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# CATM

NUMBER 47

*Capt. B. B. Barry* FEBRUARY 1945



**THE ROYAL CANADIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS**

## **SOCRATES ON WAR**

*(From Current Reports from Overseas)*

The general must know how to get his men, their rations, and every other kind of stores needed for war. He must have imagination to originate plans, practical sense and energy to carry them through. He must be observant, untiring, shrewd; kindly and cruel; simple and crafty; a watchman and a robber; lavish and miserly; generous and stingy; rash and conservative. All these and many other qualities, natural and acquired, he must have. He should also, as a matter of course, know his tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building material is a house.—SOCRATES.

# Amendment to SCHEDULE of COURSES-FIRST QUARTER 1945 as published in CATM No. 45 and amended in CATM No. 46

School and No. of Course	Course Begins	Course Ends	Vacancies Offrs	OR
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### **A32 C Pro C TC Camp Borden, Ont.**

Amend dates as follows:

5th CWAC Provost Course.....	15 Jan 45	10 Feb 45		
6th CWAC Provost Course.....	19 Feb 45	17 Mar 45		
Add:				
7th CWAC Provost Course.....	26 Mar 45	21 Apr 45		

### **School of Instruction—Special to Arm TCs**

Amend dates as follows:

AIs Course Serial 64.....	29 Jan 45	10 Mar 45		
AIs Course Serial 65.....	19 Mar 45	28 Apr 45		

### **S3 CSAS Long Branch, Ont.**

Amend 970 Physical Training to read 940 Physical Training

Add:			Offrs	OR
5 Inf Range Finder.....	26 Jan 45	9 Feb 45	5	8
1019 3 in Mortar.....	9 Feb 45	9 Mar 45	5	8
1085 6 pr A tk Gun.....	9 Mar 45	30 Mar 45	5	8

### **Instrs Trg Wing**

#### **Technique of Instr and Drill and Duties**

Amend dates of both courses as follows:

Serial 1.....	3 Jan 45	16 Jan 45		
Serial 2.....	17 Jan 45	31 Jan 45		
Serial 3.....	1 Feb 45	15 Feb 45		
Serial 4.....	16 Feb 45	2 Mar 45		
Serial 5.....	4 Mar 45	17 Mar 45		
Serial 6.....	19 Mar 45	2 Apr 45		

### **Rifle Coaching**

Amend dates as follows:

Serial 2.....	10 Jan 45	23 Jan 45		
Serial 3.....	26 Jan 45	7 Feb 45		
Serial 4.....	9 Feb 45	21 Feb 45		
Serial 5.....	23 Feb 45	7 Mar 45		
Serial 6.....	9 Mar 45	21 Mar 45		
Serial 7.....	23 Mar 45	4 Apr 45		

Delete all detail regarding Serial 8 and subsequent courses

School and No. of Course	Course Begins	Course Ends	Vacancies	
			Offrs	OR

**Royal Military College, Kingston, Ont.**

Amend dates as follows:

11 CWSC (Intermediate Wing).....	24 Jan 45	10 Jul 45		
6 CWSC (Junior Wing).....	4 Apr 45	27 Jun 45		

**A11 CMGTC—Camp Borden, Ont.**

Add:

4.2 in Mortar (Offrs).....	22 Jan 45	24 Mar 45		
4.2 in Mortar (Offrs).....	26 Mar 45	26 May 45		
Vickers MMG (Offrs).....	19 Feb 45	5 May 45		
4.2 in Mortar (NCOs).....	8 Jan 45	3 Feb 45		
4.2 in Mortar (NCOs).....	5 Mar 45	31 Mar 45		
Vickers MMG (NCOs).....	5 Feb 45	3 Mar 45		
Vickers MMG (NCOs).....	2 Apr 45	28 Apr 45		

**S2 Cdn Artillery School—Petawawa Mil Camp**

Amend "Serial GPOs—4 Mar 45—31 Mar 45"

to read "Serial 46 GPOs—18 Mar 45—14 Apr 45"

**A22 CAMCTC—Camp Borden, Ont.**

Add:

			Offrs	OR
31st Hyg & Sanitation Regt Offrs				
(Non-Med).....	5 Feb 45	9 Feb 45	25	—
32nd Hyg & Sanitation Regt Offrs				
(Non-Med).....	5 Mar 45	9 Mar 45	25	—
26th Regt Sanitary Duties (OR).....	13 Feb 45	22 Feb 45	—	30
27th Regt Sanitary Duties (OR).....	6 Mar 45	15 Mar 45	—	30

**A6 CETC—Chilliwack, B.C.**

Add:

**Photo Interpretation Wing, Esquimalt, B.C.**

			Offrs	OR
Photo Using Instrs.....	22 Jan 45	17 Feb 45	25	—

# MEN FROM THE DOMINIONS

By Arnold Haskell and Taylor Milne

## CURRENT AFFAIRS

*Issued fortnightly  
by*

THE ARMY BUREAU  
OF CURRENT AFFAIRS

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# WE'RE IN IT TOGETHER

**W**E are all members of the British Empire, which is geographically, socially and spiritually different from all other empires. As a political structure it ranks with the United States on the one side, and the Soviet Union on the other, yet is quite unlike either. We tend sometimes to be affected with a self-consciousness about it, and our collective ignorance of its organisation and purpose could be called comprehensive. There is no need for the one, or excuse for the other. This bulletin, therefore, deals with a part of it in broad outline, and invites you to consider and discuss the self-governing Dominions.

Paradoxically, this is not one of the subjects of which it could be said that your group know all the answers between them. You may be surprised at the amount that you cannot elicit, and even a little alarmed or horrified at what you yourself don't know. So this bulletin can probably best be used as the basis for an ABCA session of the informative type.

However you decide to take the discussion it might be best to loosen up with a very simple Quiz. Here are some of the questions and their answers:—

## THE ABC IN QUESTION FORM

1. Which are the five Dominions and their capitals? [*Canada : Ottawa. Australia : Canberra. New Zealand : Wellington. South Africa : Cape Town and Pretoria. Eire : Dublin.*]
2. One former Dominion has lost its status. Which is it and how is it governed? [*Newfoundland, run by a Commission responsible to the United Kingdom since 1933.*]
3. Are any Mandates administered for the League of Nations by the Dominions? (Yes. *Southwest Africa, by South Africa ; British New Guinea, by Australia ; Western Samoa, by New Zealand ; Nauru Island, jointly by Britain, Australia and New Zealand.*)
4. What is the population of the various Dominions? [*Canada : 11,419,896. Australia : 7,137,000. New Zealand : 1,640,901. South Africa : 2,192,185 Europeans, 7,873,786 Non-Europeans. Eire : 2,989,700.*]
5. Who are the Dominion Prime Ministers, and what parties do they represent? [*Canada : Mackenzie King, Liberal. Australia : Curtin, Labour. New Zealand : Fraser, Labour. South Africa : Smuts, United Party. Eire : de Valera, Fianna Fail.*]

These would do for a start. You can devise other questions, and find the answers in the bulletin.

Now what about the main body of the session? First of all you must be clear in your own mind what the purpose of your ABCA is going to be. In this instance it is to inform your group briefly and simply about the Dominions and our own relations with them.

The Introduction to *Current Affairs*, No. 77, gave you some hints on the technique of running this type of discussion, drawn up at the ABCA College at Harlech.

## STRAIGHT FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH

Here are some more tips from the same stable. They have been adapted slightly to this bulletin.

1. **Statement.** The period must have unity. The officer should begin by trying to state to himself in a sentence or two what he hopes to do. Thus: "Today we're going to consider the Dominions, the part they're playing in the war, and our relations with them afterwards." From this he should develop his main headings.

2. **Main Headings.** Keep to a few simple headings and put them on the blackboard. Thus: "Men from the Dominions."

"(I) Who are they?" (pp 4-9.)

"(II) Do we act together?" (pp. 10-13.)

"(III) What of the future?" (pp. 13-16.)

Avoid overloading. You can't get all the material in this bulletin into one session, so don't try. Select what you are going to use in each section.

3. **Presentation.** The starting point of any subject is the interests and experience of the audience.

Some at least of your men and women will have met Canadians, an occasional one will have come across Australians or New Zealanders, perhaps even a South African. What were they like? Did they speak English? Had they got British names?

Members of your group are likely to have relatives in the Dominions. Bring this out. If anyone has visited or better still lived and worked in one of them, use him freely. The object of these opening questions is to elicit existing knowledge, arouse interest, define the purpose and make your general statement.

Plan the presentation of each section.

4. **Running the Period.** Officers are not expected to know all the answers. They should not normally end a talk with "Now who wants to ask me any questions?" It is difficult to be a One Man Brains Trust. Questions, if of general interest, should be used to promote discussion by referring to the group for the answer. If there is no answer, or a doubtful one, the officer should then give the correct answer. If he doesn't know he should find out by next time. (Reference books are provided for Unit Libraries.)

Sum up the period by reiterating the main facts and opinions under the three headings.

Remember that there is no single method of taking ABCA. Each officer must experiment in order to get the best out of himself and his men."

# Men from the Dominions

By Arnold Haskell and  
Taylor Milne



## I. Who Are They ?

**D**URING your period of Army Service you will have come across many men from the overseas Dominions. The Canadian Forces have been our close neighbours in the British Isles for over four years and our comrades in many adventures, before this last great invasion of the European continent side by side. In the Middle East, North Africa and Italy, or in India and the Far East, we have learned to respect Australians, New Zealanders and South Africans as good fighters and good companions.

### 1. They Aren't Colonials

Though they come from the four quarters of the globe we find that we have a great deal in common with them. Yet they are not just Englishmen, Welshmen, Scotsmen and Irishmen overseas. Indeed, as you may have discovered, there are as many French-speaking as English-speaking Canadians, and rather more South Africans with Dutch, French or German names than with typically British names. It is true that they may speak affectionately of the "Old Country," for a chance to visit which many have made great sacrifices. They are not so keen on talk about "Mother England," which conjures up the image of a benign Victorian matron in a starched apron surrounded by her grubby, boisterous, lusty lads. Even more irritating is the "Elder Brother" image, with its atmosphere of patronage. Above all we should avoid the use of that word "Colonial," when referring to a national of one of the Dominions.

### 2. We Have a Common Allegiance

It is many decades now since the term "colony" could be applied to a self-governing Dominion. Canadians have been managing their own affairs since before 1867, when the word "Dominion" was first used to describe the new relationship between the Anglo-French Confederation of Canada and the British Crown. Australia and New Zealand followed parallel paths towards self-government and were described as Dominions in the years 1901 and 1907 respectively. After the South African War the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 with Dominion status; and in 1922 the Anglo-Irish treaty recognised




the Irish Free State, which we now call Eire, as having the same status as Canada.

All the Dominions, along with Great Britain, are now recognised as "Autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate to one another in any respect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."\*

When you talk about his country to a Canadian you will, therefore, find him either indignant or rather amused if you speak as though Canada "belonged" to Britain. You may not put it quite as obviously as that. Yet many people still seem to have a hazy idea that the Dominions owe "loyalty" to Britain, even in some mysterious way to themselves as individuals.

### 3. They Don't Belong to Us

The facts are very different. John Buchan who, as Lord Tweedsmuir, was a popular Governor-General of Canada, once pointed out that "a Canadian's first loyalty is . . . to Canada and to Canada's King." When King George VI visited Canada in June, 1939, he took up residence for a few days in the Governor-General's House at Ottawa and gave his royal assent to a number of Bills passed by the Canadian Parliament, just as he does in London for Bills passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It is because the King cannot be in several places at once that the Governor-General in each Dominion acts in his name.



*In each Dominion the powers and prerogatives of the Crown are vested in a Governor-General. Under the new Eire Constitution of 1937 the functions of the Governor-General are performed by an elected President.*

\* Balfour Declaration, 1926, confirmed by Statute of Westminster, 1931.

Your Canadian friend, then, feels himself first and foremost a Canadian, and has every reason to do so. He has got his own King (who is also ours), he has his own elected Parliament making all the laws under which he lives. And his law-courts are not subject to any body outside Canada; appeals from the Dominions used at one time to come to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council sitting in London; but various laws passed in Canada and the other Dominions have considerably limited this procedure.

After some acquaintance with Canadians you will cease to annoy them by confusing the accent of Ontario or British Columbia with the so-called "American accent" (which actually varies a good deal from state to state). Nevertheless, the Canadian manner of speaking English is quite distinct from the accents we are familiar with in the British Isles. The Australians and New Zealanders, too, have ways all their own of pronouncing English, and different in each country. South Africans have still more distinctive accents, perhaps because so many of them are used to speaking Afrikaans as well.

#### **4. They Are Developing National Characteristics**

Socially and culturally the Dominions continue to draw much inspiration from Britain; they read British magazines and books; they see British plays and occasionally British films; they play British games and follow British customs; in a hundred small ways they come into daily contact with British ideas. But they are developing traditions of their own, and other powerful influences are at work. The American movie and the American automobile go everywhere. Canadians play baseball and ice-hockey in preference to cricket and football. They are not only tied up geographically and economically with the United States of America, but they find much that is congenial in the American "way of life." In lesser degree this is true of the other Dominions.

The Dominions have already attained a *positive* nationality of their own. They are not just borrowing ideas from other people; they are separate entities in a cultural sense. Their servicemen in Britain can put on as good—and as distinctive—an art show as any we can display. They are producing talented musicians and composing characteristic music. Their young and vigorous literature is well worth reading. They have become nations in every sense of the word.

#### **5. Is the Empire Breaking-up?**



Do all these signs of self-reliance and independence mean that the British Commonwealth is finished? The Nazis would like to think so. It has been a constant theme of their propaganda both during the war and before. Before the Meetings of British Commonwealth Prime Ministers in May this year, Dr. Schmidt, the mouthpiece of Ribbentrop, was hard at work trying to persuade the world that the meeting was a sort of inquest on the body, "just as though the daughters were gathering round the deathbed of the Imperial Mother, at pains

**COMMONWEALTH LANDS AND PEOPLES**

**UNITED KINGDOM**

Area: 96,000 square miles

Pop. 48,000,000



to show consideration for one another, while the sons-in-law in the anteroom were loudly disputing about the heritage."


The results of the Conference must have been bitterly disappointing to Herr Schmidt and his masters. For not only did the Prime Ministers of the Dominions pledge their countries "... to continue in the general war with the utmost of our strength until the defeat and downfall of our cruel, barbarous foes," but they added that "when victory is won and peace returns, this same free association, this inherent unity of purpose, will make us able to do further service to mankind."

It is generally agreed that the whole future of civilisation depends on our close collaboration with the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the Chinese Republic. It should be realised that when we speak of "our" collaboration we are thinking of the nations of the British Commonwealth, not of the United Kingdom alone. With her geographical position and resources, dense population of highly-skilled workers, world-wide ramifications and great prestige, Great Britain is a powerful nation on her own account. But there are vital new resources which we lack. We are also cramped for room to grow food and handle aircraft.

**6. Would it Matter to Us?**

The Dominions have plenty of wide, open spaces, but they lack people—Canada has a mere 11½ million, Australia only 7 million, South Africa 2 million whites and New Zealand less than 2 million. Though all have made immense strides forward during the war, their industrial development is still in its early stages. More than one speaker in a recent Parliamentary debate drew the obvious conclusion. "Judged by standards of population and resources, neither Britain nor the Dominions, taken separately, can stand on the same level as Russia and the United States." So if we want to make our weight felt, the peoples of the British Commonwealth must act together.

Moreover, the war has brought home to us the unpleasant truth that in these days of bombing aircraft and paratroops, the flying-bomb and the long-range rocket, Great Britain is no longer secure behind her Moat, useful as the English Channel still is. In this connection it is well to remember how the Dominions stood by us in the dark days of 1940 and 1941. We were very glad to have Canadian troops in Britain at that time; and both New Zealand and Australian forces



were here on guard beside them. Alone we are very vulnerable nowadays, "just a small island in the mists of the North Sea," as Dr. Goebbels kindly reminds us. As part of a system we have not only physical strength, but the strength of example.

### 7. Something of Which to be Proud

"The successful launching of her former colonies among the nations of the world, while they remain members of an inner Britannic circle, will ever rank as one of the most outstanding achievements

of British political genius. Forms and formulas may still have to be adjusted, but the real work is done." This tribute is of especial value coming from a true product of the Commonwealth and a former opponent of Great Britain, Field-Marshal Smuts.

Perhaps as a reaction from a former jingo attitude, we in Britain were inclined in the years before the war to be shy, even suspicious of such compliments. Diffidence and self-criticism can, however, be carried to dangerous lengths. Both in 1914 and in 1939 Germany deduced from our apathetic attitude the complete disintegration of the British Empire under the impact of war.

