

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CONTENTS

The Cover

Highland troops under Wolfe scale the cliffs above what is now Wolfe's Cove in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham. (See article on page 1.)

The object of the Canadian Army Journal, which is published by the Directorate of Military Training under authority of the Chief of the General Staff, is to provide officers of the Active, Reserve and Supplementary Reserve Forces with information designed to keep them abreast of current military trends and topics, and to stimulate interest in current military affairs.

THE CONQUEST OF CANADA

1758-1760

By
COLONEL C. P. STACEY, OBE, CD, DIRECTOR OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION,
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

British policy in the campaigns of the Seven Years' War which resulted in the transfer of the sovereignty of Canada from France to Great Britain affords a classic example of grand strategy. In particular it exemplifies the co-ordination of effort between several widely separated theatres of operations in such a way as to ensure decisive success in the area where it is most desired. The architect of this effective strategy was the elder William Pitt, afterwards Earl of Chatham.

The Seven Years' War

The year 1755 saw the outbreak in America of the fourth of the series of Anglo-French colonial wars that had begun in 1689. The two powers were not officially at war in Europe until the following year, when the Seven Years' War broke out and Britain and Prussia were ranged against France, Austria, Russia and, later, Spain. This alignment, the result of the celebrated "reversal of alliances" of 1756, brought the predominant sea-power, Great Britain, into alliance with the rising military state, Prussia, whose army, commanded at this time by an able and ruthless sovereign, Frederick the Great, was becoming a major factor in the European power pattern.

The long intercolonial struggle had brought Britain less success in America than might have been expected. The English in America outnumbered the French twelve to one, but their fourteen disunited and unco-operative colonies were ill organized for war by comparison with New France. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) had given the British Nova Scotia, but they had failed to make headway against the colony on the St. Lawrence. As the Seven Years' War drew on, the rival empires were struggling for the control of the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. The British colonies were exposed to the imminent

danger of being contained, between the Alleghanies and the Atlantic coast, by a chain of French military posts connecting Canada with Louisiana. The very first shots of the war were fired in the Ohio Valley in 1754, between French outposts and troops commanded by Colonel George Washington, who had been sent by the governor of Virginia to warn the French off.

In 1755 the British government intervened on a large scale in the intercolonial conflict. Edward Braddock was sent out as Commander-in-Chief, and the British Army, represented by two regular infantry battalions, made its first attempt at operating actively in America. The expedition, advancing on Fort Duquesne, was disastrously defeated at the hands of an inferior French and Indian force. The next two years witnessed a largely unrelieved series of British disasters. The French commander Dieskau did meet defeat on Lake George a couple of months after Braddock's reverse, but in 1756 a new general, the Marquis of Montcalm, arrived from France. His first move was against Oswego, the only British post on the shores of the Great Lakes, which he captured out of hand. In 1757 he took Fort William Henry, on Lake George, and ended for that year any idea of a British advance on Montreal. The British commander-in-chief, Lord Loudoun, did not venture to deliver an attack on the great French naval fortress of Louisbourg in Cape Breton Island because he was doubtful whether his naval support was equal to mastering the French ships based there.

Pitt and his System

The coalition ministry of Pitt and Newcastle came to power in June 1757, and it was Pitt who made the war plan for 1758. His strategic system seems to have evolved in his mind rather gradually, but we may describe it in the complete form which it had assumed by the spring of 1758.

For Pitt, North America was the vital theatre, the area where the issues of the war centred and where the harvest was to be reaped. But action in Europe was to play a vital part in achieving the desired result. France was to be contained and kept busy there while a vigorous campaign deprived her of her possessions in America. British subsidies encouraged and supported Prussia and helped to keep her armies in the field. A small British army* operated on the Continent and made its contribution. And the main strength of the Royal Navy was concentrated off the ports of France, blockading them

**There were only six British infantry battalions at the battle of Minden in 1759. In the same year 23 were employed on the continent of America, plus others in the West Indies. In the beginning Pitt had been unwilling to send any British troops at all to the Continent.*



Historical Section, G.S.

and preventing the French fleet either from carrying reinforcements to Canada or delivering a counter-attack against Britain. This containment was made more effective by seaborne raids delivered against the French coast. In these same years British soldiers and sailors were defeating the French in India and founding a British empire there; but this was achieved with Pitt's concurrence rather than at his instigation.

Combined with all this was the main offensive in America. Large British land forces were sent thither and supported by powerful naval squadrons. The British colonies were given a strong lead and encouraged to place important forces of their own in the field, the home government paying most of the cost.

Even so, Montcalm held his own in 1758. Pitt's plan for that year involved three attacks. The main movement, under General James Abercromby, was directed by the line of Lake Champlain towards Montreal. Another major blow, under General Jeffrey Amherst, was aimed at Louisbourg. Thirdly, Brigadier John Forbes was given command in the southern colonies and ordered to undertake such offensive operations as he thought fit. He chose to march against Fort Duquesne. Amherst took Louisbourg, and thereby weakened the French naval position in North American waters and helped to cut New France off from Old France. Forbes took Duquesne, renamed it Fort Pitt (the city of Pittsburgh now occupies the site) and ended the French dream of controlling the Ohio valley. A subsidiary operation took Fort Frontenac (Kingston) and crippled French naval power on Lake Ontario, thereby seriously interfering with communications with the West. But Montcalm defeated Abercromby heavily at Ticonderoga and held the main French position for that year.

The Campaign of 1759

Pitt, nothing daunted, planned a still greater effort for 1759. Amherst, the successful assailant of Louisbourg, was now given the chief command in America and ordered to strike by the Lake Champlain route, or by the upper St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario, at Montreal or Quebec. James Wolfe, whose conduct as a brigadier at Louisbourg had caught Pitt's eye, and who was only 32, was given an essentially independent command and a more uncertain task: a direct seaborne attack on Quebec by the St. Lawrence. Pitt also desired an attack on Fort Niagara, at the Lake Ontario end of the Niagara River.

It must be remembered that at the same time significant events were taking place in Europe. British troops, British fleets and British money were at work there, and the French court

was too busy with these menaces near home to pay much attention to Canada's plight. This was the year when a partly British army under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick won the battle of Minden,* and when a French plan to invade England was defeated by Admiral Hawke's victory of Quiberon Bay. Minden, Quiberon, and Quebec were the names that were to make 1759 for Englishmen the *annus mirabilis*—the wonderful year.

As the crisis of the struggle approached, New France was almost entirely cut off from the Mother Country and the French forces there felt themselves orphans. The British control of the North Atlantic, though not absolute, was so complete as to discourage any large-scale attempt to reinforce Canada in the spring of 1759, and none was made. Indeed, Montcalm and Vaudreuil did not really press for one. (They asked for drafts and specialists—and even so didn't get all they asked for.) What they did strongly recommend was a powerful diversion against the coasts of the southern British colonies. But the French government preferred to aim the diversionary attack at Britain herself. As we have just seen, this scheme failed.

The forces defending Canada consisted basically of eight regular battalions from France; 40 companies of colonial regulars; and the citizen militia, perhaps as many as 13,000 strong. These forces were weaker than the attackers in both quantity and military quality; and they had to be divided to meet the various British threats. The main body under Montcalm protected Quebec against the seaborne threat; but three regular battalions, eight companies of colonial regulars and a considerable number of militia, under Brigadier Bourlamaque, were stationed on Lake Champlain to guard against Amherst; and detachments held Fort Niagara and the other western posts. The French position was further weakened by the lack of good understanding between Montcalm and his superior, Governor de Vaudreuil.

The British forces moving to the attack were large and efficient. Wolfe had 8500 troops, almost all regulars. His force was transported and backed by a powerful fleet commanded by Vice-Admiral Charles Saunders. The relations between the naval and military commanders were excellent. Amherst had 11,000 men, about half colonials. Another column commanded by Brigadier Prideaux moved against Fort Niagara.

**This victory saved Hanover from conquest. Hanover being a possession of King George II, it was a natural objective for the French, offering the hope of diverting British forces from America and perhaps providing a makeweight against British conquests there in a peace settlement.*

The centre attack achieved little. Amherst, a skilful administrator but very deliberate in action, advanced ponderously. The French abandoned Ticonderoga to him, but stood ready to fight at Isle aux Noix in the Richelieu, covering Montreal. The Commander-in-Chief spent so much time preparing a necessary flotilla for Lake Champlain and building a quite unnecessary fortress at Crown Point that the campaigning season ended before he had accomplished anything to assist Wolfe's operation. Prideaux was killed in besieging Fort Niagara, but his successor Sir William Johnson beat off a relieving force and took the place. However, the decisive point was Quebec, and Wolfe and Saunders had to win their fight there without the co-operation of other British forces.

There is no space to tell the tactical story of Wolfe's campaign here. It is enough to note the advantage he derived from the co-operation of the fleet. British naval control of the St. Lawrence enabled him to threaten Montcalm at one point after another, moving his forces about the theatre of operations as he chose. The ships, slipping up and down the river, kept the French in a constant state of uncertainty and wore them out by forcing them to keep constantly on the move. Wolfe was able to choose his point of attack freely; and, when he had finally made his brilliant—or fortunate—choice, the navy put him ashore at the precise time and place he desired and next day he won his battle. The small forces actually engaged on the Plains of Abraham were apparently about equal in strength; but Wolfe's men were almost all professional soldiers, while many of Montcalm's were amateurs; and this is the explanation of the result. Wolfe and Montcalm both fell. Quebec surrendered a few days later.

The Campaign of 1760

The French field army was not captured with Quebec; Montreal remained untaken; and another campaign was necessary to complete the conquest of Canada. Through the winter of 1759–60 the British under General James Murray held Quebec. Early in the spring Montcalm's successor, Lévis, marched against the city. Murray went out to meet him and was defeated on 28 April in the battle of Ste. Foy. This action in the snow was New France's last victory. Murray fell back into Quebec and Lévis besieged him. The colony might still have been saved for France by powerful aid from the mother country. But the fleet that came up the St. Lawrence in May was British, not French.

For the final campaign, Pitt again called upon the British colonies for great efforts. He gave Amherst a free

hand, and the Commander-in-Chief resolved on a triple attack. Brigadier Haviland would make the advance upon Montreal by Lake Champlain; Murray would sail up the St. Lawrence from Quebec; and Amherst himself, with the main army, over 10,000 strong, was to move down the St. Lawrence from Lake Ontario. This converging strategy prevented any possibility of French forces withdrawing into the west, where Detroit was still in French hands. The French hoped to concentrate against the smaller detachments successively and defeat them in detail; but they were unequal to the task.

On the Lake Champlain line, Isle aux Noix and St. Johns had to be abandoned to Haviland's superior force, which soon drove on to the St. Lawrence. Murray simply bypassed the French garrisons on his route; and the only serious obstacle encountered by Amherst was a petty fortification, Fort de Lévis, on an island at the head of the St. Lawrence rapids near the modern site of Prescott. He landed guns and solemnly and systematically blew it to smithereens. After losing some men in descending the rapids, he landed on the island of Montreal. ("I have suffered by the *Rapides* not by the enemy", he wrote later.) In the words of Sir Julian Corbett, "So, like the striking of a clock, Amherst's wide-flung movements chimed together at the appointed hour." With the British forces concentrated, and their own men deserting in shoals, Lévis and Vaudreuil had scarcely more than 2000 troops to face 17,000. They had no choice but to capitulate; and on 8–9 September Montreal and Canada passed into British hands. Thus ended the long struggle between France and Britain in North America.

Comments

Sea power is the dominant fact in the conquest of Canada. The war in America was fought mainly by forces from Europe; and as long as British forces could cross the Atlantic freely, and French forces attempting to do so were exposed to the almost certain prospect of interception and defeat, the ultimate result was a foregone conclusion.

The Seven Years' War affords an excellent example of *Selection and Maintenance of the Aim*. For Pitt the war was an American war; its object was the security and extension of the British dominions in America; and he never lost sight of this. All his measures, in Europe and America alike, were primarily directed towards this end. His operations in Europe were containing operations. His eyes and his efforts were fixed upon Quebec and Montreal, and he moved towards those objectives with single-minded energy until they were attained.

Thanks to this single-mindedness, and to British naval superiority, he was able to effect a destructive *Concentration of Force* in the decisive theatre. The great military strength of France was devoted to European enterprises, while Britain, whose total military power was much smaller, was allowed to bear down the French detachment in Canada by superior numbers. Here is a true *Economy of Effort*. The British effort, it is true, was tremendous; but unlike the still greater effort of France it was put forth so efficiently as to ensure "an effective concentration at the decisive time and place". The place was Canada, and the result was the conquest of the country.

Finally, a word on *Co-operation*. In this war in America the British Army and the Royal Navy worked together in a manner which has often been cited as inter-service concord at its best. In particular, the hand-in-glove partnership between Wolfe and Saunders at Quebec is remembered as a monumental example of what can be achieved when all selfish considerations are subordinated to the achievement of the maximum combined effort towards the defeat of the enemy.

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Portable Pipeline

Corps of Engineers [U.S.] is currently testing a new four-inch "portable pipeline" which can be laid from a truck at 15 miles per hour. Intended for delivery of gasoline and other liquid fuels to forward dispensing points, the pipelines were developed by the B. F. Goodrich Co. and the Corps of Engineers. One of these portable pipelines can transport 41 gallons of gasoline an hour with a daily capacity equalling that of 162 two-thousand-gallon gas trucks. The pipeline weighs less than one pound per foot and has a 500-pound burst pressure, making it the strongest hose for its weight ever built.—*United States Army Combat Forces Journal.*

CATCHWORDS — THE CURSE AND THE CURE

By
MAJOR C. H. LITHGOW, THE ROYAL CANADIAN REGIMENT*

"There are three things against which the human mind struggles in vain: stupidity, bureaucracy and catchwords." As far as catchwords are concerned, this thought, expressed over twenty years ago by Colonel General von Seeckt, is as true today as it was in 1930. The tendency towards the use of catchwords can be found among all officers and the incidence is perhaps highest among instructors in tactics. New methods, new equipment and new commanders have together given soldiers a host of catchwords and phrases most of which are vague, some of which are definitely misleading and all of which tend to eliminate clear thinking. When in 1941, battle drill became universal in Commonwealth armies, a whole new vocabulary came into use, one which threatened to nullify the vigour and enthusiasm of the training. A senior officer summed up the situation by saying. "If the word——— (a famous four letter word) and the phrase left flanking were removed from the English language, the army would become both speechless and immobile."

Before discussing some of these catchwords and phrases in detail, I propose to examine their general faults. The first criticism which one can make is that they are generally incapable of precise definition or explanation and are therefore unsuitable for military use. Some of the phrases are more or less definable but the clarity of understanding is dependent upon the military experience of the person to whom the phrase is being defined. A field officer with fifteen years service will understand but the newly-commissioned subaltern will not. Most of the phrases mean many things to many men but rarely do they mean the same thing to all men. Having accepted the fact that some of the phrases are capable of reasonable definition, my second criticism refers to their application. So easily do they roll from the lips that we find officers using them when they do not apply. *Vital ground, all-round defence* and *immediate counter-attack* are examples

**The author wrote this article while attending the Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan, in 1952.—Editor.*

of phrases which have a reasonably clear meaning but which are usually applicable at a certain level of command or action in a particular set of circumstances. Any failure to specify the level or to explain the circumstances results in misunderstanding, especially among young officers, who at that stage are groping desperately for a ready solution to their many problems. My final criticism is that these phrases are a sure bar to incisive expression and thought. As the present Staff College text on military writing states, "To write jargon is to be perpetually shuffling around in the fog and cotton wool of abstract terms."

The first phrase which I have selected for condemnation is *set-piece attack*, a comparative new-comer to the military vocabulary and whose source was, I suspect, 21 Army Group. I challenge the use of this phrase on the basis of my first general criticism. It is not clearly definable. It means many things to many men and finally it suggests some very fundamental difference from other attacks. Explanations of the phrase will vary depending upon whether the person defining it served in Burma, Italy or North-West Europe in the Second World War. All the definitions will contain vague references to time, planning, obstacles and the co-ordination of supporting arms, and eventually one decides that a set-piece attack is one which is planned over a considerable period of time, in great detail, involving the co-ordination of many supporting arms to overcome strong obstacles and enemy defences. The difference between a set-piece attack and the common variety apparently lies in the answers to "How much?", "How long?", "How many?" and "How strong?" and this will usually be expressed in words such as "a lot", "several", or "very strong"—words which are shunned by the soldier as being too vague.

Let us be perfectly clear about one thing. An attack is an attack. All attacks consist of the basic stages of deployment, assault and reorganization. One or all of these stages may be complicated in varying degrees by the ground, obstacles, the time available and the enemy defences and the result will be plans of varying complexity. The differences are ones of degree only. All attacks are deliberate ones in the sense that they are mounted with intent, after careful and logical thought and in a determined manner. Any commander who does otherwise is a fool and is not deserving of his command. The word "attack" is a vivid one. Why emasculate it?

