

# WARS WITHOUT FRONTS

A PRIMER ON COUNTERINSURGENCY



MICHAEL A. HENNESSY  
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CANADIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY PRESS

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By: Michael A. Hennessy  
John N. Rickard

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## FOREWORD

I am delighted to introduce *Wars without Fronts: A Primer on Counterinsurgency*. This book is of seminal importance to both military officers and students of the profession of arms, since counterinsurgency (COIN) currently represents a dominant challenge and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Arguably, until just recently we have spent little time looking at this form of conflict and becoming competent at its practice. This book is intended to assist you along that path.

This volume is intended as a primer. It does not delve into COIN in great depth. Rather it allows for the study of COIN in breadth so as to improve your intellectual balance. War comes in many forms and historical study can help reveal the spectrum of conflict and its manifestations. However, no two wars are identical. Once in operations, it will sometimes be difficult to stand back to fully analyze the dynamics of the campaign you are in. Therefore, having a fully, or more fully, prepared mind is important. COIN operations often place a very direct and significant burden on junior leaders whose tactical choices can have ramifications far beyond their immediate concern. As your knowledge grows, so will confidence. This confidence is critical because, in the future, you will be wrestling with the problem of planning and conducting COIN operations in the modern world. You will be asked to make plans for troops and units based on a sound understanding of your environment. This book is but one tool in helping understand that environment.

Clearly, this book will not make anyone Lawrence of Arabia. That is not the intent. However, it is important to note that Lawrence read widely in military history. He studied the classic practitioners and theorists (Hannibal, Belisarius, Napoleon, Jomini, Moltke, Guibert, Foch and, above all, Clausewitz) not for tactical lessons, which could quickly become irrelevant, but for higher concepts.



“I looked everywhere,” he recalled, “for the metaphysical side, the philosophy of war.” Once in the desert with the Arabs he was confronted with reality, “compelled suddenly to action.” As he observed, his task was now “to find an immediate equation between my book-reading and our present movements.”<sup>1</sup>

That, of course, is an enduring challenge for military commanders and practitioners. That is also the reason that the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) Press has, since 2005, endeavoured to develop a distinct Canadian military body of leadership and operational knowledge that can provide national examples, practices and experiences to assist Canadian Forces personnel to better prepare themselves for the ever-changing, ambiguous, volatile and very complex security environment. At the CDA Press we strive to support experience and training with education and self-development as a way to arm individuals for whatever challenges they may face. After all, we fully support the concept that the individual CF member is the country’s most valuable military resource.

In sum, I believe that this book will be of great interest and value to military practitioners and to those interested in the profession of arms. We at the Press hope this book assists in the study and dialogue with regard to COIN. Please do not hesitate to contact CDA Press should you have any questions or comment.

P.J. Forgues  
Major-General  
Commander  
Canadian Defence Academy

<sup>1</sup> T.E. Lawrence, « The Evolution of a Revolt », *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, octobre 1920, p. 5

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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As well, special thanks to CDA Press for the publication of this manuscript.

## AUTHORS' PREFACE

This book is aimed at introducing junior officers to the methodologies of insurgency and counterinsurgency. Beyond lived experience, from which we all learn, history offers a spectrum of examples for professional officers to study and derive lessons from. We have not attempted to be either fully comprehensive or overly didactic; you will learn that there is no template to defeat an insurgency. Rather, our aim is to introduce you to the complexity of counterinsurgency campaigns without offering doctrinaire answers because every future campaign will have its own unique characteristics. Hopefully, the range of cases examined herein will help you anticipate the type of challenges you are likely to face in any counterinsurgency campaign. Further, we hope this package will encourage you to read more so that you can enrich your mental preparation for the varied and unknown challenges of contemporary and future campaigns. On a final note, we enjoyed a free hand in preparing this book. We welcome your suggestions for revisions to the text.

Professor Michael A. Hennessy, PhD, Professor and Dean, RMCC  
Captain John N. Rickard, CD, PhD, Directorate of Army Training  
Kingston, Ontario

# INTRODUCTION

This book, *Wars without Fronts: A Primer on Counterinsurgency* establishes a solid foundation for your further exposure to counterinsurgency operations in the Contemporary Operating Environment. It is designed to provide you with a general survey of selected insurgencies and counterinsurgency efforts in the 20th Century. Our current operations in Afghanistan are not covered because we want you to conceptualize 'a' war, not 'the' war. You will have plenty of opportunity to study our current operations in Afghanistan. After a discussion of the long history of insurgency as a form of warfare, the book takes you from the Boer War of 1899-1902 to the Soviet Union's experience in Afghanistan from 1979-1989. The book concludes with an examination of Israeli Defence Force efforts to deal with the Palestinian *Al-Aqsa Intifada* at the beginning of the 21st Century. The final chapter also includes a brief analysis of the difficulty of measuring success, the role of geography and the nature of transnational insurgencies.

Each chapter focuses on a different era and examines specific COIN campaigns. Key observations are also provided for each specific campaign so that you can compare one COIN campaign to another. A short list of additional readings is included at the end of each chapter in case you want to broaden your knowledge of a specific campaign.

The book has been designed to draw your attention to the following large themes:

1. An understanding of what an insurgency is and what counterinsurgency efforts are.
2. An awareness of the pervasiveness of insurgency as a form of war throughout history, with a special appreciation for this form of warfare in the 20th Century.

3. An appreciation that not all insurgencies are of the same type and nature.
4. A sense of the complexity, time-scale and ultimate success rate of counterinsurgency efforts.
5. An appreciation of what a failed and failing state is.
6. An appreciation of how counterinsurgency fits into the Continuum of Operations.
7. A sense of limited war versus total war theory.
8. An awareness of some of the ongoing debates about COIN warfare.

The Army realizes that soldiers are very busy with career and family. Operational tempo is high and probably will not decrease in the near future. Nevertheless, ongoing professional development is essential to success as an officer. Press ahead with learning this material, but find a quiet place where you can consistently relax as you read. Cramming like you were preparing for an exam at university is counterproductive. It is far more important to take time to reflect on the book's content and talk to fellow officers to see what they think. At this point in a career *it is more important to study COIN in breadth, not depth* and the book has been designed with this in mind. Hopefully, many things you read in this book will spark your imagination, lead you to ask questions and to delve further into COIN on your own.

## CHAPTER ONE

# LEVERAGING MILITARY HISTORY

HOW ARE YOU GOING TO TRAIN A MAN TO THINK  
UNLESS YOU ENCOURAGE HIM TO READ?

-FIELD MARSHAL LORD WOLSELEY

### **Utility of Studying Military History**

As officers, you must guard against the natural tendency to believe that your current challenges are somehow extraordinarily unique. The study of history helps build a series of reference points and will inform you of various analogous conflicts. As distinguished strategic analyst Colin S. Gray has observed, “An Army struggling to adapt to the unfamiliar and unwelcome challenge of irregular warfare cannot afford to be ahistorical, let alone anti-historical.”<sup>1</sup> In a sense, in studying military history you will build up a reservoir of tactical and operational options. Furthermore, consider the following statement from John Lewis Gaddis. He argued that studying the past “has a way of introducing humility – a first stage toward gaining detachment – because it suggests the continuity of the problems we confront, and the unoriginality of most of our solutions for them. It is a good way of putting things in perspective, of stepping back to take in a wider view.”<sup>2</sup> The key here is the gaining of *perspective*. However, never forget that no two wars are identical.

To reinforce the idea of the continuity of the problems the Canadian Forces (CF) confronts today, consider the following historical examples which speak to our modern problems of distinguishing friend from foe, protecting our national image, the non-linear battlefield and the 3-Block War. One of the greatest challenges modern counterinsurgency forces face is making sure that their efforts do not harm civilians, but are focused with precision against the insurgents. This imperative is critical to success today, but it was also important in the past. Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts, commander of the Karum Field Force during the Second Afghan War of 1878-1880, understood and faced the very same challenge. As he told his troops:

The dictates of humanity require that a distinction should be made between the peaceable inhabitants of Afghanistan and the treacherous murderers, for whom a just retribution is in store, and Sir Frederick Roberts desires to impress on all ranks the necessity for treating the inoffensive population with justice, forbearance and clemency. The future comfort and well-being of the force depends largely on the friendliness of our relations with the districts from which our supplies must be drawn.<sup>3</sup>

As you can clearly discern, Lord Roberts simultaneously addressed the morality and tactical impact of imprecise targeting in a guerrilla environment. We have a responsibility to act in a certain way. During the Normandy campaign, the commander of First Canadian Army, Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, received several complaints about soldiers of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division mistreating French civilians, damaging private property outside the context of battle and looting. Crerar quickly told Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, commander of II Canadian Corps, to correct the problem.

As 3rd Cdn Inf Div is now under your direct command, the education and correction which this situation urgently calls for is a matter for you to take in hand forthwith. I do not need to stress its serious implications ... It is a matter of national importance that the enviable record of behaviour of Cdn tps, built up over these recent years, be jealously guarded.<sup>4</sup>

The imperative to protect our army, and by direct extension, our

national image overseas, was important in 1944 and it is even more critical to our success in a modern COIN campaign. In fact, the support of the Canadian people is considered one of our strategic centres of gravity.

Another example of the continuity of our problems is evident in the Boer War of 1899-1902. We currently speak of the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) as being asymmetric. Our opponents will employ non-conventional means to oppose our conventional capabilities. They will not very often stand and fight somewhere but will threaten us from everywhere. It was no different for the British Army in South Africa. Consider the following observation of a British soldier in 1902 during the guerrilla phase of the war: "So far we only really hold the ground on which our armies stand. If I were to walk out from this tent a mile or two over the hills yonder, I should probably be shot. The country all round is being repeatedly crossed by our troops. Yet an Englishman would not be safe for a minute out of range of those guns on the hill."<sup>5</sup> The idea of omni-directional threats is not new.

Finally, consider the modern concept of the 3-Block War, coined by U.S. Marine Corps General Charles Krulak in the late 1990s. Krulak argued that a military force could find itself fighting a conventional battle in one sector of its Area of Operations, conducting counterinsurgency operations in another sector and handing out food or giving medical aid to civilians (Stability Operations) in another sector – all simultaneously.<sup>6</sup> Now, consider the following statement by John M. Carland concerning the U.S. 25th Infantry Division in Hau Nghia Province, South Vietnam, in 1966.

Between January and October the 25th Division had handed out food and clothing to fifty-six thousand people, provided free medical care to more than fifty-four thousand, and had hosted parties for over four thousand children. It had distributed millions of propaganda leaflets, engaged in over three hundred construction projects, and directly supported pacification in hundreds of other ways.<sup>7</sup> The Tropic Lightning Division did all this while simultaneously engaging the Viet Cong in conventional battle. You should now have a better appreciation of what Gaddis was saying about the continuity of the problems we as soldiers face.



## Some Limitations of Military History

Military history has traditionally been seen as the study of generals and generalship, tactics, battles and campaigns, weapons and weapon systems. The field was in general decline in the 1960s due in part to the limitations of the approaches employed to 'study' military events. It focused heavily on battlefield tactics and lacked nuance and sophistication.<sup>8</sup> Political, strategic, socio-cultural and economic context was often lacking. The United States Army supports a large contemporary history office. One of its many publications observes:

The study of military history affords an understanding of the interplay of forces that have shaped the present and provides the means of viewing current problems against the long perspective of how men have handled similar problems in the past ... Knowledge of military history can not produce solutions to all problems ... But it can provide a foundation for problem-solving.<sup>9</sup>

Again, the emphasis on perspective is notable, but do not lose sight of the caution: Knowledge of military history *cannot produce solutions to all problems!* Military history is not a hard science. Its limitations include the following:

- inaccurate numbers and factual inaccuracies of all sorts;
- excessive emphasis on quantification;
- personal, national and service bias;
- lack of critical analysis in older accounts; and
- missing records/lack of combat data.<sup>10</sup>

There is also the tendency to compress the past into distinctive patterns and to cite historical examples to prove preconceived notions.<sup>11</sup> Try to avoid this at all costs.

An inescapable aspect of good military history is that it takes time to produce because all the facts are not known at the time, or immediately following the end, of a conflict. Sometimes significant information comes to light which demands a complete reassessment of the 'standard' interpretation. By way of example, one military observer writing in 1981 wrote:

A clear analysis of the United States' experience in Vietnam is yet to be found although there have been many

fine studies of some of the relevant issues involved. But, for the most part, in any comparison between Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and U.S. involvement in Vietnam, it seems we are forced to proceed from the unknown to the unknown.<sup>12</sup>

You will definitely benefit from short-term studies specifically designed by the army to pass on lessons learned through recent experience. Read as much as you can of this type of material, but be wary of ‘instant history’ purporting to know the truth and making broad generalizations based on little verifiable information. Since we cannot be certain of the ‘moment’, you will have to prepare yourself for the moment by studying past COIN campaigns which have been subjected to rigorous and critical analysis over time.<sup>13</sup> This is why military history has great utility. So, do not be disheartened by the limitations cited above, for as distinguished military theorist Martin van Creveld declared, “The value of military history – even when regarded from a supposedly ‘practical’ point of view – lies less in the conclusions than in the discussion, less in the final written presentation than in the process of study as such.”<sup>14</sup>

You may question whether ‘discussion’ and ‘the process of study’ will help you in concrete ways to perform your day-to-day duties in garrison or on operations. During your basic training you prepared combat estimates and conducted Mission Analysis as part of Battle Procedure. Now you will be preparing more elaborate estimates of varied and complex situations leading to plans that can be implemented. You will need to evaluate factors and compare possible courses of action to develop your plan. Thinking critically about the observations and conclusions in this book will train you mentally to critically evaluate the information forming the raw material of your own estimate. This will serve you well as you prepare for the Army Tactical Operations Course (ATOC) and the Army Operations Course (AOC).

There are many books and articles that stress the necessity of studying military history but there is perhaps no better place for you to start than by reading Colonel Charles P. Stacey’s short article, “The Study of Military History by Service Officers,”

written in 1957.<sup>15</sup> Stacey was the Canadian army's official historian during the Second World War. He argued that officers had to read critically because a healthy scepticism of assumptions and conclusions presented by different authors was essential for objectivity. To Stacey, nothing was more beneficial to the officer than private study.

Military history can offer the student of COIN many valuable insights. Combating modern insurgencies is a complex undertaking with many approaches. Fortunately, military history has advanced to a multidisciplinary level which can help you work through that complexity. Peter Paret's "The New Military History" describes the broadening of analytical methodologies as a result of interdisciplinary approaches. In particular, Paret emphasizes the social, economic and cultural aspects of warfare and the broadening of analytical methodologies as a result of interdisciplinary approaches.<sup>16</sup> This upgrade in the sophistication of military history parallels the complexity of the COIN environment. The broad exposure to military history will provide you with a good basis for future problem-solving. Indeed, if you can train yourself to identify with the people involved in counterinsurgencies, and understand their problems, you will have achieved something very tangible. Lieutenant-General Sir John Kiszley, Director of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, declared in 2006 that "... it would appear that the lessons of counter-insurgency are easy to forget. States and armed forces involved in counter-insurgencies often seem to be making the same mistakes twice. There is little excuse for this because the lessons of counter-insurgency campaigns of the 20th century are remarkably well documented."<sup>17</sup> It is these 20th Century COIN campaigns that you will begin to explore next. The points of view of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent are presented because in order to be proficient at COIN one has to be able to think like an insurgent.

### **Additional Sources of Interest**

Dominick Graham, "Stress Lines and Grey Areas: The Utility of the Historical Method to the Military Profession," in David A. Charters, et al, eds., *Military History and the Military Profession* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992), pp. 147-158.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Colin S. Gray, *Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War Adapt?* (U.S. Army War College: Strategic Studies Institute, March 2006), 33.

<sup>2</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconstructions, Provocations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3. We too understand this. See Allan D. English, ed., *The Changing Face of War: Learning from History* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998).

<sup>3</sup> Quoted in Sir George Forrest, *The Life of Lord Roberts, K.G., V.C.* (London: Cassell and Company, 1914), 87.

<sup>4</sup> Crerar to Simonds, July 13, 1944, Crerar Papers, MG30 E157, Vol. 7, 958C.009(D169), LAC.

<sup>5</sup> Quoted in Denis Judd, *The Boer War*. (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1977), 159-160.

<sup>6</sup> Gen. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War." *Marine Corps Gazette* 83, no. 1 (January 1999): 18-22.

<sup>7</sup> John M. Carland, *The United States Army in Vietnam: Combat Operations, Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 2000), 351.

<sup>8</sup> Paul Kennedy, "The Fall and Rise of Military History," *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History* (January 1991): 83-95.

<sup>9</sup> John E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley, *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1990), xi.

