the civil population and stability. The second grouping of stability operations and tasks was security sector reform, to include disarmament and demobilisation of former belligerents and building of host nation security force capacity, including elements of governance. The third group of stability operations and tasks focused on support to civilian infrastructure and restoration of services. This reflected the idea that in some situations the military may be the only actor able or willing to operate in a particular region, and thus the onus would be on military forces to help provide for the basic needs of the civil populace. A fourth group of stability operations focused on support to civil governance. It recognised that in some circumstances, there may be no other authority to help govern a region or nascent authorities may need advice and support particularly in adhering to elements of the rule of law and meeting acceptable standards.[34]

The exact wording of the classifications and their groupings varied over time and references, and the capstone doctrine added "assistance to other agencies" as a general category during stability activities to reflect tasks that may occur in relation to other agencies such as the provision of security to humanitarian aid convoys (as was the Canadian experience in theatres such as Bosnia and Haiti).[35] However, despite these variances, the general and specific meanings remained extant: that military forces, to varying degrees depending upon the situation, must be prepared to assume and undertake tactical operations and tasks that seek the protection and well-being of the civilian populace and the general support to stability, and that these may be required in any campaign and operation. Yet at the same time, it was realised that the host nation and other agencies are best suited to assume and lead in many of these operations and activities and thus much emphasise has been placed on transitions to civil authorities, with a combination of text and illustrations showing these necessary transitions occurring over time as stability and security increase.[36] Tactical level, prescriptive doctrine has continued to develop in terms of military operations support to elements of human security, to include doctrine for security force capacity building and other stability operations and tasks such as the Afghan provincial reconstruction teams, which were formally incorporated in Canada doctrine albeit given a more general title of civil-military transition teams.[37]

When the concept of stability activities as providing support to the civilian population was first developed, there was the concern that some nations would create specific forces to deal only with this body of tactical operations and tasks, and conventional, manoeuvre-based, military forces would focus on combat operations, involving the offence and defence. The same argument could be made for human security, that specially designed forces could be created just for these niche activities. The fallacy of this idea is quickly apparent when examining the nature of operations and the speed with which tactical situations can change. The force conducting a security checkpoint or supporting an aid agency may well find itself facing a threat that only a conventionally trained military force can properly counter or defeat. Such bespoke forces would only be another agency in a theatre and likely less effective than non-government organisations with their own specialties. Furthermore, the idea of creating a specially designed force to conduct just these stability operations and tasks undermines the core function of military forces and risks removing resources from it. Thus, it was seen that conventional military forces must be able assume stability operations

and tasks and quickly transition between them and the other types of tactical operations. Thus, all tactical operations and tasks – offensive, defensive, enabling and stability – were brought together in a full spectrum of tactical operations.[38]

In this review of extant doctrine and capabilities, in both Canada and NATO, one can see that, despite human security being a relatively new term for the authorities in question, many of the means to ensure military forces can support human security, intellectually and practically, already exist, in great detail. Such is often the case in the development of martial concepts and doctrines. An idea or challenge is presented as something new and never seen before. But in fact, to invert the well-known parable, such issues are often old wine in new skins. Although the terminology may be new or different, the tools to realise the concept may well already exist, and such appears to be the case with human security. At the strategic level, consideration of objectives related to the well-being and security of a population has become common practice and the philosophy of comprehensive approach brings together the most appropriate agencies to achieve those objectives under strategic authorities. This is of course realised through the operational level and its operational design and campaign plan that sees the application of capabilities to achieve these objectives in harmony with other agencies. As discussed, this can easily be enhanced by the adoption of a human security approach as a martial philosophy and as a standard line of operation to be refined as the situation and direction dictate. Finally, a well-established body of doctrine exists in NATO and its member nations for the tactical operations and tasks needed to support the building of human security, namely the body of stability operations and activities. Overarching all of this is the requirement for tactical level commanders, even at the lowest levels, to be mentally prepared to transition to stability operations quickly as the need arises and situation demands.[39]

Notwithstanding the extant material that supports the military's rightful and appropriate contribution to human security, issues remain. There remains a gap in the pervasive understanding of human security as a constant concern of any strategic commitment of military forces. Its introduction into the newest NATO doctrine is haphazard, with no real connection made between it, Women, Peace, and Security and the various cross-cutting topics. Furthermore, NATO doctrine seems to be going away from many of the foundational ideas that support human security, just as it is adopting the concept. The concept of a comprehensive approach has been made more generic to be simply interagency

cooperation as NATO begins to view all strategic environments as a form of competition.[40] NATO's development of doctrine for the military's contribution to stabilisation and reconstruction has only served to silo many of these tactical tasks into a particular type of campaign rather than to see them as a potential requirement in any campaign.[41] Finally, NATO recently cancelled its specific tactical level publication dealing with stability activities and tasks and replaced it with a wider interpretation of the full range of land force tactical activities that, in terms of stability, only focus on a very narrow set for which the military is best suited, such as emergency demining.

To better conceive of the military's role in respect to supporting human security, one may refine the work already done in this area and add to it specific military concepts at each level of command. As noted, in order to integrate military efforts with the understanding and approaches of other elements of power and agencies, the UN model of human security should be adopted with a logical hierarchy between it and its component parts as illustrated in Figure 9.1.

- In order to bring clarity and recognition of human security at the strategic and operational levels of command, conditions for human security should be seen as a standard objective for military deployments, be they specifically stated or implied as a universal expectation. This can be supported by the adoption of a doctrinal philosophy of an approach to human security as proposed earlier. Thus, starting with this strategic input, military forces, through their doctrine and training, will be made to understand the moral and practical reasons for a human security approach to operations – that it is a core part of military campaigns and operations at all levels of command. This approach to human security is supported by the comprehensive approach and its guidance in working with other agencies and elements of power.
- At the operational level and its development of operational designs and campaign plans, a standard line of operation to all campaigns may be introduced. This will ensure the human security is always considered in operational planning and execution and will provide that fundamental link between the strategic objectives and expectations, and the subsequent tactical operations and actions. The level of effort in this line of operation will depend upon the strategic direction, the nature of threats and operating environment in general. However, given the inherent capabilities and role of military forces, and the

immediacy of physical threats to human security, the weight of effort will always be towards the "freedom from fear" facet of human security, with the emphasis on protection of civilians.

- At the tactical level, a sound and relatively complete body of prescriptive doctrine already exists to guide military forces in their support to human security. While the primary effort will be on the protection of civilians, often through the cross-cutting topics, the various stability operations and tasks allow the military to support the broad NATO concept of Protection of Civilians, and the other facets of human security, namely the meeting of basic needs and reconstruction of services, ideally in close cooperation with other agencies and host nation authorities. Ensuring human dignity will always be an aspect of support to governance and certainly practiced in security force capacity building. Although the cross-cutting themes under the Protection of Civilians concept are important, they are not the sole focus – in many theatres all elements of a civilian population will be vulnerable and will need the provision of security. Additionally, extant tactical doctrine includes the NATO handbooks on the protection of civilians and the building in integrity, albeit they must be produced as formal doctrine to ensure proper dissemination and standardisation across NATO.

- Overarching all of this, is the need for gender perspectives in all that is planned and executed in terms of objectives and operations, as given in the earlier model. Doctrinally, this must be given as a command-driven initiative to ensure subordinates and staff fully consider the aspect of gender perspective. It can be added as a principle of the human security approach philosophy. It is also supported by intelligence staff as part of their analysis of the operating environment and threats to human security.

- Finally, human security cannot be understood and properly applied without understanding the cultural standards and expectations of the local populace, and in turn respecting their standards and expectations. As noted in Canadian counter-insurgency doctrine, there is a fine line to be walked between moral relativism and cultural absolutism.[42] Accepting what may seem like cultural norms that violate generally universal moral standards in the exploitation of vulnerable individuals will undermine the legitimacy of the campaign and do great damage

to the individual concerned.[43] However, one cannot assume that specific, particularly Western, aspects of defining and building human security are by default acceptable to the local population. Solutions to human security issues and their root causes must be socially and culturally acceptable to the local population, otherwise the legitimacy of the campaign and its objectives will be rejected.[44] Progress in human security will be limited and even issues such as progress in women's equality will struggle and possibly fail when local culture and expectations are not respected.[45] This is supported by the UN principle of "context-specific" for any efforts in building human security.[46] Efforts to ensure harmonisation with local cultural expectations and assumptions must be supported by military intelligence in their assessment of the operational environments and informed by civil-military cooperation staff and other experts and advisors in the local communities.

Using these military tools discussed above, the model of human security presented earlier can be enhanced to create a model for human security appropriately implemented through military capabilities, from the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. In Figure 9.1, the military's input and doctrinally required elements are given in italics. The enhanced model shows human security as a strategic level concern with military support integrated through the doctrinal philosophy of supporting human security, helped by adherence to a comprehensive approach. At the operational level, a line of operation of the human security approach is implemented to link the strategic and tactical levels, with the weight of effort given to freedom from fear. Such a link between the strategic desires for human security and the tactical application will help fill gaps identified in the realisation of human security through military operations.[47] At the tactical level human security is supported through stability operations and tasks, with special attention to the cross-cutting topics that directly relate to the protection of civilians. All this is guided by appropriate gender perspectives (from the WPS agenda) that are together incorporated as a principle to the human security philosophy and given context through intelligence support and ensured by commanders and their assessments. Finally, it is all conducted within the cultural context of the local operating environment. The resulting framework is the military's approach to human security and is given in Figure 9.1.

Figure 9.1: A Military Approach to Human Security.

A proposed military approach to human security is both intelligence and command driven, informed by the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda, gender perspectives, and cultural contexts. The main effort is in support of freedom from fear.

As presented above, the military's role in relation to human security becomes obvious. As a strategic instrument of nation or coalition power, it will be expected to play a role from the strategic to the tactical. The military can be guided by a philosophical approach at the highest levels, realised through a standing line of operation at the operational level that ensures a constant attention to human security, all implemented through a known and well-practised set of tactical operations and tasks, harmonised in execution with the efforts of other agencies.

Certainly, the military has limitations in terms of temporal strategic direction and capabilities needed to create many aspects of human security, particularly as related to governance and development issues. But these limitations, well vocalised to strategic authorities by senior military commanders in order to set expectations, are not impediments to military forces supporting the most urgent and fundamental aspects of human security, namely protection of civilians, helping to ensure basic needs and contributing to an overall secure environment. Not only are there moral requirements for this support, but there are practical requirements in that it gives campaigning military forces a strategic advantage over adversaries and competitors and helps build the pillars of enduring stability.

The Way Ahead in Integrating Human Security as Core Military Business

Despite the extant doctrine that supports military operations related to human security and the ongoing strategic expectations that military forces will indeed contribute to human security, much discord and confusion exists with the introduction of human security into NATO and its member nations. With the drafting of NATO doctrine for each cross-cutting theme, it is hoped that human security can be better incorporated as core military business.

To better incorporate the military's support to human security into the military mindset, a number of incremental steps are required. It is best to address this concurrently through Canadian doctrine and NATO standardisation. Firstly, a coherent and logical definition and model for human security, based on the sound and broadly accepted UN concept is required. This is the basis for a shared understanding. Based on this, a place within operational design concepts can be developed for human security efforts. From this, the logical connection to existing tactical level operations doctrine will be obvious and the links easily established. In this way, the military's role in human security can be easily and clearly articulated with minimal change to existing doctrine in Canada and NATO. This extant doctrine, including the NATO handbooks dealing with protection of civilians and building integrity, can easily be adopted with little change. In short, the tools for military support to human security exist, just a decent and logical framework is needed along with the articulated authority and expectations to have a key role in building human security.

Canada could lead such efforts in NATO, but it will be difficult. All the Canadian references used herein, less one, have been produced by

the Canadian Army. The Canadian Armed Forces have little capability to write joint or common-Service doctrine, and no dedicated doctrine writers currently exist. Extant joint doctrine is woefully out of date and what does exist is often poorly conceived and confused with temporal policy. The use of contractors to fill gaps in serving personnel and their expertise has often given mixed results at best.

The doctrine required for articulation of the military role in human security is only useful if it is applied in training, for the issue of human security is not one of so much capability, but, as noted in the NATO handbook on protection of civilians, it is more of mindset, that is, to know what human security is, and the expectations and means to help create it.[48] The subject of human security can be easily integrated in all levels of command training, from staff college lectures on operational design to tactical exercises where commanders are presented with the dilemma of pressing operational requirements interrupted by threats to civilian populations. The first step, however, is to incorporate it into doctrine.

Conclusion

Human security will be a constant issue in any military force commitment. As demonstrated, military forces have indeed a vital and fundamental role to play in the provision of human security, at all levels of command, the strategic, the operational and tactical. This is nothing new and the military already has many of the means to support key aspects of human security either as part of stated strategic direction or simply implied through moral, legal, and operational imperatives. However, the introduction of human security to NATO doctrine and its member nations' collective mindset risks being confused, misunderstood, and potentially ignored, relegated to annexes at the back of publications and lumped in with other vaguely understood concepts. To solve this issue and ensure a proper understanding and incorporation of human security into core military business, a formal effort is needed to build a human security framework applicable to all levels of command, from strategic, through the operational to the tactical, akin to the above illustration. Extant doctrine was originally written with the idea of building and supporting human security, absent the terminology, and this simply needs to be tied to the operational and strategic levels of understanding. Once incorporated into doctrine, the military's role in human security can be tied into training, built into mindsets, and thus fully operationalised. The next section of this book, Part III, provides case studies on human security themes and topics that may be useful in military operations and planning.

Chapter 9 Key Concepts

- Human security may be the military strategic objective of a commitment of military forces, as was the case with Operation HALO in Haiti, to bring stability to the nation and preserve life, to facilitate the delivery of aid, and to assist the Haitian police in the maintenance of law and order.
- Concerning appropriate military mandates, it is incumbent upon senior military commanders to ensure strategic authorities understand military limitations of human security to issue appropriate strategic direction that can be supported by military capabilities.
- An operational design and campaign plans should by default include objectives and lines of operation that speak to human security issues.
- A human security approach may be assumed as a guiding philosophy in line with other philosophical approaches that dictate military doctrines and are listed in Canadian Army capstone doctrine (ethical application of power; mission command philosophy; gaining psychological advantage; and a comprehensive approach).
- Starting with strategic input, military forces, through their doctrine and training, will come to understand the moral and practical reasons for a human security approach to operations – that it is a core part of military campaigns and operations at all levels of command.
- Conditions for human security should be seen as a standard objective for military deployments, be they specifically stated or implied as a universal expectation.
- At the operational level and its development of operational designs and campaign plans, a standard line of operation to all campaigns may be introduced. This will ensure the human security is always considered in operational planning and execution and will provide that fundamental link between the strategic objectives and expectations, and the subsequent tactical operations and actions.
- At the tactical level, a sound and relatively complete body of prescriptive doctrine already exists to guide military forces in their support to human security.

- There is a need for a gender perspective in all planning and execution. Doctrinally, this must be given as a command-driven initiative to ensure subordinates and staff fully consider the aspect of gender perspectives. It can be added as a principle of the human security approach philosophy. It is also supported by intelligence staff as part of their analysis of the operating environment and threats to human security.
- Finally, human security cannot be understood and properly applied without understanding the cultural standards and expectations of the local populace, and in turn respecting their standards and expectations. As noted in Canadian counter-insurgency doctrine, there is a fine line to be walked between moral relativism and cultural absolutism.
- Progress in human security will be limited and even issues such as progress in women's equality will struggle, and possibly fail, when local culture and expectations are not respected.

Notes

1   NATO, *Protection of Civilians – Allied Operations Command (AOC) Handbook* (Brussels: NATO-SHAPE J9 Division, n.d.), 12 (accessed February 13, 2022), https://shape.nato.int/resources/3/website/ACO-Protection-of-Civilians-Handbook.pdf. Canada defines strategic communication as: A nation's concerted efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favourable for the advancement of the nation's interests, policies and objectives. Note: This is accomplished through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages and products synchronised with the actions of all elements of national power (Termium Plus). NATO uses a slightly alternate definition: In the NATO military context, the integration of communication capabilities and information staff function with other military activities, in order to understand and shape the information environment, in support of NATO strategic aims and objectives (NATO Term).

2   NATO, *Protection of Civilians Handbook*, 53.

3   Canada, National Defence, *Operation HALO* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2013), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/recently-completed/operation-halo.html.

4   Canada, *Operation UNIFIER (Ukraine)* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2021), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/transition-materials/caf-operations-activities/2020/03/caf-ops-activities/op-unifier-ukraine.html.

5   Canada, *The Canadian Armed Forces Legacy in Afghanistan* (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2018), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/recently-completed/canadian-armed-forces-legacy-afghanistan.html.

6   Canada, Termium Plus, Defence Terminology Standardization Board.

7   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 5-1; Canada, National Defence, *Canadian Army Doctrine Note 16-01*,7.

8   Canada, National Defence, *Canadian Army Doctrine Note 16-01*, 7.

9   NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations*, 5.

10   NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 01(F) Allied Joint Doctrine.*

11   Canada, National Defence, *B-GJ-005-000/FP-001 Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01, Canadian Military Doctrine* (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre, 2011), 6-12.

12   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations; Canadian Army Doctrine Note 16-01.*

13   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 5-30. Lines of operation and lines of effort are considered synonymous terms. The latter was adopted to expand the ideas of objectives and lines of operation beyond geographic-based lines of operation against a conventional enemy.