## II. Do We Act Together ?

### 1. The Test of War

Contrary to enemy expectations, this war has again shown that the British Commonwealth is "a real League of Nations," to quote Field-Marshal Smuts once more. When hostilities broke out in 1939, the Dominions were not bound by Britain's declaration of war on Germany on September 3rd. It is true that Australia and New Zealand declared themselves instantly at war; before France did, indeed. Canada, however, awaited a vote of her Parliament which was given a few days later. Field-Marshal Smuts in South Africa led a war party which overcame the neutrality policy of the then Prime Minister, General Hertzog. Eire decided to stand out.

During the war there have been a number of treaties made by Great Britain with foreign powers, which have not bound the Dominions, notably the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1941. Although it is understood that the Dominions were consulted beforehand, they were not in fact parties to this treaty. The Atlantic Charter itself was originally a joint Declaration by the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, "representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom." All the Dominions afterwards subscribed to it, but they need not have done.

Our system certainly calls for "frequent and immediate consultation," which was difficult to achieve when first laid down at the Imperial Conference in 1893, but fully possible in these air-minded days. The problem therefore hinges largely on the value that we give to the word "consultation," and in finding the best manner in which to arrive at common decisions and in putting them into practice.

### 2. Does Britain Manage the Empire ?

In a speech at Adelaide in October, 1943, Mr. Curtin, the Prime Minister of Australia, made a remark which attracted wide attention. "I do not believe," he said, "that the Mother Country can manage the Empire merely on the basis of pure Government sittings in London."

This statement was the subject of a highly informative debate in the British House of Lords, on November 2nd, 1943. In the course of the debate, Viscount Cranborne, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, gave some facts about how the machinery of consultation is developing to meet the needs of war. "There are not less than six channels of communication between the different Governments of the Empire," he stated, and he went on to describe them as follows:—

### 3. Six Channels of Communication

(1) *The normal communication between Government and Government through the Dominions Office in London and the Departments of External Affairs in the Dominions.*

(2) *Communications with the Dominion Governments and Prime*

*Ministers personally* through the United Kingdom High Commissioners in the Dominions and in the reverse direction through the Dominion High Commissioners in London.

(3) *Daily meetings between the Dominion Secretary and the Dominion High Commissioners in London.* They are also attended by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, the Permanent Under-Secretary and a high official of the Foreign Office. These meetings are now reinforced by monthly meetings between the Dominion High Commissioners and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, with the Dominions Secretary in attendance.

(4) *Representation of the Dominions in the War Cabinet,* if desired.

All the Dominion Prime Ministers who have visited London during the war have sat in the War Cabinet. In his two visits to Canada Mr. Churchill sat in the Canadian Cabinet.

(5) *Visits by Dominion Ministers to this country and United Kingdom Ministers to the Dominions.* These have been frequent during the war.

(6) "*On the lower and technical level*" the Ministries of Food, Supply, Air, War Transport and others, have missions or representatives in the various Dominions. Equally the Dominions have their own liaison officers here—military, naval, air, supply and so on.

Lord Cranborne added that he believed these methods for Consultation had "proved satisfactory to the Dominions and had met most of the needs of wartime conditions. No doubt much of this machinery will continue after the war."

He alluded to Mr. Curtin's suggestion of a standing Empire Consultative Council with its own secretariat and quoted Mr. Churchill's reply to a question about this particular proposal: "Such spacious issues would be appropriate for an Imperial Conference or for a meeting of Dominion Prime Ministers whenever either of these becomes possible."

#### **4. The Prime Ministers Confer**

The Declaration issued by the British Commonwealth Prime Ministers at the end of their meetings last May does not, in fact, go into detail about methods of future collaboration. It asserts that there is cordial agreement on war strategy and on foreign policy between the Dominions, that after the war a world organisation to maintain peace and security should be set up, and that the British Commonwealth of Nations will be able to do "further service to mankind."

Doubtless many momentous issues were discussed at these meetings, but we shall probably not know about them for some time. The Conference was, however, preceded by a two-day debate in Parliament on imperial affairs, and another on foreign affairs followed it. The visiting Premiers have also explained their individual viewpoints in public statements before, during and since the Conference. Briefly they may be summarised as follows:—

### **(a) Canada**

Speaking in London on May 11th to members of both Houses of Parliament, the Canadian Prime Minister made his attitude clear: "Let us by all means seek to improve where we can, but in considering new methods of organisation we cannot be too careful to see that, to our own peoples, the new methods will not appear as an attempt to limit their freedom of decision, or to peoples outside the Commonwealth, as an attempt to establish a separate *bloc*."

What are these proposed new methods of organisation to which Mr. Mackenzie King refers? The other Commonwealth Prime Ministers have all referred to them.

### **(b) Australia**

Mr. Curtin wants to see better machinery of imperial constitution set up—more frequent meetings of Prime Ministers, perhaps an Empire Advisory Council with a permanent Commonwealth Secretariat. On this Council either special representatives or the resident High Commissioners would sit. "As Governments come and go, in order to have some continuity of study there ought to be that kind of organised secretariat which each Government has for itself, within its own territorial jurisdiction."

On his return to Australia after the Conference Mr. Curtin told the Parliament at Canberra that he did not seek to convert his friend Mr. Mackenzie King to his views, nor could he accept from Australia's point of view Mr. King's opinion that the present increase of co-operation had worked with complete success. "The Meeting was not an exclusive British Commonwealth *bloc* seeking its own selfish ends," but, he observed, "I do not doubt that the unity of the British Commonwealth will give his Majesty's subjects everywhere authority in future consultations with other countries. . . . Our readiness to associate in world organisation does not lessen the realism of our membership of the British Commonwealth."

### **(c) New Zealand**

Like Mr. Curtin, Mr. Fraser would welcome more frequent meetings of Prime Ministers and Ministers of External Affairs. He told pressmen that he had still an open mind about the Central Empire Secretariat idea of Mr. Curtin.

One would expect the Southern Pacific Dominions to have similar policies and, in fact, by the Canberra Convention, signed by Australia and New Zealand in 1943:—

"The two Governments agree to promote the establishment at the earliest possible date of a regional organisation with advisory powers, which could be called the South Seas Regional Commission and on which, in addition to representatives of Australia and New Zealand, there might be accredited representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and of the French Committee of National Liberation."

#### **(d) South Africa**

Field-Marshal Smuts looks forward to "a new world organisation for peace—supported and buttressed by appropriate regional groupings." In such regional groups would all the Powers concerned share the framing of policy for the whole area? Or would they be merely technical bodies for the discussion of common problems of health, agriculture, and the like? Probably the Field-Marshal had both in mind, when he spoke, quite personally, on this subject. However that may be, it is certain that the Union Government is vitally interested in the affairs of the rest of Southern Africa and will wish to have a say in future arrangements for that area.

Mr. Churchill has also spoken of regional councils for the Atlantic, Pacific and Africa. The idea is obviously in the air and, like the arguments for strengthening the British Commonwealth as a World Power, deserves the careful attention of all citizens, at home and overseas.

### **III. What of The Future?**

#### **1. The British Way**

The war has brought to the shores of Great Britain more men from the Dominions than in any previous generation. They will go back with a clearer picture of these islands and of us than ever before. Anything we do to make or mar that picture will leave its permanent mark on the future. Others, who have not visited Britain, have fought—for the first time in their country's history—to defend their own frontiers from an immediate threat: Australians and New Zealanders in the East Indies and South Sea Islands, Canadians in the Aleutians and in the air over Alaska and Canada's western approaches.

All this has sharpened their national consciousness still more, has given them a personal sense of danger akin to our "Dunkirk spirit," and a personal sense of achievement. Yet it has not weakened the feeling of these men for the British connection: rather the reverse. Australia went to war with Germany before France did. Why? Surely because men and women in Australia felt in their bones that Nazism was a threat to their whole way of life, as much as to ours, because our way and their way were very much alike: the British way.

The course of the war, the comradeship in arms, has strengthened this feeling of kinship. That is why Mr. Curtin, talking of his fellow-Australians, could say, "I speak for 7 million Britishers." How can we preserve this vital sense of unity? How can we get to **know** each other even better?

#### **2. Shall We Emigrate?**

Not only have more men from the Dominions come to see us, but more of us have gone to see them during this war. By August, 1944, the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, administered by the Canadian Government, had turned out no less than 86,000 air crew



graduates. Nearly half of these were Canadians, the rest from the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and other United Nations. 20,000 airmen have also been trained in South Africa, and two-thirds of these were from Britain; hundreds more were trained in Southern Rhodesia. Many soldiers and sailors from Britain have also experienced overseas hospitality and would like to make their permanent homes in one or other of the Dominions. Lots of other servicemen may have the same idea. What are the prospects?

This is too big a subject to tackle in this bulletin. There are great difficulties. But the Dominions Secretary, Lord Cranborne, has said that "notwithstanding the fact that our own population in these islands is tending, perhaps, rather to decrease than to increase, yet, on broad Imperial grounds, we do feel that we should encourage and assist, as far as is practicable, inter-Imperial migration."\*

### 3. Let's Keep in Touch

It seems unlikely, then, that for some years after the war anyway, there will be any large-scale emigration from Great Britain to the Dominions. There should, however, be many more chances to visit them. The developments of international and intra-imperial airways now under discussion will certainly increase immensely the opportunities for long-distance holidays overseas at a reasonable cost and for a brief period: a flying visit to the Antipodes may no longer be out of the question for the ordinary man.

Even if we cannot go to Australia or New Zealand, we shall want to see and hear on the films far more about life there than Hollywood or Elstree have hitherto vouchsafed us. We know all about covered wagons and cowboys, the Grand Canyon of Colorado and the tall cities of the United States of America. But how seldom have we seen on the screen the Canadian Mounties, the drama of the Great Trek, the bushrangers of Australia, climbing in the Southern Alps of New Zealand, life in the fine, new cities in all the British Dominions? The case for making Empire films in a big way is very strong indeed.

The British Broadcasting Corporation has already done much to link the different parts of the Commonwealth together. After the war the finest script-writers and producers should be employed to make the fascinating story of the British colonies and the dominions more vivid and dramatic than it has yet been shown. Perhaps with the progress of television we may, before very long, be able to see some of these wonders by our own firesides.

During the war all English and Scottish newspapers have carried in their columns news from Canada and other parts of the Commonwealth, largely for the benefit of our overseas visitors. If the public in this country remains sufficiently interested in great projects like

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\* *Hansard*, House of Lords, 24th May, 1944. col. 938.

the Alaska Highway in Canada and the Hume Dam of New South Wales, such news will continue to be printed prominently in our press and not relegated to obscure corners as in pre-war days. We want many more books about the peoples overseas—novels and biographies, travellers' tales and descriptions of life as it is lived over there and down under.

#### 4. Tell the Children

If the aim of education is to fit the child for future citizenship there is no more important subject than Empire history and geography. Recent official reports on secondary education, such as those of the Fleming Committee and the McNair Committee, emphasise this; and we surely need the same policy in our elementary schools, which have often been unduly shy of being accused of preaching "imperialism"—a very different thing from studying the British Empire.

The evacuated children who were lucky enough to spend several years in one or other of the Dominions will be their warmest friends for life. The more short or long stays of this kind that can be arranged in days of peace the better for mutual understanding. A few, a very few, school-teachers were able to contrive "exchange" visits with their opposite numbers overseas before the war. Our Education Authorities aim to do much more in this direction afterwards. An even better idea, already extensively used in the U.S.A., is the "Sabbatical Year," an arrangement whereby university lecturers and school-teachers get one year off in seven to "go places." The extra expense involved would be taxpayers' money well spent. At least, the teachers think so. As a taxpayer, do you agree?

#### 5. Self-defence and Empire Trade

Little has been said about imperial defence and economic problems; but these are conditional on political arrangements and informed public opinion, which are our main concern in this article.

All the Dominions have been building up small but useful Navies during the war, and not so small Air Forces of their own. The Royal Navy, thus reinforced, and the combined air forces of the nations of the Commonwealth will be one of the strongest buttresses of security in the post-war world. Once we decide, as we have decided, to act together, strategic details can be left to the experts. But we don't want another Singapore disaster.

In the same way, questions of free trade, imperial preference, access to raw materials, conditions of labour and social security can all be co-ordinated, if the will to plan together is there, as it certainly is at present. With new industries stimulated by the war, the Dominions will be able to do without many things they bought from Britain before the war; indeed, we may find them as competitors in markets we

have previously almost monopolised. It cuts both ways : our increased food production in Britain has come to stay, and means we shall need less from overseas. The need for joint planning is clearly essential for all of us, and there are excellent precedents in such wartime organisations as the Middle East Supply Centre, the North African Economic Board, the Eastern Group Supply Council, the Pacific Supply Council and the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission previously mentioned. All these bodies, and others like them, virtually control the industries and agriculture of vast areas. What can be done under the stress of war can certainly be done in the more leisurely days of peace if we so desire.

## 6. General Outlook Promising

It comes to this :—

- (a) We people of Great Britain find ourselves part of a huge system of British states freely associated together ;
- (b) in the past, because the association was a loose one and constantly changing in shape, we tended to regard the British Commonwealth of Nations as “ unreal ” ; however real the British rule over the dependent Empire seemed to be ;
- (c) the war has shown us that, in practice, in the words of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, “ The bonds which unite us are stronger than the tensest steel ” ; yet we need to make them even stronger ;
- (d) the post-war world is going to be organised in big units ; whatever these turn out to be, the nations of the British Commonwealth, speaking with different voices but all saying what amounts to the same thing, will be more powerful than its constituent parts, speaking separately ;
- (e) the more we, as individual citizens of Britain, know about the overseas Dominions, the more contacts we make or retain, the better prospects for the kind of world we all want to see.

As things are shaping, the good feelings expressed in the recent meetings of Prime Ministers, and at all times by other spokesmen of the Commonwealth, our cordial relations with the United States of America and with that other “ Colossus,” the U.S.S.R.—all give us reasonable hopes that our statesmen, backed by enlightened public opinion, may contrive a more successful world scheme than the one which finally broke down in 1939.



# CATM



## Canadian Army Training Memorandum

FEBRUARY 1945

NUMBER 47

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**Brig. P. R. Shields, M.C., E.D.**  
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps

# LABORE

Nil sine labore—"nothing without labor"—is the motto of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps. The RCASC now serves on sea, on land and in the air. Units of the Corps have in this war operated on occasion sea transport, railway and mule companies, and members of the Corps have also loaded, flown with and dropped supplies from the air. No report has ever been received that the RCASC has failed to deliver at the time and place required all that was necessary to carry on the battle. Sometimes it was said of the Corps that it "did the impossible immediately, but the miraculous took a little longer."

Today the RCASC is organized into General Transport Companies, Tank Transporter Companies and Bridging Companies. The basic unit is the Transport Platoon commanded by a hard-working subaltern, who may be called on to move at any time, day or night, anything that can be moved on wheels. In 1943 the Corps assumed responsibility for all catering throughout the army, and due to its schools and supervision caused a marked improvement in the preparation and standard of messing throughout the Canadian Army.

On all fronts where Canadians are fighting, the reputation of the Corps is that it "always delivers the goods." For this a tribute must be paid to the RCASC driver, who, acting alone or in convoy, by his determination, initiative and untiring zeal, often without food or rest, keeps the wheels turning in spite of the elements and the enemy and is always racing the hands of the clock.

*T. R. Jones*


# IDEAS ABOUT BATTLE

(*CATM* is deeply indebted to Brig. Campbell for the following excellent article. These observations, coming as they do from an officer of such wide experience and recognized ability, will be of great value to officers of the Canadian Army.—Editor.)

These disconnected notes, the outcome of varied experience, appear to claim the inevitability of the laws of the Medes and Persians. But they are expressed dogmatically only to be brief and clear. They are just one officer's ideas of how to win battles. If they have any virtue it is not that they are new but that they confirm the old.

**MORALE:** One of the most surprising differences between war as it is and war as one imagined it would be is the ease with which men break and run. Few troops, the enemy's or our own, will wait till it comes to hand-to-hand fighting. In face of a determined attack the defenders withdraw or surrender. The attack which meets a stubborn defence halts short of the objective or fades back to where it started. The occasions when **both** sides are willing to put it to the test with the bayonet are rare. Such circumstances offer a tremendous opportunity to anyone who can produce the little extra the others have not got. Troops who are determined never to be held up, never to run and never to surrender, who are imbued with the spirit of "what we go for we get and what we get we hold" and who are trained at all times to carry it through to the bayonet point will always succeed.

