

CANADIAN Army JOURNAL

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The Cover

For this month's cover, the Journal's artist has chosen a scene from a new series entitled "The Development of the Canadian Army" and written specially for this periodical by Colonel C. P. Stacey, OBE, Director of the Historical Section, Army Headquarters. The water-colour shows the parish militia of New France gathering for training in a palisaded fort in the latter part of the 17th century. In the left foreground is the Seigneur of the parish; the officer in the green jacket is the Captain of Militia. A priest looks on, and in the background a group of habitants prepare for training with Canada's first militia. Part I of this four-part series starts on page 1 of this issue.

CANADIAN Army JOURNAL

The object of the Canadian Army Journal, which is published by the Directorate of Military Training under authority of the Chief of the General Staff, is to provide officers of the Active, Reserve and Supplementary Reserve Forces with information designed to keep them abreast of current military trends and topics, and to stimulate interest in current military affairs.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CANADIAN ARMY

By
COLONEL C. P. STACEY, OBE, DIRECTOR OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION,
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

I: The First Two Centuries: The Old Militia

The history of the Army in Canada is as long as the history of the country itself, and forms a larger part of it than many Canadians realize. The Canadian soldier of today is the heir of a very old and a very proud tradition, and a tradition peculiarly his own. The Canadian Army shares many historical experiences with other forces—particularly the British Army — but some of those that helped to shape it are uniquely Canadian and are shared with nobody.

The present account is no more than a thumbnail sketch of the long process that has brought the Army to its present stage of development. It mentions only the salient points in the story. It is concerned primarily with organization, not with campaigns and battles; it is designed to provide some background for those more dramatic episodes, which are rather more familiar to most Canadians and some of which have already been described in these pages.

The French Régime

It can be said that a militia based on the principle of universal service existed in the St. Lawrence valley and in Acadia from the earliest years of French settlement there in the first decade of the seventeenth century. In every pioneer community surrounded by warlike natives, every settler must perforce be a soldier too on occasion; and French Canada was no exception.

About the middle of the century, when there were still only a couple of thousand settlers in New France, something like a formal militia system began to take shape. We have an order issued in 1651 by the Governor to the "captain of the inhabitants of Three Rivers", requiring the people to have arms and to drill, and to take turns at guard duty. After 1663, when company rule ended and the French Crown assumed direct control of the colony, an efficient and formidable defence organization came into existence.

The basic conditions which made such an organization necessary are evident. Three menaces faced New France: the Iroquois, who terrorized the colony for many decades; the British colonies, which were much more populous than the French and which were involved in four long and bitter wars with them from 1689 onwards; and behind the British colonies the naval and military power of Britain herself, which at last was brought to bear to destroy the empire of France in America. That New France succumbed to these menaces only after over seventy years of conflict was due in great part to the efficiency of her military system.

The system was effectively centralized in a manner unknown in the thirteen English colonies. At the head of it was the Governor, who in addition to being the political ruler of the colony was also the commander of all its military forces. He retained this position even in the presence of a large force of regulars from France commanded by a senior general. In the last days of French rule this centralization of authority, long a source of strength to the colony, became a disadvantage; for it enabled Governor de Vaudreuil to interfere with disastrous effect with the military dispositions of Montcalm.

The basis of the defence system of New France was the presence of a considerable body of regular troops. These were of two categories: units of the regular army of France, the *troupes de terre;* and units of colonial regulars, the *troupes de la marine.*

Regiments of the French regular army proper served in Canada at only two periods. In 1665 the famous Carignan-Salières Regiment arrived to conduct a campaign against the Iroquois. Most of it was sent back to France in 1667–68; and regular regiments appear in Canada again only in 1755, when the last great struggle for the colony is beginning. In 1758 Montcalm had eight fine French regular battalions under his command. Two more were at Louisburg in Cape Breton Island. These regulars were the most formidable element in the final defence of New France.

However, from the time when the Carignan regiment was withdrawn the colony was garrisoned by regular forces permanently localized there. These were termed *troupes de la marine* simply because they were under the Ministry of Marine, which administered the French colonies; to call them marines, as is sometimes done, is misleading. They were organized in independent companies, which were united into battalions only when some great crisis required it. As a result of this organization, their discipline and general efficiency were rather lower than those of the regulars proper. The number of

companies varied from time to time. In 1687 there were 32. Before the beginning of the Seven Years' War there were 30, but in 1756 the number was increased to 40, the authorized strength of each being fixed at 65 men. In the course of time, the commissioned ranks of these companies had come to be filled largely with Canadians; the men were recruited in France, but there may have been some Canadians among them too.

* * *

The third element in the Canadian defensive system was the Militia. What may perhaps be called the first generalized Canadian militia regulations are contained in a letter from King Louis XIV to Governor de Courcelle dated 3 April 1669. It instructs him to divide the inhabitants into companies; to appoint officers; and to ensure that drill is carried out once a month and that the militiamen have arms and ammunition ready for use at all times. Normally, as the system developed, each parish had one company of militia, composed of all the male inhabitants capable of bearing arms; but a populous parish might have two or more. The Captain of Militia was an important man in the parish. He was not the seigneur, but a substantial habitant whose commission served to confer upon him a position in the community second only to that of the seigneur himself. As time passed, these captains of militia acquired civil as well as military functions and became the local administrators and mouthpieces for the central government.

In the frontier wars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the militia of New France had an important part. Since the militia companies comprised all the able-bodied men of their parishes, it will be understood that they could be called out for service as a whole only in great emergencies, such as that arising out of Phips' attack in 1690, when the militia played a vital role. However, it was easy to call upon the companies to furnish detachments for prolonged or distant service, and it may be assumed that these would as far as possible be composed of volunteers.* Small militia forces of this sort are found taking part, along with the regulars, in almost every action the French fought against the English and their Indian allies. It was in the guerrilla warfare of the forests that the Canadian militiaman made his greatest and most distinctive contribution. In the words of Parkman, the habitant was "more than ready

*A report written by General Murray in 1762 sketches the organization as the British found it at the Conquest: "The Canadians are formed into a militia for the better regulation of which each parish in proportion to its extent and number of inhabitants is divided into one, two or more Companies who have their proper officers . . . From these Companies detachments are formed, and sent to any distance and in 1759 and 1760, the whole were in arms for the defence of their country."

at any time for any hardy enterprise; and in the forest warfare of skirmish and surprise there were few to match him. An absolute government used him at will, and experienced leaders guided his rugged valour to the best account."

The forces used by the French in this warfare were usually of very mixed composition. Take for instance the one that intercepted and crushed General Braddock's British army as it advanced on Fort Duquesne in 1755. The majority of its members were Indians; but of the white troops two thirds were militia, the rest being colonial regulars. It is true, however, that on this occasion a good many of the militia ran at the first volley (the commander at Duquesne explained indulgently that they were only youngsters); and so the regulars played a part disproportionate to the smallness of their numbers. This was the case in many actions.

The militia did much work apart from combat duty. A great deal of transport work was involved in maintaining the western posts and the Indian trade and supporting military operations. This was done by militia boatmen and was a heavy tax on manpower. At the same time, the needs of agriculture constantly hindered the employment of the militia in the field. If seeding and harvest were interfered with, the colony would starve; and Montcalm found that he could keep the great body of the farmer-soldiers on duty for only a few weeks at a time.

As a normal thing, it will be observed, the militia had no organization higher than the company, and it is probably fair to say that normally the parish captain of militia was more an administrator than a commander, and his company more a source of manpower for *ad hoc* units than a tactical unit itself. When larger units of militia were organized in a crisis, they were commanded by officers of the colonial regulars. In New France's last campaigns, in 1759–60, militia were actually incorporated into the regular units of both types; in 1759, 108 selected militiamen were attached to each battalion of the *troupes de terre*, and in 1760 almost the whole of the effective militia was distributed through the regular force. At the Battle of the Plains of Abraham (13 September 1759) this infusion of militia into the regular battalions may have helped produce the French disaster, for we read of the militiamen, having fired their muskets, throwing themselves down to reload in the backwoods manner, and thereby making confusion in the ranks. The most useful contribution made by militia was probably that of the sharpshooters who skirmished on the French flanks and to some extent covered the retreat of the defeated army.

All the various forces we have described so far were infantry; and infantry was the master arm in operations in a heavily forested country of primitive communications. The artillery arm was represented in the French army in Canada in the Seven Years' War by two companies of 50 gunners each, which seem to have been on the same basis as the *troupes de la marine*. As for cavalry, it was little used; but in 1759 Montcalm organized from the militia a corps of 200 mounted volunteers.

In these last years of New France the country's manpower was mobilized to the limit. The whole population of Canada was only perhaps 65,000, yet about 13,000 militia were called out to help defend Quebec against Wolfe. It was all for nothing. Wolfe's smaller but more efficient army of regulars, backed by British sea power, won the day. A sound military system had postponed the final catastrophe, but in the end the odds were too great. The colony capitulated in 1760; the Treaty of Paris ceded it to Great Britain; and the Militia of Canada found themselves owing allegiance to a new sovereign.

The Militia after the Conquest

The most remarkable thing about the military system in the early days of British rule is the extent to which the French system simply continued to exist. There was, it is true, no permanent continuity of units (as we shall see, no unit in the modern Army has an officially recognized organization date earlier than 1855). The French regular regiments went back to France under the terms of the capitulation, and the colonial regulars were allowed to do the same, though many of the officers and men chose to remain in Canada. Nevertheless, it was clearly understood that the militia system went on as before, and during the period of "military government" much use was made of the captains of militia. Although all these officers had been required to resign, the great majority had at once received new British commissions; and they in fact carried on the whole of the local administration of justice. Unfortunately, when civil government was set up in 1764 it was considered that the law prevented Roman Catholics from exercising judicial functions, and this useful link in the chain of government was broken. It appears, however, that the captains of militia were still considered to retain their military functions, though the loss of their civil ones greatly reduced their general importance.

As early as 1764 the British military authorities raised a battalion of Canadians, to take part in the Pontiac War. It was recruited by

volunteering (though not entirely without the threat of compulsion) and was commanded by a former officer of the French colonial regulars. It did good service though it saw no fighting. Thereafter, however, except for some limited attempt to use the militia to produce men for transport service, the system tended to fall into neglect, and it seems that no annual muster or training was held.

Every colony of British America had its compulsory-service militia system, which however it might be neglected in peacetime received due attention in time of war. The first elected assembly of Nova Scotia (where Halifax had been founded as a British naval station in 1749) passed a stringent militia law at its initial session in 1758. It required every male inhabitant between 16 and 60 to serve and to furnish himself at his own expense with "a Musket, Gun, or Fuzil, not less than Three Feet long in the Barrel, two spare Flints, and Twelve Charges of Powder and Ball". Regimental musters were to be held every six months, and commanding officers were to "draw forth" their units every three months, "to exercise them in Motions, the Use of Arms, and shooting at Marks, or other military Exercises". This, of course, was in the middle of the Seven Years' War.

* * *

For a decade after the Treaty of Paris, the Union Jack flew from the Gulf of Mexico to Hudson Bay, and defence was mainly a question of protection against the western Indians. But an attempt by the British Government to finance the garrisons required for this purpose by taxing the colonists led to rebellion in the thirteen seaboard colonies, and in 1775 the troops of the revolutionary government invaded Canada. Governor Carleton called upon the militia. Some of the King's "new" (French) subjects rallied to his cause, others joined the invaders; but the great majority, not surprisingly, were content to watch the British and the Americans fight it out. Quebec, and Canada, were saved for the Crown by troops brought from England by the Royal Navy. In 1777 a militia ordinance was enacted, the first militia legislation since the conquest; until then the old French laws had sufficed. The new law was based upon them. Like the Nova Scotia act, it defined military age as 16 to 60. Captains of militia were required to turn out their companies for drill on the last two Sundays in June and the first two in July. Provision was made for drawing as many men as required from the companies and marching them ("tho' still as militia") in conjunction with the regular forces to any place where they might be needed, and keeping them in service until the need was over.

The revolting colonies won their independence, but failed to absorb Canada and Nova Scotia; and from 1783 onwards the new and smaller British America had a new and different defensive problem. For a century or more, defence meant almost exclusively defence against the United States. British naval power protected the provinces from overseas invasion, but could not prevent attack from the south. And it must be remembered that in those days war with the republic was far from "unthinkable". It actually happened once, in 1812–14; and there was grave danger of it many times thereafter. The great turning-point, after which Anglo-American and Canadian-American relations show steady improvement, is the Treaty of Washington of 1871, which settled the serious Anglo-American issues arising out of the American Civil War.

Luckily, though the United States had both many more people and far more wealth than British North America, it was not a military power. Its military potential was not organized, and it maintained only a very small regular army. In these circumstances, defence against it was not an impossible problem to solve. The system adopted for the purpose was essentially the old one with which we are already familiar. The most vital feature of it was a considerable garrison of British regulars, usually comparable in strength to the whole U.S. Army. The colonial contribution was a militia organized on the traditional basis of universal compulsory service. The system did not vary much between colonies. When a new colony was set up—as was done in Upper Canada in 1791—legislation establishing the normal militia was usually passed very shortly.

This militia—later quaintly called the "sedentary" militia*—was a very cheap force to maintain, for it existed only on paper for 364 days a year. Battalions were organized on a territorial basis, one or more per county as a rule, and slates of officers were appointed to them; but in normal times they were not armed, uniformed, paid or trained. Only once a year did the battalion appear as such—on "training day" or "parade day", long the Fourth of June, the birthday of King George III; and usually it did not present a very martial appearance. Much fun was made of the spectacle of civilians, in mufti or odd bits of uniform, carrying ancient weapons or no weapons at all, stumbling awkwardly through a few drill movements and ending the day, in many cases, by getting splendidly drunk at the expense of the C.O. But the people who made

*This term does not seem to have appeared in legislation until the Canadian act of 1855, but it was in common use at least as early as 1812.

these jokes didn't understand what was really going on. The annual "training" was not really training, but a *muster parade;* it served to keep the battalion rolls up to date and to remind the citizen that he was in fact a militiaman, liable to be called out to defend his country in a time of crisis.

The War of 1812

This was the organization that defended Canada successfully during the War of 1812. It must be emphasized that the popular Canadian legend of the ploughboys who beat off the invader with just a little help from the regulars doesn't hold water. No one can read the records of the war without realizing that the professional soldier played the dominant role in saving the colonies. Not only did he provide leadership which was usually competent and was sometimes inspired; he bore the brunt of nearly every engagement. Consider the casualty lists of Lundy's Lane, the bitterest action of the war. The unit that suffered most heavily was the 89th Foot, a British regular regiment, now the Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's); it had 254 casualties, including 29 killed. A battalion of Incorporated Militia, a long-service unit on a quasi-regular basis, had 142 casualties (7 killed). But the local units of the sedentary force, which were present to the number of 500 men, had only 22 casualties altogether and only one man killed.* These figures tell the story. Canadians, and other British Americans, played a great part in the war; but the most effective local units were those most closely assimilated to regulars. Among them were five "Fencible" regiments (units liable for service in North America only) recruited in the provinces; these were borne on the list of the British Army and may be considered colonial regulars. Another, the Canadian Voltigeurs, though raised under the Lower Canada militia law, was in virtually the same category. Few Canadians realize that the Voltigeurs' gallant commanding officer, Colonel Charles de Salaberry, perhaps the most renowned native Canadian hero of this war, was himself a regular soldier, who had learned his trade in the 60th Rifles.

The Sedentary Militia as such was rarely found in the battleline (Lundy's Lane however exemplifies the way in which sedentary units were sometimes called out to help in a temporary crisis). Its organization was "administrative rather than tactical". It provided an effective mobilization system which made the manpower of the provinces readily available. From the sedentary units the most willing or most suitable men could be, and were, drafted away into long-

**The small proportion of killed to wounded is said to have been due to the Americans' use of buckshot.*

service units which after a few months' duty approximated fairly closely to regulars.

The successful issue of this war probably had an unfortunate influence on Canadian military policy. The successes were largely due to effective pre-war preparations, but the preparations had been made by the Mother Country, not the colonies. The people of British America were left with a vague idea that "the Militia" had done the job, and this led them to think that it was time enough to start preparing for war after war had begun. This idea was to die very hard.

The result was that the militia system was little altered for nearly half a century. Britain continued to provide a costly regular garrison at her own expense; British America was content to maintain her economical paper militia with its annual muster.* Yet it must be remembered that the colonies were poor, thinly populated, and torn by political dissension; they could not and would not have supported an expensive military organization. And as an auxiliary and support to the regular forces the old militia had much to commend it under the conditions of the day.

Through the Anglo-American crises of the first half of the nineteenth century the system continued to do yeoman service in all the North American provinces. The sedentary units could always be called out in their own organization to meet a sudden emergency, and could always furnish volunteers for *ad hoc* units raised for a longer commitment. The sedentary units of Upper Canada came marching in to Toronto to defend the government against the rebels of 1837; and they found the men for the volunteer regiments recruited at imperial expense, during the next couple of years, to protect the frontier in the troubles that the rebellion touched off. When filibusters from the United States landed near Prescott on the St. Lawrence in November 1838, they were attacked within a few hours by two columns. One was headed by a party of Royal Marines, the other by a detachment of the 83rd Foot (now the Royal Ulster Rifles); but the majority of the troops were Canadians, partly from the new volunteer regiments, partly from the local militia units. In this "Battle of the Windmill," a very fierce little action, the sedentary force, fighting in their own dooryards, gave a good account of themselves. But it was regular reinforcements that finally dislodged the raiders.

By the middle of the century a new era was beginning. The North American colonies had lately achieved a very full measure of self-government.

*As late as the fiscal year 1857–8 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick together spent only £432 on their own defence!

They were growing in wealth and population; and parliamentarians and publicists in Britain were now asking, with good reason, whether it was not time that the British taxpayer was relieved of the financial burden of colonial defence. These new conditions were shortly to produce fundamental changes in the military policies of Canada.

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Halifax Army Library in its 136th Year

One of the oldest military libraries in Canada, the Cambridge Military Library, is still going strong in Halifax. Recently the library held its 135th annual meeting and auction of books and periodicals.

The institution was started in 1817 with some 1,000 pounds sterling, which came from customs duties collected in the state of Maine.

During the War of 1812, the lieutenant-governor of Nova Scotia led a military expedition from Halifax which captured a large part of Maine. He set up customs ports and collected duties which helped found the library and also Dalhousie University.

Many of the library's volumes are of great value and no little historical interest. In 1902, it was named for the Duke of Cambridge, who had been commander of the British Army for nearly 40 years.