14   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 5-13.

15   United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, *Human Security in Defence*, i.

16   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 3-1.

17   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 6-17.

18   The term "capabilities" includes capacities. Military writers often distinguish between the two when they are in fact generally synonymous terms (see Concise Oxford Dictionary).

19   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 3-1.

20   Hill and Manea, "Protection of Civilians: A NATO Perspective"; Center for Civilians in Conflict, "NATO's New "Human Security" Umbrella."

21   NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 01(F) Allied Joint Doctrine*.

22   Canada, National Defence, *Canadian Army Doctrine Note 16-01 Land Operations – An Updated Summary* (Kingston, ON: Army Doctrine Centre, 2016), 13.

23   Centre of gravity is defined as: the primary source of power that provides an actor its strength, freedom of action and/or will to fight (Government of Canada Termium Plus – NATO Term).

24   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 3-11. See also Figure 2, Introduction.

25   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 3-15.

26   Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 6-1.

27   Canada Termium Plus – NATO Term.

28   UN, *Human Security Handbook* (New York: United Nations Human Security Unit, 2016). https://www.un.org/humansecurity/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/h2.pdf.

29   NATO, *Protection of Civilians Handbook.*

30   Canada, National Defence, *Canadian Army Doctrine Note 16-01.*

31   Government of Canada, Termium Plus – Defence Terminology Standardization Board

32 Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 3-18; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, *Allied Joint Publication 3.2.1.1 Conduct of Land Tactical Activities*, 45.

33 Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 3-8.

34 NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 3.2.1.1 Conduct of Land Tactical Activities*, 67; Canada, National Defence, Land Operations, 3-23.

35 Canada, *Canadian Military Doctrine*, 6-13.

36 Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 3-24.

37 Canada, National Defence, *B-GL-322-010/FP-001 Stability Activities and Tasks* (Kingston, ON: Director of Army Doctrine, 2012), 9-2-1.

38 Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*; Canada, National Defence, *Canadian Army Doctrine Note 16-01*.

39 Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 3-23.

40 NATO, *Allied Joint Publication 01(F) Allied Joint Doctrine*.

41 NATO, *Allied Joint Publication-3.4.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for the Military Contribution to Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Brussels: NATO Standardization Office, 2015). In ratifying this NATO document, Canada submitted a reservation outlining this doctrinal issue.

42 Canada, National Defence, *Land Operations*, 3-17.

43 R. Westhead, "Don't look, Don't Tell, Troops Told," *Toronto Star*, June 16, 2008, https://www.thestar.com/news/2008/06/16/dont_look_dont_tell_troops_told.html; R. Westhead, "Canada, Afghanistan Both Guilty of Ignoring Child-Sex Scandal: Former Ambassador," *Toronto Star*, July 11, 2013, https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/07/11/canada_afghanistan_both_guilty_of_ignoring_childsex_scandal_former_ambassador.html.

44 David Lambert, *Campaign Authority as a Framework in Operational Design*, JADEX Papers 4, NDID-B-GL-900-J01/JP-004 (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 2011), 53.

45 N. Taylor, "Women in the Afghan National Security Forces: With the future stability of Afghanistan in question, does the answer lie in the incorporation of more female troops?" *RUSI Commentary* (September 20, 2010), https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/women-afghan-national-security-forces.

46 UN System Staff College, "Human Security: From Principles to Practice," Online course, accessed July 2, 2022, https://www.unssc.org/courses/human-security-principles-practice.

47 K. Dock, V.K. Holt, and M. Keenan, *Origins, Progress, and Unfinished Business: NATO's Protection of Civilians Policy* (Washington, DC: Stimson Centre, 2021), https://www.stimson.org/2021/origins-progress-and-unfinished-business-natos-protection-of-civilians-policy/

48 NATO, *Protection of Civilians Handbook*, 63.

Part III:
Learning Human Security:
Case Studies for Military Operations and Planning

Note to Reader

Part III is a series of thematic sections, analyses, and cases intended to serve discussion and reflection on the formalisation of a human security framework across the Forces. They appear in various forms, offering critiques, questions, constructive criticism, and ample opportunity to further a dialogue on important themes such as definitions, domestic operations, and competing and cooperative international agendas. Part III ends with this volume's Conclusion.

NATO and Human Security: Broad or Narrow?

Wilfrid Greaves

Since 2019, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has employed a concept of human security comprising five main topics: protection of civilians (PoC); children and armed conflict (CAAC); combatting trafficking in human beings (CTHB); conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV); and cultural property protection (CPP). These dimensions reflect a particular evolution of the concept of human security that strongly reflects the influence of Canadian foreign policy practice and leadership since the 1990s. This *narrow* approach to human security focuses on acute violent threats to human survival and wellbeing and has clear implications for the overseas deployments and combat operations of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). It thus represents an important evolution in NATO doctrine and military practice, and convergence with longer-established trends in Canadian foreign and security policy.

However, the narrow approach to human security provides an incomplete understanding of the implications of human security for the present and future operations of the CAF. In this volume, Peter Kikkert, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and I consider CAF roles related to human security which are not captured by the NATO framework, particularly disaster and emergency response and relief activities, as demonstrated by three cases: the CAF's provision of search and rescue (SAR) services; climate-related disasters in British Columbia in 2021; and operations of the Canadian Rangers in isolated coastal and northern communities. These roles are connected to a *broader* conception of human security which requires greater attention to less conventional and non-combat functions of the CAF. These areas reflect the need for the military's role related to human security to be embedded within a whole-of-government framework that reflects both civil and military actors and capabilities. They also highlight that demand will only grow for both domestic and international deployments of the CAF to protect human security. My principal goal for the following thematic sections is to identify gaps in the narrow conceptualisation of human security employed by Canada and its NATO allies to fully understand the potential current and future roles of the CAF related to human security, domestically and internationally.

Human Security: Broad or Narrow?

Human security emerged as a response to the new policy and conceptual opportunities provided by the end of the Cold War. Building on earlier discussions of alternate ways to conceptualise security, it offered a radical departure from the dominant account of security as synonymous with nuclear-strategic rivalry between the two superpowers, the former Soviet Union and the United States. The original concept of human security is typically attributed to the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) 1994 *Human Development Report* and sought to change the meaning of security from one primarily committed to the survival and interests of states to the survival and wellbeing of people. Defined as "safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression […] and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life,"[1] it broadened security to include threats besides military force and armed violence and deepened it to include the protection of human communities above and below the level of the national state.

The UNDP report listed seven dimensions of human security – economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political – encompassing both *freedom from fear* (acute violence and repression) and *freedom from want* (chronic suffering and privation). The broad and deep UNDP approach to human security was widely adopted within the UN system and by other international actors in their foreign policies, including Japan and the European Union.[2] While the UNDP conceptualisation has been critiqued on the basis of "confusion between human security and development, the overlap between human security and human rights, and conceptual overstretch,"[3] it nonetheless inspired widespread interest in and adoption of holistic human security frameworks.

From early on, however, an alternate conception of human security also garnered widespread use in international policy circles. Critics of the UNDP approach contended it incorporated too many components to be useful in guiding post-Cold War foreign and security priorities. Among these was Lloyd Axworthy, Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade from 1996–2000. Though initially a proponent of "sustainable human security," Axworthy maintained "the very breadth of the UNDP approach […] made it unwieldy as a policy instrument."[4] Axworthy thus directed his officials to focus on four specific policy areas that "Canada has both the capacity and the credibility to play a leadership role": peacebuilding; anti-personnel landmines; protecting the rights of children; and promoting an international system of rules-based

trade.[5] Canada's human security foreign policy agenda produced several notable foreign policy achievements during this time, including the Ottawa Convention to Ban Anti-Personnel Landmines; the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court; Canadian participation in the 1999 Kosovo War; and, later, supported Canada's continued involvement in the war in Afghanistan from 2002 onward.[6] It also fostered the development of new international norms, notably through Canada's establishment of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to assess the legality of the Kosovo War. Its final report, *The Responsibility to Protect*, introduced an eponymous new doctrine for humanitarian protection that retroactively justified NATO's intervention in Kosovo and, after ratification by the UN in 2005, underpinned international intervention in Libya in 2011. Overall, these policies aligned Canada's approach to human security around two pillars: strengthening international legal institutions and using military force to prevent violent atrocities against civilian populations.

Following Axworthy's retirement, Canada's approach to human security shifted from functionally limiting its human security policies to focus on armed violence and international law to explicitly defining human security in narrow terms.[7] Whereas Axworthy once identified human security as comprising "security against economic privation, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental human rights,"[8] Canada's 2002 human security policy was titled *Freedom from Fear*, explicitly omitting the freedom from want that forms the other pillar of a broad conception of human security. Canada's approach to human security reached its *narrowest* point in 2006, when the Harper Conservative government explicitly defined human security as "freedom from *violent* threats to people's rights, safety, or lives."[9] It identified human security priorities including peace operations, children in conflict, organised crime, public safety, and terrorism, reflecting Canada's rhetorical and policy commitment to an agenda prioritising legal and military instruments for protecting human security.

Filling the Gaps in the Narrow Approach

NATO has only adopted human security within its own operations and activities since 2019 but has moved with considerable speed. A new Human Security Unit in the Secretary General's office consolidated policy across several related areas into a NATO focus on five main issues: civilian protection; children and armed conflict; countering human trafficking; conflict-related sexual violence; and cultural property protection. NATO's organisational approach to human security expressly fuses it with the Women, Peace, and Security agenda that also

originates from the UN system.[10] Indeed, NATO's whole approach to the concept is structured around adopting relevant resolutions from the UN Security Council, aligning military training and education with human security norms, and implementing best practices for NATO-led operations, missions, and activities. Though later abandoned, the United Kingdom announced in 2019 it would establish a Centre of Excellence for Human Security to provide training to NATO and partner militaries. Given this focus, there are strong similarities between NATO's emphasis on protecting civilians in conflict and regulating and improving state and other actors' behaviour in conflict zones through improved military doctrine and more robust international legal instruments, and Canada's approach to human security.

These similarities also limit Canada and NATO's approaches to human security. In the scholarly and practitioner realms, Canada's narrow human security agenda has been critiqued for various reasons, notably: the limits it imposes on the conceptualisation of human security threats; the implication that human security is principally a concern in fragile or failed state contexts receiving foreign military interventions; and the difficulty of operationalising security analysis at the individual level of analysis.[11] Each of these critiques illustrates shortcomings of a narrow approach that risks significant consequences in terms of misunderstanding the present and future role of national militaries, such as the Canadian Armed Forces, in relation to human security.

Canada is not immune to threats to human security, even if it has typically preferred to identify human *in*security as an international, rather than domestic, framework for assessing and responding to security challenges.[12] Recent trends demonstrate the limitations of the narrow approach that has been adopted by NATO and has previously informed Canada's human security policies. Multiple deployments of the CAF in response to environmental and social crises which endanger human life, and, in some cases, whole communities are not legible as responding to human insecurity according to the NATO concept. However, a broad conception of human security is increasingly relevant within Canada as a result of growing transnational forces that undermine human wellbeing, coupled with uneven levels of government capacity and socio-economic development across the country. As I argue, climate change in particular poses inter-related threats to security in Canada related to human security, economic threats, Arctic threats, humanitarian crises at home and abroad, and the risk of domestic conflict.[13] Such threats are often co-constituted or mutually reinforcing. A disaster or extreme weather event which threatens people's lives, homes, communities, and cultural

heritage invariably has significant negative economic consequences, and, if sufficient numbers of people experience critical humanitarian shortages of the necessities for life and wellbeing, then their human security is clearly harmed.

Conclusion

Disaster and emergency response and relief roles for the CAF are not encompassed by the NATO concept or, more generally, embody a narrow approach to human security. These roles reflect critical functions of the Canadian Armed Forces and illustrate the analytical and operational gaps created when human security is interpreted in exclusively narrow terms. Put differently, human security should be understood broadly *even in relation* to the deployment of the military. Increasingly, CAF operations will reflect a *broad* conception of human security that requires the military's role to be embedded within a whole-of-government framework that reflects both civilian and military actors and capabilities.

Conceiving human security principally in terms of the protection of civilian populations from violence risks obscuring the wider, non-combat role for militaries in helping to provide or restore human security when it is threatened or disrupted by environmental disasters such as extreme weather events. While the CAF will continue to perform military roles in support of human security internationally, domestically it is clear that "the problem of human security […] cannot by its very constitution be approached in a narrow manner."[14] Rather, a broader assortment of tasks related to disaster management, emergency preparedness, and search and rescue are vital contributions the CAF plays towards protecting human security within Canada.

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Climate-Disasters and
Human Insecurity: British Columbia 2021

Wilfrid Greaves and Peter Kikkert

The CAF participated in six humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions between 1990 and 2010 and 30 missions between 2011 and 2020. Climate change, the worsening natural hazards it creates, and limited provincial and territorial investment in disaster management capabilities explain this mission increase – as does the fact that the CAF is very good at disaster response.[1] This effectiveness flows from the military's organisation, strong command and control, logistical capabilities, specialised equipment, and its ability to quickly put hundreds of self-sustaining boots on the ground – a source of human power that is physically fit, does not get paid overtime, can work for extended periods (in past disasters, soldiers have slept less than three hours a day for 72 hours), and can be put in harm's way.[2]

In addition, the CAF has become adept at anticipating certain types of support requests as they occur each year. For example, during flood and fire season, it is anticipated that more requests for support will be received. Analysis of the CAF training documentation shows an alignment of the conduct of support exercises with the timing of potential support requests. The ability to utilise personnel already on exercise, especially reservists, reduces their activation time, increasing the ability of the CAF to respond to large scale support requests such as floods. By planning and preparing for these seasons, the CAF is able to successfully respond to the requests for support. The CAF also enhances its responsiveness through close liaison with regional authorities to gain as much forewarning as possible of potential requests for support.[3]

Given its proficiency at disaster response and because provinces and territories have made limited investment in disaster response capabilities, the CAF is being turned from a force of last resort into a force of first, or only, resort.[4] But, as previous commentators have pointed out, this tempo of domestic operations will negatively affect the CAF's force generation, operational readiness, and training for its primary purpose – fighting wars – particularly given its ongoing recruitment and retention challenges.[5] Importantly, the CAF also does not do mitigation or recovery work – its support is limited to response and relief. It is not a cure-all to the gaps in Canada's current disaster management system, but it is nonetheless vital to the provision of human security in responding to emergencies and disasters.[6] This speaks to the need for a

comprehensive and whole-of-government approach to human security, and robust civil-military cooperation.

The experiences of disaster management, emergency preparedness, and SAR in recent years also demonstrate the uneven distribution of human security threats according to sociological factors such as affluence, geography, gender, and degree of socio-political marginalisation.[7] For those in vulnerable groups within rural, isolated, and Indigenous communities, the deployment of the CAF during recent crises is particularly vital to help protect their human security.

Over the course of 2021, British Columbia (B.C.) provided an exemplar of the role that militaries play in responding to domestic human security crises, particularly in the context of responding to disastrous impacts of climate change-related extreme weather events. In the span of a single year, B.C. experienced three sets of climate-related disasters – record-setting wildfires, extreme heat, and catastrophic floods – that negatively impacted human security for people across the province and required separate deployments of the Canadian Armed Forces for government to respond.

According to the B.C. government's summary of the 2021 wildfire season, environmental conditions across much of the southern and eastern parts of the province contributed to an exceptionally challenging year. Below average precipitation in the winter and spring of 2021 contributed to widespread drought conditions and dangerous levels of natural wildfire fuels (trees, brush). The province experienced a total of more than 1,600 fires during the year, including more than 300 concurrent active fires at the height of the season and 67 separate wildfires of note.[8]

Aggressive fire conditions were directly worsened by the extreme heat experienced across B.C. in the early summer. High temperatures climbed throughout the month of June, culminating in a fatal, record-breaking heat wave across the entire province. The temperature in the town of Lytton set a new record for highest recorded temperature in Canada on June 29 at 49.6 degrees Celsius. On June 30, two people died and 90% of the structures in Lytton were destroyed by the second largest wildfire of the season, which consumed more than 83,000 hectares of land and. The B.C. Coroners Service identified 619 heat-related excess deaths between late June 25 and mid-July, with 93% (576) occurring during the so-called "heat dome" extreme heat between June 25–July 1.[9] In total, wildfires triggered 181 evacuation orders and directly displaced more than 32,000 people in 2021. Total economic losses from the fires have not been fully calculated, but the cost of wildfire suppression

activities alone from April 1–September 30 was approximately $565 million, more than three times the budgeted amount.

Environmental disasters often beget other disasters, and the severe wildfire season paved the way for disruption from unprecedented fall flooding across B.C. In November, repeated extreme weather phenomena called atmospheric rivers produced record rainfall, tornados, flooding, and mudslides across the southern part of the province. Four people were killed, 18,000 were displaced, and thousands of properties seriously damaged; many interior communities were also cut-off from overland access to the rest of the province. Severe damage to major highways resulted in the severing of road connection between the Port of Vancouver and population centres in the Lower Mainland with the interior of the province and the rest of Canada. The flooding destroyed road, water, sewage, electricity, and agricultural systems across numerous communities, with the cleanup and emergency reconstruction efforts lasting for weeks after floodwaters had receded. Although total costs have not been calculated, they exceed at least $9 billion in losses, making it the one of most expensive disasters in Canadian history.[10]

The wildfire and flooding disasters each led to the deployment of hundreds of Canadian Armed Forces personnel to assist with emergency response and relief efforts. In the midst of the heat dome, the CAF responded to a request from the B.C. government for assistance and deployed more than 300 personnel between July-September. Military personnel supported local and provincial wildfire response, including fire suppression, construction, and air lift. In November, the CAF was back in response to the provincial flooding crisis. Contributing to a whole of government effort, more than 500 CAF personnel delivered food and supplies, conducted reconnaissance and damage assessments, constructed flood defences, and contributed to the evacuations of people, pets, and livestock.[11] The events of 2021 demonstrate there will always be a role for the military to play in disaster response. The RCAF Cormorants that rescued almost 300 people trapped by landslides on Highway 7 near Agassiz, B.C. are a prime example of the capabilities that the CAF can bring to the table that others cannot, and which will be increasingly required as the climate crisis worsens.

