UNCLASSIFIED
93375

THE DIPLOMATIC UTILITY OF CANADA'S NAVAL FORCES

by

Dr. Nicholas Tracy

ORAE REPORT NO R60

ORAE

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

OTTAWA, CANADA

93375

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CANADA

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

ORAE REPORT R60

THE DIPLOMATIC UTILITY OF CANADA'S NAVAL FORCES

by

DR. NICHOLAS TRACY

This report does not necessarily represent the views of the Canadian Department of National Defence.

Prepared under Contract No. 2SU5-0017
With Acadia University, in support of
ORAE Project No. 96112.

OTTAWA, CANADA

JULY 1976

ABSTRACT

5%

The influence that the Canadian government obtains over international developments by virtue of the existence of the Canadian navy is primarily pertinent to issues of national security. Canadian security can most easily be threatened by the activity of her allies, and hence the purpose of Canadian armed forces is to reduce the need of her allies to dominate Canada, or to engage in military operations which could lead to nuclear war. The Canadian navy furthers these ends by protecting the integrity of the European and North American parts of NATO, and by undertaking those alliance defence tasks which if done by others would undermine Canadian sovereignty. The value of Canada to NATO gives her a voice in alliance planning, but influence over particular operations generally is limited to participants. Canada's naval establishment, however, does promote non-security interests in the maritime field. //

<u>RESUME</u>

L'influence que le gouvernement canadien exerce sur les évènements internationaux, en raison de l'existence de la Marine canadienne, se situe surtout au niveau des questions de sécurité nationale. La sécurité du Canada peut être mise en danger par les activités de ses alliés, et, par conséquent, le but des Forces canadiennes est de réduire les causes qui amèneraient le Canada à se laisser dominer par ses alliés, ou à participer à des opérations militaires qui pourraient conduire à une guerre nucléaire. La Marine canadienne poursuit ces objectifs en assurant la sauvegarde des composantes européennes et nord américaines de l'OTAN en remplissant certains engagements de défense au sein de l'Alliance, lesquels, s'ils étaient remplis par d'autres pays, pourraient mettre en danger la souveraineté du Canada. L'ampleur de la contribution du Canada à l'OTAN lui permet de se faire entendre lors des réunions qui portent sur la planification au sein de l'Alliance, mais l'influence qui peut être exercée en matière de certaines opérations se limite généralement aux pays participants. Cependant, sur le plan maritime, les marins canadiens consacrent aussi leurs efforts à des projets qui ne sont pas axés sur la sécurité.

PREFACE

This study of The Diplomatic Utility of Canada's Naval Forces has been carried out by Dr. Nicholas Tracy under a contract with DND's Operational Research and Analysis Establishment.

Dr. Tracy has discussed these questions with many concerned and qualified persons, including members of the Canadian Armed Forces, civilian members of the Department of National Defence, the Royal Navy, the U.S. Navy and with NATO Headquarters. However, the views expressed are his own, and the interpretation and recommendation do not represent officially endorsed policy. The report is being circulated with the expectation that the opinions and material may be useful to those who are engaged in formulating policy.

ORAE is glad to be able to sponsor such studies, and wishes to emphasize that they are for background and to stimulate discussion and thought.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE	PAGE NO.
ABSTRACT	i
RESUME	ii
PREFACE	iii
AUTHOR'S NOTE	vi
FOREWORD	vii
CHAPTER ONE	1
Navies as Instruments of Policy	1
Russian Use of Navies for Diplomatic Purposes	4
The Position of the Smaller State	15
Canadian Interest in Gunboat Diplomacy	21
CHAPTER TWO	28
Definition of Canada's Naval Asset	28
Canada's Reputation for Arms	34
The Diplomatic Context of Canada's Naval Forces	39
National Control of Policy	48
CHAPTER THREE	52
The Mechanisms of Military Influence for Canada	52
I. The Manipulation of an Alliance	52
The Example of the British Independent Nuclear Force	54
Non-Hostile Compulsion	61
Cooperation	64
The Demonstrative Function of Armed Forces	68
National Defence Policy as a Means of Influence	74
Conclusion	79
II. Gunboat Diplomacy	82
Limited War	86
Tactics of Coercion	90
Dangers of Coercion	91
Defensive	93

TITLE	PAGE NO.

CHAPTER FOUR 98

The Significance of Military Support in Non-Military Issues 98

CHAPTER FIVE 105

Consideration of the Mechanics of Great-Power Naval Influence in the Nuclear Age 105

CHAPTER SIX 109

Summary and Conclusions 109

Preservation of the Links with Europe Upon Which Depend Canadian Independence 110

Reduces the Danger of Accidental War 112

Indirectly Protects Independence of Third World States 113

The Political Value of Canadian Naval Visits 116

Participation in Sensitive Operations Enables Canada to Influence their Conduct 119

Domination of Allied Naval Activity off Canada's Coasts Necessary to Protect Sovereignty 119

Navies as Instruments of Policy for Maritime Objectives 120

Navies' National Bargaining assets for Non-Maritime Objectives 122

Influence over Security Arrangements Depend Upon Participation 124

Political Flexibility of Naval Forces 125

REFERENCES 127

AUTHOR'S NOTE

Analysis of the place of military forces in the relationships between states can only be undertaken with the techniques of the social sciences, which are designed to allow systematic assessment of unquantifiable, or only partially quantifiable, human phenomena. Insight into the functioning of a social system can sometimes be assisted by the quantification of incidental phenomena, such as numbers of port visits, but it is dangerous in strategic analysis to depend too greatly upon the quantification of incidentals, for the fact that an aspect of a problem is suitable for quantification may lead to giving it undue importance. On the other hand, the inability of the student of contemporary international relations to obtain free access to the state papers of the several states in which he is interested limits the understanding which is possible of any particular episode in a general relationship. Given these limitations, analysis can follow the normal scientific pattern of observation, formation of hypotheses, and testing of conclusions, although the mechanics of the operation may not necessarily be apparent. It is unlikely, however, that any general theory can be arrived at which will account for all observable developments. Accordingly a paper such as this one represents more a journey in hope than an arrival. An attempt has been made to establish the political and military mechanisms by which Canada's naval forces affect her relationships with other states, to discover the bearing that the means of influence has upon the ends for which influence is desired, and to assess the political strength of Canada's navy within the international system.

FOREWORD

The popular conception of the place of military forces in the relationships between states can generally be comprehended by the idea of one government either threatening another or providing it with military assistance, to the end that its diplomats are able to affect nationally satisfactory deals. This conception, however, represents only one of many mechanisms by which a nation's armed forces promotes its interests. Canada's naval forces further Canadian interests most fundamentally by their important contribution to the security of Atlantic communications, which helps to ensure the cohesion of NATO. The integrity of the European and North American parts of NATO at once reduces the military need of the United States to dominate Canada, fortifies Canada's cultural independence, and reduces the need of the United States to rely upon nuclear arms for defence. These benefits do not depend upon the skill of Canadian diplomats but are directly attributable to the international balance of military power, and to the effect of Canada's forces upon it.

Given the existence of a basic alliance organization which satisfies fundamental Canadian needs, Canada's military forces further protect her interests by giving her influence over the policies of her allies. The effect is most felt with respect to security-related issues, but the extent of this influence is variable and depends in part upon the accidents of any given episode. In practice influence over any particular issue may depend upon whether Canada provides an important element of the forces operating in that theatre. The over-all value of Canada to the alliance has little importance with respect to particular issues unless the continuation of Canada's effort is placed in doubt, which threat could only be employed to further causes which were very highly valued. Clearly, therefore, it is desirable to provide an indispensable element in any NATO

force over which Canada wishes to exert influence. The force may be indispensable because it is highly valued, or, as is the case of the British nuclear force, because Britain's allies cannot avoid the need to allow for its existence. Given Canada's limited resources, however, this is a policy which can only be given limited application. It may nevertheless suggest the value of extensive Canadian participation in NATO activity in the Norwegian sea and other arctic areas, which would also serve the auxiliary purposes of supporting friendly governments, and enhancing Canada's value to the alliance, while not detracting from Canada's fundamentally important contribution to the security of NATO's Atlantic communications.

Canadian statesmen have generally been cautious of relating military effort with national interests other than security interests. A clear linkage between military contributions and concessions in other aspects of international relations may only be apparent during a security crisis, in which circumstance military commitment could only be justified by the highest returns. It would be rare for any country to take military risks for returns unrelated to security. Recently interest has been focused upon the significance of Canada's military effort in Europe to Canada's application for association with the Common Market. The essence of this relationship, however, as is that of Canada's with the United States, is that military effort establishes the reality of a community of interest. Once the closeness of the relationship is evident it may be expected that each state will limit the exploitation of its advantages vis-a-vis the others. But it does not necessarily follow that a state can expect its non-security interests to be promoted by its military support of an ally. The establishment of the relationship essentially has defensive value in covering national vulnerabilities rather than fostering national growth.

In a limited range of parochial national interests military forces can sometimes be used as an instrument of policy, by virtue of their ability to conduct a controlled act of war, or to demonstrate national commitment to the issue. Clearly naval forces will most often have such abilities over maritime issues. Given the political and military difficulties of such operations, however, the potential value of Canada's naval forces is greater as a means of preventing, or raising the cost, of foreign interference in Canadian affairs. As a parallel, Canada's naval forces also help indirectly to prevent the Russian navy acquiring a position where it can be used coercively against small states, or otherwise deprive them of their independence. Canada pursues this objective largely through her allies, but is politically well equipped to undertake such operations herself in northern waters.

THE DIPLOMATIC UTILITY OF CANADA'S NAVAL FORCES

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

NAVIES AS INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY

Navies are held by many to be especially suitable military instruments for achieving political objectives. The characteristics of naval forces which are especially valued are the range at which they can sustain operations, their ability to operate ready for action close to a foreign shore but in international waters, and their ability equally easily to disengage. Analysis of the influence of "sea power" upon history was a favourite topic long before Admiral Mahan wrote his famous books, and has continued to intrigue students. But it is apparent that the continued interest in the significance of naval forces in international relations is attributable largely to the difficulty of defining what it is. In wartime the significance of naval power has frequently been debatable. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond goes so far as to say:

> It is important to recognize that sea power can do little against any great Power ... When ... the Maritime Power has been allied in a common cause with land powers, as Britain was in all but one of the great wars of the eighteenth century, and in the war of 1914, economic pressure [the weapon of sea power] becomes a far more powerful instrument. The financial need and demands of the nations increase vastly.[1]

Island states which are vulnerable to purely naval action have generally also been capable of defending themselves against other states with land frontiers which needed the maintenance of armies for their defence. Perhaps Japan might have been the exception, but Japan never attempted to concentrate her resources exculsively on her navy, and neither did her enemies rely entirely upon naval forces to defeat her. But if the wartime significance of navies is unclear, their peacetime significance is certainly no easier to understand.

The period of the mid and late 19th century when no state could challenge British naval strength is often regarded as the golden age of gunboat diplomacy. Certainly the history of the British navy in the last two hundred years provides a text-book of classical gunboat diplomacy, but with its strengths it also reveals the limitations of that sort of strategy. It also appears that the foundation of classical gunboat diplomacy is of doubtful relevance in the nuclear age. Britain's ability to dominate European activity in the rest of the world depended upon the strength of the British navy in the Atlantic coast of Europe, which gave her control over the communication of European states with their colonies, and the ability to risk war to protect her interests.[2] The limitation of this position was that European states were not vitally dependent upon their colonies and, accordingly Britain, without a continental scale army, had only a limited ability to protect her interests within Europe. And with the vast increases that have been experienced in the destructiveness of general war, increases which have passed with the advent of the nuclear age beyond the point where it can be a rational instrument of policy, the foundation of gunboat diplomacy has been cut away.

The United States Navy has now become the foremost instrument of naval power in the world. With the decision to withdraw American ground forces from South Vietnam the security of American interests in the insular fringe of eastern Asia increasingly depends upon the American fleet, supported by the United States Air Force. The American navy maintains a powerful fleet in the Mediterranean, and is active in the North Atlantic NATO area as well as in American east and west coastal waters, and the western Pacific. Political support for the maintenance of this considerable force is sought, in part, by urging that it serves an important function in preventing Russian military, including naval, forces engineering pro-Soviet policies amongst "third-world" states, and possibly even in the Mediterranean states of Europe. The implications of this claim are important, for in classical gunboat diplomacy the ability of the United States to make Russian naval power politically innocuous would depend upon the possession of the military capability and the political resolution to initiate hostilities with Russian forces, or possibly Russian client-state forces, rather than allow them to proceed with their plans. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 the American 6th Fleet deployed off Egypt in response to Russian moves to land troops to assist Egypt. The Russians turned back. Had they not done so, however, the Americans could only have substantiated their insistence that the Russians not put their men ashore by attacking the Russian transports. As was the case during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, it is evident that the Americans have been less inhibited by the fear that armed combat with the other superpower will escalate into major war than have been the Russians who, on each occasion were the first to draw back. President Truman's intervention in the conduct of the Korean war, and recall of General McArthur because he would not limit his offensive out of concern for Russian and Chinese sensitivities, however, does raise doubts that the American government is as ready to engage with Russia as the 1962 and 1973 episodes suggest. It is that consideration which impelled the French to construct an

independent nuclear deterrent force. Nevertheless, it is a reasonable assumption that American naval strength and somewhat ambiguous political will are significant factors in ensuring an ability to resist Russian pressures by states with maritime vulnerabilities, such as Britain, Japan, Norway, and many others.[3]

RUSSIAN USE OF NAVIES FOR DIPLOMATIC PURPOSES

The communist Russians have traditionally regarded the use of navies to achieve diplomatic objectives as peculiarly objectionable and imperialistic. It hardly needs to be observed that this attitude can be attributed at least in part to Russia's past naval weakness; it may be more necessary to remark that the Russians are not entirely cynical and are indeed newcomers in the field of international, maritime, coercive diplomacy. That they should be moving in the direction of greater use of naval forces to further diplomatic objectives, however, has apparently been an issue debated in the Russian higher command, with the commander-in-chief of the Russian navy, Admiral of the Fleet Sergey Gorshkov, apparently advocating that policy. In an unprecedented series of eleven articles on "Navies in War and Peace" which was published in *Morskoi sbornik* in 1972 and 1973 he seems to have pressed that view against the traditional argument that it was imperialistic. In a commentary on Gorshkov's articles Professor Mike MccGwire of Dalhousie University has observed:

> I infer him to say in one of his final conclusions that the political leadership must make a conscious decision on the future role of naval power in Soviet foreign policy; and they must not expect to be able to rely on the by-products (in terms of warships) of a policy tailored to deterrence and nuclear missile war.[4]

Less cautiously another sovietologist, James McConnell, abstracts from Gorshkov's articles:

> But the navies are the instruments par excellence of coercive diplomacy, with a great value in communicating attitudes and intentions. He refers to naval demonstrations as "exhibitions" and "propaganda" measures, which reveal one's readiness to support "friendly states" and to deter or stop a potential enemy from carrying out his intentions. There are many degrees of refinement in displaying intentions. Navies can be used to apply pressure, demonstrate, threaten lines of communication, harass commerce, even in peacetime. These aim at "startling probable opponents with the excellence of the equipment displayed, demonstrating a moral ascendancy over them, intimidating them right up to the outbreak of a war, bringing home to them beforehand the hopelessness of the struggle with the aggressor ..." If milder demonstrations do not work, then fleets can be moved right up to the water's edge, posing "a real threat of immediate action" against a country's home territory.

McConnell also understands Gorshkov to be urging the value of naval forces, especially ballistic missile armed submarines, as coercive instruments even during an actual nuclear war. The defensive strength of such forces allow them to be withheld from any initial bombardment so that they can continue to constrain the enemy government.[5] The Gorshkov series is unprecedented, but the arguments expressed there are not. Western observers have for a number of years delved in Gorshkov's writing to find support for a belief that the Russian fleet may adopt active interventionist policies in places distant from its home ports.[6]

It is evident that the coercive utility of the Russian navy is being debated in Moscow, and the lack of a clear-cut decision on this issue is reflected in the history of Russian naval deployment outside of home waters in the last decades. Two areas where observers have been looking for indications of the employment of the Russian fleet for diplomatic purposes have been

the Middle East, and the Indian Ocean area. As early as the 1956 Suez Canal crisis commentators in the Middle East began to assert that the growing power of Russia, which the Sputniks had demonstrated, effectively curtailed the ability of the United States navy 6th Fleet to dominate the area. The Russian threat of nuclear war against Britain and France could be seen as an important factor in securing the withdrawal of the invading forces. The ability of the naval forces of Russia to limit American and British naval action entered into consideration when in 1957 a Russian cruiser and destroyer made the first Russian port visit to an Arab state, at Latakia in Syria during a Syrian-Turkish border dispute. It is evident, however, that the Russians remained cautious about involving their forces when conflict with Britain or the United States was possible, and Arabs were greatly disappointed in their belief that Russian ships would prevent American intervention in Lebanon in 1958. That crisis did, on the other hand, restore the importance of foreign naval forces in Arab politics. In September 1960 the Russian navy conducted its first major exercise in the Mediterranean, and with the deployment of American Polaris-carrying submarines to the Mediterranean in March and April 1963, the Russians moved to establish a permanent naval force in that sea. Khrushchev, when visiting Egypt in May 1964 called attention to the Polaris submarines as threatening Arab independence, and one scholar, George S. Dragnich, has suggested that the Russian purpose was to establish a justification for their own naval forces in the area. In any case Russian efforts at countering the Polaris submarines by anti-submarine activity created a need for influence in Egypt for the purpose of gaining permission to base naval forces there. On a state visit to Egypt in 1966 Premier Kosygin repeated the warning that the U.S. 6th Fleet threatened the security of the Arabs, but no mention was made of the Russian fleet as a protector of the Arabs. Indeed, when in May 1967 Egyptian-Israeli relations came to a point of crisis the Russians kept their naval forces out of the way during the period before the outbreak of war when there was

a possibility that Britain and the United States might organize an international force to prevent Egypt blockading the gulf of Aqaba. Only when the war was in progress and it was evident that the western powers were keeping out of it did Russian naval forces return to their normal shadowing of American and British ships, and were reinforcements brought through the Golden Horn. The only employment of Russian naval forces to influence Egypt was in their visits to Alexandria and Port Said to deter Israeli raids, notably to deter a minor, not a great power. The eventual provision of port facilities by Egypt to Russia after the war is attributable entirely to Russia's importance to Egypt as a supplier of arms, and the urgency of the need after Egypt's defeat.[7]

Up to 1971, and less obviously thereafter, the pattern of Russian naval deployment to the Indian Ocean, in which old and small vessels predominated, suggested a desire to avoid alarming the littoral states. But the continuous presence of Russian vessels of any sort at the end of a long passage from Vladivostok indicates that the Russian government considers they serve an important function. It has been suggested that the objective is to serve a quiet warning to the littoral states that an increase in American naval activity in the Indian ocean could lead to the deployment of a significant Russian force. Specifically this warning would be intended to inhibit the development of an American base on Diego Garcia which would make possible the deployment of Polaris intercontinental ballistic missile armed submarines. D.O. Verrall, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, writes:

> The weight of the evidence thus far presented supports the thesis that what the Soviet Navy has been engaged in has been essentially an "active defence" operation designed to deny the Indian Ocean as a launch area for submarine launched ballistic missiles by creating conditions which make the operation of FBMS [fleet ballistic missile submarines] in the region non cost effective.

> It is to be doubted whether any other arguments could have won the support of the Soviet Supreme Military Council for the deployment. Despite Gorshkov's frequent and eloquent pronouncements on the use of the fleet in peace "in the state interests of the Soviet Union" it is highly unlikely that the nuclear war/ground forces orientated Military Council would have sympathized with a case for forward deployment presented solely in those terms.[8]

On the other hand, Russian naval deployment in the Indian Ocean may be entirely explainable by the necessity, if U.S. submarines ever do have to be pursued in those waters, of building up a body of hydrographic knowledge of the area and of gaining experience in utilizing it.

Certainly there is little evidence that the Russians have attempted to use their naval forces in the Indian Ocean to determine the policy of the littoral governments. A comparison of visits made to Indian Ocean ports by Russian and American warships, 35 Russian to 135 American per year between 1968 and 1972, 100 Russian to nearly 200 American in 1973, indicated, if it is accepted that port calls are a useful indicator of effort to create diplomatic influence, that the United States "makes more use of its comparatively limited naval resources in the region for this purpose". The political significance of port visits, however, probably depends less upon frequency of visits than upon other factors; indeed, over exposure may lead to undesired repercussions. In April 1970 two Russian warships happened to be in Mogadishu when an "imperialist-backed" plot was uncovered and put down, but there is no real evidence to indicate that the Russians were more than accidentally involved in the incident. Russian naval reinforcements were sent into the Indian ocean during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, but their objective appears to have been primarily to "mark" British and American aircraft-carriers in the area, probably as part of the primary defence role of the Russian fleet to be ready at all

times to sink NATO aircraft-carriers, but perhaps equally "to prevent the crisis drawing in powers from outside the subcontinent". Russian naval forces also shadowed an American task group which operated off the Saudi and Omani coasts during the oil boycott in 1973 after the October war. This may have been a serious effort at naval diplomacy in order to support Russian influence in the Arab world by offering some protection against American naval intervention. But this was not explicitly stated at the time, and in any event the Russians did not prevent the American navy making a transit of the Strait of Bab-al-Mandeb which Egypt had blockaded.

It is apparent that the Russians have been very reluctant to accept the risk involved in seeking influence in distant waters by explicitly acting as a shield for her friends against American naval intervention. Practical considerations, of course, would inhibit any such move. The only way the Russian navy could stop an American amphibious operation, for example, would be to sink American ships. There is no non-violent tactic which could not be brushed aside. The Russian commitment to a friend would have to be very great before they would initiate violence against the United States. Interposition is possible in the circumstances of bombardment of a port where a Russian presence would impose upon the attacker the need to risk damaging Russian vessels, or installations. But the only occasion on which the Russians took even that risk, involved not the United States but Israel, which state clearly posed little direct threat to Russia. Other occasions on which the Russians employed their naval forces to serve the needs of minor states, such as the transfer of Egyptian troops to Yemen in the 1960's and Moroccan troops to Syria in 1973 did not directly concern the Great Western Powers. Even the Guinea patrol mounted in 1970 possibly to prevent a second Portuguese naval attack on guerilla bases did not entail any serious confrontation with the "west" as a whole because Portugal's colonial policy met little support amongst her allies,

and Guinea is south of the NATO area.[9]

The reluctance of the Russians to become involved in diplomatic adventures depending upon military activity overseas is evident from the great caution shown even where the objective is clearly of strategic importance to Russia. The establishment of the Russian position in Somali and Guinea, where the Russians have acquired facilities to support their naval and naval-air operations, may have involved the ambiguous use of Russian naval units in a supporting role. But if attention is paid to negative evidence it is interesting to observe that the Russians apparently refused to intervene in the Anglo-Icelandic "cod war" even to the limited extent of meeting the Icelandic request for the supply of gunboats. The alienation of Iceland from NATO might be held to be a major Russian tactical goal in order to secure the sea glacis of Murmansk, but the Russians were not prepared to risk a confrontation with NATO even in circumstances which, it might be anticipated, would disrupt the political cohesion of the alliance. It is probable that the Russians understood that the Icelanders were only interested in flirting with Russia so long as there was no risk of being taken seriously, nevertheless it cannot be denied that Russia did not risk involvement. It may also be estimated that Russian fishing interests were valued higher than a small chance at strengthening the Russian strategic position in the arctic.

Nevertheless the Russians have not entirely excluded the possibility that their naval forces might serve to prevent American, or other western, navies coercing the governments of their friends. Russian pronouncements have been ambiguous, but the interpretation given them by "western" and "third world" commentators go a long way to providing Russia with the gratitude she might hope to acquire by more explicit statements. The Russians have also staged a number of ambiguous naval operations such as might suggest a willingness to confront western navies

in defence of friends. In 1968 a scratch Russian naval force manoeuvred between the coast of North Korea and a powerful American task force which was attempting to frighten the captors of the intelligence ship Pueblo.[10] And in 1973 a visit by Admiral Gorshkov and a squadron of Russian warships to Iraq during a border dispute with Kuwait may have been intended to deter a repeat of the 1961 western intervention on behalf of Kuwait. The fact that neither bluff, if such they were, was called only indicates that the Russian demarches were well conceived.[11] The Russians have increased their naval visits to foreign ports considerably, and the obvious inference of such visits is a measure of support for the host government, unless other, possibly threatening, implications are readily perceivable. Miss Ann Kelly, of the Center for Naval Analyses, has noted that:

> Sixteen countries were visited 1953-64: 45 countries were visited 1971-3. Submarine visits increased from one between 1953-64 to 63 between 1971-73. In the same period ship visits increased from 130 to 892. The visits favoured progressive regimes and clients. The most significant trend has been the expansion of submarine visits to Third World countries.

