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## RESEARCH REPORT

### Correctional Interventions for Radicalized Offenders: A Literature Review

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**Correctional Interventions for Radicalized Offenders: A Literature Review**

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## Executive Summary

**Key words:** *radicalized offenders, interventions, assessment, staff training*

Over the last several years, the Correctional Service of Canada's (CSC) Research Branch has contributed to research regarding federally incarcerated radicalized offenders. CSC defines a 'radicalized offender' as "an ideologically motivated offender who commits, aspires or conspires to commit, or promotes violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives" (CSC, 2012). This literature review was conducted to explore the best practices of correctional interventions for radicalized offenders in jurisdictions across the world. Risk assessments, population management strategies, interventions, reintegration programs, and staff training were reviewed. The findings of this literature review aim to support and assess CSC initiatives related to the management of radicalized offenders and staff training initiatives.

Overall, there is no universal risk assessment for radicalized offenders as correctional services have developed their own assessments based on operational considerations specific to their offender population. The majority of jurisdictions use a structured professional judgement approach to risk assessments, which include explicit guidelines for which factors should be considered, but the combination of those factors and the overall evaluation of risk are left up to the professional judgment of the assessor. The reliability and validity of these risk assessments is debated due to the relatively low number of radicalized offenders in many jurisdictions and the diversity of the radicalized offender population.

Generally, there are five population management strategies used: separation, isolation, concentration, integration, and dispersal. Management strategies are chosen based on a variety of factors, such as available resources and number of radicalized offenders, among others. Some jurisdictions choose a management strategy on a case-by-case basis or based on the offender's extremist affiliation, beliefs, and ideologies, whereas others have implemented only one strategy for all radicalized offenders.

Interventions are usually aimed at deradicalization or disengagement. Deradicalization focuses on the radicalized offender's beliefs and ideology, whereas disengagement targets the offender's behaviour and actions. However, there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to intervention services for radicalized offenders. Instead, correctional programming should be tailored for local contexts.

Information regarding reintegration programs was limited. It appears there are only a few jurisdictions that have reintegration programs specifically for radicalized offenders. In general, these programs focus on the radicalized offender establishing prosocial connections, gaining employment, and, when applicable, they are encouraged to continue their education.

Staff training for most jurisdictions focus on signs of radicalization occurring within the institution and the methods for reporting. Training in some jurisdictions also include education about Islam to increase staff knowledge and awareness so they are able to distinguish between Muslim teachings and extremist ideologies. Several correctional services provide training to all staff, whereas others only train staff who interact with radicalized offenders.

Overall, the review of the literature identified common themes that highlighted the importance of employing a tailored, individualized approach to case management, as well as a holistic and multidisciplinary approach, which are currently offered by CSC.





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## **Introduction**

Over the last several years, the Correctional Service of Canada's (CSC) Research Branch has contributed to the body of evidence surrounding the federally incarcerated radicalized offender population. For example, one research report examined the profile of CSC's radicalized offender population, including the specific motivations and criminogenic needs of federally incarcerated radicalized offenders, as well as the congruence of interventions offered with their identified needs. In addition, CSC's research has reviewed international best practices and lessons learned on the effective management of radicalized offenders. Overall, this work has assisted in the education of both internal and external policy makers and stakeholders, as well as facilitated partnerships and information sharing at local, regional, national, and international levels. While the gains in this area have been significant, there is recognition that research related to radicalization and violent extremism requires additional evidence, particularly as it pertains to correctional interventions and staff training on radicalized offenders. The purpose of this research is to conduct a review of the international literature on the best practices of correctional interventions used with radicalized offenders. Literature on training staff members (e.g., detecting, reporting, and response options/strategies) will also be examined. The results of this literature review will focus on supporting and assessing CSC initiatives related to the management of radicalized offenders and training initiatives for staff members.

### **Overview of CSC**

CSC defines a 'radicalized offender' as "an ideologically motivated offender, who commits, aspires or conspires to commit, or promotes violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives" (CSC, 2012). Thus, violent extremists and radicalized offenders will be used interchangeably, depending on the context. Radicalized offenders currently represent less than 1% of the Canadian federal prison population (Conley, 2019). CSC has developed assessments and interventions based on the risk-need-responsivity (RNR) principles since 1989 (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Andrews et al., 1990; Michel & Stys, 2014). The risk principle states that the most intensive intervention services should be reserved for the highest risk offenders. The need principle states that intervention and treatment programs should target dynamic factors linked to criminal behaviour and the responsivity principle states that services should employ cognitive behavioural therapies (general responsivity) and attend to those factors that influence their ability

to successfully complete treatment (specific responsivity; Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Andrews et al., 1990). Currently, radicalized offenders complete the same intake assessment as other inmates and referrals to programs are made as required, based on assessed level of need and risk (Axford et al., 2015). Criminogenic risk and need information is assessed during the Offender Intake Assessment (OIA) process. File information and interviews with offenders are compiled by CSC case management staff to profile their criminal risk and dynamic need areas in order to establish an individualized correctional plan (CSC, 2019). Criminogenic needs are measured by the Dynamic Factors Identification and Analysis-Revised (DFIA-R; CSC, 2019) tool, which is used for assessing dynamic factors upon admission (CSC, 2019). The purpose is to identify and prioritize criminogenic needs grouped into seven domains: employment and education, marital/family, associates, substance abuse, community functioning, personal/emotional, and attitudes. The tool includes a rating on each of the domains (low, moderate, high, or asset/no need), as well as an overall criminogenic need rating of low, moderate, or high.

Previous CSC research has shown that, overall, radicalized offenders differed on some demographic characteristics and in key areas related to criminal behaviour compared to the general population of offenders. Stys and colleagues (2014) compared in-custody radicalized offenders<sup>1</sup> to the full population of Canadian federally-sentenced offenders who were in custody at one of CSC's institutions. In terms of demographic characteristics, a similar proportion of radicalized and non-radicalized offenders were men and both offender groups were slightly less likely to be married or living common-law at admission. Radicalized offenders were younger at sentencing than the general offender population ( $M = 31$  years [ $SD = 11.4$ ] vs.  $M = 34$  years [ $SD = 11.4$ ]) and they were less likely to be Canadian citizens (Stys et al., 2014). Overall, radicalized offenders were less likely to be assessed as having high levels of criminogenic need or as having a low potential of successful reintegration. With respect to specific risk and need indicators, results showed radicalized offenders were more likely to be employed at the time of arrest and were more likely to have completed grade 10. Furthermore, compared to the general offender population, radicalized offenders were more likely to be assessed as having many criminal acquaintances but were equally likely to have mostly criminal friends. Radicalized offenders were less likely to have problems with their intimate relationships, less problematic upbringings,

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<sup>1</sup> Due to security reasons, the exact number of radicalized offenders was not reported; however, the number was less than 100 (Stys, Gobeil, Harris, & Michel, 2014).

and they had less problematic patterns of both alcohol and drug use, particularly as it related to offending (Stys et al., 2014). More radicalized offenders held negative attitudes towards the criminal justice system and held attitudes that were intolerant of other religions (Stys et al., 2014). Fewer radicalized offenders previously had contact with the criminal justice system and they were less likely to have previously served a federal sentence. Radicalized offenders were more likely than the full population of offenders to be convicted of terrorism-related offences, homicide offences, and “other” violent offences, and they served longer sentences ( $M = 9.5$  years [ $SD = 7.7$ ] vs.  $M = 5.4$  years [ $SD = 4.8$ ]).

