National Défense
Defence nationale

Contemporary International Terrorism and its Impact on Canada

by Anthony Kellett

ORAE Report No. R100

ORAE

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

OTTAWA

Canada

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CANADA

OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT

DIRECTORATE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

ORAE REPORT NO. R100

CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

AND ITS IMPACT ON CANADA

by

Anthony Kellett

OTTAWA, ONTARIO   FEBRUARY 1988

ABSTRACT

This report is an up-date of a report published in 1981 <u>Inter-national Terrorism: A Retrospective and Prospective Examination</u>. Both reports examine trends in international terrorism, with particular reference to Canada.

This report is divided into four main parts. Part I outlines the background of the study and the methodology used in it (definitions, data bases, and so on). Part II illustrates trends in international terrorism around the world, notably with regard to terrorist groups, objectives, tactics, and targets, and outlines the potential for high-technology terrorism. Part III deals with Canada, and examines both domestic and international terrorism, again with emphasis on groups, tactics, and targets. This part is based on a chronology of terrorist incidents affecting Canada from 1968 to 1987. Although this report is intended as a threat analysis, Part IV puts the threat in context by examining governmental responses (in Canada and elsewhere) to international terrorism.

As a comparative study, this report details interesting similarities and differences between international terrorism in Canada and elsewhere in the world.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce rapport met à jour le rapport publié en 1981, <u>International Terrorism: A Retrospective and Prospective Examination</u>. Les deux rapports examinent les tendances actuelles du terrorisme international relatif au Canada.

Ce rapport est divisé en quatre parties. La partie I souligne de la methodologie utilisé (c-à-d, les définitions, les renseignements, et cetera). La partie II examine les tendances du terrorisme global quant aux groupes terroristes, leurs objectifs, leurs tactiques et leurs buts, et il souligne la potentialité pour le terrorisme de haute technologie. La partie III traite le Canada et examine le terrorisme domestique et international encore une fois avec un accentuation sur les groupes, les tactiques et les buts. Cette partie est fondée sur une chronologie des incidents terroristes touchant le Canada de 1968 à 1987. Ce rapport est une analyse des menaces, mais la partie IV met la menace en contexte en examinant les réponses gouvernmentaux (au Canada et autre part) au terrorisme international.

Comme une étude comparative, ce rapport trouve les similarités et les différences, entre le terrorisme international au Canada et ailleurs.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. <u>General Assessment</u>

   a. The patterns of international terrorism affecting Canada during the past two decades have been remarkably consistent, such that this study predicts a continuation of those patterns, with some modifications.

   b. At any time during the past 20 years, an analysis of international terrorism inside Canada would have shown the predominance of emigré attackers, striking at diplomatic targets, and using bombs, bullets, and assault. Outside the country Canadians and Canadian interests have tended to be random victims of terrorism, usually of bombings or kidnappings in situations of turmoil or insurgency.

   c. The lack of a tradition of left-wing violence, and the dramatic decline of domestic terrorism, will have a dampening effect on international terrorism in Canada, making it difficult for outside groups/sponsors to exploit internal conditions. The general pattern of internal incidents outlined above (emigré attacks on foreign targets) is expected to continue at a reduced rate (by comparison with the early-1980s). There is the prospect of some increase in issue-oriented (nuclear, environmental, etc), and therefore largely symbolical (bombing), attacks inside Canada, although many such incidents will be domestic rather than international.

   d. The rise in the incidence of external attack evident during the 1980s is expected to persist, although Canadians and Canadian interests are likely to remain random rather than deliberate targets in the absence of any significant change in Canadian foreign policy or external economic profile. The risk will be greatest in areas of potential conflict.

2. <u>Global Patterns of International Terrorism, 1968-87</u>

   a. <u>Incidence:</u> the annual incidence of terrorism has increased more than five-fold since 1968; the number of incidents declined in 1986 but casualties increased significantly in 1987; unusual persistence of modern terrorism fuelled by generational evolution (downgrading ideology, increasing brutalization), and by Middle East situation.

   b. <u>Impact:</u> by itself modern international terrorism has not secured any of its long-range objectives (world or domestic revolution, national liberation,

etc), but it has achieved significant mid-range objectives (subverting Middle East peace process, etc), and it has significantly affected the foreign and domestic policies of some Western states.

c. <u>Terrorist Groups</u>:

  i. <u>Left-Wing</u>: Left-wing terrorism surged in late-1960s, early-1970s owing to Vietnam War, then declined, and showed signs of revival mid-1980s. Now more issue-oriented and therefore more tactically focussed; symbolism important in operations.

  ii. <u>Nationalist/Emigré</u>: historically nationalism has always been a major strain of terrorism; modern nationalist terrorism has been more violent than left-wing terrorism, and probably marginally more successful; outside Middle East nationalist terrorism has declined in recent years; emigré international terrorism is currently at a reduced level.

d. <u>Tactics</u>

  i. <u>General</u>: on the whole terrorists tactically conservative, little change in over-all patterns 1968-87.

  ii. <u>Bombings</u>: constitute over half of all incidents; large proportion of bombings symbolical, but trend to increased lethality.

  iii. <u>Hostage-Taking</u>: second in frequency, particularly favoured in Middle East; considerable political impact.

  iv. <u>Assassination</u>: usually third in frequency.

  v. <u>Assault</u>: on increase in 1980s.

  vi. <u>New Technology Terrorism</u>: relatively little resort to mass destruction weapons, but restraints may be eroding.

e. <u>Targets</u>:

  i. <u>General</u>: terrorists prefer "soft"targets, and alter targeting as particular target groups given increased security.

ii. <u>Diplomatic</u>: over-all most frequently attacked but no longer top of hit-list (down from 30-40% to 10%).

iii. <u>Business</u>: always high in frequency, attacks on increase; kidnapping a favourite tactic.

iv. <u>Military</u>: increasingly popular early-1980s, attacks have declined since early-1985; NATO a particular target.

v. <u>Public/Random</u>: indiscrimination on increase, especially in Middle East and communal conflicts; transportation particularly vulnerable.

vi. <u>Technology</u>: a target (computers) but technological vulnerabilities not consistently exploited.

f. <u>Group Cooperation/Government Involvement</u>: inter-group cooperation possibly exaggerated, now probably on decline; about quarter of all incidents in early-1980s state-sponsored or directed, but recently a hiatus in government involvement; state sponsorship has yielded substantial returns.

g. <u>U.S. Experience</u>: externally-focussed, otherwise similar to Canada's: low incidence, high emigré/separatist and low left-wing profiles; American experience indicates role of geography, foreign policy, overseas investment.

3. <u>Canada and International Terrorism</u>

a. <u>General</u>:

i. <u>Perceptions</u>: low level of international terrorism, decline in domestic terrorism, and "peaceable kingdom" myth all have led to sense of relative immunity from terrorism.

ii. <u>Domestic Terrorism</u>: steady decline from 1968-71 peak.

b. <u>Incidence</u>: Over-all low; of "Summit Seven" countries Canada ranks lowest with Japan; considerable increase during 1980s but downturn 1987; external incidents proportionally increasing; Montréal the primary venue.

c. Terrorist Groups:

    i. Emigré: responsible for 73% of incidents inside Canada 1968-87 (also long history of emigré violence in Canada); "first generation" (Cubans, Croatians) no longer on scene; "second generation" (Armenians, Sikhs) deadlier, tactically more varied; terrorists often recent arrivals in their communities; emigré terrorism quiescent since mid-1986.

    ii. Left-Wing: no tradition of left-wing violence, limited incidence; mainly symbolical (bombs).

d. Tactics:

    i. General: frequency of bombings, assassinations, and hostage-taking incidents roughly proportional to global patterns; emigré terrorism most likely to produce casualties; some evidence of tactical contagion; tactics not particularly innovative.

    ii. Bombings: 52% of all incidents, but proportionally down in mid- 1980s; many bombings symbolical.

    iii. Hostage-Taking: incidence comparable to global patterns, but preponderance of kidnappings and low internal rate atypical of world patterns; no political hijackings, only one barricade-hostage event; external kidnappings usually occurred in areas of high political violence.

    iv. Assassination: a recent tactical phenomenon in Canada.

    v. Assault: a recent phenomenon, usually linked with protests, perpetrated by emigrés against diplomats and visiting dignitaries.

    vi. New Technology Terrorism: no public evidence of resort to new technology terrorism; two instances of threatened product contamination.

e. Targets:

    i. Diplomatic: 78% of internal incidents aimed at diplomatic community; half of anti-diplomatic incidents in Canada have occurred since 1980, a contrast with declining global patterns.

    ii. Business: incidence of attacks on Canadian business targets low compared with global incidence; infrequency probably a function of Canada's relatively low economic profile in areas of political violence; kidnapping favoured tactic.

    iii. Military: Canadian Forces spared international terrorist attack (domestically militia armouries popular targets); two anti-NATO attacks have involved Canada; NATO targeting suggests Canada's escape fortuitous.

    iv. Government: Canadian government officials and facilities infrequently attacked outside Canada.

    v. Public/Random: few attacks in Canada by comparison with world patterns; most victims abroad fortuitously targeted; some threats against transportation systems in Canada.

4. Governmental Responses

    a. General: governments react most forcefully to direct domestic threats; thus historically response to international terrorism often more rhetorical than effective; increased resort to military/ paramilitary units in hostage incidents; evidence inconclusive as to whether or not forceful government responses prevent repetition; bilateral cooperation generally more effective than international (viz. U.N.) cooperation; however, increased regional (viz. EC) cooperation (especially on intelligence) showing dividends; several countries (US, GB, France, West Germany, Italy) have introduced special anti-terrorist legislation.

b. <u>Canada</u>: FLQ crisis prompted series of anti-terrorist measures, including establishment of crisis management centre; major counter-terrorist effort has occurred since 1984: CSIS, SERT, etc; unlike other "summit seven" states, Canada has not enacted special powers to combat terrorism, largely because the threat is insufficient; Canada is relatively atypical in having police not military/paramilitary emergency response unit; nature of internal threat (emigré attacks on diplomats) has been reflected in enhanced protective measures.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd)

TABLES IN THE TEXT

PART 1 - INTRODUCTION

GENERAL

1.   This report is an up-date of an earlier report (ORAE Report No. R78), entitled <u>International Terrorism: A Retrospective and Prospective Examination</u>, and written in May 1981.   It dealt with the impact on Canada of international terrorism.

2.   R78 was prepared on the eve of the Montebello Summit of the leading industrial democracies, which took place in July 1981. At that time concern over the possibility of some terrorist incident associated with the summit led to enhanced security measures, including the establishment of a short-lived tactical unit to respond to hostage-rescue situations and other emergencies. The government concern reflected in these measures was further evident in a statement made by the Solicitor-General in March 1981. He stated that death threats had been made against President Reagan during his visit to Ottawa on 10-11 March. Government concern was further reflected in the House of Commons giving final approval to an anti-hijacking bill in June 1981.

3.   The police tactical unit was broken up shortly after the Montebello Summit, but government concern over the terrorist threat to Canada has been evinced on several occasions in the past six years. That concern has recently been exemplified by: the establishment of an RCMP Special Emergency Response Team in March 1986, the withdrawal of the Canadian ambassador to Syria in October 1986 (in connection with a British protest against Syria's alleged support of international terrorism), and the conclusion of an extradition treaty with India in February 1987. Undoubtedly, the dramatic nature of several of the incidents which occurred during the past six years attracted government and public attention in a way most of the incidents (with the obvious exception of the Cross and Laporte kidnappings) occurring between 1968 and 1980 (the majority of which were bombings) did not.

METHODOLOGY

General

4.   This report will comprise two principal elements:

  a. A synthesis of the literature relating to those factors in
     international terrorism which were identified in Report R78
     as being of particular relevance to Canada; and

  b. The construction and analysis of a chronology of incidents of
     international terrorism affecting Canada, from 1968 to 1987.
     This chronology will be primarily based on open literature
     sources.

5.   The study of terrorism is an ever-expanding field, and in addition to a large number of overviews on the subject,[1] a considerable number of analyses of discrete elements of the phenomenon, including case studies,[2] tactics,[3] weapons,[4] psychology,[5] international links,[6] countermeasures,[7] and organizational directories,[8] have appeared. From amongst this large body of terrorism-related material, the literature review will concentrate on those elements which Report R78 and an updated version of the chronology in that report indicated as being most germane to Canada. Thus, the emphasis here will be placed on such aspects as: geography (notably through comparison between international terrorism in Canada and the United States), terrorist psychology (with a view to exploring the potential in Canada for variants other than emigré terrorism), terrorist trends (to determine the potential for Canadian targeting of apparent trends in Middle Eastern terrorism, anti-NATO attacks, and so forth), the modus operandi of emigré terrorist organizations (such as the Armenian groups), and so on.

6.   A summary of the salient points of Report R78 will indicate some of the considerations underlying the literature review in the present report. Only those points which seem particularly relevant to Canada will be noted, and thus the summary will not represent a compendium of international terrorism as it appeared in 1981.

Summary of Report R78

7.   a. General:

    - the overall trend of both incidents and casualties is generally upward;

    - there is an appearance of "generational" change in terrorist groups;

    - there is the possibility of increased use of "piggy-back" strategies (terrorist groups exploiting populist issues, especially nuclear);

    - there is a glorification of action - action is a prime motivator;

    - the size, ideology, composition, and resources of a particular group tend to govern its operational pattern;

    - bombings are popular because risks are relatively small, and little organization is usually needed;

    - assassination lends itself to the individual or to groups with fairly low capability;

    - "barricade" hostage incidents (where the location of captors and hostages is known) tend to occur abroad or in situations where the terrorists lack an underground or popular support;

- targeting of diplomatic and military personnel is increasing;

- emigré groups, having a low capability, usually resort to low-level operations such as bombings;

- there is less resort than is popularly imagined to high technology means and to mass destruction operations.

b. Canada:

- Canada has a comparatively low level of international terrorism;

- this low level is due in part to geography, to Canada's "middle power" international role, and to the relative non-obtrusion of the Middle East conflict;

- international terrorism affecting Canada mainly springs from emigré groups, with anti-Castro Cubans the most prolific;

- about 80% of incidents affecting Canada from 1968-80 occurred (or began) on Canadian soil;

- two-thirds of the incidents occurring in Canada were bombings, their primary targets being diplomatic personnel or facilities;

- there have been some hostage incidents, but few assassinations or assaults;

- externally, Canadians and Canadian interests are more likely to be fortuitous than deliberate victims of terrorism.

Definition

8.   A recent research guide to terrorism listed 109 different definitions of terrorism proferred between 1936 and 1981.[9] The difficulties in arriving at an acceptable definition of terrorism are well-known (as is the aphorism "One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter"). This was abundantly demonstrated in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism, established by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1973.[10] Given the centrality to terror of fear, it is hardly surprising that the term "terrorism" should acquire an emotive meaning, and that its definition should thereby prove contentious. However, the limited focus of this report - international terrorism and its effect on Canada - does facilitate the attempt at definition.

9.   The need to develop an operationally viable definition of international terrorism, with particular regard to the Canadian context,

stems from the potential for indiscriminate use of the term to inflate or otherwise skew the statistics. For example, a Rand study treated a wave of forty bombings by one group during one night in the same city as one incident, whereas the CIA counted them as forty incidents.[11] A dramatic example of the statistical implications of definitions occurred in 1981. The CIA report for 1980 was published in June 1981. Apart from introducing several new categories, including threats, conspiracies, and hoaxes, its statistics were greatly inflated by comparison with previous years. Taking the period 1968 to 1979 inclusive, and the major categories used by the CIA, the differences between the 1979 and the 1980 reports are clear:[12]

Table 1

Statistical Inflation

	1979 Report	1980 Report	% Increase
Kidnapping	263	384	46.0
Barricade-hostage	73	108	47.9
Letter bombing	186	467	251.1
Incendiary bombing	456	708	55.3
Explosive bombing	1588	2144	35.0
Armed attacks	188	227	20.7
Hijacking	100	137	37.0
Assassination	246	335	36.2
Total	3100	4510	45.5

10.   In explanation of the increase, the 1980 report noted: "New events have been added for all years as we have expanded the sources from which we draw data in order to correct for a previous overemphasis on US sources and as we have completed the validation of previously acquired and coded information. The terrorist event file is now complete and current, and the statistics in this publication replace all statistics in our previous surveys."[13] The Washington Post coyly commented that this statistical revision "coincides with a new emphasis, within the administration and on Capitol Hill, on dangers of world-wide terrorism"[14]*

11.   Attempts to conduct time-series analyses using the CIA/State Department annual reports are further complicated by definitional changes, and by the consequent inclusion, exclusion, or amendment of

---

* On 28 January 1981 Alexander Haig, the new Secretary of State, told reporters that "The greatest problem now is international terrorism."[15]

certain categories. Thus the 1983 report noted that "The statistics presented in this publication reflect new coding criteria that became effective 1 January 1983." As a result the assassination category was dropped, as were non-terrorist hijackings,* threats, hoaxes, conspiracies, and arms smuggling, and the "other" category was enlarged to include incident types previously listed separately.[16] However, in 1984 further revision was made to the data base "to make it more complete, accurate, and reliable".[17] Thus, demonstrations, nonpolitical violence, conspiracies never activated, and nonviolent, unpremeditated, or defensive attacks were no longer coded as terrorism (whether they ever should have been so coded is questionable, and points to the importance of definitional exactitude).

12.   Most definitions of terrorism tend to include many of the following characteristics (among others):

- political rather than personal goals;
- coercive purpose;
- element of terror and fear;
- indiscrimination;
- unpredictability and arbitrariness;
- implicit threat of further violence;
- symbolical selection of targets; and
- acts intended to influence target groups other than the immediate victim or victims.

In addition, while many definitions make reference to "state terrorism" or to politically-motivated violence used by government security forces (or their surrogates) against opposition groups or individuals,[18] the tendency in liberal democracies to regard conflict and violence as abnormal political expression results in an implicit** inclusion of another characteristic in definitions of terrorism: that it is directed against established governments. Thus, while the Rand definition of terrorism implies that governments as well as individuals and groups may be terrorist, a survey of Rand chronologies indicates very few examples of the use of terror by governments against their own nationals.[19]

13.   International terrorism, which is the focus of the present report, can generally be distinguished from purely domestic terrorism by the presence of an international jurisdictional element. However, the term "international terrorism" has sometimes been used to describe a sub-set of the universe of "nonterritorial" terrorism, namely actions by groups or individuals controlled by a sovereign state. Such acts would

---

* The report noted that only about 15% of the hijackings which occurred in 1983 appeared to be directly related to terrorism.

** Sometimes this assumption is made explicit, as in the 1937 League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Repression of Terrorism.

be distinguished from equally "nonterritorial" acts, committed by basically autonomous non-state actors (such as the Japanese Red Army), and termed "transnational terrorism". Some definitions of international terrorism downplay this distinction. Thus, the State Department's annual reports do not employ it in their statistical tables, bar graphs, and pie charts. Instead, they simply define international terrorism as "Terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments".[20] Nonetheless, the 1983 report noted that almost half of the terrorist casualties suffered in that year "were linked in a broad sense to state involvement in terrorism",[21] and the 1980 report noted that the files contained records of "almost a hundred terrorist attacks [out of about 5000 between 1973 and 1980] conducted directly by national governments".[22]

14.   Given the characteristics outlined above as being widely shared by definitions of terrorism, and some of the distinctions (such as that between state-supported and autonomous actors) sometimes used to refine those definitions, it may be useful to note a few well-known or widely-used definitions before advancing one that the literature review, Report R78, and the up-dated chronology indicate would be appropriate to the present report.

Terrorist: "Any one who attempts to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation."
(Oxford English Dictionary[23])

International Terrorism:
"The use, or threat of use, of anxiety-inducing extra-normal violence for political purposes by an individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a target group wider than the immediate victims and when through the nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its locations, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution its ramifications transcend national boundaries."
(Edward Mickolus[24]);

International terrorism consists of essentially criminal acts that are politically motivated and transcend national boundaries.
(Robert Fearey[25]);

"Terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments."
(Central Intelligence Agency; United States Department of State[26])

15.   The definition of international terrorism that will be used in the present report is as follows:

   a. Terrorism comprises violent acts committed or threatened by individuals or groups for political and extra-personal ends, with a view to promoting those ends through intimidation and to influence a target group or groups wider than the immediate victim or victims;

   b. International terrorism comprises those acts which, through the nationality or foreign ties of their perpetrators and/or their victims or targets, through their location, or through the mechanics of their resolution, implicate more than one country.

16.   As a liberal democracy, adhering to the rule of law, "state terrorism" is an inapposite concept to apply to Canada, and thus the definition used here has not sought to distinguish between supporters or opponents of established governmental authority.* Although the "threat – conspiracy – hoax" category has been dropped from the State Department chronologies since 1982, the element of threat has been retained in the above definition since some of the events in the Canadian chronology meet all the other requirements of the above definition, and to have excluded such events would have produced too restricted a picture of Canadian terrorism.

Chronology

17.   On the basis of the above definition, a chronology of incidents of international terrorism affecting Canada between 1 January 1968 and 31 December 1987 has been drawn up. 1968 has been chosen as the opening year of the chronology since it coincides with the debut of a number of other chronologies or data bases, notably those of Mickolus, the Rand Corporation, and the CIA/State Department. Furthermore, the late-1960s are generally regarded as heralding the onset of modern international terrorism. Naturally, acts of international terrorism occurred in Canada prior to 1968, and some of them will be discussed in the appropriate section. The chronology is constructed from open source literature, the principal sources being Mickolus's chronology of transnational terrorism from 1968-79, Canadian News Facts, The Globe and Mail (Toronto) and its data base Infoglobe, and other Canadian newspapers.

18.   Each incident was reviewed in the light of the definition and its component elements (violent acts; committed or threatened; political and

---

* A table based on information from Amnesty International and the US Department of State indicated that in 1980-81 Canada had no political prisoners. According to Amnesty International, there are currently no political prisoners in Canada.[27]

extra-personal ends; intimidation; immediate and remote targets; international ramifications). As far as possible, each incident was examined in terms of the following variables: group type, tactic used, location (internal or external to Canada), and target.

19.   The perpetrators of terrorist acts were grouped according to their stated or presumed motives. Various typologies of terrorism have been proposed,[28] and the one used here is loosely based on some of the works of Professor Paul Wilkinson:[29]

Emigré - groups with a strongly ethnic basis operating outside their countries of origin with a view to securing the rights or political ascendancy of their ethnic groups in those countries or to overthrow ideologically distasteful regimes in them (the Armenian group ASALA and the Cuban group Cuban Action being examples);

Environmental - groups protesting nuclear, hunting, and other threats to the environment (for example, the Animal Rights Militia);

Nationalist-autonomist - groups trying to assert a national identity - including such "nations without states" as the Palestinians - usually acting in the general area of the particular conflict situation (unlike the emigré groups) and often employing guerrilla as well as terrorist tactics; also separatist groups (the PLO, the IRA and the FLQ are examples of nationalist-autonomist groups);

Revolutionary - groups attempting to achieve radical political, social, and economic changes or to promote anarchy (such as the Japanese Red Army and the Turkish People's Liberation Army);

Sub-revolutionary - groups (and sometimes individuals) actuated by political motives which fall short of fundamental revolutionary change, whose tactics often seek specific political or social reforms (an example would be the United Freedom Front, formed to protest U.S. involvement in central America);

Guerrilla - groups for whom terrorism is not the primary tactic but which use it in concert with military and political campaigns of a revolutionary rather than a nationalist nature (for example, the Colombian ELN).

Other - groups whose identity is known or suspected but whose objectives differ from those noted above, and whose motivation might be as much religious as political (for example, the Universal Proutist Revolutionary Front).

20.   It was not possible to assign a group type in all cases. Terrorist groups are anonymous and clandestine organizations which generally lack a coherent programme and are not known for having a documentary record. Thus, many incidents go unclaimed (according to a Rand paper, an average of 60% of incidents recorded between 1970 and 1979 were claimed, a proportion which declined to 39% between 1980 and 1982). Some groups are more consistent in claiming or disclaiming incidents than others, among them the American groups, the Red Brigades, Palestinian terrorist groups, and the IRA.[30] Where an imprint is vague or lacking, no perpetrator type is assigned unless there are reasonably credible indicators of possible aims. By the nature of threats, it is often difficult to verify their authenticity, and thus no attribution of perpetrator group-type has been made in threat incidents, even where the warning has included authorship claims supportable by other, but circumstantial, evidence.

21.   The methods or tactics used by terrorists are relatively easily defined, although definitional changes do mar the consistency of the CIA - State Department reports. On the basis of a data base of 2670 incidents of international terrorism occurring between 1968 and 1982, a Rand report noted that six terrorist tactics accounted for 96% of all terrorist activity: bombing, assassination, hijacking, attacks on installations or facilities, kidnapping, and barricade-hostage incidents.[31] These tactics are mostly self-descriptive, although barricade-hostage incidents differ from kidnappings in that the location of hostages and captors is not intended to be secret, publicity being a major consideration. Assault is sometimes overlooked as a tactic of international terrorism, perhaps because it tends to have a domestic rather than an international orientation. It is, however, widely used internationally by some groups, most notably the Abu Nidal organization, which has frequently attacked synagogues, embassies, and similar targets. In the CIA/State Department reports, assault is termed "armed attack", and since 1983 has included assassination incidents; in the present chronology the two tactics are distinguished. As noted earlier, unlike the State Department reports, this chronology includes some threats. However, it follows the recent State Department practice of excluding hoaxes, conspiracies never activated, and political demonstrations.

22.   The location of an incident depended on whether it took place inside or outside Canada. Assignment of location in a transit-type incident (hijackings) would be a matter of judgement, depending either on where the incident originated or where it was resolved. With regard to targets, the State Department's 1984 report uses five categories: diplomatic, business, military, other government, and other. These categories will be used in the present chronology, with the addition of a sixth dealing with transportation (principally involving hijackings). The diplomatic category will include attacks on quasi-diplomatic targets, such as the business offices of communist countries (Aeroflot being an example), and on visiting dignitaries officially representing their countries (such as a 1971 assault on Premier Kosygin, and the rocket attack during the opening ceremony of the 1986 Tokyo economic

summit).   The government category includes attacks on the Canadian
government and on Crown Corporations such as Air Canada.   Attacks on
Canadian diplomatic missions will be listed under government since the
Canadian government is both the immediate and the remote target.   Where
the target fits none of the obvious categories, or could as easily be
included in two different ones (as in the case of rocket attack during
the 1986 Tokyo summit), it will be assigned to the "other" category.
The remaining target categories (business, military, and transportation)
are self-explanatory.   The targets defined by these categories are, of
course, the immediate targets or victims of the attacks which may be
calculated to influence more remote targets (such as government or
public opinion).

23.   While tactics, immediate targets (victims), and location are
normally self-evident, the identity and aims of the perpetrators are not
always so clear.   Thus in assessing each incident against the definition
of international terrorism used in this report, judgement frequently had
to be exercised in determining whether to include or exclude an incident
in or from the chronology.   For example, while the Irish police claimed
that the Provisional IRA was responsible for a 1983 kidnap attempt
against Galen Weston, a wealthy Canadian businessman living in the Irish
Republic, it was not entirely clear whether the would-be abductors' aim
was political or criminal, and thus whether or not the targeting was
confined to the intended victim.   However, the incident bore a similar-
ity to the 1975 kidnap, by the IRA, of Teide Herrema, a Dutch business-
man living in Ireland.   During the earlier incident the captors made a
series of political demands, including the release of three IRA terror-
ists.   In the circumstances it seems reasonable to include the 1983
incident in the chronology.

24.   On the other hand, some actions which have been included in other
chronologies have been excluded from the present one when the available
evidence is insufficient to permit a reasonably confident determination
regarding group identity, goals, and so on.   Thus nearly two-thirds of
the incidents affecting Canada reported in Mickolus's chronology[32] have
been excluded, most of them being bomb threats against airliners or
hijack attempts, the motives for which might well be more personal (or
psychopathic) than political, particularly given that in most cases
individuals rather than groups were involved.   Examples of such exclu-
sions include the 1969 fire-bombing of the Canadian embassy in Vienna, a
1970 bomb threat against the United States consul-general in Montréal,
and the armed occupation of the Canadian embassy in Beirut in 1976.
Somewhat differently, although the crash of Air India Flight 182 off
Ireland on 23 June 1985 has been attributed to terrorism,* the Canadian

---

* Brian Jenkins, a leading American analyst of international terrorism,
  recently speculated on the effect of "more bombings like that which
  likely caused the crash of the Air India jumbo jet..."[33], and on the
  basis of circumstantial evidence both the Indian government's Kirpal
  enquiry and the Canadian Aviation Safety Board's investigation leaned
  towards the bombing explanation.

government has not officially imputed the crash to that cause. For this reason the event is excluded from the chronology.

25.   Where incidents have not been included in the chronology, they have been listed separately, with reasons for their exclusion. The borderline between inclusion and exclusion was sometimes a narrow one. The motives of the man who held hostage the acting Bahamian high commissioner in Ottawa in 1986 seem to have been at least as much personal as political, and thus it was excluded. Two roughly similar incidents, involving the planting of dud explosives, were treated differently. One (24 July 1976) was included, the other (9 September 1972) was excluded, the former because it was apparently linked to the FLQ, the latter because anonymity made it difficult to establish the identity and aims of the perpetrator(s). Large-scale hostage incidents outside Canada (particularly aircraft hijackings) are quite likely to implicate Canadians incidentally, but in many cases it would be difficult to determine whether Canadians were involved in such situations. Incidents where the aircraft (or ship) involved was not Canadian, where it was flying to or from a Canadian airport, where Canada/Canadians was/were apparently not the intended target(s) – immediate or remote – and where Canadians were a small minority of the persons affected, will be excluded from the primary chronology and will be included in the secondary chronology only if Canadians were killed or injured. The findings relating to the nature of the international terrorist threat to Canada are based entirely on the chronology, the list of excluded incidents being attached for purposes of elucidation (the two lists can be compared, for example, in the light of the State Department's assertion that about 15% of hijackings in 1983 were apparently directly related to terrorism[34]).

PART II - CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

GENERAL TRENDS

1.   The first section of this part of the report will provide an overview of a number of apparent trends in international terrorism, some of which will be further elaborated in succeeding sections which deal with perpetrators, tactics, targets, and so on. Because of its relevance for Canada, emigré violence will be treated at greater length than will be some other elements of international terrorism.

Historical Context

2.   Previous waves of terrorism, notably those at the turn of the century and in the 1920s, surged and then declined, a tendency which makes the terrorism of the past two decades remarkable for its persistence. It has been suggested that the terrorism of the late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century differed from modern terrorism in that it was more selective and discriminating in its choice of victims.[35] Turn-of-the-century terrorism and anarchism largely centred on symbolic acts - " propaganda of the deed" - principally involving the assassination of heads of state or government (Alexander II of Russia in 1881, President Carnot of France in 1894, King Humbert I of Italy in 1900, Prime Minister Canovas of Spain in 1897, and President McKinley in 1901) and government officials.

3.   However, more indiscriminate attacks, such as the Haymarket bombing in Chicago in 1886 (in which a large number of policemen were killed and wounded) and the seizure by Armenians of a bank in Constantinople in 1896, occasionally took place. Furthermore, modern terrorism is more discriminate than sometimes appears to be the case. Not only are government officials, diplomats, and military personnel the principal human targets,[36] but Jenkins has noted that only 15-20% of all incidents have involved fatalities. Only a single death occurred in two-thirds of the incidents involving fatalities, and less than 1% of the thousands of terrorist incidents taking place during the past two decades involved ten or more deaths.[37]

Incidence

4.   Despite definitional vagaries, and the inclusion or exclusion of whole categories of terrorist actions (such as threats, hoaxes, and conspiracies), with their attendant inflation or deflation of incident statistics, both the CIA-State Department and the Rand data indicate a clear upward trend, with some cyclic variation, in the number of incidents (see Annex F). State Department statistics show that there were 500 international terrorist incidents in 1983, 597 in 1984, and 782 in 1985. While preliminary State Department statistics for 1986 indicate a slight decline, with 737 incidents being recorded (a drop of 6% from 1985), provisional data for 1987 show a significant increase in casualties (to 991 deaths and 2072 injuries, roughly up one-third from

1986, according to revised 1986 data); whether or not the increase in lethality was paralleled by a rise in the number of incidents is not yet clear.[38]

5.   This over-all increase during the past twenty years has been paralleled by a widening of the geographic distribution of attacks. In 1981 the State Department reported that terrorist incidents occurred in 91 countries, compared with 48 in 1970.[39]   Rand recorded a similar increase, from 39 in the early-1970s to an average of 65 per year in the 1983-85 period.[40]   While some countries (among them Germany) have experienced some diminution in the levels of international terrorist violence they experienced in the 1970s, others (including France and the countries of the Indian sub-continent) have suffered an increase in the mid-1980s.

6.   Although the incidence of international terrorism has been on the increase, domestic terrorism has, on the whole, been in decline in the Western world. This is attested to by the level of activity (compared with that of a decade or more ago) of groups like the IRA and the Red Brigades, not to mention the FLQ and the Tupamaros (both of which to all intents have disappeared).

Impact

7.   The number of fatalities caused by international terrorism appears to be on the increase (again with cyclical variations). The 1980 CIA report noted 35 killed and 208 wounded in 1968, and 642 killed and 1078 wounded in 1980,[41] while the 1984 report, using different criteria, also indicated a generally upward trend between 1980 and 1984.[42] Nonetheless, the sanguinary impact of terrorism is slight by contrast with other forms of conflict. But, considering the resources deployed by the terrorists, terrorism can yield substantial returns, of which only a few examples will be cited here.

8.   Rejectionist Arab governments and groups have reaped considerable dividends from terrorist activities designed to thwart the efforts of moderate Arab governments to seek accommodation with Israel. Thus, after an accord was reached between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in February 1985, Abu Nidal's Black September Organization (BSO) mounted a series of attacks against Jordanian targets, contributing to the erosion of the agreement. In February 1986 the Jordanian government ended political coordination with the PLO in working towards a Middle East peace settlement, and thereafter the BSO attacks ceased. Other Mediterranean nations have also felt the negative effects of Middle Eastern terrorism. The Italian government's handling of the Achille Lauro affair contributed to that government's fall. Likewise, Middle Eastern terrorism has frequently undermined United States policy in the region. The Iran hostage drama of 1979-81 extensively damaged American credibility, both domestically and internationally. In the words of a leading expert on terrorism, with the exception of the Pueblo incident "no single event in international relations since 1945 has so vividly demonstrated the crippling limitations of a superpower unable to risk using its giant's strength against a... minor power."[43] The deadly bomb attack on the United States Marines barracks

in Beirut on 23 October 1983 both curtailed the deployment of the Marines in Lebanon and undermined American policy in the area, as well as provoking an intense debate within the United States. The arms shipments to Iran in 1986, intended to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon, inflicted extensive damage on the presidency, and embarrassed American calls for unity in the fight against terrorism. Middle Eastern terrorist groups have also exerted an influence on the policy of European governments, one target being tourism, regarded as the Europeans' achilles heel.

9.   As a form of economic warfare, terrorism can exact a heavy price. Some terrorist groups appear to have launched an anti-tourism campaign in 1985, and the State Department estimates that $1 billion was lost in tourist revenue in that year, with a further high cost in 1986.[44] In a somewhat different vein, a boycott of South African products has been enforced by threats of food and wine tampering in Ontario and British Columbia.

10.   In the early days of terrorism analysis it was possible to assert that beyond attracting attention and wringing some concessions from governments, terrorism had hitherto not had a major impact on the international order:

> "Measured against the limited investment in violence, the effects have been significant, but measured against other disruptive forces in the world, the activities of terrorists rank far below such things as the recent Arab oil embargo, soaring energy costs, worldwide inflation and food shortages, and conventional wars"[45]

A few years later the same analyst commented that beyond publicity and occasional concessions, "no terrorists have achieved their stated long-range goals, and in that sense have failed..."[46]

11.   The negative effect on public policy - even that of a superpower - of terrorism in recent years has been indicated in some of the examples cited above. Some countries have even been reported to have had long-standing arrangements with terrorists or their putative sponsors, guaranteeing them some degree of immunity from terrorism - at a cost in their ability to pursue foreign policy objectives.[47] Nonetheless, as Jenkins pointed out in 1974, no strong governments have fallen to domestic or foreign terrorists, and where national governments were toppled, factors other than terrorism were present.[48] While rejectionist terrorism has achieved important strategic successes in the Middle East, the long-range goal of many of the groups involved - the establishment of a Palestinian state - is still far from fruition.

Generational Evolution

12.   While modern international terrorism has fallen far short of its ultimate objectives, its persistence has distinguished it from earlier waves of terrorism. A variety of explanations for this persistence can be offered. One is generational evolution. It has been remarked of several countries - among them West Germany, Italy, and Turkey - that

second, third and even fourth "generations" of terrorists have replaced the original "historic nucleus". These succeeding generations of terrorists have tended to be less intellectual but technically more proficient and more violent (the "second generation" of the Italian Red Brigades were said to have been quite largely recruited from among the prison population). There is a tendency for people who have been in the field for many years to be brutalized by the long struggle. Jenkins has suggested that the children of Belfast and Beirut, a generation inured to violence, will soon be assuming leadership positions in their war-torn societies.[49] In the circumstances, this evolution of group member-ship provides one explanation of the persistence of international terrorism.

Middle Eastern Terrorism

13. Another explanation for the persistence of international terror-ism lies in the continuation of the Palestinian problem. The State Department's 1984 report noted "the growing dominance of the Middle East as the crucible of terrorism."[50] Nearly half of all international terrorist attacks in 1984 either occurred in the Middle East or were committed elsewhere (especially in Western Europe) by Middle Eastern-ers. Middle Eastern terrorism accounted for 441 incidents of interna-tional terrorism in 1985 (or 56% of all incidents). The number of incidents of Middle Eastern terrorism which occurred in Western Europe in 1986 was 39, down 47% from the high of 74 such incidents in 1985 (the latter figure constituted 34% of all incidents taking place in that region in that year), but still above the average annual number of 35 during the period from 1981 to 1983.[51]

14. A recent study suggested that there are signs of a trend toward more Middle Eastern attacks on Western targets. There are also signs of greater indiscrimination in attacks by Middle Eastern groups. Western Europe is the only region in the world which is faced with a significant terrorist threat from foreign groups, and its vulnerability to the oper-ations of Middle Eastern groups is a function of a number of factors:

    a. Western Europe provides these groups with a potential man-power pool (there are large communities of Palestinians and Arabs in most Western European countries);

    b. it offers geographic proximity, excellent transportation facilities, and relatively easy cross-border movement;

    c. it offers abundant, easy, and attractive targets;

    d. it offers immediate world-wide publicity; and

    e. it provides these groups with a "substitute battleground".[52]

Palestinian support has also often played a critical role in the activi-ties of the European terrorist groups. Thus the international branch of the (German) Revolutionary Cells is thought to have depended for its survival on Palestinian assistance.

State Support

15.   Another relatively recent development which may sustain terrorism is the provision of state support, although the extent to which this occurs is hard to ascertain. Prior to 1970 most terrorist groups were largely self-sufficient, with local agendas and little outside support. But by the mid-1970s foreign countries, citizens, and facilities had become the preferred battlegrounds and targets for many terrorists, and increased inter-group cooperation indicated that few groups continued to be self-sufficient. By the late-1970s there was a growing suspicion that some states were beginning to promote terrorism, or to adopt terrorist methods, in pursuit of national and foreign policy goals. At a 1985 symposium William J. Casey, the then director of the Central Intelligence Agency, asserted that "Probably more blood has been shed by Iranian-sponsored terrorists during the last few years than by all other terrorists combined." He also claimed that in 1983 the CIA had identi-fied as many as fifty terrorist attacks (mostly occurring in Lebanon) with a confirmed or suspected Iranian involvement.[53]

16.   By providing incentives and resources, state sponsorship can encourage terrorists to tackle more difficult targets, perhaps thereby inducing a shift from primarily tactical targets to ones with a more strategic pay-off.

Changing Terrorist Motivation

17.   Much of the terrorism of the early part of this century centred on ethnic and separatist conflicts (the Macedonian IMRO being an example of this brand of violence). While the past two decades provide many examples of such terrorism (the FLQ, for instance), an ideological variant has come to the forefront in recent years, particularly in Europe. Groups motivated by largely ideological, rather than national-ist, principles have their effectiveness increased by the enhanced possibilities of cooperation conferred by shared beliefs. Thus in late-1984 and early-1985 the German Red Army Faction, the French Action Directe, and the Belgian Communist Combat Cells apparently collaborated in a deadly series of attacks on NATO targets.

18.   Perhaps owing to the fact that ideology has never been the force in American society that it has been in Europe, and to American preoccu-pation with attacks on U.S. citizens in the Middle East, a 1985 poll of terrorism experts found that state sponsorship, ethnic conflict, and religious fanaticism were considered to be the most likely sources of future terrorist violence; ideology ranked fourth.[54]

"Piggyback" Strategies

19.   German terrorism of the 1970s sought to influence the student movement rather than the industrial working class, and the appeal of its "propaganda of the deed" was elitist rather than populist. However, at the beginning of the 1980s the declining fortunes of both the RAF and

the 2nd of June Movement (which was assimilated by the RAF in June 1980), along with the policy of the Revolutionary Cells that every revolutionary activity should be directly related to existing conflicts in society, seem to have encouraged the development of a "piggyback" strategy.

20.   Under this strategy terrorist acts were linked with populist issues, including nuclear policy, housing, guest workers, and, most recently, immigration regulations. Thus the Federal Labour Office and the Federal Labour Relations Office were the targets of bomb attacks at the beginning of the 1980s, as was a town hall in an area with squatter problems. In April 1981 explosions damaged two pylons carrying power lines from a nuclear plant, forcing a temporary shut-down of the reactor. More recently, the Revolutionary Cells bombed a chemical factory in Cologne and a bank in Dusseldorf in 1985, and four bomb attacks were intended to "punish" corporations which allegedly had "fought against the striking miners" in Britain.

21.   A study of left-wing terrorist targeting in Germany indicates that in about the 1983-84 period one-fifth of the attacks were aimed at sites having to do with the atomic industry, the computer industry, or related research institutions, and about 20% of the targets were West German and NATO military installations or firms working for the military sector.[55] Nonetheless, a student of German terrorism dismissed the existence of an explicit link between leftist terrorism and protest groups, pointing out that the Revolutionary Cells have renounced any cooperation with non-violent movements. He suggested that terrorist groups might want to focus on populist issues (such as anti-Americanism) which have not been espoused to any notable degree by other organizations.[56]

22.   Terrorism associated with populist issues has also been practised by other left-wing groups and even by the nationalist ETA. For example, the Red Brigades launched attacks in 1981 directed against the decrepit and allegedly corrupt Italian hospital system, and it has been reported that a captured Red Brigades document urged attacks on nuclear power plants to exploit anti-nuclear sentiments in Italy.[57] Similarly, the ETA has attacked the Lemoniz nuclear plant on a number of occasions.

23.   While terrorist groups may have renounced cooperation with protest groups, the latter appear in some cases to have adopted terrorist tactics. Anti-abortionists have frequently bombed American abortion clinics (21 such occurrences took place in 1984, five in 1985), while animal rights activists have frequently resorted to terrorism (sabotage and bombings) in Britain, Portugal, and Canada.

Technology and Tactical Innovation

24.   For more than a decade the potential use by terrorists of high technology tactics or targets, or chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, has alarmed and fascinated the public, a fear reflected in the media: "Is there an A-bomb in your Backyard?", "When Terrorists go

Nuclear," and "The Plutonium Connection." In 1974 the hands of the "doomsday clock", which appears on the front cover of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists to symbolize the threat of nuclear doom, moved three minutes closer to midnight (to nine minutes before the hour). The editors wrote that one reason for the move was society's increasing vulnerability to "the disruptive acts of desperate individuals or organizations."[58]

25. Yet despite the alarm, the worst fears of the Cassandras have yet to be realized. Even though the capacity for an individual or a small group to cause an event of mass destruction has existed for at least two generations, terrorists have found that the more conventional methods of violence have been adequate for their needs. Thus, beyond a few low-level incidents, they have not resorted to nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorism, and have rarely used such weapons as surface-to-air missiles. In fact, where historically terrorists availed themselves of contemporary technology, from gunpowder to pistols, "as the 20th century has progressed, a marked change has taken place in that the technologies used by terrorists have not made the quantum jumps that technology as a whole has."[59]

26. While Jenkins and others believe that terrorist tactics will remain for the foreseeable future largely what they have been for the past fifteen years, low level incidents (vandalism, token symbolic sabotage, stand-off attack, and so on) connected with the nuclear and chemical industries are likely to continue, as is terrorist employment of new technologies as a means of coercive threat. Despite relative stability in terrorist tactics over the past two decades, evidence of actual or potential tactical innovations - such as product contamination, "white collar terrorism", "narco-terrorism", and so on - has caused concern among terrorism experts.

THE TERRORISTS

27. As was noted in the introduction to this report, the clandestinity of terrorist groups, and a differential willingness to claim responsibility for terrorist acts, tend to obscure the identity of the perpetrators of such acts. The problem is compounded by nominal problems. Some terrorist groups develop cover names to avoid blame for particular actions; others use them to create the illusion of a broader base of support; still others use special names to commemorate an anniversary or honour a fallen comrade; and finally some names are used with a view to mislead the authorities. However, it does appear that the number of groups responsible for international terrorist incidents is on the increase. In 1970 only 61 groups claimed responsibility for terrorist incidents; in 1982 the number was 125, representing 75 different nationalities.[60]

28. Some groups practise international terrorism as an adjunct to broader politico-military campaigns - examples include the IRA and Tamil groups like the Eelamist People's Revolutionary Front - while others are far more terrorist than insurgent (the Japanese Red Army, for example).

In fact, much of the international terrorism in Latin America and the Middle East is a spill-over from domestic violence. This report is principally concerned with those groups which practise international terrorism on a reasonably consistent basis, but will note the activities of groups (such as the IRA and the Red Brigades) whose incidence of terrorism is high but whose focus is primarily domestic rather than international.

Organizational Characteristics

29.   The structure of terrorist groups is governed in large measure by the need for clandestinity. Revolutionary and anarchist groups generally lack widespread public support and are forced to operate clandestinely, whereas members of nationalist or separatist groups often enjoy community support and can therefore operate more openly and may even live with their families. Popular support permits larger organizations* with a more elaborate command and control structure, a structure which slows communications and imposes constraints. Small groups operate under few constraints, are flexible and mobile, and give primacy to leadership.[61]

30.   The German terrorist groups provide a good example of clandestine organization. In 1978 the RAF was thought to have approximately forty operating terrorists, and to have the backing of support groups numbering about 150 members and providing publicity, intelligence, cover (safe houses), legal assistance, some logistic support, and a recruiting base. The link between the two levels was provided by the attorneys who maintained the contacts between the activists, their imprisoned comrades, and the support elements. In the 1984-85 period the hard core of RAF "commandos" was thought to number 15 people, the "legitimate" fringe some 200, and there were 36 terrorists in custody. In the mid-1980s the Revolutionary Cells were thought to have a maximum of 80 members who were organized into small groups of five to eight. Each group operated independently, the members of each cell knowing each other only by cover names (however, the members of the Revolutionary Cells did not live permanently underground).[62] Action Directe (AD) in France has a similar cellular structure. However, it is more a network of broadly leftist "groupuscules" - with such titles as Clodo, Angry Sheep, and Nutcrackers - operating under the AD "umbrella".[63]

31.   The Red Brigades and the IRA have operated with considerably higher levels of popular sympathy than the German and French groups (and, largely for that reason, have tended to eschew international terrorism). A poll conducted (probably in early 1982) for an Italian magazine found that while 54% of respondents considered the Red Brigades as dangerous and mad, fully 40% felt that they were pursuing a "noble end" or struggling "for a better society", while the proportion of

---

*   The Polish underground in 1944 numbered some 760,000 "front line" and "support" members, the Italian Resistance had a membership of between 150,000 and 200,000, and the French resistance totalled about 425,000 members.

respondents in the 20-24 age bracket who understood or approved went up to over 56%.[64] In the early-1980s the Provisional IRA decided to complement its military campaign with a political one - the Armalite and the ballot box strategy. In the 1983 British general election the Sinn Fein (which is widely regarded as the political arm of the IRA) garnered 102,701 votes, 13.4% of the total votes cast in Northern Ireland.

32.   Conditions of relative popularity permit comparatively intricate organizational structures. According to a 1978 study by the Italian Communist Party there were approximately 700-800 terrorists living clandestinely, and approximately 10,000 others who were often armed and given to arson, pillage, and other violent actions. In April 1979 an Italian intelligence source unofficially stated that the hard-core terrorists numbered not less than fifty and not more than five hundred; however, a senior intelligence official claimed that any attempt to assess the numerical strength of left-wing terrorism in Italy was "haphazard" because "the destructive array of the Left is vast, uneven, and composite".[65]

33.   A 1980 study reported that the Red Brigades followed "a pyramidal structure with closed compartments, each headed by a person who acts as a filter and ensures access to the higher compartment."[66] According to a Brigadist-turned-informer, the major unit of the Red Brigades was the "column".* There were five principal ones (Milan, Turin, Genoa, Rome, and Naples) in the late-1970s, each consisting of about 1500 members and having full operational autonomy from the other columns. Each column was divided into cells of from three to five members.[67] A recent assessment of Red Brigades organization notes the continuity of the column structure, and refers to the subdivision of the column into operational branches (further divided territorially into district brigades, which are probably made up of two non-communicating but paired cells) and fronts (responsible for mass work, logistical support, and intelligence).[68]

34.   However, relative popular support (in at least one segment of the community) cannot provide an indefinite lease on organizational complexity. The Provisional IRA (PIRA) initially boasted an almost military structure, comprising companies, battalions, and brigades (as well as an officer hierarchy which included commanding officers, quartermasters, and information officers). However, individual operations were carried out by "active service units" of less than half a dozen men. Waning public support for the PIRA, and security force successes, forced a reorganization on the organization, whose strength had fallen from a peak of 1000 activists in 1972-73 to 400-500 in 1985.[69] Thus a more clandestine and cellular structure was apparently adopted by the PIRA in about 1977 (one analyst suggested in 1980 that the extent of this shift had been exaggerated and that the traditional structure still persisted[70]).

---

* The Tupamaros (Uruguay) also used a column-style structure.

35.   Outside the Middle East few terrorist groups - with the possible exception of the Tupamaros and of the Basque ETA (which was thought to number about 700 activists in 1979) - have enjoyed the numerical strength of the Red Brigades and the PIRA. In the late-1970s there were thought to be twelve to sixteen groups in the United States aspiring to revolutionary change by violent means, none of which exceeded 40-50 members. The Japanese Red Army fluctuated between thirty and forty members.[71] Thus the adoption of military-style organizational designations - "army", "front", "commando", "task force", and "unit" - frequently belies both the strength and the structure of the groups concerned.

36.   With the modern wave of terrorism over two decades old, there have been generational as well as organizational changes in some of the longer-lived terrorist groups, with implications for their modus operandi. In a previous section it was noted that several countries, among them West Germany, Italy, and Turkey, were confronting second, third, and even fourth generations of terrorists, and that these succeeding generations were often less coherent ideologically, but more efficient tactically, than the historic nuclei. In Italy, for example, the Red Brigades' attacks of the early-1970s were high in symbolic content and low on physical injury. They consisted mainly of minor arson, kidnappings and "proletarian trials", and the first fatality resulting from them did not occur until 17 June 1974, nearly four years after the attacks began.

37.   The "historic nucleus" of the Red Brigades was largely destroyed during the mid-1970s, but a second generation of terrorists then came to the fore, many recruited from the criminal population in prisons. The second generation Brigadists were more deliberate in their violent acts than the first, and political violence in Italy escalated dramatically in the late-1970s. At the beginning of the 1980s the security forces scored notable successes, and the number of terrorist incidents fell as the number of arrests increased. The weakening of the Red Brigades was demonstrated by the police rescue, in January 1982, of Brigadier-General James Dozier, a kidnapped NATO officer, and follow-up work by the security forces weakened the Brigades still further. However, a third generation appeared to be emerging in the mid-1980s, and some of its actions suggested new Middle East ties, and a concomitant shift in emphasis from domestic to international terrorism.[72]

38.   A study of generational change among Turkish terrorists reported findings similar to the above. The first generation of left-wing terrorists were almost universally university students, who were politicized in the latter half of the 1960s. By the mid-1970s, when a second generation emerged, most of the best-known of the early terrorists were either dead or in prison. While many of the leaders continued to be students (often drop-outs), they tended to be less educated than their predecessors, and only one-fifth of the suspected terrorists arrested after the 1980 military coup were either students or drop-outs. Often recruits to the terrorist groups (both right- and left-wing) were recent rural migrants with low education levels and lacking jobs. During this

second phase violence escalated as dramatically as it had in Italy, triggering the 1980 coup (in 1979 left- and right-wing terrorism in Turkey resulted in an average of four deaths per day). Members of the second and third (post-coup) generations of Turkish terrorists evidently displayed a lesser interest in ideological issues, and a greater commitment to action, than did the terrorists of the early-1970s.[73]

39.   A 1985 paper on German terrorism suggested that West Germany might then be experiencing its third generation of leftist terrorists,[74] while a 1986 study of Middle Eastern terrorism contended that many of the groups in that region were already into their third or fourth generation, in terms both of membership and of leadership.[75] By contrast, left-wing terrorist groups in the United States have always had trouble recruiting succeeding generations of terrorists, relying instead on the same "hard core" of individuals, many of whom have been underground for more than a decade. Thus the arrest of members in the United States has had a devastating effect, indicated by a dramatic decline in left-wing terrorist activity in that country.[76]

Terrorist Profile

40.   Over a decade ago Chalmers Johnson argued that without knowledge of the type of individual engaged in terrorism, and of the factors motivating his actions, coping with terrorism would prove increasingly difficult.[77] While early modern terrorism was invested with both a certain mystique and a degree of mystery, the capture of large numbers of terrorists, along with the seizure of terrorist documents, has enabled analysts to establish psychological and sociological profiles of the members of terrorist groups. Given the generational changes described above, such profiles, to be useful, need to be reasonably dynamic, but even where they lag a "generation" they nonetheless remain instructive.

41.   <u>Social and Psychological Characteristics</u>: The American psychiatrist Frederick J. Hacker has divided terrorists into three groups according to their main motivations: the crazy (emotionally disturbed individuals, like Los Angeles's "Alphabet Bomber"), the criminal (those motivated by personal gain, such as the parachute skyjacker D.B. Cooper), and the crusading (the idealistically - inspired individual). He noted that crazy terrorists are often loners; criminals are mostly organized in a business-like manner (usually in groups); while crusaders are generally organized in military fashion.[78] Of course, there can be overlap between these types. Gustave Morf, a Québec psychiatrist, noted of the second wave (1963-64) of FLQ members that they had lived well on the proceeds of their robberies, and that "the liberation of Quebec had only been a pretext to give free rein to those romantic criminal tendencies which lurk in many people, and to satisfy their thirst for adventure and personal independence"[79].