I now turn to a Staff College favourite in the phrase *think two down*. This phrase has nothing to do with the state of a commander's

morals but refers to one of those mental processes of which we are so fond. My quarrel with the expression is not so much with its definition as with its application. It is fair to say that when allotting tasks to subordinate formations, a commander must think of the unit or sub-unit two levels below his own. A divisional commander in detailing tasks to his brigades must think of their capabilities in terms of the three battalions which they contain. A battalion commander's tasks for his companies will be based on an appreciation of the capabilities of three platoons. However, when we find instructors applying the phrase the result is too frequently pure nonsense. Let us say for example that we are students taking part in a TEWT and that we have been given the task of planning a battalion attack. Asked for our solution, we will, in the course of giving it, detail the objectives for the various companies of the battalion. At some stage the instructor, anxious to teach the importance of thinking two down, will ask the student what he sees the platoons of a particular company doing. The hapless student can either reply that he would leave that matter entirely to the company commander concerned or he can "stick his neck out" and give a rough idea of what the platoons might be doing during the operation. If he gives the first answer, he is eternally damned, for as the triumphant instructor will point out, "You have failed to think two down." Any other student who had the same answer immediately changes his mind and decides to produce some kind of a solution. Having demolished the first student, the instructor now turns to the other unfortunate who has prepared some kind of an answer. This student produces, as a battalion commander, an estimate as to what the platoons of the company would be doing. The instructor, poised like a cat stalking a canary, now pounces upon him and proceeds to tear the solution to pieces. This is usually not too difficult, as he has had the advantage of more time and a more detailed study of the question. The discussion invariably ends with a reiteration of the importance of thinking two down: the students go home properly humbled while the instructor sighs with the satisfaction at having done his duty. The result has been a half hour wasted.

When a commander is allotting tasks to his command he thinks automatically of their organization and capabilities and details the job accordingly. In the process he unquestionably forms a rough mental picture of what the sub-unit two levels down might be doing. The precise position or manœuvre of the sub-unit he leaves entirely to the company commander concerned, in

the case of a battalion. This process is certainly illustrative of thinking two down, but to suggest that this rough picture has any serious tactical validity is ridiculous. Even less sensible is it to subject this rough picture to a searching examination based upon tactical principles. If a battalion commander is expected to appreciate the actions of twelve platoons in sufficient detail to stand close and critical scrutiny then it is going to take us a long time to get our armies on the move.

I turn now to two phrases with a defensive flavour to them, *killing area* and *all-round defence*. Both of these became popular during the battle-drill era and continue to cause a good deal of misunderstanding. They can be criticized, not for being indefinable but because they have no universal application and relate to a certain level of command in a particular set of circumstances. I will attempt a definition of killing area as being an area into which a defender hopes to channel the main weight of an enemy attack and with superior fire-power destroy the attacking force. A complete purist may disagree with this, but I will let it stand for the time being. Few people will challenge the idea which is implied, but the nonsense arises in its application. There seems to be little doubt that a division by a judicious siting of minefields in conjunction with other ground features and with superior fire-power, especially anti-tank guns, could create a killing ground. So also, no doubt, could a brigade create one. It is much less certain that a battalion could have a killing area and the idea becomes progressively unlikely as we move down the chain of command. To be sure, there may be occasions in jungle or mountainous terrain where an enemy's approach may be canalized by the natural features of the ground but the lower down the chain we go, the more is a commander concerned with enemy who might come from any direction. An enemy will always be reluctant to be channelled into a pre-selected death-trap. The phrase is a descriptive one and is capable of reasonable definition, but we do need a clearer understanding of its application so that we will no longer find platoon commanders prowling around searching for their platoon killing area.

The connection between *killing area* and *all-around defence* is considerable. The requirements of the latter make the former more difficult to attain. A literal interpretation of all-round defence results too often in tactically unsound positions and many instructors fail to explain the precise import of the words. Certainly the defence must be prepared to engage an enemy attack from any direction. This results often in platoons being sited in a perfect perimeter facing

outwards from the centre, where stands the platoon commander with his head permanently turning. The net result is a waste of fire-power, a lack of depth to the position and a sore neck for the commander. There are perhaps occasions when such actions are necessary but each circumstance will be different and will depend upon the nature of the ground, the extent of the area to be held and the availability of approaches to it. The exact method of obtaining all-round defence will vary in each case. The mountainous terrain of Korea, for instance, makes all-round defence within companies and platoons almost obligatory, but the extent of positions to be held renders it impossible of achievement for a battalion. In flatter ground with less extended positions, however, a battalion commander might cater for it in his own plan, thereby enabling his company and platoon commanders to obtain greater depth and concentration of fire-power in their positions. All-round defence is here to stay. What we must avoid is a multitude of battalions, companies and platoons all playing "ring around a rosy."

I believe that all officers will agree upon the dangers inherent in the use of catch-phrases as a deterrent to clear thought and as an aid to misunderstanding. I suspect that most officers will agree that we show an unhealthy inclination to use them in our tactical thought. If there is agreement upon these two points, then all that remains is to forever eliminate the useless ones and to properly define the others, especially as to their use. In this brief article I have suggested four which I consider suitable either for retirement or for rehabilitation. There are many more and as Colonel General von Seeckt concluded his words on the subject, "There is one talisman against them—clear thinking."

Artificial Limbs

A new electronic arm, powered by a small motor, and a prosthetic leg, equipped with an efficient hydraulic mechanism, are two of the latest developments in artificial limbs.

The arm, still in its development stage, operates when the body muscles trip switches of the small 4-ounce motor, which is equipped with small batteries. One switch opens and closes the hand, another twists the wrist, and the third flexes it.

The new artificial leg has great promise for crippled veterans. Unlike the conventional limb, it does not collapse suddenly when a patient trips. It allows a resistance to falls, which often permits recovery of balance.—*The New York Times.*

The Gibraltar of America

CITADEL OF QUEBEC

By
Major George Guimond, Late of the Royal 22e Régiment, Curator of the Citadel Museum

Part II

It is September 13, 1759, about noon. The victorious British army is digging in on the Heights of Abraham a short distance from the fortifications of Quebec. Part of the French army has retreated to the town, through St Louis and St Jean Gates. A good number have succeeded in crossing the St Charles river and are making for Ancienne Lorette. The rout is complete; it is the beginning of the end.

The writer has been wandering again and again through the battlefield of yore. Nowadays one can follow occasionally the attacks and counter-attacks of a contest of a different nature between the descendants of those gallant soldiers who fought for such a vital prize. Those heroes from the Quebec High School and from the Séminaire de Québec are there battling for supremacy in a football match. How different from the old days though! The engagement is over and both sides are to leave the field without anger or rancour. The winners congratulate their opponents for their gallant effort, while the losers, having cheered for the victors, hope for a better luck at the next encounter.

It was not a football match which was played on that fateful day of September: the destiny of a large country was at stake. The victors who had no time to waste were standing on their positions, ready to defeat a return stroke from the enemy, they were prepared for the next encounter—the assault of the walls of the city.

The French field army was disorganized and the garrison troops could hardly be relied upon. The inhabitants of Quebec were in a desperate situation, and pursuant to a council of war, Monsieur de Ramezay, Governor of the Town, signed the capitulation during the evening of the 17 September. The following day Admiral Saunders and Brigadier Townshend signed for the British somewhere on the battlefield. Before sunset that same day, the gates of Quebec were thrown open. General Townshend, with his staff and three companies of Grenadiers,

and an artillery detachment dragging a field gun, entered Quebec and halted in front of the old Chateau Saint-Louis, where the Chateau Frontenac now stands. There he was handed the keys of the town. That was the first sign of occupation.

Many were the British regiments garrisoned in Quebec as well as in the Citadel, during the hundred years, that followed until the departure of the last detachment in November 1871. It would be interesting to review the histories of all those units which served here, but time and space do not permit. It is hoped the reader will be satisfied with some scanty notes about a few of the regiments which either occupied the Citadel or were quartered in other parts of the fortress town during that long period.

The author has chosen to deal first with those units which served under Wolfe. A few words about each might be of interest; they are taken in their numerical order.

First the 15th Foot, the East Yorkshire Regiment, which at the outset, captured Point Levis, on the opposite side of Quebec, and were amongst the first troops to gain the memorable Heights of Abraham and distinguish themselves in the famous battle that followed. This regiment remained in Quebec for the occupation. It is to be noted that Le Régiment de Québec, a local Reserve unit, is allied with the East Yorkshire.

Then comes the 28th Foot, the Gloucestershire Regiment (the "Glorious Glosters" of the Korean War), in which Wolfe had himself borne a commission. In the spring of 1760, they also took part in the battle of Sainte-Foy, a short distance from the spot where they had fought hardly six months before.

The 35th Foot, the Royal Sussex, was another of the valiant regiments which fought under Wolfe at the battle of the Plains. There they won the distinctive badge of the Feather for their heroic conduct in defeating the Royal Roussillon Grenadiers of France on that memorable day. They remained here until 1761.

Here is the 43rd Foot, the Oxfordshire Light Infantry. "At first it seemed as if their initiation into the severe mysteries of warfare was to be identified with failure, but the happy inspiration of scaling the Heights of Abraham did more than nullify failure; it transformed it into success," says a writer about them. They were in the centre of the first line, and according to Sir R. Levinge, the 43rd's historian, the defeated French paid them this compliment: "Never had they known so fierce a fire or such a perfect discipline; as the centre corps, they levelled and fired '*absolument comme un coup de canon*'."

The 47th Foot, the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, were there also

with Wolfe. Although they, at first, formed the reserve, they soon came to the front and were one of the regiments, along with the Highlanders, on whom devolved the hottest of the fighting.

The 48th and 58th Foot, the two battalions of the Northamptonshire, also served with distinction before Quebec. It was at the head of a detachment of the 58th that Wolfe, after going up the gully at the Foulon at day-break, pushed to the Sainte-Foy road, overlooking the St Charles river valley, to reconnoitre and discover whether the French army was still in the entrenchments at Beauport, in the direction of Montmorency river.

And now comes the famous 60th Foot (the Royal Americans), the King's Royal Rifle Corps. This regiment was raised in the then British colonies of America—in the state of Pennsylvania, to be precise. There were two battalions of this regiment with Wolfe in 1759: the 2nd and the 3rd. On this occasion they so distinguished themselves that, according to tradition, the gallant Wolfe himself bestowed on them their motto: *Celer et Audax* (Swift and Bold).

The following fact may be cited as a curious and noteworthy coincidence about this regiment. The 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 60th, as part of the *first* English garrison of Quebec, were present in September when the British ensign was hoisted on the Citadel, the old Fort Saint-Louis, by an officer of the Royal Artillery; and in November 1871, one hundred and twelve years later, a detachment of the 60th, the remnant of the *last* English garrison of Quebec, consigned the imperial flag to the keeping of another artillery officer, while the flag of the Dominion of Canada was hoisted in its stead on the present King's bastion of the Citadel. That detachment of the 60th left the Citadel on the 11th November 1871. This event is recalled by a very interesting drawing now to be seen in the military museum at the Citadel of Quebec.

One of the finest regiments of that daring body of troops which brought Quebec to capitulate after the desperate efforts of the French army, was the 78th Fraser Highlanders.

An officer writing at the time, said: "Our regiments that sustained the brunt of the action were Bragg's (28th), Lascelles' (47th) and the Highlanders; the two former had not a bayonet, or the latter a broadsword, untinged with blood." It shows that although the actual clash between the two opposing armies lasted hardly more than fifteen or twenty minutes, it was a fight to a finish. In their retreat, certain elements of the French army—they were Canadians—tried to make a stand approximately where the Provincial Government buildings

now stand, but the Highlanders soon came forward and hurled their opponents back.

The Fraser Highlanders spent the winter of 1766 in Quebec. No provision, however, had been made for the replacement of kilts by trousers and the Scotchmen suffered from the bitter cold when they were called either to perform sentry duty or to obtain fuel in the woods surrounding the city. It is reported that the Ursuline nuns, with whom the English military authorities were on the most friendly terms, solved this delicate problem by knitting long woollen stockings which protected the limbs of the soldiers from the assaults of Jack Frost. Someone wondered whether the good nuns rendered this service on account of necessity or modesty.

It is known that this regiment was disbanded in Canada, officers and other ranks settling at various points. Those of our readers who, at the beginning of this century, travelling on the old Inter-colonial Railway, stopped at Rivière-du-Loup station of today, will remember that the latter was called Fraserville. When the disbandment of the Frasers took place, Colonel Malcolm Fraser, the Commanding Officer, became the "seigneur" of Rivière-du-Loup. The descendants of many of those early settlers are still to be found around Murray Bay, Valcartier Camp and along the south shore of the St. Lawrence. A plan of 1760 shows these regiments occupying the following posts: The Highlanders, a few yards from the present Officers' Mess of the Royal 22e Régiment and the Administration Building of today; the 47th, close to the Military Museum in the Prince of Wales Bastion; the 48th, on the site of the now Dalhousie Bastion; the 43rd, on the *glacis* next to the King's Bastion; the 3rd Royal American, at the foot of this glacis. A little further out we find the 28th in the St Louis Bastion, near St Louis Gate, and enclosing Connaught Barracks; the 2nd Royal American within the Ste Ursule Bastion, on the Esplanade; the 15th in St Jean bastion next to St Jean Gate, and finally the 58th in the old *bastion de la Potasse* where the Dominion Arsenal now stands.

Mention should be made of some of the other regiments which came to Quebec. Amongst these we find the 7th or Royal Fusiliers, which landed in 1791 and were stationed here for some time. Their Commanding Officer was His Royal Highness Prince Edward, Duke of Kent, the father of Queen Victoria.

A few years later, in 1814, the 57th, the Duke of Cambridge's Own, are in Quebec. They had earned for themselves immortal fame by their conduct in the Peninsular War. Even as he fell dying, their Commander rallied his men with the cry: "Die

hard, my men, die hard." Hence their sobriquet of "Die-Hards".

The 79th, the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders, made a short appearance in Quebec at the beginning of the nineteenth century, being here *en passant*. They came back, however, in 1848 to be stationed in the Citadel until 1851.

The following anecdote is told about the 79th. After the regiment returned to the United Kingdom following the campaign in Holland in 1794–95, it was proposed to draft the men to other regiments. Colonel Cameron, the Officer Commanding, spoke with the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of York, and it is said, told him that "to draft the 79th is more than you or your Royal father dare do." The Duke said that the Regiment would be sent to the West Indies, and the Colonel, losing his temper, replied: "You may tell the King, your father, that he may send us to hell if he likes, and I will go at the head of them, but he *daurna draft us.*"

The regiment did, in fact, go to the West Indies.

Evidently the regiments did not travel light in those days. A note in the Quebec Gazette of Friday, the 16th June 1848, reads: "The *wines* and part of the baggage of the 79th Highlanders arrived here [Quebec] on Tuesday." The regiment itself arrived on the 27th July. Nowadays regiments do not bring their wines, but occasionally some of their members are stimulated by higher spirits . . .

It might be of interest to know that the nuns of the General Hospital of Quebec, where the wounded of the battle of the Plains, both English and French, were received, have a peculiar souvenir displayed in their museum: a drum coming from the old 79th Camerons. How this instrument found its way from the Citadel to the convent is a mystery which the candid nuns cannot solve. However, even if they are not called to their religious exercises at the beating of the drum, they are not inclined to let this one go up Citadel Hill!

On the occasion of the *Trent Affair*, the 1st Battalion, Rifle Brigade, was sent to Canada in 1861. During the stay of the 1st Battalion in Quebec a unique exploit was recorded, and that in peacetime. Pte Timothy O'Hea of that unit won the Victoria Cross near a small village called Danville, about forty miles from Quebec, on the 6th June 1866. The citation reads: "For his courageous conduct on the occasion of a fire which occurred in a railway car containing ammunition, between Quebec and Montreal . . . It is stated that it was due to his example that the fire was suppressed." The V.C. was presented to Pte O'Hea on the 27th April 1867 on the Esplanade, at the foot of Citadel Hill. The

Officer who made the presentation says, in his report: "The troops were drawn up in line of contiguous quarter distance column on the Esplanade . . . After the presentation the troops marched past in Open Column of Companys at Quick time, the ground was in very bad order, so muddy that, even supposing there had been room, which was not the case, no manœuvres could have been gone through . . ."

A few years later, the 69th, the Welch Regiment, found themselves in Quebec, arriving at the Citadel in June 1869. In May of the following year a large fire broke out in the lower town of Quebec where the services of the 69th were required. The very same day the regiment was ordered to march at midnight for the frontier where the Fenians were massed. One William Elcock writes: "We marched to the Citadel and received orders to pack our field-kits and were served out with 80 rounds, and at 12.30 a.m. we were on the wharf. We crossed the St. Lawrence and took train for Montreal."