In another CSC study, Stys and Michel (2014) examined the specific motivations and criminogenic needs of federally incarcerated radicalized offenders. This study categorized ideological motivations as those based on a desire for change (e.g., political or religious change) or a response to a grievance(s) or injustice (e.g., personal grievance, group grievance; Stys & Michel, 2014).<sup>2</sup> Criminal (non-ideological) motivations were categorized as those which strived to achieve a reward or personal gain, and included thrill and excitement, social status, friendship, religious rewards, material gain, opportunity to be violent, offering an identity and meaning, and the provision of personal safety (Stys & Michel, 2014). Results showed that over half of the sample held both ideological and non-ideological motivations for their offences; almost one-third held purely ideological motives and close to a quarter of the sample had purely non-ideological motives. The most common ideological motivations included a desire for political change and a desire to respond to a variety of grievances. Non-ideological motivations were most frequently identified as the desire for material gain and the desire for friendship. In terms of criminogenic needs, the most common need areas for the sample were in the associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional domains, where a smaller proportion were assessed as having needs in the area of substance use and community functioning (Stys & Michel, 2014).

### **CSC Intervention Practices**

CSC does not offer any specific or unique programming for radicalized offenders, opting instead to address their criminogenic needs with the current cadre of correctional programming and interventions (Michel & Stys, 2014). Core correctional programming focuses on risk factors that contribute to criminal behaviour and aim to reduce reoffending by helping offenders make

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<sup>2</sup> See Stys and Michel (2014) for a detailed summary regarding the specific needs motivations of radicalized offenders.

positive changes. It is a holistic approach to interventions by targeting multiple criminogenic needs. In addition to core correctional programming, CSC provides educational programs (provide offenders with the basic literacy, academic, and personal development skills that are needed to succeed in the community), social programs (promote positive social, personal, and recreational activities), and vocational programs (provide offenders with relevant job training to increase employment opportunities). CSC also provides psychological services and chaplaincy services; Chaplains serve as officially-recognized religious representatives in institutions and they facilitate the connection of offenders with members of their own faith communities. Based on previous CSC research, radicalized offenders presented high need in the areas of criminal attitudes, associates, and personal/emotional domains, all of which are targeted in current correctional programs. For instance, correctional programming provides the opportunity to develop social skills to help create new positive relationships for support and establish boundaries from negative influences and it provides the opportunity to learn about the connection between thinking, emotions, and behaviours.

Michel and Stys (2014) examined the interventions in which a sample of radicalized offenders participated in and whether these interventions aligned with their identified needs. Results demonstrated that the most commonly attended interventions were institutional employment, education, and psychological services, and they were found to actively participate in these programs. Furthermore, almost half of the sample received some form of religious services at least once. A large proportion of radicalized offenders who had an identified need in the attitudes, personal/emotional, and education and employment domains received programming to address those areas (Michel & Stys, 2014). While CSC does not offer specific programs that address some of the specific needs to radicalized offenders (e.g., other violent extremist attitudes such as negative attitudes towards out-group; Michel & Stys, 2014), it is evident from previous CSC research that the current roster of intervention programs may address some of their needs (Michel & Stys, 2014; Stys et al., 2014). More research is needed to determine whether interventions currently offered by CSC (e.g., core correctional programs, psychological, and chaplaincy services) address the needs aligned with violent extremist offending.

### **Radicalized Offenders and Practices in other Correctional Jurisdictions**

In order to add to CSC's knowledge base surrounding radicalized offenders as well as to



support and assess CSC initiatives related to the management of radicalized offenders, a review of the international literature on the best practices related to the assessment, management, interventions, and staff training was conducted.<sup>3</sup>

### **Assessment Practices**

Generally, risk assessments for radicalized offenders are developed to evaluate the risk or likelihood of the individual committing a violent act and/or to design an appropriate management plan, including assigning individuals to appropriate programs (Pressman & Flockton, 2012). There are three approaches to risk assessment for radicalized offenders: unstructured clinical judgement, actuarial approach, and structured professional judgement. Unstructured clinical judgement relies on an experienced clinician to make judgements based on their knowledge, experience, training, and expertise; however, this approach is rarely or no longer used as it is not sufficiently reliable or valid, and it is vulnerable to biases (Andrews et al., 2006; van der Heide et al., 2019). Conversely, the actuarial approach is a formal and objective process; the assessment consists of a set list of questions in which each answer is scored based on an established scoring scale (van der Heide et al., 2019). They provide an explicit method for combining the risk factors, which are linked to probability estimates. Since the items included are predominantly static factors and contain few or no dynamic items, determining change trajectories is not possible. Lastly, the structured professional judgement (SPJ), also known as the ‘guided clinical approach’ involves a combination of the previous two approaches (van der Heide et al., 2019). SPJ includes explicit guidelines for which factors should be considered, but the combination of those factors and the overall evaluation of risk are left up to the professional judgment of the assessor (Andrews et al., 2006).

Regardless of the type of approach used, the validity and application in the field is debated (Cherney, 2018). Many radicalized offenders are assessed as ‘low risk’ due to little to no previous criminal history, non-violent offences, or their criminogenic needs were already addressed (Cherney, 2018; Powis et al., 2021). However, it is important to consider that not all radicalized offenders have been convicted of terrorist- or violent extremist-related offences. That being said, there are no guidelines on how to address radicalized offenders with no previous criminal histories compared to those with significant criminal histories. Additionally, it is unclear

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<sup>3</sup> More information regarding the assessment, management, intervention and staff training practices in other correctional jurisdictions can be found in Appendix A.

if these tools are valid and reliable for radicalized offenders across all extremist groups, as many tools were developed with a specific extremist group or ideology in mind (i.e., Islamist extremists). CSC does not use a risk assessment tailored to radicalized offenders (Connely, 2019).

The Extremism Risk Guide (ERG22+) is the primary risk assessment tool used in England and Wales. The ERG22+ was developed based on casework of British Al Qaeda-influenced Terrorism Act (TACT) offenders but is used to evaluate any radicalized offender regardless of ideology (van der Heide et al., 2019). It examines 22 indicators across three dimensions: intent, capability, and engagement (Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020). The results of ERG22+ assessments contribute to security classifications, bail, release, and targeted interventions, among other decisions (Augestad Knudsen, 2020). The assessment is completed by a trained forensic psychologist or an experienced probation officer during the intake process (Augestad Knudsen, 2020). Initially, it seeks to identify the factors that contributed to the offence and subsequent assessments are used to track progress in interventions and highlight areas for further intervention (Augestad Knudsen, 2020). A recent study concluded that the ERG22+ is a good tool to aid in decisions regarding the supervision of radicalized offenders (Powis et al., 2021). However, it cannot be used to predict risk, as Powis and colleagues (2021) state that it is difficult to develop an accurate risk predictive tool due to the diversity in the background, beliefs, and ideologies of radicalized offenders.

The Extremism Risk Screen (ERS) and the Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) are two ‘spin-off’ tools of the ERG22+ and are also used in England and Wales. The ERS assesses non-TACT offenders in the United Kingdom (UK) when there is possible involvement or interest in extremist groups, causes, or ideologies (Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020). On the other hand, the VAF was developed to assess individuals when there is a concern of radicalization. It has the same 22 indicators as the ERG22+ and also categorizes them into intent, capability, and engagement (Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020). The VAF was created to assess individuals who are not offenders and is generally used to assess people younger than 20 years old (Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020). Notably, the indicators of the ERG22+ and VAF are only focused on psychological factors and does not consider the social, political, and religious contexts of an individual’s radicalization (Augestad Knudsen, 2020). It is suggested that the professional administering the assessment incorporates relevant contexts but it is not

required.

