


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# CATM

NUMBER 46

JANUARY 1945



**THE CANADIAN CHAPLAIN SERVICE**

### IT'S JUST AS TRUE TODAY

There are five things which the soldier must never let from him—his rifle, ammunition, knapsack, provisions for at least four days, and pioneering tools. Let him, if he thinks fit, have his knapsack of the least possible size, but have it with him always.

—*Napoleon*

# CATM



## Canadian Army Training Memorandum

JANUARY 1945

NUMBER 46

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
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# CANADIAN CHAPLAIN



H/Brig. C. G. Hepburn, M.C., E.D.



H/Brig. R. C. MacGillivray, M.C., E.D.

## SERVICE

THE legendary saying attributed to Cromwell, "Trust in God and keep your powder dry", still holds true. Faith in God, and good equipment, are both essential to victory. Cromwell's men were called "Ironsides" because they could "by no means be broken or divided." The modern version of this is "Praise the Lord and pass the ammunition." Here again it should be noted that **both** these actions are necessary for victory. A timely warning is given by one of our Chaplains Overseas that we should be careful not to "Praise the Ammunition and By-pass the Lord."

In ancient times the people of God were exhorted to "be strong and of good courage," to fear God, and to fight hard against every evil thing. In our day the same principle holds true. Therefore, the moral and spiritual values must receive the attention which is so necessary to a nation at war. If we **fight** for victory—**work** for victory—**give** for victory—(and many **die** for victory), then surely we must above all be **worthy** of that victory.

For God, for King, for country, is still the call to Active Service.

*C. G. Hepburn*

THE work of the Chaplain Service in the Armed Forces is pointed towards building a spiritual morale, radiating a spiritual dynamic, the natural result of which must be a profound influence towards conformity to discipline, unity of purpose and action, stern devotion to duty and heroic accomplishment.

Wherever the truths and laws of God have been accepted by any people, the effect in developing sound spiritual character has been clearly discernible. It must not be forgotten that those in the Armed Forces are not just so many bodies, not just so many machines or automatons; they are human beings with souls. These souls are the brood fields in which the work of the chaplain must find outlet and exercise.

The accoutrements of war take care in a measure of the dangers to human bodies or human property. There are, however, serious dangers to human souls which may easily be lost sight of in the presence of what seem to be the more pressing and larger problems of national endeavour. It is the basic responsibility of the chaplain to see that these are not neglected nor given only secondary consideration.

*Rev. Wm. Gillinay*

# THE INFANTRY IS STILL QUEEN OF THE BATTLE

By Maj. Gen. A. E. Walford, C.B.E., M.M., E.D.

*(CATM welcomes this pertinent article by Maj. Gen. Walford, newly-appointed AG at NDHQ. His observations come as a result of five years' experience and personal contact with Canadian, British and other Allied formations overseas. Gen. Walford (a gunner, by the way) returns to us direct from Holland, where he was charged with the tremendous task of maintaining the First Canadian Army in men, equipment and supplies. His remarks reflect the sincere feelings of all commanders in that theatre of operations.—Ed.)*

Everyone who went through the Normandy campaign and saw the work of Canadian, British and Allied formations in that theatre knows that today more than ever before the Infantry is the "Queen of Battle." I have the greatest respect and admiration for the courage and the efficiency of the supporting Arms and the Services, all of whom did magnificent work—but I must say with deep conviction that the Infantry still has the final word in battle. This opinion is not lightly expressed, because it is based on personal observation of the battle tactics of Canadian and Allied formations, as well as on the views expressed by senior commanders.

War of the 1944 type calls for a tremendously high standard in all Arms taking part, and in no Arm or Service is the requirement higher than in the Infantry. Consider for a moment the requirements of a first rate Infanteer. He must be endowed by nature with guts, aggressiveness, self-reliance, initiative and a goodly portion of common sense. With these characteristics as a foundation, sound training will gain him the acquired virtues of personal fitness, skill and confidence in his weapons, thorough personal discipline and practical knowledge of fieldcraft. Incidentally, a sound knowledge of these subjects is the very best insurance that a soldier can have.



Maj. Gen. A. E. Walford, C.B.E., M.M., E.D.

## Enviably Reputation

We frequently read in the paper that "Canadian patrols have been active in forward areas and in some instances have penetrated deep beyond the enemy's lines." To the uninitiated that may seem routine stuff. To those who have any military knowledge it speaks volumes, for by dominating the forward areas we are holding the initiative. Our Canadian Infanteers have established a most enviable reputation for their aggressiveness, their knowledge of weapons and their fieldcraft. No troops have ever been fitter or had greater self-reliance, or higher natural intelligence and initiative. That is why they excel in patrolling. Maintaining contact with the enemy is the foundation for any successful operation, and that means patrolling and more patrolling, continuously passing back the latest information on enemy dispositions and harassing the enemy so that he gets no rest and is prevented from breaking contact and slipping away to regroup and fight on fresh ground.

**The qualifications I have mentioned must be possessed**



# PRISONER SENSE

(AIM)

You're crawling along and feeling all right and all of a sudden you're surrounded by square-heads with Schmeissers and you're in for it. You're a prisoner. What are you going to tell your hosts?

The answer is:

- (1) **Your name.**
- (2) **Your rank.**
- (3) **Your serial number.**

There isn't anything else. **NOTHING.** Once you've delivered yourself of your name, rank and your serial number, pipe down. You can, according to Unofficial Military Law, Section 284B, grunt, whistle, wheeze or cluck, but don't SAY anything else. In short, **SHUT UP.**

Now if everybody would just observe these simple rules of captive etiquette there wouldn't be any need for this sermon. Unfortunately, however, there is a great deal of need for it since the enemy has devised a bag of tricks that would probably extract information from a mummy.

## Here's An Example

For example, there was the following elementary case. Any resemblance of the characters in this drama to a soldier named Jones and a group of German inquisitors is by no means coincidental:

**German Lieutenant** (after Jones is brought in for questioning): What is your name?

**Jones:** Jones.

**German:** What is your rank, and what is your number?

**Jones:** My rank is corporal and my number is 30256, so what?

**German:** Kindly confine yourself to the questions. What is your unit?

**Jones:** My number is 30256. Corporal Jones is my name.

**German:** You needn't be so secretive, Jones. Your colleagues have already told us everything we wish to know. You will be a whole lot more comfortable in prison camp if you co-operate.

## Spills It All

**Jones:** (believe it or not): Oh, I didn't realize that. I'm with the 312th Fusiliers; we got over here Thursday; moved up to the front on Friday, and expect to be joined by the Tenth and Eleventh Divisions sometime Saturday night. After that there will be a large-scale attack all along the road from Tuttifrutti to Chianti. Anything else you want to know?

**German:** Not just now, thank you. (To the guard). Take him away.

This incident has obviously been exaggerated to the point of absurdity

(Continued on page 48)

# CO-OPERATION IN ADVERSITY

(By Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O. in "AIM")

I am glad to contribute to your magazine which I know to be both interesting and informative. During my Service career I have spent many years in the Mediterranean in destroyers, in cruisers and in battleships, and that service has given me a deep interest in Mediterranean affairs, the countries that surround it and the people who live on its shores. It has given me also an understanding of the importance of the Mediterranean to our Commonwealth of Nations.

The prosperity of the Empire in peace and our ability to defend it in war and, finally, to defeat our enemies are dependent on the security of our sea communications. The Mediterranean is a very important link in those communications. With insecure communications we are unable to supply or reinforce areas threatened or attacked by an enemy; we are also unable to assemble the strength of arms necessary to strike at the enemy from our own territory.

## Air Power

In 1941 the relatively overwhelming air power of Germany drove us from the Central Mediterranean, and her accumulated military might swept our armies out of Greece and Crete, and threatened to drive us out of Egypt and the Middle East. In that year and in 1942 we were in great peril. The defeat of our armies based in Egypt, the security of Egypt and our oil




supplies from the countries around the Persian Gulf, and the abandonment of the Mediterranean with all that that would have meant to our prestige and influence in the course of the war—all these things were at stake.

In the Navy our losses in ships and men during the fight for Crete had been very serious, and later, the torpedoing of H.M.S. Barham and the successful Italian attack with midget submarines on our battleships in Alexandria left us without a single battleship.

**Despite these losses, however, Malta was sustained, our submarines and aircraft continued doggedly to attack the vital Axis supply line across the Mediterranean, and our light craft continued to keep the Army supplied through the coastal ports during the ebb and flow of battle along the North African coast.**

Above all, the three services refused to understand the word "Defeat" and, though for long periods were thrown on the defensive, our defence was an active defence, and we none of us lost heart.

Thanks to the great work of our submarines, which sank a million and a half tons of shipping on the Axis supply line, and thanks, too, to the magnificent work of the Royal Air





Force and the Fleet Air Arm, Rommel was never able to get the supplies and reinforcements he needed to sustain him in his final drive for Egypt. And, though we had lost control of the Mediterranean, our ocean routes remained secure.

### **Rommel Driven Back**


In this way the Navy and the Royal Air Force co-operated with the Army in those critical days at El Alamein, which finally resulted in Rommel being driven back the way he had come; and in his train we re-established our command on and over the sea to such an extent that even the means of escape were denied him. The Army and the R.A.F. made the fullest use of this great opportunity, and turned his withdrawal into a rout and final defeat. Their great work filled the Navy with admiration, though we were a little disappointed, as we waited off the Tunisian Coast, that there was nothing left for us to destroy at sea.

**There are undoubtedly disadvantages in waging war with three separate ser-**

**vices, but the campaigns of North Africa provide a shining example of good co-operation and of the benefits that result from a complete understanding between the services.**

We went to North Africa and to the Mediterranean to defend Egypt and our important interests in the Middle East. After nearly losing all we finally succeeded, and we are now using those same areas as a base from which to launch our attacks on the enemy's stronghold in Europe.

The comradeship between the services, the dogged endurance and the fighting courage shown during our period of adversity, are needed just as much now that we are striving to defeat utterly the power of Germany.



### **IN ITALY NOW**

*The following is an extract from a personal letter written by the commanding officer of a Canadian Infantry battalion in Italy:*


"We are having a short period to clear off the muck and get baths and new clothing. It's needed. The fighting here has been of a particularly dirty and nasty type, rather like Passchendaele and Valenciennes, but plus the modern trimmings.

"One of the lessons we have learnt (or learnt again, for it's not new) is that the books are still good and getting better. The only trouble is that in the

familiar fog of war one doesn't always have time or the opportunity to think of all the things the books say. Which is old stuff to you.

"Without attempting to put them in any sort of order of priority, patrolling, field engineering, hard work, long hours, fieldcraft, sniping, weapon-handiness, wireless procedure, good orders, good discipline, man management—these are the things that count. And above all, of course, stamina, which is a combination of moral guts and physical perfection. Without it you get nowhere."

# THE CANADIAN CHAPLAIN SERVICE



From earliest times priests, prophets and preachers have been closely associated with warriors. When armies were organized on a feudal basis each war lord would have his own priest or chaplain travelling with him and frequently riding behind him on horseback. The story of Robin Hood would be very incomplete without Friar Tuck. These early chaplains were sometimes men of great influence and the power behind the force of arms.

