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MILITARY DEFENCE— THE NUCLEUS OF THE PROBLEM

By

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The views expressed here are the author's, and not necessarily those of the Department of National Defence.—Editor.

This . . . is the time to look back over the experience of the 1950's, and forward to what the new decade may hold in store. This use of the decade as the period of survey is suitable in the field of defence, because the 1950's were ushered in by something important enough to dominate the whole ten-year period—and I think the same will be true of the 1960's.

The element that dominated the defence picture throughout the 1950's was the Hydrogen Bomb. The element that I think is destined to dominate the 1960's is not material, but rather the spirit of disarmament that came into being during the closing months of 1959.

My purpose now is to stimulate some broad thinking in relation to these two influences, the thermonuclear weapon or H-bomb, and disarmament. In so far as these influences may have a national character, I shall try to highlight the *Canadian* perspective and to make my approach practical, although I am well aware that the topics of nuclear weapons and disarmament are among the most coveted preserves of the idealist.

Nowadays, many varieties of nuclear weapons exist. There are nuclear weapons for use by armies: anti-tank, anti-infantry, and anti-aircraft types. There are nuclear depth-charges for use by navies, and guided nuclear missiles for the interception and destruction of aircraft and ballistic missiles. All these weapons can be regarded as the modern, highly intensified counterparts of weapons that used to employ ordinary chemical explosive, like T.N.T. But, towering above all of them, in a class by itself, is the nuclear weapon designed primarily for attack on cities—the Hydrogen Bomb, or the Hydrogen Warhead.

I think it is a mistake to call the hydrogen bomb a weapon, as though it is just a bigger version of the bombs used in World War II for attack on cities. A typical H-bomb of today might be rated at 5 megatons, which means it has the blast power of 5 million tons of T.N.T., or a million-fold greater blast effect than the big bombs of World War II. But this comparison obscures those effects of a megaton-sized H-bomb that had no counterpart in conventional bombs: the radiological effects, including fall-out; and above all, the demoralizing effects inherent in its capacity for producing a more concentrated devastation of life and material than man has ever experienced throughout history. A single hit on New York, London, Toronto, or other big city could produce a casualty list of a million killed and wounded. But how many of the uninjured would remain reasonably sane in the midst of such carnage,

**Condensed from an address delivered to the Canadian Club of Toronto last January.* —Editor.

and in the fear of radioactive after-effects? As a racial extinction goes by the name of genocide, we might term the megaton H-bomb not a weapon, but a "hydrogenocide".

No one can reliably estimate how many megaton-sized H-bomb hits on American or Russian cities would be needed to demoralize or destroy the organized life of those nations, but probably no more than 20 would suffice. And the fact is, as we enter the era when the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile becomes perfected, that science can offer no means of preventing one nuclear power from scoring 20 or more hits on selected target cities of its opponent.

The possession by the United States of a stockpile of megaton H-bombs and the means for delivering catastrophic nuclear attack on Russia has been, and still is, the cornerstone of the defence policy of the NATO Alliance, to which Canada belongs. Our group of nations has adopted, as its primary approach to defence, the policy of deterring Russia from war-making by threatening that, should she commit military aggression against any NATO member, she will instantly find herself at the receiving end of a retaliatory attack with megaton H-bombs on a scale she could not tolerate. This is called the policy of the nuclear deterrent.

This nuclear deterrent policy does not stem from any military planner's love of H-bombs or H-missiles. It is the *only* policy the NATO countries have been able to devise for keeping themselves secure from Russian attack during the years in which Russia and her satellites have been maintaining military forces on a scale that, in any outbreak of conventional war in the European theatre, would give them a numerical superiority of the order of at least four to one over the opposing forces of the NATO alliance. This position of great numerical inferiority of the NATO forces has existed throughout the 1950's. It exists today, and seems likely to exist for some time to come. It is too early to know what impact the one-third reduction of Russian military manpower, recently announced by Khrushchev, will have on the strength of the Russian armies available for war in the European theatre, but it will be surprising if it translates into any real difference in the military imbalance between opposing forces in Europe. There is indeed no reason to foresee any change in the West's policy of the nuclear deterrent. It is a policy that we shall have to live with until a better one is found.

But how do we live with our consciences in this situation? We, the guardians of freedom, are maintaining peace through the agency of nuclear threats and fears, knowing how far removed this is from the ideal of peace based on good will among all men. What is the intelligent attitude to adopt in this situation? Let me list my views in an attempt to answer.

First: Let us not talk about the preservation of peace through fear as though war would be preferable. There were days when comparatively primitive people refrained from sin for no better reason than that they feared the threat of hell-fire. Today there is no nation that behaves otherwise than as a primitive social unit. Until nations reach a much more advanced state of social maturity, there may be no substitute for fear of the threat of hell-on-earth as a means for compelling decent international behavior.

Second: We should give the devil

his due. If credit for the maintenance of peace in Europe throughout the 1950's goes to any one factor more than another, it must be to the megaton H-bomb; and this bomb is likely to earn the same credit during the next decade. Without the H-bomb the West would have had to live in the insecurity of military inferiority relative to Russia, and conduct international negotiations from a position of great weakness; or we should have had to maintain conventional armed forces on a scale that would involve a defence budget and a conscription of manpower on a level we have never approached or contemplated in peacetime. There is no doubt that we owe a great deal to the big H-bombs.

Third: We might bear in mind that it has been the U.S.A.'s nuclear stockpile and long-range bomber force that have mainly implemented the policy that has preserved peace. This effective deterrent has not been cheaply or easily provided and maintained. It has involved U.S. citizens in higher per capita taxes than we pay. Some sense of gratitude to the U.S.A. is not out of place.

Fourth: As long as Canada remains a full and loyal member of the NATO alliance, and this alliance has to rely primarily on the policy of the nuclear deterrent, Canadians should adopt a logical and consistent attitude towards the implementation of this policy. It happens that there is no occasion or military need for us to base on Canadian soil any contribution of long-range nuclear bombers or missiles to the deterrent forces of the NATO nations, and that we can better make our NATO contribution in some other way. Let us, then, not suggest that the reason we do not have the threatening nuclear weapons in Canada is primarily because we disassociate ourselves ethically from their use. Nor indeed, as I see it, are we at liberty to take ethical objection to the provision of any other kind of nuclear weapon for Canadian forces, particularly when one bears in mind such weapons would never be used except in the extreme emergency in which our very freedom and way of life were endangered.

Fifth: How many megaton nuclear bombs should be produced and held in that threatening deterrent stockpile? The answer is obvious: no more than are needed to frighten any would-be aggressor. As this stockpile has so far proved big enough for that purpose, I support the view that a halt be called to the production of megaton nuclear bombs.

Sixth: How many countries should be making nuclear weapons? The answer again is: no more than need be. The greater the number of countries who acquire the means and know-how to make megaton nuclear weapons, the greater becomes the risk that they will be used in hostilities or by accident, instead of being retained in the stockpile. The greater the number of countries who insist on acquiring the know-how of H-bomb manufacture, the less easy it is going to be to persuade the Chinese not to follow suit; and if China ever does become a nuclear power, humanity will be in real jeopardy.

Seventh: What attitude is to be taken towards the testing of H-bombs? What passions this issue raises in the breasts of the idealists and the uninformed! Let me wrap it all up in a layman's nutshell. Since the dawn of time, humanity has been bathing in nuclear radiation

streaming down from outer space and streaming up from the ground we walk on. Humanity has also been eating radioactive materials all this time. This radiation affects both the individual and the race, but we are well adjusted to take it. All the H-bomb tests carried out so far add just a little to this radiation dosage. The debit side of the H-bomb testing undertaken so far is that this slight increase in nuclear radiation may be slightly harmful. The credit side has been the production of the megaton H-bomb, with the contribution it has made to peace and will most probably continue to make for years to come. I am just as certain that the benefits we have derived from the H-bomb tests have overwhelmingly outweighed any harm they may have done, as I am that the benefits derived by man from the automobile have outweighed the loss of life on the highways. It is distressing to me that many distinguished scientists make a point, either through oversight or deliberation, of examining and advertising every detail of the possible harm that H-bomb tests may have done, without any reference to, or comparison with, the great benefits that have certainly resulted from the tests. Nevertheless, I agree with those who want to see a ban on further testing of megaton-sized H-bombs. For one thing, the military gain from further tests would not be great. For another, we badly need an example in the world today of the willingness and ability of major nations to put a brake on the development of a major weapon of destruction.

Note that I keep referring to *megaton* H-bombs, because the situation in regard to the smaller nuclear weapons raises different considerations, both in stockpiling and testing. In particular, the testing of these smaller types can only by a stretch of the imagination be regarded as creating a radiation hazard, and the case for further tests of them may, for all I know, be a good one.

Eighth: What is the most important of all aspects of our attitude towards the nuclear deterrent? As long as it is militarily necessary to threaten massive nuclear retaliation in order to keep the peace, we must keep this threat effective. We must not allow our will to implement the threat to be undermined or weakened. If the threat becomes only a form of words with no determination behind them, then the deterrent disappears. We must not, therefore, create a public opinion that negates the reality of NATO's nuclear threat to Russia. We must not say, or recommend, or urge, that retaliation must never be countenanced. Rather, what we must say is that nuclear retaliation may be resorted to only in response to an intolerably hostile act, a dire threat to the freedom, liberty, human rights, and way of life that we peoples of the democracies consider worth defending. Surely these are ideals for the preservation of which it is worth risking our all.

As long as the nuclear deterrent remains for us a military need, the way to minimize the risk of a nuclear holocaust is to raise military aggression to the status of a vastly more serious international crime than it has ever been regarded in the past. Now that aggression may spark a chain of events that would bring catastrophic nuclear consequences to humanity—not only to combatants but to neutrals too—it must be regarded as the most unforgiveable

crime any nation, large or small, may commit, not merely a crime against the attacked, but a crime against humanity as a whole. Public opinion the world over should be aroused much more against aggression than against any specific weapon that might be used by the aggressor or the defender.

The nuclear bomb is not the only conceivable weapon of mass destruction. One of these days, as science relentlessly advances, there may be developed a bacteriological weapon that can be made much more cheaply, easily, and secretly than a nuclear bomb. It may be some disease-producing device that, for example, one insignificant dictator might use against his neighbour, but with serious consequences for the health of the whole world.

If we concentrate all our thinking and our action on eliminating the nuclear threat, we may merely divert the ingenuity of the inveterate aggressor into other channels. The prime objective must be to minimize the risks of *all* weapons, present and future, by outlawing the common cause of their use, aggression.

This brings us to the topic of the 1960's, the spirit of disarmament.

It is clear from the speeches of national leaders on both sides of the Iron Curtain that we are entering the 1960's in the spirit of people who seek to diminish the burdens and worries of armaments. There is a great upsurge of hope for disarmament. But we should realize there has not as yet been any event, any proposition, any formula or plan that represents an advance towards disarmament, or that suddenly seems to commend itself as a particularly promising line of progress. There is evidence of a greater *will* to find a solution to the disarmament problem, but all the long, hard, and difficult labour needed to find and apply a solution remains to be done. And the increases in weapon performance and diversity during the last thirty years have made the problem more difficult and complex than it ever was in the days when the League of Nations made a mighty endeavour to provide a solution. This is not the time to shut our eyes to any of the snags, or to minimize them. Realization of what we are up against is different from pessimism; realization that progress is unlikely to be rapid, and that we shall need the virtue of dogged persistence, is different from a wish to prolong or postpone a solution.

A broad aspect of the disarmament problem that is obvious from what I have said about the policy of the nuclear deterrent is that we cannot simply divide the disarmament problem into a nuclear weapon problem and a separate non-nuclear problem. Take away all the nuclear weapons from both East and West, and the situation becomes one in which we would find ourselves in a position of serious military weakness relative to Russia. To talk about "nuclear disarmament" instead of "disarmament" is, in my view, not so much to limit the scope of the problem as to limit the hope of solution.

It is evident that some trade-off must be devised between nuclear weapon strength and the numerical strength of opposing forces in other respects. And when horse-trading involves some kind of package deal that has to include not only horses, but tanks, and aircraft, and missiles, to say nothing of the capacity for producing horses, tanks, aircraft and missiles, we are involved in negotiation that bristles with technical

complexity, quite aside from the politics.

While all the complexities of disarmament schemes are being examined in the months and years ahead, we are likely to see much attention paid to disengagement proposals. The term "disengagement" covers arrangements for reducing the risks of armed clashes by keeping opposing armed forces at a distance from each other. It embraces the concepts of demilitarized zones and buffer states. It may also include frontier areas in which opponents are dissuaded by the presence of a United Nations Police Force from getting at each others' throats, as in the case of the Gaza Strip between Israel and Egypt, where Canadian forces are contributing with much credit to peace preservation.

Suppose it were possible to reach agreement that no country would maintain any military equipment or armed personnel within ten miles of any land frontiers. Would this be of value in reducing the risk of hostilities, in view of the fact that aircraft, rockets and the like, are no respecters of such small distances? The answer is that any "keep-at-a-distance" agreement at least has value in reducing the chances of accidental hostile crossings of frontiers, serving to make more deliberate any act of aggression, and to reduce ambiguity as to who is the aggressor. Coupled with an intensified world condemnation of any form of aggression, even a modest degree of disengagement may be able to make material contribution to a world-wide sense of security.

Yet another line of approach to the problem of preventing war lies in devising ways and means of reducing the possibilities of any country launching a surprise military attack. Aggression can be made far less attractive, if the possibility of surprise can be largely eliminated. Intensive study of control, inspection, detection, warning, and other arrangements that might contribute to marked reduction in the chances of anyone springing a "Pearl Harbor" type of coup, may yield practicable schemes.

On the face of it, the prospects of achieving early progress in the directions of disengagement and of reducing the surprise element appear brighter than in the direction of disarmament. But whether we are pondering disarmament, disengagement, or the prevention of military surprise, we cannot fail to be impressed by the degree to which the scientific and technical characteristics of defence equipment, and a host of other complex scientific considerations, are woven into the problems of reducing the risks of war and the burdens of armament that our political leaders will be tackling in the 1960's.

Canada, although not one of the Big Powers, is yet a country in an honoured position of international opportunity in working towards peace. If she is going to take fullest advantage of her opportunity to contribute to the goal of disarmament and disengagement in the 1960's, she will need to find ways of intimately integrating into her endeavours the knowledge and the patient dispassionate analytical powers of the scientist. Science can contribute as significantly towards disarmament and peace-making as it has contributed to armament and to war-waging. It has never seemed to me merely a coincidence that the outstanding statesman of this scientific century, Sir Winston Churchill, is a

THE EMERGENCY MEASURES ORGANIZATION

By

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The following introduction to this article was written by Major-General A. E. Wrinch, CBE, CD, who holds the appointment of Major General Survival at Army Headquarters, Ottawa—Editor.

"In considering civil defence or national survival in Canada, we must bear in mind our geographical situation and remember that we lie between the giants of East and West. Thus, if war should come between East and West, and we pray that it will not, whether the main attack is by manned bombers or missiles, or whether or not it is directed against Canadian targets, there will be a grave danger of nuclear weapons exploding in Canada. If we are involved directly, of course, we would have to expect nuclear attack on major centres of industry and government with great devastation and casualties.

"In spite of the fantastic strength of nuclear weapons, we can do much to minimize the effect on our country. In addition to those tasks which have been given to the Army, there is the broader field of government emergency planning. This includes the preparation of plans for the continuity of government, stockpiling and distribution of resources such as food, fuels and supplies, protection against radiation and the provision of health and welfare services. Such precautions would pay great dividends to Canada in an emergency.

"This emphasizes the great importance of the work being done by the Emergency Measures Organization."

The Emergency Measures Organization was set up in June 1957. The Government had for some time considered that planning on the civilian side, against the contingencies of a possible nuclear war, was out of balance with military planning. In consequence, the Government set up an inter-departmental committee to review this subject.

Following several months of intensive work, the Committee recommended that the pace of emer-

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Military Defence—The Nucleus of the Problem

(Continued from preceding page)

man who established the most intimate access that any statesman has enjoyed to the viewpoint and aid of science. It will not be surprising if the honours of successful leadership towards disarmament in the 1960's go to statesmen who show similarly high appreciation of the resources of science.

gency planning by departments and agencies of government be accelerated, that certain responsibilities not formerly allocated be taken care of, and that a central co-ordinating agency be constituted, preferably responsible to the Prime Minister. As a result, the agency now known in short as "EMO" was formed in the Privy Council Office in June 1957. R. B. Curry of Ottawa was named director. The organization was given a number of specific assignments which included:

(a) planning for the continuity of government in wartime;
(b) revision of the War Book (an over-all statement of governmental emergency plans);
(c) planning for the general control of communications in wartime;
(d) planning for the wartime control of road transport; and
(e) assuming responsibilities for civilian emergency planning in NATO.

A most important assignment in many ways was that of the responsibility for stimulating emergency planning among civilian departments and agencies of the federal government generally, and ensuring that these plans were directed toward common objectives. This is what is often referred to as the co-ordinating function of EMO. The Government at the time, in taking these steps, ensured that the emphasis it was placing on civilian emergency planning would be fully appreciated and understood by its own departments, and that the planning activity would be centred in the Privy Council Office and therefore under the general direction of the Prime Minister.

One of the first steps taken by EMO was to form a carefully chosen committee of departmental liaison officers. This group, to which departments with wartime responsibilities were asked to nominate fairly senior representatives, offered an excellent means of ensuring that departmental planning would go forward with appropriate accord among all concerned. It was especially important to constitute the necessary bridges between the civilian departments and the Department of National Defence. It was also important to tie in departmental planning with the rather specialized responsibility that had been carried for some years by National Health and Welfare with respect to civil defence.

Continuity of Government

Among the assignments specifically given to EMO, one of greatest importance is that of the planning for continuity of government. Many thorough airings were given to such concepts as decentralization of government, static versus mobile headquarters, the exceeding importance of communications, the matter of constitutional and other relations with provincial and local governments, and so forth. It was decided that there should be provision for central facilities for government as a wartime alternative to Ottawa and that there should be a system of regional and sub-regional headquarters by means of which the federal government would have the required decentralization.

The concept is that civilian government, continuing control of the country and giving guidance and leadership, is essential to the preservation of Canada as a nation, especially in the chaos of nuclear war.

Each of the regional seats of gov-

ernment will be closely connected with the central facilities for emergency government through a highly efficient communications system. So long as contact can be maintained, the central authority will continue direction. If by any chance a region is cut off or isolated for a time, the federal authority there, working with the various provincial people concerned, will operate within the region.

This development of regional federal government in wartime raises a number of problems. A typical one is — should the regional headquarters be purely federal in character? It is considered that these headquarters should include three principal elements:

(a) a federal component drawn from the federal public service within the region and from such other sources as the federal government may use, including business and industry;
(b) a provincial element consisting of persons drawn from provincial government and public service sources within the region; and
(c) an Army element which will give guidance to the military forces within the area in question, and support in a number of ways the civilian effort.

Each of these three principal components has extremely important functions. Responsibility for the over-all organization of the alternative seats of government, regional as well as central, lies with the federal government.

Planning for continuity of government entails development of over-all policies, provisions of plans for physical accommodation and communications, and even more difficult plans for the functions of the various components.

EMO's work with respect to the War Book, communications planning, road transport, planning in NATO civilian matters, has progressed. The control of communications and of road transport in wartime falls technically within the compass of the Department of Transport. In the meantime many governmental and non - governmental interests are involved and planning must take into account these interests, both public and private. Under the general control of the Department of Transport, working through the central facilities and through regional headquarters in wartime, the country's communications and road transport requirements should be met. The activity of EMO has been directed toward helping to get appropriate plans underway in both these areas.

Civil Defence

Toward the end of 1958 another aspect of civilian emergency planning, namely civil defence, came under careful review by the government. Civil defence in essence has to do with the development of suitable plans at all levels of government for the well-being of people, as individuals, in the holocaust of nuclear war. This may be contrasted with the task of providing continuity of government.

Lieutenant-General H. D. Graham, the immediately retired chief of the General Staff, was asked by the government to review civil defence, its successes and its shortcomings over the ten years or so of its existence in Canada. Partly as a result of his findings and partly because of other considerations, it

was decided in 1959 to make certain re-arrangements of civil defence functions. These involved rearrangements among the federal departments themselves, and proposed rearrangements between the federal and provincial governments.

The more important federal rearrangements included delegation to the Minister of National Defence of certain technical tasks for which the Canadian Army is especially capable, such as the complete public warning system, radiation monitoring and prediction of fall-out, the provision of emergency governmental communications, the task of reentry into damaged areas, and support of local authorities in the maintenance of law and order.

The Department of National Health and Welfare, which had up to this time been the central authority for civil defence at the federal level, henceforth is charged with general guidance and policy development for emergency health and welfare services which are to be carried on in the main by the provinces. In addition, the department administers the Civil Defence College at Arnprior, Ont.

The Department of Justice was given the responsibility for the use of the R.C.M.P. in the preservation of law and order and in certain aspects of traffic control.

The Prime Minister, through the Emergency Measures Organization, has the responsibility for certain specific portions of the civil defence programme, including the administration of financial assistance to the provinces and municipalities. The main assignment to EMO in the civil defence field is the general responsibility for co-ordinating all civil defence matters at the federal level.

In respect to the rearrangements of civil defence functions between federal and provincial authorities, it is perhaps most pertinent to point to the lessened responsibility of provinces for those technical tasks now assumed by the Army, and the considerably increased emphasis to be expected from provinces on health and welfare matters.

Additionally, the provinces are asked to give special attention to those wartime responsibilities that fall on particular departments and agencies of provincial governments such as the Attorney-General, Transport, Highways, Municipal Affairs, Public Utilities, Hydro Commission and Energy Board, among others.

Civilian Emergency Planning

There are numerous examples one could cite to illustrate the course of current civilian emergency planning. EMO now has 10 regional planning officers who work closely with the federal public service, with the provincial governments and with the Army. Experience to date with these officers indicates the importance of this tie-in of the three principal components of emergency government at the regional level.

The financial assistance programme of the federal government has been expanded and provided with greater resources. Projects with regard to civil defence at the provincial or municipal levels are put forward to EMO at Ottawa. These projects upon approval are paid for, up to 75% of their costs, by the federal government. The total money made available for these purposes in 1960-61 is double that of previous years. With increased federal participation, emphasis is now directed to-

ward those civil defence preparations that fit best into a complete plan for meeting a national emergency.

A good deal of planning is being done with regard to home shelters. The importance of provisions of this sort is becoming clearer each day as it is realized that warning time will be shorter and shorter and that the possibility of evacuation of considerable numbers of urban dwellers is less likely. The principal threat against which individual defensive measures can best be taken appears to be radioactive fall-out. The government is now developing plans to promote a wide programme for basement fall-out shelters.

The emergency medical stockpiling programme has progressed steadily and now a vastly important resource is available at strategic points.

In the field of economic provisions, the government has announced the formation in peacetime of the elements of a war supplies agency. Recruitment of a small planning staff is now underway. This agency, under the Department of Defence Production, will in time of war control the distribution and use of essential supplies, their prices, their rationing as required, and in every way necessary make it possible for survivors to have their share of remaining supplies. It is realized that in the event of nuclear war there will then be no time to create such an agency; it must be provided now.

Plans for the development of wartime communications are going forward with considerable speed. These plans include those for emergency broadcasting. The government realizes the extreme importance of its ability to keep in touch with the people as fully as possible.

Plans for the control of all types of transport—air, sea, rail and road —are being brought into focus by the Department of Transport, by those other departments and agencies of government most concerned, and by the owners of the various facilities affected.

There has been some variation in the rate of development of emergency planning but on the whole significant progress is being made. The emphasis being given to such planning by the federal government is clear and emphatic. This is rapidly being reflected in the development of planning at other levels of government, such as recent moves in Ontario to create by Order-in-Council an emergency measures organization for that province, fitting in with the federal concept and pointing up the wartime tasks on the provincial departments of government and on the municipalities within the province.

Canadian plans for wartime emergencies are not being developed in isolation from plans by NATO partners generally. Experience in the United States and in the United Kingdom is being drawn on frequently in the forming of Canadian concepts and plans.

Plans Must Be Flexible

The precise character of the circumstances in which Canada would find itself in nuclear war cannot be forecast. Plans therefore must be flexible so that the Canadian Government and the Canadian people may be reasonably able to meet and deal with the circumstances that actually arise.

A Militia Commander's Views

The Army's Role in National Survival

By

COLONEL M. E. CLARKE, ED, COMMANDER OF 13 MILITIA GROUP, PETERBOROUGH, ONTARIO

The following resumé of an address delivered by Colonel Clarke to officers of the Peterborough Garrison presents a Militia commander's views on the subject of National Survival, including the Army's role and the responsibilities of the civil authorities.—Editor.

In the last few years we have heard a great deal about Civil Defence and the role the Army is to play in National Survival. It is important that we have a clear understanding of what each of the parts of the Government's statement of the Army's responsibilities means, so that we can get on with the job of study and training and be capable of fulfilling our role in National Survival.

The role of Civil Defence is not a new role: it is simply the time-honoured role of the Army with a new face to suit our modern age. I am convinced that the Army never had so important a task assigned to it, and if the task is understood and properly carried out, then indeed it might be called "A Golden Opportunity". If we are to have a successful Canadian Civil Defence Plan, then a clear statement of the total requirement is necessary.

The Army is anxious to make its position clear and have it understood, and it is necessary that civil authorities do the same. Many recent comments in the papers would lead one to believe that the Army is completely responsible for Civil Defence. This is not so. It is important then that both the Army and the civilian population in general understand the capabilities and the limitations of the Army commitments.

Let us start at the beginning. If a nuclear missile or bomb should strike any location in Canada we will have our areas of total destruction from blast, heat and rays, plus decreasing areas of damage from these causes, out and away from Ground Zero. The size of these areas will be directly related to the size of the bomb and the type of explosion, that is, air or surface and conceivably under water in some areas. There are some changes in the thinking of fall-out patterns but the problem of roentgen counts per hour and their danger is still basically the same.

To provide defence against, and more important, the means of survival after the fact, the Army has accepted the following responsibilities:

(a) Provision of technical facilities and operation of a system to give warning to the public of the likelihood and imminence of an attack.

This means exactly what it says. The Army has taken over complete responsibility for this task and now operates the warning system on a 24-hour basis. Since taking over the system the Army has established Federal and Provincial Warning Centres to which the warning system is connected. A new fast warning

communications system has been laid out and the necessary equipment approved. You will understand the reason for this when you realize that only about 15 minutes warning of the launching of an Inter-continental Ballistic Missile will be received. We can expect only about three hours warning of an attack by manned bombers. As we develop then to where the ICBM is the likely weapon, time saved will be of major importance for survival.

The meeting of Canadian and U.S. officials at Camp Drum to discuss the Master Air Defence plan indicates that we are entering the ICBM era. We find then a changing opinion on the feasibility of mass evacuation and emphasis being placed on staying put. The Army will be responsible for establishing a communications system below the Area Headquarters but of necessity this must be provided from local civilian sources who are available on a 24-hour basis. This final link in the system will likely be provided by police, fire or other service sources through agreements with the civil authorities. There will be a very important requirement for co-ordination and co-operation between Service and Civilian personnel.

(b) The second responsibility is to locate the nuclear explosion and determine the fall-out pattern, and to give the necessary warning of fall-out to the public; this responsibility the Army has accepted. This also means exactly what it says. To be sure that the Army is capable of carrying out this task, an Army officer calculates theoretical bomb and fall-out data daily for every meteorological report received. The data processed will then be reported to the civilian sources at the Provincial level. It is their responsibility to say what will be done and how it will be done. The Army's responsibility ends with the giving of the necessary warning to the public. The WHAT and HOW of any action is outside any area of Army responsibility. The Army's operation instruction makes it very clear that no action is to be taken unless requested by the civil authority.

(c) The assessment of damage and casualties from attack and fall-out.

(d) Controlling, directing and carrying out re-entry into areas damaged by nuclear explosion or contaminated by serious radioactive fall-out, decontamination work in those areas, and the rescue and provision of first aid to those trapped or injured.

These two requirements are best considered together, since assessing the task and doing something about it are very closely related. The complete method of assessing casualties is still not clear but will very obviously require co-operation and co-ordination of all authorities, both Civilian and Service.

Now let's be very clear on this point—the Army does not go to war on its own. In 1939 Canada declared war. This was followed immediately by placing the Regular Force on active duty and calling up some Militia Units who would then recruit to full strength. About nine months later a further group of Militia Units was called up. Finally National Selective Service was established. The same procedure will be followed should the requirement be necessary again but time is not available in the ICBM era to move at this leisurely pace. If the civil authority is unable to act, the Army, having been given definite tasks, will

have to get on with the job. It must have its actions approved by civil authority as soon as possible.

It has been stated that the Army has established Warning Centres for Civil Defence and these are tied into the warning system. The officers and work areas which surround the operations area are set up so that civilian personnel and army personnel who have the same or similar job requirements, work together in the same offices. It is easy to see that as the task is assessed and the decision made on the action to take, both Civilian and Army sources will have been automatically consulted and had a part in the decision on what to do.

It is extremely important that everyone understands the capabilities and limitations of the Army to carry out its National Survival role. It has been estimated that up to 500,000 persons may be required to carry out rescue tasks, depending on the number and type of strikes that might occur and their relation in time, one to another. Present strength of the Army, both Regular and Militia, will only allow for about 10% of the possible requirement to be supplied from existing Army sources. When this point is clearly understood, it is not hard to visualize the continuing major requirement for a great number of civilian Civil Defence personnel to be trained and available for service should a major attack ever develop. The Army has accepted the task of immediate operational availability. It will only be in very limited attacks that it will be able to supply anything nearly approaching the likely total requirements for personnel. The Army has accepted a role of immediate assistance for National Survival. The Army is very much aware that from the available sources of manpower it is unlikely to be able to carry out the task by itself. This must be understood by everyone. There is then, a major requirement for understanding the problem and for setting up a basis for co-operation and co-ordination of all effort in this area.

(e) The four other points which were spelled out in some detail cover requirements for:

1. Direction of police and fire services in seriously damaged or contaminated areas which are the object of re-entry operations, including the control of traffic and movement of people in those areas.

2. Direction of Municipal and other services for the maintenance and repair of water and sewer systems in seriously damaged or contaminated areas.

3. Provision of emergency support to Provincial and Municipal authorities in the maintenance of law and order and in dealing with panic or the break-down of civilian authority.