**PLAN:** A simple plan always pays. Try to give everyone one straightforward job to do. A plan which is full of "if" and "when" and "provided that" courts disaster. The ideal to aim at is a plan in which you can say to every unit and every man "You will go from here to there. When you get there you will hold on till all is blue. And that



*Brig. L. M. Campbell, V.C., D.S.O. and Bar, T.D., of the British Army Staff, Washington, was a territorial officer with the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders prior to 1939. He was 2i/c of the 8th Argyll and Sutherlands in France in 1940 and was awarded the D.S.O. for service in that campaign. He commanded the 7th Argyll and Sutherlands from El Alamein to Tunis, being awarded the Bar to the D.S.O. at El Alamein and the V.C. for outstanding gallantry and leadership at Wadi Akarit. He commanded the 13th Infantry Brigade through the Sicilian and Italian campaigns until the fall of Rome. Brig. Campbell recently visited NDHQ, the R.M.C. at Kingston and I O.T.C., Brockville.*

is all I want from you." Men given an object like that will know exactly what they have to do and all they have to do and will always attain it. Always plan for success.

**INTENTION:** Junior commanders must be sure that they understand what their senior intends and the level on which the battle is being fought. If a Commanding Officer orders a company to attack and arranges a fire plan to cover it he does not intend the company commander to arrange a covering fire plan of his own within his company and so assault with only a part of his strength. He intends the assault to be made by the whole force

of the company. This applies at all levels. Every commander must realise the scale of the plan and suit his own action to that scale.

**STARTING THE ATTACK:** The forming up is the most tricky part of the attack. Troops who get a good start already have the battle half won. The worst thing that can happen to any attack is enemy interference at the forming-up place. Consequently it is most important that it should be hidden from enemy observation and that there should be no visible movement of troops to it or reconnaissance from it to indicate that something is happening there.

The ideal position for the start line is at the forming-up place. Control is then maintained till the last possible moment. But it is often too far from the objective. If the start line you want is under observation or involves any risk of the enemy being able to interfere with troops on it, no attempt must be made to form up there. The forming-up place must then be chosen further back under cover and the troops launched from it to cross the start line at a given time without checking their advance.

**CONCENTRATION:** Do not split your effort. Trying a platoon here and a company there till there is nothing left to hit with always loses time and often loses the battle. Decide as soon as you can what is the most important piece of ground, the best for you to hold, the worst for the enemy to lose, and go all out to get it. It is better to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut than to use too weak a pair of nutcrackers and end up with the nutcrackers damaged and the nut still uncracked. If you do not destroy the German Army, you will at least have secured the ground you want for your next move.

**FIRE PLAN:** Plan your support of all kinds on a timed programme. Never have any fire which is vital to

your plan "on call." Light signals are deceptive and have led to misunderstanding time and again. Fire by observation, which sounds so good in theory, except when directed by FOOs, who are right up with the forward troops and whose communications are working, or when used on the outskirts of the battle where the turmoil is less, is difficult in practice. The dust and smoke and confusion soon make it impossible for the firer to distinguish between our own troops and the enemy's.

**In making the fire plan assume the attack will be a non-stop success. It is the only way in which you can make a plan which will cover the operation from start to finish. If there is a hold-up there will be an enforced pause in which fresh arrangements can be made. It is better to budget for the certainty of success if things go well than for the possibility of recovery if things go wrong. You cannot do both at once.**

Arrange in advance the defensive fire plan to cover you when you have reached the objective. It is something to work on immediately and can always be amended later. Pre-arranged concentrations available on call or likely forming-up places for counter-attacks will sometimes prove to be winners.

**MINEFIELDS:** No attempt must be made to rescue a man wounded in a minefield until R.E. or Pioneer assistance has been obtained. This may sound brutal, but it is better to leave one man unaided than to lose several more trying to extricate him.

**TRANSPORT IN ATTACK:** All transport must be kept right clear of the danger zone until the objective has been taken. Once that has been done and a route forward cleared, it can



come up as quickly as possible. The extra distance makes very little difference in time, and it is better to wait five minutes more for your transport than to have it knocked out before it arrives. Dispersal at all times keeps down casualties.

**DEGREE OF RESISTANCE:** All through this war there have been too many cases of being "shelled out," too many cases of being "over-run," too many withdrawals without orders, too many surrenders. These things are reported in Intelligence Summaries and newspapers as normal actions involving no disgrace. In defence the degree of resistance is still to the last man and the last round. Troops who are dug in cannot be shelled out. If neighbouring units are annihilated those which remain must still hold on and help the counter-attack which will certainly come. To withdraw without orders is disgraceful. No unwounded man must surrender.

**ALL-ROUND DEFENCE:** All-round defence has tended to become a good idea gone wrong. Every independent unit must be cited for all-round defence, but all commanders must appreciate the level on which the battle is being fought and understand when they are an independent unit and when they are only a cog in a larger wheel. The senior commander of the defended area will arrange the all-round defence of the area, and if he orders a company to face North West, his plan bargains for the bulk of that company looking North West and not for two sections only facing that way and the rest of the company bristling like a hedgehog all round the compass. This does not mean that sub-unit commanders should not keep an eye to their rear, but their positions must be sited primarily to face their allotted front. If infiltration does produce an attack from a different direction, provided the weapon slits are properly constructed, it is easy to

fire from them backward or sideways, and a sub-unit can face about without any change of positions.

**COUNTER-ATTACK:** In defence any movement except for counter-attack tends to be rearwards and infectious. Successful defence depends on everyone "stopping there." Consequently, a mobile reserve, at any rate up to battalion level, is a bad thing. Troops intended for counter-attack must be properly dug in and properly sited in positions giving depth to the defence, which, if their counter-attack is not made, they will hold to the last man.

**The first and quickest counter-attack comes from the men in the forward positions themselves. When the enemy comes to close quarters, all ranks must be trained to know that there is only one thing to do—get out of your trench and go for him with the bayonet. If you do not you can only stand in your trench with the enemy above you and wait to be shot. Usually the unexpected production of this "little extra" will rout the attackers.**

If the enemy does succeed in penetrating the position, a counter-attack by other troops will have to be made. Aim at having an absolutely immediate counter-attack always ready. The German tends to attack initially with a small force and then to build up on it. An immediate attack on the small force before it has established itself and before the build-up has begun always succeeds. Later on it is much more difficult and calls for a far greater effort.

As a general rule it is not much use to counter-attack with a section, and a company is better than a platoon. But each company commander should be prepared, if it is at all possible, to put in a counter-attack with his reserve platoon. **Speed is the key to success.**

**DIGGING:** Troops who are well dug in cannot be "shelled out," and even a tank attack will not break them. They will fight better because good protection raises morale. Parapets which are not bullet-proof are a snare and a delusion. Do not burrow in under a bank. A "near-miss" will bury you. Head cover over the part of the trench in which a man will stand to fire his weapon is a bad thing and produces the "pill-box complex," which feels that all is lost when the enemy is overhead or round the flank. It is like putting a horse in blinkers. Take an early opportunity of inspecting the field of fire of each weapon slit, not standing up, but lying down. It is surprising how often it ends in a clump of thistles 10 yards away. Positions sited at night are always too close together. It is advisable to pace out minimum distances; otherwise when daylight comes you will find you have very little dispersal.

The making of communication trenches is badly neglected both in training and practice. They are essential anywhere where enemy fire hampers or endangers movement.

**NIGHT ATTACK:** Have a standard formation and drill and practise it often. It is a basis which can be modified as required.

Any night attack will succeed provided it reaches the right place in good order. The number of men attacking is less important than their not losing



Maj. Gen. J. A. C. Whitaker, C.B., C.B.E.  
*Director of Military Training, British War Office, who was a visitor at NDHQ, RMC and OI Brockville a short time ago. From 1939 to Aug. 1940 Maj. Gen. Whitaker commanded the 7th Guards Brigade during its campaigns in France and Belgium, including the evacuation at Dunkirk. From Aug. 1940 to March 1942 he was Brigadier, General Staff, Western Command, and since March 1942 has been in his present appointment.*

themselves. Consequently it is worthwhile sacrificing any number of bayonet men to become guides, markers, etc., to ensure that the remainder reach the right place and that control is maintained.

#### **TWO MOTTOES:**

**What we go for we get, what we get we hold.**


**Plan for success, expect success and you will have success.**

*(Current Reports from Overseas)*

Delicate mechanism is of little use in war; and this fact applies to the mind of the commander as well as to his body; to the spirit of an army as well as to the weapons and instruments with which it is equipped.

—Field Marshal Lord Wavell

# SECURITY



Joe Doakes was up in front of his O.C. again a few days ago on another Security charge. Joe had written a letter to his girl friend which Censors and Military Intelligence both said contained Military Information. But when Joe came up for orders the O.C. ruled that, while it probably was military information, it certainly wasn't of value to the enemy so he dismissed the charge. Actually, he said, all Joe had given was some strength figures in an operational area and these had been published in the newspapers months ago and hadn't changed a bit.

Quite aside from the fact that figures "months ago" are not necessarily figures today, quite aside from the fact that the enemy would be more than pleased to get confirmation of the fact that the figures "hadn't changed a bit", we're strongly of the opinion that Joe's O.C., in dismissing the charge, sold Joe a sizeable bill of goods.

## Is It of Value?

Frankly, it looks to us as though Joe, in anything he says or writes from now on, is himself going to have to decide not merely whether it's military information but—a horse of a far different colour—whether it's information of

actual value to the enemy. Not only that—Joe's going to have to reach the same decision as his O.C. Not most of the time but all the time. The first time he misses he's plainly out of luck. Joe may not realize it, but he's already entered a guessing game with his own O.C.—and he's got two strikes on him from the start.

**Unfair to Joe, you say? Of course it is. Joe just hasn't the information on which to base his decisions. You have to be fully in the picture to decide just what information is or is not of value to the enemy—and even then it isn't always easy. But what of Joe's O.C.? Is he fully in the picture? Joe's O.C. would probably be the first to admit that he is not. More than ever, then, Joe's behind the eight ball . . . Where Joe's O.C. erred was in attempting to judge not the seriousness of Joe's offence but, instead, the possible results therefrom.**

Actually—a point commonly overlooked—Joe's O.C. or any O.C. has little moral right to do anything but

# PANTHERS AND TIGERS

(ATM)

*(An article and drawing on the new German Panther appeared in the December issue of CATM—Ed.)*

In recent months, much ink has been spilt in descriptions of the two German heavyweights, the Panther and the Tiger. For this very reason, the following extracts from a captured German document, which reveal these two beasts in their true colours, are of more than ordinary interest.

"When Tigers first appeared on the battlefield, they were in every respect proof against enemy weapons, and quickly won for themselves the title of 'unbeatable.' Since that time, however, the enemy has not been asleep. He has developed tanks, and anti-tank guns, and mines, which can hit the Tiger hard, and even knock it out; and the Tiger, long regarded as a 'life insurance policy,' has become just

another 'heavy tank' . . . No longer can Tigers prance about, oblivious to the laws of tank tactics. They must obey these laws, just as every other German tank must obey them.

"Remember, then, you men who fight in Tiger tanks: DO NOT demand the impossible from your Tiger; DO exactly what your commander orders you to do. He knows the limitations of his vehicle and its weapons, and he knows the best use to which they should be put. . . .

"It is particularly important to ensure that flanked protection is provided for the vulnerable sides of Panther tanks. The panzer regimental commander must always keep a reserve of tanks up his sleeve, for use at a moment's notice to counter any threat from the flank."

## SECURITY

*(Continued from page 8)*

hew to the line as established by regulations in handling cases of alleged Security violations. This for the obvious reason that the O.C. is not, admittedly, in possession of all the facts which would enable him to decide just what information is or is not of value to the foe. Immediately he attempts to decide, he automatically places the onus of decision upon every man under his command. The only sound course to be followed by both the O.C. and those under his command is to adhere strictly to the letter of Security Regulations.

The soldier's course is clear. He must not write—nor may he talk to civilians or where he may be overheard by civilians—about anything that can be classed as military information.

### Is An Offence

The O.C.'s course is equally clear. He must not permit the soldier to pass

on military information—regardless of his own personal opinion of its value to the enemy. Any variation from this course is itself an offence against Security Regulations.

Troops should be taught and O.Cs. should insist that there is no middle course. Military personnel must not write—nor may they talk to civilians or where they may be overheard by civilians—about any of the following subjects:

1. Strength and disposition of your own and other units.
2. Location or description of defence positions.
3. Armament or equipment.
4. Rumours or forecasts of movements.
5. All matters relating to ships and ship movements whether naval or mercantile marine, or to naval defences such as submarine nets and booms.



## RCASC ON OPERATIONS

(CATM is pleased to be given the opportunity of publishing this article by Brig. P. R. Shields, M.C., E.D., who has had a wealth of experience in the RCASC. As Lt Col, he was appointed CRASC 1 Cdn Div and proceeded overseas Dec 1939; as Col he became DDST 1 Cdn Corps in July 1940 and in Dec 1942 he was given command of "B" Group, CRU. In Jan 1943 he was promoted to brigadier and in Oct 1943 he was temporarily appointed commander increment 1 Cdn Corps. He was named to command HQ "B" Group CRU Dec 1943 and returned to Canada Nov 1944, being posted to District Depot, M.D. 13. While overseas Brig. Shields saw service in France in 1940 and France and Belgium in 1944.—Editor.)

"The tried and true principles of the RCASC have stood the test of War". The text books have not been wrong. We have trained units to carry out efficiently the functions allotted to them, organized and administered in such a way that all ranks have had their share of responsibility. We have seen them work without fuss or disorganization. Wherever the Canadian Army operates one of its hall-marks is the RCASC lorry rolling along the road with a cheerful alert Canadian at the wheel.

Day and night the maintenance convoys rumble up the dusty or muddy roads from railhead and roadhead bringing with them everything the fighting man requires from ammunition to green envelopes for uncensored

mail. There is little lull in the life of the RCASC for whilst this or that division may come out of the line there is always a cry for transport and during a static period the RCASC driver is bringing up stores for the next battle phase.

### Gets There On Time

Perhaps his work may appear devoid of personal glory, but it calls for much more than sitting behind a steering wheel and watching the landscape glide past; he has to buck crowded roads, diversions and sometimes interminable delays at some bottleneck—and still he gets there on time. He gets there because he is keeping a promise that is more than a duty. It is a matter of personal pride that nothing shall stop him from delivering the goods.

### Long Hours

Operations for 16 or more hours a day over distances of from 200 to 300 miles a day, seven days a week, has been quite normal. The distance over which the RCASC has been called upon to maintain has far exceeded anything visualized at the commencement of this War. As an example, it was generally conceded prior to operations

that a turn-around of 80 miles would, unless in extreme circumstances, be the maximum daily run for RCASC 2nd line transport. During operations in France and Belgium it was normal to operate twice and often three times the above distance.

### **Continuous Running**

As the lines of communication lengthened transport had to be utilized day and night and it was necessary on certain occasions to institute what was termed "continuous running". By this method a Transport Platoon was divided into three parts, two driving crews and a maintenance crew. One crew of drivers operated vehicles while other crew rested. Maintenance crew remained static in platoon area and when vehicles returned that crew took over responsibility for maintenance and refueling. Rested crew took vehicles out when maintained and on return again maintenance crew refueled and maintained. With this system in effect it was possible to keep vehicles rolling 16 and in extreme cases 20 hours out of each day.

### **Vehicle Maintenance and Workshop Repairs**

The great thing in the RCASC is that vehicles must be kept on the road. The matter of maintenance is almost a religion in the Corps. A vehicle that is improperly maintained is inefficient and inefficient motor transport can be very dangerous when so much depends on sound supply lines. The RCASC driver on operations knows that his vehicle is his best friend and that is why when he is off the road you will find him in unit lines going over his truck with grease-gun, spanner and pressure gauge, satisfying his own critical eye that those wheels will turn smoothly.

**The 6-task maintenance system has been used throughout by the RCASC during operations and has proven it-**

**self to be a sound, thorough maintenance system. If it is a bigger job that cannot be performed by the driver, behind him is always the Workshop Platoon which is an integral part of every RCASC Coy. That platoon with its fitters, electricians, turners, etc., will see to it that there'll always be a maximum number of vehicles on the road to carry their loads of rations, ammunition, clothing, petrol, troops, bridging, tanks, bombs, prisoners, refugees, EFI stores and a hundred other things that must safely reach their destination.**

### **Source of Supply**

**AMMUNITION:** In the early stages when the bridgehead was small Div, RCASC drew direct from BAD's. As lines of communication developed FMC's were formed by Corps and were used in the leap-frog method, one being cleared while another was in the process of being laid down further forward. At one stage Corps, through lack of transport and long distances, were unable to continue the formation of FMC's and Div. RCASC then reverted for ammunition replenishment to Army roadheads supplemented as time went on by Corps Ammunition dumps.