The Observable Indicators Manual (OIM) is a training manual developed and used in Greece. It includes an assessment to evaluate radicalization-related risk and vulnerability, as well as to prevent the risk of engaging in violent extremism and terrorism by recording indicators related to ideologically and religiously motivated radicalization and violent extremism (Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020). The goal of OIM was to provide frontline professionals with practical information and a useful tool that could be used in their daily work (Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020). However, OIM does not provide guidelines regarding appropriate interventions for the indications or how to measure the risk of radicalization beyond counting the present indicators (Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020). The OIM is classified, so further details are limited (Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020).

The primary risk assessment used in the Netherlands is the Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, Version 2 Revised (VERA-2R). The VERA-2R was developed based on academic research completed up until 2018 (van der Heide et al., 2019). The VERA-2R aims to evaluate the individual's risk of progressing from radicalization to engaging in violence (Fernandez & de Lasala, 2021). Overall, it has 34 indicators grouped into five domains (beliefs, attitudes, and ideology; social context and intention; history, action, and capacity; commitment and motivation; and protective/risk-mitigating indicators) and another 11 indicators categorized into three other domains: criminal history, personal history, and mental disorder (Fernandez & de Lasala, 2021). The final step is to use professional judgement to weigh the importance of identified risk and protective factors (Fernandez & de Lasala, 2021). The Corrective Services of New South Wales (CSNSW) uses VERA-2R for in-custody radicalized offenders but it has not been adopted into community corrections (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). Belgium also uses the VERA-2R to evaluate radicalized offenders (ICSR, 2020).

In addition to VERA-2R, CSNSW uses RADAR, which aims to document all aspects of the individual and their environment, and consists of two assessments (CSNSW, 2018). The first assessment is a screening tool that seeks to identify if the individual is suitable for the rest of the evaluation. The second assessment is an in-depth risk and needs assessment to determine if an intervention is appropriate and to design a case management plan (van der Heide et al., 2019). RADAR was developed to specifically examine behaviour rather than ideology or beliefs, and all indicators rely on observable behavioural facts (van der Heide et al., 2019). According to a

CSNSW (2018) document, RADAR is used to assess offenders approaching their earliest release date and it is not used to assess risk at intake.

The Prison Service of the Czech Republic initially considered adopting the VERA-2R (Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019). However, due to difficulties in gaining permission to use the tool and limited resources, the Czech Prison Service developed its own risk assessment tool: the System of Analytical Identification of Radicalisation (SAIRO) program (Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019). The SAIRO aims to assist staff in recognizing the offender radicalization process (Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019). In total, SAIRO examines 74 indicators, which are categorized into five subgroups: personal information, personality characteristics, offender's social background, criminal history, and behaviour during incarceration (Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019). The SAIRO was developed so that no training is necessary to properly use the tool.

In summation, there is no standard risk assessment used and, generally, jurisdictions develop their own risk assessment tool to tailor it to their needs and have different aims, such as evaluating the risk or likelihood of the individual committing a violent act and/or assisting in creating an appropriate management plan. Due to the relatively low number of radicalized offenders in many jurisdictions, risk assessments have not been evaluated to ensure their validity and reliability. Additionally, some risk assessments were developed based a specific group of radicalized offenders but the tools are also used for offenders affiliated with other extremist ideologies. Lastly, it is unclear if these risk assessments are also valid to evaluate women radicalized offenders, in addition to women from various extremist groups.

### **Management Practices**

There are generally five population management strategies: (a) integration: integrate radicalized offenders into the general offender population; (b) separation: separate radicalized offenders from the general offender population; (c) isolation: radicalized offenders are kept in a single cell and isolated from all other offenders; (d) dispersal: radicalized offenders are dispersed across high-security institutions; and (e) concentration: radicalized offenders are housed in a wing or unit (UNODC, 2016). Management strategies are chosen based on the available resources, number of radicalized offenders, size of the correctional institution(s), experience in managing radicalized offenders, offender's risk of becoming further radicalized or radicalizing others, and societal views regarding the political, religious, and/or ideological cause motivating the offender (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021; UNODC, 2016). All approaches attempt to

balance security, rehabilitation, and programming considerations (UNODC, 2016).

The integration approach aims to integrate radicalized offenders into the general offender population. This approach prevents the formation of extremist groups within the institution, as well as facilitates the deradicalization process by challenging their perspectives through interactions with other offenders who do not share the same viewpoints or ideologies (UNODC, 2016). However, there is a concern that radicalized offenders may radicalize other offenders. In Norway, offenders who are deemed to be vulnerable to radicalization or are convicted of hate-crimes are integrated into the general offender population (Ionescu et al., 2017).

Separating radicalized offenders from the general offender population centralizes interventions, specialized staff, and close monitoring, as well as limits impacts on the general population (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021; UNODC, 2016). However, potential adverse outcomes include stronger bonds between radicalized offenders, increased distrust between staff and offenders, all radicalized offenders are assumed to be of equal risk, high financial and resource cost, and reinforces stigmatization and perceptions of unfairness (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021; UNODC, 2016). Turkey houses radicalized offenders in high-security institutions and are managed by a specialized team (UNODC, 2016). Radicalized offenders are kept in one- or three-person rooms, interactions are restricted, and leaders are periodically relocated to limit influence on other offenders (Ionescu et al., 2017). Radicalized offenders may be granted conditional release and transferred to an open institution, if they are demonstrating good behaviour (Ionescu et al., 2017).

The dispersal strategy involves dispersing radicalized offenders throughout various institutions, which assists in lowering stigmatization and marginalization, and it increases opportunities for positive influence from others (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). Conversely, this approach may result in increased training costs, challenges recognizing offender dynamics, influence on other offenders around them, and radicalized offenders may be influenced by other Security Threat Group offenders, such as gang members (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). Initially, Indonesia used a concentration approach but changed to a dispersal approach due to accommodation issues (UNODC, 2016). Radicalized offenders are usually housed in maximum security institutions, but not isolated from the general offender population (UNODC, 2016). Similarly, Morocco used a concentration approach to house radicalized offenders to avoid the radicalization of other offenders. However, radicalized

offenders became further radicalized and committed to their cause, which undermined deradicalization efforts (UNODC, 2016). As a result, the Moroccan prison system began managing radicalized offenders with a dispersal approach. Norway and Sweden also use a dispersal approach due to its feasibility and the differences in risk and need factors among radicalized offenders, respectively (ICSR, 2020).

The concentration approach involves keeping radicalized offenders in one wing or unit (UNODC, 2016). This allows the correctional system to focus their resources, training, and specialized staff to the necessary locations. The UNODC report (2016) highlights the increased security risks with this approach, particularly external attempts to free specific radicalized offenders and internal attempts to cause disruptions and challenge security. In 2006, the Dutch government introduced the concentration approach to manage radicalized offenders in terrorism wings within two high-security prisons (ICSR, 2020; van der Heide & Kearney, 2020). When the space and resources are available, offenders are grouped to keep similar offenders together. Factors taken into consideration include combat experience, criminal record, status, level of anger or frustration, vulnerability, and gender (van der Heide & Kearney, 2020). Most radicalized offenders serve their entire sentence in one of these wings; however, depending on certain factors, such as their risk and need profile, as well as remaining sentence length, there is the possibility of a transfer to the general offender population (ICSR, 2020).

Through the isolation approach, each radicalized offender is held in a single cell and completely isolated from all other offenders. Additionally, contact with staff and visitors is as limited as possible and radicalized offenders usually have only one hour of exercise a day (UNODC, 2016). Based on available information, this approach appears to be rarely implemented and when it is, it is often in conjunction with another approach.