4. Maintenance and operation of emergency communication facilities.

Let me make it very clear right now. The civilian authorities must continue to carry out their normal duties and there is no reason to doubt that they will. The direction spoken of here is simply the passing of necessary information to the responsible civilian authority so that they can arrange to have done specific tasks which are essential if the Army is to carry out its immediate survival operational role. The Army will not tell the civilian authorities how any task will be done.

It must be stressed again that in Canada civilian authority is paramount. It will only be in areas where survival operations are ne-

cessary that directions will be given. The Army must, and will, turn any responsibility assumed back to the civilian authorities as soon as possible so as to be available for other tasks, including possible foreign operations.

Current thinking is that mass evacuation is not practical. This is due to the short warning time that will likely be available as we move into this ICMB era. The policy is to stay put and to provide shelter on an individual family basis. A shelter can provide reasonable assurance of survival provided you are prepared for survival and can wait up to possibly two weeks for rescuers to make contact with you.

In event of disaster, these forces are available:

1. The Regular Army — immediately
2. Militia Units—on short notice
3. Civilian Civil Defence Services —as available on request.

Time will be a most important factor. It is essential that everyone who has a role in National Survival —either in a Civilian or Service capacity—be organized and trained now.

The Army is considering an organization similar to the Independent Brigade Group we know and understand. Adoption of this organization would be a real help to the Militia and make our task of organization and assembly very much easier.

In the Army we have long understood the wide variety of tasks performed by the different arms and services. We do not expect any one to provide goods or services that are not characteristic of his particular arm or service. We do sometimes criticize corps and arms other than our own, but when we have a task to do we operate as one, completely dependent and inter-dependent, one on the other.

The Army has a long record of accepting its responsibilitiies in, and to, Canada.

The Army has a long record of co-ordination and co-operation within itself while being constituted of a variety of parts.

The Army has accepted a role. which really isn't new but which will require close co-ordination and co-operation with all civilian agencies.

If the Army can ignite the Canadian Spirit, then we will accomplish our role in National Survival and carry out our responsibilities to the Nation in full.

300th Jump Is Record For Canadian Army

Sgt. H. M. Allan, 36, of Bobcaygeon, Ont., a veteran of 16 years of parachute jumping, set a new record early in March for Canadian Army paratroopers at the Canadian Joint Air Training Centre at Rivers, Man., when he successfully completed his 300th descent without injury. He has been a parachute instructor at the Centre since 1950.

A member of the First Canadian Parachute Battalion during the Second World War, Sgt. Allan served with this unit in North-West Europe. He made his first operational jump in March 1945 when the battalion dropped into action under heavy fire at Diesfordt Wood, north-west of Wesel and close to the Rhine River.—*Condensed from a Canadian Army Public Relations report.*

SURVIVAL OPERATIONS IN THE USSR

WRITTEN FOR THE *Journal* BY MAJOR R. E. AKSIM, CD,
CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE CORPS, AT THE REQUEST OF THE
DIRECTORATE OF SURVIVAL OPERATIONS AND PLANS,
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

The Soviet authorities have for a considerable time been aware of the need for defensive precautions which have to be taken to avoid complete devastation in the event of a future war in which nuclear weapons might be used.

The over-all anti-aircraft defence of the country is the responsibility of the Anti-Aircraft Command (PVO Strany) of the Armed Forces of the USSR. This authority provides an air warning service and has at its disposal anti-aircraft artillery, fighter aircraft and other means of repelling an enemy attack. At the local level the responsibility for providing anti-aircraft protection rests with the local anti-aircraft defence organization known as MPVO (Mestnaya Protivovozdushnaya Okhrana). The task of the MPVO is to provide the means to protect a locality from air attacks, to clear up any damage resulting from an attack and to restore the necessary services as quickly as possible so that normal life can be resumed. For this task the MPVO employs local resources.

The specific duties of the MPVO are: the warning of a locality of an impending attack and notification of the All Clear; the provision of camouflage, and supervision of the necessary blackout; the organization of fire-fighting as well as of clearing and rescue operations; the undertaking of anti-gas defence and decontamination; the construction of shelters for the population; the provision of first aid, medical and veterinary care to those injured from the air; the maintenance of law and order in the area under its jurisdiction.

In order to accomplish these assignments, a chief of MPVO is appointed for the area, city, town or settlement. This official is usually the head of the local civil administration, or one of his senior officers. He has a staff and maintains liaison with the military anti-aircraft command. He has complete authority in the event of an air raid as far as protective measures in his area are concerned. To assist him in his task he has at his disposal civil defence groups known as Self-Defence Groups. These groups consist of about forty-eight people and are organized on the basis of one group for every three to seven hundred people, varying from the smaller figure in thinly populated rural areas to the larger one in heavily settled cities and towns.

Self-Defence Groups are organized as required on the basis of the nearest convenient units. These might be apartment blocks, factories or institutions, or rural settlements. The senior officials of such units, the factory directors, or the apartment block managers, heads of institutions, or principals of schools are usually appointed chiefs of the groups. In units of more than 1000 people, requiring more than one Self-Help group, the head of the institution or enterprise is responsible

for over-all anti-aircraft activities and he appoints the heads of the Self-Defence Groups from among his senior subordinates, section heads or branch chiefs.

The head of each Self-Defence Group has a staff consisting of a property officer, a liaison officer, and a political deputy. He also has up to eight teams of specially trained personnel to perform the necessary protective work. There is a team of six charged with the maintenance of order and observation; a team of seven fire-fighters, a seven-man team of anti-chemical defence workers, a six-man rescue squad, two first aid teams of four men each, a shelter team of five and, finally, a veterinary squad of five men. The actual number of teams will vary according to the prevailing situation. For example, shelter teams would only be created in cities and towns having shelters, and veterinary squads on the basis of one for every herd of large cattle between 30-100 head. In rural areas with a population of 200-500 persons, all-purpose groups are established, and in places with less than 200 inhabitants even smaller groups, known as separate units, are set up.

The duties of these teams are self-explanatory. In the event of an air raid warning they are to proceed to their action stations so that in the event of an actual raid developing they are ready to perform their tasks. The civil population, in this period, are to carry out preparatory tasks to reduce fire hazards, to protect food or animals. These tasks include the extinguishing of lights and fires, the turning off of gas or electricity and the assembly of protective clothing, respirators and other equipment which might be necessary for their welfare and protection during the actual air raid. When the actual alert is sounded, therefore, they are ready to proceed to their shelters or seek protection as best they can.

For the duration of the attack the various teams have full authority over the population and are responsible for all possible safety measures in their respective domains. When the All Clear is sounded the people will remain in their shelters until such time as the rescue teams make it possible for them to leave the shelters by removing any possible rubble, or completing the necessary decontamination and give the order for evacuation. The fire-fighting teams will of course be assisted by the fire-fighting services of the municipality, and the group responsible for the maintenance of order by the police.

The concept of defence, therefore, is based on self-help at the local level, rather than on the use of some type of flying columns. It is not known whether or not this rather elaborate organization has actually been set up throughout the country, but Mr. Khruschev is reported to have stated that there are 22 million trained civil defence workers now in the Soviet Union and that an additional 5 million are being trained annually. Working on the ratio of one team per approximately 500 population, however, the 22 million figure quoted would indicate that this has probably been achieved.

Team leaders and heads of the self-help defence groups are trained in special schools. The rank and file receive their training on a local basis from the personnel so qualified. The teaching of military skills to the civil population in the Soviet Union has been accepted practice

ever since the voluntary Society for promotion of Defence, Aircraft and Chemical Industries (Osoaviakhim) was organized in 1927. The training provided by this organization proved its value during The Second World War when the military skills acquired by the civilian population were put to good use in the partisan and passive air defence aspects of this conflict.

In 1948 the Society was reorganized and divided into three independent societies, one each for co-operation with the Army, Aviation and Fleet. This grouping proved too cumbersome and was, in 1951, replaced by a single organization, the Society for Co-operation with the Army, Aviation and Fleet of the USSR, (DOSAAF) which has as its aim by "co-operation and support to increase the might of the Soviet Army, Aviation and Fleet". The Society is still in existence and its facilities are now being used to provide civil defence training for the people of the country.

DOSAAF started its first CD programme in 1955, giving a 10-hour basic anti-atomic training course, which, according to official statements, was attended by 85 per cent of the population during 1955-56. In 1957 a new, 22-hour training programme was instituted, which envisaged training against chemical, biological as well as nuclear attack. This programme was to have been completed by the end of 1958. Also prepared was a course for 1959-60 which was called "Prepared for First-Degree Anti-Aircraft Defence" which was to be taught to the whole population between the ages of 16-65. The programme was practical in nature and taught the following eight specialties during a 14-hour course.

The first hour dealt with the outward signs and destructive elements of atomic, chemical and bacteriological substances and incendiary bombs. The second hour dealt with the gas mask, and also the protective qualities of substitutes such as wadded-gauze, cotton cloaks or stockings against radioactive fall-out. The third period of two hours dealt with collective means of defence such as shelters and coverings. The first part of the lesson dealt with behaviour in a shelter, and the second half with problems of escape from a damaged shelter and the use of the tools which are provided for it.

The fourth and fifth periods of one and two hours, respectively, dealt with such problems as fire precaution, fire extinguishing and the various signals used to indicate air alert, alarm, all clear, etc. The sixth period, of three hours duration, dealt with first aid and the seventh, which is two hours long, dealt with the methods of removing the damage caused by an attack. In rural areas an eighth period was added which dealt with the protection of livestock, the treatment of wounds and burns following an attack and the administration of medication and first aid to the animals.

A fair amount of literature is published by DOSAAF. This can be divided into two groups. The first consists of periodicals which are designed to maintain interest in DOSAAF activities and the second is training literature proper. In the first group belongs the bi-weekly newspaper Sovietskiy Patriot which deals with DOSAAF activities generally and the three monthly illustrated journals, one each dealing with army, navy and air matters.

Although these periodicals primarily deal with the question of imparting military skills in their respective fields to members of the Society, civil defence matters are also included.

The second group of publications includes numerous paper-backed books dealing with all aspects of civil defence matters. These books range from ones of general nature, designed for public consumption, explaining the nature, effect and results of atomic, chemical, and biological weapons, to scientific works dealing with specific aspects, particularly in the field of therapeutic medicine.

Books are also published on the subject of civil defence proper in which the duties of the MPVO personnel are described in detail. These are used in the training programme referred to above.

In order to stimulate interest in Civil Defence preparation, two awards have been established. The first is a badge, called "Distinction in MPVO" which is awarded to MPVO staff members and DOSAAF instructors who have excelled in training the population. The second award is the badge "Prepared for PVO" which can be earned by those who have completed the programme and have qualified in Anti-Aircraft defence, first class.

Whether or not this rather ambitious programme has been completed (and there have appeared comments in the Soviet Press that it has not), it is obvious that considerable time and effort is being, and has been, expended in the Soviet Union to acquaint the people with the problems of survival under an attack and the bulk of the population will have some basic knowledge to fall back on in the event of hostilities.

Underwater Nuclear Jet

The Boeing Airplane Company of Wichita, Kansas, has filed a patent application on a nuclear jet engine that may propel both submarines and surface craft at speeds of more than 100 miles an hour.

It is reported that operation of the underwater nuclear jet engine would be somewhat similar to propulsion through air, except that water would replace air and that no fuel would be used. With the new engine, water would be passed under ram pressure through a nuclear heat exchanger, then through a turbine and out the nozzle of the engine. The high exit velocity of the steam and water would provide the high thrust.

Either a turbo-jet or ram-jet type of engine would be used. With a two-foot-diameter nozzle, a submarine could be propelled through the water at speeds of more than 100 miles per hour, according to the patent application.—*Condensed from the Army-Navy-Air Force Journal (U.S.).*

Aerial Wireless

50 Years Ago: Experiments are to be made under the direction of the Chief Signal Officer of the Army ... to develop a wireless telegraph outfit that may be of use in connection with aeroplanes and dirigibles used for military purposes.—*From the files of the Army-Navy-Air Force Journal (U.S.).*

"AN ARMY SPOKESMAN SAID"

By

LIEUT.-COLONEL W. A. MILROY, DSO, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC RELATIONS (ARMY), ARMY HEADQUARTERS

"Ottawa, Jan. 19 (CP)—A Canadian Army spokesman said the missile was lanuched from a truck 12 miles from the military camp of Churchill . . . "—News item.

Do you wonder, when you hear or read a statement such as the one above, who is this "Army spokesman"? Or, knowing that he is a Public Relations Officer, do you wonder how it is that he goes about making statements to the Press? Is he a reporter in uniform? Could he be described as a press agent? Isn't he supposed to be a photographer? What is he supposed to do? Does it matter?

Let us answer the last question first. Many readers of the *Canadian Army Journal* will recall both wartime and peacetime stories which, in their opinion, were not in the Army's interest. Many of these stories filled reams of pages in newspapers, and the incident became so magnified that it demanded the time and attention of many senior officers and their staffs. And while all this was occurring you probably were seething with indignation because you knew that the reports in the press were not entirely accurate, and in your opinion were highly exaggerated. It is the considered judgment of those who have studied such cases that the trouble encountered would have been greatly reduced by the application of the principles of Public Relations. In many cases, if the facts are released to the Press immediately, the unpleasant incident will be treated for exactly what it is, and will not grow out of proportion to the true facts.

So it would appear that officers should know something about PRO's and the principles of Public Relations. This article will provide some of this information by defining the aim of PR in the Army, explaining the principles which must be followed to achieve this aim, outlining the PR organization in the Canadian Army, finally, describing the Public Relations Officer's duties and the assistance he requires to carry them out.

The Aim of PR in the Army

There are no clear-cut definitions of the practice or profession of "public relations". Any organization that deals with the general public or which is supported by the general public has public relations, good, indifferent or bad. Although the practice of PR as a special function by trained people has come about only in recent years, PR has always existed in some form as a factor of life.

One general definition of PR is as follows:

"PR is the continuing process by which management endeavours to obtain the goodwill and understanding of its customers, its employees and the public at large; inwardly through self analysis and correction; outwardly through all means of expression."

This definition can be used as a basis for defining the aim of PR in the Army, as the Army must have "the goodwill and understanding of the public" for the following rea-

sons:

1. If the public does not understand and support the Army's roles and the way they are carried out, it will not provide the money necessary to enable the Army to function.

2. Under our system of voluntary enlistment the men required by the Army will not be forthcoming if the public does not consider a career in the Army a worthy one.

The aim of PR in the Army can therefore be defined as being:

"To secure public understanding of the Army's tasks and continued public support for the manner in which they are being performed."

The Principles of PR

To achieve the above aim the following basic principles must be followed:

1. The implementation of a successful PR programme is a command responsibility at all levels.

2. The public has a right of access to all unclassified information concerning the objectives and activities of the Army.

3. A military establishment and its members must be responsible and active members of the community in which they are located.

4. A successful PR programme must be based on truth and consistency.

5. PR requires good communications.

6. Good conduct and efficient performance of their duties by all ranks is the most important single factor in creating good will between the Army and the public.

The following paragraphs expand on these principles.

The fact that a PR programme must be initiated by the commander is obvious. However, the programme that the commander wants followed is not necessarily obvious unless he makes it so; a lack of direction in this respect is almost tantamount to planning for poor public relations. A commander should, therefore, give firm direction on the PR programme he wants the PRO and other members of his command to follow. This programme should take into account any problems that threaten to damage the relations of the command with its surrounding public. Commanders should avoid having PR problems brought to their attention in the manner it happened to one U.S. Army post commander: he awoke on a "Visitor's Day" to discover his post surrounded by the local police because of what had appeared to be an insignificant argument over the custody of a soldier accused of a civil offence.

The problem of providing the public, and the newspapers and radio and TV stations, commonly referred to as the "news media", with information is the PR problem with which most officers are familiar. One of the news media's most common complaints about the Army is the difficulty of getting answers to questions, particularly about newsworthy events such as accidents.

Two points to be observed in the handling of the news are as follows:

1. The news media generally require information in a hurry. They prefer to get it from official sources if they know that it will be accurate and in the detail they require. If they can't get it this way they will get it from unofficial sources and accept the fact that it may not be completely accurate as to detail.

2. News dies quickly. If the complete information about an incident is given the news media quickly and

accurately, the incident, no matter how embarrassing, will probably be featured by the press for a day or so and then dropped. If, on the other hand, the press have to dig for the information, the reports of the incident can drag on for days or weeks.

If the above principles are to be observed, news must be provided in a "positive" manner. Commanding officers, their staffs and their PRO's should look ahead, anticipating requests for information and preparing answers or arranging visits or briefings to provide the desired information. They should have a system for providing rapid and accurate answers to questions in the event of accident or emergency. If they do this they will find that no matter how bad a situation may arise the news reports will usually present the Army's side accurately and sympathetically.

A military establishment cannot be understood and supported by the community in which it is located if the public of the community know nothing about it or its members. Ignorance breeds distrust and suspicion, and in such an atmosphere rumours and false stories take root and grow quickly. Unless specific action to prevent it is taken by a commander, it is almost certain that a military establishment will draw apart from its community.

The problems of maintaining good community relations are most apparent in our overseas stations. It is a credit to the commanders, officers and men of our Army that these relations are excellent, as demonstrated by the report that in the month of June 1959 the German newspapers in the area in which the Canadian Brigade is located carried not one derogatory word about our troops.

It goes without saying that any PR programme which is not based on truth and consistency is bound to fail. When facts are to be given out they must be correct, no matter how embarrassing they are for the Army. Security should never be used as a cloak to hide unclassified but embarrassing information.

News does not respect Army boundaries or chains of command. A newsworthy item will be carried by the news media across the country in a matter of hours. When the late Pope died at 2250 hours one evening the fact was announced on the CBC-TV news ten minutes later. The Army try to duplicate this speed in handling PR problems; an incident at a remote station may have a bearing on departmental policy so that clearance must be obtained before any release about it can be made. As we have stated, the news media will not wait very long before going to print, so the clearances must be obtained in a hurry.

A station or a unit must also have the means of communicating with the public in the midst of which it is located. These should include the local media, important members of the community, civilian organizations, etc., through which the Army's story can be disseminated.

While we all appreciate the tremendous effect on public opinion of smart, well-trained soldiers, we must remember that the soldier cannot do his best if he feels that his efforts are not known and appreciated by the public he is serving. This internal public, consisting of the soldier and his dependents and the civilian employed by the Army, must be remembered in any PR programme. The impression that is passed by word of mouth and by

example in day-to-day contacts is probably the most effective means of "communicating" there is. Therefore, the commander must ensure that his "internal public" is well informed, in general, about the Army and its roles and, in particular, about the roles, activities and purpose of the unit to which it belongs.

PR Organization

The aim and principles of PR indicate clearly that the achievement of the Army's PR aim depends on the efforts of all ranks. However, there are certain techniques and skills which are required to put a PR programme into effect. A PRO is attached to each Command, and most Area and overseas formation headquarters to provide this technical knowledge and assistance. This PRO may be either an officer who has selected PR as a career or a regimental officer with special training doing a tour of duty with PR. The Militia also has PRO's on a scale of one for each Militia Group Headquarters and each unit, commanded by a Lieutenant-Colonel.

DPR(Army), besides providing PR advice and assistance at AHQ, processes and distributes all material produced by overseas PR staffs and provides Regular and Militia PRO's with technical direction. It also provides Command PRO's with support in the form of radio and television teams.

The other services have similar PR organizations. In the office of the Minister of National Defence there is a civilian Director of Public Relations who is responsible for co-ordinating the activities of the Service PR organizations as necessary. He also obtains clearance on PR problems affecting government policy from the Minister, Associate Minister, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, or Deputy Minister, as required.

In order to match the speed with which news is moved the PR organizations have a direct channel of communication to DPR(ND) or to any Branch of AHQ or Commands on PR matters or problems.

Duties of the PRO

While the PRO at a Command or Area Headquarters has a number of duties to perform, most of his time will be taken up working with the various news media. This will involve, in order of importance:

1. Answering questions from the news media.

2. Encouraging and assisting the news media to cover Army activities in his area. The article "News Photographers and The Army" in the October 1959 issue of the *Journal* illustrates the type of work this involves.

3. Producing publicity about the Army for distribution to the news media.

Officers can assist the PRO with the above tasks in a number of ways:

1. By keeping him informed of the activities that will be taking place in the command. The PRO cannot operate without this information. It should not be withheld on grounds of security or in order to keep it from becoming public. The PRO is cleared to receive Secret or Top Secret information. Also, there is nothing in the terms of reference for his duties that requires him to broadcast all he knows. And finally, the PRO has to get clearance from the officer responsible before he makes any release involving classified information or policy.

2. By consulting with him during the planning stages of any project

GOOD PRESS RELATIONS

FROM AN ARTICLE BY MAJOR B. C. SMITH, AUSTRALIAN ARMY PUBLIC RELATIONS SERVICE IN THE JANUARY 1960 ISSUE OF THE *Australian Army Journal*

The Australian Army is a national force of major concern and interest to the Australian people. Consequently the Army should keep the public fully informed of all its various activities so far as this is consistent with the security of defence arrangements.

Obviously, only a good Army is likely to have good relations with the public. Good public support, interest, respect and understanding are resources of great value to the Army. Public confidence, however, is not possible where legitimate news, good or bad, is needlessly withheld. Withholding news only serves to create public suspicion and resentment.

Certain Army personnel having special qualifications and training are specifically employed in connection with public relations. But good relations with the public are the business of every officer and every man in the Army.

There are many media for public relations, but the news columns of the press are still the most effective.

Many occasions arise when commanding officers, staff officers, and regimental officers are required to deal directly with the press, and provisions is made for them to do this within the limits laid down. . .

What is news? News may be defined as facts not previously known to the public. The best source of news is people—stories about people are always welcome, and there is no shortage of people in the Army. . .

The opinion of the community in which the Army exists is vital to its role, and this opinion depends largely on good press liaison.

"An Army Spokesman Said"

(Continued from preceding page)

likely to have PR implications.

3. By providing him with transportation, accommodation, communications and personnel when he has a party of newsmen to conduct.

4. By providing him with the information required to answer queries from the press quickly and accurately.

5. By remembering that a PRO's effectiveness cannot be judged by a wad of press clippings. Sometimes good publicity can be poor PR. The PRO should issue releases only when he knows the information in them is likely to be of interest to the news media to which he sends it.

6. By remembering that the PRO is responsible for publicizing events, not for organizing them and that publicity for an event cannot take the place of advertising.

Conclusion

To conclude, the Army cannot carry out its roles without good PR. The achievement of good PR is the responsibility of all ranks; PROs are provided merely to assist with the task. And, in the final analysis, the public's opinion of the Army will depend to a large extent on the efficiency and conduct of its individual officers and men.

LIFE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

By

LIEUT.-COLONEL E. W. CUTBILL, DSO, ED, MILITARY OBSERVER, UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISORY ORGANIZATION, MIDDLE EAST

In this article, the first of two parts and which he calls a travelogue, the author paints a word-picture of the sights and sounds of the Middle East. It is hoped that it will be of interest to Canadian Army personnel who already have served with the United Nations Emergency Force, those who may be posted there for a tour of duty, and other readers who want to know something about the life and habits of the people who live in that biblical land.—Editor.

Part 1

This article is a travelogue dealing with that portion of the Middle East which may be seen by a military observer in the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization. The amount of land involved is very small compared to Canada's vastness, but is important because it's strategic position has made it a trouble spot in the international scene for a long time, and continues to do so.

Specifically, I propose to write about the countries, the people and some of the more interesting sights in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Jordan.

The Holy Land has an abundance of religious and historical sites that we have read about since childhood, such as Bethlehem, Nazareth, Jerusalem, Acre, Capernaum and many others. A visit to these spots, with a good guide book, is a worthwhile and satisfying experience.

During most of the year the climate is sunny and hot with little or no rain for months at a time. Each day is similar to the one preceding, and it is only during the rainy season, from about December to March, that the monotony is broken by periodic heavy rains interspersed with sunny dry spells. During the latter it is often warm enough to walk about in a light sweater. It is a pleasant climate, except for some coastal areas and also those regions lying below sea level (the Dead Sea and Lake Tiberias) which become extremely hot in summer. There is snow on lofty Mount Hermon for most of the year, and the Cedars of Lebanon is a popular ski resort in winter.

The terrain is largely stone covered. These vary in size from pebbles to massive boulders and great basalt and limestone rock formations, and one of the problems in agriculture is clearing the ground prior to ploughing. Once this is done the soil is usually rich, as can be seen from the variety of plentiful crops produced when adequate water is available.

The Hula Valley of the Upper Galilee, where a few years ago there existed malarial swamps and a small lake, now grows cotton, peanuts, grain, vegetables and fruit. Miles of sprinkler systems, particularly in Israel, allow the productive use of land that would otherwise be barren.

Around the borders of most cultivated fields are masses of stones that have been collected: sometimes these are dumped in piles or used to make walls or roadbeds, and in many rural areas they are mixed with mud to construct houses and stables. These types of buildings are

primitive, but well-suited to their purpose, being cool in hot weather and fairly easy to heat during winter. Also, they are cheap and easy to build. Furniture is sparse and cooking facilities leave something to be desired, but despite these shortcomings, the standard of health appears quite good. Stones are also useful to revet the terracing of hillsides and wadis so that soil erosion can be reduced, water conserved, and maximum use made of the land.

Banana, orange and lemon groves are numerous in the hotter districts, as are figs, dates, olives and of course the inevitable cactus, which seems to grow where nothing else will. Flowers abound the year around. In winter, lilies, Bougainvilia and roses grow. In early spring, wildflowers of many varieties cover the plains, while in summer there is a profusion of types. One of the sweetest smelling is the columbine.

By contrast, there are vast regions of desert. If and when a system is evolved to provide water, they should then be as productive as other parts that have been reclaimed. Besides the Israeli Hula Lake drainage project, mentioned above, the partially completed Yarmouk River diversion project in Jordan will allow large tracts to be usefully farmed.



Jerusalem—the Damascus Gate to the old city.

Meanwhile, the Bedouin tribesman makes the desert his home. Usually a community of Bedouins live together in a tented camp. The women attend to household chores, make the clothing, draw water from a well or stream, and search for thistle bushes which are excellent for kindling fires. The men and boys look after the sheep, donkeys, camels, goats and whatever other animals they are fortunate enough to own. Grazing is meagre, and the tribes must move their location from time to time in order to subsist. These simple people lack the things that modern society considers essential: none the less they look happy. Their sole possessions can be moved on the backs of their camels and donkeys. Life is uncomplicated and their code of conduct is unchanging. The Bedouins are an intelligent people, and quick to learn: migrants for generations, they are well organized for travel at short notice.

Aristocrat of the animal realm is the camel. He is slow moving, dignified, supercilious in facial expression, graceful and condescending. This noble beast appears out of place pulling a wooden plough or serving as a beast of burden; if appearance counts for anything, it seems within the realm of possibility that he was created by a high-level committee, and, having been thus created, somehow failed to achieve his destiny.

The most useful beast of burden is the over-worked donkey, so small, abused and overloaded. His only means of complaint is a hideous-sounding bray that is startling, coming from such a passive creature. It is usual to see a man or boy mounted on a donkey, swinging his legs in tempo to the animal's gait. One day, along a barren track, I saw an elderly Arab come riding past in this manner, carrying a transistor radio on his lap which was loudly playing a rock-and-roll tune!

It is fascinating to see a camel caravan slowly making its way across the desert. There is a leisurely tempo, and a sense of timelessness and inevitability about its movement. However, it is rapidly being replaced by truck and aircraft.

The caravan seems an integral part of the Middle East, and is associated with a way of life that is alien to the impatient crowded highway traffic to which we are accustomed.

One discomfort of life in the Middle East is the common housefly. By no means confined to the house, his habitat is legion, and during the centuries this small pest has become so accepted as one of the trials of life that no effective steps have been taken to eliminate him. Like death and taxes, he is considered a necessary evil. In summer his persistence is amazing. Swatters will kill a few but there are so many more hovering for an opportunity to alight that one develops a *laissez-faire* attitude and is content to merely brush them aside periodically.

In the countryside there are many forms of animal, bird and insect life, some harmless, others not. The lizard likes to sun himself on the warm rocks, and his colouring allows him to blend remarkably well with the surroundings. Quick of movement at any sign of danger, he scurries away at high speed.

The scorpion, although small, can inflict a nasty sting with its tail, which it raises over its head (prior to attack) like a miniature prehistoric monster. He, also, is a fast mover and if cornered will give a



Government House, Jerusalem, Headquarters of the United Nations Truce and Supervisory Organization.

good account of himself. He fears fire, and if surrounded by a ring of flame is likely to commit suicide by injecting himself with poison fluid from his tail. In cool evenings, the scorpion seeks warmth and will make entry into a heated room if he gets a chance.

Snakes are not numerous, except in some districts, and they are mainly content to be left alone. Most experience indicates that unless they are annoyed in some manner they will not go out of their way to bother humans. We accept this *status quo*.

Other forms of wildlife are numerous. At the delta of the Jordan River, for example, where it empties into the Sea of Galilee (now known as Lake Tiberias), are water buffaloes, wild boars, eagles and storks. Bird life and wildflowers also abound, and a nature lover could spend an interesting time, provided he held visas to cross the numerous frontiers.

The subject of visas and frontiers brings us to the people who occupy these small, interesting countries whose histories are so steeped in tradition. The Bedouins, who really do not seem too concerned with national boundaries, have been mentioned. These rugged individualistic nomads are found throughout the Holy Land. Then there are the Arab states and the state of Israel. It will be recalled that Israel came into being after the British Mandate of Palestine. Israel, although predominately Jewish, contains many Arabs—in fact, large areas of the country are almost exclusively Arab in dress, language and heritage.

Perhaps the best way to study the people is to visit some of their cities and towns. In the larger Arab cities, such as Damascus, Beirut and Old Jerusalem there is a mixture of cultures. East and West become mingled, and sometimes there are

violent contrasts. This does not apply to the same extent in Israel, whose large cities—Tel Aviv, Haiffa and New Jerusalem—are new both in construction and population.

Damascus, capital of Syria (now a partner in the United Arab Republic), claims to be the oldest continually inhabited city in the world, being founded prior to 2000 B.C. Built on an oasis, it is surrounded by desertlands, and when approaching the city from the south, it looks like a jewel shining in the brilliant sunlight. Part of the city is built up the steep slope of a hill in the newer section of town, and at night the lights from a myriad of houses give a fairyland effect.

The old city was surrounded by a high stone wall, many feet thick, parts of which are still standing. Entrance was gained through gates in the wall, and it is not hard to visualize camel caravans setting out through these gates on their long journeys across the barren sands. There is a window, high up in the wall, from which St. Paul made his escape from Damascus, being lowered in a basket by the disciples (*Acts 9: 11-25)*. Under the window, within the wall itself, is a small museum and chapel commemorating this event. Along the top of the walls are many huts which are occupied by families.

