CANSOFCOM PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

FEAR

DARE NOT SPEAK THY NAME

DR. EMILY SPENCER AND COLONEL BERND HORN

THE CANSOFCOM PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

MISSION

The mission of the Canadian Armed Forces Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) Professional Development Centre (PDC) is to enable professional development within the Command in order to continually develop and enhance the cognitive capacity of CANSOFCOM personnel.

VISION

The vision of the CANSOFCOM PDC is to be a key enabler to CANSOFCOM headquarters, units and Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) as an intellectual centre of excellence for special operations forces (SOF) professional development (PD).

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The CANSOFCOM PDC is designed to provide additional capacity to:

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3. provide additional research capacity;
4. develop educational opportunities and SOF specific courses and professional development materials;
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6. develop CANSOF publications that provide both PD and educational materials to CANSOF personnel and external audiences;
7. assist with the research of SOF best practices and concepts to ensure that CANSOFCOM remains relevant and progressive so that it maintains its position as the domestic force of last resort and the international force of choice for the Government of Canada.

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FOREWORD

The first Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) Professional Development Centre (PDC) series monograph of 2015 is one that we believe will be of enormous interest to both those inside and external to the Command. It deals with the subject of fear. Generally speaking, few wish to admit when they are scared. This phenomenon is underscored for military members and even more so for special operations forces (SOF). Professionalism, expectations, ego, perceptions of what a true warrior embodies, all act as barriers to acknowledging fear. Nonetheless, everyone gets scared at one point or another. The reality is that the emotion of fear is both common and not all bad. It is all about how one reacts to fear that determines whether experiencing fear will have a positive or negative outcome. Understanding fear, specifically its manifestations and influence, as well as how to mitigate it, is key to ensuring that fear does not create detrimental outcomes, which is important since fear can very easily lead to poor decision-making.

Fear: Dare Not Speak Thy Name, is the latest of our ever-expanding body of literature focused on topics of interest, or importance, to SOF in general and Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) in particular. Through this vehicle personnel within the Command, as well as those external to it, can continue to learn more about subjects and issues of importance and relevance to military professionals, those who work in the national security domain, and those with an interest in the area.

As always, I hope you find this publication informative and of value to your operational role. In addition, it is intended to spark

discussion, reflection and debate. Please do not hesitate to contact the PDC should you have comments or topics that you would like to see addressed as part of the CANSOFCOM monograph series.

Dr. Emily Spencer

Series Editor and Director of Education & Research

CANSOFCOM PDC

Anyone who says he is not scared
is either a liar or mentally deficient.[1]

Andy McNab

FEAR:
DARE NOT SPEAK THY NAME

The issue of fear is one rarely discussed in the military. In many ways it is just seen as "bad form." After all, fear is often equated to weakness and to an unsoldierly disposition. Moreover, it is seen as particularly unmanly in an institution that is still, arguably, largely quite masculine. In fact, to most serving personnel, if there was only one quality that could be assigned to them, many would choose to be described as brave or courageous. Few, if any, would emphasize the trepidation they felt during operations.

Nonetheless, fear is both common and normal. This truism in itself is important to highlight. The essence of the issue is not whether one experiences fear but rather how it is controlled and utilized to benefit the effectiveness of military personnel in times of stress, danger and crisis. Conversely, the failure to recognize the reality of fear and its effects can have serious repercussions that may manifest themselves at the most inopportune, if not catastrophic, moments. As such, it is an unfortunate component of military service, or more accurately our military culture, that has led to the misguided perception that one must never show or admit fear.[2]

Not surprisingly military culture has a pervasive influence on how the issue of fear is managed within the institution, or, more accurately, how it is often ignored. This attitude of not discussing fear has long been part of the military culture, which still maintains, particularly among the young soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers, a great degree of bravado and machismo. Fear is normally perceived as a distasteful subject that is better left unacknowledged. "An officer," former officer and current sociologist Anthony Kellet explained, "was expected to suppress fears

and foreboding, and not to discuss them as [it was considered] lacking in martial spirit and boring to brother officers."[3] Additionally, Samuel Hynes in his scholarly research on the subject found that the education and training of the majority of military officers inculcated a belief that "fear and its expression are especially abhorrent." He elaborated, "young officers had been trained to an impossible ideal of leadership and self-control; not only must they lead their men fearlessly; they must be fearless."[4]

Notably, it is not only officers who are weighted by this burden imposed by military culture. "When bullets are whacking against tree trunks and solid shot are cracking skulls like eggshells, the consuming passion in the breast of the average man is to get out of the way," a young participant of the battle of Antietam in 1862 recorded. He added, "Between the physical fear of going forward and the moral fear of turning back, there is a predicament of exceptional awkwardness from which a hidden hole in the ground would be a wonderfully welcome outlet."[5] More recently, one investigative reporter discovered after a large number of interviews that "It's hard to confess fear to your buddy, let alone the platoon commander."[6] In fact, prior to the War in Iraq in 2003, the Chaplain of the 101st Airborne Division, revealed that few came to him "openly professing fear of combat." He added, "the one who did said he was terribly ashamed to admit it."[7]

Defining Fear

Fear is an emotion that has been described as "a state characterized by physiological arousal, changes in facial expression, gestures, posture, and subjective feeling."[8] When we experience an intense emotion, such as fear, a number of bodily changes occur, including rapid heartbeat and breathing, dryness of the throat and mouth, perspiration, trembling, and a sinking feeling in the stomach. Fear can also have more embarrassing manifestations.

One veteran confessed, "…urine poured down our legs … Our fear was so great that we lost all thought of controlling ourselves."[9] Similarly, Sergeant John Kite, a British commando during the Normandy invasion of 6 June 1944 later revealed, "I was so scared, all the bones in my body were shaking. I said to myself, Pull yourself together, you're in charge and supposed to show an example. When the ramp went down dead on 0600 [hours], I looked around, and there were pools of water by men. It wasn't sea water."[10]

The bodily changes during emotional arousal are due to the activation of the sympathetic division of the autonomic nervous system as it prepares the body for emergency action, the fight or flight reflex. In short, it prepares the body for energy output. It accomplishes this task by way of a number of bodily modifications (which need not occur all at once):

1. Blood pressure and heart rate increase;
2. Respiration becomes more rapid;
3. Pupils dilate;
4. Perspiration increases while secretion of saliva and mucous decrease;
5. Blood-sugar level increases to provide more energy;
6. The blood clots more quickly in case of wounds;
7. Blood is diverted from the stomach and intestines to the brain and skeletal muscles; and
8. The hairs on the skin become erect causing goose pimples.[11]

These changes all have a specific purpose. For example, sugar is released by the liver into the bloodstream for quick energy; the

heart beats faster to supply blood to the muscles; the respiration rate increases to supply needed oxygen; digestion is temporarily inhibited (thus, diverting blood from your internal organs to your muscles); pupils dilate to allow in more light; perspiration increases to cool the agitated body; and the blood flow to the skin is restricted to reduce bleeding.[12] In this way, the sympathetic system activates the body for emergency action by arousing a number of bodily systems and inhibiting others.

As such, fear should not be viewed entirely in a negative light. Social anthropologist John Dollard was quite astute when he noted of men in combat, "it is not fear that matters, but what a man does when he is afraid."[13] Similarly in *Lone Survivor* Marcus Luttrell describes how fear can empower individuals. While on a capture/kill mission in northern Afghanistan Luttrell's four-man SEAL team was compromised by two elderly Afghan shepherds and a teenager. The SEAL team ultimately decided to abort the mission and let the shepherds go free only to, somewhat predictably, have their location compromised and be targeted by the enemy. Luttrell observed during the firefight that later ensued "it's unbelievable what you can do when the threat to your own life is that bad."[14] Luttrell also directly acknowledged the benefits that fear provides in heightening senses and allowing the body overcome hardship. While escaping his Taliban pursuers, he had to make a steep climb to escape. He explains, "…before I made the first twenty feet … I slipped badly, which was a very scary experience. The gradient was almost sheer, straight down to the valley floor." He continues, "In my condition I probably would not have survived the fall, and I somehow saved myself from falling any more than about ten feet. … Then I picked it up again." He conceded, "You'd have needed a chain saw to pry me off that cliff face." Luttrell illustrates his motivation when he states, "All I knew was, if I fell, I would probably plummet several hundred feet to my death. Which was good for the concentration."[15] War reporter Mack Morriss recognized

the phenomena Luttrell described. Morriss asserted "The man who recognizes fear can often make it work in his favor because fear is energy. Like anger, fear shifts the body into high."[16]

Importantly, once the crisis is over, the parasympathetic system reverses emotional arousal and calms and relaxes the body. As such, the benefits and disadvantages of fear are often short-lived. The consequences of decisions that are made in a state of fear may be long-lasting, however.

Fear Explained

Researchers have determined that there are two types of fear. The first is acute fear that is generally provoked by tangible stimuli or situations (e.g. a loud bang or a snake suddenly slithering by) and it normally subsides quite quickly when the frightening stimulus is removed or avoided. The second type of fear is chronic fear. This is generally a more complex form of fear and may or may not be tied to tangible sources of provocation.[17]

Importantly, fear is a natural and common phenomenon. "Fear is a normal, inevitable, useful reaction to danger," John Dollard explained in his seminal research on the subject. "It is a danger signal," he added, "produced in a man's body by his awareness of signs of danger in the world around him." As mentioned, he concluded, "It is not fear that matters, but what a man does when he is afraid." Dollard explained, "controlled fear has the power to incite a man to useful action. Uncontrolled fear is destructive; it has the power to incite in a man a senseless panic which further endangers his life."[18]

Consequently, the best way to deal with fear is to manage it. When the element of fear is too weak, individuals may get reckless and expose themselves and others to unwarranted risk and peril.