The mission capped off a very busy year of domestic operations for the CAF. Hundreds of military personnel were deployed elsewhere under Operation LENTUS to help the Yukon prepare for intense flooding, assisted with wildfire evacuations in Northwestern Ontario, fought wildfires in Manitoba, and provided potable water for Iqaluit through the deployment of Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units

(ROWPU). Meanwhile, hundreds more CAF members supported the Government of Canada's response to COVID-19 and its vaccine distribution efforts through Operations LASER and VECTOR.

Conclusion

For Canadians across the country, particularly those in rural and Indigenous communities, the CAF played a vital role in protecting their human security over the course of 2021. There are clearly limits to the CAF's role in responding to domestic humanitarian emergencies, as its capabilities remain limited and are only meant to serve as a "a force of last resort" rather than a force of "first choice."[12] Moreover, senior CAF leaders have sounded the alarm that increased domestic demands for military capabilities and deployments directly affect Canada's ability to respond adequately to the increased national security and defense pressures of a deteriorating international strategic environment.[13] While the CAF is increasingly vital to the protection of human security during climate-related environmental disasters, it is not a panacea for the gaps in Canada's disaster management regime which reduce community resilience.[14] Likewise, a growing need for military assistance at home only accentuates the urgent challenges for the CAF in terms of recruitment and retention of suitable personnel, leadership and integrity, modernisations, and cultural change within the armed forces.

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Part 3:1: Search and Rescue Squadron evacuating civilians, Canada.

A CH-149 Cormorant helicopter and its crew from 442 Search and Rescue Squadron provide support for Operation LENTUS, evacuating people out of Merritt, British Columbia (BC), after heavy rain triggered mudslides along a BC highway on 15 November 2021.

Source: Corporal Parker Salustro, Canadian Armed Forces Photo © 2021 DND-MDN Canada.

"That Others May Live": Search and Rescue

Peter Kikkert and P. Whitney Lackenbauer

The Canadian Armed Forces' (CAF) search and rescue (SAR) activities play a fundamental role in protecting human security through the preservation of human life and thus the Protection of Civilians (PoC). The CAF no-fail SAR mission contributes to human security and *freedom from harm*. Less obviously, the CAF's SAR activities can also be understood as a critical enabler of the physical, cultural, and economic security and resilience of individuals and communities, particularly in northern and remote areas.

Canada has domestic and international obligations to "prevent loss of life and injury through SAR alerting, responding and aiding activities using public and private resources."[1] Through the National SAR Program, federal, provincial, territorial, and municipal organisations share responsibility for SAR, with the support and assistance of volunteer organisations and private sector partners. Beginning in 1947, the federal government gave the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) the mandate for aeronautical SAR, and in 1951 these responsibilities expanded to include the coordination of maritime SAR.[2] Today, the CAF bears overall responsibility for the effective operation of the federal coordinated maritime and aeronautical SAR system. The CAF provides aeronautical SAR services (e.g., response to aircraft incidents; search for downed aircraft) and assists the Canadian Coast Guard in the resolution of maritime SAR cases, often tasking air resources and other assets to respond to marine incidents.[3] In the case of aeronautical and marine SAR operations, no request for assistance is required – the CAF is a first responder. In the case of ground SAR (GSAR) operations, such as searches for missing hikers or hunters which are a provincial/territorial responsibility, emergency management organisations and police services must first request assistance from CAF resources.[4]

International conventions and bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries have set the boundaries of Canada's Search and Rescue Region (SRR), which stretch well beyond its territorial limits.[5] As a result, Canada has one of the world's largest areas of responsibility for SAR, covering 18 million square kilometers of land, water, and ice, over 243,800 kilometers of coastline, three oceans, and three million lakes.[6] The federal aeronautical SAR mandate stretches from the U.S. border to the North Pole (nearly 5200 km), eastward over the Atlantic Ocean to 30 degrees west longitude (approximately 1500 km or halfway

to the United Kingdom) and westward over the Pacific approximately 1000 km west of Vancouver Island. Meanwhile, the federal maritime SAR mandate covers the oceanic waters within the Canadian SRR, the Great Lakes, and the St. Lawrence River/Seaway system.[7] The vast swath of territory covered by the Canadian SRR is not only remarkable for its size, but also its often-austere environmental conditions, severe weather, and low population density.[8]

Today, Canada's SRR is divided into three SAR regions – Halifax, Trenton, and Victoria – each the responsibility of a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (operated by the CAF, and staffed by RCAF and Coast Guard personnel), although they provide mutual support to one another and share assets.[9] Maintaining an effective SAR capability takes sustained funding, commitment, technological innovation, and international cooperation. Currently, the CAF provides around 950 personnel to deliver SAR services 24 hours a day, 365 days a year – making them "one of the busiest and most operational groups in the CAF today."[10] The CAF's primary support for SAR includes the three Joint Rescue Coordination Centres (JRCC), five SAR squadrons specifically trained and crewed for SAR activities, and the Canadian Mission Control Centre.

Commanded by experienced RCAF SAR pilots or navigators, the JRCCs are responsible for the planning, co-ordination, conduct, and control of SAR operations. They receive and interpret distress alerts, assess requirements, and develop response plans, including the identification and tasking of the most suitable response resources to locate the incident, stabilise the situation, and recover survivors to a place of safety.[11] Under the JRCCs direct tactical control are the five primary SAR squadrons, consisting of CH-149 Cormorant and CH-146 Griffon helicopters and CC-130 Hercules aircraft, which are to be replaced by the CC-295 Kingfisher.[12] Each primary aircraft or helicopter on standby is fully crewed and includes search and rescue technicians or SAR Techs. Armed with the motto *that others may live*, the 145 SAR Techs in the CAF are highly trained personnel who can deploy by parachute or hoist to an incident and perform emergency trauma care procedures, stabilising victims for evacuation.[13] SAR crews are obligated to respond within a set Response Posture (RP) standard "measured as the time from when a tasking is received to the crew being airborne." Currently, a fully operational aircrew is to be airborne within two hours of receipt of an alert (in the recent past, the RP standard called for a response of 30 minutes during normal working hours and two hours at all other times).[14] Other CAF air and naval assets can

be called upon to serve as secondary SAR resources, although they respond only as available and are not kept on standby.[15] Finally, the Canadian Mission Control Centre, stationed at JRCC Trenton, runs the COPSASSARSAT program, upholding Canada's commitments to the International Cospas/Sarsat Programme Agreement (ICSPA), a satellite-aided SAR initiative focused on detecting and locating emergency locator radio beacons activated by persons, aircraft or vessels in distress.[16]

In support of its SAR mandate, the CAF provides funding for the training, insurance, administration, and operations of the 1800 volunteers in the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA).[17] This federally incorporated non-profit volunteer association provides private aircraft, trained volunteer crews, and spotters for military aircraft during search missions. In 2022, CASARA provided 166 private aircraft, 96 chartered aircraft, 20 Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS), and 19,108 flying hours to the SAR system and responded to 196 JRCC callouts.[18] CASARA volunteers participate in search taskings for downed aircraft and other humanitarian missions, while also conducting SAR awareness and training programs.[19]

Through the Canadian Rangers, the CAF also provides a local SAR capacity to over 200 communities across the country. Within their communities, Rangers often serve as GSAR volunteers who know how to work effectively as a group or, when formally activated by the CAF, as a formal team on an official military tasking for which they are paid. The CAF provides Canadian Rangers with flexible training that is tailored to local terrain and environmental conditions but generally involves several elements directly related to SAR capabilities: first aid, wilderness first aid, GSAR, constructing emergency airstrips on land and ice, and communications. When searches go on for extended periods, the search area is too vast to be covered by GSAR teams, and/or there are insufficient community volunteers, Ranger patrols offer an accessible community-based solution. While Rangers in all 5 Patrol Groups participate in SAR operations, 3 Canadian Ranger Patrol Group is unique in having signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ontario Provincial Police authorising it to provide formal support in GSAR operations in northern Ontario. Between 2015 and 2018, Rangers in 3CRPG in northern Ontario rescued 90 people in 79 official ground and marine SAR operations. Ranger Sergeant Jean Rabbit-Waboose from Eabametoong First Nation (3CRPG) emphasised the value of Ranger participation in SAR activities, explaining that "the army's

training and funding for us has been a blessing for all our communities. It has saved a lot of lives."[20]

The CAF's SAR activities play a fundamental role in protecting human security through the preservation of human life. Aeronautical and maritime SAR is classified as a *no-fail mission* – one that *must* be undertaken to minimise injury and loss of life.[21] Given these stakes, Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) acknowledges that SAR represents its most "enduring mission" and one that brings the CAF "into constant contact with Canadians and provides services directly to them on a 24/7 basis."[22] Working closely with the Coast Guard, the CAF responds to more than 9000 SAR calls annually, with approximately 1,100 requiring the deployment of CAF assets.[23] These responses range from responding to downed aircraft, to disabled, aground, sinking, and lost marine vessels, to searching for individuals in support of provincial and territorial agencies. Annually, on average, these SAR missions save the lives of 1,200 persons directly in jeopardy, while providing assistance to approximately 20,000 others.[24]

The CAF must also have its primary SAR assets and secondary resources prepared for low-probability, high-consequence scenarios that could result in *large-scale* loss of life, namely major aeronautical disasters (MAJAID) (particularly in remote regions) and major marine disasters (MAJMAR). To address these scenarios, the CAF must be prepared to undertake mass rescue operations, "characterized by the need for immediate response to large numbers of persons in distress, such that the capabilities normally available to SAR authorities are inadequate."[25] During major air and marine disasters, the CAF provides initial care and survival support, medical evacuation, and, possibly, the deployment of its four MAJAID kits (plus an additional training kit that can be deployed if required). Each kit can be air dropped and contains tents, sleeping bags, clothing, medical supplies, heaters, generators, water, and rations to support 80 people for up to 24 hours.[26] In normal conditions, the CAF anticipates it can accomplish the entire MAJAID operation within 72 hours of initial notification.[27] In the case of a large passenger plane crashing or the evacuation of cruise ships in a remote part of the country, this rapid CAF response would prove vital and, if successful, could save many lives.

When broadly conceived, threats to human security are perceived as multi-sectoral in that they rarely affect only one dimension of human life and wellbeing.[28] Likewise, state and other governance interventions to protect human security typically support multiple dimensions of security for the affected population. Beyond its fundamental life-saving

function and the reduction of serious injury, the CAF's SAR services also make important contributions to economic security and to community and individual health and wellbeing. A range of economic activities, ranging from the fishing industry to cruise and eco-tourism, to commercial shipping and marine transportation, depend on the safety net provided by the SAR system. Canada's marine spaces, for instance, support over 350,000 Canadian jobs, many of which could require SAR assistance. In delivering its SAR mandate, the CAF supports regional, individual, and international economic security. Further, for many Canadians, spending time on the land, waters, and ice of this country is vital for recreational purposes, socio-cultural needs, and for individual mental and physical wellbeing.

For many Indigenous Canadians, in particular, SAR is perceived as an essential support to their ability go out on the land to be "healthy and whole."[29] Inuit community responders have highlighted how the SAR system facilitates on-the-land cultural activities that foster the connection with land, water, and ice that is a requirement for Inuit health and well-being. Across Inuit Nunangat, the SAR system also supports the harvesting activities required to feed families and combat food insecurity, long-distance travel between communities by snowmachine and boat, and economic activities, including local subsistence economies, commercial fisheries, and tourism. Thus, the SAR services provided by the CAF in partnership with local, territorial/provincial, and federal partners are not only viewed as a life-saving measure, but as a critical component of broader community safety, security, and resilience objectives.[30]

Conclusion

In undertaking its no-fail mission, the CAF has saved the lives of thousands of Canadians. While the CAF's SAR activities make their most obvious contribution to human security by saving lives, they should also be understood as an essential building block of the physical and cultural health and wellbeing of Canadians, of the country's economy, and of the overall resilience of individuals and their communities. As climate change continues to cause rapid environmental change and contributes to extreme weather events, the number of SAR cases will increase, as will the importance of the CAF's SAR mission, its life-saving objective, and the safety net it provides across the country.

Notes

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13 Canada, "The Military SAR Machine."

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15 Canada, *CJOC Search and Rescue Directive*.

16 Canada, *CJOC Search and Rescue Directive*. Traditionally accomplished by the LEOSAR (Low Earth Orbiting) system, the program is in the process of transitioning to MEOSAR (Mid Earth Orbiting), which will provide expanded coverage, more accurate locations, faster alerting, and more information to the RCCs. The CMCC is staffed 24/7 by military aircrew or communications officers, and provides signal analysis to assist JRCC coordinators and, at times, international partners, in the conduct of SAR operations.

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Part 3:2: Search and Rescue during a medical event exercise, Canada.

Search and Rescue Technicians Master Corporal Ashley Barker (left) and Master Corporal Jeff Connors with 413 Squadron from 14 Wing Greenwood, move a casualty to a safe location while exercise evaluators keep watch, during a medical event as part of SAREX 15, in Comox, British Columbia on September 14, 2015.

Source: Corporal Ian Thompson, Imagery Technician, 4 Wing Cold Lake AB, Canadian Forces Combat Camera © DND-MDN Canada CK02-2015-0864-061.

Broadening Human Security:
The Canadian Rangers and Community Disaster Resilience

P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Peter Kikkert

The contributions towards human security made by the Canadian Armed Forces through the provision of search and rescue (SAR) services and assistance during domestic emergencies are supported by the Canadian Rangers in remote coastal and northern communities across Canada. The Canadian Rangers are involved in every phase of the disaster and emergency management spectrum: prevention and mitigation, preparation, response, and recovery. Canadian Ranger training, organisation, structure, leadership, local knowledge, cultural competence, and relationships allow many patrols to make essential contributions to disaster resilience – and human security more broadly – in their communities.

Rangers are Canadian Armed Forces Reservists who provide a military presence in the remote parts of the country "which cannot conveniently or economically be covered by other elements of the CAF."[1] They are not intended to act as combat forces and receive no tactical military training. Instead, their regular tasks include surveillance and presence patrols, collecting local data for the CAF, reporting unusual sightings, participation in community events, and assisting with domestic military operations. To facilitate these operations, Rangers share their knowledge and skills with regular members of the CAF, teaching them how to survive and function effectively in Arctic, sub-Arctic, and rugged coastal environments. They are also heavily involved in leading and mentoring youths in their communities through the Junior Canadian Ranger program, a Department of National Defence initiative that promotes traditional cultures and lifestyles and other developmental activities.

Rangers are often called upon to respond to local emergencies and disasters, conduct SAR operations, support humanitarian operations, and perform other public safety missions.[2] Due to their presence, capabilities, and relationships with(in) their communities, Rangers regularly support other government agencies in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from a broad spectrum of local emergency and disaster scenarios. Consistent with a human security focus, Kikkert and Lackenbauer argue that DND/CAF should reinforce and enhance the Rangers' functional capabilities in light of climate and environmental changes that portend more frequent and severe emergencies and disasters.[3]

Many of the key building blocks of community disaster resilience are brought together in community-based Canadian Ranger patrols. They are an example of how community resilience can be strengthened from the bottom-up,[4] with the CAF empowering Rangers to use their existing skills and social relations within an organisational structure that provides them with the framework, training, and equipment they require to assist in every phase of disaster management.[5] Canadian Rangers view the protection of their communities as one of their primary responsibilities. A Ranger from Taloyoak, Nunavut, asserted that "we are the eyes and ears of the military, but we are also the eyes and ears of our community. We protect our communities."[6] Another Ranger from 1CRPG explained that "we [Rangers] are the people to call when things go sideways – period."[7] This willingness to help extends to emergencies involving outsiders operating in and around their communities. When asked about the possibility of a cruise ship running aground near their communities, for example, each of the Ranger patrols that participated in the Kitikmeot Roundtable on Search and Rescue in January 2020 (co-organised by the authors and Nunavut Emergency Management) said it would respond to such an incident. "We may not be happy that you've brought this trouble, but we will try our best to help you out of it," one Ranger concluded.[8] Their sense of social responsibility ensures that Rangers are willing to respond to emergencies and disasters.