In 1905, when the Canadian government took over the fortress of Halifax, the building and books passed into the hands of the Canadian Army.

Since its inception, the library has been administered by the Army for use of army officers and their families. The library contains more than 5,000 volumes. —*Directorate of Public Relations, National Defence Headquarters.*

GENERAL EISENHOWER'S REPORT ON NATO

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE, PARIS, FRANCE

The following report by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is published in its entirety for the information of readers who are interested in the first year's operations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This historic document was prepared before General Eisenhower relinquished his command, and was released for publication on 2 April 1952.—Editor.

The Chairman,
The Standing Group,
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

One year ago today, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe assumed operational control of the forces dedicated to the defence of Western Europe. From that day onward, every member of this headquarters has been dedicated personally to the cause of peace and security.

This anniversary provides a vantage point to review progress during the initial year of our joint enterprise, to take stock of our needs, and to present to member nations certain views that have developed in my headquarters concerning our present security position. Though these observations reach beyond the purely geographical limits of this command, we have found that no turbulence in the world scene fails to react directly on our common enterprise in Europe. The struggle against the threat of dictatorial aggression has no geographical bounds; it is all one.

It would be disastrous if the favourable signs and developments recorded in this report were to put any mind at ease, or to create a sense of adequate security, for there is no real security yet achieved in Europe; there is only a beginning.

Equally, it would be unfortunate if anyone were to find excuse for defeatism in the manifold difficulties and shortcomings of our joint effort to date, for we have made progress in all aspects of security. The momentum must be continued with renewed vigor, and since moral force is the genesis of all progress, especially progress toward security and peace, we must give primary attention to this vital element.

We are competing with an ideological force, communism, which has joined with the imperialistic ambitions of a group controlling all life

and resources found between the Elbe and China Sea. Throughout this vast region, unity is achieved by the simple techniques of the police state. In this concert of action and power lies great danger for any single nation exposed directly or indirectly to the unrelenting, never-ending attacks of propaganda, subversion, force and the threat of force. If the free nations are to remain secure, our peoples must march together, agreed on common goals, and win that co-operative unity possible only in a free society.

We want peace. We want freedom, too, and the individual rights to which our whole civilization is dedicated. But to want these things is not enough. We can keep them only by work, selflessness, constancy, and sacrifice. The enormity of the present threat will never be met by half-hearted measures or by any superficial military facade. Required is the full awakening of the free world and the pursuit of energetic, far-reaching measures to insure our form of life—even our survival.

During the first fifty years of this century, the nations of the Atlantic Community have spent their strength and heritage in great conflicts which began in Europe and spread over much of the world's surface. As in all wars, a costly number of the natural leaders were killed. Destruction was widespread; public treasuries were emptied and family savings wiped out through inflation. Economic conditions inflicted such heavy punishment on the masses of citizens that social problems took on new and bitter prominence. In important areas of Africa and Asia, confidence in western leadership was shaken.

As we look back over these developments, it seems almost as if the nations of the west have been, for decades, blindly enacting parts in a drama that could have been written by Lenin, prophet of militant communistic expansion. This pattern of events, which points so surely to ultimate disaster, can be changed if only the peoples of the west have the wisdom to make a complete break with many things of the past and show a willingness to do something new and challenging. NATO itself is a significant step to meet both the present danger of aggression and the tragic struggles and dissensions that have divided our peoples in the past. But NATO's development is not automatic; action is the test.

To advance this great effort, unified action is required, not only among but within our nations. Yet, it has seemed more than once within our countries that political factions hold their own immediate gain higher than the fate of their nation or even that of civilization itself. Then there are elements striving to hold back the hands of the clock, and apparently

General Eisenhower

placing profits above patriotism. At the same time, there are workers in our member countries still suffering the delusion that their interests are served by association with communist-led labor groups. It is nightmarish that any free worker of the west could respond voluntarily to the same Kremlin voices that have dictated the elimination of free labor unions in Russia and satellite countries. In the free system, labor is a full-fledged partner and must share in responsibility as equally as it must share in productivity. We can thrive mightily in an era of good feeling. It can be brought into being by vibrant, selfless leadership at all levels of society.

The unity of NATO must rest ultimately on one thing—the enlightened self-interest of each participating nation. The United States, for example, is furnishing much of the material resources of this project during the current year because it believes that America's enlightened self-interest is served thereby. Most American people agree as to the wisdom and necessity of this course. But they will continue to believe their own security interests are being served only as other participants show co-operation and enterprise in improving their own defences. Consequently, it would be fatuous for anyone to assume that the taxpayers of America will continue to pour money and resources into Europe unless encouraged by steady progress toward mutual co-operation and full effectiveness. To be sure, the citizens of all NATO countries are carrying heavy tax burdens, but even if these are at optimum levels, there still are many steps possible in Europe which would cost little and yet bring rich returns through increased strength.

Fundamentally, and on a long-term basis, each important geographical area must be defended primarily by the people of that region. The average citizen must therefore feel that he has a vital stake in the fight for freedom, not that of a bystander or a pawn in a struggle for power. There is so much talk of national and international arrangements and interests that basic issues are often obscured from view. Fundamentally, we are fighting the battle of individual freedom for all. Before all men and before the world, our policies must be such as to inspire confidence in our strength and determination, and trust in our fairness. This is the moral foundation without which any military effort, any expenditure in lives and treasure, is fruitless.

By our actions, too, we must demonstrate in convincing form that we are masters of our own destiny. Within the Atlantic Community and in Europe, we have the opportunity to build a bulwark of peace—a central position of unity and strength

for the free world. This, then, must be a first and fundamental consideration.

Situation One Year Ago.

On February 21, 1951, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe was physically established in temporary facilities at the Astoria Hotel in Paris. This step followed a period of preparatory actions, including a personal survey trip touching the capitals of the twelve nations then participating in NATO. As early as October 1950, I had been advised by the President of the United States that he might find it necessary to return me to an active-duty status to assume an allied command in Europe. While this information was not definite or official, it was sufficient for me to begin a study of all aspects of the military situation then existing.

From all information presented, it was clear that the difficulties facing the new enterprise were manifold. Problems and the doubt they bred were on every side. It is common knowledge that peacetime coalitions throughout history have been weak and notoriously inefficient. Sovereign nations have always found it difficult to discover common ground on which they could stand together for any length of time. Nevertheless, we were expecting NATO members not only to agree on common objectives but to work and sacrifice together, over an indefinite period, in order to achieve common security.

The United States, aided by other members of the United Nations, was already heavily engaged in combat operations in Korea which were taking a severe toll in manpower and military supplies. Moreover, strong voices could be heard in America, disputing the NATO concept of collective security and opposing further U.S. reinforcement of the European area. France was engaged against aggression in Indo-China in a bitter struggle that absorbed a large portion of her regular military establishment. This campaign in Southeast Asia was already draining off a significant share of the money and resources that the French government could allocate to military purposes, even though the United States was providing assistance in the form of aircraft, tanks, and heavy equipment. In Malaya, British forces, equivalent to more than two divisions, were engaged against guerrilla activities inspired by communist agents.

There was serious question as to the state of public morale among the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They were living daily under the shadow of a powerful Soviet striking force, stationed in Eastern Germany and Poland, and possessing the obvious capability of overrunning much of Europe. It was extremely difficult for

the average European to see any future in an attempt to build defensive forces which might offset this real and formidable threat. There seemed to be too much of a lead to be overtaken. The doubts of the European peoples gave birth to the false but glittering doctrine of neutralism, through which they hoped to preserve the things they had always held dear. Their fears were stimulated by ugly overtones of threat from Communist propaganda organs, and from traitorous outriders already in their own midst. Beyond all this, the cumulative effects of repeated failure to make any headway in conferences with the Soviets produced an intellectual defeatism, in some quarters bordering upon despair.

These were only a few of the obvious obstacles in the road leading to the collective security of the still free world. For my part, the effect of the negative factors was largely cancelled by a stern fact which denied refutation; the job had to be done. For my own country as for every other nation joined in NATO, there was no acceptable alternative. Otherwise, nation after nation, beginning with the weaker and the more exposed, would be infiltrated, harassed, and browbeaten into submission. The threat of force is no less terrifying to the weak than force itself. Finally, as successive states were chipped away, Europe would indeed become indefensible. This key area would be doomed to regimented service for the advancement of Communistic Imperialism. With Europe would go its skilled and productive population, its industrial resources, and also its traditional influence and relationships with other parts of the world. The transfer of this strength from the assets of the free world into Soviet resources would be a fearful blow.

Modern civilization creates more and more interdependence among nations. This is obvious in the case of all those which cannot produce the necessary foodstuffs for their own existence. But consider the United States—more fortunate, perhaps, than any other nation in the abundance, variety, and accessibility of her resources. The basic index of American industrial power is steel production. Currently, the United States produces almost one-half of the world total and, through such industrial strength, has been able to assist in arming the free world with heavy military equipment. Yet General Collins, Chief of Staff, United States Army, has reported that each new medium tank requires:

1915 pounds of chromium of which 99 per cent of the ore is imported.

950 pounds of manganese of which 92 per cent is imported.

520 pounds of nickel of which 92 per cent is imported.

100 pounds of tin of which 78 per

cent is imported.

6512 pounds of bauxite (the ore of aluminum) of which 65 per cent is imported.

1484 pounds of copper of which 29 per cent is imported.

The critical materials required in the production of a tank are needed NOT only for the weapons of defence but in the vast array of utensils, equipment, tools, and machines of modern life. These things have become essential to the full productivity and well-being of an industrial nation.

If the continued advance of the Iron Curtain could eventually damage the economic and therefore the political system of America, how much more critical was the position of practically every other nation exposed to the threat. Truly there could be no question on the part of any member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as to the overriding need for joint and vigorous defence action. Without it there was, in long term sense, hope for none. For the continental nations, there was only the specter of a godless tyranny that would stamp out freedom with machine-like efficiency. The heritage of the past and the hope of the future would alike be buried under a monolithic mass of totalitarianism. For Britain, there was the prospect of a new enemy across the Dover Cliffs, an enemy who could bring back the rockets, submarines, and bombardment on an intensive scale. For the United States and Canada, the future could promise ever-greater danger of attack, requiring endless sacrifices and defence costs which would ultimately break their economies.

With these thoughts and convictions, I joined the first members of our international staff then gathering in Paris. Though new to each other and speaking six different tongues, we were united to a man in this belief: there could be no peace and security for any of our peoples without unity in purpose and action throughout the Atlantic community.

The Military Problem

Beyond the Iron Curtain, deployed from the Arctic Ocean to the Adriatic Sea, the forces menacing the free world were formidable. Just beyond the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe lay thirty divisions with their supporting squadrons of aircraft. These were only a fraction of available Soviet strength; yet their employment was significant of the whole Communistic philosophy of force. While the Western powers reduced their active forces to small occupation units which were concerning themselves with peacetime training, and becoming identified more and more with the communities where they dwelt, the numbers and the status of the soldiers of the Soviet had remained unchanged since shortly after the

end of the war. They were still confined in sullen isolation within their barracks and compounds: they were still deployed and poised as for war.

Under duress, the satellite countries had been obliged to follow the policy of Soviet Russia. Their foreign masters had set them to work immediately to train for war and had merged their economy with that of Russia. By the beginning of 1951, these nations had been forced to produce, between them, a total of some sixty divisions, while their air forces were also under development. In Eastern Germany, in defiance of her obligations, Russia had organized a para-military force, the Bereitschaften.

Each side, the West and the East, possessed outposts beyond the frontiers of the other. Albania remained in the Soviet orbit, though isolated from it by the regained sovereignty of Yugoslavia. West Berlin and Vienna, with their devoted populations and garrisons of French, British and Americans, were still impervious to Soviet threats and blandishments alike. Apart from these exceptions, the Iron Curtain divided the continent into regimented and free Europe. East of it were 175 Soviet line divisions, one-third of which were either mechanized or armored, and an air force of 20,000 aircraft. The Navy at the same time stood at twenty cruisers and some 300 submarines. Behind all this was a vast, sprawling economy, still largely harnessed to war. Though inefficient by western technical standards, Soviet industry had already demonstrated that it was producing atomic weapons.

Obviously, the problem of defending Western Europe was much greater than the mere tactical problem of how to counter the threat of the thirty divisions and their supporting air regiments which were displayed in the shopwindow set in the Iron Curtain itself. It was clear that these forces alone were strong enough to try, with a fair prospect of success, to thrust far into the weaker west. But the array of additional strength was indeed vast, even after subtracting the forces stationed in the Far East, or in and near the Caucasus, and those which the Soviet government was bound to retain in disaffected areas within its own borders.

To know that the aggregate capacity of the west, actual and potential, was greater than that of the Soviets in all respects, was some comfort. At the moment, however, in Western Europe there were fewer than fifteen NATO divisions adequately trained and equipped for war. National service programs, existing in all European member countries, had trained, or partially trained, a reservoir of manpower since the end of the war. Unfortunately, equipment was inadequate to convert this pool

into effective reserve divisions. In the air the situation was no better, perhaps, worse. We had fewer than one thousand operational aircraft available in all Western Europe, and many of these were of obsolescent types. From the naval viewpoint we were much better off, although a tremendous effort would be required to offset the threat of submarine attack on vital sea routes. Naval carrier strength, as represented by the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, could help the over-all air picture to some extent by providing highly mobile air strength to a threatened area.

The greatest concentration of western air and ground strength was in Germany. Organized within American, British and French zones, the forces were deployed for the purpose for which they were designed—occupation and police duties. Their deployment had no relationship to what would be suitable in resisting attack. Airfields were crowded up in the forward areas, in some cases east of the ground troops that must cover them. Supply lines for British and American forces, almost parallel to the front, ran to the north German ports of Hamburg and Bremerhaven, instead of rearward through France and the Low Countries. We knew that before any division would be engaged more than forty-eight hours, it would require supply shipments of upwards to five hundred tons a day. For air units, the supply load was comparably heavy. The jet airplane burns more than a ton of fuel per hour. Obviously, a tremendous amount of depot and airfield construction would be required before our forces in this vital area were astride adequate communication routes.

To all these problems we now had to turn our minds. On the one hand, there was the problem of how to persuade the nations of the free West to allocate afresh their resources in production and manpower, so as to build between themselves and the East the required shield. On the other hand was the strategic organization of the huge region, stretching from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, which the forces of the West must defend. It is with the latter problem that I shall deal first.

Western Europe, from North Cape to Sicily, had to be surveyed as a whole. There is the main land mass, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic—a peninsula, when viewed in perspective, of that greatest of all land masses, which is Europe and Asia combined. On the flanks of this long peninsula we have two main outcrops—apart from the Iberian Peninsula and the British Isles. The one is Denmark, almost touching the tip of Scandinavia, whose western half, Norway, is among our brotherhood of nations sworn to defend

freedom. The southern outcrop is Italy, projecting into the Mediterranean, and affording us a strong position for flanking forces with valuable air and sea bases.

We therefore conceived of Western Europe as an ultimate stronghold flanked by two defended regions: one comprising Denmark and Norway, and the other comprising Italy. All three of these countries are blessed by certain dispensations in the way of natural defensive advantages. Norway has its rugged coast and hinterland; Denmark its many internal water-obstacles; Italy her mountains with the narrow passes on the north and the Adriatic to the east. It seemed sound to divide the command of Western Europe into three main sectors: Norway and Denmark as the one buttress, Italy and adjacent waters as the other, and the central mass as the main structure. Along these lines, the SHAPE command structure was fashioned. The bulk of ground and air strength would of necessity be in the center and a smaller number of land and airforces together with naval support, would defend the northern and southern flanks. Accordingly, in the spring of 1951, there was announced the formation of a northern allied command under Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, with Major General Robert Taylor as his air commander, Lieutenant General Wilhelm Hansteen commanding allied land forces Norway, and Lieutenant General Ebbe Gortz (later Lieutenant General Erik Moller) commanding allied land forces Denmark.

In the center, General Alphonse P. Jin was chosen to command land forces, with Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad in command of air forces. To insure the co-ordination of naval units operating in support of the center, Vice Admiral Robert Jaujard was appointed Flag Officer, Central Europe. These officers had the responsible duty of forging into single and redoubtable weapons the forces of the national contingents unified under their commands. There were to be units from France, Great Britain, the United States, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The air forces of the center were to be so developed and placed that they could operate with the central land forces and also be able to undertake any needed action on the flanks with the least possible delay.

At the time of activation of the Central Headquarters, the organization for the command of the southern flank was still not designated. Our immediate need was the protection of this flank with land and air forces and an effective naval force, including carrier-based aircraft. This need was intertwined with the problems of defence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, which made for

complexities that would take time to solve. The solution to the military problem was no more than begun with development of the command structure and the various headquarters. The big task of "forging the weapons" remained—that is, the recruiting, training, and equipping of the standing forces and reserves, and of providing their support in the war of airfields, signal communications, and supply lines. All these necessary elements in men and equipments, the North Atlantic Treaty nations were called upon to contribute to the common defence.

Political and Economic Aspects

The organizational framework of SHAPE was virtually completed in June, when Admiral Robert B. Carney was appointed to command Allied Forces Southern Europe. Under him, Lieutenant General M. L. De Castiglioni was named Commander Land Forces South, and Major General David Schlatter assumed Command of Air Forces. Subsequently, two sea area commands were organized by Admiral Carney, one under Vice-Admiral Leon Sala, and the other under Vice-Admiral Massimo Girosi.

Now detailed planning could go forward in all sectors to measure ultimate defence requirements and to ensure efficient use, in an emergency, of forces already available. At SHAPE, planning was vigorously pursued by our international staff under the direction of General Alfred M. Gruenther. In this task, our officers profited greatly from previous work done by Field Marshal Montgomery and his associates in the Western Union Defence organization and by the various regional planning groups of NATO.

Very quickly after the establishment of the command structure we began to see definite improvement in the morale and readiness of troops. But first and foremost was the need for more forces. The United States and Great Britain alone possessed previously formed and disposable reserves, and they proceeded to deploy additional strength in Germany—four divisions from America and two from the United Kingdom. France already had the equivalent of four divisions in Germany. Air reinforcement, although sorely needed, had to await the accomplishment of major programs for air crew training, production of aircraft, and construction of additional airfields.

The timely strengthening of allied ground forces beyond the Rhine had a good effect on morale in Europe and on public confidence in the vitality of our joint effort. Yet the situation demanded far greater strength in being, not only in the center but on the vital flanks, North and South. This had to come largely from the con-

tinental allies; they were on the land; they had the manpower.