When it is too great, there may be a lack of self-control, and fear can become contagious and often leads to panic. For example, a Special Operations Executive (SOE) operative working as part of Force 136 in Ceylon (current day Sri Lanka) noted of his time fighting in the jungle:

> We were still afraid in the jungle. The man without fear there is the man without caution and in the jungle it pays to be apprehensive. But our fear was no longer a vague, shapeless, illogical emotion. We had analysed it, reduced it to essentials, put it in its rightful perspective. Each combination of noises conveyed its appropriate message and we reacted accordingly. We knew when to relax and when to be on our guard.[19]

To date, research has provided some conclusive insights in regard to fear. First, it confirms that everybody experiences it. "Fear," scholar Elmar Dinter adjudged, "is the most significant common denominator for all soldiers."[20] Studies have also confirmed that fear in younger and unmarried soldiers is marginally less than in older, married ones and that junior officers and non-commissioned officers show a little less fear than the other ranks.[21] Not surprisingly, overwhelmingly, most people appear to be more susceptible to fear when they are alone.[22]

Some Major Causes of Fear within a Military Context

There are a number of stimuli that can create fear in soldiers. One is the fear of the unknown and the unexpected. "What a man has not seen," stated the ancient Greek General Onasander, "he always expects will be greater than it really is." Retired combat veteran and military theorist, Major-General Robert Scales Jr., opined that "soldiers fear most the enemy they cannot see."[23] The Medical Officer assigned to the original "L" Detachment of the British Special Air Service (SAS) in North Africa in 1941 wrote, "Why did

we fear, and of what were we afraid? It was the continual uneasy anticipation and mental torture of anxiety."[24]

Not surprisingly, anecdotal evidence indicates that fear increases in foggy conditions or when it is dark, or with the loss of orientation following an unexpected enemy attack from the rear.[25] This reality is in fact timeless and had particular relevance to soldiers who fought in the tightly packed phalanxes of ancient times:

> Men in the rear ranks can have had little idea of what was happening, even if they did not have their hearing and vision seriously restricted by a Corinthian helmet. They could not know whether a collapse at another point in the phalanx was imminent. If they were slow in realizing that their own phalanx had broken, they were more likely to be amongst those caught by the pursuing and vengeful enemy. Phalanxes spent a battle on the verge of panic, moving nearer to it as they battle progressed and they failed to win, or at least to continue advancing. The men in the rear ranks had to cope passively with the stress of this fear. Although they were not in direct physical danger until the phalanx was broken, battle was still a great ordeal for the rear ranks. In some respects it may have been worse for them than the men in the lead who were occupied facing the more tangible threats of combat.[26]

Fear of the unknown is arguably the most significant fear to be aware of because in this state your imagination is free to run rampant, often unchecked by reality. Before even realizing that you are running from your imagination – and your imagination alone – it can be too late.[27]

For example, Peter Blaber, a former Delta Force commander, found himself in a situation where the fear of the unknown prompted him to a nearly disastrous decision. He describes hearing grunting

and rustling in nearby foliage during the Delta selection phase. Believing it to be a threat, specifically a bear, he ran for his life. In fact, when it came down to deciding whether to follow a trail or hurl himself off the edge of an unknown cliff, he wasted little time in deciding, noting "I'm going for the cliff. No bear is gonna catch me, I'm gonna jump."[28] And jump he did, miraculously sustaining no injuries. He was later mortified, as well as terribly ashamed, to realize that he had not been running from a bear after all. In reality, he had been chased by a domestic pig that had gotten loose. Blaber explains, "When I saw the little black creature through the corner of my eye, my tired and frustrated mind took a shortcut. I decided it must have been a baby bear with a mother not too far behind. When I heard the spastic scream of the animal in the bushes, I decided it had to be the vicious growl of a mother bear instead of what it actually was – the vicious *oink* of a mother pig." Blaber continues, "My contextless [sic] response was to run for my life and jump off a cliff."[29]

Certainly when you do not have all the information and you are faced by unknowns, your mind attempts to fill the gaps and fear can be a very powerful replacement for proper context. Andy McNab, the Commander of the eight man SAS team that infiltrated Iraq in January 1991, and was subsequently compromised, attests to the impact of the fear of the unknown. Upon compromise the team was quickly separated. Three members were killed, four were captured and one escaped. McNab revealed that shortly after his capture, "I was scared: the fear of the unknown." He affirmed, "the earlier you can see it the better, then that awful dread of the unknown evaporates."[30]

The fear of failing one's comrades, or of being a coward, has also historically been one of the pre-eminent fears of soldiers of all ages and all ranks. "I'm afraid of being afraid," Captain J.E.H. Neville wrote to his father during the First World War.[31] He was not

alone. “Most men, if honestly answering ‘what was your greatest fear?’” Canadian paratrooper A. H. Carignan insisted, “will tell you that it was the fear that one might not fulfill the expectations of his comrades under extreme duress.”[32] Sergeant Andy Anderson agreed. “My personal concern,” he confided to his diary, “is that I can measure up, and not let anyone down.”[33] For Joe Dimasi of the American 82nd Airborne Division it was simple. “You’ve got to get this in your mind,” he explained, “It is death before dishonor that’s it. I went through the whole war that way.”[34] Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Mitchell confessed, “I had the usual new boy’s dreadful fear of failing and I was much more frightened of that than any of the horror going on around me.”[35] Indeed, the conflicts may change, but the underlying fear remains the same. More recently, 22-year-old American Private Jeffrey Hren confided before engaging in combat in Iraq in 2003, “I don’t want to let down my team, my squad, my company.” His colleague Private Gene Marr concurred. “I tell myself,” he shared, “don’t choke.”[36]

A corollary to the fear of letting down one’s comrades is the fear of being judged. In the case of Luttrell and his SEAL team, the fear of being judged by those back home, particularly the media and public, for their actions on the mountainside had an immense effect on their decisions. Luttrell later described:

> …I cursed those fucking goatherds to hell, and myself for not executing them when every military codebook ever written had taught me otherwise. Not to mention my own raging instincts, which had told me to go with Axe [teammate] and execute them. And let the liberals go to hell in a mule cart, and take with them all of their fucking know-nothing rules of etiquette in war and human rights and whatever other bullshit makes ’em happy. You want to charge us with murder? Well, fucking do it. But at least we’ll be alive to answer it.[37]

Later, Luttrell provided a good summation of his decision process in recapping his experience: “Helpless, tortured, shot, blown-up, my best buddies all dead, and all because we were afraid of the liberals back home, afraid to do what was necessary to save our own lives. Afraid of American civilian lawyers.”[38]

Another related cause of fear is the feeling of hopelessness. This sentiment is often due to a belief of, or actual, inability in the face of danger to influence the probable outcome of events. Simply put, it is caused by a feeling of being threatened without the power to do anything about it. “A soldier cowering alone in the bottom of his foxhole finds himself alone and isolated from his buddies,” one veteran explained. He elaborated, “This feeling of isolation leads inevitably to vague imaginings and apprehensions – not only of dying, but of helpless inaction and the intense fear of being left to die alone.”[39] Captain Adolf Von Schell, a World War I veteran agreed. “When a soldier lies under hostile fire and waits, he feels unable to protect himself,” Schell explained, “he has time; he thinks; he only waits for the shot that will hit him.” Schell added, “He feels a certain inferiority to the enemy. He feels that he is alone and deserted.”[40]

It is little wonder that individuals in such a state may decide to abandon their positions, or simply cower and hide. In fact, a survey of 6,000 airmen showed that the factors of helplessness and hopelessness were responsible for major increments in fear. “Fear,” Professor S.J. Rachman from the Institute of Psychiatry at the University of London, asserted “seems to feed on a sense of uncontrollability: it arises and persists when the person finds himself in a threatening situation over which he feels he has little or no control.” Research demonstrated that “Being in danger when one cannot fight back or take any other effective action, being idle or being insecure of the future, were the elements that tended to aggravate fear in combat.”[41]

Noise is another common stressor and major cause for trepidation. “As we had feared, we heard the roar of war again,” one German veteran of the Eastern Front recorded. “The noise,” he stated, “...in itself was enough to send a wave of terror through the…Men trapped beside the water… Every man grabbed his things and began to run… Frantic men were abandoning everything on the bank and plunging into the water to try to swim to the opposite shore.” He concluded, “Madness seemed to be spreading like wildfire.”[42] An airborne officer reported that in Tunisia, in 1942, he witnessed a group of American ammunition carriers shocked into inactivity “simply by the tremendous noise of real fighting. Instead of getting the ammunition forward to a machine gun these men were huddled together, hugging the ground, shaking – pitifully unaware that their route was protected by a hill.”[43] Sergeant Peter Cottingham revealed, “It is impossible to describe the terror which the sound of even one incoming artillery shell can instill in a person.”[44]

Notably, it is not only the sound of munitions that can create a soundtrack for fear and panic. For example, even the dreaded Scottish Highlanders were overcome by the “appalling yells of the Canadians and Indians” at Fort Duquesne in 1758 and consequently broke away in a wild and disorderly retreat. “Fear,” Major Grant of the Highlanders stated, “got the better of every other passion.”[45] Their experience was not unique. A young George Washington had witnessed similarly panicked troops during Braddock’s infamous defeat at the Monongahela River in 1754. “And when we endeavored to rally them,” Washington recounted, then an officer assigned to Braddock’s staff, “it was with as much success as if we had attempted to stop the wild bears of the mountains.”[46] Indeed, the battle cries of the North American Indians consistently unnerved their white opponents. “The war cries of the Indians,” one chronicler reported, “‘ravenous Hell-hounds...yelping and screaming like so many Devils’ – came from every direction,

terrifying men whose imaginations had fed on tales of how Indians tortured and mutilated their prisoners."[47] Similarly, Hans-Heinrich Ludwig noted with fear the "wild choir of stormy Russian hurrahs." He acknowledged that "The tendency of Russians to trumpet their assaults with bloodcurdling screams unsettled many Landsers [German infanteers]." Leopold von Thadden-Trieglaff, another veteran of the Russian Front, also wrote home of the "fanatical [Russian] cries of hurrah," which he explained, "shattered us."[48]