The organisation of the Rangers into patrols at the community-level ensures that they can respond as a group almost immediately: an important consideration in austere northern environments. The unique context of the Canadian North (and other parts of the Arctic) – remote and isolated communities, limited physical and human infrastructure, and insufficient response capabilities coupled with low temperatures and extreme weather – has led some scholars to argue for the establishment of a special category of *cold disasters*.[9] Given the vast distances involved, outside help often takes a long time to arrive and, without an effective and timely initial local response, cold disasters can cascade and worsen quickly.[10] Due to their presence and state of readiness, Ranger patrols can provide an effective and timely response. Canada's northern communities rely on diesel generators for power, and their failure for extended periods in the winter can pose a serious risk to human life (e.g., Sanikiluaq, Nunavut in 2000; Kuujjuarapik, Nunavik in 2001; Pangnirtung, Nunavut in 2015; Wawakepiwan and Muskrat Dam in northern Ontario in 2018). In these situations, Rangers quickly assist by establishing emergency shelters, going house-to-house to perform wellness checks, assisting elders, providing information about food and alternative housing, preparing meals, ensuring that people have access

to a heat source, and informing residents about potential dangers such as carbon monoxide poisoning from using camping stoves indoors.[11] Through these efforts, the Rangers directly contribute to the health, wellbeing, and morale of their fellow community members and provide an additional safety net to ensure that no one slips through the cracks of the emergency response.

The formal training provided to Rangers and the intergenerational transmission of knowledge that occurs amongst Rangers within patrols effectively address several gaps identified with disaster risk reduction in Canadian Indigenous communities.[12] More specifically, scholars and practitioners have pointed out the need to create space for traditional knowledge and practices in Canada's broader disaster risk reduction efforts.[13] Critics have also underlined the lack of opportunity provided to Indigenous communities to develop their local emergency response capabilities. Many remote Indigenous communities face difficulties in applying larger regional or national emergency response frameworks (such as the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary) to their unique contexts, as well as challenges working with outside agencies (including the Canadian Armed Forces) stemming from limited interactions and lack of trust.[14] Ranger patrols represent a community-based, culturally appropriate solution to many of these challenges, and ultimately serve as crucial providers of human security within their individual communities and across the North.

The Rangers' role in Operation LASER, the military's effort to support the Government of Canada's objectives and requests for assistance in the fight against COVID-19, also showcased their value in assisting health and emergency management agencies.[15] During Op LASER, Rangers serving in their own or neighbouring communities performed community wellness checks, prepared triage points for COVID testing, raised awareness about social distancing, established community response centres, cleared snow, cut and delivered firewood, and provided food (including fresh game and fish) and supplies to elders and vulnerable community members.[16] They also acted as a conduit between their communities and the government agencies involved in responding to potential community outbreaks, with important roles in passing along reliable information about local needs. In short, during this time of domestic and international crisis, the Canadian Rangers provided the Government of Canada with an additional layer of local capacity that it could quickly leverage to enhance its COVID-19 response efforts. "The advantage," concluded one government official in Nunavik, "is that the Rangers are already here, in their communities."[17]

As Rangers carried out their new COVID-19 related duties, they continued to perform their traditional tasks, which included preparing for the spring-time natural hazards that threaten their communities and participated in disaster response. In April and May 2020, for example, the communities of Fort Vermillion in northern Alberta, Hay River in the Northwest Territories, and Kashechewan in northern Ontario requested the assistance of their local Rangers in the face of heavy flooding.[18] Fort Vermillion, in particular, faced once-in-a-generation flooding, and its 25 Rangers were engaged in monitoring water levels, setting up roadblocks, transporting and distributing logistical equipment, sandbagging critical infrastructure, staffing the Emergency Operations Centre, and helping over 450 residents with the evacuation of their homes.[19]

Conclusion

Involvement in flood relief activities and response to COVID-19 highlight the disaster and emergency management roles that Canadian Rangers have been playing for decades. Despite these contributions to community safety, the Canadian Rangers' role has been largely ignored in the literature on human security and on emergency and disaster management in Canada – even by studies focused on remote, isolated, northern, and/or Indigenous communities.[20] Situating the Rangers in a human security framework not only helps to dispel misconceptions about the value of their non-kinetic military role,[21] it provides insights into how investments in local and Indigenous military units can build disaster resilience in at-risk, remote, and isolated communities with small populations, limited infrastructure, few local resources, and little access to rapid external assistance. The Rangers may provide a model for other NATO members and partners looking to invest in relatively low-cost, resilience-building measures in remote and isolated communities (particularly those susceptible to cold disasters). They also demonstrate the limitations of considering the military role with respect to human security in excessively *narrow* terms.

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Part 3:3: Canadian Rangers establishing communications, Canada.

Master Corporal Chris Keesic (left) and Ranger Yvonne Sutherland (right) from 3rd Canadian Ranger Patrol Group give a thumbs-up after successfully establishing communication with their colleagues on the PCX-250 high frequency radio during Exercise COASTAL RANGER in Fort Albany, Ontario on February 27, 2017.

Source: Master Corporal Mathieu Gaudreault, Canadian Forces Combat Camera © DND-MDN Canada IS04-2017-0015-006.

Structural Considerations and Meaningful Participation

Myriam Denov

In theory, the concept of human security has inspired prospects, opportunities, and a new way of envisioning the world of security. And yet, its implementation has seen ongoing setbacks and challenges.

A central challenge in successfully implementing a human security approach may in fact stem from the emphasis on the individual, as well as from the assertion that the *individual* is the fundamental vehicle through which security is attained. When the sole focus is the individual, broader structural constraints, critical to understanding the lives of individuals may be overlooked. Indeed, the human security approach appears to overemphasise the freedom that individuals have to construct their own social arrangements, as though they stood outside collective forces.[1] In reality, much human insecurity appears to result from structural factors and unequal distributions of power that extend far beyond the reach of individuals. These structural realities inevitably influence and shape human security processes like truth commissions and disarmament initiatives that, in turn, have a profound impact on people's potential for attaining long-term post-conflict protection, empowerment and, ultimately, security. For example, in post-war Sierra Leone, several human security initiatives were implemented. Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programming sought to protect the public while simultaneously increasing security and contributing to the peacebuilding process. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SLTRC) aimed to empower individuals and communities by addressing impunity and responding to the needs of victims. In turn, the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) sought to protect the public by punishing those bearing greatest responsibility for war crimes. Arguably, the Court can also be seen to promote empowerment by bringing a measure of accountability to Sierra Leone and allowing victims and families to know that justice will be served. There is little doubt of the powerful symbolic and pragmatic importance of the three aforementioned processes for overall post-conflict recovery. However, research on war-affected women and girls has shown the end of civil war and the subsequent establishment of human security initiatives like DDR, the SLTRC, and the SCSL did not necessarily have a positive effect on the everyday lives of women and girls or lead an end to gender-based violence and insecurity in Sierra Leone.[2] Ultimately,

to achieve greater long-term security, human security initiatives aimed at individual protection and empowerment must occur alongside the reformation of existing social, political, economic and educational structures and institutions.

While addressing structural realities is key, ensuring the *meaningful* participation of individuals is equally important. Christi points out that human security is, in theory, said to work on behalf of the silenced, and yet, in practice, it ultimately fails to give them a voice.[3] As a way forward, a participatory approach may enable greater participation, and thus greater empowerment. Participatory approaches seek to equitably involve individuals whose lives are being considered in all phases of research and policy development. As such, in participatory approaches, there is not a single "player" who holds all the information and absolute power, but rather a partnership that operates through sharing experience, expertise and training. By turning traditional top-down methods upside down and "handing over the stick" to communities and marginalised groups, the participatory approach seeks to create a power reversal by enabling local people to take greater control of the research and policy-making process.[4] In the case of populations affected by human insecurity, participatory approaches would view affected children, families and communities as having a keen understanding of the social forces that shape their lives and as the true "experts."[5] Perhaps the goal of achieving greater long-term security is rooted neither in a completely individualised approach nor in a solely structural one. Instead, a combination of individual and structural factors needs to be integrated into the human security agenda. Such an approach would acknowledge the importance of the individual, as well as the active role of individuals in producing and contributing to their own social circumstances and security. Yet it would also recognise that an individual's scope and capacity for choice is bound by historical, structural, and institutional constraints. Cynthia Enloe has suggested that, to understand the world better, we must take seriously the experiences of ordinary people, following the trail from national and international decision-making, and broader structural constraints, back to the lives of ordinary people.[6] This analogy bodes well for the present analysis, whereby individual and broader socio-political structures are considered equally crucial to assuring the long-term post-conflict security of the general public.

Notes

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Other Cross-Cutting Topics

Clare Hutchinson

To date, NATO has accepted five interconnected topics under the human security agenda: combatting trafficking in human beings; children and armed conflict; conflict-related sexual violence; protection of civilians; and protecting cultural property. Criticisms has been levelled towards the Alliance regarding omission of critical elements that can contribute to a holistic and robust human security agenda. As the Alliance further refines its human security agenda, it is possible that the remit will widen and expand to include other topics of concern and they are worth considering here.

Climate Change

NATO has been grappling with the issues related to climate change for decades. In 1969, NATO established the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS), which managed studies and fellowships focusing on issues like air and noise pollution, advanced health care, and the disposal of hazardous wastes. During the Cold War, environmental warfare was of heightened concern but, as détente took shape, NATO's environmental dimension lost significance and importance.[1] Today, it is clear that NATO recognises climate change as a threat multiplier that impacts allied security and physical resilience of installations and personnel, displaces large groups of refugees and migrants which fuels conflict, and places pressure on natural resources.[2]

In 2006, the NATO Science Committee merged with the CCMS to form the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme to develop initiatives on emerging security challenges, including environmental security issues like water management and the prevention of natural catastrophes, and energy security. By combining military strategies with community-based solutions, human security focuses on the importance of military-civilian coordination. In 2020 Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg outlined NATO's role related to climate change:

> Some may ask if NATO, a military alliance, should be concerned with climate change. My answer is that yes, we should, and for three reasons. Because climate change makes the world more dangerous, because it makes it harder for our military forces to keep our people safe, and because we all have a responsibility to do more to combat climate change.[3]

Following this statement, in March 2021 NATO Foreign Ministers endorsed the Climate Change and Security Agenda and in Brussels June 2021, NATO Leaders agreed to a Climate Change and Security Action Plan, with the aim of making NATO the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to security risks from climate change.

From a human security stance, the challenges to human life and human safety from climate change are profound. Only once the international community can adapt an inclusive and gender-responsive, human security approach to environmental risk and threat, and bring that under a holistic lens of security, will there be change. Extreme weather conditions, sea level rise, flood risk, depletion of natural resources, land degradation, geological hazards, and pollution are all factors that can ultimately lead to humanitarian disasters, regional tensions, and violence, and should be incorporated into a human security risk analysis.

Health

Highly systematised public health control efforts have been in place since the 1850s, spurred by the necessity to control cholera and, later, smallpox epidemics.[4] In 1951, the WHO adopted the International Health Regulations (IHR), which were revamped in 1969 to coordinate efforts to battle the most dangerous infectious diseases of that time, such as yellow fever, plague, and cholera.[5] Health security was also included as one of the key dimensions of human security in the UNDP's seminal 1994 *Human Development Report*. The UN Secretary General cited the concern for health security in 2006, stating that "Health is one of the key building blocks of society…It is a prerequisite for hope."[6]

In the early 1990s, the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus/ acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) epidemic became a watershed moment that made awareness of the global health and security nexus impossible to deny.[7] The US issued Directive NSTC-7 that confirmed infectious diseases such as Ebola, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS presented one of the most significant health and security challenges facing the global community.[8] The Directive further stated that HIV/AIDS has significant consequences on the military (including peacekeepers), affects social cohesion and potential conflicts, but it can also affect the relationships between the developed and developing countries due to restrictions in terms of travel and immigration policy.[9] The efforts by the US to present HIV/AIDS as a security issue, led to the

2000 UN Security Council Resolution 1308, designating HIV as a threat to stability and security, a threat which greatly endangers peacekeepers and their operations.[10]

Infectious diseases have always had a profound impact on military operations. During the Second World War almost one million cases of tropical infections occurred among US troops. Diarrheal disease and dysentery were widespread, and approximately one in four returning GIs suffered from at least one tropical infection.[11] Not only are military personnel at risk for infections while deployed, but these exposures can also pose a risk for host nation populations due to transmission of infectious pathogens; similarly, these pathogens may represent a risk for home nations of military personnel upon redeployment. Notably, cholera was introduced into Haiti following the 2010 earthquake from a UN peacekeeping camp, where unsafe sanitation management sent sewage into local waterways, leading to a large outbreak (hundreds of thousands of cases) of diarrheal disease among a highly susceptible host nation civilian population. This action adversely affected peacekeeping reputation, legitimacy, and thus operational effectiveness.

Despite the knowledge that the spread of infectious disease can be far deadlier to civilian and military populations than armed conflict, the field of global health security has not kept pace with the expansion of threats to global risk and security. Infectious diseases and bioterror are appropriate targets for a defensive position because they are continuous trends almost guaranteed to persist. By contrast, health security is a more nebulous term and, in its execution, requires a continual state of readiness. In this respect, security is difficult to frame in absolute terms because, in contrast to defence, security extends the time frame and readiness into the long-term future and entails an ongoing set of projects without a clear target.[12] Moreover, infectious diseases cannot be addressed unilaterally, and solutions must be holistic and wide-ranging and globally driven by security.

In post-conflict societies, the interdependencies between health and security are even more pronounced. Human security preparedness helps citizens cope with a wide range of sudden and pervasive threats— both natural and human-made—that can have major health consequences. Resilient individuals, communities, and institutions can handle daily adversities and a wide and unpredictable range of incidents that have the potential to negatively affect their lives. COVID-19 has highlighted that infectious diseases are threats to national and international security, and therefore the role of the armed forces in response to these challenges and health crises has become legitimate.[13]

The Committee of the Chiefs of Military Medical Services in NATO (COMEDS) was established in 1993 when the need for the coordination of medical support in peacekeeping, disaster relief and humanitarian operations became vital for NATO. COMEDS coordinates and provides common vision for military health care through formal setting and endorsement of policy, doctrine, and standards. Medical support provides essential combat service support, making it one of the key planning domains for operations, alongside armaments, logistics, air traffic management, and other areas of specialisation.

NATO *Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine* recognises the intersection between health and military effectiveness, "the conservation of the fighting potential of a force so that it is healthy, fully combat capable, and can be applied at the decisive time and place."[14] This includes protection from sexually transmitted diseases.[15] Not only do militaries have a clear responsibility to provide public health support and health care for their troops, they can also provide support to the civilian sector in many ways. However, until COVID-19 NATO did not have a linear connection to broader health security outside of operations.

The future of global health security is one that inevitably requires deeper analysis on the emerging and remerging risks and how these intersect with human security. Policymakers must begin to see healthy societies as the foundation of national security, and rethink collaborative governance in global health security.

Technology

Despite its ability to connect and unify, the digital divide is pervasive. In his 1972 speech, a prescient Lester B Pearson, said:

> There can be no peace, no security, nothing but ultimate disaster, when a few rich countries with a small minority of the world's people alone have access to the new world of technology, science, and of high material living standards, while the large majority live in deprivation, shut off from opportunities of full economic development.[16]

In addition to major technological advances which shape the culture, understanding, and conduct of security operations and warfighting, technology has changed planning for crisis response. Open-source information readily available and accessible could be used to formulate faster initial operational or contingency plans, specifically in planning emergency response situations.[17] The use of technology in an operational setting can also mitigate disasters, especially within an early warning context, and disseminate critical information about security threats.

Some examples such DATTALION, Ukraine's Data Battalion, and Ushadi are grassroots, and designed to provide a platform for accurate and timely reporting of human rights violations in conflict and crisis situations.[18] The Sentinel Project employs media harvesting to track civilian reports of hate speech as early warning indicators in at-risk areas, compiled within the database of hate speech called "Hatebase."[19] As early as 2013, "Hatebase" was used to conclude that there was an extremely high risk of genocide or mass atrocities in Myanmar, nearly three years before the Rohingya genocide began.[20]

In 2019, the NATO Heads of State and Government agreed to develop an "Emerging and Disruptive Technology (EDT) Implementation Roadmap", and an Innovation Board and Innovation Unit were established to oversee innovation pipelines and ecosystems across the alliance in 2020. The NATO Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies issued its first annual report identifying concrete areas for the Alliance to consider as NATO adopts new technologies.[21]As part of the NATO 2030 agenda, leaders agreed to launch a civil-military Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and to establish NATO's first Innovation Fund. Since its launch at NATO's Brussels Summit, several allies have made offers to host the headquarters, test centres and accelerator sites that will make the DIANA network in both Europe and North America. It is hoped that a gender element of this Fund will be included in the future.

While technology and innovation do not fall under the remit of the Human Security Unit in NATO, the connection to the cross-cutting topics is apparent. It does not seem feasible to address the multitude of technological advancements in defence without recognising the potential harm to civilians that advanced technologies can pose or the potential for enhanced potential of protection of civilians and troops when technology is utilised. The cutting edge of emerging technologies must be spliced with the principles of human security so that innovation and technology can benefit everyone – civilian and military, women, and men, equally. But questions should be asked about fundamental rights and freedoms, especially with rapid increase in surveillance technologies.

While AI is a fundamental game-changer in the context of human security and with it social benefits, the ethics of AI and cybersecurity, Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), and the use of AI in peace negotiations and the non-violent transformation of conflict should be considered. Moreover, gender and racial biases are inherent in AI technologies, systems, and processes. A global digital gender divide is affected by offline factors such as poverty, gender discrimination, a lack

of education, and gender stereotypes preventing women from reaping the benefits of technological advances.[22]

The key cross-cutting topics which Allies have agreed to as forming NATO's multi-sectoral approach to human security can be further considered in relation to the emergent topics discussed in this case study. Indeed, topics should not be considered in isolation. Although there might be some debate as to the number of topics which should exist in a human security approach, there are ten key elements which should form part of any approach, and which will be discussed in the next case study.