Building combat-worthy forces in Europe was certain to take considerable time. All seven of the continental members of SHAPE had been overrun in the war and occupied for long periods. Their military formations had been disbanded, and the supporting industrial and organizational network, essential to military establishments, had partially disintegrated. Actually, several of the countries had never possessed a modern military establishment. With those, everything had to be built from the ground up.

My personal efforts, therefore, and those of my deputy, Field Marshal Montgomery, and members of the SHAPE staff, were directed at the basic problem of getting more men under arms and under training in Europe. We made constant visits to military installations and to every capital, studying schedules and means for training and equipping field forces. Our aim was to insure a larger ready force and, additionally, to see a broader base established for the expanding programs for training and equipment planned for 1952 and subsequent years. The problem of greater forces could not be solved by mere extension of national military service in the various countries. There was an urgent need to enlist more career servicemen who could form the professional core for citizen levies and who would also fill the inescapable need for skilled leaders, specialists, pilots, and technicians. During his period of compulsory service, the European citizen gave his time to the nation, receiving a mere pittance as monthly pay. Improved pay scales and conditions of service were obviously needed to attract more men into the professional ranks.

Everywhere we turned, we ran into political and economic factors. One thing was clear:—Nothing would be gained and much lost through any substantial lowering of the already low standard of living in Europe. Our central problem was one of morale—the spirit of man. All human progress in the military or other fields has its source in the heart. No man will fight unless he feels he has something worth fighting for. Next, then, is the factor of the strength of the supporting economy. Unless the economy can safely carry the military establishment, whatever force of this nature a nation might create is worse than useless in a crisis. Since behind it there is nothing, it will only disintegrate.

In the general rehabilitation of European economy, the Marshall Plan had achieved remarkable success in the years 1947–1950. The measure of its contribution to the well-being and stability of Europe could be fully appreciated only by one who

had seen the situation there before and after. Nevertheless, the starting point had been so close to rock bottom that only a minimum level of economic strength had been regained. The Soviets, who wanted no recovery in Western Europe, had screamed that the Marshall Plan was a war measure, even though its terms offered economic assistance to the USSR and its satellites on the same basis as that accepted by the free nations. In concept and application, the program was political and economic: To repair the chaos of war, to start industry on the road to health, and to raise production to a level consistent with minimum civil needs.

To assist free nations, in Europe and elsewhere, to build their own defences against the persistent threat of aggression, the United States inaugurated the mutual defence assistance program late in 1949. The purpose of this program was to furnish items of military equipment which the other countries could not produce, and to assist in the training required for the effective use of these weapons. In the European area, the program also provided the countries some of the machine tools, materials, and various components needed to get the production of munitions started—the flow of material to Europe was under way during 1951, consisting for the most part of tanks, vehicles, aircraft, and guns from existing stocks. A number of light naval vessels of combat and support types were also transferred to European navies. For their part, recipient nations were to raise and maintain the forces and furnish the balance of equipment they needed. In addition, they were to prepare to cope with maintenance and replacement programs of the heavy equipment at the earliest practicable date. The United Kingdom, with her greater industrial capacity, was in the best position to furnish the bulk of her own needs in tanks, aircraft and communications equipment.

Despite this extensive aid, the rearmament program meant heavy budget increases in all European countries. Larger permanent establishments were required, and more extensive training programs. Facilities had to be created for new forces—airfields, depot, and all the requirements peculiar to military forces. Of these needs, airfields were by far the most critical and expensive category. For the 1952 airfield program then being planned, real estate and construction costs amounted to the equivalent of one-half billion dollars.

The effect of defence spending on national economies was greatly magnified by sharp worldwide increases in the cost of raw materials. Food, coal, and other basic necessities soared to new heights, kindling antagonism

against governmental defence programs and the whole rearmament effort. In the village where I live not far from Paris, ordinary laborers averaged the equivalent of seventy dollars a month; yet coal for their cookstoves ranged up to fifty dollars a ton. For the price of a pair of shoes, the average man in Italy was already working eight times as long as the American worker; for a pound of butter, the French worker toiled five times as long as his American counterpart.

It is recognized, of course, that such comparisons reflect many factors, including resources, management, tools, and efficiency. Nevertheless, they show that, heavy as defence costs were to the American taxpayer, far lesser burdens could be felt seriously by the average European. Understandably, European governments were inclined to move carefully in such a political climate. As a consequence, all recommendations for augmenting forces, building airfields, or increasing budget items were closely examined and frequently subject to lengthy negotiation within the various parliamentary factions. However, the concerted effort toward greater strength made progress throughout the spring and summer months. The attitude of the governments was co-operative but there did exist a general feeling that an accurate yardstick was needed within NATO to measure the scale and intensity of national effort. Obviously, this was an extremely complicated problem in view of the differences in natural resources, financial position, industrial potential, and standards of living of various nations. Yet, failure to meet the situation would eventually lead to dissatisfaction and friction among our membership.

There were other problems as well. Our planning estimates of SHAPE forces to be created over the next few years had been prepared largely from the standpoint of military requirements. These programs now needed a feasibility test to insure that they were within the economic capabilities of member countries. However, no one knew the price tags. Presumably, some program would in time be evolved to co-ordinate NATO-wide production. But aside from the equipment pledged by the United States, no country knew at the moment what weapons it should plan on making for itself, what specialties it might make for other allied nations, or what it should procure from others.

Concern was felt in many quarters over the apparent failure to put to full use existing production facilities of Europe. There had always been large munitions industries in France and Belgium; The Netherlands possessed unused capacity in the electrical and other technical fields; several large

aircraft factories were idle in Italy. The Defence Production Board of NATO had made extensive surveys of European production capabilities and had verified that considerable additional military production was possible. Nevertheless, financial limitations and the lack of firm national programs prolonged this distressing waste of facilities.

Recognition of the specific problems impeding progress led to the appointment of the temporary council committee at the NATO meeting in Ottawa during September of 1951. Headed by Mr. W. Averell Harriman of the United States, this committee served NATO as an advisory group but nevertheless had power to investigate the broad military effort and the potential of each of the member nations. The primary task of the T.C.C. was to develop a plan of action reconciling the issues arising from an acceptable military program with the actual capabilities of NATO member countries. It also considered ways and means of reducing the cost of building effective defensive forces. In the process, the committee surveyed the political and economic capabilities of each NATO country, as well as problems requiring attention in order to develop these capabilities.

The efforts of the T.C.C. represent a monumental achievement — an achievement which could only have been accomplished with the thoroughgoing co-operation of the member nations. SHAPE was a principal beneficiary of its labors. The operation of the committee was truly an innovation in that sovereign nations permitted an international group to examine their defence programs and their capacity—financial, economic and military—of supporting heavier burdens. As a result, the true dimensions of the rearmament task could be seen for the first time in terms of an integrated military, economic, and financial effort. For the first time, positive recommendations could be made for a more efficient pooling of production facilities and for a more equitable sharing of the burdens incident to the defence program. The recommendations of the T.C.C. were detailed and far-going. They were not all acceptable to the governments of the participating nations, but in large part they were. The final report of the T.C.C. was approved at Lisbon and represented one of the great advances made at that meeting.

Even with the maximum potential realized through the collective efforts of member nations, there is little hope for the economical long-term attainment of security and stability in Europe unless Western Germany can be counted on the side of the free nations. Here in the heart of Europe

is an area of roughly 10,000 square miles, populated by nearly fifty million industrious and highly-skilled people. Rich in natural resources and production facilities, Western Germany alone produces one-half as much steel annually as the rest of Western Europe combined. The coal of the Ruhr, along with the industrial sinews it feeds, is a prime economic fact in Europe.

As the geographic center of Europe, Western Germany is of great strategic importance in the defence of the continent. The northern plain of Germany, with its extensive network of modern roads and railways, offers the best route of advance from the east. As of today, our forces could not offer prolonged resistance east of the Rhine barrier. Thus we might lose, by default, the considerable resources of Germany and suffer, at the same time, direct exposure of Denmark and The Netherlands. With Western Germany in our orbit NATO forces would form a strong and unbroken line in Central Europe from the Baltic to the Alps. Depth is always a desirable element in defence: in the restricted area of Western Europe, it is mandatory. Defensive depth is indispensable in countering the striking power of mechanized armies, and the speed and range of modern aircraft.

At first glance, a military alliance between Germany and the European nations of NATO would seem to lose sight of history. Too recently has Germany been the destroyer of peace in the Western World. Under evil leadership, a strong and able people succumbed to the doctrine that the arbitrary exercise of force was their privilege, and early military successes gave their leaders proud hopes of becoming world conquerors. The thought of a rearmed Germany is a matter of grave concern to the nations of Western Europe, who have suffered much from the misuse of German power. Certainly their anixety is understandable.

However, the people of Western Germany have made substantial progress toward understanding and achieving self-government. This development should be further encouraged by bringing them into closer association with the freedoms of the West. Thus their contributions to the common defence must be made on the one possible basis, a voluntary one, with equality of treatment for all.

Surely, it would be foolhardy to assume that a great country like Germany could long remain a vacuum. Unless Germany becomes a partner of the West, we might, eventually, see a repetition of the disaster of Czechoslovakia. Consider the glittering blandishments held out to the Germans by Moscow during recent months—promises of German unity,

renewal of her old trade with Eastern Europe, a German national army, removal of occupation forces and restrictions. The sturdy determination of the German federal republic to ally itself with the freedoms of the West has been manifested by its refusal to be blinded by such tactics. For the good of the German people, this is certainly the only course. For them the choice is starkly clear—freedom or subjection.

Recognizing the importance of German participation, the United States proposed to the North Atlantic Council in the Fall of 1950 that a plan be devised to obtain a German contribution to Western European defence within the framework of NATO. At Brussels in December, 1950, the various aspects of this proposal were studied by members of the council, who then invited the United States, the United Kingdom and France to discuss the matter with the German federal republic.

Meanwhile, the French government proposed an appealing innovation; why not, they said, bring the Germans in as part of a unified European defence force? For several years, France had been a leader in promoting unity in Europe and was, at the time, negotiating the Schuman plan, a major expression of economic unity. It was felt that German participation within the framework of a European defence community would not only provide the safeguards desired by Germany's neighbors of the West, but would represent also a major step towards European federation. In this spirit France met with Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Western Germany to evolve an acceptable formula for German participation. From these meetings the concept of a European defence force emerged.

No one has attempted to minimize the difficulty of the new and complex problems implicit in such a plan. On the contrary, the doubters and the critical have magnified these in the hope of halting progress. Partial loss of sovereignty, complexity in administration and maintenance, destruction of patriotic impulse, and dozens of other valid and invalid objections have been pled as establishing the futility of the proposal. Here, as in so many others of the arguments developing around NATO, the answer is found in a simple test. It is: "If this plan is not adopted, what is the inevitable result on the peace and the security we seek to preserve?"

A year's preliminary work spent in refining the original concept has brought negotiations to an advanced stage with six governments participating, The Netherlands in addition to the five original nations. At the Lisbon conference in February, the plan received the endorsement and

support of all other NATO powers.

As presently conceived, the European defence force calls for the pooling of forces into a common military organization for the defence of all. Initially, the forces to be unified would be those allocated by the participating nations to the defence of Europe. Troops required to meet commitments outside of Europe proper would be retained under national control. The direction, support, and administration of the unified defence forces would be vested in a European defence community, including a European assembly, a council, a court of justice, and an executive group, along with agencies for military supply, procurement, and budget. Such integration of military forces and particularly the integration of their supply and supporting agencies, would prevent any participating nation from embarking on a separate course of aggression. The European defence force would include land, air and naval units and their supporting elements. Basic ground units would be called groupements, of about 12,000 men. The air would be organized into wing-size units. At this level, troops would not be mixed as to nationality, thus preserving the language, customs and esprit of the home peoples. These basic units would be combined in larger military formations such as army corps, made up of elements of different national origin. The practicality of such integration was proved many times during the last war and is currently being demonstrated by our troops in Korea.

When formed, the European defence force would be integrated under SHAPE in the same manner as purely national forces from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other countries not members of the European defence community. The new grouping would not modify, conflict with, or in any way supersede the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The concept of a European defence force is the consolidation of military elements of five nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with forces from still another nation, Western Germany. It cannot fail to increase greatly the effectiveness of our collective security and to facilitate the achievement of NATO aims.

Success would be a long step also toward the unification of Europe. This is the central goal and the only possible way of creating reasonable security, and insuring at the same time the improvement in living standards that characterizes Western civilization. Therein lies the real answer to the threat of communistic inundation. It is not enough to know that our combined resources outweigh those of the Soviet dictators. What matters is our ability to use

them in the best possible way for our security and well-being.

Such efficiency demands the closest kind of political and economic co-operation, particularly in the area of Western Europe. For if the free nations of this region were really a unit, tremendous benefits would accrue to them individually and to NATO. Few Europeans would quarrel with this concept: political and economic unity is a popular theme to millions who have suffered from past differences. Yet progress toward full co-operation has been limited by the intricate and artificial maze of national obstacles erected by man himself. Customs barriers, conflicting economic structures, currency regulations and countless other road blocks curtail drastically the movement of men, manufactured products, raw materials, and money upon which Europe's economic life depends. They are expensive and wasteful encumbrances, pyramiding the cost of production with tariffs, overhead, taxes and middlemen. In the political field, these barriers compound inefficiency with distrust and suspicion.

The advantages of political and economic unity can be demonstrated by such practical examples as the European defence force and the Schuman plan, which embrace the same six countries. The Schuman plan calls for the pooling and production of steel and coal—vital commodities of life and defence. The aim is to provide common objectives and common markets, to eliminate unreasonable customs barriers, to make the European economy more flexible and productive. To me this plan to work together in steel and coal is, with the European defence community, a promise of greater economic, military, and moral strength in Western Europe. It is tangible evidence of the desire to eliminate the weaknesses of separate little economies, which make it hard for Europe to arm for defence. In my opinion, the two plans, the Schuman Plan and the European Defence Community mark historic advances in European co-operation. If these could be supplemented by a Schuman Plan for electric power and for agriculture, along with a system for standardizing money values, the benefits would be profound and far-reaching. These joint efforts would serve as practical laboratories for the development of that full political and economic unity which alone can make Europe self-sustaining and secure. Indeed, until this hope becomes an accomplished fact, or some miracle brings about a disappearance of the Soviet threat, there will be no confident peace and enlarging prosperity for any part of the free world.

Situation in Europe Today

Although it is my conviction that a unified Europe offers the best hope

for permanent stability in this critical area, respectable strength can nevertheless be achieved within NATO by wholehearted effort and co-operation. Much has been done towards that end in the past twelve months. Viewed separately, as military, economic and political achievements, these gains may not be spectacular; but taken as a whole, they have created a profound change in morale, the basic factor of all.

Already our active forces have increased to a point where they could give a vigorous account of themselves, should an attack be launched against us. In terms of army divisions whether in service or quickly mobilizable, our forces in Western Europe have nearly doubled in numbers. The National units pledged to this command a year ago were for the most part poorly equipped, inadequately trained, and lacking essential support in both supplies and installations. Because of their weakness on all fronts, and the absence of central direction, they could have offered little more than token resistance to attack. Today, the combat readiness of our troops has improved markedly. Readjustments in their deployment have enhanced their potential effectiveness against the threat from the East. Behind them is a steadily-expanding supply system, and a command organization to plan and direct their co-ordinated efforts. Still far—disappointingly far—from sufficient for a determined defence, they nevertheless represent a fighting force in whose spirit and increasing fitness our nations can take considerable pride.

Pursuant to the recommendations of the temporary council committee, our member countries have pledged to produce this year fifty divisions for European defence, exclusive of those to be provided by the two new NATO nations, Greece and Turkey. Roughly, one-half of the fifty divisions will be standing forces; the remainder are planned as reserve divisions available for employment at periods varying from three to thirty days.

The number of divisions pledged does not fully represent the magnitude of the effort required from the various member nations. Along with the divisions furnished, each nation must produce a variety of combat and service support elements, such as engineers, heavy artillery, communications and transport, supply and maintenance units, to maintain these divisions in the field. When combined with other needs such as anti-aircraft defences, these requirements raise manpower and equipment totals to twice or three times those represented within the combat divisions.

The building of these priority reserve divisions and similar forces to follow them represents one of the most difficult and urgent problems

now before us. The nations of Western Europe will never be able to maintain under arms in peacetime the regular forces necessary to meet a Soviet invasion, to hold it, and to throw it back. It would entail permanent peacetime forces of a size they cannot afford. The defence of the West must necessarily be based on highly-trained covering forces, backed by reserve units which can be brought into action immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. Admittedly, this is the only system of defence which can be adopted without excessive cost or crippling damage to national economies. To make the system work will demand far more attention than is now being given to the organization and readying of reserve forces on the continent.

Each nation must now organize its reservists so as to produce trained formations which will be fit to fight without a long period of training after mobilization. This means that the reserve forces will have to receive field training as divisions and similar formations in peacetime. Moreover, adequate equipment must constantly be in the hands of these units, and strong permanent cadres assigned to provide the professional core essential to combat-worthy efficiency.

Air power is the dominant factor in war today. It cannot win a war alone, but without it, no war can be won. Our goal is to create air strength capable of answering immediately the onslaught of an aggressor and covering, at the same time, the mobilization of reserve forces. Since we cannot predict when an attack might be launched, air forces must be operationally ready at all times to rise to the defence of Western Europe.

Our air arm has gradually progressed in strength and effectiveness during the past year. But the development of air power is a long and complex process. It takes time to produce the aircraft, the fields from which they fly, and the skilled crews who operate and maintain them. The articulation of these various programs at the SHAPE level has been a primary concern of my Air Deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders.

There is still a long way to go in developing air strength in Western Europe. A major task has been and continues to be the provision of adequate air bases and communications to link them. The airfield problem stems largely from the fact that jet fighters require runways substantially longer than those in current use for even the largest commercial aircraft. During the past year some thirty airfields have been put into use, but these were largely an inheritance from previous European construction programs and involved improvements on fields already in

existence. A vast amount of new construction is needed to accommodate the air power necessary to the defence of the West.

One of the most heartening achievements of the Lisbon conference was the approval by member nations of a cost-sharing scheme to build a large number of additional airfields in Europe. Action was also taken to provide headquarters sites and communication facilities for the common use of NATO forces. Without agreement on the fundamental and complex question of costs, our whole defence project would have been crippled by the continued lack of adequate air facilities.