The conventional wisdom that it requires impressive gun-decks and wardrooms to perform gunboat diplomacy has suggested that the submarine visits were largely operational conveniences. But, at long range from Russian fleet areas, what is a more credible demonstration of an ability to prevent western naval intervention against Russia's friends than the presence of inherently defensible submarines? Visibility is probably less significant than credibility.

The frustration of western sea power, of course, is not an objective which can only be satisfied by opposing naval forces. The use of verbal threats of general war such as Khrushchev employed are too general and too extreme to be very convincing. But if it is desired to prevent western bombardment of cities, or invasion of coasts, then the commitment of Russian troops or even technicians on the ground in advance of the operation achieved the preferred tactic of interposition which compels the western power to strike the first blow between major powers. Professor John Erickson has pointed out that the Russian Airforce is especially vociferous in disputing Gorshkov's contention that only the navy can achieve world-wide diplomatic objectives.[13] On the other hand, the visits of naval forces are more likely to be acceptable, because they are less committing to Russia and the host country than is the introduction of forces on the ground. And naval forces, on occasion, may also be able to impose Russian objectives on reluctant governments with far less visibility, and therefore with less difficulty, than other military forces.

There has, in fact, apparently only been one occasion when the Russians may have used their naval forces to coerce a minor state directly, and that occured in 1969 when a Russian squadron was deployed in Ghanaian waters in response to the arrest there of Russian fishing trawlers. The rarity of similar incidents may be attributable to communist doctrine, or to a realization that the Americans are well able to turn the tables and use the U.S. navy to protect friends from the Russian fleet. It is cogently argued by Professor MccGwire that the commitment of Russian naval forces to countering the nuclear threat to Russia from American naval forces does not permit the extensive use of Russian warships for influence building. Occasions when naval force can be so employed are rare in any case, but the protection of Russian fisheries has called for, but not received, similar action to that off Ghana. In 1968 the Argentine navy fired a shot through a Russian fisheries vessel, and the

Russians withdrew from the disputed sea.[13] The results to be expected from the use of force have to be assessed in each instance, and the Russians presumably concluded that to react forcefully to Argentine's action would not serve their interests. It is also probable, since the diplomatic usefulness of naval forces is still being debated in Moscow, that there is considerable hesitation to embark upon such imperialistic adventures. And, furthermore, the local strength of the Argentine navy would be a major consideration for the Russians given their commitments elsewhere.

The emphasis of Russian employment of naval forces for diplomatic purposes seems to be, as it is in the strictly military sphere, one of confrontation with NATO, rather than empire building in the sense of "spreading the revolution". Confrontation may employ pressure on minor states. An interesting example is the postulated objective of Russian naval forces in the Indian Ocean, to put pressure on the littoral states so that they in turn, out of fear of increased naval confrontation in the area, will put pressure on the United States to defer plans to construct a base on Diego Garcia which would be capable of servicing ballistic missile submarines. Corroborating that hypothesis is a report that the visit of Australian warships to East Africa was welcomed because they were "western", indicating therefore "western" support, but would not put the host countries in the position of having to give equal hospitality to Russian ships, as would be the case had the visits been by United States warships.[14] The technique of indirect pressure on the United States has been used in the Mediterranean where the Russians built up naval forces against American naval forces, but also called for mutual withdrawal, and urged the Arab states to do so as well. In 1964 the Russians called for the establishment of "zones of peace" in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, but it is interesting that Gorshkov apparently does not now welcome such a possibility.

By no means, however, is Russian naval confrontation with NATO always indirect. It may take such forms as navigational truculence when NATO warships enter Russian fleet areas, or intensification of war-preparations to warn NATO away from actions inimical to Russian interests. Recently Russian nuclear-powered submarines have been visiting Cuba, and it is speculated that the Russian intention is to set aside by degrees the ban on nuclear missiles in Cuba which was the outcome of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.[15] Essentially, however, these activities have remained in the category of symbolic actions representing the entire range of Russian-NATO problems, rather than a necessarily naval activity.

The political significance of naval forces is a very complex problem in the study of international relations. Western observers, with years of experience of naval diplomacy, have not established a general theory of its operation, and it may be that consideration of the cruder manifestations of "gunboat diplomacy" and of Russia's limited success in such operations, is diverting attention from more subtle pro-Soviet developments. It may indeed be that the Russians themselves cannot identify the political gains they are making through the possession of naval forces that are primarily intended for general war operations. But then it may be questioned whether influences upon international relations which are not easily discernable are worth efforts to counter them. It is clear, in any case, that it is important to understand the functioning of great-power naval diplomacy if only so that existing restraints upon the political importance of the Soviet navy are not broken down.

THE POSITION OF THE SMALLER STATE

The smaller states naturally cannot employ their naval forces to the same political effect as can the super powers, but a general understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of military instruments as a means of satisfying political objectives leads to an understanding of the means by which the small state can hold its own. It is not always the greater military power which gains more from an exercise of influence diplomacy. Often a lesser state may possess assets which the greater could not easily obtain by force, and accordingly the latter may be obliged to provide a considerable outlay to obtain a minor concession which it feels it cannot do without. The approximate military equality of Russia and the United States in the 1970's increases the probability of a smaller state sucessfuly playing the one against the other. The failure of either Europe or Japan as yet to develop as expected into great military powers may indicate, amongst other things, that the governments of those peoples believe they can protect their interests as well or better and at less cost by negotiating with a limited number of super powers rather than by entering the lists as equals.

Evidence that a minor state may gain more from an influence-building program than the great power courting it can be found in the history of Russian efforts to acquire influence in Egypt. One scholar, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, has concluded from a study of the relationship that "Soviet influence over Egyptian foreign policy, even during the period of maximum Egyptian vulnerability, was limited" and that "Soviet policy seems to have made adjustments to Egyptian domestic politics more often than Egyptian policy makers yielded to Soviet perferences". In particular, the inability of the Russians despite considerable diplomatic effort to dissuade the Egyptians from launching their "war of attrition" in 1969, and the expulsion of Russian advisers from Egypt in 1972,

indicate how little return the Russians got from their enormous investment in arms for Egypt. Part of the explanation for this outcome lies in the strength of the United States 6th Fleet which was always on hand to reassure the Egyptians that their dependence upon Russia would not get out of hand.[16]

The Egyptian government used war, with Israel, as a means of putting pressure on the great powers. A more significant example for Canada of gunboat diplomacy by a small state, however, is the "cod-war" which has been conducted by Iceland in her efforts to secure control of the fishery off her shores. The third phase of that conflict, to establish a 200 mile limit of Icelandic control, is now in progress.

The principal concern of the Icelanders is the large British trawler fleet which has for centuries fished Icelandic waters. Between 1958 and 1961 the Icelanders mounted a campaign to establish a 12 mile fishery limit and to support their demands they attempted to arrest British trawlers. To prevent this happening Britain escorted her fishermen with warships, but to ensure adequate protection the fishermen were confined to small "boxes" measuring 8 by 30 miles, and this restriction prevented efficient fishing. The outcome, for Iceland, of the first "cod-war" was essentially satisfactory,[17] and accordingly when the Communist dominated Left Alliance coalition government of Iceland determined to overthrow the 1961 agreement and establish in 1972 a 50 mile fisheries limit it thought that harassment of British fishermen would force the British government to comply. The communist minister of the fisheries, Mr. Ludvik Josepsson, told Mr. Maurice Weaver of The Daily Telegraph that "the British Government was aware from its experience during the 1958-61 confrontation that efficient trawling was impossible under escort".[18] The small gunboats of the Icelandic Coastguard employed towed cutters to cut the trawl-wires of the British boats, but apparently they refrained from boarding for fear that

too much violence might take place. On a number of occasions shots were fired near British vessels.[19]

The Icelandic use of their gunboats amounted to the waging of limited war. Success depended upon their calculations being correct, that they could undermine the economies of British fishing by actions which would not break-down the political restraints upon British taking violent counter-action. But this favourable balance could not be reached because of improvements which had been made in British escort tactics.

British naval tactics had improved since the earlier confrontation and British fishing vessels were only confined within very large "Boxes" measuring 30 by up to 120 miles. At first warships were kept out of the area, but, when the trawler-men found it impossible to protect themselves by operating in formation, ocean-going tugboats were hired to interpose themselves between the gun-boats and the trawlers. The British government were reluctant to introduce warships into the area as that development could be expected to inflame the dispute. But it may be presumed that the Icelanders required the British deployment to serve their ends; politically to increase tension, and practically to implement their tactic of using the limitations of naval escort practices to inhibit British fishing. In the face of Icelandic harassing gunfire, however, the British trawlermen demanded the additional protection of warships, and eventually the British government overcame its reluctance and deployed frigates. So far Icelandic tactics may be considered to have been successful, but the British frigates were able to use their size and speed to achieve what the tugboats could not. The frigates individually "marked" the gunboats and prevented them from streaming their cutters across the sterns of the British trawlers. A number of collisions occured, but the British deny that they amounted to counter-harassment.[20] British catches remained good and the current high prices for fish effectively

defeated the Icelandic objective. Although the Icelandic government was able to coerce the British to withdraw the warships by threatening to sever diplomatic relations, the settlement which was reached essentially denied Icelandic pretensions.

The application of naval forces to a fisheries control problem is not as straight-forward as it would at first appear to be. The complication arises from the high level of violence which is unavoidable if control is to be imposed by arbitrary national action against resistance. The Icelandic experience has shown that a strong naval power can find means of nullifying to a considerable degree the effectiveness of a non-firing harassment policy of a weak state. Canada would with respect to most opponents be the superior naval power in her own waters, but the high cost of deploying warships to harass fishermen would alone, if for no other reason, rule out such an operation on a scale which would be adequate to affect the economics of foreign fishing operations. Arrest is the normal means of law enforcement as sea, but if the fishermen are determined to resist with force then even a trawler could impose the onus of initiating violence upon the arresting agency. Apparently the moderate Icelandic Prime Minister Mr. Olifur Johnesson rejected any attempt to board the British trawlers for fear that it would involve dangerous fighting. The British trawlermen actually had instructions not to resist, but, even had this been known in Iceland, the characteristic aggressiveness of the British fishermen would have suggested that violence was likely in the heat of the moment.[21] It must be anticipated that, if the crew resist, the level of violence required to subdue a larger ship such as a fish factory-ship could be quite considerable. It is probably a better policy to rely from the outset upon coercing the fishermen by threat of gunfire. But will it be diplomatically, or politically, possible to undertake a campaign involving repeated gunfire upon fishermen? It is apparent that in such circumstances it is to be expected foreign warships would be

came in to guard their fishermen. The Icelandic Coastguard used gunfire only for demonstrative purposes, only once firing to hit and then only after care was taken to warn the fishermen to shelter aft while shot was fired foreward.[22] The violence which is an unavoidable part of sea control tactics against resistance denies the use of warships to defend a sea area a truly "defensive" character. Conversely warships can defend fishing vessels merely by their passive presence, ready to respond to attack, and so are much more easily identified as "defensive". This technical problem has great importance in any plan to use naval force to obtain maritime jurisdiction.

It is apparent that the success of the Icelanders in their 1958-61 confrontation had been largely brought about by non-naval diplomacy which was catalyzed by the naval action. The American air base at Keflavik is an important link in the defences of Atlantic communications which it would be difficult to do without. It would be more than inconvenient were the facilities of Iceland to be made available to Russia. The Icelandic government utilized the advantage they had and were able to bring the Americans to put pressure upon the British government. The cost of the naval operations off Iceland, measured in fish catches as well as war-ship time, may have been significant in the earlier dispute, but the strategic dangers in alienating Iceland were more so.

The Left Alliance coalition government of Iceland, however, could not in the second "Cod War" effectively repeat the diplomatic use of the strategic argument. It is evident that the British were sensitive to the problem. But the Communist party of Iceland were more concerned to obtain an actual with-drawal of Iceland from NATO than they were to use a threat of such action to achieve their fishery objectives. Indeed it appears that they were using the fisheries issue to affect an alienation from the alliance. Mr. Josepsson remarked to a British journalist in March 1972: "But many Icelanders have said to me:

'We are supposed to be in NATO to protect our interests and this is the most vital interest we have'."[23] And Mr. Einar Agustsson, Icelandic foreign minister, also warned that the continued American presence at Keflavik would be reviewed when the cod-war was over. When British warships arrived off Iceland the RAF was immediately refused the use of Keflavik, which, however, was only a minor inconvenience as RAF planes only used Keflavik occasionally.[24] But propaganda was directed towards discrediting NATO rather than soliciting its help. The Icelandic cabinet, it was reported in The Times on 29 May, demanded that NATO take "all necessary measures" to stop the British navy protecting British trawlers in their "illegal fishery operations". But when the course of the "cod war" was interrupted by the Pompidou-Nixon summit talks in Reykjavik it did not appear that any attempt was made to solicit high level support. Certainly nothing that happened during that conference affected the course of events in the fisheries dispute. Instead the Icelanders pursued their practice of histrionics. The Icelandic permanent representative to NATO refused to attend the opening session of the planning committee on 7 June.[25] Speaking in Copenhagen Mr. Einar Agustsson said "We have come here to ask for help against aggression from another country."[26] And formal notice was given to NATO that Iceland wished to revise the 1951 treaty which authorized the American base at Keflavik.[27]

Later, on 17 September, the Icelandic cabinet warned Dr. Joseph Luns, the NATO Secretary-General, that the "cod war" could force Iceland to reconsider its position within the alliance.[28] But not only was it not in the interests of the communists to obtain their objectives by grace of NATO intercessions, the communists were not really free to use the NATO connection as a bargaining counter. It was their objective, apparently, to breed a discontent with NATO, but as yet that was only an aspiration. The majority of the Icelandic electorate were in favour of the NATO connection, as were the non-communist

members of the cabinet. A privately undertaken public opinion poll apparently indicated overwhelming support for NATO.[29] Consequently NATO could neither be importuned for assistance, nor black-mailed.

The Icelandic use of gunboats had catalyzed the diplomatic situation, but the inability of the Icelandic communists to utilize the diplomatic leverage thus gained, for fear of incurring a debt of gratitude to the United States or NATO as a whole, meant that the failure of harassment tactics to directly achieve the objective of driving out the British, which would have amounted to a limited act of war, constituted defeat for the Icelandic cause. The unavoidable violence of sea-control tactics turns any defence of a sea-area into an offensive action, and low-violence tactics designed to reduce fishing efficiency is problematic and dependent upon the use of large forces. The Icelandic experience suggests that sea-control activity, in peacetime, gains its greatest significance from its demonstrative effect. It is interesting to note that in the third phase of the "cod war" which commenced in November 1975 the non-communist government of Geir Hallgrimsson has made a clear threat to withdraw from NATO unless their needs are met. It is evident that the pro-western party, because it does not fear to receive favours from NATO, is in a position to play stronger cards.

CANADIAN INTEREST IN GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY

Canada, as a supremely "satisfied" state, has always employed her armed forces for defensive purposes. Indeed the average Canadian, secure in the North American continent, can be forgiven for regarding the Canadian effort in the first and second world wars as almost charitable acts in support of less fortunate friends. With the growing determination of Canadians to secure control over the fishing, mining, and shipping activities in their coastal waters, however, there has been a

surge of interest in the ability of the Canadian navy to pursue such objectives.

In the spring of 1970 the Trudeau government brought to the Commons four bills which extended the area of claimed national jurisdiction over coastal waters. The breadth of territorial waters was extended from three to twelve miles, and exclusive fishing zones were declared in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the Bay of Fundy, Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait, and Queen Charlotte Sound. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act laid down stringent pollution control regulations north of 60 north to a distance of 100 miles off the Canadian coast, and the Canada Shipping Act was amended to impose stricter pollution control over Canadian territorial waters and fishery closure zones. The reiteration in the House of Commons on 16 April 1970 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, that "Canada has always regarded the waters between the islands of the Arctic archipelago as being Canadian waters. The present Government maintains that position ..." further extended Canadian claims beyond what was internationally agreed.[30]

Clearly these claims would have to be enforced to be meaningful, and equally clearly Canada could expect no international support in securing her position. In May 1969 Mr. Trudeau had acknowledged that "not all countries would accept the view that all the waters between the islands of the archipelago are internal waters over which Canada has full sovereignty."[31] Because neither the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, nor the act establishing the exclusive fishery zones, were founded upon international precedent the government declared that it would not accept any judgement of the International Court of Justice with respect to them until the principle behind the laws was generally accepted. In 1964 it had been thought reasonable to write in the White Paper on Defence:

> It is, for the foreseeable future, impossible to conceive of any significant external threat to Canada which is not also a threat to North America as a whole. It is equally inconceivable that, in resisting clear and unequivocal aggression against Canadian territory, Canada could not rely on the active support of the United States.[32]

But in a speech on 3 April 1969 Trudeau established as first priority of national defence policy "the surveillance of our own territory and coast-lines i.e. the protection of our sovereignty",[33] and the white paper Defence in the 70s explained that the new priority was occasioned by the new maritime jurisdictional legislation.

> While deterring war is not an objective Canada alone can achieve, and is therefore one which must be pursued through collective security arrangements, the other challenges to sovereignty and independence must be met exclusively by Canada. The provision of adequate Canadian defence resources for these purposes must therefore be a matter of first priority.[34]

Priority was put on surveillance "to discourage" challenges, but stronger measures were not ruled out.

> In addition to the requirements for surveillance a military capability for control is required as an adjunct to the other measures necessary for the protection of Canada and Canadian interests. This should include an ability to enforce these measures should laws not be respected. Such efforts to prevent national interests are fully consistent with Canadian involvement in collective security against foreign military attack.

In the maritime area it specifically indicated a requirement for

- on-call support by naval vessels on both East and West coasts to deal with incursions by fishing fleets in the Canadian territorial sea or fishing zones;

- occasional arrest within territorial waters and pollution control zones of foreign ships in breach of Canadian anti-pollution regulations. The forces will be prepared to respond when called upon by the appropriate authorities in such situations.

Since 1970 Canada's maritime claims have vastly expanded. As a point of departure for the third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference at Caracas in July 1974 Canada co-sponsored a draft treaty which would permit a coastal state to claim:

a. Exclusive sovereign rights in the management and harvest of all living resources within 200 miles off its coasts, as well as

b. Preferential rights in respect of such resources in areas adjacent to this zone.

This was an extreme position taken for bargaining purposes. In a working paper which was prepared in 1973 by an interdepartmental committee of the Canadian government it was noted that:

> In co-sponsoring these draft articles, Canada has made clear that in the Canadian view, at least, they would not preclude continued foreign fishing, under Canadian management authority, in the areas within Canada's jurisdiction.[35]

But, on the other hand, the Canadian government has declared that whatever the international community decides Canada will extend her fisheries autnority at least to the 200 mile line, and probably also to the edge of the continental shelf where that extends, off Newfoundland, more than 400 miles. On 15 June 1974 Mr. Jack Davis, Minister of the Environment, was reported to have said, "There is no question that regardless of whether or not this summer's Law of the Sea Conference is successful, Canadian jurisdiction over the fisheries off our shore will be expanded in the future ..." Mr. Davis lost his Parliamentary

seat in the July election, but on 22 June 1974, Mr. Trudeau had made a similar declaration.[36] Political pressure for unilateral declaration of jurisdiction over the waters of the continental shelf remains strong, notably from the governments of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia.[37]

Defence in the 70s, however, besides indicating that warships would enforce coastal jurisdictional claims, noted that:

> Canada's overriding defence objective must therefore be the prevention of nuclear war by promoting political reconciliation to ease the underlying causes of tensions, by working for arms control and disarmament agreements, and by contributing to the system of stable mutual deterrence.

This objective is somewhat at conflict with the use of force to promote a national interest which has been specifically excluded from the jurisdiction of international law. Perhaps it is recognition of this conflict which has led to a de-emphasizing of the place of naval force in the maritime jurisdiction issue. The 1971 and 1972 defence reviews did not repeat the statement that military forces would be "on-call" to compel submission to Canadian claims.[38] Mr. Beesley, Canada's chief negotiator on the "Law of the Sea" issue, was asked by a member of the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs and National Defence:

> How do you deal with a superpower that opposes your position? Are you relying upon the strength of world opinion that you may have elicited through this unilateral inquiry to which you refer? What would be the means by which we continue to insist with some kind of force on our position?

And his answer refuted any idea of using force.

> It is desirable to present as small a target as possible, to make it irrelevant to have test cases and test passages, for example. Indeed, it is desirable to do the opposite in an attempt to co-operate and work out agreed solutions, which we have done. We have spent tremendous time, effort and energies in working out an agreed approach with the U.S.A. and it is not out of the question even now ... one of the things you do is try to develop international law so that the superpowers can accept it.[39]

At the end of November 1973 Mr. Sharp said that the government's intention was to obtain international agreement to coastal-state management of continental shelf fisheries, and there was no question of enforcing or policing with gunboats. Canada would certainly implement a monitoring or surveillance system to ensure that regulations were respected, "But the question of enforcement is not nearly as important as some people think it is."[40] On 7 June 1973 there was a debate in the House of Commons on an opposition motion calling for House recognition of Canadian "ownership" of the fisheries resources around the coast of Canada, and Mr. Davis replied with a reminder that the Grand Banks have been fished by many nations for centuries and that Canada could not "unilaterally kick them out"; "We have been moving in that direction but we have been doing so by negotiation and, I hope, sweet reason rather than the use of gunboats".[41] And on 22 June when Mr. Trudeau substantiated that Canada would, if necessary, take unilateral action, although Regional Development Minister Don Jamieson added that the proposed action should not be interpreted as an invitation to gunboat diplomacy.[42]

I have analysed elsewhere the practical problems of using naval forces as a means of securing maritime jurisdiction.[43] The Icelandic example is good evidence that the indirect approach to such issues may often be more effective. It is necessary, however, to examine in depth the question of what in general is the sort of return which Canada should expect to get from her

investment in armed forces, especially her naval forces, and how the forces should be employed to achieve those effects. It is also necessary to give some consideration to the mechanics of great-power gunboat diplomacy so that it may be seen what significance the Canadian navy may have in vitiating indirect military threats. It is necessary to be interested both in the Canadian microcosm and the super-power macrocosm: analysis of each assists in the analysis of the other. But the focus of this paper is clearly upon Canadian circumstances and Canadian problems.

CHAPTER TWO

DEFINITION OF CANADA'S NAVAL ASSET

The first need in any analysis of the diplomatic utility of a national asset is to define its characteristics. It is necessary to know what it can do for the state, and the significance it has to other states. In the case of a military force what can be done with it requires in part a military answer, but it is also important to examine the potential uses of the force short of general war. Whether the force can actually be used in those ways will depend upon military and political restraints which can only be considered in the light of particular circumstances. The military capability of the force will also be important in determining its significance to other states. Other diplomatic and political factors which affect the military capability, and the availability of the force, however, are also important. Unfortunately there is no way of precisely measuring the valuation a state may place upon Canadian assets, including her naval forces, except by observation of the extent to which the government of that state has allowed its policy to be influenced by consideration of the value of the asset at Canada's disposal. This is not very satisfactory. Not only is it frequently difficult to identify the reasons that determine any government's policy, but the measurement of value by the influence it yields presupposes a better understanding of the linkage between the phemomena than is the case. The best that can be attempted is an examination of the factors which appear to determine the diplomatic significance of military power, without attempting quantification of the results.

For the purposes of political analysis the military capability of Canada's naval forces can be quickly established. Primarily anti-submarine forces, Canada's squadrons on the Atlantic

and Pacific are part of the integrated defence of NATO communications and continental defence. The proximity of Canada's east coast to the trade routes between the United States and Northern Europe puts Canada in a good position to provide support for trade, and makes it difficult for NATO to attempt the task without Canadian assistance. Canada's area of command responsibility within NATO's naval control of the North Atlantic extends eastward as far as Cape Farewell at the tip of Greenland. Her forces in this area, and in the Pacific, on an approximate ratio of two in the Atlantic to one in the Pacific, include 20 specialist anti-submarine destroyers 12 of which carry heavy anti-submarine CHSS Sea-King helicopters. These are supported by 26 operationally ready Argus long-range patrol aircraft, 16 Tracker patrol aircraft, 3 Oberon Class submarines, three support ships, and by bottom-based sonar systems.