42.   Studies of terrorist psychology frequently refer to the role played by a sense of failure and victimization in actuating terrorist behaviour. This theme recurred throughout Morf's study. He noted that as early as 1963 a Montréal psychiatrist defined the terrorist as a

person who unconsciously apprehends failure, who is somebody only as far as he is against something.[80] Felquiste biographies frequently alluded to a sense of defeat - Morf commented that both Pierre Vallières and Charles Gagnon were not really satisfied with what they had achieved in life, and blamed society for their failure. Konrad Kellen likewise contended that terrorists tend to feel themselves wronged and attacked at every turn, and become absorbed by a chain of provocation and counter-provocation.

43.   Terrorism offers an alternative and a sense of purpose to the individual who is troubled by a sense of failure: "He is at last the architect of his own fate... Above all, from now on, he must be reckoned with, taken into account. In short, he is somebody, no longer a nonperson."[81] Morf remarked that acts of violence appealed to the adolescent need to boost one's ego, to feel a sense of power, and to be a hero. At the time of the 1975 OPEC incident "Carlos" is said to have told Sheikh Ahmed Yamani (Saudi Arabia's oil minister), "I want to be a hero."[82] The hero's welcome sometimes given terrorists (an example being Gaddafi's treatment of the 1972 Munich Olympics terrorists), and the widespread publicity frequently accorded incidents, provide positive reinforcement of terrorist action.

44.   The need for self-esteem and for glamour lend themselves to action, often to the point where terrorism loses its political instru- mentality, becoming submerged in an element of "ecstasy" in which terrorism is an end in itself.[83] Frantz Fanon regarded violence as "a purifying force" which freed the individual from an inferiority complex and from despair, and restored his self-respect.[84] Kellen has contended that "The desire for effective - or at least noticeable - action appears to be one of the prime motivations of terrorists."[85]

45.   Terrorists are often impatient individuals who sooner or later become disenchanted with merely verbal expression of their credos and resentments. Thus Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader, two of the earliest leaders of West German terrorism, were actuated by a belief that there was no longer any point in just writing and talking, that it was necessary to do something.[86] In March 1966 Pierre Vallières sensed that his followers were growing restless, and tried to assuage their impatience:

> "The FLQ, the bombs, the fireworks, that was the wonderful
> time! Things were happening in Quebec, it gave us the
> urge to get into the boat!... But today, the FLQ is
> nothing but a little paper appearing every two weeks!
> These defeatist remarks one hears sometimes... No more
> bombs - no more FLQ, they think."[87]

A month after this exhortation La Cognée published new instructions on bombing techniques, and money, arms, and equipment were acquired through robberies. Less than two months after Vallières's broadside a bomb exploded at the strike-bound Lagrenade shoe factory in Montréal, killing an employee.

46.   There is an idealistic as well as a psychological motivation to terror. Terrorists are often influenced by a belief that action is needed to achieve utopia, that any action is justified by the ends sought, and, above all, that the terrorist's action will make the crucial difference. Much of modern terrorism is religious in inspiration, and the belief that only the righteous will be saved, and that believers will act to ensure their own salvation, is common to more than one religion. On the other hand, some motivation is obviously as much criminal as political or religious. It has been suggested that "Carlos" may have been as much a "freelance" as an idealist, and that his team's return within a week to the scene of a previous failure - at Orly Airport in January 1975 - may have been intended, in part, to protect or restore his professional reputation vis à vis his clientèle.

47.   Several attempts have been made to explore the degree of commonality of social characteristics among terrorists and terrorist groups, along such dimensions as gender, age, class, education, recruitment patterns, rural-urban background, and so on. One such study was a sociological profile of more than 350 terrorists associated with 18 groups (among them the PFLP, BSO, JRA, 2nd of June Movement, Baader-Meinhoff Group, PIRA, Red Brigades, TPLA, and ETA), active between 1966 and 1976, drawn up by two United States Air Force analysts.[88] They found considerable congruence between groups in a number of areas. Thus, the usual urban terrorist was aged between 22 and 25; however, the leadership elements of many groups tended to be much older. Urban terrorism was a predominantly male phenomenon, with some significant exceptions (notably the Tupamaros and the West German groups). Over three-quarters of the terrorists were single, and most were of urban origin. Well over two-thirds of these individuals were of middle or upper class backgrounds (the only real exception being the IRA), and approximately the same proportion were persons with some post-secondary education.

48.   Other analysts have amplified Russell's and Miller's findings. With regard to class, Professor Norman Cantor has suggested that members of the middle class are sufficiently familiar with the power élite not to fear them greatly, have enough leisure to engage in dissident activities, and possess sufficient education and political experience to know where and how that élite is most vulnerable.[89] It has also been suggested that a sense of privileged status, along with an awareness of poverty and injustice in other social sectors, frequently results in a sense of guilt, which in turn may contribute to anti-social acts, demonstrations, and occasional terrorism.[90]

49.   At least two analysts have observed that the people who are attracted to leftist terrorism rarely belong to the class for which they claim to be fighting.[91] However, the different waves of FLQ terrorists appear to have been rather varied in social composition. Thus, Morf noted of Robert Hudon's "second wave" (L'Armée de libération du Québec, 1963-64) that none of its six members had really been under-privileged. However, François Schirm's group (also six members, operating in 1964) contained no intellectuals, three members were sons of workers, and two were unemployed.[92] A study of five groups - three "nationalist" (EOKA, PIRA, and ETA) and two "revolutionary" (the Tupamaros and the Red

Brigades) - contended that the nationalist groups were more socially representative, at least within their ethnic communities, than were the revolutionary ones.[93]

50.   Russell and Miller noted that while urban terrorism in the period 1966-76 was a predominantly male activity, there were practical reasons - largely relating to security - for women fulfilling supporting roles. In the absence of current data comparable to those of Russell and Miller, it is difficult to ascertain whether the operational role of women is increasing. Citing largely European examples, Gillian Becker (director of the Institute for the Study of Terrorism, in London) has suggested that females are playing a growing operational role in terrorism.[94]

51.   No matter how alienated the individual, or how great his impatience and his desire for action and for self-esteem, the process of a - terrorization is usually a gradual one. Jerrold M. Post, an American psychiatrist specializing in the psychology of terrorism, has noted this incremental transition: "...there is a gradual movement from sympathetic individual, to tolerant though passive supporter, to active supporter, and finally to the 'hard core' underground group."[95] The road to terrorism generally begins with some form of alienation. For Bommi Baumann the process began with his decision to grow his hair long, which pushed him into the position of an outcast (he was also repelled by the prospect of working at a construction site for fifty years).

52.   In many cases alienation would go no further than the mild symbolism of hair style, but the would-be terrorist is generally brought into contact with disaffected peers, discovering (perhaps for the first time) not only that he is not alone in his negative feelings about society, but also that he belongs. From cathartic discussions of society's evils, complaining gives way to vague schemes to "change things". But the future terrorist sooner or later becomes disabused of the efficacy of protest demonstrations and similar acts, and more and more convinced of the need for "real action". At this point he is on the verge of going underground.[96] Examples of this transition include the many members of the Revolutionary Cells who originally came from the residential squatter movement in Germany or were opponents of the Vietnam War. Similarly, most of the new members of the RAF in the mid-1980s came from the group's "legitimate" fringe of supporters.

53.   The terrorist is often induced into taking the plunge into underground activity by some critical incident such as an arrest in a broad police sweep. Although Zawodny has suggested that it is much easier to join a terrorist organization than to leave it,[97] some terrorist groups have apparently tested new recruits by giving them dangerous assignments to execute (this was evidently the practice among German groups). Post cited the case of a new recruit who questioned the ideological propriety of a risky and potentially sanguinary operation and who was made to realize that to question was to risk losing his place in the group. Andreas Baader secured compliance in this way. In Post's view, such pressure is a psychologically severe sanction for someone who might well be experiencing for the first time a sense of truly belonging.[98]

54.   For some individuals the transition does not demand a traumatic break with society, a catalytic event, or a test. Post has noted that for many "nationalist - secessionists" joining a terrorist group "is almost a rite of passage. The members may live with their families. Their identities tend to be widely known in their communities and they may be lionized for their heroism."[99]

55.   <u>Group Dynamics</u>: The act of joining the terrorist group represents an attempt to consolidate identity and to belong, a process which is reinforced by the internalization imposed by clandestinity. Highly inward-looking groups often display a tendency to "group-think", a propensity which is compounded by the use of criticism and self-criticism sessions. This introverted unity is further reinforced by leadership patterns within terrorist groups. Generally the leader's importance is enhanced because, in addition to planning and giving orders, he is normally actively involved in the operations planned by him. Furthermore, he shares the life-style, stress, dangers, and rewards experienced by his followers. These kinds of experiences build intensely personal loyalties. An American psychologist who has spent twenty years interviewing and testing terrorists has reported that this group structure provides solace for the new recruit - the group and its leaders play the psychological role of a strong, protective parent.[100] The individual gains a sense of belonging, a new identity, and a feeling of increased personal security.

56.   The protectiveness conferred by the group increases its cohesive potential, in that when the group's existence is threatened individuals feel that their own source of security is menaced.[101] Action is another factor in cohesion within terrorist groups, to the extent that one authority has suggested some terrorist incidents are prompted more by the internal dynamics of the group than by external tactical, strategic, or political requirements.[102] Post even goes so far as to propose that "the predominant determinant of terrorist actions is the internal dynamics of the terrorist group. If the terrorist group does not commit terrorist actions, it has lost its meaning".[103]

57.   As the individual's period underground lengthens, so the group experience, and the tendency to brutalization produced by violence, operate to reduce inhibitions. In his memoirs, H.J. Klein, an RAF terrorist, wrote: "...if you're long enough in the underground, you sooner or later pitch everything overboard. From humanity to your political ideals. You sink deeper and deeper into the shit."[104] Group processes allow members to act in ways that most would not have even contemplated in their pre-terrorist existences by demanding their loyalty and absolving them from all blame for their acts.

58.   While the terrorist's own psychological needs, and the effect on attitudes and behaviour of group dynamics in conditions of clandestinity, have a generally unifying tendency, this is far from invariably the case. Kellen has observed that despite a considerable commonality of experience among individuals and groups, the range of personalities attracted to the terrorist fold is very wide and varied, and that their responses to the terrorist lifestyle are also varied. Thus one of the

five terrorists he interviewed (Michael "Bommi" Baumann) disclaimed any general validity in his experiences, and in fact reported considerable disagreement between himself and some of his fellows.[105] Morf marvelled at the ability of the FLQ always to maintain the appearance of a united front when "The reality is quite different."[106]

59.   But divisions within terrorist groups have rarely been carried to the extreme recorded by the Japanese Red Army in 1971-72, when twelve members were tortured and then murdered for ideological and life-style deviation. A similar internecine struggle took place within the Irish National Liberation Army in 1986-87, resulting in the deaths of about a dozen members (including one of the group's founders).

60.   While operations have been described by some terrorists as exhilarating, they are often few and far between. The period between actions, in conditions of clandestinity, can be tense, provoking disagreements over aims and tactics, the repercussions from previous actions, the social practices of group members, and so on.

61.   Another source of internal tension, as well as a partial explana-tion of the longevity of some groups, is the difficulty of escape. A 1982 study found that in some instances terrorists were greatly relieved when they were finally caught by security forces, because they felt themselves unable to get away from the enormous group pressure, exerted in particular by the leaders of the RAF.[107] Baumann reported that it was made clear to every new member of the 2nd of June Movement that it was impossible to quit the organization,[108] and one member who was suspected of having been recruited by the police as an informer, while in jail, was liquidated by the group when released. Apparently one member of the FLQ cell involved in the abortive attack on the International Firearms store in Montréal in 1964 was reluctant to go through with the scheme, but did so after being threatened with reprisals by the leader. Some groups resort to such methods as "knee-capping" and leg-shooting in order to keep their members in line and to deter betrayal.

62.   For some individuals the barriers to abandoning an underground existence are as much intrinsic as extrinsic. The difficulties of social reintegration and employment, as well as the loss of accustomed prestige in some circles, are probably deterrents to an abandonment of terrorism for some terrorists. Such people, whether they are revolu-tionary heroes like Grivas or Guevara, or terrorists newly released from prison, often find it hard to settle into pacific pursuits.

63.   Naturally, many terrorists do succeed in leaving their groups, but often (as in the case of Klein) end in a kind of limbo, sought by both the police and their former comrades. Where terrorists do drop out, German experience has shown that the predominant reason was doubt as to the group's legitimacy, and it appears that the drop-outs were ambivalent on joining.[109]

Terrorist Objectives

64.   The preceding discussion of terrorist motivations gives rise to questions about terrorist objectives, which in turn provide signposts for terrorist tactics. An analyst of the organizational structure of terrorist groups has observed that:

> "A terrorist organization... is a social unit... deliberately constructed and managed to achieve rational cooperation as it pursues specific goals. Consequently, ideological commitment by members... to the goals of their organization is a prerequisite to organizational survival. For this purpose, results to be achieved by terrorist propaganda and armed actions are expressed in terms of goals... Goals, therefore, are a vital link in the administration of a terrorist organization..."[110]

65.   Wilkinson and others have noted the importance of distinguishing between the long-term political objectives and strategies of terrorist groups and their military strategies or tactical objectives, or even of making a triple distinction between ideological/long-range, strategic/mid-range, and tactical-military/short-range objectives.[111] In linking long- and medium-range objectives with tactics, analysts are implicitly (and in some cases explicitly) assuming terrorism to be a manifestation of rational, goal-directed behaviour rather than a collection of mindless, irrational, and therefore unpredictable, events. The link is not always there (the Symbionese Liberation Army seemed to lack clear long-term goals and focussed instead on more immediate objectives); some terrorism does appear to have a very diminished rationality (lone assassins frequently show traces of insanity,[112] and some target choices can be whimsical); terrorist goals are sometimes vague or deliberately misrepresented, making their tactics and goals appear inconsistent to observers; and some groups get themselves locked into a cycle of primarily organizational, and politically non-instrumental, tactics (such as attempts to free captured comrades). However, on the whole terrorist operations do appear to have a discernible logic.

66.   While long-term strategic objectives have very rarely been achieved by the use of terrorism, terrorism persists in part because of the repeated success of terrorist operations in securing mid-range objectives (for example, undermining peace initiatives in the Middle East) and tactical objectives (such as prisoner release or the payment of ransoms).

67.   Long-Range Objectives: Analysts have a tendency to express the principal long-term aims of terrorist groups in bipolar terms. Wilkinson has differentiated between broad "revolutionary" goals, incompatible with the existing socio-political order in the target society, and narrower "subrevolutionary" goals (policy- or personnel-specific ones), largely compatible with the existing socio-political arrangements.[113] Waugh, on the other hand, argued that, given the trend away from the traditional ideological bases of post-1945 political violence and towards more nihilistic, anarchistic, and ethnic varieties, it would be

more useful to distinguish between "territorial" groups (secessionist ones, for example) and "non-territorial" groups (anarchist, nihilist, and traditional ideological ones, for instance).[114] Still other analysts have distinguished between ideological and ethnic terrorism. These depictions of terrorist goals are largely self-explanatory. The long-range objectives which underly the resort to terrorism vary from the millenarian and the impractical, to the specific and the realizable, from the overthrow of "capitalism" and imperialism and the substitution of a radically different socio-political order, to the achievement of national liberation or independence, the establishment of a national homeland, the overthrow of a particular government, and so on.

68.   Mid-Range Objectives: Mid-range (or "strategic", as Waugh put it) objectives include: organizational, publicity, punishment, provocation, disruption, and instrumental objectives.[115] Waugh depicted organizational objectives as being violence of an intra-group nature designed to assure conformity, discipline, and high morale, as well as logistical operations ("expropriations"). Acquiring financial and material resources can become a major activity (the PIRA has been involved in extortion rackets, while the RAF netted DM 4.5 million from the 1977 ransom of a Viennese industrialist).

69.   Publicity has long been recognized as being a vital component of terrorism, whose shock element would be greatly diminished without it. The escalation of international terrorism in the late-1960s owed much to the Palestinians' wish to advertize their cause. Similarly, the Tigre People's Liberation Front kidnapped an American helicopter pilot (flying for a Canadian company) in October 1978 because "We are forgotten both in the countries of the east and in the western countries. We want to make our struggle known and that is why we kidnapped this American citizen."[116] It is thought that the international audience of the Munich Olympics massacre (1972) was 500 million persons. Thus, much of terrorism comes under the rubric of "propaganda of the deed".

70.   Both guerrilla and terrorist groups seek to provoke governments into overreaction, in order to erode public support for them. The Uruguayan Tupamaros achieved such an effect in 1973 when their activities provoked the military coup which destroyed Latin America's oldest democracy. Basque terrorists neatly described this objective:

> "The enemy, as a massive animal, stung by many bees, is infuriated to the point of uncontrollable rage, and strikes out blindly to the left and right - on every side. At this point we have achieved one of our major objectives, forcing him to commit a thousand atrocities and brutal acts. The majority of his victims are innocent. Then the people - to this point more or less passive and waiting - become indignant and in reaction turn to us."[117]

This tactic of provocation is particularly effective (and deadly) in situations of inter-communal tension.

71.   By punishment objectives, Waugh referred to terrorist attempts to subvert and replace the legitimate authority structure, by means of selective murders, knee-cappings, kidnappings, and so on. The power to punish "wrong-doers" and to "enforce" a set of "laws" is normally associated with government authority, and thus a "dual power" situation is sought.

72.   Although terrorist groups may seek varying degrees of social, economic, and political disruption, ranging from brief interruptions of government functioning to total socio-political collapse, Waugh argued that most terrorist organizations seek only as much disruption as would facilitate the achievement of their own long-term goals; utter chaos might work to the advantage of other contenders for power (for instance the Uruguayan armed forces in the early-1970s).[118] Waugh distinguished between symbolic and instrumental objectives (the latter being "military" objectives in which there is a direct relationship between the goal sought, the action taken, and the victim selected).

73.   The Red Brigades provided a good example of the link between long-range and mid-range objectives during the Moro abduction crisis (1978). During the incident a Red Brigade document - a 60-page "Resolution on Strategic Direction" - was published to define the group's goals. A long-range aim of the Brigades was to bring about "Europe's ultimate war: for communism." The first stage of the conflict was to be a series of attacks on West Germany and Italy, respectively "the strongest and weakest links in the western democratic system." Such actions (of which the Schleyer and Moro kidnappings were evidently a part) would trigger similar actions throughout Europe, leading to the next stage: the formation of a single "Organization of Communist Combat", composed of all European left-wing terrorist groups, which would then attack the West's "vital centres of multinational imperialism".[119] The kidnapping of Moro also served another important (and more parochial) mid-range aim of the Red Brigades, by subverting the "historic compromise" - the attempted rapprochement between the Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which would bring the latter into the government for the first time - of which Moro was seen by many as being the catalyst. It is noteworthy that since Moro's murder the PCI still has not won a formal share of the government.

74.   Tactical Objectives: While terrorist operations often reflect (and possibly also are governed by) a combination of (apparent) mid- and long-range goals, their tactical objectives are usually more identifiable, since many terrorist incidents are accompanied by a demand or an explanation, or fit an identifiable pattern. Waugh asserted that destructive tactics (assassinations, maimings, bombings, and arson), along with violence which is not accompanied by specific demands or by the acquisition of material needs, may be associated with such mid-range goals as organization, punishment, and disruption objectives. Hostage incidents are generally conducted with the aim of extracting specific concessions, of winning the publication or broadcast of propaganda messages, and of securing money or supplies, and thus may be associated primarily with organizational and publicity objectives. Armed attacks and robberies are usually related to logistical needs or the rescue of

imprisoned terrorists, and thus are organizational in their mid-range focus.[120]

75.   Few groups have a repertoire that runs the gamut of terrorist tactics. Among those which have demonstrated a fairly consistent ability to vary their operations are the IRA (which, however, has not resorted to hijacking) and some of the Palestinian groups, including PFLP and Black September. Some other groups seem to specialize in one type of tactic. Notwithstanding the Cross-Laporte incidents, the FLQ mainly resorted to bombings (often symbolic), as did the Puerto Rican FALN, while anti-Castro Cuban terrorists have shown a penchant for mari- time operations, and the Red Brigades for occupationally - selective assault (leg-shooting, particularly). The size, ideology, composition, and resources of a particular group do appear to play an important role in its operational patterns.

76.   Just as different groups have different operational capabilities and "signatures", so certain types are more disposed to international terrorism than other, more domestically-oriented, types of groups. Generally-speaking, it is the groups with arguably the least likelihood of ultimate success or the wildest goals - among them groups, such as the Japanese Red Army, advocating world revolution - and stateless (Palestinian or Armenian) and emigré (Cuban) groups which are the most likely to resort to international terrorism. Groups with seemingly a greater likelihood of success usually employ international terrorism within a wider framework of domestic political and military action, and with specific goals in mind - publicity, foreign support or pressure, and so on - that are less attainable by purely local or regional activi- ties. A Rand study of terrorism, both domestic and international, between 1980 and 1982 found the following:[121]

Table 2
Group Resort to International/Domestic Terrorism

Group	Total Incidents	International Incidents	Domestic Incidents
Irish Nat. Lib. Army	20	0	20(100%)
Provisional IRA	73	0	73(100%)
ETA	160	6(4%)	154(96%)
Armenians (2 groups)	125	125(100%)	0
Palestinians (6 groups)	93	58(62%)	35(38%)
Red Brigades	85	4(5%)	81(95%)
RAF	28	24(86%)	4(14%)
Action Directe	70	31(44%)	39(56%)

77.   Only one of the three major revolutionary groups listed above - the Red Brigades - largely eschewed international terrorism, and it was far the strongest and most successful of the three, numerically and operationally. Interestingly, terrorism of all stripes peaked in Italy in 1978 and 1979 and thereafter dropped steadily and dramatically, while

arrests soared. Thus, in the period represented by the above table the Red Brigades were weakening but still seemed strong. But the police liberation of Dozier in January 1982 represented a severe blow to the Red Brigades, and police follow-up action weakened the organization further. In the light of this weakness (relative to the heyday of the late-1970s) the assertion of one analyst of Italian terrorism, that it may be developing a greater international focus in the mid-1980s, suggests that the Red Brigades have not been an exception to the inter-national-domestic typology advanced above.[122]

Terrorist Groups

78.   It has been noted earlier that some analysts have grouped modern terrorist organizations into two principal types: ideological and ethnic,[123] territorial and non-territorial.[124] Such compartmentaliza-tion needs to be done with caution. Many terrorist groups are far from explicit in their ideology and aims (precision might limit support) and some groups (including the PIRA, l'Armée Républicaine Bretonne, and some of the Palestinian groups) mix nationalism and socialism in many of their public statements.

79.   But a bipolar categorization of the sort outlined above offers some interesting insights into modern terrorism. Hewitt, for instance, found that the operations of nationalist groups tend to exact high numbers of fatalities, and that the security forces are their main targets. In contrast, the campaigns of the leftist groups he examined were less sanguinary, tended to wounding rather than killing, and (initially at least) targeted establishment groups - businessmen, judges, conservative politicians, and so on - rather than the police and military. He also observed that nationalist terrorists are more parochial than leftist terrorists, and less likely to attack foreign targets, and that the two different types of groups tend to have very different social characteristics.[125] Waugh argued that to the extent that "territorial" (nationalist, autonomist, and secessionist) groups have greater "legitimacy potential" - by virtue of their distinct constituencies - than do "non-territorial" (anarchist, nihilist, and traditional ideological) groups,

> "they may have greater likelihood of success and many, therefore, pose greater danger to incumbent authorities. Popular sympathy can be translated into greater access to material and financial resources, more easily developed and maintained clandestine support structures..., more highly developed and effective intelligence networks, and greater recruitment potential."[126]

80.   The shared ideology of revolution does, however, facilitate inter-group (and therefore international) cooperation, not only in terms of logistics, intelligence, and so on, but also of operations.

81.   On the basis of the bipolar categorization discussed above, terrorist organizations will be grouped here as being either primarily ideological (revolutionary, sub-revolutionary, anarchic, right-wing, and

so on) or principally nationalist (stateless/emigré, separatist-autonom-ist, and so forth) in their aims and ideologies.

82.   Left-Wing Groups: To the extent that terrorist groups (organiza-tions whose activities centre almost entirely on terrorism) and insurgent-guerrilla groups (organizations which tend to use terrorism as an adjunct to their political and military campaigns) differ, left-wing terrorism of the terroristic kind is perhaps most characteristic of Western Europe, while left-wing terrorism of the insurgent variety is particularly evident in Central and South America. Commenting on the low level of ideological terrorism in the United States, Jenkins contended that "Ideological conflict was always a more serious business in Europe..."[127]

83.   Left-wing terrorism in Europe largely developed from the student and labour unrest of the late-1960s, although during the 1970s France was relatively free of the kind of terrorism which predominated in Germany and Italy, despite the serious political turmoil which France had experienced in 1968. Left-wing terrorism peaked in Europe in 1977-78. Thereafter the terrorists became discredited by their own actions, and this, together with a political swing to the right, a diminution of student activism, the counter-attraction and success of political and environmental protest movements, and security force successes (including the Mogadishu operation), narrowed the groups' recruiting space and operational capability. Thus, at the beginning of 1980 the 2nd of June Movement abandoned the "armed struggle".

84.   Paradoxically, as left-wing terrorism was on the decline else-where in Europe, it was on the upswing in France and Belgium. The French group Action Directe (AD) was formed in 1979. It confined itself to bombing property until February 1985, when it arranged the assassina-tion of General René Audran, the head of France's arms sales programme. In Belgium the Cellules Communistes Combattantes began operations in 1984, as part of an anti-NATO campaign.

85.   "Euroterrorism" experienced a resurgence in 1984-85, with a number of left-wing groups coalescing in a concerted attack against NATO targets. There was another upsurge of "Euro-terrorism" in the latter half of 1986, particularly in France and Germany, but also in Italy where a former mayor of Florence was assassinated. After hitting a low point in the early-1980s, the RAF appears to have rebounded, participat-ing in the anti-NATO attacks and carrying out three major assassinations in 1985-86. Recently Dr. Horst Herold, a former senior counter-terror-ism officer in Germany, declared that terrorism had "now established itself as a permanent phenomenon".[128] While also gravely weakened, by comparison with their fortunes in the late-1970s, the Red Brigades have shown signs of revival and, more significantly, of being more interna-tional in their operations (they may in fact have split into two fac-tions, with Euroterrorist and domestic foci). However, the arrest of four leaders of Action Directe in February 1987, and the capture of another top member in November 1987, appears to have paralyzed the group and also to have given pause to European leftist groups as they assessed the damage this security coup may have inflicted.

86.   The changing fortunes of European and allied terrorist groups appear to have affected a transformation in their aims. Initially these were highly millenarian. The Japanese Red Army proclaimed that its ultimate goal was universal proletarian revolution, while the RAF declared an armed anti-imperialist war aimed at the "political, economic and military defeat, destruction and annihilation of the Imperialistic Ruling System." As was noted earlier, generational evolution seems to have brought to the fore terrorists who were less ideologically coherent, if technically more proficient, than were the first wave terrorists, who were largely drawn from the student population. Furthermore, the death of Mao and the economic reforms in China have undermined the influence of Maoism (the ideology of the RAF and other groups), while the ending of the Vietnam War removed one of the great catalysts of political activism in the late-1960s and early-1970s.

87.   Although the millenarian rhetoric has not entirely dissipated,[129] left-wing terrorist groups appear to have opted for shorter-range and more practicable goals. While Action Directe has described itself as communist, anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, anti-NATO, and anti-American, even its rhetoric seems to have a focus. Thus, its activities have protested the "genocide of Palestinians by Israeli troops", "the homogenization of the European states under NATO", "French imperialist politics in Africa", "the Americanization of Europe", and so on. Action Directe rarely makes specific demands, but instead bombs and shoots targets which symbolize what it opposes. A "piggyback strategy" has become evident among left-wing terrorists groups in the 1980s, whereby their operations seek to exploit populist issues, among them disarmament, housing, labour policy, anti-Americanism, and so forth. This strategy does not appear to have produced alliances with environmental or political movements such as the German Green Party.[130]

88.   The utopianism and ideological inexplicitness of early terrorism made for operational diffuseness (almost any action could be deemed appropriate to the overthrow of "capitalism" and "imperialism"). It is noteworthy that as millenarian expectations have receded, discernible campaigns, with specific targeting, have been launched: against Christian Democratic targets prior to the 1979 election (Italy 1979); against "exploitative" technology (France 1980); against Israel (in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon War); against NATO (1984-85); against France (1986); and so on.

89.   Furthermore, as terrorist movements "age" they develop commitments - to imprisoned comrades, to external sponsors, and so forth - which strain the instrumental relationship between ideology (aims) and action. Thus in the late-1970s a German terrorist claimed that no sooner had German terrorism become established than it began to turn in on itself, becoming dedicated to the release of imprisoned comrades, and having no further goal.[131] By the mid-1970s many of the external operations of the Palestinian groups were similarly devoted to the release of captured fellows. A wave of 39 bomb attacks in Germany between 4 December 1984 and early February 1985 were intended to express support for a hunger strike by imprisoned terrorists who were trying to obtain concessions from the prison authorities.

90.   As for the relegation of ideologically-primed activity to the
.demands of external sponsors, it is thought that a wave of attacks, by
European groups, against Israeli targets in European countries during
the six months following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (June 1982) may
have represented a repayment by those groups of debts (training, weap-
ons, logistic support, intelligence, and so on) to the Palestinians.[132]

91.   <u>Nationalist-Autonomist Groups</u>: A large proportion of modern
terrorism, both of groups and of incidents, reflects the assertion of
national or ethnic identity. Under the rubric of nationalist-autonomist
groups may be included: separatists (FLQ, Tiroler Schutzbund, Front de
la Libération Nationale de la Corse); guerrilla autonomist movements
(Kurdish groups, Moro National Liberation Front); stateless groups (the
various Palestinian organizations - PFLP, Abu Nidal, and so on); emigré
organizations (ASALA, Omega 7, the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood);
unionist groups (EOKA-B, Ulster Freedom Fighters, PIRA, INLA); and
anti-terrorist movements with strong national overtones or cultural
identities (JDL, Spanish National Action).

92.   Separatist terrorism has had a considerable impact on the politi-
cal life of North America (FLQ, Puerto Rican FALN) and Europe (Welsh,
Breton, Basque, Corsican, Tirolean, and other groups) at different
periods during the past two decades. After nearly a decade of bombings
the FLQ was largely eradicated in 1970. The FALN staged a similar wave
of violence - largely taking the form of bombings - between 1977 and
1984 (some 161 acts of violence were committed), but the group has
increasingly been weakened by the arrest of key members, and its opera-
tional profile has been greatly diminished.

93.   Separatist violence has been more persistent and dramatic in
Europe, although even there a decline in the over-all incidence of
separatist terrorism is apparent. Breton separatist violence peaked in
1978 and was largely quiescent by 1980 (three incidents occurred in
1985). Although the Corsican FLNC was particularly active in 1982
(about 800 explosions were reported on the island in that year), the
French security forces have had some success against them and the number
of incidents fell to 490 on the island in 1984 and to 396 in 1985.
Likewise, the number of killings by the Basque ETA fell from a peak of
124 in 1980 to 58 in 1985, with a much-publicized economic offensive in
1985 failing to live up to its promise. However, there was a flurry of
ETA activity - mainly bombing - in mid-1986. More alarming has been the
change in ETA tactics. Until recently these were highly selective
(two-thirds of all fatalities between 1968 and 1980 were security force
personnel), but the ETA now appears to have opted for more indiscrimi-
nate attacks, outside the Basque region, largely using car bombs. Thus,
in June 1987 a supermarket in Barcelona was bombed, killing 18 shoppers.

94.   Another strain of separatism or autonomism may be found in less
developed countries, like Sri Lanka and Sudan, where the terrorism
practised by Tamil and Southern Sudanese rebels is associated with a
broader military campaign. Such groups resort to international terror-
ism infrequently, and when they do it usually takes the form of kidnap-
ping, intended to attract publicity (as in the case of the American

pilot captured in 1978 by the Tigre People's Liberation Front), or to extort money and supplies. In a period of two years at the beginning of the 1980s more than thirty foreign workers in Iraq were captured by Kurdish guerrillas. In the case of two of them (one a Canadian), kidnapped in 1982, the kidnappers had their prisoners forward letters in which the Kurds complained that "the world media" had failed to report Iraqi government "crimes" against the Kurds: "In order to break the barriers of the world media, our partisans have been following the policy of seizing foreign experts sent to help [President] Saddam."[133]

95.   The Tamil guerrilla campaign in Sri Lanka began modestly in the mid-1970s and escalated after communal rioting in 1983. As in many inter-communal conflicts, the guerrilla war has been supplemented and overshadowed by extremely high levels of terrorist violence (in one week in April 1987 some 247 people were killed in just three terrorist incidents). Nonetheless, incidents with international ramifications are comparatively rare, given the scale of the violence. In one instance - the kidnapping of an American couple in 1984 - the captives were freed unransomed after other guerrilla groups and imprisoned Tamils reproached the hostage-takers.

96.   Yet another type of nationalist organization which fights largely on its own soil - and thus resorts relatively rarely to international terrorism - is the unionist group. Examples include EOKA-B (fighting for the union of Cyprus and Greece) and the Ulster Freedom Fighters and other loyalist groups in Northern Ireland which seek to retain the British connection. Although their aims are diametrically opposed to those of the Protestant groups, the PIRA and INLA could probably be included in this category. Their campaigns aim at union with the Republic of Ireland - hence they are not purely separatist - and currently they could not really be described as guerrilla organizations.[134] After playing a crucial role in the 1974 Cyprus coup, EOKA-B gradually faded into insignificance, and announced its own dissolution in 1978 (its swan song was the 1977 kidnapping of the president's son in an abortive attempt to secure the release of some imprisoned comrades).

97.   Initially the ultimate objective of the Protestant paramilitary bodies in Northern Ireland was the preservation of the province's British connection, but now their raison d'être appears to be the prevention of any move which brings closer Ulster's incorporation into the Republic of Ireland. Striving against, as much as for, something can make for a reactive and even schizophrenic strategy, such that the loyalist groups have attacked the PIRA and INLA on the one hand, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (historically an overwhelmingly Protestant force) on the other. Loyalist violence waxes and wanes in relation to the perceived threat to the Protestant community, and largely takes the form of sectarian murders. Their main spell of concerted sectarian warfare was in 1972-73 when they terrorized Belfast. Since then the Ulster Defence Association and the UFF have shifted from indiscriminate attacks on Roman Catholics to selective elimination of prominent Republican activists. The Protestant Action Force launched a sectarian campaign in 1975 - apparently forcing the PIRA to agree to a truce regarding the bombing of civilian targets - and again in 1982-83 and

1986.[135] While largely reactive, loyalist violence is terrorism in the traditional sense of inspiring fear. But, other than in the acquisition of money, weapons, and supplies (some of which come from Canada), Protestant terrorism is not international in its ramifications.

98.   Since 1922 the IRA has opposed the partition of Ireland and supported the unification of the north with the south. Within a year of the British army being ordered in to Northern Ireland in 1969 to quell communal violence the IRA had split. The Official wing advocated a political approach and its members were mainly committed Marxists and Marxist-Leninists. The advocates of violence formed PIRA and originally sought the traditional IRA goal of unification. However, over the years (and against some internal opposition) a socialist programme was adopted, so that PIRA's two basic objectives are now British withdrawal and the establishment of a united socialist Irish state.

99.   Tactically, PIRA's main strategy has been to maintain pressure on the security forces and to extract a heavy economic cost for the continued British presence in Northern Ireland. The PIRA only rarely resorts to international terrorism. In particular, it has studiously avoided attacking American targets, dependent as it is on material and moral support from the United States (by the same token, the nationalist element of PIRA's objectives is played up, and the socialist element correspondingly understated). On the other hand, the INLA (which was formed in the mid-1970s) has been responsible for many acts of terrorism, not just in Northern Ireland, but also in the Republic, the mainland of Britain, and Germany. This international element may perhaps owe something to the INLA's putative origin in the more overtly left-wing Official IRA, as well as to its good contacts with Palestinian and European terrorist groups.

100.   The nationalist-autonomist groups described above have all generally confined their terrorism to the geographic areas in which their ethnic groups are concentrated, or within the boundaries of the metropolitan power. There are two categories of terrorist groups which are drawn from populations which lack power or statehood in their countries of origin: stateless groups, and emigré groups.

101.   The Palestinian groups fit the former category. Although a growing proportion of Palestinian terrorist operations occur inside Israel or the Israeli-occupied territories - according to Rand, there were 17 Palestinian attacks in Israel and Israeli-occupied territory in 1983-84, and 18 attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets outside Israel[136] - tight Israeli security has forced a large degree of internationalization on the Palestinians. This situation led the State Department in 1984 to describe the Middle East as "the crucible of terrorism".[137] As was noted earlier in this report, Middle Eastern terrorism obtrudes most notably on Western Europe.

102.   The Palestine Liberation Organization is far from monolithic, and it acts as an umbrella for a number of groups. In early-1986 these ranged from largely military organizations, such as Arafat's Fatah loyalists and Abu Musa's Fatah rebels (numbering between them some 6,500

members), to principally terrorist ones, such as the PFLP (500-600) and the Abu Nidal group (500-800).[138] The ideologies and objectives of the PLO groups are as varied as their operational profiles. While the establishment of a Palestinian state is presumably common to all, it is often overshadowed by the intrusion of the numerous antagonistic relationships which exist between states, groups, and personalities (of 259 Middle Eastern attacks carried out in Western Europe between 1980 and mid-1986 [6½ years], 152, or 59%, were directed at Arab and Palestinian targets[139]).

103.   One of the most significant, and recurring, mid-range objectives of the Palestinian groups is rejectionism, the negation of any diplomatic measure - such as the 1985 Jordanian - PLO agreement - which the hard-liners regard as a betrayal of their ultimate goal. Thus, for example, the Abu Nidal organization launched seven attacks against Jordanian targets in the wake of the Amman agreement, and a year after it was signed Jordan ended political coordination with the PLO.

104.   Palestinian terrorism has exacerbated terrorism elsewhere, firstly by its attacks outside the Middle East (mainly in Western Europe), and secondly by the support Palestinian groups have given European groups. Organizations as disparate as the INLA, the FLQ, the ETA, the JRA, ASALA, and the RAF are thought to have received aid, both moral and practical (training, weapons, and intelligence), from the Palestinians. They have often returned the favour: three JRA members fired on passengers at Lod airport in 1972 in an attack allegedly mounted on behalf of the PFLP, Revolutionary Cells members were involved in the logistical preparations for the 1972 Munich Olympics attack, German terrorists were recruited for essentially Palestinian operations at Orly and the OPEC conference in Vienna in 1975, and, as noted earlier, there was a rash of "surrogate" attacks in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon War. A security crack-down in Europe (notably in France), and the threat the PLO feels from Islamic fundamentalists (such as the Islamic Liberation Party) in the occupied territories, may serve to reduce the "exportation" of Palestinian terrorism in the short term. In fact, at its Algiers summit of April 1987 the PLO leadership refused to admit the Abu Nidal organization into the fold, despite the PLO's reconciliation with the PFLP and DFLP. At the meeting "Abu Abbas", the reputed architect of the Achille Lauro hijacking, claimed that there was "no point" in conducting operations in Europe, stating that the struggle for Palestine should take place in Israel and in Israeli-occupied territory.[140] The number of attacks on Israel itself does appear to be on the increase, with several rocket strikes and an armed incursion just prior to the Algiers meeting, and a bloody hang-glider attack on a military camp in northern Israel in November 1987. However, the "intelligence war" with Israel may well persist in non-Middle Eastern countries.

105.   The category of terrorist groups that has most interest for Canada is that of emigré organizations, whose terrorist activities almost by definition have to be international. Because this category has greater relevance for Canada than others, it will be discussed in more detail.

106.   Among the most prolific of emigré terrorist groups have been
Cuban, Croatian, and Armenian organizations. The aims of such groups
vary, but most include the establishment of autonomous states (for
example, the South Moluccans in the Netherlands have sought the re-
establishment of the short-lived Republic of the South Moluccas, while
Croatian emigrés have aimed at the re-creation of the "independent"
war-time Croat state).   In addition to the restoration of their
ancestral homeland, the Armenian groups want recognition of the Armenian
genocide they allege occurred at the hands of the Turks in 1915-18, and
reparations. It is rare for emigré groups to complement their national-
ist goals with left-wing beliefs and objectives, most being right-wing,
an orientation which (at least until recently) tended to preclude
alliance. ASALA does have a left-wing ideology, which facilitates close
relations with the PLO, whereas the right-wing Justice Commandos of the
Armenian Genocide (JCAG), later known as the Armenian Revolutionary Army
(ARA), shunned other international terrorist connections. A study of
Croatian terrorist groups claimed that they received little help from
left-wing international terrorist groups because of their fascist
antecedents and their narrowly nationalist aims.[141]

107.   As the prospects of emigré groups securing their primary objec-
tives recede, hopelessness may be a catalyst for violence. An Armenian
terrorist leader attributed the inauguration of terrorism in 1975 to
"the general discovery as to the failure of the policy of the tradition-
al Armenian parties."[142] Zvonko Busic claimed that the purpose behind
his 1976 hijacking of a TWA plane was to keep alive the hopes of the
expatriate Croats, and to increase their political awareness, "because
these Croatian people in the United States, Canada, and these countries
are quite simple and uneducated people... They cannot read the news-
papers of these countries... It's just a pretty desperate life..."[143]
As Busic implied, emigré terrorism may also counter assimilationist
tendencies in the emigrés' host societies.

108.   As Post pointed out, "nationalist-secessionists" tend to be
widely known in their communities, and may be lionized for their hero-
ism. Such community support can significantly influence the behaviour
of a terrorist group, not only by motivating the terrorists but also by
facilitating certain types of operation ("barricade" hostage incidents,
as opposed to kidnapping - where the location of captors and captives is
unknown - tend to occur where the terrorists lack popular support or an
underground). But it is a moot question whether emigré groups enjoy the
same degree of "popular support" as other nationalist-autonomist groups,
since their communities are often trying to establish themselves within
a different and larger culture, and are unwilling to defy the norms or
laws of their host communities.   In the wake of terrorist incidents,
community spokesmen often declare understanding of, and sometimes even
sympathy for, the objectives of the terrorists, leaving an ambivalent
image in the minds of the general public. An authority on Armenian
terrorism has claimed that "the Armenian diaspora around the world has
provided a unique, transnational system of contacts and support. Thus,
while the actual terrorists are few in number, they often are able to
draw tacit support from this broader, transnational Armenian communi-
ty."[144]   Over $250,000 in small donations was raised in the United

States to defend the man convicted of murdering a Turkish diplomat in 1982, while some $160,000 was raised in Canada. The ambivalence between support of motives but dislike of methods recurs in statements from Armenian spokesmen. A leading official of the Dashnaks (the Armenian Revolutionary Federation) commented that "If the terrorism is a contributing factor in getting people's attention, I can go along with it", and another spokesman claimed that he was "disturbed" by terrorist acts, but could "understand the motivations behind them".[145]

109.   It is possible that community attitudes become transformed by repeated incidence and by growing anger in the host society. A study of South Moluccan terrorism in the Netherlands reported that the leaders of the South Moluccan community were sympathetic to the 1975 attacks, were embarrassed by the 1977 ones, and evinced no support whatsoever for the gunmen who seized government offices in Drenthe in 1978.[146]

110.   While evidence of support - whether ethnic or ideological - for terrorism can usually be found somewhere, there is also plenty of evidence that ethnic communities reject and even oppose terrorism carried out in the name of their groups. The fact that kidnapping is not one of the tactics of emigré terrorism indicates an unwillingness on the part of the terrorists to test community sympathy. The fact that, outside Lebanon, Armenian terrorist groups apparently operate only in small cells further suggests a lack of complete confidence in community support among that particular strain of emigré terrorism. Another sign of limited or reduced support is the resort to extortion. In May 1982 four Armenians, residents of Toronto, were arrested on charges of extorting money from local Armenians on behalf of ASALA, and similar charges have been made in the United States.

111.   As communities establish themselves in their adopted countries they tend increasingly to eschew violence. Thus, terrorism may well be the handiwork of new arrivals in the emigré communities. An Armenian journal in the United States claimed in 1984 that the Dashnaks - hitherto the preeminent Armenian political organization - had alienated almost all its American-born Armenian members since it turned to terrorism, adding that the party appeared to be under the control of newcomers, mostly from Lebanon.[147] The three Armenians apprehended in the attempt to bomb an Air Canada freight terminal in Los Angeles in May 1982 were all recent immigrants from the Middle East. Gunter claimed that the terrorists probably number less than 1,000 (among more than 6,000,000 Armenians around the world), and

> "are either recent immigrants or living in areas such as Lebanon, where violence is a way of life. Although often tacitly sympathetic, older Armenians, who are more established in their adopted countries, are not normally directly involved."[148]

Similarly, observers have attributed extremism within the Canadian Sikh community to the dislocation experienced by young, recent immigrants.[149]

112.   The favoured tactics of emigré groups are bombing and assassina-
tion.   The emigrés' preference for bombs and bullets is exemplified by a
wave of Croatian bombings in Australia between 1969 and 1972, and by the
Armenian campaign of assassination of Turkish diplomatic personnel
between 1975 and 1983 (by the latter date 25 Turkish officials abroad
had been killed).   Hostage-taking (of the barricade and hijacking,
rather than the kidnapping, varieties) does occur from time to time. It
was tried with the greatest relative frequency by the South Moluccans,
but also enjoyed a modest popularity among Croatian groups.   Armenian
groups, on the other hand, have proved rather inept at hostage-taking.
Anti-Castro Cubans normally resorted to bombing, but also practised
naval operations, attacking marine targets from small boats.

113.   For the most part, the targets of the emigré groups are generally
the citizens (usually diplomatic personnel) and facilities of the home-
land states.   Thus anti-Castro Cubans have often attacked Cuban missions
(especially the consulate in Montréal), Armenians have hit Turkish
diplomats (usually in their cars), Croats have struck at Yugoslav
embassies, and South Moluccans have assailed Indonesian targets.
However, some emigré groups have shown a readiness to switch targets,
whether for organizational or other reasons.   Thus after two Armenian
terrorists were arrested in Switzerland in October 1980, ASALA carried
out 18 bombings against Swiss interests world-wide in an effort to win
their release.   A similar bombing campaign against Switzerland was
launched after the Swiss arrested an ASALA assassin in June 1981, and
the group has also attacked Italy, France, and Canada after those
countries arrested ASALA members or sympathizers.   (By contrast, the
Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, which may be an offshoot of
the Dashnaks, have declared that their "sole targets are Turkish
diplomats and Turkish institutions"[150]).   Up to the mid-1970s the South
Moluccans attacked Indonesian targets, but thereafter shifted their aim
to Dutch ones.

114.   Emigré terrorism has occurred in waves, with Cuban and Croatian
groups active in the 1960s and the early-1970s (another wave of anti-
Castro terrorism erupted in the United States between 1980 and 1983,
when they were credited with 32 acts), South Moluccan terrorism in the
mid- to late-1970s, Armenian terrorism in the early-1980s, and Sikh
terrorism in the mid-1980s.   Currently, international terrorism by
emigré groups appears to be less of a problem, world-wide, than at
almost any time since 1970, although domestic terrorism on the part of
one or two-notably the Sikhs in India - may be far deadlier (with the
exception of the Cubans, "first generation" emigré groups rarely
launched attacks in their homeland).

115.   Once among the most active terrorists in North America, the anti-
Castro Cubans were crippled by arrests in 1982-83, and have been quies-
cent since.   South Moluccan and Croatian terrorism have been largely at
a standstill since the late-1970s.   Armenian terrorism, once described
by a senior American official as "one of the most dangerous and most
neglected of all terrorist movements",[151] built up to a peak of 47 inci-
dents in 1981 and has been in apparent retreat since.   An indiscriminate
attack at Orly Airport in July 1983, in which ASALA was involved,

exacerbated strains within the group, and between it and its supporting "popular movements", with devastating effects.[152]   ASALA apparently split into a militant faction and a more moderate faction in 1983, and a long-simmering feud between the Dashnaks and ASALA broke into open violence in 1984.   A Rand study attributed an "abrupt suspension" of Armenian terrorism in the United States after 1982 to the heavy sentence imposed on the JCAG member who murdered the Turkish consul-general in Los Angeles, and to the arrests in October 1982 of five other Armenians who were en route from Los Angeles to Philadelphia on a bombing mission.[153]   ASALA was also badly affected by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which forced it to transfer its base of operations to Syria. Syrian oversight has also quite possibly contributed to a reduction in Armenian terrorism, since Damascus has apparently not wanted to undermine Turkish-Syrian relations, a policy which may be revised if Turkey's relations with Iraq improve.   There are signs that ASALA may be reestablishing its base in Lebanon, a move which might be the catalyst for renewed terrorism.   Despite the high level of violence in the Punjab over the past decade, Sikh separatist groups (such as the Babbar Khalsa and the Khalistan Liberation Front) resort to international terrorism fairly rarely and have been relatively quiescent during the past year.

116.   Yet another category of nationalist-ethnic terrorism is that which is basically reactive to perceived threats (some of them terrorist) to national or cultural groups.   The Jewish Defence League (JDL) - founded in 1968 - believes that violence is necessary to protect Jewish rights and support Israel.   It has engaged in mainly low level and symbolic acts, often directed against the Soviet Union.   Other groups are more explicitly counter-terrorist (like the Ulster groups, discussed earlier).   They range from the anti-communist Alsa Masa in the Philippines to right-wing death squads in Latin America (the White Warrior Union of El Salvador, the para-military Mano Blanca in Guatemala, and so on).   One group - the Anti-terrorism ETA in Spain - even named itself after its terrorist target.

117.   The philosophy of counter-terrorist groups was expressed in 1981 by the chairman of the Ulster Defence Association: "We are a counter-terrorist organisation.   The only way we'll get peace here is to terrorize the terrorists."[154]   Their favoured tactic is assassination, but their targeting is often so arbitrary (ranging from suspected terrorists to anyone of liberal tendencies or belonging to the wrong cultural or communal groups) that their violence constitutes terrorism in its proper sense.   Because they generally seek to defend the status quo, counter-terrorist groups rarely resort to international terrorism, but aid workers from other countries run the risk of attack.

118.   Despite the apparent lull in the activities of many nationalist-autonomist groups, several analysts have noted that this type of terrorism has done better, in terms of achieving the long-range goals of the groups concerned, than has revolutionary terrorism.[155]   From a Canadian perspective, it is noteworthy that a study of terrorism in the United States has found that emigré groups are better able than left-wing groups to spawn successor generations.[156]

119.   Right-Wing Groups: Throughout the 1970s terrorism in both Western Europe and North America was largely a left-wing phenomenon, and right-wing terrorism was considered a less serious threat. A series of bombings that occurred in Italy, West Germany, and France in 1980, and the growing evidence of the existence of a well-organized network of extremist right-wing groups in the United States, have begun to alter this perception. In fact, German government statistics show that there were 1269 right-wing attacks (murders, bombings, fire-bombings, incidents with injuries, robberies and thefts, violations of public order and acts of resistance, dangerous attacks on transportation systems, and wilful destruction and rioting) in the Federal Republic in 1984 and 1604 in 1985, compared with 83 and 69 respectively by left-wing groups.[157]

120.   Although right-wing terrorist groups have tended to evolve from existing and relatively long-established political and (in the United States) religious movements, their resort to violence is generally a recent phenomenon, dating from the late-1970s. Only the French groups appear to have sprung from nowhere, although they too did not make their appearance until 1978.

121.   In spite of the arrest of key members of right-wing groups in the United States, Germany, and elsewhere, such organizations do seem to have spawned successor groups. Numerically, the right-wing groups were fairly strong in the mid-1980s. The number of right-wing extremists in Germany is thought to have increased from 1300 persons in 1982 to 1420 in 1985,[158] while there were thought to be between 2000 and 5000 "hard-core activists" in the United States in 1985, with from 14,000 to 50,000 sympathizers.[159] Unlike most leftist terrorists, right-wing terrorists (in the United States, at least) generally do not appear to be full-time activists living underground. Right-wing terrorists largely come from the lower social classes, and their lack of access to desirable jobs makes them susceptible to the explanations and solutions proposed by extreme groups.

122.   The social recruitment pattern characteristic of right-wing groups accounts in part for their limited political articulation. Right-wing terrorists in Europe appear to have no clear-cut ideology, sharing instead racism, nationalism, anti-semitism, and xenophobia. A common objective of such groups is the overthrow of the established governments in their respective countries, and their replacement by authoritarian regimes. A leftist spokesman in Germany explained the links between the radical right and left in his country on the grounds that they were "not so far apart ideologically... Our common goal is the destruction of society."[160] The mid-range objective of right-wing terrorists generally appears to be the creation of a climate of disorder and despair, which would lead to a public demand for the restoration of law and order.   Interestingly, German right-wing extremists have exploited populist causes such as the environment and the nuclear arms race, as well as more characteristic issues, such as immigrant workers, in order to enlarge their following.

123.   "The right-wing terrorists' favorite weapon is the bomb."[161] Used indiscriminately, bombs not only attract attention to the

terrorists and their causes, but also promote the appearance of anarchy. In Italy, where there were a number of right-wing coup plots in the early-1970s, terrorists have bombed public places (usually associated with the railway system) where high casualties could be anticipated. Comparison of right- and left-wing tactics in West Germany demonstrate the right-wing's predilection for bombing:[162]

Table 3

Left/Right Tactics in FRG, 1984-85

| | Right-Wing Groups | | Left-Wing Groups | |
	1984	1985	1984	1985
Murders	0(0%)	2(1%)	1(2%)	2(4%)
Bombings and fire-bombings	219(77%)	292(76%)	12(21%)	11(24%)
Incidents with injuries	65(23%)	88(23%)	44(77%)	33(72%)
Total	284(100%)	382(100%)	57(100%)	46(100%)

Bombings are also popular among American right-wing terrorists - especially anti-abortion activists - while assassination and assault are relatively uncommon. Vandalism and robbery are characteristic, too, of right-wing groups.

124. Unlike left-wing terrorism, which has generally been targeted against specific individuals or institutions, right-wing operations often demonstrate a high degree of indiscrimination, an approach calcu- lated to provoke anger and fear. However, attacks are not invariably indiscriminate. In France right-wing extremists have tended to attack Jewish-owned property and businesses or Arab and African students' and workers' associations. In Germany refugee shelters and immigrant workers' hostels have been attacked, as have NATO and American military targets (a tactic shared with left-wing groups). Even in Italy, where bloody attacks on trains and stations imply indiscrimination, many of the targets have left-wing associations, and the desire to create a climate of collapse has apparently been offset by an aversion to incurring too much opprobrium. Shortly after the deadly Bologna explo- sion (August 1980), which killed 86 persons and injured 270, a caller claimed that the Armed Revolutionary Nucleus (NAR) was responsible, but when the full magnitude of the bombing became known another caller denied NAR involvement. (Similarly, a German group denied responsibili- ty for the 1980 Munich Oktoberfest bombing, which killed 14 people, even though one of the dead was a group member who was thought to have planted the bomb and been killed by its premature detonation[163]).