Nearby is "The Street Called Straight", also mentioned in the Bible, and here, St. Paul was baptized. It runs from the city wall to the souk, or market place, which covers a large area in the old city. The main thoroughfare in this market is about thirty feet wide, covered over by a roof, far above, giving it the appearance of an arcade. On either side are shops, some big and others merely alcoves, which sell an amazing variety of goods: rugs, brocades, silks, brass, silver, cottons, inlaid tables, souvenirs, leather-goods are a few examples. At closing time metal shutters bang down across each storefront. Narrow winding side streets branch off the arcade, and they in turn are intersected by lanes and alleys. It is customary to barter over a cup of Turkish coffee before making a sizeable purchase.

When walking through the souk one is jostled by donkeys and even camels and goats, being driven or led by their masters. There are crowds of colourful people: veiled Moslem women who avert their heads when they pass, peasant women in brightly-striped gowns and sandalled feet, Arab men wearing keffiyehs on the head (with the long ends hanging loose down the back, or thrown around the neck). The keffiyeh is held in place by an agaal, which is a band or crown, or alternately, he may wear a red fez or a turban. The balance of his attire is either the conventional Arab robes, a Western-type business suit or even a combination of the two. The keffiyeh, aside from being distinctive, is highly useful. It protects the wearer against sun, sand, rain, wind, dust, flies and cold. He merely drapes the long scarf-like tails around head, neck and shoulders as needed.

One also sees tourists and priests, diplomats and beggars, soldiers and policemen, teachers and students in the souk, for this is a melting pot of races and creeds. The contrast is apparent in modes of dress, language, skin colour and mannerisms. Barefoot boys carry trays of round pancake-shaped Arab bread on their heads; coffee vendors carry brass pots and china cups slung across

their backs; shoeshine men sit on their haunches at the curbside, women gracefully walk with loads on their heads, and there are innumerable dogs running about and barking. All these, with their associated odours and noises, are reminiscent of the Arabian Nights.

The nearby Umayyad Mosque is worth a visit. Before entering it is necessary to either remove shoes or don a pair of felt overshoes. Scattered on the floor of the huge interior are some 2000 oriental rugs of various sizes, colours and designs, creating an effect of great richness. Moslem worshippers prostrate themselves in prayer, facing Mecca. The tomb of Saladin, the great Moslem warrior who evicted the Crusaders from the Holy Land, is here, also the tomb containing the head of St. John the Baptist. When the Baptist criticized Herod for having union with his brother's wife Herodias, she, using her daughter Salome the dancer as a tool, asked for St. John's head on a charger. The request was reluctantly granted.

In the old city of Damascus are many narrow winding cobbled streets with centuries-old stone buildings on either side, flush to the cobbles. Through iron-grilled gates can be seen roomy courtyards with tables and chairs, flowers and shrubs. Inner windows and doorways lead from the dwellings onto these quiet cool retreats, which are so near but yet so far removed from the hot noisy street. Here, Arab men relax and smoke their long bubble pipes, drink cups of Turkish coffee and play a type of backgammon. In the many outdoor cafes one can witness the same pursuits.

The business, shopping, movie and hotel district occupies a newer part of town, of which "Tram

Tribesmen loading foodstuff on a camel.

Street" is the main thoroughfare. Mercedes Benz and many other expensive foreign cars and trucks, buses, and narrow little street cars race along honking their horns incessantly.

One sees new-cut stone buildings housing stores and offices. White mosques raise their minarets high in the air, from which the faithful are called to worship at set times of the day by the muezzin. Seldom does he now stand on the balcony near the top of the minaret, but uses a public address system whose amplifiers are installed around the balcony. Modern efficiency!

Billboards with Arabic legends dot the streets. The inevitable donkeys compete with surging motor traffic, while policemen stand on platforms shaded by umbrellas, turning "Stop" and "Go" signs. A variety of dress is evident among passersby. Money-changers do their business from shops having sidewalk counters, and besides making exchanges from one currency to another, they will cash personal cheques and sell tickets on the state-controlled lottery.

During the fruit season prickly pears are a best seller, and can be bought at almost any street corner. Round trays or tables are set out on the sidewalk, upon which the fruit is carefully arranged. To keep them fresh in the hot sun the vendor frequently dips his hand in a bowl of water and sprinkles the fruit.

Arab music, rather wild sounding and discordant to Western ears, blares from shop radios. Pictures of Colonel Nasser are prominently displayed in show windows.

Apartment buildings and houses in the newer residential districts are of modern stone construction, either pure white or painted in pastel shades to reflect the sun's rays. Tiled patios or balconies are commonplace in these attractive-looking structures.

The system of garbage collection differs from that in Canada. Householders throw their day's waste into the gutter, where it is collected by men with small pushcarts; watering wagons come around later.

The sights, sounds and smells encountered in Damascus are common to many Arab cities and towns.

North of Damascus, some two hours drive into Lebanon, is the famous old pagan ruins of Baalbek, City of the Sun. A guide will take you through the ruined temples, which were built by the Phoenicians and have been occupied by Romans, Crusaders and Arabs among others. Each made modifications in construction to suit his needs: for some it was a place of pagan worship, for others a fortified stronghold or perhaps a place of religious worship. The temples took some 250 years to build, with slave labour, and most of the rock was quarried about a half-mile away and moved to the site, presumably on rollers. The granite, however, is said to have come all the way from Egypt.

Baalbek lies on an old caravan route to Bagdad and India. At one time, a large community of people lived nearby, camped in the valley surrounding the temples of Venus, Jupiter, Bacchus and the smaller temples. Many of the original stone carvings are still preserved, except that all likenesses to faces (signifying graven images) have been disfigured by the Moslems. Stone carvings of Antony and Cleopatra, the latter with an asp on her breast, recline at ease, their faces scarred beyond recognition. A very common motif carved by the pagans

is the symbolic egg and arrow, signifying birth and death. The mosaic tiled floors have long since been removed.

In the outer temple of Jupiter is a chamber where the people danced and made merry, prior to going into the huge inner temple with its high sacrificial altar in the centre. Stone columns, some of them still standing (62 feet high, and 8 feet in diameter at the base), support an intricately-carved stone top-structure. Each column consists of three blocks, one above another, joined together by plugs sunk deeply into the stone.

One is amazed at how these primitive people could not only artistically carve and move such big and heavy columns, but were able to erect them with such precision that they would remain standing for centuries. Some of the massive cut stone blocks forming the walls measure 62 x 14 x 11 feet.

One evening after dark, in the Temple of Jupiter, the British Rambert Ballet Company presented two productions. A week earlier, a prominent American philharmonic orchestra had played to a packed house in the same setting. After dinner in a modern hotel nearby, we returned on foot to the Temple of Jupiter. Some 3000 chairs were arranged in a semi-circle at one end and within the open temple, facing a large stage in front of the pillars. Soft floodlights were trained on the ruins, giving an eerie effect. Stars shone above. In a few minutes the orchestra struck up the Lebanese anthem. It was not difficult to visualize this temple in ancient times, when impatient crowds awaited the sacrificial ceremony to their pagan gods.

Stables for the condemned animals lie beneath the temple, and we had walked through these vast caverns earlier in the day and seen the



Bedouins and camels.

THE USES OF EXPERIENCE

A lot is said about learning by experience, and experience is a good thing, but if hard personal lessons can be avoided by studying the experiences of others, why not avoid them? He is an unhappy motorist who becomes an expert driver by his participation in many highway accidents; he is an unhappy business man who does not learn except by becoming many times bankrupt.

The intuition which prompts the decisions and actions of many business men is the product of a large store of memories of previous experiences—their own and those of others—which can be linked in a meaningful way with the present situation.

You cannot wait through the tedious processes of learning by personal experience how to answer the questions "What shall I do?" and "How shall I do it?" The principles on which you may base your answers in science, business or the arts are to be found by reference to the past just as much as in today's trial and error.

This does not mean that we are to live by the past, but only that we should look there for anything that will make our way more certain. Going onward is the only way to gain practical acquaintance with the full colour, flavour, poetry, passion and variety of life.

By making use of the knowledge our forefathers gathered, and applying it in such a form as to fit today's changed environment, we can face difficulty with stout hearts. Only a little bit more knowledge than others have, just a little bit more effort, merely a trifle more fixity of purpose and determination, can turn an apparent minus into a plus in business as in sport. At the Winter Olympics, the winner of the women's giant slalom was only 1/10th of a second faster than the runner-up, and in the 1000-metre speed-skating the difference between first and second place was only 2/10ths of a second.—*From "On Following Through" in the April 1960 issue of The Royal Bank of Canada Monthly Letter.*

The NATO Alliance

The revolution in warfare has made it imperative that alliances must be formed to provide combined and fully integrated forces before an attack is launched, if the attack is to be successfully resisted. NATO is the West's response to the changing times and has become the most powerful, peacetime alliance in history. —*The Irish Defence Journal.*

Life in the Middle East

(Continued from preceding page)

long stone troughs on the floor of the temple itself where the beasts were washed and inspected before sacrifice.

During intermissions the spectators, mainly well dressed men and women from Beirut, priests, students and tourists strolled across to the outer temple to refresh themselves from a choice of fruit juice, Turkish coffee, whisky-and-soda, coca-cola and hot dogs.

(To be continued)

Preparing for War

The Old Defence Quarterly

By

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. F. WOOD, CD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, HISTORICAL SECTION, ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

The next time you find your "In" basket empty, go down to your Library and get out the bound volumes of the old Canadian Defence Quarterly. There is some fine military browsing to be had there and you can, at the same time, refresh your memory of the once-famous Simonds-Burns debate. You can, that is, if you ever heard of it. For the Second World War came within the year and academic articles on the employment of tanks were forgotten in the rush of learning to use them on battlefields.

The first issue of the Canadian Defence Quarterly appeared in October 1923, and the last one in July 1939. Thus the magazine spans the years between the wars, the years in which the Generals of today were training, thinking and writing about their profession. Because of this, the Defence Quarterly provides the reader of 1960 some tantalizing glimpses into the past.

Familiar names appear in the earliest volumes. One of the most frequent contributers through the years was an officer who, as Captain E.L.M. Burns, MC, RCE, wrote in 1924 that "Cavalry, if it is to survive on a modern battlefield, must be completely mechanized". Fourteen years later, as a Lieutenant-Colonel, he was gently accusing Captain G.G. Simonds, Royal Canadian Artillery, of not giving proper weight to certain factors in the tank *versus* infantry controversy.

In the years between, Canadian officers of every shade of opinion wrote for the Defence Quarterly, on a very wide variety of subjects. Lieutenant-Colonel G.R. Pearkes, VC, wrote knowingly of the Boxer Rebellion; Brigadier-General A.G.L. MacNaughton, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, contributed an article on Counter-Battery work full of authority and conservative optimism.

Captain Burns appeared again in 1926 with some "Speculations on Increased Mobility,—or the lessons of the British maneouvres of 1925." The British had used a mixed force of tanks and lorried infantry in an attempt to "turn a flank". Captain Burns' views are still sound in 1960, and one wonders if, when in 1944 he commanded a corps heavy with armour, rich in communications and trained to a peak, he ever thought of the article he had written nearly twenty years before on how to do it.

Lieutenant-Colonel H.D.G. Crerar also appeared in the Quarterly, writing of high strategy in the Empire, and Captain F.F. Worthington, at the other end of the scale, wrote with enthusiasm of the motion picture as a training aid and the value of the Miniature Battle Practice Range.

The thirties were times of transition. Side by side with articles on mechanization (one of them by Major George S. Patton, Jr.) were learned pieces on saddlery and horsemanship. Major Kenneth Stuart, destined to be a wartime

Chief of the General Staff, wrote "Is War Inevitable?", and Lieutenant-Colonel H.F.G. Letson surveyed the contribution made by the University of British Columbia to the winning of the First World War. Lieutenant-Colonel G.P. Vanier submitted some personal recollections of Marshal Foch and in April 1933 the editor of the magazine included the following interesting opinion which is quoted without comment:

"It is contended by some authorities, in view of the menace from the air . . . that the division of the future must . . . be reduced to the dimensions of a brigade group . . . Our rearward supply services are alleged to be vulnerable to the same degree, hence the general conclusion that, in a war of the first magnitude, our field armies of the future, both as regards fighting troops and supply services, must be small and extremely mobile."

By 1933, A.G.L. MacNaughton was a Major-General and Chief of the General Staff and Major Burns was contributing articles condensed from the CGS' speeches. He was also writing book reviews. In 1925 he had been a bit patronizing about the prolific British author, Major-General J.F.C. Fuller, saying that even a fiction writer would find it difficult to visualize an AA gun shooting down three out of four aircraft flying at 2000 feet. But by 1933 Major Burns had softened his attitude towards Fuller and gave him a good "chit" in his review of the General's book "Operations between Mechanized Forces". The previous year Major Burns had won the Bertrand Stewart prize essay competition on "The problems of Marlborough and Wellington in coordinating their efforts with the Government", a useful exercise in view of the role he was to play in the "peace" after the Second World War.

The Defence Quarterly provided an invaluable service to its readers in a section devoted to postings and promotions. In a small army the section took up few pages, and kept people informed. In 1933, for instance, we find that Captain W.H.S. Macklin was too busy, and too far away, to write for the Quarterly: he was attending the Staff College at Quetta. Lieutenant Geoffrey Walsh was also abroad, studying at the School of Military Engineering at Chatham, England.

The CDQ provided members of the armed forces with a forum for discussion and review for sixteen years. The committee handling its affairs was made up initially of representatives from the three services and the Non-Permanent Active Militia Associations of Cavalry, Artillery and Infantry. By 1933 it had been expanded to include representatives from the other NPAM Associations. From 1930 to 1937 there was a representative included from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Financial support came originally from the Associations, but in 1924 the Department of National Defence began annual grants of $500.00. The grant did not influence the contents; although published under the auspices of the Department of National Defence, the Department was not responsible for opinions expressed in the publication, nor did it exercise any censorship.

Thus the contributors felt completely free to express their views frankly. The majority were Army officers, although the Editor's efforts to give the Quarterly a tri-

service flavour can be detected in his selections of reprints from other publications. Editorial comment and the speeches of public figures occupy much space, especially in the later thirties, and one finds contemporary opinion and public policy preserved side by side with current military thought. Speeches by Roosevelt, MacKenzie King, Stanley Baldwin, Cordell Hull, and many others were reproduced in full.

It was in April 1938 that the article "A Division that can Attack" was published. E.L.M. Burns, by now a Lieutenant-Colonel, had been spurred to write it by the 1936 reorganization in Britain, which had left the infantry division's three infantry brigades without tanks. Infantry tanks were to be concentrated in tank brigades held as Army troops. Colonel Burns felt that the "Infantry school of thought" had carried the day in the British reorganization and would result in a perpetuation of First World War assault tactics, with their characteristically heavy casualities. He advanced the theory that the tank was now the "Queen of Battle", with the infantry role confined to fire support and consolidation of the objective. The standard division, in Colonel Burns' view, should consist of two infantry brigades and one armoured brigade, three artillery units with a total of 72 guns, and a light tank regiment for reconnaissance. His theories were not to remain unanswered for long.

In the next issue of the Quarterly, published in July, Captain Simonds appeared as the author of an article entitled "An Army that can Attack—a Division that can Defend". It was Captain Simonds' first contribution, but he lost no time getting down to it.

"Before we proceed to the design stage' . . . it is good and established practice to lay down a specification for performance' . . . Col. Burns ignores the 'specification stage', and plunges into the 'design stage',—the reorganization of the 'line of battle' division, on the *assumption* that we require a division capable of taking the offensive 'under its own steam' . . . in the opinion of the present writer, he has laboured and brought forth the unwanted brain-child—'A division that can attack' ".

Having thus firmly established his role as critic, Captain Simonds went on to argue that modern developments, including the use of air power, would make the army the lowest balanced formation of all arms. The division would be organized with the minimum number of forces required to hold a defensive position. If required to participate in an army assault, it would be reinforced with artillery and tanks according to each specific situation. Only thus could the principle of "economy of force" be observed. He opposed the permanent decentralization of armour, which he regarded as a supremely important weapon in the hands of the higher commander.

Colonel Burns had his answer ready in time for the next issue of the Quarterly. This time he chose as his title "Where Do the Tanks Belong?" He refused to play Goliath to Captain Simonds' David and began politely by saying that the Captain's article was a well reasoned defence of the existing British division; the only basic difference between them was how the armour was to be organized. Captain Simonds, while acknowledging

the virtues of "economy of force", was ignoring the equally important principles of "security" and "co-operation". There would be no time in modern war to re-group as Simonds had suggested, so his defensive division was too weak. Further, co-operation required that tank and infantry units live and train together. Colonel Burns said that Britain's contribution to a European war should be in the form of shock troops, with her continental allies providing the mass of military manpower. This required the maximum offensive punch and must include armour within the division. Having thus demolished Captain Simonds by taking the argument into the realm of international policy, Colonel Burns laid down his pen.

In the January 1939 issue, however, Captain Simonds bobbed up again, quite unscathed, to battle on the new strategic level staked out by Colonel Burns. The shock force theory he rejected; if there were to be another war, Britain would have to resort to national mobilization and the raising of very substantial field armies. Shock formations with high offensive qualities might actually be detrimental to orderly mobilization. He did, however, accept the need for infantry and armour to work together, which he would achieve by including tanks in all exercises.

This article ended the exchange. As late as July 1939 Captain Simonds wrote another article on the Attack, but it contained no reference to the great debate. Shortly thereafter, both officers went overseas to test their theories in the Second World War. The same war forced the suspension from publication of the Canadian Defence Quarterly. Both General Burns and General Simonds rose to become corps commanders. The old CDQ proves to all who care to read it that these officers, and many others like them, were preparing themselves in peace for the responsibilities of high rank in war. Army officers of today please note.

The Army's Achilles' Heel

Speed is of essence in strategic mobility. Speed to get the striking forces where they are needed and speed to move vast tonnages of equipment and supplies to support combat operations. This is the Army's Achilles' heel — and the Nation's . . .

What the Army requires for strategic mobility is to have the first troops appear in an objective area within a matter of hours. Shuttle aircraft should have the first division on site in the shortest possible time, using everything that airbases can support.

Then comes the logistical support. It too must be rapidly air-lifted until such time as surface lines of communication can be established.

In short, our strategic air-lift capability must be tailored for both limited and general warfare. It must get initial combat troops into a trouble spot in a matter of days—or hours. It must be capable of transporting a strong Army combat force which may have to be as large as two divisions. It must also support such a force until sea-lift can take over that task.—*General Bruce C. Clarke (U.S. Army).*

ROCKET FAILURES — CIRCA 1729

When we read of the failures and the setbacks experienced in the development and testing of guided missiles and satellite launching rockets we tend to think that these headaches and worries belong only to this age.

The following excerpt from a scientific publication dated 1729 makes us realize that the rocket engineer, or "pyrobolist" as he was called then, encountered the same problems and disappointments as does his present-day counterpart.

The manuscript is entitled *The Great Art of Artillery* of Casimir Simienowiez, formerly Lieutenant-General of the Ordnance to the King of Poland.

BOOK III, CHAP. X
Of the several Defects of Rockets

"The First and most remarkable Vice in Rockets, is, when after being fired, and mounted to the Height of 2 or 3 Perches, they break and disperse without performing their proper Effects.

"The Second, which is not much better than the First, is when they remain suspended upon the Nails, wafting slowly away without moving off or rising at all.

"The Third is, when in their Ascent they form an Arch, or describing a Semi-Circle, return down again to the Ground before all their Composition is burn'd out.

"The Fourth is, when they mount in a Spiral Line, winding up into the Air, without observing an uniform, regular and right Motion as they ought.

"The Fifth is, when they move up heavily and lazily, as if they refused or scorned to take their Flight.

"The Sixth is, when the Cases hang empty upon the Nails, and the Composition rises and disperses in the Air.

"There is still a greater Number of vexatious Accidents, which may frustrate the Hopes, the Labour, and the Expence of the Pyrobolist; and which would be too tedious for me here to enumerate. It will be sufficient if you keep an Eye upon these, which are the most to be feared and provided against."

If it were not for the date on the manuscript and the old style of writing the letter "S" this report could well be a recent one from any rocket launching site on either side of the Iron Curtain.—*Contributed by A. M. Pennie, Chief Superintendent, Suffield Experimental Station, Defence Research Board, Ralston, Alta.*

Use of Tanks

Speaking of a training exercise in which a tendency developed for tanks to be used singly, Lieut.-General Sir Michael West, commanding First Corps, British Army of the Rhine, said: "I should like to go on record as saying that the use of tanks singly, except in the most amazingly exceptional circumstances, is unethical, despicable and absolutely plumb crazy."—*Australian Army Journal.*



Flashback: No. 30

Motor Machine Gun Convoy—1918

NARRATIVE SUPPLIED BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION,
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

The photograph on the opposite page, taken forty-two years ago, illustrates the type of transport used by the 1st Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade in France during the closing months of the First World War.

The official caption to the picture describes the convoy as "waiting alongside the Arras-Cambrai road" and, like soldiers of all generations, those seen here seem well practised at "waiting". At the same time, the amount of anti-gas equipment, the prevalence of steel helmets and the stowage of the trucks indicate their readiness for action.

The two leading vehicles are equipped with solid rubber tires, wheel chains and left-hand drive. The third is a Ford touring-car with right-hand drive. Each vehicle in the column has what appears to be a towel or piece of white cloth stretched over the engine cover. This was, presumably, an early form of aircraft recognition panel. In the background can be seen several horse-drawn wagons and limbers.

Existing machine-gun units were formed into the Canadian Machine Gun Corps on 1 October 1917 under Brig.-General R. Brutinel, CB, CMG, DSO, (then Lieut.-Colonel), who commanded throughout the rest of the war. At the time the photograph was taken the Canadian Machine Gun Corps in France consisted of four Machine Gun Battalions (divisional troops) of 96 Vickers guns each and two Motor Machine Gun Brigades (corps troops) of 40 guns each. A total of 464 medium machine-guns was therefore available to support the four infantry divisions which comprised the Canadian Corps. They were also available for corps and army tasks. The establishment contained over 8700 officers and men.

After the First World War the C.M.G.C. became part of the Non-Permanent Active Militia until a reorganization in 1936, when it was disbanded and the machine-gun role was given to the infantry. A number of infantry battalions were then converted to the machine-gun role and a distinction was made between infantry rifle and infantry machine-gun battalions, which persisted throughout the Second World War and was only recently abolished.

Machine-gun battalions and independent companies during the Second World War were brigade and divisional troops. At present medium machine-gun support is provided by a machine-gun platoon in each infantry battalion.

Courage Above All

War is the province of danger, and therefore courage above all things is the first quality of a warrior.—*Karl von Clausewitz.*

A MEDAL FOR HORATIUS

COLONEL W. C. HALL IN *The Army Combat Forces Journal (U.S.)*

Rome
II Calends, April, CCCLX

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Senate Medal of Honor
To: Department of War, Republic of Rome

I. Recommend Gaius Horatius, Captain of Foot, O-MCMXIV, for the Senate Medal of Honor.

II. Captain Horatius has served XVI years, all honorably.

III. On the III day of March, during the attack on the city by Lars Porsena of Clusium and his Tuscan army of CXM men, Captain Horatius voluntarily, with Sergeant Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius, held the entire Tuscan army at the far end of the bridge, until the structure could be destroyed, thereby saving the city.

IV. Captain Horatius did valiantly fight and kill one Major Picus of Clusium in individual combat.

V. The exemplary courage and the outstanding leadership of Captain Horatius are in the highest tradition of the Roman Army.

JULIUS LUCULLUS
Commander, II Foot Legion

Ist Ind. A.G. IV Calends, April, CCLX
To: G-III
For comment.

G. C.

IId. Ind. G-III. IX Calends, May CCCLX.
To: G-II.

I. For comment and forwarding.

II. Change paragraph III, line VI, from "saving the city" to "lessened the effectiveness of the enemy attack." The Roman Army was well dispersed tactically; the reserve had not been committed. The phrase as written might be construed to cast aspersions on our fine army.

III. Change paragraph V, Line I, from "outstanding leadership" to read "commendable initiative." Captain Horatius' command was II men — only I/IV of a squad.

J. C.

IIId. Ind. G-II. II Ides, June, CCLX.
To: G-I.

I. Omit strength of Tuscan forces in paragraph III. This information is classified.

II. A report evaluated as B-II states that the officer was a Captain Pincus of Tifernum. Recommend change "Major Pincus" to "an officer of the enemy forces."

T. J.

IVth Ind. G-I IX Ides, January, CCCLXI
To: JAG

I. Full name is Gaius Caius Horatius.

II. Change service from XVI to XV years. One year in Romulus Chapter, Cub Scouts, has been given credit for military service in error.

E. J.

Vth Ind. JAG IId of February, CCCLXI.
To: AG

I. The Porsena raid was not during wartime; the temple of Janus was closed.

II. The action against the Porsena raid, ipso facto, was a police action.

III. The Senate Medal of Honor cannot be awarded in peacetime. (AR CVIII-XXV, paragraph XII, c.)

IV. Suggest consideration for Soldier's Medal.

P. B.

VIth Ind. AG, IV Calends, April CCCLXI
To: G-I

Concur in paragraph IV, Vth Ind.

L. J.

VIIth Ind. G-1, I day of May, CCCLXI
To: AG

I. Soldier's Medal is given for saving lives, suggest Star of Bronze as appropriate.

E. J.

VIIIth Ind. AG III day of June, CCCLXI
To: JAG

For opinion.

G. C.

IXth Ind. JAG. II Calends, September, CCCLXI
To: AG

I. XVII months have elapsed since event described in basic letter. Star of Bronze cannot be awarded after XV months have elapsed.

II. Officer is eligible for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.

P.B.

Xth Ind. AG. I Ide of October, CCCLXI
To: G-1

For draft of citation for Papyrus Scroll with Metal Pendant.

G. C.

XIth Ind. G-I. III Calends, October, CCCLXI
To: G-II

I. Do not concur.

II. Our currently fine relations with Tuscany would suffer and current delicate negotiations might be jeopardized if publicity were given to Captain Horatius' actions at the present time.

T. J.

XIIth Ind. G-II. VI day of November, CCCLXI
To: G-I.

A report (rated D-IV), partially verified, states that Lars Porsena is very sensitive about the Horatius affair.

E. T.

XIIIth Ind. X day of November, CCCLXI
To: AG

I. In view of information contained in preceding XIth and XIIth Indorsements, you will prepare immediate orders for Captain G. C. Horatius to one of our overseas stations.

II. His attention will be directed to paragraph XII, POM, which prohibits interviews or conversations with newsmen prior to arrival at final destination.

L. T.

Rome
II Calends, April I, CCCLXII

SUBJECT: Survey, Report of DEPARTMENT OF WAR
To: Captain Gaius Caius Horatius, III Legion, V. Phalanx, APO XIX, c/o Phalanx, APO XIX, c/o Postmaster, Rome.

I. Your statements concerning the loss of your shield and sword in the Tiber River on III March, CCCLX, have been carefully considered.

II. It is admitted that you were briefly in action against certain unfriendly elements on that day. However, Sergeant Spurius Lartius and Corporal Julius Herminius were in the same action and did not lose any government property.

III. The Finance Officer has been directed to reduce your next pay by II I/II talents (I III/IV talents cost of one, each, sword, officers; III/IV talent cost of one, each, shield, M-II).

IV. You are enjoined and admonished to pay strict attention to conservation of government funds and property. The budget must be balanced next year.

H. HOCUS POCUS
Lieutenant of Horse, Survey Officer

HUNTING RUFFED GROUSE

By

COLONEL JOHN A. HUTCHINS, MBE, CD, DIRECTOR OF ORGANIZATION, ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA*

Ruffed grouse—brown bombshell grey phantom — partridge—*bonasa umbellus*—call him what you will, he is the finest upland game on the hunter's list and the most prized bird in any bag.

The 1959 season opened with plenty of clear, warm weather to lure the gunner into the open in search of game. Heavy leafage inhibited vision, but this disadvantage to the shooter was more than offset by salubrious climatic conditions and, more important, by an abundance of birds.

High survival numbers over the 1958-59 winter, good nesting and breeding conditions in the spring and summer in 1959, combined with an apparent paucity of predators and an abundance of favourite grouse foods, presaged the answer to the dreams of "partridge" men; they were not to be disappointed, as the hunting days proved so amply.

The short Ontario season, apparently based on bird scarcity over several previous years, was the only fly in the ointment. Most of us, however, are quite ready to forgive the authorities for any miscalculation made with respect to the population of this more than unpredictable species.

Early season hunters found fairly sizeable flocks of birds, for family groups had not yet dispersed. The young were less wary than adults and, once bagged, easily distinguishable by their size and feather development. Here's a tip for the beginner, and perhaps some old-timers, too: examine your birds, look for the variations in weight, size, colour phases and ruff development. You will be surprised at the great differences between individual birds; you will also come across the occasional oddity such as a bird with a red ruff rather than the usual shimmering black.

Another tip for the grouse man—always examine the crop when dressing for the oven or the freezer. The contents will give you the "inside" story on what these birds like to eat and this will tip you off on where to look for your game. A good rule is to hunt first for the whereabouts of feed; apples, haws, wild grapes, cherries, berries of various types, mast—all these are favourite delicacies, and where they are found, there, too, you will generally find profitable shooting.

Here is yet another idea: make a small, compact camera loaded with colour film to capture the arresting autumn tones a standard piece of your hunting gear. Carry it in your pocket, for a permanent visual record of those thrilling moments of the hunt will long be cherished: they will help to tide you over the many months that your guns are packed away and it seems as though another season will never roll around.

In the mid-October period the weather still favoured us. Clear and cold, less foliage, better visibility,

**An upland game hunter for many years, the author treats* Journal *readers to a glimpse of his particular hobby — hunting ruffed grouse. He has hunted this prized bird in many parts of North America, including Quebec, Ontario, Western Canada, Virginia and Maryland.*—Editor.

magnificent colours—all these contributed to the magnetism of the woodland trails. Birds are now in pairs and singles, more wary, flushing wilder and often out of range. An ample supply of soft fall foods is still in evidence and grouse are persistently returning to their favourite spots, in spite of gun pressure.