As presently scheduled, NATO's European air arm will include by the end of 1952 some four thousand operational aircraft, a significant proportion of which will be modern jet fighters. When realized, this air strength will amount to a greatly improved situation over what we faced a year ago, but it will still be far from our ultimate requirements. Moreover, the operational value of the forces will depend in large measure on progress made in developing the aircraft warning system and the supply and maintenance organizations for air forces.

The naval equation in Western European waters is still weighted strongly in our favor. Deficiencies exist in mine-sweepers, anti-submarine craft, and harbor defence installations, but efforts are being made toward filling these needs. The main advance on the naval side has been realized in the excellent co-ordination and common procedures evolved by allied navies in European waters.

These developments will bring to all European defence problems—sea, air and land—the effective application of modern sea power and the wide range of weapons which its arsenal contains. This capability is of particular importance in the northern and southern regions of my command. With the extension of the southern defence area some fourteen hundred miles eastward, a broad flanking position will be organized under Admiral Carney, combining SHAPE forces in Italy and the Central Mediterranean with those of Greece and Turkey. The essential role of sea power here is to link and support the defence forces of these countries while working in close co-operation with other allied forces in the Mediterranean area.

Recently I have had the stimulating experience of visiting our two new NATO members, Greece and Turkey. Knowing the courage they have shown in the face of direct communist pressure, we are proud at SHAPE to welcome them as allies. With their resolute, hardy peoples, these nations are a significant addition to European defence. They include between them

an army strength of more than twenty-five divisions, backed by efficient but relatively smaller air and naval forces.

The growth of military strength reported during the past year has derived from various sources. Certainly, it could not have been achieved without the arrival in increasing numbers of tanks, aircraft, and heavy equipment from the United States and Canada. But arms are useless without trained manpower; and during the past eighteen months every Western European nation represented in SHAPE has increased the length of its conscription period. Defence budgets were also raised; and among these continental members, military expenditures now average over twice the pre-Korean level.

A wide range of activities has been undertaken to bring the forces of the Western powers to a greater degree of effectiveness. Thousands of reservists have been called up for refresher training in the units to which they would be assigned in an emergency. It is expected that this practice will be greatly extended during 1952 and become standard practice in the future. Preparations are now in progress for a co-ordinated set of manœuvers during the coming year to weld standing and reserve forces into integrated, battleworthy commands.

Extensive field exercises, with air forces and ground troops representing eight nations, took place in Western Germany last Fall; naval exercises and operations have been conducted by allied fleets in the Mediterranean, the channel, and northern waters. With soldiers, sailors and airmen from many nations working together, the sense of comradeship, unity and common destiny has been strengthened. The merging of diverse procedures and many tongues is not an easy task: but techniques have been designed to overcome the difficulties, and allied commanders have been able not only to test them but also to practice with valuable results the handling of international forces.

At this time, the forces assigned to SHAPE are not of themselves sufficient to stay the hand of an aggressor. Of some comfort in this bleak realization is the existence of other military forces of the NATO countries in adjacent areas. At sea, there are the fleets directed by Admiral McCormick, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic: there is the British home fleet, and other allied naval forces in the Mediterranean and European coastal waters. From its bases in the United Kingdom, the RAF Fighter Command could contribute greatly in the air battle against Soviet attack.

The U.S. Strategic Air Command, with bases in the United Kingdom and North Africa, possesses tre-

mendous capability, acting both independently and in support of European defence forces. The resources of the British Bomber Command would also be of great value in war. These forces together not only add much to over-all allied strength but must certainly give food for thought to a potential enemy. Yet they can be used to the full only so long as continental bases remain securely in our hands.

Military strength is of little worth unless backed by healthy, expanding economies. In this truth is found the source of many of our bitterest problems. Yet from the very beginning of our endeavor, we have been able to draw some confidence from the knowledge that NATO's economic potential is superior to that of the East. This potential springs from the productive peoples of the Atlantic Community who hold in their grasp the greatest economic production, the most advanced technology the world has yet seen. The task is to convert this potential into actuality, to organize and produce all that our situation now demands. Despite stresses and strains, shortages, delays and some outright failures, there has been a sustained rise in the production of goods for defence and non-defence purposes alike. But, there is no lack of problems yet to be faced and mastered.

The shortage of coal has been one of the most serious weaknesses in Europe, imposing severe limitations on economic and military production alike. Steel is the very bedrock of our Western industrial machine and of modern military power; coal is indispensable to its manufacture. The production of coal lagged behind the general level of industrial activity with the result that Europe is actually importing quantities from the United States. Carrying American coal to Europe eats into the other vital dollar imports upon which the industrial life of Europe depends.

The process of channeling economic output into military ends, though rarely easy, has seemed particularly hard in the present circumstances. Scarcity in Europe has been prolonged and severe. To deny even a part of the increased production to civil demands has been difficult. To make such decisions effective has been burdensome. The changes in established patterns of consumption and distribution, of trade and income, brought on by expanded military requirements, have encountered resistance of many kinds. Governmental decisions in this part of the world must be made in an atmosphere of extreme financial stringency and under heavy pressure from various groups who feel acutely the impact of new taxes, controls, and higher prices.

Increasing defence budgets have posed real problems of fiscal and financial management. Hanging over the NATO defence effort has been the menace of inflation which, if unchecked, could wipe out all gains. The picture is by no means bright, and we are far from being able to regard the success of the military budgetary programs as already assured. In some countries the pressure of inflation has been effectively checked. In others, inflation is surging upwards and endangering the whole defence program.

From relatively small beginnings, European production of the equipment and supplies for modern armies, navies, and air forces has increased during the past year, and further increases will be undertaken. A significant and growing proportion of the military equipment being provided by the United States to its NATO partners is soon to be produced in European factories. The rate of production of equipment, such as aircraft engines, guns, ammunition, and radio sets, is rising and will continue to rise, with the object of re-establishing in Europe a level of production capable of satisfying future military requirements. Jet fighters, tanks, military vehicles and similar heavy equipment are now produced, on a small scale in regions where, for several years all such production had ceased.

After necessary initial armaments have been produced, Europe must become self-sustaining in military manufactures at the earliest possible date.

The United States is currently making a tremendous effort to furnish a great portion of the capital outlay in military equipment. Without this, there could be no effective forces on the continent within the next four or five years. But America cannot continue to be the primary source of munitions for the entire free world. To do so would be militarily unsound. Moreover, the United States cannot long continue such expenditures without endangering her own economic structure. The soundness of that structure is of vital concern to the entire free world, for its collapse would be a world-shaking tragedy.

Within NATO, our joint enterprise, we have seen progress toward increased strength and cohesion. Member nations are progressively adjusting their internal processes both to support and to benefit from NATO operations. Since the founding of NATO almost three years ago, its activities gradually have changed from planning to implementation. This operational characteristic and the broadening scope of NATO activities are reflected in the recent reorganization which provides a permanent body of NATO representatives and an executive group under

General Lord Ismay, Secretary General. Because of their immediate availability and powers of decision, these new agencies will be a great help to the work in SHAPE and other NATO commands.

There is no precedent in peacetime for the NATO concept. At SHAPE the basic relationships and the sweep of interest of a peacetime international command have evolved from day to day. I can state accurately that a great many of the problems referred to me, and often the most difficult, have been economic, political, and psychological rather than purely military. But even in the military field we have seen considerable change in the specific responsibilities and activities of this command. SHAPE is an operational rather than an administrative headquarters. All the matters of pay, internal management, and supply of the various forces are the direct concern of the countries contributing them. Yet, in the light of a year's experience, it has been necessary for the North Atlantic council to increase the authority and responsibility of this headquarters with respect to logistics—the field of supply, construction, maintenance and transport. This will mean a sizeable increase in staff but should insure better co-ordination and fewer delays in making vital supplies and services available to our forces. As NATO develops, it is of the greatest importance to reconcile the need for flexibility with the need for firm plans. Master plans for the co-ordination of many related activities provide fundamental guidance and are an essential basis of confidence and economy. Yet where full effort is required, as in our case at present, that effort should be measured not against plans and predictions which have become frozen in documents, but against day-to-day possibilities and needs, and the determination of peoples to achieve the defence, together, as rapidly and effectively as possible.

The military forces we are building must be continually modified to keep pace with new weapons. To this end an annual review of the full nature and composition of our military programs should be accomplished. We are at the very point, for example, of seeing a whole sequence of fundamental changes made in response to development of new types of arms. The tendency in recent decades to produce weapons of greater range, penetrating power and destructiveness is accelerating. As a result, the balance between men and material is bound to shift, probably reducing the concentration of manpower on the battlefield, increasing the ratio of material to men, increasing the complexity of equipment—as the price of its power. There will be more and more demand for the highly-skilled

and specialized men in which our democracies excel. Military forces in the field may become lighter, faster and harder hitting, but the support which gives them these very qualities will become more elaborate and more costly.

This brings to both national and combined staffs the great responsibility of eliminating every trace of luxury in organization and in size and design of equipment. Utility, emphasized to the point of austerity, is the only guide to produce the required items at reasonable cost. We must be careful that we do not prove that free countries can be defended only at the cost of bankruptcy. Should the tragedy of another war occur, the sweep of combat will be over broader and deeper areas. Thus the zone of battle, in its three dimensions will tend to expand, and every element contributing directly to the conduct or support of military operations will become a target for enemy action. The concept of the maintenance of national military forces by states of small geographical extent has already become outdated. The logic of larger groups and association is becoming increasingly impelling. In the NATO nations, especially, the resultant task is to reconcile the demands for association into larger groupings with the deep and spiritual ties to nationhood and sovereignty. It is problems of this sort, inherent in our union, that are now being studied at the NATO Defence College organized in Paris during the last year by my Naval Deputy, Vice Admiral Andre G. Lemonnier. I look to this group—the officers of fourteen allied nations—to find the right answers to many questions that today are unanswerable. As months have passed, confidence has grown throughout the NATO community from the existence of greater and more effective forces and an organization to direct and support them. However, we have not yet succeeded in bringing the full force, the full moral potential of our freedom-loving people into the stark struggle for survival of priceless values. Our goals are simple; they are honourable; they can be achieved. Why, therefore, should there be confusion in the minds of millions of our own peoples as to the basic aims of our defence program, the necessity for it and the urgent demand for their own individual efforts? Once these facts are established in the minds of our Atlantic peoples, there will be less bickering in our councils, and it will become progressively more difficult for self-seeking individuals to delay our progress by exploiting internal national divisions or minor grievances between our members. Once the truth is understood, once the critical dangers present in the world situation are really known, there will be less

complacency concerning our present military situation, and the harmful effects of delay will be clearly seen.

The Soviet army casts its shadow over the length and breadth of Europe. The satellite countries have increased the size and combat effectiveness of their armed forces. Reports from behind the Iron Curtain indicate that the restiveness of these captive peoples has led to even tighter, tougher, more brutal measures of state control. The familiar technique of the purge, deliberate terror, and intimidation has forced a measure of unity—however unhappy—in this area.

The Soviet Air Force in Eastern Germany is currently replacing obsolescent aircraft with jet planes. Work on airfields, communications, and supply installations is being vigorously pursued in Eastern Europe. By the prolongation of the war in Korea and Indo-China, by the constant attempts at erosion and subversion of effective government in the Far East and Middle East, heavy drains have been imposed upon the Western powers, which reduce the resources available to establish a balance in Europe.

Nevertheless, the tide has begun to flow our way and the situation of the free world is brighter than it was a year ago. At Lisbon, our member nations made great headway on issues vital to our continued progress. They strengthened our eastern flank by bringing into NATO the stout-hearted peoples of Greece and Turkey. They agreed to the concept of a European defence community and a close relationship with the German federal republic. They approved a program to establish this year a force of fifty standing and reserve divisions and 4,000 aircraft. When combined with the ready strength available in Greece and Turkey, this force—if properly armed and trained—should produce an encouraging degree of security. Considering training, organization, material, vital installations, and all the various factors which go to make up military proficiency, I personally would look upon completion of this program as clear material evidence that the basic goals of our combined enterprise are going to be achieved. Now our governments must convert the Lisbon program into actuality. It demands full and unstinting support, for only through positive action by all our nations can we ever achieve tranquility and security. As we work together in the coming year, we are carrying out our pledge to each other. We are reaffirming our true beliefs in the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. We are one in our desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. But we are steadfast in our determination to safeguard the freedom, the common

heritage, and the civilization of our member nations.

This is a great task—a noble charge. In a world where powerful forces are working tirelessly to destroy the freedom, individual liberty, and dignity of man, we cannot for one moment delay our advance toward security. The task will require constant watchfulness, hard work, cooperation and sacrifice, but what we do now can grant us peace for generations.

It can be done, given the will to do it. There is power in our union—and resourcefulness on land, sea and air. Visible and within grasp we have the capability of building such military, economic, and moral strength as the communist world would never dare to challenge. When that point is reached, the Iron Curtain rulers may finally be willing to participate seriously in disarmament negotiations. Then, we may see fulfilled the universal hope expressed in the United Nations Charter to reduce "the diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources." Then the Atlantic Community will have proved worthy of its history and its God-given endowments. We shall have proved our union, the world's most potent influence toward peace among men—the final security goal of humanity.

(Signed) *Dwight D. Eisenhower.*

Electronic Rifle Range

Electronics has invaded the rifle range too. The Infantry School [U.S.] recently put into operation the first completely electronic rifle range. A pit detail is no longer required, as the targets are raised and lowered electrically by switches located on the firing line. Targets can be moved laterally or raised and lowered quickly for rapid firing practice.

Self-sealing rubber surfaces on the targets themselves permit an estimated 1500 bullets to puncture each square inch of the target without harming the electric grids built right into the target. When a bullet pierces a target, the target will be lowered automatically and lights on a control panel enable controllers to credit firers with their hits. It is a transition-type range with 36 targets, four of which can move laterally to simulate a man in the act of running.

The cost of the range is $100,000—plus—but the School pointed out that it has cost $130,000 annually to operate the range manually. Also, the men who would normally be required to operate each target can now use that time for training.—*United States Army Combat Forces Journal.*

Lessons from the Campaign

FIRST COMMONWEALTH DIVISION IN KOREA

By
Major R. C. W. Thomas, OBE, The Royal West Kent Regiment*

Since its formation the 1st Commonwealth Division has fought two major battles against the Chinese Communist Forces, the first offensive and the second defensive. Therefore, a good knowledge of enemy tactics and capabilities has been acquired on the divisional level, and a number of interesting facts have been learnt.

In defence it has been found generally that the enemy is willing to surrender ground if it is not considered vital to his main defensive position. At the same time every effort is made to make our troops deploy and suffer casualties while acquiring this ground. On the other hand, if our troops are making a determined effort to capture vital ground, the enemy will defend stubbornly, even to the extent of leaving small, but heavily armed, sub-units to fight on the position to the last man and the last round.

All the major attacks that have been experienced by the Division have always been launched either just before last light or under cover of darkness, usually preceded by heavy shelling. Obviously these timings are chosen on account of the fact that this is the period when our tanks, artillery and air support are the least effective. In addition it is a common practice of the enemy to subject a position that is due to be attacked to a series of minor probing offensives, sometimes spread over a period as long as two weeks. The aim of these probes is to seek out weak spots in the line, determine unit dispositions and locations of automatic weapons. Once the enemy has finally selected his objectives he then reverts to his usual practice of launching mass attacks, seeking to saturate the defenders by sheer weight of numbers and capture his objectives before first light. However, if the attack becomes held up or disorganized it has been found that he is content to break off the engagement some time after midnight, give up any ground that has been captured and fade rapidly away to his own lines to await the cover and protection of another night in which to try again.

During the November offensive against the Division the enemy was supported by a considerable amount

*Extracted from the April 1952 issue of The Army Quarterly (Great Britain).—Editor.

of artillery including a number of self-propelled guns which were often reported as tanks. As has already been stated, it is believed that the Commonwealth Division has been the first formation along the whole army front to experience mass artillery attack from enemy guns. The magnitude of the fire can be judged by the fact that just prior to the attack against 1KOSB on the 3rd of November the volume of shelling was described by some observers as being greater in proportion to anything that was ever seen in Europe during the Second World War. Probably the most impressive feature of the enemy's method of handling artillery is the masterly way in which guns are dug in and concealed, thereby making them an extremely difficult target to locate and hit.

The Division has experienced a number of rocket attacks that are believed to have originated from 132 mm. Soviet-designed rocket launchers, mounted on a 6×6 truck, and capable of firing sixteen rockets simultaneously. These attacks have done no particular damage, but it cannot be denied that their noise and flash is certainly impressive.

To date the Division has seen virtually nothing of the enemy air force, other than one lone single-engined plane commonly called by the name of "Bedcheck Charlie". During August and September this plane was wont to visit the Division from time to time and one night actually had the presumption to drop one very small bomb near Divisional Headquarters, followed by one single burst of machine-gun fire. However, after October these visits ceased, and it could be assumed that the pilot had either been sent to join his ancestors or had been repatriated.

The enemy has attempted at various times to influence our troops by means of propaganda pamphlets and broadcasts over operational wireless sets. A number of invitations have been received by forward units to come and have a friendly chat about the peace negotiations and also to enjoy the company of charming ladies. In addition roughly-made pillar-boxes have been found containing well-designed propaganda leaflets which for a while were in great demand as souvenirs of Korea. However, by the 3rd of October the enemy apparently realized that he was wasting his time trying to "propaganda" the Commonwealth Division and the broadcasts and delivery of leaflets stopped abruptly after several of the pillar-boxes had been fitted with booby traps by our troops.

No war is ever devoid of strange and even amusing stories about the enemy, and this war has proved to be no exception. For several days a report ran through the Division that during one attack a woman dressed in

black with long flowing hair had been seen leading an enemy company. Another story went around that the enemy soldiers were doped with opium before an attack, which gave them the will-power to continue to advance, even if it necessitated climbing over piles of their own dead. But in the case of both of these stories, like others, neither was substantiated. No woman's body has ever been found, neither has any opium been recovered from any Chinese soldier, dead or alive.

However, on some occasions truth can be stranger than fiction, as borne out by the fact that in one battle a N.C.O. was badly wounded and captured by the enemy; a few days later he was carried back on a stretcher over a distance of two miles and left close to our own lines. In another attack an outpost was overrun and an officer and eight men were captured and told to walk down the hill to the enemy lines. The whole party became lost in the dark and in the end found they had walked into the lines of our own troops located on the other side of the hill. Finally perhaps the strangest story of all about the enemy is his ability to remove his own dead and wounded from the battlefield. Night after night when he has been attacking, literally dozens of the enemy have been seen to fall in the moonlight and the air has been full of the cries of the wounded and dying. But when the moon has waned and dawn has come there is usually little to be found. The piles of bodies have gone and all that remains are the signs of where they have been dragged away.