125. The tendency to dismiss right-wing terrorism as little more than uniform and weapon fetishism has been belied by the events of the 1980s, but it is still unclear whether right-wing extremism is a growing or

receding phenomenon. A German expert on terrorism recently claimed that "Extreme right terrorism has lost its motivation and no longer represents any immediate danger... The terrorist activities of neo-nazis decreased decisively in 1984 and 1985..."[164] However, German government statistics indicate that serious incidents involving right-wing groups increased in 1985 by 26% over 1984, and that rightist violence far exceeded that of the left (by 387 incidents to 48 during 1985, in the following categories: murders, bombings, fire-bombings, incidents with injuries, and robberies and thefts[165]).

126.   American right-wing terrorists are not only violent, but also well-trained in the use of arms and explosives, are skilled armourers and bomb-makers, and are adept at guerrilla warfare techniques and outdoor survival. However, in June 1987 the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith reported that the various American right-wing groups (such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Order, Posse Comitatus, and the Aryan Nations) were weaker than they had been for many years, largely owing to a federal crack-down on such groups.[166]

TERRORIST TACTICS

127.   Something has already been said about terrorist tactics (and targets) in relation to the goals and ideologies of the differing types of terrorist groups. The present section will examine those tactics in greater detail. Allowing for definitional variation, the principal terrorist activities have been: bombing, assassination, hostage-taking (standard, barricade, and hijacking), and assault. According to the State Department, in 1985 bombing, armed attack (including assassination), hostage-taking/barricade/kidnapping, and hijacking constituted 81% of international terrorist incidents (arson comprised a further 13%).[167]

128.   While there has been a remarkable uniformity in terrorist tactics over the past two decades, there has been evidence of a contagion effect, with specific incidents triggering a tactical fashion. For example, in 1971 a Canadian initiated a wave of parachute hijackings, and one bomb threat was followed by a series of such threats against Canadian and other airlines in the summer of 1971. The Iranian seizure of the United States embassy in Tehran in 1979 prompted imitation - in 1979 a record total of 26 embassies and consulates around the world were occupied, and a further dozen were taken over in the first two months of 1980.

Bombing

129.   Bombing is undoubtedly the favourite tactic of terrorists, accounting for 51% of all international terrorist incidents in 1985, the same proportion as in 1984, and comparable with the rate for the period 1968-80 (53.6%*).[168]

---

* If the threat, conspiracy, and hoax categories are excluded from the State Department's tabulations for the period 1968-80 (as they are in the more recent reports), then bombing represents an even higher proportion (65.0%) of the incidents in the 13-year period. Rand data for the period 1968-82 indicate that bombing represented 48.3% of all terrorist incidents.[169]

130.   There are important organizational and tactical explanations for the preeminence of bombing. The requisite materials are relatively easy to procure, some knowledge of at least primitive explosives is widespread, the risks (other than of premature detonation) are relatively small, compared with other terrorist tactics, and little organization is needed to attack many of the targets selected by terrorists. Thus bombings - particularly those directed against "soft" targets (such as universities or offices) - are often the hallmarks of fledgling guerrilla or terrorist organizations as they seek to attract publicity and recruits. Such efforts are useful in training, and in developing self-confidence among, the first group of recruits. For example, the majority of ASALA's attacks in its early, organizational years (1975-79) were bombings. Thereafter, while bombings continued, ASALA increasingly turned its hand to assassination and, probably only once, to the occupation of an embassy (in Paris in 1981). Some groups - among them right-wing German groups, the Weather Underground, the FALN, and Action Directe - have largely confined their activities to bombing. In the mid-1980s greater indiscrimination began to be evident in terrorist bomb attacks, culminating in a wave of bombings in public places in France in 1986.

131.   However, the risk of premature detonation is a drawback, and has probably played a role in modifying terrorist tactics by encouraging the use of incendiary devices. Some of the cruder bombs are so simple to make that they induce complacency among inexperienced terrorists, sometimes with dire consequences. Of the 106 IRA members who died between 1969 and 1973, 44(42%) were blown up by their own bombs.[170] The explosion (allegedly due to a carelessly-handled cigarette) which killed three Weathermen at their Greenwich Village headquarters in 1970 also devastated the organization. Although it has carried out some bombings since 1970, it ceased to pose a serious threat after the loss of these key members.

132.   Tactically, bombing has symbolic, disruptive, and coercive elements. Typically, blast or concussion bombs are used for shock effect in urban centres, gatherings, and so on. Incendiary bombs are used as a sabotage device (often in campaigns of economic warfare) or as symbols of the inadequacy of security forces. Car bombs are often used in assassinations or massacres.

133.   The use of bombs as a coercive instrument in a campaign of economic warfare can place a heavy burden on the state. In the 1987 North Atlantic Assembly report on terrorism it was stated that since 1969 the British government has paid out more than $140 million in compensation for death and injury and $800 million for property damage caused by IRA terrorism.[171] Economic warfare is generally domestic in orientation, but inevitably foreign businessmen, facilities, and investment are affected. Terrorists are certainly aware of the repercussions on foreigners and foreign investment of their activities. In 1983 Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein, told an interviewer: "I think certainly that some IRA actions have had the effect of keeping away outside investment, and I think that's what they were aimed to do."[172] Tourism, a major source of revenue for many countries, has frequently attracted terrorist attention. A number of groups, including the Abu Nidal group,

launched an anti-tourism campaign in 1985-86, and the State Department estimated that Europe lost $1 billion in tourist revenue in 1985.[173] In 1986 the State Department published a report on terrorist attacks on American business abroad which indicated that many of the world's major terrorist groups targeted American business interests, and that bombing was the primary tactic used in such attacks.[174]

134.   Many bomb attacks, particularly those conducted by fledgling terrorist groups, are largely symbolic in their targeting and motivation. An example of such symbolism was the abortive 1965 attempt, by several Québec separatists and American black militants, to blow up the Statue of Liberty's torch-bearing arm as a means of attracting world attention to the plight of American blacks. Action Directe rarely makes specific demands, but bombs (and shoots) the symbols of what it opposes. The rocket attacks directed at the imperial palace in Tokyo, and at the opening ceremony of the 1986 Tokyo summit, appear to have been intended to signal the defiance of Japanese terrorists, and the security forces' inability to guarantee protection of even the most important dignitaries.

135.   To be coercive rather than merely symbolic, bombing needs to be conducted in waves. Thus, after the arrest in Switzerland of two Armenian terrorists in October 1980, ASALA launched a bombing campaign against Swiss targets world-wide, in an effort to win their release. Similarly, the deadly wave of bombings in Paris after December 1985 was apparently intended to secure the release of several convicted or suspected terrorists held in France. In February 1986 two Abu Nidal members were released to an unnamed country.

136.   A significant proportion of terrorist bombings is directed against security force targets, and thus has limited international implications. The PIRA are notable practitioners of such tactics, often using command-wire bombs, planted weeks in advance, to attack patrols, and also using truck-mounted multiple mortars to strike at police stations.

Assassination

137.   If threats, conspiracies, and hoaxes are discounted, assassination has usually been second in frequency behind bombing as a terrorist tactic during the past two decades (if the different types of hostage-taking are not aggregated). State Department data indicate that 6.6% of all terrorist actions (including threats, conspiracies, hoaxes, exotic pollution, theft, arms smuggling, shoot-outs with police, and so on) between 1968 and 1980 were assassination attempts, and the proportion tended to rise in the early-1980s (after 1984 it is difficult to disaggregate assassination attempts from other tactics recorded in the State Department reports, since they were subsumed under other categories, notably armed attack).[175]   Rand data show that of the major terrorist tactics, assassination accounted for 12.4% of all incidents between 1968 and 1982.[176] Some groups have demonstrated a particular

propensity for assassination, among them the INLA, ASALA, and the Abu Nidal group.

138.   Assassination is the selective and discriminating tactic of terrorism, and has a long historical pedigree. Directed against rulers, government officials, and the like, traditionally it was fairly selective, in part because the arms at the disposal of terrorists were basically short-range weapons (knives, pistols, and grenades or bombs), requiring the direct action of the terrorist and therefore tending to be used against intended targets. Despite the greater range and lethality of modern weapons, and the capability for remote operation of some of them,* the terrorist assassinations of the past two decades have tended to follow traditional patterns. The vast majority were effected by small arms, at close range, a classic example being the assassination by Black September of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tell in Cairo in November 1971.

139.   A favoured tactic of modern assassins is to shoot their victims while the latter are in their cars, often when stopped at red lights. Bombs have been used as a weapon of assassination, but while they pose greater risk than do firearms to passers-by (in the case of car-bombs in particular), they too can be used selectively, as the murder of Lebanese Prime Minister Rashid Karami in June 1987 indicates.

140.   Thus assassination remains the discriminating tactic of terrorism, in general intended less to instill generalized fear or outrage among the population (as bombing, assault, and hostage-taking tend to do) than to neutralize a particular group, to remove a threat or an unpopular figure, or to exact revenge. There is also a symbolic element to assassination. This is evident in Armenian attacks on Turkish diplomats, although such attacks also contain strong coercive elements. Similarly, victims and would-be victims of a series of shooting attacks by Action Directe in 1985-86 were all symbols of France's governmental and business establishment.

Assault

141. There is a wide variety of actions which may be grouped under the rubric of assault. These range from "disciplinary" or extortionate acts directed against individuals (such as knee-capping or leg-shooting), through attacks on embassies and other facilities, to the massacre of numbers of people in synagogues, restaurants, and airports. Between 1968 and 1980 (a period in which CIA data distinguished between "armed attacks" and assassination) 4.1% of all incidents of international terrorism comprised armed attacks. After a slight decline in 1981, and a considerable one in 1982, the proportion was higher in 1983 and 1985 (reflecting in part the inclusion of assassinations), and rocketed in 1984 to 23.3%.[177]

---

* Distance is thought to reduce inhibitions against killing.

142.   As a tactic, sanguinary assault (massacre) appears to be favoured by such groups as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Abu Nidal organization. Operating under a variety of names, the latter group has struck frequently at embassies, synagogues, tourist hotels, restaurants and cafés, and airline offices, usually in the Mediterranean region. Among the more notorious massacres carried out by Abu Nidal personnel have been the grenade and machine gun attack on the Goldenberg restaurant in Paris in August 1982 (six people were killed, 22 wounded), and the almost simultaneous shooting and grenade attacks on El Al check-in desks at Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985, in which 20 people were killed and 101 wounded. The group is thought to have been involved in the machine gun attack on an Istanbul synagogue in September 1986, in which 22 persons were killed.   It has also been implicated in the Karachi hijacking incident in September 1986, in which 19 persons were killed and 127 wounded. Low-level assault has been used by the PIRA against informers, by the Red Brigades and Prima Linea against specific occupational groups (for example, in 1978-79 a considerable number of academics, journalists, and business representatives were shot in the legs), and by the ETA as a means of extorting money from Basque industrialists.

Hostage-Taking

143.   Taken separately, the different categories of hostage-taking- kidnapping, barricade-hostage events, and hijacking (on land and at sea, as well as in the air) - constitute a smaller proportion of inter- national terrorist incidents than assassination and assault. Grouped together, however, they constituted 10.7% of all incidents in the period 1968-80, a proportion which, with a cyclical variation every two years, showed relative stability in the first half of the 1980s (it was 12.3% in 1985, but the proportion would have been comparable to that for 1968-80 if the threat, conspiracy, and hoax categories had been excluded for the earlier period).[178] Rand data for the period 1968-82 show that, of the 2670 incidents recorded under a more restrictive typology than that of the CIA/State Department (Rand's categories were: kidnapping, attacks on installations, hijacking, hostage-taking, bombing, assassination, and other), hostage-taking events comprised 24.3% of the whole.[179]

144.   As a tactic, hostage-taking (and particularly kidnapping, in which the warring groups in Lebanon specialize) is especially favoured in the Middle East, where hostage-taking events comprised 5.9% of all international terrorist incidents, world-wide, in 1985 (and 3.5% in 1984).   Groups in Sub-Saharan Africa are showing a new propensity for kidnapping, and Latin American groups, which have the strongest regional tradition in this tactic, continue to practise it, as the kidnapping of a Canadian employee of Occidental Petroleum in Colombia in March 1987 testifies.   Regionally, barricade-hostage incidents and skyjacking have shown much variation in the 1980s, with Western Europe and Latin America being, on the whole, the primary venues of barricade-hostage events. North America, Latin America, and the Middle East are the principal localities where skyjacks occur.

145.   Hostage-taking incidents, and in particular barricade-hostage and hijacking events, are well-adapted to a world of sophisticated communications;   media attention has made publicity a major objective of the captors.   The present wave of political hostage-taking may be said to have originated in Latin America, and initially appears largely to have been intended for publicity, rather than as a means of coercion.   Such "pranks" as the kidnapping of world racing champion Juan Fangio in Havana in 1958 were romanticized by the press.   In June 1958 Raul Castro seized 47 Americans and three Canadians in the area of the Sierra Cristal in Cuba, and in a letter to an American correspondent he stated that the kidnappings were intended to "attract world opinion in general, and that of the United States in particular..."[180] The Kurdish kidnappers of a Canadian aid worker in Iraq in 1982 stated that that incident, and similar ones, was aimed at breaking "the barriers of the world media..."[181] Since the early years of modern terrorism, hostage-takers' demands - with the exception of those made by groups (Kurds, Sudanese, Eritreans, and so on) with particularly low international profiles - have been coercive rather than publicity-oriented. This was clearly evident in the rash of commercial kidnappings in Latin America in the mid-1970s and in the wave of kidnappings in Beirut in the mid-1980s.   Nonetheless, as a 1977 Rand study on hostage-taking found, publicity remains a major goal, explicit or implicit, in the terrorists' actions.[182] The Rand study also found that in two-thirds of hostage-taking incidents occurring between 1968 and 1975, where recorded demands were made, the terrorists directed those demands solely at the local government, and that the release of prisoners was the principal demand in two-thirds of such cases.

146.   While modern communications facilitate, and to that degree presumably stimulate, certain types of terrorist activity, political hostage-taking clearly ante-dates the television age.   An early example of the barricade-hostage incident occurred in August 1896 when Dashnak revolutionaries seized a bank in Constantinople and made twelve demands on behalf of Armenians.   In 1904 a Morocccan bandit seized a Greek-American and a British citizen, and made a number of political demands, to some of which the sultan acceded.   The first recorded skyjacking occurred in Peru in 1931, when an American pilot was captured by rebel troops in a bid to drop propaganda leaflets over Lima.

147.   Kidnapping: In standard kidnappings the location of the captor(s) and the hostage(s) is normally initially unknown to the security forces, and the emphasis is on extortion or coercion rather than on publicity. The Rand hostage study found that standard kidnapping tactics are more likely in countries where the terrorists are operating on home terrain and have an underground organization. Barricade-hostage incidents are more likely to occur when terrorists are operating abroad or in a domestic environment where an effective underground is lacking. Although published a decade ago, more current statistics appear to verify the Rand study, in that kidnapping incidents far outnumber barricade-hostage events in Latin America, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia and the Pacific, whereas barricade-hostage events preponderate over kidnappings in North America, Western Europe, and Eastern Europe and the USSR.

148.   Kidnappings appear to require the participation of greater
numbers of abductors than do barricade-hostage incidents, and pose the
problem that it is generally difficult to obtain more than one hostage.
However, these disadvantages are offset by the frequently longer dura-
tion of a kidnapping, which offers the potential for renewable publici-
ty, an increased coercive leverage, and a relative immunity from hostage
negotiating techniques.   Although barricade-hostage incidents briefly
exceeded kidnappings in popularity among terrorists between 1980 and
1983, over-all kidnappings have preponderated over barricade-hostage
events by a ratio of three-to-one during the past two decades, and their
ratio is rising (in 1985 kidnappings constituted 11.1% of the incidents
reported by the State Department, and hijacking and barricade - hostage
incidents only 1.2% combined).   The most popular targets of kidnappers
have always been American citizens, but the Lebanese militias have
recently shown themselves to be quite eclectic in their choices of
victims.

149.   <u>Barricade-Hostage Incidents</u>: In barricade-hostage incidents the
hostage-takers either make no attempt to reach a hideout, or are
prevented from doing so, and are thus surrounded in a public place.
Embassies are frequent targets of this tactic.   A Rand study[183]
documents 48 embassy take-over attempts which occurred between February
1971 and April 1980, and more have occurred since then.   Among the
better-known embassy hostage incidents might be included: the
occupation of the Saudi Arabian embassy in the Sudan (March 1973), the
seizure of the German embassy in Sweden (April 1975), the take-over of
the United States embassy in Iran (November 1979), the seizure of the
Dominican Republic embassy in Colombia (February 1980), the capture of
the Iranian embassy in London (April 1980), and the attack on the
Turkish embassy in Ottawa (March 1985).   The Rand embassy study found
that up to mid-1980 Palestinian groups were the most prolific in seizing
embassies, followed by various groups in El Salvador.   Most of the
seizures occurred in Latin America, followed by Western Europe and the
Middle East.   In the first half of the 1970s half of the embassy
take-overs occurred outside their perpetrators' home countries, but in
the second half most occurred domestically.   In rather more than half
the cases where demands were made, they were directed to the host
country, and in just over a quarter of the cases they were directed to
the government whose embassy had been seized.   The most common demand
was for the release of prisoners.   Finally, the study found that embassy
takeovers by small groups more frequently involved violence.[184]

150.   Embassy take-overs have enjoyed a modest popularity among emigré
groups, particularly among Croatian terrorists in the 1970s.   Armenian
groups tried their hand at it in Paris in 1981, in Lisbon in 1983, and
in Ottawa in 1985, but the attacks were characterized by ill-planned
violence or poorly-specified demands.   All were terminated rather
hastily, suggesting that hostage-taking is not a tactic at which the
Armenians are particularly adept.

151.   <u>Hijacking</u>: The illegal seizure of public transportation (parti-
cularly aircraft) poses the most acute dilemma for governments, given
its international ramifications, the publicity involved, the increasing
willingness of terrorists to expedite negotiations by selective murders,

and the frequently excessive demands of the hijackers. By comparison, the demand for political asylum, so characteristic of the skyjackings which took place between 1947 and the early-1970s, was relatively acceptable. In the mid-1970s it was hoped that the problem was on the wane, but such expectations have been confounded by the events of the past half-dozen years, and governments have reacted with increasing forcefulness to skyjacking incidents. However, commando actions do not seem to be a completely effective deterrent, as the Abu Nidal operation at Karachi in September 1986, following the bloody Valetta incident in November 1985, appears to demonstrate.

152.   The problem of distinguishing personal and criminal motivations from political ones creates difficulty in assessing the scale of the hijacking problem. The CIA and State Department annual reports indicate that between 1968 and 1985 a total of 252 hijackings occurred (by land, sea, and air), with most taking place in the Middle East, followed by Latin America and Western Europe. (The vast majority of these incidents involved the hijacking of aircraft, but passenger liners - notably the Portuguese Santa Maria in 1961 and the Italian Achille Lauro in 1985 - buses, and other means of transportation have been taken over by terrorist groups). According to the American Department of State Bulletin (1982), there were 684 actual or attempted skyjackings between January 1968 and June 1982, of which 108 (16%) were designated terrorist. The Bulletin noted that more than one-third of the terrorist skyjackings resulted in casualties.[185] The number of attempted skyjackings reached its apogee in 1969-70, dropped by more than half by 1973, remained relatively constant throughout the remainder of the 1970s, and then showed a disturbing increase in the early-1980s. American carriers have been the most frequently attacked, but British, German, and Israeli airliners have also been recurring targets.

153.   Many of the early wave of skyjackings were individual efforts, personally-motivated, and were thus relatively amenable to the remedial actions taken by governments and airlines (such as the introduction of sky-marshals, improved airport screening, and bilateral and multilateral agreements). The upsurge of terrorist skyjacking in the 1980s probably reflects, in varying degrees, complacency,* technological advances in the weaponry available to hijackers, government collusion, and effective planning and ruthless implementation on the part of terrorist groups.

New Technology Terrorism

154.   As was noted earlier in this report, there has been widespread fear that terrorists would resort to new tactics, embodying recent or long-established but unused technological developments, to increase the scale of their attacks dramatically. Such fears have usually centred on the possibility of terrorists resorting to nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. However, concerns have also been raised regarding the increased use of existing weapons technologies (surface-to-air missiles,

---

*   A recent report by Control Risks Information Services claimed that "many international airports fail to meet even elementary security standards."[186]

plastic explosives, barometric bombs, and so on) to inflict heavy casualties. Other worrying possibilities include a resort to "white collar terrorism" (attacks on telecommunications, data processing systems, and so forth) to produce massive disruption, and - less directly linked with technological change, but representing potential new departures nonetheless - product contamination and "narco-terrorism."

155. The vulnerability of modern societies has frequently been noted: systemic interdependence and technology have created targets whose disruption can have enormous direct and indirect consequences. The first order effects - in terms of casualties and damage - of attacks on such targets as power grids, pipelines, LNG tankers, aqueducts and reservoirs, communications, transportation and information facilities, and food distribution systems can be compounded by panic, disruption, and disease.

156. <u>Nuclear Terrorism:</u> The public fear of nuclear weapons and of nuclear energy has an echo in the field of terrorism. A poll of 1346 opinion leaders in the United States (reported in 1984) found that "while a war between the superpowers... is a real cause for concern, [a disastrous nuclear incident involving terrorists in this country] seems... to be the most imminent danger."[187]

157. Despite the concern, the incidence of nuclear-related terrorist acts has remained low. Although the explosion, by terrorists, of a nuclear device has been threatened, no such event has yet occurred. However, there have been many low-level incidents of nuclear terrorism. During the 1970s there were over a dozen terrorist attacks against nuclear facilities (notably in Argentina, France, Spain, and South Africa), and in January 1982 terrorists hit a French nuclear reactor with four RPG-7 missiles (damage was minimal). Between May 1969 and December 1977 there were 285 acts or threats of violence against licensed and unlicensed nuclear facilities in the United States (86% of the incidents were bomb threats).[188] A 1974 A-bomb threat against the Capitol in Washington, D.C., in an attempt to extort $10 million of food for the hungry in the United States, exemplifies the coercive potential offered by the fear of nuclear weapons. Fissionable material has also been used as a radioactive poison. In 1974 a lone terrorist, protesting prison conditions in Austria, dispersed radioactive materials in two trains, resulting in several persons becoming ill. Lengthy as the list of (generally low-level) nuclear-related incidents is, in 1985 Jenkins stated that their number had declined sharply in the previous two years, while nuclear hoaxes had virtually ceased.[189]

158. Experts are sharply divided on the capability of terrorists to build and explode a nuclear device. For instance, there is disagreement about the technical capacity to make an atomic bomb. One veteran staff member of the Los Alamos plant calculated that a minimum of six well-trained people, representing just the right specialties, are needed to construct one,[190] yet a number of experiments have shown that nuclear devices can be designed and constructed on the basis of unclassified information and at a moderately small cost.

159.   Whatever the level and availability of the technical skills required, some terrorism analysts, like Jenkins, argue that, while there are a few engineers and scientists within the ranks of contemporary terrorist groups, most terrorists have social science or humanities backgrounds, "which may explain why terrorists thus far have not carried out more technically demanding operations"[191].   However, in February 1977 the West German government disclosed that one of its most prominent nuclear physicists, who had access to all blueprints for nuclear power plants in the country, had had frequent contacts with several internationally-sought terrorists over a period of at least six months during 1975-76.   In 1987 the General Accounting Office in the United States reported that a senior laboratory technician, with a top security clearance at an American nuclear facility, had been accused of selling classified documents and uranium to the PLO.[192]

160.   Disagreement also exists as to the facility with which terrorists can acquire adequate amounts of weapons-grade material, the theft or diversion of which would require extensive resources.   Yet the protection accorded nuclear facilities has attracted considerable criticism, both in the United States and elsewhere.   A 1978 CIA report identified Western Europe's nuclear storage depots as "the most vulnerable and therefore most likely targets for future terrorist activity."[193]   The constant requirement to transport nuclear materials, by air, sea, truck, and railway, poses a serious security risk, as the theft (allegedly by the Israelis) of a cargo of uranium from a West German freighter in 1968 demonstrated.[194]   In 1976 it was reported that the United States government was unable to trace at least 6,000 pounds of weapons-grade material, enough to construct at least 75 crude nuclear weapons,[195] and by 1981 the figure had climbed to at least 9,000 pounds.[196]   Whether or not terrorist groups, on their own, can acquire the capability for nuclear terrorism (technical expertise, weapons-grade materials, construction facilities, and so on), the appearance during the past decade of state sponsorship seems likely to facilitate such acquisition.

161.   Whatever the actual or potential capability of terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons or to attack nuclear targets, it is greatly influenced by their willingness to undertake such a step.   There is a considerable body of opinion which contends that terrorist use of nuclear weapons would be counter-productive and is therefore unlikely: "...from what former terrorists tell us, terrorists themselves apparently contemplate such activity rarely, if at all.   Terrorists see what they do now as sufficient."[197]   For over a decade Jenkins has downplayed the threat of nuclear terrorism, arguing that terrorists operate on the principle of using the minimum force necessary - they want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead (less than 1% of the thousands of terrorist incidents occurring in the two decades prior to 1985 involved 10 or more fatalities).   Thus, although the 2nd of June Movement considered the possibility of nuclear extortion, the German terrorist group aimed their attacks against the construction of nuclear power plants and supply industry facilities, and at high-tension poles, but they made no attacks of any kind against operating nuclear power plants: "In their 'handbooks,' the terrorists recommend against sabotage of

operating nuclear power plants leading to radiological hazards to the population."[198]

162.   There are also practical considerations militating against nuclear terrorism. Any decision to resort to "superviolence"may erode consensus and cohesion within a group, and expose it to defection and betrayal. Furthermore, terrorists tend to attack "soft" targets. An analysis of over 4,500 terrorist incidents in the United States indicated that in less than 1% of the total was there a small guard force involved, and that over 60% of all bombs were placed outside the target.[199]

163.   On the other hand, time, brutalization, state sponsorship, communal tensions, escalation requirements, and other factors may erode the constraints of political legitimacy. At the beginning of the 1970s terrorists concentrated their attacks as much on property as on people, but in the 1980s United States government statistics indicate that terrorist attacks have increasingly been directed against people, and there has been a growing number of acts of large-scale indiscriminate violence. In 1976 a CIA study warned that

> "...while most groups will probably continue to be deterred by both moral considerations and calculations of the risk involved, the danger that a fanatic few might resort to weapons of mass destruction will increase... Such weapons might include nuclear bombs, but more likely would involve chemical, biological and radiological agents. In contrast to nuclear devices, many of these are at present relatively easy to acquire. Hence the danger that they could turn up in the hands of the sort of ultraradical or psychopathic fringe group that would have the fewest compunctions about using them is very real."[200]

164.   A 1987 conference on terrorist psychology, held in Washington, D.C., was told that while mass destruction terrorism would not suit the goals of most kinds of terrorist, it would appeal to certain groups. Among these might be included groups which subscribe to messianic or apocalyptic visions, and which believe that the kind of order they wish to see established in the world requires a great catastrophe.[201]

165.   Biological and Chemical Terrorism: Much of what has been said of nuclear terrorism, especially with regard to motivation, applies equally to the use of biological and chemical agents. And as in the case of nuclear terrorism, low-level incidents of biological and chemical terrorism have occurred. In 1972 members of an American right-wing group were apprehended (quite fortuitously) in Chicago with some 80 pounds of typhoid bacillus, which they had apparently intended to introduce into the water systems of Chicago, St. Louis, and other mid-Western cities. In 1975 technical military manuals on germ warfare were found in a Symbionese Liberation Army hideout. In the same year German authorities were warned that mustard gas, stolen from an ammunition bunker in the country, would be used against the population of Stuttgart unless all political prisoners were granted immunity. In 1976 American

postal authorities intercepted a package, presumably mailed by an Arab terrorist group, containing a small charge designed to explode a vial of nerve gas when the package was opened.[202] In 1980 Paris police raided a hideout rented by the RAF, and discovered a secret laboratory that had been used to produce botulinal toxin. Shortly after, another RAF safe house was discovered in Germany, inside which several hundred kilograms of organophosphorous compounds were found, leading the authorities to speculate that the group was trying to develop a chemical-biological warfare capability.[203] Finally, in 1986 the personal secretary of Indian guru Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh pleaded guilty to causing the salmonella poisoning of about 700 people. While possibly not a politically-motivated act, nor one with international ramifications, this incident demonstrates the potential for biological terrorism.

166. For the terrorist, biological and chemical weapons have the advantage over nuclear weapons that they are technically less demanding while still evoking great fear. The raw materials for many chemical agents are commercially available, and their manufacture is within the capability of a person with some technical knowledge. In 1978 it was reported that "terrorists wanting to make deadly nerve gases can still find the formulas at the British Library despite attempts by the Government to remove them from public access."[204] But delivery poses a difficulty for terrorists, in that testing would be highly problematical, and it might be anticipated that a large proportion of the agent would be lost during dissemination. This problem (along with others) has led one analyst to conclude that an attack on a select population (such as the occupants of an office building or a large auditorium) is more credible than a chemical mass destruction attack.[205]

167. Biological terrorism is also technologically possible, and some warfare agents, such as brucellosis, are apparently easy to acquire, cultivate, and disseminate.[206] However, it has been pointed out that a reasonable attempt at manufacture and employment of a biological agent would take a wide range of technical skills, probably requiring a group of at least three to five members, with a full range of capabilities, resources, and operational experience.[207] Aerosols constitute one of the most effective means for the dispersal of biological agents, but there are a number of problems associated with aerosol delivery, among them the survival of the agent long enough to infect the intended target. Furthermore, such seemingly lucrative targets as water supply systems are apparently less vulnerable than is commonly supposed.[208] Nonetheless, Mullen has suggested that biological agents pose a more credible mass destruction threat than do chemical agents.[209]

168. As in the case of nuclear devices or radiological agents, the question of terrorist willingness to use biological and chemical agents as mass destruction weapons arises. The desire for political legitimacy acts as a considerable constraint on their use, particularly on the employment of chemical weapons, whose application has been widely condemned by public opinion and proscribed by treaty. Terrorists have retaliated against corporations for chemical spills and industrial accidents, adding to the restraints they may feel on using such weapons. While sponsoring governments may facilitate the acquisition by terrorists of a biological-chemical weapons capability, they are also

likely to impose limitations on the deployment of mass destruction weapons in order to preclude really severe countermeasures on the part of victimized states.

169.   It is significant that while the capacity for a chemical-biological attack has long existed, thus far the threat has materialized only in the form of conspiracy or of very low-level incidents.   Again, however, some of the limitations on use may be eroding, as the increase in terrorist indiscrimination and the appearance of product contamination may indicate.

170.   <u>Product Contamination</u>:   Although not a result of new technologies, or even of the refinement of existing technologies, product contamination is included in the present section because it does appear to represent a significant potential tactical innovation.   It may also signal an erosion in the restraints limiting the use of biological, chemical, or radiological agents.   The public became aware of the problem of product contamination during the 1982 Tylenol scare, when seven people in Chicago were killed by cyanide placed in capsules of the pain remedy.

171.   The threat of product contamination in fact pre-dates the Tylenol incident, although that event did generate imitative acts.   In 1977 it was reported that an anti-Amin group had threatened to poison the Ugandan coffee and tea crop, in an attempt to cut off foreign exchange, but observers doubted the credibility of the threat.   In 1978 people in a number of countries became ill after eating imported Israeli oranges that had been injected with mercury, apparently by Palestinian terrorists as a means of sabotaging the Israeli economy.   It has been reported that Tamil separatists have threatened to poison Ceylon tea, that Huk terrorists in the Philippines plotted to poison pineapples produced by the Dole company, and that animal rights activists have warned that they might poison the products of corporations which use animals in laboratory tests.   In Canada the threat of product contamination in two incidents in 1986 led to the withdrawal of South African wines and spirits from British Columbia liquor stores and South African fruit from some stores in Central Canada.

172.   A potential terrorist development which in some respects resembles chemical warfare and product contamination is "narco-terrorism." It has been claimed that terrorist groups have two principal goals in becoming involved in the manufacture and delivery of narcotics: subversion and logistical support.   Within this perspective, encouraging the use of drugs in "target countries, such as the United States, is part of the terrorists' program to undermine the integrity of their enemies. This is achieved by weakening the moral fiber of society..."[210] "Narco-terrorism" is seen as undermining society by encouraging addiction, fostering crime, undermining public faith in the government, and promoting division on such issues as drug testing. More obviously drugs can be a source of revenue to support the general activities of terrorist groups, and also can be used in exchange for arms (for example, Toronto police speculated that six Tamils, arrested on drug trafficking charges on 31 December 1987, had used the proceeds from the sale of heroin to finance Tamil separatist guerrillas in Sri Lanka).

173.   A United States government document, published in March 1986, asserted that the links between terrorist and insurgent groups and drug traffickers are most substantial in drug source countries, such as Colombia, Peru, Burma, and Thailand.[211] Two American academics have connected the PLO with "narco-terrorism",[212] and it has also been stated that there was growing evidence throughout 1985-86 of direct links between Tamil and other terrorist groups and the distribution of drugs in Western Europe.[213]

174.   New Technology Weapons: As Jenkins and others have noted, the virtually unlimited supply of targets has ensured that terrorists have had little need for tactical innovation, with the result that the relative percentages of the various tactics used by them have remained stable for a long time.[214] This, in turn, has meant that, in contrast with pre-twentieth century developments, "the technologies used by terrorists have not made the quantum jumps that technology as a whole has."[215] The wide availability of targets, and the terrorists' preference for "soft", undefended targets, have also militated against the need for sophisticated weaponry. In an article first published in 1976, R.W. Mengel observed that the failure of terrorists to remain abreast of technological innovations results from such factors as their motivations, education, and general background, and the availability to them of advanced technologies: "Crucial to the answer is the simple fact that terrorists have discovered that the more conventional methods of violence, explosives in particular, have been adequate for their needs."[216] In a 1978 article another analyst scoffed at the assertion that shoulder-fired missile launchers would become a primary weapon in the terrorists' armoury: "One may...look in vain for even modest use of portable missile launchers which have been around for decades."[217]

175.   However, the fact is that terrorists have used some first genera-tion weapons technologies that are still in use (in refined versions) in numerous world armies. Examples include the RPG-7 and SAM-7 Strela missiles (weapons first introduced in the 1960s). While instances of the use of such weapons post-date the sceptical articles quoted above, it was evident in the early-1970s that terrorists were prepared to use hand-held missiles. In 1973 Italian police raided an apartment near Rome Airport, and found two SAM-7s which apparently were to be used to attack an Israeli plane. The British army has long conducted exercises at Heathrow Airport, based on the assumption that terrorists armed with SAM-7s are mounting an attack. Terrorists operating under "Carlos" used RPG-7 portable rocket launchers on two occasions in Paris (both in January 1975) in an attempt to destroy Israeli jets on the runway at Orly. This may have been the weapon used in an abortive plot by West German and Arab terrorists to shoot down an Israeli plane at Nairobi in 1976. RPG-7s have also been used by the PIRA in attacks against British army posts in Northern Ireland.

176.   Optimistic forecasts of the non-utilization of portable missile launchers were confounded in September 1978 when ZAPU guerrillas shot down an Air Rhodesia commercial jet with a heat-seeking missile; 48 persons died in the incident. In February 1979 ZAPU downed another Air Rhodesia plane, apparently using a SAM-7; all 59 persons aboard were killed. Continuing an African tradition, in August 1986 Sudanese rebels

using a SAM-7 shot down a passenger aircraft, killing 60 people.[218] The Winnipeg-based Strategic Planning Associates identified 16 cases of rocket and mortar attack in 1986,[219] so the heightened indiscrimination implicit in such attacks is evidently becoming a more acceptable pursuit to terrorists.

177.   Some groups specialize in using rockets and mortars. Japanese terrorists have used considerable technical sophistication in launching a variety of rocket attacks against an assortment of targets (although the meagre results have belied the technical skill of some of the operations).   The PIRA has also used multiple mortars with some success, notably in a nine-round attack against the Newry police station in March 1975, which killed nine and wounded 37 persons.

178.   While precision guided munitions (PGMs) do not yet appear to have been used as a weapon of international terrorism,* they are increasingly available, and a recent survey of law enforcement officials and authorities on terrorism found that 55% thought it "very likely," and another 29% "somewhat likely," that by the year 2000 terrorists would employ PGMs to shoot down civilian planes.[221]

179.   In addition to hand-held missiles, mortars, and other stand-off weapons, terrorists have availed themselves of recent advances in weapons technology in other areas, notably that of explosives. Letter bombs (which in fact date from the late-1940s), radio-controlled car or boat bombs, suicide car bombs, plastic explosives, innovations in fusing and detonating devices (such as the barometric bomb), and other similar developments constitute enhancements in existing capabilities rather than radical new directions in the weaponry-tactics equation. But,along with state sponsorship, some technical refinements - such as plastic explosives impervious to all but the most sophisticated (and expensive) detection devices, or an all-plastic pistol which was reported in 1986 to be imminently available - facilitate attacks against targets (notably aircraft) which receive some degree of protection. Such weapons are therefore especially significant, given how lucrative certain tactics have sometimes proven (in particular the hijacking of Western planes by Middle Eastern groups).

180.   Terrorist use, or potential use, of other modern technologies has also attracted both concern and interest.   These include ultra-light aircraft (Palestinian groups have resorted to hang-gliders to infiltrate guerrillas into Israel on three occasions recently), submersibles, remotely-piloted cars, and so on.

181.   Mass Destruction: The Capability-Willingness Equation: As the foregoing indicates, the capability for causing high-casualty incidents has been accessible to terrorists for many years. The relative non-resort to mass destruction tactics, and predictions of a continuing avoidance of high-casualty incidents, are explained by putative political constraints, as well as by technical, personal, and other factors.

---

* However, Jenkins claims that terrorists have already employed them "on several occasions".[220]

182.   However, the trend in targeting patterns (from property to people), the appearance of greater indiscrimination in attacks, and the occurrence of a number of high-casualty incidents all suggest that any unwillingness on the part of terrorists to inflict heavy casualties may be eroding. In its 1981 report, the State Department noted that in 1970 about half of the incidents of international terrorism were directed against people, the rest against property; "Now, 80 percent are directed against people."[222] If the categories of threat, conspiracy, and hoax are excluded from the CIA data for 1968-80, casualty-producing incidents constituted 26% of all international terrorist incidents occurring during the period. Although different recording criteria were used in the following years, making comparison difficult, State Department data indicate that 270 out of 782 incidents (or 35%) in 1985 resulted in casualties.[223]

183.   The 1985 report also noted a substantial increase in the number of indiscriminate casualties (it included the Air India disaster as a terrorist event), a trend it linked with the increased use of car bombs. In that year most victims were random targets, such as tourists or passers-by. The number of incidents against victims such as non-official public figures and others not expressly affiliated with business, government, or the military increased from 280 in 1984 to 479 in 1985.[224] The overall trend in terrorist lethality may be expressed in tabular form, as follows:[225]

Table 4
Terrorist Lethality, 1968-86

Year	Killed	Injured	Total
1968	35	208	243
1969	64	202	266
1970	131	212	343
1971	36	227	263
1972	157	413	570
1973	127	551	678
1974	344	1,100	1,444
1975	276	748	1,024
1976	415	920	1,335
1977	261	461	722
1978	442	690	1,132
1979	738	664	1,402
1980	642	1,078	1,720
1981	173	824	997
1982	140	814	954
1983	650*	1,273	1,923
1984	312	c.1,000	c.1,312
1985	825**	1,217	2,042
1986	604	1,717	2,321
	6,372	c.14,319	c.20,691

* Including the Beirut car bomb attacks, which killed 296 Marines and French soldiers.

**Including the Air India disaster, which killed 329 persons.

184.   The appearance of increased indiscrimination is parallelled by a disturbing trend towards the selective murder of hostages.   Given the tendency for hostage-takers and hostages gradually to identify with each other (the "Stockholm syndrome"), it takes a singular ruthlessness or desperation to kill a captive after holding him or her for some time. Yet this tactic has been used on a number of occasions, and seemingly with increased frequency.   Examples include the Moluccan train hijacking near Beilen (December 1975), the Mogadishu hijacking (October 1977), the Iranian embassy incident (April-May 1980), the hijacking of a Pakistani plane (March 1981), the murder of an American naval diver on TWA Flight 847 (June 1985), the killing of Leon Klinghoffer on the <u>Achille Lauro</u> (November 1985), the death of several passengers prior to the Egyptian commando attack at Valetta (November 1985), and the shooting of a French passenger during the Air Afrique hijacking at Geneva (July 1987). Individual kidnap victims have been murdered on a number of occasions - Aldo Moro being the most celebrated - but such killings were not usually intended to put increased pressure on government negotiators, in the manner of hijack murders.

185.   Whether increased indiscrimination will create a climate conducive to deliberate mass casualty attacks is difficult to predict. However, a recent Rand paper indicates that, world-wide, mass casualty incidents may be happening with greater frequency in the mid-1980s than in any previous period.   A list of 37 incidents (several dating back to the 1920s), in which there were 30 or more fatalities, indicates that 17 occurred in the six years from 1980 to 1985 (11 of them in Lebanon).[226] Since 1985 a series of massacres in Sri Lanka and India, and the destruction of a plane by Sudanese rebels, have further demonstrated the erosion of restraint in situations of communal conflict and insurgency. To such attacks could be added recent purely terrorist massacres, such as the one at the Istanbul synagogue in September 1986.   Including the three devastating car bombs in Beirut, only seven of the 27 mass destruction incidents listed by Rand as occurring between 1970 and 1985 affected Western nations in a significant degree.   These were the three Beirut bombings, the 1985 Air India disaster, the 1980 bombing of the Bologna railway station, the destruction of a TWA plane off Greece in 1974, and a series of attacks on staff, passengers, and planes at the Rome and Beirut Airports in a bungled 1973 hijacking.

186.   If insurgencies, communal conflicts, and situations of endemic violence (such as Lebanon) are excluded (as on the whole targeting Western interests incidentally rather than directly), the Rand list does support Jenkins' contention[227] that incidents of mass murder are truly rare occurrences in international terrorism.   Nor, to the limited extent that Western societies have been targeted by mass destruction attacks, is there any real indication of a recent surge in such incidents. Rather, they have occurred sporadically throughout the past two decades (the Beirut incidents were temporally clustered, but in two out of three cases they were differentiated by their military dimensions).

TERRORIST TARGETS

General

187.   The foregoing examination of terrorist groups, their objectives, and their tactics indicates that a variety of factors will determine terrorist target selection. Among them might be included the resources and capabilities of the group, its short-, medium-, and long-range objectives, the appropriateness and vulnerability of the targets, the requirements of sponsoring states, and so on. As has been noted, there is frequently a distinction between immediate targets (those which sustain the physical assault) and secondary targets (usually governments, employers, families, or any group within the population that identifies itself with the victims). In most instances the secondary target is of greater significance to the terrorists than is the immediate one. In many terrorist incidents (particularly those involving hostage-taking) the immediate targets are the means by which the secondary ones are coerced, and the involvement of foreign nationals and interests adds considerably to the coercive potential of a terrorist action. Likewise, terrorists often select visible and important individuals as immediate targets, since the degree of pressure will usually be proportional to the importance of the victim to those who are being pressured. Another distinction in terrorist targeting is between real and symbolic targets, with some groups (such as the FLQ) showing a particular propensity for the latter.

188.   Whatever the image conveyed by suicide car bombs, terrorism is rarely suicidal, and for most groups, the "fundamental criterion is that the target not be defended by armed persons."[228] Terrorists have rarely attempted a direct attack on really difficult targets, such as nuclear reactors or offshore platforms. Even groups as deadly as the Armenian ones generally show little inclination or ability to hit a hard target. In April 1963 two FLQ members set out to blow up a statue of Sir John A. Macdonald in Montréal, but when they discovered policemen in the area of the monument, they abandoned their bomb in a garbage can behind an army recruiting centre where it later exploded, killing a night watchman. An analysis of over 4,500 terrorist incidents in the United States found that there was a small guard force involved in less than 1% of the cases. Over 60% of all bombs were placed outside the target (against a wall, on a windowsill, or against a door), where they could be deposited with little risk of detection.[229] Increased security can therefore result in significant shifts in targeting patterns. Thus, embassy seizures, which were popular in the 1970s and at the outset of the 1980s, have declined considerably in frequency as security measures have made them harder to effect. Corporate security officers worry that, at a time when security has been tightened around governmental and business facilities located in inner city areas, the trend to relocate corporate headquarters in suburbs may make them more vulnerable.

189.   Occasionally terrorists will attack a protected target, but they will usually seek its most vulnerable point. Thus, diplomats, officials, and businessmen tend to be most accessible when in their cars travelling to and from work or official functions. An analysis of 35

major political kidnappings taking place between January 1968 and June
1973 found that 20 had occurred in this manner. Of the remainder, 11 of
the victims were kidnapped from home, two from their place of work, and
two in other situations.[230] This pattern of vulnerability and exploita-
tion has since been repeated in the Armenian attacks on Turkish diplo-
mats.

190.   While target selection is usually governed by discernible ideo-
logical and operational considerations, occasionally it is a product of
whim:

> "An American terrorist responsible for a series of bomb-
> ings in the early 1970s returned home to tell his comrades
> that he had just planted a bomb at the Marine Midlands
> Bank. Since the group had not discussed this particular
> bank as a possible target, nor was it part of the litany
> of leftist enemies, his choice caused puzzlement and
> consternation. Why had he chosen Marine Midlands? 'No
> particular reason. I just walked around Wall Street until
> I found a likely looking place... You just look at the
> building and the people going in and out of it, and you
> know'."[231]

Targeting Trends

191.   Rand data for the period 1968-82 indicate that diplomatic targets
were attacked with greater frequency (31.1%) than any other category,
followed by airlines (19.0%), business targets (17.8%), "private"
targets* (10.5%), military targets (7.0%), government targets (2.8%),
exiles (1.8%), utilities (1.6%), religious targets (1.3%), and "other"
targets (6.9%).[232] CIA/State Department data[233] likewise indicate that
diplomats were the preferred target between 1968 and 1984:

Table 5
Targeting Trends, 1968-84

	1968-81 Rank	1968-81 Per-centage	1980-84 Rank	1980-84 Per-centage
Diplomats	1	38.5	1	31.4
Businessmen	2	22.7	3	18.7
Private parties/Other**	3	19.1	2	30.7
Military	4	8.8	4	10.5
Other	5	4.6	–	–
Government officials	6	3.5	5	8.7
Prominent opinion leaders	7	2.8	–	–

---

* Probably tourists, passers-by, and so on.

** The category "other" is used in the 1984 report for the period
   1980-84, but it seems to resemble the "private parties" category of
   earlier reports in relating to tourists, missionaries, students,
   bystanders, and so on.

192.   Within these periods there was some variation in targeting. Thus, in 1981 attacks against military personnel constituted one of the fastest-growing categories, and by 1983 they numbered 18.4% of the victims of international terrorist incidents, falling to 5.8% in 1984 and 7.0% in 1985. Attacks against business personnel fell, proportionally, in 1983 to 14% (placing them fourth in rank), but increased significantly in 1984 (23%) and 1985 (23.8%). From being in the front rank as terrorist targets, diplomats had fallen to fifth in rank (at 9.5%) by 1985. The State Department's 1985 report illustrates these trends:[234]

Table 6

Target Groups, 1985

	1985
Business	23.8%
Private party	15.4%
Other government	9.6%
Diplomatic	9.5%
Military	7.0%
Nonofficial public	4.2%
Politically affiliated	3.0%
Other	27.5%

The report suggested that tighter security at diplomatic and military installations may be making business people and facilities more attractive targets.

193.   It seems likely that different target groups invite different forms of attack. In the 1970s corporations appeared readier to give in to ransom demands than did governments (a tendency exacerbated by the increasing availability of kidnap insurance), and to pay more quickly. Thus businessmen have frequently been the victims of kidnapping. A study by the Conference Board found that between 1970 and 1978 55% of the Americans kidnapped abroad were business executives, while 28% were members of the diplomatic community. A 1980 article in Business claimed that of more than 230 terrorist-related kidnappings since 1970, more than 40% involved business people.[235] Diplomats, by contrast, are more likely to be the targets of assassination or barricade-hostage attempts than of kidnappings, while tourists and bystanders are vulnerable to hijacking and bombing incidents.

194.   Earlier in this report it was noted that some groups specialized in particular tactics, and in the same way there are some regional, national, and group patterns in targeting.   Just as the number of countries in which incidents of international terrorism have occurred has steadily increased (from 48 countries in 1970 to 91 countries in 1981), so the number of countries whose citizens have become victims of international terrorism has increased (from 77 in 1981 to 84 in 1985). Between 1968 and 1980 American nationals were the most victimized, and nationals from Israel, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, and

Turkey also were attacked with some frequency. In 1985 the countries most victimized by international terrorism were (in order): Israel, the United States, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, a pattern which largely held in 1986, with the positions of Israel and the United States being reversed.[236]

195.   The CIA/State Department reports do not indicate regional victimization patterns, but tables relating to regional tactical preferences and to the tactics used on American citizens and property are suggestive. Latin American groups favour attacks on American business interests, and have frequently resorted to kidnapping in such attacks. This pattern was clearly evident in the early-1970s, and it recurred in 1985, when four out of six incidents in which American businessmen were kidnapped (more than in any year since the mid-1970s) occurred in Latin America. In 1985 the greatest number of attacks against business interests happened in Western Europe, bombing being the principal tactic used.

196.   For the most part, outside the Middle East the Middle Eastern terrorist groups have targeted fellow Middle Easterners. But where they have attacked other clearly defined targets, tourism has been high on their list. A chronology of Palestinian attacks on foreign soil between 1968 and 1974 indicates that slightly over one-third of the attacks were directed against transportation systems and tourist targets, and one-quarter against diplomatic targets.[237] Again in 1985, in the belief that tourism constitutes the "Achilles heel" of European governments, Palestinian groups launched on anti-tourism campaign with attacks on airlines, hotels, and restaurants. While most attacks by Middle Eastern groups in Western Europe strike at Palestinian/Arab targets (56% of such attacks in 1985) and Israeli/Jewish targets (17%), those directed against Western targets (27%) are more indiscriminate in nature.[238] Compared with 1984, there was a dramatic increase in the number of attacks by Middle Eastern groups against Western targets in Western Europe in 1985 (six in 1984, 20 in 1985). This trend continued into 1986, most notably in a wave of indiscriminate bombing attacks in public places in France. Between 1 January and 1 July 1986 there were 16 attacks directed against Western targets.[239]

Target Groups

197.   Diplomatic Targets: As was noted above, for almost the entire past two decades diplomatic targets have been attacked with greater frequency than any other target group. According to State Department statistics, between 1968 and 1981 there were 2856 incidents involving diplomatic targets (out of a total of 7425 incidents, or 38.5%). A summary of terrorist attacks on diplomats between 1968 and 1982 reported that 381 had been killed and 825 wounded during the period, and that 38 embassies had been seized. Altogether, the diplomats of 108 countries had been attacked.[240]

198.   The earlier attacks on the diplomatic community tended to involve bombings and assassinations. Between 1968 and 1979 five American ambassadors were assassinated (in Guatemala, Khartoum, Nicosia, Beirut,

and Kabul), along with two British (in Dublin and The Hague). Perhaps the most consistent and deadly anti-diplomatic campaign has been that waged by the Armenian groups against Turkish diplomats. In the decade after 1973 Armenian terrorists killed a total of 25 Turkish officials abroad.[241] The first of the diplomatic kidnappings was that of the United States ambassador to Brazil, Burke Elbrick, in September 1969. Since that time kidnappings and barricade incidents have been increasingly resorted to in attacks on diplomatic targets, culminating in a wave of such incidents in 1979-80. Such attacks, by their very nature, are aimed at securing widespread publicity for their perpetrators, along with the fulfilment of specific demands.

199. In 1975 attacks on diplomats constituted 30% of total terrorist attacks, and in 1980 the proportion was 54% (although about 30% of the 1980 incidents involving United States diplomatic personnel were telephone or letter threats, they nonetheless caused considerable disruption).[242] Since 1980 greatly improved security at embassies and consulates has resulted in a decline in the number and proportion of attacks against diplomatic targets, such that by 1985 businessmen and the public were far more likely to be attacked than were diplomats.

200. Business Targets: Business executives and interests have tended to be attacked second in frequency to diplomats and embassies. Between 1968 and 1981 23% of the victims of international terrorist incidents were corporate officials.[243] But as the proportion of incidents affecting diplomatic targets has declined, terrorists have sought other victims, and in 1985 there was a surge of incidents involving business interests (from 185 such attacks in 1984 the number increased to 227 in 1985, representing 24% of all incidents in that year and ranking only behind the "other" category[244]). A German study found that in 1983 44% of the terrorist attacks in the Federal Republic were directed against public and social institutions, and 56% were directed against private enterprises (including energy installations).[245]

201. Business targets invite attack on several grounds. Attacks on them can be highly symbolic, and therefore ideologically appealing. Left-wing groups, such as the German ones, fight against what they call imperialism, colonialism, capitalism, and consumerism. For them, banks stand for capitalism, department stores for consumerism, and multinational corporations for colonialism in the Third World.

202. Corporations can present very lucrative targets. In 1979 Business International estimated that during the 1970s terrorists extorted some $125 million from American corporations, and up to $500 million from all multi-national corporations.[246] The Montoneros demanded, and reportedly received, $60 million after they kidnapped two sons of the co-proprietor of Argentina's largest company in September 1974. During the 1970s corporations developed a reputation for responding quickly, and without baulking, to even the most exorbitant ransom demands. Furthermore, businesses have to be accessible, and thus are vulnerable to attack by terrorists, for whom such operations usually present little risk. One analyst with the Conference Board of Canada has concluded that as "governments become more resolute in their no-concessions policy

and improve their anti-terrorist procedures, the corporation with its vast financial resources and its tendency to give in under pressure will grow increasingly attractive as a target."[247] Finally, attacks on business can be a powerful instrument of coercion against governments, although such forms of economic warfare will tend to be domestic rather than international in their ramifications. Thus, a number of prominent businessmen have been killed and injured by the PIRA in a concerted attempt to disrupt the economic life of Northern Ireland.