<sup>10</sup> Robert McQuie, "Military History and Mathematical Analysis," *Military Review* (May 1970): 8-17. See also John Keegan's overview of the strengths and weaknesses of military history in *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking, 1976), pp. 22-35 and Correlli Barnett, et al., *Old Battles New Defences: Can We Learn from Military History?* (London: Brassey's, 1985).

<sup>11</sup> Jay Luvaas, "Military History: Is It Still Practicable?," *Parameters* 25, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 82-96.

<sup>12</sup> Major Terry L. Heynz, "Will Afghanistan Become the Soviet Union's Vietnam?," *Military Review* 61, no. 10 (October 1981): 51.

<sup>13</sup> William M. Hammond, "The U.S. Army and Contemporary Military History," *Army History* No. 69 (Fall 2008): 18.

<sup>14</sup> Martin van Creveld, "Thoughts on Military History," *Journal of Contemporary History* 18, no. 4 (October 1983): 564.

<sup>15</sup> Colonel C.P. Stacey, "The Study of Military History by Service Officers," *Canadian Army Journal* 11, no. 4 (October 1957): 72-77.

<sup>16</sup> Peter Paret, "The New Military History", *Parameters* 21, no. 3 (Autumn 1991): 10-18.

<sup>17</sup> Lieutenant-General Sir John Kiszely, "Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Creating a Comprehensive Approach. A British View," U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington, D.C., 28-29 September 2006. Not all scholars agree that 'lessons' can be derived from studying the past. Ronald Spector, for example, argued that while military history "will help us to understand our Vietnam experience I do not believe it will teach us 'lessons'," "Getting Down to the Nitty-Gritty: Military History, Official History and the American Experience in Vietnam," *Military Affairs* 38, no. 1 (February 1974): 11.

## CHAPTER TWO

# THE TIMELESS NATURE OF INSURGENCY

As you go through this book you will find that there are many different terms used to describe the activities of a weaker opponent against a conventionally superior one. Many of the terms suggest the same general meaning but it is important to appreciate the differences now before you move on. Familiarize yourself with the different definitions below.

### **A COIN Lexicon: Definitions**

#### **ASYMMETRIC WARFARE**

Asymmetric warfare attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses using methods that differ significantly from the opponent's usual mode of operations.<sup>1</sup>

#### **COMPOUND WARFARE**

Compound warfare is the simultaneous use of a regular or main force and an irregular or guerrilla force against an enemy.<sup>2</sup>

#### **COUNTERINSURGENCY**

Counterinsurgency activities are those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency.<sup>3</sup>

## GUERRILLA WARFARE

Guerrilla warfare is a form of warfare characterized by irregular forces fighting small-scale, limited actions against orthodox military forces, generally in conjunction with a larger political-military strategy.<sup>4</sup>

## INSURGENCY

Insurgency is part of a wider set of irregular activities and threats to a secure and stable environment. Insurgency is distinct from other forms of threat in that it seeks a desired political effect, namely a desired change or re-ordering of affairs. A number of definitions exist for the term insurgency and, although many have been developed over the years, most have contained the same key elements: violence or at least the threat of violence, subversion, intimidation of the broad population mass, propaganda and a political aim. Again, it is the last element, a political aim, that distinguishes an insurgency from other forms of conflict or threat to security and stability.<sup>5</sup>

## IRREGULAR WARFARE

Irregular warfare (IW) occurs as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favours indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence and will.<sup>6</sup>

## LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

### 1. 1984 U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Definition:

Military operations conducted by specially trained, equipped and organized DoD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic or psychological objectives. They may support conventional operations or they may be prosecuted independently when the use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible ... Special operations may include unconventional warfare, counterterrorist operations, collective security, psychological operations and civil affairs measures.<sup>7</sup>



2. 1987 U.S. DoD definition: Low-intensity conflicts may be waged by a combination of means, including the use of political, economic, informational and military instruments ... Major causes of low intensity conflict are instability and lack of political and economic development in the Third World. These conditions provide fertile ground for unrest and for groups and nations wishing to exploit unrest for their own purposes ... An effective U.S. response to this form of warfare requires ... the use of a variety of policy instruments among the U.S. government agencies and internationally. Responses may draw on economic, political and informational tools as well as on military assistance.<sup>8</sup>

### OIL SPOT STRATEGY

An Oil Spot strategy is a defensive response by conventional and paramilitary forces to build local security where the ratio of forces and troop presence can be maintained with some consistency to prevent the reassertion of a guerrilla presence among a population centre. The oil spots would expand as the security situation improved.<sup>9</sup>

### PACIFICATION

Pacification is the subduing of a population by employing specific techniques such as population and commodity control, political mobilization, the redress of local grievances, and active counter-guerrilla methods. The term was first coined by the French and employed widely in Algeria and in Indochina and South Vietnam.

### PARTISAN WARFARE

The U.S. does not use this term but substitutes the term guerrilla warfare.<sup>10</sup>

### PEOPLE'S WAR

People's War is a term coined to refer to Mao Zedong's (Mao Tse-tung) form of guerrilla warfare that depended on mobilizing vast portions of society in support of his revolutionary forces. He used the analogy of his forces being like fish and the people the sea in which they lived. His political apparatus ruthlessly mobilized the people through political and social networks.

## PROTRACTED WAR

A protracted war is a war of long duration that involves active fighting, not merely bellicose rhetoric, for the sake of emphasizing a particular policy (e.g., the state of war various Arab states have declared against Israel since 1948, or the U.S. War on Drugs). The concern is not with the prosecution of a particular kind of war – total war, guerrilla war, war for empire, defensive war – but with the conditions inherent in continuously being at war.<sup>11</sup> Mao used this terminology, as did the theorists in Vietnam, to refer to employing their forces to erode their enemy's will and resources while seeking opportunities that time and fortune would grant them.

## REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

Revolutionary warfare refers to a seizure of political power within a state by the use of armed force and supported by a broad-based or popular political movement. Guerrilla warfare can be one aspect of the broader revolutionary strategy and one or more foreign powers may intervene.<sup>12</sup>

## UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

Unconventional warfare consists of the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion against hostile states (resistance). Unconventional warfare operations are conducted in enemy or enemy-controlled territory by predominantly indigenous personnel usually supported or directed in varying degrees by an external source.<sup>13</sup>

## NOTES

(1) Now that you are familiar with the different definitions, this book will use the terms insurgency and COIN in their generic sense for purposes of simplicity in the text. Other terms will be used when necessary for greater clarity.

(2) Our Allies may employ these terms but with a different meaning. This may be important in coalition operations.

## Canadian Army Principles of COIN

- Effect political primacy in pursuit of a strategic aim.
- Promote unity of purpose to coordinate the actions of participating agencies (including government machinery).
- Understand the complex dynamics of the insurgency, including the wider environment.
- Exploit intelligence and information.
- Separate insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength, including addressing their grievances, real and perceived.
- Neutralize the insurgent.
- Sustain commitment to expend political capital and resources over a long period.
- Conduct longer-term, post-insurgency planning.

The army's current principles are provided here so that you can identify their presence, or lack thereof, in the historical campaigns presented in this book.

As long as people have conducted insurgencies against an established, stronger opponent in order to challenge the *status quo* there have been efforts to suppress them. Many insurgency and COIN techniques considered of value today have deep historical roots. You can explore the longer historical perspective of this form of warfare on your own, starting with a look at the Bibliographical Essay at the end of this module. For now, consider the following brief synopsis.

All the great empires of the past had to deal with insurgencies (insurrections, revolts, rebellions and uprisings). The Romans repeatedly faced insurgencies and developed sophisticated responses to them, most notably in North Africa, Gaul, Germany and Spain. The Thracian gladiator-slave Spartacus led a guerrilla campaign and was only defeated when he chose to fight a regular battle against the Roman legions of Crassus and Pompey. Julius Caesar's pacification of Gaul was a long and arduous process.<sup>14</sup> The First Jewish War of A.D. 66-74 culminated in the mass suicide of Jewish rebels trapped at the fortress of Masada southeast of Jerusalem. The utter commitment the Jews felt for their

liberation cause and the ultimate price they were willing to pay to avoid subjugation echoe the modern day extremism of insurgents to keep fighting.

Insurgencies and the forms of warfare to support them, like guerrilla and irregular warfare, have been more prevalent during certain eras. They were not so pervasive in the 18th Century when strict rules of war were generally observed. However, at the end of the century, during the American Revolution, Nathaniel Greene conducted a masterful irregular war in the Carolinas. He told George Washington, "I see little prospect of getting a force to contend with the enemy upon equal grounds and therefore must make a kind of partizan war until we can levy and equip a larger force." To the famed Swamp Fox, Francis Marion, Greene declared that they had to "keep up a Partizan War and preserve the Tide of Sentiment among the People as much as possible in our favour." Indeed, there are many similarities between Greene's approach and Mao Zedong's revolutionary warfare.<sup>15</sup> Greene used partisans in conjunction with his regular soldiers to remain mobile, trading space for time. In this sense he waged compound war.

The revolutionary eras – 1776, 1789, 1848, 1917 – witnessed an increase in insurgencies, perhaps because the passions aroused in the efforts to overthrow established political systems let loose the reins of acceptable actions to achieve an end. 'Acceptable' ways of waging war were overturned as much as the political systems the revolutionaries were trying to overthrow. With the emergence of mass armies in the 19th Century, however, insurgencies receded into the background somewhat but were still evident during the Napoleonic Wars and the American Civil War. The term 'guerrilla' (*guerrilleros*) meaning 'little war', came into use during the Duke of Wellington's Iberian campaigns of 1809-1813. Spanish-Portuguese guerrillas (they were also referred to at the time as partisans and insurgents) harassed and confounded Napoleon's marshals and tied up substantially larger French forces. The Confederate general, Nathan Bedford Forrest, was a brilliant practitioner of guerrilla warfare. His success lay in his asymmetric approach to fighting. One of his troop-

ers recalled that he “never did anything as anyone else would have done or even thought of doing in regard to a fight.” Indeed, his ability to wage war in the rear of Federal lines led one historian to label him a “priceless resource” that was nevertheless improperly exploited to the fullest extent possible, especially when the North began to invade the South.<sup>16</sup>

In the three examples cited above, the American Revolution, the Iberian campaign and the American Civil War, the partisan/guerrilla activity complemented the larger conventional war. It is difficult to imagine the American colonists, Spanish guerrillas and Confederate secessionists succeeding in their causes by insurgent methods alone, unaided by major conventional power.

Despite the prevalence of insurgencies throughout history it must be kept in mind that the historical record reveals that they have failed more often than they have succeeded. One explanation for such consistent failure is that these conflicts were waged with politically and militarily weak forces against more powerful military forces of states augmented by superior economic resources.<sup>17</sup> There is an element of desperation to insurgency. It represents ‘Plan B’ because ‘Plan A’, a conventional confrontation, is impossible. Abdul Haris Nasution, leader of the Indonesian insurgency against the Dutch in the post-Second World War period, admitted frankly, “We used guerrilla warfare not because we believed in its ‘ideology’ but because we were forced into it and could not establish a modern, organized force equal to the Dutch.”<sup>18</sup>

The term COIN is relatively new and has only been in use since the end of the Second World War when a number of western powers – Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal and the United States – found themselves confronting a number of insurgencies throughout their imperial or post-imperial domains.<sup>19</sup> However, it would be incorrect to assume that armies began to study and develop doctrine to combat insurgencies only since 1945. For an excellent overview of the subject see Walter Lacqueur’s chapter entitled “The Origins of Guerrilla Doctrine” in *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (1976). A few salient aspects of this doctrinal development can be presented here.

The two leading theorists of war in the 19th Century, Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, discussed insurgencies (they did not use the specific term) but only tangentially from their main effort. In *Précis de l'Art de Guerre* (1838) Jomini briefly discussed 'Wars of Opinion' and 'National Wars'. He cautioned that, since the mass of the people were involved in both, they were forms of struggle best avoided by conventional armies used to wars with definable fronts. However, if forced to undertake such wars, Jomini declared that it was imperative to "calm the popular passions in every way possible, exhaust them by time and patience, display courtesy, gentleness, and severity united, and particularly, deal justly." Clausewitz discussed 'The People in Arms' briefly in chapter twenty-six of his seminal, but unfinished, work, *On War* (1832) but admitted that it was more of a "groping for the truth" rather than an objective analysis because "this sort of warfare is not yet very common."<sup>20</sup> Though Clausewitz was thinking of the war in Spain, it is apparent that he was uncomfortable with the subject because it demanded a new theoretical basis of study that he had not fully considered up to that time.

In general, armies did not have any manuals explaining how to combat insurgencies until the late 19th Century; some scholars look to the study of the French Revolutionary Army's struggle to defeat the Vendean insurrection, written by *Chef de bataillon* C.M. Roguet in 1833, as one of the earliest acknowledgements that armies needed to consciously devote efforts to win hearts and minds during insurgencies.<sup>21</sup> Between 1830 and 1930, the French fought numerous colonial wars and learned a great deal about pacifying newly won territory and faced numerous insurgencies. Marshals Thomas Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, Joseph-Simon Gallieni, and Louis-Hubert-Gonzalve Lyautey spearheaded France's colonial efforts in Africa and produced important works on pacifying newly won territory. Gallieni's *La Pacification de Madagascar, 1896-1899* (1900) and Lyautey's "Du rôle colonial de l'Armée" (1900) had considerable influence on future generations of French officers waging colonial warfare.<sup>22</sup>

The British also developed doctrine for dealing with insur-

gencies in their empire. Sir Robert Groves Sandeman, administrator of the North-West Frontier in India in the late 1800s, developed a system of pacification.<sup>23</sup> However, the most important British contribution to COIN doctrine was probably Major Charles E. Callwell's *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (1896). Pay close attention to Callwell's definition of 'small wars': "Campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerrilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field."<sup>24</sup> Callwell's work was revised and re-issued in 1899 (at the time of the Boer War) and again in 1906.<sup>25</sup>

The British developed a culture of colonial warfare that stressed the importance of small-scale operations rather than large, ponderous ones, small casualties and small victories. This philosophy certainly developed out of practical experience in the field but was also shaped in part because the British had no choice but to think small. The British Army was small and scattered throughout the empire. It is also apparent that the British placed great emphasis on the individual soldier, perhaps even more so than the 'system', in conducting COIN operations.<sup>26</sup>

The British waged many COIN campaigns throughout the 20th Century (See Annex A). They built up a comprehensive doctrine to deal with the problem, testing it in places like Palestine, Malaya, Aden and Oman. By 1949, the War Office had published *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* but, even so, the British Army had to relearn those lessons in Malaya, Kenya, Northern Ireland and elsewhere. It is fashionable to believe that the British practised the principle of minimum force in the wars of decolonization, but this has recently been challenged.<sup>27</sup> Decolonization COIN campaigns were hard, vicious affairs. The British in Kenya, for example, employed court executions (some 4000), forced relocation, resettlement camps, mass internment and group punishments, including acts of personal public humiliation.<sup>28</sup>

The United States Marine Corps also accumulated considerable experience waging COIN campaigns in the Philippines and during the 'Banana Wars' of 1901-1934 in places like Haiti,

Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic. In 1935 the Corps published *Small Wars Manual*, an official guide to pacification operations based on its Caribbean and Central American experience. Callwell's *Small Wars* also influenced the Marine manual.<sup>29</sup> The final edition of *Small Wars Manual* was published in 1940 but the hard-earned lessons of pacification faded during the Second World War when the Corps focused on amphibious warfare. The manual's value was further eroded by the fact that the early Cold War era witnessed the transition from the Marine Corps as the U.S. government's first choice for dealing with 'small wars', to CIA-directed covert operations.<sup>30</sup>

The Marine Corps was probably ahead of the U.S. Army in its willingness to conceptualize COIN techniques even well into the Cold War era; the Corps republished *Small Wars Manual* in 1987. Despite the publication of the Army's Field Manual 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Operations* in September 1961, President John F. Kennedy was not happy about the level of effort the army was putting into combating Communist insurgencies. He put the spotlight on insurgencies during his first year in office, asking his principal advisors, "What are we doing about guerrilla warfare?" When the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Maxwell Taylor, told Kennedy that good soldiers "are trained for all kinds of things" and that the American Army did not have to worry about special situations, the President was not satisfied.<sup>31</sup> Despite presidential prodding, the American Army nevertheless went into the Vietnam conflict with an immature doctrine for combating insurgencies, except for what had been achieved with the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg (home of the Special Forces – Green Berets).