In November 1870 the 69th left Quebec for Bermuda. Before the regiment left, a very gracious compliment was paid to it by the presentation of a candelabrum which bears the following inscription:

"Presented by the Citizens of Quebec
to
LIEUT.-COL. GEORGE BAGOT AND OFFICERS
OF THE 69TH REGIMENT
in acknowledgment
of the high estimation entertained by the whole community for their valuable and gallant co-operation in Frontier Service and gentlemanly tone that invariably pervaded their intercourse with the inhabitants whilst the Regiment was in
Garrison at Quebec, Nov. 1870"

In his reply to the address Lieut.-Col. Bagot said, *inter alia*: "The Officers of this Regiment are happy, too, that they have had an opportunity of leaving behind some proof of their affection, in entrusting to the City of Quebec their old and venerated Colours."

These Colours are now in the Holy Trinity English Cathedral in Quebec.

Reference was made previously to the last British regiment to be garrisoned in the Citadel, the 60th Foot which left on the 11th November 1871. It might be inferred from this that, from 1759 to 1871, the only British troops to serve either at the Citadel or in Quebec, were infantry regiments. Far from it. It should be remembered that during that period many units of the Royal Artillery also served here continuously. Whether they were stationed in the Citadel or in the surrounding district is difficult to ascertain from the records.

During those hundred and twelve years thirty-three artillery units relieved one another. Space does not permit the writer to enumerate them. With no intention of ignoring the others, reference will be made only

to the first and last units on the roll. For the campaign of 1759 Wolfe had with him No. 5 Company of the 2nd Battalion of artillery. This unit was designated in 1947 as the 18th Medium Battery, 18th Medium Regiment. It has the Honour title of "Quebec 1759". The last Royal Artillery unit to serve in Quebec in 1871 was the 6th Battery of the 3rd Brigade, which has been known since 1947 as 42 LAA Bty, 34 LAA Regt.

Mention should be made also of another RA unit which was garrisoned here: No. 5 Company of the 3rd Battalion. The grandfather of the late Right Honourable Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, served with this unit. He was Bombardier John King, who died in Quebec in 1843, and was buried in the military cemetery near St Louis gate and the present Connaught Barracks.

And so the last of the British troops left Quebec and sailed down the St. Lawrence, homeward-bound. Canadian troops had relieved them.

From that moment units of the Royal Canadian Garrison Artillery were in service at the Citadel. Those of us who are not so young, even if we pretend not to feel the wear and tear of time, will remember the old "B" Battery of fifty years ago and its band giving highly appreciated concerts on the Terrace. After playing their part in the First World War, the gunners came back to the Citadel for a short stay, though.

In order to commemorate the 22nd French-Canadian Battalion which had done its bit in France and Flanders, it was decided to have the unit reorganized as the Royal 22e Régiment of the Permanent Force, with its quarters at the Citadel. After a year of happy association with the gunners, the latter left for Kingston in 1921. They left something of themselves behind, though, as their band, both musicians and instruments, passed to the Royal 22e.

This is not the place to recall the history of this regiment. It does not seem inappropriate, however, to mention that His Majesty the late King George VI was the first Colonel-in-Chief, whilst the first Honorary Colonel was the late Marshal Foch. The regiment is also allied with the Royal Welch Fusiliers. It was away on duty during the Second World War, leaving on the 8th of December 1939 to return in October 1945. During that period the Citadel was occupied by various units.

This brief résumé does not pretend to cover adequately such a vast subject as the Citadel; this is an almost impossible task. It will be a precious reward to the writer if these notes, incomplete as they are, are of some benefit to those who are still interested in the fortress on the

EVERY RIFLEMAN MUST BE AN AGGRESSIVE FIGHTER

By
MAJOR W. E. GARBER, THE ROYAL CANADIAN REGIMENT*

Recent studies of United States infantry units have disclosed that at least 50 percent of the riflemen never engage the enemy with fire.** The seriousness of this problem cannot be over-emphasized, for only a handful of men in each infantry division are front-line riflemen. Lack of aggressiveness on the part of these men can reduce the effectiveness of an entire division. It is not unusual for a division to be delayed by a few enemy rifle shots.

It has long been the custom for all nations to pay glowing tribute to the fighting qualities of their military forces. That every soldier will fight bravely is taken for granted, even by the soldiers themselves. In the days of close-formation fighting and even during the trench warfare of the First World War, it was simple to ensure that each man played his part. Today, however, with increasing emphasis on dispersion, it is much more difficult to make each man take an active part in battle. The extent to which this lack of participation exists in Canadian infantry units is

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**Men Against Fire, by Brig.-Gen. S. L. A. Marshall, United States Army.

Why Half Our Combat Soldiers Fail to Shoot, by Bill Davidson, Collier's magazine, 8 November 1952.

Quebec Citadel

(*Continued from preceding page*)

promontary and all the memories which are so closely connected with it.

If the writer were permitted to express a last wish, it would be that those in authority do all in their power to preserve the Citadel in its original and imposing grandeur. Let nothing injure or destroy what time has respected.

(*Concluded*)

not known, but since there is little real difference between Canadian and United States infantrymen, it is probable that there is a comparable reluctance to engage the enemy.

The failure to discuss this lack of zeal more openly is quite understandable. The average infantry officer who has noted this condition in battle hesitates to discuss it for fear it will expose to criticism his personal leadership qualities, his battalion's battle record, and the courage of his men. The need for open discussion of this problem and its possible solution, however, is most important. Since we may be faced with a war of destruction beyond belief, the efficient use of manpower becomes of paramount importance.

Units committed to battle after extensive training together maintain a high degree of individual aggressiveness until heavy casualties make it necessary to utilize a high percentage of reinforcements. Morale and *esprit de corps* of the unit drop as new men are introduced, with a resulting decrease in the number of aggressive fighters. Moreover, as casualties occur, the most aggressive, battle-experienced men are selected as junior leaders and for light machine gun crews. Junior leaders and members of crew-served weapons are not faced with the same problem as the rifleman because they have responsibilities that help them to overcome personal fear, or have the advantage of fighting closely together as a group.

Many U.S. infantrymen interviewed immediately after battle were found to have the same amount of ammunition they had prior to the engagement. The excuse was that they could not overcome their reluctance to shoot a fellow-man. If this inhibition could be traced back to discouragement of aggressive tendencies in childhood, as is sometimes suggested, it would be logical to expect the same reaction from all men reared in normal homes. It has been demonstrated time and again, however, that the most courageous soldiers are modest, unassuming men who were reared in Christian homes where they were taught to respect the laws of God and man. Inability to shoot a man is a convenient excuse.

More likely, the real cause is that the modern infantryman lacks sufficient self-discipline to overcome natural fear. Lack of self-discipline is readily apparent among men in all walks of life, but only in battle does it become an all-important factor. Many men, for example, will not expose themselves sufficiently to fire their weapons even when faced with the danger of being overrun by the enemy. The problem has its roots deep in our way of life and cannot be solved completely by superficial means, but careful initial selection, indoctrination, and training of in-

fantrymen would improve greatly the ability of the Canadian soldier to meet the test of battle.

The desirable attributes of infantrymen are less easily determined than those of the more specialized corps, and it is therefore difficult to set suitable standards. Many of the most important qualifications of first-rate infantrymen are measured in intangibles rather than in formal education. As a result, the allocation to infantry of men who fail to meet the standards set by another corps is a common and dangerous practice for it contributes to inefficiency in a corps that is vital to Canada's defence. It is most unrealistic to expect poorly selected men to exhibit the high degree of stability, individual initiative, unquestionable loyalty, and personal courage required of an infantryman. The first positive step to remedy the situation should be, then, the development of comprehensive physical and mental aptitude tests which will ensure that a larger proportion of capable men are sent to infantry.

Better indoctrination during training is the next step. The Canadian fighting man, and the infantry soldier in particular, must be made to believe sincerely that the cause for which he is fighting is right and just. He must have a love for his homeland that will convince him irrevocably that his country is worth fighting for —and dying for, if necessary.

The development of this high level of patriotism, which is fundamental to the will to fight, cannot be left to junior officers who in most cases are not trained for the task and in any event are overburdened with many other problems of command and administration. Each training unit should have a specially qualified instructor whose sole responsibility is to prepare men mentally to meet the tests of battle. The enemy long has stressed this type of indoctrination with almost unbelievable success. The recent riots in Korean prisoner of war stockades, in which unarmed Communists defied to the death United Nations soldiers armed with machine guns and grenades, testify to the fact that the will to fight never dies as long as men believe in their cause.

The soldier should also be taught to know and to take pride in the traditions of his regiment and be given a firm sense of belonging to that unit from the earliest stages of his training. Above all, he must fight with his unit, regardless of the administrative difficulties involved. During the Second World War, men who had been wounded and evacuated sometimes were returned to action with a different unit, which required them to develop new friendships and to learn new loyalties. It would be un-

thinkable to continue to send the wrong spare parts to a unit, and men, the most important replacements of all, should never be sent to any unit but their own, except in emergency.

The maintenance of enthusiasm and high morale of both units and individuals prior to battle is very important. During this time, every opportunity must be taken to teach each soldier the special operational techniques applicable to his particular unit. Too frequently time is wasted in reinforcement units in unnecessary repetition of skills the soldier has learned previously. Battle-experienced instructors should be available to answer questions. Special care should be taken to prevent uncontrolled discussions of battle experiences, which are usually overdrawn and frequently are so horrible that even the hardier reinforcements are scared long before they reach the front.

Reinforcements should be met in the battalion administrative area by unit officers and other ranks and given a chance to get acquainted with unit personalities. There have been cases of reinforcements, both officers and men, who served with units and were wounded in action with few battalion officers even knowing their names. When a soldier finally is posted to a company, he should be brought up to date on the current tactical situation and be given time to become familiar with his new surroundings.

No matter how realistic a soldier's training has been, nothing can compare to the initial feeling of inadequacy that is experienced before battle. Every man must first prove to himself in action that he is personnally capable of overcoming the fear common to all soldiers. Experienced officers and non-commissioned officers should, whenever possible, assist their men during this stage with sympathetic understanding.

If the man can be helped to overcome his initial fear, it is probable that he will become a useful member of his unit. Sending newly-arrived men on patrol their first night in action, for example, seldom is necessary and never is desirable. It may even be necessary to supervise the soldier personally in firing his first shots at the enemy to provide him with the necessary confidence in himself and his weapon.

Recognition for service, while not so important as proper selection, indoctrination, or training, nevertheless is an important factor in building and maintaining high morale. At the present time there is no way to distinguish a soldier who has spent months in action from one who was never further forward than the base units. Participation in battle forward of the brigade area should entitle the front-line soldier to wear a distinctive

badge awarded under conditions so exacting that it would become a prized symbol worn only by worthy men. Moreover, the soldiers who actually fight should receive danger pay. Many men in specialized corps are given educations at Army expense which enhance their opportunities on return to civilian life, but the skills taught infantrymen in most cases cannot be applied to civilian occupations. They have nothing to show for their years of service except the knowledge of a job well done. Additional pay for fighting men would help to equalize the rewards of service. It is ridiculous to deny fighting men these small rewards on the basis that the administrative effort required is too great. If the task requires longer hours of work from the staff, it would be a small sacrifice to make in comparison to that of the front-line infantrymen.

The Canadian infantrymen is given the best possible equipment and physical preparation for battle. He must be inspired by the knowledge that his cause is well worth fighting for. When this is done and recognition is given for the personal sacrifice he is required to make in battle, the number of men who fail to meet the test will be few.

Pocket-Size Land Mine

A tiny land mine, powerful enough to blow the foot off anyone stepping on it, has been developed by Army Ordnance and will soon be sent to Korea. It weighs only 4½ ounces and is so small it can be carried in the palm of the hand.

In size the new anti-personnel mine is merely a shadow of the nine-pound War II mine, yet it inflicts equal damage and costs only a fraction as much—$2.50 as compared with more than $13 for the old heavy cast iron model.

Since it is non-metallic and neutral in color, the new mine, officially designated the M14, cannot be located by mine detectors.

Because of its neutral color and small size, an invisible mine field can be laid quickly. Even in withdrawal there is usually time to scatter the mines over a large area, thereby taking a heavy toll of the pursuing enemy.

The mine functions in all kinds of weather in all temperature regions.—*Army-Navy-Air Force Journal* (U.S.).

SOME AMERICAN MILITARY CHARACTERISTICS

Captain S. Vines in "The Army Quarterly" (Great Britain)*

When you learn that the British solve a particular military problem in one way and the Americans solve it in another, you are likely to assume that one is right and the other is wrong. I was recently attached to a United States organization in the field and had the opportunity to see how false this assumption can be. We can, of course, learn from each other, but very often we find that military methods which are developed in and are suited to one country are not suitable for export.

Our military characteristics, like our personal characteristics, are the result of heredity and environment. It is certainly our duty as well as our interest to understand the characteristics of our greatest ally. My intention in this article is to set out those characteristics which made the most impression on me during my visit. No attempt is made to judge or to point morals; the aim is to understand.

It may well be said that a short attachment is not time enough to form sound opinions. There is, however, much that impresses the fresh observer which is dulled by long acquaintance. Also, living and working in the field with the Americans gives one a far better insight into their characteristics than, say, joining them at a school. And it is not as if we are as, peoples, complete strangers. It is hoped that the comparisons between our two armies which follow are sharpened, without being made less accurate, by the shortness of the period in which they were acquired.

Let us first consider the relationship in the American Army between officers and men and between officer and officer.

To our eyes, American officers and men have an easy and informal relationship. The private soldier talks freely and without embarrassment to officers. This does not imply that discipline is lax. Saluting is good, and in no case did I see a soldier

*The original article was condensed for publication in the Journal.—Editor.

take advantage of this easy access to his officers. Informality did not mean familiarity or disrespect.

This is all widely known, and one was not surprised to see it. What is not so well known is the formality of the relationship between officers. It is usual to address officers by their rank. Only between close friends are Christian names used. Saluting between officers is punctilious and correct.

Here, then, are two major matters where the British system is very different. To discover why, we must look into the background in both countries and see by what system and in what circumstances officers and men arrive into the Army.

First, we will look at the American system. The great majority of men have been educated up to the age of 17, many up to 18. It is not only the officers who have been to college, so have a large proportion of the enlisted men.

They are accustomed to a much higher standard of life than our enlisted ranks. The officers, apart from reservists, are drawn from many widely separated schools. The United States Military Academy at West Point is only one and it only produces a small proportion. Nor is it the only school for high command. General Marshall, for example, graduated from the Virginia Military Institute.

Now let us compare the British system. Most enlisted personnel left school at 14. Officers destined for the Army progress through a few recognized avenues to Sandhurst. A fair proportion today spend their years of education from 8 until 19 or 20 within 5 miles of Camberley; and later in their careers they are likely to return there to the Staff College.

Here, then, are two contrasting systems. The American system produces an enlisted man with a high standard of education and the assurance and polish which that brings. There is very little barrack room language. He is well able to express himself. He has much of the same background as his officers. The system produces officers for a large army (by our standards) from a large number of sources. A Californian has much less in common with a New Yorker than a Yorkshireman has with a Londoner. That is a plain fact of geography. It is unusual for American officers to find fellow officers in their units from the same home district or school.

On the other hand, the British system produces an enlisted man whose standard of education is considerably below that of his officers and with an experience of the world far more limited. The officers, in contrast, for every reason of tradition and upbringing, have a strong bond. Take any random gathering of officers:

they will soon discover mutual friends from school or Sandhurst, and the family atmosphere soon develops. This would not be the case with the Americans. Their Army is produced from a continent rather than a country. This does not mean that they regard themselves as Americans in the same way as we regard ourselves as Europeans. They are rather a nation produced from a continent.

The foregoing observations are pertinent when we consider the American system of command and staff duties. The Americans have found that officers of equal rank simply do not know each other well enough to co-operate without a superior; they, therefore, appoint a superior. An example is the chief of staff at division headquarters; whereas we find that our GSO 1 (General Staff Officer, Grade 1) and AA & QMG (Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General) can work together without a co-ordinator. Another example is the American reserve command (a third brigade headquarters) in the armoured division: we expect the commanding officers of an armoured regiment and motorized infantry battalion to be so much "in each other's minds" that they can hand over command to each other as events dictate. The Americans would appoint a commander. For similar reasons, the Americans have found it necessary to put most orders in writing; hence, there are larger staffs and even more paper than in our Army.

We share a common heritage in the English language. The Americans, however, have had independent use of this tongue for some 170 years. They are nothing if not a lively and inventive people. The result is that the language now provides a fertile ground for military misunderstandings. Some comprehensive glossary is needed which would give the different interpretations we place on such important military words as regiment, logistics, supply, adjutant-general, and maintenance.