**PETROL, OIL, LUBRICANTS:** POL products as a general rule were drawn from Petrol Depots, type B & C, operating firstly in Base Sub-Area, then army roadheads and later in FMC. As movement developed however, it was found that Petrol Depots could not move up sufficiently fast to sites originally selected and it was necessary to utilize the more mobile MPFC's. RCASC transport formed dumps of empty Jerry cans in selected areas, MPFC eventually moved to that

area and filled cans, bulk supply being brought up by RCASC tanker companies which operated from the rear.

80 Octane Petrol was delivered to units packed almost exclusively in the Jerry can. Oils at the outset arrived in 5 gallon drums, but in later stages appeared in quart cardboard containers, twelve quart containers packed in one non-returnable tin. Greases appeared in two-pound tins, seven-pound tins and 28-pound kegs. Kerosene was at first issued in the mountain pack (2-2 gallon tins in wooden case) but recently has been issued in 40-gallon drums. DERV and Pet spirits also appeared in Jerry cans, but the more normal containers for DERV was the cylindrical can.

**SUPPLIES:** In the bridgehead, supplies were drawn directly from Base Supply Depots and later as lines of communication extended, from Detail Issue Depot in FMC. It is not generally known that the term "Supplies" covers a multitude of items. Troops were issued with Compo rations, Field Service (Fresh), Field Service (tinned equivalent) and a reserve of AFV packs was carried in AFV's. Prisoner of War (transit) rations, supplementary rations for flying personnel, 24 hr. ration packs for assault troops and rations for civilian evacuees were also drawn and delivered. Miscellaneous stores, such as hospital comforts, heating coal, blacksmith coal, disinfectants and water sterilizing expendable components, were normal items of supply.

### **Delivery**

First, in the cramped bridgehead in Normandy, ammunition, always a first priority, was required in almost unheard of quantity. Wheel to wheel, guns ate their rations so quickly that roads became crammed night and day, with endless convoys of RCASC ammunition lorries. They were bombed—they ran the risk of side-verge Teller mine—sometimes there was sniping, but there

was never an instance when the guns were kept waiting. Ammunition was pushed right forward convenient to the fighting troops and RCASC personnel maintained almost mobile ammunition Depots not more than a mile or two from the front line.

**Later, when the break-out came, petrol, oil and lubricants had to be forwarded so quickly and in such quantities that RCASC men had to work phenomenal hours. Some drivers and Despatch Riders and N.C.O's in charge of them did up to 72 hours without a break for sleep. Tired and red-eyed, they took supplies, day and night, on crowded difficult roads in every kind of weather.**

Despatch Riders, shepherding convoys or conveying messages, rode on till they literally dropped to sleep on their machines. Rations were delivered daily at supply point and did not as a rule present any insurmountable difficulty. Many activities, however, take place at supply points besides the delivery of rations. It was there that Unit representatives picked up their mail, deposited with RCASC the kits of casualties for return to kit storage or to MFO, collected stationery for which they had indented to Printing and Stationery Depot, collected ordnance stores and in fact transacted any business of a supply nature that did not include Ammunition or POL.

### **Communication**

Communication within RCASC units was primarily by Despatch Rider although adequate when line of communication was short, did not meet the full requirements of a long supply line. In some divisions the Comd allotted wireless sets to the RCASC from Div. AQ pool and where this was done the benefits were immediately apparent.

# FATIGUE

(ATM)

A commanding officer writes from Italy:

"We've been fighting continuously and pretty arduously for the last month, and killing Boche in numbers. At times, fatigue and reliefs have been an acute problem. More than once we have had to use platoons of drivers and 'odds and sods' to help out in a tight corner. Even divisional administrative units have been used for 'line holding.' It was the same in Tunisia, and no doubt it will be the same to the end of the chapter. You'll almost always be short somewhere.

## Men's Spirits

"In my experience, the most important aspect of the problem is the effect of tiredness on the men's spirits. Extreme physical exhaustion can lower morale more than anything the enemy can do. So when you're a bit tight for reserves you've got to ponder all the more carefully that other perpetual headache, the load on the man. It's got to be worked

out to the last ounce for each separate operation. Over here, we've learnt the lesson that carrying parties, even at the expense of your fighting strength, pay hands down in country where wheels can't turn. For the rest, guts and tough training are the answers.

**"During training, you must induce utter weariness. When you've got everybody thoroughly worn out, keep them going for another 48 hours. Get them so used to foul conditions, short commons, and no sleep, that action and reaction become completely automatic. And remember that the average officer gets just as tired physically as the soldier, and, of course, much more tired mentally."**

"It's all too easy, when you're sitting on your hunkers in a rest area, to write about this problem of fatigue, but so different when you're on the job."

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## RCASC ON OPERATIONS

(Continued from page 12)


A very close liaison was maintained at all times between the senior officers of the RCASC at each formation level. DDST Army passed technical data and the maintenance plan to DDST Corps and the latter in turn kept C's RASC of divisions completely in the picture. Close and regular contact by each head of service with his immediate superior was vital as long lines of communication rapidly changed the maintenance plan. Liaison officers were used extensively between RCASC Heads of Service in Army Corps and Divisions, and the advanced detailed information made readily available by this means assisted S & T officers to a very great extent in

their appreciation of the ST picture for future planning.

The closest possible co-operation existed between the various parts of the RCASC and between the units they supplied. This good spirit was built up very quickly on service and close contact with representatives of other arms is much greater than ever visualized during the training phase. Supply Points, Petrol Points and Ammunition Points are a meeting place for representatives at certain times of every unit within a Division and the greatest good fellowship exists when each learns to realize that every Arm and Service is equally important, and all in their own small way form a cog in the wheel of the big fighting machine.



# A PRIVATE SOLDIER'S VIEW OF BATTLE



*(This is a soldier's account of a patrol into St. Lo, extracted from the U.S. Infantry Journal).*

At the beginning of the battle of St. Lo, our regiment was picked for the job of driving straight into the city. It would be a stiff fight, but we thought we could do it. As it turned out it was tougher than we had expected although we eventually got into St. Lo.

The I&R Platoon was ordered to pick four men and one officer to send a patrol to an old chateau in order to find out exactly what kind of opposition we were meeting and where each gun was located. I was one of the four men.

## **Stopped By Fire**

We proceeded through the 2d Battalion outpost and advanced to the chateau grounds. At the edge we were stopped by automatic weapons fire. We couldn't tell how much, so we scouted around and finally saw four Jerries in a clump of brush. Right away we fired a rifle grenade into them, and they answered with machine gun fire. We marked the place on the map and scouted for more positions. Because the Germans hadn't seen us, we felt secure in scouting for more. In all, we found five positions. Then we pulled back and the lieutenant called for 4.2 inch mortar fire on the five positions.

Throughout the night we lay on the

ground and called for more fire on different positions as we picked them out. At about 0430 hours, when all was quiet again, we worked our way back down to the chateau grounds. We scouted until about 0900 hours and decided all was clear. Then we called back for a platoon from Company F to come up and hold the ground we had taken. After the platoon arrived and as we started to leave we decided to have a last look around, so we walked down a road behind the chateau and spotted a Jerry just ducking into the brush off the road. We decided to take him prisoner. Another fellow and I went over to get him. The man with me (I didn't know him, as he was from the rifle platoon that came up to hold for us) was to give me covering fire as I came back with the prisoner.

**The Jerry was sitting with his back to me as I walked up to him. I touched him with my tommy gun and told him to come with me. As he got up a machine gun about five yards to my left cut loose at me and missed with the whole belt. At first I thought I was shot, but my training stood me in good stead. I automatically killed the German I was trying to take prisoner, then turned my gun on the Jerry that fired**

# THREE MEN AND A GUN

(ATM)

A 6-pr was advancing across a field. Two of the gun detachment had become casualties, and the Number 1 had warned the remaining gunners, Numbers 2 and 3, to be ready for emergency action.

Sighting a tank, Number 1 ordered: "Halt. Tank by that house." Numbers 2 and 3 jumped off, unhooked the gun, and swung it round. Number 2 loaded and sat on the right trail leg. Number 3 set the range and, sitting on the left trail leg, fired. He hit and disabled the tank with the first round—and then spotted another tank firing from inside the house. He knocked a hole in the house with a couple of rounds, and, continued to fire into the house until the tank caught fire.

## Crew Killed

Expecting that the crew of the tank, if they had escaped, would reply with their small arms, he put a round of HE into the house before he switched back to the first tank, which he set on fire. When the wreckage was examined later, it was found that the HE had killed the crew outside their tank.

## A PRIVATE SOLDIER'S VIEW

*(Continued from page 14)*

**at me and killed him, too. Another Jerry reached for the gun—it was about three feet from my stomach—but I shot him as he started firing, and knocked his aim off. The fellow with me killed two Germans.**

Then a mortar coughed twice to my left front, and the lieutenant and two corporals who had come up opened fire at the mortar position and kept them from firing. Then German riflemen started firing at us with rifle


Three-quarters of an hour later the trio engaged two 88-millimetre self-propelled guns. The first gun was set on fire by the first round, the second disabled by the next, and, after several more rounds had been fired, also set on fire.

**A few minutes later yet a third self-propelled gun was observed between a house and a haystack. Once more Number 3 disabled the gun with his first round, though the vehicle chassis was undamaged. Then a cartridge jammed in the breech, and the detachment were unable to fire again. The target withdrew behind the house, and proceeded very slowly to retire.**

At the end of that crowded hour, two tanks and two 88-millimetre self-propelled guns destroyed, and a third self-propelled gun damaged, were these three men's reward for the coolness and efficiency with which a very high standard of training had enabled them to handle their gun.

grenades, which spilled liquid fire all over the place. I killed another machine gunner. My buddy killed another rifleman, and each of the others got two Jerries apiece.

It ended almost as quickly as it started. The smoke cleared away and we counted noses. All of us were still O.K., not a scratch on any of us, and we had accounted for 13 Germans, three machine guns, one mortar and the rifles and ammunition which we destroyed. We all agreed it was the closest shave we had had since D-day. I hope we never have a closer one.—  
Pte. Harold F. Clawson.



(ATM—Australia)

The purpose of the patrol was to locate enemy positions and shoot them up. It was decided that the patrol should be small in order to facilitate rapidity of movement and ease of control.

The patrol was composed of one officer and eight other ranks carrying two LMGs, four OSMGs and three rifles. The formation adopted was single file, two scouts in front followed by the patrol commander, and then the remainder of the patrol, with the sergeant bringing up the rear.

### Watch For Signals

The patrol was given all information and shown a map and sketch. Every man was given his exact task within the patrol, including a flank observation, and a full system of hand signals was arranged. It was pointed out that immediate obedience to hand signals was of paramount importance, and that therefore each man must be on the watch for them continuously, even forward scouts being instructed to look back frequently in case someone else should locate enemy on the flank.

The patrol moved out WEST along PATROL TRACK, skirted the track junction of PATROL TRACK AND ROBINSON'S TRACK, crossed ROBINSON'S TRACK, and continued on for 50 yards and then turned NORTH and moved parallel to it (see sketch). ROBINSON'S TRACK had been used a good deal by our patrols, and as the enemy had cut a patrol's signal cable there a few days earlier, the patrol commander considered it was dangerous ground.

**After the patrol had moved NORTH for some 200 yards an enemy patrol of platoon strength, under command of an officer, was seen half right moving SOUTH some ten yards off ROBINSON'S TRACK and between our patrol and the track. The ground was fairly open rain forest, and our patrol was on slightly higher ground than the enemy.**

The patrol commander immediately halted the patrol by hand signal, and the men froze, lying or kneeling, without attempting to seek cover. The forward scout had not seen the enemy, but because he was frequently looking

back, as ordered, he was able to be halted by hand signals after he had moved about 10 yards further.

The enemy main body had halted some 40 yards away NE, the platoon HQ and forward section continuing to advance parallel to the track until they were a short distance past our patrol. There they halted, and then moved up towards our patrol, stopping some 20 yards away. The officer proceeded to give instructions, presumably regarding the laying of an ambush, and then turned and moved towards our patrol.

At approximately 7 yards' distance he saw our patrol and attempted to pull a grenade from his belt. The Bren in front of the officer opened fire, and immediately every other weapon opened up, too.

The officer, his platoon HQ and forward section all fell together except one man, who attempted to sneak away to the NORTH; he was killed by the forward scout, who was on the flank, while the remainder of our patrol poured concentrated fire into the heap of enemy bodies for some 30 seconds. The remainder of the enemy platoon took no offensive action. The patrol circled round SOUTH of the track junction on to PATROL TRACK and so back to base.

#### **Casualties:**

**Enemy: 14 killed, including 1 officer.—Own: Nil.**

#### **LESSONS:**

1. Value of careful briefing.
2. Ease with which a small patrol can be handled compared with one of platoon strength.
3. Advantage of moving off a track likely to be used by the enemy.
4. Danger of using a track too often for patrolling.
5. Value of holding fire as long as possible. Shooting at close quarters is more accurate, and gives the enemy little chance to take cover or withdraw.

## **AGGRESSIVENESS**

*(From a report by an Armoured Division in Current Reports From Overseas.)*

There is a marked difference between the aggressive soldier whose first reaction to enemy fire is to find out where it is and what it is, so that he can get at its source and destroy it as quickly as possible, and the soldier who adopts an attitude of passivity. The latter type of soldier merely reports what he has seen or heard and does no more, usually because from his present position he cannot take any steps to deal with the opposition, or because he himself is in no great danger and therefore does not care.

There are, however, two worse degrees of passivity—the man who refrains from taking aggressive action for fear of provoking reprisals, or the man whose reaction is "best to avoid danger." Such attitudes are often only recognized as disgraceful if the man runs away.

**A great deal of unnecessary caution arises from the inability to gauge the effectiveness of enemy fire. British training with its emphasis on steel helmets and concealment on all and every occasion . . . is apt to make men worry far too much about their personal safety. An appropriate appreciation of the chances, the ability to realize whether the enemy's fire is aimed at you or not, a general contempt of the enemy, and above all a determined, aggressive, and confident spirit, are worth all the camouflaged steel helmets in the world.**

I have definitely seen the good moral effect of the arrival of an officer in corduroy trousers and a beret, with a pipe in his mouth, among a collection of harassed-looking soldiers huddled together in a ditch.

# A CRASC OF AN ARMOURED DIVISION TALKS TO HIS MEN


*(This address was prepared by Col. M. L. Brennan, O.B.E., for delivery to his formation when he was CRASC 4 Cdn Armd Div. It is being reproduced in CATM as an enlightening article on the work of the Army Service Corps overseas—Editor.)*

As CRASC of this formation, I feel that the time has arrived when I should place before you a picture in my own words of our work to date, your work and mine; review with you the organization and plan for the servicing of our Division as we saw it prior to leaving England, and note the changes which we have had to make to meet the real test of operational war conditions.

Let us go back to the days immediately prior to embarkation. Our Coys were formed on a Composite basis, each Coy carrying its own proportion of Amn, Pet and Supplies for the two Bde Gps in the case of the Bde Coys, and for Div Tps in the case of Div Tps Coy. Our loading plan had to be based solely on the Bde Gp principle; this was necessary due to the fact that the Division was embarked in Bde Gps and there was a probability that they would land, and commence fighting as Bdes and not as a Division. At any time, as we all know when such a possibility is envisaged, the RCASC Coy for the Bde involved must load on a composite basis, i.e., carry all commodities for that Bde and be ready to move with, and Service the Bde as required, working independently of CRASC HQ.

## **No Casualties**

Our move Overseas as you all know was carried out with a minimum of fuss and confusion. We landed without the loss of one man or one vehicle. Our loads were intact and in good condition, and we immediately launched into the daily grind of meeting demands. During this time the remainder of the Div was



*(Col. M. L. Brennan, OBE, commandant A19 CASC Training Centre, Camp Borden. He joined the service in 1922, was on RCASC Instructional Cadre 1926 to 1934 and was commissioned 1 Dec. 1939. He reported to Camp Borden 15 Jan 1940, and served on Instructional Wing as instructor until moved to Ottawa in Oct 1940 with the rank of captain as G3 in DMT. Promoted to major, he assumed command 5 Armd Div Tps Coy, RCASC, 1 July 1941 and proceeded overseas with that unit Nov 1941. Relinquishing command 5 Armd Div Tps Coy, he assumed the appointment of 2 i/c to CRASC 5 Cdn Armd Div in Jan 1942. In May 1942 he was appointed to command 1 Army Tank Bde Coy, RCASC, and in Dec 1942 he was promoted to Lt Col and appointed CRASC 4 Cdn Armd Div. Proceeding overseas, he served with that Div on operations in France, Holland and Belgium. He returned to Canada 18 Nov 1944 with rank of acting colonel and assumed command A19. CATM is glad to receive an article from an RCASC officer with such wide practical experience.)*

moving into concentration area just clear of the beaches. (Seems a long way back now doesn't it?)