As you can see from this very brief overview, the French, British and American armies have been dealing with insurgencies for a long time and each developed different doctrinal approaches. Canadian experience with insurgencies includes the Fenian Raids of 1866-1871, Louis Riel's Métis Red River Rebellion of 1870 in Manitoba, the North-West Rebellion of 1885, the *Front de libération du Québec* (FLQ) Crisis in Quebec in 1970 and the Oka Crisis of 1990. However, these experiences were



never captured in enduring, formal doctrine. Unfortunately, the writings of General Sir William C. Heneker, a Canadian officer who served in numerous campaigns with the British Army in West Africa between 1896 and 1906, are entirely unknown to the modern army. You would do well to have a look at *Bush Warfare: The Early Writings of General Sir William C.G. Heneker, KCMG, DSO*, recently published. Understanding our past experience with insurgencies will help you better understand the uniquely Canadian COIN doctrine developed by the army during the past decade in Afghanistan.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Franklin B. Miles, "Asymmetric Warfare: An Historical Perspective" (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 1999), 2-3. The term 'asymmetric' as applied to conflict is at least thirty-five years old. See Andrew Mack, "The Concept of Power and Its Uses in Explaining Asymmetric Conflict," London, Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research, 1974 and "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (January 1975): 184-185.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas M. Huber, ed., *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 2002), 1.

<sup>3</sup> B-GL-323-004/FP-003 *Counter-Insurgency Operations*, 2008, p. 1-3.

<sup>4</sup> Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History* revised one vol. ed. (London: Macdonald & Janes, 1975), xi.

<sup>5</sup> *Counter-Insurgency Operations*, p. 1-1.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of National Defense, *Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, 11 September 2007, p. 5.

<sup>7</sup> Frank Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar and Richard Schultz, eds., *Special Operations in U.S. Strategy* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1984), 30.

<sup>8</sup> David Silverstein, "Preparing America to Win Low-intensity Conflict," *Backgrounder: The Heritage Foundation*, No. 786 (August 1990): 4.

<sup>9</sup> The origin of the oil spot, or oil patch approach can probably be traced to General Louis-Hubert-Gonzalve Lyautey.

<sup>10</sup> *Irregular Warfare (IW)*, Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Appendix B, B-6.

<sup>11</sup> Lt.-Col. Richard E. Wiersema, "The Effects of Protracted War on Representative Government," USAWC Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2005, p. 3.

<sup>12</sup> John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, "Revolutionary War," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 815-818.

<sup>13</sup> FM 31-21, *Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations* (September 1961), 3.

<sup>14</sup> Stephen L. Dyson, "Native Revolts in the Roman Empire," *Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte* 20, nos. 2/3 (1971): 239-274.

<sup>15</sup> John M. Dederer, "Making Bricks without Straw: Nathaniel Greene's Southern Campaigns and Mao Tse-Tung's *Mobile War*," *Military Affairs* 47, no. 3 (October 1983): 115-121; Steven E. Siry, *Greene: Revolutionary General* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2006), 64.

<sup>16</sup> Bruce Catton, *The Centennial History of the Civil War, III: Never Call Retreat* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), 336.

<sup>17</sup> James S. Corum, *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy* (St. Paul, MN.: Zenith Press, 2007), 14.

<sup>18</sup> Abdul Haris Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian Defence System, Past and Future* (Information Service Indonesian Armed Forces, 1958), 16.

<sup>19</sup> Julian Paget's *Counter-insurgency Campaign* (London: Faber, 1967) may be the first book published in Britain that actually used the phrase 'counterinsurgency.' See Ian F. Beckett, "The Study of Counter-Insurgency: A British Perspective," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 1, no. 1 (April 1990): 47-53.

<sup>20</sup> Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War* (London: Greenhill Books, 1992), 33; Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 483.

<sup>21</sup> Paddy Griffith, *Military Thought in the French Army, 1815-1851* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 48-50.

<sup>22</sup> Jean Gottmann, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 235.

<sup>23</sup> The Sandeman 'system' consisted of several tenets including knowing the tribes and befriending them, adhering to tribal customs, working through tribal leaders, and binding the tribes to the government through tribal service which was to be paid for by the government. Peaceful means and limitations on the use of force were key, but he considered the availability of overwhelming power necessary as a fundamental deterrent. Christian Tripodi, "'Good for one but not the other': The 'Sandeman System' of Pacification as Applied to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier, 1877-1947," *The Journal of Military History* 73, no. 3 (July 2009): 767-802.

<sup>24</sup> Major C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (London: Harrison and Sons, 1903), 1.

<sup>25</sup> Beckett, "The Study of Counter-Insurgency," 48-49. Some other British doctrinal contributions in subsequent years up to the Second World War include Sir Charles Gwynn's *Imperial Policing* (1934), the War Office's *Notes on Imperial Policing (1934) and Duties in Aid to the Civil Power* (1937).

<sup>26</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel Robert M. Cassidy, "The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture," *Military Review* (May-June 2005): 54.

<sup>27</sup> Bruno C. Reis, "The Myth of British Minimum Force in Counterinsurgency Campaigns during Decolonization (1945-1970)," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, no. 2 (April 2011): 245-279.

<sup>28</sup> Caroline Elkins, *Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya* (New York: Owl Books, 2005).

<sup>29</sup> Allan R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps* (New York: Macmillan, 1980), 263.

<sup>30</sup> For an excellent overview of the U.S. Army's slow recognition of the need for COIN doctrine see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), chapter 2 and Michael A. Hennessy, *Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

<sup>31</sup> Krepinevich, *The Army and Vietnam*, 30.

## CHAPTER THREE

# FIRST WORLD WAR ERA

### Introduction


Most of the insurgencies of the 20th Century have their roots in the period of colonial expansion of the 19th Century, or earlier. The scramble for Africa and the division of Asia into colonies, or spheres of influence, by European powers set the framework for the national resistance movements or insurgencies of the 20th Century. The South African, or Boer, War was among the first wars of the 20th Century. This war started as a conventional war in which forces from the Afrikaner Free State invaded the British South African colony in an effort to stave off further inroads into what they considered their traditional lands. By May 1900 a British victory looked to be in sight. Piet Cronje, a Boer commander, had surrendered and Bloemfontein, the capital of the Orange Free State, had been taken. At this point, however, President Paul Kruger announced that the war had just begun.

The Boers decided to wage a guerrilla war because it was practicable militarily; however, there were some moral misgivings. It was not a 'civilized' war.<sup>1</sup> The British response to the new war was dismissive. The second phase of the Boer War lasted roughly from March 1901 to May 1902 and was characterized by the employment of light Boer raiding forces in what they termed 'commandos'. The British responded with their own light raiding forces, but added population-control measures including concentration camps, the destruction of rural settlements through farm burning, the control of food supplies, and the establishment of fixed defensive lines to deny the commandos free movement, supported by defensive 'block houses'.

In a rather different example from the same time period, the American Army under General Jacob H. Smith, assisted by U.S. Marines, conducted a ruthless pacification campaign on the Island of Samar in 1901. He used deportation, the killing of captives and children, the burning of villages and the destruction of crops and livestock. Smith operated under the authority of General Arthur MacArthur's (Douglas MacArthur's father) General Order No. 100, dating from the Civil War, which permitted commanders to execute Partisans and guerrillas and subject them to deportation and summary imprisonment.<sup>2</sup> The Philippine Insurrection was defeated by 1902 but the harshness of the COIN campaign is hardly transferable as a lesson for modern COIN efforts – there are many ancient tactics that are today considered illegal or morally unacceptable by the CF, the public and our Allies.

When the First World War began, the Ottoman Turkish Army was already engaged in a three-year-old insurgency in Yemen. By 1915 the Ottomans were also fighting an Armenian insurrection.<sup>3</sup> In East Africa, the Germans fought an unconventional war against British Empire forces far away from the Western Front. Lieutenant-Colonel Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck commanded the East African garrison force of perhaps 3500 German soldiers and 12,000 Africans. By waging a highly mobile campaign similar to that waged by the Boers, Lettow-Vorbeck, with no hope of outside assistance or reinforcement, managed to attract and confound a British force of more than 350,000.<sup>4</sup> When one thinks of the British Army in the First World War, one immediately conjures up images of trench warfare. Certainly that was the defining type of warfare, but the British simultaneously fought the well-known conventional war in France, battled Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa, supported a guerrilla war in Arabia against the Turks and suppressed an insurgent uprising in Ireland. This uprising in Ireland will be the first of two insurgencies you will study in this chapter.

# The Easter Rising and the Anglo-Irish War 1916-1921





## Overview

The 1916 Easter Rising, led by the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) but composed mostly of Irish Volunteers (IVF), was quickly and ruthlessly suppressed by the British Army. The Rising's origins require a brief explanation in that they reveal the source of the grievances and military preparation that predate the outbreak of open rebellion. From the late 1890s there had been continual political discussion in Ireland and Great Britain over the constitutional relationship of Ireland to Britain. Whereas responsible government had been devolved to Canada and Australia, no similar parliamentary relationship had been allowed for Ireland. In Ireland, the faction seeking a national parliament was referred to as the 'home rule' movement. The British parliament moved to adopt an Irish 'home rule' bill and did so in 1913. However, the outbreak of war in August 1914 witnessed the British parliament suspend the enactment of the 'home rule' bill. This would be a chief grievance of the Irish nationalists that rose up in 1916. They were also particularly angered by the heavy losses of Irish troops in France who died without the type of political representation available to Canadian and Australian soldiers.

The British decision to suspend 'home rule' had been motivated in part by the fear of general armed unrest in Ireland if the British parliament acted too quickly, notwithstanding the fact that the ruling party depended on votes from MPs from a particular series of Irish ridings to maintain their majority. In particular, Ireland, like much of the British Empire, had experienced the rise of numerous armed militias, motivated in part by the experience of the Boer Commandos. Just as Canada saw a large number of regiments raised by public subscription before the First World War, so too did Ireland. There were 100,000 men in the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and thousands of other members of the IRB and other militias. These forces were not all raised along sectarian lines but, on the eve of the enactment of the 'home rule' bill, the leader of the Ulster Volunteers let it be known his forces would resist any effort to devolve their representatives to an Irish parliament. The head of the British military forces in Ireland informed the government that his officers would not use force

against the Ulster Volunteers. Given that conundrum, the government chose caution and suspended the 'home rule' bill.

That action allayed the concerns of the UVF, but the leaders of the IRB and other militias felt the British parliament had let them down. The discontent swelled as British recruiting for France and Flanders escalated with the scale of losses. The IRB leadership planned a rather classic and conventional armed insurrection for the Easter Weekend of 1916. Although it became clear that their plans for a national uprising were compromised, they persisted in rising in the capital city of Dublin. Swiftly capturing the General Post Office and declaring a Republic, these forces were overwhelmed within a matter of days by the British Army. Under the powers of martial law British forces rounded up fifteen of the ringleaders and executed them without trial. The rising had not been popular, but that single act cost the British forces much support and spawned a more radicalized and cohesive resistance movement. Although a crushing defeat for the IRB, the Rising helped advance the nationalist movement and attracted new members.

Remnants of the IRB and UVF regrouped following the Rising but held off on precipitous action until the First World War was over. Throughout 1919 they waged an increasingly violent guerrilla warfare campaign. The Irish Volunteers (soon to be known as the IRA) were ably led by Michael Collins. They waged war against the local police, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), who were the only armed police force in the United Kingdom, and the British Army. The IRA was the military arm of the nationalist movement. The IRA reported to a 'provisional government' with its own elected officials and, under Collins, created an extensive intelligence and financial support network. Collins attempted to drive the police from the countryside and establish a parallel political administration with its own courts, police and taxation system. Tactically, units of the IRA formed 'flying columns', again showing the influence of the Boer Commando experience, which attacked police barracks and drove them into the cities. The scale of operations was never very large, but Britain was tired of war and the cost of suppressing these forces was both financially high and

morally challenging. Curfews, martial law, detention without trial, mass arrests, the destruction of houses belonging to suspected guerrillas or guerrilla supporters, and the employment of armed paramilitary forces, neither army nor police, were some of the tactics the British applied (indeed, the current Israeli practice of destroying suspects' houses is based on these British practices which they had later also used in Palestine). The IRA also used ruthless tactics against 'collaborators', burning many out of their homes and killing suspected collaborators and agents.

Given that the British parliament had previously agreed to 'home rule' and, given the option presented by the commander of British forces in Ireland that he could suppress the rebellion if given a free hand and the power of summary execution of suspects, the government chose negotiations. Control of the internal security forces, particularly the paramilitary auxiliaries, proved problematic. In March 1920, these forces executed the mayor of Ireland's third largest city, Cork. This was followed by a major incident later the same year when a group of paramilitary auxiliaries went on a rampage in Cork, rioting and causing a major fire that burnt out the centre of the city. Faced with a choice of increased ruthlessness or compromise, the British cabinet chose negotiation. Significantly, modern research has demonstrated that the IRA only numbered approximately 4000 when negotiations began. However, within six months of the start of negotiations, its ranks had swelled nearly ten-fold. This should not be surprising. Given the psychological component of such wars, the vast majority of a population will choose not to show their preferences if personal security is in doubt. It is a pattern seen time and again in insurrectionary warfare. The negotiations bore bitter fruit for Collins, who would die in the ensuing Irish Civil War of 1921-22, and for the people of a divided Ireland where sectarian division and conflict between the 'north' and the 'south' have continued into the modern era. Nevertheless, the case is illustrative and of significant consequence for how Britain waged COIN.

## **Recommended Reading**

- Charles Townshend, “The Irish Republican Army and the Development of Guerrilla Warfare, 1916-1921,” *The English Historical Review* 94, No. 371 (April 1979): 318-345.

## **Key Observations**

- Initially, the Irish Republicans had little use for guerrilla methods. That changed with their devastating defeat in the 1916 Easter Rising. After the Rising, they rejected the traditional approach of seeking a rather spontaneous revolt prompted by a small group striking a revolutionary spark within an urban area – the model later employed by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917.
- The IRA attacked the RIC to acquire weapons.
- Locally raised county-level companies employed guerrilla tactics.
- They did not enjoy great success in large operations.
- The provisional Irish government authority had a difficult time controlling the Republican military forces.
- By the time of the Truce, most IRA units were weakly organized, marginally effective and did not enjoy the full sympathy of the people – but there were wide swaths of

## The Arab Revolt 1916-1918



countryside under their control.

### Overview

Given the task of helping to foment and consolidate Arab resistance to Ottoman-Turkish rule during the First World War, T. E. Lawrence took disparate, uncoordinated forces and helped turn them into an effective guerrilla army that cost the "Turks" control of central Arabia and supported the wider campaign objectives of the British and French "Entente" forces in the region. His success was widely known and studied, particularly in Ireland and later in China. Your next reading was penned by Lawrence and explains a good deal of his reasoning. His strategic estimate of the relative strength of the Turkish forces, his recognition of how

they were tied to their lines of communication, and how his forces could move like the wind, strike where the Turks were weak and avoid being caught in sustained large scale operations, for which the Turkish forces were suited but his were not, remains a classical and valuable estimate because it captures a number of enduring attributes common to this form of war. An insurgent force may always enjoy such advantages against a conventional enemy. Of particular note is his appraisal of the time factor, the role of geographical/ physical distance, and willpower as strategic factors to consider in any military estimate.

It is also worth considering that Lawrence wrote as an insurgent, a successful insurgent, playing a role in a larger conventional war. Writings on waging insurgency, or pro-insurgency, are different from works explaining how to conduct COIN; and context is important. The problems of waging a COIN campaign may not lend themselves to the same techniques as the insurgent but you may encounter arguments to the contrary. Regardless of that problem, Lawrence held particular sway in the United Kingdom, and his record and experiences greatly influenced the military-romantic Winston Churchill (notwithstanding the fact that Michael Collins offered him an IRA brigade). Churchill drew on the legend of Lawrence to build the Special Operations Executive (SOE) during the Second World War, charging them with setting Europe ablaze with rebellion against the Nazi occupiers. The aim was again to have a little force do much by employing terrain, intelligence and mobility to confound a well-ordered, conventional military. Taking and holding the ground was not the aim; rather, eroding will, denying free movement and impeding those forces from supporting a conventional campaign were to comprise their purpose – as you will see in the next chapter.

### **Recommended Reading**

- T. E. Lawrence, "The Evolution of a Revolt," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal* 1, no. 1 (October 1920): 1-22.

## Key Observations

- Lawrence developed three elements of war: the 'algebraic' element of things (he also referred to this as hecastics) which was purely scientific, the 'biological' element (he referred to this as bionomics) which dealt with humanity, and the 'psychological' element of ideas (he referred to this as diathetics), propaganda and motivation.
- He did not believe in attacking the enemy simply because the enemy was there. He focused instead on destroying 'materiel'.
- Lawrence avoided set-piece battles.
- He stressed the need for perfect intelligence so as to fight a war of detachment, not a war of maintaining contact.
- He believed the war was geographical and calculated (algebraically) the forces the Turks needed to thwart his actions. He placed considerable emphasis on occupying territory.
- The greatest assets available to him were speed and time, not hitting power, which yielded strategic, not tactical strength.
- His guerrilla forces consistently operated with no fixed lines of communication because the Arabs had no materiel to lose and therefore nothing to defend.
- He placed great emphasis on studying Arab tribal structure, religion, social customs and languages. In this way he followed our COIN principle of understanding the complex dynamics of the wider environment, but from the perspective of the insurgent.
- He shaped his local allies by suggestion and example rather than by leading them by the nose and doing the job for them.