One of the most delightful American traits is their receptiveness to fresh ideas. For the last 150 years, they have increased in wealth and power at a staggering pace. The pioneering, adventurous spirit is still surging forward. Words like stability do not sound so attractive to Americans as they do to Europeans.

The foregoing remarks are not of course comprehensive. They are personal impressions of a very great ally, and of a people with whom, of all foreign countries, we have most in common. They are written in the belief that anything we can do to achieve closer understanding with the United States Army is well worth doing and in the hope that they make some small contribution to that end.

NORTHERN IRELAND'S PART IN WESTERN DEFENCE

By
MAJOR W. E. W. MONTGOMERY*

Five of Britain's most distinguished generals in World War II were men of Northern Ireland — Alexander, Auchinleck, Brooke, Dill and Montgomery. In the last half century Ulster (as Northern Ireland is sometimes called) has given the British Army eight field marshals, five of whom were Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff. This contribution — out of all proportion to the size of the territory — is a fitting demonstration of Northern Ireland's great military tradition.

From the naval and air force point of view, Northern Ireland's geographical position makes her the sentry at one of the most important "back doors" of Western Europe. During World War II, as guardian of the Western Approaches, she played a major part in keeping intact the Allies' Atlantic life-line with America, and no doubt would be called on to do the same in any future war.

Northern Ireland is an integral part of the United Kingdom. From a military point of view, her counties are just six of the one hundred and one counties of the United Kingdom, and her regiments part of the British Army in the same way as those of Scotland, Wales and England. Any one of those regiments is liable to find itself posted to any of the one hundred and one counties. Thus the 1st Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment, whose home is in the English Midlands, is at present stationed in County Down, Northern Ireland, while the 2nd Battalion of Northern Ireland's oldest regiment, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, is at Colchester, the garrison town a few miles from London.

Ulstermen In Korea

Wherever British forces are deployed Ulstermen will be found helping to hold the line for democracy. This is particularly true of Korea,

**The author wrote this following a visit to the Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards. The article and photographs were obtained from the United Kingdom Information Office, Ottawa.*— Editor.

where Northern Ireland has been represented by some of her own regiments almost since the outbreak of hostilities. First there were the Royal Ulster Rifles and the Royal Irish Hussars, and when "rotation" brought these units out of the line their place was taken by the Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.

The latter, who are equipped with Centurion tanks, arrived in Korea last December just in time to face the full rigours of the winter. I had the honour to be their guest during a visit I made to Korea early this year. I found them perched on almost inaccessible mountain peaks and ridges amongst the front-line infantry. This new technique of tank warfare had been developed by their predecessors, the Royal Irish Hussars, and had led "Iron Mike" O'Daniel, their tough American Corps Commander, to comment: "Wherever tanks can go in Korea is tank country. They've taught us something new and we are passing it down the line."

I first saw the Inniskilling Dragoons one sub-zero day in January when they were receiving their baptism of fire. The accuracy of the Centurions' guns was apparently worrying the North Koreans. That is not surprising. The British infantry rate it so highly that on one occasion, when worried by a sniper, they sent a message to the nearest tank commander asking what he could do about it. The tank commander's answer was simple and swift. With one round he scored a direct hit on the sniper.

One of Northern Ireland's most famous generals: Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein.

In China and Malaya, Too

When I left them, the Dragoons were still awaiting the chance to prove their mettle in Korea, confident that when it comes they will win fresh glory for the Northern Ireland town of Enniskillen, from which they take their name.

Meanwhile the Royal Ulster Rifles are one thousand miles away at Hong Kong. After eighteen months of "hot" war in the forbidding mountains of Korea, they find the "cold" front at Hong Kong almost a

holiday. Further south again, in the jungle warfare of Malaya, a distinguished Ulsterman, General Sir Gerald Templer, is in command, while in the Mediterranean area and in Germany such Ulster Regiments as the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the Royal Irish Fusiliers stand prepared for anything.

Back at home in Northern Ireland, Ulster is preparing her second line of defence. Unlike the rest of the United Kingdom, she has no compulsory service, and so must rely on volunteers. There are always enough of these to fill not only the Regular regiments, but also her auxiliary services. These include units of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, the Territorial Army and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force, as well as Home Guard and Civil Defence. Should war come again these "part-time services will be trained and ready to support their full-time comrades-in-arms as they did so ably in the last war.

Soldiers from Northern Ireland are to be found in many parts of the world where fighting is going on or trouble brewing. Here a Royal Ulster Rifleman is checking the papers of a farmer in Korea before allowing him to enter a village.

Front row, left to right: Captain H. D. Fripp, attached to staff, GOC, RA; Lt.-Col. A. G. L. McNaughton, Counter-Battery Officer; Brig.-Gen. E. W. B. Morrison, CMG, DSO, GOC, RA, Canadian Corps; Major A. F. Brooke, DSO, Staff Officer to GOC, RA; Major L. V. M. Cosgrave, DSO, Staff Officer, Reconnaissance. *Back row, left to right:* Lieut. L. P. Napier, Orderly Officer to CBSO; Captain H. L. Fetherstonhaugh, MC, Staff Officer, RA; Captain G. Tyndale-Lea, MC, Staff Officer, Heavy Artillery.

Flashback: No. 1

GOC, RA, AND STAFF CANADIAN CORPS, 1917

NARRATIVE WRITTEN BY THE HISTORICAL SECTION,
ARMY HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA

This is the first of a new series of "flashbacks" written for the Journal *by the Historical Section, Army Headquarters. The series presents a photographic record of events in the diversified history of the Canadian Armed Forces which, it is hoped, will interest the reader.*—Editor.

The picture on the opposite page takes us back more than thirty-five years, to the period when the Canadian Corps was fighting the grim battle of Passchendaele in the Flanders mud in November 1917. This excellent photograph of the Corps artillery staff contains two gunner officers who were to rise to the highest eminence in the Second World War: Lt.-Col. A. G. L. McNaughton, C.F.A. (now General the Hon. A. G. L. McNaughton, C.H., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.), who commanded the First Canadian Army, 1942–43, and was Minister of National Defence, 1944–45; and Major A. F. Brooke, R.H.A. (now Field-Marshal the Rt. Hon. Viscount Alanbrooke, K.G., G.C.B., O.M., D.S.O., Master Gunner of St. James's Park), who was Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1941–46.

The officers appearing in this photograph are the following:

Front row (left to right):

Captain H. D. Fripp, attached to staff, GOC, R.A.

Lt.-Col. A. G. L. McNaughton, Counter-Battery Staff Officer.

Brig.-Gen. E. W. B. Morrison, CMG, DSO, GOC, R.A, Canadian Corps.

Major A. F. Brooke, DSO, Staff Officer to GOC, R.A.

Major L. V. M. Cosgrave, DSO, Staff Officer, Reconnaissance.

Back row (left to right):

Lieut. L. P. Napier, Orderly Officer to CBSO.

Captain H. L. Fetherstonhaugh, MC, Staff Officer, R.A.

Captain G. Tyndale-Lea, MC, Staff Officer, Heavy Artillery.

Brig.-Gen. (later Major-General Sir Edward) Morrison served in South Africa with "D" Battery R.C.F.A. and won the D.S.O. in the famous fight at Leliefontein in which the Royal Canadian Dragoons won three V.Cs. saving his guns. He commanded the artillery of the Canadian Corps from 1916 to 1919. In civil life he was editor of the Ottawa *Citizen*. He died in 1925.

THINKING AND WRITING

By
COLONEL JOHN A. GAVIN, INFANTRY*

The purpose of this article is to encourage career Army officers to avail themselves of every opportunity to reduce to writing their considered opinions on problems confronting them. At the outset, it should be self-evident that the ability to write in understandable language makes for clear thinking and a better Army officer.

When the career officer examines and studies the career pattern for an officer of his particular arm or service . . . he will note that he will be called upon to serve as a staff officer at various levels of command. He will realize also that his opportunities for troop command assignments decrease as his service lengthens. Hence, it should be apparent to the career officer that he is slated for various staff assignments at different command levels following his initial basic troop duty.

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* *Reprinted from the* Military Review *(U.S.). The author is an instructor at the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.*—Editor.

Flashback

(Continued from preceding page)

Major (now Colonel) L. V. M. Cosgrave served in the Second World War as Canadian Military Attaché in Australia. On behalf of Canada he signed the Japanese instrument of surrender on the U.S.S. *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945.

All the officers in this picture are Canadians except Lord Alanbrooke. His presence in it serves to recall the very important contribution which staff officers lent by the British Army made to the work of the Canadian Corps in the First World War. General Sir Arthur Currie was very conscious of this contribution and exerted himself to have it adequately recognized. In 1921 the Prime Minister of Canada sent an official letter of thanks to each of these British officers.

It is interesting to note that when Lt.-Col. McNaughton relinquished the appointment of Counter-Battery Staff Officer to become Brigadier General Royal Artillery (Heavy), Canadian Corps, he was succeeded by another future G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army, Lt.-Col. H. D. G. Crerar (now General H. D. G. Crerar, C.H., C.B., D.S.O., C.D.).

The Staff Writer

What is the implication involved? The answer should be obvious. One of the primary requisites for any able staff officer is that he must be capable of expressing on paper, in a clear, concise, and logical manner, the results of his personal analysis of a given set of facts, in the name of his commander or immediate superior. Whether his staff action calls for the preparation of an indorsement, a directive to subordinate commands, or a detailed staff study, the capability previously mentioned is ever present. He must be able to apply common sense reasoning to the facts given to him or obtained by his intelligent research, and reduce the results to understandable writing.

The Well-Written Directive

To be considered well prepared, a written directive must satisfy the questioning minds of the party or parties receiving it. Is the directive clear? Is it complete? Are there any "bugs" in it? Only when it satisfies the affirmative answers to these questions can the action staff officer feel that he has turned out a good job. Therefore, in order for the career officer assigned staff duty to be properly prepared to assume his duties, we conclude that he must possess the ability to express his thoughts in writing in such a manner as to be readily understood. Now we arrive at the crux of the matter. Is this ability one that must be developed before he receives high-level staff duty or can we assume it is inbred in the average career officer? Let us examine the question briefly.

Writing

The basic elements of writing are taught the officer during his grammar and high school days. Here he learns not to split the infinitive, how to paragraph and spell correctly, and how to avoid entangling sentences, as well as the many other fundamentals of grammar, punctuation, and composition.

During this period, his thinking is directed at following a given set of rules of grammar and punctuation. Little, if any, original thinking is required.

Thinking

The career officer's ability to think clearly and to arrive at a sound recommendation or decision concerning a problem is, in the author's opinion, based on two main factors: his common sense and his intelligence. In approaching a problem, he must so train his mind to recognize readily the facts pertinent to the problem at hand. By a studied analysis of these facts, he must arrive at the decision or recommendation required. He must be able to

secure a firm mental grasp of the important facts bearing on the problem, and, by weighing the advantages and disadvantages of the lines of action open to him to resolve the problem, determine the one that will offer the best solution. Throughout this process of reasoning, the officer must assiduously avoid diverting his efforts down interesting paths which have little or no bearing on the problem under consideration. Here is where the element of common sense must be applied. The amount of intelligence possessed by the individual will be, in a large measure, indicative of the scope of the problem he is capable of undertaking.

Thinking and Writing

Now let us combine thinking and writing and examine the ability of the average career officer to express his thoughts in writing in such a manner as to be readily understood.

In his early commissioned days of troop duty, the young officer is faced with solving many problems. Seldom, however, do the solutions to these problems have to be reduced to writing. Most times they may be resolved through fragmentary oral or written directives. It may be concluded, therefore, that during this formative period there exists no requirement for the young officer to reduce to writing the results of his thought processes, other than in fragmentary or routine form. Unless this officer, on his own initiative, should make some attempt at placing his thoughts on paper as they may relate to a problem, he may find himself suddenly and unexpectedly assigned to a staff position, wherein he will be expected to prepare directives and studies based on facts and data presented to him without adequate preparation. It should be apparent, therefore, that any prior practical experience in the technique of good writing will be of substantial assistance to him in his newly assigned job. Otherwise, he must begin to apply himself diligently to the task of developing the art of clear, concise, logical writing.

It would be a fallacy to state that this development can be attained to a high degree in a short time. In fact, the time element will depend, to a large extent, upon the age of the officer at the time he starts to apply himself conscientiously in the field of writing. The younger, the better.

Conclusions

Based on the foregoing discussion, we may conclude that:

1. The basic elements of writing which require little original thought are taught the career officer in his grammar and high school days.

2. His ability to think clearly is based primarily on his intelligence and common sense.

3. There exists little requirement during his initial troop duty assignments for reducing his thoughts to writing.

4. His ability to place his thoughts in understandable writing is one of development to be attained objectively by displayed initiative on his part.

Suggested Remedy

The author's advice is for the career officer to commence writing, preferably on military subjects, as early in his career as possible. To overcome his natural reluctance to write, he must force himself to do so. His success as a staff officer or commander of an independent installation or unit will be measured to no small degree by the quality of the reports and studies rendered by him. It cannot be overemphasized that orderly thinking is fostered by the developed ability of clear, concise, logical writing.

Service Journals: Without question, the best outlets for expression of original thoughts by Army officers are our very excellent service journals. Here the opportunity is offered to all officers, regardless of branch or arm of service, to submit open and frank, thought-provoking articles on subjects which are military in nature. Comparatively few officers take advantage of this splendid opportunity to better themselves professionally by presenting, in written form, their considered views on a controversial or original subject. At the same time, those who do seize the opportunity are improving their ability to analyze facts, to research issues involved, and to arrive at their own personal conclusions on the problem involved. What better training in presenting his thoughts in writing could the young career officer possibly ask for in preparing himself for higher staff and command assignments?

Proper Form: The prospective author will improve his chances of having his manuscript accepted if he sends it forward in the proper form. Editors prefer two copies of a manuscript and all material should be either double or triple spaced. It is good practice to include a self-addressed envelope with the necessary postage to ensure the return of the work in the event it is not considered suitable for publication. However, the fact that the manuscript is rejected by one publication, or several for that matter, should not discourage the author for there are undoubtedly other journals which will be interested in the article. Therefore, if the manuscript is returned, it should be sent off to another publication without delay.

Tailor the Article: The type or class of reader of the magazine is a consideration which requires thought. A brief perusal of the publication in

Liftmaster Goes To Work

The first scheduled Douglas C-118A Liftmaster, having more cargo capacity than the largest railroad car, has begun trans-Atlantic operations according to Lt. Gen. Joseph Smith, USAF, commander of the Military Air Transport Service.

More than 6,000 pounds of mail and 30 passengers were airlifted from Westover AFB, Mass. to Frankfurt, Germany on the initial flight.

The C-118A Liftmaster is the military version of the Douglas DC-6 which last November completed the first commercial flight over the top-of-the-world from Los Angeles, Calif. to Copenhagen, Denmark, via Edmonton, Canada, and Thule, Greenland.

A combination passenger transport, air evacuation plane and cargo carrier, the Liftmaster can carry a capacity payload of 20,200 pounds some 2,100 miles non-stop. Cruising speed of the Liftmaster is approximately 235 miles an hour.

The four-engine aircraft is equipped with reversible pitch props and wing length brake flaps that permit the plane to land or take-off from medium sized airfields.

Powered by Pratt & Whitney R-2800-52W engines, which develop 2,500 horsepower each for take-off, the plane's take-off gross is 107,000 pounds.

Other statistics: Wingspan—117 feet 6 inches; overall height—28 feet 5 inches; fuselage length—105 feet 7 inches.

The plane can carry 62 passengers in rearward facing seats; 76 on troop benches; 24 litter and 30 ambulatory patients; or any combination of the listed passenger-patient capacity.—*Army-Navy-Air Force Journal (U.S.).*

Thinking and Writing

(*Continued from preceding page*)

question should indicate the type of reader to whom it is directed. Therefore, it may be necessary to tailor or revise the article to fit specific publications. Even the best professional writers have rejections and occasionally have difficulty in marketing a particular piece of their work. Before it is considered a total loss, however, their work has generally gone the complete route of every magazine which carries the type of writing being offered. Frequently, comments will be received which, if incorporated, will improve the article and make it more acceptable.

In any case, the experience gained by the officer in the preparation is more important than any monetary consideration that he may receive. If first attempts fail, he should keep trying. Determination will eventually meet with success and past efforts will serve to point out deficiencies that must be overcome.

THE STRATEGIC MIDDLE EAST

By
PROFESSOR R. A. PRESTON, DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
ROYAL MILITARY COLLEGE OF CANADA

To understand the situation in the Middle East today, in all its complexity, it is necessary to examine the tremendous and far-reaching upheavals of the last generation. In this second article of the series on the Middle East, the events from the First World War to the Second World War are analyzed to show the background for, and the causes of, problems which now rack that troubled area.