Visual stimuli can have a similar effect. During a German counter-attack following the invasion of Sicily in 1943, German armour advanced towards American lines on Hill 41. One historian described how their menacing long 88 millimeter cannon shone in the sun, at the same time as the enemy artillery opened up a barrage. "As if on cue, infantrymen of the 2nd Battalion of the 16th Regiment scrambled out of their holes and began rushing pellmell to the rear," he wrote. He continued, "At first it was only a handful, then more and more joined in, until within minutes two-thirds of the Big Red One battalion had urgently departed."[49] Similarly, Dominic Neal, a British officer in Burma recounted:

> There was rifle fire ahead, and rounds were hitting the trees ahead of me. I saw the British Other Ranks ahead running back shouting 'Japs.' There was confusion in extreme up front. The leading platoon came rushing back with a look of terror in their eyes. The sight of fleeing soldiers is very infectious. My men, in sympathy, turned about, and started running.[50]

Caused by both auditory and visual stimuli, but adding an additional factor to the chaos, is potential immobility due to shelling or fire. "Each time a black iron oval [shell] broke the horizon," World War I German veteran Ernst Junger wrote, "one's eye sized it up with that instantaneous clarity of which a man is only capable in

moments of life and death."[51] Samuel Stouffer in his monumental study of the American soldier in World War II reported that many veterans testified that the "severest fear-producing situation they encountered in combat was just such immobilization under artillery or mortar fire."[52] American veteran Glenn Searle acknowledged that "No matter how gung-ho you are, after about fifteen minutes of artillery shells screaming in and exploding all around you, you start to quiver not unlike a bowl of gelatin and your teeth chatter." He conceded that "We did a lot of screaming."[53] Canadian paratrooper Jan de Vries felt that "shelling was probably the worst thing to have to live through."[54] Fellow veteran, Private Mervin Jones, agreed. "One day we were shelled for 12 hours straight," he remembered, "No one was hurt, but it was sure hard on the nerves."[55] The effect was the same on both sides. "Those who weren't struck dumb with fright howled like madmen," German veteran Guy Sajer noted.[56] "For soldiers on the receiving end," American Major-General Scales explained, "firepower creates a sense of stress and alarm made all the more fearsome by its impersonal and anonymous nature."[57]

Another common cause of fear is deprivation. It is a strikingly obvious statement to declare that all soldiers need sleep, food and drink regardless of their level of physical fitness. Indeed, practical experience in World War II, and all conflicts since, has demonstrated that the physical and psychological factors that lowered morale and sapped men's courage the most were fatigue, hunger and thirst.[58] However, very little conscious thought is generally given to the high tempo of operations or ensuring that personnel, including headquarters staffs, commanders and soldiers are given sufficient rest. Often forgotten in the military is the fact that the habits we form in peacetime are those that we take with us on operations and in war. The failure to ensure proper rest routines and the normal accepted practice of driving units and personnel relentlessly is easily dismissed during short exercises and

non-combat operations. Without question, testing individuals and units is important and the stress induced provides a glimpse of how personnel perform. However, it may also have a detrimental effect if leaders are not educated and trained on the importance of rest and proper nourishment to combat effectiveness.

Interestingly, there is a direct relationship between fatigue and fear. The more fatigued a person is, the more susceptible to fear they become. The greater their fear, the greater is the drain on their energy. "Tired men fright more easily," Colonel S.L.A. Marshall in his decades of battlefield studies observed. He concluded, "frightened men swiftly tire."[59] Extreme fatigue ultimately makes it impossible for some men to continue to function. "We learned," Corporal Dan Hartigan asserted, "that the lack of sleep was the worst of all deprivations, far worse than hunger or thirst."[60] One German veteran stated, "The exhaustion we had been dragging about with us for days increased the fear we could no longer control." He explained that the "fear intensified our exhaustion, as it required constant vigilance."[61] Lieutenant-Colonel Michael Calvert, a wartime Chindit commanding officer and later SAS Brigade commander, directed in a 1943 report on Chindit operations that it was necessary to "march methodically and [not to] overtire yourselves or men, as lack of sleep and tiredness makes cowards of us all."[62] Psychologist F.C. Bartlett concurred with this assessment. "In war," he insisted, "there is perhaps no general condition which is more likely to produce a large crop of nervous and mental disorders than a state of prolonged and great fatigue." He further broke the issue down and explained that this state is the result of four factors:

1. Physiological arousal caused by the stress of existing in what is commonly understood as a continual fight-or-flight arousal condition;

2. Cumulative loss of sleep;

3. The reduction in caloric intake; and

4. The toll of the elements such as rain, cold, heat and dark of night.[63]

Scholars and researchers have shown that often the fear of killing is another predominant stress for soldiers. Cultures that inculcate individuals from an early age to the value of life and the abhorrence of killing others, end up having these sentiments reflected in the psyche of their soldiers. In fact, the lack of "offensive spirit" was widely reported in World War II. One 1943 report noted that the "average Jack was quite amazingly lethargic."[64] One British tank commander conceded that the enemy "sprang at Allied tanks like wolves, until we were compelled under the murderous rain of their fire to kill them against our will."[65] Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Cole lamented, "not one man in twenty-five voluntarily used his weapon" even though they were under attack.[66] S.L.A. Marshall, based on his World War II battlefield studies, reported that on average only 15 per cent of infanteers fired their weapons during an engagement.[67] Similarly, a Canadian military instructor complained in 1951 during the Korean War that "the problem is not to stop fire, but to start it."[68]

Another related cause of fear in soldiers is the threat of being killed or wounded. "I suddenly felt terribly afraid," one German veteran confessed, "It would probably be my turn soon. I would be killed, just like that...as my panic rose, my hands began to tremble... and I sank into total despair."[69] Notably, although this fear is self-explanatory and, arguably, completely understandable, it does not appear to be the predominant cause of fear expressed by combatants. Israeli military psychologist Ben Shalit was surprised to find the low emphasis on fear of bodily harm and death, and the great emphasis on "letting others down."[70]

A final and important fear to address is that of fear of mission failure. This fear is vital to recognize because it can cause individuals to have tunnel vision and essentially not see the forest for the trees. Although mission focus, tenacity and determination are all key virtues, it is important to note that in some cases, continuing on with a mission, despite a change of circumstance, might be even more detrimental than aborting the mission. For example, on 30 July 1997, Hamas deployed two suicide bombers who detonated their bombs in the crowded Mahane-Yehude market in Jerusalem killing sixteen and wounding 169 people. As a result, the Israeli government decided to assassinate a high ranking Hamas leader. Their target was in Amman, Jordan. Complicating this issue was the fact that Israel had signed a peace agreement with Jordan three years prior and they presently had good diplomatic relations. Nonetheless, the government chose to pursue the assassination. The mission was assigned to Mossad. Once the Mossad operators ascertained the target's routine, a plan was derived. The plan called for one operator to open a can of soda pop near the target. The popping noise and spray of the shaken soda was intended to distract the target while a second agent applied a few drops of poison on the back of the target's neck, which would subsequently cause the target to get violently ill and die, without any outward sign of violence or foul play. While the plan appeared to be sound, the actual mission was a disaster. Although told to abort if there were any complications, the agents failed to do so. On the day of the "attack" the agents apparently failed to see, or acknowledge, the target's young daughter run out of the car after her father, the driver get out of the car, the Hamas militant delivering a document to the same building, or a nearby Jordanian policeman. In addition, the tab on the soda can tore off so there was no diversion. Nonetheless, despite all multiple triggers for an abort, the operators pushed on with the mission. In the confusion, the target was sprayed with the poison, however, not before a scuffle broke-out, which attracted the police, who in turn

arrested the agents, who were using forged Canadian passports. The event became a diplomatic nightmare. The Israelis, in an attempt to repair relations, offered to provide the antidote to cure the target who had quickly become deathly ill. However, in order to do so, they were also forced to provide the chemical make-up of the poison and the antidote as the Jordanian physician would not otherwise administer the drug. Additionally, they were required to release twenty Jordanian prisoners held in Israel for the return of the two Mossad agents. Not surprisingly, political relations also soured between Jordan and Israel as a result.[71]

Notably, poor decisions resulting from a singular focus on mission accomplishment, heightened by the fear of mission failure, can have even more dire consequences. In the case of the "Triple Agent" it cost seven Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operatives, among others, their lives. In Pulitzer Prize winner Joby Warrick's national best seller, *The Triple Agent*, the author describes the events that preceded the 30 December 2009 suicide bomb attack inside the CIA compound in Khost, Afghanistan. Interestingly, in retrospect, it appears that many of the key individuals had serious doubts about the Jordanian al-Qaeda propagandist who, once captured by the Jordanians, agreed to act as a "double" agent for the West. While many had their doubts as to whether or not this rising superspy was trustworthy, or in fact acting more as a "triple" agent still committed to al-Qaeda and playing the West, fear of losing the best opportunity to locate top al-Qaeda leaders mitigated this doubt and even allowed them to ignore standing operating procedures (SOPs) when the Jordanian perceived "double agent" entered the CIA base. Had they followed the SOPs, the bomb strapped to the Jordanian's, who was actually a triple agent, chest would have been discovered before he had gained access to the inner echelons of the compound. Even immediately preceding the detonation, doubts remained but fear restrained the necessary action. According to Warrick, one of the guards, a former Green

Beret, “watched with growing alarm as Balawi [Triple Agent]” having refused to exit on the guard’s side of the car as proper protocol dictated, “hobbled around the vehicle, one hand grasping the crutch and the other hidden ominously under his shawl.” Warrick continues explaining that the guard “tensed, finger on the trigger, eyes fixed on the shawl with instincts honed in dozens of firefights and close scrapes. One shot would drop the man. But if he was wrong – if there was no bomb – it would be the worse mistake of his life.” In this case, the worst and last mistake of his life ended up being not taking that shot. Notably, this decision was simply the last of many with regard to this event that was guided more by the fear of mission failure than by sound reason and logical thinking.[72]

Manifestations of Fear

In order to mitigate the potential negative effects of fear, simply understanding what may create fear in soldiers on the battlefield is not enough. It is also critical to understand the manifestations of fear. Professor Dollard determined that the most common symptoms of fear are: pounding of heart and rapid pulse, tenseness of muscles, sinking feelings, dryness of mouth and throat, trembling and sweating.[73] Similarly, Air Crew studies showed that the symptoms of fear experienced during combat included: palpitations, dryness of mouth, sweating, stomach discomfort, excessive urination, trembling, tension and irritability. The most persistent symptoms were tension, tremor and sleep disturbance.[74]

Nonetheless, it is not necessarily the symptoms which are of consequence. More importantly, it is the effect fear has on individuals and units that must be considered as the consequences could be devastating.