Broadly understood this is no less true today than in ancient times. We fight two wars, the war of arms and the war of ideas. We are fast winning the war of arms but unless we go all out on the war of ideas we may lose the peace we have all longed for. This battle of the right against the wrong is not excluding the chaplains' job. All men at arms have their part in it. The chaplain, however, stands especially for decent living and thinking in the Army.

## Chaplains' Duty

During the past century and a half, great developments have been seen in the chaplain services of modern armies as in every other department. The fundamental reason for having chaplains in the army, however, remains largely unchanged. In times of danger and stress men realize, what they often forget in the easier days of peace, that they need a Power outside of themselves to forgive, protect and guide them. Chaplains undertake many duties, educational, recreational, and welfare, but their primary function is

to minister to the morale and spiritual needs of all ranks in the army.

In the Canadian Army the Chaplain Service is organized under two main Branches. These are:

- (a) The Canadian Chaplain Service (Protestant) serving all personnel with the exception of the Roman and Greek Catholics. The C.C.S. (P) includes Chaplains from all the major Christian denominations and for administrative purposes the Jewish chaplains. They are appointed on the basis of one chaplain per 1,000 serving personnel.
- (b) The Canadian Chaplain Service (R.C.) ministering to Roman and Greek Catholic personnel. R.C. chaplains are appointed on the basis of one per 500 Roman Catholic personnel.

## Soldiers Too

Chaplains come into the service with the honorary rank of captain. This is real rank in the sense that it entitles them to the courtesies, precedence and pay of rank. It is honorary because they are not trained for, neither do they accept military responsibility. They are primarily Christian priests and ministers, although in a very real sense, they are also soldiers along with their comrades. A number have already been killed and wounded. Some are prisoners. Many have been decorated.

**Recently the policy of appointing a few Women Assistants to the Chaplain Service (P) has been initiated. These are Ancillary C.W.A.C. Officers, who have been previously trained as Christian workers. They work in centres where there are large numbers of C.W.A.C. assisting the Chaplain (P) in that area.**

The young soldier often sees the chaplain first on Church Parade. Although, this is the most conspicuous part of his service the chaplain does not regard the Church Parade as his most important work. Soldiers who are in the army for several years come to recognize the padre, as the chaplain is commonly called, as a friend whom he can approach informally at any time and to whom he can say the thing that is in his heart without any fear that it will prejudice his standing in the unit.

There are at least three things to remember when we think of the place of the parade service in the Army set-up:

- (a) We are all, both padres and soldiers, under orders in the army for almost everything that we do. We parade for meals, pay and medical treatment as well as for training. We do well to look beyond the way we get there to the meaning of the service itself.
- (b) The Parade Service is not an encroachment on our free time. When we are on leave we do as we please. When not on leave time used for Church Parade could otherwise be used for training.
- (c) One important reason for the Church Parade is that it is a public and frequent acknowledgment of our national dependence on Almighty God, a thing our enemies have largely left out of their reckoning.

### **Padre's Hour**

One of the great developments in the Canadian Chaplain Service within the past two years is the Padre's Hour. This started in the 51st Highland Division and was shortly introduced in the First Canadian Division. Its values were quickly recognized by the army commander and during the latter part of the long waiting period in the United Kingdom, Padre's Hour was written into the training syllabus of all units. It takes its place as part of the three-fold educational program in connection with Army training. These three are:

- (a) The Army Bureau of Current Affairs.
- (b) Citizenship.
- (c) The Padre's Hour.

**The Padre's Hour is one period a week of training time, when the men, preferably in groups of less than one hundred, meet with the padre for free discussion along religious lines. A subject is briefly introduced by the chaplain after which general discussion is in order, the chaplain acting as chairman. He permits any point of view to be expressed and often makes a summary of the discussion at the end. He seeks to keep the discussion within the proper scope of the subject of the day.**

Soldiers come to this period wearing the clothing that they have been using for maintenance or training. They are put at their ease and usually permitted to smoke. Most chaplains feel that this is one of the most important parts of their work and many soldiers have expressed special appreciation of it. To be well done this class requires careful preparation, clear ideas, and an open mind on the part of the padre.

Under actual battle conditions the duties of chaplains are greatly changed as are those of combatant personnel.



# THE PREPARATION OF INFANTRY FOR BATTLE

(By Major General F. S. Tuker,  
C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.,  
in the Army Quarterly)

This war has shown that infantry, good infantry, is still the most important arm on the battlefield: it is therefore more important to train this arm and to prepare it for battle than to train and prepare any other arm. That is logical, so let us all remember it. Infantry is Priority No. 1.

It is perhaps not generally realized that victory on the battlefield depends far more on the approach to battle than on what is done on the battlefield itself. History is brimfull of the achievement of the seemingly impossible by troops who are put off "on the right leg" for their fight, and as full too of failures by those who are sent in "on the wrong leg." The approach to battle comprises not only the planning and the staging but also the training of the individual and of the mass for the tasks that lie before them.

## Point to Future

Thus, training must always point to the future; from that it follows that a clear and imaginative picture of war as it will be must be produced by those who direct training policy. . . . Always we should know in good time how we propose later to fight in order to make the enemy dance to our tune.

The infantryman's training is now intense like that of the other arms but his mental and spiritual training are more important than are those of other arms and services. He has a specially

dangerous and exacting job, a job more testing than that of the others. He has to endure far longer, in worse conditions and in closer contact with the enemy; he has finally to close with him, to outwit him in those last few yards and to kill him, perhaps with his own two hands. And with all this he has to be a quick thinker, a quick actor and quick on the draw with his hand weapons. There are far too few really-high-class infantrymen; those that are high-class stand out in any unit clearly from the rest. The really high-class battalion stands out in any division; it is a thing apart and its feel is like a first-class pack of hounds. It is the most powerful thing on the battlefield, the most deadly.

**The ground training of our paratroops approximates to the standard that should be set for all our infantry. The higher we set the standard the better; one can teach a keen man almost anything.**

The heart of an infantry soldier must be the stoutest of all and since it is he who kills most he must be most skilled in his profession. Finally, he has to be versatile so as to be able to use the enemy's weapons against him, and to turn his hand from a heavy mortar or anti-tank gun to a light grenade or the laying and lifting of mines—his own and the enemy's.

Our first task is to imbue the infantryman with the fighting spirit, for without it he may as well be driving a bus in England for all the use he will be on the battlefield. The fighting spirit will give him not only the will to fight, but what is more important to him and to this war, the desire to fight.

### **Make Real Appeal**

The important thing is to make the real appeal to the man who is to be so hardy tried in war. When the right appeal has been made and he is satisfied that the appeal is honest and worth while, it will be answered to the limit of courage and endurance, for he is then a very brave man. Without that appeal he is a lost soul.

But the possession of these good weapons, in ample supply, and a high skill at arms are the second aspect that we are to examine in the making of the fighting spirit.

Any man who is superlatively good at a game will be seeking to find an opponent on whom to try out his skill.

**The soldier who is far more highly skilled at arms than are his potential enemies and who possesses the very finest weapons will be spoiling for a fight.**

The foundation of the strength of an army lies in the weapon-training of its infantry. It is only too often that a unit is allowed to get away with an

unsatisfactory standard of weapon training, yet what is the use of having an implement of any sort in any trade if one is not highly skilled in its use?

The infantry do most of the killing. Since that is so it stands to reason that they must be quick, accurate and deadly with their arms. Too many of them are not. Sometimes they have not been satisfied by their trainers of the necessity for a high standard of skill nor given the determination to reach it. No man is fit to be an infantryman who cannot or will not reach this standard. He must be sent to some other branch of the service for he will sacrifice the lives of other infantrymen.

### **Picture of Battle**

With a firmly founded fighting spirit and the desire to fight, we have yet to present to our men a picture of battle as it will be. To assist us there will be specially selected men who do not boast or "shoot a line" to live with the freshmen and to talk to them of battle conditions; and there is what we call "inoculation" for battle, well known to all in the Army. Both these ways of depicting battle are good and they will help enormously in that first test, but there are two other courses that we must take. The first is to give our man a few standards of conduct in battle, to let him know what is expected of him and to show him that if he lives



up to those simple standards, his unit will suffer far less than if he falls below them. Such guides as these:

**Positions once taken will never, never be given up while a man can use a weapon.**

**If a position is "overrun," the garrison fights on.**

**No man who can use a weapon will be taken prisoner. If, by mischance, he is captured he will do all in his power to escape as soon as possible.**

And the second is to give him guides for sudden emergencies. These guides form a part of his battle drill. The reason for them is easy to see. One good thing about any drill is that on the one word of command certain movements are quickly and precisely executed without their having to be detailed each time.

There are limits to the amount of close order drill a trained man needs and the limits are pretty closely drawn. Above all, noisy drill, loud orders, butt slapping and stamping are not good introductions to battle for an arm that must be the most silent and unobtrusive.

Battle drill has its place among small units of infantry in perfecting the automatic action in emergencies where there is no time to think. . . . More battles are won by speed, by being quicker than one's enemy, than by any other means.

### **Surprise Is Vital**

Thus the infantryman, to whom surprise is more vital than to any other arms for his life hangs by that thread, has his own responsibility as an individual for studying the tactical ways, habits and changes of his enemy.


It is at this point, that is at the study of his enemy, that the infantryman's tactical training starts. With this study comes the devising of action as an individual to take advantage of the knowledge that he has gleaned of the enemy. In other words, the art of a stalker and a sniper. . . . This is better done by two men and thus the pair becomes the tactical basis of infantry work, after the individual men have been individually trained to take their places in this tactical unit.

While training to gain information of the enemy by day the pair will also work to prevent the enemy from gaining information about ourselves, in other words to stop in their turn his movement and to kill his watchers.

**In defence, one's patrols keep the enemy at arm's length; for the attack they probe to find the right place and time at which to hit and to cover the staging of the attack. Chance sometimes offers special and paying tasks. The fact is, however, that one does not "dominate the enemy" by aimless patrolling but by patrolling that pays a good dividend. If it is not paying a good dividend either in information gained or casualties inflicted then there is something basically wrong with it.**

We must never forget that a good infantryman is a responsible individual; as such he is responsible for his own physical fitness; he and no one else. To a great extent he is also responsible for his own efficiency as a man-at-arms.

The more we can make our man a fully responsible man the better infantryman he will be.



# ARTILLERY'S PRESENT PLACE

(Cyril Falls in the Illustrated London News)

In the early stages of the present war many observers came to the conclusion that it would be remembered in tactical history largely as marking the decline of artillery. Its role, they decided, was passing to the aircraft and the tank. These critics based their views upon the campaigns in Poland and on the Western Front. In so doing they failed to take into account the great superiority of the German military machine as a whole.

This superiority was so great that it afforded the Germans an excellent opportunity to win the war outright within a brief period, as, in fact, they almost did. But it should have been manifest that, if they failed to do so, then the power of great industrialized opponents—the only foes who could possibly stand up against them—would presently produce a comparative equilibrium in armaments which would profoundly affect tactics and tactical methods.