* * *

II: The Middle East from Turkish Caliphate to British Mandate

The Decay of Turkey

The most significant political change in the Middle East in recent times has been that it passed from the jealous possession of the Ottoman Empire to the care of Britain as the protector of the majority of a patchwork of small states. During the nineteenth century, Turkey, described by a Russian Czar as "the Sick Man of Europe", had been slowly disintegrating. Russia had pressed along the northern Black Sea Coast towards the Straits and had intrigued for the liberty of the Balkan Christian states so vigorously that most European statesmen had believed that she intended to make them into her satellites. Outside Europe other Turkish dependencies had been also lost to Ottoman rule. In North Africa, Egypt had become a virtual British Protectorate in 1882; and Algiers and Tunis had become French by 1847 and 1883, respectively. In the Arabian peninsula, Turkish control of the Bedouin Arabs was weak and the British government of India had established treaty relations with the Sheiks of the coast of the Persian Gulf. The vicinity of the Port of Aden had become a British Protectorate. It was already clear in the nineteenth century that the power which had for centuries occupied the great continental land-bridges was losing its grip.

In the early twentieth century Turkey crumbled at an even greater pace. In October 1908, taking advan-

tage of a revolt of "Young Turks" who had seized Constantinople in the name of "Reform", Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. In 1911 Italy seized Libya. In 1912, as a result of the first Balkan War, the Turks lost all their European territory except their capital and East Thrace. By 1913 Turkish rule was effective only in Constantinople and its hinterland, in Asia Minor, in Syria (including Palestine), in Mesopotamia, and in the Hejaz (the western littoral of the Arabian peninsula). When the World War broke out the "Sick Man" was but a shadow of his former self.

Nevertheless the Turk showed that, despite his economic and social backwardness, with the support of powerful allies, he could still be a very formidable opponent. The Entente powers found at the Dardanelles and Gallipoli that they could not force the Straits either by sea or by land. For a time the Turks even threatened the Suez Canal. An Anglo-Indian invasion of Mesopotamia was stopped halfway to the key city of Bagdad at Kut-al-Amara on the Tigris; and General Townshend's surrender in April 1916 was followed in June 1917 by General Murray's failure to conquer Palestine from bases in Egypt.

The Arab Revolt

It is against this background of unrelieved Allied failure in the Middle East that the drama of the Arab "Revolt in the Desert" must be set. Aided by Colonel T. E. Lawrence, Sharif Hussein of Mecca and his sons led many of the Bedouin Arabs against their Turkish overlords in a rebellion which was an important ancillary to Allenby's successful campaigns of 1917 and 1918. But Arab support was given only at a price. Hussein, with the customary ability of his race to drive a shrewd bargain, carefully obtained written promises from Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan. The British agreed to welcome the "reversion of the Caliphate to a true Arab born of the blessed stock of the Prophet"; and McMahon spoke of "the Arab Kingdom". Hussein, who had hitherto been only a somewhat obscure religious official (his appointment by the Turks as Grand Sharif of Mecca was an ecclesiastical rather than a political one), claimed to be the leader of the Arab peoples; and Lawrence and the Arabs interpreted the McMahon letters to mean that Britain would support the unity of the greater part of the Arabs in the Middle East and under the rule of the dynasty of Hussein. The way thus seemed clear for the erection of a new Arab Empire to replace the Turkish Empire in its domination of the land-bridges.

However, in the extremity of their war danger, the British had made certain other commitments. In the Balfour Declaration they had promised to the Jews a "National Home" in Palestine provided there was no "prejudice to the civil and religious rights" of the residents, that is to say of the Palestinian Arabs. Secondly, in the Sykes-Picot agreement and parallel treaties with Russia and France, they had planned to divide certain territories into "spheres of influence" when conquered from Turkey. When the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 destroyed the obligations to Russia, Britain still remained committed to a policy of carving up Arab lands between herself and France, partly as outright possessions and partly as protectorates.

At the Peace Conference in Paris, Emir Feisul, representing his father King Hussein, demanded for the Arab territories "open internal frontiers and common railways and telegrams and systems of education"; but this degree of integration, which would have been a big step towards some form of political unity, was not achieved. Instead of a united Arab Empire to replace the Ottoman Empire astride the Middle East landbridges, the war left a number of petty states and dependencies and a series of bitter disputes. The French obtained Syria and Lebanon as a League of Nations Mandate; Palestine became a British Mandate held in trust for both Jews and Arabs; Trans-Jordan and Iraq were established as British mandates with sons of Hussein as their rulers and future kings; King Hussein himself reigned in Arabia, at first under British protection.

While the British felt that they had honoured their obligation to Hussein, the Arabs disputed the meaning of the phraseology of the McMahon letters and of the Balfour Declaration, accepted with reluctance the fragmentation of the Arab peoples and, in anticipation of Jewish immigration, mourned the loss of Palestine.

Arab Nationalism and Disunity

Some authorities have questioned the strength of Arab nationalism at the time of the World War and have asserted that the Arabs did not earn their unity and freedom by an all-out contribution to the Allied war effort. The Syrians, for instance, did not raise a hand to help expel the Turk. The nature and strength of Arab nationalism at that time is a matter about which there is considerable difference of opinion. But most contemporary statesmen were agreed that the Arabs were not ready for a united Arab Empire in 1919. Such an Empire would probably have not held together, let alone have been able to protect that integrity of that vital area against a powerful aggressor.

The history of the succeeding generation seems to support the Allied decision that the Arabs were not yet ready to stand alone. The Arab world was far from being a united whole. Thus, Egypt, which had been declared a British Protectorate when Turkey entered the war in 1914, and which had become independent in 1922 (with certain reservations to protect foreign interests and the vital Suez artery), was more concerned with its own independence than with that of a united Arabia. Although the Egyptians are not of pure Arab stock they are Arabic-speaking and Cairo is the Arab literary and cultural centre. Egypt is potentially the most powerful of the "Arab-speaking" states of the Middle East. Under King Fuad the Egyptians aspired to become the leaders of the Arab World and therefore looked with disfavour on Hussein's claims to leadership. At the same time their nationalism was better expressed in the cry "Egypt for the Egyptians" than in any call for a "Greater Arabia".

Colonel T. E. Lawrence

Hussein found himself challenged yet more directly nearer at home. His attempts to establish control over the interior of the Arabian Peninsula led to his downfall. During the nineteenth century the Bedouin tribes of the Arabian Peninsula had been divided in their allegiance between two great families, Ibn Rashid and Ibn Sa'ud. Shortly before the First World War the tribesmen of Ibn Sa'ud had overcome their rivals. In 1924–25 their sheik went on to conquer the Hejaz, and King Hussein was forced to accept the protection of the British whom he had come to dislike. He fled on a British destroyer to exile in Cyprus. Thus there was born the Kingdom of Sa'udi Arabia, an Arab state dominating most of the Arab heartland and the Holy Cities. Ibn Sa'ud was for many years at odds with the sons of Hussein and also, for religious reasons, with the King of Egypt. The dream of a united Arab Empire had quickly faded away.

However, at the same time the results of the peace settlement were working to arouse nationalist fervour

"Lawrence of Arabia" in Arab dress

among the Arabs. Up to the Second World War Arab nationalism had been primarily a literary and cultural movement which had been fostered by growing Arab self-consciousness in face of Turkish hegemony. It had also been stimulated by the work of the American University of Beirut as well as by Arab cultural organizations. In the twentieth century Arab nationalism had undergone a very important transformation. It is now vigorously political. This change was a product of the Revolt in the Desert, and of the world-wide ferment of nationalism which had found expression in President Wilson's 14 Points and the Peace Treaties. It was further stimulated by the fragmentation of the Arab peoples and by their disappointments of 1919. Most of all it was aroused to fury by the impact of Zionism. Arab nationalism has become a political force which colours every situation in the Middle East.

The Impact of Zionism

The greatest single factor in producing Arab nationalism, and therefore Arab dreams of unity, was and is the Zionist movement. There had long been a small Jewish population in Palestine under Turkish rule; and a Zionist movement with headquarters in Berlin had striven with little success to persuade the Turks to permit Jewish colonization in the traditional homeland. During the First World War, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, a Manchester chemist, bargained with the Allied Governments to support Zionism in return for Jewish aid. Actually the bulk of English Jewry was at that time not sympathetic to the movement; but Weizmann got the ear of Prime Minister Lloyd George and obtained the promise given in the Balfour Declaration.

The Arabs allege that British support for Zionism was not given in return for Jewish help in the war but was merely a political move to win over German and Austrian Zionists. They show that millions of copies of the Balfour Declaration were scattered



The Middle East campaigns in the First World War, 1914-1918.

from the air in Germany and Austria. Whatever the motive, when peace came Palestine was made a League Mandate with special recognition of Zionist aspirations.

From the first the Arabs objected to the separation of Palestine from the rest of Syria and the different treatment which it was to receive. But the British claimed that the McMahon letters had excluded Palestine from the area for which independence had been promised. At the same time the phrase "National Home" was not clear. Did it mean that, if Jews came to predominate, Palestine would become a Jewish state? The Arabs, fearing the eventual loss of a land in which they had lived for many centuries, felt that they had been betrayed.

Violence in the Holy Land

During the nineteen twenties there was little that the Arabs could do, and the flow of Jewish immigration was not sufficient to create a crisis. With the rise of Hitler and of anti-semitism in Central Europe in the 1930's the flow became a flood. Aided by money collected throughout the world, and particularly in the United States, European Jews poured into Palestine. Britain, concerned about feeling among her Moslem subjects in India, tried to control the amount of immigration and as a result extreme Zionist groups known as "Revisionists" preached violence. In 1935 the entry of Jews to Palestine had increased so much that, if maintained, the Jews would be in a majority in the country by 1952. Hence the Arabs called a General Strike as protest and this led to incidents. Twenty thousands British troops and three thousand Jewish supernumerary constables were necessary to preserve order and the British allowed the Jews to arm in self-defence.

When a Royal Commission in 1937 recommended the partition of Palestine as a way to settle the dispute, the Jews accepted the proposal, but only as a step further towards the acquisition of the country as a whole or at least of more than their allotted share. The Arabs, on the other hand, rejected partition entirely. Extremists on both sides then resorted to violence and illegal Jewish immigration increased. In 1938 the Palestinian Arabs broke out into open revolt. In an effort to appease the country and neighbouring Arab states the British proposed in May 1939 that an independent Palestine with an Arab majority and democratic rule should be established in ten years' time. That proposal was, of course, unacceptable to the Jews and it was also declared by the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League to be not in accordance with the terms of the Mandate promising the

establishment of a "National Home" for the Jews.

On the eve of the Second World War, therefore, the Palestine problem remained unsettled. Because of the internal friction, Palestine had been denied independence; and although Zionist immigration had brought great prosperity from which the Arabs had benefitted indirectly, political difficulties seemed completely insoluble. More important still, Zionism had brought into the Middle East an irritant and therefore another element of weakness. Although some British imperialists thought the Jewish settlers were more stable and reliable as potential allies than the Arabs, the gradual withdrawal of British support for the Jewish National Home in face of Arab intransigeance had led the Jews into direct conflict with British rule, particularly with the laws governing immigration. Meanwhile the Palestinian Arabs had also been driven into even more bitter hostility and the whole sympathy of the Arab world was with them and against Britain. Furthermore, Zionism had pushed the Arab states into some sort of harmony. Thus, while King Hussein had rejected British support largely as a result of his objection to the Balfour Declaration, Ibn Sa'ud, who had taken advantage of Hussein's consequent weakness to drive him out of the Hejaz, was even more bitterly opposed to Zionism. In 1939 the British government tacitly recognized the fact that Zionism had created an Arab unity which had previously been non-existent. They called all the Arab states to a Round-Table Conference on Palestine.

Britain and the Arab States

It is noticeable that, when dealing with Arab nationalism uncomplicated by Zionism, British policy in the Middle East proved comparatively successful. In 1920 Iraqi extremists rose in revolt against tactless British rule, but the moderate nationalists did not join them. However, Feisul, when appointed King of Iraq by the British, also demanded a greater degree of freedom for Iraq. It took until 1924 to work out a plan of constitutional government which would safeguard what Britain regarded as her essential interests and at the same time satisfy moderate Iraqi nationalists, at least for the time being.

In 1930, Britain and Iraq agreed on a Treaty by which Iraq would achieve independence but in which Iraq promised to accept British military guidance and to give facilities and assistance in the event of war. The League of Nations was less sure than Britain that Iraq was fit for complete independence but ended the Mandate at British insistence. Iraq thus embarked on an uneasy and somewhat

unstable independent career still under limited British tutelage.

In Trans-Jordan the British had installed the Emire Abdullah, Feisul's elder brother. He worked amicably with his British advisers and his desert domain became relatively stable and prosperous. The Arab Legion, a bedouin force officered by Britishers, became the most efficient military unit in the Arab World.

France in the Middle East

French claims in Syria went back to the Crusades in which Frenchmen had played a leading part. France had little sympathy with the Arab Revolt or with Arab nationalism. Having in mind her millions of Arab-speaking subjects in north Africa, she was inclined to regard Arab nationalism as a British trick which might deprive her of her rightful place in Syria and elsewhere. However, in 1925–6 the Druse Revolt proved so costly to suppress that the French came to see that they must deal tenderly with Arab nationalism. The Lebanon was declared a Republic under French protection in 1926.

The French worked out a treaty of independence for Syria by 1936; but opposition by Syrian nationalists (who wanted to get rid of all French influence) and by certain groups in France who opposed surrender of French imperial interests, prevented its ratification before the Second World War suspended such schemes for the time being. The erection of an independent Syrian Republic had to await a new era.

Brigadier John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha), CMG, DSO, OBE, MC, commander of the Arab Legion.

The New Turkey

While the Arab World was split into fragments and seething with rivalries, the new Turkey presented a picture of growing stability. During the war King Hussein had told Sir Henry McMahon that the Turks would "try to give them (the Arabs) constant provocation in religious as well as temporal matters, and to wreak the utmost vengeance upon them". After the war, however, Turkey ceased to be an ecclesiastical

imperialist state and became, instead, a nation-state with a republican form of government. Its leader, Ataturk, renounced the old imperialist aspirations of the Ottoman Empire and the claim to be the leader of Islam. He undertook a programme of modernization typified by the abolition of the fez as the national headgear and by the introduction of a latin alphabet. He also separated church and state but continued to regard the country as Moslem. This is a particularly important change because the Moslem religion has always been a political religion. Its "high priests" have been political leaders. The idea of a secular Moslem state is new in history and may have far-reaching consequences.

Ataturk's most important change was his withdrawal of Turkey within her own borders. Although his government rejected the Treaty of Sèvres and drove the Greeks out of Smyrna in 1922, they acted on a policy of national and racial autonomy and made no claims to rule non-Turkish lands. Nationalism and secularism were matched by constitutionalism. Ataturk was a dictator but he introduced the forms of popular government; and in the succeeding twenty years Turkey was led towards democracy by its authoritarian ruler, a most unusual development in political life.

On the eve of the Second World War the Turks succeeded, by a treaty with France, in making good their claims to the Sanjak of Alexandretta, an important port and area on the Mediterranean claimed also by Syria. The agreement was made over the heads of the Syrians and has never been ratified by them. Some people have seen in this an incipient revival of Turkish imperialism. The truth is, however, that until the Second World War the Turks had followed a policy of demilitarization which made any revival of imperialism impossible. Turkey, occupied with her internal problems, showed no desire to recreate the Ottoman Empire and as a result she actually began to attract the friendship of some Arab groups.

New Factors: Air Power and Oil

While its problems were growing more complex between the World Wars, the Middle East was becoming much more important. It was pioneered as an air route by Sir Alan Cobham in 1926. Thus its traditional role as a pathway of world communications was greatly increased in the air age. At the same time British experience in Iraq (which was garrisoned and policed by the Royal Air Force) showed the importance of air power in the area.

In addition, its own economic importance greatly developed. Not merely did the Jews, by pouring in American capital, show that some parts of the desert could "blossom as the rose", but there had appeared

another and more important source of wealth—oil. Between the wars civilization came to rely on the internal combustion engine both in peace and war. The Middle East, particularly Iraq, Arabia and Iran, as well as adjacent areas of the USSR, was found to be one of the world's greatest sources of petroleum and allied products. The Middle East thus came to be important, not merely as a means of passage from one continent to another, but also for its own wealth in a national product of vast strategic importance.