Some jurisdictions use a combination of approaches. For instance, CSC currently uses an Integration-Separation accommodation model where the goal is to integrate radicalized offenders in an open general offender population while permitting the physical/geographical separation of certain radicalized offenders from other offenders when circumstances necessitate (CSC, 2012). Importantly, their behaviour and needs remain the focus of the management strategy (CSC, 2012).

In Algeria, radicalized offenders are separated from the prison population and divided into three classifications based on personality and severity of their offence(s): violent extremists,

ideological extremists, and ‘other’ offenders (UNODC, 2016). The most dangerous radicalized offenders are isolated from all other offenders, whereas the less dangerous are concentrated in a small group (UNODC, 2016). However, the Administration of Penitentiary Establishments and Reintegration in Algeria avoids housing a high number of radicalized offenders in one institution (UNODC, 2016). Similarly, correctional jurisdictions in Australia currently use both the dispersal and separation approaches to accommodate radicalized offenders with varying levels of risk, as well as different extremist beliefs and ideologies (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). The separation approach is used specifically at the Goulburn facility in New South Wales. The High Risk Management Correctional Centre, also referred to as ‘supermax’, houses high-risk radicalized offenders in separate cells (Cherney, 2021).

The dispersal approach is commonly used in England and Wales. However, following a government initiated review of prison-based radicalization to violence, the Ministry of Justice announced a policy shift, in part due to evidence of a “radicalising influence” over other Muslim offenders, aggressive conversions to Islam, and the intimidation of imams working within the institution (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021; UNODC, 2016). As a result, the concentration approach is used for the most dangerous Islamist radicalized offenders; they are removed from the general offender population and housed in specialized units within high-security institutions (ICSR, 2020). Similarly, Belgium favours the dispersal approach, but also uses the concentration approach when deemed necessary (ICSR, 2020).

The correctional system in Spain also uses a variety of approaches based on the specific extremist group the radicalized offenders aligns themselves with (UNODC, 2016). For example, offenders affiliated with the Basque separatist group, ETA, are managed through a dispersal approach, whereas Islamist radicalized offenders are housed through a concentration approach (UNODC, 2016). Different management approaches are used based on the characteristics of the extremist groups. For instance, due to the organized and hierarchical nature of ETA, the dispersal approach limits the amount of control and influence the group could exert over their members, as well as other offenders, within the institution (UNODC, 2016). The concentration approach is used to house Islamist offenders because they were not all affiliated with the same group and lacked a clear structure or hierarchy (UNODC, 2016). In the few instances that Islamist offenders were managed by a dispersal approach evidence of radicalization of other offenders was noted, therefore, this approach is not considered a viable approach (UNODC, 2016).

Overall, there is no universal population management strategy for radicalized offenders. Each jurisdiction chooses an approach based on specific areas of concern or unique factors to the jurisdiction, such as size of radicalized offender population, available resources and staff, as well as the variety of ideologies of radicalized offenders. It appears that several jurisdictions initially choose an isolation or concentration approach to manage radicalized offenders due to the concern of other offenders becoming radicalized. However, a review of the literature has shown that radicalization in prison is a generally rare phenomenon (Stys et al., 2014; Hamm, 2007; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017). While some jurisdictions have implemented one approach, others have implemented a combination of approaches and a few jurisdictions use different approaches on a case-by-case basis.

### **Intervention Practices**

Before summarizing the literature on intervention programs for radicalized offenders, it is important to highlight some limitations and gaps in our knowledge within the literature. This list is not exhaustive but it may provide some additional context to the broader issues surrounding “what works” in correctional interventions for this sub-population of offenders. For example, heterogeneity among radicalized offenders can exist at the individual level (e.g., demographic, motivations, or role within the group) and among the group itself, such as the size, capacity, resources, and cultural background (Cherney, 2020; Horgan & Braddock, 2018). As such, what may work with one group or individual in one jurisdiction may not work in other jurisdictions. For instance, CSC research conducted by Stys and Michel (2014) found there were differences in the assessed needs between ideologically-motivated radicalized offenders and non-ideologically radicalized offenders, where the latter group appeared to have more similar needs and motivations to the general offender population (Michel & Stys, 2014; Stys & Michel, 2014). Relatedly, heterogeneity among the different correctional jurisdictions such as the size of the radicalized offender population, the cultural background of the country, differences in national laws, policy, prison service and prison institutions further confounds the issues (Dean et al., 2018). Consequently, there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to intervention services for radicalized offenders. Instead, correctional programming should be tailored for local contexts.

Furthermore, there is a lack of conceptual clarity between deradicalization and disengagement programs within the broader literature, where they are often used interchangeably (Baaken et al., 2020; Cherney, 2020; Horgan & Braddock, 2010). Deradicalization programs



focus on significant changes in an individual's (or group's) extremist ideology and attitudes, which may also reduce their risk of involvement in violent activity (Cherney, 2020; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Neumann, 2010). In this approach, understanding the radicalization process is important in order to develop a program that can "reverse the course" (Sumpter et al., 2021). However, radicalization is the product of a complex processes involving multiple factors (e.g., psychological, grievances/perceived injustices, social network/peers, broad social structural factors) and they may operate at the individual, group, or mass levels (Dawson, 2019). In addition, there may be different factors that push an individual away from violent extremism, such as losing faith in the groups' ideology, disillusionment with the group or the leader, and personal and practical circumstances (e.g., growing older; Bastug & Evlek, 2016; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013; Sumpter et al., 2021). In contrast, disengagement programs focus on changing their behaviour (i.e., disengagement from violent action to achieve their goals) without having to necessarily renounce or change their extremist views (i.e., change behaviour not ideology; Neumann, 2010; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Webber et al., 2018; UNODC, 2016).

Another limitation is the overall lack of evaluative work done on the existing programs, where studies often lack the methodological rigour needed to accurately assess the validity and impact of the programs (Cherney, 2020; Horgan & Braddock, 2018; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017; Webber et al., 2018). For example, there is a heavy reliance on subject-matter experts (e.g., anecdotal evidence) and qualitative methods (e.g., case studies). While these approaches are able to provide useful insights, they are largely descriptive or theoretical, rather than resulting in evidence-based conclusions (Schuurman & Edwin Bakker, 2016; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017; Stern & Pascarelli, 2020; Webber et al., 2018). Furthermore, there has been an absence of longitudinal studies to examine the effectiveness of a program overtime, which may also impact the reliability of the data (Baaken et al., 2020; Cherney & Belton, 2021). As such, this creates difficulty in replicating findings from one study to another, identifying valid and reliable indicators of successful programs, and generalizing findings from one jurisdiction to another (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Silke & Veldhuis, 2017; Van Der Heide & Shurmann, 2018; Weeks, 2021; UNODC, 2016).

Lastly, recidivism is a common litmus test for the success of a deradicalization or disengagement program (Cherney, 2020; Webster et al., 2018), such as the extent to which released radicalized offenders are implicated in new terrorist acts (Webster et al., 2018).

However, recidivism is not always a reliable measure of the success of a program as the base rates of reoffending with radicalized offenders is generally low (Cherney, 2020; Silke, 2014). This may be because crimes go unreported, undetected, or the intensity of surveillance and restrictions placed on a radicalized offender once released into the community may confound recidivism rates (Cherney, 2020; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Webber et al., 2020). Moreover, an individual may support terrorist networks in ways that are not illegal. Therefore, determining the goals and outcomes of the program is key to determine the success of the program. For example, is complete abandonment of ideology and cessation of violent extremist behaviour the ultimate objective of the program (i.e., deradicalization)? Or is the cessation of violent behaviour a sufficient outcome of the program (i.e., disengagement)? This begs the question as to whether deradicalization (i.e., the abandonment of extremist views/beliefs and their associated behaviour) is a feasible outcome of a rehabilitation program (Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Horgan, 2004); instead, disengagement from violent action may be a more realistic and attainable alternative (Cherney, 2020; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Horgan, 2004). Creating further difficulty in measuring the impact of the program is that one may disengage or desist from criminal activity without participating in a formal intervention program (e.g., as a result of age or burnout; Cherney & Belton, 2021).