## **Additional Sources of Interest**

Andrew Selth, "Ireland and Insurgency: The Lessons of History," *Small Wars and Insurgency* 2, no. 2 (1991): 299-322.

T. Bowden, "The Irish Underground and the War of Independence, 1919-1921," *Journal of Contemporary History* 8, no. 2 (April 1973): 3-23.

Linda J. Tarver, "In Wisdom's House: T. E. Lawrence in the Near East," *Journal of Contemporary History* 13, no. 3 (July 1978): 585-608.

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Lieutenant-Colonel (Ret) John A. English, "Kindergarten Soldier: The Military Thought of Lawrence of Arabia," *Military Affairs* 41, no. 1 (January 1987): 7-11.

## **Endnotes**

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Packenham, *The Boer War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979), 472.

<sup>2</sup> Allan R. Millet and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America* (New York: The Free Press, 1984), 295.

<sup>3</sup> Edward J. Erickson, "Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations – 1915," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 3 (June 2005): 529-548.

<sup>4</sup> Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1976), 155.



# CHAPTER FOUR

## THE SECOND WORLD WAR ERA

### Introduction

Guerrilla warfare was an almost universal feature of the Second World War. It developed in all the European countries that were occupied by the Germans and in most of the Far Eastern countries that were occupied by the Japanese. After the fall of France and the evacuation from Dunkirk in the summer of 1940, the British and Canadians and other members of the Empire faced the burden of taking the fight to Germany and Italy alone. The British were also pushed out of Norway and Greece. With no footing in continental Europe and limited long-range bombing capabilities, Britain could do little to strike directly at Germany. As a result of this weakness Winston Churchill created the SOE to “coordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas” to harass the Germans and erode their will in preparation for an eventual return to the continent, in force, somewhere.

Although the British War Office had not institutionalized the lessons of Lawrence's success during the Arab Revolt in the First World War, it did develop doctrine for guerrilla warfare. Military Training Pamphlet No. 54: *Guerrilla Warfare* was issued in August 1942 and declared:

Where guerrillas have been ultimately successful ... success has been clinched by the intervention of regular forces, but until then they have always depended, as the guerrillas of today are depending, upon the goodwill and support of the inhabitants, and on the existence of inaccessible country, or on their ability to disappear from the scene of their activities at will.


Churchill's charge to the SOE, "to set Europe ablaze" was taken seriously by all the Allies in the struggle against Nazi tyranny in Europe and the Empire of the Rising Sun in Asia. Soviet partisans, Yugoslav partisans (communist and non-communist), the French, Dutch, Greek and Italian 'undergrounds' were all supported by British and American agents and military aid. Small, specially trained 'Jedburgh' teams were dropped with wireless equipment to help the Resistance. The Jedburghs worked with no defined boundaries and ignored all political affiliations. With varying degrees of success, the resistance fighters in the occupied countries waged wide-ranging subversion, intelligence collection and sabotage operations. They served as an important force multiplier for the conventional Allied powers because they operated within occupied territory and effectively waged a proxy, low-intensity war as part of a larger global setting. Their total strategic impact remains debatable. However, they did harass and tied down considerable German and Japanese forces, particularly in eastern Europe and the Far East.

Many special operations forces owe their origin to the Second World War. Britain fielded a large number of unusual or unique commando and raiding formations to take the war behind enemy lines and aimed at significant targets. These operations kept up pressure well beyond the immediate front and served in some manner as a force in being or Fabian strategy – especially

before the Italian and Normandy landings. The Special Air Service (SAS) and Special Boat Service (SBS) trace their origin to British operations in the North African and the Mediterranean theatres of operations. The British Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) operated in North Africa and the Long Range Penetration Group consisting of the Chindits (Chinthe) and Merrill's Marauders operated deep behind Japanese lines in Burma. While the Allies effectively practised compound warfare, the Germans did not. They had no equivalent to resistance fighters behind Allied lines but made a feeble attempt to wage guerrilla warfare in Germany late in the war.

The resistance movements and the role of special operations forces often get overlooked in discussions of the major battles and campaigns of the Second World War. Long before the Western Allies returned to the continent of Europe, the Strategic Bombing Offensive was considered a 'second front', complementing the Eastern Front. In reality, however, the Resistance movement can be considered a front by itself and lessons can still be derived for modern COIN forces by a close study of the Second World War experience.

## The Wehrmacht and Partisan Warfare 1939-1945



### Overview

Although partisan warfare was not extensive in 1941 during BARBAROSSA, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, it rapidly increased in scale and intensity. By mid-August 1942, the Wehrmacht's inability to deal with *Bandenbekämpfung* (anti-partisan warfare) led Hitler to declare in Fuhrer Directive No. 46 that "Banditry in the East has assumed intolerable proportions". In Yugoslavia the Germans devoted significant forces to combat the partisans of Josip Broz (*nom de guerre*: 'Tito'). Partisan activity increased dramatically in Italy after the surrender of Italy. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Commander-in-Chief South-West, called it "a degenerate form of war": "In peacetime the German armed forces received no training or instruction in warfare of this kind, and thus were unprepared to fight the growing menace in Italy."

In France, the French resistance made a significant contribution to the invasion by sabotage of all types while in Poland. The Warsaw Uprising in July 1944 represented the one major

urban insurrection during the war. The Germans suppressed the uprising by October at the cost of 11,000 casualties; the number of Polish dead has been estimated at almost 200,000.


### **Recommended Reading**

- Walter Laqueur, "The Twentieth Century (II): Partisans Against Hitler," in *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), 202-238.

### **Key Observations**

- The Partisans' main effort was on disrupting lines of supply and communication and on creating a general climate of insecurity to force the Germans to divert forces from the main fighting.
- The Soviets created a central partisan staff to coordinate activities. This reflects our principle of promoting unity of purpose to coordinate action, but from the perspective of the insurgent.
- Germans had great difficulty suppressing the Soviet partisans because of the vast spaces and a lack of manpower.
- The Germans made no effort for most of the war to win hearts and minds in the occupied villages. Hitler's racial policy undermined it. This was particularly true of the Ukraine which might have provided valuable assistance to the Germans had they not been treated so poorly.
- Guerrilla operations were part of, and aimed at, supporting the wider conventional war.
- Support of proxy wars proved relatively easy for the large conventional powers.
- Many partisans were self-motivated to engage in some level of combat but were rarely so reckless as to risk their complete destruction through precipitous action that brought too wide-spread or effective a campaign to suppress them – e.g., to drive their enemy to really hunt them down – rather as Lawrence had waged against the Turkish forces.

# Mao Zédong in China 1927-1949



## Overview

For the Allied powers, guerrilla and insurgent warfare was only a secondary form of warfare, adjuncts to their efforts. However, there was one theatre where it was more than a secondary effort. China was occupied by Imperial Japanese forces in 1937. The occupation was resisted by two quite different Chinese military movements. The bulk of the conventional fighting was waged by nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) forces under Marshal Chiang Kai-shek, but the Communist People's Liberation Army (PLA), under Chairman Mao Zédong, also fought the Japanese invaders. Chiang Kai-shek's forces largely decapitated the Communist Party in 1927. Mao survived that purge to lead the remnants of the Communist Party and later he led the PLA on the 'Long March' to evade Chiang's forces. Mao found safe haven deep in the Chinese interior. There he formulated his concept of a People's War waged by Chinese peasants in the countryside, a philosophy diametrically opposed to the established Marxist model of a proletarian, urban, workers-based revolution that had proven successful in Russia in 1917. Once the war against Japan ended in 1945, the PLA and KMT forces fought each other for control of China. Mao successfully converted his guerrilla army into one poised for, and successful in, mobile conventional warfare. The last of the KMT were driven from their homelands and across the straits of Formosa in 1949.

Mao is generally considered the father of modern guerrilla warfare. A large number of his writings are available in French or English translations. He employed many terms to describe the forms of warfare his forces waged over their long armed struggle. The terms 'People's War', guerrilla warfare, protracted warfare and revolutionary war are not always synonymous. Mao did not pen a single unified document explaining his methods, but he wrote a series of essays throughout his long tenure that were aimed at internal audiences to explain to them how he saw the various struggles developing and, sometimes, to address very particular arguments. Educated as both a classical and Marxist scholar, Mao filled his writings with both classical Chinese references and with references to debates within Marxist theory that, for the uninitiated, are easily missed or misunderstood. Efforts to

remove those passages were made in many of the early translations of his work, but that did some injustice to his meaning. Mao's writings were not penned as timeless pieces. He usually wrote in specific circumstances to address immediate needs, from raising morale by instilling a willing spirit, despite recent setbacks in the field, to calls for caution and the avoidance of large-scale operations when the circumstances were not favourable, or to explain how the Party would win in its long struggle despite having to make common cause with the KMT. Several key elements of Mao's thought, however, do appear to transcend the particular circumstance of each writing.

Mao understood that to win, his forces had to survive until winning circumstances were created or which presented themselves. He had to mobilize the population to support him and his forces against both the KMT and the Japanese. He had to avoid falling subject to doctrinaire military thought, especially that of the Communists who favoured emulating the Soviet model, and to avoid militaristic thinkers who repeatedly pressed for more large-scale operations. Mao often wrote that guerrilla warfare alone would not bring victory. The PLA would have to become masters of conventional mobile and positional warfare to fully defeat a well-armed conventional foe, but to rush that effort risked much. Mao's first principle, then, was survival of the struggle. He wrote extensively of having to understand the particular conditions the struggle faced at any given moment and the necessity of always adjusting course regardless of the dictates of theory, doctrine or dogma. His writings on the unity of theory and practice, something Marxist and other scholars refer to as 'praxis' reveal his training as a Marxist scholar, but the concept is not Marxist and should be considered a powerful analytical tool that others may employ. Mao used that method to identify and outline how the Japanese, for instance, would always be at a disadvantage over the PLA while they occupied China. Mao's "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla Warfare Against Japan" is just one example of his many military writings, which were not really publicized in the West until after the Second World War.



## **Recommended Reading**

- Mao Tse-Tung, “Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla Warfare Against Japan” in *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), pp. 153-186.

## **Key Observations**

- Mao’s Revolutionary War consisted of guerrilla war, mobile war and the strategic offensive, in sequence. Mao’s approach changed according to time and circumstance. Given the ability to trade space for time, he preserved his forces and led them through a defensive phase both against the KMT and Japanese forces, but he developed his fighting forces for guerrilla warfare, then mobile quasi-conventional war, and he finally was successful in waging a conventional strategic offensive.
- Revolutionary War involved fomenting a social revolution, but Mao argued against precipitous action that would cost his forces popular support.
- Protracted War was a war of resistance against the Japanese invaders.
- Mao argued for social mobilization through developing social networks and addressing social grievances – but with centralized Party control.

## **Additional Sources of Interest**

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Ben Shepherd and Juliette Pattinson, "Partisan and Anti-Partisan Warfare in German Occupied Europe, 1939-1945: Views from Above and Lessons for the Present," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 31, no. 5 (October 2008): 675-693.

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Colonel Francis F. Fuller, "Mao Tse-Tung: Military Thinker," *Military Affairs* 22, no. 3 (Autumn 1958): 139-145.

Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., and Gene Z. Hanrahan, "The Revolutionary Strategy of Mao Tse-Tung," *Political Science Quarterly* 70, no. 3 (September 1955): 321-340.

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# CHAPTER FIVE

## THE COLD WAR ERA


### Introduction

Many insurgencies of the Cold War era found their origins in Second World War partisan forces. The war weakened or destroyed many old colonial empires. British, French and Dutch colonies in Asia occupied by the Japanese in 1941-42 had to be reoccupied and colonial control re-established. Nationalists within colonies such as India and Algeria found advantage for their cause in the weakness of their imperial powers. Insurgent successes of the early Cold War era were achieved over dying imperialist powers in the very midst of liquidating colonies they could no longer afford or physically control. Between 1945 and 1965 all the European imperial powers, except Portugal which would follow suite in 1975, divested control to local 'responsible government' for virtually all their African and Asian colonial possessions. In many colonies and dependencies, the transition to independence was prompted and complicated by armed violence which, in many cases, was organized by well articulated guerrilla-revolutionary, political-military movements.

The guns of the Second World War had barely fallen silent when war broke out in August 1945 between the Indonesian People's Army and British/Dutch forces. In Palestine, the British were immediately confronted with a Jewish insurgency which included acts of terrorism. *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (IZL) terrorists blew up British Army Headquarters at the King David Hotel in July 1946. The next year Britain granted India and Pakistan independence amid great civil unrest. The French fought hard to preserve their empire, making a particularly great effort to hold on to Indochina, but they were finally defeated in 1954 at Dien Bien Phu in northern Vietnam.

The insurgencies of the post-Second World War period must be studied in the context of declining colonial power and bipolar, Cold War geo-politics. Communism was a great catalyst for insurgencies in the Third World. Even superficial support for communist ideas attracted the sympathy of the Soviet Union. Conversely, it drew a strong anti-communist reaction from the United States. In March 1947, President Harry S. Truman announced the 'Truman Doctrine', a guarantee of military and economic support for nations facing communist insurgency, the Greek Civil War being the catalyst. On one level, the majority of the insurgencies can be considered proxy wars of the super powers. You will explore some of the largest or most commonly cited COIN campaigns of the Cold War era.

**The Hukbalahap Rebellion (Philippines) 1946-1954**



## Overview

The United States annexed the Philippines in February 1899 following the Spanish-American War. The Japanese occupation of the islands in 1941-42 ended the American colonial administration. Hukbalahap, an acronym for *Hukbong ng Bayan laban sa Hapon* or People's Anti-Japanese Army, became the military arm of the Philippine Communist Party. Its support came from the poor peasants of the rice-growing areas of Luzon. The United States supported the fledgling independent government established after the collapse of Japan in 1945, but both parties excluded the 'communists' from elected office. The Huk resistance, led by Luis Taruc, was born out of this political exclusion. The Philippine government tried a 'mailed fist' approach from the start of the insurgency in 1946 to 1950, but to little effect. Thereafter, a new Minister of Defence, Raymon Magsaysay, assisted by U.S. Air Force Lieutenant-Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, changed tactics. Military operations became more targeted and were matched by more political action to address local grievances through land and political reform. The government also enticed Huk guerrillas away from their organization with a wide-ranging amnesty and re-establishment program. The granting of land to local guerrillas greatly undercut the insurgency. The Huks probably achieved their peak strength of approximately 12-13,000 armed guerrillas in 1950, but between 1951 and 1954 the insurgency was effectively suppressed by the government, assisted materially by the United States. This success proved important in shaping later U.S. counterinsurgency campaigns.

## Recommended Reading


- Wray R. Johnson and Paul J. Dimech, "Foreign Internal Defense and the Hukbalahap: A Model Counter-Insurgency," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 4, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1993): 29-52.

## Key Observations

- The *Partido Komunista Ng Pilapinas* (PKP) did not initiate the rebellion.
- The U.S. promised Philippine independence.
- The U.S. government recognized the long-standing and legitimate grievances of the peasants. This action clearly reflects our principle of separating insurgents from their physical and moral sources of strength.
- NSC 84/c clearly recognized the limitations of purely military measures.
- The scale of the U.S. effort appeared to be correct. The employment of greater resources might have done more harm. The Korean War limited the scale of U.S. commitment to COIN efforts.
- U.S. military efforts focused heavily on psychological warfare, not field operations, to precisely attack the principal grievances of the insurgents.
- The number of Huks who surrendered almost equalled the number killed and captured.



# The Malayan Emergency 1948-1960<sup>1</sup>



## Overview

The Malayan Emergency is often considered 'the' model of what a successful COIN campaign is.<sup>1</sup> Established as a British colony in the late 19th Century, Malaya sat at the end of long peninsula. Britain had supported local insurgents there during the Second World War against Japan which occupied the country at the end of 1941. But after the war, the communist guerrilla organization, the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army, was excluded from political power. A British Military Administration was established at the end of the war and communists were disarmed in September 1945. This group proved the kernel for the insurgency that erupted in 1948 when Britain restored the Federation of Malaya and set the conditions for eventual independence on the India model.

The guerrillas proved difficult to drive from the urban areas but they were eventually forced to take refuge in the jungles. The British Army moved from multi-battalion sweeps to smaller and smaller unit operations typified by company level actions and constant patrolling. In 1950, the insurgents were cut off from further support when Lieutenant-General Sir Harold Briggs became Director of Operations and instituted the 'Briggs Plan' consisting of a deliberate and highly controlled, massive resettlement program to isolate the enemy who had taken refuge among the many settlements of 'Chinese squatters'. Upwards of 500,000 people were relocated. The communist guerrilla movement was composed primarily of ethnically distinct Chinese immigrants and the British and local COIN tactics exploited this division. Thailand, the only country to share a land border with Malaya, also helped isolate the insurgents by taking measures to prevent them from using the border region as a safe haven.