The Eve of the Second World War

However, two decades after the First World War the control of the land-bridges, waterways and air routes across the Middle East, and of the new wealth in oil, was still a matter of some doubt. The Straits had remained in the possession of Turkey; but although Turkey was regenerated by Ataturk, who had striven to overcome social and economic backwardness, the Turks had deliberately concentrated on the arts of peace. In size, and even more in modern arrmaments, their army was almost certainly inadequate for the protection of that great waterway against a major attack. Secondly, Britain had maintained her responsibility for the protection of the vital Suez area by the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 which was designed to last for twenty years; but this had been accepted reluctantly by Egyptian nationalists and only because Italian aggression in Abyssinia had led them to realize their weakness. Thirdly, the Arabs had failed in their bid to unite the greater part of the remainder of the Middle East in an Arab kingdom or empire and political autonomy had served to heighten, rather than reduce, their disunity. Only in the face of another alien immigration, that of Zionist Jewry, had they shown any capacity for united action. The loss of Arabia to Ibn Sa'ud left the Hussein family in possession only of Iraq and Transjordan and the "United Arabia" dream had faded.

Thus it was Britain, supported by France, and not the Arabs, that had stepped into the shoes of the Ottoman Empire and had taken over the position astride the Middle East. But the British hold was made less sure by Arab hostility aroused by nationalism. Arab nationalism owed its origin largely to British encouragement of Zionism, but Britain, because of her tenderness towards Arab susceptibilities, had failed to win the confidence of the Jewish immigrants into Palestine.

During the nineteen thirties, as the general world situation darkened, it was feared that the onset of a new conflagration would inevitably involve the Middle East. Realization of

their insecurity made the more responsible elements among the Arabs ready to come to terms with the Western powers. Strong groups in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq were prepared to accept British and French protection and, although still opposed to Zionism, did not give outright support to the Palestinian extremists when they rose in revolt in 1938.

World Crisis and the Middle East

Accordingly, when Britain called on Egypt and Iraq to fulfil their obligations to provide facilities for the defence of the Middle East, those countries, while not prepared to go to war with Nazi Germany themselves, made a show of living up to their treaty commitments. Nevertheless, in Iraq some elements under Prince Rashid Ali tried to oppose British war efforts and later rose in revolt; and in Egypt the British found evidence that suggested that responsible ministers had given secret defence information to the Italians. On one occasion Cairo students paraded in the streets singing "We are Rommel's soldiers". The British found it necessary to bring pressure to bear on King Farouk to accept a government which he did not like. Oddly enough this government, which co-operated faithfully with the British for the rest of the war, was the Wafdist or nationalist government.

It must be recorded that there was practically no sabotage in Egypt in the dark days before Alamein. In Palestine, where the 1938 revolt had fizzled out, the Arabs gave a limited support to the British war effort, but the Jews, realising that they were surrounded by a sea of thirty million enemies, gave the utmost assistance against their hated persecutor, Hitler.

On the whole it is fair to say that the Arab political barometer in the Middle East fluctuated directly in accordance with the general strategic situation. The Arab peoples were neutral at heart, but when Axis forces seemed to be likely to succeed they were prepared to curry favour with the likely victors. Only the Jews had a real stake in the struggle.

It was the collapse of France and the entry of Italy into the war in 1940 that brought British control of the Middle East into most serious danger. In Syria a Vichy French government gave encouragement to Nazi dreams of using the Middle East as a stepping-stone on the way to southern Asia. Free French and British forces had to invade the country to preserve it from becoming a pawn of the Axis. It is noticeable that the Syrian Arabs watched this Anglo-French struggle as neutrals.

To the north, Turkey resisted all pressure asserted by both Britain and Russia to bring her to join forces against the Axis. The Turks declared their determination to maintain their

integrity against any violator. As their army was old-fashioned and their country lacks modern communications, to carry out this policy the Turks had to mobilize disproportionately huge armies and station them along their frontiers. The result was a serious decline in the nation's productive capacity. Because of Turkish neutrality the Straits, which might in certain circumstances have become a supply-route to Russia, were closed to the Allies.

Iran: Supply Route to Russia.

However another, but inferior, route was available in the Middle East, through Iran. Iran has not been mentioned previously in this article, but its history must be outlined briefly. It had preserved a shaky existence as an independent state during the nineteenth century between the Russians in Asia and the British in India. During the First World War, while pro-German in sentiment, the Iranians, because of their position between the Allies, remained officially neutral.

After the War, the Bolsheviks professed to renounce the old imperialism in Iran. At the same time the Iranian government did not ratify a proposed Anglo-Iranian Treaty negotiated in 1919 aimed at maintaining Iranian independence under British protection, and henceforward the Iranians deliberately avoided using British political advisers and financial experts. Britain had withdrawn her troops from Iran in 1919 and she returned to her nineteenth century policy of keeping free from military and political commitments in the country. Thus Iran became once more a state free from any form of outside interference or control.

However, investments in Iranian oil inevitably preserved British interest in the country. Since 1914, when Mr. Winston Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty, the British government had owned the controlling stock of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a means of obtaining fuel oil for the Royal Navy. But during the nineteen twenties, the relations between "Anglo-Iranian" and the Iranian government were not cordial and in 1932 a showdown occurred. The government of Shah Rezah alleged that if Anglo-Iranian had paid ordinary taxes instead of royalties it would have contributed a hundred per cent more to the Iranian treasury between 1901 and 1932. It therefore announced that the Company's concession was annulled. Britain sent warships to the Persian Gulf and also brought the dispute to the Council of the League of Nations. But the matter was settled by direct negotiation in 1933 when a new concession, to last for sixty years, was given by the Iranian government to Anglo-

Iranian. This concession was so favourable to Iran that it was widely regarded as a great triumph for Iranian foreign policy. Hence it gave the Iranians an inflated idea of their own power in relation to that of Britain.

During the ensuing years Iran turned to Germany, as she had done before the First World War. The Nazis, vigorously fostering cultural and economic penetration in the country, built up a strong fifth column. So in 1941, when Hitler, using landing rights given by Vichy-French Syria, sent 50 German planes to aid Rashid Ali in Iraq, the move was particularly dangerous. Iran was already practically sold out to the Nazis. If prompt British action, and lack of more effectual German support had not suppressed revolt in Iraq, the Nazis would have been able to establish direct contact with their Iranian fifth column and would have exerted a powerful influence on the not unwilling Iranian Government.

When the Nazi invasion of Russia brought with it the problem of sending American and British supplies to Russians, Iran was seen to be the best available route. The German fifth column in the country was clearly a serious threat to what was already a long and difficult line of communication. A joint Anglo-Russian occupation was therefore arranged. The Shah had boasted his ability to preserve neutrality, but he was obliged, even in such a time of external threat, to keep the greater part of his forces in remote parts of the country to preserve his authority over unruly tribes. The Iranian troops sent against the invaders melted away. Their morale proved to be exceedingly poor. The occupation was effected practically without opposition.

At the time of the occupation, Russia and Britain declared that they had no designs on the independence and territorial integrity of Iran. But their entry soon put an end to the long tyranny of the Shah. Because of his well-known pro-German sympathies he abdicated in favour of his son, Mohammed Rezah Pahlavi, and a more democratic regime was instituted. In September, 1943 Iran declared war on the Axis, but in the agreement with the Allies her only military commitment was to defend her own territory against Axis aggression.

In Iran the Middle East had once more lived up to its traditional strategic importance as a link between continents. Without the aid of the Iranian railway to bring Western supplies to the Eastern Front the Allies would have been greatly impeded in their joint efforts against Germany. Thus, while the Allies prevented the Italians and Germans from crossing the Middle East through Egypt, and while both the Allied

nations and the Axis were unable to use the Middle East route through Turkey, it was the use of this third Middle East passage through Iran which helped to turn the scale in Allied favour. The Middle East was indeed a vital area in the strategy of the Second World War.

The use of the Iranian railways, however, illustrated in a small way what pre-war history and the war as whole suggested, namely that Britain could not hold the Middle East alone. Although Britain continued to be responsible for the military security of the southern part of Iran, the railway itself had to be operated by the Americans. The same lesson, that Britain was not strong enough on her own to hold the most important centre of communications in the world, had been emphasized in another way when the collapse of France had nearly led to the turning of the whole Middle East position. And it was shown yet again by the fact that the British victory at Alamein and the triumphant repulse of the Axis threat to Suez was only made possible by American industrial production and, in particular, by the Sherman tank. At the same time the British, by the efforts they made to hold the Middle East, have shown a true appreciation of its importance. Even while invasion threatened their own island, Mr. Churchill had sent to Egypt precious divisions when British divisions were few. Britain had committed all her strength to guard the vital Middle East; but her strength was not enough.

The lessons to be drawn from the Second World War are clear. The First World War had entrenched Britain in the Middle East, but although she had fully realized its strategic importance, she was unable to hold it by her own strength. Furthermore the people living in the area made little effort to defend it themselves. Yet if it had fallen to the German land-attack, either through the Lybian desert or the Caucasus, or to the Nazi air-invasion via Crete and Syria, the whole war would have taken a very different course.

(To be continued)

Sudden Changes

Not only do tactics and techniques change constantly and rapidly in modern war, but the whole background against which it is fought may alter almost as quickly. To these, often startling, variations on all levels the commander must be able immediately to attune himself and to readjust his plans.—*Field-Marshal Sir William Slim.*



SOMETHING NEW HAS BEEN ADDED

A Report by the Directorate of Military Intelligence, Army Headquarters, Ottawa

Established by authority of the Minister of National Defence, the Canadian School of Military Intelligence was opened in January 1953 at Camp Borden. It is administered by the Royal Canadian School of Infantry.

This event constitutes a big step forward in intelligence training for the Canadian Army. It meets a need for an adequate organization where officers and men of all corps may receive standardized and up-to-date training in intelligence subjects.

During the Second World War intelligence training was conducted both in Canada and United Kingdom. Troops stationed in England received their intelligence training at the British Army School of Intelligence located at Matlock and later at the Canadian Intelligence Corps depot at Aldershot under the supervision of Canadian personnel. Intelligence courses were conducted in Canada at the Royal Military College, Kingston, with the object of providing reinforcements for employment in battle intelligence, field security, photo interpretation, and training men as interrogators. The Canadian schools were disbanded at the end of hostilities and the peacetime Canadian Army did not include any counter-

part to the wartime intelligence schools.

The necessity for intelligence training in the Canadian Army has always been recognized by the authorities, but various factors such as restrictions on manpower limited the facilities required to conduct such training. In the light of conditions prevailing in 1946, Army Headquarters authorized intelligence courses on a command basis during the summer training period of 1947.

In order to effect economy of effort, already limited, and to standardize intelligence training, representatives of Quebec and Central Commands met at Army Headquarters and agreed to pool their instructors, training aids and reference material and to conduct joint command intelligence courses at Petawawa Military Camp during the summer training period of 1947. This joint organization was to become the nucleus around which the peacetime Canadian School of Military Intelligence was to develop in the following years.

As a result of this experience it became evident that joint command courses were the answer to conditions then existing. Therefore, the Directorate of Military Intelligence began to assume more responsibility for the provision of instructors and the preparation of precis and other training material. In 1948 the intelligence training forces of Western and Prairie Commands were combined at Wainwright, while Quebec and Central Commands continued operating on a joint basis at Petawawa.

The formation of the Nos. 1 and 2 Reserve Force Intelligence Training Companies (Canadian Intelligence Corps) and the constant progress made in the intelligence training of the infantry and armoured units intelligence sections brought about the centralization of all training resources in Petawawa under the command of the General Officer Commanding Central Command. In 1949 the Intelligence Wing at Petawawa Summer Camp received candidates from all commands, and the instructional and administrative staffs were provided by Army Headquarters and Commands.

This centralized school proved to be the best solution to intelligence training, particularly as the time had arrived for more varied and more advanced specialist courses. In view of the responsibility involved in the preparation and organization of a centralized school, the Directorate of Military Intelligence assumed the full responsibility and recommended the activation of a Canadian School of Military Intelligence to operate on a temporary basis during the summer months at Petawawa. This recommendation received the approval of the Minister of National Defence in October 1949 and became the basis of

operations for the years 1950, 1951 and 1952.

This arrangement required the Directorate of Military Intelligence to assume all the training responsibility connected with the operation of the school, with the commands supplying the instructional and administrative personnel. Some 220 officers and men of all corps attended courses in 1950. With the formation of additional Reserve Force Companies (Canadian Intelligence Corps), approximately 360 candidates attended in 1951. In 1952, a total of 475 candidates attended courses, of whom 200 were from the Canadian Intelligence Corps and 275 from all other corps. The constant increase in numbers attending necessitated increases in instructional and administrative staffs: 17 all ranks could handle the training load in 1950, but 44 all ranks were required in 1952. Such a heavy staff requirement placed an immense burden on the commands since it deprived them of the services of key men for one to two months every year.

This situation could not continue without impairing efficiency. With the Army increasing in size and assuming additional commitments overseas, resulting in a greater demand for more personnel trained in intelligence duties, the idea of a permanent school developed. On 7 July 1952, a Canadian School of Military Intelligence with a permanent staff was authorized as an increment to the Royal Canadian School of Infantry establishment.

The new school provides for a better distribution of the annual training load, a larger variety of courses, higher standards of instruction and adequate intelligence training for all corps of the Canadian Army. It also provides a "home" for all Canadian Intelligence Corps personnel. Due to its location, the School of Military Intelligence is able to offer full-time assistance on intelligence subjects to five other corps schools.

The Canadian School of Military Intelligence offers courses in battle intelligence, counter-intelligence, photo reading, counter sabotage and foreign armies for all ranks of all corps of the Active and Reserve Forces. To promote inter-service relations, vacancies on specialist courses are available to the other components of the Armed Forces of Canada and to certain government agencies interested in or concerned with intelligence work. Details concerning these courses will be published annually in the Canadian Army Courses Manual.

United States Army

HISTORY and TRADITIONS OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

By
Lieut.-Col. P. Drake-Wilkes, Royal Engineers*

Necessity may or may not be the Mother of Invention but it is usually the Mother of all Military Engineers. The birth of the United States Corps of Engineers was no exception. When the Colonies took their wrongs to the ultimate court of war and called on George Washington to take supreme command of the hastily-formed armies they gained not only a great Commander but one who, by his foresight, laid the foundation of a Corps which has been described as "the oldest and steadiest branch of the Military Establishment of the United States".

The proud boast of the United States Corps of Engineers is that Washington was the first American Military Engineer and no one who has studied the career of this remarkable man will deny their claim. Long before the outbreak of war with England, Washington, who had been trained as an Engineer, had surveyed large parts of the settled colonies and had accompanied General Braddock on his expedition against the French and Indians. In fact, it was he who was responsible for the cutting of the road the expedition followed.

When, therefore, he took command of the newly-formed forces he was quick to appreciate the need for Engineers if the war was to be brought to a successful conclusion. There were few Engineers in the country, however, and those that were available were not particularly well qualified. Washington had a friend, however, Richard Gridley, a British Colonel of Engineers who was living in retirement in the Colonies.

*This article is reprinted from the Royal Engineer Journal. Lieut.-Col. Drake-Wilkes is currently integrated with the Office of the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, as a working member. Prior to this assignment he was serving on the Allied Staff of the Commander-in-Chief's Committee, Western Union Defence Organization. He went to France at the outbreak of the Second World War, serving throughout the French Campaign until wounded at Dunkirk. He was later successively a DAAG and SORE at the War Office until joining the Chief Engineer's Branch, 21 Army Group, in 1943. He later served in France, The Sudan and Egypt.—Editor.

On the 16th June 1775, the day before the battle of Bunker Hill, Colonel Gridley at the age of 64 was appointed Chief Engineer with his cousin Jonathan Baldwin as assistant. From this date the Corps of U.S. Engineers count their foundation, and, whatever the reasons for his appointment, it must be with a certain amount of pride that we find a British Engineer selected as the first Chief Engineer of the United States Army.

No portrait of Colonel Gridley has survived the years and little has been published of his work but there is no doubt that during his life he enjoyed an outstanding reputation in two continents as a military Engineer.

On the day after his appointment the new Chief Engineer was at Bunker Hill enthusiastically tracing the fortifications, helping to erect the ramparts and fighting in the battle until a wound forced him to leave the field. He was forced to retire for the second time in 1776 as a result of this wound, but it must have been some compensation for him to learn that his accomplishment in fortifying Dorchester Heights had caused Lord Howe to exclaim, that the Americans had done more in a night than his "whole Army would have done in a month".

It is interesting to note that his assistant, Jonathan Baldwin, continued in the Army and took part in many campaigns of the Revolution. He was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel and was the Engineer adviser at the siege of Quebec. He was at Saratoga when Burgoyne surrendered, caught smallpox and tried to resign from the army. His reasons for resignation could have been written by anyone, anywhere, in any war, for in addition to not receiving his pay and having his clothes stolen, he wrote "I am highly tired of this retreating, ragged, starved, lousy, peevish, pocky Army, in this unhealthy country." He was naturally not permitted to resign for such inadequate reasons and continued in the Service being eventually promoted to Colonel. As the war progressed the necessity for more and more skilled Engineers became increasingly apparent and Washington was forced into recruiting several French officers who were commissioned into the American service. The most prominent of these was DuPortail who came to command the Corps of Engineers and was promoted to Major General at the end of the Revolutionary war. The influence of a foreign element in the American Army had important effects in the later history of the Corps and to a certain extent the whole army. Even today in General Staff procedure, and in other small details, the French influence can be detected.