Firstly, fear affects performance. After decades of battlefield studies, S.L.A. Marshall determined that “in the measure that

the man is shocked nervously, and that fear comes uppermost, he becomes physically weak." He added that the "body is drained of muscular power and of mental coordination."[75] Anecdotal accounts from Omaha Beach, on 6 June 1944, demonstrated that some men "were so weak from fear that they found it physically impossible to carry much more than their own weight." Staff Sergeant Thomas Turner revealed that "we were all surprised to find that we had suddenly gone weak. . . .under fire we learned that fear and fatigue are about the same in their effect on an advance."[76] Remarkably, combat veterans discovered that "some frightened men have spent two hours negotiating the distance, which calmer ones cover in six minutes."[77] Dan Ray of the U.S. 36th Infantry Division recalled preparing to ambush a group of German soldiers in the Colmar Pocket. "I was shaking so bad from fright," he declared, "I had to brace my knees against the sides of the hole so that I could be ready to function."[78] Similarly, Walter Pippen who served with Merrill's Marauders in Burma admitted that "I couldn't speak. My vocal cords seemed to have jelled. It was as though my legs had been severed at the knee."[79] Air Force research demonstrated a similar result determining that fear, or flying stress, rendered individuals mentally and physically tired.[80]

Dollard also discovered that fear can lead to over-caution. Of those he questioned, 59 per cent stated that there were occasions when they were too cautious and had their efficiency reduced by fear. For example, an SAS patrol operating behind enemy lines in Indonesia in the late 1960s was compromised and found themselves on the run. One morning they became exceedingly frightened by barking dogs. They quickly imagined, and then convinced themselves, that they were the quarry. They became overly cautious and slow, only to later discover that the barking dogs had nothing to do with them at all.[81]

It is even more deleterious to performance when fear leads to panic. “The men from what storys [sic] they had heard of the Indians in regard to their scalping and Mawhawking [sic],” a British officer during the French and Indian War wrote in his journal, “were so pannick [sic] struck that their officers had little or no command over them.”[82] The timeless infectious nature of panic was confirmed by United States Marine Corps (USMC) Lieutenant Philip Caputo in Vietnam. He witnessed a tough sergeant curse and kick a soldier who collapsed in tears unable to take any more combat. “None of us did a thing to stop Horne because we felt the same terror,” he confessed, “And we knew that that kind of fear was a contagion and the marine a carrier... beat him, kick him, beat that virus out of him before it spreads.”[83]

The belief that fear can spread is generally widely held. Dollard found that 75 per cent of the veterans he questioned expressed the view that “fear can be contagious [and] that it can be transmitted from one soldier to another.”[84]

Fear can also cause severe emotional stress and psychological breakdown. Scholar Stephen G. Fritz noted that “Fear was the real enemy of most Landsers: fear of death or of cowardice, fear of the conflict within the spirit ... or, a simple fear of showing fear. Men felt haunted, hollowed on the inside by pockets of fear that would not go away, caught in the grip of something enormous about to overwhelm them.”[85] German veteran Will Thomas recognized the mental strain that fear exacted. “The psychological load,” he explained, “presses harder than the burden of the almost super-human physical exertions.”[86] Similarly, Harry Mielert emphasized the “enormous amount of psychological stress demanded of each soldier.” He asserted that the “physical is the smallest part of the strain.”[87] An American commander observed that “Gradually, your numbers are whittled down, your men grow jumpy, and approach the cracking point.”[88] Professor Kellet’s examination of

World War II studies led him to believe that "More than anything else, fear itself is the critical ingredient in psychiatric breakdown in combat...causes a strain so great that it causes men to break down."[89] Stouffer's seminal work reported that 83 per cent of those questioned asserted that they had the experience of seeing "a man's nerves 'crack up' at the front."[90] Notably, seventy per cent of 1700 American veterans surveyed in Italy in 1944, said that they became nervous or depressed, or their morale suffered, at the sight of another man's psychiatric breakdown.[91]

Moreover, and arguably most important, fear can also impact adversely on decision-making. Research has shown "that during stressful combat-like training, every aspect of cognitive function assessed was severely degraded, compared to the subjects' own baseline, pre-stress performance." Notably, the magnitudes of the deficits were greater than those typically produced by alcohol intoxication or treatment with sedating drugs. The study team concluded that "on the battlefield, the severe decrements we measured ...would significantly impair the ability of warfighters to perform their duties." Specifically, the team determined that extended periods of pressure and fear lead to over-reaction, an increase in wrong decisions and inconsistency.[92] Similarly, Professor Dinter noted that fear and exhaustion may also reduce the willingness to make decisions at all.[93]

These results are not surprising. Anecdotal evidence provided in war literature and interviews with veterans clearly endorses these findings. Often fear can cause people to make decisions that are based more on imagined outcomes that are derived by the fear rather than on a critical assessment of the evidence. For this reason, fear often leads to poor decision-making. Recognizing this connection will likely not diminish fear but it can help mitigate some of the negative consequences with regard to decision-making that fear can cause. For example, a special operations

forces (SOF) operator, after hearing some of this evidence, reflected that a similar incident had occurred during the recent war in Afghanistan (c.2001-2014). He recounted how during one combat engagement, close air support was called in to suppress heavy enemy fire. Shortly afterwards, an Afghan man approached the convoy with what appeared to be a covered child cradled in his arms. He yelled at the foreigners and claimed that they had killed the infant. He warned that if they continued along their current trajectory, they would come across enraged villagers, including women and children, who were prepared to retaliate and avenge the infant's death. The choice was clear. The convoy could either continue on their planned route, or they could detour and go through an area that was a known ambush site. There was no third option. In discussing the alternatives, they graphically described the moral and ethical challenges that would face them if they continued on as planned. On a moral plane, they feared having to fight civilians, particularly women and children. This fear was heightened when they imagined how their actions, even in self-defence, might be viewed and judged back home. In fact, the imagined consequences were so awful that they quickly decided to go with a known high level threat, an ambush, rather than potentially face a mob of angry villagers. Upon reflection, the operator acknowledged that their decision was based largely on imagined fear and that most probably the Afghan had been lying not only about the impending attack by villagers, but also about the dead infant, whom no one had actually seen. Thankfully, although they had to fight through a heavy ambush, all survived.[94]

In another example of the debilitating effect of fear on decision-making, Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler, who while acting as the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy to Niger, was kidnapped by members of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). He was held for five months along with his colleague Louis Guay. Fowler was quick

to identify the negative impact of fear on their decision-making processes. As he describes:

> Extreme fear and worry were the pervading themes of our Al Qaeda captivity: fear to the point of physical pain, fear that it would end suddenly with a sword, in a tent, on a video that would be seen by family and friends, and fear that it would go on and on and we would die of the heat, the food, the snakes, scorpions, or merely of broken wills and hearts.[95]

Fowler acknowledged, "Extreme worry and fear were enormously debilitating and physically taxing (memory loss, diminished appetite, insomnia)."[96] In particular, however, it was how fear affected their moods and their thought processes that were most troubling to the diplomat. At one point, Fowler describes watching his captors dig a deep pit which he and Guay took no time in concluding was surely going to be their final resting spots. With few options, they worked themselves into somewhat of a grim acceptance of their fate. As such, they were quite surprised when their captors placed long sticks over the whole, then stretched a poncho across it in order to create a shelter from the rain. Fowler notes of himself and Guay after this discovery: "We were in shock. It took a while to reconcile ourselves to the fact that the whole near-death experience had been a fabrication of our own less than stable minds." He continues, "While we believed our captors were entirely capable of killing us, and it was all too clear some of them wanted to get on with doing just that, what had happened the previous day was only indirectly related to them and far more something we had done to ourselves." As he lamented, "that took some getting used to."[97]

Additionally, and what is largely unknown, is that fear has a cumulative effect. Dollard's research indicated that fear increases

in proportion to the duration of the engagement and the number of frightening incidents endured by an individual.[98] Scottish historian Hew Strachan concluded that "the battle-hardened veteran was a mythical figure." He discovered that "sustained exposure to danger did not harden a soldier but eroded his limited resources."[99] Canadian military historian Desmond Morton agreed. "Most men [in World War I] arrived at the front fearful of the unknown, mastered it if they survived," he asserted, "and then, in days, months or years, wore out their courage."[100] Marshall explained that "sustained fear is as degenerative as prolonged fatigue and exhausts the body energy no less."[101] Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Grossman determined from his research that "In sustained combat this process of emotional bankruptcy is seen in 98 percent of all soldiers who survive physically."[102] Another contemporary report concluded that "All soldiers have a breaking point beyond which their effective performance in combat diminishes."[103] Quite simply, even the most psychologically strong person will eventually succumb. No one ever becomes accustomed to fear – it is just a matter of trying to control it. One study conducted during the Second World War by Lieutenant-Colonel J.W. Appel and Captain G.W. Beebe, observed, "Each moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to the intensity and duration of their exposure...the average point at which this occurred appears to have been in the region of 200-240 aggregate combat days." The British estimated that a rifleman would last for about 400 combat days – the longer period being attributable to the fact that they tended to relieve troops in the line for a four day rest after approximately twelve days.[104] Another study confirmed that at 200-240 days of combat, the average soldier became "so overly cautious and jittery that he was ineffective and demoralizing to the newer men."[105]

While the negative effects of fear might be easy to identify post crisis, they are often ignored during the decision-making process,

as the previous examples have illustrated. Importantly, recognizing the manifestations of fear can help you acknowledge your state of mind. Additionally understanding that fear is not uncommon and appreciating how it might negatively impact your decision-making process can help you mitigate potential pitfalls.