Despite these methodological shortcomings, a review of the literature has presented certain elements that may assist in the rehabilitative efforts of radicalized offenders. Intervention programs should employ a holistic, individualized, and multidisciplinary approach that encompasses a broad range of activities to address the personal concerns or needs of radicalized offenders to some degree (Sumpter et al., 2021). These may include vocational training skills, education, psychological services, chaplaincy services, and community support services (El-Said, 2015; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Neumann, 2010; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021; UNDOC, 2016). While some countries do not offer any specialized deradicalization or disengagement programs for radicalized offenders, they offer the same treatment programs utilized with their general offender population (e.g., France, Romania, Turkey, the Netherlands, Sweden; Ionescu et al., 2017; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). For example, in the Netherlands, interventions are tailored to each individual inmate based on their Detention and Reintegration plan (van der Heide, & Kearney, 2020). Inmates are provided the opportunity to engage in other activities such as work, education, sports, recreation, time outside, or time for

spiritual guidance (van der Heide, & Kearney, 2020). France provides a multidisciplinary approach to address their identified risks, where professionals from different areas provide services (e.g., prison guards, psychologists, teachers, and health-care; UNODC, 2016). In contrast, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Germany offer specialized deradicalization and disengagement programs; although there is some clear overlap with services provided to non-radicalized offenders.<sup>4</sup>

Since 2016, Corrective Services New South Wales (CSNSW) in Australia<sup>5</sup> has run the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM), which targets prison inmates who have a conviction for terrorism or inmates who are at risk of radicalization (Cherney, 2020; CSNSW, 2018; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021) and is the only prison based intervention in Australia dedicated to adult extremist offenders. Participation in the program is voluntary and is delivered by a team of psychologists who work with other staff as part of an inmate's case management (Cherney & Belton, 2021; CSNSW, 2018). Prior to commencement of the program, a risk and needs assessment is conducted to determine individual treatment program. Therefore, PRISM employs an individualized approach to intervention, where PRISM staff work one-on-one with the offender in order to address the psychological, social, theological, and ideological needs of radicalized offenders in order to help them transition out of custody (Cherney, 2020; Cherney & Belton, 2021; CSNSW, 2018). Cherney & Belton (2021) conducted a quantitative assessment of disengagement based on the coding of client case files. Their analysis of client documentation showed consistent intervention goals and demonstrated change related to indicators of disengagement, such as development of prosocial supports (e.g., family engagement), activities (e.g., work and education), and the influence of associates. While these results are promising, the authors do acknowledge more research is needed given the recent implementation of the program.

Commencing in 2001, Germany's Violence Prevention Network (VPN) is a network of programs that includes deradicalization programs, which target a variety of ideologically and religiously motivated forms of extremism (Stern & Pascarelli, 2020; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). It offers deradicalization, intervention, and prevention work both within and

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<sup>4</sup> Other jurisdictions were reviewed but not included in the body of this report. These jurisdictions can be found in Appendix A.

<sup>5</sup> Australia is divided into six states and two Territories. Each state and territory in Australia is responsible for its own prison system.

outside of the prison environment. It is an individualized approach to case management where it also provides services related to employment, housing, and counselling (Stern & Pascarelli, 2020). VPN programs begin in prison and it can continue for up to 12 months post-release (Stern & Pascarelli, 2020). In another initiative, Germany's Taking Responsibility – Breaking Away from Hate and Violence program seeks to question the ideology used to justify violence and to identify and critique past strategies used to justify offences (UNODC, 2016). The program uses training, role-play, presentations, and coaching to help offenders question the ideology used to justify violence. Its 20 weekly sessions cover a series of modules, with options for group or individual participation (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021).

The United Kingdom offers two primary rehabilitation programs in prisons (ICSR, 2020). The Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) was piloted in 2010 and it is a voluntary program, where inmates work one-on-one with a facilitator. The aim of this program is to promote disengagement, with five specific intervention goals: (a) fulfill an offender's needs; (b) reduce offence-supportive attitudes, beliefs, and cognitions; (c) increase emotional tolerance and acceptance; (d) increase personal agency; (e) express values and pursue goals legitimately (Dean, 2014; ICSR, 2020). The modules of HII all work towards helping participants fulfill one or more of these goals (Dean, 2014). The second program, the Desistance and Disengagement Programme (DDP), was launched in 2016 and supplements the HII program. The DDP is a mandatory program, where it aims to dissuade individuals from participating in terror-related activity (desist) and to abandon (disengage) their radical ideological beliefs (Weeks, 2021). DDP provides tailored interventions and incorporates three main elements, including psychological, theological, and ideological mentoring (ICSR, 2020; Weeks, 2021). In addition, participants are provided with practical support (e.g., job hunting and housing assistance) to help with reintegration efforts. It is important to note that these two programs have not been systematically monitored or evaluated (ICSR, 2020).

While there is not a one-size-fits-all approach to the management and treatment of radicalized offenders, programs or elements of programs that have decreased criminal behaviour for non-radicalized offenders may also have the same impact on decreasing criminal behaviour for radicalized offenders. Given the lack of reliable evaluative studies on deradicalization and disengagement programs, it remains unclear as to whether these specialized programs are more effective than the programs offered to non-radicalized offender populations. Therefore,

identifying what unique approaches for radicalized offenders and reliably measuring the long term impact of these programs is still in its infancy and requires more research.

### **Reintegration Programs**

According to the UNODC report (2016), regardless of the effectiveness of interventions within the institution, the risk of radicalized offenders reoffending substantially increases if there are no reintegration programs available. The importance of employment upon reintegration into the community is also highlighted because the offender is occupied, establishes ties with prosocial individuals, and earns an income that is not dependent on the extremist group (UNODC, 2016). While a recent qualitative study found that radicalized offenders do not have specific needs compared to other offenders, this is in contrast to other studies from other jurisdictions, which found that radicalized offenders had unique needs compared to the general offender population (Cherney, 2021). Moreover, recent empirical research has raised questions regarding the notion that radicalized offenders are less likely to reoffend (Cherney, 2021; van der Heide & Schuurman, 2018). Overall, this area of the literature remains under-researched and limited by the relatively small population. Similar to interventions, reintegration programs seem to have general aims of deradicalization or disengagement.

The Indiana Department of Corrections attempt to reintegrate radicalized offenders through a faith-based transition centre (UNODC, 2016). The aim of this centre is to assist radicalized offenders in their transition from being in custody to living in the community. This approach is based on the belief that strengthening employment opportunities prevents radicalization and continued engagement in violent extremism (UNODC, 2016). Additionally, it includes a re-entry unit to provide offenders with free movement to create a culture and setting similar to the community (UNODC, 2016).

In Saudi Arabia, after a radicalized offender is released into the community, authorities continue to monitor them and engage in deradicalization programming (UNODC, 2016). Components of the reintegration program include assistance in gaining employment and financial support of a monthly payment for roughly a year or until they are financially stable (UNODC, 2016). Radicalized offenders are encouraged to continue their education upon their release into the community, which is paid for by authorities (UNODC, 2016). In some instances, financial assistance is also provided to facilitate marriage (UNODC, 2016).