Briggs was succeeded by General Sir Gerald Templar in early 1952. Templar served as a senior officer in the SOE within the Political Warfare Directorate during the Second World War. He continued in this work by serving both as the Director of Operations and as the British High Commissioner for the colony, thus bringing a new unity to civil-military command. Moreover, Templar made plain that the British government would support

Malaya becoming a self-governing state. These actions, good coordination, political reform, isolating the guerrillas, amnesty and political accommodation (which resulted in an Alliance Party win in the first federal election in 1955) and constant military pressure are seen as the key lessons of this campaign.

### **Recommended Reading**


- Robert O. Tillman, “The Non-Lessons of the Malayan Emergency,” *Asian Survey* 6, no. 8 (August 1966): 407-419.

### **Key Observations**

- The Chinese and the Malays were ethnically distinct which permitted easier identification of the insurgents.
- The Briggs Plan consisted of separating the insurgents from sources of support by relocating the people into New Villages. Separating insurgents from sources of physical and moral support is one of our COIN principles.
- The Malays had historic ties to the land unlike the Chinese “squatters”.
- The British were already preparing Malaya for independence. This fact undercut support for the insurgents.
- The Korean War greatly assisted the rubber and tin business in Malaya. The increased prosperity undermined the insurgents’ political appeal.
- The British government and civil service continued to function well throughout the Emergency. They were able to achieve unity of purpose to coordinate actions of government and military resources. This is one of our COIN principles.

**Note:** A nearly contemporaneous COIN campaign was mounted by British forces against the Mau Mau insurrection in Kenya. In stark contrast to the Malayan experience, the war in Kenya was marked by very systematic use of state violence to quell centres of rebellion. Many of these measures would not be acceptable in a modern Canadian campaign. A shoot-on-sight policy was implemented around wilderness areas where the guerrillas found safe haven. Moreover, the courts were heavily involved in prosecuting 'terrorists' and the campaign witnessed over 4000 judicial executions of Mau Mau fighters. Large internment camps were established and the elements of Mau Mau leadership were subjected to systematic acts of humiliation and shaming in order to break their blood oath to the movement and diminish them in the eyes of their followers. Ethnic profiling was utilized to help separate out guerrilla political elements, particularly in the urban centres where the organization's political leadership lived and found support. This entailed sophisticated police intelligence employing link and social analysis. As in Malaya, the British developed a highly coordinated civil-military campaign and conceded the path to eventual independence for the colony.

# The Algerian War of Independence 1954-1962



## Overview

During the Algerian War of Independence, France made a major effort to prevent the further liquidation of its empire. France returned to Indochina after the Second World War to re-establish its control but was soon confronted by the Vietminh and the First Indochina War was waged from 1946-1954. On 7 May 1954, airborne forces of the French Army were defeated at Dien Bien Phu and in July, Groupe Mobile 100 was destroyed. These military defeats led to a ceasefire and an armistice that ended the war and also ended the French presence in Indochina. Only a few months after France agreed to withdraw from Indochina it faced a new insurgency, this time in Algeria.

The social geography of the Algerian War was complex, consisting of the French government, the Algerian nationalists and the European settlers residing in Algeria known as *pieds noirs*. Algeria was legally a part of France and the *pieds noirs* refused to sanction any political compromise that would establish equality between themselves and the Muslim majority. The National Liberation Front (FLN) began a campaign of violence in November 1954 and, from the beginning, the French government announced its determination to keep Algeria as an integral part of the Republic. France responded with a massive military build-up, reaching a peak of 500,000 in 1960, augmented by perhaps as many as 60,000 Muslim auxiliaries. While the bulk of the army guarded roads, bridges, farms and infrastructure, French paratroopers sought out and destroyed organized Armée de Libération (ALN) units, using helicopters extensively for the first time in combat. The French Army also interdicted cross-border movement along the Tunisian and Moroccan borders by erecting a physical barrier known as the Morice Line which was backed up by 80,000 troops.

The war was vicious on both sides and the French Army frequently employed torture to augment its intelligence.<sup>2</sup> The FLN engaged in a policy of “outrages” – mutilating and butchering men, women and children whom they saw as collaborators or *pieds noirs*. During the Battle of Algiers in January 1957, the 10th Parachute Division cordoned off the Casbah, the Muslim quarter

of Algiers. By September it had crushed the terrorist organization by harsh interrogations. The *pieds noirs* hailed the paratroopers as heroes, but segments of French society did not. The excesses of the campaign were a major reason why Charles de Gaulle terminated the military campaign and sought peace through negotiations that ended French control of Algeria. Indeed, some twenty-five African nations, including twelve former French colonies, gained their independence during the time that France was attempting to hold on to Algeria; this speaks to the futility of French efforts despite winning the war militarily. Open talks got underway in June 1960 and, by 1962, Algeria was an independent nation. Virtually all of the *pieds noirs* left Algeria in an act of 'self ethnic cleansing'. Some 30,000 French soldiers were killed during the war.

### **Recommended Reading**

- Lieutenant-Colonel Phillippe Francois, "Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria: A French Point of View," *Military Review* (September-October 2008): 56-67.

### **Key Observations**

- The French-Algerian war offers an unusually rich case study but caution is advised in making comparisons to current COIN campaigns.
- Algeria was more than just a colony to the French. It was a French territory and province.
- The NLF probably received assistance from Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt.
- The social geography of the war was complex, including the French government, the Algerian nationalists and the European settlers (*pieds noir*).
- The NLF was an underground organization, not a mass, popular movement and its public appeal was limited because of the employment of brutal methods.

## **Key Observations**

- The Battle of Algiers was a ruthless but effective campaign to weed out the insurgent network. They neutralized the insurgents, which is one of our COIN principles, but at a tremendous moral cost.
- Terrain control was important.
- French military units in Algeria were about ninety percent mobile and light infantry was backed up by an army corps on call as an operational reserve.
- Both sides identified the population as the centre of gravity and most of the fighting took place among the people.
- Domestic support for French Army actions in Algeria declined as the war progressed.



# Latin America 1959-1980



## Overview

The beginning of widespread revolutionary movements in Latin American can be traced to Fidel Castro's successful overthrow of the Fulgencio Batista government in Cuba in 1959. That same year, one of Castro's lieutenants, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, published *Guerrilla Warfare* and it quickly became a 'how to' handbook on revolutionary warfare. His basic tenets were that popular forces could win against a regular army, and that it was not necessary to wait for optimal conditions for launching a revolution because an insurgency could create them. Finally, the underdeveloped countryside was the best area for armed fighting. Guevara's concept of waging revolutionary war represented a variant of the Maoist model and based on the unique conditions of the Cuban revolution. His fundamental operating principle was *focoism*. A *foco* was a mobile point of insurrection. While Mao believed that conditions for revolution at the village level had to be developed over time, Guevara preached that the people could be animated quickly from a basic state of indifference by *foco* attacks. Castro's success in Cuba, aided by Guevara, sparked many rural insurgencies in Latin America in the 1960s. Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Peru, Columbia, Guatemala, Bolivia and Nicaragua experienced the revolutionary tide. All failed with the exception of Nicaragua where the Sandinista National Liberation Front (SNLF) rode a general wave of discontent to victory in the 1970s after having failed to achieve power between 1961-1967. This isolated success makes Castro's accomplishment all the more interesting to study and it brings into question Guevara's *foco* concept.<sup>3</sup>

Any study of revolutionary warfare in Latin American during this period must take into consideration the ongoing adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine – that the Western Hemisphere was America's natural sphere of influence and they would not tolerate outside interference – in the Cold War context. During the 1950s, the United States once again instituted a policy of intervention in Latin America to resist what was perceived by Washington as 'communist encroachment'. As a result, the U.S. supported the COIN efforts of many Latin American nations, spearheaded primarily by the CIA and army advisory teams.

## Recommended Reading


- Richard Weitz, "Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Latin America, 1960-1980," *Political Science Quarterly* 101, no. 3 (1986): 397-413.

## Key Observations

- Four variables appear to have had some influence, but no consistent impact, on the success or failure of the insurgencies discussed: (1) the performance of the economy at the time of the insurgency; (2) the existence of ethnic cleavages; (3) the geographic location of the guerrillas' main base of operations; and (4) the quality of the insurgents' leadership.
- Four variables are indispensable prerequisites for a successful insurgency in Latin America:
  - (1) The guerrillas must coordinate their rural operations with the activities of the government's urban opponents. In all four cases the government confronted an active urban opposition.
  - (2) The guerrillas are more successful when they appear least threatening, focusing their violence with precision against their opponents and avoiding civilian casualties.
  - (3) Since 1945 no insurgency in Latin America succeeded against a regime that enjoyed full and unqualified American government support.
  - (4) Government chances of success increased when the government ruled with a mass-based political party and avoided indiscriminate civilian casualties while engaging the guerrillas in combat at an early stage.



# The Vietnam War (American Phase) 1965-1973



## Overview

The war known in Vietnam as the National Liberation Struggle is regarded in most American and Canadian literature not as a single war, but as a series of them: the first, the French Indochina War, 1946-1954; and the second, the 'Vietnam War', generally dated for only the phase in which there was large-scale U.S. conventional force participation, 1965-1973. This book looks primarily at the American phase but some background discussion of its predecessor is necessary. The American phase was only one stage of the thirty-year protracted revolutionary nationalist-communist-led struggle for a unified and independent Vietnam.

France occupied all of Indochina (present-day Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) during the 19th Century. Nationalist elements within these states continually agitated for independence. Notably, the revolutionary leader known as Ho Chi Minh attempted to have Vietnamese independence recognized during the Paris Peace talks that followed the First World War, but his aspirations were denied. With the Japanese invasion and occupation of Indochina in 1941, Ho made common cause with the Allies and supported the creation of a resistance army which found support from China, with which Vietnam shared a long and rugged border. The military leader of the resistance army, General Vo Nguyen Giap, developed an extensive guerrilla network while Ho concentrated on political activity. With the end of the Japanese occupation, Ho and his army declared an independent republic with its capital in Hanoi. France brushed aside this force and reoccupied Indochina. Thus followed the French-Indochina war.

Traditionally, Vietnam was divided into three distinct regions: Tonkin in the north; Annam in the centre; and Cochin in the south. The resistance forces developed different operational techniques in each region. In the rugged Tonkin region, Giap's forces attempted to fight a more conventional war, using supply-lines to China (which became very robust after 1949 when Mao's forces drove the KMT from the mainland) while the French attempted to spread their control from the capital of Hanoi. In the southern two regions, large Viet Minh formations operated more rarely, though they continually attempted to keep up pressure near the ancient capital of Hue, just

below the 17th Parallel. The Viet Minh created an extensive guerilla network and the war in the south was typified by small-level action; nevertheless, the outcome of the struggle was determined in the north. Believing they could cut the Viet Minh's supply-lines, the French developed a large forward operating base known as Dien Bien Phu. However, Giap turned the tables on the French and invaded their camp, cut it off from air resupply and eliminated its strong points through a series of pitched battles. The French army suffered a humiliating defeat in which twelve battalions were overrun and interned.

Peace talks followed almost immediately. The peace negotiations were held in Geneva and resulted in the cessation of hostilities, the division of Vietnam along a demilitarized zone at the 17th Parallel and the establishment of the Democratic (People's) Republic of Vietnam, under Ho Chi Minh. The South became a French protectorate under the Emperor Bao Dai. Both north and south were to allow relocation of populations according to their conscience and they undertook to hold national plebiscites on unification. In the south, the prime minister deposed the emperor and established a Republic, renaming the country the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). The United States thereafter became increasingly invested in the survival of that regime, motivated primarily by the desire to stem what was considered in the United States as the march of communism across Asia.

After the French Indochina War, the new leader Ngo Dinh Diem enjoyed several years of stability but the Viet Minh, which Diem's regime, dubbed 'Vietcong' (short for Vietnamese Communists), began rekindling its insurgency in the south by the late 1950s. Diem proved increasingly repressive and as his domestic support diminished, the insurgency grew. The 'strategic hamlet campaign' that mirrored the population control and relocation program used by Britain in Malaya, proved highly controversial but had a great impact on the Viet Minh. These forces escalated political violence and agitation in the face of that campaign. Eventually, Diem's growing unpopularity led to his overthrow, which the U.S. government had the opportunity to forestall but chose not to do. The anti-Diem coup, however, resulted in rather more

instability. Over the next twelve months the government changed hands repeatedly between political and military factions opposed to the VC. The VC took advantage of this instability, eliminating most of the 'strategic hamlets', while the local security forces retracted their footprint into South Vietnam's urban areas. Through 1964, insurgent activity swelled in scope and audacity.

The Americans attempted to shore up the South Vietnamese government by building up the South Vietnamese armed forces and police and by attempting to prevent the regular forces of North Vietnam from aiding and extending the war in the south. By the end of 1964 there were several thousand U.S. military advisors assisting these efforts. The initial U.S. offensive thrust resulted in a controlled air-campaign against targets in the north and in the Laotian panhandle. Terrorist attacks against U.S. air bases located in South Vietnam prompted the landing of U.S. ground forces to secure the air bases and stave off complete collapse. Originally tasked only to provide airfield security, the forces quickly determined they were facing an insurgency. Airfield security made it necessary to get involved in COIN.

The conduct of operations in South Vietnam fell to General William C. Westmoreland, designated Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, in 1964. While serving as the Superintendent of West Point, he developed certain ideas about guerrilla warfare. Consider the following observation: "Convinced that communist insurgency was to be the dominant military challenge of the future, I read all I could on the subject."<sup>4</sup> Westmoreland even went to Malaya with Sir Robert Thompson to study the British experience. Despite the on-site assessment, Westmoreland came away convinced that, other than the principle of centralized control, not much was of use to him in Vietnam because there were "so many differences between the two situations".<sup>5</sup> His strategy was based on the situation as he found it at the time and on the limitations under which he was forced to operate. In short, at the time of the large-scale American intervention in March 1965, the primary task was to prevent a complete collapse of the South Vietnamese government. After preventing a catastrophic collapse of the host government, he would build up the



necessary logistical base network and supply system to allow the expansion of conventional military operations to begin the winning phase of driving out large enemy formations from all of South Vietnam.

The U.S. military mission would change continually between 1965 and the end of 1967 as U.S. force strength increased, shifting from airfield security to limited COIN, to active large-scale operations to take the fight to the enemy strongpoints, then to driving all large enemy formation from the territory of South Vietnam. The U.S. forces became the Sword in a Sword and Shield campaign, whereas the South Vietnamese security forces were to act as the Shield, providing local protection for population centres and government activity. The Shield Campaign contained an element that became known as 'pacification', including all those efforts to wean the local village populations away from supporting the VC and the conduct of a nation-building campaign to build national institutions through legal and constitutional reform.

The U.S. land forces confronted a problem on the ground that is highly suggestive of the complexity of all COIN campaigns. The national government they came to support was weak, unstable and inefficient; also, many officials were corrupt or of questionable loyalty. The local military forces were underdeveloped, poorly motivated and led, too few in number and inexperienced in sustained combat. The local population was highly divided, with some harbouring both active enemy combatants and many who were either part of the resistance apparatus or who otherwise did not support the government. Throughout the struggle, the U.S. forces had difficulty identifying the nature of the enemy threat they faced because many who supported the insurgency could not officially be placed into an order of battle. Whenever efforts to weed out the insurgent level of activity proved fruitful, the enemy attempted to counter-poise by drawing U.S. forces off to deal with larger more conventional threats.

Under American Foreign Internal Defences (FID) doctrine (which still applies today) all these efforts were to be coordinated through the Country Team leader, the U.S. ambassador.<sup>6</sup> In prac-

tice this proved largely unworkable. In 1967, a new hybrid command organization entailed the appointment of a joint Deputy Ambassador/ Deputy Military Commander (i.e., a civilian given both ambassadorial status and that of a three-star general) to coordinate the inter-agency side of the COIN programs. This deputy ambassador/ DepCom ran an organization titled CORDS, short for Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. In practice, this brought a central coordinator for all aid, security support, police training, amnesty, national intelligence coordination, nation-building and similar programs. Even so, U.S. forces primarily focused on reducing the threat of large enemy formations and left the village-level war to the South Vietnamese. The failure of the South Vietnamese to control the lower-level insurgent activities was demonstrated during the TET Offensive of January 1968. Nearly 400,000 enemy personnel, ranging from NVA regulars to locally recruited VC, threatened to overrun most of the country's provincial capitals, and they did capture the old capital city of Hue. After this major set-back, American military operations were refocused on providing better local security and turning the broader security task over to the South Vietnamese; at the same time the U.S. government began peace negotiations in earnest. The U.S. spent the next five years attempting to secure a treaty that brought "peace with honour".<sup>7</sup>

## Recommended Reading

- John M. Carland, "Winning the Vietnam War: Westmoreland's Approach in Two Documents," *The Journal of Military History* 68, no. (April 2004): 553-574.