By now the observant hunter will have found three or four roosting places in close cedar or spruce woodlots. Droppings on the ground tell their tale. These roosts, usually adjacent to open spaces and a source of choice food, are worth regular visits. In any one season four or five shooting areas of moderate dimensions will be sufficient to provide a single hunter with all the territory he can or should wish to cover. Once you know your areas have birds, keep to them, get to know each area intimately. In this way your knowledge will enable you to out-smart your game by anticipating with accuracy where they will be and how they will fly on their speedy dash for cover. Remember to study cover as you move, proceeding slowly, always at the alert, pausing frequently to look, listen, and (equally important) to avoid fatigue. In upland shooting of this type it is not so much how much ground you cover but how thoroughly you cover it.



"Pay special attention to split-rail fences . . ." A fall scene, showing the author and his birds.



A bag of ruffed grouse spread out on the living-room floor. The Canadian-made 12-gauge shotgun shown here has been in action for more than 50 years and is still in excellent shooting condition. The author's father purchased it in 1909.

Practise stealth and concentration and you will bring more and more birds within shooting range and you will be less and less startled by their thundering bursts from close by.

Never overlook woodland trails or grown-over, infrequently used rights-of-way. Pay special attention to split-rail fences with brush and cover alongside. These locations are favoured by grouse, if not too far from heavier woods, and often afford excellent going-away shots as your quarry flies briefly along the trail before suddenly veering off out of sight.

A wounded bird with a broken wing will generally stay where it drops, making recovery simple. If the wings are intact the bird will usually take to the ground none the less, and travel, using every means to escape detection as it does so.

I have known badly hurt birds to range up to a hundred yards or more from the point at which they were hit before expiring. Do not give up the search for a wounded bird too readily. Move in ever widening circles from where it was seen to

drop; this procedure will reward you in a surprising number of cases. There is nothing more frustrating than to know you have mortally wounded and yet lost a bird. A retrieving dog is of great help in such a situation; however, many hunters prefer to omit dogs in this type of shooting, for unless perfectly trained and under control at all times an animal can spoil your chances for good grouse shooting rather than enhance them.

It is wise to remember that your game is destined for the table. Take precautions to ensure against meat spoilage. Disembowel your bird at once; if you prefer, pluck in the field as well, but this is not necessary. Refrigerate as early as possible upon returning home. Next to failing to recover a wounded bird comes the sin of allowing meat to become unfit for consumption.

A double-barrelled 16- or 20-gauge shotgun, accommodated to the owner, light in weight, is ideal for the fast shooting necessary to bag grouse. Your shot should be 7½ with long-range load—this will meet all requirements in so far as ammunition is concerned. A pump gun is not recommended: a two-barreller is faster in action and should give all the confidence needed plus a chance for an occasional double.

What are the things that draw the gunner to the pursuit of such difficult game? Each sportsman will have his own answer. It would be safe to wager that among his reasons (each of us would include a few, if not all) include the following:

1. The primeval instinct to hunt.
2. The glorious and revitalizing solitude of the bushland; the feel of a solid boot on solid ground; the refreshing, and often thrilling, sights, sounds and smells of nature.
3. The exultation of controlled body movement.
4. The challenge to nerve and coordinated reflex action.

Man is a predator, and it is not good that he should sublimate this instinctive characteristic. It is good that man still has the means to channel this instinct in the way of the disciplined hunter.

Happy hunting to all in 1960.

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250 Million in China's Militia

The Chinese Communists are reported to have drafted a militia force of 250 million men and women. Of this number, 130 million, consisting of men between the ages of 16 and 32 and women between 17 and 25 years of age, will constitute the "basic" militia and will be trained as front-line reserves. This group will be drafted immediately into the regular army in the event of war. The remainder will consist of older men and women under 50 years of age who will comprise the "ordinary" militia charged with support of the front and maintenance of peace and order in the rear.

Children under 15, persons over 50, and the infirm are not included in the 250 million aggregate but will be organized into a "rear service contingent."

Training of the militia generally is conducted before and after work in fields and factories.—*A news item published in the December 1959 issue,* Military Review *(U.S.).*

Book Reviews

More About The Fightin' Chiefs of Staff

A BOOK REVIEW BY COLONEL C. P. STACEY, OBE, CD,
SUPPLEMENTARY RESERVE

The content of *Triumph in the West**, the second instalment of Sir Arthur Bryant's book on the Second World War based on the diaries and other papers of Field-Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1941-46, will come as no surprise to the many readers of the first, *The Turn of the Tide*.† Like it (and Gaul), it is divided into three parts: extracts from the contemporary personal diary which the C.I.G.S., with a disregard for security which he would doubtless have considered a serious crime in one of his subordinates, kept for the information of his wife; fragments of post-war commentary on the diary, written by Lord Alanbrooke from memory; and "continuity" provided by Sir Arthur Bryant. And the general tone and outlook of the book are very similar to the first volume's: it is packed with personal and national prejudice. Nevertheless it makes very interesting reading; and if read with discrimination it makes a not unimportant contribution to our knowledge of how Allied strategy was hammered out.

We could have done very nicely without the second and third parts of the book if Messrs. Alanbrooke and Bryant had only been willing to give us the whole of the diary and not merely some extracts from it, no doubt chosen with some care. It is true that the diary was sometimes written in haste and anger, as an outlet for its author's feelings. Nevertheless, in spite of all its defects of prejudice and lack of perspective, the diary is a record made at the time by a participant whose military appointment placed him in an ideal position to know almost everything that was going on. And the editor has fortunately included some correspondence which —particularly several letters that passed between Alanbrooke and Field-Marshal Montgomery—is really the most interesting and important portion of the book. By comparison with these, Alanbrooke's afterthoughts and Bryant's nationalistic pomposities seem insignificant.

As with the earlier book, many a reader will be left wondering whether in the long run *Triumph in the West* may not do actual harm to the reputation of the officer whom it is intended to honour. For Alanbrooke, a most able soldier who certainly was a great contributor to the Allied victory, is represented here again as that victory's chief author; sometimes, it almost seems, as its only author. This uncritical exaggeration is certainly calculated to produce reaction—as, indeed, it has done in the United States. It will be a pity if it leads to a permanent downgrading of Alanbrooke among Americans. And it must be said that Alanbrooke's own acid comments on a wide variety of his contemporaries, quoted here, are

**Triumph in the West; 1943-1946*. By Arthur Bryant. Collins, London and Toronto. 1959. $6.00.

†See *The Fightin' Chiefs of Staff* by the same reviewer in the July 1957 issue of the Journal.—*Editor*.

likely to encourage just such a result. One of his most eminent victims is Sir Winston Churchill. Alanbrooke now admits that he was unfair in some of his wartime observations about the great man. Nevertheless, it is abundantly evident that Churchill was an unnecessarily difficult master to the men who were trying to win his war for him; and his future biographers would be unwise to ignore Alanbrooke's evidence on this point.

This book reminds me of an American reviewer's comment on General Pershing's memoirs of the First World War. He called his review "General Pershing's Three Wars". They were, he explained, first a war with the General Staff in Washington, which took up a great deal of Pershing's time and attention; secondly, a war with the British and French, which seemed to be the book's main topic; and thirdly, a war with the Germans which by comparison appeared to be a relatively minor affair. I would not say that Alanbrooke goes quite as far as that: but certainly his war with Churchill and his war with the Americans are major elements in his story. The Americans take a very severe beating from him, and the person most heavily belaboured is General Eisenhower. It is a pity, really, that publication of the book could not have been postponed, as a matter of elementary courtesy, until he had ceased to be President. Like so much else in the volume, the references to him are exaggerated. In the long run, nevertheless, they are likely to be damaging; although for the moment the fact that the strongest evidence takes the form of letters exchanged between two British officers, Alanbrooke and Montgomery, is calculated to reduce its impact in the United States. The student of the North-West Europe campaign would be well advised to read with care the correspondence of the winter of 1944-45 which is printed here. Not the least interesting portion of it, incidentally, is Montgomery's comment on the conditions he found when he was temporarily placed in command north of the Ardennes after the great German stroke in December. Telling of how he then visited the First and Ninth U.S. Armies, he wrote to Brooke, "Neither Army Commander had seen Bradley or any of his staff since the battle began. . . . There were no reserves anywhere behind front. Morale was very low. They seemed delighted to have someone to give them firm orders." Perhaps this should be taken with a slight grain of salt; but it is not evidence that the historian can disregard.

In the Anglo-American strategic controversies described in this book the British case was often strong. It is a pity however that it represents the American strategists — except MacArthur, with whom Brooke had little to do — as pretty uniformly foolish, ignorant and incompetent. The partiality is so obvious that many readers will discount the British arguments even when they are sound. Bryant even tries to take over the North-West Europe invasion of 1944 as primarily a British strategic project. This is an absurdity; the Americans were the sponsors of that plan from the beginning, the British merely went along with it. This reviewer is convinced, from what evidence he has seen, that if the British had been left to make the decision there would have been no cross-Channel attack in 1944. Yet Bryant asserts

— as he did in the previous volume — that Operation *Overlord* was the "culmination" of Brooke's Mediterranean strategy and that Brooke "knew that victory could only be won ultimately through *Overlord*". No evidence is produced to support this. When Brooke is discovered in October 1943 writing in his diary of the Americans' "insistence to abandon the Mediterranean operations for the very problematical cross-Channel operations", Bryant explains that by "problematical" Brooke meant that the prerequisite conditions for success did not yet exist. Again he gives us no evidence.

As so often in these British books, there are almost no Canadian references. There is a brief and inconclusive mention of the change of command of the First Canadian Army ("I have had to get rid of Andy McNaughton, give Crerar sufficient war experience in Italy and get Monty to accept him with very limited active experience. All has now been accomplished with much anguish and many difficulties, but I have full confidence that Crerar will not let me down . . ."). There is one strategic opinion of special Canadian interest: Brooke wrote in his diary on 5 October 1944, after attending a conference of Eisenhower with his army group commanders, "I feel that Monty's strategy for once is at fault. Instead of carrying out the advance on Arnhem he ought to have made certain of Antwerp in the first place." On this point posterity seems likely to agree with Alanbrooke, as it is also likely to agree with the excellent advice he gave Montgomery concerning his relations with the Supreme Commander. What a pity that Monty did not combine with his great strategic competence the humbler but so very helpful gift of tact!

The Archduke Charles on Coalitions

The idea of a common advantage, a mutual trust based on identical sentiments gives birth to coalitions. The differences of views about the ways and means to be used to attain the intended goal soon bring about division. This division increases when the events of the war displace the points of view, disappoint hopes, and change objectives. It becomes very dangerous when independent armies must act in unison for a long period of time. It is possible to count on great results from a cooperation of masses of people who are strangers to each other only in cases where necessity forces the rulers and their peoples to take up arms in order to free themselves from insufferable oppression. Even then, the decision should be reached rapidly, so that the ardour has no time to dwindle. The hope of achieving successes can also be realized when a state—through its preponderant influence — avails itself of the right to cause its opinions to prevail and imposes its will on its allies.—*The Archduke Charles in "The Campaign of 1799 in Switzerland".*

Exercising Judgement

The crux of the matter is having people who are not merely able to make weapons or equipment function, but who also can exercise the judgement to know when to use them, and how to combine them to the best advantage.—*General Lyman L. Lemnitzer (U.S. Army).*

The First of the Total Wars

Reviewed by Colonel G. W. L. Nicholson, CD, Director of the Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottawa

There is a tendency among some whose soldiering began with the Second World War (or since) to regard the conflict of 1914-1918 as one of unwarranted bloodshed characterized, particularly on the western front, by prolonged and frustrating deadlocks under incompetent leaders who ran up appallingly long casualty lists but contributed nothing to the advancement of military science. This viewpoint is reflected in the choice of officers' courses in military history, wherein the First World War seems to have been found disappointingly barren of campaigns worthy of study.

Cyril Falls' new single-volume history of the war* should do much to correct such faulty notions. Let it be said right away that this is an excellent, highly readable book that can be unreservedly recommended to all interested in military history. Few writers are better qualified for the task undertaken by Captain Falls. Having served with distinction in the First World War, he spent the next twenty years working on the comprehensive British official history of the military operations in that struggle. As military correspondent of *The Times* during the Second World War, and then Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford, he has had plenty of opportunity to measure the two world conflicts against each other. For him the former emerges from this comparison as the *Great* War. His yardstick is not that of the overall number of casualties suffered and inflicted (though by this standard 1914-1918 can well hold its own with 1939-1945), nor the mass of material employed, nor the effectiveness of the strategy and tactics displayed. "I wanted to show", he writes, "what the war had meant to my generation, so large a part of which . . . lost their lives in it. I wanted to commemorate the spirit in which these men served and fought." It was this spirit, these qualities of comradeship and courage and self-sacrifice, displayed by officers and men of all the combatant nations, that Falls repeatedly extols in his pages as forming the outstanding attribute of the war.

For a single volume to deal with all the battlefronts of the First World War without becoming a mere summary of events presents the author with a challenge which he has met with considerable skill. The fact that major active operations closed down every winter has made it convenient for him to divide his story into five books—one for each year of the war. Within these units he moves chapter by chapter from one theatre to another, thereby allowing the reader to view the progress on any one front against the perspective of the war as a whole. The operations on the Russian front, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine, characterized at times by rapid movements resulting in substantial gains and losses of ground, stand out in marked contrast to the siege conditions that prevailed in the west from late in 1914 to the spring of 1918. Falls thus explodes the myth that the whole war on land was one of stagnation. That

**The Great War.* By Cyril Falls. Longmans, Green and Co., Toronto, 1959. $6.95.

the Western Front remained so long virtually static was because (being regarded as the most vital front) it was held "by more troops, more artillery, more machine guns, per mile, and stronger fortifications, than any other". Falls blames on these cramping conditions rather than on a lack of tactical initiative the failure of attacking generals to devise methods of setting the front in motion. When they were transferred to other theatres they manoeuvered "fast and brilliantly".

This general immobility in the west was part of a situation that saw the defensive in the ascendancy—just as the turn of the offensive was to come in the next war. The attacker was not equipped to cope with the defender's concrete-studded trench networks, protected by curtains of artillery fire and bullet-swept zones of barbed wire. The tank was in its infancy. The role of the aeroplane was pretty well restricted to reconnaissance and mutual combat; its employment in close support of ground forces or in strategic bombing was still to be developed. Above all, rapid movement was hampered by dependence on horse-drawn traffic or the very indifferent mechanical transport of the time.

But despite the limitations on the attacker, Falls demonstrates that military science was not standing still. He examines the tactics employed in the big battles and shows, for example, that the prolonged offensive through the water and mud of Passchendaele was not "mere blind bashing"—though he admits that "even with good tactics the human body is lucky to prevail over ferroconcrete". Later in 1917 Cambrai was to furnish a pattern for infantry-cum-tank employment in the following year as well as in the Second World War. Falls suggests that at Cambrai, with a better disposition of tank and infantry reserves and more boldness by senior commanders, Haig's "great experiment" might have come off.

At a time when the leadership of the British Commander-in-Chief is still the subject of controversy among amateur and professional historians, Captain Falls comes out in support of Haig, recognition of whose generalship, he charges, has suffered from "the myopia of the English-speaking races where it was concerned." He is inclined to be somewhat abrupt in dismissing criticisms of the Field Marshal's policy of attrition in 1916 and 1917, but he compels recognition of Haig as "master of the field" in the final year of victory. The author sees Foch as the second of "the great captains of 1918", and he gives Ludendorff a lesser place only because he lacked the "virtues of character" of the former two. Elsewhere Falls earns his readers' gratitude by his effective thumbnail sketches of the military leaders on both sides.

The Great War is illustrated by a section of 31 photographs of scenes from the various fronts and portraits of senior commanders. The sketch maps that have been included are so helpful in following the operations in the different theatres that one would be grateful for more of them. The publisher's omission of an index to these maps imposes an inconvenience on the reader, who is compelled to thumb through large sections of the book in search of the map dealing with a particular theatre. It is hoped that this will be put right in the subsequent editions that are bound to be demanded.

"The lamps are going out all over Europe"

1914

Reviewed by Lieut.-Colonel H. F. Wood, CD, Deputy Director of the Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottawa

It is a pity that this book* was not received in Canada six months ago. Captains in the Army have been studying 1914 in preparation for their promotion examinations and James Cameron's book on the subject is valuable background material. Since one would hope, however, that writing such an examination would stimulate rather than suppress interest in the subject, the book is recommended as being well worth owning.

The battles of 1914 are described with clarity and understanding; the personalities of Ministers and Generals supplement and dramatize the events. We see the young Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, who even in those days "reacted vigourously to the pressure of crisis", dashing off a telegram to the Prime Minister proposing to resign his office to take command of all the British troops around Antwerp. The Prime Minister refused, and the author surmises that the spectacle of an ex-lieutenant of Hussars commanding numbers of generals, brigadiers and colonels was too much even for Mr. Asquith.

The generals, too, have their place in the narrative. The controversial figure of Henry Wilson, the Director of Military Operations who meddled in Irish politics, appears early in the account, as do the generals who led the BEF to France and to its destiny at Mons and Le Cateau. These men had earned their reputations and developed their prejudices during the South African war and this was to influence the battles of 1914 to a significant degree.

But this is no mere war story. One of the best features of the book is the long careful look at the mood of Europe on the eve of war. It is a penetrating picture of the end of an era.

Cameron's account deals with the leaders of both sides of this great struggle; he seems to feel that the tragic events of 1914 were inevitable in the light of the personalities and problems of these men. His book ends on a sombre note:

"So 1914 came to an end, with the customary communique from French Headquarters: 'A l'ouest rien à signaler'—'All quiet on the Western Front'.

"Down the long arc of wretchedness from Picardy to the mountains the men waited among the mud and the ice, the gun limbers and the vermin. Very soon the horizons would open up again; someone in Whitehall or the Invalides would press the button again and they would climb—wearily, angrily, fearfully, gloriously—over the parapet again, and what would happen then no one could say."

James Cameron's book is something for officers to ponder over.

*1914. By James Cameron. British Book Service (Canada) Ltd., Kingswood House, 1068 Broadview Ave., Toronto 6, Ont. $5.00.

The Story of Militarism

Reviewed by J. Mackay Hitsman, Historical Section,
Army Headquarters, Ottawa

No one likes being ignored. Since Canada is neither a great nor well established power in the world, we tend to treat mere oversights as being deliberate snubs. But the omission of the words "Canada" and "Canadian" from the index of *A History of Militarism** is something that should gladden us. True the author has centred attention on Germany, France, Britain and Russia, but he did ramble wherever his evidence pointed.

A German veteran of the Kaiser's War and a refugee from Hitler's Germany, Dr. Vagts first issued *A History of Militarism* on the eve of the Second World War. The difference between the "military way" and the "militaristic way" is the thread which linked his story of the rise of armies from the Middle Ages to the 1930s, when Germany, Italy, Japan and certain of the lesser countries of Eastern Europe found themselves controlled by military dictatorships. Or so it was then thought. Subsequent events were to reveal how little influence the professional military leaders had over Hitler and how completely inept were their efforts to curb or destroy what they had allowed to grow. Therefore Dr. Vagts revised his text somewhat and added two chapters, "The Militarism of the Civilians" and "Militarism after 1945", to bring his story up to date. A bibliography was also added to the existing notes. These provide a most useful guide for further study of the subject. This is, however, not the sort of book that can be digested over a weekend. Its 480 pages of text warrant closer scrutiny and much of it may be profitably reread as occasions occur for reference. And it is not necessary or desirable to agree with all the author's conclusions.

The "military way" has existed among all peoples since time immemorial, so the author quickly skips over the centuries "From the Mounted Warrior to the Standing Army". During the "Age of Enlightenment" in Europe, which lasted from the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War in 1648 to the outbreak of the Napoleonic Wars, armies were small and composed of mercenaries. The younger nobility were given something to do and the lowest classes were kept off the parish relief rolls, thus permitting the bourgeois to continue uninterrupted their pursuit of worldly wealth. But the raising of conscript armies by Revolutionary France was copied by most of Europe.

Once Napoleon was defeated, however, these citizen armies became an embarrassment to autocratic rulers who wished to put back the clock to 1789 or earlier. Therefore Prussia, Austria and France quickly reverted to small professional armies. The Industrial Revolution was now spreading from England to the Continent, so industrious citizens were happy enough to be excused from military service. But the workers in the new factories were shortly

**A History of Militarism*, Civilian and Military. By Alfred Vagts. (Meridian Books, New York). Canadian Agent: Longmans, Green & Co., 20 Cranfield Road, Toronto 16. 1959. $8.50.

to discover that these long-service troops stood between them and better working conditions. The younger sons of the nobility realized that the career of an army officer was all that stood between them and having to work for a living and began to develop a cult of the "officer caste" in order to render themselves indispensable to society. This "militaristic way" seems to have been first recognized by French liberals during the early years of the Second Empire.

Dr. Vagts describes in some detail the growth of this caste system in Prussia, with courts of honour to punish its own members, an emphasis on duelling and almost complete success in excluding the more intelligent of the younger *bourgeoisie* from its ranks. In France matters were brought to a head by the Dreyfus Case, which showed the lengths to which an Army would go to conceal its own mistakes and shortcomings. The author is at his best here. Had he been able to read Japanese it seems probable that more space would have been devoted to the development of the "Land of the Rising Sun" into a first-class military power.

Both England and the United States have been spared the "militaristic way", but his line of reasoning is noticeably weak when trying to explain English-speaking attitudes. Despite repeated references he does not seem to comprehend fully either Clode's *Military Forces of the Crown* or Fortescue's *History of the British Army*. England has always refused to take seriously its small standing army, whose officers persisted in regarding themselves as being gentlemen first. As long as promotion was by purchase there was no danger of some professional adventurer like Napoleon getting ahead and attempting a *coup d'état*. And it naturally followed that discipline among officers could not be too strict, since any one of them could use an unexpected financial windfall to buy promotion up to and including the colonelcy of a regiment. Most American historians also continue to misinterpret this mentality, which led naval and military commanders to be addressed as "Mr." during the 18th and early 19th centuries. Even the late Harold Laski was obsessed with the fear that a (mythical) officer corps would forcibly prevent his beloved Labour Party from taking office should it win a general election in Britain. What a let-down, therefore, must Clement Attlee's quiet succession to Winston Churchill have been to this intellectual giant.

It is a bit strange that Dr. Vagts' work of revision has ignored the Colonel Blimp of Low's cartoons — another myth of the British Labour Party. Of course, Colonel Blimp was not a real militarist by Vagts' definition and his amateur standing was clearly revealed as early as the wartime film of "The Life and Death of Colonel Blimp". Although Blimp rattled his sabre on occasion, and jangled his spurs, his fellow countrymen failed to take him seriously — which is what the author might have noted. And there must be some doubt that even Blimp really took himself seriously. Likewise American officers have never been looked up to, envied or taken seriously by the American people. In Canada, it might as well be added, militia officers were long ago facetiously dubbed "Saturday Night Soldiers".

Lee's 1862 Offensive

Reviewed by J. Mackay Hitsman, Historical Section,
Army Headquarters, Ottawa

Major-General Stackpole's fourth Civil War campaign study* discusses the four battles fought in the five weeks between 9 August and 17 September, 1862 — Cedar Mountain, Second Bull Run (Manassas), South Mountain and Antietam (Sharpsburg). The format is similar to *They Met at Gettysburg, The Fredericksburg Campaign* and *Chancellorsville*, which were reviewed in this journal and reflects the fact that the author, a retired National Guardsman, is his own publisher. Most of the 53 black-and-white illustrations are taken from *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*. The 38 full-page situation maps and the end papers are based on modern U.S. Geological Survey maps.

The story opens with the failure of Major-General George B. McClellan's Peninsular Campaign, either to take Richmond or to inflict a serious defeat on General Robert E. Lee. In the first serious attempt to co-ordinate the military effort of the continuing United States, President Lincoln brought Major-General Henry W. Halleck to Washington. He then organized an Army of Virginia under Major-General John Pope for the protection of Washington. Unfortunately Halleck was a theorist at heart and proved unable either to reach firm decisions or enforce obedience from his subordinate army commanders. Although a first-class organizer and trainer, and well regarded by all ranks of his own Army of the Potomac, McClellan was to continue to demonstrate both unwillingness and inability to fight. General Pope, whom he professed to regard as a competitor rather than colleague, was soon to prove to be incapable of directing an army in battle.

While McClellan was considering whether or not to comply with Halleck's order to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, Lee abandoned the defensive before Richmond and sent Stonewall Jackson's corps on a wide sweep which quickly got to the rear of Pope's new army. As soon as McClellan finally began to withdraw, the balance of the Army of Northern Virginia (Longstreet's Corps) hurried away to support Jackson. It arrived just in time to enable the Confederates to win a decisive engagement at Manassas and bring the career of General Pope to a close. Although his two Confederate corps were inferior in strength to what remained of the Army of Virginia and the larger Army of the Potomac, Lee now decided to gamble on an invasion of Maryland. Lee did not have the strength to remain in alien territory, but he needed supplies and knew his adversaries. Bad luck resulted in a copy of his campaign order falling into Federal hands, but even then McClellan muffed his opportunities and the Battle Antietam proved to be inconclusive — even though the bloodiest single day's fighting of the war.

The author writes that "Lee's battles had in common one signifi-

**From Cedar Mountain to Antietam, August-September, 1862. By Edward J. Stackpole. The Stackpole Company, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1959. $5.95.*

cant characteristic that was strangely lacking on the part of most of his opponents. That was the mobility of his army, an expression of the commanding general's uncanny, almost instinctive ability to manoeuver his divisions in such a way as to have them in the right place at just the right time to make their presence felt most effectively". Certainly it is this strategic sense that has caused Lee to be counted among the Great Captains.

Once a battle was joined, however, Lee's practice was to leave matters largely in the hands of his subordinates. And the author correctly suggests that these very seldom let him down. But when they did, as the author endeavours somewhat unsuccessfully to gloss over, things really went wrong. Jackson's worst lapse had already occurred, during the Seven Days Battles before Richmond, but Longstreet's conduct at Manassas was only a forerunner of what was to come at Gettysburg. "Old Pete," as he was affectionately known, refused to attack Pope's flank and take the pressure off Jackson's decimated divisions until he himself was good and ready. Lee was unable to hurry him. It has been argued that Lee was too much of a gentleman to act firmly towards his subordinates; also that he fully recognized their failings but realized that they were the best lieutenants available. He might have been wiser to follow the example of Napoleon, who did not trust his marshals out of his own sight and kept a firm hand on the tactical situation. Or could Lee have been dubious of his own tactical sense, and been unsure of himself whenever challenged by Longstreet?

This failing of Lee, if it can be termed that, certainly was not yet a matter for worry. Only after U.S. Grant had arrived in the east and the Army of Northern Virginia had begun to feel the loss of Jackson and Stuart did Lee really experience difficulties. By that time dwindling manpower and acute shortages of supplies were overriding considerations that nothing could offset. But 1862 definitely was a Confederate year in the East.

There can, however, be no hesitancy in recommending *From Cedar Mountain to Antietam* to readers of the *Canadian Army Journal.* It provides a very readable account of what transpired, sparked by the author's personal interpretation of what might or could have been. This reviewer thought that he discovered the odd inconsistency. This may, of course, merely be a delusion created by the fact that he gradually is learning a little bit about the American Civil War. What did annoy him, however, was the large number of split infinitives used and the widespread employment of jargon from the world of sport, when standard military terminology would more adequately have described matters to any interested reader. The statement quoted above regarding Lee's ability as a strategist is beautifully clear, for example, unlike some of the allusions to commanders who decided to "run the ends" rather than "pass" because they imagined their opponent's footwork to be faulty.

Napoleon Still Lives

The history of most men terminates with the grave. It is not so with Napoleon. His wild and wondrous story is continued beyond the dying hour and the silence of the tomb.—*Abbot.*

The 100-Hour Campaign

Reviewed by Professor Richard A. Preston, Department of History, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario

The deserts of the Middle East have been the scene of great military operations from biblical times. In our own age, Lawrence's operations, Allenby's campaigns, and the various campaigns of the Western Desert, have provided valuable material for military study, and have led to the production of several valuable works of reference.

The most recent of these desert wars is the brief 100 hours of operations in 1956 in which the army of Israel overran the Sinai Desert and won what seemed like a push-over against Nasser's Egyptians. The relative size of the P.O.W. bag — thousands of Egyptians as against two or three Jews—seemed at the time to indicate a victory of unusual decisiveness.

One of the most interesting things about this victory was that it was alleged to have been achieved by militia soldiers. The Israeli army was described as a citizen army — a part-time army — and this campaign was therefore regarded in some quarters as a triumph of the zealous amateur over the professional soldier who was no more than that. The shades of the Lawrence myth were revived, although in a somewhat different form. And militia enthusiasts elsewhere, rather downcast these days, raised their heads again. The Swiss military authorities, still tied firmly to amateurism in army organization, were said to be particularly interested.

No newspaper reporters were allowed to accompany Israel's armies in Sinai. And authoritative accounts of the campaign have been slow to appear. The best so far has been by a U.S. Army Reservist, Brigadier-General Marshall, *Sinai Victory*, an account which follows the campaign chiefly from the Israel end, although with a reasonable degree of objectivity. This book is now supplemented, and perhaps supplanted, by Major O'Ballance's *The Sinai Campaign, 1956.**

Major O'Ballance, a frequent contributor to the British Army Quarterly on mid-East affairs, has already produced one of the best accounts of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. He writes with real clarity, if less dramatically than Brigadier Marshall. This is a book which every serious student of modern war should know.

The Sinai Campaign, 1956, throws a new light on the significance of the desert operations. Marshall had shown that the Israelis were successful because they were resourceful, unorthodox, and lucky. But he had also revealed their lack of efficient planning, and he had therefore left doubts whether such methods could really pull anything off against a properly trained western army.

Major O'Ballance gives us much more information on this subject. He shows that Egyptian resistance was much more effective at individual strong points than had been realized before; that the desert operations were greatly affected by the Anglo-

**The Sinai Campaign, 1956.* By Edgar O'Ballance. (London, Faber & Faber, 1959). Available from the British Book Service (Canada) Ltd., Kingswood House, Toronto 6, Ont. $5.00.

Doctor Goebbels: Genius of Propaganda

Reviewed by A. G. Steiger, Historical Section,
Army Headquarters, Ottawa

We may fail to remember what happens when Greek meets Greek, but we are not likely to forget what may happen when a frustrated and rejected painter meets a frustrated and rejected writer and the two set about working off their king-sized inferiority complexes on the world at large. To wit: Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels.

Countless books have been written about Hitler, many to titillate the lover of the macabre, and many to explore his seething and savage mind.

But far too little background information has been available to date about Doctor Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's most astute collaborator and a very important man indeed. For without Goebbels Hitler might well have failed to achieve power and, while Goebbels is dead, his spiritual legacy survives and bedevils people everywhere with the locally suitable adaptations of the techniques he devised.