At the same time that the Division has been acquiring knowledge about the enemy, many valuable lessons have also been learnt by our own troops, some of which are given below:

1. In order to give units, when defending, the best possible chance of stopping the hoards of attacking Chinese, it has been found that there is a real need for each rifle section to have at least two bren guns. These extra weapons are only required for defence, and when advancing they are held back in either the battalion A or B Echelon.

2. In addition to the requirement of extra bren guns it is essential for every single defensive position to be stocked with masses of grenades, as our troops have found that the grenade is a magnificent killing weapon when employed against an enemy advancing *en masse*. Therefore it is essential that all soldiers coming to Korea are properly trained and have no fear in handling this weapon.

3. When the enemy is really bent on capturing a position he has proved himself capable of penetrating protective wire round a defensive position. The wire is first subjected to a

considerable amount of artillery and mortar fire and then penetrated by means of either a kind of improvised bangalore torpedo, poles with hooks to snap any wire that is laid too tight, or some form of cushion. To be effective wire needs to be laid comparatively loosely and to a terrific depth, festooned as much as possible with trip flares to give the defenders early warning of the arrival of the enemy on the wire.

4. Due to the superiority of our tanks, artillery and air the enemy does nearly everything by night and is a skilful fighter in the dark. Therefore it is essential that all troops sent to Korea are thoroughly trained in night fighting, as this is the time when many of the major battles are invariably fought.

5. In Korea it is almost impossible to deploy a large number of tanks to move close behind advancing infantry. However, on the occasions when it has been possible for the infantry to assault with even one tank, the effect has been devastating. However, more often than not, tanks have had to support the advancing infantry with fire from lay-back positions on tracks to the rear and flanks. In defence it has been found possible with careful reconnaissance to get tanks on to the most unlikely hills in battalion areas where their fire-power and morale value is tremendous.

6. The centralized control of artillery has again and again proved its worth, and there is no doubt that in defence the artillery had done more to break up and destroy enemy attacks than anything else. It has been found that it is essential to start killing enemy by artillery fire as far out as possible and from the first moment that it appears that an attack is imminent, for when dealing with saturation attacks invariably it is too late if firing is not started until the enemy is close to our positions. Of course these tactics result in a tremendous ammunition expenditure, but the only way to break up mass attacks is to hit the enemy early with everything and go on doing so.

7. 4.2 mortars have proved to be invaluable, but they would be even more useful if they were more accurate and had a longer range. Whenever practicable mortars have been used concentrated, but in a wide defensive position this has not always been possible. Mortars have been used well forward and incorporated in battalion areas, often close behind the leading companies.

8. During the enemy offensive in November, when our troops were under almost continuous attack, the Division was allotted 105 air strikes (a total of nearly 500 planes) during a period of twenty flying days. Air strikes have a tremendous morale value to our own troops, but the enemy is so expert in digging in and

concealing himself that it is extremely difficult to damage him with this form of attack unless troops and vehicles can be caught in the open, when a Napalm attack can then be very effective. From reports of numerous prisoners it is clear that the enemy has a far greater fear of artillery fire than air attack.

9. Although the results of air strikes by day have proved to be somewhat disappointing, the Division has obtained great assistance at night from bombers in close support of ground troops. Pinpoint targets have been given within one thousand yards of our forward positions, which have been bombed with great accuracy. By selecting targets of likely enemy FUPs* and axis of advance, it is believed that two enemy attacks were completely broken up before they could get under way on account of enemy units being accurately bombed at the decisive moment. The big problem is, of course, to guess from what direction and at what time an attack will come, as the bombers that are used have to fly from bases in Japan on a timed programme.

10. Unfortunately the universal carrier has proved to be a complete failure in Korea. It has been found that it cannot hold the icy roads, negotiate paddy fields or make any headway in soft going or mud. As a consequence, the majority of carriers in infantry battalions have had to be replaced by Jeeps to carry mortars and tow the anti-tank guns. At the same time the Oxford carrier has proved itself to be a fine vehicle, and everyone has been after them for a multitude of different jobs.

11. Due to the fact that many defensive positions have to be sited on the top of high features, every battalion has to have its own Porter Company, consisting of locally enlisted Koreans who are enrolled in a Korean Service Corps. In order to obtain the maximum lift from these porters it is essential that proper drills are worked out, otherwise much of their potential value will be wasted. Porters must be employed under the direct supervision of an officer, and if they are properly treated they soon become loyal servants of the unit. On occasions porters have been known to join in a battle by throwing grenades at the advancing enemy with the very best will in the world.

12. On account of the amount of fighting that has to be done at night the Division has put to excellent use some searchlights borrowed from the Americans. These lights have been allotted to forward brigades manned by *ad hoc* infantry teams who have been given a short course in how to operate searchlights. No doubt every rule and principle as laid down in the

*FUPs = Forming up positions.

book have been broken, but nevertheless the fact remains that the light that has been produced has certainly been of great value. They have been particularly effective when there is snow on the ground.

13. In Korea communications have been surprisingly good, especially the telephone which has made it possible in rear of Brigade H.Qs. to fight most of the battles using this form of communication, as opposed to wireless. No. 19 and 31 wireless sets have worked especially well, but all sets need careful siting in view of the large number of long valleys and hills in the country.

IV. Conclusion

The First Commonwealth Division has now been fighting in Korea under U.S. operational command for nearly six months and has been heavily engaged with the enemy for at least half of this time.

If the question is asked whether it is difficult to make an efficient fighting machine out of a collection of Commonwealth units there is no better way of answering this question than by stating the simple fact that the Division can claim that it has never failed to carry out its allotted task and that in every engagement it has always acquitted itself with credit.

This record has been achieved because the officers and men who have been privileged to serve in the Commonwealth Division have found that although they may belong to different armies this fact is only incidental. It has been learnt that nearly all Commonwealth ideas, conceptions and techniques of war are virtually the same and that where there have been differences it is always possible to find a solution to the problem acceptable to both schools of thought.

At the same time, when moving around the Division it is impossible not to notice how every Commonwealth unit seems to have the same aim in life, namely, to be a credit to the Commonwealth and the Division as a whole, as opposed to its own particular army. Such is the spirit that has developed in the Division, simply because every day men find that there are new friends to be made and new ideas exchanged. This is just one of those things that happen naturally when men from the four corners of the earth meet with the determination to live and work and fight together as one team.

Foundations of Morale

The foundations of morale are, I think, first, spiritual, then mental, and lastly material. I put them in that order because that, I believe, is the order of their importance.—*Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.*

MORALE and LEADERSHIP

By
COLONEL WILLIAM LINE, OBE*

On these pages the* Journal *presents the views of two authors on the subject of Morale and Leadership. While the subject is the same, the writers deal with it from different points of view. The second article appears on page 53.
—Editor.

Morale and leadership are both important in military economy and efficiency. Of the two, morale is the more basic. If morale is low, leadership will be ineffective. By contrast, leadership is an emergent of good morale, and a great factor in its continuance.

Churchill did not inspire us in 1940, in the sense that he dictated our emotions. Rather, *we* were inspired by *him*. He was a superb and supreme symbol of our solid determination—and an artist in voicing the common will. In so far as he, or we, think that it was his "leadership", divorced from our collective will, that mattered, we miss the real point in regard to his dynamic role then, and his present political significance, which would be unfortunate.

If leadership, however well intentioned, does *not* emerge in a condition of high morale (through inadvertance or nepotism or autocracy) morale will be lowered. More naturally, however,—and this is the core of democratic process—high morale will sensitively slough off the artificial "leader", and an appropriate symbol of the group's solidarity will "take over".

Accordingly, morale is the basic concept. Let us therefore examine it at the outset.

Morale is a group feeling, a sense of effective, virile membership, pervading the belongingness felt by individual members of the group. It is not a dependence *on* the group, so much as an effective and privileged responsibility *to* the group, whose values are ours, because we create and share those values. Morale is dynamic. It supports an individual in apparent

*This is the text of an address which Dr. Line, who is now Professor of Psychology at the University of Toronto, delivered at the Canadian Army Staff College, Kingston, earlier this year. He was in charge of Personnel Selection for the Canadian Army during the Second World War. Born in England, he holds the degrees of B.Sc. (Mount Allison University, Sackville, N.B.); M.A. (University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alta.); M.Ed. (University of Alberta); Ph.D. (University College, London, Eng.). He is Past President, World Federation of Mental Health; Research Director, Canadian Mental Health Association, Toronto; Adviser in Psychology; Department of Veterans Affairs, Ottawa, Member, Expert Consultative Committee on Mental Hygiene, United Nations, New York.—Editor.

isolation *from* the group. It makes modern warfare possible, and artistic in its infinite variety. Not the simple belongingness of the "hollow square", nor the pre-Hollywood Hollywood glamour of "Their's not to reason why"; not the beating of drums, or "my country right or wrong". But rather, the force that makes possible "infiltration", responsible use of an enormous fire-power of individual soldiers, self-abnegation and sacrifice for the good of the group, cross-fire for the protection of others, non-private enterprise in matters that really matter to us all.

Military morale is easier to develop and maintain at a high level than is civilian morale, particularly in war-time. This is true even when, as in modern war "we are all in the front line". Military morale should therefore be an outstanding example to the nation as a whole. Again, therefore, morale is basic to success.

Military morale in peace-time, or even in cold-war time, is quite a different problem from war-time morale, (and a much more difficult one). Consequently the military community must understand the dynamic factors operating to develop high morale. This is but one of many social understandings on which our culture depends, and one of the many ways in which military organization can furnish important insights for society at large—right up to the level of the much-desired world society.

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All great military leaders stress the importance of morale. But they focus attention on different mechanisms, and therefore reap varying degrees of success. It is true that there can be developed a semblance of high morale by catering to a variety of psychological mechanisms. But unless the process of morale is soundly based—and that means based upon real and universally valid psychological laws—the morale will be temporary, ephemeral, self-destructive in the long run, incapable of developing a lasting sense of value; and will thus contribute eventually to difficulty in social adjustment, rather than to character-enhancement.

For example, at one time, during the recent war, particularly in building the morale of the 8th Army, (the "Desert Rats"), Field Marshal Montgomery appeared (to the outside observer) to base the dynamics of morale on hostility. According to reports, the Rats said "we'll knock Rommel out of Africa, and then we'll knock the 5th Army out too." Certainly there were difficulties encountered when the 8th Army had to be reformed, with many if its men dispersed to other units, etc.; for a morale based upon hatred of an "enemy" is of questionable worth—in the pinches, and in the long run.

Thus, fanaticism, based on the hatred of sin or the evil one; thus also, many of the basic aspects of Hitler's welding of the German people and especially the German military.

Morale based upon the enthusiasm of conquest, is likewise insecure. Witness Napoleon's techniques—and the difficulty he always had during periods of inactivity, and in retreat. The "rout", as against the orderly and strategic and purposeful rear-guard—in which latter the British Army has proved itself to be second to none—the "rout" is a sign, not of overwhelming military odds, but of a breakdown in morale, because that pseudo-morale was based upon the shifting sands of conquest. Dunkirk was no rout; and Germany lost, psychologically, much more than she gained, simply because the British morale was soundly based in the sense that is focal to our argument, and that will be discussed in a moment.

Whether we have done an injustice to the military leaders we have cited above—Montgomery, Napoleon, Hitler—or to such as might equally well be implied, (Stalin for instance, not as at Stalingrad, but in current world-gain phase)—makes no difference to the argument. The point is that morale is never sound if based on hostility, or even fear, (out of which hostility is usually born). Neither is it sound if based on conquest, or any other selfish motivation. Even the destruction of evil is a relatively shiftless and somewhat holier-than-thou motivation. Churchill was probably at his worst in catering to our hatreds, as when he developed that remarkable pronunciation of "Nazi", or interjected terms like "jackal" into his broadcasts. Roosevelt's "unconditional surrender" likewise.

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More positively, let us first remember that an army isn't always fighting. Soldiers are "killers" only to a very limited degree. And it is not as killers, even as powerfully armed killers, that they are soldiers. That part is incidental. Granted a soldier will feel more *confident* if he has better weapons. But though morale cannot exist without confidence, confidence, in itself, is not morale. The megalomaniac is confident; but he's no soldier.

In illustrating the obvious statement that an army isn't always fighting, one of the outstanding feats of military morale—of all time—is that of the Canadian Army, geared to fighting, yet held in Britain for almost four years, 1939-43. (The Dieppe incident was but a brief interlude, and involved only a relatively small proportion of the Canadian troops.) The feat was outstanding in that morale was consistently

high. How could this happen?

Basic to military morale is the conviction that there is something to preserve, to defend. All the propaganda in the world *against* Hitlerism, or Stalinism, will not engender sound morale. At the most, it can serve only as an indication that some threat exists—but it must be a threat to something we hold dear and valuable in a very deep sense. That value—which holds our meaning of life itself—must be basic and crucial and fundamental to morale.

We cannot communicate that sense of value by lessons or lectures in "understanding our cause"—in the usual way in which these lectures are peddled. It must be felt. It is the underlying conviction of worth that permeates our whole personal and immediate social culture.

To illustrate, let us take the Canadian military situation. We in Canada are first and foremost citizens of our country, with all the hope for world citizenship that true democratic nationhood implies. We become soldiers voluntarily; and for a purpose dear to our own individual and collective hearts and minds. That purpose is most readily symbolized by the home, with its friendliness and freedom, its implied ideal in human relationships, its spiritual values, and so on. If this is threatened, we are willing to leave home in order to preserve it. Quite apart from any fear element it is important that we fight our defensive wars as far away from home as possible. And the whole purpose of our military experience is to get the job over as soon as possible, so that we may return to that life for which we are prepared to sacrifice everything but the ideal itself.

It is for this reason that the soldier in many ways behaves as if he had lost sight of the home he is striving to preserve. The process of giving it up is painful. He therefore uses all sorts of tricks of behaviour and attitude that help him to forget— or at least to persuade himself that he is enjoying his "independence". His speech becomes a little harsher, his attitudes more hard boiled. He swears more than is his normal wont; plays aggressive games like poker, drinks a bit more, even plays hob, to a degree, with his basic ideals of fidelity and love. These, however, aren't the *true* soldier. Scratch the surface and you see him more clearly. What irks him most is delay. He'll curse the weather, the flies, the Brass Hats. . . anything that appears to be holding up this process of getting the job done. He welcomes action, especially action that is visibly connected with getting at the essentials of the business, however much those essentials involve him in personal risk and grave danger.

Here we see quite clearly the behaviour and attitudes of the Cana-

dians overseas in the last war. Based in Britain, they had a plainly marked defensive role—the centre of the stage after Dunkirk. It was very sound that they should occupy the most vulnerable parts of England. They found (and their national culture is steeped in this truth) that England is a land of homes. They were welcomed to the British hearth. In their distress at having to leave their own firesides, they readily became anglicized, sometimes even to the extent of pretending to have transferred their familiar loves to their new-found friends and hosts.

There was a time, in that waiting period, when Canada seemed a long way off—and something that had been put behind them, almost put away from them. Canadian newspapers remained rolled up in the racks, unread. Ottawa (N.D.H.Q.) was almost an enemy, rather than a friend. The ways of Canadians irritated our own boys. The "civilians" back home didn't know there was a war on. "Mackenzie King" was a doubtful character, to say the least. And so on. By the time the Canadians reached Italy, their domestic mail to Britain and British friends far outweighed their domestic mail to Canada—for psychological reasons, not for economy in trans-Atlantic transport.

I remember a very striking incident of those waiting days. In Ottawa, the wife of one of our 1st Division soldiers informed me that she had just received a letter from her husband to say that he wished a divorce so that he could marry an English girl. She did not seek advice, for she had already decided to behave as if the letter had never reached her. All she asked was, could she still write to her husband, under all the circumstances of war; and would she be informed if he were seriously wounded or killed. Being assured on both these counts, she continued to send regularly the family news;—(they had two children, and she was convinced that the basis on which the family was first set up was sound, and still persisted.) His letters became less frequent; finally they ceased altogether. But hers were constant as ever.

Eventually, after Italy turned into North-West Europe, and D-Day began to give place to V.E. Day, his letters started to come again. That family has not broken, has enjoyed a sound post-war re-establishment; and as far as I know the husband is unaware that his crucial letter was ever received. He has perhaps forgotten that he ever wrote it.

* * *

Much of the underlying feeling and idealism is, of course, unanalyzed; it is latent rather than manifest. If challenged overtly it might even be denied. Furthermore, the superficial reasons for volunteering may often

seem to be more real than the wish to defend something of value that is threatened. Military training must take these matters into consideration.

For example, the Army may appear to give economic security. To an immature, somewhat inadequate type of citizen, this embracing of security may be, for him, a basic purpose. Similarly with those who enlist to evade a domestic responsibility for which they are, for one reason or another, unfitted. Or again, those who join up because it's "the thing to do", or because society looks askance at the "slacker"; and so on.

Recognizing and allowing for all this, military training takes on a very laudable, because natural, role. It establishes its own family pattern—the platoon—with a father-figure, the platoon officer. Functionally this is very sound. It does not deny the idealistic basis of high-grade morale; but at the same time it is able to take an enormous range of emotional development in the spread of its recruits, and to establish a milieu in which emotional development may flourish.

Let us examine this process in some detail, for it is of basic moment. The civilian recruit comes with many handicaps, the least of which is his ignorance of the art and technique of war. He has been brought up in a culture where safety—his own safety—is a virtue. He must now learn to consider himself and his own safety as of value only in order that he may protect others. He has been skilled in competition with his neighbour. He must now regard his role as that of providing vital support for his neighbour. His culture may have used safety or competition as means of controlling his behaviour; as when, for example, the youth is urged not to take risks or drive his car recklessly lest it worry his mother and cause heart failure in her; or again when aggression is cultivated in young people as a sign of not being "yellow".*

Early military training endeavours to establish an emotional state of acceptance on the part of the recruit, of such a nature that the soil is prepared for developing co-operative attitudes. This is important and clear. Not the fire-eating enemy-killing tough-guy; but the emotionally-at-home member of a team.