## Key Observations

- The mission of all U.S. forces was to assist and support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam in their efforts to defeat the insurgency.
- Westmoreland's approach called for the simultaneous engagement of the VC with reestablishment of Saigon government, strengthening of GVN military forces, and progressive enhancement of security for the people.
- Westmoreland perceived the war as a political and a military problem.
- People living in VC-dominated areas were not necessarily the enemy.
- The application of U.S. force must be carefully controlled and restrained.
- Large-scale sweeps were not effective in the long term.
- Emphasis on intelligence (Aerial, Combat Reconnaissance and Local), but determining the nature of enemy forces was difficult.
- There was a real requirement for civilian ministries and National Police to play a major role.
- The Pacification process was slow. The U.S. did indeed expend political capital and resources over a long period. Our COIN principles call for this as well. Yet the U.S. failed to sustain a broad commitment to do so and fought the war largely behind closed doors.
- A change in attitude and an appreciation for political/psychological factors involved was key.
- The U.S. military was often unable to bring the enemy to battle on favourable terms.

- There was a significant problem of base security “in a war with no front lines”.

While Westmoreland prosecuted the war in South Vietnam, General Harold K. Johnson, Army Chief of Staff since July 1964, attempted to alter Westmoreland’s approach. Soon after returning from South Vietnam in the spring of 1965 he commissioned a study entitled ‘A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam’, known as PROVN for short.

### **Recommended Reading**

- Lewis Sorely, “To Change a War: General Harold K. Johnson and the PROVN Study,” *Parameters* (Spring 1998): 93-109.

### **Key Observations**

- Unobserved artillery fire had to be restricted to avoid civilian deaths and property damage.
- General Johnson argued that a strategy based on attrition was fundamentally flawed and the reliance on body count was a poor metrics of success in the COIN environment.
- The priority should be security for the people in the villages.
- There was a need for much greater patrolling.

One final observation is that campaigns such as Malaya and Vietnam require a high level of coordination between government and security force activities.

# Soviet-Afghan War 1979-1989



## Overview

The Soviet-Afghan War lasted for ten years, commencing in late December 1979 and ending in February 1989. The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Moscow-inspired, Afghan-Marxist organization, took control of Afghanistan on 27 April 1978 with a bloody military coup. President Nur M. Taraki sought rapid modernization and quickly implemented dramatic land and cultural reforms throughout the country. The draconian way in which these reforms were instituted completely broke with the long-established model of governance through alliances with local elites in a predominantly feudal-tribal society.<sup>8</sup> As a result, the government was almost immediately confronted with armed resistance. Taraki also purged the officer corps of the Army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, undermining combat readiness. In March 1979 the city of Herat revolted and most of the Afghan 17th Infantry Division mutinied and joined the rebellion. Large portions of the army soon followed. In effect, Afghanistan spiralled into civil war. In September the Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, executed Taraki and seized power, but his rule did not improve the situation.

On December 27 the Soviet Union invaded and began the first phase of the war. The 40th Army, spearheaded by the 103rd Guards Airborne Division, seized the major cities, the radio stations and other centres of power. The Soviets had two immediate objectives: pre-empt and effectively deal with Afghan army resistance; and remove Amin and replace him with Babrak Karmal.<sup>9</sup> By June 1980 the strength of the 40th Army was 81,000.

Phase Two ran from 1980 to 1985 and witnessed full-scale combat operations. By August 1980, after only eight months, *Time Magazine* was already calling Afghanistan "Moscow's Military Deadlock ... Kremlin faces a no-win dilemma". The Soviets ignored their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933 and the British experience in the region, probably because Soviet military interventions had always worked in the past, whether in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956) or Czechoslovakia (1968). However, their invasion changed the dynamics of the Civil War from internecine to a

galvanized resistance against a common enemy, the Soviet Army. *Mujahideen* (holy warriors) rapidly expanded in numbers.

Phase Three, from 1985 to 1987, was characterized by a change in strategy. In March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and changed the strategy to one of 'Afghanization', similar to 92. Gorbachev gave the military a maximum of two years to achieve a military solution and the Politburo authorized an increase in Soviet airpower to help in this effort. An elite force of paratroopers and *Spetznaz* spearheaded operations against the insurgents and interdicted the infiltration of weapons and supplies while the Afghan army assumed a greater role. This surge resulted in Soviet forces reaching a peak strength of 108,000. This Soviet numerical escalation was matched by *Mujahideen* technological augmentation. By early September 1986, the CIA began supplying the *Mujahideen* with Stinger missiles (upwards of 1000 until the end of the war) to shoot down Soviet helicopters.<sup>10</sup>

During the final phase of the war, Soviet forces engaged in combat only when attacked or when supporting the Afghan army. Although preparing for withdrawal, the war spiralled further when the *Mujahideen* launched attacks into Russia itself in April 1987. The next year, the KGB blew up a huge ammunition dump in Rawalpindi in Pakistan. The Soviet Union sustained approximately 14-15,000 dead and missing. Some 642,000 Soviets served in Afghanistan during the ten-year war and just under 470,000 became casualties, an almost incredible 73 per cent of the committed forces.<sup>11</sup>

## Recommended Reading

- Pierre Allan and Albert A. Stahel, "Tribal Guerrilla Warfare Against a Colonial Power: Analyzing the War in Afghanistan," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, XXVII, 4 (December 1983): 590-617.

## Key Observations

- The successful guerrilla war in Afghanistan involved nearly universal resistance by the Afghan people against the Soviet invaders despite historic tribal feuding.
- The Soviets fundamentally failed to understand the problems they faced. One of our COIN principles is to understand the complex dynamics of the wider environment. The Soviets did not put much effort into this.
- Despite some conventional confrontations in towns, the war was mainly characterized by the lack of established fronts.
- The Soviets suffered a marked numerical inferiority versus the guerrillas.
- Only a very large Soviet escalation of several hundred thousand troops would have a significant impact on the situation. The guerrillas, however, could significantly augment their position by the incorporation of modern weaponry. This is precisely what happened when they received American-made Stinger missiles which inflicted heavy casualties on Soviet helicopters.
- Simply building up the Afghan regular army was not enough to win.
- The Soviets, following the general trend of modern armies to less and less infantry, put its soldiers into armoured vehicles and had great difficulty adjusting to the guerrilla warfare fought by mountain infantry.



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## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 2002), 31.

<sup>2</sup> General Paul Aussaresses, *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957* (New York: Enigma Books, 2002).

<sup>3</sup> See Eldon Kenworthy, "Latin American Revolutionary Theory: Is It Back to the Paris Commune?," *Journal of International Affairs* 25 (1971): 164-170.

<sup>4</sup> William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1976), 46, 59, 82.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Orin Schwab, *Defending the Free World: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and the Vietnam War, 1961-1965* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), 8.

<sup>7</sup> The traditional interpretation of the Vietnam War is that it was unwinnable at a reasonable cost. Some scholars have challenged this, arguing that by the end of the TET Offensive the United States and its allies had effectively crippled the Viet Cong and controlled virtually all the rural population. See Lewis Sorely, *A Better War: The Unexplained Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999). For a sophisticated rebuttal of this counter-thesis, see Kevin M. Boylan, "The Red Queen's Race: Operation Washington Green and Pacification in Binh Dinh Province, 1969-1970," *Journal of Military History* 73, no. 4 (October 2009): 1195-1230.

<sup>8</sup> Kristian B. Harpviken, "Transcending Traditionalism: The Emergence of Non-State Military Formations in Afghanistan," *Journal of Peace Research* 34, no. 3 (August 1997): 275.

<sup>9</sup> Rasul Bakhsh Rais, *War Without Winners: Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition After the Cold War* (London: Oxford University Press, 1994), 92.

<sup>10</sup> John Prados, *Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 484-489.

<sup>11</sup> Lester W. Grau, ed., *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), xiv. 415,932 casualties were the result of disease (hepatitis and typhoid fever). (Ed. Is this an orphan phrase that should be included somewhere else?)

## CHAPTER SIX


# THE 21ST CENTURY

### Overview

For most of the 1990s the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) dominated the mainstream military journals devoted to strategic studies. The RMA discussion was heavily technology-oriented. Technology was (and is) seen as a virtual panacea by Western military powers and this virtual obsession was one reason why COIN was almost forgotten about. As Robert Tomes observed, “Nation-building and peacekeeping discussions rarely addressed counterinsurgency warfare, perhaps because nation-building operations of the 1990s did not confront a determined, violent insurgency.”<sup>1</sup> Moreover, the post-Vietnam U.S. Army turned its attention to “Maneuver Warfare”, “Air-Land Battle” and operational art in anticipation of conventional wars.

That COIN should have been overshadowed in this way is interesting because it was also held to a *de facto* state of affairs at the end of the 20th Century that our potential adversaries were incapable of high-intensity conventional combat ‘in the open’.<sup>2</sup> Their only recourse was to wage classic insurgency warfare from a position of ‘weakness’. The very fact that insurgents cannot quickly achieve a decision against conventional forces means that any conflict will be protracted (unless unusual circumstances predominate). The 21st Century may be ushering in a new era of technological progress but there is little evidence as yet that the RMA has produced quicker ways to overcome insurgencies. One of the first major insurgencies of the 21st Century, the Palestinian *Al-Aqsa Intifada*, continues to this day.

# Palestinian Al-Aqsa Intifada, 2000 – Present



## Overview

The ongoing conflict between Arabs and Jews that characterized much of the 20th Century can be traced to the First World War. Even while Lawrence was waging the Arab Revolt, the British government issued the Balfour Declaration of 1917 expressing its support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. One of the key provisions was that such action must not prejudice the rights of the Arab inhabitants, who at that time represented the clear majority. This expression had already been anticipated by the Zionist movement at the end of the 19th Century which sought international recognition of a Jewish desire to return to Palestine. In 1922 the League of Nations granted Britain a mandate to administer Palestine on both sides of the Jordan River. As Jewish immigration steadily increased, tension with the Arabs increased as well. The Arab disturbances of 1922, 1929 and 1936 were minor compared to the violence that erupted as a result of the 1947 United Nations General Assembly decision to partition Palestine west of the Jordan River in order to establish a Jewish state and an Arab state. Jerusalem was to be administered internationally. Almost immediately the new territory of Israel was invaded by seven Arab armies. This War of Independence was followed by several other major conventional clashes between Arabs and Israelis in the following decades, including the Sinai Campaign of 1956, the Six Day War of 1967 and the 1973 Yom Kippur War (or October War).

The conventional Israeli Defence Force (IDF) doctrine was put to the test when the IDF invaded southern Lebanon in 1982 to root out the terrorist infrastructure of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO).<sup>3</sup> The IDF's only real experience dealing with insurgency and guerrilla warfare prior to 1982 were in Gaza in 1956 and during the War of Attrition along the border with Egypt from 1968-1970. By 1987, the IDF faced an insurgency known as the First *Intifada* (*Intifada* translates to "throwing off") which began as an incident in the Gaza Strip and spread to Judea-Samaria, more commonly known as the West Bank. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank are also known as the Occupied, or Administered Territories. The West Bank has been under Israeli military administration since the 1967 Six-Day War.

The First *Intifada* lasted from 1987-1993 and was characterized by an effective Palestinian information/propaganda campaign portraying Israel as the brutal aggressor. This is why the pictures of the Intifadas show Palestinians throwing rocks against regular Israeli troops supported by tanks.<sup>4</sup> An Israeli policy to break the bones of those caught throwing rocks only fuelled greater resistance. At the same time, Yasser Arafat, head of the PLO, renounced terrorism as a vehicle for political change. This actually reversed the traditional international image of tiny Israel fighting for its survival amidst a sea of Arabs.

On 13 September 1993 the Palestinians and Israelis signed the Oslo Peace Accords. The Accords dictated that the IDF was to withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank town of Jericho, of which the latter was to come under civilian Palestinian authority headed by Arafat. The new Palestinian police was to work with the IDF to provide internal security and to fight Hamas.<sup>5</sup> Between the signing of the Oslo Accords and the outbreak of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada* in September 2000, hardliners on both sides undermined the peace process. In July 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton invited Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to Camp David in an attempt to reinvigorate peace negotiations, but this failed. On September 28, 2000 Ariel Sharon visited the *Al-Aqsa* mosque, escorted by 1000 riot police, in a blatantly provocative move that sparked a second *Intifada* which continues to this day.

### **Recommended Reading**

- Sergio Catignani, "The Strategic Impasse in Low Intensity Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counter Insurgency Strategy and Tactics During the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 28, no. 1 (February 2005): 57-75.



## Key Observations

- Although the IDF has adapted its tactics, a battlefield decision against the Palestinian insurgents is unattainable.
- The IDF is willing to go to greater lengths than other democratic countries in combating terrorism despite censure expressed by human rights organizations.
- Israel's conventional strategic goal of maintaining the *status quo* through deterrent retaliatory and pre-emptive measures has been ineffectively applied to the contemporary Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- The Israelis used overwhelming numbers, approximately 100 soldiers for every Palestinian gunman, during the fighting in the Jenin refugee camp during Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002.
- The IDF employed *Mistar'aravim* ('to become an Arab') units to blend in with the local population. This reflects our COIN principle of exploiting intelligence and information.
- The IDF practised swarm tactics to confuse the urban guerrilla and reduce exposure to enemy fire.
- After Operation Defensive Shield the IDF began to transition to more 'low-signature' operations to mitigate domestic and international controversy.

## ***Measuring Effectiveness***

### **Overview**

Determining the effectiveness of selected tactics and strategies in conventional warfare is relatively simple. Planners for OVERLORD, the Allied invasion of Normandy, envisioned being at the River Seine by D+90, but in actual fact the Allies got there by D+75, fifteen days ahead of schedule. By this criterion the Allies were 'effective'. Operational research had its origins in the First World War where it was used to upgrade the effectiveness of artillery. In the Second World War, operational research revealed the degree of accuracy of strategic bombing, the effectiveness of mortars, fighter bombers and tanks against German armour. In COIN campaigns, however, the traditional metrics are not as useful. As Sir Robert Thompson noted in his 1966 book *Defeating Communist Insurgency*: "Progress cannot be judged by the success or failure of a short-term operation, nor by statistics even over a period of a year or more."<sup>6</sup>

Colonial warfare, characterized by confrontation between adversaries with acute differences in technology, also had different metrics than conventional warfare. The British and French, for example, sought to integrate their one-time enemies into a larger imperial construct. This was best achieved by avoiding the random destruction of property. Post-war union and reconstruction were higher strategic goals. It was not necessary to defeat the enemy decisively to achieve that end. The metric was to achieve permanent pacification by subordinating the enemy at the lowest cost.<sup>7</sup>

In Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara attempted to consistently quantify progress in absolute terms through the use of a Systems Analysis Office.<sup>8</sup> So too did General Westmoreland's headquarters, Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV). Enemy Order of Battle (OOB) intelligence was used to measure the progress of the attrition strategy. Based on analysis of the 'body-count' (both friendly and enemy) MACV determined that the 'crossover point', where enemy losses exceed replacements from recruitment and infiltration, had been achieved in South Vietnam after June 1967 and MACV it officially

captured this observation in a Measurement of Progress (MOP) Report. CIA analysts, however, felt MACV estimates of enemy-strength were far too low.<sup>9</sup> Some scholars argue that: the United States had virtually crippled the VC by the end of the TET Offensive of 1968; the metrics were misinterpreted; and the United States was closer to victory than commonly supposed.<sup>10</sup>

Different metrics, or Measurements of Effectiveness (MOEs) could be applied at different levels of the Vietnam War, or any insurgency war for that matter. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. made the following statement about the American effort in Vietnam: “On the battlefield itself, the [U.S.] Army was unbeatable. In engagement after engagement the forces of the Viet Cong and of the North Vietnamese Army were thrown back with terrible losses. Yet, in the end, it was North Vietnam, not the United States, that emerged victorious.”<sup>11</sup> Summer’s follow-on question – “How could we have succeeded so well, yet failed so miserably?” – is a direct reflection of the confusion over the definition of success in Vietnam.

The problem of generating metrics for success and having confidence in them has not become any easier. In modern COIN operations there can be numerous metrics: levels of violence; levels of infiltration; availability of food and water and the basic necessities of life; and the degrees of political pluralism, economic progress, and training of indigenous military personnel to combat the insurgents, to name only a few. At the end of the day, a judgment call is made by the COIN forces as to what is acceptable. Clearly, ten violent firefights per week in a defined geographic area is better than 100, and 5000 children attending school in an area is an improvement over fifty. The great difficulty lies in assessing whether or not improvements in specific areas correlate to ‘winning’ the COIN campaign.