## Polish Campaign

Yet, even taking conditions as they existed in 1939, the critics, owing to an excusable lack of detailed knowledge of events, misread German practice. In the Polish campaign the Germans made most effective use of artillery preparation in the offensive. They relied so much upon it that where


they suffered a check, as happened in several instances, they repeated it. The Germans did not look upon aircraft, the artillery of the air, as a substitute for guns, the artillery of the land. They treated the former as a valuable adjunct to the latter, using its superior flexibility and range to engage more distant targets.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that in that early phase of hostilities, the tank and the aircraft, working on the German side with a coordination which has never since been excelled and perhaps never equalled, "ran loose" over the campaigning grounds of Poland, Belgium, and France. After that, the inevitable tendency came into play.

**The improvements and increases in antitank artillery made the breakthrough by armoured forces a matter of greater difficulty, and this in its turn summoned other natures of artillery to play an enhanced role in the offensive.**

We saw Rommel in Libya using antitank artillery itself in what was essentially an offensive capacity, attempting, more than once with success to lure the British armour into costly attacks, and thus preparing the way for the advance of his own armour. Then we saw General Montgomery, at El Alamein and in subsequent battles down to the offensives in Italy, employ

# THE TECHNIQUE OF INSTRUCTION



The ability to instruct others has been variously described as an art, a science, a divine gift. Perhaps it is something like greatness—some are born with it, some achieve a measure of skill and others have an instructional job thrust upon them.

If you are in the first of these classes the following suggestions will not interest you; but, if like most of us, you belong to Class 3, even though you may now claim membership in Class 2, they may be of interest and benefit.

There are five basic principles of good instruction. They may be stated briefly as follows:

**1. Make your instruction CLEAR:** How? By using simple language (none of us likes to be blinded, not even

by science); by defining all new terms as they are needed; by using appropriate **VISUAL AIDS** such as diagrams, films, film strips, models, etc. Byspeaking relatively slowly and distinctly.

**2. Make your instruction DE-**




**FINITE:** How? By having in your own mind a clear picture of the purpose, particularly the "battle purpose" of today's bit of work. By avoiding all by-paths, however tempting and however "red the herring."

**3. Make your instruction appeal to as many of the PHYSICAL SENSES as possible.** Those most applicable to military training are:

- (a) The sense of hearing.
- (b) The sense of sight.
- (c) The sense of touch.
- (d) The muscular or, as it is sometimes called, the kin-aesthetic sense.

In the great majority of cases, the two last-named senses are of paramount importance. We learn a little from

what we hear, more from what we see, but most of all from what we do. **LISTEN, LOOK** and **DO** should be the watchword of your squad.





# PLATOON EPISODES

(The following extracts are taken from reports in Progress Bulletin—Infantry made by two platoon sergeants following a battle.)

1. **PIAT:** The line of the advance now led along a narrow road with the convent and church buildings on our right but no opposition was encountered until the leading section had reached the cross roads immediately behind the church. At this point an S.P. gun supported by Spandau fire was encountered, this causing several casualties. The platoon took up positions behind a row of cottages and this information was passed back to Company Headquarters. The position of the S.P. gun was located as being in front of the cottages and Gdsn. Pettigrew with the PIAT moved forward to the house directly in front of the S.P. gun. After observing through an aperture in the door, he fired his PIAT, setting fire to the gun and killing several of the crew. A short time afterwards a second vehicle was seen on our left, with the crew standing beside the gun. Small arms fire was brought to bear on the crew, who scattered in all directions, several of whom were seen retreating hurriedly on bicycles.

2. **Flanking Co-operation:** At approximately 1900 hrs a large number

of the enemy were observed about 200 yards to our front, apparently forming up for a further attack across the open ground and an enemy S.P. gun took up position on the road beyond. The enemy advanced in extended order, the platoon opening fire on them when they were about 75 yards from the house. The enemy were now pinned to the ground and seemed surprised by our fire and before they had time to re-organize mortar fire was brought to bear on them by 13 Platoon's mortar, as much to our surprise as the enemy's. This was very accurate and caused heavy casualties.

3. **A Sniper's Field Day:** After the visit of the S.P. gun, enemy were observed digging in among the gardens to NE and NW. Sgt. Dannfald, who throughout had maintained an OP in his house although it was repeatedly hit by 75 mm shells, was able to give detailed information of this and it was engaged by a troop of tanks. The enemy were thrown into confusion and during this Gdsn. Harly had a sniper's field day, seeing eight victims fall to his shots. During this and the previous day, his bag from this OP was 13.

## TECHNIQUE OF INSTRUCTION

(Continued from page 14)

4. **Make your instruction SYSTEMATIC:** Every bit of instruction should have a beginning in what the squad already knows. It should also have a development of some new phase, some new skill, some new body of knowledge and an ending that tests and confirms this new phase of **SKILL** or **KNOWLEDGE**.


A military analogy may be found in the terms "Approach to Battle," "The

Assault," "The Consolidation." A great deal of the arrangement of the necessary material has been done for you in the pamphlets at your disposal. **DON'T NEGLECT THEM!**

5. **Make your instruction CO-OPERATIVE:** Get the class "into the picture." You can **TEACH** but only the class can **LEARN**.

You may have the lilting quality of a Richard Crooks in your voice, but don't let it bewitch you. Don't be led astray by the sound of your own voice. Keep the **TWO-WAY TRAFFIC** going!

# A NOTE ON DEFENCE ORDERS



(U.S. Intelligence Bulletin)

The Japanese are fully aware of the capabilities and limitations involved in establishing an island defence. The orders which follow have been selected because they are representative of Japanese concepts of island defence, and because they give the U.S. soldier an intimate glimpse of enemy plans for combat activity by small units.

It will be noted that reserves, about half the total force on the island, were to remain in positions under cover and were to enter the battle by prearranged routes if a U.S. landing was attempted.

Great stress was placed on the rapid reorganization of the defending troops and on the importance of launching night counterattacks. (U.S. officers who took part in the operation commented on the number of Japanese who were discovered inland, sitting patiently in covered foxholes. Although these enemy soldiers attempted to leave their positions during the night, the U.S. forces pushed inland so rapidly that the planned night counterattacks never materialized.)

## Japanese Plan

The standard Japanese plan was, and is, to annihilate a hostile landing force before it reaches the shore, or at least to destroy it on the beaches. On Brown Atoll this plan was to be accomplished by forcing the landing craft, tanks, and infantry to split up and by destroying them individually. To achieve this,

obstacles were to be erected on the beaches and in the shallow water in front of Japanese prepared positions, and fire power was to be concentrated in these positions.

The Japanese had learned a good deal from previous encounters with Allied landing forces, and were aware that certain tactics probably would be repeated. The atoll garrisons were cautioned to expect a landing any time after a heavy sea and air bombardment of the island.

## First Plans For Defence

Before the 1st Amphibious Brigade arrived at Brown, General Nishida gave the officers who were to command the individual island garrison an outline of the general defence plan.

**"Our mission is to prevent an Allied invasion of Eniwetok, Engebi, and Parry Islands, and to protect the anchorage and the various naval installations within the atoll.**

"Each island garrison force will defend its assigned sector to the last man.

"The Brigade Reserve will be prepared to move in its entirety, or in part, to reinforce the other island garrisons or to go outside Brown Atoll, depending upon the situation.

"The three island garrisons will commence construction of positions immediately after landing, and should have them completed within a month.

## Positions

"The following points are to be given special consideration in the organization of positions:

"1. Positions must be strong, and must be so planned as to allow for all-round defence.

"2. Try to convert key terrain features into strongpoints and successively complete permanent installations in vital sectors so that it will be possible to conduct a strong, flexible defence.

"3. In planning the defences, pay special attention to the shoreline, the ocean bottom, and the depth of water. Erect suitable artificial obstacles along the shoreline where landings are anticipated.

**"4. For protection against enemy artillery and bombs, build covered positions, cave-type shelters and hangars. Use local materials. Prepare at least four alternate positions for heavy weapons.**

"5. Prepare a large number of dummy positions and dummy installations of all kinds."

Shortly after the 1st Amphibious Brigade landed on Brown, General Nishida sent his garrison commanders the following estimate of U.S. capabilities and intentions:

"1. Hostile landing strength is believed to amount to at least 3 infantry divisions and a tank division, and an escort fleet of 6 aircraft carriers, 4 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 40 destroyers and 60 transports of approximately 5,000 tons each.

"2. To establish beachheads as quickly as possible, the enemy will launch assaults against Engebi, Eniwetok, Meriren, and Japtan Islands.

## Reconnaissance

"3. The hostile landing force will appear after about 3 days of air reconnaissance and bombing, and will invade

Brown Atoll with the object of isolating the rear of the Marshalls. The assault will coincide with attacks on Kusaie and Wake Islands.

"4. The enemy often anchors within a lagoon and debarks after 0200. Enemy forces may attempt surprise assaults from the sea side of the atoll about midnight.

**"5. During the period of debarkation, landing forces will be covered by bombing and naval gunfire. The enemy will use submarines to blockade all passages into Brown Atoll.**

"6. The enemy expects rapid successes. Landings will continue day and night, and in one day enough supplies will be put ashore to last a week.

"7. Amphibious tanks probably will lead the enemy landings and will be followed by a flotilla of boats 50 to 100 yards apart.

"8. Employing boats and barges of many types, the enemy conducts the first phase of debarkation in co-ordinated waves. During the second phase and thereafter, each boat navigates independently, taking about 30 minutes for each round trip.

"9. When debarking in the daytime, U.S. forces use smoke on a large scale."

## Defence Plans for Engebi Island

Early in February, Colonel Yano, commander of the Engebi Island Garrison Force, issued this order regarding the improvement of the existing defences of the island:

"A hostile force will bomb this island either with carrier-based or land-based planes, and will bombard us from all sides with battleships and heavy cruisers. Directly after these attacks, an amphibious force will attempt to land.

**"Whether or not the enemy is able to land on the islands to the east and west, it is expected that he will force his way through one of the passages**

## USER OPINION

The following are interesting extracts from a letter written by an officer who has been in action in Northwest Europe since "D" Day:

"Pound weapon training and physical condition including living in 'wet' slit trenches for two days. . . .

"Pound it into the lads to always move near cover whenever possible. A lot of good men are killed from being caught in the open. It is a treat to see our lads automatically dig themselves in whenever they stop in action—no one has to tell the old-timers.

"We used to argue what to carry into action, but here is what the lads carry in this unit. This varies with each show, but normally 100 rounds in bandoliers, 2 Bren mags, 2-36's, 1-77, basic pouches, shovel and steel helmet. Officers carry pistol, rifle or Sten, no rank badges or at least ones not easily seen, binoculars (in pouch), basic pouches, compass (for flash spotting), map in pocket, and shovel. Outwardly there is no difference in appearance (between officer and man)."

### DEFENCE ORDERS

*(Continued from page 17)*

#### **and enter the atoll and carry out landing operations from the lagoon.**

"Our plan must be to let the enemy approach the shoreline and then annihilate him with withering fire power.

"The 8th Company, less two platoons and with an automatic weapon attached, will occupy and defend the east corner of the island. The 1st Platoon of the 8th Company will occupy and defend the west corner under my direct command. The naval detachment will occupy the north corner. The detachment, as well as seamen who have taken refuge on this island and who now are under my command, will defend the area of Lookout Post No. 1,

and deliver artillery fire from the fixed guns in the north corner of the island.