The quality of this force has generally been considered to be high. Canada's anti-submarine forces have received high praise from Admiral Kidd, USN, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and from Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, Britain's First Sea Lord. By specialization it has been possible for the Canadian navy to become excellent in an important aspect of naval warfare. The fact that the ships and the Argus aircraft are mostly of Canadian design and construction adds to their prestige value. Each class of destroyer was, at its time of completion, a world leader in design. The modification of the 2,800 ton St. Laurent class to carry a large variable depth sonar, and a CHSS Sea-King helicopter was a great advance in anti-submarine systems design, and the carriage of two Sea-King helicopters on the 4,200 ton Iroquois class anticipates the American patrol frigate by five years, with the difference that the American vessel will carry only the lighter SH-2D LAMPS helicopter. Canada's fleet replenishment ships are also design leaders as they have a flight deck and hangar for three Sea-King helicopters, and defensive armament, so that they can take an active part in anti-submarine operations.

Specialization has allowed Canada's small forces to have quantitative importance in North Atlantic anti-submarine operations, which is a field which has received low priority in American naval planning because the efforts of her allies has allowed her to do so. One rough estimate has put it that Canada supplies 10% of the necessary forces for the control of North Atlantic communications and for monitoring Russian submarine movements. It is evident, however, from conversation with Admiral Shear, USN, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, that the important considerations are not the size of Canada's naval force, so much as their high quality, and the inability of NATO to conduct the operation without the use of Canadian territory.

On the debit side, as far as influencing friends is concerned, is the stop that there has been in the delivery of new ships, so that the Canadian fleet is aging, and no replacements have been ordered. The St. Laurent class was completed in 1956 and 1957 which means the critical 20 year limit will soon be reached. Whether or not hull and plant wear will actually become unacceptable in these ships in the near future remains to be seen - why should twenty years be a universally applicable deadline for small vessels? Nevertheless, the fact that it is generally believed to be reduces their prestige value. The new generation of Iroquois class destroyers are only four in number and are in some respects similar to the eight general purpose frigates which were announced in 1962 but cancelled a year later. They may be five years ahead of world design, but they are also five years late in the fleet rebuilding program. Unless a follow-on building program is soon announced, the prestige value of Canada's fleet will begin to slip.

Of the technical ability of Canada's forces, in the aspects of warfare in which she specializes, there appears to be no doubt. In the purely naval sphere, however, there is

beginning to be some apprehension that Canada will not keep in the forefront of anti-submarine warfare research. The fear is not that Canadian forces will become less capable than American or British forces, but rather that Canada will no longer help to advance the general level of knowledge, so that the alliance as a whole would be less capable of meeting a submarine threat. In itself this would be a serious development for Canada. It would also, inevitably, reduce respect for her.

Anti-submarine forces are also significant to Canada outside of the NATO context for their ability to monitor foreign submarine operations off Canadian coasts, and to pose difficulties for any state which might wish to use submarine forces to limit Canadian control in her coastal waters. To some extent it can be argued that if Canada had no ability to be aware that submarines were operating off her coasts they would be unable to have any political effect. But because of their high survival capability submarines could be used in a limited war operation against Canada which would otherwise be totally impossible. Canadian anti-submarine forces could make such an option too risky for an opponent. Of course, such a possibility pre-supposes a disintegration of NATO, in which case Canada would have more than anti-submarine problems to solve, and Canada's forces must accordingly have a primary purpose of cementing NATO ties.

Besides anti-submarine surveillance and war-capability, Canada's naval forces also have a limited ability to deter or defeat foreign surface operations against Canada, for example, against Canadian fisheries control vessels. This is not a strong feature of the Canadian navy but the Iroquois class destroyers with a high performance 5" gun and point defence missile systems have a limited surface combat capability. Canada's three submarines could increase the risk of engaging in surface operations against Canada. And Canada's CF-5 ground support

aircraft and Trackers with rockets have exercised in maritime strike operations, although their abilities against ships with sophisticated air-defence systems may not be high. The aggregate effect of these limited combat capabilities is to give Canada an ability to trigger the military assistance of NATO. Unless Canada is capable of demonstrating her determination to resist attack her allies might be excused for being reluctant to engage their own forces to get Canada out of a scrape. Should Canada become more evidently exposed to surface naval attack, perhaps because of her fisheries policies, it might become necessary to increase her surface combat capabilities to achieve the same effect.

Canadian naval forces can provide a small support force outside the NATO area should such be called for by Canadian interests. Again, the nature of Canadian equipment would make this an anti-submarine force, but in support of another state which could provide a secure air and surface environment, the force could be deployed virtually world wide.

But Canadian naval capability is extremely limited in ice-covered waters. The importance of this weakness is debatable, for ocean trade does not operate in icebound waters -yet-so there are virtually no tactical targets to be defended in a frozen ocean. The most dangerous tactical problem is the possibility that submarines might hide under the ice and pounce upon ships passing near the ice-field. Submarines could also enter the Gulf of St. Lawrence and engage in clandestine operations, but such low-intensity war-making in current conditions would most likely be conducted during a period of tension and not as part of "general war". Accordingly there would be easier ways of introducing agents into Canada than by submarine. It is only with respect to the movements of ballistic missile submarines, or in the context of general war, that anti-submarine capabilities in the arctic might be useful. But considering those possibilities it is evident that some Canadian capability in the area would be politically useful.

Another limitation upon the utility of Canada's anti-submarine forces is that they were organized around the concepts of escort of convoys, and in peace-time area surveillance. There were good reasons for this organization, for the lesson of two world wars has been that convoy was the best way of protecting shipping, and that it also served as the most effective way of bringing submarines to combat. The weakness of convoy organization, however, is that it wastes ship-time because less cargo can be handled by a given number of ships many of which will perforce be awaiting convoy or unloading. It also requires a very large defensive force to guard against even a very small number of submarines. Accordingly it would be nice to be able to dispense with the convoy, and perhaps this may be done by sending task-forces into the Barents Sea where they will invite attack and hopefully will destroy many submarines attempting to do so. But such forces would require area-defence anti-air and surface weapons mounted on cruisers or aircraft-carriers, and would profit by the cooperation of supporting submarines. Such capabilities Canada does not have. Convoy may be the only adequate defence, and in time of crisis convoy is clearly a defensive measure which can freely be adopted. But to the extent that Canada's allies are looking at the prospect of dispensing with the convoy, Canadian inability to form even a single task force exclusively with her own ships reduces her prestige. On the other hand the maintenance of cruisers and hunter submarines at the expense of surface ASW ships could reduce Canada's net assistance to the alliance. The question is how important it may be to possess an independent capability.[44]

In aid to civilian authorities the Canadian navy, including the air component of Maritime Command, has considerable surveillance capability. The three primary features of this operation are visual air surveillance, radio signal monitoring, and acoustic monitoring. The ships of the Atlantic Squadron have now been given the authority under the International Commission

for the North Atlantic Fisheries to supervise the fishery, and have been highly effective in this role thanks to their ability to operate helicopters for detailed surveillance, and to send inspection parties onboard suspected violators. It was on the basis of evidence collected in this way which indicated that the Russians were violating their ICNAF-granted catch quotas that the Canadian government closed the ports of Halifax and St. John's to the Russian fishing fleet. The result was the reluctant agreement of the Russians to a reduced catch quota, and the action also served to warn other fishing states that violations would not be overlooked.

CANADA'S REPUTATION FOR ARMS

A critical factor determining the influence that a state may obtain from the possession of a military establishment is the reputation that state has for employing its forces. The competence with which the government makes war, and the political restraints upon it doing so, are both important. A country which will not defend itself when attacked can obtain little respect for its arms. A defence against hopeless odds yields more respect than a well armed but, perhaps more reasonable submission to superior force. Equally, a state cannot expect to influence by virtue of its ability to provide military support, if it is not capable of conducting the military operation effectively, or may for domestic political reasons be unable to engage in combat. In the years after the defeat of the South Vietnamese government the United States is going to be less respected as a source of military support because of her doubtful resolution and competence. It is obvious that in considering the effectiveness of Canada's naval forces as sources of influence it will be necessary to consider the reputation of the Canadian government as an employer of force.

International respect for Canada's political attitude to security problems, in contrast to the technical competence of her military forces, is not so evident. Canada's history in this respect has reflected some immaturity. Canada's refusal to cooperate with British Imperial defence schemes before the last war was based in part upon the inability of the Empire to defend Canada from the U.S.A. But the effect of refusing to support British policy vis-a-vis Germany in the thirties was that Britain's own ability to stand up to Hitler was gravely weakened. The massive support Canada has given Britain in two world wars indicated that Canadians were prepared to fight, if necessary, but the reluctance to create the forces in peacetime which might have made war avoidable was at least a failure of strategic understanding.

It took the atomic bomb and the Korean war to convince Canadians of the necessity of constantly supporting the forces which could deter war. The St. Laurent government was partly instrumental in the creation of NATO, and contributed heavily to its initial military forces. The Diefenbaker government, on the other hand, was inept in its handling of security problems, an ineptitude which was instrumental in bringing about its downfall.[45]

The military independence of Canada after the Second World War had been increased by the ability of Canadian industry to produce most of the equipment that Canada needed. But the rising cost of the more sophisticated equipment by the late 1950's was squeezing Canada, with her small needs, out. It was unfortunate for the Diefenbaker government that decisions to formally establish a unified Canadian-American air defence organization, NORAD, to cancel production plans for a highly sophisticated and excessively expensive Canadian jet interceptor-aircraft, the Arrow, and to substitute it with American Bomarc missiles and Voodoo aircraft, had to be taken in quick succession.

Both the Bomarcs and the Voodoos were intended for nuclear armament, and the Diefenbaker government also decided to acquire Honest John missiles and F-104 aircraft to support Canadian forces in Europe, which latter were designed as nuclear delivery systems. The nuclear weapons were only available under joint-control arrangements with the United States. The effect was to seriously reduce the independence of Canada's forces.

An independent source of weapons may not be important in giving a country military influence, other factors appear to weigh more heavily. The inability of the Diefenbaker government to decide to accept delivery of the nuclear weapons the necessity for which had been determined by their earlier decisions, however, can only have undermined Canada's influence in Washington. When eventually the Diefenbaker government was brought down on the issue of nuclear weapons procurement the new Pearson government quickly agreed to arm the forces which had been standing useless for up to two years. But it also undertook to bring about a gradual rearming of Canadian forces with non-nuclear systems. This decision to limit Canadian strategy by Canadian political susceptibilities indicated an acceptance that Canada could no longer support influence by an independent military capability.

The weakness of the Diefenbaker government during the Cuban missile crisis, on the other hand, apparently stemmed from lack of machinery for emergency decisions and an inadequate understanding of the relationships between military interdependence and diplomatic influence. The Canadian government was uncooperative with American military preparations. Although requested two hours before Kennedy's speech of 22 October 1962 to permit the movement of nuclear weapons into American bases in Labrador and Newfoundland, clearance was not given. Canadian interceptor squadrons were not alerted apparently until one day later, and then by the Minister of National Defence

Mr. Douglas Harkness in the absence of a cabinet agreement. It also appears that only eight of 640 requests for Strategic Air Command overflights of Canada were granted. Mr. Diefenbaker later defended his government on the grounds that the United States had not adequately consulted them. The NORAD agreement had recognized the "importance of the fullest possible consultation between the two governments on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America", but this was understood as no bar to the reflexive raising of the guard in the event of a crisis. The effect of this Canadian failure was to reduce Canada's reputation for reliability. This might be thought to be desirable, if the objective was to influence the outcome of the crisis. It cannot be denied that the Americans were attempting to make use of defence arrangements, which had been worked out for the contingency of a Russian suprise attack, to permit them to risk a Russian response to possible American acts of war. To fulfil the obligation due to her sovereign allies the United States ought to have consulted them before acting against the new security threat in Cuba. But the Diefenbaker government's dilatory behaviour did not help the situation, beyond possibly restraining American aggressiveness. It may have awakened Americans to the need to cement their relations with their allies, but the normally preferable course would have been for the Canadian government to have made the necessary defensive measures and then attempted to influence American policy. The Canadian ability to do so would have been increased by her sense of responsibility, coupled with her importance to American defences in time of crisis. But the Diefenbaker government appears not to have been interested in influencing American foreign policy, during the Cuban crisis or later at the Nassau conference.

A strong military reputation may not always be an asset in an alliance situation. As United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger observed in 1965 (while still an academic):

> Many American schemes for strengthening NATO have taken the form of making our predominant position psychologically more acceptable; we try to create a structure which physically prevents any ally (except the United States) from acting autonomously. This tends to turn our Allies into advisors in an American decision-making process.

He also observed that:

> President de Gaulle, with his disconcerting habit of cutting through slogans to the underlying reality, has put his finger on the fact that as long as NATO is an alliance of sovereign states, a too literal conception of "integration" can easily lead to an evasion of responsibility. Difficult decisions can be blamed on other allies.[46]

American adverse reaction generally to De Gaulle's independence and resolution indicates that submissiveness may be valued more greatly. Dr. Kissinger argued that the political strength and independence of America's European allies ought to be desired, but when faced with the burdens of office, and especially the problems of the Arab oil embargo, he too indicated irritation that allies should conceive their response to the Arab injury in different terms than did he.

Whatever doubt there may be about the effect of a nation adopting an independent policy, however, there can be none about the effect of ineptitude, as was experienced in 1962, or of irresponsibility. One of the recurring criticisms of Canadian defence policy abroad is that Canada is a wealthy state benefiting greatly from the prosperity of the industrial world, but that she takes little responsibility for its security. The Canadian government, it is observed, does not calculate the over-all needs of alliance defence and offer to supply a proportion of the required forces. Instead it contents itself with furnishing the forces which are domestically convenient, and which appear to be just adequate to turn away the wrath of her

allies. This criticism may seem very narrow to one who sees Canada's continuing involvement in United Nations security operations, and who believes the ultimate danger is of strife between the industrial north and the non-industrial south of the world. Nevertheless it is a criticism which must be born in mind if it is the governments of one's allies which it is wished to influence.

The reluctance of Canadian governments to take diplomatic risks which require military activity in support of Canadian interests also weakens respect for her. This is a paradoxical situation, for ultimately the Canadian policy of minimizing the use of military force for national purposes is a necessary precondition for international justice. But the wide-spread supplanting of laissez-faire free trade by government control has such a great potential for international injustice that the threat of violence is comparatively an easily controlled evil. And it is an evil which often depends for its control upon force being matched with force. Accordingly the need is for Canada to place her forces where they will contribute most to the countering of hostile forces, and this may mean taking diplomatic risks. The issue immediately under some debate is whether Canada should make her forces available on a day to day basis to support the Norwegian forces operating under the shadow of Russia. Such activity would involve diplomatic risks, but in the view of the Norwegians and others would constitute deterrents to Russian adventures rather than provocations of Russia. In the process of helping to vitiate Russian naval power Canada would also enhance her reputation for arms.

THE DIPLOMATIC CONTEXT OF CANADA'S NAVAL FORCES

The diplomatic and political context in which a military force exists is critical in determining its effectiveness, and by extension a nation's diplomatic and political associations

help to define the diplomatic significance its military forces can have. It is generally understood that geography has major importance in determining the military effectiveness of military formations, but less recognition is given to the effect of political factors upon military effectiveness. Perhaps this may be attributed to the lesser distinctiveness there is about political features. Nevertheless, despite the intangible quality of politics, it remains true that military forces of different states have greater or lesser political freedom to undertake particular activities. History, race, and relationship to greater powers, are all important factors. The British, for example, during the twenty-five years of de-colonization following the second world war, were for historical reasons politically capable of taking a military part in the Indian ocean area which no other state could. This fact enhanced Britain's international reputation.

The strength of Anglo-American cooperation is founded largely upon the similarity of the needs of those states in the North Atlantic area, and upon their established friendship Britain's post-war involvement in the politics of the Indian ocean littoral was essentially a product of Imperial and post-Imperial commitments, together with a concern to prevent instability in the area harming British trading interests. But nevertheless the preferential position Britain enjoyed in that large area because of her history, which preference enable her to employ her limited military strength to assist local governments in a manner no other state could, was valued by the government of the United States. On 11 December 1961 Paul Nitze, American Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internal Security Affairs, told the Institute for Strategic Studies that the United States Government was more concerned that Britain maintain the strength of her forces east of Suez than of those in Germany. On 15 February 1962 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara reportedly said the same thing to a closed session of the U.S.

Senate Military Appropriations Sub-Committee. And when Harold Wilson formed his Labour government in 1964 he told the Commons, on 16 December shortly after returning from Washington, that:

> ... our American allies are not so impressed with our claims to be a world power or to have a seat at the top table if we base those claims on matching our nuclear policy with theirs. They are perfectly capable of doing the arithmetic of megatons. What does impress them is our ability to mount peace-keeping operations that no one else can mount.[47]

Eventually the need for economy persuaded the British to reduce their military forces below the minimum level which made operations east of Suez possible, and the American experience in Vietnam may have persuaded the British that the size of forces necessary for an effective military effort in Asia had mounted unacceptably. This view is illogical, of course, as it ignores the argument that Britain's relations with the Indian Ocean states were such that Britain could do in Malaya, for instance, what the United States could not with greater forces do in Vietnam. In any case it is evident that, before the decision had to be made in 1967-8 to withdraw from east of Suez, the British gained, both directly and by virtue of the influence it gave them in Washington, by their military exploitation of their political position in the Indian Ocean. Whether the gains justified the cost may, of course, be open to question, but as recently as the summer of 1975 Harold Wilson was reported in *Time* magazine as commenting, in reference to a question on Britain's influence in the world, that:

> We haven't got vast military forces, though we make a bigger contribution to NATO than anyone of our size and spend more of our G.N.P. on defense than any other European country. Our contribution is now experience. Nixon used to say to me, and L.B.J., "If it's an African question, we'll ask you because you have so much more experience than we have". Modestly, I'm not speaking for myself

> or even my Cabinet, but certainly our parliamentarians and administrators are trained to deal with these problems. We can do more in that way perhaps than we were doing with defense.[48]

Canada has her own diplomatic advantages which strengthen her influence in Washington and elsewhere. One asset she has, with respect to the European states of NATO, is her intimate relationship with the United States. In a talk to the Canadian Parliamentary Association in 1973 the Minister of External Affairs Mitchell Sharp noted that "Given Europe's continuing preoccupation with security, the continued presence of Canadian forces (in Europe) has important political overtones ... as a symbol of the credibility of the North American commitment".[49] It is the armed forces of the United States which are most needed for the defence of Europe, or rather as deterrence against Russian attack, but the Canadian brigade group in Germany is seen by the Europeans as a moral inducement to the Americans not to withdraw their forces. Mr. Sharp indicated that the Germans considered the Canadian military presence as a justification for the European Economic Community admitting Canada to some sort of associate status.

The intimacy of Canada's relationship with the United States is also important, of course, in giving the Canadian government influence over American policies. And in some circumstances it is apparent that the political intimacy of Canada with the United States enhances the influence-value of Canada's forces in Washington. Equally, it may be said that sometimes Canada's military forces are a necessary part of any attempt to use Canada's intimacy with the United States as a means of gaining influence over American policy. Despite complaints that their UN allies were "not pulling their weight", the Americans attached considerable importance to allied support during the Korean war. The Eisenhower administration rejected a proposal to send combat troops to Vietnam because the support of her European allies was not forth-coming. And when later

Presidents did send combat troops they found that the lack of European allies was extremely embarassing domestically. Great efforts had been expended to get token military support from New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, and South Korea, which last furnished 48,000 men but at the expense of the United States. This involvement in the absence of French and British support was inadequate to satisfy the need to make any war effort an allied effort for the purposes of inhibiting or diminishing domestic political opposition to that effort. Bernard Brodie has written:

> We have also learned the wisdom of the late President Eisenhower's extreme reluctance to consider undertaking any intervention without allies. Even though we would in any case carry a disproportionate burden, the cooperative participation of other powers, as in Korea, places the entire operation in a different moral light both in our own country and in the world outside.[50]

The psychological dependence of the Johnson administration upon British support in 1967, when consideration was being given to breaking Egypt's blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, was also evident, although later in the crisis when the need was to vitiate Russian rather than Egyptian power the American government felt less hesitation about acting on its own.[51] Brodie regards the need for allies as a prerequisite for American intervention abroad.

Canada may or may not be in a position to provide any greater military support than did Australia. But Canada's intimate relationship with the United States ensures that whatever attitude she takes to American activity will have greater significance to domestic American politics, although perhaps less significance than would the views of Britain, France, or Germany. What part Canada's navy will have to play in a future crisis cannot be predicted. In the Korean war there was pressure put upon Canada to send a small force

immediately, rather than wait six months to train a larger specially recruited force. The United States needed political rather than military support but that support had to take a military form. But on that occasion it also had to take the form of ground troops. Canada had sent a squadron of destroyers to assist United Nations' operations at the start of the war, but the predominately ground forces nature of the war reduced the value of naval forces as tokens of support. In other circumstances, however, Canada's naval forces may be able to be of greater symbolic value.

There are in fact aspects of Canada's diplomatic position which may have considerable potential for the enhancement of the diplomatic significance of Canada's naval forces. It was noted in the first part of this study that visits by Australian warships to East African ports were welcomed because they symbolized "western" support for the states visited, but, because they had not been made by American ships, did not create an obligation to offer the Russians equal opportunities to visit. Canadian warships enjoy a similar degree of acceptability as do Australian ships, although usually in different parts of the world. Canada is an arctic state with, accordingly, undisputable rights to conduct military operations in the arctic. Because of this, and because Canada is not the primary opponent of Russia, her military forces can be expected to be more acceptable operating close to Russia's arctic coasts. It follows that the arctic states contiguous to Russia: Iceland, Denmark and Norway, should be less hesitant about welcoming Canadian naval support. Norway has, in fact, expressed considerable gratification for Canada's military commitment to Norwegian defence, inside NATO. Indeed the Russian government has itself attempted to foster a Canadian buffer zone.[52] The Canadian government has been careful not to move against American interests, and the advantages of Canada's position have not been exploited. But exploitation might be advantageous to both the super-powers, and to the states between.

The opinion of one senior American officer questioned about this proposition was that it would be highly valued in Washington. Its primary value, however, would of course be in the stabilizing effect it might have in the Norwegian sea area. As a number of Norwegians have commented, the defensive need in the area is the creation of deterrents against Russian risk-taking. It may also be necessary to confront growing Russian naval power in the Norwegian sea with increased western naval activity in order to protect the Norwegians from pressures. Hence involvement in the defences of Norway would be more a defensive operation vis-a-vis the Russians than an offensive influence generating operation vis-a-vis the Americans, but it might also serve that purpose.[53]

The care the Canadian government has taken to make Canadian forces available for United Nations peace-keeping operations, and to ensure that they take a disinterested part, enhances Canada's position in many small non-aligned states. On occasion it may also be expected to protect Canadian interests with the great powers whose interests are served by the U.N military presence in unstable parts of the world. Canada's active military support of the U.N. increases respect for her, and also on occasion may help to prevent criticism of her for not taking a more partisan position. The acceptability of Canadian forces to the United Nations is partially the product of Canada's secondary stature in the world, but is largely the result of careful Canadian behaviour.

In February 1944 Lester Pearson, then Ambassador to Washington, wrote that the means by which Canada could acquire some influence over British and American policies after the war might be by "achieving ... a very considerable position as a leader, if not the leader, among a group of states which are important enough to be accepted" by the Great Powers.[54] This policy was indeed pursued after the war and apparently with some success in promoting Canadian views on the form which the

United Nations should take. But Canada's leadership of the middle powers was an ephemeral thing which melted as the strength of other "middle" powers grew. Perhaps it had only been a reality for the particular purposes which Canada shared with the other "middle" powers. Increasingly Canada's "middle power" position has served, not to strengthen Canada's ability to satisfy her needs, but rather to excuse her avoidance of activities she might otherwise need to undertake as part of her effort to build up a spirit of mutual cooperation with the United States. This in itself, however, is a benefit. Association with lesser powers may yield results only in specific and limited ways, but if it serves a real need then it is sufficient. Association with other small arctic states, not necessarily as "leader", may serve to protect specific Canadian interests even if it does not enhance Canada's value to Washington. It could, for instance, help to protect Canadian sovereignty in her arctic archipelagic waters.