### **Recommended Reading**

- James Clancy and Chuck Crossett, “Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare,” *Parameters* 37, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 88-100.

## **Key Observations**

- There is a vast amount of data to analyze.
- There is little foundational understanding of what success means in irregular warfare.
- Traditional metrics for war were domination and seizure of territory and Order of Battle data.
- Three areas – sustainability, legitimacy and environmental stability – allow for selection of specific metrics.
- Historical evidence can formulate a yardstick which forces can use to comprehend effectiveness. It needs to be tested against real-world operational data and under the most rigorous scrutiny.
- Military operations that counter the sustainment and legitimacy of the insurgents and support the stability of the general situation seem to be highly influential.

## ***The Role of Geography***

### **Overview**


Physical geography is just as important in COIN operations as it is in conventional war. Considerations of geography, including the physical size of an actual or potential operating environment and its topography, lead to conclusions about how much force can be deployed and what can be physically accomplished. You will have already noticed that Lawrence tried to establish a mathematical relationship between space and force. Liddell Hart declared, “The ratio of space to forces is a key factor in guerrilla warfare ... but the product varies with the type of country and the relative mobility of the two sides.”<sup>12</sup> In Vietnam, General James M. Gavin recommended an ‘enclave’ strategy in which American forces would only hold major population centres, because trying to defend all of South Vietnam would take a million men and more than a decade.<sup>13</sup> The Portuguese Army’s COIN campaign in Angola, an area larger than Texas, California and New York combined, definitely restricted its ability to be everywhere at once. The very nature of guerrilla warfare forces the defending regular army to fragment in order to defend many potential targets (unless it specifically adopts a strict economy-

of-force approach). In this way, geography levels the playing-field somewhat and gives the guerrillas the potential to achieve local superiority despite the fact that they are strategically inferior.<sup>14</sup>

An optimal geographical space for insurgencies to flourish is difficult to determine. The West Bank is a very small area (5000 sq km) compared to a COIN environment like Algeria or Afghanistan. However, during the First *Intifada* in the West Bank in 1987 geographical elements played a major role. Though it started at a random geographical spot, its rapid rate of advance and the acceleration of intensity have been linked to the location and the dispersion of points of friction.<sup>15</sup> All successful rural guerrilla insurgencies have exploited a defensible territorial base where they represent the sole legitimate government and can convince the people.<sup>16</sup> The insurgents in Turkey, between 1976 and 1980, seized control of well-defined geographic areas from which they established alternate forms of government.<sup>17</sup> Castro developed his insurgency in the Sierra Maestra Mountains of Eastern Cuba.

Clearly, sanctuary is very important for insurgents. Sanctuaries can be either inside the country, being subjected to the insurgency, or outside the country. One school of thought was that an insurgent sanctuary inside the country needed to be far enough away from the main population centres to frustrate COIN forces from easily bringing them to battle, but close enough to be able to influence the people. How far away is entirely subjective. In Vietnam, the Iron Triangle was a VC base area and was a mere thirty-five miles from Saigon while War Zones C and D, additional base areas, were not much further away.<sup>18</sup>

# The Iron Triangle



## **Recommended Reading**

- Robert W. McColl, "The Insurgent State: Territorial Bases of Revolution," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 59, no. 4 (December 1969): 613-631.

## **Key Observations**

- There was a common commitment in the Chinese, Greek, Philippine, Malayan, Indonesian and Cuban experiences to the capture and control of a territorial base within the state.
- The territorial stage of revolution begins when the insurgents are deprived of any means of open political opposition.
- By the 1960s, revolutionaries learned not to underestimate the ability and determination of the government to hold on to its critical installations, including cities and major lines of communication.
- Since cities and key transport-communication lines are major objectives, the expansion of guerrilla-controlled territory and its boundaries will be greatest in the direction of population concentrations.
- Most contemporary national revolutions start in the countryside.

## **Key Observations (continued)**

- There are very explicit geographic criteria that have evolved from past revolutionary experiences.

They are:

1. An area should be chosen that has had previous experience in political opposition to the central government;
2. Political stability at both the national and local levels should be weak or actually lacking;
3. Must provide access to important military and political objectives;
4. Ideal locations are areas of weak or confused political authority such as border areas between provinces or along international boundaries;
5. Terrain should be favourable for military operations and personal security;
6. Should be economically self-sufficient; and
7. The base should never be abandoned except under the most critical circumstances.

## ***Transnational Insurgencies***

### **Overview**

Insurgents can receive outside support in different forms such as money or the physical infiltration of men and supplies across international borders. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) received financial support from Irish Catholics in North America and the Germans attempted to ship in 20,000 rifles and a million rounds of ammunition to the Atlantic coast of Ireland for the 1916 Easter Rising. One scholar has argued that the “correlation between external assistance and insurgent victory, and the lack of foreign intervention and insurgent defeat, is striking.”<sup>19</sup> Make sure to have a close look at Annex A for a sense of the importance of outside assistance to insurgencies.



There have been numerous attempts throughout history to prevent cross-border infiltration. Roman walls and barrier systems were designed to control the scale and location of infiltrations. In Algeria, the French constructed the Morice Line to seal the borders with Tunisia and Morocco but employed 80,000 troops to man it constantly. In Vietnam, the United States was faced with the dual task of preventing infiltration along the 17th parallel and via the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Consisting of some 12,000 miles of pathways and roads, the Ho Chi Minh Trail was a major impediment to American operations and some scholars have argued that it was physically impossible to cut or interdict it completely and consistently; however, some military observers insist that it was possible.<sup>20</sup> One proposal to deal with the Ho Chi Minh Trail was the McNamara Line, an electronic barrier with sensors capable of detecting human urine deployed across the DMZ and into Laos. Westmoreland considered it “highly theoretical” and estimated that the ‘line’ would have required a battalion every mile to cover it by fire. Based on his appreciation of the enemy threat throughout South Vietnam, Westmoreland thought that a corps of three divisions might do the job, but he simply did not have the troops.

Wanting to stop physical, trans-national insurgent movement and actually being able to do it are two different things. Isolating the area of the insurgency to the extent that consistent interdiction of the majority of incoming manpower and supplies – and conversely, insurgent withdrawal into cross-border sanctuaries – requires large forces-in-being on the ground. Have a look at Annex B and C for some idea of the ratio of force to space of some selected COIN environments.

## **Recommended Reading**

- Shawn Brimley, "Tentacles of Jihad: Targeting Transnational Support Networks," *Parameters* (Summer 2006): 30-46.

## **Key Observations**

- Transnational insurgent movements have posed daunting, even insurmountable, challenges to counterinsurgent forces. COIN forces must be vigilant in appreciating the breadth and depth of the strategic battleground.
- Transnational support networks can be the Achilles heel of the insurgents if properly targeted.
- Neighbouring states often contain large diaspora communities into which insurgents can easily disappear while regenerating supplies and raising personnel.
- Modern transnational terror groups gain strength and capability by using a global system that simultaneously favours the offence and allows for greater operational security.
- Until quite recently, many analysts argued that large and active international terrorist organizations could not survive without significant support of the state in which they operated. Brimley argues that this now seems to have been proven false for the current era in certain instances.
- The ability of a network to regenerate and recuperate from losses is directly related to its ability to represent a compelling message to disparate groups in dozens of states and over thousands of miles.

- Four possible ways to target terrorist support networks include:
  1. Focus on offensive strategies;
  2. Infiltrate transnational networks the terrorists exploit for their survival such as drug networks, international gangs, organized crime, money-laundering, and international arms dealers;
  3. Increasing the effectiveness of international co-operation; and
  4. Make greater effort to understand how the processes of learning and innovation in terrorist organizations affect their strategic perception and operational effectiveness.
- Information Operations and Psychological Warfare can delegitimize the insurgent group and scare off supporters.

### **Additional Sources of Interest**

Amidror, Major-General (Ret) Yaacov. "Israel's Strategy for Combating Palestinian Terror." *Joint Forces Quarterly* 32 (Autumn 2002): 117-123.

Jones, Clive. "One Size Fits All: Israel, Intelligence, and the Al-Aqsa Intifada." *Studies in Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 4 (July-August 2003): 273-288.

Michele K. Esposito, "The Al-Aqsa Intifada: Military Operations, Suicide Attacks, Assassinations, and Losses in the First Four Years," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 34, no. 2 (Winter 2005): 85-122.

Captain Brian Gellman, "Assessing Stability During Counterinsurgency (COIN) or Stability and Support Operations Through Patrol Briefs," *Military Intelligence* (January-March 2005): 8-12.

Kyle Teamey and Lieutenant-Colonel Jonathan Sweet, "Organizing Intelligence for Counterinsurgency," *Military Review* (September-October 2006): 24-29.

Allen G. Noble and Elisha Efrat, "Geography and the Intifada," *Geographical Review* 80, no. 3 (July 1990): 288-307.

Paul Staniland, "Defeating Transnational Insurgencies: The Best Offense is a Good Fence," *Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005-06): 21-40.

Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation," *Strategic Forum* No. 214 (January 2005): 1-7.

Jeffrey Record, "External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success," *Parameters* (Autumn 2006): 36-49.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters* (Spring 2004): 16.

<sup>2</sup> Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 212. Creveld was not the first to make this argument.

<sup>3</sup> Richard A. Gabriel, *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1984). It is important to remember that the IDF itself began as a guerrilla-terrorist organization. The *Irgun Hagana* (translated as 'Defence Organization') was the main Israeli force but other organizations such as *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (National Military Organization – IZL) and *Lohamei Herut Israel* ('Fighters for the Freedom of Israel'), known as the 'Lehi' or 'Stern Group', employed terrorist tactics. Sometimes these organizations are referred to as 'dissidents' rather than terrorists. See Chaim Herzog, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of Independence to Lebanon* (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1984), 13.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN.: Zenith Press, 2004), 108.

<sup>5</sup> There are many Palestinian terrorist organizations including the *Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade*, *Force-17*, *Fatah Tanzim*, *Palestinian Islamic Jihad* and *Hamas*.

<sup>6</sup> Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 168-169.

<sup>7</sup> Jean Gottmann, "Bugeaud, gaul, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," in Edward Mead Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli to Hitler*

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 234-235.

<sup>8</sup> Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers* (Hanover, New Hampshire: University of Vermont, 1977), 72.

<sup>9</sup> James J. Wirtz, "Intelligence to Please?: *The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War*," *Political Science Quarterly*, 106, 2 (1991): 239-263.

<sup>10</sup> See Lewis Sorely, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999), xv.

<sup>11</sup> Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, CA.: Presidio, 1982), 1.

<sup>12</sup> B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* 2nd revised edition (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), 378.

<sup>13</sup> James M. Gavin, *Crisis Now* (New York: Pantheon, 1968).

<sup>14</sup> S.J. Deitchman, "A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla Warfare," *Operations Research X*, 6 (November-December 1962): 819, 827.

<sup>15</sup> Allen G. Noble and Elisha Efrat, "Geography of the *Intifada*," *Geographical Review* 80, no. 3 (July 1990): 306.

<sup>16</sup> Robert W. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), 185. See particularly chapter 8, 'Geography and the Insurgency: The Territorial Base of ETA'.

<sup>17</sup> Sabri Sayari and Bruce Hoffman, *Urbanization and Insurgency: The Turkish Case, 1976-1980* (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, 1991), 17.

<sup>18</sup> See Harry G. Summers, Jr., *Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995), 117.

<sup>19</sup> Jeffrey Record, "External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success," *Parameters* (Autumn 2006): 42.

<sup>20</sup> John Prados, *The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999), 375; Major General William E. Dupuy, former commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam, envisioned seven U.S. combat divisions astride the Ho Chi Minh Trail along the DMZ into Laos as the best way to end the fighting in the south. "What Might Have Been And Why We Didn't Do It," *Army* 36, (February, 1986), 36, 39.

## **Conclusion**

### **What Has Been Learned**

In this book you have been exposed to some selected insurgencies and counterinsurgencies of the past century with key observations of why they succeeded or failed. As you can see there are great variations in COIN environments. Conditions do not replicate themselves exactly. Many other insurgencies could have been chosen and you are highly encouraged to explore these at some point to increase your ability to compare different environments. You have also learned that military history can be a useful tool to help you prepare for COIN environments.

### ***Being Good at Learning***

COIN environments are really no different than conventional warfare environments in the sense that each demands a steep learning curve in order to survive and win. This book will help you with your learning curve. As Bernard Brodie said, “The only empirical data we have about how people conduct war and behave under stresses is our experience with it in the past, however much we have to make adjustments for subsequent changes in conditions.”<sup>1</sup>

Mao Tse-Tung argued much the same thing. He made it clear: “To learn is no easy matter and to apply what one has learned is even harder.” One had to acquire a method not only to apply what was learned, but also a method for learning. Mao’s learning method was studying the past: “All military laws and military theories which are in the nature of principles are the experience of past wars summed up by the people in former days.” A serious study of the past was important, but pay particular attention to Mao’s further observation: “We should put these conclusions to the test of our own experience, assimilating what is useful, rejecting what is useless, and adding what is specifically our own. The latter is very important, for otherwise we cannot direct a war.”<sup>2</sup> This is precisely why you cannot select any of the insurgencies presented in this Module and hold them up as the

model. Identifying what is useful and what is useless requires study, reflection, good judgement and, sometimes, trial and error; that is, in part, learning by doing.

### ***The Next Step***

It is now your professional duty to take it a step further. Why, you ask? Quite simply because the army will be taking it two steps further while you are still a captain in your Developmental Period 2. This book serves as a solid base. From this point forward, you will be taught our COIN doctrine in an ascending order of complexity; and the basic principles and tenets of our doctrine appear to be validated by historical analyses of COIN campaigns over the last thirty years.<sup>3</sup>

The next official exposure to COIN in a learning environment for Canadian soldiers will be on the Army Tactical Operations Course (ATOC) followed, a few years later, by attendance on the Army Operations Course (AOC). As such, one is strongly encouraged to have a read of the bibliographic essay at the end and of the list of sources at the end of each chapter. One can also begin to explore the rest of the COIN doctrine, found in B-GL-323-004/FP-004 Counterinsurgency Operations.

### **Endnotes**

<sup>1</sup> Bernard Brodie, "The Continuing Relevance of *On War*, in Carl von Clausewitz, *On War* Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 54.

<sup>2</sup> Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), 87.

<sup>3</sup> Christopher Paul and Colin P. Clarke, "Evidentiary Validation of FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Worldwide, 1978-2008," *Joint Forces Quarterly* No. 60 (2011): 126-128.

## **Bibliographic Essay**

There is a vast literature covering insurgencies and COIN. Good broad surveys can be found in Robert Taber's *The War of the Flea* (1965), Robert B. Asprey's *War in the Shadows: The Guerilla in History* (1975) and Walter Laquer's *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study* (1976). Carl von Clausewitz's *On War* and Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini's *The Art of War* both address this form of warfare. The Oriental tradition is best captured in Samuel B. Griffin's translation of *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (1963).

Works by the actual practitioners of insurgencies are an invaluable primary source. They include T.E. Lawrence's *Revolt in the Desert* (1927) and *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* (1935), Abdul Haris Nasution's *Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare* (1958), Che Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare* (1959), Tse-Tung's *Selected Military Writings* (1966), Fidel Castro's *Selected Works* (1971), Vo Nguyen Giap's *People's War, People's Army* (1962), G. Grivas's, *General Grivas on Guerrilla Warfare* (1965), and Ho Chi Minh's *Selected Works* (1961).

The Anglo-Irish War is well covered in William H. Kautt's *The Anglo-Irish War, 1916-1921: A People's War* (1999). There are many studies of T.E. Lawrence and the Arab Revolt. Paula Mohs, *Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War* (2007). Guerrilla and Partisan warfare during the Second World War continues to receive study. Perry Biddiscombe's *Werewolf!: The History of the National Socialist Guerrilla Movement, 1944-1946* (1998) and Ben Shepherd's *War in the Wild East: The German Army and Soviet Partisans* (2004), Kenneth Slepyan's *Stalin's Guerrilla's: Soviet Partisans in World War II* (2006) and Philip W. Blood, *Hitler's Bandit Hunters: The SS and the Nazi Occupation of Europe* (2006) are four excellent modern works.

The post-Second World War period is rich in counterinsurgency literature. An excellent overview of counterinsurgency doctrine and theory is David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (1964). An excellent source for the Malayan Emergency is Victor Purcell, *Malaya: Communist or Free?* (1954). The campaign is well covered by John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948-1954* (1992) and Julian Paget's *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (1967). The French experience in the Algerian War of Independence is well covered by Roger Trinquier in *Modern*



*Warfare: A French View of Counter-Insurgency* (1964), Alistair Horne's *The Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962* (1977) and General Paul Aussaresses's, *The Battle of the Casbah: Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Algeria, 1955-1957* (2001). A specialized study of the French Army's efforts is Charles R. Shrader's, *The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954-1962* (1999).