"I am issuing special instructions regarding plans for the construction of obstacles at the water's edge and for laying mines in the reefs.


#### **Use of Workers**

"Construction workers (the Japanese group, the Sankyu group, and the Korean group) will be used for work on additional fortifications, repair work on the air strip and the preparation of dummy installations.

"A splinter-proof shelter will be constructed immediately in the north corner of the island for the naval communications post. Brigade radio personnel will be established in strong emplacements.

"The food ration is reduced to 540 grams per day."

# THE VALUE OF INFILTRATION



(U.S. Military Review)

(Digested at the Command and General Staff School from an article by Major General F. I. S. Taker, Commander, 4th Indian Division, in *AIM, Army Magazine of the British Middle East Command.*)

The highest form of offensive operation that infantry can achieve is the infiltration attack, either silently or with artillery support. This operation can only be achieved by an infantry that has been properly trained in patrolling.

Patrolling, then, is the basis of the highest infantry tactics. The higher developments of patrolling are raiding and Commando work, of which all infantry should be capable.

## Gap is Found

At Wadi Akarit in early April 1943, it seemed impossible to get into the precipitous Zouai Hills held by the enemy. Perhaps the Germans thought so too. But a patrol of the 2d Gurkhas worked into the position and found a gap in the enemy defences and a way up the precipice that led into the heart of the position, and so to the tops of the dominating hills.

**On a dark night the battalion quietly slipped through this**

**gap company by company, the platoons working outwards to right and left inside the position: by 0200 hours they had got those dominating hills and were killing everything they could find.**

The Sussex men passed through the gaps the Gurkhas had now made and worked out still wider to the north and, with a series of sharp assaults, seized the vital heights to protect the flank of the Northumbrian Division. The 16th Punjab Regiment did the same to the south, and by dawn the 7th Indian Brigade had "opened up" the position to over 2,000 yds in depth. Then 5th Indian Brigade, infiltrating boldly through, rapidly secured the whole position. The armour was free to go straight through in its turn.

Thus a prolonged and costly assault against a very heavily defended hill position was turned into a one-night battle solely by infiltration tactics.

(NOTE: Don't forget to apply this in trg.)

# ENEMY WEAPONS

(From "Yank")


**GERMAN 50-mm light mortar,** which the Nazis call a "mine-thrower," is a very common infantry weapon. There is at least one in every rifle platoon. It has a maximum range of 568 yards. The weapon is capable of firing six smoke or heavy explosive projectiles in eight seconds. Designed in 1936, this mortar is a nicely finished weapon with a rather neat and cleverly constructed elevating and traversing



mechanism. The traverse is 16 degrees to the left and right. Tunisia is full of these weapons.

**JAPANESE 6.5-mm light machine gun** is the standard Nipponese weapon used against us in the jungle warfare of Bataan, Guadalcanal and New Guinea. It loads and fires like our U.S. Army Browning, but like all Japanese weapons it throws a very light bullet (calibre .256), which does not compare with the stopping power of the Browning .30-calibre slug. It has a normal muzzle velocity of 2,400 foot seconds,

which is not bad. The gun is crudely made but weights only 19 pounds, 2 ounces—one of the lightest machine guns in the world. The bayonet is a strange feature for a machine gun. It shows how the Nips are always worrying about the danger of close-up, hand-to-hand fighting with their bigger and tougher enemies. Imagine running a bayonet course with one of these babies in your arms.



# ANTITANK GRENADE

(Tactical and Technical Trends—U.S. War Dept.)

The new German Faustpatrone, a recoilless antitank hollow-charge grenade with expendable launcher, designed as a basic close-combat antitank weapon, is the latest German development in close-combat antitank matériel. The tables of issue give 36 to each rifle company, and a total of 2,000 to the infantry division. The Ofenrohr (German "bazooka," also called Panzerschreck) remains the basic close-combat weapon of the regimental antitank company.

There are two models of the Faustpatrone, the Faustpatrone 1, also called the Gretchen; and the Faustpatrone 2, also called the Panzerfaust. The literal translation of Faustpatrone is "first cartridge."

## Fired By One Man

Both are hollow-charge grenades, and easily fired by one man. The grenades and launchers are identical in operation and similar in design,


except that the Gretchen is somewhat smaller than the Panzerfaust (see figure). Both of these weapons have a maximum range of less than 50 yards, but improved models with longer ranges may be encountered. Penetrations are claimed by the Germans of 5.5 inches (140-mm) for the Gretchen and 7.9 inches (200-mm) for the Panzerfaust.

The weapons consist of two main parts, a simple launching tube with a sight and firing mechanism, and a hollow-charge grenade with wooden tail and spring-steel fins. The weight (grenades only) of the Panzerfaust is 6 pounds 14 ounces; the Gretchen, 3 pounds 9 ounces.

The expendable launching tubes of thin steel, open at both ends, contain the propelling charge, which is fired by percussion.

The grenades have thin steel heads containing the hollow charge.

The grenade may be launched from standing, kneeling, or prone positions.



The Gretchen is illustrated at top; the Panzerfaust below.

# NO FAIR WEATHER SOLDIERS

(ATM)

The article under this heading in ATM No. 49 stressed the importance of an unflinching insistence on the care and maintenance of arms in all conditions of climate and weather. (This also appeared in CATM No. 44—Ed.)

The highest possible standard of weapon-handling is one need, but a second, even more important need, upon which the fulfilment of the first depends, is the need for troops to be so hardened during training that they will be able to withstand the toughest and most gruelling conditions they are ever likely to experience in the field.

Australian troops occupied Madang after an Allied advance through the dense undergrowth of the rain forest that follows the coastline, in a belt several miles wide, from Madang to the south of Hansa Bay. In this corner of north-east New Guinea, malaria is of the malignant tertian variety; black-water fever and typhoid are rampant; the rate of mortality from scrub-typhus is high; no water is safe from bacillary dysentery; mosquitoes cause elephantiasis; hookworm is universal; and giant stinging nettles the size of a tree produce blisters and sores that recur after a wetting.

## No Cause for Alarm

There is no reason why this catalogue of Nature's frightfulness should alarm the British soldier, any more than does the Japanese enemy, of whom he has proved himself the master. Nevertheless, anyone who has not encountered nature in so grim a setting will give the highest praise to troops whose skill, determination, and self-discipline made it possible for them to retain their fighting efficiency in the face of such hardships and dangers. The Chindits, the Russian partisans, Tito's Yugo-Slav Army, the men of the Maquis, and again

that handful of Australians who halted the Japanese advance on Port Moresby, and drove them back across the nightmare country of the Owen Stanleys—all these have displayed the same immense toughness of mind and body, the same dogged refusal to be beaten, whether by man or by nature.

Captain Ralph Ingersoll, of the United States Army, comments shrewdly on this vital aspect of training in his outspoken book, "The Battle is the Pay-off," published by The Bodley Head:—

**"It is the practice at home to put troops through rigorous exercises called manoeuvres. During these manoeuvres soldiers do sleep on the ground and get wet in the rain. But manoeuvres are for so many days, for so many weeks, and at the end of them there are the nice warm barracks and the day-rooms . . . to go back to, and in which to sit around and beef about how tough it all was. But after three weeks in the field there will simply be three more weeks of the same, and then three more, and then three more . . ."**

"What I am trying to say is that if men are still thinking of this kind of out-door life as tough, they are not qualified to set their will against the will of men to whom marching thirty miles and sleeping on the ground in the cold rain is the natural order of things.

"When men are really well conditioned, living in the field is no hardship at all. When they are hard enough, physically, they understand this."



## OFFICERS PLEASE NOTE!

In this issue of CATM there is a poster insert dealing with Recreational Shooting for your men in the Dominion Marksmen Army Competition sponsored by the Directorate of Auxiliary Services. The poster contains all rules and regulations governing the Competition which is designed to develop the interest of soldiers in shooting for recreation during off-parade hours.

Attractive badges have been produced as awards for marksmanship and the programme is being sponsored through the formation of unit Rifle Clubs. The Club committee is composed of five members, one of whom is the Unit Sports Officer, who serves as secretary.

Targets and badges are being forwarded to District Sports Officers for distribution only on your request to Training Centres and units, and all information pertaining to the organization of the Rifle Clubs may be obtained from District Sports Officers.

Service rifles, .22 calibre, will be used and ammunition will be obtained through the normal channels. WTOs are asked to assist in the organization of the Rifle Clubs.

Officers are requested to assist as much as possible in the promotion of this Competition by placing the posters in prominent places—such as barrack rooms, lecture huts, etc., and also by assisting Sports Officers in establishing the Rifle Clubs.

## THE BRITISH SOLDIER

(ATM)

A man is drafted to the infantry. At enormous cost to the country he is provided with special clothing and equipment, drilled, exercised and trained in manoeuvres. Special corps of commissariat, the R.A.S.C., are detailed to feed and look after him. The R.A.M.C. look after his health. The navy gets him across the sea. The R.E. make roads and railways and the transport division provides vehicles to get him to where he is going to start operations. He takes with him every conceivable article of equipment and daily utility which the experience of the Army Council has proved to be best for a soldier in the field. **ALSO HE TAKES A RIFLE AND BAYONET!**

### One Object

There is one object behind all this—one only. It is to get that man in the best possible health into the best possible spot where he can **FIRE THAT RIFLE TO THE BEST ADVANTAGE,**

and contribute to the demoralization of the foe.

**And in all our talk about war effort and war preparation this seems to be the one thing which nobody ever thinks about. However well supported by our magnificent guns, tanks and airplanes, of what use are all these millions of riflemen if they cannot shoot as well as a schoolboy with a bit of air-gun practice? They are really not riflemen at all; but merely gun-bearers until they master fully the rifle they carry in their hands.**

I tell you, from hard and prolonged experience, you cannot turn a man who has never handled a rifle into a skilled rifleshooter in the few hours of practice which comes in a wartime military training. It is utterly impossible. It must be done beforehand.



# Close Combat



AART DAVIS

You've probably seen all these tricks before—there's nothing new in the science of fighting without weapons. The two pictures on the left show how to get out of a stranglehold. Seize your opponent's left wrist from underneath with your left hand. Feint as if to force it away. Suddenly pull instead of push, and seize his left upper arm with your right hand. Now you've broken his hold and you've got an armlock on him. He's all yours—unless he knows the counter!




To avoid a downward truncheon blow—attack immediately, slip out of the way, encircle your opponent's body with your right arm and follow up with a cross buttock throw. If he's left-handed use your left arm instead.

Disarming an opponent who is covering you with a pistol can be done in several ways. Here's one of them. Suppose he's marching you along, covering you from behind. You turn rapidly outwards towards your right side, swing your right arm down and pass your right hand over and around your assailant's pistol forearm, holding it firmly against your body with the pressure of your arm. At the same time hit him with the hard edge of your left hand on the Adam's Apple.



# FLAME THROWERS



*The "Wasp" on a Universal Carrier at work*

*(The Fighting Forces)*

Among the equipment with which the British Army blasted its way into France and which it is now using, are flame-throwers. Chief among them are the "Lifebuoy", a man-carried weapon, the "Wasp", a light armoured weapon, and the "Crocodile", which is fitted to a heavy tank.