Courage

The question must now be asked, if fear is so prevalent and its manifestations so overwhelming, how do we have heroes? Is courage an attribute that "trumps" fear?

An examination of courage is revealing but also difficult. It is difficult, because there is no universal definition or understanding of the term, yet most would agree that it is a quality that all wish to possess. "I do not believe," Field Marshal Viscount Slim extolled, "that there is any man who would not rather be called brave than have any other virtue attributed to him."[106] Additionally, courage is often seen in two lights – one as an act or action such as a single desperate act (i.e. the storming of a pillbox or falling on a grenade); the second, as Socrates would tell us, as a very noble quality. Both suggest the expression of strength, power and might in the face of fear.[107]

This dichotomy is further developed by scholars, researchers and veterans. Stouffer noted there was an internal struggle between an individual's impulses toward personal safety and comfort and the social compulsions which drove them into danger and discomfort. He observed, "Sometimes a guy would say, 'How do I keep going?' You have to fight with yourself. You didn't want to be a quitter...' In the case of the combat soldier, this internal fight was one of the factors which sometimes lay at the root of neuropsychiatric breakdowns involving gross disorganization of behaviour."[108] Anecdotal accounts reinforce this view. "I will not be a coward, so

I pray a lot to God," confessed Walter Happich, "I know against what opponent I must fight," Horstmar Seitz, another German soldier commented. He continued, "We must often conquer ourselves."[109]

As such, as Dollard is apt to reveal, "Courage is not fearlessness; it is being able to do the job even when afraid."[110] Professor Rachman formulated that "true courage" was a quality of "those people who are willing and able to approach a fearful situation despite the presence of subjective fear and psychophysiological disturbances."[111] S.L.A. Marshall considered courage more than an innate quality; courage and cowardice to him were alternative free choices that come to every man. These views accord well with that of Lord (Sir Charles Wilson) Moran in his classic work, *The Anatomy of Courage*. Moran theorized that courage was "a moral quality" and "not a chance gift of nature." He asserted, "it is the cold choice between two alternatives, it is the fixed resolve not to quit, an act of renunciation which must be made not once but many times by the power of will." In the end, Moran concluded, "courage is willpower."[112]

Strategies for Mitigating Fear

While courage may trump fear, the issue need not be shrouded in uncertainty. In fact, all officers, NCOs and soldiers can take measures to put an effective fear policy in place in order to manage it. Notably, to contend with fear, one must be able to recognize it before it becomes so strong that nothing can be done about it. One must recognize the symptoms, understand where to expect danger and comprehend the conditions under which fear builds. Although impossible to eradicate, fear can be controlled to maximize individual and unit performance.

In fact, it must be recognized that there can be a positive component to fear as well, if the emotion is managed properly.

"We fought," Guy Sager maintained, "from simple fear which was our motivating power." Fear also sharpens an individual's senses and makes them more alert, mainly because of the release of adrenalin in the body. Panama Operation Just Cause veteran Sergeant First Class James Coroy, from the 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division, noted that "Fear is not that bad, because it heightens your senses."[113] In fact, a U.S. Air Force study found that 50 per cent of the airmen reported that fear sometimes improved their efficiency so they were more accurate in their work.[114]

The first strategy for controlling fear is to explain that it is a normal occurrence and encourage discussion on the topic. The existence of fear must not be repressed by individuals, nor should those who articulate their fears be ridiculed. Research has indicated that eight out of ten combat veterans felt that it is better to admit fear and discuss it openly before battle. The belief that "the man who knows he will be afraid and tries to get ready for it makes a better soldier," was shared by 58 per cent of those surveyed.[115] Conversely, "If it [fear] is allowed to back up in a man, unspoken and unaired in any way," war correspondent Mack Morriss explained, "it can form a clot and create an obstacle to normal action."[116] As such, the key factor identified by combat veterans was not the fact that someone had fear but rather "the effort to overcome the withdrawal tendencies engendered by intense fear."[117] Stouffer determined that when a person regards fear reactions as a normal response to a dangerous situation, they are less likely to be disturbed, once the danger has subsided, by self-reproaches of cowardice, unmanliness, or other accusations that lower self-esteem. Moreover, in the face of danger, a source of conflict is eliminated if one accepts the notion that he need not fear the loss of status and esteem in the eyes of his fellows if he trembles, gasps, and exhibits other marked fear symptoms while carrying out his job.[118]

Additionally, the failure to discuss one's fears may have tangible and substantive costs. For example, paratroopers are generally recognized as having the highest casualty rates and the most difficult situations to cope with in combat. Yet, as a group they have an attitude that does not permit free expressions of anxiety and fear. "In an atmosphere where everyone is tough, rough and ready for the worst," Stouffer explained, "anxiety cannot be verbalized or [be] socially accepted." As a result, he discovered that neurotic reactions among paratroopers "are apt to take the form of conversion symptoms involving the lower extremities - weakness or paralysis of one or both legs." Similarly, British officers who suffered from the same type of self-imposed intolerance tended to suffer from paralysis of limbs, and in extreme cases suicides.[119]

The Iroquois provide another compelling example of the need to openly address fears. During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries, First Nations often suffered from "desertion" prior to battle. As historian Carl Benn explains:

> Iroquois society, with its emphasis on personal stoicism and bravery, may have failed to address the instinctive fear that a person feels when preparing to engage in mortal combat. At the beginning of the battle of Fort George, one Iroquois tried to rally the warriors with the simplistic declaration, 'The warrior knows no anxiety for his safety." This was rhetoric, not the truth, and dangerous rhetoric because it conflicted with the immediate experience of people who heard it. Fear, and its attendant symptoms, such as uncontrollable trembling or bowel movements, are due to rapid involuntary muscular action designed to warm up the body for the anticipated fight. Most combatants experience such symptoms, yet warriors seem to have grown up hearing only about the fearlessness of their ancestors and the courageous exploits of the war

> without reference to the reality of fear in anything but contemptuous terms. Therefore, when they had to confront their own terror, some presumably believed they were cowards, not the 'men' of their culture's tradition, and they responded by fleeing if they could not bring their fear under control.[120]

A vital method for controlling fear is through training and education.[121] Flavius Renatus asserted in 378 AD that "the courage of the soldier is heightened by the knowledge of his profession." Knowledge is the key as it provides confidence, not only in self, but also in one's comrades, equipment and tactics. This confidence is achieved through realistic training, as well as a complete understanding of the realm of conflict. This knowledge in turn reduces the fear of the unexpected and the unknown. It is for this reason that the British parachute school has adopted the motto, "Knowledge Dispels Fear."

For example, realistic training (e.g. battle simulation, full combat loads, non-templated enemy action, intense tempo, stress, physical exertion and fatigue) can create reasonable expectations of how far a unit can go and how long they can fight. It is also valuable to the extent it inculcates in soldiers the realization that they can survive on the battlefield. Major John Masters, a World War II Chindit commander, explained that it is "easy it is to be brave when a little experience has taught you that there is nothing to be afraid of."[122] Dollard explained that "fear is useful to the soldier when it drives him to learn better in training and to act sensibly in battle."[123] Stouffer believed that fear aroused in training could serve a useful purpose. He argued that it "can motivate men to learn those habits which will reduce danger in battle." He explained that "training benefits by accustoming – taking away the unknown unfamiliar element." He concluded that "a certain amount of adaptation to the extremely loud noises and other stimuli probably

takes place with repeated exposures so that when the stimuli are encountered in battle they elicit less fear."[124]

As such, it is critical to add the element of ambiguity and the unknown in all training activities. Consequently, training should be conducted at night, in poor light, and unknown surroundings. Moreover, it should include situations where things go wrong. In tandem, these occurrences will assist with inoculating individuals to the fear of the unknown and accustom them to dealing with adversity. For this reason demanding Adventure Training in remote regions is invaluable. It is always varied from the routine and incorporates real, unexpected events that must be dealt with on the spot.

Certainly, the beneficial effect of realistic training is undisputed. Research and studies have shown that "the general level of anxiety in combat would tend to be reduced insofar as the men derived from training a high degree of self-confidence about their ability to take care of themselves...troops who expressed a high degree of self-confidence before combat were more likely to perform with relatively little fear during battle."[125] Major Reg Crawford of the Australian SAS commented, "We wouldn't be able to do the things we do if a guy knew he was going to be faced with a degree of danger and didn't have the confidence to confront that and carry out the task regardless."[126] Similarly, specialist Matthew Eversmann said of his combat experience in Mogadishu in October 1993, "seeing the men perform gave me the confidence and reassurance that I needed."[127]

The issue of confidence is an important one to underscore. It has been determined that confidence is perhaps the greatest source of emotional strength that a soldier can draw upon. "With it," behavioural expert Bernard Bass insisted, "he willingly faces the enemy and withstands deprivations, minor setbacks, and extreme

stresses, knowing that he and his unit are capable of succeeding."[128] Indeed, numerous studies have shown that well-led and cohesive units tend to have fewer stress casualties than units lower in these qualities.[129] Self-confidence can be achieved through training, education and fitness, as well as through sound leadership, team cohesion and dependable equipment. In essence, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that troops who expressed a high degree of self-confidence before combat were more likely to perform with relatively little fear during battle.