All the early steps point towards this. The uniform—a mark of belonging; certain standard forms of behaviour, such as standing at atten-

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*Interestingly enough, the Canadian Army figures of functional sicknesses reflected cultural emphasis in different Canadian regions, in that, in some recruits, there was a predominance of "heart", respirational symptoms; in others, a predominance of "stomach ulcers", lower back pain, etc. These variations paralleled semantic differences, as for instance, the emotional force of the French "Coeur", and of English "guts".

tion, at ease, the length of pace in marching; a regimental or corps badge; an historical tradition; a simple and universal and inviolable language of command; and so on.

To give all such things an emotional warmth, the immediate human relationships are carefully handled. Thus the strangers from Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and B.C., finding themselves on the parade ground side by side, begin to "belong" emotionally together as they "keep in step"—like kindergarten children responding emotionally to the formal collective clapping of hands. (The hard-surface parade ground has its obvious purpose, here.) They live together—under undifferentiated conditions of rigour and comfort. The negro, perhaps a social outcast in a camp of whites, becomes a personage to himself and the group when he is made "right marker" for battalion parade. And so on.

The art of shooting is more than a physical skill. For military morale develops remarkably under the stimulus of cross-fire—never firing at one's own "enemy" but always at some one who is shooting at someone else—often an unknown comrade.

The key-figure in all this is the platoon officer—who must play the role of the father-figure, to whom his men look for succour, and for leadership. The platoon officer is interested in the men's food, quarters, health—even inspecting their feet after each route-march—and must at all times demonstrate that interest. He must understand the functional meaning of marching, of bands and ceremonials, of public displays—such as church parades, marching through towns and villages. He must be prepared to interest himself (where his interest is sought, invited or obviously needed) in the men's domestic and intimate affairs, their spiritual concerns, and so on. He must *drill* them, not leave it all to the sergeant; for the men must feel their unity in part *through* him, their pride in belonging to *his* group, their respect for him as their symbol of belonging (which is why they are proud to salute him.) He must recognize that simple things like warmth (even to a "fug" in the hut) are important to the sense of comradeship, whereas "cold" is divisive. If transfers have to be made, he will see that no man (at least in his early or junior rank period) moves to a strange unit alone, but always with at least two other "buddies"—so that this comradeship is never completely jeopardized or threatened from then on.

These are but some of the things military training does and soundly so. They may serve to illustrate the point—namely that morale depends upon the insightful understanding of all military officers as to the psycho-

logical meaning of military routine and regulation.*

Morale based on a firm foundation of belongingness to the group and all it stands for makes possible the demand for, and the emergence and development of, loyalty to leadership of increasing high standard and degree of ethical maturity. So-called "Leadership" divorced from the former cannot be effective, and can retain even its semblance of "command" only by fear and authoritarian power. True leadership is the development of higher and higher ethical purpose—not of conquesting the world or the enemy, not of expressing hostility to anyone, but rather of determined defence and enrichment of a human way of life based upon personal and corporate conviction.

*This aspect of morals is most adequately discussed by Major General G. Brock Chisholm, C.B.E., M.C.M.D., in a pamphlet entitled "Morale—a Platoon Commander's Responsibility for the Morale of his Men." This pamphlet is obtainable without cost through The Canadian Mental Health Association, 111 St. George St., Toronto.

LEADERSHIP and MORALE

By
Squadron Leader Peter Caddy*

Introduction

Dynamic leadership, with the resultant raising of morale, is the greatest need of this country. Upon a fuller examination it will become evident that the qualities required for such leadership are essentially moral and spiritual in nature.

The democracies lack not only leadership but the potent ideology with which their enemy is armed. In democratic countries this lack of this positive faith creates a vacuum in which Communism flourishes. Not only can leadership raise the morale necessary to withstand this onslaught but it can lead the country to rearm morally and spiritually as well as materially in defence of her threatened liberty.

The Nature and Effect of Leadership

What are the nature and effect of leadership? They are primarily a gift of character which can be developed but not created. Leadership is a quality of the soul. In the words of Emerson, "Who has more soul then I, masters me, though he should not raise a finger. Round him I must revolve by the gravity of spirits. Who

*Reproduced by courtesy of the Royal Air Force Quarterly (Great Britain).—Editor.

has less, I rule with like facility." It is through its leaders that the human race has stepped up the ladder of evolution. Such leaders can inspire man and draw out his inherent qualities of greatness, courage, faith and initiative. They can co-ordinate and harness all his faculties and energies, thus liberating the individual to express his maximum capabilities. This liberation in turn binds him to his leader.

Qualities Required of a Leader

In considering the qualities required of the leader it will be evident that first and foremost there must be self-mastery. Lack of this essential foundation to a strong character will hamper or even nullify whatever other qualities of leadership a person may possess. From self-mastery springs self-forgetfulness and unselfishness. The secret of such leadership is revealed in the words "Whosoever would be first among you shall be the servant of all." Self-mastery is the prerequisite to this ability to dedicate oneself wholly to service.

Secondly, the leader must have the ability to inspire others. There is in all men, even the lowest, a spark of the divine, something which is capable of rising superior to pain and loss, superior to seeking after gain, superior even to death. The true leader evokes this. Montrose appealed to that god-like something in his rough soldiers so that they followed him blindly. Not only must a leader fan the flame of the divine in his followers but he must inspire their perfect confidence in himself and in his undisputed authority. This requires a strength of character that will dominate others.

Thirdly, a leader must have moral courage, which is often preached but rarely practised. The final test of moral courage is the ability to stand alone and to take sole responsibility for one's decisions. A striking example of this can be seen in the decision which rested with General Eisenhower as to whether or not to postpone, owing to unfavourable weather conditions, the invasion of Normandy.

Fourthly, there must be fortitude and resoluteness, the power to endure sufferings, hardships and reverses unflinchingly. Courage is the quality necessary for attack. Fortitude or resolution is the quality necessary for endurance. Both are essential to leadership. Churchill's memorable speech on the eve of what seemed to the onlooker absolute disaster has already become an immortal example of fortitude. It might be pointed out here what an effect one great leader can have on a situation. Britain was at her lowest ebb, disaster seemed inevitable, and all she was promised was "blood, sweat and tears." Yet such was the power of her leader, such was his

inspiration, courage and fortitude that the whole nation rose at his call to face with a similar courage and resolution whatever the future might bring.

Finally, the majority of great leaders have been aware of a sense of mission, which has been the driving force of their lives. This sense of mission seems to arise in the heart of a man who sees a need to be met or a work to be done, for which he feels himself to be especially fitted and chosen. It is this sense of mission that fortifies the will to achieve the aim regardless of hardship, obstacles or even seeming impossibility. Field-Marshal Montgomery has said: "If a commander has a righteous cause and gives his soldiers success, he will gain the complete confidence of his men: and then there is nothing he cannot do."

These qualities of the soul require adequate development of the heart, mind and body through which to express themselves. If the latter become degenerate through power of corruption, the leader, no matter how great his qualities of leadership, is bound to deteriorate.

The heart must be developed through experience, sensitivity and imagination in order to have the necessary understanding to handle men and their affairs wisely. The following attributes are by no means exclusive to leaders, but they are necessary for effective leadership. One is sympathy, which may be described as the opposite of that magnetic quality in a true leader through which he can make his followers identify themselves with him, his will and his aim. Sympathy, on the contrary, enables him to identify himself with them, with their needs, their outlook and their way of thinking.

Another heart quality essential to the good leader is loyalty, loyalty both to his superiors and his subordinates. John Buchan, when writing of Montrose, said: "Loyalty is one of the greatest of our mortal virtues, and loyalty is not devotion only to a cause but to men, or to a man in which the cause is embodied." Abuse of those above and criticism of orders received from superior authority always recoils eventually on the critic and undermines his authority with those below him.

The intellect of a leader must be sufficiently developed in order to maintain intellectual superiority over at least the majority of his following. A stupid man can never be a great leader. Nevertheless, many a poor scholar in early life turned out to be a great leader. To mention only a few: Eisenhower, Roosevelt, Einstein, Edison and Churchill were all considered of poor-to-average intelligence at school.

The Need for Moral and Spiritual Leadership

This century stands out from the past as one of change, upheaval and disintegration in every department of human life. Science has moved forward by leaps and bounds and changed our whole manner and tempo of living. War has disrupted the stable pattern of Victorian England, opening the door to so-called "free thinkers", who, in the vacuum of discarded religion, have sown the seed of many "isms," societies and creeds. Social disruption has followed. Implicit loyalties have been forsaken and the motto has become "Self-service". Not only nationally but internationally is this state of flux and chaos prevailing. Solemn agreements are repudiated. Promises are made without any intention of fulfilment, and the accepted usages of international diplomacy have been spurned.

Surely in such times as these the great need of this country, as well as of the world, is for leaders with unshakable convictions who will harness the energies of the people into constructive purposes and who will light their souls with the ideals they have lost. The urgency of this need is underlined by the state of the world today. It is being divided rapidly into two belligerent camps, each with an opposite way of life, conflicting principles and opposing policies. On one side is the ardent ideology of Communism which is incessantly practised and preached—with a goal towards which all plans, all energies and all activities are directed. This challenge to authority, to the accepted religions, becomes increasingly strong, enticing the adolescent and the idealist as well as the disaffected. In this camp everyone is either a whole-hearted and implicit follower or is coerced into an abject obedience.

What opposes this potent force? Where is the faith to combat this ideology? "It takes a faith to defeat a faith," and we shall never defeat the faith of Communism unless we have a faith more real and dynamic. It is the belief of the writer that Christianity is that faith, for through this faith Britain has risen to her greatest achievements, and without its guidance and inspiration she is bound to fall from her position of moral leadership in the world. Mr. Arthur Bryant, the well-known historian and writer, in a lecture on "British Character" at Cheltenham in 1950, said that in his opinion by far the most important factor in the forming of the British character was the daily reading of the Bible. This reading of the Bible has now almost ceased. We are living today on the spiritual capital accumulated in our years of greatness. General Sir Bernard Paget, in his opening address to the

courses held at Ashridge, affirmed that our great Christian heritage, which has been handed down from generation to generation, is being dissipated; thus we are undermining the greatest bulwark against Communism in the world today.

The qualities of leadership may lie dormant until awakened by some great need or emergency. There can be no doubt that the conditions existing today urgently require qualities of leadership perhaps to a greater extent than ever before. These conditions have produced such leaders as Churchill, Eisenhower and the outstanding men in our three Services. But leaders are all too few and are insufficiently backed because of the lack of leaders at all levels of the community, in industry, government, education, as well as the Forces. The qualities are no doubt there, but the urgency of the times is not sufficiently realized, nor is the desperate need for these qualities made clear to the nation. The man in the street pursues his lethargic way wrapped comfortably in the blanket of the welfare state and sustained by the soothing syrup of specious promises. His myopic eyes are unaware of the storm that threatens not only his welfare but his very life. He is like a sheep without a shepherd, a boat without a rudder, a compass without a needle.

The Christian way of life in this country has been handed down from generation to generation. But the youth of today has been robbed of this inestimable advantage by two world wars which have impoverished the lives of their parents as well as themselves. These youths are Britain's coming generation and her destiny is in their hands. They have been brought up in broken homes with little or no family life. They have been evacuated from blitzed homes and cities to new and strange surroundings. The resultant malaise has sprung from the individual's sense of no importance, of not being part of a pattern and, probably most significant of all, of not being necessary to anyone or anything. This belief, which is indeed the exact opposite of the teachings of Christianity, breeds the evils which are so rife amongst the young people now in their late teens or early twenties. They have left whatever homes they had and are now forced to spend two years in one of the three Services. We, as the older generation, must accept some responsibility for the state of the world in which they spent their childhood. The three Services are thus given the unique and far-reaching opportunity to discharge this responsibility.

A Pattern, and its Practical Application by the Commander

Having considered the spiritual

and moral aspects of leadership, let us conclude by studying its practical application by the commander. As we have seen, this age has presented him with a bigger problem than his predecessors. He must be father and mother as well as leader and teacher to the young Service men in his charge. How can he accomplish such a task?

We have said that the Founder of Christianity gave us the supreme example of leadership. How did He set about His work, which has revolutionized world history? First of all, He prepared Himself by a complete dedication to His mission, by continually seeking God's guidance, and by setting an example that all should emulate. This can be followed in the Royal Air Force today by leaders at all levels. The commander also can thus prepare himself by putting his whole heart into his job, by daily seeking for guidance, and by setting an example to his men.

Jesus then chose a team, trained them, inspired them with His spirit, and put them to work in the environment prepared for them. The commander's second task, then, is to build up a team. He must have the right man in the right job. Those who are unsuited for their work must be replaced. The commander must understand and be understood by his officers and non-commissioned officers. This team must then be trained to work in harmony both with their leaders and themselves.

Having welded his officers and non-commissioned officers into a single team, the commander's next task is to create the right environment and atmosphere throughout his unit or command.

The most important condition is enthusiasm. You can do anything with a man who is enthusiastic. Those who wish to inspire others with vitality and enthusiasm must themselves possess these qualities. Men cannot be talked into enthusiasm; they can only be infected by it.

He must then build up esprit de corps. The real leader inspires his men to a pride in themselves and in their unit. This can be helped through drill and parades, particularly with a band, and team games. Thus the men gain self-respect; they gain a pride in their bearing and work, a pride in their unit and Service, which should lead eventually to a real patriotism which Britain so sadly lacks today.

The commander should make himself readily accessible to his men. They need to sense a personal regard for their welfare and a personal knowledge of their characters and circumstances. In this way the commander can to a great extent counteract the lack of effective parenthood. He can prevent the magnification of

imaginary or petty grievances before they assume serious proportions. Every opportunity must be taken in attending to the welfare of the men, improving conditions, and removing small and needless irritations. He can almost eliminate absence without leave.

Further, the commander must produce an atmosphere of success, for nothing succeeds like success. A man who never receives a word of praise becomes resentful and acquires a sense of inferiority. Morale can be heightened by giving praise when it is earned, by encouraging men who, while slow to learn, are obviously doing their best, and by preventing the intimidation of such men.

Provision also must be made for keeping the men abreast of events and their implications. A man will be more valuable if he understands clearly what is going on in the world and, when at war, if he knows why he is fighting. This can be done with the help of an information room or, more effectively, by the commanding officer giving instruction in person. This provides a valuable opportunity for contact with his men, and does much to build up individuality and make the men part of the social community, aware of the trend of events and conscious of their responsibility towards life.

Finally, there must be built up a sense of fellowship. The self-seeking, self-protective point of view prevalent in civilian life must be replaced by one of mutual co-operation, support and confidence. Individuals accustomed to competitive living must be fused together to form a group.

If such leadership is compared with the leadership of German or Russian officers it will be realized that the latter exercise their powers through force and fear, whereas Christian leaders exercise their powers through confidence and love. In the one the individual depends on the state; in the other the state depends on the individual. The writer has proved that Christian leadership can raise the condition of a unit from that of low morale, poor discipline, lack of enthusiasm, indifferent work and an unhappy spirit to that of a thoroughly successful and happy unit.

The Need for Training in Moral Leadership

What is being done in the Royal Air Force to develop these qualities in its leaders? The Air Council realized the importance of this aspect by inaugurating a course in moral leadership followed by a conference at the Chaplains' School at Dowdeswell Court in November, 1950. The course was attended by all home commanders-in-chiefs as well as two

officers of air rank from each command. The Bishop of Croydon, assisted by the Archdeacon of Lewes, were the speakers. One result of this course has been a programme of week-end courses at Dowdeswell Court for officers, particularly station commanders, and non-commissioned officers.

The Commander-in-chief, Technical Training Command, has introduced training in Christian principles throughout his command. The syllabus for every course includes a weekly period for this instruction. Further, he has inculcated the importance of the subject in all his officers through conferences, letters and, above all, the influence of his own convictions. The results have been spectacular and are borne out by statistics.

But this is not enough, and no other steps appear to have been taken in this direction. Training in moral and spiritual leadership is neglected almost entirely in such establishments as the Royal Air Force College at Cranwell and the Staff Colleges, despite the fact that these are the sources from which our future leaders are drawn.

If the Royal Air Force has gone too far along the road of material endeavour, surely much more could and should be done to restore the balance by arming our leaders spiritually and morally as well as materially—not only against the armed might of Russia but against the insidious propaganda and distorted half-truths of Communist ideology which is threatening the foundation of our national morale.

Flying "OP"?

Dr. I. M. Levitt, director of the famous Fels Planetarium in Philadelphia, recently told the Rittenhouse Astronomical Society that the first nation to conquer space, even to the extent of building a successful "satellite" rocket, would control the earth. Such a rocket, he explained, would be launched to a point just beyond the gravitational pull of the earth, where it would remain, circling the globe as the moon does. The Doctor says that only $200,000,000 would be required to build the rocket which would probably be a huge cigar-shaped projectile 250 feet long and 75 feet in diameter. A speed of seven miles per second would be needed to get the rocket beyond the limits of the earth's atmosphere. — *"The Island Gunner", 8 AAOR, RCA, Victoria, B.C.*

TEETH *versus* TAIL

By Colonel H. M. Whitecombe (Retd.), Royal Engineers*

The title of this article is not meant to suggest that there is rivalry between the teeth and the tail. It is simply to remind readers of the obvious truth that, when man-power is limited, the more there is of tail the less there is of teeth; that the more men are employed on administration the fewer are left to fight the battle.

It is only comparatively recently, for several reasons, that this has become of such importance that it may decide the result of a campaign. In the first place, during the last fifty years or so armies have become so very much more complicated than before that the administrative tail has grown enormously. Secondly, the general standard of living has gone up, and this is reflected in the standard of administration needed by the soldier in the field, and demanded by public opinion. These are the two main reasons for the great increase in the numbers needed for the tail, but the chief cause of anxiety is not that the tail has grown, but that it has grown much more in the armies of Great Britain and her allies than it has done among potential enemies; potential enemies whose man-power is generally much greater than our own, even without this extra tip to the scale. Numbers still count, as events in Korea have shown. In the past our enemies have usually been either European armies with an administrative organization much the same as our own, or primitive peoples over whom we held a decisive advantage in weapons, discipline and training. The Japanese in the late war were a notable exception, which should be a timely warning. Our future enemies are likely to be little inferior to us, if at all, in training and equipment, and to be used to a considerably lower standard of living. They will expect very much less of the administrative services in the field, and so will be able to manage with a much smaller tail. The search for means of reducing our own administrative tail, and thus reinforcing the teeth, therefore becomes vital.