When this war broke out the Germans had new and improved flame-throwers. We had none. Flame-throwers were first used by British troops in this war in the Dieppe raid, when in the hands of the Commandos they put out of action a coastal battery.

## **Better Than Enemy's**

The Petroleum Warfare Department has been responsible for the development and design of British flame weapons. . . Full advantage was taken of the knowledge of enemy equipment and a band of workers, building up from the flame weapons rapidly extemporized to meet the threatened invasion of this country, have now produced apparatus greatly superior to the German counterparts in range and ferocity and in technical features.

**The "Lifebuoy" derives its name from its appearance. It**


**consists of a ring-shaped tube for carrying the fuel, and another spherical container to carry a compressed gas. These are carried on the back. The flame is projected from a "gun" in which is incorporated an igniting mechanism. The "Lifebuoy" has a range of about 50 yards and has been used with conspicuous success by paratroops, Commandos and Canadian infantry.**

For bigger operations, a larger fuel supply and greater mobility are needed, and to meet this the "Wasp" was designed. This is a flame-thrower fitted to a Universal Carrier. The tanks containing the liquid fuel and compressed gas are easily carried on the carrier, and the "flame-gun" projects through the front armour. Apart from the very much greater fuel capacity this equipment also has a much greater range than the "Lifebuoy", and because of the bullet-proof body of the carrier can be taken forward under fire to attack enemy strong-points and positions. The fuel tanks can easily be put into or taken out of the carrier in the field, and the carrier is immediately ready for normal use again.

## The "Crocodile"

The most powerful and effective flame-thrower of all is the Churchill "Crocodile" which is fitted to the heavily armoured tank. In this case the fuel is carried in an armoured trailer towed by the tank. The trailer is universally articulated so that it can move in any direction, and the fuel is carried through an armoured pipe. By an ingenious device, the trailer can be jettisoned if the need should arise. The tank can then revert to its normal role since the flame-throwing apparatus does not interfere with its existing armament. The trailer is controlled from inside the tank and its movements are indicated by pilot lights mounted on a panel in front of the tank commander. This makes it unnecessary for the commander to expose himself to enemy fire, in order to see what is happening.

**The "Wasp" and "Crocodile" can project flame to distances of over 150 yards and they and the "Lifebuoy" use a special new type of fuel. One of the curiosities about this fuel is that it enables the**



*(The "Wasp" advancing under smoke)*

**"flame-gun" to be fired round corners, as the fuel will ricochet and produce fierce and persistent fire in the nooks and crannies of pillboxes and trenches.**

The "Crocodiles" were needed at H + 35 (thirty five minutes after the landing in France on "D" Day). The workers responded. They collaborated in the special training of the troopers who were to man the "Crocodiles." The contracts were completed. The stuff was delivered on time.

## ENGINEER RUSES

*(From an account of fighting in Italy appearing in U.S. Intelligence Bulletin)*

"While we were clearing mines from a beach, I found a number of Tellermines embedded in the sand. About 6 of these mines had been laid fairly close together, and when these 6 were detonated, a field of about 25 or 30 mines exploded simultaneously. The entire group had been connected with primacord to produce this result. As our work progressed, we found that the Germans had gone in extensively for this method of booby-trapping.

"On one occasion, at the Rapido River, my company had cleared a road through a minefield and had marked the clearing with tapes. Our unit moved ahead without leaving a guard at the clearing. During the night the Germans infiltrated into the area. They discovered the tapes, moved them some distance from the clearing and set them up again, marking a road directly through a minefield. The Germans were well aware that an infantry advance the following morning would have to be delayed until engineers could clear another pathway for the advance."



## ARTILLERY IN ATTACKS ON STONE VILLAGES

(By Col. Francis H. Boucher, F.A., in U.S. Field Artillery Journal)

An increasingly noticeable feature of this war is the difficulty of capturing villages and cities. When stubbornly held, a town is captured only after many successive attacks, each netting small gains and heavy losses. The defenders' success seems to increase more or less proportionately with the amount of demolition. This is especially true of towns the buildings of which are composed of stone—which is the case with most European houses in regions where stone is readily available.

Possibly Stalingrad was the first notable example . . . at Stalingrad, which could be supplied, the Germans received their first real lesson in the defence of piles of rubble which formerly constituted a city. They did not capture it, although they expended fully a half million men in the attempt. They did learn the method, though, and employed it systematically in all their subsequent defensive operations.

### "By-Passing"

This new knowledge has not been of great value to the Germans on the eastern front. The Russians soon learned the defensive power of the aptly named German "hedgehogs" and adopted the policy of envelopment (or "by-passing") so evident in recent operations. These wide envelopments served the double

purpose of preventing the escape as well as the supply and reinforcement of the garrisons thus trapped on their pursuance of the Hitler policy of holding to the last, and Russian offensive operations against the town were reduced to cleaning-up methods by reserve or second line troops while continuing the pressure farther to the front.

Cassino is a name known to all Americans, who know also that it was assaulted by the heaviest weight of airplane bombs ever placed upon such a small area. Following this record aerial bombardment a terrific amount of artillery shells was poured into this unfortunate town, so that it was almost entirely demolished. But it was not captured—at least, not by storm. Despite heavy assaults by courageous, well-led, and well-supported troops, the Germans held on and even increased their holdings in the fluctuating battle. Cassino fell only after it was outflanked, whereupon the Germans quietly evacuated the long contested city.

**Why could we not capture Cassino? Partly because of enemy possession of strongly held heights to its rear and flank, which afforded excellent observation and positions for supporting weapons. Attempts had been made, unsuccessful-**

**ly, to capture these heights, culminating in the destruction by aerial bombardment of the monastery on the mountain. But even this destruction was fruitless, for the ruined monastery was held despite heavy losses among the courageous troops sent against it.**

There are other reasons why Cassino was not captured. One was the rubble-filled streets, accomplished largely by our own bombardment. Tanks could not progress through the streets; the rubble afforded the Germans many admirable places in which to deposit antitank and antipersonnel mines easily and with little regard for camouflage. Another reason was the excellent field of fire over and among the piles of rubble where buildings had stood. Others were the wealth of material available for construction of defensive works and the ease of camouflaging such works amid the ruins.

Since tanks could not negotiate the easily constructed tank barriers, and riflemen as well as mine-clearing squads were subjected to effective short-range fire from the defenders, resort was made to a new weapon. Here the tank-dozer had its birth, although the combat value of the bulldozer previously had been demonstrated in the Pacific. But clearing rubble-filled streets and removing mines from the rubble, for the subsequent advance of other tanks and self-propelled guns without which the storming of a city is almost impossible, is a dangerous and slow progress. Progress through a city with buildings intact (though filled with enemy) and over streets whose undisturbed cobbles give reassurance against mines may easily be preferable and less costly.

### **Demolition Plan**

These are facts quite well known to the Germans. Their defensive prepara-

tions in a city include the demolition of selected buildings in order to provide (1) fields of fire, (2) rubble piles as obstacles, (3) material for breastworks and barricades, (4) emplacements for weapons among debris so as to cover selected "killing-grounds."

If it is true that the demolition of a city or village prior to attack enables the defender to make a more protracted defence, it is also true that a heavy artillery preparation, resulting in the destruction of a large percentage of the buildings, may not only fail to aid the attack but actually help the defender. . . With streets debris-filled only the near edge of the village can be overrun quickly by infantry properly supported by tanks and self-propelled guns.

**The storming of a more or less intact city is a laborious task, involving sending many parties along parallel routes. Some must advance through courts (backyards), others through the streets, while still others move from house to house by crossing roofs, and by "mouse-holing," clearing out one house at a time. Bitter and dangerous though this may be, the infantry can be closely supported at short ranges by tanks and direct-fire artillery, both of which may manoeuvre easily through streets relatively free of debris.**

If artillery is not to be used to fire a preparation on a city prior to assault, it still has many uses during the attack, even with indirect laying. If not required during the preparation—and consideration of the ammunition supply and the life of the guns, always critical matters, should preclude any fire not expected to produce real results—it may be held mobile for future action. As soon as the position areas can be

## THE SAD SACK

## "BOTTLES"



Reproduced by permission of U.S. Army Weekly "Yank"

### HOW DO YOU READ A MAP?

In the fighting in northwest Europe, many officers have had a sharp reminder of the unwisdom, not to say the danger, of relying too much on roads and railways, villages and woods, as a means of identifying a position on a map. Again and again it has been found that the expected feature has

been obliterated, or else has been changed or developed until it is no longer recognizable. Even the course of a river is sometimes found to have altered.

However good the map may be, it must be used intelligently. The only reliable guides are hills and valleys. They are always recognizable.

### STONE VILLAGES

(Continued from page 29)

known with certainty, this artillery should be sited in localities from which its fire upon selected areas can be placed most accurately and effectively.


Light field artillery, with its low velocities and relatively small bursting charges, is not of great value when fired against heavy stone buildings, some walls of which may be as thick as fifteen feet. Even with high angle fire, the slope of fall of its projectiles is not sufficiently steep for effective fire in areas defiladed closely behind buildings. But it is effective (especially with time fire) against troops in the open or behind uncovered barricades, and is of value for destruction of light cover.

Medium and even heavy artillery

can be used to advantage—some of it from short ranges, and even with direct laying—for fire against strong points and pillboxes. High velocity weapons of calibres smaller than 155-mm should be used to fire from close range into windows and loop-holes to destroy enemy weapons and personnel within. Each weapon should be sited to obtain its most accurate fire and the greatest effect.

Summing up, it may be stated that for the assault of a city preparation fires, at least those of the usual massed fire variety, should be placed only on areas outside of the city proper, while any fires within the city should be executed by small fire units, preferably of heavy calibre, accurately directed on small, specific targets.





Editor, CATM: While CATM contains a lot of good information, we'd like to see the Engineers getting a little more space. Information about the work this corps is doing overseas would be appreciated by the Engineer officers.—R.D.P.

*(The Engineers are never forgotten, R.D.P. We'll see what we can do for you in future issues.—Editor.)*

Editor, CATM: As an officer of the Veterans Guard of Canada, I'd like to compliment you on the VGC articles published in the December issue. The art work with the VGC crest on the cover was very striking.—H.J.L.

*(Thanks for the bouquet, H.J.L. You've got a corps to be proud of.—Editor.)*

Editor, CATM: I'm glad to see Recce get a break. That was a nice two-page spread of cartoons CATM published in

the December issue. The verses carried a punch, too.—R.S.

*(Glad you liked the layout, R.S. Thanks for writing.—Editor.)*

**NOTE:** This section in CATM is reserved for letters to the editor. Don't be shy. Send along your "pats and pans."

## An Explanation

An article under the title "Ortona" which appeared in the No. 42 issue of CATM was attributed to a U.S. War Dept. publication from which the article was extracted. The editor of CATM has since been informed that material for this article on ops in Ortona was prepared by HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div and circulated by CMHQ, London, Eng., in Series 15 of "Extracts from Memoranda." CATM hereby gives credit to the original source of the article.

## SIGS ATTENTION!!

*(Progress Bulletin—Infantry)*

In Burma, the Japs, having discovered a British telephone line, cut 5 out of the 7 strands of the wire over a 1/4" section. The remaining 2 strands were left intact and the line wrapped in insulating tape to suggest that an

ordinary splice had been made by British linesmen. As a result, telephone conversations, though audible, were indistinguishable. The moral is that linesmen should be able to identify their own splices.