This great gap in our knowledge has now been closed by the appearance of the excellent work, *Doctor Goebbels*, by Roger Manvell and Henrich Fraenkel.*

After digging deeply beneath the overburden of Nazi-inspired legend, the authors have come up with a study that will fascinate all readers and will please the professional who likes his facts well indexed and well referenced. The reader's train of thought glides along smoothly on a roadbed of unobtrusive writing.

On the whole the stability of an organized society depends on the degree of prosperity it offers to the majority of its members. In a prosperous society the combination of the satiated who resist change, the "Dagwood" men who know not and care not, and the "safe" men who will stay bought, will ever overwhelm the restless intellectual or the agitator.

Not so, however, where the social fabric has been damaged by military defeat, economic calamity, or both. After the First World War, Germany's social structure was badly in need of overhaul. Sane counsel might have led to recovery, but, as it

**Doctor Goebbels (His Life and Death).* By Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel. British Book Service (Canada) Ltd., Kingswood House, 1068 Broadview Ave., Toronto 6, Ont. 1960. 329 pp. $7.00.

The 100-Hour Campaign

(Continued from preceding page)

French threat to Suez; and that the Israeli methods were so wasteful in equipment and personnel that the attack would have quickly lost its momentum had it not been called to a halt by outside interference.

This book confirms, what was already well known, that the real difference between the armies was in the quality of the officers, and the author believes that this difference was so important that, even if Egypt and Israel had fought without other complicating factors, Israel would have won. But he challenges the myth of a kind of supernatural superiority of Jew over Arab and he says that the survival of the state of Israel is still not a certainty.

happened, victory in the fight for power fell to a crew of egomaniacs headed by Hitler.

Joseph Goebbels, one of the chief architects of Nazism, was born in the Rhineland in 1897. His parents were upright folk, precariously perched on the lowest rung of the middle class, worshipping God and aspiring to respectability. Nothing in Joseph's background pointed to a spectacular career; his start in life was dismal. At the age of four he was ravaged by infantile paralysis; his growth was stunted and one foot crippled: he was never to be more than a little five-foot man with a large head on a shrunken 100-pound frame. This was the first of the blows which were to turn him into a vessel of venom and hate.

Unable to play like other youngsters, he turned to reading voraciously and precociously, and soon discovered the sense of power that knowledge and intellect can impart. His father was impressed by his sharp mind and began to dream that some day he might have the ecstatic pleasure of introducing him as "my son, Herr Doctor Goebbels". He sent him to the schools leading to admission to the university.

When the war began in 1914, among those who queued up at the recruiting depot was Joseph Goebbels. The army doctors merely glanced at him and rejected him on sight. He was mortified and would not speak to anyone for days. Once more there was nothing else to cling to but his intellect.

When he finally matriculated with the highest marks, he was invited to deliver the valedictory address. It was stilted and pompous. The headmaster remarked, "At least one thing is certain, Joseph Goebbels will never make an orator".

To finance a university education was beyond the means of his family, but somehow he managed to enroll for one term at the University of Bonn. Like most people in the Ruhr, his people were Catholic, and when his money ran out he became dependent on receiving scholarships from Catholic charitable institutions. He was granted a series of interest-free small loans.

By 1919, however, he ceased to report to the society which had granted him the loans, and was clearly beginning to sever his connections with the Catholic Church.

Falling under the spell of distinguished men of letters, he became fired with literary ambition and desired to become a professional writer. His doctoral thesis was aesthetic in nature; politics were still to come. By 1924 he was Doctor Goebbels, all pride and no money.

He was now ceaselessly writing verse-plays, poems, novels and articles. They were rejected with monotonous regularity. Publishers buy what they can sell, but his absolute belief in his genius as a writer made him think that he was the victim of discrimination. Since a great many German publishing houses were owned by Jews, he convinced himself that the Jews were strangling the cultural life of Germany and rejecting his magnificent writings because he was not "one of the boys". He became intensely and viciously anti-semitic, a ripe and ready target for the poison pamphlets of the budding Nazis.

How he joined the party, wavered between the Strasser and Hitler factions and finally threw in his lot with Hitler is described in detail. When Goebbels and Hitler met in person, they fizzed like fruit salts hitting water. Hitler realized Goeb-

bels' potentialities, and Goebbels found a master. He was to note, "I bow to a greater man. To the political genius."

To win Germany, Hitler needed Berlin. But the local party organization there was weak. To strengthen it Goebbels was made *Gauleiter* of Berlin. He worked like an ox and developed his talent for political agitation. He proceeded on the assumption that the perceptive powers of the masses are small, their understanding feeble, their collective mind amenable to being played like a piano. Soon he was a cunning and ruthless master of propaganda. He conquered Berlin for the Nazis and played a decisive role in capturing the chancellorship for Hitler.

When the party came to power Goebbels was appointed Minister of Propaganda. One of the very few blunders he made was the great book burning fiesta when his ruffians amongst others burned the works of the great Heinrich Heine, who in 1823 had written, "Wherever they burn books, sooner or later they will burn human beings too".

In the meantime he had married Magda Quandt, a divorced woman of much grace, who bore him six children, was a good wife and mother and an accomplished hostess. But Goebbels' enormous drive was not limited to the arts and politics, and a few years later he embarked on a series of extra-marital *affaires*. When his liaison with the film star Lida Baroova became a public scandal, Magda Goebbels wearily set about preparing for divorce. Hitler was horrified, sent for Goebbels, refused his request for permission to resign and go abroad with Lida, and issued a formal Führer Order for the two not to see each other again. To disobey such an order meant death. They never met again.

Goebbels would have preferred consolidation of power to war, but success had made Hitler disdainful of advice, even Goebbels'. During the war Goebbels worked ceaselessly and effectively. He was fully aware of the inhuman practices in vogue and approved completely. "There must be no squeamish sentimentality about the Jews; they must be destroyed . . . the procedure is pretty barbaric but one must not be sentimental in such matters."

When things began to go badly and Hitler and his top aides scuttled into their funk-holes, Goebbels remained undaunted and was a constant visitor to the devastated areas. In a great oration he mobilized the populace for "Total War". In this great feat of propaganda he found deep satisfaction. He fiddled best when Berlin burned.

When the last rats had left the ship, and Hitler had killed himself, and there was no other way out, Magda and Joseph Goebbels poisoned their children and took poison themselves. Seconds later Goebbels shot his wife and himself.

Manvell and Fraenkel have fully explained what made Goebbels tick. His devotion to Hitler was based on his own urge to gain power and prestige. In essence his loyalty to Hitler was loyalty to himself.

Quite apart from all this, the book might well serve as a foundation for a Handbook of Political Propaganda.

Truth is Courage

I have always felt that truth is courage intellectualized. — *Maj-Gen. J. F. C. Fuller, British Army.*

Observation Post Party

REVIEWED BY MAJOR J. D. CROWE, MC, ARMY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

Aubrey Wade first published this book* in 1936 under the title "The War of Guns", and one suspects that his purpose in writing at that time was prompted by the revulsion against war which swept British literary circles in the nineteen-thirties, for his account is stark and horrifying in places. None the less, it is an honest account, told simply, of one man's experiences in the First World War, and one of special interest to present-day gunners.

The author spent the First War as an artillery signaller in a British brigade of field artillery (such a unit, despite its name, corresponded more closely to a field regiment of today, as it comprised three batteries of eighteen-pounder guns, and one battery of 4.5-inch howitzers). After two years training at practice camps in England and Ireland, Wade's unit was posted to France in mid-1916, where it was employed as an Army Brigade corresponding to Army Field Regiments of the Second War. Not being allotted in support of any particular division resulted in this unit being used as a "Flying column" wherever support was required in a hurry.

Hence Wade's account is essentially that of an artillery signaller, whose time was spent mainly at an OP during the various actions in which his unit was involved. Tactics are kept well in the background and one is only vaguely aware of what particular battle is being described.

During the First War, the battle technique of field artillery in positional warfare was developed to a high degree of efficiency, and after forty years his description of events at the OP and the guns will be recognized by any field gunner.

There is a vague raffishness and an occasional rebellious note which creep through this otherwise objective account. The discomfiture of an unpopular sergeant-major is told with loving detail, as is a visit to a business-like brothel (business-like in its organizational efficiency). However, these do not detract from a simple yet intelligent description of war seen from a low level.

All told, Aubrey Wade has produced a satisfying book for the discriminating reader who is trying to recapture the atmosphere of war. Some of his accounts will sicken the gentle-hearted, and the book is well laced with photographs of corpses in shocking attitudes of death. In spite of these deliberate attempts to horrify, however, it remains an honest account of war as seen by a gunner.

**Gunner on the Western Front.* By Aubrey Wade. British Book Service (Canada) Ltd., Kingswood House, 1068 Broadview Ave., Toronto 6, Ont. $4.25.

Duty and Discipline

To obey God's orders as delivered by conscience—that is Duty; to obey man's orders as issued by rightful authority—that is Discipline. The foundation of both alike is denial of self for a higher good. Unless the lesson of Duty be first well learned, the lesson of Discipline can be but imperfectly understood.—*The Infantry Journal (India).*

The Sixth of June, 1944

Reviewed by Major O. K. H. Kierans, MC, CD,
Emergency Measures Organization, Privy Council, Ottawa

"Believe me, Lang, the first twenty-four hours of the invasion will be decisive . . . for the Allies, as well as Germany, it will be the longest day".—Rommel.

Cornelius Ryan has written the longest news-story about the "longest day".* It's a sixteen-year-old news-story, yet I believe you will find it, as I did, as dramatic and compelling a story as if to-day were the seventh of June 1944, and you are reading of yesterday's great event.

In reading *The Longest Day*, I was struck immediately by the "newsiness" of it. It wasn't long before the style became apparent. "It's a story out of *Time* magazine", I told myself, and decided that I would put it to Dr. Rudolf Flesch's "Readability Test". Sure enough: the book scores right alongside *Time* magazine and *Reader's Digest* —"Interesting" and "Fairly Difficult" to read.

This idea intrigued me further until my curiosity forced me to read the biographical sketch of Cornelius Ryan. *Voila!* He is on the staff of TIME, INC., as is his wife, Kathryn, who assisted him in revising the manuscript.

I called the story "dramatic"; possibly a better description would be "tragic". The central figure, the protagonist, is Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. As Mr. Ryan writes of him, all the elements of a classical tragedy unfold—Rommel's ambition, his confidence and yet a nagging uncertainty, his fatal blunder and the rapid denouement — with all hope gone of pushing the invading armies back into the sea as a church bell tolls midnight on the sixth of June.

Still, as we watch the tragedy our sympathy is with Rommel. We, the audience, know he is to fail and feel disgust for what he represents. But then for a fleeting moment, as we would for Macbeth, there comes the thought "If he could only succeed". The tragedy, however, must unfold. No human now may interfere.

There is one major criticism I have of Ryan's tragedy—his lack of humour. He builds us up to a great emotional crisis but then refuses to release us. We must pass on to another emotional crisis. Certainly with the tremendous research into his subject, there must have been a number of D-Day incidents recorded that would amuse us and relieve the tension. Of the two or three humorous incidents he does mention, it is probably natural that the best relate to British soldiery. The one I like is the most hackneyed, but I never tire of it. It is the picture of a sergeant—in this case a Paddy de Lacy, but he could have been anyone of a hundred—making a cup of tea during a lull in the battle. He is upbraided by a young officer who was born when Paddy was serving his first period of enlistment with his regiment. "Now look here, Sergeant, this is no time to be making tea."

**The Longest Day: June 6, 1944.* By Cornelius Ryan. The Musson Book Company Ltd., 103 Vanderhoof Ave., Toronto 17, Ont. $4.95.

Paddy looked up as patiently as discipline would allow. "Sir, we are not playing at soldiers now—this is a real war. Why don't you come back in five minutes and have a nice cup of tea?" The Lieutenant did, as all junior officers eventually do.

There are a few retrospective shudders in Ryan's tale. One is the compromise of the code sent to the French underground signifying that the invasion was to begin. I will remember for a long time that line of Paul Verlaine's poem "Blessant mon coeur d'une langueur monotone" which was the tip-off over the BBC that the landings were imminent. The Fifteenth German Army at Pas de Calais went on an immediate alert, but due to a staff error the Seventh Army in Normandy was not notified of the message "Expect invasion within 48 hours, starting 0000, June 6".

As a *Time* writer in good standing, Ryan offers some great dramatic reading. He underplays the impact of many stories until the last few words and then gives it to you, full force. Here is a typical example from a description of an attack against a coastal battery by British airborne forces.

"Elsewhere in the battery Germans were surrendering. Private Capon caught up with Dowling's men just in time to see 'Germans pushing each other out of a doorway and almost begging to surrender'. Dowling's party split the barrels of two guns by firing two shells simultaneously through each barrel, and temporarily knocked out the other two. Then Dowling found Otway. He stood before the colonel, his right hand holding the left side of his chest. He said, 'Battery taken as ordered, sir. Guns destroyed'. The battle was over; it had taken just fifteen minutes. Otway fired a yellow flare — the success signal—from the Very pistol. It was seen by a R.A.F. spotting plane and radioed to H.M.S. *Arethusa* offshore exactly a quarter of an hour before the cruiser was to start bombarding the battery. At the same time Otway's signal officer sent a confirming message out by pigeon. He had carried the bird all through the battle. On its leg in a plastic capsule was a strip of paper with the code word 'Hammer'. Moments later Otway found the lifeless body of Lieutenant Dowling. He had been dying at the time he made his report."

There are many other examples I could select to indicate Mr. Ryan's approach to the story of D-Day, but possibly the chapter headings convey it best of all. They are simply "The Wait", "The Night", and "The Day".

Mr. Ryan, in an appendix to his book, has included a long list of contributors, 114 of whom are Canadians. Being a skeptical sort, I asked a number of those I knew if in fact they were asked to contribute by Mr. Ryan. Final observation: they were and they did.

The Commander's Duty

The safety, honour and welfare of your country comes first, always and every time. The honour, welfare and comfort of the men you command come next. Your own ease, comfort and safety come last, always and every time.—*The Infantry Journal (India).*

The Story On Disarmament

Reviewed by J. Mackay Hitsman, Historical Section,
Army Headquarters, Ottawa

In the disarmament talks which opened at Geneva during the spring of 1960 Canada has a key role. Anyone interested can be very quickly briefed by Anthony Nutting's little volume* outlining the negotiations that have been carried on since the end of the Second World War. It is short (52 pages) and, like all publications issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, to the point.

"Efforts to secure disarmament", according to Mr. Nutting, "have commonly faced the difficulty that disarmament requires confidence and that 'In order that it may be effective it must be controlled, and guarantees given that those who observe it will not suffer.' In March 1816 Alexander I of Russia, in an informal letter to Castlereagh, proposed a general reduction of armed forces by the powers at a time when Russia was the only country in Europe which was still keeping her army on a war footing. Metternich's reaction to this proposal, as conveyed to Castlereagh, was that because of 'the difficulty always of obtaining any true data from Russia . . . to take the initiative here, uncertain of a reciprocity of confidence, would be impossible.' "

A similar dilemma to that which confronted the peacemakers of the early nineteenth century has equally baffled the statesmen of the period since 1945. Both have in their turn found themselves travelling the same old vicious circle—there can be no real confidence about disarmament and there can certainly be no real disarmament without confidence.

A desire for peace, quiet and comfort was really behind the enthusiastic efforts by Britain, France and the United States to promote disarmament during the 1920's and early 1930's and, in consequence, the Second World War almost spelt disaster for the democracies. As it was, Britain and France ceased to be first-class powers. This fact may be hard to relish but it is painfully spelt out in the subsequent disarmament proposals and counter-proposals to reduce manpower to 2,500,000 men for the Soviet Union, United States and China, and 750,000 men for each of Britain and France.

Since only the Americans possessed knowledge of nuclear weapons in 1945, the Russians initially rejected all proposals for United Nations' control of atomic development in favour of their own proposals for immediate prohibition of the use, production and accumulation of atomic weapons, until they managed to explode a bomb of their own in 1949.

The author suggests that there is no hope of making even a start on disarmament until and unless the powers agree on at least the following: a suspension of nuclear tests under adequate control; a measure of disengagement or thinking-out of conventional forces and armaments in Germany and her neighbours east and west; an agreement

**Disarmament: An Outline of the Negotiations.* By Anthony Nutting. Oxford University Press, 480 University Ave., Toronto 2, Canada. 1959. $1.75.

New Military Atlas

A REVIEW BY MAJOR C. C. J. BOND, HISTORICAL SECTION,
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

In his foreward to *The West Point Atlas of American Wars** President Eisenhower speaks of his confidence in the tremendous aid the work should give "in instructing—and inspiring—the minds of those whose profession it will be to defend the frontiers of the Free World against all enemies." This work, which the preface states is for the use of cadets of the United States Military Academy and for other students of military history, deserves examination to see how it can serve the Canadian professional soldier.

The Atlas is in two volumes. The first deals with Colonial Wars, the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War, the great Civil War and the Spanish-American War. The book is laid out so that each page of maps is accompanied by a page of concise text. The military student's eye leaps to the Civil War —and finds that it is wonderfully well illustrated. Nineteen major campaigns have been selected for study and one hundred and thirty-eight pages of maps illustrate these. The emphases are interesting: the strategic situation is constantly pictured; Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley gets six maps, all of which in a general way cover the operations in the Virginia theatre, and four inserts describe the only battles shown: Kernstown, McDowell, Cross Keys and Port Republic. On the other hand, the great positional battle of Spotsylvania is given seven detailed large-scale maps. Forts Henry and Donelson, the Shiloh and Vicksburg campaigns are particularly well covered. The Mexican War gets thorough treatment; those who have read Prescott will note the capital city that Cortes once captured, bereft by 1847 of its surrounding waters but still served by causeways over the swamps.

It has been suggested by a reviewer in Washington, D.C., that the Spanish-American War might have been more fully treated. It is certain that the maps of the Colonial Wars, the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812 do not do full justice to some aspects that interest us. The Louis-

**The West Point Atlas of American Wars.* Colonel Vincent J. Esposito ed., New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. Two volumes; over 400 maps with text, $47.50.

The Story on Disarmament

(Continued from preceding page)

regarding the status of West Berlin; and, possibly, some measure of progress towards a reunification of Germany.

Unfortunately, however, the world seems satisfied with the state of stalemate which has prevented anything but "brush fire" conflicts breaking out during the past 15 years. Probably common sense would deter the leaders of Soviet Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and now France, from launching a nuclear attack. But the "know-how" can be developed by any number of smaller powers willing to spend enough money. And can there be any guarantee of the actions of a popular demagogue?

bourg campaigns of 1745 and 1758 are faultily shown. Haviland appears as "Havailand", and the Anse au Foulon as "Anse du Foulon". On the Revolutionary War maps, Fort Schuyler appears as "Fort Stanwix", Sullivan's great raid of 1779 is not shown, nor is the important British base, Fort Haldimand, at Carleton Island on Lake Ontario. As to the War of 1812, there is a mixture of detail and sketchiness. For example, Brock's move to Detroit in 1812 is indicated (though the route is not altogether correct) but the action at Stoney Creek is not shown. What is more important, the lines of communication to the naval bases—Sackets Harbor and Erie on the one hand, and Kingston, Amherstburg and Penetanguishene on the other—are not brought out nor are those bases indicated as such. The text makes it appear that Yeo's fleet controlled Lake Ontario in 1814. This was only so from mid-October. The conquest and annexation of Maine is not mentioned, although the other raids along the eastern seaboard in 1814 are described.

Volume II, thicker by half than the other, covers the major military history of this century, in so much of which the United States has been involved: the two World Wars and the Korean conflict.

Of seventy-one pages of maps on the First World War, less than half concern the Western Front. These maps are general in scope, showing usually down to corps only. Particular attention is devoted to the war of manoeuvre in 1914, to Verdun, St. Mihiel, the Aisne-Marne and Meuse-Argonne offensives, operations which except for the first were either American or French. There is a detailed page on the naval battle of Jutland. Nineteen pages of maps cover in a lavish way the Eastern Front, including Salonika and Rumania. Italy has nine, Palestine and Mesopotamia seven and the Dardanelles four.

The Second World War is treated on one hundred and seventy pages of maps in a similar broad and all-embracing way with high-lighting of some American actions. As an indication of the wide coverage in this work, four map pages are devoted to Poland in 1939 and the Soviet-Finnish War receives three. Some naval actions are indicated, and one air operation, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Spot-checking, one notes that the Second British Army front on D-Day is incorrect, 2nd Canadian Corps in the operations at Caen is wrongly shown, and in Sicily the Commandos are depicted landing to the east of 1st Canadian Division (they landed to the west). There are other touches that suggest the Canadian official histories weren't consulted — although they are cited: in Sicily, at the Hitler Line, Hong Kong, to name a few instances.

The same sort of criticism from our point of view could be made of the section dealing with Korea. The 25th (Canadian) Brigade or Canadian participation of any sort shows on no map—it is cursorily mentioned in the text—and the Brigade is not named. The Commonwealth Division as such receives similar treatment.

The maps throughout this work, with one exception, are in three colours, grey for the topography, blue and red for "own troops" and enemy. The cartography is good, a little unsophisticated perhaps. Hachuring is used to show relief except for one layer-tinted map of Korea. Military tactical symbols as used today serve for depiction of operations on all the maps from the

Citizens In Uniform

Reviewed by J. Mackay Hitsman, Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Ottawa

As if there were not already too many studies of the American Civil War and its battle leaders for even the most interested military reader ever to find time for, the volume of new books is accelerating with the approach of its centennial. This reviewer was pleasantly surprised, therefore, to receive a handsome volume of text and photographs about the soldiers themselves—who they were, why they donned uniform, how they were armed, clothed and fed, what were their amusements and diversions between battles, and what happened to those who became casualties. Professor Wiley has based the text of *They Who Fought Here** on his earlier studies of *The Life of Johnny Reb* and *The Life of Billy Yank*. Mr. Milhollen, Curator of the Photographic Collection of the Library of Congress, has selected 169 excellent illustrations to accompany it. Photography was then in its infancy and equipment cumbersome but the results are good; and the fact that most of the pictures are very obviously posed merely lends an air of quaintness.

The opening chapter deals with manpower problems. Here, as throughout the volume, the discerning reader will find much to remind him of the Canadian Army Overseas of the Second World War. The overwhelming majority of the 2,500,000 Federals and 1,000,000 Confederates were American-born whites drawn from every occupation and profession. Naturally enough, since it was only the middle of the Nineteenth Century, there was a far larger proportion of farmers than there would be in the United States Army during the Second World War. But the occupations listed on attestation

**They Who Fought Here.* By Bell Irvin Wiley and Hirst D. Milhollen. Brett-Macmillan Limited, 132 Water St., South Galt, Ontario. 1959. $10.00.

New Military Atlas

(Continued from preceding page)

Mexican War on. It is perhaps a little pedantic to suggest the fact, but in actuality, maps for the use of professional soldiers should show accents in foreign names where they occur. None are used in this work.

The "Recommended Reading List" at the back of each volume has not been carefully prepared. Titles are incorrectly given: "A Half Century of Conflict"; "Les Armées Françaises dans la Grande Guerre". Names are wrong: [Col] G.W.L. Nicholson; Department of National Defence (so far as Canadian publications are concerned). There are errors in the notes: "Dunkirk" was not one of the "pre-invasion raids launched by Canada from Britain"; "Der Weltkrieg 1914-18" is not "incomplete". (Volumes 13 and 14 were published in 1942 and 1944, respectively.)

Notwithstanding the exceptions noted above, this work is a good compilation of the military history of the United States. For the broad picture, for most American campaigns and for most of the fronts in the two World Wars it is a useful work.

papers included entries such as "gentlemen", "gambler", "loafer" and "Jack-of-all-trades". Eighteen-year-old youths were the largest single group of enlistments in both armies, while 70-80 per cent of the total were aged 18 to 29, inclusive. There were a number of boys aged 13 and a sprinkling of youngish grandfathers. Although both sides resorted to conscription, those drafted were permitted to hire substitutes. Northern draft laws, for example, produced only 170,000 men of whom nearly 120,000 were substitutes. The principal benefit from conscription seems to have been the stimulus given to volunteering both in the North and the South.

Mobilization was haphazard in 1861 and the greatest problem was to restrain the tide of volunteers until facilities could be provided for equipping and training them. Medical examinations tended to be perfunctory, causing one official to write President Lincoln in July 1862: "The careless and superficial medical inspection of recruits made at least 25 per cent of the volunteer army raised last year, not only utterly useless, but a positive encumbrance and embarrassment, filling our hospitals with invalids."

The second chapter is a critique of organization and training. "Square bashing" seems to have been emphasized, although the accompanying photographs suggest that the parade grounds were often far from level and satisfactory for that purpose. Little attempt was made to create anything like the modern battle drill: "Skirmish drill on the company and regimental level seems rarely to have been enlivened by the firing of blank cartridges. Target practice with live ammunition appears to have been limited largely to small groups going out with their officers or on their own and trying out their weapons on fence rails, saplings, or small game. When on rare occasions a brigade or division commander brought his infantry, artillery and cavalry together and let them pitch into each other in simulated combat with blank ammunition, they made the hills and valleys ring with shouts of joy and excitement."

That battle casualties were heavy was due to the close order tactics slavishly followed by both sides, despite the great improvement in fire power since the Napoleonic era which they were copying. But the reasons why there were still higher casualties from sickness are clearly indicated in Professor Wiley's chapters. To begin with, although rations were excellent on paper, the troops were not well fed: in practice the Confederates were usually in short supply and often without; peculation resulted in poor quality bread and meat being distributed to the Northern armies, whose cooks did not improve matters. Sanitation tended to be primitive, and malaria, smallpox, tuberculosis, yellow fever and intestinal infections were real killers. Farm boys in particular possessed little immunity to such common diseases as measles which thus caused a good many deaths. Unfortunately, much of the medical practice tended to be primitive, because of a shortage of competent personnel and drugs. The performance of much rough-and-ready surgery without anaesthetics also contributed to the fact that soldiers had to be tough to survive.

There were no organized Auxiliary Services and both officers and men had to make their own entertainment. In consequence there was

a surprisingly large number of amateur theatricals and minstrel shows. Naturally enough, baseball was the most popular game. The more serious read a good deal, particularly during the winter when operations were generally suspended. But gambling and drinking had their devotees, despite the realism of hell-fire to men steeped in mid-nineteenth century orthodoxy. Over-indulgence in liquor was more prevalent among Northerners because they had more money to spend. These also did far more looting, because of generally being in enemy country. Then as now American discipline was strict and punishments awarded were really rugged — the latter so much so that a man's comrades often forcibly intervened to put an end to what can only be deemed torture. Of course prostitution did its usual roaring business, being taken to the camps on both sides because the cities were generally inaccessible to the troops.

When all is said and done, and despite superficial differences, there is much to suggest that the average soldier was much the same as now. It is not too surprising, therefore, that Irving Berlin's understandably popular song of the First and Second World Wars is strangely similar to a refrain sung by the Confederates:

Oh, how I hate to get up in the morning,
Oh, how I'd like to remain in bed!
But the saddest blow of all is to hear the bugler call,
You've got to get up, you've got to get up,
You've got to get up this morning.

* * *

Other Books Received

Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces Year-Book (1959). Edited by Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield, with Brigadier C. N. Barclay and Air Vice-Marshal W. M. Yool, as assistant editors. Now in its 70th year, this is known as the standard book of reference on matters of defence policy, strategy, and the development of armed forces and their weapons in all countries. Chapter headings include Space Travel and Defence (The Editor), N.A.T.O. and the future (Colonel the Hon. E. H. Wyndham, MC), Organization for Defence in the United Kingdom and the United States, 1945-58 (Michael Howard), The Problems of the Arab World (Brigadier Barclay), The Defence of the Deterrent (J. W. R. Taylor), The Need for an Objective Leadership in the Western Alliance (Wing-Commander Norman Macmillan), The Situation in Algeria (Major Edgar O'Ballance), Soviet Military Doctrine—A Possible Pattern of War (Group Captain P. de L. le Cheminant), Guided Missiles (W. T. Gunston), Technical Knowledge and the Command and General Staff Structure (Colonel P. E. Crook) and Military Operational Research (Dr. E. R. R. Holmberg). The book also contains an extensive Reference Section. Brett-Macmillan Ltd., 132 Water St. South, Galt, Ont., $9.50.

* * *

Narvik, Captain Donald Macintyre, DSO, DSC, Royal Navy (Retired). A story of a gallant failure, it tells of the attack on Narvik following the German invasion of Norway and Denmark in 1940, and the subse-

quent withdrawal of allied forces. British Book Service (Canada) Ltd., Kingswood House, 1068 Broadview Ave., Toronto 6, Ont. $4.25.

* * *

The Desperate People by Farley Mowat. The story of forty-nine survivors of a tribe of Eskimoes, the Ihalmiut (The People of the Little Hills), who live in the barrenlands of Northern Canada. Beginning with a short history of the Eskimo peoples from their first appearance in Canada, Mr. Mowat gradually narrows his focus to the twentieth century and the growth of contact between white man and Eskimo. Little, Brown & Company (Canada) Limited, 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 16, Ontario. $5.00.

* * *

The Siege at Peking by Peter Fleming. The story of the Boxer Rising, 1900, with 34 illustrations and seven maps. British Book Service (Canada) Ltd., Kingswood House, 1068 Broadview Ave., Toronto 6, Ont. $5.75.

* * *

Fidel Castro: Rebel, Liberator or Dictator? By Jules Dubois, McClelland & Stewart Limited, 25 Hollinger Rd., Toronto 16, Ont. $5.50.

Drums, and More of Them

In point of antiquity, the oldest musical instruments in the world are drums. Among savage tribes of to-day, where no other musical instruments are to be found, the drum is usually in evidence. African tribes have developed the art of drumming to a high degree. They have evolved a sort of primitive code telegraph system through expert manipulation of the instruments. Some of the tribes use huge hollowed logs, placed near a river, upon which they beat with sticks. The strange tattoo can be heard for distances up to twenty miles; and in this manner messages are relayed for thousands of miles across impenetrable jungles of the Dark Continent. The different tribes, strange as it seems, are able to understand each other's drumming through a sort of African "Esperanto", a universal code system which natives spend years in learning.

One of the strangest drums on record was made from the human skin of Zizka, the great Bohemian general who fought for the cause of the Hussites during Europe's Thirty Years' War. In his lifetime, Zizka—who got his name from the fact that he had but one eye—was a powerful and fearless military leader. Once he threw back an attack of one hundred thousand Crusaders with only a handful of forty thousand untrained Bohemian peasants.