The value of training is also derived from its ability to create an element of habit and routine (i.e. developing instinctive reactions). Drill, for instance, is utilized to teach the instinctive reaction of a body of troops to commands. "What is learnt in training," commando commander Lord Lovat insisted, "is done instinctively in action - almost without thinking - down to the last man."[130]

Similarly, discipline provides a psychological defence that helps the soldier to control fear and ignore danger through technical performance. "It is a function of discipline," Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery extolled, "to fortify the mind so that it becomes reconciled to unpleasant sights and accepts them as normal every-day occurrences...Discipline strengthens the mind so that it becomes impervious to the corroding influence of fear...It instils the habit of self-control."[131]

Another related method for controlling fear is the maintenance of routine and habit. The adherence to simple daily routines, such as the ritual of shaving, provides a sense of normalcy, in essence reassurance, to individuals. This sense of well-being is vital in maintaining an equilibrium that allows individuals to perform consistently. Major John Masters revealed deep in the Burmese jungles that "It was not the food that refreshed and renewed us as much as the occasion."[132] Commando Lieutenant-Colonel the

Lord Lovat summed it up when he declared that "habit is ten times nature."[133]

Additionally, humour can aid with regard to managing fear in a positive manner by helping to release tension. World War II veteran Howard Ruppel of the 517th Parachute Infantry Regiment observed "when circumstances become unbearable, the experienced soldier with some sense of humor and the ability to laugh at one's self has a better chance to retain his sanity than the serious minded fellow."[134] One long-time intelligence operator serving with a highly classified unit in Northern Ireland commented in regard to the fear and strain of long hours in covert observation posts, "the unit ran on a sense of humour."[135]

For some, religion and faith also provide a foil for fear. Max Kocour of the 90th Infantry Division revealed that faith among combat men was usually a general belief in God and was not necessarily centered around any particular religion or denomination. "We developed faith," he divulged, "regardless of religions, which had been created by man, we felt we were on the right side of faith, under the protection / care of a truly fine Supreme Being." Arlo Butcher, a paratrooper with the 101st Airborne Division disclosed, "No matter what kind of protection you've got, or how deep the hole is, I sure realized the mighty power of God. It was your prayers ...that helped us through this awful mess."[136]

Another effective tool for fear management is the timely and accurate passage of information. In the chaos of battle information is almost a means of power. Individuals are interested in anything that may shed light on what is transpiring and/or about to impact on their future. Quite simply, knowledge dissipates the unknown and dampens groundless rumours. "If a soldier knows what is happening and what is expected of him," a veteran British officer explained, "he is far less frightened than the soldier who is

just walking towards unknown dangers."[137] Theodore Roosevelt insisted that "fear can be checked, whipped and driven from the field when men are kept informed."[138]

The passage of information is predicated on effective communications which are equally as vital to staving off the effects of fear. It is critical to keep personnel informed as much as possible about virtually everything. It is not only the content of the message that is important but also the process itself. Regular communications ensures that everyone knows that they are not alone, that they are still part of a team. It is for this reason that communications should always be maintained at all cost. Initially, during World War II, the Allies believed that German and Japanese night attacks were amateurish and disorganized because of the excessive amount of yelling that was used. However, they later discovered that this communication was deliberate, not only a means of control, but also as fear management.

Strong group cohesion/primary group relationships also help to keep fear at bay. As already noted, one of the greatest fears felt by most combat soldiers is the fear of letting down their comrades. This is a powerful impetus not to allow fear to create panic. Paratrooper John Agnew explained that "Pride in Regiment and Division and being able to depend on each other makes individuals courageous regardless of fear."[139] S.L.A. Marshall asserted, "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade."[140] Conversely, fighter pilots suffered the greatest stress due both to their isolation while flying alone, as well as to the strain caused by the unpredictability of their adversaries in combat.[141]

This sense of obligation coupled with a sense of responsibility for ensuring the well-being of others also generates a feeling of

responsibility for upholding the reputation of the unit. This sense of responsibility in turn helps to alleviate fear as well. Creating demanding expectations of combat behaviour in members and then linking soldier's self-esteem to the reputation of the unit and the welfare of their fellow soldiers is a powerful control mechanism. Many believe that a person behaves as a hero or coward according to the expectations of others of how he or she is to behave.

In that vein, Marshall insisted, "no matter how lowly his rank, any man who controls himself automatically contributes to the control of others." He added, "Fear is contagious but courage is not less so."[142] This connection was also borne out in research. Dollard revealed that 94 per cent of those veterans surveyed stated they fought better after observing other men behaving calmly in a dangerous situation.[143] Additionally, General Slim's subordinates were all in agreement that his "remarkable calmness in crisis, despite his own inner fears and anxieties, contributed significantly to a lessening of the storm of panic which erupted at every new and unexpected Japanese move."[144] In John Flanagan's 17 volume report on performance of US combat air crews, he concluded, "The primary motivating force which more than anything else kept these men flying and fighting was that they were members of a group in which flying and fighting was the only accepted way of behaving."[145] Similarly, studies of German forces during the Second World War also showed the key to their success, despite the worsening situation, was the strength of the primary group. Clearly, when the primary group developed a high degree of cohesion, morale was high and resistance effective.

Leadership is a critical element as well. Dollard noted that 89 per cent of those surveyed emphasized the importance of getting frequent instructions from leaders when in a tight spot.[146] Furthermore, evidence clearly indicates that leaderless groups normally become inactive.[147] Not surprisingly, Samuel Stouffer found that

"cool and aggressive leadership was especially important" in pressing troops forward in dangerous and fearful situations such as storming across a beach raked by fire.[148]

This finding is based on the fact that "role modeling" has an extremely important influence on a person's reaction to threatening situations. With regard to the evocation of courageous behaviour, American enlisted men in World War II told interviewers that leadership from in front was very important.[149] Most research has reinforced the intuitive deduction that "men like to follow an experienced man … [who] knows how to accomplish objectives with a minimum of risk. He sets an example of coolness and efficiency which impels similar behaviour in others." In this regard, the presence of strong thoughtful leadership creates "a force which helps resist fear."[150] A United States Marine Corp (USMC) private in the Pacific campaign was devastated by the death of his Company Commander. He revealed that his officer commanding [OC] "represented stability and direction in a world of violence...[when he died] We felt forlorn and lost."[151] A wounded veteran from North Africa put it in perspective. He explained, "everybody wants somebody to look up to when he's scared."[152] Sir Philip Sidney affirmed, "A brave captain is as a root, out of which, as branches, the courage of his soldiers doth spring."[153]

This effect, however, is only present if there is trust in the leadership. Soldiers must believe that leaders mean what they say. Body language, tone, eye contact can all betray insincerity. Most importantly, actions must match words. In the end, it comes down to setting the example. A leader must never ask, or expect, troops to do that which they are unwilling to do themselves. Stouffer's study showed that what the officers did, rather than what they said was important. "I personally recall," Sergeant Andy Anderson wrote, "when in the advance in Germany, our Platoon was 'on point' and we suddenly came under small arms fire from our front and my

men all took to the ditches. I was peering about, under some cover to get a fix on the enemy. In a matter of minutes, I felt a poke in my back from a walking stick and it was the Brigadier with a smile. His comment was simply, 'not to hold up the entire Division,' so 'press-on' which is what we did. The point is, that you have no idea what confidence is carried to the troops when you have great leadership."[154]

Another "tool" for managing fear is simple activity. Dollard found that veteran soldiers quickly learn that to be busy means to be less afraid: "When fear is strong, keep your mind on the job at hand."[155] Major-General T.S. Hart, former Director of Medical Services in the UK agreed. "There is no doubt," he asserted, "that inactivity at a time of tension breeds fear and that the best antidote ...is purposeful action."[156] Colonel Palmer noted that "actions such as giving and receiving orders reduce fear by focusing the minds of those giving and receiving them."[157] Naval surgeon R.N. Villar confessed, "I found waiting the most worrying and doing the most relaxing."[158] Similarly, Ted Barris acknowledged, "I flew twenty-two missions ...and it's only when I have time to think that I realize how scared we were."[159] Finally, Robert Crisp, a tank troop commander in North Africa in 1941, acknowledged, "when the race is begun or the innings started, the fullness of the moment overwhelms the fear of anticipation. It is so in battle. When mind and body are fully occupied, it is surprising how unfrightened you can be."[160]

Notably, however, others have relied on more artificial tools for controlling their angst. Alcohol and drugs are a time honoured way of dealing with pain, fear and stress, and their use is often more widespread than generally acknowledged. British regiments fought at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 with barrels of whisky in the centre of their Squares. "Had it not been for the rum ration," one British medical officer testified to the 1922 Shell Shock Committee, "I do not think we should have won the war."[161] Prior to

the Dieppe Raid, the commandos were given a breakfast served with rum which at least one veteran of the raid credited with allowing them to keep the contents of their stomach despite the devastation, carnage and death they faced that morning.[162] The Japanese and Russians regularly plied their soldiers with alcohol prior to their fanatical human wave charges. The American and Russian experiences in Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively are laden with accounts of substance abuse as a means of coping. It is important to acknowledge, however, although drugs and alcohol have often been used to help cope with stress, their success is generally of marginal value and short-lived. Their use alleviates anxiety only temporarily and, more importantly, it reduces the ability to act in a rational and coordinated manner. In addition, there are often long-term consequences of use.

Conclusion

In the end, there need not be a stigma surrounding fear. The essence of the issue is not whether one experiences fear but rather how it is dealt with. It can be controlled and utilized to benefit the effectiveness of individuals and units in times of danger. Conversely, the failure to recognize the reality of fear and its effects can have serious repercussions that could manifest themselves at the most disadvantageous moments.

Therefore, it is important to ensure that the necessary steps are taken to ease anxiety and fears. Discuss the issue to ensure that the perceptions and expectations of leaders and subordinates alike are realistic. Imbue confidence in individual, team and equipment and develop strategies to allow all to feel a sense of control over their destiny regardless of activity or operation. Develop contingency planning and undertake additional training and education so that individuals are better able to cope with the unknown or unexpected.

The emotion of fear has physiological consequences for your body, namely heightened awareness and strength. As such, a proper understanding of fear, its causes, manifestations and how to control it will actually provide an edge that may make the difference between success and failure, life and death. In the end, fear is universal. Controlling fear so that it empowers you and does not impede your decision-making is the ultimate goal.

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Colonel Bernd Horn, OMM, MSM, CD, PhD is a retired Regular Force infantry officer who has held key command and staff appointments in the Canadian Armed Forces, including Deputy Commander of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment and Officer Commanding 3 Commando, the Canadian Airborne Regiment. He is currently the Director of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command Professional Development Centre, an appointment he fills as a reservist. Dr. Horn is also an adjunct professor of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, as well as an adjunct professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada. He is also a Fellow at the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute. Hehas authored, co-authored, edited or co-edited 39 books and well over a hundred monographs / chapters / articles on military history, special operations forces, leadership and military affairs.