Notes

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A Canadian Framework for Human Security

Clare Hutchinson

Mirroring NATO's human security progress, the Government of Canada could again take a lead on the design and implementation of the concept. Human security could be further refined to meet CAF needs. Integration of human security into training and education; deployment of expertise; establishment and support of research and a Centre of Excellence on Human Security; drafting of lessons learned and doctrine. For Canada, the human security agenda plays to the nation's comparative advantages. Canada emphasises the roles of human rights monitors and civilian police in peace operations, the disarming, demobilising, and re-integrating of ex-combatants, and the protection of civilians in armed conflict, especially women and children. The concept of human security draws upon long-standing Canadian values of tolerance, democracy, and respect for human rights. There is potential for Canada to develop a robust and expansive framework for human security, utilising the expertise and experience already in place, and building on the following ten elements: 1) relevance; 2) trust; 3) inclusivity; 4) adaption and resilience; 5) protection; 6) reputation; 7) values driven; 8) operational effectiveness; 9) international legitimacy; and 10) civ-mil partnership.

Relevance: The core issues of the human security agenda are more relevant than ever, because of the complexity of insecurity and emerging non-tangible threats. Multiple threats need multiple solutions and utilisation of different stands of peace building, diplomacy, development, and defence tools are all needed. Protection of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), combating exclusion, empowering and protecting women and girls from sexual violence in conflict are already tasks undertaken by the Canadian Armed Forces. The situation in Ukraine has highlighted that strong defence is essential but that war is also fought by other means. The use of dis-information, sexual violence, attacks on schools and hospitals, mass migration coupled with the increased threats to fuel, food, and water, has opened the dialogue on human security. There is not one solution that can accurately respond to crisis and conflict of today. The various tools, military and political, that can be available to address crisis or conflict, can support and provide value to actions for peace.

Trust. Engaging with the whole of community, while adopting a people-centric approach, is the blueprint for operational effectiveness. Liaison with the populace and local civilian agencies is necessary.

Lessons gathered from Afghanistan and other out-of-area operations highlight that the stronger the force, the larger the local resistance and therefore winning community trust is essential. Excessive use of force, selective application of security measures, and constraints on freedom of expression reinforce the sense of marginalisation and alienation among citizens. In turn, this increases the prospects of radicalisation. Integrating a human security lens to address root causes of violence provides a comprehensive understanding of security which in turn leads to safer deployments and enhanced trust in the armed forces. Protection of local cultural property as well as local citizens creates a bond of trust and engagement between troops and civilians.

Inclusivity. Human security exists alongside Canada's commitment to gender equality and other cross-cutting topics. By expanding the view of security, integration of a gender perspective is possible. Generally, women and men perceive security differently and, as a progressive liberal-democratic country, Canada fully understands this fundamental difference in perception. Inclusivity can create a more intellectually vibrant, creative, and inclusive environment for all, and one that better equips armed forces to tackle the complex challenges of today and tomorrow. Most Canadians recognise that diversity and inclusion has both relevance and importance for today's world. An inclusive approach relies on a whole of society engagement, including youth, women, and minorities. For those target groups awareness of and familiarity with the CAF continues to be very low, particularly among those 18–34's, who do not believe that military force is the best method to address diverse, global issues.[1]

Youth are sceptical of the "peace through strength" philosophy that has traditionally underpinned NATO, and defence policies more broadly.[2] The youth across the Euro-Atlantic domain look to a dynamic and multicultural world, where they want these institutions to work for *human* security over *national* security and to uphold universal values such as freedom and human rights. A recent poll by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs revealed that the top foreign policy priorities among youth included: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons (64%), securing adequate supplies of energy (59%), and combating world hunger (47%)—which are not *traditional* NATO issues.[3] Post-millennials immersed in a digital world use digital platforms in innovative and unique ways. The Canadian Armed Forces could strengthen its human security approach by engaging diverse youth voices. This will not only create a more inclusive environment, but it could also better equip CAF to tackle complex security challenges.

Adaption and resilience. Human security does not imply that the military must dilute its focus on defence but consider the wider range of security threats. The concept of security, once framed largely in conventional military terms, must today consider a range of evolving threats including international terrorism, drug trafficking, child recruitment, corruption, organised crime, etc. In some nations, poverty, disease, and environmental degradation further threaten stability and undermine security. The aim of a human security approach is to strengthen political response to all forms of risk and increase the potential for armed forces to protect civilians and minimise casualties. Hybrid threats have become staples of the modern security environment. Hybrid threats, such as information operations, political subversion, economic coercion, organised crime and trafficking of people and property, and critical infrastructure attacks, are standard elements of the modern security environment. At the 2018 Brussels Summit, allied leaders also pledged to assist allies at *any stage* of a hybrid attack.[4] Armed forces must be able to translate conventional military applications to new threats. For instance, AI and synthetic environments can be used to build indications and warning systems, improve exercises, automate and digitise planning, and support decision-making around hybrid threats. Technology from drones to AI applications can be made more standardised, interoperable, and resilient. While critics have argued that climate change falls far beyond a defence mandate, NATO has acknowledged the potential for the effects of climate change, such as water scarcity and restricted energy access, to disrupt the future of international security.[5]

Protection. Essentially, the human security agenda is a shift in vision away from a state-centric perception of security to one that placed the security of people at the heart of foreign policy. In the Canadian formulation of the concept, human security is advanced by protecting people from violent threats to their safety, their rights, or their livelihoods. Human security collects in one conceptual framework many issues which had previously been regarded as discrete domains of foreign policy. Many of the issues on the agenda were longstanding but had acquired new urgency due to the prevalence in intrastate conflict and state failure in the 1990s. What was common to all of them was that they involved threats to the security of people directly and the introduction of emerging areas of threat. Military commanders balance the protection of the local populace in their Area of Operation with sufficient force protection. Human protection operations are different from both the traditional operational concepts for waging war and for UN peacekeeping operations.

Reputation. There is a growing interest among civilian and military actors about engendering goodwill on the part of the local population in out-of-area operations. This includes the responsibility to protect, and positive conduct, applied in conflict and post conflict nations. The specter of genocide, ethnic cleansing, failed and lawless states, and massive refugee flows calls for coordinated international response. The international media contributes to an emerging global conscience through the transmission of live images of brutal conflict and human rights violations. The resulting humanitarian imperative pressures nations as well as individuals to develop new initiatives and policy responses to save lives and alleviate human suffering.[6] In the human security domain, where the sanctity of human life is paramount, the pressing need is to find effective means and mechanisms to protect human beings, especially the many innocent victims of armed attacks. Post-millennials are more likely than older generations to view the Canadian military as a rigid and exclusive institution that is rooted in nationalism and colonial legacies – an institution that does not align with their values.[7] Integrating human security into military doctrine and response could demonstrate to the younger generation that CAF is responsive to modern attitudes and values.

Values Driven. Human security is aligned to Canada and commitments to human rights, freedoms, values, and standards. Canadians have long viewed national unity, political liberty, the rule of law and acceptance of responsibility to be prioritised in their international obligations[8] In the 1960s, Canadian interests, projected by the Pearson government, focused on military security, expanding economic strength, maintaining national unity, and playing a creative role in international affairs. In the 1990s, Canada's interests were to foster economic growth, to safeguard sovereignty and independence, to work for peace and security, to promote social justice, to enhance the quality of life, and to ensure a harmonious natural environment.[9] It is accepted that Canada cannot do these things without an effective military force structure. The foundation for human security is the ability to translate these values into action.

Operational Effectiveness. Human security is not about carrying out non-combat operations. The integration of human security principles into operations is critical. For example, every military operational plan for any unit size could include CAAC, PoC, CPP, THB and guidelines on protection from sexual violence. Additionally, there should also be guidance on working with civil society, including women, marginalised and minority groups. Human security considerations should be made a part of all military activity, not just an add-on. The Human Security

Doctrine thinkers within all allied militaries have yet to create a systematic framework for intervention for the protection of civilian populations. It is also advisable to deploy a civilian protection component.

International Legitimacy. Human security is linked to the Geneva Conventions, international law, and Security Council resolutions. For Canada, human security has become associated with already existing features of Canadian diplomatic and foreign policy traditions. The debate on sovereignty and the conditions under which human rights concerns should take precedence over sovereignty has been a central preoccupation of both practitioners and analysts of foreign policy in recent years. Perceptions of security have changed and collective security, is regarded in a much broader sense than military security. The adoption of a human security narrative is often cited as a key driver behind a number of Canadian-led initiatives, such as the campaign to ban landmines in the 1990s which culminated in the Ottawa Treaty.[10] International legitimacy underlies a Canadian's perception of their role in the international order, especially related to conflict and intervention. Currently public support of military intervention to respond to any humanitarian crises is at an all-time high. At the beginning of the Ukraine crisis a quarter of Canadians said they would support military forces being sent to Ukraine alongside NATO allies to deter Russia and protect citizens "even if it means casualties."[11] By aligning international commitments on human security, Canada could encourage more robust support for the armed forces.

Civ-Mil Partnership. No one group can achieve human security on their own without working with others.[12] Unity of effort between all agencies is a key success factor for missions and operations.

> Not only does a holistic approach draw different specialties together in the quest to understand interconnections between diverse aspects of human insecurity it may also bolster co-operation between international agencies in the fields of security, development and human rights.[13]

Human security depends on civil-military-police understanding and coordination. Human security requires local ownership and active engagement between the security sector and civil society. Integrated training for the security sector and civil society can help identify common ground and divergences. Engaging with civilians on perceptions of security is essential to foster good will, but also for legitimacy and support. By closely working together military and civilian stakeholders can fashion a more comprehensive understanding of resilience shortfalls and their immediate and long-term impacts on societies.

As discussed in Chapter 3, in order to enable human security for all humans, there must be a deliberate furthering of the WPS agenda through an inclusive approach and a total realisation of women's rights across all economic, political, and social spheres. The two agendas, human security and WPS, are complementary, and should be considered concurrently within any military actions, planning, or operations, as discussed in the next case study.

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Part 3:4: Providing clean potable water during disaster response operations, Philippines.

Master Corporal Yani Fauchon, a Preventative Medicine Technician and Corporal Frank Hamil, a Water-Fuel-Environmental Technician, take water samples from the Reverse Osmosis Water Purifying Unit to check the purity of the water as part of the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) efforts in the province of Capiz, Philippines on November 22, 2013 during Operation RENAISSANCE.

Source: Corporal Darcy Lefebvre, Canadian Forces Combat Camera © 2013 DND-MDN Canada, IS2013-6012-02.

Women, Peace, and Security

Clare Hutchinson

In 2000, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) recognised the importance of integrating a gender perspective in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. Nine additional resolutions on WPS were adopted to further elevate global attention to the specific issues outlined in SCR 1325.[1] Where SCR 1325 was wide and sweeping, the additional resolutions were narrow and targeted, allowing for further refinement and attention to specific issues that needed the Council's attention. The resolutions on WPS were intended to structure the overlooked and undervalued elements of WPS in a comprehensive and holistic way. This foundation of WPS builds on the integrated and interconnected themes of empowerment and protection which are inherent in a human security approach. Empowerment and protection are separate but equal, a pillared approach to the fundamentals of gender equality. Gender equality has always been a vital component of the human security agenda as the consideration of gendered insecurities necessitates a broadening of the concept of security beyond territories or boundaries, to the total realisation of women's rights across all economic, political, and social spheres.

WPS is built on principles of protection, participation, and prevention. The vision of security must be anchored to the inclusion of women in all activities, which reaches beyond that of specific military tasks. Protection is a critical element of the WPS mandate, but so is women's participation and not only in military functions. Integrating gender into cyber and technology, guaranteeing that terrorism response or combatting violent extremism and online hate is driven by a gender perspective, countering dis-information and changing the narrative of conflict, raising awareness of gender-language and promoting an intersectional approach to climate change, are all valued parts of the WPS agenda. Situating WPS solely under a human security structure would only dilute the strength of the agenda to strategically weave across all areas of security at all levels. NATO's approach to WPS, through its *Policy of Inclusion, Integrity and Inclusiveness*, therefore, provides a framework for gender perspectives to be integrated into all areas of security and defence, and not only in the specific cross-cutting themes of human security.

Despite existing under the same unit in NATO, concerted efforts have been made to separate protection issues[2] from the wider lens of gender equality so as not to limit the potential for WPS to widen its lens beyond operational approaches to the strategic level. Whereas human security is the inter-connective tissue between all cross-cutting areas that can create conditions for security and protect citizens, WPS addresses the holistic vision of security from the political to the tactical, from empowering women to participate politically to protecting women from abuse. The WPS agenda also promotes different expectations of security that require increasing levels of protection. But the various levels of protection need to address the both the systemic and fundamental differences between women and men. Recognising this is essential to foster resilient and healthy populations in safe and secure environments.

The benefit of integrating gender is clear, but it is essential to ensure that gender equality continues to be understood as foundational to human security and that it underpins human security by providing the connective tissue between all the cross-cutting areas. WPS as a political and operational tool can be framed to respond more holistically, equitably, and sustainably to both traditional and non-traditional threats to international peace and security. WPS complements and deepens the human security vision by recognising protection is different for everyone, and thus everyone needs to be empowered.

Ensuring a strong gender equality focus within human security is particularly important if issues, including those of violence against women are to be recognised and effectively addressed. For this to happen, defence and security policies and strategies must mainstream a gender perspective and connect WPS to all work in relation to defence, operations, and operational planning. For population-centric operations to respond to the specific needs of the population, then our understanding must be gendered. Children and Armed Conflict and Youth, Peace, and Security are also key components in driving our understanding of these human security issues. For example, if we do not address the marginalisation of boys, born of war and mythologising the warriors of the past, then there is a huge potential security risk that can drive the cyclical and intergenerational nature of violence and conflict.

The WPS agenda has tremendous potential to transform how gender is considered across international peace and security and within military tasks. It complements the work of human security and efforts to protect women and men, mutually reinforcing, separate, yet equal. WPS must stand alone, theoretically and practically, as an agenda to be

advanced in its own right. Human security is anchored to protection, WPS is embedded in empowerment. Recognising that empowerment of women and girls is the baseline for equality in turn makes for more resilient and better protected populations.

Notes

1 UNSCR 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013), 2122 (2013), 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), 2493 (2019).
2 Protection (operational) agendas primarily constitute the NATO Human Security agenda, this is the basis for division of the WPS and HS work.

Human Security as Part of National Resilience

Rachel Grimes

Much of the discussion in this volume so far has concentrated on the military application of human security both as an end-state to operations and as a way of conducting operations. The review of literature focused on human security within the context of a military operating in another country whether as a peace support operation, counter-insurgency operations, or major combat operations. Until the COVID-19 pandemic, human security within peacetime military engagement was mainly associated with military forces providing support to other government agencies through Operation LENTUS, as noted in Greaves' discussion of British Columbia in 2021, and also Lackenbauer's discussion of the Canadian Rangers.[1]

NATO has recently developed work encouraging Allies and Partners to enhance their domestic resilience: "Each NATO member country needs to be resilient to resist and recover from a major shock such as a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack."[2] NATO defines resilience as a "society's ability to resist and recover from such shocks and combines both civil preparedness and military capacity."[3] While it is unlikely that NATO would be involved in a conflict in Canada, there may be an occasion when CAF deploys to another NATO member state to conduct Peacetime Military Engagements (PME) or military operations. In such instances CAF may be required to ensure the security of European civilians in relation to NATO's seven benchmarks for resilience:

- Assured continuity of government and critical government services;
- Resilient energy supplies;
- Ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people;
- Resilient food and water resources;
- Ability to deal with mass casualties;
- Resilient civil communications systems;
- Resilient transport systems.

Further to this, Table Part 3:1 provides examples of how the security of women, men, girls, and boys may be impacted by failures to maintain the seven benchmarks of NATO resilience listed above.

CAF personnel could be tasked to respond to the various insecurities brought about by a nation unable or struggling to meet the various benchmarks. Applying a third-generation women, peace and human security approach could result in a more systematic method to consider the security of civilians within the context of national resiliency.