Before leaving England I had, with my HQ Staff, Coy Comds and Coy Officers, spent many hours discussing the feasibility of changing our organization from Composite to Commodity Coys. We had worked out all the paper mechanics of such a change, and were prepared to put it into effect as soon as the Div landed and the Div role had been definitely confirmed.

I was given to understand that the Div would be in concentration area for at least 10 days, and my plan was to carry out the change-over in a leisurely methodical manner after our own Coys had landed and were all bedded down.

**At this point I learned my first lesson on operations—the AA & QMG sent for me, and said "Ten day concentration period is out. 3 Cdn Div have been at it for 40 days and we relieve them tomorrow night. We move at dawn on a long and fast approach march—top everyone up with Pet and prepare to move."**

I think you will all remember that afternoon—the S. Sup O. tore up his carefully prepared Composite Load Tables, tore out a handful (?) of his hair, and commenced to write short curt field messages in quadruplicate to Coy Comds.

I feel quite certain that none of you knew exactly what was up and as I circled the various Coys, I could tell by the looks on your faces that the general opinion was "It's happened at last; the Old Man has gone Nuts—too bad, and just when we are starting on Ops."

### **Plan Behind It**

As you now know there was a plan behind it all, and when you finished up that night, Div Tps Coy had all the supplies and miscellaneous stores, the Inf Bde Coy had all the Pet and Lubs, and the Armd Bde Coy had all the Amn. Presto — Commodity Coys. We

were loaded, but did we know how to work the new Organization? That is a question to which we have now the final answer. Commodity Coys have proven to be an efficient and orderly arrangement for distribution of Stores. You probably noticed when we regrouped that all the Supply Boys were posted to the Supply Coy, lads who were fond of the smell of gasoline found themselves in the Pet Coy, and the old explosive Wallahs moved in with the Amn. It couldn't go wrong. All the experts in each Commodity were concentrated, they had to think of one commodity only and as it was the one they liked working with in most cases we ended up with a fair number of satisfied customers.

**I know that the change-over in the early stages caused many heartaches. Pls had to be separated from their own Coys, Secs had in some cases to be detached from pls and in one case a pl had to be broken up altogether in order to equalize the tpt in each Coy to meet the Commodity lift. Although at first there was the expected fair share of good old army grousing, it soon died down.**

So much for Commodity Coys. We have learned how to operate them the hard way, but I believe most of this war business is learned that way and we now know that our Commodity Coys are a going concern capable of delivering at anytime, any place, in almost, we are sure, any known quantity.

Now let us consider fwd pts. You remember in England on exercises the many long hours of darkness we spent setting up those very uncomfortable little arrangements on roads. I don't quite know who thought up this one but we were only operating a few days when we found that to operate a fwd pt of any kind on a road was

not only impractical, a danger to life and limb, but also a really good way to get a Court Martial for being on the road at all.

### **Points In a Field**

We were really a bit non-plussed until some bright lad said "Why not put points in a field?" Horrors, it wasn't in the book, we had always had them on roads, an unheard of ideal! But as we had to get off the roads there was no option, and a field it was.

Very soon things took another step forward, cook lorries were set up at points, the bivouacs took form and soon we were living there. The operation of points is now so simple that we continually get volunteers asking to be allowed to join that select fwd gp. Don't forget, however, that the above system would quickly have to change if we did not have air cover. The old principles still stand, we have just varied their application temporarily to meet present operational conditions.

### **How It Works**

To put you in the picture of what actually happens in the setting up of fwd points, it works like this: the 2 i/c of CRASC HQ who is attached to Rear Div HQ gets from the DAQMG each morning an area where points are to be put in position that day. The 2 i/c contacts present points and picks up an RCASC Officer for each Commodity with signs. A common report centre is selected and Rear Div HQ notifies units of new location, time of closing present point, opening of new point and any other relevant infm. The 2 i/c and Recce Offrs proceed to new area, sign and man report centre, select areas, sign areas and at a specified time meet incoming tpt which is being brought along by Tpt Officers.

**Pet and Amn Pts are kept open at a standard holding. Sup Pt is open only during period of Bulk Breaking and**

**Issue, but Sup Officer and Comp Pl personnel live at the point and bulk, less that for Adm Gp, is broken at Fwd Pt. The Amn and Pet pts are replenished from Coy area, empty tpt returning to Coy area and full lorries going forward.**

Now about transport and traffic control. What have we learned about that? I should say that the old tried and true method of caring for our tpt, carrying out regular maintenance tasks and driving in a careful efficient manner cannot be beaten.


Lads, we have great equipment—let us continue to treat it well. I have noticed myself, that convoy spacing, convoy control, and traffic discipline generally have improved every day since arrival overseas. Why? I think everyone of you now realizes that the correct way is the best way and that all the long time we spent in training on care of tpt and movement has not been lost.

### **Trying Period**

In closing I wish to thank all ranks for the very excellent manner in which you have supported me over a most trying period in our work and it is certainly gratifying to see the cheerful unselfish manner in which you now conduct your affairs and your able approach to an S & T problem. We learn something every day. Let us always keep an ear to the ground for new ideas. I have learned many things from the officers, NCOs, and men whom I have had the pleasure to command in this formation. I hope you have learned some lessons from me. Whichever way it goes, as long as it is for the good of the S & T Service in giving assistance to the successful prosecution of War, we should have no regrets.

"Nil Sine Labore." Wise lad who gave us that motto, eh?

# THE TECHNIQUE OF INSTRUCTION



## THE \$64 QUESTION

The ultimate test of efficiency in Military Instruction is the battlefield, but before that ultimate stage is reached there is a constant need for recapitulation and review. Such recaps and intermediate tests take many forms—TsOET—field exercises—TEsWT and many others. Most, if not all of these tests, involve the instructor in the problem of how to frame and how to ask questions. Like most instructional techniques the art of asking questions is not a heaven-sent gift but is the result of experience plus a knowledge of the questioning technique.

Here are some of the accepted principles of questioning:

1. Make your question simple and direct. Normally one wishes to elicit a specific answer to the question, and this can best be done by avoiding the compound question which requires a correct answer to Part I before the answer to Part II can be given. Better make this two separate questions. It is also well to avoid

the too-general type of question, which on analysis usually resolves itself into the conundrum. "I've got something in my mind. You guess what it is."

2. Frame the question—pause—then

name the person who is to give the answer. By such a drill the instructor is assured that the attention of all the squad is centred on the question, whereas if the question is phrased "Brown — what is the meaning of V.1?" poor Brown is the only one whose attention is assured.

3. Distribute the questions widely and without following any recognizable pattern.

A wide distribution of questions is the only means whereby a fair sampling of the class may be obtained. There is always a tendency to ask "the bright lad" the questions as a time-saving measure, but the results of such a practice lead only to a "fools paradise" in which the instructor feels that his squad knows the subject whereas in fact only the few brighter lads who were asked know the answers.

So much for the "thou shalt's"—now for a few "thou shalt not's".

4. Avoid the 50-50 question such as the true-false on such a question as "Is the marking on this bomb grey





# A COMPANY ATTACK IN THE WAREO AREA

(The following is an account of an action fought by a company from an Australian infantry battalion—Extracted from *ATM, Australia*).

Following a general withdrawal of the Japanese forces in the WAREO area, a pocket of the enemy of approximately platoon strength was located in dug-in positions on a steep razor-back ridge.

The Japanese, making full use of the narrowness of the ridge and the steepness of its profile, had so sited their positions that the only feasible means of approach was up the slope of the ridge, which varied in its precipitousness from 45 deg. to 60 deg., and the approaches to which were covered by fire from well dug-in positions along the top of the ridge itself.

**Shelling and mortaring had no apparent effect, and it was suspected that during bombardment the enemy withdrew to the "lee" side of the ridge, leaving only odd men in fox-holes as sentries.**

With this suspicion in mind a plan was evolved whereby two platoons under cover of artillery and mortar fire, and with a start time coincidental with a misty afternoon rain, would attack up the slopes.

The attack went in and the suspicion proved well-founded when the Japanese were caught in the open returning to their foxholes.

## TECHNIQUE OF INSTRUCTION

(Continued from page 21)

or green?" Here the candidate has an even chance of guessing the right answer and the right answer does not prove his knowledge. Equally reliable results could be obtained by tossing a coin and using the formula "Heads he knows it—tails he doesn't."

5. Avoid questions inviting a chorus answer. The reasons for this suggestion are obvious. In the first place those members of the squad who are slower in their reactions will always be "beaten to the punch" by those with the quicker reactions—and in the second place the chances are that one or two will give the



lead and the remainder of the squad will merely join in the chorus.

6. Avoid questions that suggest the answer—such questions are usually merely a test of man's alertness in picking up a hint and not a test of his knowledge.
  7. Avoid questions that test merely the candidate's power of expression. The aim of questioning is to determine a man's military knowledge—not to test his facility in English composition. In a great many cases a practical demonstration of skill is a much better test than the ability to describe that skill in words. None of us would have any difficulty in demonstrating the meaning of "cough". Yet to put that idea into words would tax and did tax the erudition of a Samuel Johnston.
- Now can you frame a real \$64 question?

# NOTES FROM NEW GUINEA



(The following extracts are taken from "Notes from Operations New Guinea," compiled by an Australian Infantry Brigade.—Progress Bulletin (Infantry).)

## (A) COMFORT IN THE JUNGLE:

An outstanding feature was the ability of a well-organised battalion to beat jungle and mountain country, despite its long periods of heavy rain, mud, and cold, of tortuous trails and what can be most uncomfortable living and fighting conditions. An experienced jungle battalion can move into an area during the afternoon and by morning can be comfortably set up, rain shelters constructed, good cooking arrangements made, latrines built and the area sign-posted.

Within a day or two, areas are cleared, tracks to sleeping quarters are corduroyed, kitchens established, and the plan under way for the continuous improvement of the area. The result is increased comfort under the most unpleasant conditions, with a consequent rise in morale and cheerfulness.

## (B) WORK DEFEATS BOREDOM:

A busy battalion has no time to mope, and no matter how inactive the operational situation may be, much can be done to maintain morale and an offensive spirit by patrols, raids, area improvement, training, range practices, and plenty of hard work. A high standard of discipline was insisted upon. As

a result of saluting and courtesy a strong team spirit developed. At the end of four months of hard campaigning, the morale, esprit de corps, and physical fitness of the brigade were far greater than when the operations began.

Being busy is the complete answer to a fairly general belief that fighting troops suffer from tropical tiredness after twelve months. Work, interest, and insistence on efficiency will beat the tropics.

**(C) PATROLLING:** Information can only be obtained by patrolling, usually on a wide front. If patrols are briefed properly, and know how to produce sketches and panoramas, the intelligence officer can very quickly build up his information about an area from their reports. In one case, a battalion using seven 4-day patrols, which were followed by seven more 4-day patrols, obtained full information about an area of over 72 square miles.

An essential factor with patrolling is to allow adequate time, and adequate rations, to enable the patrols to complete their tasks. Unless contact with the enemy is very close, one-day patrols in jungle are useless. Usually two or three days are necessary. Commanders must make allowance for this time and place factor. Patrols should carry sufficient rations for their tasks, plus one day's reserve, as well as their emergency rations.

After the first beach defences had been overrun, American troops met no organized defensive lines on Guam except for the resistance encountered by the Marines in the capture of the Orote Peninsula area. A fast-moving attack that knifed through the entire northern half of the island, a distance of 12 miles in four days, smashed any possibility of systematized defensive warfare by the Japs and shattered their organization so that only scattered groups were left to oppose the advance. Captured plans disclosed a scheduled "Banzai" attack, but it never materialized because the Japs could not marshal a force of sufficient size.

The speed of the attack, the way supporting weapons were used, the extensive use of the tank-infantry team, all paid handsome dividends in disorganizing and routing the hasty Jap defences of this particular combat situation, and held the casualty rate low among our attacking troops.

### Heavy Jungle


The heavy jungle growth would have made any attempt to advance on a broad front a tedious, slow-moving effort and would have granted the Japs time to organize their last-ditch defensive positions. A network of trails and unimproved roads throughout the northern plateau gave the best chance for aggressive attack in column, and a scheme of manoeuvre adaptable to this kind of terrain was worked out.

Since troops moving in column along trails flanked by heavy underbrush and numerous small cocoon grove clearings offer excellent targets for enemy ambush, it was necessary to devise, first, a suitable formation, and, second, a plan of action which would drive out the enemy groups along the route of advance without seriously checking the momentum of the attack.

### Formations

In general, our formations were like this: First, a rifle company, with one platoon of medium tanks, a platoon of heavy machine guns and a section of 81 mm. mortars in direct support was followed by the battalion commander and his OP group, which consisted of the artillery, naval gunfire and air support, liaison officers, reserve company commander, heavy weapons company commander, S-2, S-3, runners and SCR-300.

Behind this column came a second rifle company, M-10 tank destroyer, the heavy weapons company, the battalion CP, organic vehicles and the anti-tank platoon. The third rifle company brought up the rear. Distance between units was dictated by the density of the jungle and the visibility to the front along the trail. The leading company, whose main mission lay to the front, gave only cursory attention to installations off the trail or to small trails leading off the route of advance. The second rifle company in the column was responsible for investigating and mopping up any enemy that had been by-passed by the leading elements. Whenever a side trail was concerned sufficiently important to warrant sending a patrol down it any distance, two men were left at the junction and as the last company passed that point they were dispatched to bring the patrol in on the rear of the column.



## KNIFING THROUGH GUAM

(By Capt. Charles P. Mailloux, in U.S. Infantry Journal)

The assault platoon of the leading rifle company operated with flank protection and scouts well forward so that an area 30 yards on each side of the trail was covered. Keeping some men well off the trail paid off because the Japs continually camouflaged their installations along the trail from the front but neglected the rear almost entirely. This made it easy for the flank patrol to pick them off.

The action of the leading company called for a high degree of co-operation between the tank and infantry commanders and was successful only because the two units trained together before going into action. Communication between tanks and infantry was by radio, smoke signals and tapping on the hull of the tank; a system of designating targets to the tank, by using the long axis of the tank as a line through the center of a clock from 12 to six and pointing out direction by using

the numerals on the face of a clock was one of the many techniques worked out by tank commanders and the infantry units they were supporting.

The tank platoon moved with the support elements of the leading company, with one tank advancing through the brush off the trail on one side, another following by 20 to 30 yards on the other side, and a third moving on the trail about 100 yards back of the first two. The other two followed behind on the trail. This formation permitted the tanks to give each other mutual support in case any one tank was engaged by a A/tk gun. It also kept the leading tanks out of the center of the trail, which is most likely to be covered by A/tk fire, and widened the trail for units following the tanks.

### Tanks Protected

Four men from the support platoon were assigned to each tank with the mission of protecting it from Japs who might attempt to close in with a molotov cocktail or grenade. One of these men moved just in front of the tank, guided it around holes and large stumps and examined the ground for signs of antitank mines. At no time did a tank precede the infantry that it was supporting.

Whenever stiffer resistance was encountered, and the Japs usually organized strong points at the larger trail junctions and crossings, the leading company commander called back to the mortar section for support fire. . . When fire was requested, the mortars were put into position right on the trail and within 60 seconds observed fire could be brought down on the enemy position.

During the attack the battalion commander constantly placed naval gunfire and air strikes on the more important road junctions ahead of the column. This practice accounted for a great number of enemy casualties. In Yigo over 100 enemy had been killed by this bombardment several hours before the attacking troops entered the town.

**(CATM NOTES: Instructors should make use of the following lessons emphasized in the foregoing article: 1. Speed pays dividends. 2. Co-operation between units makes for success. 3. Wise use of supporting weapons is a vital factor in battle.)**



# ASSAULT ON THE LANDET SPUR

(From Current Reports from Overseas)

## OPENING SITUATION:

By the end of the first day of the operation, two battalions of the brigade had failed to capture the LANDET spur, and D Coy of "X" Bn—the third battalion on the brigade—had also been committed to secure the cross-roads West of TESSEL-BRETTE-VILLE (see map facing page 30). Though it had been planned for "X" Bn to attack another objective, the commanding officer now realized that his battalion would be called upon to complete the first phase of the operation. At 0200 hrs on the morning of the second day, he attended a brigade conference and received orders to pass his battalion through "Y" Bn—one of the battalions committed the previous day—and gain a footing on the spur. "H" hour was tentatively fixed for 0830 hrs.