NOTES

1 Andy McNab, *Bravo Two Zero* (New York: Dale Publishing, 1993), 118.

2 "Culture," according to anthropologist Dr. Donna Winslow, "represents the behaviour patterns or style of an organization that members are automatically encouraged to follow." She believes that "Culture shapes action by supplying some of the ultimate aims or values of an organization and actors modify their behaviour to achieve those ends." She explains that culture "establishes a set of ideal standards and expectations that members are supposed to follow." Donna Winslow, "Changing Military Culture," presentation to NDHQ Daily Executive Meeting, 17 November 1999. Quite simply, the existing culture within an organization socializes those within the group, particularly newcomers, and shapes their attitudes and behaviours to correspond to the existing framework in place. In sum, it creates common expectations of what is and is not acceptable behaviour.

3 Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation - Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE) Report No. R77* (Ottawa: DND, 1980), 194.

4 Samuel Hynes, *The Soldier's Tale. Bearing Witness to Modern War* (New York: Penguin Press, 1997), 63-64.

5 Jay Luvaas and Harold Nelson, *The Army War College Guide to Antietam* (Carlisle, PA: South Mountain Press, 1987), 246.

6 Gregg Zoroya, "As war looms, young soldiers confront fear; 'Black Hawk Down' scenario among worries," *USA Today*, 18 March 2003, A1.

7 Ibid., A1.

8 Dennis Coon, *Introduction to Psychology, 8th Edition* (New York: Brooks / Cole Publishing Company, 1998), 429.

9 Stephen G. Fritz, *Frontsoldaten* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1995), 139.

10 Douglas Brinkley, "What They Saw When They Landed," *Time,* May 31, 2004, 41.

11 Rita Atkinson, Richard Atkinson, Edward Smith, Daryl Bem, and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, eds., *Hilgard's Introduction to Psychology, 12th edition* (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1996), 379-380.

12 David M. Myers, *Psychology, 4th edition* (Holland, Michigan: Worth Publishers, 1995), 433. See also Coon, 431.

13 John Dollard, *Fear in Battle* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1944).

14 Marcus Luttrell with Patrick Robinson, *Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2007), 250, 296.

15 Ibid., 295-296.

16 John C. McManus, *The Deadly Brotherhood. The American Combat Soldier in World War II* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1998), 251.

17 S.J. Rachman, *Fear and Courage* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1978), 6. For example, an individual who persistently feels uneasy and anxious for unidentified reasons, such as the fear of being alone.

18 John Dollard, *Fear in Battle* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1944), 56. Dollard's research was based on his study of 300 American volunteers who fought in the Spanish Civil War.

19 Quoted in Roy Maclaren, *Canadians Behind Enemy Lines, 1939-1945* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 211.

20 Elmar Dinter, *Hero or Coward* (London: Frank Cass, 1985), 12.

21 Ibid., 24.

22 Rachman, 84.

23 Major-General (retd) Robert H. Scales Jr., *Yellow Smoke. The Future of Land Warfare for America's Military* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2003), 168.

24 Malcolm James, *Born of the Desert. With the SAS in North Africa* (London: Greenhill Books, reprint 2001), 125.

25 Dinter, 18 & 98; and Wood, 28-29.

26 A.K. Goldsworthy, "The Othismos, Myths and Heresies: The Nature of Hoplite Battle," *War in History,* Vol. 4, 1997, 23.

27 For instance, the true story of the Nineteenth Century sinking of the US whaleship *Essex*, as retold by Professor Karen Thompson Walker, and which represented part of the inspiration for Herman Melville's epic tale *Moby Dick*, is an excellent example of how fear can lead to poor decision-making:

> In 1819, the whaleship Essex found itself nearly 5,000 kilometers off the coast of Chile. There were twenty US sailors on board when the ship was struck by a sperm whale and sustained a massive leak. The twenty whalers huddled in three small whale-boats as the Essex flooded and sank. They were 16,000 kilometers from home and about 1,600 kilometers from the nearest landmass. They were floating in the middle of the Pacific Ocean with only rudimentary navigation equipment and limited food and water. There was no way to signal for help and there would be no search parties. As such, they were left alone with their fears.
>
> Twenty-four hours after the Essex had sunk the whalers came to the conclusion that they needed a plan. While they had options, none appeared to be good. They were just about as far from land as it was possible to be on earth. Their first option

was to go to the nearest landmass, which were the Marquesas Islands, roughly 2,000 kilometers away. Even though they represented the closest landmass, there were rumours that the islands were inhabited by cannibals. Their second option was to sail to Hawaii. The danger with this option, however, was that given the season, they were likely to encounter potentially fatal storms along the way. Their third option was to go 2,500 kilometers south and then hope the winds would be favourable to get them to South America. The danger with this longest option was that they had limited food and water.

Essentially, they needed to choose between cannibals, storms and starvation. Their imaginations went wild in conjuring images of each of these possibilities. Not surprisingly, the most vivid image that they created was that of cannibals sinking their human teeth into human flesh and roasting live bodies or boiling them in water to later be devoured in some sort of ritualistic feast where limbs would be pulled off corpses and gnawed on like chicken bones.

As such, while sailing to Tahiti represented the most logical choice, and likely best chance of survival, the imagery of cannibals elicited the most fear and this choice was rejected. The fear of being ripped apart by storms also proved too much to bear. The least gruesomely imagined death, that of starvation, evoked the least fear and, despite the fact that this option represented the furthest distance to travel and the most likely outcome of running out of water and food, it was chosen because it also evoked the least vivid imagery. Death by starvation and dehydration did not cause the same fear as being ripped to shreds by a storm or by human teeth.

Two months into their journey, somewhat predictably, they ran out of food. By the time, they were finally picked up by a passing boat over half of the crew of the Essex were dead. Ironically, amongst the survivors some had resorted to their own form of cannibalism – the very thing that they had feared most.

> Ultimately, the fear the crew of the Essex chose to listen to governed their fate. What they feared most – cannibals – was instantaneously rejected even though Tahiti represented the likeliest chance of survival. Conversely, the fear of dehydration and starvation did not elicit nearly as much detailed imagery and, consequently, fear, and was thus selected even though it represented the least probable chance of survival.

The ill-fated crew of the *Essex* had allowed their fears, specifically of the unknown, to guide their decision-making without also adding scientific rigour to their thought process and thereby applying the coolness of judgement, devoid of passion and imagination. Consequently they made a poor decision that was based on fear rather than reason. It was a bad choice that many of them paid for with their lives.

This story is derived from an excellent TedGlobal talk by Karen Thompson Walker. While the analysis is unique for this monograph, the story, including much of the vocabulary, is entirely that of Karen Thompson Walker. Karen Thompson Walker, "What Fear can Teach Us" TedGlobal 2012 <http://www.ted.com/talks/karen_thompson_walker_what_fear_can_teach_us>, accessed 14 May 2014.

28 Pete Blaber, *The Mission, The Men and Me: Lessons from a Former Delta Force Commander* (New York: The Berkley Publishing Group, 2008), 30-39, citation 35.

29 Ibid., 38.

30 McNab, 196 and 111.

31 Richard Holmes, *Acts of War. The Behaviour of Men in Battle* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 141.

32 Private A.H. Carignan – Interviews, letters and recollections compiled by Gary Boegal for the 1 Cdn Para Bn Assn.

33 R.F. Anderson, "From the Rhine to the Baltic," 1 Cdn Para Bn Assn Archives, File 11-2, Anderson, R.F.

34 Captain T.M. Chacho, "Why Did They Fight? American Airborne Units in World War II," *Defence Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 2001, 81.

35 Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Mitchell, *Having Been a Soldier* (London: Mayflower Books), 50.

36 Zoroya, A1.

37 Luttrell, 236, 232, 241-42, 359.

38 Ibid., 236, 232, 241-42, 359.

39 Scales, 58.

40 Captain Adolf Von Schell, *Battle Leadership* (Quantico, VA: The Marine Corps Association, reprint 2000 [original 1933]), 13.

41 Rachman, 50-52.

42 Guy Sajer, *The Forgotten Soldier* (New York: Brassey's, 1990), 257.

43 Don Wharton, "Bringing the War to the Training Camps," *The Reader's Digest*, Vol. 42, No. 254, June 1943, 37.

44 Peter Layton Cottingham, *Once Upon A Wartime. A Canadian Who Survived the Devil's* Brigade (Private Printing, 1996), 103.

45 Charles Hamilton, ed., *Braddock's Defeat. The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley's Batman; The Journal of a British Officer; and Halkett's Orderly Book* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 50. See also Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe* (New York: Modern Library, 1999, reprint), 333.

46 George F. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers. The Military History of an Unmilitary People* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1960), 66; and Paul E. Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1977), 70.

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49 William Breuer, *Drop Zone Sicily. Allied Airborne Strike, July 1943* (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1983), 119-120.

50 Julian Thompson, *War Behind Enemy Lines* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1998), 155.

51 Ernest Jünger, *Storm of Steel* (London: Allen Lane, 2003 ed), 214.

52 Samuel A. Stouffer, *The American Soldier. Combat and its Aftermath. Vol II* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), 83; and Rachman, 82.

53 McManus, 250.

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55 Jean E. Portugal, *We Were There - The Army. A Record for Canada, Volume #2 of Seven.* Toronto: The Royal Canadian Institute, 1998, 953.

56 Sajer, 192.

57 Scales, 57.

58 Major P.B. Deb, "The Anatomy of Courage," *Army Quarterly,* Vol. 127, No. 4, October 1997, 405.

59 S.L.A. Marshall, *The Soldier's Load and the Mobility of a Nation* (Quantico: The Marine Corps Association, 1950), 46.

60 Max Arthur, *Men of The Red Beret, Airborne Forces, 1940-1990* (London: Century Hutchinson, 1990), 163; 1 Cdn Para Bn War Diary, 9 June 1944. NA, RG 24, Vol. 15299, June 1944.