Table Part 3:1: Women, Peace and Human Security analysis of NATO's Benchmarks for Resilience.[4]

Human Security Considerations / Resilience Benchmarks	Civilian women, men, boys and girls	Women	Men	Girls	Boys
Uncontrolled Movement of People (either voluntary or through coercion)	1. Separation from family members/missing persons. 2. Lack of access to employment, no money (long or short term). 3. Lack of access to education (long-term) 4. Short and long-term trauma. 5. Susceptible to criminal activity (theft/physical harm). 6. Lack of access to basic needs, shelter, health care.	1. More likely to be moving with their children, elderly. 2. More vulnerable to sexual violence/trafficking especially in communal shelters or where there is no shelter. 3. Access to reproductive health is limited.	More likely to be killed by adversary forces (mass executions)	1. More likely to be taken for sex either by adversary forces or as part of human trafficking criminal activity. 2. Forces recruitment as child soldier (usually for sex/tasks around military bases/camps).	1. More likely to be taken as child labour, recruitment as child soldiers 2. More likely to be killed as adversary forces or used ss suicide bombers if abducted.
Mass Casualties	1. Public health will seriously deteriorate if energy infrastructure is not operating—also impacts on equipment. 2. Hospitals may be understaffed due to staff shortages caused by displacement. 3. Awareness that older men more than women and especially those from Africa or Asia are more susceptibal to the COVID-19 pandemic. 4. Victims will be in various stages of pain and distress and range in age from infants to geriatric patients. 5. Women, girls, and boys are 14 times more likely to die during a disaster.	About 4% of the casualties will be pregnant women.	More men and teen-aged males will die through direct conflict or massacres inflicted by adversary troops.		
Continuity of Government Services	1. Anticipate absence of Rule of Law and ungoverned areas leading to increased criminality. 2. Men more likely to be asked to support armed resistance/national military. 3. Importance of governmental actors listening to Civil Society—especially those representing women (who are often overlooked).				
Energy Supplies	1. Destruction or damage to oil refineries—loss of energy, potential fires/smoke inhalation, creates tonnes of rubble, asbestos, cement, heavy metals, domestic chemicals and combustion products, causing prolonged exposure to harmful dusts in the long-term leading to damaged respiratory health. 2. Damage to power plants—impact on access to water, creating water-related diseases and wastewater management issues (eg sewage could flow into rivers). 3. Damage to communications systems – leaving people shocked in fear.				
Food and Water	1. Reduced access to clean water leading to illness and disease (cholera etc) 2. Reduced food intake, malnutrition/dehydration—long-term effect of stunted growth in children.				
Communications Networks	1. Unable to know which are the best ways to leave the area. 2. Cut off from life-saving assistance—unable to request help. 3. No access to internet/social media.				
Transport Systems	1. Reduced food/water availability. 2. Unable to more the injured. 3. Unable to move medical care or humanitarian aid to civilians.				

Notes

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2   NATO, "Resilience, Civil Preparedness and Article 3," (last updated September 20, 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm.

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Canada's Human Security Agenda

Myriam Denov

Canada's role in developing and implementing a human security agenda has not been immune to criticism. These relate to the use of the human security agenda to promote national unity and identity, the limited attention to gender in Canada's early work on human security, as well as the authenticity and legitimacy of Canada's commitment to human security. These are addressed in the following sections.

Human Security as a Political tool for National Unity

For some, Canada's human security policy was not an accidental element of Canadian foreign policy or a new direction, but a natural expression of Canadian identity, as well as the continuation of Canadian multilateralist traditions.[1] However, critics argue that although human security was developed as a foreign policy agenda, it was also used in domestic settings as a political discourse to promote national identity and unity. Ozguc argues that human security as a governmental practice aimed to constitute Pan-Canadianism and endorsed the historical essentialist constructions of Canadian identity as being tolerant, peaceful, generous, a good international citizen, and non-American.[2] Moreover, in the wake of the 1995 Quebec referendum, the Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Mexico, and economic decline, Canadian human security policy united Canadians at a time when these crises divided them. Critics argued that through the promotion of "shared Canadian values," the human security agenda supported the nation-building efforts in Canada and was used as a political tool for national unity.

Human Security as Concealing Insecurity within Canada

Critics have also argued that by focusing on foreign policy and insecurities outside Canada, the human security agenda concealed human insecurities within the Canadian state. Ozguc argues that the celebration of the values of pluralism and tolerance work to mask and obscure Canada's systemic and structural racism and domination.[3] More recent examinations of Canada's commitment to principles of human security at a domestic level have led to similar conclusions and ultimately questioned Canada's domestic commitment to human security. Smith and Ajadi suggest that a deeper examination of domestic human security reveals a significant gap between theory/discourse/ practice

and the historical and current structural violence and discrimination occurring within Canada:

> If we open up the state and expose domestic politics, we find a history of oppression of Canada's Indigenous peoples. It is a history of residential schools, reserves, and relocation of Inuit peoples to suit the state while our current government, rhetorically engaged in reconciliation, denies the experiences of First Nations children in care and ignores the work of the National Inquiry on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls—hardly feminist. If we open up the black box, we don't find nationwide human security—we find the razing and expropriation of Africville, the practice of indefinite immigration detention that disproportionately affects people of African descent, and the proliferation of street checks and racial profiling in Canada's major cities as three of many examples. Through the outward projection discourses of human security and feminist foreign policy there is an invisibilization of people and peoples which discursively provides many Canadians with the opportunity to distance themselves from their own histories and feel good about themselves.[4]

Absence of a Gendered Lens

Canada's human security strategy has also been criticised for its lack of attention to gender. Ali highlights the inattention to the dimension of gender in many Canadian-led human security initiatives, including R2P, the ICC, and the invisibility of girls when considering children affected by war.[5] While more recent human security initiatives have included a gendered analysis, which likely a result of the WPS agenda's influence, greater attention is required to fully integrate the gendered needs, vulnerabilities, and risks of civilians.

Canada's Wavering Commitment to Human Security

As an initial leader and strong proponent of human security, Canada's relatively sudden "disappearance" from the human security agenda in both theory and practice in the mid-2000s has led some critics to question both the legitimacy of and authenticity in pursuing the agenda. Some authors have even suggested that it served as *political theatre* and have questioned the government's self-interest in pursuing the agenda. As Hanlon and Christie note:

> There is a serious risk that governments are capturing the debate around human security to achieve their own gains. That is, human security can serve as political theater. A telling example is the Canadian government's retreat from the human security concept within its own foreign policy strategy. When the Conservative Party took office in 2006, there was a rollback

in human security-led initiatives, especially surrounding peacekeeping and climate change…raising serious concerns over the legitimacy of politically driven human security initiatives.[6]

While faced with multiple critiques, there is some evidence of a resurgence of the human security agenda. An example is Canada's leadership role in the recent conception and adoption of the Vancouver Principles. In addition, human security discourses, approaches and initiatives have also featured more prominently in more recent action plans in Canada. For example, as noted earlier, in 2017, the Trudeau government produced Canada's National Action Plan for the Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security 2017–2022. The 2017 Action Plan highlights many challenges and opportunities in relation to women and girls:

> Despite achievements by the UN, its Member States and other actors on the WPS agenda, a gap remains between words and action. Closing this gap represents a unique opportunity for Canada to increase the well-being of women and girls in conflict-affected states, contribute to sustainable peacebuilding, and decrease threat to international security. . .. It requires Canada to identify the barriers to women's participation and seek the opportunities in conflict, humanitarian settings, peace operation, and statebuilding to challenge the status quo – to transform harmful gender relations and empower women.[7]

In addition, Canada launched *It's Time: Canada's Strategy to Prevent and Address Gender-Based Violence*, which was supported by $20.7 million per year over five years for its implementation. The potential resurgence of human security in theory and practice has yet to be determined in Canada's domestic and foreign policy. However, some have declared that it is already in the works. Drawing on speeches of government ministers, policy documents, media and scholarship, Smith and Ajadi argue that a resurgence may be underway:

> Canadian federal governments regularly try to craft a unique image of Canada in the world; however, the Trudeau government's embrace of feminist foreign policy feels strikingly similar to the late 1990s, when human security was embraced. There seems to be a "sameness" in the promotion of a progressive values-based discourse that has transformative potential for Canadian foreign policy.[8]

Time will tell as to whether the human security agenda will continue to gain traction. However, writing in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the need to further cement and entrench the notions of freedom from fear and freedom from want, both domestically and internationally, are increasingly apparent.

Notes

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3   Ozguc, "Remaking Canadian Identity."

4   H. Smith and T. Ajadi, "Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy and Human Security Compared," *International Journal* 75, no. 3 (September 2020), 11–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702020954547

5   Shelina Ali, "Gender Mainstreaming in Canadian Human Security Policy: The Limitations of Bureaucratic and Security Discourses," *Innovations: A Journal of Politics* 8 (2008): 34–58.

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8   Smith and Ajadi, "Canada's Feminist Foreign Policy and Human Security Compared," 2.

Human Security Definitions: Challenges and Limitations

Myriam Denov

For some, the wax and wane in interest in human security is related to its inherent weaknesses and limitations. The following outlines some of these critiques, including the challenge of defining the concept, its neo-colonial nature, the problems inherent to the UN's use of the concept, the short-term vision of the concept, and the absence of a gendered lens.

Critics argued that the concept of human security had no common agreed upon definition and was "extraordinarily expansive and vague."[1] In fact, with over 30 different definitions, the concept was perceived by some as being too broad to be of any theoretical or practical use.[2] A 2004 issue of *Security Dialogue* convened 21 experts that showed that scholars and policy makers tended to fall into three categories in relation to defining human security: (1) those for whom human security represents an attractive idea but lacks analytical rigour, (2) those who accept the concept, but insist on limiting it to a narrowly conceived definition, and (3) those who insist that the broad definition of human security is an essential tool for understanding contemporary crises.[3] That said, while the concept continues to be used, critiques concerning its lack of precision persist. Writing in 2019, Peou notes that there is no global consensus on what human security means and that, as a result, it remains difficult for the global policy community to take collective action to address threats to human security. Peou notes that "if the definition of human security covers almost everything, what is not human security?"[4] Furthermore, it has been challenging to provide an operational definition that provides clear metrics for measuring human security. Paris' critique regarding the problem of *vagueness* is summed up in the following comment:

> As a rallying cry, the idea of human security has successfully united a diverse coalition of states, international agencies, and NGOs. As a political campaign, the human security coalition has accomplished a number of specific goals, such as the negotiation of the land mines convention. But as a new conceptualization of security, or a set of beliefs about the sources of conflict, human security is so vague that it verges on meaninglessness— and consequently offers little practical guidance to academics who might be interested in applying the concept, or to policymakers who must prioritize among competing policy goals.[5]

Human Security as Neo-Colonialism

Reflecting a North-South divide, some have argued that the promotion of human security is simply a new way for Western states to impose their preference for liberal democratic politics—which only developed states have the luxury of focusing on—rather than more basic socio-economic threats to the individual.[6] Others have taken this critique further by arguing that proponents of human security—by advocating the notions of freedom from want and freedom from fear—locate threats to human security in the developing world, leading to the *problematisation* of non-western states. Moreover, others still have argued that human security has been co-opted and appropriated by state advocates (realists, neo-conservatives, liberal internationalists) as a way of advancing their neo-colonial or imperial ambitions.[7] Howard-Hassmann has also questioned the human security paradigm and its capacity to undermine human rights given its broad view. She notes the risk of it "undermin[ing] the primacy of civil and political rights as a strategic tool for citizens to fight for their rights against their own states."[8]

Problems Related to the UN's Use of the Concept

To explain the concept vanishing from the UN's agenda, Martin and Owen argue that there are three core problems in the UN's use of the concept. First, there is the ambiguity surrounding both the concept and practices of development and of human security. In both theory and practice, development and human security are often used interchangeably, resulting in significant confusion regarding the added value offered by human security discourse. Second, there is the lack of a clear distinction between human rights and human security, with nearly no attempts to differentiate the concepts. Third, there is the conceptual overstretch of the UN's use of human security. They argue that there has been a tendency to include each and all possible threats to the individual in various UN conceptualisations of human security and that this has led to the discouragement of its use. In so doing, this "can lead to false priorities and hopes, create causal confusion, can encourage military solutions to non-military problems and non-military solutions to military problems."[9] The authors argue that these three core problems may help to explain why the Secretary General and many UN member states are reluctant to fully endorse the concept. Moreover, in an interview on the role of human security within the UN, Lakhdar Brahimi, former special representative to Afghanistan, Iraq and Haiti and chair of the UN Panel on Peacekeeping stated: "I don't use the term

human security because I don't know exactly what I mean, and I worry that someone will come up and contradict me."[10]

Short-Term Vision

Some critics have argued that the human security agenda has facilitated short-term policymaking in the absence of clear strategic policy visions. Here, critics like Chandler have argued that human security approaches enable governments and policymakers to opt out of taking responsibility for foreign policy, encouraging a shift from strategic thinking to sound bites and ad hoc policymaking. As Chandler notes, "human security approaches argue that causal relationships are impossible in an interconnected world, making it much easier for governments to evade responsibility by seeking praise for their 'good intentions' rather than being held to account for the policy consequences of their actions."[11] Similarly, Christie argues that while the concept of human security may have value in highlighting particular issues, and may enable short term gains, it is unable to provide the basis for a substantive change of the system of international security.[12]

The Absence of a Gendered Lens

A strong critique came as a result of the lack of gendered analysis of human security. The failure of academics and policymakers to address the unique security experiences of women and girls, who often suffer the brunt of armed conflict, poverty, and human insecurities, highlights the stronghold of patriarchal structures of security. Despite these differential experiences of security, in key human security reports, such as the Sen-Ogata report of 2003, the unique (in)security experiences of women and girls were overlooked. Critics argued that by failing to make the security of women and girls an area of concern and attention, the report not only neglected key threats, but also further rendered them invisible.[13] Within the academic literature on human security, there was an ongoing call for a gender-based approach to overcome gender silences, including women (and girls) as a category of identity within security discourse, and integrating gender as a unity of analysis.[14] Indeed, Hutchinson in this volume would add there needs to be a unity of complementary approaches in theory and in practice.

While the concept of human security has received strong criticism, it has been remarkably resilient. There has been an enduring willingness by scholars not only to analyse and critique human security, but also to embrace it as a means of furthering political goals.[15] Writing in 2015, Breslin and Christou note that 20 years after the publication of the UNDP report in 1994, the debate on human security, as a concept and an accompanying agenda, "is still…very much in flux."[16]

Notes

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7   D. Chandler, "Review Essay: Human Security: The Dog That Didn't Bark," *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 4 (2008): 427–38.

8   R.E. Howard-Hassmann, "Human Security: Undermining Human Rights?" *Human Rights Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (2012): 88.

9   Mary Martin, and Taylor Owen, "The Second Generation of Human Security: Lessons from the UN and EU Experience," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 86, no. 1 (2010): 216.

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15 Christie, "Critical Voices and Human Security: To Endure, to Engage or to Critique?"

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Military Challenges:
Human Security from Strategy to Application

Rachel Grimes

The words we use to label concepts unwittingly often "freeze their meaning in unexpected ways."[1] The two words *human* and *security* are understood separately but used together they create a much-maligned phrase.[2] As noted by Denov in this volume, to come to an understanding of what the phrase human security means is but one challenge for those in the military seeking to expand the traditional notion of state and territorial security to one that includes security from the perspective of an individual.

At the strategic level, scholars encouraged by the end of the Cold War presented human security as an alternative objective of warfighting where "the primary goal of intervention is to protect civilians rather than to defeat an adversary."[3] This case argues that the state remains the main interlocutor for the provision of security, either domestically or internationally, and that the Armed Forces could enhance its operational effectiveness through adopting the tenets of human security within military action. It can, however, be challenging to apply human security within a military organisation.

This case raises the *gender-blind* nature of human security and uses the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) planning levels as a vehicle to further introduce the concept of third-generation Women, Peace, and Human Security (see Chapter 8, for discussion).

The Many Aliases of Human Security

The UN Human Development Programme (UNDP) *Human Development Report*[4] is seen by some as the catalyst of the human security debate, almost overlooks warfighting and conflict. Instead, the Report's seven categories of human security have a more developmental outlook listing economic, food, heath, environmental, and political security, in addition to community and personal security. This sparked an ongoing discourse between the hierarchy of *freedom from want* and *freedom from fear*[5]. It unwittingly led to the sense that a human security approach was an *either/or* dilemma with Canada focusing on the physical security of the individual while Japan advocated for a developmental approach.