There is another danger which arises from an unwieldy tail. To fight successfully an army must retain its mobility, but the more unwieldy the tail is, the more the mobility and power of manœuvre of the teeth are restricted. The administrative system

*Reprinted from The Army Quarterly (Great Britain).

can be compared to a number of ropes against which the army has to pull if it is to move. The greater the number of ropes, the more difficult it is for the army to move, and it may be outmanœuvred and defeated by a smaller army with fewer ropes to pull against. Moreover, though an army which is immobile may win a battle, it cannot consummate its victory by pursuing and destroying the enemy.

I believe that 3 or 4 to 1 was a fair average for the proportion of tail to teeth during the late war, and that it was sometimes higher. Much must depend on the local conditions and the length of the lines of communication. Certainly the tail is much more numerous than the teeth.

To illustrate the importance of the size of the tail, consider two armies opposed to each other, each of 500,000 men. In one the proportion of tail to teeth is 4 to 1, in the other it is 3 to 1. Otherwise they are equal in equipment, morale and training. The first will have 100,000 men to fight the battle, the second 125,000. The difference may not be enough for immediate victory, but there is little doubt which side will win in the end. Economical administration will have ensured its success.

Suppose again that the army with the 3 to 1 proportion has cut the administrative tail too far, so that it cannot work successfully and breaks down in some way. The fighting men—the teeth—will be short, say, of ammunition; their ability to fight and their morale will be affected, and it is very likely that the smaller, but better administered, fighting force will win. The balancing of administrative economy against administrative efficiency is clearly a very delicate matter. The argument is not all one way.

The teeth must be supplied with arms, ammunition, food, clothing and everything to enable them to fight successfully, and it needs a certain number of men in the tail to supply them. Then these men of the tail need to be supplied in their turn; those who supply them need to be supplied and so on. The importance of this is easy to overlook. The tail is usually believed to consist of a number of men to supply the teeth, plus a few more to look after the tail. That is not the way of it at all. A number of men supply the teeth, and a much larger number look after the tail.

Let us call the men who supply the teeth the useful tail, and those who look after the tail the fat tail. I mean nothing derogatory by the term; the fat tail performs an essential function. Indeed, it is almost impossible to say of any individual whether he is part of the useful tail or of the fat tail, since the same unit nearly always serves both teeth and tail to some extent. But it is important to recognize the distinction, and it makes

it much easier to consider the comparative numbers employed on the two functions.

It is quite clear that if one man is needed in the useful tail for each man in the teeth, then the useful tail will have as many men as the teeth. If two men are needed it will have twice as many; if half a man, half as many. The useful tail is always a simple multiple of the teeth.

The fat tail is different. If it needs half a man to look after each man in the tail, what is the answer? Imagine 16 men of the useful tail. They will need 8 men for their administration, who in turn will need 4 men for their administration, who will need 2 men, who will need 1 man and so on. It works out that when each man in the tail needs half a man for his administration, the total number behind 16 men of the useful tail is not 8 but 16. It can all be worked out mathematically, but without going into details the result is this:

When half a man is needed for the administration of each man in the tail, the fat tail is equal to the useful tail;

when two-thirds of a man is needed, the fat tail is twice the useful tail;

when three-quarters of a man is needed, three times;

when four-fifths of a man, four times;

when five-sixths of a man, five times; and so on;

when 1 man is needed, the fat tail is infinity.

This is surprising, but true, and we now begin to see the size of the fat tail.

A man in the tail will always need less men to look after him than a man in the teeth. The tail needs little in the way of arms and ammunition, which is a big item in the supply of the teeth. It needs less medical attention. The teeth are nearly all at the far end of the lines of communication, while the tail is distributed all over the area between the base and the front. On the other hand, the tail will get more in the way of accommodation, and usually comes off better in the way of amenities. It would be interesting to work out figures for various theatres in the late war, but as a guess, the needs of a man in the tail might be half the needs of one in the teeth. On this assumption, it is possible to estimate the comparative sizes of the useful tail and the fat tail.

Suppose $1\frac{1}{4}$ men are needed in the useful tail for each man in the teeth. Then $\frac{5}{8}$ men (half $1\frac{1}{4}$) will be needed in the fat tail for each man in the tail. Then, mathematically, the fat tail will be $1\frac{2}{3}$ times the useful tail. The proportion of teeth, useful tail and fat tail will be roughly $1 : 1\frac{1}{4} : 2$, and the proportion of

tail to teeth 3¼ : 1, which is fairly normal.

Now suppose that 1⅓ men are needed in the useful tail for each man in the teeth, and ⅔ men are needed in the fat tail for each man in the tail. Then the fat tail will be twice the useful tail, and the proportions will be 1 : 1⅓ : 2⅔. The useful tail increases seven per cent.; the fat tail increases thirty-three per cent. The proportion of tail to teeth will be 4 : 1, which is still not abnormal.

These are two examples of a tail of quite an ordinary size. In the first, the fat tail was nearly half the total force; in the second, more than half. In the second, in the force as a whole, twenty per cent. do the fighting; twenty-seven per cent. look after the teeth; and fifty-three per cent. look after the tail. It is a solemn thought. As a name, fat tail is not unapt.

This is the rule of the fat tail. For every man that is added to the tail, two or three more have to be added to the fat tail to look after him. Every increase in the tail results in a much greater increase in the fat tail.

Of course it does not really work as simply and as exactly as that. The work of administration is so widespread and so diffused that for the maintenance of each individual innumerable people are contributing their fractional bits. The addition of one man cannot make any difference. Yet that is a very dangerous thought, for though it is true, the addition of a man here and a man there can soon make up quite a respectable total. The feeling that one more doesn't matter allows the tail to grow unchecked. If a few hundred men are added to the tail the additional load will be felt, and similarly if the tail is reduced by a few hundred the reduction in work will be felt. It should then be possible to make the appropriate reduction in the fat tail. Human nature being what it is though, the economy which should result from cutting down the fat tail will not be achieved unless it is insisted on by some watchful and powerful authority. It does not call for very acute observation to notice that when work goes up, by ever so little, a demand for increased establishments quickly follows, but that when work goes down there is no similar eagerness to reduce establishments. Nobody minds having a little less work to do. The result is that when work is increased the numbers in the fat tail follow the rule fairly closely, but that when work is decreased the numbers follow sluggishly, if at all.

This leads to a further danger. If economies lead to a reduction of 500 men in the tail, but without any corresponding reduction of the fat tail, what has happened is that the proportion of fat tail in the tail has

gone up. Then, when for some reason it is found necessary to add more men for some new duty, the rule will operate and a corresponding addition to the fat tail will follow. It seems very likely that if, first, 500 men are cut out of the tail, and a little later 500 men are put back again, the result will not be nil, but a quite appreciable increase in the tail. The moral is that it is very easy to increase the tail, but very difficult to decrease it. All sorts of specious reasons will be found for resisting a decrease. The tail will increase automatically but it can only be decreased by force.

It is evident that while economy in the administration of the teeth is important, it is economy in the administration of the tail that is vital. That is a most welcome conclusion. The administration of the teeth includes the supply of ammunition and equipment and all the things that it is hoped will enable them to win the battle. Undue economy in the supply of these things would be false, since it would tend to defeat the object of the whole expedition, teeth and tail alike; but economy in the administration of the tail can be carried to the limit, which is that it must not so cripple the tail that it cannot supply the teeth.

There is only one object of administration in the field and it can be simply stated. It is to ensure that the fighting man—repeat fighting man—goes into battle physically fit, in high morale, and supplied with the arms and equipment he needs. There is no other object. The object of the army is to defeat the enemy and that is done by the fighting man. He is the man who does the business of the army, and the sole object of administration is to give him the means—physical, spiritual, mental and material—to do it. All the functions of administration are means to this end. The men of the tail need to be fed, and to be supplied in other ways, but only because if they were not they would fail to carry out their function of supplying the teeth. Any frill or luxury in administration, unless it eventually leads to greater fighting power in the teeth, wastes the services of the men engaged on it, and of the fat tail needed to maintain them. The object of the administration of the tail, which is a means to the ultimate end of supplying the teeth, is to enable them to deliver the goods at the least cost of man-power.

It is now time to think of ways of curbing the natural exuberance of the fat tail, and first it is relevant to consider what "efficiency" really means when applied to administration. At one end of the scale can be imagined an administrative organization that just manages to work, though haltingly, but is very economical of man-power; at the other a most magnificent organization, which pro-

vides for every contingency and where nothing ever goes wrong, but which absorbs so much man-power that the army is all tail and no teeth. The first does a useful job, though it does it poorly and uncertainly, since it does serve an army with plenty of teeth to bite. The second is militarily useless because it serves an army which cannot bite at all; all it can do is revel in its own "efficiency", having completely confused the means and the end. The first is the more efficient in the true sense, which is a comparison between the amount of work put in and the useful work done. The second is hopelessly inefficient except in the erroneous, but very popular, sense that it does what it is doing very beautifully even though it achieves nothing by doing it. The problem is to discover a happy mean between these two extremes. On the one hand, the system must be able to do its job and overcome unexpected difficulties and emergencies; on the other hand, perfection absorbs man-power, and the more perfect the system is made the more it will defeat its own ends by absorbing men who might be fighting with the teeth. There is no exact answer to the problem; the thing to remember is that something that works and is economical is better than a perfect organization that absorbs too much man-power. The criterion is "does it work?" not "is it the best?" It is an instance of the best being the enemy of the good.

Any administrative corps wants to be thoroughly efficient at its job. It wants to be able to deal effectively with any problems that may confront it in war. It wants to be able to boast not only that the army was never let down by its failure, but also that the way it fulfilled its task contributed much to the army's success. Such an ambition is entirely right, but if it is pursued without constant and understanding care for the interests of true efficiency, it will probably result in extravagance and the inflation of the tail. Preparations to meet an emergency nearly always mean more men, and if the emergency does not arise, those additional men will, in a sense, have been wasted. Whether they have really been wasted depends on how near and how pressing the emergency was. War is unpredictable, and its emergencies cannot be foreseen at long range; all that can be said with certainty is that they will be there. Efforts to predict them in detail and to provide an organization which can deal with each as it happens will almost certainly lead to waste of man-power. What is wanted is an organization which can deal with any emergency, generally, and not with certain emergencies, specifically. Von Moltke observed that the enemy invariably had three courses open to him, and

that he invariably chose the fourth. The administrative enemy works on the same principle. If specific plans are made to meet certain emergencies, in the event none will work, because the actual emergency will not quite fit any of them. The officers and men concerned will have to overcome the difficulties by using their ingenuity and experience, which will be of far greater use to them than pre-fabricated plans. The development of resource and ability in officers and men is a more valuable contribution to efficiency than the development of organizations to deal with hypothetical emergencies. That does not mean that it is wrong to imagine possible emergencies and think out possible ways of dealing with them. It would be criminal not to do so, but the next step is to see whether the organization, and the training of officers and men, are able to overcome them. If they are not, then the fault, if the organization is basically sound, lies in the training of officers and men. The more an organization is designed to cope with certain specific emergencies the more man-power it will consume and the less it will be able to adapt itself to sudden unexpected emergencies. It will become rigid and inflexible and more likely to fail in war. The most economical and the most efficient organization for war is one that is not rigid but flexible, and, thanks to the high state of training of its officers and men, who must expect the unexpected, can be coaxed and twisted to conform to any difficulties and obstacles that may confront it. The place to prepare for emergencies is not the office but the training-ground.

Paradoxically, a potential source of waste of man-power is the good idea. In war few things are all they should be in a perfect well-ordered society. Few things are beyond criticism, and those that are probably need it most. There is ample opportunity for the grouser, and ample opportunity for the exponent of the good idea. The good idea is simply some improvement in organization, some new comfort or entertainment for the troops, some new return to be filled in, some form of additional security, anything provided it serves some useful purpose. It must serve a useful purpose or at worst appear to do so, since otherwise it would stand no chance of being adopted. The danger of the good idea is not that it is not good, but that it almost certainly needs more men to work it. It may only need two or three men, or only one, but the good idea spreads. If it is good in one place, or in one unit, it is good in another, and instead of absorbing two or three men it may absorb twenty or thirty, or even two or three hundred. Up goes the fat tail, and in the end perhaps a thousand men have been

added to the tail. There are two questions to be asked before any good idea should be accepted. First, is it essential, or only very desirable? More specifically, will the organization break down if it is not adopted? It is most necessary to appreciate the difference between the essential and the desirable. Secondly, will it need more men? If it really is essential it must be adopted, though if it also needs more men every effort should first be made to find some other way out of the difficulty. If it is only very desirable it should be thrown out unless it can be shown quite certainly that it does not, and never will, need more men; for it is curious how good ideas that need no more men prove, after they have been adopted, to need quite a lot of men after all. The same thing as before applies—the thing that works is more efficient than the thing that is perfect.

There is also, of course, the bad idea; the thing that ought never to exist but too often does. It can best be illustrated by an example. A good many years ago, long before the late war, I had to embark with a draft in a ship going home. The train arrived at the pier, the ship was alongside; the draft was all present and correct and I had all their documents. It seemed that all that was necessary was for me to report our arrival and lead the draft on board. That was not the idea at all. We were taken, with several other drafts, to a large shed, where many officers and clerks were dotted about at tables. There we moved slowly from table to table, spending long intervals just sitting about. We were counted, our documents were inspected, our tonsils were looked at, we were counted again. I have forgotten all the things that were done to us, but it was not until three hours later that at last, weary with boredom, we were allowed into the ship. Towards the end of our vigil, when even my almost limitless patience was wearing thin, I asked one of the officers what was the purpose of it all. "Well," he said, "someone might try to desert; we must see that you all go on board." He was a fairly junior officer and probably didn't know the real answer, but even he might have realized that the best way of stopping a man deserting was to get him into the ship as soon as possible. All the tedious and interminable ritual was merely inciting men to wander off and lose themselves, whether they intended to desert or not, and giving them every opportunity of gratifying their whim. But the real point of the story is that almost every one of the things that was done in that shed was already the responsibility of someone else. It was the draft conducting officers' duty to see that their drafts went on board as ordered. It was the despatching unit's

responsibility to see that the documents were correct. It was the unit medical officer's responsibility to see that the medical regulations had been complied with. Probably the only useful thing done was by the medical officer who examined the men for symptoms of cholera or other diseases that might have developed since the journey to the port started.

It is a well-known principle that when an officer is charged with a duty he should be left to carry it out. To give a lot of other officers the duty of watching to see that he does it, besides being an indefensible waste of man-power, means generally that if anything goes wrong everybody can shift the blame on to somebody else. The officer's sense of responsibility is blunted and consequently things are more likely to go wrong. Boring troops unnecessarily is also a crime worse than a good many in the Manual of Military Law. This all happened a long time ago, and no doubt all has long been changed, but it is a good example of the thoroughly bad idea, which wastes men by employing them on a number of superfluous tasks and in the end usually invites trouble. Then when trouble comes more men are asked for to overcome it. If, in the case I have quoted, anyone had got lost or deserted, the next step would obviously have been to post sentries all round the dock area, wasting more men. I suspect that there are still bad ideas waiting to be suppressed.

An incentive to the production of good ideas and bad is temporary rank. So long as an officer's rank is governed by time there is no urge for him to enlarge his job, but if he knows that by building it up he may be able to earn himself a step in rank, it is expecting much of human nature to imagine that he will do nothing about it. An ulterior motive is provided for the production of good ideas. Most fertile fields for this sort of empire-building lie among those administrative functions and units that are not represented in peace. At the beginning of a war there is something experimental about them and it is wonderful what an earnest tiller of the soil can achieve. If the result were simply that an officer went up one in rank little harm would be done, but to justify higher rank it is usually necessary to gather a greater number of subordinates. That is where man-power comes into it, and as usual up goes the tail, and particularly the fat tail. The process can be curbed by applying the tests suggested for the good idea, but in the initial stages of an organization it is not always easy to say what is really essential. Otherwise, since temporary rank seems inevitable in wartime, it might be salutary to make a general rule that when an appointment is upgraded in rank the officer holding the appoint-

ment should be transferred elsewhere. It would be impossible to apply as an absolute rule, but it would make a good general rule. The careerist will not work too hard to gain promotion for others. The officer who really has the interests of the job at heart will not be deterred; he will soon get his promotion anyhow. Officers should at all times be thinking of ways of improving the organization for which they are responsible, and excluding possible causes of failure. But the way to make a thing foolproof is to eliminate the fools; it is not to increase the number of fools and thus make a nice foundation for some higher ranks. Training comes into it again.

There is another source of waste of man-power worth considering and that is public opinion. Public opinion derives its information about conditions in the theatres of war from two sources. First, from the letters written by its friends and relations who are there, and who feel that it would be disappointed if they did not appear in a rather heroic light, and who therefore often make the most of the rigours of war. Secondly, from the Press, which recounts mostly the deeds of the fighting troops in action, their bravery, dangers and hardships. Public opinion does not differentiate much between teeth and tail; anyone who is in the theatre of war is at the front and is suffering all the dangers and hardships that are going. The Arakan, in 1944, was a byword for beastliness. When I went there I went expecting all the horrors the greenest and most hellish of green hells could produce. When I arrived I found it quite a tolerable place, as such places go. Indeed, in the cold weather it was delightful. It is true I was not sitting at the top of Mayu range watching the Japs, nor was I carrying out deep patrols in the jungle, but nor were most other people. Public opinion needs to be educated on two points. First, that there is a great deal of difference between the teeth and the tail, and the conditions under which they live, and that only about one in four of the soldiers in the theatre of war are teeth. Secondly, that when they demand comforts and amenities for the boys at the front, those comforts can seldom, with the best will in the world, get further than the boys at the back.

Public opinion should also realize that every amenity provided for the troops costs something in man-power and that in the long run its provision means that there will be fewer men to fight the battle. The man they were hoping to help probably loses both ways. He does not get the amenity, and he is deprived of support; maybe by a very small amount, but small amounts add up. Lieut.-General Percival in "The War in Malaya" quotes a soldier as saying

to him, "We soldiers, sir, don't want to be pampered. All we want is to be treated fairly and given a man's job to do." What the soldier wants is to win the war and go home. He can best be helped to fulfil his wish, and he usually knows it, by cutting out the coddling, treating him as an intelligent human being, and thereby releasing a number of men to come and help him at his job.

These are a few ideas for checking the growth of the tail, and for cutting it down. To consider in detail all the functions of administration and how men might be saved on each would require many volumes, and more knowledge than any individual possesses. It would be attempting to achieve that perfection that defeats its object and is a waste of time. Let every officer, remembering the sole object of administration, examine his own administrative tasks and ask himself whether they are serving that object and no other; whether in the true sense they are efficiently and economically organized, or swollen by good ideas or bad. Let him remember that every man he can save will release two or three men of the fat tail to be added to the teeth. If officers would do this, then the heavy tail with which the army is burdened might be sensibly reduced.