At 0600 hrs the commanding officer went forward to see the commanding officer of "Y" Bn, and at the same time ordered his battalion up to an assembly area in an orchard beyond the range of the German mortars. The battalion order group also assembled in a place indicated by the commanding officer.

## RECONNAISSANCE AND PLANNING:

Time was very short and the commanding officer of "X" Bn had to do a lot of quick thinking. Since two battalions had met with failure and the

enemy were, therefore, obviously prepared, his first thought was how to achieve surprise in the third attack. He was determined not to use the same start line that the other two battalions had used. The problem was how to find another. Ground reconnaissance at first light, from a point South of LE MARAIS, had availed him little. A thick, low mist limited visibility to such an extent that he was unable to see anything of the countryside. The commanding officer, therefore, took a chance and selected a start line from the 1/25,000 map.

**This new start line ran from a corner of a wood South-Eastwards, and was chosen because the commanding officer thought that the edge of the wood would help his right company to keep direction on to its objective. From such a start line the impending attack would also come up against the flank of the defenders holding the LANDET spur, thereby possibly achieving the desired surprise.**

The country was typically BOGAGE, and consisted of small fields bounded by trees and high hedges on wide banks. Even if the mist did clear, it was well-nigh impossible to see from one field to another. Any observation of

the ground was very limited indeed. Fortunately the commanding officer had a vertical air photograph and from this he had to do all his planning. Having studied this photograph, he first mapped out a route for his battalion to move to the start line, and secondly he chose a route for the supporting weapons, particularly the anti-tank guns to get up on to the objective, once it had been captured.

At 0700 hrs, the commanding officer, having decided on his outline plan, again met the brigadier. He told him that he would be unable to mount the attack, supported by tanks, by 0830 hrs, and that, since he could not get any firm information about the enemy, an infiltration attack over unknown ground in a heavy mist was simply "not on." The brigadier agreed to alter "H" hour, and the two officers worked out a fire plan to cover the assault.

#### **Asks For Barrage**

The commanding officer asked for a barrage. He wanted fire to stand on the opening line for 15 minutes, and then to lift to a depth of 800 yds at the rate of 100 yds every five minutes. It was purposely agreed that the barrage would move from North to South in much the same way as it had for the first two attacks, because the commanding officer hoped that, by not attacking square to the barrage like the other two attacks, he might again deceive the enemy. (The opening line of the barrage is shown on the map.)

At this conference the commanding officer was told that the following troops would be available to support his battalion:

One squadron of an armoured regiment.

One troop of Crocodiles.

Six field regiments—one regiment to be on immediate call of the armoured squadron and one on call of "X" Bn.

One 17-pr troop of an anti-tank battery.

One 3-in SP troop of an anti-tank battery.

One platoon of sappers—the field company commander was to act as adviser to the battalion commander.

One MMG platoon.

#### **No Time To Lose**

The time was now 0845 hrs, and the mist was beginning to clear. The brigadier suggested that "H" hour should be 1115 hrs, but the commanding officer asked for 1145 hrs, since he did not think that two and a half hours gave him sufficient time to marry-up the supporting arms with the battalion, to issue orders, and to get the assaulting companies forward to the start line. Even with three hours, he knew that there would not be a moment to lose with such a large battalion group to handle.

#### **"X" BN PLAN:**

The commanding officer dictated his orders to his intelligence officer. On the right, A Coy, with one troop of Shermans in support, was to capture Objective A (see map) consisting of an enemy locality and buildings. On the left, B Coy, also with a troop of Shermans in support, was to capture the enemy localities in Objective B. C Coy, probably to be supported by a troop of Shermans and a troop of Crocodiles, was given the task of mopping up, and had orders to move approximately 400 yds behind A Coy. The assaulting companies were to marry-up with their tanks just beyond the start line.

**D Coy was to be picked up from the area of the cross-roads as the battalion moved up to the start line. The company was to be held in reserve for the attack and was allocated a troop of Shermans and the carrier platoon less a sec-**

**tion in support. The fourth carrier section was to be retained for the close protection of the battalion command post.**

The mortar platoon was given tasks on the right flank of the attack. A mobile fire controller was allotted to each leading company and the company commanders were told to arrange their SOS tasks to cover reorganization. FOOs, in tanks, were also to move with A Coy and B Coy—and DF tasks were drawn up to include FERME DE GUIBERON LANDET, and BORDEL, in addition to other suspected danger points. For reorganization, the battalion anti-tank guns, the troop of 17-prs, and the MMG platoon were distributed among the four rifle companies.

#### **ISSUE OF ORDERS:**

Time was short, so while the commanding officer was preparing his orders, the second-in-command was putting the company commanders in the picture, and they in turn were studying air photographs and the 1/25,000 map. Reconnaissance of the ground and enemy positions was still quite impossible.

Orders were ready for issue by 1020 hrs and the second-in-command read them out to the order group, while the commanding officer was working out a plan for reorganization on the objective, with the commanders of the supporting arms. This plan was marked on an air photograph and had to go into very great detail. Positions of anti-tank guns had to be plotted so that the routes forward could be agreed on, because these routes required a considerable amount of sapper work to make them feasible.

Fire tasks for the supporting arms to cover the reorganization were also arranged. The plan for this part of the operation was completed by 1050 hrs, and the commanding officer then gave it out to the order group. He also

answers any questions on the first part of the orders.

**An officer from a neighbouring battalion of another brigade now turned up to see if he could be of any help. He had been sent by his commanding officer, who had heard that "X" Bn was going to do the attack. This officer knew the ground, having previously patrolled over it. The start line was pointed out to him on the map and air photograph, and he agreed to guide "X" Bn forward to it over a good route that he knew. In anticipation of being able to help in this way, he had brought guides with him.**

Three of the companies were already on their way when the commanding officer received a message postponing "H" hour until 1230 hrs. It was not easy to get this alteration in timing through to the companies on the move, but, in point of fact, the new "H" hour did just allow A Coy and B Coy to cross the start line on time. They would have been late, had the attack started at 1145 hrs as originally planned.

#### **NARRATIVE OF THE ATTACK:**

As the barrage opened, the German defensive fire came down in front of their forward defensive localities and up to a distance of 1700 yds due North of them. Little or none of this fire, however, touched "X" Bn. The first message to be received at battalion headquarters came from B Coy, who asked the commanding officer over the wireless to stop our gunners shooting into them, but, in reply, was told not to go so fast!

Shortly afterwards, a second message came in from the same company to the effect that it had captured Objective B and taken 40 prisoners. The Commanding officer was so surprised at the speed

at which the attack had gone so far, that he could hardly believe what he had heard, and asked for this message to be repeated. At the end of the repetition he was also informed that some 25 Germans had made off towards BORDEL.

**A Coy now reported that it had captured a few prisoners, but that very heavy and sustained fire prevented it from getting completely on to Objective A. C Coy was heavily mortared as it crossed the start line behind A Coy and was ordered to stop before it telescoped into the latter company. The troop of Crocodiles was sent forward at 1500 hrs and A Coy, who had only two very junior subalterns left, was placed under command of C Coy. This company group, ably assisted by the Crocodiles, managed to clear the buildings and orchards of Objective A and consolidated the locality.**

In the meantime, D Coy, passing through B Coy, had secured Objective C and were digging in. B Coy then moved forward to capture Objective D, and patrols were sent out to the South and South-East towards BORDEL. As the commanding officer and his gunner and sapper advisers approached the wood to the North-West of the start line in carriers and scout cars, they were greeted by a series of heavy German artillery concentrations. They left their vehicles in a hurry and jumped into some old enemy weapon pits, and decided to establish a command post there.

The enemy shelling now increased in intensity, particularly in the neighbourhood of the command post. The first sapper party, moving up to clear a route forward for the anti-tank guns, was completely knocked out by this

fire and had to be entirely replaced. The sapper officer then arrived with the somewhat disquietening news that the clearing of the route was going to be a bigger task than had been expected. A bulldozer would probably be required and the work would take at least three hours. Panthers had already been reported on the roads from VENDES and LANDET, making it all the more essential to get the anti-tank guns forward as quickly as possible.

### **Counter-Attack**

Shortly before last light, the commanding officer set out to visit the rifle companies, and after he had left B Coy (in Objective D) he heard heavy mortar and small arms coming down on its locality. Thinking it to be the prelude to a counter-attack he immediately returned to the command post. B Coy did report a small counter-attack supported by two Panthers but it was easily beaten off. One of the Panthers was hit by a PIAT and they both turned tail. A section of anti-tank guns and a section of MMGs now managed to get up to D Coy's locality (in Objective C), but it was another four or five hours before all the anti-tank guns were really in position.

**During the night, the Luftwaffe began dropping parachute flares and the shelling started again. Suddenly, two 500 kilo bombs dropped out of the blue, scoring direct hits on battalion headquarters. Three AFVs, a jeep, and a considerable amount of the wood itself caught alight. Ammunition, bombs, and signal cartridges began to explode in all directions, and there was considerable confusion. Casualties were heavy. Fortunately one 18 set survived, and with it the commanding officer was able to call for the help of some more**

### **stretch r bearers from the field ambulance.**

The commanding officer then collected the remnants of battalion headquarters and moved to D Coy's locality where a new command post was dug. Early the next morning he ordered D Coy to mop up the isolated Spandau posts left behind in the battalion's new locality. The task was satisfactorily completed and more prisoners were brought in. During the day a start was made to lay mines in front of the forward companies, and patrols went out 1,000 yds beyond the position. It was believed that Pt 124 near LANDET had been evacuated by the enemy, so just before last light, A Coy, with an FOO and supported by a troop of tanks, moved forward to secure the area. It reported itself in position by 2300 hrs, having encountered no enemy.

### **NOTES:**

- (a) The enemy were holding the objective in considerable strength, and had offered determined resistance to the attacks by the first two battalions. It often happens that the enemy cleverly conceal their actual strength, in the hope that we shall suppose that they are weak on the position, and so mount a hurried attack against them.
- (b) The enemy were undoubtedly surprised by the direction of "X" Bn's attack. The axis of advance was about 40 degrees to the line of the barrage, and this fact alone must have misled them.

### **Used Bayonet**

- (c) B Coy suffered some casualties from our own shells because it moved too fast. Nevertheless, men of the company afterwards stated that it was well worth while being so close to the barrage because they were in time to catch the Germans with the bayonet as they left their dug-outs after the barrage had

passed over.

- (d) As a result of this attack, the commanding officer considered that more attention should be paid to mopping up during training. He believed that even companies should detail perhaps a couple of sections to mop up in their own company localities. The German "stays put" after an attack has gone in and will continue to shoot as long as he is allowed to. Immediate action should be taken against such posts.
- (e) Difficulty was experienced in knowing where to move the mopping up company. C Coy, detailed for this duty, was caught by heavy mortar fire and sustained casualties before it was even properly committed.
- (f) **One prisoner who was interrogated severely criticised the fieldcraft of the English on the objective. The average soldier too often feels that once the objective is captured, he can sit back and take it easy, and his fieldcraft immediately deteriorates.**
- (g) During the battle, the commanding officer received a considerable amount of information over the squadron net by a remote control from a tank. The soldiers carrying 18 sets were found to be very vulnerable; it was difficult to work the sets on the move.
- (h) This attack proved the wisdom of companies carrying forward their PIATS and bombs with them. Nevertheless, there is still tendency to leave these valuable weapons behind to be brought up later in the company vehicles. It often seems to be forgotten that enemy tanks may counter-attack before these vehicles and the anti-tank guns can be got forward.



# EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN NORMANDY

(U.S. Military Notes)

Shortly after Allied Forces had penetrated the outer crest of West coast defenses in Northwestern France, reports began to filter back of the new infantry-tank tactics that were being developed as the result of the unusual terrain in Normandy. The hedgerow had proved to be a formidable barrier.

The typical hedgerow is composed of a line of trees, up to two feet in diameter and heavy brush which grows on top of a ridge of earth four feet in height and eight feet in height. Frequently there are ditches on one or both sides of the hedge. These hedgerows afford excellent protection for enemy infantry and at the same time serve as ready-made tank obstacles.

The Germans frequently organize their defensive positions over a series of three hedgerows. When the first hedgerow line is threatened the German withdraws, usually along the existing hedgerows, under cover of fire from the next hedgerow line. Withdrawing personnel may either reinforce the second line or continue to the third line prepared to cover a withdrawal from the second. In addition, the Germans use a leapfrog system of defense which enables them to maintain objective resistance even after the loss of the rearward hedgerow of the original position.

## First Hedgerow

The first hedgerow is usually occupied by only a few men, some of whom are armed with machine pistols. Sometimes a single individual armed with an automatic weapon will move rapidly from place to place firing one or more bursts at each point for the purpose of creating the impression that the

total hedgerow defense is in Normandy.


The second hedgerow is usually held by riflemen and machine gunners. Sometimes tanks are dug through the bank and the machine guns also are frequently positioned on command posts. Usually machine guns for the purpose of hedgerow in the front.

The third hedgerow is prepared for assault and is usually lined initially equipped with rifles and automatic weapons.

The entire position is defended by the fire of mortars and artillery which may range in caliber from 75 mm to 240 mm. Shells used are both high and low and ground impact. Artillery and mortars are almost invariably registered in the hedgerow corners, gaps in hedgerows, and other obvious critical points such as crossroads and road junctions.

The defensive zone is permeated with snipers whose the Germans use freely to contribute to the delaying effect of their organization. These snipers may be found in trees, buildings, towers and similar vantage points. Consensus of opinion is that the snipers are great shots and constitute a serious threat to individuals who attempt to move.

Germans also use machine guns and bobby traps freely. Bobby traps



# EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS IN NORMANDY

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Typical hedgerow-enclosed road in Normandy.

holding force is much larger than it is.

The second defended hedgerow usually is held by riflemen and machine gunners. Sometimes tunnels are dug through the bank and the machine guns also are frequently emplaced to command gaps, already existing or made for the purpose, in hedgerows to the front.

The third defended hedgerow is prepared for occupation and is sometimes initially occupied by riflemen and automatic weapons.

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**The defensive area is permeated with snipers, whom the Germans use freely to contribute to the delaying effect of their organization. These snipers may be found in trees, buildings, towers and similar vantage points. Concensus of opinion is that the snipers are poor shots and constitute no serious threat to individuals who continue to move.**

Germans also sow anti-tank mines and booby traps freely. Booby traps

frequently will be found at openings in the hedges and near parallel hedgerows, where they will cause casualties if our troops attempt to work along or through them.

In attacking these German defensive positions, the lack of observation has made close support by artillery and mortars very difficult, with the result that tanks have been employed to supplement their fire. Tank operations, in turn, have been made more hazardous by the many hedgerows and sunken roads, which tend to canalize tank movement; by the ease with which enemy infantry could ambush unsupported tanks and knock them out with grenades and bazookas; and by the prevalence of anti-tank guns so cleverly concealed in hedgerows that they were not detected prior to their opening fire.

### **Blades On Tanks**

In avoiding roads, the tanks had to force their way over or through the hedgerows. Some tanks were equipped with special blades so that they could open a breach for themselves. In other cases, engineer troops blasted out gaps through which they could pass. The infantry provided the cover for the tanks, and for the engineers when they formed part of the team.

The attack in this type of terrain, as in any close country, is marked by



Typical hedgerow in Normandy with most of the vegetation shot off.

conflicting needs for decentralization and for close control. Decentralization is necessary because limited visibility tends to isolate the fight in each field. Control is necessary to insure against exposure of a unit to flanking fire by a too rapid advance. The need for decentralization is largely met by the formation of small semi-independent teams capable of capturing a single field or two adjacent fields. The need for control is met in one or more of the following ways:

**a. Telephone lines from battalion to company commanders to permit frequent reports. Reporting of locations is facilitated by assigning arbitrary numbers to the fields.**

**b. Numerous phase lines (usually specified hedgerows) on which co-ordination is obtained before further advance.**

**c. The inclusion of each parallel hedgerow in the zone of advance of a small unit, to insure the interest of its leader in the situation on both sides and to facilitate mutual observation by adjacent units.**

**d. Special measures for infantry - tank communication. Some units install infantry telephones on certain tanks and connect them with the interphone communication system. In others, the infantry is provided by the tank unit with a tank radio.**

**e. Depth in deployment.**

The technique of employing tanks in close support of infantry differed considerably in various units. These methods can best be described by giving their actual experiences.