Canada's association with NATO, and especially with the United States, may reduce the acceptability of her forces outside the NATO area. But NATO itself also enhances the significance of Canadian forces within the very narrow frame of Russo-Canadian relations. The narrowness of the area of significance, however, does not affect the importance of the association, for the behaviour of Russia is very important to Canada. Even were Canada to pursue narrow national interests, when her forces could not be considered to be representing NATO as a whole, the value of Canada to NATO would still serve to deter action against them, by Russia or indeed by the NATO allies themselves.

Finally, the utility of Canada's armed forces is also increased by her Commonwealth connections, although circumstances have not recently given an occasion when this has been of major importance. Canada provided assistance for the establishment of the Malaysian airforce, however, and small Canadian naval squadrons

have exercised with the Commonwealth squadron based on Singapore. The purpose was to bolster the military and political ability of Malaysia to resist a Communist take-over. This in itself was thought to be useful to Canada, but perhaps it also helped to protect Canada's reputation in Washington at a time when the Americans were heavily involved in South East Asia.

Although political association of a state with others may enhance its strength in some respects, it may also, on the other hand, pose knotty problems. It is self-evident that international associations, which produce for a state influence amongst other states, also commit that state to costs of some sort. The British military establishment "east of Suez", for example, was found to be more expensive and to involve greater risks than could be justified from the apparent returns, even including the influence they produced for Britain in Washington. On the other hand, it is to be expected that the nature of a state's political associations will have considerable bearing upon whether it can influence particular developments. The British obviously must lose some considerable ability to influence events in the Indian ocean by withdrawal of forces from Singapore and Kenya, and it is likely that an aspect of this lost influence is a diminished ability to influence the Asian policies of the United States. Before entering into association with other states it is obvious that the Canadian government must consider not only whether such will increase her influence over events which are important to her, but also what are the costs of that association. This is a permanent problem for Canada which has always found security through association with greater states, independence through keeping the association tenuous, and influence through her degree of independence from her associated greater power.

NATIONAL CONTROL OF POLICY

As Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger wrote in 1965 (while he was still an academic):

> In an alliance of sovereign states, a country's influence requires that its effort be considered essential and that its partners do not take it for granted. In determining an ally's real - as opposed to his formal - role, one can do worse than inquire what its choices are in case of disagreement.[55]

It is necessary for a government to have some measure of control over whether its assets will or will not be available to support or injure another before it becomes worthwhile to court that government's favour. Most national activity is governed with the intention of maximizing return, and naturally this limits the freedom of a government to alter the established pattern for reasons of creating influence. The difficulty is greatest if the deprivation cannot be justified to the public by promises of compensatory gains which may have to be in a closely related area of activity. The opportunity to use national assets for influence-building may be dependent upon there being available an alternative way of conducting the nation's business which will have little domestic significance.

The premise upon which much of military influence-building is founded is that a state will have military assets in reserve which can be deployed at will. This is not always the case. Obviously an existing state of war can monopolize the military forces of a state. Equally the anticipation of imminent war can leave little latitude for the employment of forces. It is this problem, their commitment to anti aircraft carrier and ballistic missile submarine operations at the outset of any global nuclear war, which limits the availability of Russian naval forces for gunboat diplomacy.

Canadian naval forces appear to be freer in this respect, but the question remains whether there is any alternative to present Canadian policy. Mackenzie King's promise that Canada would never let a threat to the security of the United States be mounted from Canadian soil was a pragmatic recognition of the limits there are to the freedom of neighbours of superpowers. But even were hostility towards the United States militarily possible, and the Cuban example indicates that if the hostility is limited it is not impossible, Canada is economically bound to the United States. And even were the sacrifices involved in breaking the economic link acceptable, Canada would lose through hostility her voice in world affairs as it works through her influence in Washington. Nevertheless, it is apparent that in extreme eventualities, as for instance if the American were not to learn their lesson from Vietnam and develop international policies which were increasingly alien to Canadian ideas of social justice, it may be possible for Canada to abandon her close military ties with the United States. Any such movement would be dangerous, for it is to be anticipated that the development of American policies which alienated Canada would be symptomatic of a disregard for the sovereignty of foreign states. On the other hand, the very closeness of present Canadian-American relations would mean that Canadian withdrawal from alliance would produce a powerful domestic effect within the United States. Accordingly it may be said that, largely as an instrument for influencing Washington, Canada does have the option of reducing or breaking her close alliance with the United States.[56]

There is no question, on the other hand, that Canada has considerable freedom to alter the extent of her support for the European members of NATO. Were there any doubt about this freedom it would only be necessary to consider the pressure being put on Canada to retain her present level of military support for NATO forces in Europe, as she has indeed now agreed

to do. The only question about her ability to withdraw occurs because of the automatic penalties there would be for Canada, such as a disruption of European politics, and loss of an ability to influence NATO military decisions in the planning stage. If these penalties are accepted, however, Canada appears to be free to alter her NATO commitment, as a means of influencing European capitals and Washington.

In fact, it may be said that the bulk of Canada's military effort is free for disposition as Canada choses. This gives her greater freedom to use her forces as a means of influence. Nevertheless, there are serious complications in the way of using Canadian forces for influence-building in the simplistic sense of bartering, for there would inevitably be penalties in the form of the loss of existing beneficial influences of the existing arrangements. Canada's freedom to alter her defence relationships with other coutries is in effect limited by the demands of her political objectives. To some extent it might be possible to retain some of the political advantages of the present system while diminishing some of its weaknesses, by undertaking more of the joint defence tasks herself. But the cost of doing so would be large. It is estimated that withdrawal from the North American Air Defence Agreement joint command structure, and the establishment of an all-Canadian defence arrangement, would cost an extra $100 million per annum in operating costs.[57]

It is not possible to construct a complete profile of Canada's naval asset from the comments made in this chapter. The qualities which have been considered are not the only ones which may have a bearing on any particular situation. On occasion, for example, the diplomatic abilities of Canadian officers may be of considerable importance. The generally high level of military competence of Canadian forces may be betrayed by weakness in particular directions, such as military intelligence, which could

be obvious to representatives of other governments. The low reputation of Canadian governments for the use of arms, may often be off-set by their high reputation for restraint in the use of arms. The political factors which give Canada some freedom to use arms for specific national purposes may be irrelevent to other purposes. All that can be done, having examined some of the characteristics of Canada's naval forces is to keep them in mind when examining the mechanisms of international influence.

CHAPTER THREE

THE MECHANISMS OF MILITARY INFLUENCE FOR CANADA

I. The Manipulation of an Alliance

For the small state armed forces have always been an important means of controlling its relationship with more powerful neighbours. The limitations which international politics place upon the freedom of the great power to engage in offensive war has often permitted the limited forces of the small state to pose an adequate deterrent to military intervention, provided the nation otherwise did not unduly provoke attack. In special circumstances it has even been possible on occasion to exploit local advantages and seize a national objective while the deterrents of war prevent the response of the greater. The armed forces of small states have also been assets which could be used to foster its relations with its neighbours. Mercenary forces could be hired out, or, in alliance, the force of the two states could join in common cause. As allies the forces served a common interest, but simultaneously they could earn a return in gratitude which might take a practical form, and they could continue to deter exploitation by the greater. The last purpose could be served as much by the value placed on the services of the small state as from its ability to defend itself.

Canada has always been a part of a greater international system, but her relationship with the rest of the British empire was only occasionally influenced by military considerations. Until the twentieth century her military forces existed primarily to deter intervention from the United States, and the warming of Canada's relations with the United States was seen as a justification for maintaining a virtually unarmed state. When armed forces were mobilized in 1914 and 1939 it was, as a part of

in alliance, to vitiate the effect of hostile forces, rather than to advance Canadian interests. The development of a permanent military threat to the United States, and to Western Europe, however, created a situation where armed forces could be seen to be an important element in Canada's relations with her neighbours.

Canada had hoped that the United Nations, with armed forces on call, could put an end to the political significance of national armed forces. But with the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950 it was realized that only through her relationship with the United States could Canada influence world events. In an analysis of the operating practice of the St. Laurent government, with Mr. Pearson in the Secretaryship of State for External Affairs, Denis Stairs has outlined the strategy by which it was hoped to protect Canadian interests in a belligerent world.

> It was clear that Canadian security ultimately depended on whether or not the global system proved to be stable. The government in Ottawa therefore had a vital interest in the workings of the system as a whole. Canadian influence, however, could be exerted at this global level only through the United States - that is, indirectly, by way of activity initiated within the 'subsystem' of western allies. Given the limits of Canadian power, and of Canada's 'place' in the international hierarchy, there was certainly no way in which Canadian decision-makers could hope to affect directly the objectives or expectations of the Soviet Union, China, and the other members of the eastern polar group. The attentions of the communist governments were naturally focussed on the United States, whose policy-makers ultimately controlled the general pattern of western activity in the cold war. If the Canadians were to influence the interactions which were taking place at the global level, therefore, they had to do so by moderating the behaviour of the only 'world', or 'polar', actor to whom they had access - that is, the United States. For this reason, the bulk of Canada's diplomacy in the context of the Korean War was concerned with the constraint of American policy, and many of the government's more subtle diplomatic calculations were devoted to identifying the point beyond which it could not hope to engage in productive action - in effect to identifying the limits of Canada's 'systemic role'.[58]

The primary need of the Canadian government to obtain some significant influence in Washington was made explicit by Mr. Pearson in a speech on 10 April 1951: "Our preoccupation (he said) is no longer whether the United States will discharge her international responsibilities, but how she will do it and how the rest of us will be involved".[59]

Mr. Pearson's view of diplomatic possibilities, according to Stairs's analysis, recognized the importance of national "power" as a determinant of influence, and sought to mitigate the difficulty through internationalizing the American war.

> In dealing with allies, Mr. Pearson's assumptions with regard to the significance of 'power' as an ingredient of international affairs entailed the tactical view that the possibilities for containing the behaviour of great power decision-makers are increased if they can be induced to operate within a multilateral arena. In such a context they are subject to the demands and pressures of smaller states, whose representatives can sometimes be mobilized in concert. At the same time, however, it is vital to recall that the essence of great power status in world affairs is the capacity in the final analysis to treat lesser powers as incidental. This being the case, the leverage of small power statesmen is always limited by the degree to which their views are regarded as important by the great power policy-makers whom they seek to influence. Hence, in the Korean case, Washington could be constrained, but only to a point. The location of the 'point' might be obscure, and different decision-makers in Ottawa (and elsewhere) might be prepared in approaching it to accept different degrees of risk, but to cross the line (as the Indians were often wont to do) was to accept the possibility of driving the Americans from the multilateral arena entirely, and therefore to lose everything. The calculations of the "constrainers" must therefore be computed with care, and they must in the extremity be willing to muffle their convictions and accept political reality, entailing the ultimate authority of the powerful, for what it is. ...'Marginal' states had to be content with marginal influence.[60]

internationalization of the conflict was also seen as a tactic towards the establishment of international institutions for the resolution of world problems in general.

Pearson's and others', success in bringing the American war in Korea under the control of the United Nations was probably the greatest diplomatic achievement of the states fighting along-side the United States. This was brought about long before Canadian troops could be sent to Korea, but Canadian diplomats considered that their continued influence in Washington, directly and through the United Nations, required a Canadian military contribution. Such was almost a domestic necessity in any case. The Canadian contribution to the war effort had considerable importance for the Truman government in that it helped to stifle domestic political protest. But militarily the Canadian troops were of only marginal importance to the war effort, and the American government could probably have done as well even without allied support in the United Nations. The Americans were more concerned to have token support immediately than to have militarily more significant forces which could not be deployed for six months. Accordingly, as Stairs observed, Canada's limited importance limited her potential influence.

Besides keeping the Korean war within the auspices of the United Nations, the allies of the United States, including Canada, had little influence on the substance of American policy. Despite their somewhat weak protests General MacArthur was allowed to pursue the war north of the 38th parallel which brought the intervention of China. MacArthur's subsequent torpedoeing of efforts to reach a truce with China met with strong allied protests, but American statements have denied that it was the allied protests which led to the dismissal of MacArthur. Allied protests were more apparently influential when in 1953, after the truce talks had been going on for two years, the Americans were brought to adopt a more flexible attitude which, combined with the increased bellicosity of the

new Eisenhower administration, and the diminished propaganda value to China of the deadlocked war, led to the conclusion of an armistice. But it is difficult to ascribe even that success to American need for allied support, let alone allied military assistance. Nevertheless, perhaps the defusing of international crisis by keeping the Korean war within the United Nations, and the small influence which may have been generated in Washington towards the limitation of the war, can, for the military and diplomatic effort expended, be considered a reasonable return.

The British had also contributed forces to the United Nations army in Korea and in return aspired to some control over American war policy. In particular Prime Minister Attlee flew to Washington in 1952 when there were indications that the Americans might be contemplating using atomic bombs in China. Subsequently the American Secretary of State Dean Atcheson denied that allied pressure had influenced the decision not to employ atomic weapons, but that denial does not constitute conclusive evidence of the strength of British influence in Washington. The history of the post-second world war efforts of the British to maintain influence over world events by the retention of a significant military establishment is a very important example of the utility of armed forces as a source of influence. As with Canada, the means by which Britain hoped to influence world events was to a considerable extent through a "special relationship" with the United States. It was partially to foster this relationship, and partially to reduce dependence upon the United States, that the British decided to develop their own atomic weapons.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE BRITISH INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR FORCE

When the American passage of the McMahon Act in 1946 ended the cooperation that had existed during the war on the Anglo-American development of the atomic bomb, British statesmen regarded it as essential for Britain to develop her own weapons,

partially because American commitment to European defence was uncertain, but also because an independent nuclear capability was seen as a necessary prerequisite to regaining influence over American policies in general. In March 1952 Attlee told the British House of Commons, at the time when Britain was trying to restrain American action in Korea:

> I do not believe it is right that this country should be absolutely dependent on the United States of America, that is one very good reason for going ahead with our own work on the atomic bomb.[61]

In 1955, as Minister of Defence, Harold Macmillan rejected the view that as the American nuclear force was adequate for British defence the British force could be scrapped:

> I think this is a very dangerous doctrine.... Politically it surrenders our power to influence American policy and then, strategically and tactically it equally deprives us of any influence over the selection of targets and the use of our vital striking forces. The one, therefore, weakens our prestige and our influence in the world, and the other might imperil our safety.[62]

And Churchill declared,

> Personally, I cannot feel that we should have much influence over their (i.e. American) policy or action, wise or unwise, while we are largely dependent as we are today upon their protection.[63]

But the desire for British controlled nuclear weapons, because of divergence of British from American policy, did not lead to confrontation with the United States, as it was to do when France began developing her force de frappe. In general, the policy would appear to have been that greater British independence ensured interdependence within the alliance. From the beginning the British were careful to retain cooperative

political links with Washington. In 1948, for example, during the Berlin crisis, the British quietly accepted the deployment of American B-29 nuclear-armed bombers into East Anglia. The British never accepted the permanency of the McMahon act, and at the same time as they developed an independent force, they sought to reestablish close nuclear relations with the United States.

With the amendment of the McMahon Atomic Energy Act in 1958 allowing the British to receive information to assist them in developing their weapons, the British began to become technically dependent upon the United States. This trend was accelerated by the development of air defences, which led to dependence upon ballistic missiles, and eventually upon underground or submarine missile sites. The agreement between Macmillan and Kennedy at Nassau in 1962 by which Polaris missiles and important parts of the submarines in which they were to be based were sold at a low price to Britain made the technological dependence explicit. But this dependency was not seen as significantly reducing the influence-value of the nuclear force, which was not intended to threaten the U.S. but rather to enhance the credibility of the U.S. deterrent in British defence, and to put Britain in a position where her opinions on nuclear matters could be informed and influential. Harold Wilson, after the election in 1964 of the Labour government, eventually abandoned his declared intention to "renegotiate Nassau" because he found the agreement supported British influence at a very low price.

What influence, however, did Britain really acquire by virtue of her nuclear arsenal? An excellent study has been made by Andrew Pierre of the Anglo-American atomic relationship, in which a clear linkage is established between the rationale for a British nuclear force, and the desires for British influence in Washington.[64] Pierre's comments are interesting. He observes that:

> The most subtle criticism by the critics of the views shared by the leaders of both political parties (in Britain) was of their assumption that nuclear weapons bestowed political influence and independence. British influence, it was argued, would depend more on the nation's ability to forestall trouble and maintain order and confidence in South East Asia and Africa, and to contribute to the conventional defence of Western Europe, than on duplicating SAC (i.e. Strategic Air Command of the USAF) in minute scale. There was no evidence that Britain's nuclear capacity enabled her to restrain American intervention or impetuosity. Whatever influence Britain had exercised in limiting the war in Korea was two years before her first atomic explosion. Nor had her nuclear weapons influenced Dulles on Suez. In laying stress upon the independent deterrent the Government was therefore being led by false concepts of prestige and influence and was misrepresenting the true source of British influence in Washington.[65]

But, from a vantage point which included a period in the American Embassay in London between 1962 and 1964, he gives his own view.

> As full nuclear partners they acquired a privileged position which no other ally enjoyed in day-to-day discussions of nuclear targeting and war planning. The act of nuclear sharing also created an environment in which American trust in the British government deepened so that American officials discussed a wider range of military and political topics more frankly with their British counterparts than with officials of other friendly nations. ...Although there were a number of factors other than the nuclear partnership which account for the 'Special relationship', it would appear that without their atomic programme the British would not have received the same preferential treatment on nuclear matters and the same intimate rapport between Governments would not have been achieved.[66]

And again, he later writes:

> The advent of the missile age augmented the desire for wielding influence in Washington, for it was there more than ever that the

> decisions crucial to Britain's security would be taken. British nuclear weapons were neither the sole nor the primary source of British influence, but it was thought that the nuclear force provided a means of exerting influence in an operational manner on American strategic planning, or on the conduct of a crisis, which was not available to non-nuclear powers presumably lacking the necessary military and technological sophistication. ...Those who held power, whether politicians in office or civil servants, also viewed the nuclear force as an important bargaining asset and instrument of diplomacy. ...After one cast away some of the more specious 'ticket at the top table' justifications for nuclear arms by the Conservatives in the General Election of 1964, one was left with the undeniable fact that the existence of the nuclear force did ensure that a greater regard was given to Britain's point of view on such issues as the MLF (i.e. Multi-Lateral nuclear Force) and the non-proliferation treaty. ...to cancel the Polaris submarine programme unilaterally, that is without a suitable quid pro quo, would not have improved Britain's bargaining power in the arena of international politics.[67]

This view was also held by Dr. Kissinger when, in 1965, he wrote:

> The fact that we (i.e. the United States) gave Britain a special status in East-West negotiations did more to emphasize the political utility of Britain's nuclear arsenal than the claims of British defense ministers.[68]

Kissinger criticised American efforts to establish a "Multi-Lateral Force" of mixed-manned ships carrying ballistic missiles, because

> In its advocacy of the MLF, the United States ...has admitted that influence in the Alliance somehow depends on access to a strategic arsenal.[69]

This view, however, is not entirely incompatible with that of the nuclear critics who believed that Britain obtained greater influence by virtue of her strength "East of Suez".

Given the technical dependence of the British nuclear force upon American delivery systems, and the small size of the British strategic nuclear force which rendered it useless except as a revenge weapon, it amounted to less of a national asset than did Britain's irreplacable military and political capabilities East of Suez. Consequently, it cannot be as valuable a breeder of general influence. But, on the evidence, it appears to have been of considerable value to Britain in giving her a voice in nuclear matters, where Britain's nuclear capability once it had been established and regardless of whether it was self-sustaining could not be entirely ingnored. This in itself is of considerable importance. Following the 1964 general election Douglas-Home observed:

> I was in the negotiations all through on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. I have no doubt whatever that we would never have got that Treaty unless the United Kingdom had been in a position to intervene from knowledge and had a status which could not be denied. We would not have got it if it had not been that we were a nuclear power.[70]

NON-HOSTILE COMPULSION

It is apparent that Britain's creation and maintenance of a nuclear force gave her influence in nuclear discussions with her ally the United States, as well as with her rival Russia, because she could not be ignored. American Defence Secretary McNamara was highly critical of the independent nuclear forces of Britain and France for the endemic tendency to obsolescence, but his real concern was with the control of any near-nuclear war crises which would be complicated by the existence of small independently controlled forces.[71] Being unable to prevent the continuation of the British force, however, the Americans had to accommodate its existence by allowing the British government a voice in United States war planning as an inducement to the British to coordinate their plans with those of the Americans.

The British experience with nuclear forces indicates how closely the means of influence must, on occasion, be matched to the objective sought. The concept of coercion is dependent upon the belief that military or economic, or political danger can lead a rational state to "buy-off" its enemies with concessions which are unrelated to the form of threat employed. The problems of employing coercion upon a state whose good will it is wished to retain, however, prevents such a loose linkage between ends and means. A loose linkage requires the employment of diplomats whose task it is to establish the reality of an otherwise unreal connection, and in effect if the intention is coercive the diplomat must employ threats. Where explicit threats are inappropriate, therefore, coercion is only possible where the linkage between the form of pressure and the objective is innate. Arnold Wolfers speaks of "a relationship of mutual dependence between ends and means".[72] His stipulation is too absolute, but it is valid where coercion is practised between friends, when a degree of automaticity is necessary to prevent the development of hostilities.

In the instance of the British nuclear force automaticity was the product of a previous policy decision, and so was not perfect. Had not the ostensible and the principal reason for that decision been to strengthen Britain's position vis-a-vis Soviet Russia its impact upon Anglo-American relations could have been more destructive. Automaticity is more nearly perfect when such immutable factors as geography are involved. Canada benefits from such a situation, for her juxtaposition with the United States and interposition between her and Russia gives the Americans no choice but to be concerned for Canadian security. This coercion can produce no resentment, but on the other hand neither is Canada able to control the implications. For influence to be obtained as a result of policy decisions it is necessary to create situations, and to do so without creating hostilities as well requires careful balancing of different forms of influence.

The formation in 1966 of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) within NATO to give West Germany a voice in American nuclear planning has reduced the importance to Britain of the possession of nuclear arms. For the NPG to be adequate to discourage the Germans from building their own nuclear force it had to give them, and with Germany the rest of NATO, the same access to American strategic planning as Britain obtained from the actual possession of nuclear arms. In contrast to the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in the negotiation of which Britain played an active part, only the United States and Russia participated in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the United States reportedly consulted closely with NATO concerning the talks. It is apparent that there has been a parallel development of greater equality amongst the NATO members, and also of greater recognition of the preeminent position of the United States. It is reported that the British are not notably active in NPG discussions. This development is indicative of a changed relationship within NATO, and Britain's quiescence is attributable to the basic similarity between British and American strategic concepts. Nevertheless it should not be thought that the compulsive mechanism of influence which first gave Britain access to American nuclear planning is not still functioning. All that has happened is that the Americans have become more sensitive to diplomatic imperatives. In the 1950's Britain had to build a nuclear force in order to obtain influence over American policy, but in the 1960's it was enough for the Germans to be in a position to do so.

Nuclear forces command the greatest public interest, but less dramatic forms of military power also serve to give states an undeniable right to influence policy decisions pertaining to that form of force. Canada's investment in anti-submarine forces obviously has the effect of ensuring that her opinions on the conduct of operations in the defence of trade in the North Atlantic, and to a lesser extent in the submarine operations of allies, will command attention. Her expertise will

make consultation with her a sensible precaution, but expertise alone (which would not survive without the forces) may not serve to influence allied policy. For that purpose it is necessary that Canada have significant forces. If Canada were to exploit her political acceptability in the Norwegian sea and become a major factor in the stability of the area by virtue of her naval operations, she would also acquire a position where her views on the conduct of allied defense effort in that sensitive area could not be ignored.