In England and Wales, there are a few reintegration programs available to radicalized

offenders reintegrating into the community, which includes programs available in the community that are not exclusively for offenders. The London Probation Trust's Central Extremism Unit encourages the reintegration of radicalized offenders by establishing positive social networks to replace their extremist affiliations (Sumpter et al., 2021). It also emphasizes the importance of healthier, more positive identities among radicalized offenders; the purpose is to broaden their identity, so that it is not narrowly defined by their extremist beliefs (Sumpter et al., 2021). Additionally, Stockwell Green Community Services has a reintegration program for released radicalized offenders with aims to address core issues related to their radicalization (Pressman, 2009). However, it has been difficult to measure the impact and effectiveness of the program.

Channel is a multi-agency approach to identify individuals at risk, assess the nature and extent of the risk, and develop an appropriate support plan for the individual, which is also available in England and Wales (HM Government, 2020). Channel is not exclusively available to offenders; it can be applied to any individual who is assessed as vulnerable to radicalization and/or terrorism (HM Government, 2020). Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) are for individuals who present high risk of harm in their community (HM Government, 2020). MAPPA is also not exclusively available to radicalized offenders, however, all radicalized offenders convicted of Terrorist Act offences are managed through MAPPA (HM Government, 2020; Sumpter et al., 2021).

### **Staff Training**

According to the UNODC report (2016), the international standard is to provide initial/orientation training, as well as follow-up sessions as 'refreshers'. In general, the aim of training is to raise awareness of the radicalization process and its signs; increase awareness of cultural and religious norms and practices; provide staff with the tools to detect and respond to radicalization; and promote early intervention (Cherney, 2018; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). As a result, training programs often include a combination of terminology and definitions, overviews of the political climate, motivations and operational techniques of extremist groups, differences among extremist groups, signs of radicalization, and the reporting process (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021; UNODC, 2021).

Effective supervision and successful reintegration of the offender is partially dependent on guidance, training, and educational support available to staff (Cherney, 2018; UNODC, 2016). It is also essential that staff interacting with or supervising radicalized offenders have

both personal and technical skills to effectively deal with difficult situations, particularly those involving danger and manipulation, while being able to recognize and report the signs of radicalization among the offender population (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021; UNODC, 2016). Staff training may be dependent on the type of population management strategy implemented for radicalized offenders within the institution. For instance, a dispersal approach may require all staff to receive training, whereas a concentration approach may only require staff working within that unit to receive training (UNODC, 2016).

In Austria, the Ministry of Justice created a Task Force in 2015 to establish a set of measures to facilitate deradicalization in prisons (Götsch, 2017). Special training for prison guards was highlighted as one of the measures for deradicalization in prisons (Götsch, 2017). Similarly, through the creation of the Austrian Prison Service's Action Plan on Prevention of Extremism and De-Radicalisation, training and education for staff regarding radicalized and extremist offenders was one of the identified tasks (Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019). However, there is no further information regarding training and education opportunities.

In Australia, the Radicalisation and Extremism Awareness Program (REAP) is delivered by correctional authorities to staff interacting with radicalized offenders in custody and the community (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). REAP seeks to provide staff with the knowledge and skills to understand and identify signs of the radicalization process, as well as how to report it (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). Additionally, the *Countering Violent Extremism in Prisons: Good Practices Guide* is a resource available to staff and developed by the Commonwealth Department of Home Affairs (Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). This guide covers five domains of good practices: regime, security and intelligence, risk and need assessment, interventions, and reintegration.

The Czech Prison Service, along with the Czech Police Academy and National Headquarter against Organized Crime, developed an education module for staff frequently interacting with radicalized offenders (Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019). It is a three-day intensive workshop that covers the explanation of key terms and how different types of extremism may be expressed, as well as how political views, ideology, and/or religious beliefs can be related to extremism (Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019). The workshop also covers the importance of tattoos to identify an offender in the process of radicalization. Of the 5,000 tattoos identified by the Police Academy of the Czech Republic, 500 are linked specifically to extremism (Vejvodová & Kolář,

2019).

The objective of the mentor training program *De-radicalization – Back on Track* (BOT) in Denmark is to provide targeted mentoring to radicalized offenders to support their disengagement and ultimate disaffiliation from the extremist group, both within the institution and when they re-enter the community (UNODC, 2016). Mentors participate in five two-day seminars and a supplementary two-day course related to extremism and radicalization is also offered (UNODC, 2016). Through the training, mentors develop skills in coaching, conflict management, and dialogue technique (UNODC, 2016). Following the end of the training, BOT facilitates networking opportunities for mentors to share their experiences and learn from one another (UNODC, 2016).

In 2010, the Office of Training of the Penitentiary Department of the Italian Ministry of Justice developed a training course for staff related to managing radicalized offenders, specifically Muslim radicalized offenders (UNODC, 2016). The two objectives of the course were to assist staff in navigating religious sensitivity of Muslim offenders and to teach staff about Islam to ensure offenders are not exploiting staff's lack of knowledge (UNODC, 2016). The three-day course covers a variety of topics related to Islam, management strategies of radicalized offenders, and international terrorism and violent extremism (UNODC, 2016; Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019). In a six-month follow-up assessment, the majority of staff reported significant improvement in their daily duties and awareness of cultural and religious practices of Muslim offenders. As a result, staff felt they were better equipped to establish constructive relationships with offenders (UNODC, 2016).

The deradicalization program created by the Nigerian Prison System incorporates staff who already have the necessary skills to deliver the interventions (Barkindo & Bryans, 2016). Staff could have gained their experience within the prison setting or through work in the community (Barkindo & Bryans, 2016). Selected staff members were subsequently vetted by the government and only faith leaders who were already a part of the institution's staff are involved (Barkindo & Bryans, 2016). Following the selection and vetting processes, European Union Technical Assistance to Nigeria's Evolving Security Challenges technical assistance team provided training for staff (Barkindo & Bryans, 2016). The training covered various topics, such as the goals and objectives of the deradicalization programs and interventions, and roles and responsibilities (Barkindo & Bryans, 2016). Staff safety was a unique consideration compared to



other jurisdictions; previously, staff working at institutions housing radicalized offenders had been attacked and/or killed (Barkindo & Bryans, 2016). As a result, secure accommodations were provided for the deradicalization program team.

The Norwegian Correctional Service is currently establishing coordinators with specific knowledge in the field of radicalization and violent extremism within the correctional setting (Ionescu et al., 2017). Coordinators are meant to provide guidance to staff when dealing with radicalized offenders, to distribute information between relevant partners and coordinate actions when necessary, and to contribute to the risk assessment process for new offenders (Ionescu et al., 2017). Additionally, Ionescu et al. (2017) indicate that an internet-based training program is under development and there are also training modules available for general correctional staff, however, there are no further details.

According to Ionescu et al. (2017), the Romanian Prison Service has had difficulty identifying radicalized offenders within its offender population. However, beginning in 2015, various institutions created officer teams, comprised of staff from three prison departments: security, social reinstatement, and crime and terrorism prevention (Ionescu et al., 2017). Some staff members have been trained regarding main concepts and ideas related to radicalization by an international counter-terrorism expert. Additionally, some staff members have received training from European Commission specialists (Ionescu et al., 2017). Staff interacting with radicalized offenders have also been presented with facts regarding the effects of radicalization within the institution, as well as steps to take when intervening (Ionescu et al., 2017).