Not content to cease leading his troops when death should overtake him, Zizka ordered that his skin should be stripped from his body and made into a drumhead. His request was granted, and after death halted his plans to effect a treaty to give the Hussites religious freedom, his own skin reverberated to the beat of drumsticks time and again at the head of the army he had once led in person.—*An extract from "The Etude" Music Magazine contributed by Pierre Brunet, Assistant Dominion Archivist, Public Archives, Ottawa.*

THE STUDY OF MILITARY HISTORY

LIEUT.-COLONEL E. G. WILLIAMS IN THE DECEMBER 1959 ISSUE,
Australian Army Journal

Military Board approval has recently been given to changes in syllabi and the method of setting written examinations in Current Affairs and Military History. It is proposed in this paper to examine briefly the aim of written Military History examinations and a suggested method of study for them.

The Aim

In the introduction to *Australian Army Journal* No. 56 of January 1954 on the Shenandoah Campaigns of 1861-62, the then Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant - Général Sir Sydney Rowell, wrote with regard to the study of Military History: "The American Civil War also, demonstrates the fallacy of the belief that all that is required to make a good commander is a strong character and common sense . . . common sense is necessary, but it is not enough. Nor is the mere ability to memorize the few and simple principles of strategy sufficient. It is the knowledge of how to apply those principles that counts. And this knowledge can best be acquired by studying the ways in which the principles have been applied by the great masters in the art of war. It is true that no two situations are ever exactly alike, but the technically competent officer who has conditioned his mind to the study of accumulated military experience will have little difficulty in adapting the means at his disposal to the solution of any problem which confronts him."

The Army Headquarters memorandum which promulgated the changed syllabi and method of setting the Military History and Current Affairs papers stated, *inter alia*, that: "It is considered that the modified examinations will ensure that officers presenting for these subjects—

(a) Should have attained a broader knowledge.

(b) Will have been permitted more incentive for intelligent research and constructive thinking.

(c) Will have had an opportunity of expressing their opinions on the broad aspects set for annual study."

So there you have it: the aim of the study of Military History is to give the student that background to, and climate of, war, and the knowledge of how great soldiers have approached problems by application of the various principles of war so that he may, by accumulation of this theoretical knowledge, be better able to deal in the most effective way with the problems that may arise for him in the crisis of war.

Equally obviously, then, since the aim of all written examinations is to test the knowledge of the candidate . . . the aim of written Military History examinations is to test the candidate's knowledge of events that have occurred in the campaigns under study, the factors influencing those events, and the conclusions that may be drawn from those events and the factors.

The Modified Examination Paper

Three campaigns for Australian Regular Army officers and two campaigns for CMF [Citizen Military Forces] officers for study will be set at the beginning of each training year; from each of these campaigns three alternative questions will be set also early in the training year. At the examination ARA and CMF candidates will be required to write a paper on one question that they have selected from each relevant campaign.

It follows, therefore, that since ARA officers have to write papers on three questions only, and CMF officers on two questions only, that the questions set will be such that a reasonably full study of the campaign involved is necessary to produce adequate answers to the questions set.

The questions set for the June 1960 and July 1960 series of examinations have been published in Australian Army Orders for October 1959, and it may be seen that their answers will involve some quite deep research and preparation.

The Approach to Detailed Study

It is felt that it will be necessary, before the candidate selects the particular question from each campaign, that he will answer in the examination, for him to have a reasonable picture of the whole of the campaign. Once having obtained this by, say, reading the text book through once slowly and intelligently, the candidate is better able to select the question he will answer in that campaign.

Following up this thought, the automatic question that follows is: "Is it a good idea to do the same thing with the other one (or two) campaigns before getting down to detailed study?" For what it is worth, my own opinion is that this would be a bad approach to study for the complete examination, as in the reading of the other two text books, some loss of knowledge of the first campaign would follow, and the candidate would not have advanced very far on the way to completion of his study. Also, bearing in mind that possibly five other subjects have to be studied within the candidates' available time, too great a weighting would be placed on one particular subject.

In addition, as a glance at the questions promulgated will show, it will be necessary for considerable "side reading" to be done in addition to study of the set text books.

These factors, then, suggest that study for Military History be undertaken campaign by campaign, with good solid notes made on each campaign for pre-examination revision.

Detailed Study

Having decided upon the proportion of your study time that you will allot to Military History, and having read one of the campaigns and selected the question you will answer, you will be looking for some quasi-mechanical means of gaining the knowledge necessary to answer the question you have selected. It is not considered that there is any method of obtaining the requisite knowledge without study, but it is felt that there are means by which the study can be crystallized into apt and complete "revision briefs".

From a look at the questions set it will be seen that in most cases opinions of the candidates are required as well as knowledge of events. Since any opinion based on historical events collated by one

author may not present the whole picture, it is necessary that as many references as practicable be studied with a view to gaining diverse treatment of the particular matter.

It will be necessary to write down in detail any references to the question context from all references studied, to compare one against the other, and by reasoned argument to arrive at a considered opinion.

You will ensure, naturally, in this process, that where the question calls for facts to be quoted, as opposed to opinion, or to arrive at an opinion, you must be sure to get the facts written down, too, and to make sure that your facts are right.

This will take some time and a good deal of writing, but as for an appreciation, it will be necessary to study the factors (reportings of the events by different authors), the courses (why it happened, what could have happened if . . .) to arrive finally at your plan (opinion, possible solution to the historical problem, etc.)

It must be emphasized that this is not study that you can afford to do "on the cheap". No amount of coaching can make details stick in your mind as completely as details and opinions you have worked out yourself.

Having prepared your appreciation of the question set, reduce it to a summary containing "all the meat", which summary will become your "revision brief", and with its study just before the examination, you should be able to write adequate answers when you sit for the actual examination.

Remember that the three questions (or two for CMF officers) carry equal values and, logically, each should be allotted the same time-marks value. Naturally since one hour per question is allotted, one hour's value should be presented in actual writing (although this is not an open invitation to "pad and waffle").

Since you will have had about nine months in which to select and study the actual questions you are going to answer in the examination, it is obvious that you are going to save some time in the examination room, in contrast to the old Military History papers, where you had to read the paper and select the questions you were going to answer before you could put pen to paper.

Study of the selected questions in the above manner will certainly ensure that you have studied the campaigns, and moreover should ensure that you pass the examination subject!

Coaching

Few of the questions are such that collective coaching will be effective to the degree that it was formerly, since most questions will require individually reasoned opinion, viz., "discuss", "comment", "compare", "give your opinion", etc. These questions require knowledge of the principle underlying the questions and its relation as a whole to the campaign.

Conclusion

These hints are offered in amplification of those shown in the Preface of *Australian Army Journal* No. 56, and are complementary to them. The main thing to be understood is that the subject of Military History is, and will remain, a requirement for promotion to the rank of major, and that the only way to pass any Military History examination is by adequate presentation of sound knowledge achieved by study.



Courtesy Military Review (U.S.)

Parachute-launched rocket.

ROCKET LAUNCHED FROM PARACHUTE

FROM A NEWS ITEM IN THE FEBRUARY 1960 ISSUE OF THE MILITARY REVIEW (*U.S.*)

Full-scale tests of an unusual rocket - launching technique have been conducted at Holloman Air Force Base in New Mexico. The tests were designed to boost a weather instrument package to altitudes of 200,000 feet, and featured the launching of a rocket from a tube suspended between three parachutes.

The parachute device was ejected from an aircraft at approximately 20,000 feet. A small drag 'chute slowed the assembly, and three larger stabilization 'chutes spread out in a clover-leaf pattern, leaving an open space directly above the launcher tube. The rocket, which was less than eight feet long, was then fired straight up out of the launcher tube, and within six seconds after firing was travelling at Mach 4. At about 200,000 feet the instrumented nose-cone was released for a parachute descent to earth.

LEADERSHIP AND MAN MANAGEMENT

A DIGEST OF AN ARTICLE BY LIEUT.-GENERAL B. M. KAUL IN THE *Journal of the United Service Institution of India*, APRIL-JUNE 1959*

Leadership is the ability of a commander to get the best out of the team he leads under all conditions. It is not something which can be acquired. Its talents are inherent, as in the case of artistic pursuits such as painting, music, and poetry. In order to lead any group of men successfully, it is necessary to possess profound professional knowledge. Its main requisites are courage, personality, physical fitness, ability to make supreme sacrifices, sincerity, and character.

A good leader has an open mind, forgets and forgives, takes, in stride, flattery, disloyalty, ingratitude, meanness, cowardice, falsehood, and other frailties of human character, without malice. He exhorts the timid, stirs up the fight when it slackens, rallies the troops when broken, displays sound judgment, loves his men and in turn is loved by them, and cares for their safety, interests, and well-being. He is generous, warmhearted with a soul of fire and a cool head. A good mind can see and judge whereas character leads to resolute execution. If there is perfect equilibrium between mind, courage, and character and one is also favoured by circumstances and fortune, he becomes a rare leader.

Another facet of leadership is justice. But Pascal said, over three centuries ago, that justice without force is impotent and force without justice is tyrannical. Justice must, therefore, be combined with force.

There is also the question of whether age affects good leadership. Abundant examples of young and old leaders who earned great fame are available. Alexander, Napoleon, and Wellington were young leaders. On the other hand, Julius Caesar, Marlborough, and Foch became renowned as military leaders at an older age.

The test of a leader comes in a crisis; and the biggest crisis of all is a war. It is a tempest which blows through our lives and challenges every institution of our society. It is in war that we are exposed mercilessly and emerge from it as good or bad leaders of men.

The military profession demands our lives, But what causes us to face death willingly? Is it temptation for promotion or decorations, tradition, discipline, patriotism, or visions of glory? Perhaps a little of everything. It is due mostly to personal loyalty and devotion between individuals. This comes through good man management.

Leadership and man management go hand in hand. Relations between commanders and their men are very much like those that exist between a rider and a horse. You must know your horse, its temperament, and its habits. It should be looked after in the stables as if it were worth millions, but should be ridden in

**This digest is reprinted from the March 1960 issue of the* Military Review *(U.S.).* —Editor.

the field as if it were worth a straw. A horse always knows whether he is being ridden well or badly. Similarly, a subordinate always knows whether his superior is commanding him well or poorly.

Other Important Qualities

A good leader should always be sympathetic to those under him, but especially so when they are in trouble or faced with difficulties. In helping them he should go the whole hog and not indulge in half-hearted lip-service. In the latter case they will soon begin to distinguish between genuine and superficial assistance, and lose faith in his word. He should be impartial and avoid favoritism and sarcasm, and not humiliate or belittle them. He should refrain from joking at their expense publicly or displaying his sense of humour too often. They should not feel that he is impervious to their interests, or that he imperils their lives in war without giving them a fair chance of survival. He should never make cannon fodder of them. They expect good leadership, adequate weapons, and supplies from him.

While it is necessary to look after his men and do all that is outlined above, on no account should he ever look for cheap popularity or be oversolicitous toward them. He should not allow them to take advantage of him in any way—some will try to run their superiors. They must be put in their place. No doubt should be left in their minds that he is their boss. He need not be apologetic for any orders he gives. There is a tribe of bullies in all armies. There may be others under him who wield influence in various spheres and are connected with important people. This should never sway or worry him. He must remain the boss of his subordinates. Members of these tribes resent being put in their place. They must be controlled with an iron hand. If this fails to work, they must be removed or suitably punished. They should not be allowed to undermine the position of their boss; once a leader allows his realm of command to be threatened, he will forfeit the respect of his subordinates and virtually will cease to lead them.

The morale aspect should not be exaggerated in a crisis. Men should be nursed carefully in peace but driven hard in an emergency. There is always time and place for solicitude. They should not be praised unduly, but, of course, encouraged when they deserve any approbation; nor should the necessity of hot meals, full sleep, and other amenities be harped upon in situations which do not permit these luxuries. In other words, men should not be pampered nor made into "paper tigers".

Conclusion

If we rise to a high position in life, we must search our hearts. In case we really feel we have some frailties of character, we ought to put them right so that we can justify the high rank attained by us, perhaps through favourable circumstances. But on no account must we ever let ourselves have any pangs of conscience in our eminence or it will begin to prick.

Finally, it should be remembered that man is the most important weapon of war. His management is, therefore, a delicate matter and of great consequence.

A leader may succeed for some time in persuading his superiors that he is a good commander, but he will never be able to persuade his sub-

COMMAND INITIATIVE

A DIGEST OF AN ARTICLE BY MAJOR-GENERAL MILIJA STANISHICH IN *Vojno Delo* (YUGOSLAVIA), ISSUE 1-2, 1959*

Modern military theory recognizes the importance of initiative, and the fact that a future war will be total, long-lasting, and devastating; that it will be conducted over much greater expanses than previous wars and will be primarily a war of maoeuvre. Hence it is necessary that the initiative of the human individual in war be studied thoroughly.

Initiative in an army is that force which is created by the capability and habit of its men and commanders, acting in the spirit of the directives of their superiors — and outside of these bounds whenever the situation requires — employing those means and methods which best meet the requirements of the particular situation, accepting responsibility as logical, and mobilizing both the power of the human intellect and material means at their disposal to the maximum extent.

The necessity for initiative in an army stems from the nature and character of armed conflict. Combat operations take place under conditions which cannot be predicted accurately. Changes are rapid and sudden in war. Higher staffs often are not in a position to have a precise picture of the situation, particularly over an entire front. It is not possible to deal successfully with all these complex conditions and changes by means of fixed regulations and initial plans. If they are to be dealt with successfully, commanders, who are capable of solving new problems by the quick application of their own decisions and counter-measures, are indispensable.

It is impossible completely to foresee and make provision for the fluid situation which will be faced by an entire army or its individual units. Therefore, maximum realization of plans and orders can be expected only when a command structure exists that will carry out orders in a realistic manner and courageously make use of its resources for the attainment of success.

There are many conditions and factors which influence the appearance and development of initiative in an army. Among them are the character of a war, combat morale,† mode of combat action, unity of view of command cadre, training, and schooling. Although these exert their influence on initiative collectively and in mutual interdependence, they shall be examined separ-

**This digest was reprinted from the March 1960 issue of the* Military Review *(U.S.). The translation is by Mr. LaVergne Dale, Leavenworth, Kansas.*—Editor.

†*In this article, the author uses the term "combat morale" to mean morale and esprit.*

Leadership and Man Management

(Continued from preceding page)

ordinates unless he has the real qualities of leadership. There is no known recipe for either leadership or man management, but fundamentally there are no two opinions on the basic requisites of both.

ately in order to analyze the subject matter from a number of points of view to attain a more reliable conclusion.

The Character of War

The character of a war is determined by the social and economic framework within which it evolves, and by the objectives for which it is carried on. This in turn exerts an influence on the human factor — on moral strength and combat ability. A direct influence is exerted by the character of a war on the involvement of men's conscience. This is manifested in the form of convictions of the masses of the unavoidability and justness of the war which they are conducting, and in the will, effort, capability, and energy for enduring and conquering which they display.

With the advent of massive armies equipped with various means, the participation of the masses in the establishment of the economic, moral, political, military, and technological conditions indispensable for the conduct of war has increased greatly. Recently, the role of the public conscience has attained extraordinary significance in wars of liberation and revolution. Such struggles have made a marked imprint on war as a social phenomenon.

The objectives of wars of liberation and revolution correspond to the demands for social development and lead to decisive social changes. The fundamental and progressive nature of these wars makes the broadest participation of the masses in the struggle possible. They demand maximum mobilization of the economic and moral forces of the country. The political aims of these wars, aims in which the masses are vitally interested, develop an enthusiasm in the struggle which motivates heroism, resoluteness, endurance, and initiative.

The internal relationships of armies of liberation and revolutionary armies differ essentially from the relationships in armies waging unjust wars. These factors exert a positive influence on the development of initiative. The unity of the common interests for which they are fighting deeply penetrates and unites commanders and men, and a new perspective and relationship toward the freedom and rights of the individual is developed. All this contributes to the development of a healthy and vigorous atmosphere in which reigns the spirit of mutual trust, esteem, and companionship — a spirit which develops in the individual a strong drive and the will to fight and conquer.

It is essential that the leaders of wars of liberation and revolution stir up, by every means, the initiative of the masses and the individual. In this force resides one of the principal advantages over the enemy. It has been necessary to discard the concepts and reactionary theories which regard a man as an instrument of combat, and to assume the view that every human being in combat is an active factor on whose consciousness, will, and ability the outcome of the struggle depends.

Based on what can be foreseen of the nature of a future war, it is logical to presume that it will require greater political and moral unity of the population and the army. It would be possible, without exaggeration, to say that never before was the outcome of a struggle so dependent on the awareness of men, on their moral strength, and will to conquer.

Combat Morale

Success in war depends, in addition to other factors, on the combat morale of the nation and the army.

The character of the economic and social situation constitutes only the general supporting framework for combat morale. Combat morale is a specific aspect of the understanding of men in combat. It depends on a considerable number of factors, among which are: conviction of the masses of the unavoidability of the war, the effectiveness of military doctrine and organization, and the influence of command, military tradition, and allied successes. In addition to all this, combat morale is formed and its quality is tested in battle against the adversary. Therefore, the combat morale of an army is not a constant, but, under the influence of reality is subject to frequent change. This factor imposes on commanders the task of ceaselessly and energetically working toward its development.

Strong combat morale is marked by a high degree of aggressiveness in the execution of combat operations. A unit possessing this characteristic may be assigned decisive objectives and missions for it is prepared to employ fearless and energetic measures to attain them.

A commander with high combat morale is prepared to make courageous decisions, to undertake operations best calculated to surprise the enemy, and to wrest the initiative from enemy hands. He is capable, under conditions of the gravest danger, of making maximum use of his capacity for action, of his training and his will, continuing his fight for victory although it cost him his life.

If we examine the influence of combat morale on initiative in a future war, it is logical to presume that morale will be of even greater importance than it has been in the past. It is most probable that the complex over-all conditions and the violence with which war will be waged will increase the influence of morale in the outcome of operations. If we analyze the destructive possibilities of modern weapons, we arrive at the conclusion that the hardships and the dangers in modern battle can be countered successfully only by constant manoeuvre. Only the man who possesses an unshakable will to conquer is able to conduct operations under such complex combat conditions.

Mode of Combat Action

In tracing the quality of initiative throughout the history of war, we find that it has always been related to and dependent on the manner in which operations have been conducted. Thus it continually evolves and changes.

In the earlier historical eras the conditions for the development of initiative did not exist to any significant degree. Relatively small armies with modest means, the small size of the battlefield, and the short duration of decisive battles did not favour the development of initiative in each echelon of the armed forces.

Matters underwent a radical change in this respect with the appearance of national armies on the stage of war. The conduct of warfare over greater expanses and the complexity of war materiel required greater activity, self-reliance, and initiative in combat operations.

The Second World War and the period immediately after it are most interesting in the study of the influence of initiative on the conduct of combat operations. This pe-

riod discloses that there are great differences between armies that have waged classical, frontal wars and those which have waged fully nationalized partisan war.

Definite social, economic, military, and technological conditions and a concrete relationship toward the enemy have restricted the methods and forms of combat employed by armies conducting the so-called frontal war. This kind of warfare is characterized by a high degree of centralization both in the employment of forces and means and in the organization and execution of operations. It is understandable that such control of operations restricted self-reliance and freedom of action on the part of subordinate commanders to a considerable degree. That is the chief reason why initiative in those armies was manifested preponderantly in the higher commands. Only under certain conditions and in certain operations such as fighting in mountainous and broken terrain, night fighting, pursuit, and action in the enemy's rear was it displayed by lower commanders. But even with limitations of this kind imposed by the general conditions of combat, commanders made efforts to enable subordinates to act with initiative within the framework of the existing situation.

Nations and armies which have waged completely nationalized partisan war have adopted original principles and methods for the conduct of operations which differ basically from those adopted by armies which have waged frontal wars. Commanders of partisan warfare have striven to employ such methods and forms of action as would encourage initiative. In a war of liberation or revolution, the presence or the absence of initiative has meant either success or defeat. Command control also has been adjusted to this mode of operation: high command has retained control of only the general matters of war and the direction of the most important operations, assigning to tactical units broad freedom in the conduct of their own operations. This method of directing operations has created favourable conditions for the development of initiative from the individual soldier to the highest commander.

There is no doubt that atomic weapons and other new means of war will bring great changes in the methods of conducting combat operations. The absence of fixed fronts, the major expanses over which operations will be conducted, frequent change from the attack to the defence, and operations in the enemy rear will create difficulties in co-ordinating the operations of lower units and will require their greater independence. Commanders on the battlefield will be faced with many great difficulties. There will be more surprise and unexpected losses and units will get into "impossible" situations more frequently. Contact with higher headquarters will often be broken. Advances and withdrawals at prescribed times may be impossible. The commander can have only one solution for these and similar problems. He must take the situation in hand and devise procedures for overcoming difficulties and, using his own initiative, continue operations in the spirit of the concept of his superior.

The conclusion can be drawn, therefore, that modern combat cannot be successfully conducted without officers who are capable of operating independently and on their own initiative.

Unity of View

The more complex the organization of armies becomes, the greater becomes the need for unity of view on the part of the command cadre. This unity constitutes the basic prerequisite for united will and action and for the effectual employment of forces and means both in peace and war.

As a result of the rapid development of war materiel, many changes have occurred in the mode of warfare during recent years. Governmental and military authorities, faced with objective reality, have required that suitable tactical methods be developed and adopted by the entire officer corps.

Today, the question of unity of view of the officer cadre assumes increased importance for several reasons.

Great social and economic changes, and changes in the quality of weapons and equipment indicate a significant difference in the conditions under which the war of the future will be fought. New conditions will bring changes in strategy and tactics. History shows us that during periods of rapid development of human society great changes have occurred in the character of war. It has been very difficult to predict the forms these would assume. This is confirmed by the divergencies found in present-day theories of war.

In the armies of small countries unity of view assumes great importance, for the conditions under which such armies conduct war are often more complicated and difficult than those in which large and well-equipped armies operate.

Unity of view can be attained only with the broad and active participation of the officers corps in the development of doctrine. To discover the most favourable ways, methods, and means for the conduct of a future war, it is necessary for the staff to analyze their own and other nations' military experiences and peacetime exercises. It is necessary to determine the general and special conditions under which war may be conducted, and to prepare an accurate estimate of its locale and the influence of new materiel on it. The end results of this effort will be dependent upon the degree to which favourable conditions are secured for the frank exposition of the various ideas and proposals.

Unity of view will play an important role in the conduct of war to the extent that it is based on correct and proper doctrinal concepts. Countries and armies which achieve unity of view will possess a powerful potential force, out of which will continually spring readiness on the part of commanders and units to oppose the enemy in the most effectual manner, to act with initiative against him, and to overcome him.

Training and Schooling

Training and schooling occupy a prominent place among the factors which influence the development of initiative. Enthusiasm on the part of the individual in work or combat is indispensable for its appearance. Systematic training of will and practice on the part of commanders and men are required for its successful development and exploitation. Training assists in the formation of those traits of character without which initiative cannot be exploited successfully. Initiative is an essential part of the moral and intellectual strength of the individual.

Training in the development of in-

itiative does not require any separate and special measures, procedures, or forms aside from the influence of the every-day experience received during command duty. On the contrary, higher commanders by means of well-conceived and planned guidance and supervision can promote the development of initiative in their subordinate commanders.

The key in the training of subordinate officers in general, and particularly in the development of initiative, is in rendering them capable of independent action. The nature and character of armed combat demands the prominent expression of this quality, for the conditions of combat necessitate quick and timely arrival at suitable decisions, often on the basis of limited or unconfirmed information which is incapable of being weighed accurately. Only a commander who is capable of independently arriving at decisions and solutions to problems can employ initiative successfully and accept all the responsibility that goes with it.

Although the army is one of the most centralized organizations of human society, it has adopted to its own needs the principle of decentralization of command. With the aim of increasing the efficacy of the military organization, decisions are left to subordinate commanders on problems that they are able to solve independently. But the delegation of authority and competence alone does not assure the development of initiative. This is a complex and lengthy process in which the final goal is attained by persistent effort on the part of the subordinate, and by care on the part of the superior to create conditions which promote the development of habits of independent decision and action.

The realization of these conditions requires skill of direction on the part of the higher commander and is manifested by avoiding unnecessary limitations on subordinates. This is best achieved when each echelon of command decides those matters which are within its competence and for which it is responsible. The most efficacious help for the lower commands is offered when the higher commander concentrates his efforts on the correct assignment of responsibilities and formulation of objectives, on ensuring the necessary means for their execution, and on timely checking of the results achieved. This approach to command enables the subordinates to understand completely what they are to achieve, the action desired, and the results sought.

Of equal importance is the attitude of the superior commander toward the manner in which a mission is fulfilled by his subordinate. To the same degree that the method of accomplishing the mission is prescribed to the junior commanders, the problem posed by the mission is solved for him. It is better that the one who executes the mission be allowed the choice of the manner of its execution. It goes without saying that this cannot always be done, for the senior commander must provide suitable control of the decisions which he makes.

Independence and initiative of commanders in training and combat is directly contingent on their readiness to assume complete responsibility for all that their unit has done or has failed to do.

Method of command exerts a strong influence on whether the properties of will and character will be developed in the subordinate commander, and to what degree. When

missions are definitely and clearly assigned and the results of the work of subordinate commanders is checked conscientiously, then a feeling of responsibility grows quickly. On the contrary, when superior commanders assign indefinite missions or when they only check how the work is done and not the result, the feeling of responsibility is not strengthened in the subordinate. Attitude toward errors committed by junior officers also will exert its influence on their willingness to accept responsibility. Errors are the unavoidable accompaniment of any kind of human activity. If officers who have committed unintentional errors while acting energetically are dealt with rudely, their capacity for independent action will be killed. Vigour will be stifled and willingness to assume risks in the future lessened.

Responsibility derives from the necessities of armed conflict: situations change so rapidly, and critical situations come to a head so quickly that a passive attitude in combat or neglect at a decisive moment inevitably brings defeat. Likewise, in the peacetime development of an army, officers are of but little value who have not learned to make decisions independently within the bounds of their competence.

A special and powerful influence on the self-reliance and initiative of officers is exerted by training in their units and schools.

Schooling enables individuals to act independently and with initiative, for it develops professional confidence. This makes it possible to employ the most advantageous combat procedures successfully which, in turn, ensures the most effective employment of forces and means.

Schooling is most effective in making officers self-reliant when the planning, organization, and administration of this schooling is subordinated to the necessities of war. Officers must be placed in complex situations resembling those of war and an effort made to instill the habit of acting independently in making decisions and solving problems. This is especially important today when even minor units are given a more independent role.

Schooling which is either too far removed from the conditions of war or which, under the inertia of old, outmoded concepts, limits the freedom of action of commanders leads to the stifling of the self-reliance of the student officers.

The time has passed when only gifted individuals decide the question of the combat needs of units. Today every army is interested in the collective knowledge and experience of its entire cadre which is acquired and developed by schooling. There follows, therefore, the obligation of the commander, by means of well-planned and systematic supervision, to awaken and develop the creative energy of his men and, by control of schooling, to ensure the systematic gathering, unceasing study, evaluation, and passing along of new information and experiences. In this way an atmosphere is created in which all are interested in the improvement of the combat strength of their units, and subordinate officers consider it their obligation to proffer their proposals and ideas with complete fearlessness, frankness, and in realization of their responsibility.

For officers to be capable of conducting combat operations, they must understand the nature of the war of the future and become ac-

quainted with its fundamental characteristics. They must find new solutions and procedures that will meet the new requirements. This cannot possibly be achieved if the efforts of the students are oriented toward the verbal learning of facts and principles from past wars or the superficial application of norms derived from definite military and technical conditions which have ceased to exist. For the realization of objectives in the present-day military school, it is mandatory that there be painstaking and studious work on the part of both instructors and students. Faces must be turned toward the study and understanding of the new means and requirements. The place and role of the student, in this work, are determined not only by the nature of the matter that is studied, but also by their maturity, life experiences, and aptitude for leadership. For this reason the modern theory of military pedagogy, and especially didactical practice, emphasizes the active participation of the student during the entire course of study. The degree of interest of the student does not depend solely on his alertness and will, but also on the degree to which, through the curricular plan and programme, this interest is stimulated. The establishment of curricular programmes which are realistic and the bold pushing of those curricular methods which most stimulate the students, permit them to understand the new means and methods and render them capable of reaching independent decisions and solutions in complicated situations.

Conclusion

From all that has been expounded, it follows that initiative is the product of a series of objective and subjective factors. In war it is not possible to win solely on the basis of the possibilities offered by objective conditions. Victory is obtained by the reciprocal action of objective and subjective factors. It is not enough that there exist solely favourable conditions for the appearance and development of initiative. Something else is required: systematic effort on the part of the commander permits initiative in the army to become a reality.

For "Confined to Barracks" Read "Restriction of Privileges"

It seems that like horse-cabmen, hot-cross bunmen and those in many other outdated callings, the [British] Army defaulter, as we have known him, is now redundant. The mechanical potato-peeler and other scientific devices mean that even the most ingenious regimental provost sergeant is hard put to it to find enough dirty jobs for even the small number of defaulters per unit in the well-behaved British Army of today.

"C.B." has had its day, and we believe most commanding officers will welcome the new substitute—"Restriction of Privileges". Whether in practice it will prove a good substitute is difficult to say: it is one of those things which can only be judged with certainty after a considerable period of trial.

We shall have more to say on this subject, and the "Probation" system for Service offenders when further details become known.—*From an editorial in the January 1960 issue of The Army Quarterly and Defence Journal (United Kingdom).*



Swiss *P58* light tank.



Japan's new light tank.

Two New Light Tanks Developed

NEWS ITEMS PUBLISHED IN THE DECEMBER 1959 ISSUE OF THE *Military Review* (U.S.)

The Swiss Army has developed a prototype of a 35-ton light tank designated the *P58*. This vehicle mounts a new 90-mm. cannon and a coaxial 20-mm. machine-gun in the turret. The unusually long 90-mm. gun has exceptionally high muzzle velocity and is reported to have great armour-piercing capability.

The Japanese have developed a 35-ton light tank which mounts a high-velocity 90-mm. gun plus two machine-guns. The *STA2* is only 79 inches high and is equipped with a 550-horsepower air-cooled diesel engine. It is operated by a four-man crew and affords up to 75-mm. of armour protection.

British Army to Abolish Battledress

London, England: The coarse khaki battledress British soldiers have been wearing since the 1930's is to be abolished next year. For the first time, non-commissioned soldiers will get a dress uniform.