COOPERATION

The transferal of the principal mode of nuclear consultation from bilateral discussion to NATO is important. Where coercion occurs between friendly states it may perhaps be better described as enlightened self-interest. Certainly within NATO with its unusual degree of intimacy between states there is no evidence that cooperation is maintained at the lowest possible level consistent with immediate needs and capabilities. The need to cement the political cohesion of the alliance, and the soundness of obtaining the judgments of allies with different perspectives, serve to give the allies influence which is disproprotionate to their military strengths. Because of Canada's contribution to allied defence efforts the government of Canada is kept informed of defence research and planning on the part of her allies. Being thus informed, the Canadian government is then in a position to form judgments about how the defence efforts of her allies can best be deployed to maximize Canada's security. The NATO alliance consultative organization puts Canadian officials into the committees where policy is formed. And once inside the committee room, informed, and instructed from Ottawa, the Canadian officials have a fair chance of persuading NATO as a whole to adopt their policy. If they succeed it will be because their opinions are considered to be sound, not because Canada's forces are indispensable.[73]

The degree of consultation which takes place within NATO means that a nation's military effort in one mode of warfare serves to give it influence over the use of other military forces to which it does not contribute. Canada' anti-submarine forces gain access for Canada to allied anti-submarine research and to naval operations planning. This in itself is valuable; the submarine being one of the major weapons of the current era, Canada is naturally concerned to be kept aware of allied and opposition submarine activity. The fact that submarine surveillance is a naval task which is undertaken off Canada's coasts makes it particularly important that Canada has a voice in its conduct. But Canada is probably more concerned to influence American, and NATO, policies in other matters. Canada specializes in anti-submarine naval forces not because she identifies submarines as her principal danger, but rather because it is a field of activity in which she can perform a major service to the alliance.* In return she hopes to influence a wide range of activities, military and otherwise, of her allies.

Specialization makes Canada's naval forces indispensable for a number of alliance objectives. It also allows Canada to become excellent in a technically demanding mode of warfare. The valuation given to Canadian military activity can also be enhanced by the exploitation of Canada's peculiar political advantages as a close associate of the United States, but also a middle power in her own right, with close ties to the Commonwealth, and political acceptability in arctic areas. By undertaking activities for which she alone is politically most suitable, or for which she has the right combination of political suitability and military ability, Canada can make it good politics for allied governments to listen to her views on a wide range of subjects.

---

* Specialization has the tactical advantage of making Canadian forces indispensable in at least one area of alliance activity.

There are, however, a number of difficulties which reduce the ability of a country like Canada to influence allied policy outside her own area of activity. In areas of defence where Canada conducts no research she has no means of forming a judgment as to the adequacy of the information given her by allies. And even when Canada is able to judge what her interests require, freedom to argue in alliance planning sessions is a weak mechanism of influence which may be defeated by another state with stronger claims not to be ignored, or, indeed, by the mere inertia of decision-making processes. John W. Holmes, Canada's Acting Permanent Representative in the United Nations from 1950 to 1951, and Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Department of External Affairs between 1953 and 1960, comments:

> A super-power, particularly a complicated democracy such as the United States, has a colossal job making up its own mind, and when it has done so it is hard to shake. To reach a decision on China, Vietnam, or Berlin the State Department, White House, Pentagon, C.I.A., other agencies, and Congressional leaders must first negotiate among themselves, a process which can be protracted. The result is viewed as the end-product of a complicated, delicate negotiation each phase of which has involved compromise and which can be altered or even re-opened only at great risk of bringing down the edifice.

But he does add,

> There is no need, however, for Canadians to be defeatist. The process of affecting American policy is baffling but not impossible. Canadians and the other allies can and do have an impact when they are able to inject sound ideas, directly or indirectly, into the process at an early stage.[74]

The NATO planning sessions, being held in camera, have a better chance than might otherwise occur of influencing policy before it has become ossified in the national context.

The answers which were given to questionnaires circulated by Professor Peyton Lyon in 1969 amongst diplomats accredited to NATO headquarters in Brussels indicate that the relationship between armed strength and influence within the alliance was not clear-cut.[75] The evidence was contradictory. On the one hand it appeared that Britain, France, and Germany were most influential with the Americans, but on the other it was agreed that a well formulated presentation by a lesser ally got a good hearing. A senior member of the British Foreign and Commonwealth office has expressed his opinion to me that Britain's greater defense effort does give her greater influence in Washington. One mechanism by which this influence operates is the higher number of British officers commanding NATO posts. A great deal depends upon the intellectual capability of the individual statesmen, and their supporting organizations. Influence within a council also inevitably depends for the small state upon the existence or otherwise of a balance of opinion amongst the other members. As Hume Wrong observed in 1942, when at the Canadian Embassy in Washington,

> With the entry of the United States into the war we are not as well placed to influence the conduct of the war as we were when the United States was neutral. Canadian influence can be greatest when there is a divergence of policy between the United Kingdom and the United States. Now that they are partners, we become only a junior member of the partnership.[76]

The more powerful states clearly have a greater ability to be obstructive, but more to the point, their national forces will actually be engaged in and constitute a major part of more alliance activities; as major participants their opinions clearly cannot be ignored. In the end Dr. Kissinger's previously quoted dictum is not much wide of the mark. In 1965, it will be remembered, he wrote that

> In an alliance of sovereign states, a country's influence requires that its effort be considered essential and that its partners do not take it for granted. In determining an ally's real - as opposed to his formal - role, one can do worse than inquire what its choices are in case of disagreement.[77]

For the small state specialization is tactically useful as a means of making the national forces indispensable to the alliance, but inevitably it also reduces the number of activities in which it can participate.

THE DEMONSTRATIVE FUNCTION OF ARMED FORCES

It is not exclusively on military grounds that the military effort of a lesser ally is valued, it is also politically important as a demonstration of partnership. It is the function of the statesman to exploit the assets of his country in order to obtain influence for it. He may establish linkages between services provided and services sought for, and he must create the atmosphere in the council rooms which suits the mechanism of influence it is wished to utilize. In this manoeuvering the Canadian statesman can make some use of the asset value of the Canadian navy. An armed force, however, is also an instrument of diplomacy which, by the way it is used or by its very existence, can enhance the credibility of the government's stated intention. A diplomat can explain his government's attitude, but if it should be his task to threaten a disruption of international cooperation which would harm both parties in the dispute, to establish the limits of national demands, or to commit his country to support of another as an inducement to the latter to accept risks, the diplomat's word may not be enough to inspire belief. It may be necessary for the state to make some more convincing demonstration of its commitment. President Kennedy is reported to have commented of Premier Khrushchev that "That son of a bitch won't pay attention to words, ... He has to see you move".[78] Sometimes the demonstrative use of armed forces can provide the necessary means of conveying national determination and policy.

The importance of demonstrative military action as a communicator of national intention is derived in part from the influence of domestic politics in international relations. The significance of domestic politics will be different with different political and social systems, but broadly the effect may be likened to inertia. In a large bureaucratic government decision-making may be distorted by the incompetence of the system to maximize the national advantage. In a democracy government policy cannot be developed far beyond what is publicly acceptable. And no autocratic state is so well run or free from public opinion as to be free from similar deviations from the maximization of national advantage. Military action by a state provides evidence that the government has indeed made up its mind to adopt a particular attitude, and believes that it has public support for its stand; and it also creates a domestic political effect which reinforces the evidence. If the government's judgment has been sound and its action receives general public support then it will become to some considerable degree committed to its policy. This is particularly important if the military action has only been demonstrative in purpose, because the public support it receives will substantiate the reality of the threat or commitment which has been made. The possibility that the domestic political reaction will not support the government confirms the value of demonstrative military action as a communicator of national purpose. It follows that the victim, or beneficiary, of demonstrative action will be intensely interested in the reaction it receives within the state which made it, which in practice is very much the case.

As a threatening token a military demonstration does not necessarily imply that the state will actually engage in military action (vide infra), but in support of another state military demonstration invariably constitutes a promise of military support. One of the reasons for this phenomenon is that the linkages between a supportive military demonstration and the influence it has does not necessarily involve the instrumentality

of diplomats and governments. The demonstration can be perceived by the people of the state directly, and they draw their own conclusions. So it is with Canada's military establishment in Europe which besides giving Canada a voice in NATO councils also serves Canadian interests by, apparently, having a reassuring influence in European politics through its direct impact upon the people of the area. International relations take place on many levels at the same time, and it is obvious that without reassuring contacts taking other forms a Canadian brigade group permanently stationed in a foreign country could have other implications. But as it is, it amounts to a pledge of military support which is more convincing than could be any declaration of a diplomat. Admiral Gorshkov's belief, that the use of advanced warships to make state visits would impress the people of other countries with the progress of communism, is another instance of influence aimed directly at the people, with results which can only be altered by altering the means of influence. But whether the results are those that Gorshkov intends, on the other hand, may be open to question. The state visits made by Russian warships may also build up an expectation of Russian military support, a danger which probably concerns the politburo. Evidently Russian port visits to India were important in developing the political climate which allowed the Indian government to adopt a pro-Moscow line; it is probable that they were seen by Indians as evidence of an ability and willingness to provide military support.

Warships are not necessarily the best means of demonstrating support. Clearly with respect to the European members of NATO Canada's land forces are the more significant demonstration of Canada's commitment. Where naval forces are most useful as instruments of diplomacy, beyond the few occasions when it is actually necessary that support take a naval form, is when there is hesitation on the part of the host government to become involved. Because the high seas are common to all mankind the movement of warships is far less objectionable to

foreign countries than would be that of armies. With the occasional exception of military bands, elements of an army virtually never make formal visits even to friendly states. But warships have acquired the customary privilege of visiting foreign ports in order to refresh their crews, and the custom has been transformed for diplomatic purposes to one of state visits. The dispatch of ground troops remains a more convincing statement of support, beacuse of their immobility, but also because generally they can more readily assist in the defence of an allied state. The fact that naval visits have become customary also makes it possible for there to be a degree of ambiguity in the diplomatic significance of the action, which may suit the purposes of the state, or relieve the political problems which might obstruct a more explicit commitment.[79]

The influence that a state can obtain through demonstration of support is clearly less certain than that available to the state which possesses control over indispensable assets. It may be possible for a state, by its behaviour, to create within another strong political pressures to support its interests. But to do so requires sophisticated exploitation of public attitudes which may at the same time be subject to other rapidly changing pressures. Difficulties are created by the subtle differences that exist between admirable and objectionable behaviour. States are expected to pursue their own interests, for example, and such behaviour need not damage relations with even rival states. Indeed it may be that it is only by the pursuit of national interests that a government can retain the respect of its peers. Nevertheless there are limits beyond which the pursuit of national interests becomes definitely hostile. Unfortunately the limits are not clearly drawn. Especially perplexing is the limit beyond which it is objectionable for a state to maintain armaments against the possible action of others. The behaviour of states can be contradictory, with

cooperative action belying stated intentions, or the reverse, and only circumstances will determine what aspect of the relationship will be more important. Generally, however, it will be evident to the diplomat in touch with the situation what national activities are necessary to produce what effect.

Within NATO, at present, it appears that the factor which has the greatest significance is the proportion of its Gross National Product which a state devotes to defence. If it is lower than the average a state such as Canada finds it difficult to convince its allies that it is making an equal contribution because of the quality of its effort, or because of other factors. Within NATO it is evident that only ground forces committed to the defence of western Europe have high political value, but this stipulation is less absolute if individual members of NATO are considered. In any case, what significance there will be in any military activity will partially depend upon circumstances, expecially upon the context of other aspects of the relationship between states.[80]

It is the belief in Britain, on the other hand, that, while the size of national military effort is important, the foundation of their influence in Washington is their tradition of military reliability - in other words, the strength of their reputation for arms. The Churchill image of the British "Bull-Dog Breed" has been carefully fostered. Prime Minister Harold Wilson appears to accept the validity of the argument, and of course an image which is kept alive for such a long time generally is self-fulfilling. It is interesting to note the comment of the American Admiral Samuel Eliot Morrison's comment on Martin Frobisher's description of an attack made by the latter in 1594 on a Spanish garrison in Brest:

> It was tyme for us to goa through with it he said as a Spanish relief force was advancing. He and Sir John personally led the assault ... England

> and her offspring have every reason to cherish the records of the "late voyages of discoverie ... under the conduct of Martin Frobisher, General". If nothing else, they taught England to "goa through with it" to glory, dominion and empire.[81]

The French, however, with memories of 1940 and their belief that French army might have survived had not the British withheld fighter-aircraft for later action, and earlier with their memories of British reluctance to act in the Rhineland crisis, don't see the British as quite such reliable allies.

The value of established good will is impossible to test accurately, but the efforts of the British after 1945 to maintain their "special Relationship" with the United States reflect the British experience in the Second World War when American neutrality was set aside to help them, and later when the Americans gave first priority to winning Britain's war in Europe. It is interesting to compare the outcome for Britain of a policy of cooperation and subordination to the United States, with that of General de Gaulle's France. De Gaulle held that only the ostentatious pursuit of French national interests would protect the amour propre of Frenchmen, and French strategists maintained that in an era of nuclear balance national security could not be entrusted to any ally. The result of the French insistence upon constructing a nuclear force de frappe, and disassociation with the command structure of NATO, was the break-down of friendly rapport with the American government. The Americans could not write off their French ally who occupy the heart of NATO, however, and the outcome was that the need to conciliate a truculent France exerted an influence upon American policy which rivaled the sentiments of good will for Britain.

It appears that the French were more influential than the British within the restricted field of nuclear strategy. But this is not conclusive evidence that obstruction is more influential

than is cooperation. British strategic thinking anticipated the American in recognizing that nuclear forces even in small quantities are too destructive to be employable, and that in consequence greater attention has to be given to preventing an enemy using other means to achieve victory. But the British share the American desire to prevent a European war automatically becoming a nuclear holocaust, and agree on the need for central control of nuclear forces. The French wish, by contrast, to ensure by national control of nuclear arms that any European war would be nuclear (and therefore improbable), was a complete rejection of American preferences. Accordingly the French needed to influence the Americans more than did the British. Their success may, perhaps, also be attributable to the evident soundness of their views. Certainly the institutionalization of nuclear parity in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks has made the American Nuclear forces a doubtful factor in allied defence planning.

NATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY AS A MEANS OF INFLUENCE

Canada's military involvement in the Korean war was clearly valued largely for the demonstration of support which it constituted, and the limited influence this gave Canada equally clearly reflected the limited importance which was attached to the demonstration. Greater respect was apparently given to British statesmen because of the greater military power of Britain. The limitations which there are upon Canadian influence in Washington and the other NATO capitals, however, does not necessarily amount to any great hardship or danger to Canadians. A good case can be made for increasing the ability of Canadian statesmen to determine international developments, but the need is at present largely hypothetical as American objectives are similar to Canadian ones, and there is no good reason to believe that Canadians would handle the problems of international affairs with better over-all success. The fundamental need is to preserve the international system

which is so beneficial to Canada. It is by helping to maintain this system that Canada's military forces must fundamentally protect Canadian interests.

Both in a military and a politico-military sense the primary importance of Canada's armed forces lie in the effect they have in helping to maintain the association of the European and North American parts of NATO. Her ground forces in Germany help to reassure the Germans that they can count on North American determination to support Europe, and also assist the American administration in its efforts to retain the American garrison in Germany by helping to defuse domestic American opposition. Canada's naval forces constitute an important part of NATO's ability to ensure that North American reinforcements can reach Europe in a crisis. Were it to become apparent that the growth of Russian naval strength in the North Atlantic made it problematic that North America could reinforce Europe, then it is probable that the American Congress would insist upon withdrawing American forces from Europe. If American support could not be guaranteed, European states would be obliged either to move closer to the Russian system, or to establish forces of their own which would be capable of threatening Russia. Either alternative could be injurious to Canada. Increased European armament and sense of insecurity, especially as it would primarily amount to increased German armament, would pose the danger of a third European war with world-wide consequences. European subordination to Russia, on the other hand, would isolate Canada econimically, politically, militarily, and most importantly, culturally, in a North America dominated by a United States which would be increasingly concerned for its vulnerability. Even if Europe found a middle course to pursue which did not pose a threat of war, or involve subordination to Russia, Canadian independence within North America, which is the product of the American sense of security, and the support of NATO's European states, would be undermined.

This is conceptually a simple defence problem, but one made credible in a world of nuclear deterrents by the fact that the injury could be suffered even without the actual engagement of forces. There are many ways in which the increased naval strength of Russia can be countered by the alliance, but any development which alters the political balance of NATO could upset the functioning of a system which has been proved to be beneficial to all NATO countries. This being so it is the least-risky course for Canada if she plays a full part in any increased naval effort which must be mounted to counter the expansion of the Russian northern fleet. Equally, if Canada perceives that her trading and security interests in other parts of the world are threatened by Russian naval power, a remedy can be found in Canadian naval effort, possibly taking the form of increased responsibility in the North Atlantic to allow her allies to deploy ships to other seas.

It is sometimes argued that the maintenance of armed forces, which admittedly buy Canada influence in military councils, nonetheless has an effect which is contradictory to the objectives of security and peace for which Canadian statesmen need influence. Certainly the possibility ought not to be lightly dismissed, but in fact it appears that the effect of Canadian armament is stabilizing. It is evident that, although the armament of states is a prerequisite for serious wars, armament as such does not necessarily bring states into collision any more than it necessarily promotes security. On the other hand, there are notable instances in recent history when the nature and size of a nation's armament was instrumental in bringing about wars between states, or making them inevitably total wars. The development of the German navy before the First World War, because it upset the calculations upon which the British based their security, led to hostility between Britain and Germany, and eventually to Britain taking the French part in the crisis of August 1914. The Franco-Prussian war had established German supremacy on the continent of Europe, but it was only when Germany acquired a navy that it began to appear as though German

militarism could endanger Britain. As it developed, the increase in German strength, because it brought Britain and eventually the United States into the lists against her, proved to be her downfall. Another miscalculation was the famous Schlieffen Plan which so organized the German army that a mobilization order inspired by anticipation of attack from the allied states of Russia or France could only be carried out by mounting an actual attack upon the latter. The effect was that mobilization could not be used as a threat, and neither could diplomacy be used to detach France from a bellicose Russia. The result was that Germany found herself fighting, and losing in the end, a war against all the great powers.

From more recent history, it has been argued that it was the possession of excessive military capability which led the United States to become committed to a war in Vietnam. The formation of NATO may also be attributable to the maintenance by Stalin of excessive armament after the conclusion of the war in 1945. The formation of a hostile alliance, however, is not the same thing as war. In recent history there are as many occasions when inadequate armament has led to miscalculation and war as there are of the opposite. Hitler believed his opponents to be impotent, and indeed it was because they also thought themselves to be so that Hitler was able to profit. The Japanese attack on the United States was a gamble which never really made sense: the moral blow of the attack was not enough to inspire a defeatist mood, while the material advantage gained was very short term. But it is clear that Japanese planners under, rather than over, estimated American military potential. The Korean war might never have happened had the American military in Japan been clearly prepared to react to aggression in Korea.

The only parallel to the Schlieffen Plan which has troubled the post-war world was the Dulles policy of massive retaliation, that is, the stated intention of the United States to

retaliate to any Russian military activity anywhere by the launching of general nuclear war. Even if it was credible at the time the policy was declared it later became absurd because Russian nuclear armament made it a policy which could not be carried out. Indeed it may be speculated that it was only the Russian development of nuclear weapons which prevented the world being involved in a third great war, which of course would have been provoked by the size of Russian conventional armament.

The themes which run through this catalogue of miscalculations are that new or increased threats to another state's security, and military organization which can only function effectively at a high level of action, or in a mode which endangers otherwise unconcerned parties, create danger of war, or more war than the minimum required in the circumstances. Armament itself is perhaps of secondary importance, save that inadequate armaments may tempt an opponent to aggression, while excessive armament may tempt oneself, and probably also creates anxiety in others. Hypothetically a strong military establishment may push a state into war in order to perpetuate its position within the state, but if this phenomenon has contributed to any of the great wars of modern history it has not obviously been the deciding factor. More realistically, it can be argued that professional concern to retain large military establishments creates the circumstances, a security threat to others, which lead to war. But it is apparent that the opposite concern of the economist to reduce expenditure upon armament can also be dangerous. Security organization must depend upon circumstances, and be a careful balance of incentives to cooperation and deterrents to war.

The instances cited of miscalculation leading to war, however, all inevitably involve the great powers. It is less easy to identify what effect a middle power can have either for good or for ill upon world security problems. The argument that Canada can set an example by voluntary disarmament,

which in the nuclear sense she has done by signing the non-proliferation treaty, does not really bear scrutiny considering the security Canada enjoys by virtue of her partnership with the United States. It is more to the point to observe that Canada's refusal to promise Britain military support in the 1930's, because of a desire to assert national independence, was an important contributing factor to Britain's inability to resist Hitler until 1939. Mackenzie King did tell Hitler that Canadians would support Britain in a war, but the size of Canada's regular forces did not give much indication of the military importance of Canada.

In the 1970's, when the United States and Russia have more than enough nuclear weapons to ensure mutual destruction in a war, the primary function of the armaments of lesser states in alliance with either are to demonstrate the determination of that state to resist aggression, and ability to maintain a very substantial defence without depending upon nuclear arms. The double effect is to deter an enemy from attacking, and to increase the sense of security of the ally. It is in striving after these effects that Canadian armed forces have their primary purpose.

CONCLUSION

The White Paper Defence in the 70's declared that "deterring war is not an objective Canada alone can achieve, and is therefore one which must be pursued through collective security arrangements". The need for "working for arms control and disarmament agreements" and for "contributing to the system of stable mutual deterrence" was recognized, but implicitly the White Paper did not accept that Canada could be responsible for the satisfactory functioning of the system of deterrents. To the extent that security was to be sought through "arms control and disarmament", which read as virtual synonyms, it is apparent that the means to the end of security was to be the

nagging (or soothing) activities of Canadian diplomats in allied and other capitals. Meanwhile Canadian forces were to concentrate upon parochial and small scale problems.

Canadian statesmen have, in the words of Hume Wrong in 1942, adopted "what may unkindly be called a semi-colonial position". "We have tended" in attempting to influence the conduct of the war "to be satisfied with the form rather than the substance".[82] The so-called "Functional" approach in international influence which the Canadian government developed during the war stressed the individual capabilities of the several countries and urged that countries ought to be allowed influence over matters in which they could be active in the international scene. It was according to this principle that the Canadian government demanded in 1942, and did not get, a place on the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; as it was to be expected that Canada would be one of the greatest contributors in aid it was felt she had a right to help formulate relief policy.[83] The "functional" approach was pragmatic: at the same time as it recognized the limitations on Canada's means of influence it also recognized that she had some strong positions which could be exploited. The inadequacy of the conception, however, was that it took no account of the relative importance to Canada of the areas over which she did or did not have influence. Certainly it did not establish influence over the functioning of the international security system as a primary national objective. Canada did persuade the creators of the United Nations that in the selection of non-permanent members of the security council consideration should be given to the contribution of members to the maintenance of international peace and security. Canada has certainly done her share, and by doing so has had the opportunity in the Suez crisis of 1956 of helping to extricate Britain from her difficulties which endangered Canada's own position. There are substantial limitations, however, upon the influence a small state can have within any council, whether

of the United Nations or NATO, and in consequence there is a need to consider all the various possible techniques by which Canada can influence the functioning of "the system of stable deterrents" to promote the security of her own interests.

The enhancement of her value to the NATO alliance, and possibly to the influential members of the United Nations, is certainly an important means of acquiring some direction over world developments. The Canadian navy is of little immediate significance to the United Nations, but has considerable importance to NATO. Its value can be sustained by specialization which makes it vital for some purposes, by technical excellence which further enhances its importance and also yields prestige, and by exploiting Canada's political position which enables her to use her navy for particular alliance needs such as flag showing in the Norwegian sea. Because Canada is peculiarly suited for that task her efforts in it would increase her value to the alliance. But such activity would serve to do more than enhance the gratitude of allies, it would also put Canada in a position where, over another important aspect of alliance activity, her opinions could not be ignored. The inclusion of Canada in the Congress on European Security which met in formal session in Finland in 1975 is an example of the way in which her possession of forces in critical areas gives her a voice in the conduct of local affairs in those areas.

Canadian governments have been ambivalent concerning the extent they wished to direct the policies of other states, but this "semi-colonial" attitude is a luxury, and incompatible with Canadian views that not always do her allies behave in the most appropriate manner. On the other hand, the present alliance arrangement is in many respects beneficial to Canada, and her military effort has some bearing upon whether it can continue to function in its present form. The military significance of Canada's navy, and her other forces, has considerable importance in ensuring that the defence of North America is linked with that

of Europe. Upon this linkage depends to some extent the American government's sense of security, which has an immediate bearing upon the "stability" of deterrents, and upon the independence of Canada from American control. The effect of Canada's military effort upon the fundamental structure of the NATO alliance is at least as important a mechanism of influence as is any which depends upon diplomatic processes.

II. GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY

The subordination of parochial national interests in this study to world security problems is deliberate. The armed forces of a state, however, can have considerable importance in the former order of problems. It is sometimes also possible for the small state to exploit circumstances and apply pressure on other states, whether in alliance with them or not. The ability of the small state to do this is in fact increasing. Classically the ability of an armed force to further national interests is derived from its ability, supported by the entire strength of the nation, to defeat an opponent in general warfare. War has become increasingly destructive, however, and the small state is sometimes able to capitalize on the disinclination of the greater to accept the penalty even of victory; sometimes the forces of the small state can even be used to achieve a coup de main which cannot be undone without greater destruction than the greater state will accept. The reduced acceptability of war, especially now that any violence poses the risk of a nuclear holocaust, has also had the effect of making economic factors a primary means of coercion.

Sometimes the armed forces of a state can be employed demonstratively to give a general warning that if the requirements of the state are not met some form of reprisal will be taken. Military attack would only be one form that reprisal could take, and generally it would be the least likely because of the risks involved. The actual penalty exacted could be economic, political,

or diplomatic, and the effectiveness of the threatening military demonstration would depend, in part, upon the economic, or political, or diplomatic punishments which are available for use. Military demonstration will only have been necessary because it is rare for any state to be able to injure another seriously without at the same time injuring itself. It may therefore be necessary to convince the victim of the action that the state is committed to the execution of its threat if its demands are not met.

A warship can be used effectively as a threatening token, and for this purpose it has the advantage that, being able by its location alone to indicate what country is being threatened, it may be able to convey its menace without there being any need for diplomats to make the threat explicit. Of course, when the state it is wished to threaten has a common border it is equally possible to use an army to demonstrate a threat, but no country borders on more than a few other states while most states have sea-coasts. The practical problems of coercive diplomacy, however, mean that the advantages of naval forces as instruments of diplomacy are greatest when the issue is maritime.

Coercive diplomacy is a blunt instrument and the difficulties in the way of an efficient operation are great. The willingness of a government to submit to pressure may be considerably inhibited by concern for the implications of the consequential loss of prestige. As the Duc de Praslin said in 1764:

> France might be disposed either from the Reason of the Thing, or for the Sake of Peace, to give up a Claim; and yet not be inclined to suffer an Affront offered to Her in the Face of all Europe, by Force of Arms.[84]

The loss of prestige may embarrass a government domestically and bring about the loss of office of the administration, or even the

break-down of law itself. Externally the government may be concerned by the possibility of other states, observing weakness, feeling free to pursue their own objectives by force, or threatened force. And it may also be feared that the original aggressor has more comprehensive demands than have so far been declared, which will be advanced if the original use of force seems to have been effective. Some of the problems will come from the evidence which may appear of the real military weakness of the state, and others from the apparent weakness of the government's will. This diversity produces complexity, for the protection of the credibility of a state's military capability may be favoured by submitting before it is tested in confrontation, but the reputation of the government may require that resistance be offered until it is evident that only the inherent weakness of the state has occasioned the loss.

The complications in international relations which limit the options of the state attempting the demarche and which inhibit the compliance of the victim, or even impel it to strike back, place enormous importance upon the adoption of the right degree and form of pressure. In any given instance it may well develop that the greatest degree of pressure which can be generated without producing adverse reactions is insufficient to achieve the objective. It may be that a considerable increase in the level of military action would reach another point of favourable balance, but such escalation would only be sound if the issue at stake were valued enough to make the cost of escalated confrontation acceptable. On other occasions it may be far more cost-effective to offer positive inducements to the opponent state to agree to the demands made of it. The effectiveness of postive inducements, however, is also complicated by numerous factors, and it may not be politically possible for a state to accept such an arrangement, especially if it has been the victim of hostile action. There are narrow limitations on the ability of a state to vary the degree of threat and inducement in the pursuit of any particular objective.

A wide variety of military and non-military instruments can be, and frequently have been, used to provide what is hoped will be the right degree of pressure and inducement. Naval forces are only one of these instruments. If the dispute is over maritime matters, however, there are practical advantages to the employment of naval units for the demonstration. Demonstrative coercive action depends for its effectiveness upon the existence of economic, political, diplomatic and military pressure upon the opponent constraining him to concede the demands which may have been made. But the ability to employ demonstrative action to make the reasons for compliance urgent while retaining some control of the crisis depends as well upon the availability of the appropriate forces for the particular occasion. In the words of Dr. Alexander L. George, coercive diplomacy is "circumstance dependent".[85] In practice it is often the means which a state has available for the generation of pressure which determines whether it can generate enough to serve its purposes without creating an unacceptable degree of confrontation which would either outweigh the advantages gained by the demarche, or actually prevent its acquisition altogether. If an objective is only vulnerable to a general threat to the wellbeing of a state, such as would be the case in a dispute over domestic policy on political publications, then it may be anticipated that the reluctance of a state to submit to pressure would be greatest. If it is possible to apply pressure directly upon the objective in such a way that the significance of the threat is essentially limited to the objective, on the other hand, the restraints upon compliance will be diminished. Naval forces have this ability with respect to maritime objectives, for they can operate in the vicinity of the disputed objective, and are clearly incapable of threatening other, non-maritime, aspects of the relationship between states. Furthermore, being in the vicinity of their objective, the naval forces can also on occasion move from demonstrative to purposive action and seize the objective directly by an act of limited war.

For a small state in Canada's position the substance of a coercive action is only likely to be a threat to the security of another state when Canada is in a position to withdraw support from a cooperative arrangement. This discontinuation of a freely provided service is clearly a right of a sovereign state. The effectiveness of the threat to do so will depend, as Kissinger observed, on the value of the contribution, and on the freedom of the state to dispense with the alliance. This latter is the weak point for Canada in that she probably gains more from the NATO alliance than she gives. For one thing, the abandonment of NATO would deprive Canada of influence within the alliance which, as has been shown, is disproportionate to the size of her forces. For another, the existence of the alliance, because of operational requirements it imposes, reduces the freedom of opponents to use force against Canada. Canadian membership in the alliance further inhibits action against Canada. Because of the advantages Canada obtains from the alliance, threats to withdraw must be inconclusive. Here Canada's armed forces can be especially valuable as instruments of diplomacy, for the manner in which they are employed can serve as more or less subtle warnings. For this purpose naval forces are especially valuable because they can most easily vary their pattern of operations, and can chose whether to minimize or maximize the dramatic impact of doing so. If warships are re-deployed from NATO related tasks to fisheries control, for example, the move can be devoid of explicit threats and explained by the exigency of the moment. But nevertheless the move will cause some anxiety amongst NATO members.

LIMITED WAR

The ability of a state to achieve its objectives by limited acts of war is one of the strongest mechanisms of influence. If the purposive act is indeed undertaken it may still be proper to refer to it as a diplomatic action, for the success of the outcome

depends upon many of the same factors as does that of any demarche. In particular, the inhibiting of escalatory violent reaction is a need common to all influence diplomacy. The hostility which acts of war tend to produce, however, increases the difficulty of controlling the outcome. And the different tactical needs of achieving the objective while deterring the escalation of response may be incompatible. Comparison of the degree of commitment of the two or more states to the satisfaction of their respective needs is the essence of a limited war engagement, but the limited choice of tactics available for the purpose may profoundly prejudice the outcome.

Only occasionally will circumstances be such that the national objective can be achieved by acts of war which do not destroy the restraint upon the victim's tendency to take counter-action. Generally counter-action must be expected and the judgment must be made whether it can be confined to an acceptable level. The experience of the Icelanders' between 1970 and 1973 is a case in point where the level of force needed to determine the issue by an act of limited war proved to be incompatible with the need to deter violent counter-action by controlling the demonstrative effect of the act of force. The restraints upon British counter-action were primarily political, and Iceland's vulnerability reinforced the political restraint. But it could not be expected that sympathy for a gallant but feeble neighbour would long survive a vicious resort to violence and accordingly Icelandic tactics had to be limited by the avoidance of danger of loss of life. Humanitarian reasons presumably also restricted the tactics which could be used. The effect was to render Icelandic action incapable of accomplishing its purposive objective. The lesson has general application. Referring specifically to the planning of limited war, Bernard Brodie has written:

> Among the military lessons we have learned is that <u>restraint in the application of force - in order to keep the application compatible with its purpose</u> -

> may make the force applied ineffective for its purpose. ...For the future, this is bound to mean, and should mean, not fewer limitations upon the use of force, but rather fewer occasions for applying force under circumstances requiring such restraint. (Emphasis in original)[86]

Compared to Iceland, Canada's much greater military strength, and her geographic advantages, greatly increase the military restraints upon nations wishing to interfere with her ends. The scale of effort which would have to be mounted to maintain in Canadian waters, for instance, forces superior to those of Canada, would prevent all but a few states making the attempt. The problem would not be so great, however, were the opposition free to employ efficient ship-killing military tactics against Canada. It would be in Canada's interest to confine the level of violence below a point where an opponent might feel that the restraints upon his own resort to violence were broken-down, so that he would have to attempt expensive non-violent tactics should such be possible, or concede the field to Canada.

Of course, the availability or otherwise of non-violent counter-tactics to the opponent must be considered in the planning of any exercise of limited war below the level of inter-state violence. If an effective non-violent counter-tactic exists, as it was found that the British has a non-violent counter to Icelandic harassment, then the policy may be expected to fail. But conversely, if there is no non-violent response it must be expected that the opponent will more easily be driven to violence. The same arguments apply to higher levels of confrontation where different levels of force may give a tactical advantage to one or other party of the dispute.

Generally it is at the lower levels of confrontation that the possession of specialized military means of acting in the immediate area of the objective, with the forces to which the

objective is vulnerable, is advantageous. If the issue is vital to both parties, and an amicable arrangement cannot be reached, then the only advantage to be gained from the possession of the specialized military units may be the ability to enjoy the use of the disputed objective while the war is being fought to secure the seizure. Not all objectives, of course, are readily vulnerable to direct military action. In the event that the nature of the dispute precludes such action the aggressor state may have to chose between general war, or demonstrative action unrelated to the objective with the added difficulties that that produces. Where direct action is possible, however, a state has the choice between highly focussed demonstrative action and limited war, with a third option of adopting a highly flexible ambiguous policy involving elements of both. It is evident that the possession by Canada of naval forces gives her this ability up to a point with respect to her coastal maritime disputes.

The strength of this position is important. The more clearly a nation has the ability to take by force what it wants the less resistance it will be offered. The ability to undertake purposive action is dependent, as has been observed, upon practical and political considerations, and these may permit action if resistance is weak, but preclude action against determined opposition. But not all the factors are easily judged, which makes the anticipation of another government's action difficult. By keeping government policy ambiguous it may be possible to inspire fear of the worst but inhibit any counter-action. If the worst does not take place, and a coup de main is not attempted, then the government may even acquire respect for its restraint. But all this is dependent upon the government appearing to have command of the situation.

TACTICS OF COERCION

The manipulation of naval forces to serve as a demonstration both of the danger that there will be a general deterioration in the relationship between states, and that they might be used for purposive action, is part of the art of coercive diplomacy. It has been observed that the theory of graduated pressure and escalation is missing in action somewhere in South-East Asia. It is evident that the escalation of American air attacks upon North Vietnam did not coerce Hanoi, and it may be that the deliberately mild first attacks served to reasure the government in Hanoi that the war they had been dreading would in fact be tolerable.[87] Deducing from this evidence Dr. George has condemned as weak what he calls the "wait-and-see" approach, in that it tends to adjust upwards the opponents acceptance of punishment by a process of acclimatization. By contrast he describes an ultimatum supported by the maximum threat the circumstances warrant as strong.[88] Certainly the failure of the simplistic application of graduated pressure in Vietnam, where the form of pressure was confined to air attacks, is a salutory reminder that consideration of the psychology of foreign statesmen, and of the influence upon their decisions, is a highly sophisticated matter. But it would be wrong to react to this lesson by assuming that it is necessary on every occasion to take the most extreme measures immediately, and forget about anything less than a total effort. Such would only be rational if it were possible to anticipate completely accurately the effect of a national demarche. As it is not, plans must always allow for the unknown, by an exhibition of caution, and by allowing for the possible later need to disengage without too much loss. Furthermore, coercive diplomacy is a dynamic process because the constraints upon government action can rapidly change, most particularly as a result of the recent experience of states. The early stages of a confrontation are themselves important influences upon the possible later behaviour of governments. The consideration must not be whether

the formula of graduated pressure failed to work in North Vietnam, but what formula seems most suitable to the issue at hand considering the level of commitment of the two or more states. It may often in practice be necessary to increase the violence of a military demonstration in order to persuade the opponent that the government's commitment to its policy has not diminished with time. But equally it may be necessary to reduce the pressure as an indication that the state's demands are not unlimited. These decisions can only be made with as full a knowledge as is possible at the time of all the circumstances.

DANGERS OF COERCION

The requirements which must be met before any resort to war is rational are very demanding. National vulnerability to military and non-military response must be calculated and minimized. Even demonstrative action has its dangers. The more the activity of a military force inconveniences its victim the greater is the probability that the restraints upon counter-action will be broken down. In practice, the use of Canadian naval forces for demonstration and limited war may impose upon the Canadian government a need to make military preparations. The constraints a state may feel upon its freedom to attempt a violent counter-attack against Canadian naval forces engaged in demonstration and harassment may be somewhat less than those upon its freedom to commence general hostilities against Canada. The importance of Canada to the security of the United States and NATO in general provides considerable security that non-allied states will not attempt the military defeat of Canada, and allied states will also be deterred from the attempt by consideration of the probable effect upon the alliance. But Canadian units actually engaged in confrontation may be more vulnerable. Allies may feel no need to defend units which are engaged in aggressive activity of which many of them do not approve. It may be thought to be in their interest to remind Canada of her dependence upon allied support by exposing her

vulnerability. If sufficiently provoked they might even attack those units themselves. Consequently, if Canada is going to undertake naval operations which are strongly opposed by her allies, she will have to ensure that her naval force can defend itself at least against some of her possible opponants.

But that precaution is just the beginning. The complexity of international relations inevitably prevents accurate prediction of the outcome of any national demarche, and the problem is generally greater where public passions are aroused, as they will be when military forces are involved. Accordingly it is not enough to decide that national objective can be pursued wholly or partially by means of the military forces of the state, it is also necessary to decide whether the end is sufficiently important that the nation should, or will, endure the hardship of the means. It is not to be expected that there will not be some serious adverse side-effects or reaction to even the most successful use of armed forces. In his epitome on War and Politics, Bernard Brodie has quoted Sir Winston Churchill's caution "Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter".[89] In reviewing Brodie's book the British student of war Michael Howard, Fellow of Higher Defence Studies, All Souls, Oxford, has commented that it often appears that "interests only become 'vital' when one has the capacity to fight for them. If one has not, it is amazing how rapidly 'vital interests' become marginal and expendable conveniences."[90] It is evident that both Howard and Brodie feel that statesmen should have more substantial grounds before they resort to the desperate remedy of military action. Brodie goes so far as to write that "One effective means of keeping out of trouble is to lack the means of getting into it."

It is necessary for the statesman to decide what are the national objectives for which the state must be prepared if necessary to use some measure of force, knowing that by so doing

it will also suffer injury. Then it must be considered whether the practical limitations upon the use of military forces will, in fact, allow them to be used for that purpose at a level of confrontation which is compatible with the objective. Logically, when it is found that the state's military forces possess capabilities which have utility only for the pursuit of objectives which are not sufficiently vital to warrant such risky means, Brodie's policy would indeed be carried out and that aspect of force would be decommissioned. Unfortunately it is rarely possible to identify such "Excess capabilities", and in any case it is sometimes useful to be able to undertake an operation and be seen to be exercising restraint in not doing so.

DEFENSIVE

The principal reason that states tend to over-insure in the military preparations is that generally the conscious objective is not so much a desire to impose national policies upon other states, as a concern to prevent foreign states imposing their will upon the nation. Secure within North America, and within NATO, Canadians may be excused for perceiving little immediate danger of military coercion, and any danger of annihilation can be seen as a product of the alliance structure rather than of deep racial hatreds. But to the extent that a country may influence foreign developments by military means without going to war, so may military means be used against its interests. It must not be forgotten that influence is a game in which all actors are free to make their moves simultaneously. At the same time as a state is influencing, it is also being influenced. It is to be expected that the small power will have to be more concerned about minimizing the adverse effects of great-power attempts to influence, than it is in undertaking nationally inspired demarches. In effect, the primary function of the armed forces, at least of the small state in peacetime, is a defensive one of vitiating the influence of the armed forces of others.

In the purely domestic sense the function of an armed force in the diplomatic defense of a nation is closely related to the simple requirements of military defence. To the extent that a state is vulnerable to attack it must be capable of defending itself. Dependence upon an ally makes a state vulnerable to that ally and accordingly reduces its independence. It will also, of course, affect the attitudes of all states in their dealings with the dependent satelite. The only redemption for the small state in alliance is that, if the ally is also equally or more vulnerable to the same danger, it will lose control of the availability of its assistance and can make little use of it for dominating the government dependent upon it. This is the reason dependence upon the United States and NATO does not enthral the Canadian government, which is at once the least vulnerable member of the alliance and a contributor to the joint defence. Should Canada adopt policies such as unilateral extention of fisheries control to the edge of the continental shelf which might make her vulnerable to foreign action which could not fall within the province of NATO, however, dependence upon foreign military support for the enforcement of her claims would make her vulnerable to her allies.

The actual level of defences which would have to be maintained to retain independence would be governed by the political commitment of the foreign state to defeating Canada's objective, the level of conflict which would be necessary to alter that commitment, and the maximum level of local conflict which would be tolerable to NATO before it would intervene. With respect to the United States, for instance, it is to be expected that resistance would not have to be militarily effective. Resolution would be enough to create strong political pressures within the United States to end the conflict. It is, of course, highly unlikely that the United States would ever use armed forces against Canada. The Russians, for their part, are extremely sensitive to affronts to their status as a super-power.

Resistance to their military operations could therefore be expected, initially, to provoke stronger measures. But on the other hand the Russians are sensitive to the appearance of bullying small states and are also unlikely to resort to force. In any event Canada's defensive capabilities vis-a-vis Russia would not have to be greater than that required to make the minimum possible level of Russian attack a serious threat to NATO as a whole.

The provision of forces to obviate the need of allies to operate in Canadian territory is an important measure of preventive defence. By policing her own territory and providing the minimum of surveillance which will satisfy the United States, Canada can prevent the gradual growth of American control within Canada. This is most important in areas where Canadian authority is open to dispute, which essentially means at sea. This function may be described as coercive in circumstances in which it would be a clear violation of Canadian sovereignty for the United States to establish its own installations unasked. At sea, however, because Canada cannot claim sovereignty and therefore has no legal right to exclude foreign warships, preventive measures can only demonstrate that Canada would prefer to do the job herself. Beyond that it is necessary to utilise the military shortages of her allies which do not permit wasteful duplication of Canadian effort. Canadian effort, accordingly, has to reach a higher minimum standard at sea. Furthermore, at sea, the greater the effort the more extensive will be the area in which Canadian forces dominate.

It is also possible that naval forces might be needed to protect Canada against the foreign use of warships for demonstrative purposes. Logically a naval demonstration, intended as a warning, should be accepted as such. If the substance of the threat were the possibility of the break-down of trading relations, or political attacks, then the response would be attempts to limit the possible economic and political injury. But because warships can protract their demonstration for weeks or months if necessary and yet keep

their menace vague and ambiguous, they can have a powerful psychological effect upon the people of the country, especially upon coastal dwellers and seamen. It may be impossible for them to employ military force at a level which would be low enough not to be self-defeating. Nevertheless the government will not be able to ignore their existence without risk of loss of political control. The danger is that the foreign naval presence will give ambiguous but important moral support to local elements which are antipathetic to the general will of the nation. In Canada's current political situation the deployment of foreign warships to demonstrate off Canada's coasts may be expected to be counter-productive from the point of view of the aggressor state, for the effect would probably be to enhance unity and defensive determination. Were the separatist movement in Quebec to become a serious threat to the government, however, and were France to return to its policy of supporting the separatists, French naval demonstration might be dangerous to the Canadian state.

In circumstances where a naval demonstration can actually be dangerous to a state there probably is no effective means of vitiating the threat other than by the deployment of visibly superior force. In such circumstances it may be dangerous to depend upon any ally, for such dependence would be an admission of weakness which could be domestically dangerous. Canada should only have to call on the assistance of one super-power if she is being threatened by the other. The most visible response to a threatening warship is locally superior naval forces, but military and political requirements can be met by the use of visible surface ships which may have limited surface combat capability, but which are backed up with maritime strike aircraft, or submarines. The conduct of such a defense may be complicated if it is desired to avoid the actual engagement of forces; in which case it may be necessary to be seen to have a large margin of superiority in order to obtain the desired political effect. Then, even if the opponent felt inhibited from withdrawing his forces, it would be

evident that he was powerless, and the forebearance of the national government in permitting their continued presence might actually enhance its appearance of strength.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MILITARY SUPPORT IN NON-MILITARY ISSUES

It is a belief generally held in Ottawa that, if for no other reason than that Canada does not face any obvious and immediate threat, the principal returns that Canada gets for her military co-operation with allies, and with the United Nations, are not directly related to security. British civil servants also believe that their military effort yields advantages in many aspects of international relations. In the event of a security crisis it would be easy to identify what a state was being offered in return for military support, but otherwise it is difficult to obtain satisfactory evidence. Indeed, it is difficult to believe that any state would accept military risks in the nuclear age except in return for increased security. Accordingly it is desirable to define more closely the relationship that exists between military co-operation and the non-military issues between states.

The linkage which has been established by European statesmen between Canadian hopes to obtain a contractual link with the European Economic Community, and the continuation of Canada's military contribution to NATO forces in Eurcpe, is currently the most important evidence concerning the implications of military co-operation to non-military issues. In 1973 the then Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, observed that:

> Participation in NATO provides a means of strengthening our relations with the countries of Western Europe. To the extent that most, if not all, of the European members of NATO attach considerable importance to the alliance as a guarantee of their security, Canadian

> support for and active participation in the political and military activities of the alliance can help create a favourable attitude towards Canada on the part of the individual European governments ... A good example of this interaction was the West German Government's initiative in making a direct reference to Canada's economic interests in the communique issued by EEC heads of government last year. This step was prompted, we have good reason to believe, by the importance the Germans continue to attach to maintaining a Canadian presence in Europe ... To the extent that we continue to play a positive and constructive role in NATO, I am convinced that our participation in the alliance cannot but assist us in establishing a good working relationship with the EEC.

His explanation of the reason Canadian forces are valued has been noted in the previous chapter:

> Given Europe's continuing preoccupation with security, the continued presence of Canadian forces has important political overtones ... as a symbol of the credibility of the North American commitment.[91]

During Mr. Trudeau's visit to Europe in the early months of 1975 he was apparently repeatedly reminded of the importance European statesmen attached to Canada's military forces in Europe, and how their continuation was an important factor in determining Canada's relations with the EEC. A few months later Defence Minister Richardson reversed previous indications that there would be major cuts in Canada's armed forces, and announced that the force in Europe would not be diminished.[92] At first sight this appears to be a clear instance of a military commitment being used to elicit concessions which are unrelated to national security. This is not really the case. Canadian motives for not maintaining military forces in Europe are largely economic, reinforced with doubts about the necessity for them. As it is regarded that Canada cannot avoid injury from a war in Europe

whatever she does it is apparent that the price of EEC association may be an increased military establishment but is not an increased military risk. Indeed, if the Europeans are correct, the increased establishment will reduce the risk. Hence the price of EEC association appears to be the Canadian expenditure of funds, on defence, as it happens.

The argument that no state will take military risks for returns which are unrelated to security loses some validity if the forces have to be maintained in any case to retain alive the military skills which may someday be needed, and if there is no immediate prospect of the military activity leading to serious danger to Canadians outside the services. After all, states have often been prepared to take the risk of war when the possible losses were distincly limited, an example being the American gamble in Vietnam where an army and a reputation could be lost but little more. Canada's military efforts are far less of a gamble, and don't involve fighting. With an all volunteer force it is possible to pursue peripheral interests. Nevertheless, Canada's military effort clearly does have defence significance for Canada, and it is doubtful that the forces could continue to exist once it were publicly acknowledged that Canada was exposed to no military danger. Canada's military men are guarding the frontiers of the western world, which could become vulnerable should the guard be relaxed, and clearly Canada would find her security endangered by any major alteration of the economic and military structure of western Europe or North America.