In England and Wales, Her Majesty's Prison and Probation Services introduced the Developing Dialogue toolkit to assist staff in their understanding of extremist ideologies (Cherney, 2021; ICSR, 2020; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). The toolkit provides staff with materials and knowledge to avoid conflating religious beliefs and practices with extremist ideologies, and to assist in engaging in discussions with radicalized offenders about their extremist beliefs (Cherney, 2021; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021). Through the UK's Prevent strategy, training programs were developed to assist staff in identifying signs of radicalization occurring within the institution (Awan, 2013). These programs also facilitate information sharing and the dissemination of best practices related to managing and rehabilitating radicalized offenders (Awan, 2013). Staff complete the e-learning course *Understanding and Addressing Extremism in Prisons and Probation*, which explores reasons for

engagement in extremism (ICSR, 2020).

Staff training includes a range of topics, including the radicalization process and signs of it occurring, as well as the reporting process. Some correctional services developed and tailored training programs to the needs of their staff, whereas staff in other jurisdiction receive training from an external provider. In general, the identified indicators of radicalization were based on Islamist radicalized offenders and it is unclear if these signs can reliably identify radicalization of other extremist ideologies.

## Conclusions

This report reviewed the key research related to the assessment, management, intervention approaches, and staff training related to radicalized offenders. While not an exhaustive literature review, the purpose of this examination was to assist in supporting and assessing CSC initiatives related to the management of radicalized offenders and training initiatives for staff members.

In terms of population management strategies, a review of the literature has shown there is no universal population management strategy and the best approach is dependent on a variety of factors, such as the size of the radicalized offender population, available resources, and trained staff. Due to the relatively low number of radicalized offenders, risk assessments have not been evaluated to ensure their validity, particularly in assessing radicalized offenders with different ideologies, beliefs, and experiences. In addition, there is no standard risk assessment used; often jurisdictions will develop one independently to ensure that it fits the needs of their radicalized offender population. Some jurisdictions solely use risk assessments to determine the risk or likelihood of reoffending, while others also use risk assessments to establish a case management plan.

The literature on staff training tends to focus on staff learning to identify the signs of radicalization occurring within the institution and the avenues for reporting. However, it is unclear if the identified signs of radicalization are applicable to all radicalized offenders, regardless of ideology (i.e. left- or right-wing), as many identified signs or examples of radicalization appear to be based on Islamist extremism. In some jurisdictions (i.e., Italy, and England and Wales), training also includes staff learning about Islam to better distinguish between Muslim teachings and extremist ideologies.

One limitation of this literature review is that the majority of risk assessments, management strategies, and interventions were developed specifically for men radicalized offenders. However, the small number of women radicalized offenders could have a greater impact due to the small general women offender population. Therefore, it is important to have management strategies, assessments, interventions, and staff training that take into account the women radicalized offenders' unique factors and characteristics. Women are less likely to engage in violent extremism; however, women have held significant roles within extremist

groups, including as propagandist, recruiter, fundraiser, and some have experienced combat (UNODC, 2016). Additionally, women are more likely than their men counterparts to be coerced or forced by their family to participate in violent extremism; therefore, they can be both a victim and perpetrator. As a result, the UNODC (2016) suggests that a woman's pathway to becoming radicalized and/or joining an extremist group should be examined when conducting a risk assessment, and choosing the appropriate management strategy and intervention(s).

Although CSC does not currently provide any specific or unique programming for radicalized offenders, common themes identified in the literature have pointed to the importance of employing a tailored, individualized approach to case management as well as emphasizing a holistic and multidisciplinary approach, all of which CSC currently offers. Moreover, it is evident that there is clear overlap between interventions for radicalized offenders and with what should be provided to rehabilitate non-radicalized offenders, including education, employment, vocational training, psychological services, such as cognitive behavioural therapy, and community support services. The difference between interventions for non-radicalized offenders and radicalized offenders is the emphasis on religious and ideological motivated interventions (UNODC, 2016). Therefore, building on the principles underlying effective interventions with the broader offender population (e.g., RNR principles) may provide a solid foundation to build on (Silke and Andrew 2014); however, the research available regarding the applicability and validity of these principles for radicalized offender's remains limited and requires more research (Michel & Stys, 2014; Stys & Michel, 2014; Stys et al., 2014).

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## Appendix A: Jurisdictional Review

Jurisdiction	Management Strategies	Risk Assessment	Interventions and Programs	Reintegration	Staff Training	References
Algeria	Separation and concentration depending on the security and risk level of the offender.					UNODC, 2016
Austria			Deradicalization counselling through the association DERAD - a community based program		Training and education for prison staff related to radicalized and extremist offenders facilitated through a Task Force established in 2015 and the Austrian Prison Service's Action Plan on Prevention of Extremism and De-Radicalisation.	Götsch, 2017; Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019
Australia	Dispersal and separation used in various jurisdictions				Radicalisation and Extremism Awareness Program is provided to staff interacting with radicalized offender in custody and in the community.	Queensland Corrective Services, 2021
New South Wales	The High Risk Management Correctional Centre (HRMCC), also referred to as 'supermax', houses high-risk radicalized offenders in separate cells	RADAR documents all aspects of the individual and their environment, and consists of two assessments: initial screening to identify if the individual is suitable for the rest of the assessment; and an in-depth risk and needs assessment to determine if an intervention is appropriate and to design a case management plan. RADAR was developed to solely examine behaviour rather than ideology or beliefs, and all indicators rely on observable behavioural facts.	Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) is delivered by psychologists and religious leaders, as well as other staff and stakeholders. Usually offered to in-custody offenders, but may also be available to offenders in the community.			Cherney, 2021; CSNSW, 2018; van der Heide et al., 2019

Jurisdiction	Management Strategies	Risk Assessment	Interventions and Programs	Reintegration	Staff Training	References
<b>New South Wales (continued)</b>		RADAR is used to assess offenders approaching their earliest release date and it is not used to assess risk at intake.				
<b>Belgium</b>	Dispersal and concentration	VERA-2R is only used for in-custody radicalized offenders. VERA-2R is used to inform decisions, such as management strategy, individual security measures, and restrictions on visitors and contact with other offenders.	No official deradicalization program. Instead, voluntary, individualized, and multi-disciplinary programs are offered (e.g., psychological support, trauma, religion, professional skills, and reintegration projects).	Disengagement programs available through federal entities, such as the Centre for the Assistance of People concerned by any Radicalism or Extremism leading to Violence. This program is not exclusive to offenders, but is available to in-custody offenders.	Belgian Prison Service staff working within the specific units managing radicalized offenders receive training and education about radical extremism. Further training is under development.	ICSR, 2020; Ionescu et al., 2017; Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019
<b>Czech Republic</b>		System of Analytical Identification of Radicalisation (SAIRO) aims to assist staff in recognizing the offender radicalization and examines 74 indicators across five dimensions. It was developed with the intention that no training is necessary to properly use it.			Three-day intensive workshop covers issues related to radicalization and recruitment, and how to identify radicalization. It also demonstrates how extremism may manifest in a correctional setting. The importance of tattoos and symbols associated with extremist groups versus other offenders is also covered.	Vejvodová & Kolář, 2019
<b>Denmark</b>			The De-radicalization – Back on Track (BOT) is a mentorship, prison-based intervention offered to offender vulnerable to radicalization/extremism. Mentors assist offenders with practical challenges and motivates the offender to make lifestyle changes.		As part of the EXIT program, awareness training is delivered to correctional staff. Mentors from the BOT program attend five two-day seminars and an additional two-day course related to extremism and radicalization.	Stern & Pascarelli, 2020; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021; UNODC, 2016