Elements of one division attacked and captured a certain hill with very few casualties, using the method described below. Four previous attacks had failed.

A company of tanks was attached to each assaulting infantry battalion. In addition to their normal equipment, tanks carried nine sets of prepared demolition charges for use in breaching hedges, and one telephone instrument mounted on rear of tank and connected to interphone circuit in order to provide voice communication between infantry and tank commanders.

### Operate As Team

The leading tank of each close support column operated as a member of a team consisting of the tank itself, one rifle squad and one engineer demolition detachment of four men. The engineer detachment accompanied the tank throughout the operation to assist its advance by breaching hedges with demolition charges and to provide a measure of local protection against AT grenades and rocket launchers.

Elements of the team moved from one hedgerow to the next, usually in the following sequence: infantry scouts,



Hole cut through a thick hedgerow by blades mounted on tanks.

covered by the fire of the other infantry and tanks; the infantry automatic weapons; the remainder of the infantry squad, accompanied by two engineers who selected a firing position at the new hedge for the tank and signalled it forward. The new tank position was selected near, but not in, an existing gap, or at a planned gap which afforded observation and a field of fire and also facilitated further movement forward.

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## USE THIS MATERIAL

It has been the policy of DMT to reproduce and distribute Extracts from War Diaries and Memoranda from Canadian Forces in North West Europe and the Mediterranean Area. All Districts, Commands, Training Establishments and Schools receive these communications, and it is thought that some information should be given as the reason which prompts DMT to reproduce these bulletins.

There are, in fact, two reasons: (a) It is felt that these reports provide a definite link between the Training Establishments in Canada and the Units in the field. (b) There are many valuable lessons to be learned from actual experiences recounted in these reports from various units. These interesting cases can be taken to illustrate realis-


tically to the reinforcement the urgent necessity of absorbing such lessons as camouflage, siting of personal weapons, marksmanship, fieldcraft, etc.

It is recognized that the distribution is reduced to the minimum but this is dictated by the limited capacity to reproduce these reports in sufficiently short time in order that their value will not be lost through time lag. Therefore it behooves Training Establishments to formulate some plan whereby their officers are permitted to see these reports as soon as possible after reception, so that they in turn may apply the points of interest to current training. This material might well form the basis for a lecture by COs to officers or as a basis for officers' discussions.

# ENEMY WEAPONS

*(Extracted from The American Rifleman)*

The accompanying photo shows the German Gewehr 43 semi-automatic rifle—the new German answer to the U.S. Garand. This enemy weapon is 44 in. long, weighs 8.9 lbs. The calibre is 7.92 mm.; it has a 22-inch barrel, is sighted from 100 to 1200 metres and is notched to receive a telescope sight. The cocking handle is on the top left side. The bolt may be locked open and 10 cartridges stripped into the magazine from the top from standard five-shot



Mauser clips, or the magazine may be removed from the bottom of the receiver and a loaded magazine inserted from below. Pressing the bolt catch on the right rear side of the receiver frees the bolt assembly and permits the coiled spring behind it to drive the moving units forward to load the rifle.

## **Compact Unit**

The bolt is a compact unit consisting of a bolt housing which is fitted with a sliding cover, together with the bolt slide, firing pin housing, firing pin extension and the recoil spring and guide. The operating (or recoil) spring and guide rod are seated in the housing behind the bolt to provide the power for driving the mechanism forward. The spring is compressed around its guide, of course, during the rearward motion of the bolt.

The bolt itself is cut away on top to permit the insertion of a loose operating slide to which is attached the bolt handle. This slide acts against a firing pin housing containing the firing pin and its extension, to cam the bolt locks, which operate through bolt cuts on right and left during rearward motion.

When the bolt is fully forward and locked, the cartridge chambered and the extractor snapped into the cartridge extracting groove, the top face of the bolt slide rests against a hole drilled straight ahead through the receiver above the line of the bolt.


A long thin steel operating rod and its coil return spring are seated in the top of the receiver above the line of the barrel, one end in contact with the operating slide, the other end touching a short free "tappet" piece which floats in a chamber parallel to the barrel, supported by a gas chamber rising

from the gas port drilled in the top of the barrel.

## **How Action Works**

As the trigger is pressed to rotate the sear away from the hammer, the hammer flies forward under spring tension to strike the firing pin and fire the cartridge. The bullet passes under the gas port (about 12 $\frac{1}{2}$  in. back from the muzzle) and a quantity of gas rushes through the port and into the chamber. Here it strikes a sharp blow against the tappet (or piston). This blow is transmitted to the operating rod, which flies back through its hole in the top of the receiver below the rear sight to drive the bolt slide back. This slide is travelling independently of the locked bolt while pressure is high, carrying the firing pin housing also. As the pressure drops, the con-

# JAPANESE AMBUSH IN NEW GUINEA



## LEGEND

- |                     |                    |
|---------------------|--------------------|
| 1. FWD SCOUT Killed | 5. PL. COMD Wound  |
| 2. FWD SCOUT Killed | 6. O. C Killed     |
| 3. BREN GNR killed  | 7. RUNNER Killed   |
| 4. RIFLEMAN Killed  | 8. RIFLEMAN Killed |
| 9. RIFLEMAN Wounded |                    |

(ATM—Australia)

The action occurred in hilly country covered by considerable jungle with occasional open spaces. The enemy, after being driven from his position, retreated along a track, and a company of Australian infantry was ordered to move, as forward company to a battalion, along the track towards the next objective.

The company moved in normal formation in single file. The leading section had a strength of four—section commander and one scout armed with OSMGs, one bren gunner and one rifleman.

## ENEMY WEAPONS

(Continued from page 34)

tinued rearward motion of the sliding piece carries the firing pin housing to the point where its shape causes it to cam the two bolt locks out of the receiver cuts and into the sides of the bolt. From this point on, the bolt assembly travels rearward as a unit to extract and eject the empty case, cock the hammer and compress the recoil spring.

On forward motion, the spring continues to force the firing pin housing and bolt slide ahead after the bolt is fully forward. The firing pin housing cams the locking pieces out of its path within the bolt, into locking slots in the receiver walls.

During their advance the company saw evidence on the muddy track of a considerable number of the enemy having moved ahead of them. Some 500 yards out they killed one Jap, but saw no others. The ground was rising steeply at this time, and about four hundred yards on a halt was called.

## Fire From Ambush

After moving another 300 yards the forward scouts came to a tree which obscured the track and held them up. The company commander moved forward, presumably to keep the advance going, and remained with the platoon commander. At 1350 hours the advance had continued for only about 50 yards when the leading platoon was fired on from an ambush, sited in an excellent position on both sides of, and looking down on, the track. The company suffered seven killed, including the company commander and his runner, and five wounded, including the forward platoon commander.

The ambush was sited in a position where a LMG on either side of the track could completely cover it for one hundred yards without risking observation themselves.

Reference to the accompanying sketch will assist in explaining the following description of the ambush:—

**The LMG on the north side of the track could cover it**

from forward of the "S" bend, and including the bend, while the LMG on the south side could cover the track from the "S" bend for some distance back. In addition to these there were approximately three riflemen on the north side of the track who dealt with the forward scouts who had been allowed to go through.

After the ambush was sprung the enemy immediately withdrew his LMGs, but left snipers to cover his withdrawal. Later, he hampered further advance by sporadic automatic fire from farther up the track, apparently in an endeavour to cover movement along the track.

#### **LESSONS LEARNED:**

1. When pursuing a retreating enemy as much care must be exercised by forward troops as at any other time, particularly with respect to the avoidance of bunching.
2. Company commanders should not normally place themselves in a position where they may be involved in an ambush or action which should concern only the forward platoon.
3. In an advance along a track forward troops should not move on the track if it is at all possible to move with sufficient speed off the track. This should apply to at least the whole of the forward section and at times to the whole platoon.
4. Troops should be trained so that forward scouts have an eye for ambush country and take suitable precautions.

**NOTE:** Surprise was probably lost to us by the shooting of the Jap on the track 400 yards before reaching the ambush, particularly as the company rested for a short period, giving the enemy time to prepare.

## **SOME NOTES ON ENGINEER ACTIVITIES IN FRANCE**

*(U.S. Military Review)*

The outstanding impression I got from my trip was that the training of engineer combat units that went to France was very sound and thorough. These units knew their jobs and proved it. If their training had not directly covered the work at hand, they were soundly trained in the fundamentals and were able to solve the new problems as they came up.

Engineer combat units have the respect and admiration of the entire expeditionary force. Many officers from other branches, when they saw I was an engineer, went out of their way to tell me what fine work the engineers have been doing. The combat engineers are operating close to the front lines with often only a thin line of infantry ahead. I doubt that in any battle in history the bridge work has been so well handled . . . road maintenance has been well done.

#### **Clearing Routes**

In clearing routes through ruined towns a circulation problem is involved. Which routes should be cleared first to handle the traffic in the best possible manner? . . . Very often the traffic can be handled best by the removal of buildings to widen the route and make a second route for traffic. Also, road repair work should be planned by engineers so as least to interfere with traffic, by doing the work at odd hours and not creating bottlenecks on a busy road. . .

The first step, of course, is to get a route through by clearing the main road in the direction of advance. Then two-way traffic in that direction is necessary. Here some ingenuity is required because this can be done either by clearing a two-track road or, if the road net permits, clearing two one-track roads.

"There is a widespread tendency to exaggerate and over-estimate the strength of enemy resistance. The result is we are all often too cautious."

—A British Infantry Commanding Officer

## A RECIPE FOR SUCCESS

*(The following memorandum was issued to all his commanding officers by the commander of a Canadian infantry division in ITALY—Extracted from Current Reports From Overseas.)*

I want the following simple formula rubbed home with all ranks in your units, especially with company, platoon, and section leaders.

**ATTACK:** Move fast from one tactical bound to another. Make wide use of ground and dispersion, frontally and in depth. **BE QUICK TO EXPLOIT SUCCESS.** You can only be so if your reserves are properly positioned and handled.

Make full use of the fire power of all your weapons in the assault—Brens, rifles, TMCs, grenades, PIATS, 2-in. mortars. Do not forget that the bayonet is a lethal weapon; therefore train your men to use it.

Outflank the enemy whenever possible. The Boche is most sensitive about his flanks and rear. Pin him frontally, however. **DO NOT CROSS A SKYLINE STANDING UP.** Whenever you are in doubt as to what should be done—attack.

**DEFENCE AND CONSOLIDATION:** Always be prepared for all-round defence. Make full use of your automatic weapons. Remember that automatic firepower is the framework of the defence. Conserve riflemen.

Keep a reserve in hand, mainly riflemen, suitably disposed for immediate counter-attack, for which you must be prepared in advance.

**Patrol vigorously, and take advantage of opportunities. Build up a clear picture of enemy dispositions.**

Study the problem of attacking from your defensive position. Remember that defence is only a momentary phase.

Battles are won by offensive action.

**PURSUIT:** In pursuit, you must take risks and move fast. Remember the enemy is tired. Infiltrate on a wide front. Keep going. Live off the country. In a break through, the object should be to overrun the enemy's mortar and gun lines, which are the backbone of his defence. Once these have been destroyed, an orderly retreat becomes a rout.

**TANK AND INFANTRY CO-OPERATION:** Do not forget the basic formula: the infantry deal with the anti-tank guns and the tanks with wire and MGs. **BUT** remember always that infantry working with tanks are the eyes of, and close-in protection for, the tanks.

Know your opposite number, his limitations and his advantages.

Never let the tanks get forward without your support close behind. You must get up to them at all costs.

### Offensive Weapons

Tanks are offensive weapons more than defensive. Their role in defence is offensive action. They should rally behind the objective where they can be employed for counter-attack.

If the tanks cannot get forward **DO NOT** lose your offensive spirit, but go on without them. They will follow you as quickly as they can.

Practise assiduously with 38 set inter-communication between tanks and infantry. If sets are properly netted, and operated by personnel trained for the purpose, this system can and will work.

**SUMMARY: REMEMBER THAT THE OBJECT OF WAR IS TO DESTROY THE ENEMY.** Be correct in your treatment of prisoners, but do not be friendly or you are inviting treachery.



# INFANTRY POINTS OF VIEW

*(During a recent lull in offensive operations the G.S.O. 1 of a division fighting in North West Europe took the opportunity of recording the impressions of various infantry officers of proved ability and experience. The following are extracts from his report.—Progress Bulletin (Infantry).)*

## The Platoon Commander

(a) **WEAPON TRAINING:** There's practically no question as to what comes first: that is weapon training. The platoon lives or dies by its ability to use the Bren, 2-inch mortar, PIAT and grenades; and not all of them **can** do it. I suppose there is only one real way of learning how to keep a Bren firing, and that is by keeping the Bren firing. It isn't the dead accurate shooting that counts so much as knowing the gun so well that it doesn't stop. So give the lads plenty of shooting with live ammunition, having first filled their own magazines, and give them plenty of stoppages.

## Mortar, PIAT Too

The same too with the mortar and PIAT. The PIAT is an excellent weapon you know, to use against a Boche light machine gun, at almost any range up to 300 yards, once the firer really knows the weapon inside out and realises what it can do. It's amazing how many men have had little or no actual firing experience. You wouldn't believe either that some men don't even know that a grenade has to be primed, let alone how to prime it.

(b) **SLIT TRENCHES:** We used to dig a lot at home and nobody needs telling about that now; but this head cover business is new to most who are just out from home. It not only protects against air bursts and the weather, but is absolutely essential if slit trenches are anywhere near trees, for the mortar bombs and shells will detonate in the branches and go right down into the bottom of any slit trench without head cover. Probably the best arrangement is an "L" shaped trench, one leg of

which is an ordinary fire trench and the other a little dugout, with a good solid roof, flush with the ground, made of scrounged timber or branches.


(c) **CHIN STRAPS:** One small point is the wearing of chin straps. I have seen several chaps with their chin strap under the chin get half throttled as a result of their steel helmet being pushed back on their head by blast. I must say they are lucky if that is all that happens to them if the blast is as bad as that, but we all wear our chin strap at the back, pulled tight so that it grips the back of the head. It's just as firm as wearing the chin strap under the chin.

(d) **DISCIPLINE:** I may as well tell you, not that there is much you can do about it, that the "scruffy men," the men you are always checking for this and that, are the men who will let you down in battle, anyhow with very rare exceptions. I was three years in the ranks myself, and like most of the troops often thought less than nothing of all the "bull" of blanco and brasses and collars and salutes. But I've learnt my lesson now. I've had 60 or 70 men through my platoon now; and I **know** that the "scruffs" are just as bad soldiers in battle as they are out of it. So keep on trying to cure them.

## The Company Commander

(a) **ARTILLERY FIRE:** The ability to direct and correct artillery fire is a real life-saver. One can't always get a forward observation officer, but if all officers take the trouble to learn the procedure, they will be surprised how often they will use it.

(b) **REST PERIODS:** One tip I have found useful is to send one or two men per platoon every day to "B" Echelon for 24 hours to have a real rest in peace and quiet and comparative comfort. Front-line soldiering is a terrific



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strain on the nerves, and very often if one can get a man back out of it, even for a day, when his nerve is beginning to go, it will just save him and he will come back a different creature. When they are back at "B" Echelon, they are allowed to sleep as long as they like, and given bags of food. The CQMS can fix this easily enough.

### The Carrier Platoon Commander

Since the CAEN days we have been doing "advance to contact" patrols, moving ahead of the battalion; doing patrols out from the battalion position in defence, or doing flank guards. My remarks therefore particularly apply to that. The first point to remember in the struggle to locate the enemy is to avoid barging around corners, over crests and the like. If you do that he is bound to see you first. So we dismount from the carrier at each tactical bound and go and have a careful look on foot. "When in doubt, dismount" is an excellent motto for carrier platoons.

**But very often you won't be lucky enough to see him first**

**and the first thing you will know is that you are under fire. If that happens, open up with every weapon you have got in the probable direction of the enemy; then go to ground as quickly as you can under cover of that fire and get the carrier out.**

When light machinegun groups are going to the positions given them by the section commander, I make them double there, **NOT** crawl. That nearly always draws fire (and very, very rarely hits anybody) which the other light machinegun teams can locate, as their job is to observe while each light machinegun gets into position. It's the battle school drill in fact and I find that it works, though I know a lot of other people don't fancy the idea much.

I have found most of my fellows pretty good with the Bren, but when it comes to 2-inch mortar and PIAT some of them are very poor. As regards grenades, I know several who didn't even know that a grenade has to be primed, let alone how to do it.