61 Fritz, 121. See also Rachman, 25.

62 Cited in Thompson, 155.

63 Lieutenant-Colonel Dave Grossman, *On Killing* (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1996), 69.

64 Joanna Bourke, *An Intimate History of Killing* (London: Granta Books, 1999), 73-74.

65 Ian Baxter, *SS: The Secret Archives. Western Front* (London: Amber Books Ltd. 2003), 111.

66 S.L.A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire* (Alexandria: Byrrd Enterprises, Inc., 1947), 72.

67 Ibid., 54.

68 Captain W.R. Chamberlain, "Training the Functional Rifleman," *Canadian Army Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 9, February 1951, 29.

69 Sajer, 245.

70 Grossman, 52.

71 Michael Bar-Zohar and Nissim Mishal, *MOSSAD* (New York: Harper Collins, 2012), 268-278.

72 Joby Warrick, *The Triple Agent: the al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA* (New York: First Vintage Books Edition, 2012), citation, 8. Thankfully, common sense often prevails over mission accomplishment at a tactical level in the decision-making process. For instance, in *Lone Survivor*, Luttrell recounts how several days after his teammates were killed he came face-to-face with his team's target. He describes, "I seem to recall that he had green eyes and that they were filled with hatred which would have melted a U.S. Army tank. He stared right through me and spoke not one word." He continues, "I noticed he was unarmed, and I tightened my grip on the Mark 12 and very slowly turned it on him until the barrel was aimed right between his eyes. … After all, it was what I had come for; that or capture him, and that last part wasn't going to happen at all." Nonetheless, realizing that

there was no danger to his life, and that shooting the target could cause harm to the villagers who had protected him and undoubtedly hinder the Coalition's efforts in the counterinsurgency, Luttrell wisely lowered his weapon. By not allowing the fear of mission failure to cloud his judgment, Luttrell quite probably contributed more to the Coalition's campaign than proceeding with his mission could have accomplished. While SOF should be considered a no-fail force in the sense that they are assigned high value tasks and targets, they should not be driven by the fear of mission failure, but rather by the importance of their roles within the wider political / military context. Luttrell, 396.

73 Dollard, 2.

74 Rachman, 52.

75 Marshall, *The Soldier's Load*, 41.

76 Ibid., 43- 44.

77 Don Wharton, "Bringing the War to the Training Camps," *The Reader's Digest*, Vol. 42, No. 254, June 1943, 35.

78 McManus, 251.

79 Ibid., 252.

80 Allan D. English, "A Predisposition to Cowardice? Aviation Psychology and the Genesis of 'Lack of Moral Fibre,'" *War and Society*, Vol. 13, No. 1, May 1995, 18.

81 Peter Dickens, *SAS. Secret War In South-East Asia* (London: Greenhill Books, 2003), 166.

82 Walter O'Meara, *Guns at the Forks* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1965), 147.

83 Philip Caputo, *Rumour of War* (New York: Ballatine Books, 1977), 273-274.

84 Dollard, 28; and Rachman, 76.

85 Fritz, 134.

86 Ibid., 138.

87 Ibid.

88 Captain T.M. Chacho, "Why Did They Fight? American Airborne Units in World War II," *Defence Studies,* Vol. 1, No. 3, Autumn 2001, 81.

89 Kellett, *ORAE Report No. R77* (1980), 268.

90 Samuel A. Stouffer, *The American Soldier. Combat and its Aftermath. Vol II* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1949), Vol. 2, 124-25, 134, 208-9; See also Rachman, 61, 76-78.

91 Ibid. (Stouffer and Rachman).

92 H.R. Lieberman, G.P. Bathalon, C.M. Falco, J.H. Georgelis, C.A. Morgan III, P. Niro and W.J. Tharion, "The Fog of War: Documenting Cognitive Decrements Associated with the Stress of Combat," *Proceedings of the 23rd Army Science Conference,* December 2002, abstract.

93 Dinter, 82.

94 As related to the authors by a SOF operator.

95 Robert R. Fowler, *A Season in Hell* (Toronto: HarperCollins Publishers, 2011), 161.

96 Fowler, 116.

97 Ibid., 169.

98 Dollard, 22.

99 Cited in Brigadier-General Denis Whitaker and Shelagh Whitaker, *Rhineland. The Battle to End the War* (Toronto: Stoddart, 2000), 351.

100 Desmond Morton, *When Your Number's Up* (Toronto: Random House, 1993), 230.

101 Marshall, *The Soldier's Load*, iii.

102 Grossman, 84.

103 Jeremy Manton, Carlene Wilson and Helen Braithwaite, "Human factors in field training for battle: realistically reproducing chaos," in Michael Evans and Alan Ryan, eds., *The Human Face of Warfare. Killing, Fear and Chaos in Battle* (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 188.

104 Holmes, 215. The "process of gradual adaptation can be disrupted by exposure to a near miss." Rachman, 11 & 22.

105 William Ian Miller, *The Mystery of Courage* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), 61. Yet another research report confirmed that after approximately 30 days of combat there was noticeable decline in combat performance. See Jeremy Manton, Carlene Wilson and Helen Braithwaite, "Human factors in field training for battle: realistically reproducing chaos," in Michael Evans and Alan Ryan, eds., *The Human Face of Warfare. Killing, Fear and Chaos in Battle* (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 188.

106 Cited in Major-General F.M. Richardson, *Fighting Spirit - A Study of Psychological Factors in War* (London: Leo Cooper, 1978), 67.

107 The *Canadian Oxford Dictionary* defines courage as "the ability to disregard fear; bravery (i.e. [brave] able or ready to face and endure danger, pain, adversity, etc...). Katherine Barber, ed., *The Canadian Oxford Dictionary* (Don Mills, ON: The Oxford University Press, 1998), 323, 170. Similarly, the American *Standard Dictionary* states courage is "the quality of mind which meets danger or opposition with intrepidity, calmness and firmness; the quality of being fearless, bravery." It further states that "the brave man combines confidence with firm resolution in the face of danger. Courageous is more than bravery with a moral element, however. The courageous man steadily encounters perils to which he may be keenly sensitive, at the call of duty." The British

Chambers Dictionary explains courage as "the quality that enables men to meet danger without giving wary to fear; bravery (courage, heroism; to brave - to meet boldly, to defy, to face, spirit). And finally, the Israeli *Ben Shushan* dictionary depicts courage as "strength, power, might." Definitions quoted in Ben Shalit, *The Psychology of Conflict and Combat* (New York: Praeger, 1988), 97. In all cases, the underlying theme is a human trait or quality.

108 Stouffer, 84.

109 Fritz, 135.

110 Dollard, 57.

111 Rachman, 25.

112 Sir Charles Wilson (Lord) Moran, *The Anatomy of Courage* (New York: Avery Publishing Group Inc, 1987), 61.

113 Zoroya.

114 Rachman, 60.

115 Dollard, 2-3 and 24. They also felt that thinking the enemy is just as scared as you is also helpful in controlling fear.

116 McManus, 251.

117 Ibid., 200.

118 Ibid., 205.

119 Stouffer, 206 and Holmes, *Acts of War.*

120 Carl Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 82.

121 Training is defined as "a predictable response to a predictable situation," as opposed to education which is "the reasoned response to

an unpredictable situation - critical thinking in the face of the unknown." Professor Ronald Haycock, former Dean of Arts, Royal Military College (RMC), "Clio and Mars in Canada: The Need for Military Education," presentation to the Canadian Club, Kingston, Ontario, 11 November 1999.

122 John Masters, *The Road Past Mandalay* (London: Cassell, 2003 reprint), 271.

123 Dollard, 2-3. See also Stouffer, 195.

124 Stouffer, 223.

125 Rachman, 63-64.

126 Major Reg Crawford, Australian SASR, Phil Mayne, "Professionals Accept High-Risk Employment," *Army*, No. 907, 27 June 1996, 3.

127 Russell W. Glenn, *Capital Preservation. Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century* (Santa Monica: RAND Arroyo Center, 2001), 423.

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130 Fowler, 55.

131 Field Marshall Bernard L. Montgomery, "Discipline from Morale in Battle: Analysis," in Canada, *The Officer. A Manual of Leadership for officers in the Canadian Forces* (Ottawa: DND, 1978), 66.

132 John Masters, *The Road Past Mandalay* (London: Cassell, 2003 reprint), 198.

133 Cited in Will Fowler, *The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D-Day* (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2002), 55.

134 McManus, 247.

135 Mark Urban, *Big Boys' Rules* (London: Faber & Faber, 1992), 178.

136 Ibid., 233-234.

137 Lieutenant-Colonel Colin Mitchell, *Having Been a Soldier* (London: Mayflower Books), 41.

138 Cited in Canada, *CDS Guidance to Commanding Officers* (Ottawa: DND, 1999), 230.

139 Chacho, 80.

140 Miller, 214.

141 English, 17.

142 Miller, 209.

143 See Dollard, 28; and Rachman, 76.

144 Robert Lyman, *Slim, Master of War* (London: Constable, 2004), 108.

145 Ibid., 50.

146 Dollard. 44.

147 Dinter, 92.

148 Stouffer, 68.

149 Kellett, *ORAE Report No. R77*, 299.

150 Dollard, 44.

151 Kellet, "The Soldier in Battle," 224.

152 Stouffer, 124.

153 Grossman, 85.

154 Letter, Sergeant Andy Anderson to Bernd Horn, 10 January 2003.

155 Dollard, 3.

156 Kellett, *ORAE Report No. R77,* 281. Dollard's study found that 71 per cent felt fear most acutely just before going into action, generally, from not knowing what to expect.

157 Palmer, 132.

158 Holmes, 139.

159 Ted Barris, *JUNO Canadians at D-Day June 6, 1944* (Toronto: Thomas Allen Publishers, 2004), 209.

160 Kellett, *ORAE Report No. R77*, 282.

161 Holmes, 249.

162 Will Fowler, *The Commandos at Dieppe: Rehearsal for D-Day* (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2002), 138.

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