It is apparent, therefore, that Canada's armed forces are primarily maintained for their military value rather than for their utility as barter tokens which may be traded for influence over non-military matters. Nevertheless, it is also apparent that, in one instance at any rate, influence in non-military matters is a by-product of the possession of forces which are primarily intended for other purposes, and that there is no other way of achieving the same

end. But in practice the concept of "barter" may not be very useful in describing the significance of Canada's military forces in her relationship with allies. The mechanism is somewhat less concrete and more comprehensive. In effect Canada's military effort establishes Canada as a member of the European community in a political and cultural sense, which at the least establishes a moral obligation not to undermine Canadian interests, and may also serve to justify within other countries any concessions made to Canada. With respect to Canadian interests in Europe, Canada's brigade group constitutes an asset, the most important quality of which is its North American origin, which serves to defuse the pressure within the United States to withdraw American forces from Europe. And it also constitutes a demonstration, as Dr. Joseph Luns noted in a press conference in Ottawa in July 1974, of Canada's dedication to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.[93]

NATO itself has not proved to be an especially important means of furthering Canadian interests outside of security-related matters. Canada managed to cajole the founding members of NATO into accepting article 22 which calls for co-operation in non-military as well as military fields, but the NATO organization has not been active outside of security problems, because the cooperation has taken place through other agencies. This means that Canada's place in the NATO Council is of little importance in determining her influence over non-military relations with her allies, although her military contributions to the alliance are important in her bi-lateral relations with allied states. The NATO organization constitutes the linkage between a narrow military means of influence and a narrow security objective - the vitiation of Russian military power in Europe. It has been sufficiently flexible, however, to be creative of detente between East and West, being intimately involved in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (on a consultative basis), talks on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe, and the Russian proposed Conference on European Security. And the

vitiation of Russian military power is of considerable importance in allowing allies to pursue their non-military interests. As the Icelanders have shown, the importance of a state to NATO can also be used to extort concessions from allies, although this is a destructive practice.

Canada's ground forces in Europe are also important in Canadian-American relations for precisely the same reason they are valued in Europe. The American administration is acutely aware of the value of allies as a means of easing its domestic political problems, and in some respects the symbiosis of Canada and the United States makes her an especially important ally. The American government recognizes the importance of its troops in Europe and welcomes Canada's effort which undermines pressure to withdraw them. With respect to Canadian-American relations, however, Canadian statesmen are clearly reluctant to accept that the "barter" concept is pertinent. Dr. Kissinger's academic assertion of 1965 that an ally's influence is a factor of the indispensability of its effort, and of its ability to withdraw it, does not find an echo, perhaps because it is recognized that with respect to the United States Canada's armed forces do not fulfil those requirements. The primary importance of Canadian defence effort in Canadian-American relations is recognized to be that of establishing a community of interest between the two states. In giving evidence in February 1975 concerning the renewal of the NORAD agreement with the United States the Minister of National Defence James Richardson gave his opinion to the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence that:

> Canada's co-operation with the United States, in North American defence was "a major positive element in the over-all relations which exist between the two countries." The United States attached considerable importance "to the principle of continued Canadian co-operation in

> North American air defence through the renewal of the NORAD Agreement", and Canadian willingness to renew it would therefore have "a positive impact on Canadian - U.S. relations at a time when a number of difficult issues have to be settled between our two countries."[94]

Two months later the Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr. MacEachen reiterated this view that:

> Defence is an important element of our over-all relationship which can be affected for better or for worse by our own willingness to respond positively to issues which we know to be of deep concern to the United States.[95]

Obviously the conduct of every aspect of national life which affects other states affects their perception of the relationship between them. Canadian resources policy, for example, may be as important to the American Congress as is Canadian defence policy. It is apparently the view of the Canadian government, however, that the American administration rates defence co-operation very highly. The influence value of military forces will often depend upon the significance within the allied state of the defence leadership, who may be expected most greatly to value allied military support. In the opinion of one senior British statesman with whom I have spoken, security concerns have high importance in Washington, at present at any rate. Dr. Kissinger equates military strength with a nation's ability to protect its interests, and judges allies by their military effort. Security concerns are also, in the view of the aforementioned statesman, of high importance within the British government, and that of Germany. In the British instance it may be true that other considerations rival security in government affairs, but Prime Minister Wilson reportedly is very sympathetic to the military. This is in contrast to the Canadian government which is apparently more susceptible to economic arguments.

Trade-offs between national effort in one category for gains in others are facilitated by the tendency of international relations to rise to heads of government level, and possibly to a level of public politics. The extent to which trade-offs are possible, however, is dependent upon the personalities involved. Some American presidents, an example being Lyndon B. Johnson, were very active bargainers. When an American administration is both sensitive to military considerations, and active bargainers, then it may be expected that Canadian defence effort would produce gains in other areas of national interest.

Canadian statesmen, however, have been reluctant to discuss national issues with the United States in a general context, because "barter" or trade-offs inevitably favour the state with more assets. This policy does not contradict that of using defence effort to establish a community of interest with the United States, but it confines the expectations of returns. It means that positive influence over American policies is not the principal diplomatic objective of Canadian defence effort, although there will be some accretion of national prestige which may be drawn upon at some time to support a major Canadian objective. The primary diplomatic objective must be a defensive one, to encourage American policy-makers to regard Canada as a state which ought not be dealt with too harshly. One Canadian diplomat's assessment was that, with respect to Canadian-American relations the effect of Canada's military effort was pervasive, but would only become of major importance were it discontinued. In effect, it serves to reduce American inclinations to exploit their preponderant advantages, and there remains a small residue of influence which may be vital in a time of crisis. Beyond that the influence generated by military effort must be looked for essentially with respect to security matters, when the mechanism of influence is not solely confined to diplomatic interchange but also works in direct practical ways, as has been noted, and also may be inherently coercive of the ally's policy.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONSIDERATION OF THE MECHANICS OF GREAT-POWER NAVAL INFLUENCE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE

The difficulty which exists in any attempt to assess the "threat" posed to "western" interests by the deployment of Russian naval forces into volatile parts of the world, such as Africa, and the Indian ocean littoral, is that direct coercion by small isolated naval forces does not appear to have much prospect for success. On the other hand, the philosophy of free choice for all peoples cannot take alarm at the prospect of states choosing to be impressed by Russian achievements. Concern, however, is justified by the occasional opportunity there may be for localized coercion, and by the possibility that the legitimate decisions to seek Soviet support may lead to situations where it becomes impossible to limit the Soviet control over national activity.

Openings for coercion of any sort are always few, and depend upon the existence of forces of appropriate size and nature, operating upon a sufficiently sensitive political situation. As instruments of coercion naval forces have advantages because of their ability to operate at long range, and because of their customary access to foreign harbours. But they also have disadvantages by virtue of their limited ability against any state, except if the ultimate contemporary weapons are used, in which case their force will be too great for most circumstances. If warships can be safely brought into a port where important political developments are taking place, however, secured perhaps by the hesitation the "host" state may feel about initiating violence against, or even snubbing, a great power, the presence of such an impressive armament may suffice to throw the political balance in a favourable direction. It is impossible to foresee what openings for coercion there may be, but it is certain that

they can only be exploited by forces available on the spot.

Non-coercive tactics, however, must be considered as more suitable to the warship on distant deployment. The fundamental need is to develop a local acceptance for the presence of the warships of the state which wishes to develop its influence in the area. In some areas of the world, such as the Persian Gulf, foreign warships have been frequent visitors, and in the Persian Gulf British warships have been directly associated with British political authority ashore. It may therefore be easier for Russian warships to find acceptance, although the Russian apeing of western practices is also likely to brand them as "imperialist". And once accepted as legitimately in the area it may be anticipated that authority ashore will become tacitly understood. But such speculation depends upon a simplified conception of local, in this case Arab, politics.

Once accepted as legitimately within an area, however, whether or not the local people are easily led to acknowledge any authority vested in the naval power, the warships will be available to exploit the tides of local politics. Their function will usually be demonstrative and ambiguous, in support of a friendly element within the state. So far the Russians have confined themselves to supporting governments. The use of Russian naval visits by the Indian government to develop a political acceptance for a pro-Soviet policy is a good example of such an operation. The pay-off for the naval power lies in the ally it has been able to support, and possibly in the inability of that ally to change its allegiance once it has become dependent upon outside support.

If there should be only one outside power operating in an area then it is easy to foresee that there could be an accretion of authority in favour of the great naval state. This was the situation in the "golden age" of gunboat diplomacy, the 19th century, when if British warships were not always the predominant local force, it was rare for them to be in competition with other European navies. Quarrel as they might amongst themselves, in the Victorian period European states tended to co-operate when it came to imposing order in the non-European world by means of naval forces. Perhaps this is attributable to the impossibility of challenging the British navy which could always concentrate naval forces in a disputed sea area, and could risk local war because her navy made her virtually immune from threats of war in Europe.

Nuclear parity now gives Russia a measure of immunity from general war, but as yet the Russian navy cannot expect to be able to maintain local naval superiority except close to her fleet bases. The situation is more similar to that which existed in the mid-eighteenth century when British, French and Dutch navies scrambled for power from the Cape of Good Hope east to the Philippines, and from the Falkland Islands westward. But there remains an important difference in that the imperial wars of the eighteenth century often involved direct conflict between the metropolitan areas. Nuclear parity closes that option and necessitates a more tentative approach to local engagements. Nevertheless it is not impossible that a predominant naval power should attempt to isolate a local engagement and impose authority while remaining elsewhere at peace. This sometimes happened in the first three hundred years of European imperial development, and in recent decades the super-powers have on several occasions explicitly, or in effect threatened local engagements with each other, although actual combat has been avoided.

It is the combination of nuclear stalemate and naval competition which prevents the Russians from being able to, except occasionally, use their naval forces coercively. Nuclear

stalemate is virtually a fact of life, but the maintenance of "western" naval forces in a competitive position to those of Russia is more problematical. To do so, however, may be as important a means of aiding the "third world" as is financial support.

The presence of rival naval forces also reduces the danger of governments which have benefited from Russian support becoming dependent upon the Russians. Not only will there exist alternative sources of support from "western" states, but the same naval symbols will exist to counter-act those of Russia. The existence of "western" navies in reasonable force will also help to prevent Russian use of naval force to retain a wayward client, although the forces of other local states are probably at least as important in that respect, and such action would harm Russia's carefully built-up position elsewhere in the world. Indeed the Russians doubtless have recognized that their prompt withdrawal of forces from Egypt in 1970 supported their interests elsewhere.

Not too clear a forecast can be made on a priori reasoning alone of the political significance of Russian naval deployment outside of home waters. Because of the possible openings there may be, however, for the predominant naval power to gather authority, it would appear to be a reasonable precaution to ensure that Russian naval forces are kept in a competitive position.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is self-evident that Canada's defence policy should support her foreign policy, but the interrelated complexities of the relationships between nations makes the devising of means to achieve particular political ends a sophisticated art. It may be true that ultimately there is no aspect of human affairs which cannot be controlled by military force, but the statesman is concerned not with abstract models but with an existing order, which is one that has been carefully built-up so as to minimize the importance of superior military power. For a country such as is Canada, satisfied with its material assets and with a limited demographic and industrial base upon which to build a military establishment, this is a desirable state of affairs. Accordingly the perpetuation of the system and its improvement ought to be, and is, a primary objective of her foreign policy. Paradoxically, it is an objective in the pursuit of which Canada's military forces have some significance. The system, however, is far from perfect and a country may often advance its own interests by exploiting aspects of the military and political relationships between states. Accordingly, it is also necessary for Canada to compete on the smaller scale in order to minimize the inroads made upon her interests, and perhaps also to influence the policies of other countries. In this competition the ability of a state to use military effort to achieve particular political objectives is circumscribed by the implications any action has upon other aspects of the relations between states. In effect the emphasis has to be upon non-hostile and indirect modes of achieving national objectives by influencing foreign governments. Non-hostile modes of influence may nonetheless be coercive, however, and in some circumstances, where national rights are most clearly established or where a state can benefit from legal

dubiety, coercion may also be hostile without unacceptable repercussions upon the basic system.

The part played by the navy of Canada in establishing Canada's relationship with other countries is not as apparent at present as is that of her ground forces in Europe. Navies have often been described as especially valuable instruments for military demonstration. This reckoning is not always valid, as the example of Canada's brigade group in Germany shows. If the objective is to demonstrate political and military commitment to the security of another state a premium is placed on the very qualities which navies are praised for lacking, immobility. The commitment which a state makes with a warship may seem to be as ephemeral as is the visit which that ship makes. It is true that port visits can last a very long time, as has the stay of Russian ships in Egyptian harbours, and as did the visit of British squadrons to the Tagus in the 19th century. But even so, the warship, or squadron, will always be free to depart at a few hours notice.

PRESERVATION OF THE LINKS WITH EUROPE UPON WHICH DEPEND CANADIAN INDEPENDENCE

The Canadian navy apparently has less symbolic significance at present than does the Canadian army. Neither does naval effort earn for Canada any disproportionate credit with her NATO partners. Indeed even the American Defence department has indicated that Canada's ground forces in Europe ought to be given the first priority in Canada's defence budget, over naval forces and the air defence of North America. But in strictly military terms it is apparent that Canada's naval forces have paramount importance in protecting Canadian interests.

Canada's naval forces support her international interests in the most fundamental way by helping to stabilize the political situation of western Europe through the important part they play in maintaining the military viability of the Atlantic sea-lanes. The continued integrity of the NATO alliance increases the security of the United States, which reduces the American motivation to impose controls on Canada, and increases the conventional options in defence of American interests, which may reduce the risk of nuclear war. If the ability of the United States to reinforce her troops in Europe in time of war were ever to become problematic it may be anticipated that those forces will be withdrawn, and if this did not lead to Western Europe adopting a pro-Russian position, it would lead to the European states, especially Germany, developing their own conventional and nuclear defences. Russia could be expected to react strongly to any such development which could lead to an explosion. To prevent this happening it is vital that NATO's naval defences be kept in a condition in which they appear to be capable of guaranteeing the passage of the necessary cargoes. Canada is well placed to provide assistance to operations in defence of the lines of communications, and she does in fact provide a significant proportion of the forces that are available. If on the basis of technical calculations it were to be found that the expansion of Russian naval capability puts in doubt the ability of North America to reinforce Europe then in Canada's own interest it would be vital to strengthen Canada's Atlantic squadron. But this must not be at the expense of Canada's ground forces in Europe which serve the same purpose of maintaining the links between western Europe upon which depends Canada's economic, political and cultural independence.

REDUCES THE DANGER OF ACCIDENTAL WAR

Hitherto it has been Canada's provision of early warning facilities, and interceptors against manned bombers, which, by increasing the security of Strategic Air Command's bases, most greatly served to reduce the danger of nuclear war. On the one hand the enhanced security reduced the chance of Russia attempting a surprise attack, and on the other it reduced the American need to anticipate attack, which could have led to accidental war. With the development of Russia's overwhelming missile force, this service has only vestigial importance, although there is still need for continuous monitoring of Russian air activity near or over Canada. Canada's ability to monitor submarine operations off her coasts, however, has become far more important as a means of reducing the risk of war. Russian hunter-killer submarines, should they seek to lie off the approaches of American Polaris or Trident missile bases in order to be able to trail the missile submarines, could approach their targets through Canadian sea areas. It is in Canada's interests that American ballistic missile submarines should not become vulnerable, and accordingly it is in Canada's interest to be able to monitor submarine operations efficiently. With the development of the Trident missile base at Bangor in Washington state, because the missiles could be fired from within North American anti-submarine defences, it will become even more important that Canada should be in a position to provide security for the Trident-carrying submarines.

The inherent importance of monitoring submarine movements may be open to question, on technical grounds. But it must be accepted that any increase in the American sense of security reduces the danger of general war, unless that sense of security were to be based upon a belief in allied reliability which proved to be false and in a crisis collapsed, or if adventurers came to power in the United States when it might be necessary to restrain them. It is apparent that the efforts of the Canadian navy to keep open the North Atlantic sea lanes, which in turn preserves

the alliance of North America and Europe, is also a major service for peace. In practice it appears that Canada can do more to preserve peace by maintaining effective forces than by attempting to lead the way to the general reduction of armaments.

INDIRECTLY PROTECTS INDEPENDENCE OF THIRD WORLD STATES

Less directly, Canada's naval forces protect Canadian interests by augmenting allied aggregate naval strength so that forces can be made available to inhibit the ability of the Russians to use naval forces to command authority in "third world" areas. It is the frequently stated assessment of western commentators that the presence of Russian naval forces in token quantities has inhibited the coercive use of western navies in third world areas. Russian advocates of the foreign deployment of warships have naturally agreed with this assertion, and as communist doctrine holds that it is upon the ability to coerce the third world that the western democracies survive, it ought to follow that the foreign deployment of the Russian navy will be a significant factor in bringing about the collapse of the west. The vulnerability of the west to third world initiatives may not be so great as the oil crisis of 1973 suggested, for that occurrence born of a local political emergency, has revealed that the repercussions of any injury to western industry affects the world as a whole and has the most serious effects in the poorer states. In any case, the confrontation between American and Russian ships in the Mediterranean in 1973 suggests that fear of naval action at sea is not a prime deterrent of western intervention policies. If the growth of Russian naval strength has anything to do with the reluctance of western states to intervene with force in Angola, for example, it is probable that western reluctance to face the problems of guerrilla warfare once ashore is more important. But to the extent that token Russian naval forces do inhibit western coercive use of warships it is equally true that western warships inhibit the coercive employment of the Russian navy. It is important to retain this curb on Russian freedom.

Besides controlling Russia's coercive options, it is also important to limit the extent of the Russian ability to acquire influence through the non-coercive use of the Russian navy. The primary means by which a naval power can gain influence over littoral governments, short of outright coercion, is through the provision of a service to them. The service may be an ambiguous demonstration of support. Unobjectionable though this may be, it can lead to the acquisition of control if the littoral government is deprived of options. Governments which may have felt bound "to go to the devil himself", in the words attributed to President Nasser, to obtain perceived national necessities, will only be able to retain their independence if they have some alternative to continued receipt of support from Russia. Accordingly, for states which may dread the growth of Russian influence in the Indian Ocean, for example, there is a need to maintain options which protect the independence of the local governments. This requires diplomatic tolerance of the country's independent line, and requires an ability to serve the country's economic needs, but it also requires the maintenance of adequate local forces so that if the local government wishes to diminish the political importance of its Russian commitment it can call upon western naval forces to demonstrate that Russia does not have exclusive power in the area. An equally plausible scenario, the rivalry of pro and anti Russian elements within a state, also calls for the maintenance of adequate local forces to support the pro-western elements in the same way as the anti-western ones may be supported by Russian ships. Canada has no traditional naval role in the parts of the world which are at present subject to the greatest Russian pressure, the Indian Ocean and Eastern Mediterranean, but her assistance to the NATO states in the North Atlantic region permits her allies to rotate some forces through the Indian Ocean, and to maintain naval parity or superiority in the Mediterranean. If she perceives that her trading and security interests in the Indian Ocean are threatened by the weakness of allied naval forces in the area then she would be advised to strengthen her forces in the Atlantic so that her allies can send more forces to the Indian ocean.

In the Indian Ocean the Russian navy is building up an established position so that, in time, her right there may be unchallenged. Providing they are not left alone as the only outside power operating in the area this may not be harmful to western interests. But with the establishment of their forces in the area, and especially if they should obtain clear local superiority, they may acquire the freedom to interfere forcefully in local affairs. Historically, naval forces on distant deployment gained their power from the ability of their country of origin to undertake general war. But with general war ruled out, local balance of forces is much more significant. It is conceivable that there could be an engagement of naval forces in the Indian Ocean or Mediterranean which did not spread to other parts of the world. The extreme danger of nuclear war, however, makes that prospect unlikely even now. Accordingly, the effect is to give enhanced importance to the prior arrival of forces in a trouble spot. The position Russia appears to be acquiring in Somalia subsequent to the apparently fortuitous presence of Russian warships in Mogadishu harbour during the pro-Russian coup d'état, may be the model for such occasional openings. Once a gain has been made, using a degree of force acceptable to local states, the presence of superior Russian forces may perpetuate the foot-hold and allow for the gradual accretion of local domination.

In the view of Britain's First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, the ultimate military objective of Russian forces in the Indian ocean is to acquire adequate local power so that if the Russian government chooses it can stop the shipment of oil from the Persian Gulf to Europe and Japan. Russia has not obtained political domination of the oil producing states, and had, apparently, no part in bringing about the 1973 oil embargo, although the presence of Russian forces may have encouraged the expression of anti-western sentiments. Nevertheless it is apparent that, until such time as Russia acquires political control of Arab capitals, naval blockade will be the only way she has of controlling the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. The

circumstances in which such a blockade could be attempted are certainly obscure, but the political effect upon the western system should such occur is more predictable. Until alternative sources of oil supply become available it certainly appears to be necessary to prevent Russia acquiring such a position of strength, and the most hopeful policy is to provide the forces which are necessary to prevent Russia having a virtually free ride to a position of power in critical areas.

THE POLITICAL VALUE OF CANADIAN NAVAL VISITS

The political usefulness of naval visits is dependent upon many factors. The Canadian navy is no exception in being used for formal visits to other states. In a recent year visits were planned, usually in conjunction with exercises or operations, to ports in Great Britain, the United States, Portugal, the West Indies, the Western Pacific, and the Antipodes. Most of them took place within the NATO area or on the Pacific coast of North America, and generally they can be considered as intended primarily for the recreation of the crews. A cruise to Guam and Hong Kong was exceptional, and a three month cruise to Australia and New Zealand by three ships, where they took part in several exercises, clearly had diplomatic purposes. What the political benefit was to Canada, however, is less clear. High Commissioners in the West Indies have reported port visits by Canadian warships to be helpful in cementing Canadian relations, but it is not apparent that any concrete advantage has been gained in an area where warships are common, and those of Canada can hold no promise of advantage. In the Indian Ocean Canadian warships might be useful as a means for local governments to favour the "western" system without making them liable to offer Russia an equal opportunity for port visits as would be the case with respect to the British and American navies. On the other hand the prime value of port visits, their demonstration of an ability to render military support, would hardly be applicable to Canada in that area. The places where the Canadian navy can have greatest

political utility are those where it is credible that Canadian military support in significant quantity could be forthcoming. Given current political and military circumstances this consideration limits the demonstrative value of the Canadian navy to the North Atlantic area, and to Canada's own coasts. But within that area her navy has the triple advantage of being militarily significant, an integral part of NATO, and yet not a primary antagonist of the Soviet Union.

It is for these reasons, and because Canada as an arctic state has a degree of legitimacy in arctic areas, it appears that the Canadian navy, together with Canadian ground and air forces, could play a useful role in countering the political effects of Russian naval strength in the Norwegian sea. At present the Canadian navy operates only to the edge of the area, except as part of the NATO standing force Atlantic. Her naval materiel is not designed for operations in such a high-risk area. On the other hand, her political position as both a North American state and an arctic state give her peculiar advantages in the area. Operations in support of Iceland, Norway, and Greenland would help to reassure the local people that the North American commitment was strong, and at the same time not pose a provocative threat to Russia. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic serves a similar purpose, but the political control of the force is uncertain, and the task of securing the Norwegian sea against Russia is primarily a political one. Canadian forces could play a very important part in the strategy of deterrents upon which NATO security is based. They might also be able to help defuse the intra-NATO crises over resources management. Visits by Canadian warships to Reykjavik during the course of the "cod-war", for example, might help to reassure the Icelanders that NATO states were sympathetic to her needs, and also make the point that Canada has found it possible to pursue her resources objectives without quarrels with her allies.

From the Russian point of view the regular operations of Canadian forces in the Norwegian sea might be seen as an aggressive movement into an area which is becoming predominantly Russian. As such the action might be thought to be destabilizing as the Russians clearly regard the Norwegian sea as a necessary defensive glacis. But the littoral states of the Norwegian sea, Greenland, Iceland, Norway and Britain, may be excused for feeling that the development of Russian predominance in that area is destabilizing and must be offset by NATO naval activity. Canada is the only NATO country with a deep-water navy which, as an arctic state, has some political legitimacy in the area, and is yet not a great power and so not a major threat to Russia. Her intimate military involvement in support of the local states may be seen as deterrents to Russian action rather than provocations. Any stability she imparts to the politics of the local countries can only help to preserve the cohesion of NATO as a whole. The development of her ability to operate in the Norwegian sea, which would require a new emphasis on air defence, and which might require an increased submarine force trained to group-work against submarine targets, may also be important in other respects. The recurring dream of NATO naval planners is to be able to dispense with convoys, and in the current context this requires the ability to put such forces into the Norwegian sea in time of crisis that the Russians, if planning belligerence, will have to attack them and in the process lose many submarines. If such a strategy should in fact be feasible, Canadian ability to participate in it would be necessary to further her objective of preserving the alliance. This latter consideration depends upon a technical judgement which is certainly still debated, and in any case it may be that in the first stages of a crisis it would be impossible to take any more active a defence than to form convoys. The political value of Canadian naval, as well as ground and air, activity in the Norwegian sea area, however, remains.