The Human Security Report Project published by Simon Fraser University went on to define human security as "the combination of threats associated with war, genocide and the displacement of populations",

unsurprisingly aligning itself with the Canadian-touted freedom from fear approach.[6] Human security is also conflated and used interchangeably with the Responsibility to Protect principle, a legal means of intervening in another state when that state has failed to protect its own citizens, typically from ethnic cleansing or genocide.[7] The former United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, outlined that "R2P is not the same as its conceptual cousin human security, the latter is broader and posits policy should take into account the security of people."[8] Less frequently adopted but still prevalent is the inclination to describe humanitarian missions as "human security interventions,"[9] or to use the term interchangeably with "peacekeeping missions."[10] To add to this confusion human security has been associated as an extension of human rights. According to Brunee and Toupe one motivation behind the human security agenda "was to transform human rights and humanitarian concerns into high politics, in the hope that they would be treated more seriously."[11] This has drawn criticism from some as "political pandering"[12] and from others as undermining human rights.[13]

The lack of an organisational definition within the UN means that the term can be related to almost any threat "from substance abuse to genocide."[14] In the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) the term is employed more as a chapeau than an approach.[15] NATO's co-opting of the term along with the UK Armed Forces, has thrown a smoke grenade into the human security mix. Both use the term human security as an umbrella over topics with strong UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) affiliations. This has inadvertently resulted in a war of topic hierarchy. NATO places the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda outside of its Human Security Unit,[16] while the UK Ministry of Defence places WPS as the foundation for implementing topics relating to children and armed conflict, human trafficking and protection of civilians.[17] In both instances the use of human security is more as a catch-all phrase as opposed to an overarching approach, potentially seeking to bring together subjects that are not broadly accepted as pure military business. For the UK, the term human security was also seen as useful in a male-dominated organisation, attempting to circumvent the toxic nature of the term *gender* and *WPS* in male-dominated organisations.[18] In the Brussels 2021 *Communique*, the chapeau is acknowledged:

> NATO has long recognised the importance of Human Security, which focuses on risks and threats to populations in conflict or crisis areas and how to mitigate and respond to them.[19]

The same paragraph explains that "[t]aking a Human Security approach is a reflection of [NATO's] values and makes us more operationally effective."[20]

NATO's WPS and Protection of Civilians policies both link discourse and engagement between overlooked communities and NATO personnel as a way of better understanding the human terrain. This understanding leads to more sophisticated planning, which could enhance operational effectiveness. Thus, we see that human security is an approach to be taken for both ethical and functional reasons and simultaneously refers to a set of policies that lack a natural home in the planning processes of NATO and indeed most other militaries. Thus, human security is seen by some as "proliferating concepts without adding analytical value"[21] and only being used "to attract a larger share of public resources."[22]

Gender Matters

In addition to the various manifestations of human security, *invisible* factors also contribute to its censure. Gender dynamics within governmental departments, particularly the military, generate resistance to the inclusion of what is seen by some as *soft* power and undermining the effectiveness of warfighting.[23] This initiates a reluctance to identify or endorse a military contribution to human security. Globally, foreign affairs departments and departments of defence see the world differently and predictably have different methods for addressing insecurity. Although it is beyond the scope of this thematic section to consider why government departments have dissimilar attitudes towards *insecurity*, the role of gender dynamics within both ministries is likely to be a strong factor.[24] Certainly, research within the sphere of Women, Peace and Security has noted that certain, non-traditional security topics tend to be personality driven rather than institutionalised[25] and that male-dominated organisations are "deeply skeptical organisations resistant to change."[26]

The invisible power of gender politics is also apparent when considering the nomenclature around human security.[27] To put it bluntly, human security is gender-blind. The terminology overlooks the fact that depending on the sex, age, ethnicity, and gender-orientation a person is, that this will influence the type of insecurity they face.[28] As J. Ann Tickner pronounces:

> We cannot meaningfully consider human security without first discussing the different ways women and men experience life; a precondition for human security is women having the same opportunities as men.[29]

The Challenge of Human Security

Human security is viewed as a "good idea"[30] and something that has to be "done."[31] Canada has signed up to several policies relating to human security in the North Atlantic Council and politically shows strong leadership across all domains of human security in the UN and international community. Unfortunately, there is still little consensus about what human security means or how to *do* it. There is also a perceived friction with the WPS agenda: "why doesn't WPS sit under the human security umbrella in NATO, and which is more important?" is a common question raised by officers new to this domain.[32]

With no formal definition, an array of interpretations which are glaringly gender-blind, a penchant to use the term interchangeably with other policy areas, a tendency for the Government's left hand and right hand to be askew, and a potentially psychologically reluctant Defence military staff, one can envision only an *ad hoc* and half-hearted military application of human security.

Notes

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3   C. Chinkin, and Mary Kaldor, *International Law and New Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 491.

4   Chinkin and Kaldor locate human security at various points in recent history and date the spirit of the term human security back to 1922, when Jane Addams wrote "two of men's earliest instincts…the first might be called security from attack, the second security from starvation": *International Law and New Wars*, 481. See also Denov, this volume.

5   Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, *Human Security Concepts and Implications*, 28-29.

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Part 3:5: Rescue swimmers during Operation LENTUS, Canada.

Rescue swimmers and other members of HMCS MARGARET BROOKE remove debris from the community's shoreline in La Poile, Newfoundland and Labrador during Operation LENTUS 22-04 on September 29, 2022.

Source: Cpl Kuzma, Canadian Armed Forces Imagery Technician, Canadian Forces Combat Camera © DND-MDN Canada.

Conclusion: Continuing the Human Security Conversation

Melissa Hollobon, Shannon Lewis-Simpson, and Alan Okros

This volume explored international approaches to human security to revitalise a conversation about *how* and, perhaps more importantly, *why* a human security approach could be incorporated within Canadian defence and security. NATO has signalled a greater significance for human security within the Alliance by promulgating the 2022 "Human Security Approach and Guiding Principles", based on the UN conceptualisation of multiple dimensions of human security, within a narrowed scope of five cross-cutting topics.[1] Canada is recognised as a past and current champion of many of these cross-cutting topics, including Children in Armed Conflict CAAC), Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), and Protection of Civilians (PoC). Also noteworthy, the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) seeks to integrate human security across all defence functions, especially intelligence. The MOD emphasises opportunities for prevention and disruption of insecurity destabilisers in its human security approach and responses, to "act as a 'force for good', minimizing harm to civilians and maintaining legitimacy."[2] These moves indicate a keen awareness of why human security is, indeed, an appropriate defence and security approach to the most pressing challenges faced in the contemporary security environment in which Canada plays a role.

As NATO and other allies broaden their focus to include both the protection and prevention dimensions in an operational environment, following lessons learned in Afghanistan and in response to current conflicts and crises in Europe and around the world, it is prudent for the CAF to review its understanding of a human security approach. As a key NATO partner, the CAF can be guided by these works to enhance operational effectiveness through additional appreciation of human security within domestic routine and contingency operations as particular to Canadian tasks and experiences. The contributors to this volume agree that Canada is well positioned to incorporate a more formalised human security framework within its defence policy and increase meaningful contributions in this area, building on existing initiatives to progress security to include a people-centric, context-specific, comprehensive, and prevention-oriented approach. It is timely that leaders be aware of the challenges and possibilities of a human security approach to anticipate when and where policy decisions will be made by allies. This volume made suggestions where the CAF might

anticipate and suggests further work to better inform decisions to adapt and act.

Summary of the Volume Parts I–III

The analyses within the volume allowed readers to gain an appreciation of what human security is, where CAF currently sits in relation to ongoing developments in human security, and how a human security approach can be used to anticipate and respond to emerging and future threats. In Part I, Denov and Hutchinson provide comprehensive back briefs of the theoretical concept of human security and how that has shifted and changed in practice over the past century. Denov discusses how Canada assumed a leadership role in human security, largely informed by experiences in Kosovo and Rwanda. Hutchinson draws upon her professional experiences to ground the conversation in past work and current thinking with a summary of human security developments within the NATO Alliance.

The second part of the volume considered the mechanisms and potential frameworks through which human security could be actioned, and some theoretical and practical challenges in the implementation of such an approach. Denov discusses the paired *development-security* approach at the UN. Grimes and Lambert present arguments that move us through the doctrinal, strategic, operational, and tactical concerns challenging the formalisation of a human security framework. They offer insights that augment the further maturation of the ends, ways, and means of human security for the CAF.

As articulated in the contributions to this volume, the CAF has continued to engage in human security work in many respects following existing Government of Canada policies since the 1990s. Canada has supported or provided leadership on significant human security initiatives including R2P, the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Mine Ban Treaty on anti-personnel landmines,[3] the Vancouver Principles, CAAC, and the WPS agenda. Allies and partners have expectations as to what Canada traditionally and naturally brings to the table concerning human security. Meeting such expectations requires analyses to understand perceptions of Canada internationally to better assess gaps and opportunities. Lambert, Hutchinson, and Grimes examine the gaps that exist in the implementation of human security through a comprehensive Canadian whole-of-government approach. These authors provide practical suggestions to develop a more holistic approach towards people-centric security. Their analyses offer ways to reconsider the case studies and thematic sections in Part III of this volume.

The third and final section of the book provides case studies of human security in military activities at the operational and tactical levels and pauses to reflect on some lingering questions as to the practicality of its application within the Canadian military. Greaves, Kikkert and Lackenbauer provide tangible examples of the benefits of a human security approach within domestic operations, and how the approach could be further formalised within routine and contingency operations. These case studies raised some further questions and ways of approaching human security that are worth considering in order to deepen understanding:

- How can human security be used as an organising framework?
- What are the implications of a widened or narrowed scope to human security?
- How can a gendered lens be applied within human security? What is the intersection with WPS and other security initiatives?
- Whose security is it? Who decides? Who has agency?
- How might human security contribute towards more resilient communities in the long term as opposed to measurement of short-term gains?
- How could human security be defined?
- How might human security be used as a tool for deeper collaboration with, and understanding of, others?
- How do the considerations of human security inform what Canadians may be expecting from their military domestically?
- What importance might Canada place on a renewed consideration of human security?

This conclusion discusses some of these questions, considering ways in which human security might be approached, with the intent to further a Canadian conversation about the motivation behind, and the application of, human security.

Human Security as an Organising Framework: The Big Umbrella

As noted by Hutchinson, Lambert, and Grimes in this volume, human security can be considered as a framework to organise and integrate multiple objectives and different military tasks towards a common security goal. NATO has selected five areas of focus "where the Alliance can be most effective: protection of civilians; preventing and responding to conflict-related sexual violence; combating trafficking in human beings; children and armed conflict; and cultural property protection."[4] The UK MOD has focused on seven areas deemed important as these "could affect an operation in a number of ways", mapping "onto one

or more of the HS factors" which "exacerbate, perpetuate or entrench conflict/instability": protection of civilians; women, peace, and security; children and armed conflict; modern slavery and human trafficking; preventing and countering violent extremism; building integrity; and cultural property protection.[5] Within the new UK MOD human security doctrine, there is clear awareness of the interconnectivity of the cross-cutting topics of human security elements. It is simply not possible to consider any of the elements in isolation as the drivers of insecurity in one element and actions taken to alleviate risk do impact one another and may further impact development, governance, and civil society actions. Interconnectivity is key, as is collaboration and participation by all sectors of society, including the state. The UK human security approach is closely aligned with UK government priorities. A key difference is that the UK approaches WPS as a cross-cutting topic within human security, whereas NATO would hold the WPS agenda as a complementary agenda but not subordinate to the human security agenda. This difference shall be discussed further below.

To open the umbrella further, human security could be conceptualised as inclusive of state security. To date, most considerations of security have taken either a state-based or a people-centric security, not both. It is a fundamental responsibility of states to address the security of their citizens; the international community intercedes when states are unable or unwilling to do so, illustrating the recognised security interconnection between a state and its people. The integration of state and human security into a broad framework can also overcome the military binary of warfighting versus non-warfighting (stability or peace operations). As noted in the resolution concerning human security by the UN General Assembly in September 2012,

> The role of the international community is to complement and provide the necessary support to Governments, upon their request, so as to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging threats. Human security requires greater collaboration and partnership among Governments, international and regional organizations and civil society.[6]

If there were some consensus that state security is an integral part of human security, or a robust description of what fits, or what does not fit, inside the human security remit, it might be possible to clearly articulate the rationale/principle for inclusion/exclusion of various elements. Such functional analyses can lead to consideration of the aspects of security for which the state should be the primary (or even exclusive) provider (integrity of borders); those where civil society organisations

should be the primary provider (potentially respecting human rights or supporting social institutions), and where provision of security can be shared (ensuring social cohesion, supporting democratic institutions, generating national will). This 'big umbrella' approach might better inform the scope of the military role and implied tasks and is particularly important when considering emerging risks and challenges to the security environment.

Complex issues confronting humanity in the Anthropocene – the era in which humans and human actions have become the primary drivers initiating rapid planetary changes, altering our biosphere[7] – cannot be solved through a traditional and narrowed view of security that prioritises the nation-state, nor through a compartmentalised approach to individual issues. Human security as a people-centric approach is not confined to the security of the individual, but refers to security of individuals within the communal, the collective, with actions contextualised and interconnected. As noted throughout this volume, the scope of human security and what is included under its umbrella are points of some significance concerning implementation. A narrow scope, with tightly defined tasks and a desired end state is more clearcut for militaries to implement and measure effects. Cross-cutting themes and topics are those employed to coordinate and focus efforts. With this combination of lenses, allowing for coordination, focus, as well as effectiveness, it is a possibility that more might be accomplished with fewer resources in the mid-to-longer term horizon.

Yet a further expansion of the human security concept is called for in the 2022 UNDP report, *New Threats to Human Security in the Anthropocene: Demanding Greater Solidarity*.[8] The report calls for a next generation of human security to address challenges within the context of the Anthropocene. The 2022 report articulates emerging threats to human security, related to technology, climate change, health, and inequalities, and the consequential inequities which can arise as development impacts "planetary processes."[9] The report calls for increased global solidarity to meet the challenges caused by inequity and insecurity, and a reversal of fragmented efforts of the past towards a more collaborative, sustainable, and secure future. As the report puts quite plainly, "humanity's problem is not lack of ingenuity but an inability to see our security in the security of others."[10] The idea of seeing one's own security in the security of others is an important consideration, one noted in 1995 by Jorge Nef. Considering security in terms of world systems theory, Nef suggests that,

in an increasingly interconnected system, there is neither invulnerability nor developmental irreversibility; rather, the weakness of the periphery increases the exposure of the centre, making the entire configuration, including the centre, more unstable.[11]

In the past, Canada's geography has made it seemingly immune to global human security issues. Canada does not have millions, rather merely thousands of refugees, entering the country, as compared with Turkey, Romania, Italy, or Poland. There are no mountains of lifejackets on the beaches of Prince Edward Island as there are on the Greek beaches of Lesbos. Canadians routinely view the evidence of insecurity elsewhere via our screens.[12]

However, human security is a vital lens to understand multidimensional threats to individuals and domestic insecurities here in Canada, as noted by Denov,[13] and as described in the *Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls*:

> In many of the Indigenous world views presented within the context of the Truth-Gathering Process, the right to security includes both a physical right and a social right. International covenants and conventions also take a broad look at the concept of "security" as being both physical and social. This broad sense of human security draws from an approach that places well-being at its very centre, and that recognizes complex economic and social interactions – encounters – that work to shape security, or a lack of security, in a person's life. It moves human security beyond the agenda of the state alone, and instead considers other factors or "non-traditional" threats such as poverty, disease, and the roots of issues such as the crisis of missing and murdered Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people.[14]

Restoring security for Indigenous women and girls and their communities "requires collective, Indigenous-led solutions," [15] addressing root causes of systemic violence and inequity which have been perpetuated by institutions such as the military.[16]

Additionally, climate crisis and climate events within Canada increasingly contribute to insecurity, particularly in geographically isolated regions, as noted by Greaves, Lackenbauer, and Grimes. As members of the global economy, when global supply chains are disrupted, we are affected, the most vulnerable among us even more so at the grocery stores and gas pumps. Mutual vulnerability calls for mutual awareness of specific insecurities. The authors of the *Human Security in the Anthropocene* report favour the term "human security

frame" in order to reaffirm implementation principles of human security: "people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific, prevention-oriented and focused on promoting protection and empowerment."[17] This notion of a frame, framework, or umbrella, encourages the establishment of security through and between concurrent and complementary lines of effort. This is how Hutchinson visualises the relation between human security and the WPS agenda: everyone needs to be under that umbrella for humans to be secure.

A safe and secure environment is required to set the conditions for freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity, but it is important to recognise that the very nature of military operations creates instability and further potential for harm for some while resulting in stability and security for others. In short, security and the solutions to alleviate insecurity are context specific and experienced by various communities in different ways. Therefore, it is necessary to apply an intersectional lens to insecurity to determine what systemic risks and threats exist which may disproportionately and adversely affect groups of people differently. The WPS agenda, the Convention on the Rights of the Child[18], and the Youth, Peace, and Security agenda[19] should be considered within any human security framework. Although special attention is focused on the prevention of insecurity and protection of women and children in these agenda, it is critical to recognise the agency of individuals and communities within these groups to understand positionality of all and to not assume vulnerability or victimhood of any specific group.

Women, Peace, and Security
Agenda and Human Security: How may they fit together?

A comparison of the NATO and the UK approaches reveals a tension as to how to implement the WPS and human security agendas. UK Defence sees WPS efforts as best placed under the umbrella of human security. Critics of this amalgamation would argue that less attention may be paid to the inherently *gendered* nature of military activities. Feminist scholars have challenged the adoption of the WPS agenda into an already patriarchal military structure that tends to remove the feminist origins of the agenda and dilute the ultimate intent of challenging oppressive power structures.[20] Feminist scholars have long critiqued the fact that human rights are androcentric in formation (as are military institutions), and thus so, too, is the concept of human security, positioning men as the gender-neutral standard. *Women's* security issues, such as bodily autonomy or reproductive rights, for

example, are often considered as peripheral to *human* rights. Yet these issues are central to the achievement of gender equality, and ultimately human security.[21] This is why Grimes would call for a third-generation "Women, Peace, and Human Security", ensuring both agenda are centrally conceptualised by the practitioner.

Hutchinson cautions against the subordination of the WPS agenda within a general concept of human security as this may reproduce dominant power norms and inhibit the ability to strategically weave the WPS agenda across all areas of security at all levels. Instead, the WPS agenda should be considered not an integral part of human security but a complementary framework to the human security agenda for "gender perspectives to be integrated into all areas of security and defence, and not only in the specific cross-cutting themes of human security."[22] For NATO, the WPS agenda can provide a policy framework and therefore a potential solution to the ambiguous nature of human security. The WPS agenda requires accountability, with all measurements and reporting mechanisms required of NATO. All the cross-cutting topics must be considered through the WPS agenda to be fully implemented. Continued progress on the WPS agenda will only reinforce NATO's approach to human security and all five of the specific cross cutting themes. However, the separation of human security and WPS, as NATO has done, can undermine the UNDP call for fully interconnected and collaborative action.