With the commissioning of more officers a plan was prepared for the proper establishment of a Corps of

Engineers and in 1778 the needs of the service were partially met when Congress authorized three companies of Sappers and Miners. These companies were the first organized bodies of Engineer troops, but it was not until the 11th of March 1779 that a resolution constituting a Corps of Engineers was finally passed in Congress and their responsibilities defined as:

"To understand the fabrication of field works—to instruct fatigue parties to do their duty with celerity and exactness, to repair injuries done to the works by the enemy's fire and to prosecute works in the face of it. The commissioned officers to be skilled in mathematics; the NCOs to write a good hand."

A concise definition of the duties of Engineers which can hardly be bettered after nearly two hundred years.

The Sappers and Miners were no sooner formed when, like all Military Engineers throughout the world, they proceeded to participate in every action of the war, serving with efficiency and distinction until the conclusion of hostilities. The records of the Continental army are most incomplete and of the men who fought in the new Corps, not very much is known, two names, however, survive: Moses Cleveland who became the founder of Cleveland, Ohio, and Pierre Charles L'Enfant who laid out the City of Washington.

In 1783 the Corps of Engineers was



Rich'd Gridley

No portrait of Richard Gridley is known to exist. The above is a facsimile of his signature and his famous map of the harbour of Louisburg.

mustered out of the Service. They were not alone in this fate, however, for Congress in the manner of democracies, both before and since, could see no reason for maintaining an army after a conclusive victory and reduced its entire strength to 70 men. Fifty-five soldiers were stationed at West Point near New York, the remainder being sent to Pittsburgh to guard stores. So it was that for a few months in the summer of 1784 one John Doughty commanded the whole of the American Army with probably the lowest rank ever held by a Commander in Chief, that of Major. In spite of many appeals by Washington, this state of affairs continued for ten years.

Troubles with the Indians were constantly flaring up, however, and several expeditions were sent to protect the settlers in the West. Each expedition was decisively beaten and with each defeat Congress authorized another regiment for the Army. Finally in 1794 a small nucleus of a regular Army had been built up; but by that time the new country was facing more serious threats. France, the ally of earlier days, was threatening war and with a long unprotected coastline, Congress was forced to act. A decision was made to fortify the coast and once again it was found that suitably trained and qualified Engineers did not exist in the Army.

Fortunately, some of the French Engineers who had served in the War of Independence were still in America, and a number of these were reappointed and entered upon their new duties without delay. At the same time the necessity for a small Corps of "well disciplined and well informed Artillerists and Engineers" which had been recommended in 1789 was at last appreciated by Congress and authority was given for the raising of four battalions each for a term of three years. The Commander of these battalions was a Frenchman, Rochefontaine, one of his Majors being the late Commander in Chief of the American Army, John Doughty.

The main body of Engineers and gunners were stationed at West Point, where at the same time a Military School was organized.

It would be impossible in this short paper to follow the rise of the Military Academy at West Point through the 150 years of its existence. Its history, however, is inextricably mixed with that of the Engineers who founded it, staffed it and taught there for 65 years. Not until 1866 when it passed to the Army at large did Engineer superintendency end, and of the Corps stewardship it was written that "the present efficiency, everywhere acknowledged, was given to it during the Sixty years' control by the Corps of Engineers."

The combination of Sappers and Gunners was not a success, the duties

did not mix well and neither did the officers who, at that time, consisted of representatives of practically every European nation. The system continued, however, for eight more years during which a second regiment was raised in which a Major Jonathan Williams started his rise to prominence.

Jonathan Williams had had no previous military experience prior to his commissioning as a Major in 1798 but he was one of the acknowledged scientific leaders of the country. In a very short time he was assigned the duties of Superintendent of the new Military Academy as well as being appointed Chief of Engineers. It was in his latter capacity that he designed the fortifications of New York harbour which so satisfied the citizens that they made him a Freeman of the City.

He was a brilliant scientist, but frequently found himself in difficulties with the rest of the Army. He resigned twice, on each occasion as a result of his attempts to obtain the right of Engineer officers to command outside their own arm. Though he was overruled then, his efforts bore fruit in future years for today the Engineers are the only Service whose officers can and do command line units.

In 1802 Colonel Williams was made Chief Engineer and this event marked the beginning of the present Corps, for Congress finally approved the establishment of a separate Corps of Engineers on March 16 of that year. The numbers authorized were very small, being only one colonel, two Lieutenant-Colonels, two Majors and sixteen junior officers with one Sergeant and eighteen enlisted men added a year later.

By 1812, when war was once more declared against Great Britain, the Corps had increased to 22 officers and 113 enlisted men, most of whom served in all the campaigns from Hull's ignominious failure at Detroit in 1812 to Jackson's final victory in 1815.

The land operations of the war added little lustre to the arms of either of the combatant nations but the Engineer officers gained distinction wherever distinction was to be gained. Out of seventeen officers who saw action, four were killed or died and ten were brevetted, three being brevetted twice. At that time the brevet was awarded for bravery and efficiency in action and was both a form of temporary promotion and a decoration. It will be seen, therefore, that the Engineers fully lived up to the high traditions they had earlier established.

The war of 1812 brought into being a new arm of the Service, the Corps of Topographical Engineers. The need for mapping and surveying the vast areas of America had become increasingly important as the popula-



Jefferson Barracks, home of the three companies of Engineers shortly after the Civil War.

tion increased and moved westward and the war had disclosed the utter inadequacy of what maps were available. Congress accordingly authorized, as part of the General Staff, eight Majors and eight Captains to be known as Topographical Engineers. With the coming of peace all but two of the Majors were mustered out of the service. A year later, however, five topographical officers were provided for each army Division and in 1818 these officers were removed from General Staff status and placed under command of the Chief Engineer.

The growth of private armies was not unknown, however, even in those days and soon the Topographical Engineers had established themselves as a separate bureau and finally in 1838 as a separate Corps. They were assisted in their efforts by the demands of the people for internal improvements, roads, canals, trails, everything that would assist in the development of the huge continent to which they were now the heirs. The Topographic Engineers were the obvious choice. The Corps of Engineers continued to handle fortifications along the coast and the new Corps became responsible for explorations and Internal Improvements.

The men who staffed the Topographical Engineers penetrated to all parts of the Continent and many became famous. Stephen Long explored Colorado and designed a bridge truss which was used very considerably in railway construction. George Whistler was an equally noted Topographic Engineer as well as being the father of James Whistler, the famous painter. John Fremont achieved great prominence both in winning California for the United States and becoming one of the most conspicuously unsuccessful generals of the Civil War.

For half a century the Topographical Engineers continued as a separate Corps, being in charge of a vast number of projects, both civil and military, which contributed in no small extent to the enormous expansion of the United States during that period. In 1863, their major work completed, they were consolidated with the Corps of Engineers and lost their separate identity for the second and last time.

It is necessary, however, to return to 1816 when, following the close of the war with Great Britain, the army as usual was reduced and a peace strength fixed at 10,000 officers and men. All the Engineer enlisted men were either discharged or transferred to the Artillery, but the officer cadre of the Corps of Engineers was retained, chiefly because the coast fortifications remained a continual source of anxiety, particularly on the Atlantic and the Gulf Coast. In spite, however, of the excellent services

which the Engineers had rendered in the recent war the old idea still persisted that good Engineers must necessarily be foreign, and Simon Bernard, a General in the late Napoleonic Army, was invited to America and appointed Assistant Chief Engineer with the rank and pay of a Brigadier General.

Bernard was an expert on fortifications, but his arrival was bitterly disputed by the senior officers of the Corps, many of whom resigned in protest. Bernard, however, persevered in his appointment and formed a Board of Engineers which was active for 40 years. The board, among its other activities, supervised the work of the Topographical Engineers and during its life the first survey of the Mississippi River was made, canals were dug, roads laid out and finally in 1829 it supervised the construction of the first railroads. General Bernard finally retired in 1830, having previously had a heated difference of opinion with the Commanding General of the Army of the South, one Andrew Jackson. When Jackson was elected President, Bernard, having no delusions as to his future, promptly went on six months' leave and posted his resignation from France.

From 1821 when the company of Bombardiers, Sappers and Miners was disbanded, frequent requests were made by the Chief of Engineers for at least one company of Engineer soldiers to be included in the Peace Establishment. There was, however, active opposition to maintaining any permanent military forces in peacetime and his efforts were of no avail. Then in 1846 came the battle of Palo Alto and the war with Mexico. On May 15th of that year Congress authorized a company of Engineer soldiers and Company "A" came into existence. From that day Company "A" has remained continuously in active service. Of its first officers, 2nd Lieutenant George B. McClellan rose, in the Civil War, to command the Union Armies, and the other two subalterns both became General officers.

At the end of September the company had received its basic training and was ordered into Mexico where it took part in the campaign against Vera Cruz. It was in this action that the first amphibious landing was made by American forces and one or two important differences can be discerned between that landing and the more recent ones in the late war. At Vera Cruz the Engineer Company marched ashore in broad daylight with flags flying and bands playing and such was the display of martial might that the Mexican Army offered very little serious opposition and finally Vera Cruz capitulated.

Nineteen officers of the Corps of Engineers served with the Armies in Mexico with Brigadier General Tot-

ten as their Chief Engineer. It was in this war that the Engineers found their greatest opportunities, both from the circumstances of the campaign and the character of the Commander-in-chief, General Scott. Utilizing his Engineers to the utmost, he found among them such men as Lee, Johnston, Stevens, Beauregard and others whose names in later years were to become world famous. Ten officers received brevets, three, of which Lee was one, being brevetted three times.

After the war the Engineers were kept busily employed in renovating and constructing fortifications, laying out railway surveys, building roads and bridges on the Pacific Coast, erecting lighthouses and gradually increasing their strength as their work became better known and appreciated. Then in 1861 came the tremendous struggle between the States that was to engulf most of the continent of America and send its repercussions round the world.

So much has been written of the Civil War that little need be said here, except to emphasize its unique position in the history of warfare. It was the last of the old style wars with animal transportation, smoothbore muskets, primitive supply and medical services; yet as the war progressed railways were used, pontoon trains were organized, steamboats, armoured ships, balloons, photography and rifled weapons all came to play their part and from the heat of this conflict the concepts of modern warfare were born.

The outbreak of the Civil War found the Union Army with two organizations of Engineers of a total strength of 79 officers and one company of 100 men. These numbers were shortly increased by 24 officers and four Companies of Engineers, one of which was a Topographical company. The original Company "A" was withdrawn from West Point and sent to Washington, proceeding later to New York to put the city fortifications in a state of defence. It returned to Washington in September of 1861 where Companies "B" and "C" were assembling and joined the Battalion of Engineer Troops, a hastily-formed provisional Headquarter organization which, nevertheless, continued to exist throughout the war.

During the winter the Engineers were engaged upon the construction of the capital's defences and in training in the use of pontoon equipment with which they were to be so largely concerned later in the war. In March 1862 the Battalion was formally placed in support of the Army of the Potomac with whom, in the normal Engineer manner, it took part in every notable action until the end of the war. Its duties were the usual engineering ones of bridge



The 400-foot railroad bridge across the Potomac Creek built in nine days during the Civil War, 1862, by the Corps of Engineers.

building, road making, sapping, mining, and fighting as infantry as the occasion demanded. Its chief accomplishment was, however, the construction of railroad bridges which in their size, capacity and speed of erection were regarded, on first being reported, as fabulous by the Military Engineers of Europe.

The bridge across the Potomac constructed by General Haupt, an Engineer Officer, was 400 feet long and 80 feet high, being built entirely from local timber of which two million feet were used. The bents were four stories high and this remarkable erection was completed in the nine days, during which the bulk of the timber was cut and hauled. Of even greater size was the bridge across the Chattahoochee River near Atlanta which was 780 feet long, 90 feet high and was constructed in four and a half days.

These bridging exploits resulted in General Haupt being invited to England in 1868 to address the British Association for the Advancement of Science on how such structures were erected, and at the conclusion of his lecture a banquet in his honour was given by the Officers of the Corps of Royal Engineers.

With Lee's surrender of the Confederate Army on April 9, 1865, the Battalion of Engineer Troops was given its final task, being sent ahead of the Army of the Potomac to repair the roads and bridges in preparation for the Army's triumphal march to Washington.

The services rendered by the Engineers in the field, however, though arduous and performed with efficiency and gallantry, formed only a minor part of the duties accomplished by the Corps of Engineers. The requirements of the Engineer Battalion absorbed only a small part of the commissioned strength of the Corps and the greater proportion of Engineer officers served on the Staff or in command of troops of the line with the greatest distinction. Of approximately one hundred general officers on both sides who served during the war, twenty-nine were or had been Engineer officers.

It is obvious to a student of this period that neither the Union nor the Confederate Forces had an adequate Engineer organization. In the Union armies, Engineer Regiments, composed of volunteers, were added from time to time to assist the regular establishment, but the numbers and skills fluctuated and in many cases pioneers from the Line Regiments had to be impressed for duty. The Confederate forces had no authorized Engineer troops until 1864 when three Regiments were formed, although by the end of the war they had increased the number of their companies to thirty-five.

The Civil War and the period

immediately succeeding brought certain changes which had a material effect on the Corps. Two have already been mentioned—the merging of the Topographical Engineers with the Corps of Engineers and the passing of Engineer control of the Military Academy to the Army at large. While these changes made for a stronger Engineer organization, nevertheless they left the Corps without a School. A separate Engineer School was therefore established in 1866 at the previous Engineer garrison post at Willets Point, New York. For the first 19 years of its history the Engineer School was not officially recognized, but under the inspired command of Colonel Henry L. Abbot, its first Commandant, and the then Chief of Engineers, Major General Andrew A. Humphreys, it progressed and developed on such sound lines that it was officially approved by the War Department in 1885, and redesignated the United States Engineer School. In 1905 it was renamed "The Engineer School", a title it has retained to the present day. In 1919 the School was moved to Fort Belvoir, Virginia, which is now the permanent home of the Corps.

For twenty-three years the United States enjoyed a period of peace until the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in 1898. The Corps of Engineers tightened its organization and with official approval formed its authorized five companies into a Battalion, the troops of which were divided between the Engineer School and the Military Academy. The Battalion, as well as performing normal engineer duties also engaged in such unusual tasks as suppressing illicit distilleries near the Brooklyn Navy Yard, riot duty in the railroad strike of 1877 and flood relief during the disastrous flood in Pennsylvania in 1889.

The Spanish-American war did not result in any great expansion of the Army. Two Engineer companies were organized into a provisional battalion for service in Cuba and Company "A" went to Manila, being joined there later by Companies "B" and "E". Another amphibious landing was made, this time using pontoon boats, but the Engineers spent most of the war repairing roads, relaying railway tracks and constructing bridges and ferries. That they were not used to their fullest capacity is shown by the fact that out of 92 General Officers who served in the War only seven were originally Engineer Officers.

In 1901 Congress increased the numbers of Engineer troops to three Battalions, and the old Battalion of Engineer Troops ceased to exist. Born of the difficulties confronting the Army in Mexico, expanded during the Civil War, revived and enlarged during the Spanish War, its organization did not lend itself to further

expansion, and its name, though not its traditions, disappeared from the roster of the Army. The newly-formed battalions were stationed at Willets Point (School of Submarine Mining), Washington Barracks, Leavenworth and Vancouver Barracks, with periodic tours of duty in the Philippine Islands, Panama, Hawaii and Cuba. At the same time Engineer Officers carried out many other activities, their greatest feat being the supervision of the building of the Panama Canal after the project had been abandoned by France as impossible. The Engineers completed the construction of the Washington Monument, built most of the important government buildings in Washington, made roads in Alaska and were engaged in so many other public works that it would seem that there was hardly a new activity in the United States at that time in which the Corps was not involved.

In 1916, America entered World War I and the record of the Engineers in this war was outstanding. Commencing with 256 officers and 2200 men, by November 1918 they had expanded to 10,000 officers and 285,000 men.

The immediate urgencies of the war made the Allies extremely anxious to put more Engineers on the ground and therefore some of the first troops to land in France with the American Expeditionary Force were Units of the Corps of Engineers, the 11th Engineer Battalion being the first organization of the United States Army to participate in the fighting, being attached to the British Third Army in the Battle of Cambrai.

The formation of a separate American Army to the east of the British sector imposed an enormous logistic problem, as the U.S. lines of communications were forced to operate across the existing French supply system. This became almost entirely a matter for the Engineers. New ports were established, bases, railways, depots and camps were all constructed at the same time that Engineer units for the various divisions were being formed and trained.