203. <u>Military Targets</u>: CIA/State Department statistics indicate that military targets generally rank fourth, behind diplomatic, business, and "private party" targets, as objects of terrorist attack. The 1981 State Department report contended that attacks against military personnel then constituted "one of the fastest growing categories" of international terrorism.[248] Two years later military personnel composed the second highest target category due to the particularly lethal attacks against the American and French multinational force contingents in Lebanon: 18.4% of the targets of terrorist attack in 1983 were military.[249] Thereafter there was a relative decline in military targeting, such that military targets and victims constituted only 7.0% of all victims and installations attacked in 1985.[250] As for NATO, although specifically targeted by some of the major European left-wing terrorist groups in 1984 and early-1985, State Department data indicate that it was implicated in only 17 incidents in 1985* (compared with 198 incidents affecting Israel, 170 affecting the United States, 46 affecting France, 29 affecting the United Kingdom, 27 affecting the Federal Republic of Germany, and 6 affecting Canada, the Netherlands, India, and Japan).[251]

204. Attacks on military targets naturally have a strong ideological attraction for left-wing terrorist groups, but they appear also to appeal to a nationalist and anti-American sentiment in some European right-wing groups. A Rand report published in October 1986 noted that beginning in mid-1982, nearly 60 attacks on NATO and American military targets in West Germany had been attributed to neo-Nazi terrorists.[252]

205. Nonetheless, the principal threat to NATO and to national military establishments during the 1980s has been from left-wing groups. A German government study indicates that in the early-1980s West German and NATO military installations, along with firms working for the military sector, constituted about 20% of leftist terrorist attacks in the Federal Republic.[253] The anti-NATO, anti-military campaign in Europe effectively dates from a June 1979 incident, when Gen. Alexander Haig, then NATO commander, narrowly escaped death after a bomb was detonated near his car in Belgium. The attacks escalated in 1981 with a

---

* There were 782 incidents of international terrorism in 1985, but some of them involved more than one country, ethnic group, or international organization, so that in aggregate the State Department's victim list records 1022 "country-incidents," and this therefore is the overall figure with which NATO's 17 attacks should be compared.

series of bombing incidents, most of which targeted American military personnel and installations. In September 1981 two RPG-7 grenades and machine gun fire were aimed at the car of Gen. Frederick Kroesen, commander of United States Army forces in Europe, while the vehicle was halted by a stop light. The general's car was severely damaged, but no one was seriously hurt in the attack. In December 1981, Brig-Gen. James Dozier, attached to a NATO headquarters in Italy, was kidnapped in Verona. In January 1982 Lt.-Col. Charles R. Ray, assistant United States military attaché in Paris, was assassinated. Four individuals broke into a United States Army camp near Mutlangen in December 1983, and used sledgehammers to destroy a Pershing II transporter (Mutlangen was widely believed to be the site for the first INF deployment).

206.   Another wave of anti-military attacks occurred in 1984-85. A chronology of actions by European terrorist groups indicates that in the space of fifteen months between mid-January 1984 and mid-April 1985, NATO and American military personnel and installations in Europe were the targets of terrorist attack on at least 25 occasions. Terrorists also struck at institutions (such as the Atlantic Institute, the West European Union, and the North Atlantic Assembly) and companies (Litton, M.A.N., and Honeywell) thought to be linked with NATO or the military-industrial complex.[254] Beginning in the summer of 1984, at least three of the major European groups - the RAF, Action Directe, and the Communist Combat Cells (Belgium) - joined forces in an anti-NATO offensive. On 15 January 1985 the RAF and Action Directe announced the formation of a "Political-Military Front in Western Europe" to attack NATO targets. Despite its anti-NATO rhetoric the Red Brigades was slow to join the offensive. But in December 1986 a Red Brigades member was arrested and was found to be in possession of documents detailing the anti-NATO activities of other European groups. In March 1987 an Italian general was assassinated, an action for which the Combatant Communist Union (a wing of the Red Brigades) claimed responsibility. Other European groups have also emerged as targeting NATO personnel and facilities with some frequency in the mid-1980s, most notably the April 25 Popular Front (Portugal) and the November 17 Organization (Greece).

207.   Although the scale of attacks against NATO and military targets appears to have fallen considerably from the peak reached in December 1984 and January 1985, anti-military incidents continue. A recent example was a car bomb attack at a British base at Rheindahlen in March 1987, which injured at least 31 persons. At least two attacks against American military targets in Greece took place in 1987.

208.   _Official Targets_: For most of the past two decades government officials have been less subject to attack than have diplomatic, business, and military personnel, although their susceptibility to attack seems to be on the increase. Between 1968 and 1981 they ranked sixth as targets of international terrorism (with 3.5% of the total incidents involving government officials), but between 1980 and 1984 their proportion of the total rose to 8.7%, and in 1985 the "other government" category represented 9.6% of the total (to which might be added the 3.0% of targets or victims which were "politically affiliated").[255]

209.	In many insurgencies public officials are the focus of attack as part of a bid to create a "climate of collapse." The assassination of government officials in Algeria and South Vietnam are examples of this tactic, but it has also been used in conflicts which lean more towards terrorism than insurgency. Thus, in the early-1970s the Tupamaros in Uruguay resorted to the assassination of high level police authorities and ordinary policemen alike, as well as raiding police stations and the homes of policemen. This tactic so demoralized the Uruguayan police that at one stage seventy policemen were dismissed because of "insubordination", and the armed forces were eventually called in to take over the fight against the Tupamaros. In Northern Ireland it is judges and other members of the judiciary who are a primary target of terrorist attack. In 1986 there were signs that German terrorists were aiming their attacks at government officials and political figures. After a senior foreign ministry official was assassinated in Bonn in October 1986 a spokesman for the federal prosecutor's office commented: "There is now a fear that after so far attacking members of the so-called military-industrial complex, the RAF is turning to politicians."[256]

210.	In general, the targeting of officials tends to have domestic rather than international implications, a situation which perhaps largely explains the relatively low ranking of this group among target categories.

211.	Public Targets: The targets described thus far have been groups or categories of individuals or facilities which are attacked largely by virtue of their functions. Such attacks are therefore generally focussed and deliberate, and thus can encourage a sense of relative immunity among non-target groups, particularly in the public at large. Terrorism terrorizes most effectively where it is less discriminating and where fewer people feel themselves immune from it by virtue of their occupations, political or religious views, social status, ethnic background, and so on. An example of this more generalized fear was the dramatic decline in the number of North American tourists visiting Europe in 1985-86 in the wake of an anti-tourism campaign launched by the Abu Nidal group.

212.	For most of the past two decades totally random, indiscriminate terror has been the exception rather than the rule, and victims have usually been selected according to specific criteria. Right-wing operations have been more likely to seek to kill and injure as many innocent persons as possible, as a means towards creating the atmosphere of crisis sought by such groups. Although the CIA/State Department statistics do not readily lend themselves either to aggregation or to longitudinal analysis, they do seem to indicate a trend towards more random targeting. Out of 7425 incidents occurring between 1968 and 1981, 1415 (or 19.1%) were directed against "private parties" (tourists, students, missionaries, and the like) and 341 (or 4.6%) were directed against "other" targets. Thus, during that period of 14 years 1756 incidents (or 23.6% of the total) were directed against targets other than diplomatic, business, military, or governmental targets, or prominent opinion leaders. In 1985 15.4% of attacks were against private party targets, and 27.5% were against "other" targets; a further 4.2% of

incidents affected "nonofficial public" targets. Thus, the share of diplomatic, business, military, and governmental targets fell from about three-quarters of all targets in the period 1968 to 1981, to roughly two-thirds in the period 1980 to 1984, and to approximately one half in 1985.[257] The 1985 State Department report noted that in that year "most victims were random targets, such as tourists or passers-by".[258]

213. It seems likely that the trend toward random targeting reflects less a growing indiscrimination among left-wing groups than it does the increasing lethality and indiscrimination of nationalist groups (such as the ETA) and Middle Eastern groups (such as the Abu Nidal group, the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, and the various militias in Beirut and elsewhere).

214. Many examples of random attacks could be adduced, among them the following: the bombing of the Bologna railway station, (probably) by right-wing terrorists, which left over 80 dead and 200 injured (August 1980); the PIRA bombing of Harrods, which left five dead - including one American - and 91 wounded (December 1983); the simultaneous attacks by Abu Nidal terrorists on the Rome and Vienna Airports, which killed and injured over 120 people (December 1985); the wave of bomb attacks at peak hours in crowded public places in Paris (fall 1986); and the bombing of a Barcelona supermarket by the ETA, which killed 18 people (June 1987). These incidents are of recent occurrence, but random terrorist massacres, while more frequent now than in the past, are not new. An early example of indiscrimination occurred at Lod Airport in 1972 when Japanese Red Army terrorists, acting at the behest of the PFLP, opened fire on passengers arriving from an Air France flight, killing 28 and wounding 76.

215. As recent events in India and Sri Lanka have shown, random violence is particularly associated with transportation systems, especially airports, bus and train terminals, planes, buses, and trains. However, all public gathering places, whether schools, synagogues or churches, community or recreational facilities, restaurants, or whatever offer wide scope for indiscriminate attack. While buses and planes seem to be especially vulnerable in third world countries and in situations of communal violence (in the contemporary Punjab, for example), from time to time the Palestinians have specifically targeted transportation links, particularly in the 1969-72 period and again in the mid-1980s. While air transportation is especially violence-prone in the contemporary Middle East - a situation exemplified by the abortive Iraq Air hijacking in December 1986 which resulted in the plane's crash and the death of more than 70 persons - planes and terminals in other regions have been the targets of random violence also. One example was the bombing of the passenger terminal at Seoul Airport in September 1986.

216. Shipping has also been affected by terrorism. According to a Rand study, between March 1960 and August 1983 terrorists attacked 47 ships, hijacking eleven and sinking or destroying twelve.[259] Their passengers and crews might thus be said to have been randomly targeted. However, the level of violence associated with such incidents has generally been low. Nonetheless, even such relatively low-level

incidents clearly worry the public. A Canadian opinion survey, administered in the wake of the <u>Achille Lauro</u> hijacking (October 1985), found that 73% of respondents were aware of the incident. Of those who were aware of it, fully 80% felt that the United States was justified in acting against terrorism (compared with 10% who felt it was not).[260] A further indicator of public concern was the incident's effect on tourism. It has been estimated that fear of terrorism was responsible for over 12,000 vacant Mediterranean cruise accommodations in 1985, and in July 1986 the owner of one cruise ship operating in the Mediterranean reported that bookings were running at only 32% of capacity. The U.S. Travel Data Center reported that a third of the 5.1 million Americans who had overseas reservations cancelled their plans between July 1985 and February 1986 because of terrorism.[261]

217.   <u>Technology as a Target</u>:   While it is attacks on human targets which largely produce terror, much of modern terrorism is aimed at inanimate objects, and is often intended, therefore, to be symbolic and propagandistic rather than coercive or terroristic. Some analysts have noted an increased propensity to attack human targets. The 1981 State Department report claimed that in 1970 incidents were roughly evenly divided between attacks on people and attacks on property, whereas 80% of the incidents in 1981 were directed against people.[262] The State Department's annual reports of the early-1980s generally noted that between one-quarter and one-third of all incidents resulted in casualties. However, incidents devoid of casualties, or aimed at property, are not invariably benign by comparison with casualty-producing attacks. In fact, attacks on property can have serious political, social, and economic consequences, particularly given the interdependence of many high technology systems.

218.   Among the inanimate targets of modern terrorism one that is of interest (as representing a modern Luddism) and of concern (for its disruptive potential) is the computer. Although terrorists have attacked computer firms on a number of occasions, and some of these attacks demonstrated some knowledge of computers, the groups involved have not thus far tried to penetrate computers in any sophisticated fashion to disrupt or destroy data. In Germany the Revolutionary Cells have attacked computer firms on a number of occasions. In 1983, 4% of the terrorist attacks in the Federal Republic were directed against such companies (and half of the incidents involving computer firms were bombings).[263] The attacks have continued since 1983. In 1985, for example, virtually simultaneous explosions damaged the offices of computer software companies in Frankfurt and Dortmund. In France, Clodo (Comité liquidant ou détournant les ordinateurs), one of the terrorist bands grouped under the Action Directe umbrella, has attacked computer companies on a number of occasions, being active at the beginning of the 1980s. Explaining its motives, Clodo asserted that computers were "the favoured tool of people who dominate. They serve to exploit, to document, to control and to punish."[264]

219.   Another high technology target which has come under attack recently is the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), and particularly European companies and institutes engaged in SDI research. To some

extent attacks on SDI-related targets may be displacing NATO targeting (although the latter continues).[265] In July 1986 a car bomb killed the chief of research for the Siemens electronics group, an action for which the RAF claimed responsibility, declaring the victim and his company were collaborators in SDI. On 24 July 1986 a bomb exploded outside the Fraunhofer Research Institute in Aachen, and a day later a leading German aerospace firm linked with SDI was also bombed. The Italian general who was shot in March 1987 was the top-ranking official in Italy's space and air weapons programme.

220.   Other potential or actual high technology targets of terrorism have been discussed elsewhere. They include nuclear facilities, the chemical industry, maritime targets such as LNG tankers and oil rigs (in 1981 Greenpeace activists tried to disrupt a conference on a rig off the Massachusetts coast), refineries, telecommunications and data processing facilities, power grids, and so on. The motives behind attacks on high technology targets vary, but they are often singled out on such grounds as their links with the armed forces, their trading ties with South Africa, or their contribution to unemployment and the dehumanization of society. The RAF regards efforts in civil high technology, such as the Eureka programme,* as being almost as dangerous as military techno-logy.[266]

221.   Despite such thinking, and the attacks which accompany it, the full disruptive potential of technological targeting has rarely been exploited, in part because many groups lack the capability to do so. Jenkins has argued that "Attacks on high-tech targets will remain within the operational domain of established guerrilla groups and larger terrorist organizations. Smaller terrorist groups will continue to carry out sporadic and often symbolic attacks on energy systems and other similar targets."[267]

INTER-GROUP COOPERATION AND STATE SPONSORSHIP

222.   For about a decade the public imagination has been exercised by the possibility that disparate terrorist groups have joined forces to form a "Terror International", and that a number of states, notably the Soviet Union, Libya, and Syria, have actively supported terrorist groups. Such beliefs have been fuelled by the writings of Claire Sterling, an American correspondent long resident in Italy. She has claimed the existence of a "worldwide terror network", aimed at the destabilization of Western democratic society, and consisting of a multitude of disparate terrorist groups. Sterling has contended that the links between such groups have been forged by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the PLO.[268]

223.   Naturally, Sterling's lurid "exposé" has attracted rebuttal. Edward S. Herman, a professor of finance at the University of Pennsylvania, has asserted that the "real terror network", and the

---

*   A programme established in 1985 to promote the commercialization of European high technology research.

"quantitatively important" variant of terrorism, is state terrorism, sponsored by the United States and most evident in Latin America. For Herman the Soviet "network" is mythical, and the international terrorism chronicled by the CIA, the press, and other sources, and practised by "small groups on the left", is "the lesser terror", whose depiction is intended to obscure "the greater terror" (state terrorism).[269]

224.   Most analysts of terrorism dismiss the possibility of there being a global conspiracy behind terrorism.[270] Even Sterling derided the idea of a phantom mastermind coordinating worldwide terror as "a comic-book concept"[271]. Nonetheless, the activities of some governments have clearly contributed to an escalation of terrorism. In a 1984 article, Professor Wilkinson estimated that roughly 25% of international terrorist incidents since 1980 were either state-sponsored or state-directed.[272]

Inter-Group Cooperation

225.   Just as much of the evidence of group links and state sponsorship is circumstantial, and the extent of such cooperation and support is conjectural, so the origins of inter-group ties are hard to ascertain. Sterling traced the origins of terrorist cooperation to the Tricontinental Conference held in Havana in January 1966. In 1978 Tom Mangold, a BBC correspondent, claimed that a terrorist alliance was established in 1969 with the aim of returning Israel to the Palestinians and of overthrowing all so-called Western and Arab imperialist and capitalist states. The groups principally involved in "Terror International" were Palestinian organizations (notably the PFLP), the JRA, the RAF, and Carlos's "network".[273] However, Ted Gurr, a noted analyst of civil violence, found in 1970 that out of 355 terrorist groups which he examined, only 19 "were reliably reported to have gotten material support, training or safe bases from which to operate outside the country in which they were active."[274] Nonetheless, by 1976 the CIA estimated that over 140 terrorist bands from nearly 50 countries or disputed territories were connected in some way.[275]

226.   Ideology is an important factor in inter-group cooperation. German terrorists attempted as early as the first half of the 1970s to establish contact with terrorist groups in other European countries. While no joint operations resulted, Meinhof's suicide in 1976, and the suicides of Ensslin, Baader, and Raspe in 1977, were followed by waves of terrorist incidents against German targets in (mainly) France and Italy.[276] The RAF tended to be rather independent until the early-1980s, although it did initiate an abortive scheme in the late-1970s whereby a group of 50 international terrorists from seven countries would kidnap a former Swedish minister of labour in an attempt to secure the release of terrorists imprisoned in Germany. The Revolutionary Cells had a rather higher international profile in the 1970s, although it seems to have been more closely involved with the Palestinians than with other European left-wing groups (it provided logistical support for the 1972 Munich Olympics attack). Similarly the Red Brigades' international connections in the 1970s appear to have been more logistical than operational, and to have been more oriented towards the Palestinians.

Action Directe and the Belgian CCC only appeared on the scene, operationally, in 1979 and 1984 respectively, but their appearance was possibly a catalyst for greater collaboration among European left-wing groups.

227.   Such cooperation seems to have been initiated in mid-1984, was publicly announced in 1985, and since then appears to have drawn the interest of previously relatively distant groups such as the Red Brigades. The French, German, and Belgian groups achieved some measure of coordination in part because their nations share long and thinly-guarded borders and they have some linguistic commonality. However, such cooperation may be a short-lived phenomenon. A former head of the German security service argued in April 1986 that "in the last year" the RAF had "lost its international links", while another German authority recently alleged that there is no such thing as a single European terrorist organization or a joint command, and that despite cooperation between French and German groups, terrorism remains a primarily national phenomenon.[277]   While both the PIRA and the ETA espouse socialism, nationalism is their dominant motivational force. Thus, though they have links with each other and with some European left-wing groups, such ties do not appear to be especially significant. The PIRA, in particular, "is ideologically inclined to 'go it alone'."[278]

228.   Even though most right-wing terrorism falls into the category of domestic violence, right-wing groups also have developed certain ties amongst themselves. In Europe such groups have in the past shared a loose alliance, exchanging information, engaging in training exercises, possibly trading in arms, and so on. Fraternal ties are perhaps strongest among Italian, German, French, and Belgian groups. Although Sterling would appear to have exaggerated the extent of right-wing collaboration at the beginning of the 1980s - she described the Bologna, Munich Oktoberfest, and Rue Copernic bombings of 1980 as "unmistakably concerted hits, orchestrated by a Continent-wide Black Terrorist International"[279] - right-wing groups have benefited from mutual cooperation. Bruce Hoffman, a Rand analyst who has studied right-wing terrorism, has warned against complacency in the light of "evidence of a clandestine international support network linking neo-Nazis in West Germany with their like-minded counterparts in other European countries, with left-wing terrorist groups in Germany as well as in France and Belgium, and with an assortment of Middle Eastern terrorist organizations operating in Europe..."[280]

229.   There is a pragmatic, as well as an ideological, dimension to inter-group collaboration. This is demonstrated both by the ties many European groups (and the JRA) have had or have with Palestinian groups, and by the occasional collaboration of left-wing and right-wing groups. The well-funded and state-supported PLO can provide valuable assistance for many terrorist groups whose existence is far more covert and precarious and which lack well-developed support infrastructures. Links between the PLO and non-Middle Eastern groups date from the late-1960s, when terrorists from many countries (including Canada) started to receive training in Palestinian camps. Palestinian support for European and other terrorist groups continued for much of the 1970s - the PFLP

apparently organized a number of "terrorist summits" during this period
- but then declined late in the decade, largely as a result of the PLO's
diplomatic successes, the death of Wadi Haddad, and defeats such as
Entebbe and Mogadishu. The link between Palestinian and European groups
began to revive in the early-1980s, and according to Israeli estimates,
some 40 different international terrorist groups (half of them European)
received training, weapons, intelligence, and logistical support from
the PLO before the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982.[281] In 1984
an Italian magistrate concluded that the PLO functioned "as a political
and military point of reference for all the European terrorist
organizations (the IRA, RAF, ETA, etc.) above all as regards the
delivery of arms."[282]

230. Palestinian groups have provided support not only for left-wing
groups (such as the Red Brigades and the German groups), but also for
nationalist groups (such as ASALA and ETA) and right-wing groups. In
June 1981 evidence of a connection between the Hoffmann Military Sports
Group (a German right-wing terrorist organization) and the PLO was
discovered in Lebanon, where a number of German neo-Nazis apparently
received training. A German security expert claimed that such links
were founded on the "common basis...[of] hatred of the Jews and
Israel."[283]

231. The rather surprising collaboration between left-wing and right-
wing groups underscores the pragmatic aspect of inter-group coopera-
tion. Evidence of links between the radical left and right has surfaced
in both Germany and Italy. In the early-1980s left- and right-wing
extremists in Germany apparently cooperated in arms training and
trading, the manufacture of bombs, and the exchange of intelligence.[284]
A leftist spokesman explained the situation thus: "We are not so far
apart ideologically... Our common goal is the destruction of society.
We want to develop a basic strategy of resistance and liberation."[285]
With their "strategy of tension" it was not illogical for right-wing
Italian groups to have links with left-wing organizations, and after the
Armed Revolutionary Nucleus (NAR) shot a Roman judge in 1980, the
Italian authorities apparently discovered that the NAR was about to form
an alliance with the Red Brigades in order to undermine the state.[286]

232. The provision of logistical support by one group (or coalition of
groups) to another establishes debts which tend to be repaid by
"surrogate" attacks. This has clearly been the relationship between the
Palestinian and European (and Japanese) groups. Non-Palestinian groups
have complied with PLO requests to use their members on intelligence-
gathering and reconnaissance missions in Israel, as couriers and weapons
smugglers, and in operations against Israeli and Jewish targets in their
own countries.[287] Thus, European or Japanese terrorists have conducted
a number of operations with Palestinian groups or on their behalf, among
them the Lod Airport massacre (May 1972), the PFLP-JRA hijacking of a
Japanese plane to Libya (July 1973), the attack on oil installations in
Singapore harbour (January 1974), the OPEC raid (December 1975), the
Entebbe incident (June-July 1976), the Mogadishu hijacking (October
1977), and so on. In the six months following Israel's 1982 invasion of

Lebanon there were seven times as many attacks staged by surrogate terrorists, operating either at the behest of the PLO or independently in a demonstration of "revolutionary solidarity", as in the six months prior to the invasion, and after this dramatic upsurge there was an equally dramatic decline in such proxy attacks.[288] Typical of the surrogate operations were a series of Action Directe bomb attacks on Israeli diplomatic offices and businesses. Hoffman has suggested that the decline in surrogate attacks after the end of 1982 indicated that the proxy operations were not part of any lasting, orchestrated campaign, and that the PLO's problems after its expulsion from Lebanon meant that it had less to offer its international counterparts than hitherto.[289]

233.   Apart from the coordinating function to a certain degree provided by a few governments and by the PLO, there appears to have been some attempt at creating a centralized coordinating mechanism by the groups themselves, although the initiative seems to have been short-lived. In 1974 revolutionary groups in Latin America set up a central organization called the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR). In October 1977 The Times of London reported that the JCR had established a headquarters in Paris which had become "a kind of clearing house for international terrorism."[290] Sterling claimed that at the time she was writing her book (about 1980) the JCR was "still operating out of Paris, Rome, Stockholm, and Madrid..."[291] The JCR reportedly raised funds, forged passports and identity papers, and published training manuals. However, little has been heard about it in the 1980s (it was overlooked in a recent book on the international linkages of terrorism[292]).

234.   As authorities on terrorism have periodically noted, it is likely that inter-group cooperation involves informal, fraternal contacts, and occasional logistical and operational support, rather than a directed and coordinated campaign controlled by some central syndicate.

Government Participation in International Terrorism

235.   Prior to 1970 most terrorist groups were self-sufficient, but by the mid-1970s evidence (much of it circumstantial) of state involvement in international terrorism was accumulating. Initially such involvement largely concerned the provision of training and logistical support, but in the late-1970s governments began implementing terrorist campaigns of their own, principally against dissidents living abroad. The State Department's 1984 report argued that "in large measure, the range and lethality of terrorism derive from the increasingly active role played by sovereign states..."[293] This trend contributes to the persistence of terrorism not only by assisting terrorist groups, but also by the probable creation, within the sponsoring states, of agencies charged with dealing with such groups. The continued bureaucratic existence of agencies of this sort would seemingly depend on their ability to keep terrorists "producing".

236.   Governments sponsor, or themselves practise, terrorism for a variety of reasons, principal among them the strengthening of their own

influence, the weakening of rival or hostile powers and of internal opposition, and the obstruction of unwelcome diplomatic initiatives.

237.   State Sponsorship: State Department reports over the past half-dozen years have most consistently identified some of the Middle Eastern states, notably Iran, Syria, and Libya, as the primary sponsors of international terrorist groups.

238.   Libyan sponsorship of terrorism has been both long suspected and widely publicized. As early as 1973 there was tangible evidence of such support when a Libyan-supplied arms shipment for the PIRA was intercepted aboard the _Claudia_ off the Irish coast. In November 1987 French authorities intercepted a shipment of between 150 and 200 tonnes of arms (including SAM-7 missiles, without launchers, and machine guns), which were apparently destined for the PIRA (possibly in conjunction with other European groups). These weapons were thought to have been supplied by Libya. In 1986 it was reported that a British agent had discovered that the Libyan embassy in Madrid had operated a terrorist network for the previous two years,[294] and in November 1986 _Jane's Defence Weekly_ alleged that Libya was spending $70-100 million (US) per year in direct support of terrorism, mainly through the provision of at least 20 training camps where over 7,000 volunteers had been trained.[295] By the mid-1980s the Reagan administration had long been convinced that Libya was a major sponsor of international terrorism, and American analysts claimed that there were approximately 26 acts of Libyan-sponsored terrorism in 1984 alone.[296]

239.   The erratic policy and the rhetoric of the Libyan government has occasionally led to an exaggeration of the terrorist threat posed by Libya. An alleged Libyan bomb plot led to security being tightened at a number of Canadian airports in January 1986. The "plot" proved to be a hoax, but it is possible that the "involvement" of Libya was intended by its authors to lend the scheme verisimilitude. Despite frequent press speculation regarding Libyan support for Irish terrorism, a 1984 British government briefing paper concluded that "Evidence of specific aid, with the exception of the Claudia incident, has so far been circumstantial."[297] Reports of Libyan "assassination squads" being sent to the United States (possibly via Canada), to attack senior government officials, induced alarm and heightened security in 1981. This particular incident was a more credible threat than some of the others discussed here, one of the sources of the warning being the Ethiopian minister of defence (a CIA informant), who participated in a meeting in August 1981 between the Libyan and Ethiopian leaders at which the former announced that Reagan was his next target. Nonetheless, like many of Gaddafi's threats, this one did not materialize.

240.   It is widely felt that the April 1986 American bombing of Libyan targets has produced a hiatus in Libyan-sponsored terrorism.[298] However, as the Libyan threat has seemingly receded in the public consciousness, two other countries have come to the forefront as major sponsors and practitioners of international terrorism: Iran and Syria.

241.   In a conference which took place in April 1985 William J. Casey, then director of the CIA, argued that "Probably more blood has been shed by Iranian-sponsored terrorists during the last few years than by all other terrorists combined."[299]   Casey claimed that the United States government identified as many as 50 terrorist attacks which took place in 1983 as having "a confirmed or suspected Iranian involvement;" most of them occurred in Lebanon.[300]   Although the State Department's 1984 report gave no indication of the number of Iranian-sponsored incidents thought to have taken place that year, the 1985 report described the incidence of such attacks as having reached a record level in 1984.   The level declined in 1985, but remained high, with groups having ties with Iran being involved in some 30 attacks ("although Iran cannot be linked directly to most of these attacks").[301]   Casey imputed Iran's support of terrorism to the regime's desire to export the Iranian revolution throughout the Muslim world and to reduce Western influence in the Middle East.[302]   To these motives might be added a desire to punish the United States for its support of the Shah, and France for assisting the Iraqi war effort.[303]

242.   During the past two years Western governments and media have increasingly identified Syria as a major sponsor of international terrorism.[304]   PLO leader Yasir Arafat has accused Syria of being behind the Achille Lauro hijacking (an opinion possibly coloured by Damascus's support for anti-Arafat groups).

243.   A number of incidents occurring in 1986, including the bombing of a discotheque in Berlin, have been laid at Syria's door, but the most significant was the attempted bombing of an El Al jet at Heathrow Airport in April 1986.   The British government claimed to have "conclusive" proof linking the latter incident to Syria, and as a result severed diplomatic relations with Damascus in October 1986 (Canada and the United States also withdrew their envoys, and ten of the 11 members of the European community took measures against Syria).   As with other Middle Eastern states, terrorism offers Syria a low-cost means of pursuing its regional policies.   For example, depending on French government reactions, pressure is applied - in the form of bombings in France and hostage-taking in Lebanon - and relaxed in an apparent bid to reduce French support for Iraq.

244.   For all the "conclusive" proof found in the El Al incident, the evidence implicating Syria as a sponsor of international terrorism tends to be as circumstantial as that inculpating other alleged sponsoring states.   As one analyst of Middle Eastern terrorism explained,

> "The case for Syrian involvement in Middle East terrorism is... strong but unproven.   The skill with which this political tool is manipulated by Damascus and the 'remote control' method of operating obviously make it difficult for President Reagan to find the 'irrefutable evidence' he says he would need for another Libyan-type raid."[305]

245.   By providing his "good offices" to attempt to free Western hostages, Assad has partially assuaged Western anger at Syria's alleged

sponsorship of terrorism.   Three American and two French hostages in Lebanon were released through Syrian intervention, along with over 30 American passengers from TWA Flight 847. While such assistance seems to be linked with specific policy directions taken by Western governments vis à vis the Middle East,[306] along with Damascus's apparent crackdown on the Abu Nidal group and the entry of Syrian troops into Beirut (February 1987) - which has greatly reduced the incidence of international terrorism in that city - it has encouraged a thaw in Western relations with Syria.   Early in June 1987 Reagan apparently offered to improve relations with Syria after administration officials had concluded that Syria's record on international terrorism had greatly improved since late-1986.[307]

246.   Sooner or later, discussion of state sponsorship of terrorism tends to lead to the Soviet Union and its "proxies" (Cuba and the PLO). Describing the links between terrorist groups, Sterling wrote: "What is now beginning to emerge is the degree to which the links in this network have been purposefully forged - and continue to be maintained - by the Soviet Union and its two chief proxies in this regard, Cuba and the Palestinians."[308]

247.   So pervasive in Western counter-terrorism circles is the suspicion of Soviet involvement in international terrorism that the USSR has been called to account for what it has not done as well as for what it has been alleged to have done. In the wake of the April 1986 bombing in Berlin (which killed two people, including an American, and wounded over 100), the official spokesman of the State Department stated that, prior to it, the United States had passed intelligence of the impending attack to the Soviets and East Germans. He added: "we urged the Soviets and East Germans to restrain the Libyans. Had they done so, this entire cycle of events would have been avoided."[309]

248.   Direct evidence of Soviet sponsorship of international terrorism is hard to adduce. Analysts who seek a link between the Soviet Union and terrorist groups tend to point to putative motives and a fairly large body of circumstantial evidence. For example, the fact that the Soviet bloc has largely been spared terrorism has sometimes been implied to indicate the terrorists' indebtedness to their sponsors. The USSR's general lack of support for international efforts to combat terrorism is also regarded as evidence of Soviet complicity. In a chapter entitled "The Beneficiary," Sterling suggested that the Soviets have supported disparate terrorist groups because terrorism destabilizes and weakens the West.[310] Neil Livingstone similarly commented on the congruence between terrorist activities and Soviet objectives: "Whether by design or simply the result of similar convictions, the European terrorist groups making war against NATO and the United States are serving Soviet interests in the region..."[311]

249.   Over the years United States government reports have alluded to the lack of a "smoking gun" clearly implicating the Soviet Union in the promotion of international terrorism. In 1981 it was reported that a CIA draft report had concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support administration charges that the USSR was directly helping to

foment international terrorism.[312] The State Department's 1984 report claims that while the Soviet Union clearly supported international terrorism, in contrast with Iran, Syria, and Libya "we have no evidence of the Soviets directly planning or orchestrating terrorist acts by Middle Eastern, West European, or Latin American groups."[313]

250.   However, critics of the Soviets' role in terrorism argue that it was never their intention to direct the operations of terrorist groups, their aim rather being to profit from the activities of groups whose existence and capability could be assured by discreet assistance. Ray Cline, former deputy head of the CIA, remarked that

> "It's very important to realize that when you say the Soviet Union and the KGB...support terrorism, that you do not mean they direct and command each terrorist activity. That would be impossible, and really not very useful. What they do is supply what I call the infrastructure of terror - the money, the guns, the training,the background information, the communications, the propaganda which will inspire individual terrorist groups."[314]

A study of Soviet bloc involvement in terrorism, by Shlomi Elad and Ariel Merari, found that, with few exceptions, the Communist bloc countries encouraged existing terrorist groups in preference to creating new ones, in contradistinction to the radical Arab countries, some of which have established guerrilla/terrorist organizations (for example, Syrian-sponsored Saiqa).[315]

251.   Assessments of Soviet infrastructural support for terrorism depend on both hard and circumstantial evidence. Training is the subject about which the most testimony has apparently been accumulated. In a fairly detailed analysis of terrorist training, Elad and Merari noted that there is no evidence available of Western European terrorists being trained in the USSR* (a function filled by the radical Arab countries and, to a lesser extent, by Cuba), and few examples of such training being conducted in Eastern Europe.[317] The same study claimed that North and South American terrorists have trained mainly in Cuba and in PLO camps, that Africans have trained in the Soviet bloc and the Middle East, and that the PLO has trained nearly everywhere, including the Soviet Union.[318] Thus, whether directly or indirectly, the Soviet Union is regarded as assisting in terrorist training. In addition, Soviet and East European arms find their way in large quantities into terrorist hands, but usually through third party channels (except in the case of the PLO). Again, the Soviet Union does not appear to play a direct role in providing such things as identification papers, money, transportation, and so on, although Cuba, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia apparently do. However, Soviet diplomatic personnel have been expelled from a number of countries (most notably Mexico in the early-1970s) as a result of their alleged contacts with terrorists.

---

* Testimony given to investigators of a United States congressional committee on terrorism, by former Palestinian and Namibian guerrillas, indicated that Irish terrorists had been receiving training in the USSR and in East Germany.[316]

252.   Soviet support tends to be given to the major terrorist and guerrilla organizations - most notably the PLO - and to be channelled through countries, especially Cuba and some of the radical Arab states, which are less sensitive to being seen to support terrorism.   As Sterling put it, "few of the terrorist bands mentioned in this book can be shown to have had direct links with the Soviet Union; but not one could have gotten started or kept going without help from Havana, or the Palestine Resistance, or both."[319]

253.   The United States routinely identifies Cuba as being a major sponsor of international terrorism.   The State Department's 1985 report claimed that Castro's government "has maintained a large and complex apparatus for subversion that supports many leftist revolutionaries and terrorists.   This has ranged from arms and funding to safehaven and training..."[320]   Cuba is thought to have been operating guerrilla training facilities since 1961.   Initially the trainees were from Latin America and Africa, but after 1964 they were joined by West Europeans and Palestinians.   It is believed that Cuba has played an important role in attempts to unify, and coordinate the efforts of, disparate Latin American groups, as well as in the establishment of the JCR.

254.   Other countries have also been identified as major sponsors of international terrorism.   Among East European states, Bulgaria has been singled out as the most active,[321] but East Germany has also been implicated.   For example, the Baader Meinhoff group is said to have received forged papers, identification cards, money, arms, ammunition, and training from East Germany, and Georges Schoeters, co-founder of the FLQ, was identified as an instructor at a guerrilla training school in the country in 1980.[322]   Czechoslovakian arms and explosives have frequently been used by terrorists.   Other countries linked at different times with international terrorism have included North Korea, South Yemen, Iraq, and Algeria.

255.   <u>Government Terrorism</u>:   As was noted at the outset of this report, the use of violence and terror by governments to coerce their populations will not be discussed here.   However, there is a variant of state violence which has become a significant component of international terrorism in recent years: attacks carried out by governments themselves, rather than by surrogates.   The CIA identified 1980 as the first year in which a large number of such attacks were carried out.   The annual report for that year noted that by the end of 1980 almost one hundred attacks conducted directly by national governments had been recorded, occurring in every year since 1972, but with the majority taking place in 1980 (over-all, 5643 incidents were recorded for the 1972-80 period).[323]

256.   Government complicity in modern terrorism has taken a number of forms, although assassination has been the principal tactic used, and dates back before the 1970s.   Recently it was alleged that Britain's MI6 made a bungled attempt to assassinate Nasser at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956, and that in 1959 the CIA was developing "a new capability" in the field of selective assassination, and wanted to tap British expertise in the area.[324]   United States Senate investigations in 1975

concluded that the American government had been involved in several unsuccessful attempts to assassinate foreign leaders, including Castro and Lumumba.[325]

257.   Government assassination of expatriate dissidents achieved prominence in the late-1970s and at the start of the 1980s. In 1978 Bulgarian agents assassinated a defector in London and tried to kill another in Paris. However, most incidents of government terrorism between 1972 and 1980 occurred in the Middle East, were carried out by Middle Eastern nations (notably Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria), and were directed against the citizens (usually diplomats) of other Middle Eastern countries. In 1980 Gaddafi warned Libyan exiles that if they failed to return they would be punished, and during the balance of the year CIA records indicate that Libyan assassination teams carried out 14 attacks in Europe and the United States.[326] Since 1980 Libya has frequently used assassination as a means of eliminating dissidents.[327] A series of arrests of Libyans by the FBI in May 1985 suggested that Gaddafi was in the process of mounting a major anti-dissident campaign in the United States.[328] In July 1987 France and Iran severed diplomatic relations after the French restricted access to Iran's Paris embassy. The French wanted to question an interpreter thought to be an Iranian agent involved in the wave of bombings which occurred in France in 1986.

258.   Other countries than Bulgaria and Middle Eastern states have also practised direct government terrorism. In Rangoon in 1983 an attack primarily directed at the South Korean president killed twenty-one, and injured 48, South Korean and Burmese dignitaries (four South Korean cabinet ministers were included among the casualties). A Burmese tribunal subsequently attributed the attack to a special North Korean commando unit. More recently, North Korean agents were implicated in the destruction of a South Korean airliner near the Burmese coast in November 1987. In 1984 British authorities discovered the drugged body of a kidnapped Nigerian ex-minister, along with three Israelis, inside crates being shipped to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Lagos (the crates were accompanied by a Nigerian official to supervise the loading). In 1985 French government agents sank the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour.

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND THE UNITED STATES

259.   Earlier in this report it was remarked that, compared with many other countries, Canada has experienced a fairly low level of international terrorism. This relative good fortune has been ascribed to Canada's geographic position, which is thought to have "isolated her to a certain extent from the worst manifestations of Western terrorism."[329] In that Canada and the United States share the North American continent, it may be instructive to examine the impact of international terrorism on the United States, as a means of assessing the extent to which geography and other factors have influenced Canada's experience of the phenomenon.

Incidence

260.   The United States has long regarded itself as the principal national target of international terrorism, and the available statistics support such a contention. However, it should be noted that American data (such as those contained in the State Department reports) are likely to over-represent incidents involving American targets.

261.   The following CIA/State Department statistics indicate the United States's share of terrorist victimization:[330]

Table 7

U.S. Targets, 1968-86

Year	U.S. as Target (% of Incidents)
1968-80	43.9
1981	36.4
1982	50.5
1983	41.0
1984	21.9
1985	21.7
1986	26.9

The 1981 State Department report observed that "Each year, between 35 and 45 percent of all the international terrorist incidents are directed against US personnel or property. The second-highest number of incidents against any single country has consistently been far less - about 10 percent of the total."[331] Only in 1985 did the United States slip into second place as a terrorist target, behind Israel, but preliminary data for 1986 indicated that America had recovered its unenviable top ranking.[332]

262.   While the United States is clearly highly victimized, most incidents affecting it occur outside the country: "Although the number of incidents occurring on US territory account for less than 1% of the world total, 30-35% of those incidents world-wide are directed against the USA."[333] The proportion of international terrorist incidents occurring in North America has always been small, as the following figures attest:[334]

Table 8
Incidents in North America, 1968-86

Year	Total Number of Incidents*	Incidents in North America	Proportion in North America(%)
1968-80	6,714	673	10.0
1981	709	88	12.4
1982	794	61	7.7
1983	500	12	2.4
1984	597	5	0.8
1985	782	4	0.5
1986	737	2	0.3
	10,833	845	7.8

By comparison with other regions, the State Department statistics demonstrate a fairly low (and declining) incidence of international terrorism within North America, a finding confirmed (for the United States alone) by FBI statistics.[335]

263.   While the great majority of the incidents which occurred in North America clearly took place in the United States, the proportion of North American incidents actually directed at United States targets probably falls below 40% and constitutes a very small proportion of anti-American attacks world-wide, as the following table demonstrates:[336]

Table 9
Location of Anti-U.S. Incidents, 1968-85

Year	Incidents in N. Am.	Incidents vs. US targets in N. Am.	%	Incidents vs. US targets in N. Am.	Incidents vs. US world-wide	%
1968-80	673	282	41.9	282	2,949	9.6
1981	88	23	26.1	23	258	8.9
1982	61	14	23.0	14	401	3.5
1983	12	3	25.0	3	205	1.5
1984	5	2	20.0	2	131	1.5
1985	4	2	50.0	2	170	1.2
	843	326	38.7	326	4,114	7.9

---

* In 1983, and the years since, the threat, conspiracy, and hoax categories were deleted, explaining the apparent decline in the total number of incidents and in the number occurring in North America.

264.   The foregoing statistics indicate that during the period 1968-85, 92% of all anti-American attacks occurred outside North America, and in the mid-1980s that proportion had reached nearly 99%. To compare Canada and the United States using different data sets would be fallacious, but each data set should be internally consistent, and so it might prove illuminating to examine what Canadian and American statistics indicate about the geographic orientation of international terrorism in their respective countries. The Canadian chronology (Annex A) distinguishes between internal events (over 90% of which are directed against non-Canadian targets) and external events (all of which are directed against Canadian targets). A very rough comparison between the Canadian chronology and the State Department data, regarding internal-external occurrence affecting the United States, might be reached by comparing all incidents in North America between 1968 and 1985 (843, of which it is unlikely that more than 5% occurred in Canada) with the total number of incidents directed against American targets outside North America (4114-326). Thus, roughly 843 incidents may be described as internal to the United States, and 3788 (anti-American) incidents as external to that country.

265.   This calculation would show that 22% of all terrorist incidents affecting the United States, whether or not Americans or American interests were the targets, occurred in North America. The Canadian chronology shows that over two-thirds of the international terrorist incidents affecting Canada between 1968 and 1985 (whether or not the targets were Canadian) occurred in Canada. Thus, the American data indicate that the United States experienced an externally-focussed variety of international terrorism, while the Canadian data suggest that Canada experienced a domestically-focussed variety in the period in question.

Domestic Terrorism

266.   Despite the differing geographic orientation of the two countries' experience of international terrorism, the United States and Canada share many similarities in the internal variant of it. The most obvious, already discussed, has been its relatively low incidence. However, a perhaps more significant resemblance lies in the source of international terrorism within Canada and the United States. A Rand study recently noted that "approximately two thirds of all terrorism in the United States is carried out by ethnic-separatist or emigre terrorists."[337] The Canadian chronology indicates that about three-quarters of the international terrorist incidents occurring in Canada between 1968 and 1987 were committed by emigré groups or individuals. Emigré terrorism has declined in recent years in the United States, largely as the result of the arrest of key personnel. Thus, the FALN was crippled after the neutralization in 1984 of a key cell in Chicago. Similarly, a 1986 Rand paper argued that although Armenian groups committed 115 acts between 1980 and 1982, they had staged none since the latter date, largely owing to the stiff sentence handed down to Hampig Sassounian and to the arrest of five Armenian youths on the eve of an operation in October 1982.[338] After committing 32 acts of terrorism during the period between 1980 and 1983, anti-Castro Cubans were so crippled by the loss of key members that their activities ground to a halt after 1983.

The study suggested that a further reason behind the decline of emigré terrorism in the United States might be disillusionment that after years of effort the terrorists' goals are no closer to fulfilment.[339]

267.   Ideology appears to have been less of a driving force in North American than in European terrorism. According to Jenkins, the capacity of the political system of the United States to absorb discontent and accommodate diverse interests is the reason the country has been spared much of the terrorist violence which afflicts many other countries.[340] Nonetheless, left-wing terrorism did reach moderately high levels during the Vietnam War era (being exemplified by the activities of the Weathermen). American withdrawal from Vietnam, and the winnowing of extremist ranks through accident and arrest, resulted in a considerable decline in left-wing terrorism during the 1970s. There was a resurgence in the mid-1980s as radical groups embraced populist causes - such as United States involvement in Central America and South Africa's apartheid policy - in an attempt to broaden their base of support. However, the tactics of such groups are still largely defined by their desire to generate "armed progaganda", and thus continue to concentrate on the bombing of such essentially symbolical targets as banks, corporate offices, and military facilities. Because of the world-wide anti-United States stance of left-wing terrorist groups, left-wing terrorism in the United States consists primarily of domestic groups - notably the Black Liberation Army - attacking American targets. Thus its international element is limited, although issues such as apartheid have provoked attacks on non-American targets (South African Airways offices, for example). As was the case with emigré and separatist organizations, left-wing groups have been hurt by the arrest of key members. For example, the United Freedom Front was destroyed by police action in 1985. Police successes, along with an apparent decline in the number of violent incidents attributable to left-wing groups, suggested by late-1986 that leftist terrorism might have peaked in the United States.[341]

268.   Right-wing terrorism is thought likely to herald a new type of American terrorism,[342] but its implications are largely domestic (although the 1987 Senate Special Committee on Terrorism report noted some disturbing testimony regarding cross-border links between right-wing groups in Canada and the United States[343]). Another recent development in American terrorism is anti-abortion violence. Between March 1982 and the beginning of 1986 there were some 42 bombings of abortion clinics and more than 150 acts of vandalism in Washington, D.C. and seven states.[344] Again, the focus of this terrorism is domestic. The Rand report on terrorism in the United States in 1985 found that the only area of increase was Jewish extremist violence.[345] Its focus has always been international.

269.   Ethnic and emigré groups have generally shown themselves to be more persistent and violent than other groups in the United States. Left-wing groups and issue-oriented groups tend to be less lethal, and to engage mainly in symbolic bombings. Leftist bombings usually occur at night, and with pre-announcement, to avoid the infliction of casualties.   The tactic most commonly used by U.S.-based terrorists is bombing.   However, Jewish extremists are resorting increasingly to assassination, both to publicize their views and to eliminate perceived enemies.[346]

External Terrorism

270.   While the United States has long been an attractive target for international terrorists, an ominous trend began to develop in the mid-1970s: "Between 1968 and 1981, 189 American citizens were killed in international terrorist attacks. Almost half of them were victims of indiscriminate killings, but the number of Americans singled out for assassination has increased steadily since the mid-1970s, and all Americans killed in 1981 had been selected for assassination."[347] The increased lethality of attacks upon Americans was indicated in a recent study which showed that on average there were eight lethal attacks (incidents in which Americans were killed, or were intended to be killed or seriously injured) per year between 1973 and 1979, and 15 per year between 1980 and 1986.[348]

271.   Canadians overseas have rarely been the victims of terrorist attack, but when they have been it appears likely to have been as much a result of accident as of design. In approximately half of the external cases included in the chronology, Canadian nationality does not seem to have been a major factor in victimization,* and Canadians have very rarely been killed in international terrorist incidents. Whereas most incidents affecting American nationals or interests are ultimately directed at the United States government, "a minority of terrorist events affecting Canada and Canadians has as its ultimate target or focus a desire to change Canadian government policies, positions or activities."[349]

272   The Middle East has been a particularly fertile region for systematic attacks on American targets, but American businesses have been vulnerable in Latin America, as have United States military personnel and institutions in West Germany. Between 1968 and 1980, 29% of all attacks against Americans occurred in Latin America, 23% in the Middle East, and 23% in Western Europe. In 1980 attacks against Americans were recorded in at least 51 countries.[350] In the period 1968-80, 31.5% of attacks against American targets were directed at business facilities or executives, 28.1% against diplomatic officials or property, 15.9% against military officials or property, and 12.0% against private citizens.[351] In 1985 businesses were the most frequently attacked American targets and Latin America was again the favoured venue.[352]

273.   By contrast, the Canadian chronology indicates that the Canadian government and private citizens are the most common targets of international terrorism overseas, while Canadian business and military personnel and facilities have been attacked very infrequently.

---

* This proportion would be still lower if the main chronology included incidents involving Canadian casualties - such as the 1985 Valetta hijacking - in which other countries or governments were clearly intended to be the immediate and the remote targets.

274.   The State Department has attributed American vulnerability to international terrorism to a number of factors: leftist ideology and "anti-imperialist" motives encourage many groups to attack United States targets; American targets are numerous, varied, and accessible in most of the countries where terrorists are active; American policies are usually opposed and often inimical to the goals and interests of many terrorist groups; and United States support of some of the governments that terrorist groups are trying to destabilize or overthrow automatically puts Americans into the enemy's camp.

275.   By contrast with the United States, Canada's foreign policy, overseas economic profile, and tourist presence is relatively low, making the citizens and interests of this country less susceptible to attack.

Canada and the United States

276.   Comparison between the levels and types of international terrorism experienced by Canada and the United States does prove illuminating. The major difference between the two countries lies in the heavy, and increasingly deliberate, external targeting of American citizens and interests, by comparison with which the overseas attacks on Canadians and Canadian facilities are few, and relatively non-lethal and haphazard. The Middle East problem and ideology also obtrude little on Canada by comparison with the United States. This pattern of victimization essentially reflects the difference between a Western superpower and a middle power having a high peacekeeping profile and lacking an imperial past or a reputation for an assertive foreign policy. The Canadian government simply has not been either an immediate or a remote target, by contrast with its United States counterpart.

277.   The similarities between the two countries lie in their internal experience of international terrorism. In both Canada and the United States the incidence of international terrorism has been very low (although in Canada it has recently been on the increase). In both countries emigrés have been the principal source of international terrorism (and separatists - Puerto Ricans and the FLQ - have been far the most prolific source of domestic terrorist acts). Tactically, these patterns have largely resolved themselves into bombings in Canada and in the United States alike.

278.   Both the similarities and the differences between Canada and the United States suggest that geography, as well as political and cultural factors, play a significant role in shaping Canada's experience of international terrorism.

PART III - CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

BACKGROUND

General

1.   In the preceding section, reference was briefly made to the relatively low incidence of international terrorist events affecting Canada, particularly by comparison with the United States. While the public probably makes little distinction between domestic and international terrorism, the decline in the level of the former during the past 16 years, and the always low incidence of the latter, appear to have combined to produce the impression that Canada is relatively immune from terrorism. Naturally, some incidents cause concern, and even anger, but they are generally short-lived emotions. Furthermore, the concern appears to be outward-focussed. It has been noted that the aim of terrorism is to terrorize. Later in this section it will be shown that the Canadian population is rarely victimized by acts of international (or even domestic) terrorism occurring in Canada, and that a high proportion of the few acts which do occur deliberately target non-Canadian victims. Thus, the public perception that Canada has no major terrorist problem is entirely comprehensible, because the bulk of the population has not been even remotely intimidated.

2.   In the absence of viable survey data regarding Canadian public perceptions of terrorism, a partial sense of such perceptions may be derived from the way in which the subject is reported in the media. An analysis of newspaper headlines suggests the existence of a roller coaster awareness of international terrorism, alternating between complacency and alarm. As will be seen, for the most part both the public and the media appear to subscribe to the myth of "the peaceable kingdom". But while the rarity of Canadian incidents probably encourages such a belief, the actual occurrence of a terrorist act in Canada tends to produce an exaggerated response. The Kelly Committee indirectly alluded to this phenomenon when it observed that "media self-examination usually occurs after a widely-publicized terrorist event and wanes shortly thereafter, perhaps to be resuscitated by a subsequent event."[353] Newspaper headlines give an interesting indication of the periodicity and potential exaggeration of media coverage of the subject, as the following examples demonstrate:

- "The terrorist threat to 'peaceful' Canada" (Globe and Mail, 9 December 1980)

- "Armenian terrorists issue threats against Canada" (Winnipeg Free Press, 12 August 1982)

- "Terrorists may key on Canada: expert" (Citizen, 30 October 1982)

- "Every terrorist group here: Kaplan"
  (<u>Citizen</u>, 12 May 1984)

- "Terrorism a risk business may face"
  (<u>Globe and Mail</u>, 4 June 1984)

- "Conservatives declare war on terrorism in Canada"
  (<u>Globe and Mail</u>, 26 June 1985)

- "Increased terrorism feared in Canada"
  (<u>Globe and Mail</u>, 25 April 1986)

However, it would be unfair to imply that the media invariably overrate the terrorist threat to Canada. Thus, in 1984 the <u>Globe and Mail</u> reported that a survey of international terrorist acts over the previous decade showed that Canada had experienced a relatively low incidence of terrorism. The story was headlined "Canada rates low in survey of terror".[354]

3.   While survey evidence of Canadian public perceptions regarding the terrorist threat to Canada is lacking, occasionally polling and other data do indicate a considerable public awareness of the dangers posed by terrorists. After the <u>Achille Lauro</u> hijacking, 73% of Canadians surveyed claimed to have heard of the incident.[355] A Gallup poll published in November 1986 suggested that terrorism would make 58% of Canadians change their travel plans outside Canada or the United States.[356] According to Ontario's travel registrar, hundreds of thousands of Canadians voiced a fear of terrorist attacks when they cancelled or delayed European vacations in 1986.[357] It would appear that terrorism evokes the greatest concern among Canadians who travel. A recent newspaper article detected increased concern among Canadian firms that do business overseas.[358]

4.   Again, however, the awareness of terrorism seems to be episodic. While terrorism greatly affected travel plans in 1986, overseas travel from Canada was reported to have increased as much as 60% in the first half of 1987, with concerns about safety having apparently died down.[359] Among businessmen, awareness and concern regarding the risks of terrorism often have not been translated into safety programmes. According to an analyst with the Conference Board of Canada, few Canadian companies have a formal management apparatus to deal with terrorist incidents. The president of Pinkerton of Canada Ltd claimed in 1984 that his company had only eight or nine national clients in its crisis management programme, which instructs staff on how to deal with kidnapping, hostage-taking, and extortion. By contrast, he noted that about 80% of the top 200 international companies in the United States had started executive protection plans.[360] One executive told a reporter that while businessmen were aware of the terrorist problem, "I just don't think they have practised a lot of the safety measures."[361]

"The Peaceable Kingdom"

5.   The relative unwillingness of many Canadian businessmen to take protective measures against terrorist attack has been attributed to the comparatively tranquil business environment of North America and to diminished international terrorist activity.[362]   Such an attitude probably also stems from a widespread belief that political violence has been a rare occurrence in Canadian history. The report of the Kelly Committee noted that "During its hearings the Committee heard many explanations for Canada's relative freedom from terrorist attack. The explanations largely encompassed what is referred to as the 'peaceable kingdom theory'..."[363]

6.   The view of Canada as an unusually peaceful country is widely shared, by authorities on political violence and by lay people alike. Thus, in 1980 Dr. Maurice Tugwell (then director of the Centre for Conflict Studies at the University of New Brunswick) characterized Canada as an "extraordinarily peaceful" country, a situation he attributed to a sparse population, to the rarity of social violence in cold climates, and to Canada's tradition of respect for the law.[364] (However, Tugwell noted that the potential for political violence did exist in Canada).   In 1982 a professor at the University of British Columbia, who had formerly been a member of the Israeli Irgun, commented that Canada had thus far escaped the ravages of terrorism. But he added that North America was not prepared for terrorism, and that while politicians did not understand its long-term implications, the general public understood even less.[365]   In a 1985 speech to the International Civil Aviation Organization delivered shortly after the Air India and Narita Airport incidents, Mr. Don Mazankowski, the then Minister of Transport, remarked that "The fact that terrorists have chosen to strike in one of the most non-violent countries in the world underscores how vulnerable every country is."[366]

7.   The phrase "the peaceable kingdom" seems to have been adopted as a depiction of Canadian political life in the early-1970s, and it quickly gained currency. The belief in Canadian peacefulness has become so well-engrained that even well-known incidents of collective violence - such as the Riel rebellions, the Winnipeg General Strike, and the October Crisis - have usually been dismissed as aberrations.