# STILL HIS BEST FRIEND

(ATM)

"The attack on the bridge was stopped, while it was still 300 yards distant from the canal, by accurate fire . . . The Germans imagined that they were everywhere opposed by machine guns only, not realizing the intensity of British rapid fire."

The quotation is from the description in the Official History of the last war of the fighting on the 23rd August, 1914. The superiority of the British soldier in the use of his rifle was the outstanding feature of the battle of Mons.

Today, with innumerable automatic weapons and formidable artillery and air support, there is a danger that the soldier may come to regard his rifle merely as a weapon provided for his personal defence, instead of treating it as a weapon of great offensive power.

## Hit Him at 300

Although every battalion has its snipers with their special rifles and equipment—field glasses, telescopes, and telescopic sights—this fact does not relieve the rest of the unit of the responsibility of being able to fire their rifles to hit a man at 300 yards, and kill him.

It would be deplorable if we were to forget the lesson of 1914, and only the

Germans had learnt it—as undoubtedly they have. Almost every report from northwest Europe and Italy emphasizes the activity of "German snipers," and the casualties they cause. Investigation has revealed that these so-called snipers are for the most part not specialists at all, but stout-hearted, well-trained riflemen, who infest the area and shoot, with the ordinary service rifle, from concealed positions.

**Two extracts from reports received from senior officers in France are perhaps worth quoting. One says: "During these attacks snipers were a considerable nuisance. There were large numbers of them in the trees. The impression that they were not selected snipers was confirmed later when it was found that they were using ordinary rifles without telescopic sights."**

The other writes: "The German snipers were brave men, prepared to fight as individuals. They infested the whole area, and were responsible for most of our casualties. Their effective range was anything up to 300 yards, and they had an unpleasant trick of firing single shots intermittently into headquarters—a habit that caused a

# OURS ARE BETTER

(Progress Bulletin—Infantry)

*The following is an extract from a letter written by the 2 i/c of a battalion that has seen a great deal of fighting in Italy:*

"I wonder if you people who train infantry at home tell them how very much better our infantry weapons are on the whole than the German. We are all convinced of their superiority. The Bren is a better weapon than the MG34 or 42 (Spandau) . . . The Tommy is better than the MP38 or 40 (Schmeisser). The PIAT is a splendid weapon, and the Germans just hate it. Used against M.Gs, etc., behind walls or banks, it is just deadly . . . Our grenades are better than his.

He hates the 36 and is terrified of the 77 (and I don't blame him) . . . The 75 makes a very powerful anti-personnel mine. At Anzio a huge German stepped on one and both his legs were blown clean off at the hips. One night on the Garigliano, a German patrol with a Spandau got to within a hundred yards of our positions, and opened up. It was a great nuisance,

(Continued from page 32)

good deal of annoyance." This officer confirms that these snipers also were no more than stout-hearted riflemen, firing ordinary service rifles; they were not specialists using special equipment.

but as usual he fired a tracer and gave his position away, so a patrol of ours went out and shot him up with a PIAT at short range. They went in and finished him off with Tommy guns and grenades. The Germans always fire tracer at night and I cannot think why."

## IT'S STILL TRUE

(Progress Bulletin—Infantry)


**The following remarks were made by a company commander of the U.S. Army in action in Italy: "If I had to train a Rifle Company again I would stress the following:**

**"Basic Discipline: Make men keep their shoes shined and their hair cut. Stress alertness, the salute and other items of military courtesy. Work on this to get perfection early, as it is the basis of later training."**

## Use it for offence

A man will never have confidence in his rifle if he regards it solely as a last means of personal defence. It is a means of personal offence, and no soldier worthy of the name will be incapable of using it to kill his enemy at 300 yards, or will feel unprotected and naked, so long as he has his rifle to enable him to get on even terms with his opposite number.

In days gone by, the soldier was always taught that his rifle was his best friend. The aphorism is as true today as it ever was. It is applicable to the fighting in the jungles of Burma and New Guinea and the islands of the Pacific as it is to the fighting in north-west Europe and Italy.



# REALISM IN TRAINING

(Condensed from a report to the War Office by the Commandant Highland Fieldcraft Training School, Scotland)

The ideas put forward here have been tried with excellent results at a course conducted in the U.K. The course was designed to develop the latent characteristics of leadership in potential officers. It is realized that no such course is conducted in Canada, but the ideas herein can be adapted to Canadian conditions and utilized to form the basis for some very realistic training. As such they are offered for the serious consideration of officers engaged in training in Canada.

1. Observation is practised at all times by snap questions in the field and in the barrack room. Special observation exercises include Kim's Game, observation of fire, observations walks, stalking, selection of line of advance, the study of animal and bird behaviour and elementary astronomy as an aid to night marching.

## Wide Experience

2. The candidates are given a **wide background of experience**. Bridging, rafting, block and tackle, knots and lashings, axemanship, tree felling, map reading and compass traverse, field geometry, explosives and demolitions.

3. Ideas are put into their heads but they are expected to develop them themselves. Questions are always welcomed by the DS and as far as possible every question is answered either at the time or after research. When possible the answer is drawn out of the candidate himself or his fellows.

4. Every day a fresh pl comd, pl sgt, and sec leaders are provided from the candidates themselves, who are responsible for all the routine duties of their ranks: inspections, parades,



the provision of necessary equipment and stores and the sub-allotment of bivouac areas and distribution of rations, where applicable. Apart from muster parade in the morning, no DS ever takes direct charge of a squad.

5. Useful and amusing deduction exercises have been provided, sections being taken one at a time to an area in which clues have been laid, and being given 15 to 20 minutes in which to note various objects left laying about, without touching anything; a dirty blood-stained bandage, for instance; the impress of a man's seat and heels in soft ground, with a small pool of blood near the right heel mark, to show a wound in the lower right leg; the impress of a Bren tripod on a fixed line; the remains of a fire; brushwood cut for bivouacs and camouflage; the butt of a cigar; a few empty cases of 9 mm parabolium; .38 pistol and .303; a small part of a 2" mortar, and possibly the impress of stretcher legs. This will open their eyes to the possibility of following clues, and drawing conclusions.

## Change Programmes

6. Programmes are never static. Pls are kept out at night unexpectedly. Programmes are changed without warning and Pl Comds are told at 1800 hrs that at 1000 hrs they will parade with their pls 30 to 50 miles away. No hiring of transport, buying of railway tickets

or use of civilian cars or bicycles without permission is allowed. They must use their own initiative and are entirely responsible for their own actions. It is up to them whether they keep together as a Pl or go in small parties.

**7. Elementary principles of tactics are taught by trial and error in the field. Candidates are urged to show initiative and take risks even if it leads to mistakes. The value of lessons learned from mistakes is emphasized at all times.**

After all exercises, Pl and Coy discussions are held when situations are analysed by candidates themselves. During the discussions, many odd views will be put forward; these should **NOT** be checked by the officer, but, at the same time, it is his duty to put forward at the end of the discussions any facts which he thinks may be helpful, and the more conventional viewpoint, if it has **NOT** already emerged during the discussion.

8. Five days and nights are spent in bivouac cooking their own meals and carrying out normal training. This is probably the most valuable period of the whole course, but it is essential that it be carried out regardless of weather and that there be no question of huts once locked being re-opened in order to enable men to retrieve articles which they may have left behind; nor should canteens be open to them during this period. Pls are separated from each other, and ideally within close proximity to a training area, but **NOT** necessarily in the immediate neighbourhood of the camp. Exercises are "controlled" as little as possible. The candidates are made to suffer for their mistakes. If, through lack of security, the position of a ration dump is given away to the enemy no fresh rations are issued but they have to go hungry. If, through mistakes in map-reading, they miss the RV, they have to find their own

way home, no matter how far it may be, the best way they can. One party of three covered 56 miles in 23 hours through losing their way on a 14-mile cross country march.

**Use Initiative**

9. Candidates are given a sense of achievement and success, by using each man's special knowledge in instruction, lecturettes, brain trusts or discussions. They conduct their own ABCA, Agility Courses, Rock Climbing and Endurance Tests on long exercises where they **HAVE TO FINISH THE COURSE** as no transport can reach them. No man is **FORCED** to overcome obstacles; he is encouraged to overcome fear of heights, awkwardness and clumsiness by special practice and tuition by himself or by DS outside parade hours. He can only overcome them by his own efforts. Pushing a man off a high jump may well accentuate his nervousness.

10. The duty of the DS is **NOT** primarily to instruct, but to observe, encourage, report, prevent the teaching of false doctrine and prevent a course of action which will involve an undue risk of serious physical injury. If candidates lose their way they do **NOT** correct them; if they are likely to fall 10 feet into 6 feet of water a valuable lesson will be learned; but if they are likely to fall 60 feet onto rock it is the duty of the DS to suggest that there might be a better way. If such cannot be found by the reigning Pl Comd he is "killed off" and another appointed in his place.

11. To sum up, little alteration is needed to Col. Bernard Fergusson's statement of his job in preparing his Column for Wingate's Expedition into Burma in 1943.

"Our job is to make the men familiar with the mountains, self-sufficient in open country, skilled in woodcraft, tireless in marching, silent in movement, crafty in tactics, stealthy in nightwork, and, as for the comforts of life, 'content wi' little and canty wi' mair'.

# Letter from the Front

(ATM)

My Dear Paul:

Lately we've had one or two absolutely first-class parties. What has struck me particularly is the amazing similarity between war and realistic training; or, if you like, the equally amazing dissimilarity between war and unimaginative training. I wonder how many lives have been saved, in our battalion alone, by the lessons we learnt during the long months of training before "D" day? Incidentally, I'm told they've printed an account of one of our actions in a recent number of "Current Reports." I haven't seen it, of course, but you may be able to get hold of a copy.

We came into the-place-where-we-are-now at dusk the day before yesterday, amid scenes of enthusiasm and rejoicing never to be forgotten.

## Magnificent Maquis

The Maquis have been magnificent; and more than once they were a tremendous help to us by ringing up the next town to find out whether it was held and, if so, by what, and where.

That's the lot for the present. Enjoy the flesh-pots while you can.

TOM.

P.S.—I'm not being funny when I say that some of the stuff you sent us from Italy really has been useful; and though I don't intend to give an old hand like you any "tips from the front," I think you'd like to see this nicely-worded fragment about street fighting, which I have had from Peter. It makes rather a good tailpiece to the notes you sent me last Apr. The paragraph



on "How you rush a house" I have read before somewhere. I'm almost certain it comes from a training directive by General Chuykov, the defender of Stalingrad. "Let the grenade go in first, and then you follow" is perfect.

## Use of Cover

"Before storming a building you must work your way to within 30 yards, probably by crawling, using shell holes and ruins as cover. Trenches, too, can be dug at night and camouflaged to get a covered approach. The essential is: get within 30 yards before you storm.

"Be lightly armed with grenades. This is how you rush a house. Let the grenade go in first, and then you follow. Go through the whole house: first the grenade, then yourself. You need speed, drive, great initiative, and boldness, because the unexpected is sure to happen. You find yourself in a labyrinth of rooms, all full of dangers. Never mind. Chuck a grenade in every corner. Go on. Put a Tommy gun burst into the remains of the ceiling. The next room — another grenade. Comb it out with your Tommy gun.