PARTICIPATION IN SENSITIVE OPERATIONS ENABLES CANADA TO INFLUENCE THEIR CONDUCT

Inevitably any increase in NATO's defensive strength amounts to a reduction in the power of Russia to defend herself by offensive means, and some NATO defensive forces could also be used for aggressive purposes. The development of anti-submarine forces which are suitable for action in the Norwegian sea poses problems, for at the same time as they would support the littoral peoples, and help secure the Atlantic sea-lanes, they would also create anxieties for the Russians. But so long as the systems are in opposition anxiety cannot be avoided, and the resolution of the problem lies in maintaining the NATO force at a level where it poses problems for Russian offensive plans, but does not have the evident ability either to attack the Russian bases or to systematically interdict their ballistic missile submarines. By participating in such a force, preferably by maintaining a squadron which could take its turn on duty in the Norwegian sea, Canada would at once help to ensure that the minimum level of force was available, and have influence over how the forces were used. Canadian naval operations in the Norwegian sea, and in the Arctic in general, would maximize Canadian influence in allied capitals by exploiting her political acceptability in the area. But more to the point, she could at once increase the security of NATO's northern flank, while minimizing the effect on Russia's security and acquire a position in NATO's military planning for the area in which her opinions could not be ignored.

DOMINATION OF ALLIED NAVAL ACTIVITY OFF CANADA'S COASTS NECESSARY TO PROTECT SOVEREIGNTY

Protecting the integrity of the NATO alliance, increasing the security of American nuclear forces, and helping to neutralize the naval forces of Russia in the "third world" are all means to the end of preserving the system which minimizes the significance of military power. In local terms the effect is to enhance

Canada's independence from the United States by reducing the American need to control Canadian territory and activity. The need is only reduced, however, not eradicated. This latter stage of complete exclusion of American power is only approached by the employment of Canadian forces to achieve nearly the same tactical objectives as the Americans require. Canadian effort in this respect necessarily falls short of American preferences, for the forces undertaking the operations do not come under their President's authority. Nevertheless the American government is obliged to accept that situation because the Canadian effort, which demonstrates Canada's commitment, makes it politically impossible for them to do otherwise. Naval forces have only become involved in this calculation because of the need to monitor the movements of Russian submarines, but they are now important if the waters off Canada's coasts are not to be dominated by non-Canadian warships. The effect of that happening would be to debase Canadian claims to authority off-shore. Because Canada has no clearly defined exclusive legal rights to sea areas outside of territorial waters the primary means of deterring foreign naval activity in Canadian areas is for Canada to mount such an effort that no ally would duplicate it: and the greater that the effort was the greater would be the area in which Canadian forces predominated. If Canada is to substantiate her claim to authority in arctic archipelagic waters she will have to find ways of obviating the need for American nuclear submarines to patrol the area.

NAVIES AS INSTRUMENTS OF POLICY FOR MARITIME OBJECTIVES

In the nature of things, the vitiation of foreign military power must be the primary task of the armed forces of a "middle" power. The mounting of suitable military efforts to establish and perpetuate a stable system, however, is not adquate to ensure a state's security. Relations between states are in a constant state of flux and it is often necessary for a state to attempt to influence the source of events as they affect its security and

well-being generally. The means to furthering national interests may sometimes be objective-specific when it is possible to apply the strengths of a nation to directly securing the desired ends, and sometimes it is naval forces which may be allied to the objective. Otherwise it is necessary to procure the objective indirectly by manoeuvering another government to serving the desired purpose.

The parochial national objectives which may be pursued directly by Canada's naval forces are, naturally enough, maritime in character. As is to be expected, this is because naval forces can exercise military power over maritime affairs. More important, however, is the ability of naval forces to achieve maritime objectives with the minimum of violence whereas littoral objectives involving operations against a foreign coast would necessitate a higher degree of violence. But the most important factor which gives naval forces an immediate voice in maritime affairs is the present uncertainty in maritime law which leaves authority dependent upon the ability to command obedience. Because of the attenuation of naval power by distance from bases, and because of the apparent attenuation of national claims to authority by distance from the nation's coasts, even the naval forces of a small country such as is Canada can command considerable authority. The reluctance of foreign states to engage in armed conflict with Canada enhances the power of the Canadian navy. Nevertheless the limitations of the naval weapon does not make the imposition of national jurisdiction at sea, against opposition, an operation devoid of diplomatic risk, for against resistance there is no substitute for violence. Accordingly a nation's power to impose its will by acts of limited war must be exploited with caution. Except in extraordinary circumstances it may be considered to be too destructive of other national interests to actually resort to force. However, the ability to do so will remain as a measure of last resort and the naval forces of the state can be employed to give ambiguous warning of this fact. The effect will be to

strengthen the nation's claims to maritime jurisdiction, and in addition the evident restraint of the state will assist it in the pursuit of its other national objectives.

The fisheries issue is an example of the pressures which sometimes arise to utilize force where it is possible to do so. The depredations of foreign fishing operations off Canada's coasts is unquestionably an important concern of Canada, but it does not appear that the economic effect upon Canada's marginally profitable fishing industry poses a serious danger to Canada. The apparent ability of the Canadian government to intervene with naval forces, however, has suggested that the fisheries issue should be considered to be "vital" and that force therefore ought to be used. This is a dangerous over-simplification. The fisheries issue is not "vital", i.e. that upon which depends the life of the nation, it is only very important. At the same time Canada's naval forces can be applied to the problem. It is necessary, accordingly, to govern the use of these naval forces by the limitation there is upon the national need to succeed in the dispute. So far this policy has been carried out. Canada's naval forces have conducted ostentatious surveillance of foreign fisheries activity, thus demonstrating national concern. But the next stage of confrontation has not involved the navy. The closing of Canadian ports to the Russian fishing fleet in July 1975 was an effective reprisal which has fewer dangers than would any act of force, and so far it seems to have had the desired effect.

NAVIES' NATIONAL BARGAINING ASSETS FOR NON-MARITIME OBJECTIVES

As few of Canada's national objectives are readily within the reach of her naval power it is apparent that the utility of Canada's navy in realizing those other objectives must be indirect through influence upon foreign governments. This is a complex business which depends ultimately upon the Canadian navy providing a service to her friends, which also happen to be the countries she most needs to influence. The "services" called for are

diverse. Initially what is required is a demonstration of national resolution and commitment. It may also be necessary to demonstrate an independent national sense of responsibility for joint problems, which creates an air of partnership. If respect is to be assured, however, the country must actually help to reduce the security problems of her friends, and to be seen to be making an effort commensurate with the wealth she has derived from the stability of the international system. Canada's naval forces serve this tactical purpose by their effort in defence of the North Atlantic sea lanes, and by their monitoring of submarine movements. Their size is somewhat small by international standards, however. Their influence value might also be enhanced by their use in the Norwegian sea to help stabilize the area in the face of Russian naval power. On the other hand, the specialization of Canada's navy as an anti-submarine force is tactically sound, for in practice it ensures that Canada controls forces which are nearly indispensable to the alliance.

Gratitude and respect are emotions which may be calculated to rebound to the national advantage in the negotiation of a wide range of issues, but military effort is not the only means to such ends. Furthermore there may be other aspects of state power which can be applied more directly to particular objectives. The advantage of the military as a source of influence, however, is that it is at once applicable to all issues, which is not true of purely economic or political power, and is less inhibited by domestic cross-purposes. The military is the common coin of influence whereas most other sources of influence are constrained by the need to protect some aspect of the national economy. It does not appear that Canada's military effort is important enough to have much significance in day to day negotiations beyond establishing Canada's stature as a country to be treated with respect. But that in itself is a vital service. The full bargaining value of military force does not come into effect except in time of a security crisis, and, since in such a crisis Canada's military would measure small against other states it is in

Canada's interest to deflect crises. Canadian statesmen, in any case, have been careful to avoid the concept of "bartering" military effort for unrelated gains, preferring to consider Canada's military contribution as establishing Canada's membership in a community with common interests. It is supposed to follow that stronger members of the community will hesitate to exploit their full strength.

INFLUENCE OVER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DEPENDS UPON PARTICIPATION

Even in time of greatest military security, on the other hand, military effort is the only means of gaining substantial influence over the military plans of other states. If a state perceives the existence of security risks and wishes to modify the security planning of other states it can do so only by increasing the security of those states. In practice, within the NATO alliance, military effort buys a place in the NATO planning organizations which permits a national government to state its case and negotiate on equal terms with larger states. The latter will have greater ability to protect their own interests because of greater knowledge and an ability ultimately to use their forces under national control. Furthermore the bigger states provide commanders for more of the NATO commands. The ability of a state such as Canada to modify the security philosophy of the great powers, however, can only be derived from an intimate relationship with at least one of them, and that relationship must include a military element. NATO provides an unusually effective mechanism for influencing the system as a whole. The direct effect of Canada's military effort does not appear to greatly reduce the security of Russia, and certainly increases the security of NATO states. And the influence of Canada's efforts in the NATO council, and in allied capitals, enables her to shape NATO defence policies away from dangerous collisions with the Warsaw pact.

THE POLITICAL FLEXIBILITY OF NAVAL FORCES

The supposed generic flexibility of naval forces is often grossly overstated, for the limitations upon the effectiveness of naval forces in war, and as a political instrument short of violent conflict, are substantial. What is true, however, is that it is possible, albeit with some inefficiency, for the same ship to undertake a wide variety of political functions for which any warship can be suitable. Some of the political effects which Canada may wish to achieve with her armed forces may require land or air elements, but the bulk of those which may be pursued with naval forces do not require any distortion of the balance of the fleet, although they may require the acquisition of new capabilities.

The greatest difficulty, for the small state, comes from the desire to possess conventional military deterrents to encroachment from neighbours, at the same time as it maintains a fleet which is valued by allies. Because of the attenuation of naval power by distance it is often possible for a weak state to maintain adequate defences for its coasts, but generally only by devoting its limited resources to inexpensive coastal craft armed with deadly weapons but unable to keep the sea for any length of time, or to operate outside of shore-air cover. Unless the coastal waters of that state are also of great strategic importance to the alliance, as are those of Denmark, a purely coastal navy is a weak tool of diplomacy for any but basic defensive purposes. Being a member of a great naval alliance, however, and being so vulnerable by land and air to its neighbour and ally, Canada has no need and little incentive to maintain powerful local forces. The sort of coastal conventional military deterrent Canada needs to maintain is primarily a symbolic one, with some capability to require an attacker to employ a level of force which would be unacceptable to Canada's allies; or, if the attacker were an ally, its electorate. This level of defence can easily be provided by Canada's deep water navy, and indeed the ability to recall ships from alliance activities to domestic ones enhances the demonstrative value of the conventional deterrent. The current deployment of Canadian anti-submarine destroyers on fisheries surveillance

operations is a good example of such a demonstration. Because it has not been given publicity as being significant in international politics, it has had the desired effect without overstating Canada's position, at the same time as it satisfies public demands for action. The deployment has also been a very effective means of providing short-term surveillance of the fisheries. Since Canada is spared the need for substantial coastal forces it is possible for her to satisfy simultaneously many political requirements with her navy.

REFERENCES

1. Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World, pp. 71-3 (London, 1934).
2. See: G.S. Graham, The Politics of Naval Supremacy (Cambridge, 1965).
3. See: F.C. Miller, "Those Storm-beaten Ships, Upon Which the Arab Armies Never Looked", The United States Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 101 no. 3, March 1975.
4. R.G. Weinland, M.K. MccGwire, and J.M. McConnell, "Admiral Gorshkov on 'Navies in War and Peace'", Centre for Naval Analyses (Arlington, 1974).
5. Ibid.
6. See: J. Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy (London, 1971), especially pp. 143-5.
7. George S. Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 1967", in Nasser's Egypt [ed: J.S. Badeau] and to be reprinted in: Soviet Naval Influence ed: M. MccGwire et al .
8. D.O. Verrall, "The Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean" to be printed in Soviet Naval influence. See also: J. McConnell and A. Kelly, "Super Power Naval Diplomacy in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis", Centre for Naval Analyses, no. 108, reprinted in Soviet Naval Policy [ed: M. MccGwire, K. Booth, and J. McDonnell] (New York, 1974).
9. See: R. Weinland, "Soviet Naval Operations: Ten Years of Change", Ch. 20, Soviet Naval Policy op.cit.
10. See: J. Cable, op.cit., p. 142
11. "Naval Power as an Instrument of Peacetime Policy", p. 24, and "Soviet Naval Influence", p. 87, "Summary Report of Proceedings", IInd Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments 1973, Dalhousie.
12. See: "Summary Report of Proceedings", IInd Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments 1973, Dalhousie.
13. Milan Kravanja, report to IIIrd Dalhousie Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments, 1974. See also by the same: "Soviet and Cuban Fisheries in the Carribean", Soviet Seapower in the Carribean: Political and Strategic Implications, [J.D. Theberge, ed.] (New York, 1972).
14. G. Jukes, report to IIIrd Dalhousie Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments, 1974; "Summary of Proceedings" p. 84.
15. B. Bletchman, Report to IIIrd Dalhousie Seminar on Soviet Naval Developments, 1974, "Summary of Proceedings".

16. A.Z. Rubinstein, "Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship since the June 1967 War", Ch. 10 <u>Soviet Naval Policy,</u> op.cit.
17. See: R.J. Hill, "The Rule of Law at Sea, The Capacity and Suitability of Maritime forces for the Enforcement of International Law at Sea", University of London Thesis, 1972.
18. <u>The Telegraph</u>, 18 July 1972.
19. See: Iceland No. 1 (1973) "Fisheries Dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland, 14 July 1971 to 19 May 1973", UK Command paper June 1973.
20. Letter to the author from Commander Thomas, Staff Officer to the C-in-C Scotland and Northern Ireland, 23 April 1974. See my full account of the "Cod War" in: Canada, Department of National Defence, ORAE Report no. R44 "The Enforcement of Canada's Continental Maritime Jurisdiction" (February 1975).
21. Conversations with Mr. Austin Laing, British Trawlerman's Association, 26 April 1974, and with Mr. Mar Elison, Icelandic Fisheries Association, June 1974.
22. <u>The Times</u>, report by Tim Jones, 28 May 1972.
23. <u>The Times</u>, 12 March 1972.
24. <u>The Times</u>, 21 May 1972.
25. <u>The Times</u>, 7 June 1972.
26. <u>The Times</u>, 14 June 1972.
27. <u>The Times</u>, 26 June 1972.
28. <u>The Times</u>, 17 Sept. 1973.
29. Bjorn Bjarnason, "Some Aspects of Icelandic Security Policy", paper presented in Reykjavik Oct. 1975 a conference on "New Strategic Factors in the North Atlantic".
30. Canada, <u>House of Commons Debates</u>, 16 April 1970.
31. Canada, <u>House of Commons Debates</u>, 15 May 1969, p. 8720.
32. Canada, Department of National Defence, <u>White Paper on Defence</u>, (196
33. Statements and Speeches, Department of External Affairs, no. 69/7.
34. Canada, Department of National Defence, <u>Defence in the 70s</u>, (1971).
35. Canada, Working paper of the Interdepartmental Committee on Canada's position at the Law of the Sea Conference, "Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea",1973. See also: Department of the Environment, Fisheries and Marine Service, <u>The Marine Environment and Renewable Resources</u>, Law of the Sea Discussion Paper, 1973.
36. <u>Halifax Chronicle-Herald</u>, 15 and 22 June 1974.
37. <u>Halifax Chronicle-Herald</u>, 20 February 1975.

38. Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence 1971, and Defence 1972.

39. Canada, House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, Issue No. 12, 18 May 1973.

40. Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 1 Dec. 1973.

41. International Canada, June 1973.

42. Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 22 June 1974.

43. See: N. Tracy, The Enforcement of Canada's Continental Maritime Jurisdiction, Canada, Department of National Defence, ORAE Report No. R 44, Feb. 1975.

44. The tactical considerations in this paragraph have been written as a result of a conversation with Admiral Sir Edward Ashmore, First Sea Lord, 12 Nov. 1975.

45. See: J.B. McLin, Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963, (Baltimore, 1967).

46. H. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, pp. 228-9 (New York, 1965).

47. 704 House of Commons Debates; col. 425-6; Times 8-9-10 Dec. 1964; referred to in: Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968 (RIIA, London 1973) pp 222, 285 and 293.

48. Time, 4 Aug. 1975, p. 33.

49. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, no. 73/12.

50. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (N.Y., 1973) p. 357.

51. See: Jonathan Trumbull Howe, Multicrisis (Massachusetts, 1971) passim, and p. 293.

52. See: Murry Goldblatt, "Canadian-Soviet bilateral ties: the record and the prospects", International Perspectives, Jan./Feb. 1972; and Franklyn Griffiths, "Canadian Sovereignty and Arctic International Relations", paper given at CIIA conference on Strategic Competition in the Arctic and North East Atlantic", Ottawa, March 1975. Griffiths dismisses a Canadian association with Norway and Denmark as too obviously American inspired.

53. Conversations with delegates at the IISS conference on New Strategic Factors in the Arctic, Reykjavik, Iceland, October 24-6, 1975.

54. External Affairs Records, file 7-V(s), Pearson to Robertson, 1 Feb. 1944; reference in: J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-45 (Toronto, 1975) p. 319.

55. H. Kissinger, op. cit., p. 229.

56. Cf. James Eayres, In Defence of Canada (Toronto, 1972), vol. 3, Ch. 6 "Defending the Continent".

57. Evidence before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, by the Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr. MacEachen; 22 April 1975; in: International Canada, April 1975, p. 89.

58. Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, The Korean War, and the United States, (Toronto, 1974) p. 323.

59. Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, no. 51/14.

60. Stairs, op. cit., p. 311.

61. 497 H.C. Debates col. 537 (5 March 1952).

62. 537 H.C. Debates col. 2182 (2 March 1955).

63. 537 H.C. Debates col. 1905 (1 March 1955).

64. Andrew Pierre, Nuclear Politics (London, 1972).

65. Ibid. p. 106, referring to: Alastair Buchan, 'The Only Way', Observer 27 Jan. 1957; 'Prestige', Observer, 14 July 1957; Denis Healey, News Chronicle, 16 April 1957; Manchester Guardian, Leader, 15 April 1956.

66. p. 144.

67. p. 304

68. Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership, op. cit., p. 144.

69. Ibid. p. 153.

70. H.C. Debates col. 588 (17 Dec. 1964).

71. See: Henry A. Kissinger, op. cit., chapters 3 and 4.

72. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, (Baltimore, 1962) p. 114.

73. Professor Mike MccGwire, sometime Commander R.N., has remarked to me that in his own experience in Britain's naval intelligence, expertise in different areas earned for different countries what Britain had to offer, but Canada could contribute little.

74. John W. Holmes, "The Relationship in Alliance and in World Affairs", The United States and Canada. [ed. John Sloan Dickey], N.J., 1964.

75. Peyton V. Lyon, NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument, Atlantic Council of Canada, 1970. See also: R.J. Hill, Political Consultation in NATO, ORAE Memorandum No. M64, Canada, Department of National Defence, March 1975.
76. Quoted in: J.L. Granatstein, op. cit., p. 295.
77. See above, p. 53.
78. Quoted by James Wechsler, New York Post, in: Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (Boston, 1965) p. 391.
79. See: Robert A. Kilmarx, et. al, Soviet-United States Naval Balance (Georgetown University, 1 April 1975), Chs 3 and 4.
80. See: D.A. Grant, Factors Pertaining to Defence Postures, ORAE Memorandum No. M59, Canada, Department of National Defence, November 1974.
81. S.E. Morrison, The European Discovery of America, The Northern Voyages (N.Y., 1971) pp 549-550.
82. Vide n. 76.
83. J.L. Granatstein, op. cit., p. 300 ff.
84. Public Record Office, SP 78/265, fo. 57, 16 Jan. See: N. Tracy, "The Gunboat Diplomacy of the Government of George Granville ...", The Historical Journal XVII, 4 (1974) pp 711-731.
85. Alexander L. George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston, 1971).
86. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (N.Y., 1973) p. 358.
87. See: A.P. Sights, "Graduated Pressure in Theory and Practice", The United States Naval Institute Proceedings vol. 96 (1970) no. 7.
88. Alexander L. George, op. cit., passim.
89. Bernard Brodie, op. cit., p. 57, from A Roving Commission.
90. Times Literary Supplement, p. 946, 6 Sept. 1974.
91. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, no. 17 April 1973.
92. Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 28 May 1975.
93. Halifax Chronicle-Herald, 8 July 1974.
94. International Canada (Vol. 6 no. 2) Feb. 1975 p. 21.
95. Ibid. (Vol. 6 no. 4) April 1975, p. 89.
96. Reported statement by Secretary James Schlesinger in Ottawa, September 1975.
97. Information supplied by Department of National Defence.

UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA – R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY Department of National Defence Operational Research and Analysis Establishment	2a. DOCUMENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified 2b. GROUP III

3. DOCUMENT TITLE

The Diplomatic Utility of Canada's Naval Forces

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

5. AUTHOR(S) (Last name, first name, middle initial)

Tracy, N.

6. DOCUMENT DATE July 1976	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 143	7b. NO. OF REFS 97
8a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. 96112	9a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER(S) ORAE Report No. R 60	
8b. CONTRACT NO. 2SU5-0017	9b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO.(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this document)	

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES	12. SPONSORING ACTIVITY

13. ABSTRACT The influence that the Canadian government obtains over international developments by virtue of the existence of the Canadian navy is primarily pertinent to issues of national security. Canadian security can most easily be threatened by the activity of her allies, and hence the purpose of Canadian armed forces is to reduce the need of her allies to dominate Canada, or to engage in military operations which could lead to nuclear war. The Canadian navy furthers these ends by protecting the integrity of the European and North American parts of NATO, and by undertaking those alliance defence tasks which if done by others would undermine Canadian sovereignty. The value of Canada to NATO gives her a voice in alliance.

KEY WORDS

purpose
diplomatic utility
military influence
cooperation in NATO

DSIS
70-241

Security Classification

KEY WORDS

INSTRUCTIONS

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY: Enter the name and address of the organization issuing the document.

2a. DOCUMENT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: Enter the overall security classification of the document including special warning terms whenever applicable.

2b. GROUP: Enter security reclassification group number. The three groups are defined in Appendix 'M' of the DRB Security Regulations.

3. DOCUMENT TITLE: Enter the complete document title in all capital letters. Titles in all cases should be unclassified. If a sufficiently descriptive title cannot be selected without classification, show title classification with the usual one-capital-letter abbreviation in parentheses immediately following the title.

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES: Enter the category of document, e.g. technical report, technical note or technical letter. If appropriate, enter the type of document, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.

5. AUTHOR(S): Enter the name(s) of author(s) as shown on or in the document. Enter last name, first name, middle initial. If military, show rank. The name of the principal author is an absolute minimum requirement.

6. DOCUMENT DATE: Enter the date (month, year) of Establishment approval for publication of the document.

7a. TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES: The total page count should follow normal pagination procedures, i.e., enter the number of pages containing information.

7b. NUMBER OF REFERENCES: Enter the total number of references cited in the document.

8a. PROJECT OR GRANT NUMBER: If appropriate, enter the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written.

8b. CONTRACT NUMBER: If appropriate, enter the applicable number under which the document was written.

9a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER(S): Enter the official document number by which the document will be identified and controlled by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.

9b. OTHER DOCUMENT NUMBER(S): If the document has been assigned any other document numbers (either by the originator or by the sponsor), also enter this number(s).

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT: Enter any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification, using standard statements such as:

    (1) "Qualified requesters may obtain copies of this document from their defence documentation center."

    (2) "Announcement and dissemination of this document is not authorized without prior approval from originating activity."

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES: Use for additional explanatory notes.

12. SPONSORING ACTIVITY: Enter the name of the departmental project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development. Include address.

13. ABSTRACT: Enter an abstract giving a brief and factual summary of the document, even though it may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall end with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (TS), (S), (C), (R), or (U).

    The length of the abstract should be limited to 20 single-spaced standard typewritten lines; 7½ inches long.

14. KEY WORDS: Key words are technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloging the document. Key words should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location, may be used as key words but will be followed by an indication of technical context.