In a little over a year the Corps had constructed 80 new shipping berths in 15 ports, built 23 divisional areas and carried out over three hundred major projects. When the war ended in 1918, 86,000 Engineers were actually engaged in combat duties with nearly 150,000 in support.

Reorganization of the Army followed the signing of the Armistice and the Engineers came in for their full share. The Chief of Engineers was authorized the rank of Major-General, but the total number of officers permitted in the peace establishment was reduced to six hundred. In 1936, one hundred and eighty-five additional officers were added so that the Corps



The Officers' Mess, Willets Point, N.Y., 1902.

strength on September 1st 1939 was 785.

No history of the Corps of Engineers, however short, would be complete without some mention of its civil duties which, commencing shortly after its formation, have continued without interruption ever since. Some of the past projects of the Corps have already been mentioned, the completion of the Panama Canal—the numerous public buildings, the construction of the first national highways and the survey work in the early days of the new continent. To these duties was added in 1826 the responsibility for rivers and harbours, and since that date all navigation improvements and most of the flood control projects undertaken by the Federal Government have become a Corps responsibility.

The total volume to date of river and harbour and flood control work, from the first expenditure in 1800 of $5000 on a survey of part of the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers, has exceeded $7,000,000,000, and the successful accomplishment of the enormous Mississippi River project has established the Corps as the foremost authority on river engineering in the country.

World War II with its technical problems caused an even greater expansion than in previous wars. It is

still too close for a critical appraisal to be made but, like the Royal Engineers, the Corps rapidly acquired new duties. The development of aviation required the formation of a new type of organization, the Aviation Engineers, who did outstanding work not only at home, but in all the theatres of operations throughout the world. The responsibility for all military construction within the United States was given to the Corps in 1942, which increased the burdens and the size of their operations. The Alcan Highway, linking the States with Alaska, was one of the many major accomplishments. Sixteen hundred miles long, with only four points of access for the delivery of equipment and supplies, it was built in extremes of temperature ranging from 40° below to 90° above. In every operation in every theatre, the Corps of Engineers were the advance units gaining wide recognition for their magnificent work in both technical and tactical operations.

At the end of the war the Corps numbered 700,000 men, of whom 500,000 were overseas, and of the many war leaders the Engineers can claim their full share. General Douglas McArthur, one of the most famous United States Generals, General Somervell, General Groves of Atomic Bomb fame, General Lucius Clay, the Military Governor of Germany, together with seven Lieutenant-Generals and thirty-one Major-Generals, all were late members of the Corps.

Throughout the 177 years of their eventful history representing a period of service spanning the entire history of the nation, the Corps of Engineers have amassed a proud record. The future is unfathomable, but in the words of the present Chief of Engineers, Lieutenant General Lewis E. Pick, "The Corps faces forward with renewed confidence in the opportunities of the future—'The Past is Prologue' ".

Insignia

"*Essayons*" Button

The confidence in which each successive government, from the beginning of the Constitution, has had in the United States Corps of Engineers is reflected in the distinctive insignia that its officers are privileged to wear. The Engineer button is not only different from the one authorized for the rest of the Army but is unique in so far as it does not resemble that of the Engineer Service of any other Country.

The design consists of a representation of the bastion of a marine battery surrounded by water over which the rays of the rising sun are depicted, the whole surmounted by a soaring eagle bearing in its beak a streamer with the motto "*Essayons*".

The inspiration for the design is



Abbot Hall, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, Headquarters of the Engineer School.

believed to have originated in the defence works of New York Harbour, constructed by Colonel Jonathan Williams. In 1812, Colonel Williams introduced a form of defence, not known in America at that time. This was the casemated embrasure which consisted of a thick head-cover for the guns which protected both guns and gunners from enemy fire. The gateway of Castle Williams, as the main bastion was named, had a plain stone arch with a stone eagle as a decoration placed over the centre. It is, therefore, easy to discover how the principal elements typified in the button came into existence.

The motto "*Essayons*", the literal translation of which is "Let us strive", was inspired by the close association French Engineer officers had with the newly-formed Corps in the days of the American Revolution.

In 1902 "Regulation" buttons were officially ordered for the whole of the Army, but the Corps of Engineers was allowed to retain its own distinctive button.

Collar Device

General James Totton, one of the great Chiefs of Engineers, accepted the turretted castle as the official insignia of the Corps in 1839.

Prior to that date a star surrounded by a laurel and palm leaf had served as the collar ornament of the Engineers. This device was not, however, confined exclusively to the Corps; other branches of the Army wore it on various parts of their person, General officers having it embroidered on the skirts of their jackets. It was therefore neither distinctive nor symbolic and its passing was unmourned.

The present badge represents a castle in its most conventional form and is believed to have been designed by a French officer stationed at West Point, and had for its inspiration one of the gates of Verdun. The original gate has survived the last two wars and is still standing.

Although primarily designed for the Engineers, its first appearance in September 1839 was on the cap-



The turretted castle, official insignia of the U.S. Corps of Engineers.

plates of the Cadets of the Military Academy at West Point. It was, however, officially prescribed for the Corps later in the same year. At that time it was worn on the epaulette and belt plate and moved up and down the uniform during the ensuing years, appearing at times on the shoulder, on the hat and finally on the saddle cloth.

With the new clothing regulations of 1902, it disappeared from all these places, and was officially promoted to its present position on the collar. In 1921 its colour was changed from silver to gold.

Grand Strategy

While the horizon of strategy is bounded by war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the subsequent peace. It should not only combine the various instruments but so regulate their use as to avoid damage to the future state of peacefulness, secure and prosperous. Unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part still awaiting exploration and understanding.—*Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart.*

A Book Review

THE RECORD OF THE 43rd WESSEX DIVISION

Reviewed by Maj.-Gen. E. L. M. Burns, DSO, OBE, MC,
Deputy Minister, Department of Veterans Affairs,
Ottawa*

Canadians who fought through the Normandy campaign and operation "Veritable" need no introduction to the 43rd Division, whose men wore on their shoulders the sign of the wyvern, mythical half-dragon, half-snake, a heraldic device which had appeared on King Alfred's battle banners. Major-General Essame, in compiling the division's history,** has not only created a monument which will stand to the honour of those who served in its ranks, but has provided a very useful document for those who may require to study the operations, and particularly the tactics, of the Western European campaigns of 1944–45.

It can be argued that a divisonal history provides the best scale and setting for the study of tactics. General military histories of modern wars must deal with groups of armies, and cannot as a rule go into the detail which is required to give the student who has not had war experience a reasonably clear idea of the factors which bear on tactical success or failure; while regimental histories, stressing the achievements of a unit, and the deeds of individuals, do not bring out the essential co-operation and interaction of all arms and services.

General Essame emphasizes throughout a prime cause of the division's excellent record; and that is the thorough and strenuous training it received in all the operations of war for several years in England, under Maj.-Gen. Ivor Thomas, who

*Commissioned in the Royal Canadian Engineers in 1915, Maj.-Gen. Burns achieved an outstanding record of service in two world wars. A lieutenant-colonel at Canadian Military Headquarters, England, in 1939, he held a number of senior appointments both at CMHQ and in Canada, and was given the acting rank of lieutenant-general early in 1944 when he assumed command of the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy. He later commanded the First Canadian Army Lines of Communication troops in North-West Europe, reverting to his substantive rank of major-general and serving with these troops until the end of the war. Maj.-Gen. Burns is well-known for his writings on military subjects.—Editor.

**The 43rd Wessex Division at War, 1944–45. By Maj.-Gen. H. Essame, CBE, DSO, MC. Wm. Clowes & Sons, London, 271 pp., 20s.

commanded it also from beginning to end of its fighting. The vigour of the leading at all levels is shown by the casualties; of the sixty officers who held lieutenant-colonel's or higher commands, thirteen were killed in action.

The 43rd Division landed in Normandy on the 24th of June, and fought almost continuously until VE Day. In the words of Lieut.-Gen. Horrocks, commander of the famous 30th Corps in which the divison operated most of the time, "The capture of Mount Pincon, the crossing of the Seine, the fighting around Nijmegen, the battles at Geilenkirchen, Operation Veritable and the final advance into Germany is a formidable list. I doubt whether any other division has had so much hard fighting during the campaign and has been so successful."

It was during "Veritable" and the subsequent Rhine crossing that the 43rd Division had the closest connection with Canadian formations. It also fought on the flank of the 2nd Canadian Corps in the bitter struggle to advance southward, following the capture of Caen.

Another link with the Canadian forces was that some sixty officers served with units of the 43rd Division, under the "Canloan" scheme. It will be remembered that, for a while in 1943–44, it seemed that Canada had a surplus of trained officers, and an arrangement was made to lend them to serve with British units. The names of the officers in question are set out in a special appendix, and many of them receive honourable mention in the narrative.

Major-General Essame, who served throughout the operations as Brigadier of the 214th Infantry Brigade, has done a most competent piece of military writing. The text is illustrated by numerous sketch maps, properly set in the book, which enable the operations to be followed readily. There are also many excellent illustrative photographs. The history can be recommended as a valuable addition to any military library, for the light it throws on the how and the why of the fighting methods used in West Europe, from Normandy to North Germany.

Originality

Originality is the most vital of all military virtues as two thousand years of war attest. In peace it is at a discount, for it causes the disturbance of comfortable ways without producing dividends, as in civil life. But in war, originality bears a higher premium than it can ever do in a civil profession. For its application can overthrow a nation and change the course of history in the proverbial "twinkling of an eye".—*Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart.*

Standard Ammunition

During the joint British, United States, French and Canadian conference in Washington in the summer of 1951, called at the suggestion of Defence Minister Brooke Claxton of Canada, the question of adoption of a standard rifle along with production and further development of other small arms and ammunition was discussed.

It was evident that until differences of opinion over the choice of a suitable round of small arms and ammunition had been cleared between the countries, no decision could be made on the adoption of a new rifle.

During Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington in December 1951, the question of the adoption of a new rifle was again discussed but without any change in decisions previously taken. For this reason, it was agreed that Britain and the U.S. should retain their existing weapons but that development of new ammunition should continue at high priority with a view to producing a cartridge upon which standardization would be possible.

(Defence Minister Claxton said in a statement issued on July 6, 1951, that "to have a standard round is even more important than to have standard weapons." He pointed out that Canada, as a large surplus producer of small arms ammunition, would work toward mediation on this matter among the leading countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.)

The press reported recently that the standardization of small arms within NATO was under consideration. This study is in accordance with the decisions previously reached by the standing group. In addition to the United States, Belgium, Great Britain and Canada are closely associated in this work. The three countries are co-operating to produce, as soon as possible, a new round of small arms ammunition which will meet the requirements of the NATO forces.

An important feature of this work is that while rounds of different calibres are being developed by these countries and the United States, the overall length of the complete cartridges will be the same. At the same time, new weapons are being considered with a view to having a modern rifle immediately the new ammunition has been adopted. Because the overall length of the cartridges under development is the same, whatever ammunition is adopted the rifles considered by each of the four countries may be easily adapted for firing the new standard round.—*Directorate of Public Relations (Army), Ottawa.*

A Letter to the Editor*

OFFICER TRAINING

The Editor,
British Army Journal.

Sir,

Judging from the reports produced by the War Office, the standard of knowledge shown in the major Army Examinations, such as the Staff College Entrance Examination and the Promotion Examination has been startlingly low. Undoubtedly this is in part due to the war which interrupted the normal academic and theoretical study of officers, for it must be remembered that the practical experience which they gained on active service can only be applied to relatively few papers. However, I do not believe this to be the major factor.

Officers themselves will always seek to excuse their low standard by pointing out that their normal work takes up most of their time these days and they have little left for private study. Needless to say, those who got their examinations behind them before the war are not prepared to consider this excuse; but, although it is unlikely to be wholly valid, it is short-sighted to deny that it has some substance. Before the war any reasonably intelligent officer undertook some sort of private study, either to occupy those afternoons when he was not playing games or hunting, or the evenings when he was fresh for some mental effort after the stimulus of such exercise.

Today the average officer is fully occupied in the afternoons and at regimental duty must be prepared to do his office work after tea, so he undoubtedly does work very much harder than his predecessor did before the war; however, the pertinent question is whether his work is more effectual.

Here, I think, we will find the kernel of our problem. The officer today is bogged down— and bogged is the word — by routine administrative work and minor duties, which before the war were carried out by non-commissioned officers; consequently too little time is devoted to his military education and he has little energy left for it in his leisure hours. If this statement is accepted it remains for us to discover its causes and suggest a remedy.

Undoubtedly the primary cause is that most regular soldiers are now on short service engagements and, as a

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result, never gain the years of experience which a pre-war NCO was expected to have. The remedy for this lies outside our hands; however, there is, arising out of it, a secondary cause which could easily be put right.

We under-assess the intelligence and potential capacity of the present NCO, not the least because he is spoon-fed throughout his service and never gets the chance to forage for himself. The CQMS need not check his stores too carefully: officer checks are now no longer periodic but continuous. A CSM need no longer know his range of duties from A to Z: an officer will, in the event, always organize the day's work himself. A corporal instructor need no longer know his SAT Vol I backwards, his platoon commander will always be there to put him straight. The officer's excuse for this absurd situation is that the post-war NCO has no sense of responsibility, but what he fails to appreciate is that a sense of responsibility cannot be taught in theory; it has to be acquired in practice. In other words, if an officer is to have NCOs who do their job efficiently and thus relieve him of day-to-day anxiety regarding petty routine, he must be prepared to take a calculated risk. He must allow his subordinates executive responsibility, and to carry their task through, checking it only after the event. Thus a CSM detailed to prepare his company for live range practice must not have a company commander beside him saying, "Have you remembered the red flag at the far end of the range?", but he must have one who will say to him afterwards "If you had not forgotten, you would not have held up the firing for two hours whilst a red flag was fetched from the WT stores in barracks". In the first instance the CSM will never remember the red flag; in the second he will never forget it. In the first instance, no officer need reach the range until five minutes before firing is due to start; in the second, one will have to be there an hour beforehand. In the first instance, the company commander will be able to allot one hour for instructing his officers in one of the many now neglected aspects of officer training, and in the second he will not. Indeed only in the second instance will units have happy and efficient NCO cadres, and the army have officers who are efficient as officers.

To sum up: if an officer is to do his job efficiently, he cannot do that of his NCOs as well; furthermore, for them to be equally efficient, they must be allowed to work with the minimum supervision.

This letter must not be interpreted as a criticism of the modern NCO. Given a chance to acquire a sense of

(Continued on page 80)

KOREAN AIR WAR

THE PATTERN AND TWO OF THE PLANES



Reproduced from the Military Review U.S.)

THE HAND DOES NOT FORGET ITS CUNNING

In *Eastern Approaches* (London, 1949) Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean describes why the Germans were unable to destroy the last bridge over the Danube at Belgrade and prevent the Russians from remaining close at their heels:

"In one of the apartment houses near the bridge there lived an old man, a retired school teacher. He was warlike neither by nature nor by training but in the course of a long life he had had one outstanding military experience. This was during the Balkan War of 1912, when, in the course of a battle with the Turks, he had, as a private soldier, distinguished himself by removing the demolition charges from beneath a bridge across which the enemy were retreating, thus preventing them from destroying it and enabling the Serbs to follow up their advantage. For this deed he was awarded a gold medal by King Peter I. After which he took to schoolmastering and relapsed into obscurity.

"Thirty-two years later, on the night of October 19th, 1944 the old man, armed with this solitary but valuable experience of modern warfare and with a stout heart, was looking out of his window as the Germans made preparations for their withdrawal. With growing interest he watched them laying and connecting up the charges under the supports of the bridge. This was something familiar, something in his line. He knew exactly what to do.

"Biding his time, he chose a moment when the attention of the guards had been distracted. Then, of his own initiative he went downstairs, crossed the road and devoted a well-spent half hour to disconnecting the charges under the bridge. When, some hours later, the enemy's demolition party tried to detonate the charges, nothing happened, and, before they could put things right, the Russians were upon them. Some weeks later a second gold medal was awarded to the old man."

Officer Training

(*Continued from page 78*)

responsibility, he does so quickly and, commanding increasing confidence, is known once more to his men as "sergeant" instead of the familiar "sarge".

Middle-Piece-Officer

January, 1952

With this number, the Journal discontinues its monthly issues in favour of a quarterly, the first edition of which will be published in April 1953. This step has been taken for reasons of economy, and to give the editorial staff more time to select and edit material. The suspension of this publication for the two-month period will provide the staff with the opportunity to design a format and obtain material for the new periodical, which, however, will still be known as the Canadian Army Journal. It is the intention of Army Headquarters to maintain in the quarterly the same high standard of military literature achieved in the monthly issues of the Journal, and to improve it wherever possible.—Editor.

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