8.   Canada's apparent political tranquillity has been ascribed to a number of factors. Among these are the absence of positively valued violent models (such as a revolution), the active rejection of other societies' violent models (the Loyalist tradition), the tolerance and the respect for authority of Canadians, the belief that violence accomplishes little, and the precariousness of Canadian life (physically, politically, and economically) which has encouraged the view that the country cannot afford turbulence.[367]   The concept of the peaceable kingdom is not merely a descriptive one.   The idea that political violence is unequivocally illegitimate has encouraged Canadian governments to deal forcefully with any manifestation of violence, confident

in receiving public approval (as the invocation of the War Measures Act in 1970 demonstrated).

9.   Recently two analysts of violence in Canada contended that uncritical acceptance of the myth of the peaceable kingdom has caused misjudgments about the extent of political conflict in this country, and posed serious obstacles to its understanding. In fact, they argued that while the incidence of collective violence in Canada during the decade after 1955 could not be considered excessive, it was either at or above the median for advanced industrialized countries.[368] This study ranks among a growing number of works on violence in Canada, many of which point not to the absence, but to the relative prevalence, of collective violence in this country. In a 1986 book on public violence in Canada, Judy Torrance found that in a sample of 18 countries similar to Canada in level of economic development, form of government, and geocultural region, five were more violent than Canada during the two decades following the war,* seven were less violent,** and five joined Canada in the middle ranks.*** While countries with large populations tend to show higher rates of violence, countries with smaller populations but having significant ethnic or linguistic divisions, also demonstrated a greater disposition to violence.[369]

10.   Although a recognition of the reality of political violence in Canada is relatively new, such violence has been a fairly consistent thread in Canadian history, both before and after Confederation. There was a relatively large number of riots and disturbances during the nineteenth century, mostly arising from ethnic and religious tension. In fact, between 1872 and the outbreak of the First World War there were 80 instances in which military aid of the civil power (MACP) was invoked. While the use of MACP has declined in frequency since 1914, the incidence of collective violence has probably not done so, ethnic and labour unrest being its chief staples. An analysis of incidents of collective violence in Ontario and Québec between 1963 and 1973 found that in Ontario 45% were linked to immediate economic issues and 41% to political issues, whereas in Québec much more of the violence centred on domestic political issues.[370]

11.   Political violence and terrorism are different although related phenomena, but as Torrance and others have stated or implied, the one creates the necessary climate for the other. Thus the study of political violence is related to that of terrorism (which of course it subsumes), particularly where it challenges widely-held misconceptions which obscure the threat posed by terrorists.

---

*   Belgium, France, Italy, UK, and USA.

**   Australia, Denmark, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

***   Austria, Eire, Finland, Israel, and West Germany.

12.   Whether it is the increasing number of studies which debunk the peaceable kingdom myth, or simply the fact that modern international terrorism has persisted for two decades, there seems to be a growing appreciation in Canada that the country has not been spared, and is not immune to, political violence and terrorism. In 1984 Solicitor General Robert Kaplan claimed that every existing international terrorist organization was operating in Canada, and added: "it would be foolish for anyone to assume that Canadians aren't capable of engaging in the kinds of activities that the Red Brigades engage in in Italy and Japan, and that the Palestine Liberation Organization engages in in France and West Germany and the Middle East."[371] In September 1985 Mr. John Bosley, Speaker of the House of Commons, told delegates to an Ottawa conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union that the reality of terrorism had been "brought home tragically to Canadians" by the destruction of an Air India jet over the Atlantic in June 1985.[372] In March 1986 the new Solicitor General, Mr. Perrin Beatty, announced a series of measures to combat terrorism, defending them on the grounds that Canada "is certainly at risk. Terrorism is no longer something that happens somewhere else."[373]

13.   On a more day-to-day basis Canadians are confronting the terrorist threat on a variety of levels, from the guard huts set up outside foreign embassies in Ottawa to enhanced security in airports. In the wake of the 1985 Turkish embassy incident, uniformed RCMP special constables replaced commercial guards at Ottawa embassies, and guard huts were built, causing a local furore on both aesthetic and safety grounds. More Canadians are now affected by the security measures taken at airports, and these have been progressively enhanced in recent years (although they have been brought into question by periodic lapses and by investigative journalists). In 1982 security precautions were stepped up at a number of Canadian airports as a result of threats by some international terrorist organizations. A similar tightening-up of airport security occurred in the wake of a bomb hoax in January 1986. Long-term measures have also been taken, inevitably causing some inconvenience to Canadian travellers. The 1985-86 annual report of the Solicitor General stated that "in light of international terrorist activities", the various authorities charged with airport security were developing a new police response package.[374] Its implementation would doubtless further bring home to Canadians their country's vulnerability to terrorism. In late-1986 it was reported that several ministerial chauffeurs had taken an anti-terrorism course at a privately-owned security company in Halifax, with a view to being prepared for terrorist attacks.[375]

Domestic Terrorism

14.   Although this report is concerned with international terrorism, both-world wide and with respect to Canada, the evident link between domestic and international terrorism in a number of countries (notably France and Germany) suggests the utility of examining domestic terrorism

in Canada in order to understand international terrorism. Not only have Canadian domestic terrorist groups (notably the FLQ) resorted occasionally to acts of international terrorism, but also their very existence in Canada both offers the possibility of their exploitation by like-minded overseas groups, and reflects a rejection of the norms which deter violence.

15.   Incidence: The Kelly Committee report included a table of terrorist incidents which occurred in Canada between 1960 and 1985. It clearly showed a decline in the incidence of domestic terrorism over the period, from an average of 23 incidents per year between 1960 and 1971 to an average of five per year between 1972 and 1985. The table is reproduced below:[376]

<div align="center">

Table 10
Terrorist Incidents in Canada, 1960-85

</div>

Year	Domestic	International	Total
1960	3	0	3
1961	12	0	12
1962	10	0	10
1963	24	0	24
1964	8	1	9
1965	15	1	16
1966	6	1	7
1967	7	3	10
1968	68	4	72
1969	42	3	45
1970	46	0	46
1971	40	3	43
1972	5	5	10
1973	1	0	1
1974	3	1	4
1975	1	1	2
1976	0	2	2
1977	3	3	6
1978	1	1	2
1979	17	4	21
1980	8	2	10
1981	10	3	13
1982	9	7	16
1983	12	0	12
1984	0	0	0
1985	0	3	3
	351	48	399

It is interesting to note that the evident decline in domestic terrorism in Canada in recent years has been parallelled by similar declines in other Western nations (for example, the United States, Great Britain, and Italy).

16.   Doukhobors: Perhaps the earliest, the longest-lasting, and the most prolific - if not the most sanguinary (because directed against property) - campaign of terrorism in twentieth century Canada has been the pyrogenic activism of a religious community in British Columbia. Between 1923 and 1962 the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors established a tradition of destruction with few parallels. An arson campaign in British Columbia in the 1920s in effect destroyed all schools accessible to Doukhobor children in the province, and established a pattern followed for four decades by Sons of Freedom zealots, anxious to halt the process of absorption into Canadian society. The burnings continued into the 1930s, and by 1937 the toll of depredations had risen to 153.[377] There were only 44 incidents during the years of the Second World War, but the campaign of arson and dynamiting was renewed after the war, with 118 incidents occurring in 1946-47 alone.[378] Thereafter outbreaks followed each other every few years until 1962. The total number of Doukhobor incidents is not known, but one authority gives a figure of over one thousand.[379]

17.   Despite the high incident total, only three people - all Doukhobors - lost their lives, two to their own bombs (nine people, including the sect's first leader in Canada, were killed in an apparent train bombing in 1924, but the incident, if deliberate, was possibly part of a leadership struggle and not the act of the Sons of Freedom). Among the targets were schools and even a suspension bridge, but for the most part the extremists concentrated on Doukhobor property in the Kootenays as they fought against assimilationist tendencies in the community.

18.   A study of the Doukhobors contended that throughout the forty years of violence the terrorists never represented more than a minority of the Sons of Freedom, probably numbering no more than two hundred.[380] The authors claimed that the "black work" was perpetrated by

> "gangs of youngish men driven into tense psychological states by the atmosphere of fanatical communities like Krestova and Gilpin, by traditional winter idleness, and by an enduring sense of grievance - all complicated by competitiveness between gangs. In other words, Sons of Freedom violence has been a product of alienation, and, like the violence of city youth, it is inclined to be unplanned in its manifestations."[381]

19.   The last serious acts of dynamiting and arson took place in 1962, and fanatical activism declined thereafter. However, occasional minor bombings, burnings, and nude protests still occur.

20.   FLQ: The most violent campaign of domestic terrorism in modern Canadian history has been that of the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) between 1963 and 1970. (It is noteworthy that separatist terrorism has also been the most prolific source of domestic terrorist acts in the United States). Although the FLQ violence was primarily directed at

property, eight persons died as a result of it, and many more were injured. From 1917 to 1963 there had been no recorded acts of terrorism in Québec, so the activities of the FLQ had the impact of novelty.

21.   The FLQ was founded in 1963, and, like most fledgling terrorist organizations, launched itself with a wave of bombings. A 1974 study of violence in Québec, by Marc Laurendeau, claimed that bombings constituted 48% of incidents. Laurendeau reported that 131 out of 174 acts of FLQ violence took place in Montréal, a fact which he attributed to the large number of symbolic targets in the city.[382]   In a more recent assessment Laurendeau contended that the FLQ was involved in over 200 bombings between 1963 and 1970.[383]   Before 1967 many of the bombings were largely symbolic in intent, with military, governmental, and mass media targets being especially singled out, along with monuments having "colonial" overtones (among them the Wolfe Memorial and the Queen Victoria monument in Québec, both of which were attacked in 1963). Apart from bombings, a large proportion of FLQ activities in the first three years of operations consisted of robberies and hold-ups, whereby large amounts of money, arms, and equipment were acquired. After 1966 "financing raids" diminished and symbolical attacks largely ended, and private sector targets were struck with greater frequency (reflecting the influence of Pierre Vallières).

22.   Laurendeau noted that with the exception of 1965, the number of incidents decreased each year from 1963 to 1968. However, events of a more violent nature began to take place from 1967 (although the first death attributable to FLQ terrorism occurred as early as 1963). By 1970 some of the largest dynamite bombs ever found in Canada were discovered, some of them having highly sophisticated fuses. A bomb attack on the Montréal stock exchange in February 1969 demonstrated the FLQ's increased capability (27 persons were wounded in the explosion, three of them seriously).

23.   At the end of the 1960s there was evidence of a change in FLQ tactics. With a number of militants in jail by 1970, it is not surprising that the FLQ should turn to a tactic which had proven highly successful between late-1968 and 1970 in securing the release of "political prisoners" in Central and South America: kidnapping. In 1970 the FLQ planned or implemented four kidnapping attempts - against the Israeli consul in Montréal (February), against the United States consul-general in Montréal (June), and against James Cross and Pierre Laporte (October). This internationalization of its campaign (and particularly the kidnapping of a foreign diplomat) gave the FLQ an influence which seven years of bombing had failed to provide, but it also hastened the organization's demise. Yet throughout the period the FLQ remained a parochial group, and there is little evidence of foreign involvement in its activities.

24.   Despite the escalation of serious attacks in the late-1960s and in 1970, the FLQ was always numerically weak. In his 1974 book,

Laurendeau included an appendix listing the persons suspected of terrorism between 1963 (the first network) and 1970 (the ninth, tenth, and eleventh networks). It contained 90 different names , although the name of at least one prominent felquiste was missing. Laurendeau listed nine persons in the Libération and Chénier cells, which were involved in the Cross-Laporte kidnappings, and added the names of six "collaborators".[384] In his article for The Canadian Encyclopedia, Laurendeau claimed that the two cells, which were both based on Montréal, numbered about twelve members.[385]

25.   Whatever the actual number of felquistes, it would appear that, by comparison with terrorist groups elsewhere, the FLQ was relatively weak, so much so that it was largely destroyed during the October Crisis. An FLQ rump seems to have continued operations in a small way in 1971,[386] but effectively the FLQ ceased activities after the October Crisis. Both Vallières and Gagnon turned their backs on violence, as did some of the exiles in Cuba. Nonetheless, since 1970-71 occasional acts of low-level violence have occurred which might be attributed to the FLQ. In 1976 a caller using an FLQ slogan warned that a bomb had been placed at the Olympic Stadium during an Olympic handball game. A bomb-type device was found, but it lacked explosives. In March 1980 a bomb exploded under a Montréal billboard which carried a Pro-Canada Foundation message calling for Canadian unity. Whether or not the FLQ claimed responsibility for the incident was not indicated in the article describing the incident.[387] After a ruling by the Québec Court of Appeal in December 1986 that struck down sections of Bill 101 which forbade companies displaying bilingual signs, there were several incidents of vandalism in Montréal which police suspected may have been committed by one or two FLQ-type cells. These included the firebombing of a Zellers store and the smashing of a window in one of the stores which launched the appeal court hearing (a local radio station received a communiqué purporting to come from the FLQ after the Zellers incident). Low-level as such incidents are, they hardly suggest a revival of the terrorism of the 1960s, even if it is appropriate to link them with the FLQ.

26.   Left-Wing Terrorism: As was noted in the section which examined terrorism in the United States, ideology has probably been less of a driving force in North American terrorism than it has been in European terrorism. Nonetheless, a conference at St. Jean in April 1986 caused a furore when two participants suggested that a left-wing group called Direct Action posed a serious domestic threat in Canada.

27.   Left-wing groups in Canada have rarely strayed from protest activities into the realm of political violence. There was a flurry of minor attacks, probably attributable to left-wing radicals, in the late-1960s and early-1970s. Few in number, they largely consisted of graffiti painting, bomb threats, and bombings directed against United States consular offices, in protest over such issues as the Vietnam War and the testing of nuclear weapons at Amchitka. In 1969 student radicals occupied the computer centre of Sir George Williams University in Montréal and subsequently wrecked it, causing damage amounting to $2

million. In an act of vandalism rather than of violence, a Toronto art student in 1983 seriously damaged one of the original copies of the 1982 Constitution Act, as a protest against the government's decision to approve cruise missile testing in Canada. Low-level as this incident was, it did exceed the usual boundaries of Canadian political activism. Taken together, these few incidents pale by comparison with left-wing terrorism elsewhere. Thus, the appearance of Direct Action in 1982 - at a time when the incidence of domestic and international terrorism in Canada was low in comparison with the period 1968-71 - came as a shock to Canadians.

28.   Direct Action's attacks began in May 1982 with the bombing of a hydro sub-station at Dunsmuir, B.C., resulting in $4 million damage. In October the Litton Systems plant in Toronto was bombed, wounding 10 people and inflicting $3.9 million damage, and a month later three video outlets in British Columbia were firebombed. When five radicals were arrested in Squamish in connection with these attacks, it was discovered that they were in the advanced stages of a plan to rob a Brinks truck to finance their activities. It subsequently transpired that they had considered sabotaging a National Defence building in Ottawa, blowing up a number of CF-18s at Canadian Forces Base Cold Lake, and placing a bomb on a commercial flight originating in Toronto.

29.   The Dunsmuir and Litton attacks were both claimed by Direct Action. Nonetheless the group seems to have been limited to radicals based in British Columbia, and it does not appear that any Toronto-based activists were involved in the Litton incident. However, in the spring of 1983 a group calling itself Groupe action directe claimed responsibility for a series of arson and bomb attacks in Montréal. Among its targets were the Grenadier Guards armoury, a telephone relay station, and a Petro-Canada installation. The group also claimed responsibility for setting a fire in the lobby of an apartment complex which housed the office of a member of Parliament. Groupe action directe did not last very long on the Montréal scene. An equally meteoric group appeared at the same time, but Friction directe espoused nationalist as well as left-wing causes. This group, of which the Montréal police had had no previous knowledge, threw two molotov cocktails at the Black Watch armoury in March 1983. Two further molotov cocktails were found near the armoury of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal. Apart from protesting United States support for Central American governments, and Ottawa's approval of cruise missile testing in Canada, Friction directe claimed that its attacks were intended to remind people of the twentieth anniversary of the FLQ's first successful bomb attack.

30.   After conviction of the "Squamish Five" in 1983, Direct Action became quiescent. When it reappeared in the news, it was less the result of its own actions than of the dire predictions made by two participants at a conference of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) at St. Jean in April 1986. Peter Shoniker, an assistant crown attorney in Ontario (and a Canadian delegate to the United Nations special congress on international terrorism in 1980), was one of the

speakers. In his published paper, and in remarks made at the conference, he warned that "the greatest threat posed by terrorists in Canada today comes from an organization known as Direct Action or Action Directe".[388] Shoniker claimed that Direct Action was a splinter group of the German RAF: "The connections of ideology, recruitment, training and modus operandi between the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Army Faction and the Direct Action organization in Canada today are profound and in my view inextricable."[389] He then noted "shocking" similarities in anti-police statements by Ulrike Meinhof and the Squamish Five, parallels in recruitment (notably among university students), and tactics (the Baader-Meinhof group, the RAF, and Direct Action all launched their campaigns with the bombing of facilities). In fact, the profile drawn of the Baader-Meinhof group, the RAF, and Direct Action resembles that of many other terrorist groups, and thus hardly constitutes proof of an "inextricable link" and "splinter group" status. Furthermore, it was noted in an earlier section that German experts regard the international links of the German terrorist groups as being weak, even in Europe.

31. While similarities of rhetoric, tactics, and recruiting provide rather circumstantial evidence of inter-group linkages, Shoniker also noted that the Litton terrorists were "all trained by the Red Army Faction Terrorist Organization in places like Libya, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen..."[390] However, training camp contacts do not necessarily result in continuing and strong inter-group ties, as analyses of other terrorist groups clearly indicate.

32. The controversy aroused by Shoniker's remarks centred mainly on his claims that Direct Action was significantly larger and more potent than was generally believed, and that it would graduate from bombings to assassinations within five years. In his paper, Shoniker claimed that "at least seven Direct Action cells" had manifested themselves in Canada (in Toronto, Vancouver, Montréal, and Ottawa), and that the imprisonment of the "Stewart cell" (the Squamish Five) would have a marginal effect in "terminating" the group's threat.[391] However, at the conference Shoniker seems to have stated or implied that Direct Action was still larger than the reference to seven cells implied. According to press reports he claimed that a police raid in Ottawa "turned up a group mailing list with 780 names."[392] Although the same story reported that Shoniker would not say how many active members the group had, several conference participants evidently received the impression that Direct Action numbered 780 members. One of the speakers, with a wide practical experience of terrorism, ridiculed the statistic, as did members of the audience.[393] The image of potency conveyed by size was reinforced by Shoniker's contention that Direct Action recruits received very extensive training: "The training these people do is mindboggling."[394]

33. After noting that the Baader-Meinhof group and the RAF graduated from bombing facilities to political kidnappings and in-transit assassinations, Shoniker predicted that "if permitted to recruit within our country, Direct Action will be engaging in political kidnappings and in-transit assassinations in this country within the next five years."[395]

34.   Shoniker's claims received some support from the conference organizer, Mr. John Thompson, head of research for the CISS.   He asserted that up to 80 people were involved in four Direct Action cells, with many of them disposed to violence.   However, he believed that much of Canada's terrorism was imported, and contended that up to 14 members of the RAF and its support groups were hiding in Canada.[396]   Such claims provoked questioning in Parliament.   Thompson also stated that Direct Action was gearing up for a series of terrorist actions later in 1986 or early in 1987.[397]

35.   In September 1986 the post office in Cedar, B.C. was firebombed. A letter purporting to come from Direct Action claimed that the action was intended to protest the use of the post office as a channel for financial support for the Nicaraguan Contras.   Minor as this incident was, does it vindicate the more dire predictions made six months earlier at St. Jean?

36.   So far, both temporally and (to a lesser degree) tactically, left-wing terrorism in Canada has matched that in the United States, although on a much smaller scale.   After a brief flurry of activity in the late-1960s it was dormant in the 1970s, but then showed signs of a resurgence in the early-1980s.   However, the resurgence evident in the United States in the early-1980s appeared to have peaked by 1985-86, in part due to the arrest of key left-wing activists.   The similarity of Canadian and American leftist terrorism, the lack of a tradition of left-wing violence in Canada, the brevity of the campaigns of Group action directe and Friction directe, and the imprisonment of the Squamish Five all suggest that left-wing terrorism in this country will continue to be sporadic and largely symbolic (in other words, taking the form of occasional bomb attacks against property targets).

37.   Environmental Activism: The German experience has indicated that however much terrorist groups might wish to harness populist issues (such as disarmament, and housing and labour policy), they have been unable to "piggyback" terrorism and environmental protest.   In fact, some environmental groups - particularly animal rights groups - have shown a strong tendency to unassisted violence in a number of countries, including Canada.   The British Animal Liberation Front (ALF), founded in 1976, has been particularly militant.   In November 1984 ALF claimed that it had poisoned candy bars, as a pressure tactic against Mars Confectionery Ltd, which was accused of sponsoring dental research using laboratory animals.   Although the threat proved to be a hoax, it nonetheless provoked widespread public alarm.   In February 1987 nine ALF members were sentenced to a total of more than 37 years in prison for leading a nation-wide bombing campaign in 1985-86.

38.   The Canadian branch of the ALF was formed in 1982, and came into prominence early in 1985 with a number of raids on laboratories to free animals used for research purposes.   The group, which operated in fairly tight cells, also claimed responsibility for vandalism directed at a number of Toronto furriers and meat packers.   A spokesman stated that the ALF would continue its activities until policies regarding the use

of animals in experiments had been changed.[398]   In January 1987 five animal rights activists in Toronto were charged with spraying graffiti (including the acronym for the Animal Liberation Front) on a restaurant, as well as with involvement in other attacks on Toronto food outlets, during which windows were broken and tyres slashed.   One of the accused was also charged with an incident of vandalism at the University of Toronto's faculty of dentistry in February 1986.

39.   The Canadian branch of the ALF is less militant than its British counterpart.   Furthermore, its attacks have been largely symbolical. Paul Watson, a Canadian animal rights activist whose Sea Shepherd Conservation Society sank two Icelandic whaling ships in November 1986, plans his movement's operations on the basis of avoiding personal injury.   By contrast, animal rights activists in Britain sent letter-bombs to the Canadian high commission and to several British targets in February 1983.   One person was slightly injured in the attacks.   While Canadian activists have not gone to such lengths, the letter-bomb incident demonstrates the potential for increased violence by animal rights groups in Canada.   So, too, does a recent change in tactics on the part of American anti-abortionists.   The first wave of anti-abortion bombings was clearly designed to avoid inflicting casualties, but in 1985 two incidents occurred (one of them involving a large parcel bomb) which suggested that anti-abortion extremists were prepared to kill or injure people.[399]   Thus, there is a potential for personal violence even among groups dedicated to protecting lives (those of animals and of unborn babies).

40.   Thus far, violence on the part of environmental activists in Canada has been largely restricted to animal rights issues.   However, American and European experience suggests that such violence could easily extend to other issues, notably that of nuclear power.   While links between established terrorist groups and "green" protest organizations, and the causes they support, can probably be discounted on issues such as animal rights, groups like ETA have evidently recognized the potential popular appeal of attacks on targets related to nuclear power.   While such attacks have been more common in Europe, they have also occurred in the United States.   For example, in October 1977 the "Environmental Assault Unit" of the New World Liberation Front took responsibility for a bomb attack on the visitors' centre at the Trojan nuclear power plant in Prescott, Oregon.

41.   Right-Wing Terrorism: In Canada, as in Europe, there has been a tendency to dismiss right-wing extremism as a marginal threat.   As has been noted, however, the incidence of right-wing violence in West Germany far exceeded that of the left in 1984-85.   Right-wing extremism is less threatening in Canada, but it has had as lengthy antecedents as its European counterpart.

42.   The Ku Klux Klan was active in Canada in the 1920s, particularly in the West.   Largely anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic, it occasionally resorted to violence, and was possibly implicated in a fire at St. Boniface College in about 1922, which killed 10 Roman Catholics.   The

Klan in Canada faded in the late-1920s and did not reappear for almost half a century. The existence of right-wing groups in Toronto paved the way for its reappearance. The Edmund Burke Society was formed in 1968. It occasionally indulged in violence - mostly brawls at opponents' meetings - before it was replaced by the more violent Western Guard in 1972. Guard members were involved in political brawls, and in 1978 one was convicted of possessing explosives and conspiring to commit arson.

43. The Canadian Klan reappeared in 1978, and by its own account drew one quarter of its members from the Western Guard. The Canadian Klan of the early-1980s was numerically weak. Police and human rights campaigners estimated the "hard core" strength of the Klan in Toronto and Vancouver to be between 25 and 50 people in each city.[400] Klan members in Canada tended to be organized in cells ("dens") of from six to 30 people each, and there was a strongly paramilitary overtone to the organization's structure. In addition to the usual cross-burning, the Canadian Klan seems likely to have been associated with a number of acts of violence and vandalism, usually of a race-related nature: beatings in subways and bars, firebombings, and harassment and intimidation of opponents. In 1981 and 1982 four leading Canadian Klan members were arrested in connection with an abortive 1980 conspiracy to overthrow the government of Dominica. These arrests greatly undermined the Canadian Klan, which ceased to be much of a threat after 1982. Since that date there has been little evident right-wing violence, despite the widely-publicized Keegstra and Zundel cases and the establishment of an Aryan Nations camp in Alberta in 1984.

44. _Communal Terrorism_: Expatriate politics have occasionally been the cause of communal violence in Canada during the past decade. While such violence is often a reflection of political turmoil in other countries, in its implications it is more domestic than international. The primary examples of such communal terrorism have been incidents of violence in the Serbo-Croatian community (mainly in the late-1970s) and the Sikh community (mid-1980s).

45. In September 1977 three Serbians were killed in a bomb explosion in a Toronto garage. It was thought that one of their aims had been to bomb the homes of pro-Tito Yugoslavs. In August 1978 the homes of two members of Toronto's Yugoslavian community were bombed, in April 1979 a Toronto camera store was also bombed (it had long been the target of threatening telephone calls), and in July 1980 a Serb-owned travel agency was bombed. After the last incident Toronto police reported that they were exploring the possibility that the bombing might have been linked with a long-standing feud between Serbians and Croatians.[401] In June 1979 two Croatians were killed in a bomb blast in a Mississauga home, which police speculated may have been related to the camera store bombing. While most terrorist incidents within or between the two communities involved the use of bombs (and threatening calls), in September 1977 a doctor of Yugoslavian origin was shot and killed in Vancouver. The feuding within and between the two communities, and

between pro- and anti-Yugoslavian groups or individuals, has been less publicly evident since 1980.

46.   Events in the Punjab during the past decade have produced discord within the relatively large and peaceful Canadian Sikh community. Dramatic evidence of a dispute between rival factions in Toronto was provided by a courtroom shooting in 1982 in which two people were killed and one seriously injured.   In November 1982 a Toronto demonstration against the Indian government turned violent, with rival Sikh factions abusing each other.   A policeman was shot and wounded in the fracas. According to police and moderate Sikhs, militant groups have been trying to take control of Sikh temples in Canada and to intimidate moderates. The feuding was intensified by the Indian army's attack on the Golden Temple in Amritsar in 1984.   After that had fuelled passions, prominent moderates in both Toronto and Vancouver were physically beaten.

47.   However, negative community and public reaction to the Air India and Narita Airport incidents, along with the imprisonment of, or sur- veillance over, a number of militants, appears to some degree to have dampened intra-communal discord during the past two years, although in January 1986 a bomb was found on the premises of a pro-Khalistan (Punjabi separatist movement) newspaper in Surrey, B.C.

48.   Miscellaneous Terrorism: Many violent incidents which tend to be labelled terrorist because of the methods employed (such as bombing and hostage-taking), appear to be, and often are, ambiguous in their motiva- tion and are therefore difficult to classify.   Such acts incorporate elements of criminal, personal, and even psychopathic motivation. Single-handed hijacking attempts typically fit into this category of somewhat ambiguous incidents.

49.   Bomb attacks in Canada give an indication of the wide range of non-ideological terrorist-type incidents.   The RCMP's Canadian Bomb Data Centre (CBDC) attempts to ascribe motivations in bombing incidents (explosive and incendiary) in Canada, although this is obviously not possible in all cases (motivations were ascribed in about half the inci- dents recorded between 1980 and 1985 by the CBDC).   The largest propor- tion of known motivations listed by the centre in the 1980-85 period consisted of pranks, followed by vandalism and by personal animosity. (The prank and vandalism categories included such incidents as rural mail box bombings around the time of Hallowe'en).   Organized criminal activity, labour-related incidents, and extortion followed, in order, some distance behind.   Combined, domestic and international terrorism, political bombings, and protest bombings (other than those of a reli- gious or racial character) constituted less than one-fifth of the incidents attributable to pranks alone.   If bombings associated with labour disputes are excluded, economically-motivated (criminal) inci- dents comprised less than one-fifth of all the bombings to which motiva- tions were ascribed.[402] Thus, it can be seen that crime and political ideology constituted a relatively small proportion (perhaps one-third)

of the determinable motives in terrorist-type incidents (bombings) in Canada in recent years.

50.   A combination of terrorist-type tactics and criminal intent can be sufficiently confusing as to induce observers to label largely criminal and non-political acts as terrorist incidents, not only in newspaper articles but also in terrorism chronologies. In his chronology of transnational terrorism, Mickolus included a number of incidents which would seem more criminal than political in motivation. For example, in September 1971 a caller in Vancouver claimed that there was a bomb on a CP Air flight, and demanded $20,000 to specify which one. In February 1972 the Vancouver office of CP Air received a warning that planes would be blown up in flight if the caller was not given $200,000. Although a bomb was found, the money was not paid, and the perpetrator was subsequently arrested.[403]

51.   Other largely criminal incidents have similarly been associated with terrorism, either by the perpetrators or by observers. Thus, although the man who held Peter Pocklington and his wife hostage in April 1982 seems to have been actuated by economic considerations (he demanded a $1 million ransom), he styled himself a "Yugoslavian terrorist", implying political motives. In the eighteen months following this incident, five other Canadian executives, or members of their families, were attacked by would-be kidnappers (one incident occurred in the Republic of Ireland, the remainder in Canada). Although the newspaper article which described this spate of executive kidnappings noted the difference between psychopathic, terrorist, and criminal motivations, the terms "terrorism" and "terrorists" appeared six times in the story, illustrating the difficulty of separating personal and criminal motives from political ones.[404]

52.   Although criminal motives are obviously personal, the CBDC data indicate that there is a wide range of motives which are personal without being linked to financial gain. Hijackings in which the hijackers demand to be flown somewhere, without actually seeking political asylum, would fit this category. In April 1973 three juveniles used sharpened toothbrushes to hijack a Midwest Airlines plane flying between Dauphin (Manitoba) and Winnipeg. They wanted the plane to fly to Yorkton. On two occasions (in 1968 and 1971) Air Canada planes were hijacked by American citizens trying to escape prosecution in the United States.

53.   Finally, beyond the crusading, the criminal, and the crazy, there are terrorist-type acts which by their scope are significant, yet which appear, by the diversity of their targeting, to embody a variety of motivations. A wave of bombings in the Vancouver area in early-1979 (23 incidents were reported in three months) fits into this category of ambiguity. The principal targets of the bombings were government offices, banks, and schools. The continuation of the campaign after the arrest of two men in the wake of the 17th firebombing seemed to confirm police suspicions that the attacks were the work of different arsonists,

and also indicates the role played in terrorist-type incidents by "copy-cat" behaviour.

CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

54.   The sections which follow are based largely on data derived from the chronology of international terrorist incidents affecting Canada which was developed as part of this report (Annex A). The construction of the chronology (as also of a secondary chronology, Annex B, containing 71 incidents excluded from statistical interpretation) was described in the introduction to this report.

Incidence

55.   As the earlier examination of the myth of "the peaceable kingdom" demonstrated, Canada has experienced a higher level of political violence than many Canadians realize. Most Canadians would probably also be surprised to learn that by the Kelly Committee's reckoning, 399 terrorist acts (both domestic and international) occurred in Canada between 1960 and 1985, an average of 15 per year.[405] Most of these incidents were minor ones which, by their nature, would not have attracted public attention on a nation-wide scale.

56.   Few analysts agree exactly on the incidence of terrorist attacks affecting Canada. The statistical variety is a function not only of information accessibility, but also of differing reporting criteria. The Kelly Committee "was struck by the wide variation in the statistics presented by different witnesses and by the facility with which similar statistics could be interpreted in widely divergent ways."[406] While the present report is concerned with international terrorism occurring both inside and outside Canada and affecting this country, other tables deal only with events taking place inside Canada, and may or may not include domestic terrorist incidents. Thus, Jeffrey Ross's table of incidents occurring between 1960 and 1985, culled from Canadian newspapers, includes both domestic and international terrorist events, but is concerned only with incidents taking place in Canada.

57.   However, there is general congruence regarding the relative scale of international terrorism as it affects Canada. The chronology, which deliberately excludes some incidents reported in other sources, indicates that between 1968 and the end of 1987, Canada was affected by 46 incidents of terrorism, of which 32 (70%) occurred within the country. Ross's table indicates that 38 acts of international terrorism occurred in Canada between 1968 and 1985. Over the same period the chronology reports 26 incidents. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) prepared a list of terrorist incidents which took place in Canada between 1980 and 1986. It included a total of 35 terrorist incidents, of which 11 were domestic, and 20 were international; the remainder were

unclassified.[407]   Over the same period the chronology lists 16 inter-
national terrorist incidents as occurring in Canada.   Finally, in an
August 1986 paper, Dr. David Charters, of the Centre for Conflict
Studies at the University of New Brunswick, identified from public
sources a total of 80 terrorist incidents in Canada, or affecting
Canadians, between 1966 and 1986. Of these, 49 fitted the Kelly Commit-
tee's definition of international terrorism, seven were domestic, and
the remainder were not identifiable.[408]

58.   While the above statistics suggest that the incidence of terror-
ism affecting Canada is relatively low, the public record can be rather
ambiguous regarding the number of incidents occurring in Canada.   In a
newspaper report of a conference on terrorism and democracy, held at
York University in May 1987, the commissioner of the RCMP was quoted as
claiming that there had been "fewer than a dozen terrorist incidents in
Canada since 1980."[409]   This is about half the number reported by the
CSIS, and would appear likely to reinforce the public perception that
Canada has largely been spared from terrorist attack.

59.   Nonetheless, by comparison with other Western industrial demo-
cracies (and notably the group of seven major industrial nations whose
annual summits frequently explore ways of responding to terrorism),
Canada appears to have experienced a low level of international terror-
ism, both internally and externally.   Unfortunately, international
comparison is far from easy, as data sets tend to over-represent the
share in global international terrorism of the country in which each is
compiled.   As one of the State Department's annual reports observed,
"The reporting on international terrorist incidents involving Americans
is unquestionably more complete than incidents involving nationals of
other countries.   This is almost unavoidable in collecting terrorist
data..."[410]   Thus, the incidence of international terrorism affecting
Canada, indicated by the chronology developed for this report, cannot be
compared with numbers reported for other countries by other data sets.
Furthermore, national (as opposed to regional) comparisons are rare in
the open, non-commercial literature.   Hence, it is possible to obtain
only a rough indication of Canada's relative vulnerability to interna-
tional terrorism.

60.   Mickolus's chronology of transnational terrorism contained a
table showing the location of terrorist incidents (including not only
incidents beginning in the countries listed, but also events concluding
in them after originating elsewhere) during the period 1968-77.
Abstracting the data relating to Western industrial nations (and, for
comparative purposes, the Soviet Union), and ranking countries in terms
of both incident starting and ending locations, Canada's relative
susceptibility to terrorism during that period appears to have been
low:[411]

Table 11

Incident Locations, 1968-77

Rank	Country	Starting Location		Ending Location		Victims	
1	USA (incl. Puerto Rico)	372	(1)	369	(1)	1483	(1)
2	UK (incl. N. Ireland)	221	(2)	254	(2)	339	(3)
3	France (incl. Corsica)	177	(4)	189	(3)	105	(6)
4	Italy (incl. Vatican)	179	(3)	177	(4)	110	(5)
5	Israel	142	(5)	174	(5)	417	(2)
6	Greece	120	(6)	118	(6)	40	(11)
7	West Germany	99	(8)	100	(7)	145	(4)
8	Netherlands	112	(7)	36	(10)	43	(9)
9	Ireland	55	(9)	54	(8)	42	(10)
10	Spain	42	(10)	42	(9)	102	(7)
11	Belgium	26	(11)	30	(11)	10	(18)
12	Switzerland	22	(12)	27	(12)	27	(13)
13	CANADA	18	(15)	26	(13)	23	(14)
14	Austria	21	(13)	22	(15)	17	(16)
15	Australia	18	(15)	23	(14)	6	(19)
16	Portugal	19	(14)	19	(16)	18	(15)
17	Japan	18	(15)	18	(17)	35	(12)
18	USSR	17	(18)	17	(18)	72	(8)
19	Sweden	17	(18)	16	(19)	13	(17)
20	Denmark	12	(20)	12	(20)	5	(20)
21	Norway	6	(21)	6	(21)	2	(22)
22	New Zealand	4	(22)	4	(22)	4	(21)

61.   The finding in Mickolus's chronology is reflected in two other sources. A 1984 tabulation by a New York research group (using statistics compiled by Risks International Inc.) showed that of the 72 countries included in the survey, only 19 suffered fewer terrorist attacks than did Canada (many of them being African or Soviet bloc countries). Canada was affected by eight incidents during the period, compared with one for the Soviet Union, two for Sweden, nine for Denmark, 330 for West Germany, 830 for France, 1448 for Spain, and 2,965 for El Salvador.[412] While the incidence of international terrorism in Canada was clearly under-reported in this study (which included domestic, as well as international, terrorist attacks, among the former a bombing of a Montréal militia armoury in April 1983), it further demonstrated Canada's relative good fortune.

62.   Finally, the State Department's annual report for 1985 listed the number of times particular countries were victimized by international terrorism in 1985. Of the seven summit countries, Canada ranked last with Japan. In a wider international context Canada's relative ranking remained much the same as in the previous table which reported Mickolus's findings. Including the same countries as the previous table, national victimization rankings in 1985 were:[413]

Table 12

Victims of International Terrorism, 1985

Rank	Country	Number of Incidents
1	Israel	·198
2	USA	170
3	France	46
4	Spain	37
5	UK	29
6	West Germany	27
7	Italy	19
8	Portugal	13
	USSR	13
10	Greece	11
11	Switzerland	7
12	CANADA	6
	Netherlands	6
	Japan	6
15	Belgium	5
16	Denmark	4
	Austria	4
	Australia	4
19	Ireland	3
	Sweden	3
21	Norway	2
22	New Zealand	0

63.   Temporally, both the chronology and Ross's table indicate surges of international terrorism in Canada during the period from 1968 to 1972 and during the early-1980s, with a period of relative quiescence between. Both indicate that 1972 and 1982 were peak years (Ross's table ends with 1985, but the chronology shows that 1986 was another peak year for internal incidents). Although Canada's external victimization follows a roughly similar pattern, such congruence appears to have been largely fortuitous. In fact, the decline in Canada-related terrorism in the 1970s contrasts with the global patterns recorded in the CIA and State Department reports, which demonstrate a considerable increase (though with cyclical variations) in the incidence of international terrorism during the 1970s, from 391 incidents in 1970 to 657 in 1979.[414]

Location of Incidents

64.   The role played by geography in terrorist targeting has been examined, particularly in the context of the similarities and differences in the experiences of international terrorism of Canada and the United States. As was noted, about one-quarter of all terrorist incidents affecting the United States, whether or not Americans or American property were the targets, occurred in North America (with most taking

place in the United States). By contrast, the chronology indicates that nearly three-quarters of international terrorist incidents affecting Canada occurred within the country (32 events), and just over a quarter (14 events) outside Canada. However, there was a slight shift towards external targeting in the 1980s. Between 1968 and 1981 external incidents constituted 22% of all events, a proportion which rose to 39% between 1982 and 1987.

65.   Within Canada terrorist incidents usually occur in the largest urban centres. The CSIS inventory shows that of the international terrorist incidents which occurred in Canada between 1980 and 1986, most (13) happened in Montréal, followed by Toronto (7), Ottawa (5), Winnipeg (2), and Vancouver (1); five others took place in other locales in British Columbia.[415] According to the chronology, 14 incidents occurred in Montréal between 1968 and 1987, followed by 9 in Ottawa, and three each in Toronto and Vancouver.

66.   The location of an incident (whether internal or external to the country affected) is often reflected in the groups and tactics involved. Thus, 73% of incidents occurring inside Canada between 1968 and 1987 were perpetrated by emigrés. Typically, emigré groups resort to bombing, assassination, and assault, and in fact between 1968 and 1987, 81% of all incidents taking place in Canada used these tactics (if the threat category is excluded, the proportion rises to 93%). Also they tend to operate in their country of residence. Externally, nationalist-autonomist and revolutionary groups have posed the greatest threat to Canadians and to Canadian interests. In addition to the usual predilection for bombs, such groups often have sufficient popular support or underground infrastructure to permit kidnapping operations, and in fact 43% of the attacks on Canadian targets overseas since 1968 have involved the use of this tactic.

67.   <u>Internal Attacks</u>: For the most part, international terrorist incidents in Canada have been perpetrated by groups or individuals resident in the country. A probable exception was the campaign against Cuban targets. Otherwise, actions occurring in Canada, whether committed by domestically-oriented groups (such as the FLQ) or by ones having off-shoots in a number of countries (ASALA, for example), have tended to be implemented by persons living in Canada.

68.   The Kelly Committee speculated that Canada's relative freedom from terrorism has been due in part to geography: "Canada is far away from the major terrorist 'hot spots' of Western Europe, the Middle East and South and Central America."[416] However, the committee also noted that Canada shares a border with the favourite target of terrorism - the United States - and could therefore be used "as an entry point or haven for terrorists taking action against the U.S. and U.S. citizens."[417]

69.   Terrorists appear to have tried to enter the United States via Canada on a number of occasions. In August 1975 a member of the Japanese Red Army was arrested when he tried to enter the United States from Canada. In July 1978 Kristina Berster, a suspected German terrorist, was arrested while attempting to enter Vermont. The following day

three other individuals (one a Montréal resident) believed to be associated with Berster returned to Canada after also attempting to enter the United States. In September 1981 an Italian was arrested in Montréal while en route from Paris to the United States. The Italian government requested his extradition to face charges on the 1978 kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro (the request was rejected). In the same year it was reported that the United States government had established a special counter-intelligence group to look for suspected Libyan assassination teams which it was feared were planning to enter the United States from Canada.[418] In January 1982 the FBI reported the arrest of two IRA members, who were trying to enter the United States in the company of two Canadians. In July 1984 three suspected terrorists were intercepted while attempting to enter the country illegally. One of them was stopped in Toronto while trying to board a flight to Los Angeles, where the Olympic Games were being held. One of the other two was a naturalized Canadian. Finally, at the end of October 1987 an explosive device was discovered on the Vermont side of the Canada-United States border, and subsequently three Montréal-area men (all of Lebanese descent) were indicted by a grand jury on explosives charges.

70.   In the future, geography may become less of a barrier to terrorist attack on Canada than it has apparently proved to be in the past. The increasing attractiveness to terrorists of American targets - where attacks on such targets were relatively random in the 1970s, they have become more deliberate in the 1980s - makes Canada a more alluring transit point. Efforts by the United States to improve security against terrorist attack may then have repercussions for Canada. As the Kelly Committee observed, "As targets 'harden' worldwide, terrorists' attention could well turn to places such as Canada, where there remain a number of vulnerable and attractive targets."[419] This raises a second point related to geography, vulnerability, and immunity: Canada's size. Total supervision of such vulnerable targets as power lines, pipelines, and railways is impossible in a country as large as Canada. While the distances involved in the trans-Atlantic route appear likely to continue for some time to discourage hijacking, air travel itself has reduced Canada's insulation from the major terrorist "hot spots" by making the country increasingly accessible from any point on the globe.

71.   External Attacks: Outside this country Canadian citizens and property seem to have been attacked as much by chance as by design. Of the 14 external incidents included in the chronology, the fact that a target was Canadian appears to have been a significant factor in five of the cases. Among these were the 1968 bombing of the Canadian consulate and tourist office in New York, the abortive 1982 bomb attack on the Air Canada freight terminal, and the 1983 letter bomb incident involving the high commission in London. In six incidents nationality would not seem to have been a major factor in the targeting. These incidents include the 1982 kidnapping of Guy Boisvert in Iraq, the 1983 kidnapping of Martin Overduin in Sudan, and the 1987 kidnapping of a Canadian oil executive in Colombia. The role played by (Canadian) nationality in the remaining incidents is hard to determine.

72.   Where the fact of targets being Canadian was not a significant factor in their selection, chance seems to have played an important role in attacks upon Canadian citizens or premises. Guy Boisvert, for example, appears to have been an unfortunate "target of opportunity". At the time of his capture in May 1982 he was working for a Canadian company building maternity hospitals in northern Iraq. When their vehicle broke down in a rural area, Boisvert and an American co-worker were seized by some passing Kurds, and were taken to the headquarters of the Kurdish Socialist Party of Iraq (KSPI). The KSPI then sought to capitalize on their capture to win some publicity and to acquire some supplies.

73.   The element of chance is further indicated by the fate of foreign citizens working for Canadian companies overseas. For example, a hostage seized for publicity reasons by the Tigre People's Liberation Front in 1978 was an American who worked for a Canadian company. Similarly, in December 1984 a French executive of a Bolivian subsidiary of Bata (a Toronto-based shoe company) was kidnapped and a ransom was demanded, although whether the motives of the abductors were primarily political or criminal was not apparent.

74.   In that Canadian companies were involved in these incidents, Canadians could perhaps count themselves lucky in not being included among the victims. But the balance has to some extent been restored by incidents where Canadian employees of foreign companies were the victims of political violence. For instance, three Canadians (all employees of companies in Cuba) were kidnapped by Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristal in June 1958, along with a number of Americans (eventually 47 Americans fell into rebel hands). Recent examples of attacks on Canadians working for foreign companies include the March 1986 kidnapping of a Canadian metallurgist working for the Angolan government diamond company, and the kidnapping of an executive of Occidental Petroleum in Colombia in March 1987.

75.   Just as Canadians working in foreign countries have occasionally been the prey of terrorists, so other Canadians travelling abroad have sometimes fallen victim to terrorist attack. In most such cases Canadian nationality was not a factor, and in some (notably hijackings) a handful of Canadians were implicated in incidents in which other countries were the principal focus of attack. Among such incidents might be included the following: the bombing and crash of a Swissair plane in which two Canadians were killed (February 1970); a gunbattle aboard an American plane on a domestic flight in which the sole fatality was a Canadian (July 1972); the bombing of an American-owned hotel in Buenos Aires in which a Canadian tourist was killed (October 1972); the death of a Canadian and six West Germans in Afghanistan (September 1979); and the wounding of several Canadians in a similar incident at Karachi Airport (September 1986).

76.   The incidents mentioned in the foregoing paragraphs indicate that Canada cannot expect to escape terrorist attack overseas as long as Canadian citizens travel, live, and work abroad, and Canadian companies conduct operations in foreign countries. Insurgency is a common denominator in a number of the incidents (among them the kidnappings in Iraq,

Sudan, Angola, and Colombia), but even in such cases Canadian involvement is as accidental as deliberate. This situation appears to contrast with that of the United States, attacks against which seemed by the beginning of the 1980s to be becoming less indiscriminate and more intentional.

77.   Whether Canada will be more deliberately targeted in the future remains to be seen.   The Kelly Committee believed that Canadian responses to terrorism could prompt "reactions" on the part of terrorist groups, instancing the retaliation by Armenian groups after the arrest of alleged Armenian terrorists in Toronto.[420] Armenian groups have threatened to retaliate for such arrests.   Their anger has translated into a few minor incidents involving Canadian targets, among them an attempted bombing of a freight terminal in Los Angeles in May 1982, an apparent bomb threat against the Toronto transit system in April 1985, and a peaceful occupation of Air Canada offices in Paris and Lyon in November 1986.   The Canadian government has taken such threats seriously.   In the wake of threats against Canada by ASALA in August 1982, security was tightened at Canadian embassies, and Canadian firms abroad were urged to take special precautions.

78.   Canada's experience of Armenian retaliation pales by comparison with the world-wide attack on Swiss interests by ASALA in the wake of arrests by the Swiss of group members in 1980 and 1981.   But if, as the Kelly Committee suspected, Canada's foreign policy has helped to keep it out of the terrorists' sights, Switzerland's experience has been a sobering one.   In fact, it is evident that a significant proportion of terrorist attacks is related to the imprisonment and liberation of terrorists.

Terrorist Groups

79.   Naturally, police intelligence regarding the number and capability of terrorist groups operating in Canada is not a matter of public record (in 1981 the Solicitor-General noted that "Most of the information [on terrorism] is secret"[421]).   However, the information that has been released to the public in recent years appears to have been coloured to some degree by the spate of attacks which occurred in 1982 and the years following.

80.   In mid-March 1981 Mr. Robert Kaplan, the Solicitor General, claimed that "We would know of any terrorist groups operating in Canada which would pose a threat to Canadian interests. Categorically, there are no terrorist groups that pose a threat to Canadian interests operating in Canada" (he did note that some ethnic groups constituted a threat to foreign embassies).[422] Just over three years later Kaplan justified an increased use of national security surveillance warrants on the grounds that "every international terrorist group that you could know about is present in some degree in our country.   I'm not saying they have targets in this country but they develop their activities and

support for what they are doing in Canada."[423] (By such support, he meant the use of Canada as a base to raise money, buy material, and recruit members). Kaplan further pointed out that 1983 had been a year of "very greatly increased terrorist activity in Canada."[424]

81.   With regard to international terrorism, the incidents which occurred in Canada in the three years between Kaplan's statements were all apparently the handiwork of Armenian groups. Thus, the seeming transformation - from there being no groups operating in Canada, to all the major groups being present - is largely explained by Kaplan's qualifications about their choices of targets and the nature of their activities. However, over the years undoubtedly a number of actual or suspected terrorists have attempted to enter Canada, not simply in order to continue on to the United States, but also to remain here, either to further their terrorist objectives or to find shelter in some way. In early-1986 a senior Canadian immigration official claimed that his department had prevented known terrorists from entering Canada on three or four occasions during the previous five years.[425] In November 1985 it was reported that the RCMP believed that a Libyan student at a college in Thunder Bay had been a member of a Libyan assassination team used to silence opponents of Gaddafi. The suspect was not regarded as a threat to Canada, but the manner in which he had entered the country was stated to be under investigation.[426] In January 1988 it was discovered that a Palestinian, who had been convicted for his role in an attack on an El Al jet in Athens in 1968, had entered Canada under false pretences in February 1987.

82.   As was noted in the previous section, most international terrorist attacks in Canada (70%) are perpetrated by emigrés or emigré groups. Such groups have attacked Canadian targets abroad only twice during the past two decades, constituting 17% of all external incidents in the chronology, and reducing somewhat the over-all impact on Canada of emigré terrorism. After the emigrés, the group-type which has most frequently attacked Canadians or Canadian interests is the nationalist-autonomist group (18% over-all), whose attacks are roughly divided between external and internal locations. Between them revolutionary and sub-revolutionary groups account for one-fifth of all incidents. The chronology shows the following pattern of group involvement in international terrorism directed against Canada:

Table 13
Incidence of Canadian Terrorism, by Group Type

Group Type	Internal Incidents	External Incidents	Total
Emigré	19 (73%)	2 (17%)	21 (55%)
Nationalist-Autonomist	3 (12%)	4 (33%)	7 (18%)
Revolutionary	0 (-%)	3 (25%)	3 (8%)
Sub-Revolutionary	3 (12%)	1 (8%)	4 (11%)
Environmental	0 (-%)	1 (8%)	1 (3%)
Guerrilla	0 (-%)	1 (8%)	1 (3%)
Other	1 (4%)	0 (-%)	1 (3%)
Unassigned	6 -	2 -	8 -

83.   Given the heavy preponderance of emigrés among the group-types
involved in terrorism, it would be surprising if there were any discern-
ible variations in group trends, and in fact the chronology indicates a
broad temporal parallelism between over-all trends and patterns among
the more prolific groups. Thus, emigré groups were most active between
1968 and 1974, and between 1980 and 1986, the two periods in which the
incidence of terrorism in Canada was highest.   Likewise, external
incidents were more characteristic of nationalist-autonomist groups in
the early-1980s - when the ratio of external to internal incidents rose
from one to three, to one to two - than they were in the early-1970s
(the two periods in which such groups were mainly active).

84.   Emigré Groups: In its report the Kelly Committee stated that
"The current threat originates primarily from three ethnic groups in
Canada, each reacting to a past, current or evolving situation in their
country of origin."[427]   (The committee declined to identify the groups
involved).   In fact, as the foregoing data indicate, emigré groups have
played a preeminent role in international terrorism in Canada during the
past two decades.

85.   Emigré violence, involving the continuation of homeland disputes,
has a long history in Canada.   Orange-Green rioting among people of
Irish descent is one example (there were 22 such riots in Toronto alone
between 1867 and 1892).   The Fenian dispute with Britain was transposed
to Canada in a dramatic fashion in 1868, when D'Arcy McGee was shot (the
most significant political assassination in Canadian history).

86.   The modern strains of emigré terrorism in Canada date from the
mid-1960s.   The first of the modern emigré terrorist groups to appear
were the anti-Castro Cubans and, to a lesser degree, Serbian and
Croatian groups hostile to the Yugoslavian government.   In August 1964 a
Cuban ship was bombed in Montréal harbour, an act for which an anti-
Castro organization in New York claimed responsibility.   In September
1966 a bomb exploded outside the Cuban embassy in Ottawa, and six months
later a Montréal building used to auction Cuban goods was bombed.   The
identity of the attackers in these two cases is not known, but the
targets would suggest that they were anti-Castro Cubans.   The Cuban
Nationalist Association threatened to bomb the Cuban pavilion at Expo
67.   In early-1968 El Poder Cubano struck several times at firms which
specialized in shipping packages to Cuba.   Because the United States
Post Office would mail only letters and medicines to Cuba, packages were
sent by way of Canada, Mexico, and Spain.   It appears likely that an
explosion at the Havana post office in January 1968, which injured five
workers, was caused by one such package, sent via Canada aboard a
Canadian ship.