The Army's farewell to battledress and web belt, and the introduction of a Canadian-type dress uniform and an olive-coloured American-type combat outfit was announced in London, England. The soldiers will get their first dress jackets in 1961. They will have the same cut as officers' jackets, but with cloth belts.

The new jackets will be set off with shirts and ties and flat officer-type caps. A new khaki raincoat of the type a Canadian soldier wears will replace the groundsheet that now doubles as a cape.

For combat purposes, the soldier will get a cotton sateen jacket about half-way between parkas and golfing jackets, with zippered fronts and lots of pockets. For cold weather the British tommies will get lined parkas.—*From The Canadian Gunner.*

Dedicated Men

A man who desires to give orders must study. If the military life is aspired to there is work ahead. Without undue emphasis on platitudes of altruism, there is a need for dedicated men. There is one other requirement . . . That is the quality of balance, the quality which enables one to see oneself as others do.—*Major H. B. Chamberlain in the Australian Army Journal.*

LIMITED WAR—A 60-YEAR-OLD VIEW

REPRINTED FROM *Army*, MAGAZINE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

In the summer of 1959 issue of *Military Affairs*, publication of the American Military Institute, Dr. Russell F. Weigley of the University of Pennsylvania discusses the *Military Thought of John M. Schofield*, as the retired former commander of the U.S. Army and one-time Secretary of War developed it in testimony before the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 1902.

General Schofield's thoughts about the nature of war and strategy have some meaning today, as Dr. Weigley makes clear in the following passages:

"While deploring war, [Gen. John M.] Schofield believed it necessary to prepare for war. 'What guarantee of peace with honor,' he asked, 'has the history of the world ever assured except preparation for war...[?]'

"If preparation were necessary, then it was necessary also to devote thought to the nature of war, so that preparation could be carried out rationally. Repeatedly Schofield emphasized the need to fight wars as reason dictated and not as passion decreed. Of the Civil War he said 'It would seem that the official correspondence of that period ought to be a sufficient warning to deter any future generation from bringing the country into a condition where even some of the most distinguished citizens, statesmen, and soldiers seem to be governed more by passion than by reason in the conduct of public affairs.' Reason demanded especially a definition of the purpose of any war and the consequent adjustment of means to purpose. Unlike so many soldiers of his time, Schofield did not allow Clausewitzian catch-phrases to usurp the place of his thought. He wrote at a time when the military minds of Europe were enamoured increasingly of Clausewitz's doctrine of 'absolute war', repeating increasingly the maxim that 'To introduce into the philosophy of war a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. War is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds.' Schofield did not agree. He believed that limited wars had their place.

"Strategy might have as its object, said Schofield, the destruction or capture of the enemy's armies, such is the case when the purpose of waging war is to suppress a rebellion, as in the Civil War, or to secure the total conquest of a foreign country. On the other hand, the purpose of waging war may be something less than total conquest, in which case the 'all-sufficient and hence best' strategy is simply that of 'defeating in battle or out-manoeuvring the defending armies' without seeking their utter destruction. In the Civil War the worst strategy was a territorial strategy, since the purposes of the North could be achieved only through complete destruction of the fighting power of the Confederacy; but not all wars aim at the total conquest of the enemy, and accordingly a territorial strategy may sometimes be the appropriate strategy.

"The strategy of the soldier, then, is defined by the purposes of his

COFFEE-BREAK ON A CIVIL WAR BATTLEFIELD

WILTON P. MOORE IN THE FALL 1959 ISSUE OF *Military Affairs* (U.S.)*

The coffee-break has become a recognized American institution in recent years. The ten- or twenty-minute break for a cup of coffee in the morning or afternoon is now an integral part of the American industrial scene.

It is easy to picture the British stopping everything, even a war, for their tea at four o'clock. One can also picture D'Artagnan and his comrades having breakfast under enemy fire at the siege of La Rochelle. It is difficult, however, for us to imagine American soldiers breaking off a hotly-contested action to have a cup or two of coffee and, after having it, resume the battle as if nothing had happened. Perhaps by stretching the imagination, we might conceive of individuals, or perhaps a squad doing such a thing, but certainly not an entire brigade.

Yet, such an incident actually occurred during the Civil War. It has received little or no publicity, and is presented here as one of those small and unsung incidents which when discovered, make a researcher's task all the more rewarding.

The incident happened during the Battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862, and was reported by Brigadier-General Marsena R. Patrick, who commanded a brigade of New York troops in that engagement. Patrick was later to achieve fame as Provost-Marshall-General of the Army of the Potomac. He kept a daily journal of his military experiences, and it is in this that he has recorded the coffee-break incident.

He tells how the firing opened at day-break that day and how his brigade marched and counter-marched. He recounts attacks and retreats, advances, and repulses. He describes how his brigade was in pretty severe straits, being attacked in the rear and right flank, and how one of his regimental commanders requested two adjoining regiments to throw back their right at right angles with his line. The general comments: "They did throw back their right, and left, too, and marched off the field, to which they did not again return."

General Patrick's description of what happened next is filled with unconscious humour: Our Cartridges being nearly spent and our right turned, I withdrew the Brigade to a low spot opposite the Barn, and in rear of some rocky knolls, where it remained, between our own and the enemy's Batteries, long enough for the men to make Coffee, as they had not been able to get any Breakfast.

Limited War — A 60-Year-Old View

(Continued from preceding page)

war; and the purposes of war ought to receive their definition in turn not from the soldier but from the civilian heads of government. If the civil government prescribes a war of limited purposes, then it is the soldier's duty to adopt a limited strategy."

Young Soldiers, 1813

CONTRIBUTED BY J. MACKAY HITSMAN, HISTORICAL SECTION,
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

During 20 years almost continuous war with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France that commenced in 1793, life in the British Isles was being altered by an Industrial Revolution which was to make Great Britain the wealthiest manufacturing and trading nation in the world. Since children were expected to toil from daylight to night in the new factories, labour underground in the mines, sweep the insides of chimneys and perform other arduous work guaranteed to shorten their life expectancy, the fact that boys as young as 10 years of age were recruited to fill up the ranks of the British Army cannot be considered surprising. That their lot in the Army should have been better, if only to promote military efficiency, however, is evident from the following order inspired by Field-Marshal His Royal Highness Frederick, Duke of York, Commander-in-Chief of the British Army:

GENERAL ORDER

Recruiting Department	**Horse Guards 25th Feb., 1813.**

THE following General Order is substituted for the Memorandum of the 10th instant, relative to Boy Recruits, which is hereby annulled.

The Commander in Chief is pleased to direct that the Regiments of Foot Guards and Infantry of the Line, shall be allowed to Enlist as part of their Establishment, *Fifty Boys* for each Battalion; and His Royal Highness desires, that Commanding Officers will adopt the most effectual means of filling up the Vacancies which will, from time to time, occur in that number, from these Boy Recruits becoming efficient Soldiers, by engaging a corresponding number of Boys; in the Enlistment of whom, the utmost attention will be required as to their make and general appearance of Health, Vigour and Activity. They must be selected from such as offer the fairest prospect of becoming valuable Soldiers, and of repaying by their future Services the Bounty of the Public in their Maintenance and Instruction before they arrive at the state of Manhood.

The following Instructions regarding the Levy Money, Discipline and general treatment of Boys enlisted under this Order, are to be particularly attended to by the Officers in Command of Battalions, Regimental Depôts, &c. viz.

The Levy Money for each Recruit

Coffee-Break on a Civil War Battlefield

(Continued from preceding page)

Within about 40 minutes or 45, the lull that followed our withdrawal from the ledge was broken by the arrival of reinforcements. The 60th and 78th New York . . . moved up, and my Brigade followed in close support.

The General goes on to tell how the Brigade fought gallantly throughout the rest of the action, well-fortified and refreshed, no doubt, by their coffee-break on the field of battle.

of this description, is £6. 14s. 6d. If engaged for *limited* Service, and £8. 16s. 6d. if for *unlimited* Service.

Boys of *fifteen* years of age, and upwards, receive the same pay as Men.

Those *under* fifteen years of age, are allowed only ten pence per Diem.

It is essential that Arms should not be put into the Hands of these Boys until they have attained a knowledge of the different modes of Marching, Wheeling and the Formations which occur in the ordinary Field Exercise; and as their strength will not at first be adequate to the management of the Firelock a proportion of Fuzils will be furnished for their use by the Ordnance Department. When these Boys attain sufficient strength to perform the Duty of Soldiers, the Fuzils which may have been issued to them are to be received into the Regimental Store for the purpose of being delivered to the younger Recruits of this Class.

Recruits of this description belonging to Regiments which have a Battalion at the Cape of Good Hope, or to the Eastward of that Settlement,—in North America, the Mediterranean, or Gibraltar, are to be forwarded to their Battalions whenever opportunities occur. But they are in no case to be sent to the West-Indies, or to join a Battalion employed on *active* Service, until they are equal in every respect to the performance of their Duty as Soldiers.

The Commander in Chief strongly recommends to Commanding Officers, and all Officers who have the Superintendence of Recruits of the above description, Mildness and Lenity, and whatever Indulgence is compatible with the necessary Instruction of the Boys and accustoming them to habits of Order and Regularity. They will by these means become attached to the Service and desirous of learning their Duty as Soldiers, and their constant attendance at the Regimental School must be enforced, in order to give them the qualifications which may fit them hereafter for Non-commissioned Officers. In cases where all the Battalions of a Regiment are Abroad, the Boy Recruits will naturally fall under the care of the Officers attached to the Regimental Depôt, and it is essential that the Non-commissioned Officers appointed to the same important Duty, should be selected with the utmost circumspection as Men of approved Integrity, who by the regularity and propriety of their own conduct are likely to promote those habits in the Recruits and impress on their young minds those principles which will render them good Subjects and faithful Soldiers.

By Command of His Royal Highness,
The Commander in Chief,
HARRY CALVERT,
Adjutant-General.

Inspiring an Army

To learn that Napoleon won the Campaign of 1796 by manoeuvre on interior lines, or some such phrase, is of little value. But if you discover how a young, unknown man inspired a ragged, mutinous, half-starved army and made it fight, how he gave it energy and momentum to march and fight as it did, how he dominated and combated generals older and more experienced than himself, then you will have learnt something.—*Lord Wavell.*

Plastic Foam Shelter

U.S. Army Photograph

Openings can be cut where desired.

U.S. Army Quartermaster Corps tests are currently underway on a new type "do-it-yourself" shelter produced by spraying a self-rising plastic mixture over an inflated canvas hemisphere. In less than an hour the material hardens to produce an inexpensive light-weight, weather-proof igloo-like structure with foam walls about 1½ inches thick. These can be cut with a bayonet to form doors and windows.

Shelters measuring six feet in height by 12 feet in diameter, and weighing less than 200 pounds, have been tested. The technique was developed by a Quartermaster contractor—Atlantic Research Corporation, Alexandria, Virginia.

Further Quartermaster exploration of foamed plastics may ul-



U.S. Army Photograph

Completed foam shelter.



Multi-Fuel Engines for Future Military Vehicles

FROM A REPORT ISSUED BY THE UNITED KINGDOM INFORMATION SERVICE

British military vehicles of the future will be able to operate on any fuel from high-grade petrol to kerosene and diesel or a mixture of any of these fuels. This was made apparent during a demonstration late last year of multi-fuel engines at the Fighting Vehicles Research and Development Establishment, which was watched by Britain's Secretary of State for War, Mr. Christopher Soames.

Among the exhibits during the demonstration was this 10-ton A.E.C. vehicle operating in tropical conditions. The temperature of the room where the demonstration of this vehicle was held was 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Solar lights blazed down from above the driver, simulating the sun beating down on the desert. The vehicle's engine

U.S. Army's Plastic Foam Shelter

(Continued from preceding page)

timately enable one man to carry in two small containers the tentage requirements of a ten-man squad. When combined, the two chemical components which form the foam-in-place mixture expand to about ten times their original volume. Colour additives can be blended in for camouflage.

Possible adaption to other uses such as packaging, cushioning of air-dropped items, and field refrigeration are also being studied by the Quartermaster Corps.

No Victory Without Pursuit

We are indebted to Captain M. F. Thurgood of the 2nd Battalion, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, for the following verse. Casting a retrospective eye on the Battle of Borodino, 7 September 1812 (see the April 1955 issue of the Journal), *he contributes these lines to teach what he believes to be a basic lesson of military history. This verse was passed on to the* Journal *by Colonel P. R. Bingham, DSO, Director of Infantry at Army Headquarters.*— Editor.

The sun of Austerlitz shines this day,
We'll fight the Russians should they stay.
Brave Davout will the centre try
And Murat rout them 'ere they fly.
As Ney attacks the Great Redoubt
The Russians flee, then turn about.
Again Ney strikes, the Russians yield,
But are not driven from the field.

The Marshals beg their Leader true,
"Release the Old Guard to pursue".
Napoleon in pain now hesitates,
While Cossacks march for Moscow's gates.
The battle ends, the bands are mute,
There's no victory without pursuit.

FRENCH MILITARY REVIEW INVITES CONTRIBUTIONS

Our readers are advised that General of the Army M. Carpentier, Editor-in-Chief of Revue Militaire Générale (France), is inviting Canadian Army Officers to submit articles for publication in that periodical. Payment is made for such contributions.

Further information may be obtained by writing to:

General of the Army
M. Carpentier,
Editor-in-Chief,
Revue Militaire Générale,
5, Rue August-Comte,
Paris (VIe), France.

In this connection, the attention of officers is directed to the provisions of Queen's Regulations (Army), Vol. 1, Section 3, Sub-section 19.37, dealing with the subject of writing articles for publication.

Multi-Fuel Engines for Military Vehicles

(Continued from preceding page)

switched from a tank of low-grade diesel fuel to a tank of high-grade octane and back again without trouble and without loss of power.

Mr. Soames said that the world-wide development in the multi-fuel engine was still in its early stages, but the British multi-fuel engine developed for use in tanks was "unique in the present state of the art in that it produces more power from a smaller unit than any diesel engines yet developed in any part of the world."

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Providing the response is satisfactory, the *Journal* proposes to institute a "Letters to the Editor" column. This column will be open to all officers of the Regular, Militia and Supplementary Reserve forces, as well as Officer Cadets.

Through this medium, we hope to encourage officers to express constructive views on articles appearing in the *Journal,* as well as their opinions on any matter pertaining to current tactical training, organization, equipment, etc., of the Canadian Army.

While the modern trend in many fields of endeavour seems to be towards conformity, the *Journal* believes that it would be to the advantage of the Armed Services if officers were given the opportunity to exercise their powers of original thought and imagination by putting forward their differing views in a service journal.

Only three limitations will be imposed as far as correspondence of this nature is concerned:

1. Opinions may be controversial, but they must be constructive; it is not intended to air views which are destructive and which are not in the best interests of the Armed Services.

2. Letters will be published subject to the limitation of space. For this reason, the *Journal* reserves the right to condense letters which are too long.

3. Correspondents must sign their names and repeat their signatures in block letters; rank, corps and address must also be given.

Correspondents are reminded that the *Journal* is an unclassified publication, and material (including letters to the Editor) submitted for publication must not contain classified information. In cases where it is uncertain whether statements are classified or not, the material is referred to the appropriate authority for a ruling. This protects both the writer and this publication against inadvertent breaches of security.

"So many men, so many opinions." The *Journal* hopes it may be privileged to publish some of them.

A Time for Critical Analysis

Today, great efforts are being made to assess realistically the extent of our Army's new capabilities, to develop tactics which will make the most of those capabilities, and to adopt forms of organization to make the improved tactics feasible. All these are healthy signs.

While these efforts will result in continually improved doctrine, it is equally necessary for each officer, in his own thinking, to develop the habit of objective, critical analysis. Even in time of peace, published doctrine can seldom keep abreast, in every detail, of the latest technical capabilities. The soldier who first realizes a new capability—and applies it—will have a substantial advantage.—*Lt.-Col. John B. B. Trussell in "Is the Doctrine Pertinent?", Association of the United States Army magazine "Army".*

CANADIAN ARMY ORDERS

Listed below is a resumé of Canadian Army Orders for the information of military personnel. Details of these orders are available in all Army units.—Editor.

CAO 20-26

Designation of Officer Cadets
(Issued: 18 Apr 60)

This new order prescribes the designation to be used to indicate, for records and pay purposes only, the terms of service under which an officer cadet of the Canadian Army is accepted for officer training.

CAO 20-27

Officer Candidate Programme — Terms of Service
(Issued: 18 Apr 60)

This new order, which supersedes AGI 54/35, prescribes the terms of service which govern the selection, enrolment, promotion and release of officer cadets of the Officer Candidate Programme.

CAO 73-2

Dental Treatment
(Issued: 2 May 60)

This revision incorporates policy on entitlement to dental treatment for cadets of Canservcols and members "employed with industry".

CAO 73-3

Dental Treatment by Civilian Practitioners
(Issued: 2 May 60)

This revision outlines the authority for Command Dental Officers to employ civilian practitioners on a per diem basis if in his opinion it is in the interest of economy.

CAO 73-4

Dental Treatment — Civilians
(Issued: 2 May 60)

This revision combines in one CAO the treatment regulations for civilians by incorporating CAO 73-5.

CAO 73-6

Dental Examinations
(Issued: 2 May 60)

This revision expands the CAO to incorporate policy on dental examinations for members of CA(R), and for members of Reserves engaged in flying duties.

CAO 73-8

Dental Documentation
(Issued: 2 May 60)

This revision notifies changes in dental documentation procedure on release.

CAO 85-8

Authority of Civilian Employees to Issue Instructions and Sign Documents
(Issued: 7 Mar 60)

This revision more clearly defines the powers of civilian employees to give certain instructions and sign certain documents.

CAO 94-2

Permanent Assistance in Militia Orderly Rooms and Quartermaster Stores
(Issued: 18 Apr 60)

This amendment prescribes the

new ceilings for other ranks employed as permanent assistants in Militia units.

CAO 97-5

Life History Documents
(Issued: 7 Mar 60)

This amendment authorizes the use of RCAF Aircraft Maintenance Record set L-14 for all Army aircraft.

CAO 98-2

Holding and Administrative Lists
(Issued: 21 Mar 60)

This amendment authorizes a Holding List for CALE to account for personnel being enrolled or released in UK.

CAO 128-28

Decorations and Medals — Replacement
(Issued: 21 Mar 60)

This amendment notifies the cost of replacing the United Nations Medal when it is lost through circumstances which cannot be attributed to the exigencies of the service.

CAO 130-9

Sanitary Control of Army Indoor and Outdoor Pools and Swimming Areas
(Issued: 7 Mar 60)

This revision breaks down the division of responsibility of the Medical Service and Army Works Service.

CAO 139-5

Supplementary Death Benefits Plan
(Issued: 4 Apr 60)

This amendment provides a procedure to be followed when it is intended to release a member who is eligible to become an elective participant of the Supplementary Death Benefits Plan, but who is mentally or physically incapable of making an election.

CAO 162-1

Leave and Pass
(Issued: 7 Mar 60)

This amendment shifts responsibility for leave from D Adm to D Org.

CAO 162-1

Leave and Pass
(Issued: 2 May 60)

This amendment permits apprentices to be granted 16 days leave at Christmas.

CAO 162-1

Leave and Pass
(Issued: 18 Apr 60)

This amendment deletes all reference to Isolation Leave as a result of the repeal of QR(Army) 16.24, effective 1 Apr 60.

CAO 212-25

Isolation Allowance
(Issued: 18 Apr 60)

Effective 1 Oct 59, QR(Army) 205.40 (Northern Allowance—Rates and Conditions) was replaced by article 205.40 (Isolation Allowance — Rates and Conditions), which is based upon the Isolated Posts Regulations applicable to civilian employees of the Public Service of Canada.

CAO 218-3

Overseas Mail, Addresses and Rates of Postage
(Issued: 2 May 60)

These amendments add the Staff

of Maple Leaf Services to the list of civilians accompanying Armed Forces who are privileged to use the Armed Forces postal services, and also includes a revised table of postage rates and regulations.

CAO 218-5

Use of Registered Mail
(Issued: 21 Mar 60)

This revision provides that the use of registered mail for transmission of classified material will be in accordance with CAO 255-1—Security of Information.

CAO 218-6

Postal Service—Department of National Defence—Camps in Canada
(Issued: 22 Feb 60)

This new order outlines the division of responsibility between the Post Office Department and the Department of National Defence in the provision of postal service at camps in Canada.

CAO 225-30

Ordnance Manual
(Issued: 22 Feb 60)

This amendment notifies that Volume 3A of the Ordnance Manual has been cancelled; all pertinent data has been transferred to Volumes 3 and 12.

CAO 225-53

RCOC Pricing Guides
(Issued: 18 Apr 60)

This new order notifies the transfer of responsibility for the publication and distribution of RCOC Pricing Guides from the Directorate of Cataloguing and Equipment Requirements to the Directorate of Ordnance Services.

CAO 264-1

Declaration of Surplus Assets
(Issued: 4 Apr 60)

This revision expands the number of classes of stores which may be disposed of without reference to Crown Assets Disposal Corporation.

CAO 271-10

Postings and Detachment Postings Approving Authorities
(Issued: 7 Mar 60)

This new order contains the policy of AGI 55/20 on postings and detachment postings.

Gas From Coal

The USSR is employing a process of subterranean conversion of coal into gas on a large scale as a source of industrial power and raw material. At least four plants are currently in operation which use this method. One of these, located near Tula, produces 24,000 kilowatts of energy. In addition, a portion of the gas produced at this plant is processed chemically to produce gasoline.

A plant near Moscow produces 400 million cubic metres of gas annually for local industrial use. It is significant that the process can use any type of coal regardless of quality.—*News item in the Military Review (U.S.).*

THE CORPS OF ROYAL CANADIAN ENGINEERS

Kimberley Militia Unit Aids Community

Engineers Train in Mountain Valley

By

MAJOR J. W. REYNOLDS, OFFICER COMMANDING 17 FIELD SQUADRON, ROYAL CANADIAN ENGINEERS (MILITIA), KIMBERLEY, B.C.

Maintaining a militia unit in a state of healthy activity is always one of the chief problems facing a commander. Fundamentally, it is a matter of conceiving and developing a training programme which will attract and hold men to the unit. Once the initial period of common-to-all-arms and corps training has passed, there has to be found an interest to retain men already trained. It is not sufficient to proceed to leadership or specialist training with selected individuals. What is required is a challenge to the imagination of the whole unit, sufficient to arouse morale and stimulate that *esprit de corps* without which no militia unit can thrive.

Urban and rural units have different opportunities and difficulties, as different as those between arms. This is the story of a militia squadron of engineers located in a remote mountain valley, and how they have helped themselves.

No. 17 Field Squadron, Royal Canadian Engineers, was established at Kimberley, in south-eastern British Columbia, on 1 January

Bulldozing the road to Cherry Creek site.

1951. Previous military history of the area included battalions raised in the district for the First World War, but continuous service only began with the establishment of 108 Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery, in 1936. It went through various stages of evolution, first as a field howitzer battery until 1939, then as an anti-tank battery in the Second Canadian Division until 1946, before returning to Kimberley as an Anti-Tank Battery (Self-Propelled). That battery formed part of the 41st Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA, which in 1946 had one battery at Red Deer, Alta., one at Calgary, Alta., with the RHQ, one at Courtenay on Vancouver Island, together with the one at Kimberley.

The regiment never assembled, and the battery at Kimberley had a host of other problems. Its accommodation consisted of the rented lower half of the Oddfellows Hall, as it had since 1936. The equipment consisted of one tractor-drawn piece assembled on the floor of the hall, from whence it could not be drawn outside, and a self-propelled piece, housed in a civilian garage, which was too heavy to cross any highway bridge in the area.

There was no parade square, no rifle range within 300 miles, no recreational or mess space, no adequate accommodation for stores. Despite the limitations, the unit managed to maintain an identity until 1950, by which time anti-tank functions in the RCA were being declared redundant. Being given a choice, the unit elected to convert to RCE. There were a number of

Cutting timbers for the pier crib.

Bents up and stringers starting.

good reasons. The commander had served in the RCE, as had several of the NCO's. Kimberley is a town based on the lead and zinc mining operations of the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada Limited, and there was a potentially attractive pool of professional engineers and tradesmen from which to draw officers and men. Engineers stores are generally reducible to items which can be man-handled. The hinterland was Crown-owned, offering endless opportunities for practical exercises. The unit was therefore re-established as an Independent Field Squadron, RCE, and given the number 17 from a unit in Quebec which had become dormant.



Final details in the construction of the Cherry Creek bridge.

There was a lot to be done. The first step was to reduce strength to a small group of officers and men who could undertake conversion training. When these were qualified, the normal cycle of basic and corps training was instituted. It became evident that practical application of training would be desirable, and a demolition exercise was arranged in the fall of 1953 to break up several hundred tons of steel castings which were being scrapped at the mine. Since this was carried out almost within Kimberley, it received a great deal of notice and stimulated interest, both from outside and within the unit. Strength began to climb. It was decided, therefore, to try to carry out other local exercises which might create interest and provide training as well.

In 1954 a site was found where a local resources bridge might be erected and which would be within the capability of the unit to construct. Surveys and preliminary work were done in 1954, and the project advanced to the point of getting bank-seats and piers in place, before winter, for a 120-foot Class IX trestle-bent, single-track bridge which would serve to open up more than 100 square miles of timber and hunting territory.

The only engineer plant used to this stage had been a compressor. Hand tools such as axes, saws, picks and shovels had sufficed for the rest. During the winter of 1954-55, with the enthusiastic support of the Command Engineer, Western Command, and the GSO 2 (Militia), the project was enlarged to offer training opportunities to other militia engineer units. A regimental-scale exercise was conceived, called Cherry Creek III. Engineer plant was obtained, including a mobile

shovel, dump trucks, dozers and a grader. In one three-day period elements of the following units were moved to the site, employed and returned: 24 Field Squadron RCE from Yellowknife, NWT; 25 Field Squadron RCE from Edmonton, Alta.; 13 Field Squadron RCE from Calgary, Alta.; 33 Field Squadron RCE from Lethbridge, Alta.; 44 Field Squadron RCE from Trail, B.C.; and 39 Technical Squadron RCEME from Blairmore, Alta. Elements of 150 Company RCASC and 21 Medical Company RCAMC were included, as well.

As its function on the exercise, 17 Field Squadron directed the work and handled the many administrative and quartering problems, getting an exceptional opportunity to gain experience with staff problems. It provided the necessary Special Engineering Equipment (SEE) operators, but as far as possible the actual tasks were put into the hands of the visiting units so that they could actually carry out practical training, such as felling trees, drilling rock, timber assembly, etc., for which opportunities were lacking in their home areas.

More than a mile of road was built, but the time available was insufficient to finish the bridge on this exercise with the unskilled organization. There was time, however, to hold a mess dinner, a rare opportunity for the officers of many of these far-flung units. The bridge was finished by 17 Field Squadron on the day the Edmonton Eskimoes took the Grey Cup for the first time! It has proved sufficiently stout to carry logging operations ever since, and is still in ser-



The early stages of the Mark Creek project which called for the dismantling of a railway turntable and re-erecting it as a dual carriage-way Class 80 highway bridge. The turntable is shown here stripped of track.

vice five years later without any more maintenance than occasional repair to handrails.

The bridge on Cherry Creek had provided a tremendous stimulation to the unit, and had raised local prestige to the point where other chances for practical and profitable training were made available.

The city engineer of the City of Kimberley was an ex-Engineer officer and he suggested that the unit might like to participate in two permanent bridges to be built in Kimberley over Mark Creek. An arrangement was arrived at and agreed to by Command whereby the city would supply all necessary materials and the unit could take as much time as it wanted doing such aspects of the work as were practicable to include in its training schedule. One bridge was a simple 25-foot stock steel span with a heavy timber deck which was easily erected. The bank-seats were already in place.

The other was a much more interesting problem. The proposal was to dismantle a railway turntable and re-erect it as a dual carriageway Class 80 highway bridge. It is the sort of task available to many units and localities where the adoption of diesel locomotives has rendered the need for turntables obsolete. Survey, design, approaches, excavation and pier construction were accepted as unit tasks. Throughout, the thought was to use standard military engineering methods and tables as references and let the tasks serve as practical proof to the unit of the validity of

The pier excavation for the Mark Creek project.



The Bailey bridge which was used as a detour while the new permanent bridge was being constructed.

their training. The unit obtained a D-7 dozer complete with a full range of Hystaway power-takeoff attachments, and this is believed to be the first time that equipment of this scale had been issued to a militia engineer unit, although it is on the normal scale of issue to a regular unit.

When weather conditions were right, in the spring of 1957, the turntable was cut into its two main components, and the girders were lifted from the turntable pit so that they could be skidded on their sides through the city streets. Frost in the ground and snow on the pavement allowed this to be done without damage to municipal property. No transport able to carry the girders was available. The summer and fall of 1957 were spent doing the extensive site and approach work required.

Excavation for piers began after the height of the annual spring run-off passed in 1958, and the unit gained experience in reinforced concrete design, erection and placement. Each pier called for more than 100 yards of concrete. The work was done in a series of week-end exercises.

Progress was too slow to allow completion in 1958, so a problem arose when the bridge which the new one was to replace was condemned. To provide a route, the unit erected a Class 70 Triple-Single, Extra-widened Bailey bridge 70 feet long alongside the permanent bridge site. This was maintained during the winter of 1958-59 and again provided the unit with train-

ing opportunities seldom available to a militia unit. The Bailey was lifted just prior to high water in 1959. The permanent bridge was decked and opened to the public in the fall of 1959. It provides the main highway artery crossing over Mark Creek through the City of Kimberley and is thoroughly appreciated by the citizens.



The new bridge completed and open to traffic.

As was anticipated, there were considerable periods during the erection programme of this bridge when only small parties could work or when the plant was idle. Therefore, when the Kimberley and District Recreational Projects Society asked for help on two community enterprises a sympathetic hearing was given. One was for help to level the ground adjacent to the bridge so that a covered hockey arena could be built. The other was for help to clear slopes of secondary growth timber on nearby North Star mountain for ski trails. Both tasks were undertaken, serving not only to further heighten unit prestige in the area but also to carry the unit easily through the difficult period when the militia was being reoriented for National Survival roles.

The arena is approaching completion in the spring of 1960, and the ski slopes were in constant use, offering what is considered to be the finest skiing in Canada, complete with what is thought to be the longest Tee-bar tow in North America, somewhat over 6000 feet in length and raising skiers more than 2000 feet. The unit, together with the Society, took tremendous satisfaction from the fact that it was available in time to be used to train Canada's ski team for the 1960 Olympics.