"Marine Tramway"

A device which will enable Marine amphibious forces to land equipment ashore in areas where they cannot beach their landing craft has been developed and is being evaluated at the U.S. Naval Civil Engineering Research and Evaluation Laboratory, Port Hueneme, Calif.

Designed to span reefs or other underwater obstacles which would prevent the Marines from landing their vessels on the beach, the "ship to shore tramway" consists of cables which stretch from a tower on shore to a vessel lying off the beach. The tramway has a span of 500 feet and can carry one ton of equipment on each trip, making 30 trips per hour. It can be controlled either by an operator riding with the unit or by electronic means from either ship or shore, or both.

A similar device, known as a "Ship to shore conveyor" had been developed previously by the Marine Corps to meet the need for rapid unloading of supplies. The conveyor consists of a 22-inch wide belt which is fabricated in 20-foot sections. It moves at a speed of 33 feet per minute, and can unload 40 tons of equipment per hour. A prototype of the conveyor is being evaluated at Quantico. — *Army-Navy-Air Force Journal* (U.S.).

OPERATION "NUTHATCH"

Reproduced by Courtesy of Pegasus, the Journal of Airborne Forces (Great Britain)*

"I'm not really going to ask you to believe all this, old boy," said Ffoulkes-Trilby, "but the fact remains that this story is quite true and actually happened to a complete brigade: they say there were hardly enough bowlers to go round when the facts came out.

"It all started with a chap called Whippet, a really fly boy, if a bit odd. Well, fact was, he got a bit browned off with life among the jerboas, and one day he thought of a brilliant plan. He thought he would 'arrange' the return of his brigade to England . . . No, don't laugh too soon: it was just like Whippet to think of something like that, but, by bully, he fixed it.

"He knew of a codeword called 'Nuthatch' and, being a bit intelligent, he reckoned any word with 'nut' in it must be for a return to England. So he sat down late one night and typed out a likely looking signal with all the correct trimmings—it went quite simply: 'Nuthatch now,' and signed it illegibly for B. Belchem, a big noise up at G.H.Q. who lays these little things on.

"So far so good, thought Whippet, and having signed, sealed and stamped several large envelopes he dashed them off by S.D.S. to the main action addresses: there was Thawpit at Brigade, Grinder at M.E.L.F. and Winder at M.E.A.F. Reaction was instantaneous. Primed by rumour and counter-rumour, Thawpit, Grinder and Winder tripped over their teacups to snatch the third phone in their respective line and pass the word along. 'Nuthatch' is through—good show eh?' said Thawpit. 'Get 'em packing at once and put 'em at two hours' notice for good measure.' 'Bang on,' grunted Winder as he got on the blower to his transport wing. 'Oh, no, old boy; don't know the timings yet, but you can bet your last Anson they'll start at first light . . . you know these brown jobs always must travel in indecent haste.'

"Meanwhile", Trilby went on, "the battalions and everyone else were up at ten thou' or more: Q.Ms. and M.T.Os. throwing fits all over the place: a glorious sight, old boy. I mean to say, can't you just see those camps? . . . like an overturned hive . . . hundreds of little men running about with boxes and bed-

*The accompanying cartoons were drawn specially for the Journal by Capt. G. G. McDermott, Directorate of Military Intelligence, Army Headquarters, Ottawa.—Editor.

ding, handling in some and taking out more, with admin. orders coming in by the bundle, all 'Topsec' and 'Priority Nuthatch'.

"Anyway, the thing somehow sorted itself out: advance parties flew off at dead of night, bound for Lyneham direct. Rear parties, with long faces, watched the huge pile of heavy baggage mounting, whilst the main bodies crammed themselves into B.D. and stuffed their packs with cigarettes. Never saw anything like it . . . at least not since the last move, that is.

"Whippet, the cunning——, kept mum and no one knew just how much they owed him."

Trilby swallowed his sixth brandy and continued: "Of course, you're probably wondering what happened at home: fact is, old fellow, sounds incredible, but someone in the War House who wanted 'em back but

". . . he sat down late one night and typed out a likely looking signal . . ."



"I say, old chap, you're looking a bit pale . . . Missing the sun or something?"

couldn't get 'em, twigged the ruse and backed it for a winner. Fixed it all and even remembered to warn the Aldershot people to expect a brigade in twenty-four hours—shook 'em to the core: they say it was another Alamein when the news came in."

Just then a quiet, mousy individual crept up to the bar, shook some sand out of his corduroys and ordered a double orange and water. Smacking a ten-piastre note on the mahogany, he stalked away.

"Well, I'll be——," stammered Ffoulkes-Trilby. "Know who that was? That's Whippet, the chap we've been talking about."

"Hey, Lacey," he called across the saloon, "come and meet an old jerboa." Lacey came over meekly and held out a limp hand. "I say, old chap, you're looking a bit pale," said Trilby, steadying himself. "Missing the sun or something?" "Oh, no," replied Whippet studying a brunette by the door. "The fact is, they've gone and given me the G.B.E. for my part in 'Nuthatch'."

PORTRAIT OF A COMMANDING OFFICER

CAPTAIN F. H. GOSSE, ROYAL ARTILLERY*

The little book is bound in worn old calf that is a pleasure to the touch and its spine is ornamented with gilt and bears a red label on which appears an abbreviated form of the title. It must not be thought that I am the book's first owner: that distinction, I think, belongs to Wm. Adair, 25th Regt., whose signature, in faded, rusty ink, appears twice on its pages, and whose bookplate bearing his name and the crest and shield of his Arms is to be seen inside the back cover.

On the title-page we see the resounding title—"CAUTIONS AND ADVICES TO OFFICERS OF THE ARMY: PARTICULARLY SUBALTERNS. Very proper to be Read by all Gentlemen of that Rank and profession. By an OLD OFFICER". There is also a quotation from Ecclesiasticus—"*whatsoever thou takest in Hand, remember the End, and thou shalt never do amiss.*" The book was "Printed for THOMAS PAYNE, next the *Mews-Gate*, in *Castle-street*, St. *Martins*, and D. WILSON, and T. DURHAM, at *Platos' Head* in the *Strand.*" The next page bears a dedication—"TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS GEORGE, Prince of *WALES*. The following sheets are most humble [*sic*] dedicated, by *His Royal Highness's Most Obedient, Most Devoted, and Most Humble Servant.* The Author.—1760."

The title of the book explains its original purpose, and the cautions and advices are as sound and valuable to-day as when the book was published. Apart from this purely military interest there are other attractions: interesting glimpses are provided of the life, habits, and manners of another age, and we make the acquaintance of a most engaging personality, the author. This gentleman remains anonymous: he was at least a Major, and held the Command of a Regiment, but, alas, "The *Gout*, and other Infirmities, obliged me to quit the Army in the *Prime* of my Life". I think of him as "The Colonel", and I suspect that he belonged to the Fifteenth Regiment of Foot. Not content with merely offering advice to young Officers, the Colonel states with considerable forcefulness his views on many of the social usages of

*Condensed *from an article in* The Journal of the Royal Artillery (*Great Britain*).—Editor.

his day, in military and civil life, and illustrates them from his own experience. Here one does not find the strained deduction of the psychiatrist, or the tiresome fabrication of the scientific crank, but the shrewd observations of a wise and humane man. His humanity is particularly striking. In an age when it was accepted that the exercise of authority, military or civil, must be attended by cruelty, our Colonel's views must have been unique.

After explaining in a short foreword his reasons for taking up his pen (" . . . as I always loved a *Soldier*, and honoured the Profession, I thought I could not better employ my Time and Experience, than in Endeavouring to do all the Good to the Service in my Power . . ."), the Colonel begins with an article in the form of a letter offering advice to one who has "taken up so laudable a Resolution as entering into the Army". Having served for upwards of twenty-two years himself and having had a father ("one of the best of Men") who served fifty-six, and been advised by an elder brother who served thirty-four, the Colonel feels qualified "to give you my Opinion and Advice with great Impartiality, . . . The Honesty of my Heart; the Sincerity of my Intentions . . . must plead my Excuse for all Faults, both in Diction and Method".

"*The Army*, is either *the best* or *the worst* School in the World; and it may very easily be judged by a young Man's *Outset*, what his End will be . . . COURAGE, or RESOLUTION, is so *essentially* necessary . . . that it requires the nicest, the strictest Scrutiny into yourself beforehand". Lack of these qualities may lead to ignominous death "by the Martial Laws", or to a life so shameful that "surely *Death with Glory*, or in discharge of Duty, is infinitely *preferable* to such *a Life* as this!" A certain reputation for bravery may easily be gained, when at school, by not refusing challenges. The worst that one risks thus is "a black Eye, or the Loss of a Tooth . . .But how widely different is this from . . . *Military Courage?* where a Man must go on as his Duty calls him, though he has all the Reason in the World to expect he shall not come off again with Life? or, if he comes off with Life, yet perhaps with the Loss of a Limb? Such are the Trials of true Courage, when a Man dares look upon Death or Maims, with coolness and steadiness of Mind sufficient to enable him to keep the Soldiers under his command strictly to their Duty; and with such an uniformity of Countenance as to betray no Appreciation of the Danger they are in to those with him, whatever his private Thoughts may be . . . It is not the Strutting with a Cockade, dressed in Scarlet . . . that constitutes an Officer

. . . No: *That Man only is truly Brave, who fears nothing but doing a shameful Action; and that dares resolutely and undauntedly go, where his Duty, how dangerous soever it is, may call him* . . . OBEDIENCE is likewise so necessary an Article in the Composition of a Soldier . . . for if a commanding Officer once suffers his *legal* Orders to be contested, he may bid adieu to Discipline and expect his Corps will run into Riot and Disobedience".

The second group of letters begins with an expression of the Colonel's pleasure that his young friend has made this self-examination and is hopeful of his courage and obedience. The Colonel will therefore fulfil his promise to give some rules of conduct for the military life. "You are no longer to look upon yourself as the Master of your own Time. It is now the *Public's*: and your *Sovereign*, your *General*, and your *Superior Officers*, have the absolute Disposal of it". The Colonel has happy memories of his own subaltern days, "I ever found my superior Officers very ready to give Advice when asked", and who should know better than he that "it must give great Pleasure to a superior Officer to see a young Man inquisitive to know his Duty by asking Advice: and I never knew greater satisfaction than when I saw such a one profit by *that* Advice, and put it in execution".

Moore had not yet established his camp at Shorncliffe: in a brutal age the old Commanding Officer's views on the treatment of those set under authority must have made surprising reading. "I come now to speak of your Behaviour to INFERIOR OFFICERS, and I think I cannot set you down a better Rule than, *that your Behaviour to them should be such as you expect from your Superiors to yourself* . . . Are they guilty of an unpardonable Crime? then confine them, without Insults, and let the *Martial Law* take its Course . . . it is no part of Duty, either as a *Soldier* or a *Christian*, to add *Insults* to Confinement . . . it is highly disagreeable to hear a Man, because he is my Superior in Rank, preface his Orders with *D--n your Bl--d, Sir, I order, etc., etc.* . . . Be assured of this, that Men love to be used as Men. Look upon the SOLDIERS under your command as *Servants* to the same Royal Master with yourself, and not as Slaves . . . without *them* you would be of no consequence; . . . their good or bad Behaviour reflects either *Glory* or *Shame* upon you; . . . Study to obtain their Obedience by *Love*, rather than by *Fear* . . . an affable, courteous Behaviour from an *Officer* to his *Soldiers*, cannot fail of gaining their *Love* and Confidence". With evidence from the battlefield itself the Colonel supports this policy most convincingly. "At the siege of *LISLE*

in Queen ANN's Time . . . the Grenadiers of the Fifteenth Regiment of Foot were obliged to retire . . . the Lieutenant of these Grenadiers, remarkable for his ill Treatment of them, was wounded, and fell. The Grenadiers were passing on, nor heeded his Intreaties to help him off: at last, he laid hold of a Pair of Shoes that were tied to the Waste-belt of one of them; the Grenadier regardless of his Situation, and in Resentment of his former Ill-usage, took out a Knife from his Pocket, with which he cut the String and left them with him, with this remarkable Expression, *There! there is a new Pair of Shoes for You to carry to H-ll . . .*".

Happily, it was not always thus. "Upon the Retreat after the brave, but fruitless Attack upon the Fort of *SAN-LAZARO* . . . the Lieutenant of Grenadiers in the Fifteenth Regiment of Foot . . . marching in the Rear of his Men, which is the Officer's Post upon a Retreat, one of the Men observed to him, that the *Spaniards* fired very thick that way: but, says he, they shall not hurt you if I can prevent it, for I will march directly behind you and receive the Shot lest they should hit you. This you may be sure the Officer would not suffer for fear of his Credit. . . . What was remarkable in this poor Fellow's Esteem was, that he had no personal knowledge of the Lieutenant's Treatment of his Soldiers . . . so that his Regard and Care for the Officer's Preservation could only arise from the general Character he had of him from his brother Soldiers".

"Never make your Men any absolute Promise, unless it is entirely in your own Power to perform it; in that case keep strictly to it, and never break your Word on any Account" precedes the most painstaking advice on the management of a Company's pay and on keeping accounts—"*An Officer may very easily lose Money by paying a Company, but it is absolutely impossible for him to get any*"—and on maintaining the authority of N.C.O's. If the men are allowed "to contest, or despise their Authority, it is but one Step to your own. . . ." The Officer must be careful not to abuse his position, as the soldier is prevented by fear of punishment from defending himself from blows and curses; but ". . . *Englishmen* . . . do in some Measure part with their Liberty when they enlist, yet is the Law still as ready to screen them from Violence, Oppression, and Tyranny, as it was before they entered into the Service". Punishments awarded casually by Officers for trivial offences include such shocking tortures as "PICKETTING—TYING NECK AND HEELS, and RIDING THE WOODEN HORSE" which are described in horrid detail. "Can anyone who has brought a man into such Circumstances, ever forgive

himself? I think not". Running the Gauntlet, which may only be awarded by Court Martial Sentence, is apparently not such a terrible punishment as "if the Criminal has a good Share of Heels and a little Cunning, he may not *feel* twenty Lashes from a whole Battalion". (The Colonel explains how this may be achieved.) In filling vacancies amongst the N.C.O's. it is wise to "Let the Good of the Service determine your Recommendation; and be biassed neither by Favour nor Affection".

In the Colonel's day troops were usually billetted. Relations with the Magistrates and civil populace are of great importance, but possibly of even greater importance is one's relationship with those on whom one is billetted. "If they have *Wives* or *Daughters*, by no means dare to exceed the Limits of Decency or good Manners to them". I am sure that most military triflers would be deterred by the impressive end of Cornet Buckle ". . . this ill-fated Youth had just obtained a Cornetcy of Dragoons, and the Man of the House where he lodged, having reason to suspect too much Familiarity between his Wife and the Cornet, ripped up his Belly with a Knife which he used in his Trade as a *Cork-Cutter*".

Swearing is a particularly reprehensible habit. "His Majesty, in great tenderness for the Souls of all his Subjects", has forbidden it, and further condemnation is provided by a long quotation from a sermon by "that great Ornament of our Church Archbishop Tillotson". And here, in the most charming manner imaginable, the Colonel's sense of humour emerges again. He apologizes for the long quotation, which he could not abridge "without doing Injustice to this great Man's Meaning; . . . I was unwilling to refer you to the Sermon itself, for fear it would not have been looked into at all; for such Works, I well know, as Archbishop Tillotson's, seldom make part of an Officer's Library". The Colonel himself was addicted to swearing when a youth under twenty, but he thought better of it, and "after I was made a Major, no Man ever heard me Swear at the Head of the Regiment . . . and yet I am certain never Major was more implicitly obeyed than I was".

Three pitfalls lie in the path of the young Officer. In what we think is our plain-spoken age we should call call them Wine, Women and Song. . . In a time when the drinking of spirits was almost entirely confined to the lower classes, the Colonel warns against "*Dram-drinking;* this is another wretched Vice that steals upon the unhappy Practitioner before he is aware; till at length half Pints of Spirits, and those double distilled, are too cold to warm his corroded Stomach". The Colonel had a narrow escape when he first joined the

Regiment, having been tempted by "two old Officers, that had practised it upwards of Forty Years", but he stopped in time, having seen that "I should soon commence complete *Sot*". And when men's honour was touchy, drink was dangerous—"The Swords are drawn, and one unfortunate *Longe*, hurries one of the Combatants to Perdition, who pours out his Soul together with his Wine at the same Orifice!" The Colonel does not object to a man's "being accidentally disguised with Liquor", but to "the constant, habitual Practice of Drinking" . . . "An Army or Town stands a fine chance that depends upon Drunkards for their Protectors".

These three evils spring from Idleness. A proper occupation of one's time will avoid them. Fishing, shooting, reading, mathematics and drawing will help to pass time, while acquiring useful military accomplishments. And the really keen Subaltern is urged to qualify himself for, and, if possible, to get, the post of Adjutant—"by far the most desirable Commission a young alert Man, whilst a Subaltern (for I think it incompatible with a higher Rank) can enjoy".

His advice on "OECONOMY, or the right Management of your Income" is based on the assumption that the Officer has only his pay. The Colonel has lived on his pay, and speaks with authority on the subject. Keeping up with the Joneses is strongly discouraged, and there are three neat tables showing how a Subaltern's pay may be made to support him. Such entries appear as "To 7 Breakfasts, if of Tea you cannot have it for less than 6d. per Morning", "To a Soldier for cleaning your Shoes, and brushing your Cloaths", "To Shaving, if you cannot do it yearself, at the Rate of", "Suppose you make three Shirts per Week serve you, and shave yourself", "To Hair-Powder and Pomatum". It is even possible for a Subaltern to maintain "himself, a Wife, and several Children, in a decent creditable Way, *on his Pay Only*".Odd expenses may await the young Officer on joining: the Drummers may welcome him with a Beat called *A Point of War*, for which a gratuity is expected; other gratuities may be due to the first Guard he mounts, and to his Company when first he takes post at its head. All these soldiers are anxious to drink his health. The duty of Officer of the Guard is explained, together with the procedure at Courts Martial, both Regimental and General.

Unintentionally, the Colonel gives us a very clear picture of himself. Fortunately the species is by no means extinct, nor confined to the Fifteenth Regiment of Foot. To the young Subaltern of 1952, about to join his Regiment, we could wish nothing better than that—in the Colonel's words—"*Your* superior Officer may be of the same Disposition".

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