Never dawdle. Don't be afraid if the enemy counter-attacks. You have the initiative; keep it.

# A WORD TO THE WISE

(ATM)

The strength of the British soldier lies in his adaptability, in his obstinacy in the face of adversity, and in a sense of humour that enables him to rise above almost unbelievable hardships and difficulties.

His weakness is a lack of imagination. Like the rest of mankind, he has the vices of his virtues, and the stolidity and equanimity with which he faces danger and discomfort are linked with a constitutional belief that the worst will not happen, and that there is no reason to expect the unexpected.

The lack of imagination, although he derives much of his strength from it, explains why it is so difficult to convince the soldier of the need to take his training seriously.

Unless this limitation is known and recognized, it will lead to unnecessary casualties. To overcome it during training must be the aim of every officer, whose background and training have taught him not only how to learn from others more experienced than himself, but also how to teach those who do not possess the same breadth of experience as he does.

## Alertness

The average soldier knows only two states of alertness. If he is convinced that the enemy will not come near him, he is not really watchful . . . In the second state, he is so alive to the possibility of enemy attack that he tries not to sleep at all; then, ultimately, he falls asleep from sheer exhaustion. An efficient system of reliefs (which ensures that, of each pair of men in a slit trench, one is awake and the other asleep at his feet, ready to be kicked into activity), can only be maintained if officers display untiring energy in organizing and supervising it.

The standard of efficiency in routine

sentry duties that is tolerated during training is the standard that must be expected in battle. The NCO who does not carry out his reliefs properly in camp is the NCO who will not carry out his reliefs properly in battle. It is the same with weapons. Men can become extraordinarily negligent. They crawl away into a dug-out to sleep, and, forgetting that sentries are mortal, leave their arms outside—as if they were inviting the enemy's patrols to seize the prisoners they had come to take.

## Digging

At last the soldier has learnt that, no matter how tired he may be, and no matter what hour of the day or night it is, he must dig in as soon as he occupies a new position. This standard must never be relaxed. What he has not yet learnt is how to make a slit trench in which he can handle his weapons. He usually gives more thought to comfort than to efficiency, and digs a trench that is far too wide and gives too little protection. Where building up is necessary, he is satisfied with a couple of sandbags instead of six feet of good solid earth.

## Platoon Position

Everyone is aware that in siting a platoon position the principle is that the whole platoon should be under voice control (and, if possible within sight) of a platoon commander; yet . . . what is so difficult to impress upon most junior commanders is that it is far more effective to have a strong, easily controlled, platoon area, covering the main lines of approach, than it is to have the sections so scattered that they can cover all the possible lines of approach.

## Use of Weapons

There was a time when the infantry had to be prevented from opening fire too early, and so betraying their posi-

tions. Now we have gone to the other extreme. Even when positions are separated by only short distances, and the localities of each side are reasonably accurately known to the other, it is often only with difficulty that the infantry can be persuaded to use their own small arms fire effectively. Such is their faith in the capability of our artillery and mortars to stop the enemy that they entirely overlook the fact that, if the enemy is determined to come forward, only small arms fire and the threat of the bayonet will stop him.

### **Fire and Movement**

The implications of fire and movement are not fully understood. Battle drills should be so framed that they make abundantly clear the difference between the broken battle—that is, advanced guard actions, pursuit, exploitation, and mopping up, in which the infantry work forward supported by their own fire—and an attack supported by an organized fire plan—in which the attacking troops must not stop to fire, and must understand that, from the moment they cross the start line until they reach their objective, they must go forward.

If this teaching is to succeed, it is important that the number of objectives allotted to a company should be strictly limited. When they are, the soldier gains added confidence. He knows that he is being given a possible task—the task of capturing a certain objective and holding it.

### **Reinforcements**

More often than not, lack of success in battle is due either to neglect of principles learnt during training, or to unrealistic or insufficient training, of which the commonest characteristic is the absence during field training of active service conditions—which are admittedly very difficult to reproduce. For this reason, the consequences of a lack of imagination are never more apparent than when reinforcements join

their comrades in battle for the first time. No matter how well trained they may be in other respects, very few have any conception of the realities of life on active service.

### **The Essentials**

Energy and ingenuity are the essential ingredients of successful training. When these are lacking, realism; and unless men have learnt something of the realities during training, they cannot be expected to make good reinforcements. They and the units they reinforce have to suffer the consequences together.

Commanders of training units, and of all units that have not yet been in action, have a grave responsibility. They will not discharge it unless they realize that not only the battle-worthiness but also the lives of their men will ultimately depend upon a constant emphasis, throughout their training, on the realities of field service.


### **Conclusion**

It is evident that the tactical doctrine of the Army is basically sound. Yet almost every man who returns from the battlefronts is eager to stress, particularly as being novel, some particular point which experience has taught him is a saver of lives or winner of battles. It does not occur to him that, in doing so, he is, if the point is a fundamental of accepted doctrine, making the tacit admission that he had not finished his training for war by the time he arrived on the battlefield, and that it was in fact the shells and bullets of the enemy that completed his schooling for him.

Let those who are still undergoing training see to it that the same fault cannot be imputed to them; and, **above all, let those responsible for organizing training spare neither themselves nor their subordinates in their determination to see that their training methods are the most thorough and the most realistic that it is possible to devise.**




# Passing it on!



## COCKING THE PIAT


A simple and quick method of cocking the PIAT has been developed at A15 Canadian Infantry Training Centre, Shilo Camp, Man. A15 has found this method very satisfactory, Nos. 1 and 2 on the weapon being able to cock the weapon and bring it into action with very little practice within three seconds. No. 1 on the weapon grasps the PIAT firmly as illustrated in the top photo. No. 2 rolls over onto his haunches, places the instep of the left foot against the trigger guard, grasps and releases the shoulder piece from the slot. The bottom photo shows the full cock. This is a time-saving idea and well worth using.






## AN IDEA FOR PIAT RANGE

The accompanying photos show the PIAT range at S4 Canadian Small Arms School (W.C.) at Nanaimo, B.C. This school has constructed many useful training aids, and the PIAT range is one of the valuable installations made to promote efficient instruction in weapon training. The top photo shows the soldier at the firing point ready to fire, while the bottom photo is a close-up of the dummy tank target on a track. By an ingenious arrangement of pulleys and wires, the target is pulled across the firer's front on a track. The target is used for practice "bombs" only. Another good piece of work done by S4 is an A/T miniature range which exercises gunners in fire orders for groups of tanks and also teaches leads.



# SIGHTING PRACTICE DEVICE



The following idea was extracted from "Basic Field Manual—Military Training Aids" and should prove helpful as a sighting practice device. The device, which is best used with the coach and pupil method of instruction, enables the trainee to look through the rear sight and direct the coach in moving the apparatus until the correct sight picture is obtained.

An empty tin can salvaged from the mess hall, a gummed white cloth reinforcement for loose-leaf notebook paper and a dab of black paint are all that are required for the construction of this gadget. The tin is cut into the shape shown on the accompanying drawings

with tin snips. The edges of the outer section are bent as indicated, so that when part "A" is inserted a slight friction exists when it is moved up and down. The friction may be adjusted by compressing overlapping flange "C" if necessary.


Hole "D" is formed by cutting a simple cross in the metal with a knife or chisel. The triangle corners thus formed are pushed outward and used as clamps to hold the device on the rifle barrel.

This training aid may be made locally by any handyman who has access to a pair of tin snips and a set of pliers.

## THE PIAT IS GOOD

Reports from operational theatres of war state that it has been found that PIATS, under favorable conditions, can knock out both Tigers and Panthers.

# SAFETY PRECAUTIONS




Regrettable accidents have occurred from time to time involving civilians who through ignorance or curiosity have come into illegal possession or tampered with live ammunition or explosives. When civilians have become victims of such accidents the primary responsibility rests on the military establishment concerned. Failure to guard training areas with adequate danger signs, lack of supervision in clearing areas of blinds and dangerous material, and illegal possession of material by troops, who may pass such material to friends for souvenirs, are only a few of the contributory causes.

Accidents might also be prevented if a suitable program of public education had been instituted in areas adjacent to training areas. In many cases children frequent training areas and ranges just to watch the soldiers. At times they have paid for their curiosity with their lives.

Fully alive to this danger, S17 Canadian School of Infantry, Vernon, B.C., promoted a safety precautions campaign. A window display (shown in the accompanying photo) of dangerous bombs, grenades, explanatory cards, warnings and a district map showing training areas did much to interest the general public. This display was followed up by lectures to school children and displays of dangerous material.

Similar action might well be taken by other training centres.

## ANOTHER BUTT-MEASURING DEVICE



Another butt-measuring device comes to CATM from No. 20 C.I. (B) T.C., Brantford, Ont. The equipment was constructed from the end of a rifle butt and a flat piece of thin board, the board being fastened to the butt piece as shown in this illustration. Sizes are marked on the board, as shown. In order to clearly depict the method in which this equipment is used, the soldier is shown measuring with the arm upright. In actual practice, however, the arm is held **IN FRONT OF THE BODY** and parallel to the ground. This device has been found very effective in fitting rifles and the idea is offered here for your use. Try it!

### CHAPLAIN SERVICE

(Continued from page 9)

The padre shares the dangers and rigours of warfare with his comrades. He ministers to the wounded and dying. As far as possible he writes letters to all next-of-kin of deceased personnel. He writes many other letters for men who are wounded or who have special difficulties. Many family worries have been cleared up by co-operation between chaplain in the field and in Canada.

### Meet Your Padre

The young soldier should make a point of meeting his chaplain soon after he joins the army. He will usually have an office and regular office hours. The recruit should not wait until he has some difficult problem. Friendship with the padre may help him to avoid such. He will not find him a man who

is trying to ram a point of view down his throat. He will find him a kind, wise, and friendly man and one who represents the highest ideals our race has known. He represents also the principle of divine authority in human life. Every true chaplain believes that he has been appointed to speak for God to his comrades.


The Chaplain also represents the church which ordained him. Behind him is a great body of people who have been willing, with considerable sacrifice, to release their ministers in order to make this work for the soldiers possible. Several hundred ministers cannot be taken from a small population such as ours without greatly crippling the general work of the church. This only serves to demonstrate the way in which all people of good will in Canada want to support the men and women in the forces to the limit of their ability.