As an indication of what the citizens think of the help given, the ski hill has been offered to the Regular Army for ski training. It is a community-owned, non-profit project and is available between week-ends. Though the offer has not yet been taken up, it offers attractive possibilities. For one thing, snow can be guaranteed which is not always the case in many parts of Western Canada in mid-winter, as training officers know to their sorrow. For another, there can be few places in Canada where Arctic conditions can be reached so easily or comfortably, for an Arctic climate can be reached just as easily by going up a mountain as by going to northern latitudes; and the gentle wooded slopes of the Selkirk range offer ideal training terrain, attainable directly by road or by railway to within a mile, and only 10 miles from an airport!



Raising a tower during the construction of the North Star ski run.

The habit of helping themselves to solve their own problem has grown on 17 Field Squadron. In order to contend with another long-standing training difficulty, they have started constructing their own rifle range, again as a training project to provide the practical aspects of training in such engineer tasks as road building, demolitions, bridging and water supply.

They have to do these things to offset other difficulties, for the unit is still housed in the lower half of the Oddfellows Hall and its vehicles are still stored in a civilian garage. Despite the lack of amenities, the unit has grown to the point where the whole unit can neither train nor even fall in on parade in its accommodation, and space in an adjacent school has to be rented. The projects undertaken have only served to round out a normal engineer unit's training programme, to supplement normal summer camps and ordinary training exercises. The unit enjoys tremendous local support. The mining company which employs most of the men generously offers to grant leave for attendance at camp every year, without prejudice to holidays, and makes up the difference in pay between Army rates and the individual's normal wages.

How have the policy and programme adopted worked? Perhaps the best gauge is to cite the record for the Gzowski Trophy, emblematic of proficiency amongst engineer militia units. In the eight years since 17 Field Squadron RCE was established at Kimberley, the unit has won the trophy for Western Canadian units three times, for the years 1955, 1957 and 1959, and has been runner-up in '56 and '58.



Stringing the tee-bar tow cable.

ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS

A NEWS ITEM IN THE NOVEMBER 1959 ISSUE OF THE MILITARY REVIEW (U.S.)

Organized in February 1958, the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) is responsible to the [U.S] Secretary of Defence for projects in the general areas of military space technology, advanced research and development of future ballistic missile defence and solid propellants.

During the first 20 months of its existence ARPA has commenced work on 10 major projects. These are:

Project *Saturn:* A new space booster consisting of a cluster of eight ballistic missile type liquid propelant rocket engines, with a total thrust capability of about 1.5 million pounds. It is expected to enter flight test status in late 1960.

Project *Defender:* The entire ARPA effort in the field of ballistic missile defence consisting of more than 50 programmes.

Project *Midas:* The development of an early warning system against ballistic missile attacks based on the use of satellites.

Project *Discoverer:* A research programme for the development of advanced space vehicles and systems to perform sophisticalted tasks in space.

Project *Transit:* A system of using satellites for navigational purposes. It is planned to provide an instantaneous, all-weather system for determining position at any point on the globe by passive means.

Project *Courier:* The first phase in the development of a communication satellite system.

Project *"Mrs. V":* A programme designed to conduct the research necessary to produce a monoeuverable, recoverabl space vehicle.

Project *Sentry:* The development of an advanced satellite reconnaissance system.

Project *Centaur:* Designed to produce a new high energy upper stage engine to provide a 4- to 5-ton payload capability when used as a second stage to an inter-continental ballistic missile booster.

Project *Orion:* The study of the possibility of using controlled nuclear detonations to propel a rocket.

Automatic Mapping System

A system which will provide accurate map information from aerial photographs in less time than is required by manual photogrammetric methods is being developed by the United States Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories. The system, expected to be in operation during the current year, employs electronic scanning of overlapping photography and can produce a contoured photograph on which the position of the image is displayed to its true scale position.—*News item in the Military Review (U.S.)*

THE ROYAL CANADIAN CORPS OF SIGNALS



Canadian Army Photograph

Th UNEF dispatch rider in his white jeep is beset by every traffic hazard imaginable — except icy roads.

THE SIGNALS' JOB IN THE UNEF

By

LIEUT. F. W. PRATT, THE ROYAL CANADIAN SCHOOL OF SIGNALS, BARRIEFIELD, ONT.

Today, three and one-half years after the Sinai clash, strong feeling between Egypt and Israel lives on. And so, too, at a cost of $53,000 a day, does the 5400-man, seven-nation United Nations Emergency Force, and both sides credit UNEF with the prevention of any major clash between them.

An important factor behind the success of this combined police and observer force is its effective communications organization. This is one of Canada's largest contributions to UNEF — known since its formation in November 1956 as 56 Canadian Signal Squadron, and now in the midst of a change-over between fourth and fifth contingents.

Tailored to fit the special needs of this unique force, the familiar elements of radio, telephone, teletype, radio-teletype, dispatch rider and signal centre comprise the backbone of this unit. There, however, any similarity to a normal signal squadron ends.

Jobs assigned to signalmen on the Sinai beat vary from weaving a dispatch rider's white jeep among camels, donkeys and swarming natives along the treacherous road between Gaza and Rafah, to "talking in" an RCAF Dakota to a smooth landing at El Arish; from pounding out radio-teletype signals in 120-degree heat at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba to setting up loudspeakers so a Scandinavian concert party can entertain Jugoslavs at a remote desert oasis.

All the Force's internal communications, except those between UNEF's Gaza headquarters and its


MEDITERRANEAN SEA
TEL AVIV
JERUSALEM
GAZA
PORT SAID
SUEZ CANAL
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EL ARISH
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GULF OF SUEZ
GULF OF AQABA
SAUDI ARABIA
SHARM EL SHEIKH
RED SEA



Canadian Army Photograph

Mid-day heat drives the UNEF Headquarters staff to the cooling waters of the Mediterranean, but Signals work on because "the message must get through".



Canadian Army Photograph

Canadian signalmen in the Middle East are ready to send a mobile radio station into the desert on short notice, should a remote sector of the frontier become suddenly active.

air station, are the responsibility of the signal squadron whose commanding officer is also the commander's Chief Signal Officer.

External links through Geneva to UN's New York headquarters, and to other UN offices in Cairo, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Beirut, are handled by the civilian UN Field Service Radio, as is the radio circuit to the air station.

To discharge its internal communications responsibilities, the squadron's strength is distributed among four locations: at UNEF headquarters in pre-biblical Gaza, at the Maintenance Area in a former British Army camp at Rafah, with the RCAF at El Arish and 220 miles away at the southernmost tip of the Sinai Peninsula where, at Sharm el Sheikh, a UNEF outpost keeps a lonely vigil over the narrow entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. A continuous rotation system from outpost to outpost gives most members of the squadron a change of scene every few months.

Vital Tasks at UNEF Headquarters

The UNEF HQ Signal Troop in Gaza operates a Message Control Centre around the clock, even while the rest of the headquarters staff knocks off during the heat of the day for a dip in the Mediterranean. This office combines the functions

Canadian Army Photograph

Not even the sands of the desert are free from the ubiquitous public address system — another chore for Signals.



Canadian Army Photograph

Vital telephone lines which have been damaged are repaired by Signals linemen, who have few idle moments.

of a normal signal centre and those of a staff message control, processing all messages entering or leaving the headquarters, whether via army signals or UN Field Service, making additional copies for various interested offices, and deliveries to individual addressees. In a headquarters combining many nationalities and a large civilian component, the successful operation of such a centre is a difficult but satisfying task.

In a separate office, Canadian signalmen maintain radio-teletype contact with Rafah and Sharm el Sheikh, using AN/GRC-26 equipment, with a landline teletype circuit to Rafah as a standby. Still others operate the headquarters' two-position telephone exchange (107 locals and 13 trunk lines).

Dispatch riders working out of Gaza call at the Danish-Norwegian Battalion and the Indian Battalion on their 30-mile daily run to the Rafah Maintenance Area, as well as at various UN establishments in Gaza itself. They never travel alone, and always carry a trusty sten in case of excessive native interest in their activities.

On special occasions such as a suddenly active distant sector of the frontier, or a four-day desert sightseeing tour to St. Catherine's Monastery at Mount Sinai, radio operators from Gaza take out a mobile station to maintain direct contact with headquarters.



Canadian Army Photograph

Teletype mechanics soon learn that the shifting sands of the desert have a habit of shifting deep into the heart of their machines.

Canadian Army Photograph

Canadian operators at the radio-teletype station at Rafah are the main link with home, as well as with other parts of the UNEF.

A Canadianized British Camp

The bulk of the signal squadron is found at the UNEF Maintenance Area in Rafah Camp, almost flattened in the Israeli invasion but now restored even beyond its former splendour by successive waves of Canadians. Here a Signal Centre operating around the clock incorporates under one tin roof the camp telephone exchange (115 locals, 5 trunks), signal office and the teletype and radio-teletype stations in contact with Gaza and Sharm el Sheikh. Dispatch riders from this centre call at all units in the maintenance area and at the nearby Brazilian Battalion.

Also in Rafah is the squadron headquarters, quartermaster stores, Motor Transport compound and maintenance workshops for unit radio and teletype equipment and charging sets.

Linemen based at Rafah share with their counterparts at Gaza the maintenance of the vital but trouble-ridden 30-mile telephone and teletype lines between the two headquarters. The necessity for 24-hour communication brings them out at all hours of the night with an armed Provost escort whenever vandals snip the wires.

Newly-acquired microwave radio relay equipment now being installed will replace this over-worked and vulnerable line and provide many badly-needed extra speech and teletype channels. It will also permit a considerable reduction to the squadron's establishment.

Where MIGs and Dakotas Co-exist

Thirty miles south-east of Rafah,

Canadian Army Photograph

The Canadian message control centre at UNEF Headquarters in Gaza operates around the clock regardless of the heat.

on a road to the Suez Canal once travelled by the Holy Family, is a desolate airfield shared by 115 Air Transport Unit, RCAF, and a squadron of MIG jet-fighters of the United Arab Republic. Here the ground-to-air VHF radio station is operated by a detachment from 56 Canadian Signal Squadron, as is an automatic radio beacon for aerial navigation. Operators at the VHF station work as an integral part of the RCAF operations room and give out wind, visibility, barometric pressure and other weather information to incoming aircraft from Beirut, Jerusalem, Sharem el Sheikh, Montreal, Cairo and Athens, and to occasional visitors from Sweden and Brazil.

The Sinai's Hot Spot

The Signals' job at Sharem el Sheikh is to transmit reconnaissance reports from the Scandinavian-manned lookout tower where a close watch is kept on all shipping on Israel's only direct route to the Far East since she was denied use of the Suez Canal. Here a sergeant and five men sizzle for a month at a t i m e — in forbidding mountainous country that even the roving Bedouins shun and where the last rainfall occurred seventeen years ago. The sub-tropical heat is made bearable only by luxurious natural swimming facilities and such off-beat diversions as shark-shooting with the .303 Lee-Enfield and skin diving among fabulous underwater scenery that has to be seen to be believed.

As well as operating the radio circuit to Gaza and Rafah, the "Sharm Swelterers" maintain a small UNEF switchboard and a telephone line to the observation tower. The highlight of the monotonous routine is the arrival of the twice-weekly supply aircraft from El Arish bringing

(Continued on page 132)

Canadian Army Photographs

"All clear to land on runway two" is flashed by a member of 56 Canadian Signal Squadron to an RCAF Dakota circling the UN Air Station at El Arish.

A field switchboard at Rafah Camp.

THE ROYAL CANADIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS

THE RCASC IN PORT SAID

By

CAPTAIN W. R. SECORD, CD, ROYAL CANADIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS*

This report of Royal Canadian Army Service Corps activities in Port Said, Egypt, is concerned with the Port Platoon of No. 56 Canadian Transport Company, RCASC, United Nations Emergency Force. The period of activities covered here is from November 1957 to November 1958, during the tour of duty served in the Middle East by the 2nd Canadian Army contingent to UNEF.

A Port Platoon is a unit, seldom and likely never before, employed by the RCASC. Its formation in Egypt occurred early in 1957 during organization of the UNEF Administrative Area at Rafah Camp, located in the desert approximately 160 miles east of Port Said.

In Rafah Camp, operation of the Supply Depot and issue of rations to all UNEF units became the responsibility of the Army Service Corps of the Indian Army. The Composite Platoon of 56 Canadian Transport Company, which normally handles rations and POL, therefore had no function in Rafah Camp but in Port Said an organization was needed to assist UNEF Movement Control in the receipt and onward dispatch of supplies brought into the port by sea and shipped by rail to Rafah Camp. The Composite Platoon designated "Port Platoon", was assigned to this task, and was detached from the Transport Company and moved to Port Said.

Port Said is a harbouring area, without docking facilities, for ships passing through the Suez Canal. Stores landed at Port Said are unloaded from ships to lighters which, in turn, unload at quays.

The Port Platoon conducted operations on Cherif Quay, situated within a customs zone, which included bonded warehouses and was served by several railway spurs. Stores arriving at the quayside were sorted by size or type, tallied and loaded into waiting railway equipment for the journey to Rafah Camp.

Large shipments originating from United Nations countries, when sorted, covered most of the quay and required two or three days for accurate tally, particularly when damaged enroute overseas by rough handling, pilfering or as the result of improper packing. Inadequate labelling of crates and boxes by the consignor also presented difficulties.

Congestion of space on the quay was often experienced when several ships simultaneously discharged UN cargoes, and many days would be required to load trains. While the stores were on the quay, they were guarded by a platoon of infantry dispatched to Port Said on a rotation basis by UNEF battalions stationed in the Gaza Strip. The guard platoon also supplied a train guard to accompany the supplies to Rafah or Gaza. While Rafah Camp was only 160 miles away by road, the goods train journey required two or three days owing to the overland route and number of scheduled stops required.

The operations described up to this point have dealt with the on-

**The author was Officer Commanding the Port Platoon and UNEF Port Storage Depot during the period covered by this report. He is now employed with No. 11 Company, RCASC, at Victoria, B.C.*—Editor.

ward dispatch of hardware and non-perishable foodstuffs. At least twice yearly the UNEF received shipments of perishable foodstuffs, mainly frozen meats and fish. No refrigeration or deep freeze lockers existed in Rafah Camp. Consequently, Headquarters UNEF rented deep-freeze refrigerators in Port Said from an Egyptian cold storage company whose bonded warehouse was also located in the custom zone near Cherif Quay and whose company offices provided office accommodation for the Officer Commanding the Port Platoon and his staff.

Cargoes of frozen perishables were unloaded at night to avoid spoilage which would occur if handled in the heat during daylight. These cargoes were loaded on horse-drawn carts at the quay and hauled to the refrigerators located several hundred yards distant, where the weight of each box was recorded (few commodities were in standard weight boxes) before the boxes were stacked methodically in pre-determined locations in deep-freeze. The amount of work entailed will be appreciated when it is realized that shipments of between 50 and 100 tons were packed in various sized boxes ranging in weight from 50 to 150 lbs.

It should be explained here that accounting, and supervision of operations was performed by the members of the Port Platoon or the Movement Control detachment while manual labour was done by Egyptian labourers hired from stevedoring companies or the cold storage company.

Shipment of perishable foodstuffs



Photograph by author

A lighter tied alongside Cherif Quay, waiting to discharge UNEF stores.

Photograph by author

Scene on Cherif Quay. Vehicle tires being brought ashore and stacked for tallying.

and perishable medical supplies to Rafah Camp was by road, not by rail. Two tractor-trailers with refrigerator units were operated for this purpose by 56 Canadian Transport Company. These vehicles, which shuttled between Rafah and Port Said three times a week, were nicknamed "reefers" and their arrival in Port Said was, to the Canadians stationed there, reminiscent of the celebrated arrival of stagecoaches in lonely localities of Old Wild West fame. They brought mail from Canada, money on paydays, and news from the camps at Rafah and Gaza.

The "reefers" were refuelled, loaded with rations, the required quantities of which were previously demanded by signal from the Supply Depot in Rafah, and returned the following day. A storeroom of still another bonded warehouse on Cherif Quay was rented by UNEF for storage of spirits, wines and beer of various types to suit differing national tastes, pending provision of storage accommodation in the Administrative Area. These canteen amenities were referred to in American terminology as "PX" supplies. Security for these attractive stores was a responsibility shared by the Port Platoon, the bonded warehouse company and the Egyptian customs police. Only one break-in, entry and theft occurred. The culprits were quickly apprehended, and major portion of stolen items recovered by the police.

In addition to forwarding perishables in detailed issues (by pounds and ounces) to the main force, the Port Platoon issued rations in detail to the guard platoon, supplying perishables from stock and purchasing locally the fresh vegetables, eggs and fruit.

The guard platoon was quartered in a villa located in Port Fouad, a residential area situated on the east bank of the Suez Canal immediately opposite Port Said, where it cooked its own rations. Members of the Port Platoon, on the other

hand, were quartered in a hotel in downtown Port Said and ate meals in local restaurants, being paid a subsistance allowance for these requirements.

From the foregoing, the reader with knowledge of the Army Supply System, and particularly members of the RCASC, will realize the Port Platoon, besides fulfilling its military forwarding duties, also functioned as a Base Supply Depot and as a Detail Issue Depot.

These factors combined with a levelling off in the frequency of incoming supplies brought about another change of name for the Port Platoon (formerly Composite Platoon). As the shipping slackened, the strength of the platoon was reduced and by mid-1958, the platoon was re-organized and designated UNEF Port Storage Depot, becoming part of the UNEF Supply Company and ending the brief appearance of a port platoon in the current history of the RCASC.

After re-organization, the UNEF Port Storage Depot continued issuing foodstuffs and forwarding supplies by road. Receipt of supplies by sea and rail shipments to Rafah were handled by the local Movement Control detachment.

In conclusion, there are a few incidents to relate concerning daily routine, welfare and recreational activities of the Port Platoon.

In the beginning of operations, a 2½-ton truck was allotted to the Port Platoon. This vehicle was soon replaced as it was found difficult to manoeuvre in the more confined streets, particularly the market area. The replacement vehicle was a ¾-ton truck, painted white, bearing the blue and white insignia of the UNEF and RCASC tactical signs. This latter vehicle was often pressed into sad duty as a hearse. Canadian soldiers accidentally killed were flown to Port Said in RCAF aircraft, then conveyed, via the Canal Road, to Ismailia, 70 kilometers south of Port Said. There they were interred with military honors in Maoscar military cemetery which is maintained, it is understood, through the joint auspices of the Egyptian government and the British Imperial War Graves Commission.

To permit accounting personnel to enter the deep-freeze lockers and take stock of supplies, it was necessary in January 1958 to forward an urgent demand for parkas and shearling boots. Members of the platoon wondered, with amusement, what effect the request for northern climate protective clothing, emanating from the Middle East, would have on the suppliers back home.

One of the interesting cargoes handled through Port Said was a shipment of small European automobiles purchased by UNEF as replacements for the more expensively maintained standard military pattern vehicles such as jeeps. These lightweight vehicles, resembling toys in Canadian eyes, contained several astonishing features, one item being detachable seats which could be lifted out and used, for example, as beach chairs.

Health of the Canadian soldiers stationed in Port Said was looked after by an NCO from the RCAMC who, in emergencies, called upon the services of an Egyptian civilian doctor or dental surgeon. Serious cases were later evacuated by air to the UNEF military hospital in Rafah.

After duty, recreation usually consisted of attending local cinema houses which showed a large number of Hollywood films, the sound-

track being recorded in English with Arabic and French sub-titles. The more adventuresome chose to attend local cabarets of which there were two. In the smoky, dimly-lighted atmosphere of the cabarets where the famed "belly dancers" performed to exotic native music, surrounded by tourists and soldiers of many nations, the imaginative Canadian soldier could, however briefly, regard his service with UNEF in the Middle East, not so much as a year's tour of duty, but more like "365 Arabian Nights".

Another pastime was to shop for souvenirs to send home, and camel saddles were a favourite purchase. When leave entitlement accumulated, personnel returned to Rafah Camp and joined guided tours to the many historical sites in this area of the Middle East.

During the year, Port Said was visited by senior officials of UN member nations on occasions when certain UN contingents rotated to and from their countries by sea. The Port Platoon had the honour of showing its facilities to the Director of Supplies and Transport of the Indian Army Service Corps who holds the rank of Major-General. The facilities of the unit were also opened for inspection one time for a group of Egytian student teachers visiting Port Said from a neighbouring town.

As the eventful year's tour of duty drew to a close and rotation home by RCAF aircraft commenced, the last memorable sight in Egypt seen by former members of the RCASC Port Platoon was a yellow

Photograph by author

A goods train, loaded with UNEF cargo, ready for dispatch to Rafah.

This photograph was taken during the ceremony which marked the presentation by Colonel E. J. Cosford, Honorary Colonel of No. 3 Column RCASC (Militia), of a painting of Field Marshal His Royal Highness The Duke of Gloucester, Colonel-in-Chief of the Corps, to the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps. *Left to right:* Colonel G. F. Stevenson, CD, Director of Supplies and Transport, Army Headquarters, Ottawa; Maj.-Gen. J. M. Rockingham, CB, CBE, DSO, ED, General Officer Commanding Quebec Command; Colonel Cosford; Lieut.-Colonel A. A. Edgington, CD, Commanding Officer of No. 3 Column RCASC (Militia): Colonel O. H. Barrett, OBE, ED, Honorary Lieutenant-Colonel of No. 3 Column.

(See article on page 128)

The RCASC in Port Said

(Continued from preceding page)

and black sign erected in the desert sands at El Arish airstrip for the benefit of the arriving 3rd Canadian Army contingent. It read:

THE 2ND CDN CONTINGENT
TO UNEF
WELCOMES YOU TO
EGYPT
Land of Eternal Sunshine
Please do not Throw Matches
or Cigaret Ends From Cars
HELP KEEP RAFAH GREEN

A UNIQUE GIFT TO THE CORPS

By

CAPTAIN R. M. SELLERS, OFFICE OF THE COMMAND SUPPLIES AND TRANSPORT OFFICER, HEADQUARTERS QUEBEC COMMAND, MONTREAL, QUE.

Earlier this year No. 3 Column, Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (Militia), stationed at Montreal, Que., became the proud custodian of a fine portrait of Field Marshal His Royal Highness The Duke of Gloucester, KG, KT, KP, PC, GMB, GCMG, GCVO, the Colonel-in-Chief of the Corps.

This painting, the only one of His Royal Highness made specially for an Army Service Corps formation anywhere in the Commonwealth, was presented by Colonel E. J. Cosford, Honorary Colonel of No. 3 Column. Colonel Cosford personally obtained His Royal Highness's consent and commissioned the painting from Mr. L. A. Wilcox, RISMA, a noted British portrait painter.

In his presentation speech at the ceremony held in the Officers' Mess at Bel Air Street Armouries, Colonel Cosford indicated his wish to leave a treasured and lasting memento of his service as Colonel of the Column and to do honour on behalf of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps to its illustrious Colonel-in-Chief.

The painting is now the property of the RCASC Regular Officers' Fund (an organization which holds title for the Corps to all its valuable possessions), and it will be kept in the custody of No. 3 Column RCASC (M).

RCASC SENDS GREETINGS TO COLONEL-IN-CHIEF

On behalf of the Honorary Colonel Commandant, Brigadier G. E. R. Smith, CBE, CD, greetings were dispatched to Field Marshal His Royal Highness The Duke of Gloucester, Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, on the occasion of his birthday, 30 March.

Text of the cablegram sent to His Royal Highness follows:

"All ranks of The Royal Canadian Army Service Corps send their best wishes on the occasion of the birthday of their Colonel-in-Chief."

Text of the reply received from His Royal Highness follows:

"Please thank all ranks of The Royal Canadian Army Service Corps for their kind message of loyal greetings which I very much appreciate."

French Missile in Production

The French *R-511* air-to-air missile is reported to be in the production phase. The *R-511* is a two-stage, solid propellant missile weighing 395 pounds that can be equipped with either an infrared or an electromagnetic homing guidance system.—*A news item in the "Military Review" (U.S.).*

THE CANADIAN PROVOST CORPS

Honorary Colonel Commandant for Canadian Provost Corps

WRITTEN SPECIALLY FOR THE *Journal* BY
HEADQUARTERS, CANADIAN PROVOST CORPS, OTTAWA

On April 11th, Army Headquarters announced the appointment of the first Honorary Colonel Commandant of the Canadian Provost Corps. He is Colonel L. H. Nicholson, MBE of 737 Lonsdale Road, Ottawa, a former Provost Marshal of the Canadian Army and a former Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The Corps is particularly fortunate in the appointment of its new Commandant since he not only served with the Corps during the Second World War but has been in police service throughout his career.

A biography of Colonel Nicholson is the history of a man who has devoted his life to the service of his country and his countrymen. He was born at Mount Middleton, Kings County, New Brunswick, in 1904. At the age of 19 he began his career as a policeman by joining the RCMP as a constable. Leaving the Force at the end of his three-year term of engagement, he headed for Australia with the intention of entering the West Australia State Police. He was stopped at Vancouver, however, and called back to New Brunswick by the serious illness of a sister.

He worked in the bush and on the family farm for a year and then, in 1928, enlisted in the newly-organized New Brunswick Provincial Police as a constable. He had risen to the rank of inspector before he resigned in 1930 to enter service with the Nova Scotia Police on its formation. In 1932 this force was absorbed by

Colonel Nicholson

the RCMP when it assumed the responsibility of policing the province of Nova Scotia. Along with other members of the Nova Scotia Police, Colonel Nicholson was appointed to the RCMP. He was given the rank of inspector and was appointed officer in charge of investigation, an appointment he held until 1937 when he was transferred to Saskatchewan to fill the same appointment.

On the outbreak of war Colonel, then Superintendent Nicholson, volunteered for service with No. 1 Provost Company (RCMP), then being mobilized as a unit of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, but was not accepted. As it became

clear that application for special leave to serve in the Armed Forces could not be granted, he resigned from the RCMP in 1941 and joined the Canadian Active Service Force.

He was commissioned as a reinforcement officer in the Saskatoon Light Infantry but never served with this unit, as immediately after he had graduated from the Officer Cadet Training Unit he was posted as Deputy Army Provost Marshal, 5th Canadian Armoured Division. In January 1943 he was appointed Army Provost Marshal, 2nd Canadian Corps.

In 1943 he transferred to the Canadian Provost Corps, and in September of that year he became Assistant Provost Marshal of 1st Canadian Corps, serving throughout the Italian Campaign and during the move to North-West Europe with that formation. It was while he held these three appointments that he became so well known to members of the Canadian Provost Corps; it was then, too, that he met so many of its members who were to serve with him both in the Army and in the RCMP in later years.

In September 1945, Colonel Nicholson, having returned to Canada, was appointed Provost Marshal and stationed at Ottawa. He held this post only until April 1946 but his tour proved to be, for many, the most eventful months in the short history of the Canadian Provost Corps. It was during this time that he set about the task of organizing the first peace-time service for the Corps.

Never before in Canadian history had the Corps maintained an establishment except during wartime. This was the task Colonel Nicholson undertook. Not only did he devise the organizations, establishments and roles for the new units of the Corps but he also selected the personnel who were to fill the posts available. His background of police and army service was of great help to him, but so, also, was his intimate knowledge of the individual men who made up the Corps. This was made possible by the keen interest he took in the duties and welfare of those who were fortunate enough to serve under him. For his wartime service he was made a Member of the Order of the British Empire and was mentioned in despatches.

His work with the army finished, Colonel Nicholson retired and returned to the RCMP with the rank of superintendent. He attended the Canadian Police College and soon after was promoted to the rank of Assistant Commissioner. He served for five years as Director of Criminal Investigation in Ottawa and in May 1951 he was appointed Commissioner of the RCMP, an appointment which he held until his resignation from that force in April 1959.

Although he has served as a policeman throughout his career except for a brief tour as an infantry officer, Colonel Nicholson's interests and hobbies have carried him far afield. He is a Knight of Grace of the Venerable Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem and is Deputy Chief Scout of the Boy Scouts of Canada. He received the honorary degree of Doctor of Law from the University of New Brunswick in May 1955. He is a keen marksman, a member of the Council and Executive of the Dominion of Canada Rifle Association, and in 1954 he commanded the Canadian Rifle Team at Bisley, England.

Colonel Nicholson has been a

member of the Council of the North-West Territories for some nine years and has travelled extensively throughout the north in order to acquaint himself with the problems and conditions of that region. In the early spring of 1954 he accompanied a police party on a dog team patrol from Coppermine to Bathurst Inlet and Cambridge Bay, a distance of 470 miles.

His interest in photography is well known, and he has kept a photographic record of the people he has met and the places he has seen during his travels.

While Commissioner of the RCMP he became internationally known through his association with Interpol (the international criminal police organization), and since his resignation from the RCMP he has served with the United Nations in the cause of justice and human welfare as a member and Chairman of the Middle East Narcotic Survey Mission.

He has recently been appointed Chief Commissioner of the St. John Ambulance Brigade, and is President of the Board of Directors of the Ottawa Winter Fair.

Colonel Nicholson married Mary Copeland of Moncton in 1930 and they have two daughters, Mary Anne, a TV script assistant in Ottawa, and Marjorie, a nurse at the Royal Victoria Hospital, Montreal.

The members of the Canadian Provost Corps are honoured indeed to have as their first Honorary Colonel Commandant a distinguished Canadian who has served his country with such unselfish and continuing devotion.

The Signals' Job in the UNEF

(Continued from page 131)

mail, rations, canteen supplies and usually a few visitors.

Another aspect of the squadron's work concerns communications assistance to Scandinavian, Indian, Brazilian and Jugoslav battalions patrolling the Armistice Demarcation Line. This responsibility is divided between the signal troops at Gaza and Rafah and includes training of regimental signallers, help in obtaining supplies and equipment, maintenance of switchboards and radio sets, major line construction jobs and advice on thorny problems.

Odd jobs which fall to the lot of Signals everywhere are no less prevalent in UNEF, including such gems as telephone directories, ailing movie projectors and the ubiquitous sputtering public address systems.

A strong unit spirit, encouraged by regular internal postings, social gatherings, sports events and a lively unit newspaper, binds the scattered elements of 56 Canadian Signal Squadron together into as happy a group as can be expected under the arduous conditions prevailing in the Middle East.

Recent developments in the squadron include a proposed reduction in size from five officers and 141 other ranks to four and 85. This will be possible when 24-hour standby radio circuits are eliminated and when radio relay equipment is introduced to replace vulnerable and unreliable rented telephone lines. Improvements in the squadron's living and recreational accommodation have also been made in the last few months, all of which will help to make life better for the incoming fifth contingent.

THE QUEEN'S PRINTER AND CONTROLLER OF STATIONERY
OTTAWA, 1960

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