<b>Jurisdiction</b>	<b>Management Strategies</b>	<b>Risk Assessment</b>	<b>Interventions and Programs</b>	<b>Reintegration</b>	<b>Staff Training</b>	<b>References</b>
<b>France</b>	Dispersal and isolation on a case-by-case basis	Probation officers, psychologists, educators, and religious leader (i.e., imam) collaborate to assess the `degree of dangerousness` for each radicalized offender. Management plan is based on this assessment. Further details are not known.	Participate in workshops; some are run by external stakeholder. Some Islamist radicalized offenders discuss their beliefs and ideology with an imam; the goal is to deconstruct their ideology and beliefs.		Three-week training course before working in an institution with radicalized offenders.	ICSR, 2020; UNODC, 2016
<b>Germany</b>	Dispersal		Violence Prevention Network (VPN) is a multi-faceted network of programs. Taking responsibility-Breaking away			ICSR, 2020; Stern & Pascarelli, 2020
<b>Greece</b>	Case-by-case basis	Risk assessment tool in the Observable Indicators Manual (OIM) evaluates the risk and vulnerability of radicalization.	Rehabilitation programs are provided on a voluntary basis, with the aim to address issues with social relationships, education, family, living conditions, employment, drug or other substance abuse and addiction, and previous criminal convictions. In addition, education, vocational, sport and cultural services are provided to help contribute to disengagement from extremist and terrorist behaviour.			ICSR, 2020; Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020
<b>Indonesia</b>	Dispersal		Establish alternative social network of friends, family; psychological counseling; vocational training	The deradicalization program in Indonesia consists of four stages. Depending on time served of their sentence and good behaviour, the offender moves through the stages to reintegrate into the prison population and then the community.		Istiqomah, 2012; UNODC, 2016
<b>Italy</b>					Three-day course which assists staff in navigating religious sensitivity of Muslim offenders and provides staff with	UNODC, 2016

Jurisdiction	Management Strategies	Risk Assessment	Interventions and Programs	Reintegration	Staff Training	References
<b>Italy (continued)</b>					knowledge regarding Islam so offenders cannot exploit staff's lack of knowledge.	
<b>Malaysia</b>	Concentration		Deradicalization program at Kamunting Prison seeks to intervene in the extremist ideology that motivated their offences and actions, and contrast it with other teachings of Islam; teach appropriate civic values; provide psychological support; and provide vocational training to assist in preparing the offender for their release			UNODC, 2016
<b>Morocco</b>	Dispersal					UNODC, 2016
<b>Netherlands</b>	Concentration	The Violent Extremism Risk Assessment, Version 2 Revised (VERA-2R) was developed to assess the risk of violent individuals motivated by ideology and the VERA-2R was updated to include additional motivational indicators identified as relevant to the process of radicalization and committing violence.	Individually driven / interventions are tailored to each inmate based on their Detention and Reintegration plan. Inmates are provided the opportunity to engage in other activities such as work, education, sports, recreation, time outside, or time for spiritual guidance			van Heide et al., 2019
<b>Nigeria</b>		Nigerian Prison Service created a risk assessment tool with support from the European Union Technical Assistance to Nigeria's Evolving Security Challenges (EUTANS) team following a review of the VERA-2R. A tool with 47 indicators was developed; it provides the minimum set of risk factors that should be considered.			Prior to training, staff go through a selection and vetting process. EUTANS technical assistance team provided training for staff covering various topics, such as goals, objectives, and how to deliver interventions to offenders.	Barkindo & Bryans, 2016

Jurisdiction	Management Strategies	Risk Assessment	Interventions and Programs	Reintegration	Staff Training	References
Norway	Dispersal		Provides a voluntary mentor program, which is a specific initiative meant to facilitate disengagement and contribute to the rehabilitation of extremist offenders. In addition, all inmates are mandated to participate in programs that encourage change in criminal behaviour, cognitive behavioural programs as well as leisure activities (e.g., sports activities).	If possible to facilitate with regional partners, mentorship programs are available to radicalized offenders.	Norwegian Correctional Service is currently establishing coordinators with knowledge in the field of radicalization and violent extremism. Coordinators provide advice and guidance to general staff. Training modules are available and an internet-based training program is under development. No further details are known.	ICSR, 2020 Ionescu et al., 2017
Pakistan			The terrorist rehabilitation program is routed in religion, with the aim at rehabilitating by providing a clear understanding of religion. It also offers a vocational rehabilitation system, where the inmates can train as electricians, carpenters or computer operators.			Parvez, 2011
Philippines			Offers the Alternative Learning System, which is an educational program available to all inmates.			UNODC, 2016
Romania					Staff receive training offered by a variety of European and international experts and specialists.	Ionescu et al., 2017
Saudi Arabia			Prevention, Rehabilitation and Aftercare strategy. The programs incorporate ideological “re-education” and dialogue between inmates and religious scholar. The program also provides psychological and vocational assistance.	Holistic approach to deradicalization. In the community, radicalized offenders receive financial assistance until they are financially stable and are encouraged to continue their education. They may also receive financial assistance to facilitate marriages.		Stern & Pascarelli, 2020; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021; UNODC, 2016

Jurisdiction	Management Strategies	Risk Assessment	Interventions and Programs	Reintegration	Staff Training	References
<b>Spain</b>	Dispersal and concentration approaches depending on the extremist group affiliation.		Offers a therapeutic program called Framework Program for intervention in violent radicalisation with Islamist inmates. It is a voluntary, individualized program with a focus on disengagement.			ICSR, 2020; UNODC, 2016; Webber et al., 2018
<b>Sri Lanka</b>			Offers a terrorist rehabilitation program that is available to Tamil Tiger (LTTE) terrorists. It includes seven components: education, vocational, psychological, spiritual, recreational, cultural/family, and community			Stern & Pascarelli, 2020
<b>Sweden</b>	Dispersal	All offenders are assessed with the Risk, Need, and Responsivity Assessment. If staff believe further assessment is required, VERA-2R can be used for further evaluation of radicalized offenders.	There is no specific deradicalization or disengagement program. Instead, staff develop an individualized plan based on their Risk, Need, and Responsivity Assessment (RNR-A). The intervention is geared towards the inmate's criminogenic needs and their attitudes, values and life choices.			ICSR, 2020
<b>Turkey</b>	Separation		No specialized program; however, access to individual and group interventions.			UNODC, 2016
<b>United Kingdom</b>						
<b>England and Wales</b>	Dispersal and isolation	The Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG22+) is the primary risk assessment used in England and Wales for offenders convicted of terrorism-related offences that examines 22 indicators across three dimensions.	Two primary rehabilitation programs: 1. Healthy Identity Intervention (HII) 2. Desistance and Disengagement Programme		Developing Dialogue kit was developed to assist in staff's understanding of extremist ideologies. The toolkit provides staff with materials and knowledge to	Cherney, 2021; ICSR, 2020; Queensland Corrective Services, 2021;

<b>Jurisdiction</b>	<b>Management Strategies</b>	<b>Risk Assessment</b>	<b>Interventions and Programs</b>	<b>Reintegration</b>	<b>Staff Training</b>	<b>References</b>
<b>England and Wales (continued)</b>		The Extremism Risk Screen (ERS) assesses non-radicalized offenders in the UK when there is possible involvement or interest in extremist groups, causes, or ideas. The Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) assess non-offenders and generally used to assess people younger than 20 years old.			assist staff in engaging and initiating in dialogue with radicalized offenders regarding their extremist beliefs.	Skleparis & Augestad Knudsen, 2020; UNODC, 2016
<b>United States Indiana</b>					Faith-based transition centre aims to assist in transition from being incarcerated to living in the community, and uses a disengagement approach.	UNODC, 2016
<b>Minnesota Probation Office</b>			Multi-tiered approach, which includes mentoring, counselling, religious education, social assistance, employment and vocational support, and family engagement			Queensland Corrective Services, 2021