The value of good driving is obvious

The boot is the most important factor in infantry marching, and plays an important part in strategy.

—Wellington

and there is no need to labour the point, but I must point out how terribly useful it is to have every member of the crew able to drive.

### **The Mortar Platoon Commander**

Far and away the commonest form of shoot we have done is the map shoot. One must get that absolutely taped. The firing of defensive fire tasks, night or day, just like the gunners, is first cousin to the map shoot, if **NOT** actually a map shoot. These you must be prepared to put down at immediate notice. In this connection, by the way, make quite sure you have a good supply of protractors. They are **NOT** so easy to get out here.

### **The Signal Platoon Commander**

My commanding officer tells me that when communications don't work he might just as well go to bed and stay there, for all the good he is. Well the two things to concentrate on are wireless and line and you can't do too much of that. We have never used morse once in five months and I don't expect we will in the next five months. So don't waste too much time on that—I almost said, don't waste **any** time on it!

The Signal platoon sometimes—and rather naturally—seems to collect the intellectual type of men. Well, there's no harm in that, but do realise that the signaller needs as much guts (or discipline—one makes up for the other) as any rifleman. Walking about with an 18 set on your back or mending telephone lines in mortar fire is no

picnic and the signaller has got to be able "to take it" with the best of them.


### **The Anti-Tank Platoon Commander**

I may say it is remarkable how many detachments of other battalions there are, that we have taken over from, who have not dug their gun in. It is almost incredible to me.

**Apart from knocking out three tanks, we have also been used quite a lot for taking on houses and pillboxes. Using high explosive we have done some very good work with the guns and find that the shell knocks a hole up to 3 feet wide in the wall of a house. It's remarkable how accurate the gun is and I have seen a layer put 3 or 4 shots through a bedroom window at 600 yards.**

Our Loyd carriers have stood up well to their work. We usually have 10 up with the guns, 1 with B echelon and the last one at workshops and that system has been a great success. As regards where the Loyd carriers are kept, I know there are two schools of thought, but we always keep ours fairly close up behind the guns and **NOT** back in waggon lines. Apart from being able to move the gun in a hurry, which may be necessary, it means the driver is available to help with guards. We have our own cooking set with us and cook our own meals, instead of being fed by the company.

# PASSING IT ON!



## WOODEN MODEL OF BREN


The accompanying illustration shows a Training Aid consisting of an over-size model of the Bren LMG built to teach mechanism. This model was devised and constructed from local materials by A14 C.I.T.C., Aldershot, N.S., and has assisted greatly as a time-saver in teaching mechanism to rft personnel.

Local construction of such an aid is recommended to Training Centres. The

parts may be constructed large enough so that any demonstration is plainly visible to the class under instruction. Thus the movements of the trigger mechanism and the relative forward movement of the piston and breech block are plainly reproduced for the benefit of the class.

The illustration shows the assembly and method of mounting.

**All training establishments note this remark from overseas:  
" . . . It confirms the opinion that the only way to properly train  
a man is by practical work outdoors in all weather."**



## BAYONET FIGHTING DEVICE

Hats off to No. 23 C.I. (B) T.C., Newmarket, Ont.! For sheer simplicity of design this is one of the best examples of ingenuity brought to the attention of CATM for some time.

As shown in the accompanying photos, this Training Aid is made simply of lumber, a couple of springs and some sacking. Constructed to represent an enemy armed with a bayonet, the device gives realism to the parry and butt stroke.

Ordinarily, the butt stroke is merely a gesture, but No. 23 found that by padding an old-fashioned bed-spring to resemble a head which wobbled on being struck the recruit saw action as he struck.

In order to give realism to the parry, the training stick has a long brake spring attached at the ring end, the other end of the spring being attached to a stake in the ground. Tension is given by slipping the ring over a nail in the bayonet standard. The force of the parry moves the training stick sufficiently for the ring to slip off the nail and the brake spring contracts, drawing the "weapon" to the rear



Before parry, ring rested on nail at "A"

through a slot in the standard, as shown. This device can be constructed in a short time and injects a lot of enthusiasm into bayonet practice.

## QUIZZ ON CATM

In order to stimulate interest in CATM and to ensure that this publication is read fully by every officer of A29 Canadian Infantry Corps Training Centre, the commandant of this Centre prepared and conducted a quiz programme on material contained in the November issue of CATM. (No. 44).

Officer personnel were warned that the quiz would take place and were notified of the date and time. Five points were given for each correct answer and prizes awarded to the winning individuals, as well as a team prize for the coy with the highest percentage. Prizes added a touch of humor to the program. They included extra time in bed on Sunday morning, a drink on the CO, one free beer, etc., and a team prize of a package of cigarettes for each officer.

A few samples of the 20 questions used in A29's quiz follow; answers being given in brackets:

"U.S. Enlisted Men Discuss the Jap:"  
What word does the Jap yell as he goes forward into action? ("Banzai"—Blood for the Emperor).

"Modern Japan:" What is the unit of Japanese social life? (the family.)

"Passing It On": What did "Passing It On" deal with? (Sten Battle Ranges.)

"Are you a Junior Officer? If you are, keep on reading. This is meant for you. If you are not, keep on reading anyway. It will do you no harm:"  
What is the name of the article from which this statement is taken? (One Minute Please).

This quiz was productive of good results, both in interest and entertainment. It's an idea worth trying.

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## HWE TRAINING

Here's another training idea:


The problem of keeping HWE personnel up to the required standard of training is one that has vexed many commanding officers and chief instructors. Following is a solution to the problem that A29 Canadian Infantry Corps Training Centre has found effective:

All HWE personnel are divided into two equal groups, "A" and "B". On Tuesday night "A" Group are on parade from 1830 to 2130 hours and on Thursday night "B" Group has its innings. In this way it is possible to get every man on parade for three hours once a week without disruption of essential services.

### Two Advantages

To avoid overworking the already hardworking members of the instructional staff, these evening periods for the HWE are conducted by NCOs who are attending the School of Instruction with a view to becoming Assistant Instructors. This system has two advantages at least: (a) it gives the potential A/I a chance to try out his technique under more realistic conditions than usually pertain to a School of Instruction; (b) it gives the officer in charge a better chance to assess the potential A/I.

This solution has been found not only effective but popular with both those under instruction and those giving the instruction.



## LAMP MAKES STOVE

In winter months a great deal of difficulty is experienced in preventing target patching paste from freezing. This was overcome quite readily by Al CATC, Petawawa, by converting an ordinary coal oil lantern into a heater as shown in the photograph.

The first step in this conversion was to remove the small cap on top of the lantern. This left a hole in the top. Next the glass chimney was removed and replaced by a piece of stovepipe which had been cut down to proper height and approximately the same circumference as the top of the globe.

A shield, about 5" high and made of tin, was then placed on top of the lamp. The paste pot is placed on top of the shield and the lamp lit. This provides ample heat to keep the paste warm in sub-zero weather and has been

used with success by Al.

Another handy little trick is to mix one cup of rock salt to each bucket of paste. This gives an even texture to the mixture and prevents it from becoming "watery" when left standing.

It's a good gadget for sub-zero weather.


## ANOTHER BOOBY TRAP


To stimulate interest in the Mines and Booby Trap Syllabus by realistic demonstrations, No. 122 C.I. (B) T.C., Maple Creek, Sask., has developed a training expedient which functions perfectly.

The A/P British Shrapnel Mine Mk 1 (Practice) is armed with a .303 blank cartridge as per MTP 40, Sec. 2. On pressure of the trip wire, the striker of the cartridge pistol hits the cap of the blank cartridge, which explodes and throws the mine approximately 3 feet in the air.

To prevent cracking of the outer casing of the mine as a result of the explosion, the mine is embedded in a block of cement which may be buried in the ground as desired.

This device, depicted in the accompanying photo, provides an excellent demonstration and is well worth trying.





A soldier in action, especially when alone and on his own resources, is protected mainly by the thoroughness of his training. The training is effective only in so far as the soldier remembers it.

Training aided by sound films leaves an impression on both sight and hearing. The lesson of a sound film, or other visual aid combined with the instructor's voice, is usually easily recalled.

Instructors should take care that, in

so far as time and materials will allow, soldiers have an opportunity to see films on general and specialized phases of military training. Recollection of the images, sounds and words will remain in the soldier's mind.

Training is a weapon which cannot be taken away. Visual-audio aids help build memories of training into clear and precise recollections.

Equipment, films and library services are available; they demand intelligent application to training.





# NEW TRAINING FILMS

(For your info the following trg films have recently been distributed or are being distributed during the current month)

## 1. Administration and Supply

- (a) C-614 Organization and Route Signing Eqpt (8 mins)
- (b) C-615 Route Signing (21 mins)
- (c) C-616 CMP at Work (12 mins)
  - (i) Three Brit trg films which explain the org of secs of CMP (Pro) and CMP (TC) into the various types of coys, and methods of using eqpt when signing and manning a sector or route.
  - (ii) Distributed to RMC and A-32 C Pro CTC.

## 2. Aircraft Recognition

- (a) C-773 Mustang III (6 mins)
- (b) C-774 Tempest V (6 mins)
  - (1) Distributed to A-23 CC & AAATC and No 1 Trg Bde Gp.
- (c) TF1-3379 Japanese Dinah (7 mins)
  - (i) Distributed to Pacific Comd HQ Film Library and S-1 CC & AAAS.

## 3. Artillery—A tk

- (a) C-735 A tk Gunnery—Org of Defence and Fire Plan (19 mins)
  - (i) Shows the org of def of an A tk bty within a Bde def area and the siting and fire plan for individual guns.
  - (ii) Distributed to Pacific Comd and MD 6 HQ Film Libraries and also to A-3 CATC, S-3 and S-4 CSAS's, S-17 CS of I, No. 1 Trg Bde Gp and RMC.

## 4. Infantry

- (a) C-461 Carriers—Close Support (21 mins)
  - (i) Showing the danger of enemy ambush to carriers and how, by the employment of scout, support and manoeuvre carriers, this danger can be countered.
  - (ii) Distributed to Pacific Comd and MD 6 HQ Film Libraries, and also to No. 1 Trg Bde Gp, S-17 CS of I and A-27 CRTC.
- (b) C-717 Tactical Handling of 3 in Mortar (23 mins)
  - (i) The tactical handling depicted includes the principle of two or four mortars controlled by one fire controller, and that of mobile fire controllers going fwd with advancing tps, thus ensuring close support.
  - (ii) Distributed to Pacific Comd and MD 6 HQ Film Libraries, and also to RMC, No. 1 Trg Bde Gp, S-3 and S-4 CSAS's, S-17 CS of I and A-27 CRTC.

## 5. Mechanical Transport

- (a) C-779 REME—Organization in the Field (27 mins)
  - (i) Describes the way the REME org functions in the fd in the repair and rec of damaged eqpt.
  - (ii) Distributed to RMC and A-21 CO & EMETC.

## 6. Medical

- (a) TF8-1343 Care of Sick and Injured—Morning Care (6 mins)
- (b) TF8-1344 Care of Sick and Injured—Evening Care (6 mins)
- (c) TF8-1345 Care of Sick and Injured—Post Operative Care (15 mins)
- (d) TF8-1346 Care of Sick and Injured—Temperature, Pulse and Respiration (18 mins)
- (e) TF8-1382 Care of Sick and Injured—Surgical Dressings (19 mins)
- (f) TF8-1383 Care of Sick and Injured—Enemas (20 mins)
  - (i) Distributed to Camp Borden and Petawawa Mil Camp HQ Film Libraries.

## 7. Signals

- (a) TF11-2068 Defence Against Radio Jamming (18 mins)
  - (i) Designed to help in minimizing the effect of enemy attempts to jam radio comn freqs with intentional interference.
  - (ii) Distributed to A-7 CSTC, A-27 CRTC and A-33 CACTE.

# Letters to the Editor

Editor, CATM: Congratulations on your fine article on "The Canadian Chaplain Service" (Jan. CATM), but your reason why a chaplain has to carry an honorary rank is based on a misunderstanding. You state: "It is honorary because they are not trained . . ." etc. I am afraid all the priests and ministers who have joined the army during the past two years and have had to qualify at OTC, Brockville, Ont., will testify to the strenuous training chaplains **do get**. Having visited the U.S. Chaplains' School I can say that the Canadian Course is more strenuous. At OTC these chaplains qualify side by side with Medical, Dental, Pay and other Corps, yet the chaplain's rank is still honorary. **WHY?** Some of us have qualified before becoming priests or ministers, yet now as chaplains we have to carry **that much-disliked honorary prefix**.—E.J.W.

*(We appreciate your interest in the article mentioned, E.J.W. The complete sentence to which you refer reads: "It (the rank) is honorary because they are not trained for, neither do they accept, military responsibility." Doesn't the phrase "military responsibility" answer your question?—Editor.)*

Editor, CATM: It is noted with regret, but not with surprise, that there was no mention in the December number of CATM of the Reserve Companies of the Veterans Guard of Canada. In the Pacific Area, at least, these companies formed the backbone of the reserve battalions to which they were attached, and during the most critical period were the only trained and experienced units in the area.

Throughout Canada the example and bearing of the men of these companies

has been an inspiration to thousands of younger men, but because they could not go active for economic or physical reasons, they have never received the official appreciation they deserve, except on the Pacific and possibly the Atlantic Coast.

Now, apparently the policy is to let these companies disintegrate or disband without so much as a thank you for their long and self-sacrificing service.—J.R.Mc.

*(We hope publication of your letter will put your point across, J. R. Mc.—Editor.)*

Editor, CATM: I'd like to say a few words in support of sports in the army.

Games and sports have become a necessary part of a soldier's training, not just off-parade recreation. Principles developed by games, boxing, gymnastics and track and field events all possess certain virtues so essential to character and sound morals, let alone the physical benefit.

Leadership is probably the most outstanding good principle displayed in games. They also help to overcome fear, a sense that is quite natural in most people but which must be overcome in the soldier in training and replaced by confidence in mental and physical ability.

Sports provide a means of promoting confidence through the desire to do one's best in competition with others.

I think there is considerable truth in that pertinent observation made in the First Great War that "battles were won on the playing fields of Eton."—H.C.B.

*(Well said, H.C.B. The Canadian Army regards sports as being so important that they are now a regular part of the training syllabi.—Editor.)*

## LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

(Continued from page 47)

Editor, CATM: In accordance with the invitation on Page 28 of CATM No. 39, the following suggestion is respectfully submitted for your consideration:

That at least one issue of CATM be devoted to information about the navy, which would be of interest and value to army personnel, and one similar issue regarding the air force.

In these days of Combined Ops when officers and other ranks of all three services not only work but spend considerable social and recreational time together, it would be valuable for each to understand something of the status and problems of the others.

As suggestions for contents of a navy issue, such information as the different types of ships and their specific uses, how squadrons are organized for training and operations, etc., and the differences between executive and administrative personnel, etc., would be of interest and value to many army officers.

In regard to an air force issue, similar information could be given regarding

the characteristics of different types of aircraft and squadrons, e.g., bomber, fighter, recce, etc.; also the work of different personnel, such as pilot, bombardier, navigator, engineer, gunner, radioman, etc., and in what allied branches such persons are trained.

The above suggestion is believed to be in line with your present policy of publicizing the characteristics and duties of the various arms of the army.—M.B.W.

*(Thanks for the suggestion, M.B.W. We regret that while we would like to follow out your idea, the size of CATM limits us strictly to subjects dealing with the training of army personnel—subjects for which there is a pressing need.—Editor.)*

**TRAINING EXPEDIENT:** The talc shortage is being met by No. 23 CI(B)TC, Newmarket, Ont., in a novel way. Discarded X-Ray film plates from which the emulsion has been removed are perfectly transparent and are useful for map boards.

## ACCURATE SHOOTING


The accompanying poster "Make Them Count" is another in the series of Musketry Training posters produced by the Directorate of Military Training to stimulate more accurate shooting in the Canadian Army. The first two in the series are "He Can Kill—Can You?" and "She Did It—Could You?"

Distribution of this latest poster is now being made. As it was designed primarily for the men in training, it is recommended that the poster be placed where it will be seen at all times, such as sleeping huts, lecture rooms, dry canteen, etc.

Watch out for visits by Training Liaison Officers. They'll be looking for these posters—and **NOT** in cupboards.



**THIS MONTH'S COVER . . .**




CATM dedicates its cover this month to the ROYAL CANADIAN ARMY SERVICE CORPS. Members of this Corps must not only be able to "deliver the goods" but fight as well.



**Next Month—THE ROYAL CANADIAN ARMY MEDICAL CORPS**

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