87.   The campaign against the Cuban government persisted until
December 1980, with six more incidents, all of them bombings, of which
three were directed against the consulate in Montréal.   In addition,
terrorists attacked the Canadian consulate and tourist office in New
York in July 1968, presumably because of Canada's recognition of the
Castro government.

88.   As was noted earlier, some of the incidents directed against Cuba in Canada were probably the work of terrorists based in the United States. For example, the 1964 attack on the <u>Maria Teresa</u> was claimed by a New York - based group, and two Cubans who were arrested in connection with an attempted bombing of the Montréal consulate in May 1969 were picked up in New Jersey. Not only was the Cuban community in Canada miniscule, but the lack of Cuban diplomatic missions in the United States (outside the United Nations) tended to encourage anti-Castro extremists in America to look northward in search of targets.

89.   The incidence of anti-Castro terrorism in Canada to some degree paralleled that in the United States. Fairly frequent until the early-1970s it then died down, only to flare up again in 1980. But while in Canada there have been no further attacks since December 1980, the upsurge in the United States lasted until 1983, when arrests among key members of Omega-7 so crippled the anti-Castro terrorist movement that its attacks ceased.

90.   Beyond the incidents of intra-group and inter-group violence within the Serbian and Croatian communities in Canada, which were discussed in the earlier section relating to domestic terrorism, acts of international terrorism emanating from these ethnic groups have been few. On 29 January 1967 time bombs went off at the Yugoslav embassy in Ottawa and at the consulate in Toronto (and also at several Yugoslav diplomatic and consular missions in the United States). In April 1968 two time bombs, thought to have been planted by Croatian exiles, exploded in the Yugoslavian embassy in Ottawa.

91.   With the exception of several incidents connected with Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin's visit to Ottawa in October 1971, anti-Castro and anti-Yugoslav attacks (all bombings) were the staple of emigré terrorism until 1982. Although Armenian terrorism outside Canada peaked in 1981, this country was not affected by this variant of exile violence until 1982 (if the bombing of a newspaper vending box in Toronto in January 1981, which bore the hallmarks of an ASALA operation, is discounted on the grounds of unclear authorship). Between January 1982 and March 1985, six incidents (actual or attempted), attributable to Armenian groups, took place in Canada or were directed at a Canadian target outside Canada.

92.   These incidents demonstrated a much wider tactical repertoire than the first wave of emigré terrorism, and involved bombing, assassination, and hostage-taking operations, and possibly also at least one threat against an urban subway system.* The 1982 assassination of the Turkish military attaché followed a pattern typical of such incidents in that it occurred when the victim's car was stopped at a traffic light.

---

* On 5 April 1985 a caller, claiming to represent the Armenian Secret Army, warned that a Montréal subway station would be bombed. The incident occurred a few days after the threat against the Toronto transit system, and seems to have been a hoax.

93.   In a previous section it was noted that Armenian terrorists were less adept at hostage-taking than at assassination, and in the wake of the 1985 Turkish embassy incident the media speculated that the terrorists were amateurs. However, an article by the head of a Calgary-based organization, which specializes in VIP protection and terrorism research, claimed that an anonymous police source had commented that the raiders appeared well-armed and well-prepared.[428] Nonetheless, at the trial of the three men arrested in the incident, it was alleged that the attackers had thought that the embassy was empty, and that their plans had not taken the presence of a security guard into consideration.[429] Furthermore, it was the opinion of the police that the terrorists had not considered raising "short term demands" prior to being asked by a radio reporter what those demands were.

94.   The incidents attributed to Armenian groups are unusual in that at least one (the Los Angeles bomb attempt) was directed against a Canadian target, and a second incident involving a Canadian target (the Toronto transit threat) was also claimed in the name of an Armenian terrorist group. Of the 22 emigré attacks listed in the chronology, and the incidents which occurred prior to 1968, only one other attack (the bombing of the Canadian consulate in New York in 1968) was clearly directed against Canada, although two others were aimed at Canadian businesses which dealt with Cuba. The two incidents of Armenian origin directed against Canadian targets were both prompted by the arrest of Armenians in connection with the 1982 Gungor assassination attempt and the 1985 Turkish embassy seizure. A spokesman for an Armenian organization in Paris pointed out that "ASALA always employs the same tactic. As soon as one of its members is arrested, it sets up a small violent cell that stages attacks to obtain his liberation."[430] An FBI telephone tap monitored a call from ASALA in Beirut to the three Armenians who tried to bomb the Air Canada facility at Los Angeles Airport in May 1982. The call instructed them to "put it on the Canadians".[431]

95.   Earlier in this report it was noted that emigré terrorism has often been the handiwork of new arrivals in the emigré communities involved. This would seem to have been the case where Canada is concerned. The three Armenians apprehended after the Los Angeles incident were all recent immigrants from the Middle East. Four Toronto residents were arrested in March 1984 and charged with the attempted murder of the commercial attaché at the Turkish embassy in Ottawa in 1982 (the four had previously been arrested on charges of extorting money from local Armenians on behalf of ASALA). One of the men originally came from Lebanon, and two were Iranian Armenians. Of the three men involved in the 1985 embassy attack, one had arrived from Lebanon in about 1968, another came from Syria in either 1978 or 1979, and the third was born in Syria.

96.   This pattern conforms to Gunter's observation that well-established Armenians are not normally directly involved in terrorism in their adopted countries.[432] This absence of direct participation may affect the tactics used by more newly-arrived militants, by precluding kidnapping. However, as Gunter also noted, while the actual terrorists have been few in number, they have often been able to draw tacit support

from their community.[433]   In Canada there was evidence of this in the $300,000 collected within the Armenian community for the defence of the three men charged in the Turkish embassy incident.

97.   Armenian terrorism in Canada clearly peaked in 1982, revived briefly in 1985, and has been dormant since. But other emigré groups, not previously associated with terrorism in this country, have filled the gap. Most notable among them have been the Sikh activists associated with several recent incidents of political violence in Canada.

98.   The incident usually associated in the public mind with the Sikh agitation against the Indian government is the destruction of Air India Flight 182 on 23 June 1985, which killed 329 persons, 279 of them Canadian citizens. Many authorities in the field of terrorism research lean towards the belief that the plane's loss was an act of sabotage. It was so treated in the State Department's 1985 report, and Jenkins also appears to regard the incident as a terrorist bombing.[434] The Indian government's Kirpal enquiry concluded that a terrorist bomb concealed in a piece of baggage exploded in the forward cargo hold of the plane.[435] Likewise, the Canadian Aviation Safety Board's investigation leaned towards the bombing explanation. However, the police enquiry into the incident is still continuing, and the Canadian government has not officially imputed the plane's destruction to a terrorist act. Furthermore, responsibility for the act, if a terrorist one, cannot yet be assigned. Initially responsibility for the disaster was claimed by two quite disparate groups, the Sikh Students Federation 10th Regiment and the Kashmir Liberation Army. Spokesmen for both groups later denied involvement, and in the absence of convictions in the case it would be inappropriate to link the incident with a specific group or community.

99.   The explosion of a bomb at Tokyo's Narita Airport on the same day as (and within an hour of) the destruction of Flight 182 was evidently a terrorist act, but again responsibility can only be assigned on the basis of circumstantial evidence. In this incident the bomb was loaded on the CP Air flight at Vancouver, and it exploded as it was being transferred to an Air India plane at Narita Airport, killing two baggage-handlers.

100.   When the State Department asserted that Sikh extremists did not conduct their first international terrorist attack until 1985,[436] it was probably referring to the Air India and Narita incidents as the debut of Sikh international terrorism. However, as will be seen, militant Sikhs had attacked Indian officials in Canada prior to 1985. Nonetheless, the internationalization of the Sikh campaign against the Indian government evidently post-dates the Indian army's attack on the Golden Temple in Amritsar in June 1984. But if Sikh terrorists have been recent arrivals on the international terrorist scene, it appears that they were quick to consider joint operations with other terrorist organizations. In 1986 British security forces revealed details about a 1985 plot to assassinate Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Sikhs had approached a Scotland Yard undercover agent who purported to be an IRA member, an initiative which suggests that Sikh extremists were prepared to work with well-established terrorist groups such as the IRA.[437]

101.   Inside Canada, Sikh activists were clearly involved in two incidents of assault and one attempted assassination, and also were implicated in a separate conspiracy incident. In the wake of the Golden Temple attack two sword-wielding Sikhs attacked and damaged the Indian consulate in Vancouver, briefly holding consular officials under duress.   A month later Sikh protesters in Winnipeg attacked India's acting high commissioner, pelting him with eggs and trying to hit him with picket signs. Three Sikhs pleaded guilty to the assault. In May 1986 a Punjab cabinet minister was shot and wounded on a private visit to Vancouver Island.   Four Vancouver-area Sikhs were subsequently convicted of attempted murder, although conspiracy charges against the four, and against five others, were later thrown out.

102.   In December 1986 two Montréal-area Sikhs were found guilty of conspiring to plant a bomb aboard an Air India flight leaving New York on 31 May 1986. An Indian cabinet minister was aboard the flight.

103.   Evidence of militancy within the Sikh community has generated speculation about the existence of some kind of terrorist infrastructure in Canada. Thus the <u>Christian Science Monitor</u> at one point claimed that militant Sikh organizations in Canada were "operating a number of military training camps."[438]

104.   Whether or not claims about such things as training camps in Canada are accurate, there have been indications of conflict within the Canadian Sikh community regarding the militants' activities. As with the Armenian community, such conflicts may reflect differences between long-established members of the Canadian Sikh community and relatively recent arrivals. Commenting on the plight of young immigrants who have little education and no jobs, one Sikh businessman remarked that "A lot of the fanaticism is born of the frustrations that these young men run into while adjusting to a new way of life in Canada."[439]

105.   The attack on the Golden Temple produced a surge of militancy within the Canadian Sikh community, but the resort to terrorism may have been a short-lived reaction.   Many community spokesmen have condemned the use of violence.   A communiqué published by community leaders in British Columbia stated: "We stand for a peaceful but respectable solution of every problem. We categorically condemn any act in which violence is involved."[440] In June 1986 the Canadian president of the World Sikh Organization commented that the Sikh community could not support violent action by its members in Canada to achieve the creation of Khalistan: "We opted to live in Canada or the United States... None of our members would do anything that is not within the Canadian or American or British systems."[441]   A Sikh lawyer in Vancouver, whose opposition to pro-Khalistan extremism was probably the cause of his being physically beaten in February 1985, felt by mid-1986 that the militants were becoming less prevalent.[442] This assessment seems to have been borne out by the absence of terrorist incidents attributable to militant Sikhs during the past eighteen months.

106.   The emigré terrorism which has affected Canada has largely followed the patterns indicated in that part of the report dealing with global trends (Part II).   Its communal orientation has precluded alliance; the terrorists have usually been recent arrivals in Canada (or at least not Canadian-born); their tactical repertoire has consisted almost entirely of bombing, assassination, and assault; and their targets have usually been diplomats or foreign statesmen.

107.   <u>Nationalist-Autonomist Groups</u>: After emigré groups, nationalist and autonomist groups have posed the greatest international terrorist threat to Canada, both within and outside the country. In trying to assert national or ethnic identity, such groups are in many ways akin to the emigré groups.

108.   Internally, the first and most serious threat from groups of this sort came from the FLQ, although few of its attacks were international in their ramifications. The first such was the abortive joint attack with black militants on the Statue of Liberty in February 1965. In 1970 the FLQ decided to increase its pressure on the federal and provincial governments by kidnapping diplomats, moving once more into the international sphere. After planned attacks on the Israeli and American consuls in Montréal were thwarted during the planning stages in the first half of 1970, the FLQ succeeded in kidnapping the British trade commissioner, Mr. James Cross, in October 1970. Some minor incidents have occurred since 1970, for which callers claiming to represent the FLQ have assumed responsibility. The only one having international implications was the placing of a dud bomb at the Olympic Stadium during an Olympic handball game in July 1976.

109.   As was noted earlier, separatist terrorism has had a considerable impact in North America, with Puerto Rican groups such as the FALN and Macheteros showing themselves both more prolific and deadlier than the FLQ.   However, this brand of terrorism has generally been on the decline recently, in both North America and Europe.

110.   Canada has not suffered a terrorist spill-over from the conflicts in the Middle East, as have other countries, notably the United States and some European nations. For a short time in 1972-73 a letter-bomb campaign was directed against Israeli and Jewish targets in Canada, possibly by Black September. The FLQ appears to have had tenuous links with the PLO. In August 1970 a Radio-Canada crew met two Québec terrorists who were training with Palestinian commandos at a camp in Jordan. They announced that the FLQ would shortly begin a campaign of "selective assassination".[443] Furthermore, the police linked the abortive plot to seize the Israeli consul in Montréal with the celebration by Québec leftist circles of "Québec-Palestine week".[444]

111.   All of the incidents attributable to nationalist-autonomist groups which have occurred in Canada took place in Montréal, a situation perhaps due as much to geography as to ethnicity.

112.   No international terrorist incidents have been perpetrated in Canada by nationalist-autonomist groups since 1976, but several incidents attributable to such groups have occurred outside the country in that year and since. All of them involved kidnappings or attempted kidnappings, a testimony to the tactical value of terrorist appeal to national or ethnic identity (studies of terrorist hostage-taking have shown that the choice between kidnapping and "barricade" hostage-taking to a large extent depends on the existence or absence of an underground or of popular support). The kidnapping of Gerald Utting in Beirut (1976), of Guy Boisvert in Iraq (1982), and of Martin Overduin in Sudan (1983), and the attempted kidnapping of Galen Weston by the IRA (1983) all demonstrate the risks which foreigners confront in situations of low intensity conflict. For example, Gerald Utting (a reporter with the Toronto Star) was apparently seized by Palestinian gunmen as a result of mistaken identity. This was an action which seems to have embarrassed the senior echelons of the PLO, who secured his release after he had been held captive just over two days.

113.   Left-Wing Groups: As the earlier section on domestic terrorism indicated, there is no real tradition of left-wing terrorism in Canada. Furthermore, the left-wing terrorism that this country has experienced has been largely domestic in orientation, and has consisted almost entirely of arson and bomb attacks of a primarily symbolical nature.

114.   The chronology shows that three incidents of revolutionary and sub-revolutionary international terrorism occurred inside Canada between 1968 and 1987, and four more took place outside Canada. Such acts constituted 12% of the incidents happening inside Canada, 33% of those attacks against Canadian targets outside this country, and 19% over-all.

115.   As in the domestic variety of left-wing terrorism (and, indeed, in its global expression), leftist international terrorism which implicates Canada has tended to be as symbolic as coercive. A typical example of left-wing terrorism was the firebombing of the post office at Cedar (B.C.) in 1986, in protest at its alleged use as a conduit for funds for the Nicaraguan Contras and the government of El Salvador. As elsewhere, the United States government has been a target of left-wing terrorists in Canada, with the consulate-general in Vancouver being the object of two attacks. American foreign policy was also the focus of a third incident, this time directed at a Canadian target.

116.   As has been the case with external attacks on Canadians by nationalist and separatist groups, Canada has rarely been specifically singled out as a target by foreign revolutionary or left-wing groups. However, the element of chance in left-wing attacks which have implicated Canadians abroad has been rather less than that involved in nationalist-autonomist incidents, in that three of the leftist attacks were directed against international groupings (NATO and the "summit seven") of which Canada is a member. In March 1972 three NATO radar technicians, one Canadian and two British, were kidnapped by the Turkish People's Liberation Army and were subsequently killed in a battle between the terrorists and security forces. Japanese leftists launched

a rocket attack during the welcoming ceremonies of the Tokyo summit of the leading Western industrial nations in May 1986. Although the rockets were well off-target (and may have been more symbolical than destructive in intent), Mr. Mulroney, as one of the seven participating leaders, may be regarded as having been a possible target. Ten days later the Canadian embassy in Indonesia was bombed, apparently in connection with the Tokyo summit (the Japanese and United States embassies were also attacked, and the group which claimed responsibility - the Anti-Imperialist International Brigades - linked the attacks with the Tokyo meeting). Indonesian police also found evidence linking the attack with the long-inactive Japanese Red Army.[445]

117. The fourth external incident involving Canada - the 1970 fire-bombing of three Canadian bank branches in Trinidad - was more protest-derived than revolutionary. However, it seems to have been more definitely aimed at Canada than were some other external incidents, in that 10 West Indians were then undergoing trial in Montréal in connection with the destruction of the computer centre at Sir George Williams University.

118. <u>Other Groups</u>: Within Canada authorship of international terrorist incidents has been confined to the group-types described above. Thus, for example, there is no recent history of right-wing violence directed against foreigners, as has been the case in Germany. Abroad, Canadian targets have only been hit twice by groups which fall outside the categories of emigré, nationalist-autonomist, or leftist terrorists. One of these incidents was a protest against Canada's seal hunt by environmentalists, who sent a letter-bomb to Canada's high commission in London in February 1983 (others were sent concurrently to British targets). The other was the kidnapping of a Canadian executive of Occidental Petroleum in Colombia in 1987. The group involved was thought to be the ELN, a guerrilla rather than a terrorist group.

119.   <u>General</u>:   As multi-cultural societies with traditions of providing political refuge, Canada and the United States have both experienced a relatively high degree of emigré terrorism. But while it is difficult to assess the relative impact of the different group-types on global terrorism, it would appear likely that emigré groups have been more preponderant in international terrorism in North America (and in Canada in particular) than they have been in the world as a whole. The State Department data do not lend themselves to disaggregation by group categories, but the significance of the nationalist-autonomist variety of international terrorism is evident in the assertion of the 1985 report that nearly six out of every 10 attacks occurring in that year either took place in the Middle East or were perpetrated by Middle Easterners elsewhere.[446] An examination of European terrorism shows the significance of left-wing and right-wing groups in the over-all incidence of terrorism in that continent.

120.   Thus, in the high proportion of emigré incidents, the relatively low ratio of left-wing attacks, and the still lower proportion of nationalist-autonomist incidents affecting it, Canada is somewhat atypical of global patterns of international terrorism.

Terrorist Tactics

121.   The preponderance of emigré terrorism in Canada, and the pre-
dilection of emigré groups for certain tactics - bombing, assassination,
and assault - is reflected in the incidence of the varying terrorist
tactics directed at targets in Canada or at Canadian targets abroad.
In incidents affecting Canada, emigré groups are a much stronger force
internally than externally.   Fully 81% of international terrorist
incidents included in the chronology as occurring in Canada between 1968
and 1987 consisted of bombings, assassinations (or attempted assassina-
tions), and assaults.   Externally, 50% of the attacks on Canadian
targets were bombings, and 50% were hostage-taking events.   The inci-
dence of the various tactics, as they have affected Canada, is shown in
the following table:

Table 14

Incidence of Canadian Terrorism, by Tactic Used

Tactic	Internal Incidents	External Incidents	Total
Bombing	17(53%)	7(50%)	24(52%)
Assassination	4(13%)	0 -	4(9%)
Assault	5(16%)	0 -	5(11%)
Kidnapping	1(3%)	6(43%)	7(15%)
Barricade-Hostage	1(3%)	0 -	1(2%)
Hijacking	0 -	1(7%)	1(2%)
Threat	4(13%)	0 -	4(9%)

122.   Bombings: Approximately half the incidents of international
terrorism affecting Canada between 1968 and 1987 consisted of bomb
attacks.   There was virtually no difference in the incidence of this
tactic between internal and external attacks.   By contrast, all the
other tactics reported in the chronology varied considerably in their
internal and external occurrence.   The incidence of bombing in Canada or
directed against Canadian targets (52%) corresponds quite closely with
the global patterns reported by the State Department and by Rand.
According to the State Department, 51% of all international terrorist
incidents which occurred in 1985 were bombings, while Rand data show
that 48% of all attacks committed between 1968 and 1982 were
bombings.[447]

123.   On the whole, bombings were more prevalent in the periods 1968-72
and 1980-82 than they were in the balance of the 1970s and in the mid-
1980s.   The bulk (82%) of internal bombings were directed at diplomatic
targets, while the Canadian government, or Canadian dignitaries, were
the targets of four out of the seven bomb attacks which occurred outside
the country (or 57%).

124.   Typical of the terrorist bombings of diplomatic targets in Canada was a series of attacks, or attempted attacks, on the Cuban consulate in Montréal (one in 1969 and two in 1980), Soviet diplomatic premises (1971 and 1972), and on United States diplomatic facilities (1969 and 1981). Most of these attacks were symbolical in nature (although two resulted in casualties), and they often involved firebombs being thrown at the buildings concerned.   However, there was a brief wave of letter-bomb incidents directed at Jewish and Israeli targets, including diplomatic personnel, in Canada in 1972-73.   The letter-bomb tactic reappeared in 1983 when one was sent to the Canadian high commission in London by animal rights activists.

125.   In that many bombings are small-scale and symbolical, they tend not to attract a great deal of public attention.   One example of such a symbolical incident was a smoke-bomb attack on the United States consulate-general in Vancouver in January 1981.   Incidents which are destructive rather than symbolical tend (perhaps paradoxically) to attract more attention.   The destruction of Air India Flight 182 has attracted a great deal of attention, and there is a fairly widespread perception that it resulted from a terrorist bombing.* In the discussion of global patterns of international terrorism it was noted that there were signs in the mid-1980s of an increasing indiscrimination in bomb attacks.   If the Air India incident was indeed a bomb attack, then it would appear to reflect this increased willingness to inflict casualties.   However, it would not be the first mid-air bombing in Canadian aviation history.   In fact, at least two passenger aircraft have been destroyed in flight over Canada by bombs.   One of these incidents occurred on 8 July 1965 when a Canadian Pacific Airlines DC6B, en route to Whitehorse from Vancouver, crashed after an explosive device detonated within the fuselage.   All 52 persons aboard were killed.

126.   Assassinations: Political assassinations, both domestic (D'Arcy McGee's and Pierre Laporte's murders being examples) and international, have been rare in Canada.   The chronology indicates the occurrence of four such incidents, having international ramifications, between 1968 and 1987.   All of them were internal, and they comprised 13% of all international terrorist incidents in Canada.   In the absence of external assassination attempts targeting Canadians, the over-all proportion fell to 9%.   These proportions are basically similar to global rates, as indicated by State Department and Rand data.

127.   As elsewhere, terrorist assassination attempts in Canada have been largely directed at the diplomatic community.   Three out of the four incidents in Canada were aimed at diplomats or at visiting statesmen.   There were two attacks by Armenian terrorists on Turkish diplomats

---

* In attacking the government over its alleged mishandling of CSIS, one Member of Parliament in the fall of 1987 described the Air India disaster as the "biggest mass murder in Canadian history..."[448]

in 1982, and a Punjabi cabinet minister was wounded on Vancouver Island by Sikh extremists in 1987. All four incidents (the fourth was the 1986 assassination of the editor of a pro-Communist Romanian-language newspaper in Toronto) involved the use of small arms. The use of bombs - notably car bombs - as a means of assassination, while seemingly increasing in frequency elsewhere in the world, has not been attempted thus far in Canada (although they have been used in criminal assassinations, and the FLQ demonstrated a recognition of the potential of car bombs when they parked an explosives-filled vehicle behind the headquarters of the Bank of Montréal in September 1970, only to have the detonator fail).

128.   Assault: Physical attacks, intended in most cases to wound rather than to kill, were a rare feature of Canadian international terrorism before the mid-1980s. Then there was a rash of political assaults in Canada (as elsewhere in the world), but unlike in some regions, assaults in this country tend to the protest end, rather than to the massacre end, of the continuum of violence (in contrast to the actions of groups such as Abu Nidal's). Thus Sikh protesters have pelted and struck an Indian diplomat, and have damaged Indian consular premises. The protest element of these attacks was evident from their occurrence in the immediate wake of the 1984 army attack on the Golden Temple. The Haitian consul-general in Montréal was similarly manhandled by protesters in 1986. In January 1986 a Romanian official was wounded when shots were fired through the window of the Romanian consulate in Montréal. Whether he was the intended target (in other words, the victim of an assassination attempt), or the unlucky recipient of bullets fired randomly at the consulate with a view to damage (an assault) is not clear. The only incident of assault which occurred prior to 1984 was a 1971 attack by a member of the Canadian Hungarian Freedom Fighters Association on Soviet premier Aleksei Kosygin.

129.   As the foregoing clearly indicates, the victims of terrorist assault in Canada have invariably been diplomatic personnel or visiting statesmen. Equally, the perpetrators have uniformly been emigré protesters. Such patterns of targeting and of group involvement largely explain the absence in Canada of the more indiscriminate attacks associated with groups such as that of Abu Nidal.

130.   Hostage-Taking: Altogether Canada has been involved in nine hostage-taking incidents having international ramifications. Hostage-taking was the tactic used in 20% of all Canadian incidents. It constituted 24% of all attacks world-wide recorded by Rand for the period 1968-82. State Department statistics show a somewhat lower global rate of 12%.

131.   Most hostage-taking incidents in which Canada or Canadians have been involved have been kidnappings. In fact, kidnappings implicating Canada have occurred at roughly twice the global rate (as indicated by State Department statistics). This tactic has had little appeal for emigré groups, and thus, given the preponderance of such groups in internal terrorism, it is hardly surprising that six out of seven

terrorist kidnapping incidents have occurred abroad. The only kidnapping incident to take place in Canada was the Cross abduction in 1970. As was noted earlier, political kidnapping generally requires the existence of an underground or of popular support, and is a tactic particularly favoured in the Middle East and Latin America. Of the six external incidents, four occurred in the Middle East (the Canadian NATO radar technician in Turkey in 1972, Utting in Beirut in 1976, Boisvert in Iraq in 1982, and Overduin in Sudan in 1983), and one took place in Latin America (the 1987 kidnapping of an Occidental Petroleum employee in Colombia). In all of these cases the abductors seem to have had the support of a well-established organizational structure (overt as well as covert) or of significant local sympathy. Internally, only the FLQ has shown an interest in this tactic, but pulled off its only kidnapping after two planned abductions (of the Israeli and American consuls in Montréal) were thwarted in the planning stages during the first half of 1970.

132.   The kidnappings described above were all effected in conditions of considerable turmoil, a situation which seems to have conduced to rather more diffuse targeting patterns than was the case with regard to bombing, assassination, and assault (in 65% of the cases involving these latter tactics the diplomatic community was the target). Thus, two Canadian businessmen, two workers connected with aid projects, a NATO radar technician, and a journalist have been the victims of kidnap attempts abroad.

133.   During the early-1970s Canada shared in the North American predilection for hijacking. However, most of the hijacks which occurred in this country, or which involved Canadian carriers, seem to have been personal, psychopathic, or criminal in motivation. As a result, only one politically-motivated hijacking incident has been recorded in the chronology: the ground hijacking of an Air Canada jet at Frankfurt in November 1972. In this incident the German, rather than the Canadian, government seems to have been the hijacker's secondary target. Although hijacking has staged a revival elsewhere in the world during the 1980s, it has remained an unfashionable tactic in Canada. In 1985 the vice-president of the Air Transport Association of Canada claimed that the hijacking threat was non-existent in this country. He refuted statements by Mr. Kaplan that the RCMP needed to improve its capacity to deal with hijacks: "If Bob Kaplan thinks there are going to be a lot of hijackings in here, let him come out and tell us who's doing it."[449]

134.   The only barricade-hostage incident included in the chronology was the 1985 seizure of the Turkish embassy in Ottawa by three Armenians. The three were residents of Ontario and Québec, and apparently none had any previous dealings with the police, or were suspected of prior terrorist activity in their home countries.[450] Their principal objective in attacking the embassy seems to have been to gain publicity.

135.   Canada has been involved in four other embassy seizures (if the Sikh and Haitian attacks on Indian and Haitian consular premises,

mentioned earlier, are excluded). However, none were included in the chronology. Three - a "sit-in" by Arab students at the Lebanese embassy in 1969, and two occupations of the Iranian embassy (in 1979 and 1981) - were peaceful protests, and cannot therefore be characterized as terrorist incidents. The fourth incident - the 1976 seizure of the Canadian embassy in Beirut - was actuated by personal rather than by political motives. Whether included in, or excluded from, the chronology, it is noteworthy that several of the embassy take-over incidents affecting Canada can be attributed to emigré groups, particularly when it is recalled that, world-wide, embassy occupations have been strongly linked with emigré groups.

136.   Threats: If hoaxes and non-activated or thwarted conspiracies are excluded from the chronology (and thus from statistical interpretation), along the lines of recent State Department practice, the incidence of terrorist threats (or at least, those threats which become public knowledge) in Canada is relatively low. Over the whole period, only four (or 13%) of the international terrorist incidents which occurred in Canada comprised threats of a nature suitable for inclusion in the chronology. The State Department dropped the categories of threats, hoaxes, and conspiracies from its annual reports in 1983 and the years following. However, State Department data prior to 1983 indicate a high proportion of threats. Thus, for the period 1968-80 threats comprised 15% of all incidents of international terrorism (18% if hoaxes and conspiracies are included in the threat category).[451]

137.   As elsewhere, foreign diplomats in Canada have been threatened with violence. In 1974 the United States consul-general in Montréal received a telephone threat from an individual who stated that he intended to kill someone within the consulate. This threat appears to have been linked to the landing of Turkish troops in Cyprus. Two of the other threats - the putative FLQ "bombing" of the 1976 Olympics, and the contamination threat against South African produce in 1986 - have been mentioned.

138.   The remaining threat purportedly came from the Armenian Revolutionary Army, which claimed authorship of a letter threatening to bomb the Toronto transit system in April 1985. A similar threat to the Montréal subway system, made a few days later, was probably a hoax. On 21 January 1988 a radio station was warned of an impending bombing at Ottawa airport. The threat was not considered to be sufficiently serious to warrant a full evacuation, and while it caused some disruption to service it proved to have been a hoax.

139.   Public transportation has long offered terrorists (or pranksters) great scope for making threats. Airport policing statistics released by the Solicitor General indicate the incidence of bomb threats during the first half of the decade:[452]

Table 15

Canadian Airport Bomb Threats

Year	Number of Bomb Threats
1979-80	204
1980-81	124
1981-82	126
1982-83	141
1983-84	75
1984-85	78

There have been several waves of threats against passenger aircraft in Canada, including a series in 1970-72 and another in 1977-78. Threats have also been made against trains (the Washington-Montréal Amtrak was menaced in 1978) and against ships (the Princess Marguerite, a Canadian ferry on the West coast, was threatened in 1982). One of the most recent threats against a passenger carrier was a bomb warning directed against an Air Canada plane en route from Toronto to Vancouver in February 1987.

140.   Tactical Innovation: Canada's experience of some of the potential or actual tactical innovations discussed in an earlier part of this report - the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical agents, the employment of surface-to-air missiles, and so on - has been limited. However, the potential for nuclear terrorism has been demonstrated in Canada on at least two occasions. In 1975 a member of the Ontario legislature entered the Pickering nuclear plant to test its security. A year later the Greenpeace Foundation asserted at the United Nations Habitat Conference in Vancouver that it had been offered (but declined to accept) a pound of stolen plutonium to present at the meeting, to publicize the dangers of nuclear diversion. However, there is no indication in the public literature of any terrorist incidents having occurred in relation to Canada's nuclear industry. Equally, there has been no evidence of the use of biological and chemical agents by terrorists against international targets in Canada or Canadian targets overseas, or of the employment in a Canadian context of newer technology weapons.

141.   However, Canada has had some experience of one recent trend in terrorist tactics: product contamination (or its threat). The threat of contamination proved an effective political tool in two incidents in 1986. In July a letter, purportedly from the Azanian People's Liberation Front, threatened the poisoning of South African produce as a means of enforcing a boycott against that country. While no evidence of tampering was found, some distributors in Central Canada removed South African produce from their shelves. Some two months later $15,000-worth of South African wines and spirits were removed from liquor store shelves in British Columbia and subsequently destroyed as a result of a

similar threat. The success of these two threats, and the ALF's 1984 claim that it had poisoned candy bars ·in Britain, suggest that product contamination, or its threat, may continue to be employed in certain protest situations.

142.   Tactical Trends: In his analysis of the FLQ, Morf claimed that "acts of violence ARE infections... Terrorist acts, just like the hold-ups, are contagious, even if the number of persons susceptible to catching the disease is very limited."[453]   Hacker has similarly argued that bomb-throwing, skyjacking, seizure of buildings, and hostage-taking have all occurred in rashes: "These trends are comparable to fashions ..."[454]   An oft-cited example of contagion - a wave of parachute hijackings in 1971 - began in Canada. A Canadian who claimed to be a member of the IRA included a parachute in his list of demands. His exploit was widely publicized, and two weeks later a man calling himself D.B. Cooper carried out a sensational and apparently successful para-chute hijacking.   In the months following Cooper's act skyjackings, including parachute jumps, were attempted dozens of times. The waves of bomb threats against aircraft and the Montréal subway hoax are other examples of tactical contagion in Canada.

143.   Beyond the evidence of sporadic contagion, there appear to have been few marked trends in terrorist tactics in Canada. As was noted earlier, international terrorist bombings within Canada came in two spurts - 1968-72 and 1980-86 - but this really reflects only the quies-cence of the period 1973-79. Of the nine incidents of assassination and assault in Canada, eight occurred in the five-year period from 1982-86. The apparent recency of the debut on the Canadian scene of these two tactics can be largely explained by tensions within two communities, the Sikh and the Armenian. Five of the eight attacks were committed by members of these communities, and a sixth incident - the assault on the Haitian consul-general in Montréal - was directly attributable to contemporary events in Haiti. Thus the significance of the apparent upsurge in assaults and assassination attempts should not be exaggerated (three of the four assaults which occurred in the period 1984-86 were connected with protest demonstrations, a form of political expression which in Canada only rarely generates international terrorism). By contrast, hostage-taking incidents occurred at roughly two-year intervals during the past two decades, with a gap between 1973 and 1976.

144.   Tactical consistency is more evident externally than internally, with overseas events evenly divided between bombing and hostage-taking. Temporally, external bombing and hostage-taking incidents have been relatively evenly distributed over the period, so no tactical trend is evident among overseas attacks, whose random targeting (discussed elsewhere) would anyway preclude generalization.

Terrorist Targets

145.   As was evident in the incidence of the varying terrorist tactics, the frequent involvement of emigré groups in attacks affecting Canada

(either by their location or by their victims) has been clearly reflected in targeting patterns. Equally, such patterns tend to reflect target availability. Thus, diplomats are the targets of over three-quarters of the attacks which have occurred inside Canada, but have never been the victims of external incidents involving Canada (attacks on Canadian diplomats are included in the government category). By contrast, Canadian businessmen and government officials overseas provide tempting targets for terrorists - by virtue of their foreign status - and so might be expected to be more frequently attacked outside than inside the country. The frequency with which different groups are targeted is indicated in the following table:

Table 16

Incidence of Canadian Terrorism, by Target Attacked

Target Group	Internal Incidents	External Incidents	Total
Diplomatic	25(78%)	0 -	25(54%)
Government	1(3%)	4(29%)	5(11%)
Military	0 -	1(7%)	1(2%)
Business	2(6%)	4(29%)	6(13%)
Transportation	2(6%)	2(14%)	4(9%)
Other	2(6%)	3(21%)	5(11%)

146.   Diplomatic Targets: More than three-quarters of all international terrorist attacks which have taken place inside Canada have been directed at the diplomatic community. Of the 25 attacks upon diplomatic targets 14 (56%) were bombings, five (20%) were assaults, three (12%) were assassination attempts, and the remaining three were divided between kidnapping, barricade-hostage, and threat incidents. The proportion of all international terrorist incidents affecting Canada, both internally and externally, which has been directed against diplomatic targets is 54%. State Department statistics indicate that of 7425 terrorist incidents world-wide which occurred between 1968 and 1981, 2856 (or 38%) were aimed at diplomatic targets.[455] Thus, the extent of diplomatic targeting in Canada is atypical of global patterns. Furthermore, half of the attacks on diplomats in Canada have occurred since 1980, a period which has seen a steady decline in attacks on diplomats elsewhere in the world.

147.   If there has been a trend in the attacks upon the diplomatic community, it has been away from bombings (the last of which occurred in January 1982) and towards assassination and assault. This trend seems to be largely a reflection of changes in the groups involved, away from Cuban and Croatian groups and towards Sikhs and Armenians. Perpetrator group-types have been identified in 22 out of the 25 cases, and out of these 22 emigrés were involved in 16 incidents (73%), nationalist-autonomist groups in three (14%), and sub-revolutionary groups in two

(9%). The only period during which the diplomatic community in Canada has experienced a respite from terrorist attack was between 1977 and 1979.

148.   Cuban exile attacks on the Cuban consulate in Montréal are fairly typical of bomb attacks on diplomatic targets. The consulate has been the target of three attacks, one of which was abortive. The Cuban trade mission in the same city was also the target of a lethal bomb attack which killed one person and injured seven others.

149.   Diplomatic premises have been occupied on a number of occasions, but such incidents tend to be protest-related rather than terroristic. For example, the Iranian embassy in Ottawa has twice been occupied by protesters. On the first occasion the embassy was occupied for four days in February 1979, but the incident was a peaceful one, and External Affairs noted that the occupiers were entitled to stay as long as they had the consent of the embassy staff - which they did in this instance. However, some occupations have degenerated from protest to violence, an example being the incident at the Haitian consulate-general in Montréal in March 1986, in which the consul-general was assaulted.

150.   Diplomats in Canada have also been the victims of types of hostage-taking other than protest-related duress, but only very rarely. There has been one kidnapping* - the Cross abduction in 1970 - and one hostage-taking - the 1985 seizure of the Turkish embassy - involving diplomatic personnel. The small number of hostage-taking incidents probably reflects the limited capability of emigré groups to carry out such operations. One of the two incidents, the FLQ's kidnapping of James Cross, supports this contention in that it was the work of a non-emigré group having a relatively well-developed support infrastructure.

151.   The trend away from bomb attacks and towards assassinations and assaults in attacks upon the diplomatic community in Canada has been mentioned. This tactical watershed probably occurred in 1982, the year in which two assassination attempts were made against Turkish diplomats in Ottawa, and in which the most recent bomb attack directed against a diplomatic target was recorded. Since April 1982 there have been three assassination attempts against diplomats and four assault incidents.

152.   In terms of location, it is noteworthy that only about one-third of the attacks directed against diplomatic targets occurred in Ottawa. Of 26 incidents,** 11 (or 42%) occurred in Montréal, nine (or 35%) in

---

* As was noted in the introduction, the incident in which the acting Bahamian high commissioner in Ottawa was held captive in April 1986 has been excluded from the chronology owing to the act being largely inspired by personal motives.

** Of the 25 attacks on diplomatic targets, one - a series of letter bombs in 1972 - was divided between two locations (Ottawa and Montréal), and is therefore counted as two incidents for purposes of assessing location.

Ottawa, three (or 12%) in Vancouver, and one each in Toronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver Island (4% each). It may be surmized that the concentration of potential diplomatic targets in Ottawa is offset by the relatively higher degree of protection accorded them.

153.   Government Targets: While government officials and buildings are popular targets in insurgencies or in domestically-focussed terrorist campaigns (such as that of the Red Brigades), the Canadian government has rarely been singled out as a primary target. If the rocket attack at the 1986 Tokyo summit is included (as potentially endangering the Canadian prime minister, and also because the missiles landed near the Canadian embassy), a total of six incidents having international ramifications (13% of the total) have been directed at Canadian government (or Crown corporation) targets.

154.   Excluding the Tokyo attack, of the remaining five incidents all but one occurred outside Canada, and all were bombings. The targets were the Canadian consulate and tourist office in New York (1972), a freight terminal at the Los Angeles airport (1982), the high commission in London (1983), the Canadian embassy in Jakarta (1986), and a post office in British Columbia (1986). The incidents were all minor ones, inflicting no casualties, causing relatively little damage, having low coercive potential, and even lacking symbolical value (several received little or no publicity). It would appear that the Canadian government has been, on the whole, more troubled by indirect attacks of which it is the secondary target (such as the Turkish embassy incident) than it has been by direct attacks on government officials and facilities.

155.   Apart from the mortar attack on a NATO squadron in Lisbon harbour in January 1985,* there has been only one international terrorist attack involving a Canadian "military" target (2% of all attacks, a very low proportion by world standards). State Department data show that 8.8% of all incidents which took place world-wide between 1968 and 1981 were directed against military targets, and 10.5% of attacks occurring between 1980 and 1984 selected military victims.[456] The sole victim of terrorist attack was a Canadian radar technician (a civilian) on NATO duty in Turkey. He was kidnapped, along with two British technicians, in March 1972, and all were killed during a battle between their captors and security forces. In August 1974 a Canadian soldier of the United Nations forces in Cyprus was stabbed while investigating reports of looting along the Green Line. However, this incident has not been included in the chronology, since it appears to have been more a by-product of the peacekeeping operation than a deliberate terrorist act. Similar incidents elsewhere (in Vietnam, for instance) have likewise been excluded.

156.   The frequent attacks upon NATO targets in Europe indicate the potential for attacks upon Canadian military targets, as well as

---

*   HMCS Iroquois was part of the squadron, but was not one of the three ships which were the direct targets of the attack.

Canada's relative good fortune thus far. However, Canadian vulnerability has been demonstrated by some recent incidents in Germany. In late-April 1986 a Canadian military bus and an American civilian car were set on fire near Heidelberg, causing damage but no injuries. There was no claim of responsibility for the incident, which may simply have been an act of vandalism. On 6 July 1987 there was an explosion in a fuel compound at Canadian Forces Base Lahr, which caused an estimated $4 million damage. However, the attack does not appear to have been the work of a terrorist group, and in fact military investigators have speculated that the bombing was carried out by someone with inside knowledge of the base. A German police spokesman commented that "we are sure, or nearly sure, that this was an act of sabotage in which German persons, especially terrorists, were not involved."[457]

157.   Business Targets: Canadian business targets (whether personnel, facilities, or commerce) have been struck with relatively low frequency by comparison with global patterns. The chronology indicates that business targets have been attacked six times during the past two decades, 13% of all attacks affecting Canada. By comparison, 23% of the victims of international terrorist incidents, world-wide, between 1968 and 1981 were corporate officials, a proportion which rose to 24% in 1985.[458]

158.   Canadian business personnel have been attacked by a variety of methods, with kidnapping being the most popular tactic, used in half the incidents. Again this contrasts with patterns evident elsewhere in the world. A State Department summary of attacks against American business targets between 1980 and 1985 implies that bombing is the tactic most frequently used against such targets, particularly in Western Europe.[459]

159.   The relatively low incidence of attacks on Canadian business targets would appear to reflect Canada's overseas economic profile. The State Department's annual reports indicate that American businessmen are frequently the victims of terrorist attack, and attribute the United States's vulnerability to terrorism in part to the multiplicity of American targets (including economic ones) in countries where terrorism is rife. In 1985, 70.4% of Canadian direct investment abroad was invested in the United States (up from 52.5% in 1970).[460] Given the relatively low level of terrorism in the United States, this suggests that some three-quarters of Canadian external investment is reasonably sheltered from terrorist attack. The contrast this presents with American business vulnerability is further illustrated by reference to specific countries in which domestic civil violence poses a threat to foreign business interests. For example, in 1985 Canada's stock of registered direct investment in Peru was worth about $US38 million. By contrast, the United States's stock was worth about $US643 million, approximately 17 times as much as Canada's. In 1985 the United States had 199 foreign collaborative ventures in India, Canada 15.[461] Canadian direct foreign investment in developing countries is small, especially in troubled areas. Thus, Canada's economic profile in terrorist-prone countries is generally not high enough to attract terrorist ire on anything other than a sporadic basis.

160.   Nonetheless, few Western countries can be entirely immune from attacks on expatriate or travelling nationals, and occasional (possibly random) attacks on Canadian businessmen may be anticipated. Thus at different times Guy Boisvert, Galen Weston, and the Canadian executive who was recently kidnapped in Colombia all provided terrorists with "targets of opportunity". Besides attacks on foreign businessmen, terrorists or protesters frequently bomb business premises, largely for symbolical reasons. Canadian businesses have rarely been subjected to such attacks, the fire-bombing of three Canadian bank branches in Trinidad being an exception. These attacks appear likely to have been linked to the Sir George Williams University incident or to "black power" demonstrations then taking place on the island.

161.   <u>Random Targets</u>: It has frequently been observed that the purpose of terrorism is to terrorize, and yet the selection of diplomats, military personnel, officials, and businessmen overseas as targets can leave large sectors of the population with a sense of immunity. The Canadian public's reaction to the <u>Achille Lauro</u> incident, and the widespread cancellation of travel plans by Canadians, do indicate an occasional perception of public vulnerability. Such perceptions depend to a considerable extent upon random targeting, and inevitably such randomness tends to be associated with attacks on public places and events and on tourist targets.

162.   Canadians have quite often been the victims of terrorist attacks on transportation systems. At least two Canadians were among the hostages on an Indian jet hijacked to Lahore by Sikh extremists in September 1981. Two years later a Canadian diplomat and his family hid under a table at an airport restaurant in Ankara while Armenian terrorists held other patrons hostage, and escaped injury in the ensuing gunbattle which killed a number of the captives. In November 1985 two Canadian tourists were killed in a battle at Valetta airport between Egyptian security forces and Abu Nidal hijackers of an Egyptair flight. In September 1986 three Canadians were among the injured in the bloody climax to another Abu Nidal hijacking, this time at Karachi Airport. Incidents such as these receive considerable publicity in Canada. A high proportion of Canadians - 73% of survey respondents - indicated an awareness of the <u>Achille Lauro</u> hijacking. This is evidence of a public awareness of terrorism, even where (as in this incident) Canadians do not appear to have been involved.

163.   Just as attacks upon tourists have occasionally stimulated anxiety in the Canadian public, so fairly random attacks on Canadian businessmen overseas have combined with highly publicized campaigns against businessmen from other countries (notably the United States) to produce increased concern among Canadian firms that do business overseas.[462]

164.   Living in countries marked by political violence renders Canadians susceptible to attack, even if the attackers are not particularly hostile towards Canada. Guy Boisvert discovered this vulnerability in Iraq, as did Martin Overduin in Sudan and the metallurgist

captured by Angolan rebels in 1986. A Canadian biologist in El Salvador was reported missing in April 1981. It transpired that she had been taken into protective custody after receiving threats for her part in organizing fishermen's cooperatives. While this incident was probably not an act of political terrorism, it indicates the risks faced by Canadian aid workers, residents, tourists, and businessmen in countries afflicted by civil strife.

165. International terrorist acts committed in Canada have rarely been indiscriminate in their targeting. The only two incidents in which the general public, rather than a specific target group, seemed to be at risk were both threats: the 1985 threat against the Toronto transit system, and the 1986 claim that South African produce would be poisoned. Although neither threat was apparently carried out (the Department of Health and Welfare found no evidence that South African fruit had been tampered with), both caused alarm. The Toronto transit system's weekday ridership of 1.5 million passengers was down by 35% on 1 April 1985 (the date given in the letter purportedly sent by the Armenian Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Our Homeland as the debut of the bomb attacks). It continued to be below normal levels for the next two days.

166. While the foregoing suggests that indiscrimination tends to produce a public reaction, on the whole terrorist targeting in Canada has been such that it has not really evoked a strong domestic demand (as in some European countries) for government action. Furthermore, some deliberate acts which did not themselves directly threaten the general public have strongly influenced opinion. The FLQ's kidnapping of Cross achieved as much or more, in terms of public reaction, as had seven years of bombing (some of it indiscriminate, as for example the 1969 attempt to bomb an overpass of the Metropolitan Boulevard in Montréal). According to opinion surveys, an overwhelming majority of Canadians supported the government's action in proclaiming the War Measures Act. Nonetheless, public concern was short-lived, and, despite government pledges, no revision of the emergency powers act was made until 1987, a situation which contrasted with the wide body of anti-terrorist legislation introduced in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, often in response to public demand.

167. <u>Potential Targets</u>: The record of terrorist targeting in Canada, along with global trends in terrorist tactics (including the use of, or access to, new technology weapons), gives some indication of potential future terrorist targets in this country.

168. During the past two decades emigré attackers, largely symbolical attacks, and diplomatic targets have consistently been the hallmark of international terrorism as it affects Canada. There appears to be little reason to anticipate significant changes to this pattern.

169. Nonetheless, the historical record indicates that predicting where and when attacks may occur will prove difficult. For example, given the prominence of exile politics in Canadian terrorism, it might

be assumed that at least a few incidents would be linked with signifi-
cant anniversaries. Yet this does not appear to have been the case.
While the Armenians have dedicated the whole of April (and particularly
24 April) to the memory of the genocide which allegedly occurred during
the First World War, only two of the incidents attributable to Armenian
groups took place in April (the shooting of Mr. Gungor on 8 April, and
the threat against the Toronto transit system on 1-3 April). Similarly,
although the anniversaries of the founding of Sikhism and the 1919
Amritsar massacre both fall in April, none of the terrorist acts
attributable to Sikh extremists in Canada have occurred in April. In
fact, several were clearly stimulated by contemporary rather than
historical events (notably by the Indian army's attack on the Golden
Temple). Nor is there any indication that Cuban exile terrorists follow
the calendar with any degree of exactitude. Two potential anniversaries
occur in January (the overthrow of the Batista government on 1 January,
and the birth of José Marti on 28 January). Two of the seven incidents
attributable to anti-Castro Cubans occurred in January, on the 14th and
the 21st respectively. The anniversary of the Bay of Pigs operation is
celebrated on 19 April in Cuba, but the only incident to take place in
April occurred on the 4th.

170.   Thus, in Canada exile anniversaries do not appear to be particu-
larly reliable signals of terrorist incidents. Events in the homelands
of particular emigré communities may in fact be better indicators of
potential terrorism.

171.   Another indicator of possible attack is opportunity, or availa-
bility of targets. This takes several forms. For emigré groups, the
presence in Canada of statesmen from their homelands provides a tempting
target, as the 1971 attack on Kosygin, and the 1986 assassination
attempt on a Punjabi cabinet minister, demonstrated. The presence of
foreign dignitaries at high profile international meetings in Canada
complements opportunity with publicity. Concerns for the safety of Mr.
Rajiv Gandhi resulted in very heavy security being provided for the
conference of Commonwealth heads of government in Vancouver in October
1987 (similar fears led American authorities to arrest five Sikhs in
April 1985 on charges of conspiring to assassinate Gandhi during his
visit to the United States in June 1985). Canadian Sikh leaders in fact
promised to stage only "peaceful demonstrations" during the conference,
an assurance which was honoured. However, the government was suffi-
ciently concerned that it deployed slightly over 2000 police, along with
approximately 500 military personnel (3 Battalion, PPCLI) to provide
security for the meeting.

172.   Not all international events are equally vulnerable to attack.
For example, there has been no history of terrorism at world's fairs
(Expo 86 in Vancouver appears to have been devoid of terrorist inci-
dents). Since the bloody attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972, Olympic
games have largely been spared from terrorist attack (there was an
incident during the 1976 Montréal Olympics, but it was a minor one). By
contrast, the summits of the seven major Western industrial powers have

recently become an attractive target for terrorists, with rocket and bomb incidents connected with both the 1986 Tokyo meeting and the 1987 Venice summit. In both cases the Anti-Imperialist International Brigades claimed responsibility for bomb incidents occurring during or soon after the summits.

173. After the Tokyo summit a follow-up attack in Jakarta included a bomb attack on the Canadian embassy. At the time of the Venice meeting Italian police reported that a room from which rockets had been launched at the United States embassy in Rome had been rented to a man with a Canadian passport. The 1988 summit will be held in Toronto. However, Canada has no tradition of left-wing violence to match that of Japan or of Italy, and the relative absence of a left-wing terrorist underground in this country will hamper the operations of any foreign leftist group which might wish to exploit the occasion.

174. There are several situations or factors which could increase the potential for terrorist acts in Canada or against Canadian targets abroad. Certain forms of attack are fairly easy to carry out in a country of Canada's size, and can reap benefits, in terms both of disruption and of publicity, out of proportion to their feasibility. For example, power lines and railways are vulnerable to attack. This was demonstrated in August 1987 when an Ontario man cut through several of the 32 steel cables supporting a Bell Canada microwave tower near Morrisburg. The tower was toppled, causing $4 million damage and disrupting long-distance service in Eastern Ontario, West Québec, and the Maritimes for three days, as well as interrupting CBC radio transmissions. The attack caused Bell Canada to place guards at all its communications towers in Eastern Ontario. Fuel pipelines are also inviting targets. The transmission system for natural gas being piped from Alberta to Québec is 10,000 kilometres in length, and the length of the mainline pipe for oil transmission from Edmonton to Montréal (via Chicago) is virtually the same. Their length makes these systems vulnerable, particularly given the terrorist preference for "soft" targets.

175. In policy terms, the growth of issue-oriented or "piggy-back" terrorism elsewhere in the world may be reflected in Canada. There is a range of issues which could stimulate terrorism in, or affect, Canada, although such acts may not always have international ramifications. Environmental and defence concerns are in the forefront of such issues. For example, a Crown corporation (Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd) has been linked with "star wars" research. Strategic weapons often generate protest in Canada,* and protest of this nature has the potential to stimulate violence and terrorism, as has clearly been shown in Europe.

---

* In July 1987 two Greenpeace members spent a night dangling from Vancouver's Lion's Gate bridge to protest nuclear-armed warships.

It is also possible that Canadian foreign policy decisions might stimulate attacks in or against Canada. It will be recalled that Iranian foreign minister Ghotbzadeh threatened retaliation against Canada for the successful smuggling by embassy staff of six American diplomats out of Tehran in January 1980 - and Iranian retaliation tends to be terroristic. More recently, in January 1988 a Lebanese group warned that Canadians in Lebanon would become kidnapping targets if Ottawa decided to deport to Israel a Palestinian terrorist who had slipped into Canada a year earlier. The Kelly Committee expressed concern that some foreign policy initiatives (such as Canada's perceived support for the United States after the bombing raid on Libya in 1986) might incur the wrath of states which tend to sponsor terrorism. The committee also noted that Canada's membership in organizations such as NATO, NORAD, the OECD, and the "summit seven" could provoke attack.[463]

176. Thus, issues and opportunities may occasionally coalesce to produce terrorist incidents in Canada, although attacks with international dimensions will probably remain fairly rare. Overseas conflicts are rather more likely to find an answering echo in Canada, continuing the pattern of emigré terrorism of the past two decades. As was noted earlier, Canadians living, working, or travelling abroad are exposed to terrorist attack, although rarely because they are Canadians. The fact that most external attacks upon Canadians during the past two decades have been fortuitous, rather than deliberate, indicates that Canada itself is not a significant terrorist target. Nonetheless, the increase in the number and proportion of external attacks upon Canadian targets during the 1980s indicates the possibility of continuing Canadian victimization abroad.