The literature on Vietnam is massive. The French experience in Vietnam is best covered by Dr. Bernard Fall, *The Two Vietnams-A Political and Military Analysis* (1967) Classic studies on the American experience in Vietnam include Robert Thompson's *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (1966) and Edward G. Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (1972). Excellent modern studies include Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (1986), Dr. Michael Hennessey's *Strategy in Vietnam: Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1967* (1997) and Larry E. Cable's, *Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the Vietnam War* (1986).

Counterinsurgency in Latin American has also received considerable study. One of the best studies is J. Kohl and J. Litt's *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America* (1974). The Soviet-Afghan War is well covered in Lester Grau's edited work *The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan* (1996). An updated work is Lester Grau and Michael A. Gress's *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost* (2002). The Israel-Palestinian conflict is well covered in Richard A. Gabriel's *Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon* (1984).

As you move into Post 9/11 writings, have a look at John A. Nagl's *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (1996) and Colonel Thomas X. Hammes's *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (2004). Hammes goes to great lengths to explain Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), a controversial concept at the moment. James S. Corum's *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy* (2008) is an excellent overview of the American way of war.

## Annex A

### Chronology of Selected Insurgencies/Guerrilla Wars<sup>1</sup>

<b>War</b>	<b>Dates<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>Western Forces</b>	<b>Outside Assistance?</b>	<b>Insurgency Successful?</b>
Boer War(guerrilla phase)	1901-02 (2)	Britain/Canada	NO	NO
Philippine Insurrection	1899-02 (3)	U.S.	NO	NO
Boxer Rebellion (China)	1900 (1)	Britain/U.S.	NO	NO
<b>Russo-Japanese War<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>1904-05 (2)</b>	---	---	---
Nicaragua	1909 (1)	U.S.	YES (U.S.)	YES
<b>First World War</b>	<b>1914-18 (4)</b>	<b>Britain</b>	---	---
Haiti (Cacos)	1915-20 (5)	U.S.	NO	NO
Easter Rising (Ireland)	1916 (-1)	Britain	NO	NO
Arab Revolt	1916-18 (2)	Britain/Turkey	YES	YES
East Africa	1914-18 (4)	Britain	NO	YES
Russian Civil War	1918-21 (4)	---	YES	NO
<b>1919: Paris Peace Conference: U.S. President Woodrow Wilson declares that all nations have the right to self-determination</b>				
Anglo-Irish War	1919-21 (3)	Britain	YES	NO
Soviet Union (Basmachis)	1919-30 (12)	---	---	---
Morocco	1921-27 (7)	Spain/France	---	NO
Brazil (Prestes)	1924-27 (4)	---	NO	NO
Nicaragua (Sondino)	1925-33 (9)	U.S.	YES	PARTIALLY
China	1927-49	---	YES	YES
Chaco War	1932-35 (4)	---	---	---
Palestine (Arabs)	1936-39	Britain	YES	NO
<b>Spanish Civil War</b>	<b>1936-39 (4)</b>	---	---	---
<b>Second World War</b>	<b>1939-45 (6)</b>	---	---	---
Second World War (Partisans)	1940-45 (6)	U.S./Britain	YES	YES
Peru vs Ecuador	1941-42 (2)	---	---	---

<sup>1</sup> This is not an exhaustive list.

<sup>2</sup> Numbers in parentheses represent duration of the insurgency in years.

<sup>3</sup> Conventional wars in bold type.

**1945: Cold War Begins**

Palestine	1945-47 (3)	Britain	YES	YES
Greek Civil War	1945-49 (4)	U.S./Britain	YES	NO
Indonesia	1945-49 (5)	Netherlands/Britain	NO	YES
Philippines (Hukbalahap)	1946-54 (9)	U.S.	NO	NO
French-Indochinese War	1945-54 (9)	French	YES	YES

**1947: President Truman announces Truman Doctrine – Containment of Soviet Communism world-wide**

Burma	1947-P (61)	Britain/Burma	YES	NO
Malaya	1948-60 (12)	Britain	NO	NO
<b>Korean War</b>	<b>1950-54 (5)</b>	<b>U.S./Britain/Cda</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>
Kenyan Emergency	1952-60 (9)	British	NO	NO
Bolivia	1952-64 (12)	----	YES	NO
Cuba (Castro)	1953 (-1)	----	NO	NO
Algeria	1954-62 (8)	French	YES	YES
Sudan	1954-72 (17)	Britain	YES	YES
Cyprus	1955-59 (5)	Britain	NO	YES
<b>Suez Crisis</b>	<b>1956 (-1)</b>	<b>Britain/France</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>
<b>Sinai Campaign</b>	<b>1956 (-1)</b>	<b>Israel/Egypt</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>
Cuban Revolution	1956-59 (4)	----	NO	YES

**1961: U.S. President John F. Kennedy institutes new doctrine of Flexible Response and establishes the Army Special Forces to deal with low-intensity warfare**

Angola	1961-74 (13)	Portugal	YES	YES
Mozambique	1964-75 (10)	Portugal	YES	YES
Iraqi Kurdistan	1961-75 (14)	----	YES	NO
<b>China – India</b>	<b>1962 (-1)</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>
<b>Cuban Missile Crisis</b>	<b>1962 (-1)</b>	<b>U.S.</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>
Venezuela	1962-65	----	YES	NO
<b>Morocco vs Algeria</b>	<b>1963 (-1)</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>
Aden	1963-67 (4)	Britain	YES	YES
Borneo (Sarawak)	1964-66	Britain	YES	NO
Rhodesia	1965-80 (15)	----	YES	YES
Colombia	1964-P (45)	----	YES	NO
Vietnam	1965-73 (8)	U.S.	YES	YES
Oman	1962-76 (14)	Britain	YES	NO
Vietnam War (U.S.)	1965-73 (9)	U.S.	YES	YES
Brazil	1965-72 (8)	----	YES	NO
<b>Six-Day War</b>	<b>1967 (-1)</b>	<b>Israel</b>	<b>---</b>	<b>---</b>
Northern Ireland (Troubles)	1969-95 (26)	Britain	YES	YES
Italy (Red Brigade)	1969-80 (12)	Italy	YES	NO
Dhofar (Sudan)	1970-75 (6)	Britain	YES	NO
Quebec	1970 (-1)	Canada	NO	NO

## Chronology of Selected Insurgencies/Guerrilla Wars (continued)

<b>India vs Pakistan</b>	1971 (-1)	---	---	---
<b>Yom Kippur War</b>	1973 (-1)	Israel	---	---
Syria	1976-82 (6)	----	YES	NO
Aceh (Indonesia)	1976-05 (29)	----	YES	PARTIALLY
Turkey	1976-80 (5)	----		NO
Soviet-Afghan War	1979-89 (10)	Soviet Union	YES	YES
<b>Iran-Iraq War</b>	1980-88 (9)	---	---	---
El Salvador	1979-92 (12)	U.S.	YES	NO
Nicaragua (Sandinistas)	1980-90 (10)	U.S.	YES	YES
Peru	1980-P (12)	----	YES	NO
Hezbollah vs. Israel	1982-00 (18)	Israel	YES	YES
<b>Falklands War</b>	1982 (-1)	Britain	---	---
<b>Lebanon</b>	1982-00 (18)	Israel	---	---
<b>Grenada</b>	1983 (-1)	U.S.	---	---
Turkey	1984-P (15+)	Turkey	YES	NO
<b>Libya</b>	1986 (-1)	U.S.	---	---
<i>Palestinian Intifada I</i>	1987-93 (6)	Israel	YES	PARTIALLY
<b>Panama</b>	1988 (-1)	U.S.	---	---
<b>1989 Berlin Wall Falls – Cold War Ends</b>				
Jammu/Kashmir	1989-P (20)	----	YES	NO
Oka (Quebec)	1990 (-1)	Canada	YES	NO
<b>Gulf War</b>	1990-91	U.S./Britain	---	---
South Ossetia War	1991-92 (2)	----	----	----
Chechnya	1994-08 (14)	Russia	YES	UNKNOWN
Algeria	1992-P (13+)	----	YES	NO
Somalia	1993 (1)	U.S.	YES	YES
<b>Balkans</b>	1993-98 (7)	NATO	---	---
Nepal	1996-P (12+)	----	YES	NO
<b>Kosovo</b>	1999 (1)	NATO	---	---
<b>21st Century</b>				
<i>Palestinian Intifada II</i>	2000-P (9+)	Israel	YES	PARTIALLY
Afghanistan	2002-P (8+)	U.S./Canada	YES	UNKNOWN
Algeria	2002-P (8+)	----	YES	NO
<b>Iraq War (Initial Phase)</b>	2003- (-1)	U.S./Britain	---	---
Iraq War	2004-P (6+)	U.S./Britain	YES	UNKNOWN
Lebanon	2006 (-1)	Israel	YES	PARTIALLY
Sri Lanka	2006-P (3+)	----	YES	NO
Dagestan	2007-P (3+)	----	YES	NO
Ingushetia	2007-P (3+)	----	YES	NO
<b>South Ossetia War</b>	2008 (-1)	---	---	---

**Some Observations from the Chronology**

Number of Conventional Wars	=	25
Number of Insurgencies	=	73
Number of Insurgencies receiving outside assistance	=	53 (73%)
Number of outright successful insurgencies	=	23 (32%)
Number of successful insurgencies with outside assistance	=	19 (36%)
<u>Average</u> length of insurgency	=	Approx. <u>9.2</u> Years

**NOTE:** Determining the beginning and end of insurgencies is problematic. Insurgencies like that in Northern Ireland can have flare-ups over a long period. The dates given above represent the generally acknowledged beginning and end. Do not accept these dates in concrete terms. There is a tyranny to numbers that can lead one to wrong conclusions. This table gives you some idea of very long insurgencies and very short insurgencies.

## Annex B

### Geographical Comparisons of Select COIN Environments

The following is a brief description of basic geographical realities in four different COIN environments. Such things as political geography, topography and climate are not included. The intent here is to demonstrate the physical challenges of COIN campaigns.

	Malayan Federation	S. Vietnam	Iraq	Afghanistan
<b>Sq km</b>	132,364	173,809	437,072	647, 500
<b>Border*</b>	2669 Thailand: 506	1070 DMZ: 45 Laos: 270 Cambodia 720	3,631 Iran: 1458 122: 181 Kuwait: 242 Saudi Arabia: 814 Syria: 605 Turkey: 331	5,529 Iran:936 China: 76 Pakistan: 2,430 Tajikistan: 1,206 Turkmenistan: 744 Uzbekistan: 137
<b>Bordering Nations</b>	1	3	6	6
<b>Sanctuaries</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<b>Infiltration</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

\* All numbers in km. As you can see, there is a considerable difference in the size of the operating environments. What is consistent throughout, however, is the presence of sanctuaries for insurgents to withdraw to and infiltration routes into the area of operations. Now that you have some sense of the geo-spatial context of a few selected insurgency environments, consider the force ratio per square kilometre contained in Annex C.

## Annex C

### Data of Selected COIN Environments

	Sq km	Troops Deployed*	Troops/ Sq Km	Total Enemy	Force Ratio	Pop (Million)	Pop Density (1000/Sq km)	COIN Force Deaths
<b>Malayan Federation</b>	132,364	40,000 <sup>1</sup>	3.3	6,000	6.5:1	4.9	37	1,855 <sup>2</sup>
<b>Algeria</b>	2,381,740	540,000 <sup>3</sup>	0.3	40,000	10:1	10	4.2	35,000 <sup>4</sup>
<b>South Vietnam (1964-1968)</b>	173,803	1,143,000 <sup>5</sup>	6.6	250,000 <sup>6</sup>	4.6:1	16	92	60,000 <sup>7</sup>
<b>Iraq</b>	437,072	130,000	0.3	20,000+ <sup>8</sup>	6.5:1	28.2	64.5	35,417 <sup>9</sup>
<b>Afghanistan</b>	647,500	149,000 <sup>10</sup>	0.2	249,000	0.6:1	15.5	24	14,000+ <sup>11</sup>
<b>Central Luzon (Huks)</b>	21,470	22,500 <sup>12</sup>	1.0	12,000 <sup>13</sup>	2:1	2.0	93.1	30,000 <sup>14</sup>

\* Represents the peak strength.

<sup>1</sup> This figure is for British Army troops only and does not include upwards of 40,000 police and tens of thousands of Malayan Home Guard forces.

<sup>2</sup> This figure represents 509 British soldiers and 1346 Malayan Police killed. The guerrillas lost an estimated 6700 killed while 1752 surrendered and 1173 were captured.

<sup>3</sup> This figure includes 500,000 French troops plus 40,000 police.

<sup>4</sup> French Army fatalities all causes.

<sup>5</sup> This figure includes 543,000 American troops, Korean troops, Australian troops and 600,000 Army of the Republic of Vietnam Troops (ARVN).

<sup>6</sup> These include North Vietnamese Army (NVA) forces, Viet Cong (VC) main force units, VC local force units and VC irregular forces (guerrilla, self-defence, and secret self-defense forces).

<sup>7</sup> The Vietnamese communists admit to having sustained 1.1 million dead during the American phase of the war.

<sup>8</sup> Estimating total insurgent forces in Iraq (total members and foreign jihadists) is difficult. See Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White, *Assessing Iraq's Sunni Arab Insurgency*. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus # 50, December 2005.

<sup>9</sup> This figures represents 4264 U.S. personnel killed, 17,439 WIA RTD, 13,714 WIA did not RTD. These numbers are for 1 April 2009.

<sup>10</sup> This figure represents a peak of 104,000 Soviet troops and 45,000 Afghan regular Army troops. A total of 642,000 Soviet troops served in Afghanistan during the course of the war.

<sup>11</sup> Upwards of 1,000,000 Afghans died during the war.

<sup>12</sup> This figure represents the strength of the Philippine Armed Forces organized into twenty-one battalion combat teams.

<sup>13</sup> This figure represents the peak strength of Huk guerrillas. The estimate of total Huk guerrillas who fought between 1950-55 is 25,000. Upwards of 50,000 auxiliaries are said to have supported the main Huk fighters. Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Analysis* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1976), 202.

<sup>14</sup> This figure is for Philippine army forces. Huk losses are estimated at 5000-7000.

## Annex D

### Acronyms and Abbreviations

#### Insurgent Organizations

ALN	<i>Armée de la Libération Nationale</i>	Algeria
BPP	<i>Black Panther Party</i>	United States
CPV	<i>Communist Party of Venezuela</i>	Venezuela
EOKA	<i>Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston</i>	Cyprus
ELN	<i>Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional</i>	Bolivia
ETA	<i>Euzkadi ta Askatasuna</i>	Spain
FARC	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia</i>	Columbia
FNF	<i>French National Front</i>	Quebec
FLN	<i>Front de Libération Nationale</i>	Algeria
FLOSY	<i>Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen</i>	Yemen
FLQ	<i>Front de Libération du Québec</i>	Quebec
FSLN	<i>Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nationale</i>	Nicaragua
IRA	<i>Irish Republican Army</i>	Ireland
IRB	<i>Irish Republican Brotherhood</i>	Ireland
IZL	<i>Irgun Zvai Leumi</i>	Palestine
KLA	<i>Kosovo Liberation Army</i>	Kosovo
KMT	<i>Kuomintang</i>	China
KNDO	<i>Karen National Defence Organization</i>	Burma
KNU	<i>Karen National Union</i>	Burma
KPMP	<i>Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas</i>	Philippines
LTTE	<i>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam</i>	Sri Lanka
MRLA	<i>Malayan Races Liberation Army</i>	Malaya
MNR	<i>Movimento Nacional Revolucionaria</i>	Bolivia
NLF	<i>National Liberation Front</i>	
OAS	<i>Organisation Armée Secrète</i>	
PDPA	<i>People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan</i>	Afghanistan
PIRA	<i>Provisional Irish Republican Army</i>	Ireland
PKP	<i>Partido Komunista Ng Pilapinas</i>	
PLO	<i>Palestinian Liberation Organization</i>	Palestine
UVF	<i>Ulster Volunteer Force</i>	Ireland
VC	<i>Viet Cong</i>	Vietnam



## **Other**

ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam	
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment	
CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support	Vietnam
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone	Vietnam
FID	Foreign Internal Defence	
IDAD	Internal Defence and Development	
IDF	Israeli Defence Force	
IMF	International Monetary Fund	
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict	
LRDG	Long Range Desert Group	
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam	
MOE	Measures of Effectiveness	
MOP	Measurement of Progress	
NVA	North Vietnamese Army	
OAS	Organization of American States	
OOB	Order of Battle	
PROVN	Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of Vietnam	
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs	
RVN	Republic of Vietnam	
SAS	Special Air Service	
SBS	Special Boat Service	
SOE	Special Operations Executive	

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