However these agendas are considered and implemented, it is critical that who is excluded from the application of the "universal human" construct in human security due to systemic inequities and/or personal bias must always be front of mind.[23] If left unquestioned, a general conception of human security has the potential to reproduce dominant gendered norms and systemic inequalities. A feminist critique reveals that human rights applications fall short without intersectional approaches and the same challenge arises when implementing human security as a framework.[24] As noted in the *Anthropocene* report, an intersectional feminist lens cannot be separated from an understanding of human security to ensure the needs and conditions of all groups are considered. An understanding of the root causes of inequality in each society from such factors as patriarchy, racism, and economic disparity is needed to account for the different needs and risks of all humans, as articulated in Clare Hutchinson's contribution in this volume. Fundamentally, a human security lens requires us to shift from considering the functioning of state institutions to understanding more specifically who is experiencing what types of insecurities, what are the

differential impacts, and what may be potential solution sets for each situation. Thus, there is a need for clarity as to whose security is being considered, how that security is defined, and who may be harmed in the acquisition of such security. In short: who has agency in matters of human security?

Human Security, Agency, and Neo-Colonialism: Whose Security is it?

Human security is intended to be people-centred as well as context-specific,[25] thus, to ensure a clear, comprehensive definition of human security, consideration needs to be given to the consequences of who is defining it. If human security is defined in collaboration with the state, the international community, intervening nations, agencies, and CSOs, then there is a better chance of meeting the needs of the community in crisis or conflict, leading to less risk of deeper inequities, and benefiting those who are insecure.[26] If the concept of human security is to be based on rights, then whose? If interests, who mediates these interests, and how can effective management of the communal good be ensured? What are the implications of greater versus lesser relative emphasis on freedom from want versus freedom from fear to achieve freedom to live in dignity? Essentially, if agency is not wielded by the insecure community of human beings through the twin strategies of empowerment and protection, a neo-colonial power relation could be created, one modelled on past colonial and patriarchal structures which contributed to insecurity in the first instance.[27]

An understanding of human security has the potential to contribute to systemic change internal to the CAF through an intersectional analysis of actors encountered during military action, and by carefully considering the potential second or third-order effects of harm on these diverse actors resulting from military actions or presence. Self-criticism and self-awareness within a human security framework would facilitate understandings of any potential destabilisations or negative impact from military operations or activities and, in so doing, actively, prevent factors which cause inequity and insecurity. The internal culture change initiatives within CAF could be viewed as part of this process of self-criticism and reflection, as are such DND/CAF initiatives to progress the WPS agenda as noted in the contribution to the Canadian National Action Plan for WPS, such as the Elsie Initiative. This analysis is not a task for the military alone, but a shared task for a whole of government approach, as noted by Grimes, Lambert, and Hutchinson. The CAF could mitigate any potential harm or insecurity in military approaches

through reconciliation, through understanding, and by centering community. In essence, the use of a participatory-based human security approach could retain a people-centric focus in military operations, demonstrating consistency, presence, seeking to do no harm, and mitigating harm if use of force is required to create a safe and secure environment.

In practice and in theory, one of the objectives of a human security approach is to confront systems of colonialism and patriarchy, and achieve feminist empowerment. The military can make a contribution here and, at a minimum, work to ensure actions do not exacerbate inequities. It remains to be seen to what extent systems of oppression can be changed by a military institution that is seen by many as inherently colonial and patriarchal in origin and foundation. Yet, it is useful for all military members to understand their position in relation to the world in which they operate to help contribute to substantive, long-term change.

Short-Term Gains versus Long-Term Change

Denov observes another criticism of human security: the lack of a longer-term vision for international security. Where states and organisations choose to highlight particular security challenges to enable "short-term gains", there is no basis for substantive change towards a more secure world.[28]

This is a valid criticism concerning the organisation of cross-cutting topics by NATO. Rather than aligning with the broader UN organising framework of human security as a transformational approach to security through development and empowerment, NATO has limited the concept to suit military operational foci specific to aims and constraints within specific cross-cutting topics. The narrowing of human security considerations to specific operational actions limits the NATO perspective on human security to a militarised one, separating root causes of conflict from the cross-cutting topics and military activities for each. A comprehensive definition of human security might be developed for allies to use as a method of analysis and to support activities beyond the cross-cutting topics, as attending to these will not necessarily remove the root causes of conflict. This highlights the difficulty of translating the human security concept to the specific mandate, mission, and organisational identity of NATO. The 2022 UNDP report articulates the necessity of an interconnected, collaborative approach in a global human security frame. As the UK MOD has articulated, "By coordinating with other actors, we can shape

the discourse on the security of human beings on the global stage and increase the prospects for long term peace and stability."[29]

Towards a Collaborative Definition of Human Security

The CAF is commonly required to work from the broad (often vague and ambitious) political language used at the UN to justify interventions, to a more specific articulation of mission mandates and analyses, leading to specific military roles to enable operational planning and tactical activities. Some of the nuances and general intent of the original political narratives can be lost in these multi-layered processes. Human security objectives are aspirational, with less concrete expressions of what the military is expected to accomplish. Using a human security framework could ensure those working at each level (political, strategic, operational, tactical) asks accurate questions and obtain required clarification to ensure that (political) intent is understood; (strategic) mission parameters are effectively defined; (operational) military tasks are appropriately articulated; and (tactical) plans and actions taken are effective in reaching the desired end state. Grimes' and Lambert's contributions identify options and considerations at each level. A shared understanding of human security can also assist in the implementation of a whole of government approach towards insecurity. This can be useful when human security is understood as an approach to address wicked problems with the recognition that how a problem is framed determines the solution set.[30]

Consideration needs to be given to updating CAF doctrine and professional knowledge to formalise work in this area and to encourage a collaborative approach towards human security. At present, Canada's overall approach to human security is somewhat *ad hoc*, in that some issues and topics, such as CAAC and PoC, receive greater amounts of attention, while some are not thoroughly approached or are only approached at the tactical level (cultural property protection, for example). It might be appropriate to consider integrating human security more fully across CAF doctrine and processes in order to better align with NATO's approach. Efforts likely could be expended to approach human security in step with key allies and alliances, particularly in terms of intelligence and where the military will lead/partner/support. Should CAF/DND decide to move to implement a human security approach, communication with trusted partners concerning human security is advised, encouraging collaborations and discouraging silos. A working definition could be helpful in this endeavour.

The 2011 NATO *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN)*, to which Canada currently subscribes, provides a broad definition of human security as "freedom from persecution, want and fear; adequate provision of essential commodities to sustain life; broader environmental security; and the protection of cultural values."[31] The challenge is that the philosophy of addressing these aspects in order to win the support of the local population for the military mission is inconsistent with human security principles of empowerment, agency, collaboration, and dignity. In the 2022 Human Security Approach, NATO now describes human security as:

> [a] multi-sectoral approach to security that identifies and addresses widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of the people.

There are other considerations articulated within the guiding principles. Human security is intended as: people-centred and comprehensive; responsive by integrating gender perspectives and considering differential impacts of conflict and crisis; prevention- and protection oriented; contextualised through cultural appreciation; guided by international law; collaborative and respectful to other agencies and humanitarian actors; respectful of sovereignty and enabling agency and empowerment. Following the theoretical and practical examples provided in this volume, a working definition might be proposed for human security in a Canadian context:

> Human security is people-centric, referring to the feeling of security of an individual within a community, free from harm, free from want, and free to live with dignity, in terms of health, environment, and expression, enabling well being and self-worth. Human security is achieved through empowerment and agency, attentive to an intersectional lens, following human rights, preventing threats, minimizing risks, through protection, collaboration, and cooperation. Human security is gender-responsive, comprehensive, interconnected, situational, and enables community and individual resiliency.

The following section uses this proposed working definition to further examine the questions coming out of this research and analysis.

How Might the CAF Approach Human Security?

A key issue for any military is to answer the basic question: what are we meant to do here? This is usually addressed by examining the mandate and tasks but, depending on who set the mandate, this may not provide a practical appreciation of how human security can be

achieved or considered. The issues are best framed using Galtung's notion of negative vs positive peace, negative peace defined as an absence of violence and positive peace created through relationships, social systems, and recovery. The military role creates negative peace by preventing violence under a protection mandate.[32] Transitioning from establishing the conditions for negative peace towards setting conditions for long-term, positive peace is a trajectory that blends the protection and prevention dimensions. Yet, suspending violence does not enable conditions for positive peace in themselves, other conditions are needed for resilience and recovery. Human security frameworks are assessed as encompassing both negative and positive domains with the overarching task to set conditions for positive peace. As a minimalist summary, adopting HS to articulate strategic objectives leads to the military at all levels asking: how will this decision set the conditions for long-term peace and security? This approach may be of use in avoiding repeated "ROTO 0s" where Commanders and staff respond to evolving security conditions by revamping the plan for the next six months and can assist in developing appropriate measures of mission effectiveness.[33]

A more holistic and formalised approach to human security would enable greater efficiency in operations for various reasons. Human security can be used as a translation device for shared understanding, working with a whole-of-government approach, or within the UN at all levels (strategic/operational/tactical), thus enhancing collaboration and connections leading to efficiencies.

A human security approach can be used as an analytical lens towards understanding to help build, among other things, resilient communities domestically and abroad, thus potentially reducing factors leading to insecurity and further need for military action. Individuals need to apply multiple lenses (legal, ethical, gendered, etc.) to ensure that all aspects are considered and, increasingly, to arrive at an accurate assessment or interpretation of social contexts or social facts. NATO capstone doctrine underscores the importance of understanding culture through sharing information and professional collaboration, which is relevant to the CPP cross-cutting theme of human security and understanding the human environment.[34] The application of a gender perspective is one which has been mainstreamed in UN and NATO decision-making processes and operations. Likewise, the complementary lens of human security can be applied to assess strategic effects by articulating the broader, longer-term effects to be created. It is important to understand that both the human security and WPS agendas call for assessment of the long-term structural changes required to prevent repeated cycles of

violence. Setting the conditions for peace and security usually involves addressing power imbalances that exist across (often ethnic) sub-groups and setting the conditions for gender equality. Both a localised, precise lens and a nuanced analytical lens are necessary to focus dually on insecurities at the local level *and* on systemic issues towards long-term security for all.

Much work in the UK is focused on adding the analytical lens of human security to be able to understand, recognise, and respond appropriately. This can also inform the CAF as to what level of expertise is required by whom at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and, if following the UK approach, identifying specialists and experts for those in theatre to contact when they encounter a human security issue. The application of a human security lens could actively support the *prevention* element of human security, one of the guiding principles of both the UN and NATO approaches. In addition, attention to human security can go beyond simple human terrain mapping and appreciation of the operating environment. CAF could consider a more intelligence-based approach and consider risks to human security and opportunities to prevent threats from emerging, in line with UN and NATO HS approaches, thus reducing need for military action in the first instance.

Internally, there are benefits to adopting a human security approach which align with current priorities of culture change and reconstitution. As mentioned, an understanding of the basic principles of human security deepens understanding of positionality of the *military self* in relation to humans at risk. This leads to improved CAF outcomes concerning internal culture change. The importance of culture to human in/security was noted in the 1994 UNDP report which listed *community security* as one of the seven principles of human security. It was further recognised by UNDP that culture could also threaten human security, as a catalyst for ethnic conflict and violence, leading to inequitable treatment of Indigenous peoples or the perpetuation of *oppressive practices* such as bonded labour/enslavement and female genital mutilation.

An understanding of the meaning and importance of the culture in which one operates can help inform military personnel about systemic global inequities within the wider context of human security. By asking basic questions such as who decides *who* and *what* is to be protected or made secure, military personnel can challenge the very nature and purpose of military intervention for more effective outcomes. A deep understanding of how culture can be considered within conflict and

crises enables the mirror to be turned on the self and better understand how culture creates insecurity for individuals internally within the force.

Moving the Conversation towards Action

Opportunities have been identified by our contributors which, if addressed, may improve operational outcomes and advance human security at home and internationally. These are offered here for information and to help planners and decision makers understand potential demands being signaled by NATO's approach, and future national needs should Canada move to focus on human security within national doctrine. These opportunities for further research and study provide context for asking more difficult questions about the theory of Canadian human security approach.

Anticipate. How might the CAF understand, anticipate, and prepare for current/emerging/future issues which are not currently considered in new (NATO) doctrine? How does the CAF understand and, ideally, address causal factors?

Protection to Prevention. How might the military role be expanded to include both protection *and* prevention, as is called for with the Vancouver Principles and NATO's 2021 Policy on Preventing and Responding to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence? How might this prevention mandate be expanded to other human security themes?

Understanding Risks to Human Security. What education/awareness is required for military personnel to understand and recognise emerging risks, expanding the military role to include both protection and prevention? What knowledge is required to shift from perceiving threats to recognising insecurities? Preventing future insecurities is a much more daunting task than alleviating the ones that are visible – and requires the military to, at a minimum, understand and ideally, address causal factors. This requires doctrinal changes and changes to professional military education.

Insecurity Accelerators. Climate change and pandemics serve to increase levels of insecurity. How will these factors further impact military operations within Canada, and lead to insecurities globally? What roles emerge for the military? How might the CAF prevent further instability?

Space and Cyber Human Security Risks. Grimes and Hutchinson draw attention to the risks to humans posed in the space and cyber realms and "the responsibility of the military to protect civilians from digital harm."[35] What role does the CAF fulfill in the reduction of harm? And how might we fulfill those roles to meet future threats?[36]

Other threats. What are the military implications and potential tasks concerning other emerging threats, such as food insecurity, violent extremism, disinformation campaigns, and cultural heritage exploitation?

Human Security as Instrument of Systemic Internal and External Change. How can CAF consider a long-term systemic approach to human security, and how might these considerations promote positive internal cultural change?

Intersection of WPS and HS. How might WPS and human security be positioned with existing Canadian intersectional approaches and GBA Plus?

Revisiting Canada's Human Security Agenda

In 2016, Michael Small posed the question, "should Canada revisit the human security agenda?"[37] Small identifies four global issues which could be taken into account concerning foreign, development, and defence policies: global migration including refugee flows; pandemics; cyber; and climate change. All of these, he says, "will increasingly affect the security of everyone on the planet, including Canadians."

> What unites these four global trends is that together they erode the political, economic, social, and environmental boundaries that underpin people's sense of security that the future will resemble the present. All four of these trends are directly related to human security in terms of threats to people's lives and their livelihoods but none of them are confined to threats of violence – which was the explicit focus of Canada's previous human security agenda.[38]

If anything, in the years since Small proposed a revised human security approach for Canada, the CAF has been actively challenged by human security threats arising from these four issues, domestically and internationally. There is an ever increasing need to understand and be prepared to meet future threats to humans in an insecure, uncertain world.

Although he notes that "the human security agenda offers no solutions" to deal with "classic state-centred security problems", Small recognises that "the reality of state-centred hard security threats does not trump the need to attend to human security challenges."[39] Instead, Small suggests,

> It is entirely right for the Canadian government to adopt once again an explicit human security *approach* within its foreign policy, by focusing on certain kinds of threats to people and certain communities that are especially vulnerable to those threats. That is how Canadians started the last time: by letting practice inform theory.[40]

The contributors to this volume advocate this bottom-up/top-down plan. As demonstrated within this volume, there are many ways by which current initiatives in human security could be advanced. Further initiatives could be created by building on lessons identified through practice. Reflection in practice could lead to the development of a national human security approach which is both attentive to specific national requirements and aligned with approaches of international partners. It is hoped that this volume has provided sufficient material on emerging issues in human security to better understand the military nexus within human security developments and to be able to anticipate, adapt, and act appropriately in an ever-changing security environment.

Conclusion Key Concepts

- This volume made suggestions where the CAF might *anticipate* and suggests further work to better inform *adapt* and *act* functions, within the context of a human security framework.
- Such a human security framework is intended as: people-centred and comprehensive; responsive by integrating gender perspectives and considering differential impacts of conflict and crisis; prevention- and protection oriented; contextualised through cultural appreciation; guided by international law; collaborative and respectful to other agencies and humanitarian actors; respectful of sovereignty; and enabling agency and empowerment.
- Human security can be considered as a framework to organise and integrate multiple objectives and different military tasks towards a common security goal that is also inclusive of state security.
- Key areas deemed important to consider in a human security framework include: protection of civilians; women, peace, and security; children and armed conflict; modern slavery and human trafficking; preventing and countering violent extremism; building integrity; and cultural property protection.
- A safe and secure environment is required to set the conditions for freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity, but it is important to recognise that the very nature of military operations creates instability and further potential for harm for some while resulting in stability and security for others.

- The use of a participatory-based human security approach could retain a people-centric focus in military operations, demonstrating consistency, presence, seeking to do no harm, and mitigating harm if use of force is required to create a safe and secure environment.
- With regards to the military, an understanding of human security can contribute to systemic change internally through intersectional analysis of the CAF and other actors encountered during military action, and through carefully considering potential second or third-order effects of harm on these diverse actors resulting from military actions or presence.
- Adopting human security to articulate strategic objectives may lead to the military at all levels asking: how will this decision set the conditions for long-term peace and security?
- NATO and some of Canada's allies add the analytical lens of human security, to be able to understand, recognise, and respond appropriately.

Notes

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Evolving Human Security: Frameworks and Considerations for Canada's Military brings together scholars and security practitioners who identify topics and themes critical to militaries involved in establishing peace and stability, examining the protection-or-prevention prioritisation. The authors and editors have situated the human security approach, identifying trends, and focusing on relevant considerations for adopting a CAF human security framework. The contextual development of human security in policy and doctrinal terms is highlighted through descriptive cases, issues, and themes from which readers can better grasp the scope of this seemingly simple idea: human security. This volume also explores the ways in which human security can be considered and operationalised in relation to other defence and security approaches, such as the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, and great power competition.