177. Over-all, therefore, it seems likely that where international terrorism is concerned, the targeting patterns of the past twenty years will persist, with possibly a slightly increased tendency to issue-oriented attacks and external incidents.

PART IV - GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

1.   Although this report is primarily concerned with the threat posed by international terrorism, the earlier examination of terrorist trends suggests the usefulness of including a brief overview of trends in governmental responses to terrorism, particularly given the sometimes symbiotic relationship between terrorist acts and government measures against terrorism.

GENERAL

2.   The variety of terrorism and of terrorist groups has been matched by a medley of governmental responses. The country most targeted by, and at risk to, international terrorism - the United States - set up a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism as early as 1972, but despite strong White House rhetoric, the American government did not pay serious attention to the problem until the 1983 Beirut bombing. From being a "tolerable" nuisance, terrorism came to be recognized as an issue capable of undermining United States foreign policy. A study of governmental responses commented:

> "... it is fair to suggest that there is an improvised, even jerry-built, quality to the strategies that have evolved to date in the Western democracies for combating terrorism. Moreover....it is perhaps inevitable that this situation will persist for the indefinite future. The choices now before the United States and the other countries seriously challenged by international terrorism involve the selection of a mix of strategies tailored to their specific threat environments, political realities, moral and legal traditions, and the human and physical resources available."[464]

3.   This last point, regarding the constraints on action, is well reflected in the seeming ambivalence of recent American responses to terrorism. Thus, although Reagan promised "swift and effective retribution" for terrorist attacks during his first term, American officials indicated that the United States' war on terrorism would remain primarily a defensive war. Similarly, in 1986 the Americans launched an air strike against Libya and traded arms for hostages with the state American officials described as the leading exponent of state-sponsored terrorism.

4.   The options available to a government in combatting terrorism essentially boil down to prevention, protection, and response, which in turn resolve themselves into such elements as socio-political initiatives, improved physical security, intelligence, legal measures, intergovernmental cooperation, preemption, retaliation or retribution, economic sanctions, and so on.

5.   A former terrorist claimed that "The only way to fight terrorism is to solve the real problems",[465] and government counter-insurgency campaigns which incorporated significant political programmes - as in the Philippines and Malaya in the 1950s - were ultimately successful. But not all political problems can readily be solved. It is hard to see how anarchistic groups such as the Japanese Red Army can be satisfied, and concessions to the IRA would presumably prompt a backlash on the part of Protestant paramilitary groups. A study of five modern terror- ist movements found that reforms do affect levels of violence, but in a complex fashion. Concessions made from a position of weakness will increase violence, while there will be a lag of several years after the start of a reform programme before the violence begins to abate (even after significant changes in Northern Ireland, violence remains a major problem).[466] Furthermore, many states and individuals have a vested interest in the continuation of terrorist activity.

6.   A hostile population is one of the chief restraints that can be placed on terrorist activities. A German terrorist attributed a decline in the fortunes of the RAF and the 2nd of June Movement in the late-1970s to a fall in public sympathy.[467] Thus the availability of legitimate channels of protest (the German Green party has a number of former terrorist sympathizers in its ranks), the implementation of amnesty programmes (used effectively in Italy), and attempts to demythologize terrorism can all create an unfavourable climate for the terrorist. Public awareness can also help to foil terrorist attacks - citizens have reported and even removed suspicious packages later found to contain explosives - and revulsion at terrorist methods can facili- tate intelligence-gathering (as seems to have occurred in Italy in the wake of the 1978 Moro assassination). However, attempts to isolate the terrorist from the population can backfire, as internment did in Northern Ireland, by alienating the Roman Catholic community.

7.   In April 1984 Reagan signed a National Security Decision Direc- tive, allegedly dealing with the use of pre-emptive force. In the words of a defence official, this directive represented "a quantum leap in countering terrorism, from the reactive mode to recognition that pro- active steps are needed".[468] Governments have a number of pro-active strategies at their disposal, from enhanced security to disruption of terrorist operations. Improved physical security - particularly of diplomatic targets - is a response whose necessity was made clearly evident by several car-bomb attacks in Beirut in 1983-84. After an attack on the United States embassy annex in September 1984, President Reagan signed legislation providing $356 million to increase security at US embassies worldwide. Jenkins has found that terrorists are most unwilling to attack well-protected targets.[469]

8.   Intelligence is a key element in any counter-terrorist strategy. Timely intelligence led to the apprehension of terrorists who were preparing to shoot down civilian airliners in Rome (1973) and Nairobi (1976). In 1986, Robert B. Oakley, then head of the State Department's counter-terrorism section, claimed that more than 120 terrorist attacks against American citizens at home and abroad were foiled in 1985.[470]

9.   Along with the ability to acquire timely and accurate intelligence regarding terrorist groups, governments require an evaluative capability to assess the threat posed by them, particularly where that threat has technical dimensions. In the late -1970s the United States government established the Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) in order to analyze the credibility of any nuclear threat, and to identify and render harmless any "improvized nuclear device".   The importance attached to such a capability is evident in the fact that by 1981 NEST's budget had reached $50 million.

10.   The CIA's intelligence-gathering capability is said to have been undermined by morale problems in the 1970s and by an excessive reliance on electronic forms of intelligence-gathering. Furthermore, in attacking international, as opposed to domestic, terrorism governments confront the reluctance of intelligence services to share information. Nonetheless, intelligence cooperation is becoming more effective, in part as a result of the establishment in 1977 of TREVI (Terrorism, Radicalism and Violence International), a forum wherein police chiefs, ministers, and senior officials from the EEC could meet regularly to discuss intelligence and police matters.   Prior to 1986 no procedure existed for contacts between the TREVI group and other countries (notably the United States).   The terrorist crisis of April 1986 prompted meetings between European and American counter-terrorism officials, and Canada first became involved in TREVI group discussions in April 1987.

11.   A number of countries have attempted to disrupt terrorist operations through a process of disinformation, dirty tricks, and "black work" (intelligence agents posing as arms merchants have sold terrorists defective equipment, leading to loss of life in premature detonations). The activities of the Israeli counter-terrorist group, the "Wrath of God," are said to have been responsible for the dissolution of Black September.[471]

12.   On the whole, international co-operative initiatives have yielded slender results in the battle against terrorism. In 1973 the United Nations established a 35 nation ad hoc committee on international terrorism.   The committee was disbanded after six years of wrangling, although in 1979 the General Assembly did adopt a non-binding resolution that condemned "all acts of international terrorism which endanger or take human lives or jeopardize fundamental freedom."[472] Some success has been achieved in drafting international conventions, including several on air piracy (Tokyo 1969, The Hague 1970, and Montréal 1971), one on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons (1973), and still another on the taking of hostages (1979).   Walter Laqueur scoffed that such conventions "may be of interest to lawyers and insurance companies, but they have not the slightest practical importance,"[473] and a report by a North Atlantic Assembly working group similarly concluded that such agreements have generally not proved very helpful in combatting terrorism, in part because many states are reluctant to ratify them, and in part because they often contain loopholes relating to political motivation in terrorist acts.[474]

13.   At a regional level, initiatives taken within the Council of Europe resulted in the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1977). This removed the traditional "political offence" safeguard in extradition for crimes of hijacking, attacks on internationally protected persons (diplomats), and so on. This was followed in December 1979 by another convention meant to implement the 1977 agreement. Although less supportive than Britain of the American raid on Tripoli, on 21 April 1986 the nations of the European Community decided to impose sanctions (mainly diplomatic) against Libya. On the other hand, the EC countries were initially not supportive of British attempts to impose sanctions on Syria following the conviction of a Jordanian, allegedly acting under Syrian auspices, for trying to blow up an Israeli plane in London in April 1986. The sanctions which were ultimately imposed were milder than requested and not unanimous.

14.   The summits of the seven major industrial nations have regularly produced statements and agreements relating to terrorism (for example, in Bonn in 1978, Vienna in 1980, Ottawa in 1981, London in 1984, and Tokyo in 1986). Proposals for an international anti-terrorist unit have thus far proved abortive. First raised in the aftermath of the Entebbe raid (1976), the idea was revived by Italian and German ministers in 1986, and by Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres in the same year.

15.   Perhaps the best results in the fight against terrorism have come from bilateral agreements. The 1973 United States-Cuba agreement on hijacking has proved a workable arrangement, despite the inherent hostility of the two countries. A 1981 accord between France and Spain yielded results in Spain's fight against Basque terrorism by denying the ETA French sanctuaries.

16.   If political initiatives, preemptive attacks, and improved security fail to prevent the occurrence of terrorist acts, governments have a number of additional options open to them. These range from concession to military resolution or retaliation. Concession has been a not uncommon response to terrorist incidents, particularly in hostage-taking situations. Thus, a hostage-taking, by Palestinian terrorists, between Czechoslovakia and Austria in September 1973 resulted in the closure of a transit camp for Soviet Jewish emigrés. More recently, when TWA Flight 847 was hijacked to Beirut in June 1985, an element of the understanding whereby the hostages were freed was the release by Israel of some 700 Lebanese prisoners (while Israel had been planning their repatriation prior to the incident, the hijacking was seen as a victory by Israel's enemies). A 1977 study of hostage-taking by Rand found that in operations where something more than just safe passage or exit permission was demanded, there was a 40% chance that all or some of the terrorists' demands would be met; there was a 36% chance of full compliance with such demands; and where safe passage or exit, for the perpetrators or others, was the sole demand, there was an 86% chance of success.[475] In 1976 Robert Fearey, then a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and the Co-ordinator for Combatting Terrorism, stated that "the US government has not and will not pay ransom, release prisoners, or otherwise yield to terrorist blackmail".[476] President

Reagan reiterated this stand in 1985, yet soon thereafter resorted to arms sales to Iran to try to secure the release of American hostages in Lebanon.

17.   Negotiations do not always result in concessions, even minor ones. A policy of waiting out hostage-takers has often shown dividends. After a 130-hour siege in December 1975, IRA terrorists released hostages, taken after an attack on a restaurant, and then surrendered. Similarly, in the same month Dutch authorities refused to give in to the demands of South Moluccan terrorists who had seized a train and some seventy hostages, and the hostage-takers surrendered after twelve days. A parallel incident two days later was even longer drawn out, but produced essentially the same result, although a minor concession was allowed. In Canada, the Cross-Laporte kidnappings (1970), the Turkish embassy incident (1985), and the capture of the Bahamian vice-consul (1986) were all resolved by negotiation and with few, if any, concessions.

18.   While the threatened use of force has often been employed in negotiating strategies, its actual use has also occurred with some frequency. Such use has been facilitated to some extent by technical advances in the field of security equipment (among them the development of stun grenades, sensors, sniperscopes, breaching and entry devices, and so on), but it has been encouraged even more by the creation in many countries of specialized hostage rescue units. A 1981 study of government responses to terrorism claimed that there was "a growing tendency on the part of national governments to resort to unilateral military action against terrorism..."[477] Initially (as at Munich in 1972) police units tended to be used to resolve impasses in hostage-taking incidents, but the need for specially-trained rescue units came to be increasingly recognized during the 1970s. The first successful assault on a hijacked airliner was conducted by the Israeli Sayaret Matkal at Lod Airport in May 1972. Since that date forcible hostage rescues have been attempted or effected (not always using specialist units) on a number of occasions, among them:

- the freeing by Dutch units of hostages held in the Scheveningen jail during a prison uprising led by an Arab terrorist (October 1974);

- the rescue by the French GIGN of French school children held on a bus in Djibouti by Somali rebels (February 1976);

- the Israeli rescue of 103 hostages held by pro-Palestinian terrorists at Entebbe Airport (July 1976);

- the rescue, by Egyptian troops, of passengers held by pro-Palestinian hijackers on an Egyptian plane at Luxor (August 1976);

- the storming, by Syrian special forces, of a Damascus hotel where Black June terrorists held about ninety hostages (September 1976);

- the resolution by Dutch Marines of two hostage-taking incidents involving South Moluccan terrorists (May 1977);

- the rescue by Kuwaiti troops of passengers aboard a Middle East Airlines jet (June 1977);

- GSG 9's rescue of hostages hijacked to Mogadishu (October 1977);

- the failed Egyptian commando assault at Larnaca (February 1978);

- the death of the captive American ambassador in Kabul during a rescue attempt by Afghan security forces (February 1979);

- the abortive Blue Light mission to rescue American hostages in Tehran (April 1980);

- the SAS rescue of hostages in the Iranian embassy in London (May 1980);

- the rescue by Spanish GEO personnel of hostages held by right-wing terrorists in a Barcelona bank (May 1981);

- the freeing by Pakistani troops of hijack victims at Lahore (September 1981);

- the rescue of Gen. Dozier from the Red Brigades, by Italian NOCS personnel (January 1982);

- the liberation by a Swiss police tactical unit of 14 hostages held in the Polish embassy in Bern (September 1982);

- the liberation of five foreign relief workers, including a Canadian, by Sudanese special forces (July 1983);

- the successful assault on a hijacked airliner at Aruba, conducted by Venezuelan troops (July 1984);

- the Colombian army's recapture of the Palace of Justice in Bogota, during which over ninety people were killed (November 1985); and

- the bloody storming of a hijacked plane at Valetta by Egyptian security forces (November 1985).

Contrary to early accounts of the bloody denouement of the Pan Am hijacking at Karachi Airport in September 1986, Pakistani security forces do not appear to have been involved in the shooting which led to the termination of the incident. It will be noted that in seven of the incidents noted above - Entebbe (1976), Mogadishu (1977), Larnaca (1978), Iran (1980), Bangkok (1981), Aruba (1984), and Valetta (1985) - the rescue units were operating outside their own countries.[478]

19.   Successful forcible hostage rescue attempts can reap long-term benefits. One of the European radical student leaders claimed that the Mogadishu raid represented the "moral and political end" of the RAF,[479] and word of GSG 9's success led to the prison suicide of three of Germany's top terrorists. However, abortive attacks can produce domestic and diplomatic crises, as the Larnaca and Kabul incidents demonstrated. The British government suffered negative repercussions politically from its support of the American air raids on Libya (a Gallup poll indicated that the British public opposed the raid by 65% against 29% in favour).

20.   Force has sometimes been used in retaliation for, as well as resolution of, terrorist incidents. After a letter bomb killed an Israeli diplomat in London in 1972, the Israelis sent letter bombs to Palestinian officials in a number of countries. After a large number of French troops were killed by a terrorist car bomb in Lebanon in October 1983, French planes bombed Baalbek. The Israelis often resort to bombing in response to terrorist attacks, their most notable riposte being a bloody raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis in October 1985. In 1985 an American-supported group in Lebanon, acting on its own initiative, attempted to assassinate a Hesbollah leader, and killed over eighty people in the neighbourhood. In October 1985 American planes intercepted the aircraft carrying the Achille Lauro hijackers, forcing it to land in Italy, where the terrorists were arrested and tried. Retaliatory tactics have apparently also been used to resolve a hostage-taking. The KGB is said to have secured the release of three kidnapped Soviet diplomats in Lebanon in 1985 by seizing, torturing, and killing a relative of a Hesbollah leader and threatening further such attacks if the diplomats were not freed.[480] The German government maintains a somewhat different retaliatory capability in the form of Zielfahndurg (Target Squads), three-man units which are responsible for capturing wanted terrorists who have escaped abroad (the prior consent of the country concerned is necessary).

21.   It is not clear how far the incidence of terrorism is affected by government responses. The 1977 Rand study of hostage-taking found that there was an inconclusive relationship between government policy on negotiations (whether hard-line or conceding) and future kidnapping trends. Some obdurate governments (Israel and Turkey, for example) were confronted with further hostage-taking incidents, while countries (among them Austria) which made concessions were not necessarily targeted again. It also noted that "Only Canada and Cuba have adopted hard-line, no concession policies from the start and never had another hostage event."[481] Since that study events have reinforced its findings

regarding the inconclusiveness of the relationship between response policy and targeting.

22.   Despite its public "no concessions" stand, the United States is regularly attacked by terrorist groups.   Its concessions to Iran in 1985-86 apparently had the odd effect of securing the release of two American hostages in Lebanon and prompting the seizure of three more.[482]   Recently a senior French police officer was quoted as saying: "The terrorists set up in France during the 1970s. We let them have their houses, their structures, as long as they operated elsewhere. We thought we could buy a little peace. We were wrong."[483]   The French were hard hit by terrorism in the decade prior to 1984, and were badly stung by a wave of deadly terrorist bombings in 1986.

23.   While the Israelis have made significant concessions, such as prisoner exchanges, on at least two occasions, they are generally recognized as pursuing a hard-line policy regarding concessions to terrorism, to the extent of having consistent pre-emptive and retaliatory strike practices. Nonetheless, a 1985 Rand study of Palestinian terrorism found that, after a brief pause in anti-Israeli operations in the wake of the 1982 Lebanon War, terrorist attacks fairly soon returned to previous levels, with a dramatic (and, in view of Israel's tough security posture, perhaps surprising) escalation in Palestinian operations within Israel itself.[484]

CANADA

24.   Compared with other countries, Canada's experience of terrorism - both domestic and international - has been fitful and limited. Nonetheless, the Canadian government has undertaken a number of initiatives to counter terrorism, of which this section will provide a brief overview, but one which is intended to be illustrative and comparative rather than comprehensive.

25.   In the wake of the 1970 FLQ crisis a number of administrative measures were introduced to improve Canada's anti-terrorist capability. The first of these was to empower the Solicitor General with broad authority over internal security matters in terms of policy and coordination. The Security Planning and Research Group was established in 1971 to oversee national security affairs. A second measure was the restructuring and revitalization of inter-agency security and intelligence committees. As a result, a ramified inter-departmental committee structure has evolved which includes the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, the Interdepartmental Committee on Security and Intelligence, the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and the Security Advisory Committee (SAC). In mid-1987 the Kelly Committee reported plans to develop a sub-committee of the SAC which would focus exclusively on terrorism.[485] A third initiative arising from the 1970 crisis was the establishment of a crisis management study group. As a result of the study group's work, a decision to designate the Ministry of the Solicitor General as the lead department in handling domestic terrorism was

implemented in 1976. External Affairs was designated as the lead department in dealing with incidents affecting Canadian interests abroad. Another initiative of this period was the formation in 1976 of a Special Threat Assessment Group, comprising scientific and technical experts and intended to advise and assist law enforcement officials in responding to the use by terrorists, criminals, or psychopaths of nuclear, biological, or chemical agents.

26.   Parallel with the largely bureaucratic initiatives of the 1970s, described above, there was a series of legislative measures designed to enhance Canada's counter-terrorism effort. The Criminal Code has been amended a number of times (in 1972, 1976, and 1985) in an attempt to address the terrorist threat. Other legislation has also been passed, including the 1981 Prohibition of International Air Services Act, which enables Ottawa to cut off air service to and from countries not taking legal action against hijackers.

27.   A number of countries, including Italy, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, and India, have enacted special anti-terrorism laws which provide their governments with greater legal authority - expanded arrest powers, longer prison terms, greater powers of pre-trial detention, and so on - in the battle against terrorism. In Canada acts of terrorism are largely treated like any other form of criminality under the Criminal Code, and the Kelly Committee rejected the notion of a separate stream of anti- terrorism legislation being enacted. It contended that the terrorist threat in Canada is not of a sufficient magnitude to justify the adoption of the type of measures enacted elsewhere, and that terrorism should not be recognized as being different from any other type of crime.[486]

28.   For all the measures effected in the 1970s, the most significant evolution in Canada's counter-terrorism structure has occurred since 1984. In that year a directorate responsible for security planning and operations was formally established, among its responsibilities being the management of the operation of the SAC and the coordination of counter-terrorism programme measures within the federal government. In 1977 the McDonald Commission was established to enquire into alleged RCMP wrong-doing and to make recommendations regarding the reorganization of the security intelligence system. As a result of the commission's work it was decided to establish a civilian security intelligence agency, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) formally came into being in July 1984.

29.   The roots of the RCMP's Special Emergency Response Team (SERT) also date from 1977. In November 1977 a recommendation to establish an assault and hostage rescue unit was approved in principle, but implementation was deferred owing to financial constraints.[487] However, in that year the RCMP established a system of "emergency response teams". Based in 31 centres across Canada, and accounting for more 300 officers, these teams have largely been trained and equipped to carry out assault and hostage-rescue missions in criminal incidents. These teams do not constitute a national emergency response unit, and not only do they

generally train only one day a month, they must also be assembled in times of crisis, and therefore are not available for immediate response. In 1981 a small RCMP "hostage assault and rescue team" (HART) was set up to respond to any terrorist actions occurring during the Montebello summit, but it was disbanded soon after the end of the meeting. In January 1986 the cabinet decided to create the SERT, which by mid-1987 had 51 members (some of them former HART personnel) in training, ready to operate as one team or as two independent teams.

30.   Finally, an Interdepartmental Terrorist Alert System has been developed to coordinate the activation of the federal crisis management apparatus in response to a terrorist threat.

31.   The organizational structure which has evolved in Canada in recent years is evidence of the government's heightened concern regarding terrorism. In July 1984 the Department of the Solicitor General was confirmed as the focal point for the coordination and planning of the federal government's counter-terrorism activities. These activities are centred in the new Security Planning and Coordination Directorate. The department also has a crisis centre charged with responding to terrorist incidents which take place in Canada, advising ministers and their deputies, coordinating actions of all federal departments and agencies involved, and liaising with the appropriate provincial and local authorities.

32.   The Solicitor General's crisis centre has been in existence for more than a decade, and in 1979 two American analysts of terrorism described it as "among the world's best-conceived incident-management mechanisms".[488] However, the 1987 Kelly Committee report charged that there were too many "crisis management centres" - "at least six" - within the federal government for effective coordination.[489] In fact, the committee claimed that during the Air India and Turkish embassy incidents the government's response to a considerable extent ignored the processes and structures in place.[490] Furthermore, the committee reported that a senior official had stated that inter-governmental coordination (between the federal, provincial, and municipal levels of government) had proved particularly difficult, resulting in some serious problems in responding to specific terrorist incidents.[491]

33.   There has been considerable speculation in the media about possible tensions between the RCMP and CSIS. For example, in the fall of 1987 it was charged that liaison failures between the two agencies had contributed to the Air India and Narita incidents.[492] The Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) alleged in its 1986-87 report that "CSIS and the RCMP had yet to completely mesh their mandates in counter-terrorism."[493] Similarly, SIRC claimed that there had been distrust and a "turf battle" between CSIS and the Ottawa police during a terrorist scare in December 1985 and January 1986.[494]

34.   The Kelly Committee noted such claims of inter-agency jealousy, but largely discounted them (although it did observe that "in at least one instance" more timely communication between CSIS and the RCMP would

have averted a terrorist incident). On its formation CSIS replaced the RCMP Security Service in intelligence-gathering and analysis for purposes of national security, and the Kelly Committee noted that there may well have been adjustment problems at the outset. However, it reported that it had "heard no evidence that problems persist or that CSIS's intelligence-gathering system is less effective than the system previously in place."[495] Furthermore, in the latter part of 1986 an exchange of liaison officers between the CSIS and RCMP counter-terrorism programmes helped to ameliorate "turf" problems, although a few remain (notably CSIS's lack of access to the Canadian Police Information Centre data banks). While criticizing aspects of CSIS's counter-subversion programme, SIRC has noted that "CSIS is operating at a high level of competence and professionalism within its counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism programs, providing useful intelligence assessments and advice to appropriate officials."[496] Nevertheless, a lively public debate concerning the activities of CSIS led to the establishment in June 1987 of a panel to enquire into the agency's problems. Partly on the basis of the panel's recommendations, a series of reforms affecting CSIS was announced at the end of November 1987. These included the disbanding of the counter-subversion section, a heavier infusion of civilian personnel, the re-training of former RCMP personnel, and the reactivation of the CSIS training academy.

35.   The primary function of CSIS is to collect and analyze information concerning anticipated threats in the areas of espionage and sabotage, foreign-influenced activities, political violence or terrorism (generally defined as the actual or threatened use of violence in an attempt to force the Canadian government to take certain actions, or to interfere with or force certain actions among specific Canadian population groups or foreign governments), and subversive activities.[497] Apart from supplying the government with strategic intelligence on the terrorist threat, CSIS is responsible for providing operational intelligence to various government departments and law enforcement agencies. This assistance includes providing investigational leads to the RCMP for prosecutions and to Employment and Immigration Canada for immigrant screening purposes.

36.   Some national intelligence agencies, including the CIA, the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the Israeli Mossad, have the ability to acquire covert intelligence in other countries. Canada has chosen not to develop such a capability and therefore formal intelligence exchanges with foreign security agencies, while limited to security intelligence, are important in monitoring the activities of, and threat posed by, international terrorists. For example, intelligence information is regularly exchanged with the United States, and CSIS is reported to have established good relations with the FBI.[498] However, the Kelly Committee was concerned that the lack of the means for gathering clandestine intelligence abroad might erode CSIS's currency with the foreign intelligence agencies with which it works, although it did envisage organizational (and, implicitly, political) problems in establishing a foreign intelligence branch within CSIS.[499]

37.   The RCMP is the focal point for the coordination of law enforce-
ment operations in response to a terrorist incident. Under the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act the RCMP have "primary responsibility"
to investigate offences and otherwise perform the duties assigned to
peace officers in relation to offences arising out of "threats to the
security of Canada."[500] Although the RCMP has lost the intelligence
function formerly assigned to its Security Service, it continues to
operate the Canadian Bomb Data Centre, which collects data regarding
terrorist techniques and devices (there were also rumours, subsequently
denied, that the RCMP set up its own "shadow" counter-terrorism unit
whose work parallelled that of CSIS)[501]. The RCMP also plays an
important role in protective security operations, at embassies,
airports, and elsewhere.

38.   Although Canada has had relatively few terrorist hostage-taking
situations, and none of those incidents which have occurred were
resolved by force in a manner comparable to the Entebbe, Mogadishu, and
Iranian embassy operations, the ready availability of a tactical unit
considerably enhances the authorities' negotiating position. Canada is
a relatively new member of the group of Western nations boasting
counter-terrorist or emergency response units. By the mid-1980s a
number of countries had such forces, among them the United States (Delta
Force and the FBI Hostage Response Team), the Federal Republic of
Germany (GSG-9), France (the GIGN), the Netherlands (the Royal Dutch
Marines Close Combat Unit), Britain (the SAS), Italy (GIS and NOCS),
Spain (GEO), and so on.

39.   Some response teams are military (for example, the SAS and Delta
Force), some paramilitary police (GIGN and GSG-9), and some police (the
FBI HRT and units in Scandinavia, Italy, and Spain). The report of the
Kelly Committee includes a table of assault forces around the world. Of
23 countries, 14 vested principal responsibility for hostage rescue
within the armed forces, six within the national police, and four
adopted a hybrid solution.[502]

40.   Although the Canadian Forces have had a long history of opera-
tions in aid of the civil power and in counter-terrorist missions
(notably during the FLQ crisis), and have provided support in some
hostage-taking incidents (among them that at the Turkish embassy),
Canada's counter-terrorist unit was established within the RCMP.
According to the Deputy Solicitor General, this action reflected the
government's view that, however political their ultimate objectives,
terrorist acts involve criminal offences which fall within the purview
of the civil law enforcement authority.[503]

41.   However, the Kelly Committee report claimed that the cabinet had
approached both DND and the RCMP to prepare proposals regarding the
creation of an anti-terrorist emergency response team: "Although
neither agency particularly wanted the function, the RCMP proposal was
accepted and SERT is located within the RCMP."[504] The committee
understood that there were a number of factors behind the decision to
locate SERT within the RCMP. These included the prior existence of RCMP

emergency response teams across the country, the history of the HART unit, the fact that terrorist acts fall under the Criminal Code, and the simplified communications resulting from SERT being placed within the Solicitor General's department.

42.   Nonetheless, the committee believed that it would have been more logical to locate SERT within DND, and urged the cabinet to reverse its 1986 decision. The committee argued that a military mission (the possibility of terrorists having to be killed) was ill-suited to a police force, that there is already a "plethora" of police emergency response teams in many locations, that SERT could not easily respond to two or more concurrent incidents across Canada, and that the armed forces are the logical source of new assault tactics, weapons, explosives, and equipment technology. Furthermore, under the existing structure, DND is tasked with providing transportation, training, and other support to SERT.[505]   However, in his response to the committee's report, Mr. James Kelleher, the Solicitor General, stated that the government had no intention of shifting SERT from the RCMP to DND.[506]

43.   As have other countries, Canada has given a high priority to improving security and protective measures, sometimes under the spur of terrorist attack (notably the Air India and Narita incidents, and the Turkish embassy attack). Overseas, this involves providing information to Canadians likely to be threatened by terrorist incidents, and upgrading physical security and personal safety at diplomatic missions. For example, the threat of attacks by Armenian terrorists in 1982 led to security being tightened at Canadian embassies around the world.

44.   When the decision to create SERT was made public in March 1986, it was also announced that the new counter-terrorist programme would include protective and security measures costing an estimated $33.2 million (including equipment) during the first year of the plan (and less in succeeding years). Anti-terrorist screening has been improved at airports, as have luggage-handling procedures. Security has been tightened at diplomatic missions in Canada, with private guard services being replaced by RCMP special constables trained and equipped for the role. In addition, VIP protection at international events and conferences has been stepped up, and a vital points programme, which has been in existence for some years, has been completely computerized.

45.   There have been problems associated with the programme to enhance physical security. For example, during a 15-month period in 1986-87, nearly one-quarter of the fake weapons deliberately carried through airport screening checks by transport officials went undiscovered. This failure rate was attributed to the poor training given to the private security guards on airport security duty. However, it was anticipated that a new training programme instituted in the spring of 1987 would improve airport security.[507] (In a somewhat similar test of counter-terrorist security, Morton Shulman, an Ontario MPP, entered the Pickering nuclear plant on 1 August 1975; although carrying a satchel he was not checked at any time during his brief visit). A slightly different problem has been the strain imposed by the diversion of police manpower

to protective duties. The RCMP's last two spending estimates warned the cabinet about the dangers of this practice. The 1987-88 report stated that "These constant disruptions of work patterns have caused important investigations to go undone or to be late in receiving attention. Similar disruptions to home and family life of the membership continue to affect morale."[508]

46. Beyond stimulating intelligence, security, and response measures of the sort described above, the need to respond to terrorism has had an impact on Canadian diplomacy, both in terms of cooperation with allied or concerned countries, and in terms of taking remedial action against nations linked with specific terrorist incidents. A few examples of each will suffice.

47. Canada has played an important role in promoting counter-terrorist measures at international fora, among them the United Nations and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). As the home of the headquarters of ICAO, Canada has long involved itself in seeking measures to curtail hijacking. In 1970 Canada and the United States each submitted proposals to ICAO on sanctions to be imposed on states failing to comply with conventions relating to hijacking. After ICAO shelved the proposals in 1971, this country participated in a joint Canadian-United States draft convention in 1972. Recognizing that international law covers terrorist acts against aircraft in flight but not attacks at airports, Canada initiated an attempt to fill the gap at ICAO's 26th session in September 1986, and contributed $10 million to assist developing countries improve airport security. Canada has also joined in attempts to achieve a UN consensus on international terrorism, playing a major role in getting the first unanimous resolution on the subject out of the General Assembly (in 1985). On a bilateral level, Canada was among the first countries to effect an anti-hijacking agreement (with Cuba in February 1973, with subsequent renewal, most recently in 1984). In February 1987 Canada and India signed an extradition treaty which reflected the two countries' concerns regarding terrorism.

48. Canada has also regularly joined with other countries - notably with the "summit seven" - to concert action against terrorism. In his first UN speech, Mr. Mulroney called for all countries to deny sanctuary to terrorists.[509] In October 1986 Canada (along with the United States) withdrew its ambassador to Syria "for consultations", in support of a similar move by Britain (the ambassador returned in February 1987). Canada has also taken measures against Libya because of its support to extremists. In January 1986 Canada initiated a series of trade measures against Libya, among them a ban on the export of oil-drilling equipment, the addition of Libya to the export control list, and a prohibition on Export Development Corporation financing or export insurance.

49. There have been a number of signals of the Canadian government's concern with terrorism in recent years. One has been its willingness to commit financial and personnel resources to the fight. It was estimated that the first year (1986-87) of the new counter-terrorist programme

would cost $48.8 million, excluding about $7 million spent on the CSIS counter-terrorism programme,[510] and the RCMP budget has been increased in 1987-88 to allow it to hire 500 new people to replace personnel diverted to the fight against terrorism. The administrative initiatives of the past four years, the diplomatic break with Syria, the extradition treaty with India, and other measures are further signals of both concern and intent. In March 1986, Mr. Beatty, then Solicitor General, announced the formation of SERT. In doing so he argued that its creation would underscore Canada's hard-line policy on terrorism: "We won't make deals, pay ransoms, release prisoners or make other concessions that will encourage terrorists."[511]

PART V - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1.   The 1980s have been studded with numerous terrorist events, and government counter-attacks, of a dramatic and newsworthy nature. Among the more notable incidents have been the Tehran rescue attempt (April 1980), the SAS operation at the Iranian embassy (May 1980), the bomb attack on the South Korean president in Rangoon (October 1983), the car-bomb attack on the Marine barracks in Beirut (October 1983), the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi (October 1984), the hijacking of TWA flight 847 (June 1985), the Achille Lauro incident (October 1985), the bombing raid on Libya (April 1986), the kidnapping of Terry Waite (January 1987), and the Enniskillen bomb attack (November 1987). In the circumstances it is hardly surprising that there exists in Western societies a widespread public perception of terrorism as a serious and escalating problem.

2.   Terrorism has undoubtedly exerted a powerful influence on the foreign and domestic policies of many countries. Most recently the release of two French hostages held in Lebanon (December 1987), and a diplomatic démarche between Paris and Tehran, seem to have been closely linked, suggesting a high rate of return for two simple and relatively minor actions. Yet for all its impact on government policy and on regional developments (notably in the Middle East, where rejectionist terrorism has constantly subverted attempts at accommodation), terrorism has been successful in attaining the long-range goals of its practitioners only where it was used in concert with other strategies or where other factors intervened.

WORLD PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

3.   It is possible to detect a number of trends in the patterns of international terrorism over the past twenty years, but the central trend has essentially been: more of the same. Thus, given that the Palestinians played an important role in the escalation of international terrorism in the late-1960s, it is interesting to note that the Middle East was being described as "the crucible of terrorism" in the mid-1980s. Even an apparent decline in the incidence of international terrorism in 1986 does not necessarily signify a major departure from existing patterns since cyclical down-turns have occurred before (in 1973-75, 1977, 1979, 1981, and, making allowances for changed recording criteria, 1983). However, there does seem to have been some abatement in state sponsorship of terrorism during the past eighteen months. If, as Wilkinson suggests, state sponsorship is responsible for as much as a quarter of international terrorist incidents in the first half of the 1980s, then a continued diminution in such support might well result in a more lasting reduction in the incidence of terrorism.

4.   Although it is not entirely clear at this point whether the frequency of terrorist acts declined, remained relatively stable, or even (judging by casualty data) increased during the two-year period

1986-87, it is evident that the incidence of international terrorism is nonetheless substantially higher currently than it was in the late-1960s. According to State Department statistics, there were over five times as many incidents in 1986 as in 1968. This increase in the number of incidents over the whole period differentiates the modern wave of terrorism from earlier ones by its persistence. Where the terrorism of the late-1960s and the early-1970s tended to be ideological and symbolical (and casualties were correspondingly low*), generational evolution in many groups has to some extent diminished the role played by the early ideologues, conducing both to greater violence and to the unusual persistence of contemporary terrorism. The possibility of renewed issue-oriented (or "piggyback") terrorism suggests that symbolical attacks (usually bombings) will continue to constitute a significant proportion of all incidents of international terrorism. Nonetheless, a parallel trend – towards greater indiscrimination and higher casualty tolls – has disturbing implications regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction.

5.   While much of the terrorism of the early-twentieth century was inspired by nationalist motives, the groups which have come to the fore during the past twenty years have as often as not been actuated by broader political philosophies (mostly left-wing, but with a strong right-wing surge in the early-1980s). The Vietnam War was an important catalyst in this transformation, and although left-wing terrorism continued after the war's termination (probably reaching its peak in 1977-78), American withdrawal from South Vietnam deprived revolutionary terrorism of perhaps its strongest raison d'être. Left-wing terrorism began to decline at the end of the 1970s, but was showing signs of a revival in the mid-1980s, capitalizing on populist issues (by contrast, in the early-1970s groups like the JRA had been more millenarian and absolutist, and less pragmatic). However, given the reduced numbers of hard-core terrorists and of supporters, the loss of key members can critically affect operations, as recent European experience has demonstrated.

6.   Although left-wing terrorists appear to have a greater predilection for operating underground than do terrorists of other stripes, and are better able to cultivate inter-group cooperation and state sponsorship, they have shown more interest in symbolical attacks or low-casualty incidents than have right-wing or nationalist groups. Groups whose aims are more nationalist than revolutionary tend to stage more violent attacks, although their targeting is, on the whole, less varied. Two types of nationalist group have had a particularly forceful impact in North America: separatist and emigré organizations. Both types have

---

* The average annual casualty rate between 1972 and 1985 was 4.4 times that of the average annual rate between 1968 and 1971, whereas the average annual incident rate between 1972 and 1985 (after deducting threats, hoaxes, and conspiracies) was only 2.2 times that between 1968 and 1971.

been fairly quiescent in North America (as elsewhere) in recent years. With the exception of the Middle Eastern variant, there has been something of a lull - by comparison with earlier levels of violence - in the terrorist activities of many of the longer-lived nationalist groups (such as the PIRA, the FALN, and some of the European separatist groups). On the other hand, communal terrorism is clearly on the rise in Asia (notably in India and Sri Lanka), and it occasionally implicates foreigners or reaches out to foreign countries, Canada among them.

7.   The attacks of the past twenty years have shown considerable tactical stability, with terrorists tending to adhere to tried and trusted methods, and largely failing to use the available technology. Bombing is the terrorists' favoured tactic, representing about half of all attacks, and being popular with left-wing and emigré groups (among others). Compared with other tactics, bombing tends to be more symbolical than coercive, and this is particularly the case with left-wing groups. The use of assassination has followed traditional lines, and it has remained an essentially deliberate and discriminating tactic, used against specific groups, such as diplomats. Hostage-taking, particularly hijacking and barricade-hostage events, can be highly coercive, and on the whole has shown signs of being on the increase in the 1980s, especially in the Middle East.

8.   Despite fears to the contrary, there has been little resort to newer technology tactics (the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical agents, PGMs, and so forth), and in fact the frequency of low-level NBC attack has declined in the mid-1980s. While it is clear that most groups are currently unwilling to inflict mass casualties, and are equally averse to attacking "hard targets", other groups have shown less restraint or possess a greater ability to attack protected targets. The existence of such groups, the use of surface-to-air missiles, and a trend towards greater indiscrimination are, however, causes for concern.

9.   The terrorist preference for "soft" targets has resulted in some changes in victimization patterns as favoured targets - notably diplomats or embassies - are given increased protection. On the whole, left-wing groups have aimed their attacks at specific individuals or institutions, usually in conformity with their ideological principles. In contrast, right-wing operations often demonstrate a high degree of indiscrimination.

10.   During the past two decades the target group which has been the one most frequently attacked has been the diplomatic community, but proportionally the frequency of attack upon it has declined, and it is no longer at the top of the terrorist hit-list. That unenviable distinction has devolved upon business and upon random targets in roughly equal measure. While military targets were increasingly popular in the early-1980s, the relative frequency of attacks against them has declined since the beginning of 1985.

11.   Until recently indiscriminate attacks (such as the 1980 Bologna incident) tended to be characteristic of right-wing groups. However,

since the mid-1980s random attacks have been on the increase, a trend which probably reflects a growing indiscrimination among nationalist groups, communally-oriented ones (such as Tamil and Sikh organizations), and Middle Eastern groups. Random attacks are particularly devastating when directed against transportation systems, and their vulnerability has been most strikingly demonstrated in situations of communal violence.

12. While terrorists have attacked high technology targets (notably computers), they have yet to exploit technological vulnerabilities with any consistency.

13. The extent of cooperation between terrorist groups has probably been exaggerated, and may in fact be on the decline as individual groups react to their own domestic situations. Inter-group ties are facilitated by ideology, and therefore are more characteristic of left-wing (and occasionally right-wing) groups than they are of nationalist and emigré groups. It has been calculated that about a quarter of the international terrorist incidents occurring in the first half of the 1980s were state-sponsored or directed. Recently there has been a reduction in this form of attack, but surrogate or government-directed terrorism has yielded substantial returns - particularly in the Middle East - and therefore seems unlikely to be entirely discarded.

14. The American experience of international terrorism provides a number of insights into the Canadian experience. While Canada's variant has been internally-focussed, and that of the United States externally-focussed, both have been characterized by a low incidence, limited ideological terrorism, and high emigré/separatist violence. In both countries bombing is the favoured tactic. The American experience does suggest that geography has been a fairly important factor in the low level of international terrorism experienced by Canada. It also indicates that Canada's foreign policy and pattern of external investment have also played a role in the country's relative freedom from terrorist attack.

CANADA AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

15. The nature of international terrorism in the Canadian context (most internal incidents are aimed at non-Canadian targets), the decline of domestic terrorism in Canada, and the "peaceable kingdom" myth, have all tended to lull Canadians into a sense of relative security. While it would be wrong to be complacent about the level of international terrorism affecting Canada - the Kelly Committee warned against such an attitude,[512] and even a single event can have a serious impact on policy - it is clear that Canada has as yet experienced very low levels of the phenomenon. In fact, Canada's relative good fortune is evident when comparison is made with other "summit seven" countries.

16. There has been a steady decline in domestic terrorism in Canada from its peak in 1968-71. Evidence of this downward trend is provided

by the fall in the average annual number of domestic terrorist incidents from 49 between 1968 and 1971 to 5 between 1982 and 1985.[513] Doukhobor terrorism largely ended in the early-1960s, the FLQ virtually ceased operations after the October Crisis, left-wing violence has been rare (although occurring in waves, of which the most recent was in the early-1980s), and right-wing groups have never constituted a particularly serious threat.

17.   The decline in domestic terrorism has placed international terrorism affecting Canada into higher focus, particularly since the incidence of the international type, both internally and externally, has increased considerably during the 1980s (by reference to the annual averages for the 1960s and 1970s). Inside Canada most international terrorist attacks have been staged by emigrés. "First generation" emigré attacks largely involved anti-Castro Cubans whose tactics (bombing) and targets (principally the Cuban consulate in Montréal) were pretty unvarying. In the 1980s they gave way to deadlier, and tactically more eclectic, groups, with Armenians and Sikhs in the forefront. The ethnic orientation of such groups tends to preclude alliance or state sponsorship, thus enjoining self-sufficiency on them (and probably restricting somewhat their tactical options). As elsewhere, the practitioners of emigré terrorism in Canada tend to be recent arrivals, often from areas, like Lebanon, with high political violence.

18.   Group-types which are active in other countries have played a lesser role in Canada. Nationalist-autonomist groups, such as the FLQ, have rarely resorted to international terrorism inside Canada, although Canadians abroad have occasionally been attacked by such groups. Similarly, there have been few incidents of international terrorism in Canada attributable to left-wing groups. Thus, with its high proportion of emigré incidents, and low ratio of left-wing and nationalist-autonomist attacks, Canada has been somewhat atypical of global patterns.

19.   While the pattern of group involvement has differed from global patterns, their tactics have conformed to world patterns to a greater degree. The frequency of bombings, of assassinations, and of hostage-taking incidents in Canada have been roughly proportional to the world-wide incidence of such tactics. However, differences in group patterns may be reflected in the ways in which specific tactics have been employed. Left-wing groups favour "propaganda of the deed", and hence a high proportion of their bomb attacks is symbolical and not intended to inflict injuries (they are, in fact, often preceded by warnings). While emigré groups - the Armenians in particular - often also view terrorism as a means of publicizing their causes, retribution, coercion, and terrorization are also factors behind their tactical choices. Most of the international terrorist attacks inside Canada which have inflicted casualties have been the handiwork of emigrés. Casualties or physical assault occurred in 11 out of the 32 internal incidents listed in the chronology, and in every single case except one, responsibility for the attack has been attributed to emigrés (no attribution was made in the single exception). Furthermore, the preponderance of emigré terrorism within Canada is reflected in the low incidence of kidnapping in this

country (by comparison with the global patterns indicated in State Department statistics). Kidnapping is a tactic which poses difficulties for emigré groups.

20.   Although bombing has established the same primacy in Canada as elsewhere, since 1982 there has been a trend away from bombing and towards assassination and assault in internal incidents, with the diplomatic community taking the brunt of this change. Following world patterns, international terrorism in Canada has not been especially innovative, although two instances of threatened product contamination in 1986 were a departure from traditional methods. The record of both domestic and international terrorism in Canada also shows some evidence of contagion, mostly in connection with airline incidents.

21.   In the light of the prevalence of emigré terrorism in Canada, it is hardly surprising that the diplomatic community (or visiting dignitaries representing regimes distasteful to particular exile groups) should have been the target of over three-quarters of all international terrorist incidents within the country. In this regard Canada has also been atypical of global patterns. By contrast, the Canadian Forces have virtually been spared attack, unlike the armed forces of other Western nations, although anti-NATO targeting suggests that this escape may to some extent have been fortuitous, and thus may not last. Equally, Canadian business personnel or facilities have been attacked fairly infrequently by comparison with global targeting patterns, a situation which doubtless reflects Canada's low economic profile in violence-prone countries.

22.   By comparison with the United States, Canada's involvement in international terrorism outside her own borders seems to have been as much accidental as deliberate, and this country ranks fairly low in tables of international victimization. Whether as a function of Canada's world power ranking, her foreign policy, her foreign investment situation, or of the strong counter-attraction of other (American) targets, Canadian nationality or the policies of the Canadian government have rarely been a magnet for terrorists, and nor, apparently, has Canada thus far been subject to state-sponsored attacks. The incidence of external attack has been fairly low, but relative to internal incidents it increased considerably between 1982 and 1987. During this period external incidents constituted 39% of all international terrorist incidents affecting Canada. Although bombing and kidnapping have represented 93% of the incidents of external international terrorism affecting Canada, there has been some variety in the groups and targets involved.

23.   One factor held in common by many of the external incidents has been a climate of significant political violence. Therefore it is hardly surprising that Canadians working or travelling in areas of endemic turmoil should occasionally become embroiled themselves. The risk (however small) faced by Canadians in other countries is increased (albeit marginally) by the tendency of a significant proportion of terrorist incidents to be prompted by the capture and imprisonment of

terrorists. Thus, the conviction in Canada of members of groups with branches in other countries does pose the risk of retaliatory attacks (such as the 1982 Los Angeles bomb attempt) against Canadians and Canadian interests abroad. The threat to kidnap Canadians living in Lebanon, made in early-1988 to avert the possible deportation of a Palestinan terrorist living in Canada, demonstrated the risks faced by Canadians living or travelling in countries prone to terrorist violence.

24.   The terrorist threat to Canada, both domestic and international, has been relatively muted during the past 17 years. Consequently there has been little public pressure - by comparison with other countries - on the government to take concerted action against terrorism, as the delay in replacing the emergency powers act indicates. Specific events (such as the 1985 attack on the Turkish embassy and the possibility of sabotage in the Air India disaster) have provoked furores, and stimulated some counter-measures, although the effectiveness of such measures often erodes with time and non-use.

25.   The responses of many Western governments to terrorism have often been as much rhetorical as practical, as some of the pronouncements of the annual economic summits would seem to indicate. However, it may be that palliative denunciations of terrorist violence reflect the nature and the scale of the threat it actually poses with reasonable accuracy. As far as Canada is concerned, the emphasis on security and prevention, epitomized by the measures taken to protect diplomatic premises, does reflect the principal terrorist threat to this country: emigré attacks on diplomatic targets.

26.   In sum, during the past two decades emigré attackers, using bombs, physical assault, or assassination against diplomatic targets, have consistently been the hallmark of Canada's international terrorist experience. Of the 26 internal incidents in the chronology for which group responsibility has been assigned, 15 (or 58%) comprised attacks by emigrés against diplomatic targets, employing these three tactics. Although both globally and internally there has been something of a hiatus recently in emigré attacks, the limited links between Canadian terrorist groups and groups elsewhere, the relative non-obtrusion in Canadian affairs of Middle Eastern terrorism, and the low terrorist profile of left-wing groups, all suggest that the terrorism patterns of the past twenty years will probably persist. While there may be a slightly increased tendency to issue-oriented and external attacks, there are some indications that the over-all incidence of international terrorism affecting Canada may decline from the historically high levels of the early-1980s.

REFERENCES

1. For example, Bell, J. Bowyer, <u>A Time of Terror</u>, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1978; Gutteridge, William, ed., <u>Contemporary Terrorism</u>, New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986; and Alexander, Yonah, ed., <u>International Terrorism: National, Regional, and Global Perspectives</u>, New York: Praeger Publications, Inc.,1976.

2. For example, Horchem, Hans Josef, <u>Terrorism in West Germany</u>, Conflict Study No. 186, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, April 1986; Langford, K.R., <u>An Analysis of Left and Right Wing Terrorism in Italy</u>, Washington, D.C.: Defense Intelligence College, July 1985; and Herman, Valentine, and Rob van der Laan Bouma, "Nationalists without a Nation: South Moluccan Terrorism in the Netherlands," in Lodge, Juliet, ed., <u>Terrorism: A Challenge to the State</u>, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981.

3. For example, Dobson, Christopher, and Ronald Payne, <u>The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics</u>, New York: Facts on File, 1979; Rapoport, David C., <u>Assassination and Terrorism</u>, Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1971; Aston, Clive C., <u>Political Hostage-Taking in Western Europe</u>, Conflict Study No. 157, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1984; and Jenkins, Brian Michael, et al, <u>A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets</u>, Paper P-6906, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, September 1983.

4. For example, Truby, J. David, <u>How Terrorists Kill. The Complete Terrorist Arsenal</u>, Boulder: Paladin Press, 1978; and Dobson and Payne.

5. For example, Kellen, Konrad, <u>Terrorists - What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions</u>, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, November 1979; and McKnight, Gerald, <u>The Terrorist Mind</u>, London: Michael Joseph, 1975.

6. For example, Sterling, Claire, <u>The Terror Network. The Secret War of International Terrorism</u>, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, and Reader's Digest Press, 1981.

7. For example, Siljander, Raymond, P., <u>Terrorist Attacks. A Protective Service Guide for Executives, Bodyguards and Policemen</u>, Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1980; and Lightbody, Andy, <u>The Terrorism Survival Guide: 101 Travel Tips on How Not to Become a Victim</u>, New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1987.

8. For example, Janke, Peter, <u>Guerrilla and Terrorist Organisations: A World Directory and Bibliography</u>, Brighton: Harvester, 1983.

9. Cited in Laqueur, Walter, "Reflections on Terrorism", in <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, vol. 65, no.1, Fall 1986, p. 88.

10. See Goldie, L.F.E., "Combatting International Terrorism: The United Nations Developments," in <u>Naval War College Review</u>, vol. xxxi, no. 3, Winter 1979; and Thackrah, Richard, <u>Terrorism: A Definitional Problem</u>, paper presented at Research on Terrorism: An International Academic Conference, Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, April 1986, p. 11.

11. National Foreign Assessment Center (CIA), <u>International Terrorism in 1979</u>, April 1980, p. 12.

12. Ibid, p.15; and National Foreign Assessment Center (CIA), <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980</u>, June 1981, p.8. This table of statistical inflation excludes several categories. The total number of incidents reported for the period 1968-79 was 3336 in the 1979 report and 6714 in the 1980 report.

13. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980</u>, p.iii, fn.1.

14. <u>Washington Post</u>, 16 June 1981.

15. <u>The Gazette</u>, 29 January 1981; the <u>Sunday Star</u>, 1 February 1981.

16. United States Department of State, <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983</u>, September 1984, p. 2.

17. United States Department of State, <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984</u>, November 1985, p.2, fn.2.

18. United States Department of State, <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1982</u>, September 1983.

19. Thackrah, p.8.

20. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1982.</u>

21. <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983</u>, p.2.

22. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980</u>, p.8.

23. <u>The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary</u>, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971, vol. II, p.3268.

24. Mickolus, Edward, "Trends in Transnational Terrorism", in Livingston, Marius H., ed., <u>International Terrorism in the Contemporary World</u>, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1978, p.44.

25. Cited in Hamilton, Lawrence Campbell, <u>Ecology of Terrorism: A Historical and Statistical Study</u>, unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Colorado, 1978, p.12.

26. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980</u>. Subsequent to the 1980 edition the State Department published the annual reports,but it continued to use the CIA definition for the 1981 and 1982 reports. In 1984 the report defined international terrorism as "terrorism involving citizens or territory of more than one country".

27. 1980-81 data from (J.L. Scherer) <u>Terrorism. An Annual Survey</u>, Minneapolis: J.L. Scherer, vol. 1 (1982), p. 177; contemporary information from Amnesty International (Ottawa), 1 June 1987.

28. For example, Mickolus, "Trends in Transnational Terrorism", p. 67; Wilkinson, Paul, <u>Terrorism and the Liberal State</u>, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977, pp.55-57, and St. John, Peter, "Analysis and response of a decade of terrorism", in <u>International Perspectives</u>, September/ October 1981, p.2.

29. Wilkinson, <u>Terrorism and the Liberal State</u>, pp. 56-57; and Wilkinson, Paul, "Terrorist Movements", in Yonah Alexander, David Carlton, and Paul Wilkinson, eds, <u>Terrorism: Theory and Practice</u>, Boulder: Westview Press Inc., 1979, p.104.

30. Cordes, Bonnie, et al, <u>A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups</u>, Report R-3151, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, June 1985, pp.23-24.

31. Ibid, p.21.

32. Mickolus, Edward F., <u>Transnational Terrorism. A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979</u>, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980.

33. Jenkins, Brian Michael, <u>Future Trends in International Terrorism</u>, Paper P-7176, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1985, pp.14-15.

34. <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983</u>, p.5.

35. Léauté, Prof. Jacques, <u>The Role of Academic Research on Policy-Making and Decision-Taking in Terrorism</u>, paper presented at Research on Terrorism: An International Academic Conference, Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, April 1986.

36. United States Department of State, <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981</u>, July 1982, p.12; and <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983</u>, p.5.

37. Jenkins, <u>Future Trends in International Terrorism</u>, p.12.

38. CIA/State Department annual reports, 1983-85; provisional State Department statistics for 1986 provided by the Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, 1987; 1987 State Department casualty data cited in <u>The Ottawa Citizen</u>, 22 January 1988, p.A18.

39. _Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981_, p. 3.

40. Jenkins, _Future Trends in International Terrorism_, p. 9.

41. _Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980_, p. vi.

42. _Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984_, p.1, p.5.

43. Wilkinson, Paul, "After Tehran", in _Conflict Quarterly_, vol. I, no.4, Spring 1981, p.7.

44. George, Bruce, _Working Group on Terrorism. Final Report_, Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, February 1987, p.33.

45. Jenkins, Brian M., _International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare_, Paper P-5261, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, June 1974, p.10.

46. Jenkins, Brian M., _International Terrorism: Trends and Potentialities_, Paper P-6117, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, May 1978, p.2.