# Amendment to

## SCHEDULE of COURSES-FIRST QUARTER 1945

### as published in CATM No. 45

School and No. of Course	Course	Course	Vacancies	
	Begins	Ends	Offrs	ORs
<b>Royal Military College—Kingston, Ont.</b>				
11 CWSC (Intermediate Wing).....	24 Jan 45	11 Jul 45		
<b>Delete</b>				
11 CWIC (Mil Int Wing)				
12 CWIC (Mil Int Wing)				
13 CWIC (German Refresher Wing)				
14 CWIC (German Refresher Wing)				
11 CWIC (Fd Security (Offrs) Wing)				
24 CWIC (Fd Security (ORs) Wing)				
25 CWIC (Fd Security (ORs) Wing)				
<b>S2 Cdn Artillery School—Petawawa, Ont.</b>				
<b>Delete</b>				
Serial 43(a) Obs of Fire				
Serial 44 Tp Comds				
<b>No. 1 CWAC(A)TC—Ste. Anne de Bellevue, P.Q.</b>				
Practical Domestic Science No. 6.....	8 Jan 45	27 Jan 45		
Practical Domestic Science No. 7.....	29 Jan 45	17 Feb 45		
Practical Domestic Science No. 8.....	26 Feb 45	17 Mar 45		
Practical Domestic Science No. 9.....	19 Mar 45	7 Apr 45		
<b>A22 CAMCTC—Camp Borden, Ont.</b>				
10th Army Chiropradists Course.....	24 Mar 45	21 Apr 45		
<b>S3 CSAS—Long Branch, Ont.</b>				
<b>Delete</b>				
1083 6 pr A tk Gun				
1084 6 pr A tk Gun				
1085 6 pr A tk Gun				
1086 6 pr A tk Gun				
5 Inf Range Finder				
6 Inf Range Finder				
1018 3 in Mortar				
1019 3 in Mortar				
<b>A5 CETC—Petawawa Mil Camp</b>				
Mines and Booby Traps Course No. 1..	15 Jan 45	27 Jan 45	15	15
Mines and Booby Traps Course No. 2..	29 Jan 45	10 Feb 45	15	15
Mines and Booby Traps Course No. 3..	12 Feb 45	24 Feb 45	15	15
<b>A6 CETC—Chilliwack, B.C.</b>				
Mines and Booby Traps Course No. 1..	15 Jan 45	27 Jan 45	11	11



Before operating an army motion picture projector all projectionists must be properly trained and in possession of Certificate of Projectionist Training MFM 370. The projectionist must know how to revise film.


The projectionist must carry out revision so as to ensure that films are properly spliced and re-wound and that the films are properly identified by the containers. Failure to revise will result in embarrassing and time-wasting "accidents."

Condition of the films is usually a

reflection of the care with which revision has been carried out. This in turn is a reflection of the industry of the projectionist and of the direction and supervision he has received from the Senior Projectionist and the officer in charge.

Previews of all new training films and use of proper technique in presentation are vital factors, but they become ineffective if the film itself is not in proper condition when shown.

Film revision is a **"MUST."**



## NEW TRAINING FILMS

(For your infm the following Training Films have recently been distributed or are being distributed during the current month)

### 1. Aircraft Recognition

- (a) C-786 "Testcraft III" (10 mins)
- (b) C-808 "Testcraft IV" (11 mins)
  - (i) Two of a series of trg films designed for testing personnel in aircraft recognition. The films consist of brief shots of approx 20 aircraft so arranged as to allow just sufficient time between each exposure for the class to write the name of the aircraft depicted.
  - (ii) Distributed to Pacific Comd and MD 6 HQ Film Libraries, and also to S-1 CC&AAAS and A-23 CC&AAATC.

### 2. AFV—Weapons

- (a) C-532 "Gun 37mm—Mechanism" (19 mins)
  - (i) Diagrammatic explanation of the op of the loading, firing and automatic firing mechanism.
  - (ii) Distributed to A-33 CACTE and A-21 CO&EMETC.

### 3. Artillery—AA

- (a) C-724 "Radio Location Pt VIII" (15 mins)
  - (i) Principles and practical examples of target selection ("PPI" Display).
  - (ii) Distributed to Pacific Comd, "W" Force, and MD 6 HQ Film Libraries, and also to S-1 CC&AAAS, A-23 CC&AAATC and A-36 C Radar TC.

### 4. Artillery—A tk

- (a) C-571 "Gun 17 Pr A tk—Recoil System" (45 mins)
  - (i) Description and op of the recoil system and procedure for maint in the fd.
  - (ii) Distributed to A-3 CATC and A-21 CO&EMETC.
- (b) C-572 "Gun 17 Pr A tk—Sights, Sight Testing and Zeroing" (13 mins)
  - (i) Title self-explanatory.
  - (ii) Distributed to A-3 CATC and A-21 CO&EMETC.

### 5. Bridging

- (a) C-505 "FBE Mk III—The Trestle" (30 mins)
  - (i) Depicts method of construction of the trestle and its use.
  - (ii) Distributed to A-5 CETC, A-6 CETC and No. 1 Trg Bde Gp.

### 6. Infantry

- (a) C-474 "Camouflage and Fieldcraft—Prepare for Battle" (14 mins)
  - (i) Personal cam of the man, his weapons and eqpt; the use of cam nets; the elimination of shine, shape and shadow.
  - (ii) Distributed to Pac Comd, District and Camp HQ Film Libraries, and also to all Basic Trg Centres and Corps Trg Centres doing Pt I trg.

### 7. Obstacles

- (a) C-747 "German Wooden Box Mine" (13 mins)
- (b) C-748 "Italian 4 Igniter Mine" (6 mins)
  - (i) Two films which give details of the construction and op of the mines mentioned, and which demonstrate methods of detection and neutralization.
  - (ii) Distributed to all Basic Trg Centres, Corps Trg Centres doing Pt I trg, 0-1 OTC, S-3 and S-4 CSAS's, and No. 1 Trg Bde Gp.

### 8. Security

- (a) A-128 "Jig Saw" (38 mins)
  - (i) A Royal Navy trg film which tells a story of how lives and ships are lost through careless talk—the "unimportant" pieces of infm which are overheard by enemy agents and which, when put together, provide complete details of Allied ops.
  - (ii) Distributed to Pac Comd, District and Camp HQ Film Libraries.

### 9. General Training

- (a) TF21-2056 "By Your Command" (25 mins)
  - (i) One of the US "Fighting Men" series, emphasizing the responsibility of the pl comd in fitting himself to lead his men, in ensuring they are well-trained, and of always being primarily conscious of their welfare.
  - (ii) Distributed to Pac Comd, District and Camp HQ Film Libraries, and also to 0-1 OTC, No. 1 Trg Bde Gp, A-7 CSTC and A-21 CO&EMETC.



## ARTILLERY

(Continued from page 13)

dense artillery concentrations in hurricane preliminary bombardments.

So, simultaneously in attack and in defense, artillery began to recover any ground which it may have lost temporarily and to re-establish its ancient prestige.

### Gun More Accurate

I have spoken of the vast superiority of the aircraft to the gun in flexibility and range. The gun has an equivalent superiority in accuracy. . . And if artillery fire be less accurate by night than by day, because in the latter case it can be observed and directed from the ground or from the air, it nevertheless maintains by night its superiority over the aircraft. Moreover, a mass bombardment, which is in either case fired from the map, is as accurate by night as by day. On the Italian front the Germans have on numerous occasions shown themselves more afraid of the little, slow, low-flying artillery aircraft of the Allies than of any other type.

I think it reasonable to assert that the outstanding artillery development of this war is the self-propelled or mobile gun. Early in the war I interviewed an artillery expert on its possibilities. He pointed out the difficulty of obtaining enough stability in any form of truck platform, mentioning earlier experiments with a lorry-borne 18-pr. I then spoke of a tractor carriage. His reply was: "Then you have nearly got a tank. Why not have a whole tank? It's better in the long run." We now know that he was wrong.

**The turretless tank chassis will carry a bigger and more powerful gun—or howitzer, if desired—than the tank. It does not confine the vision of the detachment. It certainly will not fulfil the functions of**

**a tank, but though a tank can itself be used effectively as a mobile gun, the self-propelled gun will prove a great deal more effective. In particular, it goes a long way towards solving the problem of long-range support of tanks or any other highly mobile forces in the course of a rapid advance.**

The development of the antiaircraft gun mostly took place between the two wars, but that of the antitank gun, longer delayed, has been more recent. As tanks were improved in the strength of their armour and the range of their guns, armies sought heavier and longer-range antitank artillery. Yet it would appear that there must always be a limit in these respects, because the antitank gun must be highly mobile.

### Little Change

Field artillery has changed comparatively little. Its range and hitting-power have been improved, and in most cases, including that of our 25-pr, it can be used with either the flat trajectory of a field gun or the high trajectory of a field howitzer. What we now call medium artillery, of or about six inches in calibre, has also not altered very much from the "marks" we were using by the end of the last war, but is no less indispensable than then. Heavy artillery has been in great part relegated to coast defense and the siege train, though I am not sure that we ourselves have not gone too far in the matter, and that we do not require more heavy artillery support for our armies.

Within the scope of this article it is not possible to deal with the technical side of what is nowadays called predicted fire, but it may be said that artillery can now be brought into action in a new position, and in country which the detachments have never seen, much more rapidly than was formerly the case.

## QUEEN OF BATTLE

(Continued from page 4)

**by every Infanteer, but the N.C.O. and junior officer must have still additional qualifications. Their self-confidence must be based upon a mastery of all that is required of their men, but, in addition, they must have those very-hard-to-describe qualities of man-mastership and leadership. There is no greater privilege or responsibility in life than that of leading men in battle.**

Development of one ability adequately to discharge this great responsibility is the most important task in a junior officer's life. He has on his shoulders responsibility for the accomplishment of his task and for the lives of the men who serve under his command. It is invariably true that a good unit means a good commanding officer, and that statement is quite as true of a platoon as of a battalion, for

## PRISONER SENSE

(Continued from page 5)

for the sake of emphasis, but the result was generally the same. Jones, who probably would have stood firm in the face of torture, fell victim to the simplest of all ruses.

At this point we will assume, no doubt incorrectly, that you wouldn't think of going near a battle or an enemy line without first having emptied your pockets of all written material.

You hadn't thought about it?

Then pay attention, if you please, to another case.

A Marine private whom we shall call Psmith had the misfortune to be taken prisoner during the late September fighting on Guadalcanal. . . The Japanese, in searching him, came upon two items that were singularly revealing.

good platoons make good companies and good companies make good battalions.

There is a further reason why the junior leader must continually apply himself to the process of improving his qualities of leadership and man-management. Every Army, and the Canadian Army is no exception, suffers severe casualties at times. The vacancies must be filled by promotion, frequently very rapid promotion. There is a continual demand for the right kind of junior leaders.

## Every Day Must Count

So I say to you, make every day count in your training. Tomorrow you may be called to heavier responsibility. Your success in the larger job will depend upon the use you have made of the opportunities for learning which are yours today.


We are engaged in a gigantic task which calls for the best in each of us. The time it will take to finish the job depends upon how good our best really is.

**One was a counterfoil bearing the legend, "Star and Garter Burlesque House, September 2", and the other was a page of a letter from a girl, who wrote, ". . . and I don't care what you say, there ought to be some place for me on one of those 13 boats!"**

From these scraps the Japs gleaned the information that the Marines on Guadalcanal had been substantially reinforced, and they withdrew to previously prepared positions, as the saying goes. Thus, through Psmith's carelessness, the Japs saved themselves considerable losses.

**MORAL:** Never get near the enemy with any written material on you or even with any markings on your clothes; not even a laundry mark.

THIS MONTH'S COVER . . .



CATM dedicates its cover this month to the **CANADIAN CHAPLAIN SERVICE**. Men of this Corps accompany soldiers to all battlefronts and face with them the common danger in the exercise of their duty.



Next Month—**THE ROYAL CANADIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS**

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