47. Schmetzer, Uli, "Airport slaughter killed Italy's Mideast policy," in _The Citizen_, 4 January 1986, p. B5; and _Maclean's_, vol. 99, no. 45, 10 November 1986, pp.28-29.

48. Jenkins, _International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare_, p.10.

49. Jenkins, Brian M., _Looking into the Future_, paper presented at Research on Terrorism: An International Academic Conference, Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, April 1986.

50. _Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984_, p.1.

51. United States Department of State, _Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985_, October 1986, p.1; and provisional State Department data for 1986.

52. Pluchinsky, Dennis, "Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe: A Diagnosis and Prognosis, in _Conflict Quarterly_, vol. VI, no.3, Summer 1986, p.6.

53. Casey, William J., "The International Linkages - What Do We Know?", in Ra'anan, Uri, et al, eds, _Hydra of Carnage. The International Linkages of Terrorism and Other Low-Intensity Operations_, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986, p.6.

54. Jenkins, _Future Trends in International Terrorism_, pp.6-7.

55. Zimmermann, Ekkart, "Terrorist Violence in Western Germany: Some Reflections on Recent Literature", in _Journal of Political and Military Sociology_, vol.14, no.2, Fall 1986, p.325.

56. Ibid.

57. Bass, Gail, et al, <u>Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs</u>, Report R-2554-SL, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, February 1980.

58. Day, Samuel H., Jr. "We Re-Set the Clock," in <u>The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</u>, September 1974, p.5.

59. Mengel, R.W. "Terrorism and New Technologies of Destruction: An Overview of the Potential Risk", in Norton, Augustus R., and Martin H. Greenberg, eds, <u>Studies in Nuclear Terrorism</u>, Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1979, p. 191.

60. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1982</u>, p.4.

61. Zawodny, J.K., "Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations", in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol.1, no. 4, Spring 1981.

62. Horchem, pp.2-7.

63. Moxon-Browne, Edward, <u>Terrorism in France</u>, Conflict Study No. 144, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983, p.24.

64. <u>Christian Science Monitor</u>, 1 April 1982, p.23.

65. Pisano, Vittorfranco S., <u>The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy</u>, Conflict Study No. 120, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, July 1980, p.3.

66. Ibid, p. 10.

67. Buckingham, Capt. Larry Allen, <u>The Red Brigades: A Description of a Terrorist Organization</u>, unpublished MA thesis, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base (Ohio), August 1982, pp.33-34.

68. (Scherer, J.L.) <u>Terrorism</u>, vol. I, no. 4, October 1986, p.16.

69. Kelly, Ross, "Not Quite War, Not Quite Peace", in <u>Defense & Foreign Affairs</u>, vol. XIII, no. 5, May 1985, p.39. In addition, the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) was thought to number under one hundred activists in the mid-1980s.

70. Quoted in Hewitt, Christopher, <u>The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies</u>, Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1984, p.12, fn.2.

71. Zawodny, p.25.

72. Langford, p. v-6.

73. Sayari, Sabri, <u>Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case</u>, Paper P-7124, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, July 1985.

74. Zimmermann.

75. Pluchinsky, p.5.

76. Hoffman, Bruce, "Left-Wing Terrorism in the United States", in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. VI, no. 4, Fall 1986, p.13.

77. Quoted in Kellen, <u>Terrorists - What Are They Like?</u>, p.iv.

78. Hacker, Frederick J., <u>Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies. Terror and Terrorism in Our Time</u>, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1976, p. 10.

79. Morf, Gustave, <u>Terror in Quebec. Case Studies of the FLQ</u>, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, 1970, p.37.

80. Ibid, p.15.

81. Kaplan, Abraham, "The Psychodynamics of Terrorism", in Alexander, Yonah, and John M. Gleason, eds, <u>Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism</u>, New York: Pergamon Press Inc., 1981, p. 43.

82. Quoted in "Study of Terrorism Emerging as an International Endeavour", in <u>Science</u>, vol. 203, no. 5, January 1979, p. 33.

83. May, William F., "Terrorism as Strategy and Ecstasy," in <u>Social Research</u>, vol. 41, no. 2, 1974.

84. Quoted in Wilkinson, "Terrorist Movements", p. 103.

85. Kellen, <u>Terrorists - What Are They Like</u>?, p.37.

86. Dobson and Payne, p. 48.

87. Quoted in Morf, p. 81.

88. Russell, Charles A., and Miller, Capt. Bowman H., "Profile of a Terrorist," in <u>Military Review</u>, vol. LVII, no.8, August 1977.

89. Cited in Kalinowski, Sharon Ann, <u>Leftist Terrorist Motivation</u>, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Institute of Technology, August 1979, p.51.

90. Ibid, p.49.

91. Ibid, p.47; and Hewitt, p.26.

92. Morf, p.38 and p.58.

93. Hewitt, p.26.

94. Gill, Liz, "Deadlier than the male?", in The Times, 26 January 1987, p.11.

95. Post, Jerrold M., "Hostilité, Conformité, Fraternité: The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior", in (Defense Nuclear Agency) Outthinking the Terrorist: An International Challenge, proceedings of the 10th annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security, Springfield, 23-24 April 1985, Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1985, p. 28.

96. Hoffman, Bruce, The Prevention of Terrorism and Rehabilitation of Terrorists: Some Preliminary Thoughts, Paper P-7059, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, February 1985.

97. Zawodny, p.30.

98. Post, p.26.

99. Ibid, p.25.

100. Goleman, Daniel, "The Making of a Terrorist", in The Gazette, 6 September 1986, p. B-5.

101. Post, p.27.

102. Zawodny, pp.30-31.

103. Post, p.29.

104. Ibid, p.25.

105. Kellen, Terrorists - What Are They Like?, p.11.

106. Morf, p. 157.

107. Cited in Zimmermann, p. 328.

108. Post, p. 27.

109. Ibid, p. 28.

110. Quoted in Kalinowski, pp.32-33.

111. Wilkinson, <u>Terrorism and the Liberal State</u>, p. 106; and Waugh, William L., Jr., "The Values in Violence: Organizational and Political Objectives of Terrorist Groups," in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. III, no. 4, Summer 1983, p.6.

112. Rapoport, p. 21.

113. Cited in Waugh, p. 5.

114. Ibid, p. 8.

115. Ibid, p. 9.

116. Quoted in Mickolus, <u>Transnational Terrorism</u>, p. 812.

117. Quoted in Jenkins, Brian M., <u>International Terrorism: The Other World War</u>, Report R-3302-AF, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, November 1985, p. 10.

118. Waugh, p. 12.

119. Quoted in Kupperman, Robert H., and Trent, Darrel M., <u>Terrorism. Threat, Reality, Response</u>, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979, pp.24-25.

120. Waugh, p. 14.

121. Cordes, p. 46. Some of the groups listed in the Rand table have been excluded from this table.

122. Quoted in Langford, pp. v-5 and v-6.

123. Corrado, Raymond R., "Ethnic and Student Terrorism in Western Europe", in Stohl, Michael, ed., <u>The Politics of Terrorism</u>, New York: Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1979, p. 194. Post categorized terrorist groups as "anarchic-ideologues" and "nationalist-secessionists" - Post, p. 25.

124. Waugh, p. 8.

125. Hewitt, p. 26, pp.28-33.

126. Waugh, p. 8.

127. Jenkins, <u>Future Trends</u>, p.7.

128. Kellen, Konrad, "The RAF in West Germany: Stronger Than Ever?", in <u>TVI Report</u>, vol. 7, no. 2, p. 24.

129. See, for example, Miller, Bowman H., "Terrorism and Language: A Text-Based Analysis of the German Case", in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. VII, no. 1, Winter 1987, pp.46-52.

130. Zimmermann, p. 325.

131. <u>Manchester Guardian Weekly</u>, vol. 120, no. 1, week ending 1 January 1979, p. 11.

132. Hoffman, Bruce, <u>Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism: II</u>, Paper P-7076, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, March 1985, pp.10-14.

133. Quoted in Nelson, Barry, "Kidnapped!", in <u>Canadian Business</u>, vol. 56, no. 6, June 1983, p. 33.

134. Laqueur (p.90) distinguishes between guerrillas and terrorists.

135. McIlheney, Colin J., "Arbiters of Ulster's Destiny? The Military Role of the Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland," in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. 5, no. 2, Spring 1985.

136. Hoffman, <u>Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism</u>, p. 8, p. 11.

137. <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984</u>, p. 1.

138. (Scherer, J.L.) <u>Terrorism</u>, vol. I, no. 1, February 1986, pp.8-9.

139. Pluchinsky, p. 7, p. 15.

140. <u>The Times</u>, 23 April 1987, p. 7.

141. Clissold, Stephen, <u>Croat Separatism: Nationalism, Dissidence and Terrorism</u>, Conflict Study No. 103, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, January 1979, p. 17.

142. Quoted in Gunter, Michael, "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism", in <u>Terrorism: An International Journal</u>, vol. 8, no. 3, 1986, p.217.

143. Quoted in Kellen, <u>Terrorists - What Are They Like</u>?, p. 31.

144. Gunter, Michael M., "Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism," in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. V, no. 4, Fall 1985, p. 31.

145. Ibid, p. 38.

146. Herman and van der Laan Bouma, pp.134-35.

147. Cited in Gunter, "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism", p. 231.

148. Ibid, p. 236.

149. "A Troubled Community", in Maclean's, vol. 99, no. 25, 23 June 1986, p. 13.

150. Quoted in Gunter, "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism", p. 229.

151. Ibid, p. 213.

152. Perera, Judith, "An end to armed propaganda?," in The Middle East Journal, no. 107, September 1983, pp.18-19.

153. Hoffman, Bruce, Terrorism in the United States During 1985, paper presented at Research on Terrorism: An International Academic Conference, Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, April 1986, p.7.

154. Quoted in The Economist, vol. 278, no. 7171, February 1981, p. 62.

155. For example, Wilkinson, "Terrorist Movements," p. 104; Waugh, p. 8; and Laqueur, p. 92.

156. Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States During 1985, p. 4, p. 10.

157. (Scherer, J.L.) Terrorism, vol II, no. 1, February 1987, p. 23.

158. Hoffman, Bruce, Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany, Paper P-7270, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, October 1986, p. 24.

159. Hoffman, Bruce, Right-Wing Terrorism in the United States, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1986, p. 2.

160. Quoted in Hoffman, Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany, p. 9.

161. Hoffman, Bruce, Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe, Note N-1856-AF, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, March 1982, p. 13.

162. (Scherer, J.L.) Terrorism, vol. I, no. 1, February 1986, p. 23. The table reproduced here excludes some of the categories of terrorist activities included in the original, among them robberies and thefts, violations of public order and acts of resistance, dangerous attacks on transportation systems, and wilful destruction and rioting, for some of which categories data are not available for left-wing groups.

163. Hoffman, Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe, p. 24.

164. Horchem, p. 10.

165. (Scherer, J.L.) Terrorism, vol. I, no. 1, February 1986, p. 23.

166. Globe and Mail, 11 June 1987, p. A13.

167. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 28.

168. Ibid; also Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, p. 8; and Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984, p. 18.

169. Cordes, p. 21.

170. Cited in The Economist, vol. 303, no. 7504, 27 June - 3 July 1987, p. 92.

171. George, pp. 32-33. The damage estimates are probably expressed in United States currency.

172. Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, The Provisional Republican Movement: Sinn Fein, briefing paper, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, February 1984, p. 3.

173. George, p. 33.

174. Cited in (Scherer, J.L.) Terrorism, vol. I, no. 3, July 1986, pp.22-23.

175. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, p. 8.

176. Cordes, p. 21.

177. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, 1981, and 1982; Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983, 1984, and 1985.

178. Ibid.

179. Cordes, p. 21.

180. Quoted in Wohlstetter, Roberta, "Kidnapping to Win Friends and Influence People", in Survey, Autumn 1974, p. 16.

181. Quoted in Nelson, p. 33.

182. Jenkins, Brian, Janera Johnson, and David Ronfeldt, Numbered Lives: Some Statistical Observations from 77 International Hostage Episodes, Paper P-5905, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, July 1977, p. 21.

183. Jenkins, Brian M., Embassies Under Siege. A Review of 48 Embassy Takeovers, 1971-1980, Report R-2651-RC, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1981.

184. Ibid.

185. United States Department of State, <u>Department of State Bulletin</u>, vol. 82, no. 2065, August 1982, p. 18.

186. Cited in <u>The Sunday Star</u>, 1 February 1987.

187. Quoted in Jenkins, Brian M., "Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?", in Leventhal, Paul, and Yonah Alexander, eds, <u>Nuclear Terrorism. Defining The Threat</u>, Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers Inc., 1986, p. 26.

188. Norton and Greenberg, pp.429-41.

189. Jenkins, "Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?", p. 26.

190. Davies, Thomas D., "What Nuclear Means and Targets Might Terrorists Find Attractive?", in Leventhal and Alexander, p. 63.

191. Jenkins, "Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?", p. 28.

192. <u>The Ottawa Citizen</u>, 10 April 1987, p. A7.

193. Davies, p. 57.

194. Demaris, Ovid, <u>Brothers in Blood. The International Terrorist Network</u>, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977, pp.407-8.

195. Rosenbaum, David M., "Nuclear Terror", in <u>International Security</u>, vol. 1, no. 3, Winter 1977, p. 142.

196. Davies, p. 55.

197. Jenkins, <u>Future Trends</u>, p. 17.

198. Hildenbrand, Guenter, response to Davies, in Leventhal and Alexander, p. 71.

199. Mengel, p. 221.

200. Quoted in Clark, Richard Charles, <u>Technological Terrorism</u>, Old Greenwich: The Devin-Adair Company, 1980, p. 106.

201. International Security Studies Program, <u>Security Digest</u>, no. 18, May 1987, p. 3.

202. Alexander, Yonah, "Super-Terrorism", in Alexander and Gleason, p. 346.

203. Livingstone,Neil C., and Terrell E. Arnold, "Democracy Under Attack", in Livingstone, Neil C., and Terrell E. Arnold, eds, <u>Fighting Back. Winning the War against Terrorism</u>, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986, p. 4.

204. Quoted in Alexander, "Super-Terrorism", p. 346.

205. Mullen, Robert K., "Mass Destruction and Terrorism", in Norton and Greenberg, p. 261.

206. Ibid.

207. Mengel, p. 213.

208. Ibid, p. 211.

209. Mullen, p. 262.

210. Ehrenfeld, Rachel, and Michael Kahan, <u>The 'Doping' of America: The Ambivalence of the Narco-Terrorist Connection and a Search for Solutions</u>, paper presented at Research on Terrorism: An International Academic Conference, Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, April 1986, p. 2.

211. Ibid, p. 18.

212. Ibid, p. 2.

213. Strategic Planning Associates, <u>Strategic Planning Associates Assessment Newsletter</u>, vol. 1, no. 3, September-December 1986, p. 4.

214. Jenkins, <u>Future Trends</u>, pp.18-19.

215. Mengel, p. 191.

216. Ibid.

217. Mullen, p. 271.

218. Strategic Planning Associates, <u>Strategic Planning Associates Assessment Newsletter</u>, vol. 1, no. 2, May-August 1986, p. 8, p. 10.

219. Ibid, vol. 1, no. 3, September-December 1986, p. 5.

220. Jenkins, <u>Future Trends</u>, p. 23.

221. Ibid.

222. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981</u>, p. 4.

223. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 4.

224. Ibid, p. 1.

225. CIA/State Department annual reports, 1980-85; State Department statistics for 1986 cited in The Ottawa Citizen, 22 January 1988, P.A18. The 1984 report was unique in providing only an approximate number ("some 1,000") of wounded (p. 12).

226. Jenkins, Future Trends, p. 13.

227. Jenkins, "Is Nuclear Terrorism Plausible?", p. 29.

228. Jenkins, International Terrorism: The Other World War, p. 17.

229. Mengel, p. 221.

230. Cited in Fattah, Ezzat A., "Terrorist Activities and Terrorist Targets: a Tentative Typology", in Alexander and Gleason, p. 27.

231. Jenkins, International Terrorism: The Other World War, p. 17.

232. Cordes, p. 22.

233. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p. 12; and Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984, p. 3.

234. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 3.

235. Business, vol. 30, no. 2, March-April 1980.

236. Provisional State Department statistics for 1986, provided by the Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, 1987.

237. In (Scherer, J.L.) Terrorism: An Annual Survey, vol. 2 (1983), pp. 125-38.

238. Pluchinsky, p. 7, p. 10.

239. Ibid, pp.14-15.

240. Cited in (Scherer, J.L.) Terrorism. An Annual Survey, vol. 2, p. 144.

241. Ibid, p.146.

242. State Department statistics, cited in (Scherer, J.L.) Terrorism: An Annual Survey, vol. 2, p. 144.

243. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p. 12.

244. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 1.

245. Rupprecht, Reinhard, "Terrorism and Counter-terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany," in (Defense Nuclear Agency) Outthinking the Terrorist, p. 74.

246. Cited in the Citizen, 15 November 1979.

247. Mitchell, Thomas H., "Corporate Security in an Age of Terrorism", in The Canadian Business Review, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring 1984, p. 35.

248. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p. 4.

249. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983, p. 5.

250. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 3.

251. Ibid, pp.41-42.

252. Hoffman, Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany, pp.14-17, p. 23.

253. Cited in Zimmermann, p. 325.

254. TVI Journal, Spring 1985, pp.18-22.

255. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p. 12; Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984, p. 3; and Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 3.

256. The Toronto Star, 12 October 1986, p. A2.

257. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p. 12; Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984, p. 3; and Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 3.

258. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 1.

259. Jenkins, A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks...Against Maritime Targets, p. 3.

260. World Opinion Update, vol. X, issue 1, January 1986, p. 7.

261. The Ottawa Citizen, 25 July 1987, p. A22.

262. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, p. 1.

263. Rupprecht, p. 74.

264. Quoted in Moxon-Browne, p. 23.

265. Communication from Dr. D. Charters, Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick, 21 July 1987. See also Heather, Randall, Terrorism, "Active Measures", and SDI, Toronto: The Mackenzie Institute, 1987, pp. 8-10, 25-30.

266. Conzelmann, Claus, and Misha Glenny, "Scientists on terror hit-lists", in New Scientist, vol. III, no. 1517, 17 July 1986, p. 15.

267. Jenkins, Future Trends, p. 22.

268. Sterling, Claire, "Terrorism. Tracing the International Network", in The New York Times Magazine, 1 March 1981, p. 19.

269. Herman, Edward S., The REAL Terror Network. Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda, Boston: South End press, 1982.

270. Jenkins, Brian Michael, Fighting Terrorism: An Enduring Task, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, February 1981, p. 1.

271. Sterling, The Terror Network, pp.291-92.

272. Wilkinson, Paul, "State-sponsored international terrorism: the problems of response", in World Today, July 1984, p. 292.

273. CBC Sunday Morning, 12 February 1978.

274. Quoted in Livingstone, Neil C., "Terrorism: The International Connection", in Army, vol. 30, no. 12, December 1980, p. 15.

275. Cited in Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 10.

276. Frenzel, Dr. Jürgen, "Terrorism and Its International Aspects", in Wilton Park Journal, no. 59, Winter 1979, p. 10.

277. Horchem, p. 20; Langguth, Gerd, "Euroterrorism: Fact or Fiction?", in TVI Report, vol. 7, no. 3, 1987, pp.8-12.

278. Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Irish Terrorist Contacts in Europe and the Third World, briefing paper, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, May 1982, p. 1.

279. Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 1.

280. Hoffman, Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany, p. 23.

281. Cited in Hoffman, Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism, p. 12.

282. Quoted in Sterling, Claire, "The State of the Art", in Ra'anan et al, p. 53.

283. Quoted in Hoffman, Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany, p. 18.

284. Ibid, p. 9.

285. Ibid.

286. Burton, Anthony, <u>The Terrorist Assault on Italian Democracy</u>, London: Foreign Affairs Research Institute, 1980, p. 6.

287. Hoffman, <u>Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism</u>, p. 12.

288. Ibid, pp.10-14.

289. Ibid, p. 14.

290. Quoted in Kupperman and Trent, p. 32.

291. Sterling, <u>The Terror Network</u>, p. 111.

292. Ra'anan et al.

293. <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984</u>, p. 4.

294. <u>The Citizen</u>, 14 May 1986, p. A16.

295. <u>Jane's Defence Weekly</u>, vol. 6, no. 19, 15 November 1986, p. 1163.

296. Livingstone, Neil C., and Terrell E. Arnold, "The Rise of State-Sponsored Terrorism", in Livingstone and Arnold, p. 17.

297. Great Britain, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, <u>Libya and Irish Terrorism</u>, briefing paper, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, June 1984, p. 6.

298. Zimmermann, Tim, "The American bombing of Libya. A success for coercive diplomacy?", in <u>Survival</u>, vol. XXIX, no. 3, May/June 1987, p. 212.

299. Casey, p. 6.

300. Ibid.

301. <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985</u>, p. 6.

302. Casey, p. 6.

303. <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984</u>, p. 4.

304. See, for example, the State Department annual reports for 1984 and 1985; "The Syrian Connection, 1986," in (Scherer, J.L.) <u>Terrorism</u>, vol. II, no. 1, February 1987, pp.17-22; <u>Newsweek</u>, 3 November 1986, pp.40-42; and <u>The Sunday Star</u>, 18 May 1986.

305. Perera, Judith, "Terror and counter-terror", in The Middle East, November 1986, p. 13.

306. Ibid.

307. The Ottawa Citizen, 30 June 1987, p. A17.

308. Sterling, "Terrorism. Tracing the International Network", p. 19.

309. Globe and Mail, 17 April 1986, p. A1.

310. Sterling, The Terror Network, pp.286-97.

311. Livingstone, N.C., People and Property: The Impact of Terrorism on U.S. Global Interests, paper presented to the National Issues Seminar, Advanced Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, 5 April 1982, p. 5.

312. International Herald Tribune, 30 March 1981.

313. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984, p. 4.

314. Quoted in Elad, Shlomi, and Ariel Merari, The Soviet Bloc and World Terrorism, Paper No. 26, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, August 1984, p. 48.

315. Ibid, p. 69.

316. The Sunday Star, 27 March 1983, p. H4.

317. Elad and Merari, pp. 12-20.

318. Ibid, pp.19-20.

319. Sterling, The Terror Network, p. 247.

320. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 7.

321. Ibid, p. 8.

322. The Daily Telegraph, 15 December 1980.

323. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, p. iii.

324. Wright, Peter, Spy Catcher. The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence Officer, Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Limited, 1987, pp.160-61.

325. Jenkins, Brian Michael, International Terrorism: Choosing the Right Target, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, March 1981, p. 7.

326. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980</u>, p. 9.

327. "Chronology of Libyan Support for Terrorism, 1980-85", in (Scherer, J.L.) <u>Terrorism</u>, vol. 1, no. 1, February 1986, pp.12-14.

328. Livingstone and Arnold, "The Rise of State-Sponsored Terrorism", p. 18.

329. Ollivant, Simon, <u>Canada: How Powerful An Ally?</u>, Conflict Study No. 159, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1984, p. 9.

330. CIA/State Department annual reports, 1980-85; provisional State Department statistics for 1986, provided by the Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism, 1987.

331. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981</u>, p. 10.

332. <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985</u>, p. 15; provisional State Department statistics for 1986.

333. <u>Jane's Defence Weekly</u>, vol. 6, no. 19, 15 November 1986, p. 1163.

334. CIA/State Department annual reports, 1980-85; provisional State Department statistics for 1986.

335. Cited in Hoffman, <u>Terrorism in the United States During 1985</u>, p. 2.

336. CIA/State Department annual reports, 1980-85.

337. Hoffman, <u>Terrorism in the United States During 1985</u>, p. 4.

338. Ibid, p. 7.

339. Ibid, p. 8.

340. Cited in Mitchell, Thomas H., <u>Politically-Motivated Terrorism in North America: The Threat and the Response</u>, paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, 9 June 1982, p. 18.

341. Hoffman, "Left-Wing Terrorism in the United States", p. 12.

342. Hoffman, <u>Terrorism in the United States During 1985</u>, p. 6.

343. Kelly, The Hon. William M., <u>Terrorism</u>, the Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, June 1987, p. 10.

344. Hoffman, <u>Right-Wing Terrorism in the United States</u>, p. 18.

345. Hoffman, <u>Terrorism in the United States During 1985</u>, p. 10.

346. Ibid, p. 4, p. 6. p. 12.

347. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981</u>, p. 5.

348. United States Department of State, <u>Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans 1973-1986</u>, Washington, D.C.: Threat Analysis Division, Diplomatic Security Service, United States Department of State, 1987, p. 3.

349. Kelly, <u>Terrorism</u>, p. 12.

350. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980</u>, p. 3.

351. Ibid, p. 4.

352. <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985</u>, p. 15.

353. Kelly, <u>Terrorism</u>, p. 98.

354. <u>Globe and Mail</u>, 22 September 1984, p. N11.

355. <u>World Opinion Update</u>, vol x, issue 1, January 1986, p. 7.

356. <u>The Ottawa Citizen</u>, 25 July 1987, p. A22.

357. Ibid.

358. <u>The Ottawa Citizen</u>, 11 October 1986, p. E13.

359. <u>The Ottawa Citizen</u>, 25 July 1987, p. A22.

360. <u>The Citizen</u>, 4 June 1984, p. 58.

361. <u>The Ottawa Citizen</u>, 11 October 1986, p. E13.

362. <u>The Citizen</u>, 4 June 1984, p. 58.

363. Kelly, <u>Terrorism</u>, p. 13.

364. <u>Globe and Mail</u>, 9 December 1980, p. 8.

365. <u>The Vancouver Sun</u>, 2 January 1982, p. A12.

366. Mazankowski, The Hon. Donald F., <u>Towards the Prevention of Aviation Terrorism</u>, notes for an address to the International Civil Aviation Organization, 27 June 1985, Ottawa: Cultural and Public Information Bureau, Department of External Affairs, 1985, p. 2.

367. Torrance, Judy M., <u>Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982</u>, Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986, p. 101.

368. Kelly, Michael J., and Thomas H. Mitchell, "The Study of Internal Conflict in Canada: Problems and Prospects", in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. II, no. 1, Summer 1981, p. 12.

369. Torrance, pp. 60-61.

370. Cited in Torrance, pp. 163-64.

371. <u>The Gazette</u>, 12 May 1984, p. A-9.

372. <u>Globe and Mail</u>, 3 September 1985, p. 4.

373. <u>Globe and Mail</u>, 11 March 1986, p. 2.

374. Solicitor General of Canada, <u>Solicitor General Annual Report 1985-1986</u>, Ottawa: Solicitor General of Canada, 1987, p. 34.

375. <u>The Citizen</u>, 20 September 1986, p. 1.

376. Kelly, <u>Terrorism</u>, p. 7.   The table was compiled by Mr. Jeffrey Ross, a Canadian student at the University of Colorado and one of the witnesses who appeared before the Kelly Committee.

377. Woodcock, George, and Ivan Avakumovic, <u>The Doukhobors</u>, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 319.

378. Ibid, pp. 319-20.

379. Cited in Torrance, p. 35.

380. Woodcock and Avakumovic, p. 333.

381. Ibid, p. 328.

382. Laurendeau, Marc, <u>Les Québécois violents</u>, revised edition, Montréal: Les Éditions du Boréal Express, 1974.

383. Laurendeau, Marc, "Front de libération du Québec," in <u>The Canadian Encyclopedia</u>, Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers Ltd., 1985, vol. II, p. 698.

384. Laurendeau, Les Québécois violents, pp. 222-24.

385. Laurendeau, Canadian Encyclopedia, vol II, p. 698.

386. Fournier, Louis, F.L.Q. Histoire d'un mouvement clandestin, Montréal: Éditions Québec/Amérique, 1982, pp. 385-86.

387. New York Times, 29 March 1980, p. 9.

388. Shoniker, Peter A.E., "Canada: New Crossroads for International Terror," in MacDonald, Brian, ed., Terror, proceeding of a conference on terrorism held at Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, 25-26 April 1986, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986, p. 49.

389. Ibid, p. 50.

390. Ibid, p. 49.

391. Ibid, p. 51.

392. The Citizen, 26 April 1986, p. A1.

393. The Sunday Star, 4 May 1986, p. A14.

394. The Citizen, 26 April 1986, p. A1.

395. Shoniker, p. 51.

396. Globe and Mail, 25 April 1986, p. A1.

397. Globe and Mail, 26 April 1986.

398. Globe and Mail, 5 January 1985, p. M3.

399. Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States During 1985, p. 17.

400. Sher, Julian, White Hoods. Canada's Ku Klux Klan, Vancouver: New Star Books, 1983, p. 114.

401. Globe and Mail, 24 July 1980, p. 3.

402. Canadian Bomb Data Centre, annual bulletins 1980-85, Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

403. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism, p. 277, p. 299.

404. Globe and Mail, 16 September 1986, pp. B1-B2.

405. Kelly, Terrorism, p. 7.

406. Ibid, p. 6.

407. Ibid, p. 8.

408. Ibid.

409. Globe and Mail, 11 May 1987, p. A23.

410. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, p. 3, fn. 3.

411. Mickolus, Transnational Terrorism, pp. xiv-xvii.

412. Cited in Globe and Mail, 22 September 1984, p. N11. The article did not mention the incidence of terrorism in the United States.

413. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, pp. 41-42.

414. Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, p. 8.

415. Cited in Kelly, Terrorism, p. 8, fn. 3.

416. Ibid, p. 14.

417. Ibid, p. 15.

418. Globe and Mail, 28 November 1981, p. 1.

419. Kelly, Terrorism, p. 16.

420. Ibid.

421. Globe and Mail, 16 March 1981, p. 1.

422. Ibid.

423. Citizen, 12 May 1984.

424. Ibid.

425. Globe and Mail, 25 April 1986, p. A1.

426. Globe and Mail, 8 November 1985, p. A18.

427. Kelly, Terrorism, p. 9.

428. Bain, George A., "The Seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa," in TVI Report, vol. 6, no. 2, Fall 1985, p. 21.

429. The Ottawa Citizen, 1 November 1986, p. A12.

430. Quoted in Winnipeg Free Press, 12 August 1982, p. 4.

431. Gunter, "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism", p. 240.

432. Ibid, p. 236.

433. Gunter, "Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism", p. 31.

434. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 1; Jenkins, Future Trends in International Terrorism, pp. 14-15.

435. Globe and Mail, 28 February 1986, p. A11.

436. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 27.

437. Strategic Planning Associates, Strategic Planning Associates Assessment Newsletter, vol. 1, no. 2, May-August 1986, p. 2.

438. Quoted in Globe and Mail, 28 June 1985, p. 6.

439. Maclean's, vol. 99, no. 25, 23 June 1986, p. 13.

440. Globe and Mail, 24 June 1986, p. A8.

441. Globe and Mail, 9 June 1986, p. A4.

442. Maclean's, vol. 99, no. 25, 23 June 1986, p. 12.

443. Loomis, Dan G., Not Much Glory. Quelling the F.L.Q., Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1984, p. 28.

444. Globe and Mail, 8 January 1979, p. 1.

445. The Chronicle-Herald, 15 May 1986, p. 1; Globe and Mail, 21 June 1986, p. A15.

446. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 2.

447. Ibid, p. 28; Cordes, p. 21.

448. Maclean's, vol. 100, no. 39, 28 September 1987, p. 14.

449. The Citizen, 30 November 1985, p. A16.

450. Bain, p. 21.

451. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980</u>, p. 7.

452. Solicitor General of Canada, <u>Solicitor General Annual Report 1983-1984</u>, Ottawa: Solicitor General Canada, 1985, p. 34; Solicitor General of Canada, <u>Solicitor General Annual Report 1984-1985</u>, Ottawa: Solicitor General Canada, 1985, p. 34.

453. Morf, p. 147.

454. Hacker, p. 75.

455. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981</u>, p. 12.

456. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981</u>, p. 12; and <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984</u>, p. 3.

457. <u>The Ottawa Citizen</u>, 18 July 1987, p. A1.

458. <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981</u>, p. 12; and <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985</u>, p. 1.

459. Cited in (Scherer, J.L.) <u>Terrorism</u>, vol. 1, no. 3, July 1986, pp. 22-24.

460. Statistics Canada data, cited in <u>The Canadian World Almanac & Book of Facts 1988</u>, Toronto: Global Press, 1987, p. 421.

461. Communication from Dr. S. Rahman, Conference Board of Canada, 13 November 1987.

462. <u>The Ottawa Citizen</u>, 11 October 1986, p. E13.

463. Kelly, <u>Terrorism</u>, p. 15.

464. Arnold, Terrell E., and Neil C. Livingstone, "Fighting Back," in Livingstone and Arnold, pp. 229-30.

465. Quoted in Livingstone, Neil C., "States in Opposition: The War against Terrorism," in <u>Conflict</u>, vol. 3, nos. 2/3, 1981, p. 88.

466. Hewitt, pp. 47-54.

467. Kellen, <u>Terrorists - What Are They Like?</u>, p. 43.

468. Quoted in Livingstone, Neil C., "Proactive Responses to Terrorism: Reprisals, Preemption, and Retribution," in Livingstone and Arnold, p. 112.

469. Jenkins, <u>International Terrorism: The Other World War</u>, p. 17.

470. The Toronto Star, 1 June 1986, p. H1.

471. Livingstone, "Proactive Responses to Terrorism", p. 127.

472. Quoted in The Korea Herald, 31 May 1981, p. 4.

473. Quoted in Livingstone, "States in Opposition," p. 86.

474. George, p. 41.

475. Jenkins, et al, Numbered Lives, p. 24.

476. United States Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 29 March 1976.

477. Livingstone, "States in Opposition", p. 109.

478. On the subject of hostage rescue see Thompson, Leroy, The Rescuers. The World's Top Anti-Terrorist Units, Boulder: Paladin Press, 1986.

479. Livingstone, "States in Opposition", p. 116.

480. International Herald Tribune, 21 January 1986, p. 4.

481. Jenkins et al, Numbered Lives, p. 30.

482. Newsweek, 9 March 1987, p. 29.

483. Quoted in The Ottawa Citizen, 18 September 1986, p. A12.

484. Hoffman, Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism.

485. Kelly, Terrorism, p. 56.

486. Ibid, p. 32.

487. Globe and Mail, 16 March 1981, p. 1.

488. Kupperman and Trent, p. 128.

489. Kelly, Terrorism, p. 45.

490. Ibid.

491. Ibid.

492. The Ottawa Citizen, 23 September 1987, p. A2.

493. Security Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report 1986-87, Ottawa: Security Intelligence Review Committee, 1987, p. 29.

494. Ibid, p. 28.

495. Kelly, Terrorism, p. 60.

496. Security Intelligence Review Committee, Annual Report 1985-86, Ottawa: Security Intelligence Review Committee, 1986, p. 4.

497. Rutan, Gerard F., "The Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Squaring the Demands of National Security with Canadian Democracy," in Conflict Quarterly, vol. V, no. 4, Fall 1985, p. 26.

498. Ibid, p. 28.

499. Kelly, Terrorism, p. 60.

500. Ibid, p. 47.

501. The Ottawa Citizen, 16 September 1987, pp. A1-A2.

502. Kelly, Terrorism, p. 65.

503. Gibson, p. 10.

504. Kelly, Terrorism, p. 64.

505. Ibid, pp. 66-67.

506. The Sunday Star, 2 August 1987, p. B4.

507. The Ottawa Citizen, 30 September 1987, p. A1.

508. Quoted in The Sunday Star, 4 October 1987, p. B4.

509. Globe and Mail, 24 October 1985, p. A1.

510. Globe and Mail, 11 March 1986, pp. 1-2; Globe and Mail, 11 May 1987, p. A23.

511. Globe and Mail, 11 March 1986, p. 1.

512. Kelly, Terrorism, pp. 14-17.

513. Ibid, p. 7 (see Table 10, p. 94).

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bain, George A., "The Seizure of the Turkish Embassy in Ottawa", in TVI Report, vol. 6, no. 2, Fall 1985.

Canadian Bomb Data Centre, annual reports, Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Citizen (Ottawa)

Cordes, Bonnie, et al, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing Terrorist Groups, Report R-3151, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, June 1985.

Dobson, Christopher, and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists: Their Weapons, Leaders and Tactics, New York: Facts on File, 1979.

Economist

Ehrenfeld, Rachel, and Michael Kahan, The "Doping" of America: The Ambivalence of the Narco-Terrorist Connection and a Search for Solutions, paper presented at Research on Terrorism: An International Academic Conference, Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, April 1986.

Elad, Shlomi, and Ariel Merari, The Soviet Bloc and World Terrorism, Paper No. 26, Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, August 1984.

George, Bruce, Working Group on Terrorism. Final Report, Brussels: North Atlantic Assembly, February 1987.

Globe and Mail

Gunter, Michael M., "Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism", in Conflict Quarterly, vol. V, no. 4, Fall 1985.

_____, "Contemporary Armenian Terrorism", in Terrorism: An International Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, 1986.

Hacker, Frederick J., Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies. Terror and Terrorism in Our Time, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc. 1976.

Herman, Valentine, and Rob van der Laan Bouma, "Nationalists without a Nation: South Moluccan Terrorism in the Netherlands", in Juliet Lodge, ed., Terrorism: A Challenge to the State, Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981.

Hewitt, Christopher, The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorist Policies, Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1984.

Hoffman, Bruce, Right-Wing Terrorism in Europe, Note N-1856-AF, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, March 1982.

_____, Recent Trends in Palestinian Terrorism: II, Paper P-7076, Santa Monica: the Rand Corporation, March 1985.

_____, Terrorism in the United States During 1985, paper presented at Research on Terrorism: An International Academic Conference, Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen, April 1986.

_____, Right-Wing Terrorism in the United States, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1986.

_____, "Left-Wing Terrorism in the United States", in Conflict Quarterly, vol. VI, no. 4, Fall 1986.

_____, Right-Wing Terrorism in West Germany, Paper P-7270, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, October 1986.

Horchem, Hans Josef, Terrorism in West Germany, Conflict Study No. 186, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, April 1986.

Jenkins, Brian, et al, Numbered Lives: Some Statistical Observations from 77 International Hostage Episodes, Paper P-5905, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, July 1977.

_____, A Chronology of Terrorist Attacks and Other Criminal Actions Against Maritime Targets, Paper P-6906, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, September 1983.

Jenkins, Brian M., Embassies Under Siege. A Review of 48 Embassy Takeovers, 1971-1980, Report R-2651-RC, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, January 1981.

_____, Future Trends in International Terrorism, Paper P-7176, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1985.

Kellen, Konrad, Terrorists-What Are They Like? How Some Terrorists Describe Their World and Actions, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, November 1979.

Kelly, Michael J., and Thomas H. Mitchell, "The Study of Internal Conflict in Canada: Problems and Prospects", in Conflict Quarterly, vol. II, no. 1, Summer 1981.

Kelly, The Hon. William M., Terrorism, the Report of the Senate Special Committee on Terrorism and the Public Safety, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, June 1987.

Kupperman, Robert H., and Darrell M. Trent, <u>Terrorism. Threat, Reality, Response</u>, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979.

Langford, K.R., <u>An Analysis of Left and Right Wing Terrorism in Italy</u>, Washington, D.C.: Defence Intelligence College, July 1985.

Laqueur, Walter, "Reflections on Terrorism", in <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, vol. 65, no. 1, Fall 1986.

Laurendeau, Marc, <u>Les Québécois violents</u>, revised edition, Montréal: Les Editions du Boréal Express, 1974.

Leventhal, Paul, and Yonah Alexander, eds, <u>Nuclear Terrorism. Defining the Threat</u>, Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers Inc., 1986.

Livingstone, Neil C., "States in Opposition: The War against Terrorism", in <u>Conflict</u>, vol. 3, nos. 2/3, 1981.

Livingstone, Neil C., and Terrell E. Arnold, <u>Fighting Back. Winning the War against Terrorism</u>, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986.

MacDonald, Brian, ed., <u>Terror</u>, proceedings of a conference on terrorism held at Collège militaire royal de Saint-Jean, 25-26 April 1986, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1986.

McIlheney, Colin J., "Arbiters of Ulster's Destiny? The Military Role of the Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland", in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. 5, no. 2, Spring 1985.

Mickolus, Edward F., <u>Transnational Terrorism. A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979</u>, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980.

Mitchell, Thomas H., <u>Politically-Motivated Terrorism in North America: The Threat and the Response</u>, paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Ottawa, 9 June 1982.

_____, "Corporate Security in an Age of Terrorism", in <u>The Canadian Business Review</u>, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring 1984.

Morf, Gustave, <u>Terror in Quebec. Case Studies of the FLQ</u>, Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company Limited, 1970.

National Foreign Assessment Center (CIA), <u>International Terrorism in 1979</u>, April 1980.

_____, <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980</u>, June 1981.

Nelson, Barry, "Kidnapped!", in <u>Canadian Business</u>, vol. 56, no. 6, June 1983.

Norton, Augustus R., and Martin H. Greenberg, eds, <u>Studies in Nuclear Terrorism</u>, Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1979.

Ollivant, Simon, <u>Canada: How Powerful an Ally?</u>, Conflict Study No. 159, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1984.

Perera, Judith, "Terror and Counter-Terror", in <u>The Middle East</u>, November 1986.

Pisano, Vittorfranco S., <u>The Red Brigades: A Challenge to Italian Democracy</u>, Conflict Study No. 120, London: The Institute for the Study of Conflict, July 1980.

Pluchinsky, Dennis, "Middle Eastern Terrorist Activity in Western Europe: A Diagnosis and Prognosis", in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. VI, no. 3, Summer 1986.

Post, Jerrold M., "Hostilité, Conformité, Fraternité: The Group Dynamics of Terrorist Behavior", in (Defense Nuclear Agency) <u>Outthinking the Terrorist: An International Challenge</u>, proceedings of the 10th annual Symposium on the Role of Behavioral Science in Physical Security, Springfield, 23-24 April 1985, Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1985.

Ra'anan, Uri, et al, eds, <u>Hydra of Carnage. The International Linkages of Terrorism and Other Low-Intensity Operations</u>, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986.

Russell, Charles A., and Capt. Bowman H. Miller, "Profile of a Terrorist", in <u>Military Review</u>, vol. LVII, no. 8, August 1977.

Rutan, Gerard F., "The Canadian Security Intelligence Service: Squaring the Demands of National Security with Canadian Democracy", in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. V, no. 4, Fall 1985.

Sayari, Sabri, <u>Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case</u>, Paper P-7174, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, July 1985.

(Scherer, J.L.) <u>Terrorism. An Annual Survey</u>, vols. 1 and 2, Minneapolis: J.L. Scherer, 1982, 1983.

(Scherer, J.L.) <u>Terrorism</u>, various issues.

Security Intelligence Review Committee, <u>Annual Report 1985-86</u>, <u>1986-87</u>, Ottawa: Security Intelligence Review Committee, 1986, 1987.

Sher, Julian, <u>White Hoods. Canada's Ku Klux Klan</u>, Vancouver: New Star Books, 1983.

Solicitor General of Canada, <u>Solicitor General Annual Report, 1983-1984</u>, <u>1984-1985</u>, <u>1985-1986</u>, Ottawa: Solicitor General of Canada, 1985, 1986, 1987.

Sterling, Claire, <u>The Terror Network. The Secret War of International Terrorism</u>, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, and Reader's Digest Press, 1981.

Strategic Planning Associates, <u>Strategic Planning Associates Assessment Newsletter</u>, various issues.

<u>Sunday Star</u> (Toronto)

Torrance, Judy M., <u>Public Violence in Canada, 1867-1982</u>, Kingston and Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1986.

United States Department of State, <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981</u>, July 1982.

_____, <u>Patterns of International Terrorism: 1982</u>, September 1983.

_____, <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983</u>, September 1984.

_____, <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984</u>, November 1985.

_____, <u>Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985</u>, October 1986.

Waugh, William L., Jr., "The Values in Violence: Organizational and Political Objectives of Terrorist Groups", in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. III, no. 4, Summer 1983.

Wilkinson, Paul, <u>Terrorism and the Liberal State</u>, London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1977.

Woodcock, George, and Ivan Avakumovic, <u>The Doukhobors</u>, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Zawodny, J.K., "Infrastructures of Terrorist Organizations", in <u>Conflict Quarterly</u>, vol. 1, no. 4, Spring 1981.

Zimmermann, Ekkart, "Terrorist Violence in West Germany: Some Reflections on Recent Literature", in <u>Journal of Political and Military Sociology</u>, vol. 14, no. 2, Fall 1986.

CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INCIDENTS
AFFECTING CANADA, 1968-1987

DATE	INCIDENT	LOCATION	PERPETRATOR TYPE	INCIDENT TYPE	TARGET
13 April 1968	Two time bombs believed planted by Croatian exiles, exploded in Yugoslavian embassy in Ottawa.	Internal	Emigré	Bombing	Diplomatic
4 July 1968	The Canadian consulate and tourist office in New York City bombed by anti-Castro Cubans.	External	Emigré	Bombing	Government
20 May 1969	Two Cubans arrested in New Jersey after they had attempted to bomb the Cuban consulate in Montreal.	Internal	Emigré	Bombing	Diplomatic
1 October 1969	A firebomb was thrown against the door of the U.S. consulate-general in Vancouver by two women protesting Amchitka nuclear test.	Internal	Sub-Revolutionary	Bombing	Diplomatic

Date	Description	External	Sub-Revolutionary	Bombing	Business
7 March 1970	Three Canadian bank branches in Trinidad fire-bombed. The attacks may have been linked to "black power" demonstration on the island and to the Montreal trial of 10 West Indians implicated in the destruction of a computer centre at Sir George Williams University.	External	Sub-Revolutionary	Bombing	Business
5 October 1970	An FLQ cell kidnapped the British trade commissioner in Montreal, James Cross.	Internal	Nationalist-Autonomist	Kidnap	Diplomatic
2 June 1971	A molotov cocktail was thrown at the entrance of the Aeroflot office in Montreal. The action was attributed to a JDL splinter group.	Internal	Nationalist-Autonomist	Bombing	Diplomatic
17 October 1971	Two dynamite bombs were found in the general area of the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, and 11 molotov cocktails were found near where buses, which had carried demonstrators protesting Premier Kosygin's visit, had parked.	Internal	-	Bombing	Diplomatic
18 October 1971	A member of the Canadian Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation assaulted Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin in Ottawa.	Internal	Emigré	Assault	Diplomatic
23 January 1972	Three molotov cocktails exploded in the entrance to the Soviet consulate in Montreal, injuring a night watchman.	Internal	-	Bombing	Diplomatic

Date	Description				
27 March 1972	Members of the Turkish People's Liberation Army kidnapped 3 NATO radar technicians, one a Canadian. The Turkish government refused to bargain and stormed the kidnappers' hideout. The 3 hostages were killed.	External	Revolutionary	Kidnap	Military
4 April 1972	Two plastic bombs exploded in the Cuban trade commission in Montreal, killing one and injuring 7 others. An anti-Castro Cuban group claimed responsibility.	Internal	Emigré	Bombing	Diplomatic
20 September 1972	Six letter-bombs addressed to Israeli officials were intercepted in Ottawa and one in Montreal. Black September may have been responsible.	Internal	Nationalist-Autonomist	Bombing	Diplomatic
24 November 1972	An Air Canada jet, scheduled to fly from Frankfurt to Montreal and Toronto, was hijacked on the ground. The gunman released the passengers, but held a stewardess for 24 hours before he was shot. He had demanded the release of a number of Czechs held in German prisons.	External	-	Hijack	Transportation
12 December 1972	A Cuban group claimed responsibility for bombing a travel agency and three offices - one in Montreal, the remainder in the U.S. - that handled packages bound for Cuba.	Internal	Emigré	Bombing	Business

Date	Description				
21 January 1974	The Cuban embassy reported receiving a package containing high-power explosives, through the mail from Cuban Action. Similar attacks occurred at other embassies, 20-21 January.	Internal	--	Bombing	Diplomatic
19 August 1974	The U.S. consul-general in Montreal received a telephone threat from an English-speaking male claiming to be of Greek origin, saying that he intended to kill someone in the consulate within the week (U.S. ambassador to Cyprus assassinated the same day; Turkish troops had landed in Cyprus on 20 July).	Internal	--	Threat	Diplomatic
20 April 1976	Toronto Star journalist Gerald Utting was kidnapped in Beirut and held by PLO for two days.	External	Nationalist-Autonomist	Kidnap	Other
24 July 1976	A caller using an FLQ slogan warned that a bomb had been planted at the Olympic Stadium during an Olympic handball game between Japan and Yugoslavia. A bomb-type device was found, but it lacked explosives.	Internal	--	Threat	Other
19 November 1977	The Indian high commission in Ottawa was fire-bombed, possibly by members of the Universal Proutist Revolutionary Front, a group thought to be linked with an Indian religious movement. Several such attacks against Indian missions were carried out in late-1977.	Internal	Other	Bombing	Diplomatic

A-4

Date	Description				
14 January 1980	A small, "amateurish" bomb exploded near front door of Cuban consulate in Montreal. Little damage, no injuries.	Internal	Emigré	Bombing	Diplomatic
22 December 1980	Cuban consulate in Montreal bombed, resulting in property damage but no injuries. Alliance of Cuban Revolutionary Organizations claimed responsibility.	Internal	Emigré	Bombing	Diplomatic
27 January 1981	Smoke bomb thrown through front door of US consulate in Vancouver. Note at scene linked incident with El Salvador conflict.	Internal	Sub-Revolutionary	Bombing	Diplomatic
13 January 1982	Bomb explodes in stairwell near Turkish consulate in Toronto. ASALA claimed responsibility in letters to press.	Internal	Emigré	Bombing	Diplomatic
8 April 1982	Turkish commercial counselor, Kani Gungor shot and wounded outside his Ottawa home. ASALA claimed responsibility.	Internal	Emigré	Assassination	Diplomatic
2 May 1982	A Montrealer working for a Canadian company in Iraq was kidnapped by Kurdish rebels. He was released after 6 months.	External	Nationalist-Autonomist	Kidnap	Business
7 May 1982	Explosive device detonated near Swissair office, Montreal. At that time Swissair was a threatened ASALA target.	Internal	Emigré	Bombing	Transportation

A-5

30 May 1982	Armenians placed bomb outside Air Canada freight terminal, Los Angeles, apparently in an attempt to force release of Gungor assailants.	External	Emigré	Bombing	Government
27 August 1982	Col. Atilla Altikat, Turkish military attache, assassinated in Ottawa. Anonymous callers, claiming to represent the Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide, claimed responsibility.	Internal	Emigré	Assassina-tion	Diplomatic
15 February 1983	A letter bomb was sent to the Canadian High Commission in London (others were aimed at British targets) by the Animal Rights Militia, protesting the annual seal hunt off Newfoundland.	External	Environmental	Bombing	Government
24 June 1983	Five foreign relief workers, including a Canadian (Martin Overduin), were captured by Sudanese rebels seeking funds, publicity, and supplies. Hostages freed by Sudanese troops 8 July.	External	Nationalist-Autonomist	Kidnap	Other
7 August 1983	Attempted kidnap of Canadian business-man Galen Weston in Ireland. The attempt was foiled and 5 out of 7 attackers were captured. The police claimed that the Provisional IRA was responsible.	External	Nationalist-Autonomist	Kidnap	Business

Date	Description				
4 June 1984	Two sword-wielding Sikhs attacked and damaged the Indian consulate in Vancouver, in the wake of the battle at the Golden Temple in Amritsar. Consular officials were briefly held hostage.	Internal	Emigré	Assault	Diplomatic
18 July 1984	In Winnipeg Sikhs attacked India's acting high commissioner, pelting him with eggs and trying to hit him with picket signs. This was a further protest against Golden Temple attack.	Internal	Emigré	Assault	Diplomatic
12 March 1985	Turkish embassy in Ottawa seized by 3 gunmen (all Armenians from Montreal or Toronto areas) claiming to belong to the Armenian Revolutionary Army. A guard was killed and the ambassador injured before the gunmen surrendered.	Internal	Emigré	Barricade Hostage	Diplomatic
1-3 April 1985	A letter, purportedly from the Armenian Revolutionary Army, threatened to bomb the Toronto transit system unless the attackers in the Turkish embassy incident were freed. The threat was not implemented.	Internal	-	Threat	Transportation
23 June 1985	Bomb exploded at Tokyo Airport, killing 2 and wounding 4 airport workers. The workers were handling luggage unloaded from Canadian Pacific Airlines jet that had arrived from Vancouver.	External	-	Bombing	Transportation

20 January 1986	Shots fired through window of Romanian consulate in Montreal, wounding a Romanian trade official. A man claiming membership in the Aiud terrorist organization took responsibility and threatened further attacks against Communist representatives.	Internal	Emigré	Assault	Diplomatic
9 February 1986	Editor of pro-Communist Romanian-language newspaper shot and killed in Toronto. Two Montreal residents of Romanian origin were the centre of police investigation after this and the 20 January incident.	Internal	Emigré	Assassina-tion	Other
5 Mar 1986	About 75 persons briefly occupied the Haitian consulate-general in Montreal and physically assaulted the consul-general. Protestors wanted removal of Duvalier appointees.	Internal	Emigré	Assault	Diplomatic
4 May 1986	Five home-made rockets were fired during the welcoming ceremony of the Tokyo summit of leaders (including Prime Minister Mulroney) of the 7 major industrial democracies. They overshot the target and landed near the Canadian embassy.	External	Revolutionary	Bombing	Other

Date		External / Internal	Revolutionary		Government
14 May 1986	A car bomb exploded outside the building containing the Canadian embassy in Jakarta (the Japanese and U.S. embassies were also attacked). A telephone caller linked the attacks to the Tokyo summit, and the police claimed to have evidence linking the bombings to the Japanese Red Army.	External	Revolutionary	Bombing	Government
25 May 1986	Punjabi cabinet minister shot and wounded in Vancouver Island. 4 Vancouver-area Sikhs convicted of attack in February 1987.	Internal	Emigré	Assasina-tion	Diplomatic
2 July 1986	The Azanian People's Liberation Front threatened to poison South African produce to enforce a boycott. Some distributors removed South African produce from their shelves, but no evidence of tampering was found.	Internal	–	Threat	Business
14 September 1986	A post office at Cedar (B.C.) was fire-bombed. Claiming responsibility, Direct Action claimed the post office was a channel for funding of the Nicaraguan Contras and the Salvadorian government.	Internal	Sub-Revolutionary	Bombing	Government
8 March 1987	A Canadian executive of Occidental Petroleum was kidnapped by gunmen presumed to be leftist rebels (possibly the ELN) in Colombia.	External	Guerrilla	Kidnap	Business

A-9

Sources: Globe and Mail Online.

Canadian Business and Current Affairs data base (on Dialog, File 262).

Canadian News Facts.

Facts on File

Mickolus, Edward F., Transnational Terrorism. A Chronology of Events, 1968-1979, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1980.

Jenkins, B.M., and Johnson, Janera, International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974, Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, March 1975.

Scherer, John L., Terrorism. An Annual Survey, vol. 2, Minneapolis: J.L Scherer, 1983.

Other Canadian newspapers, government agencies.

A-10

INCIDENTS EXCLUDED FROM CHRONOLOGY

DATE	INCIDENT	REMARKS
24 May 1968	An explosion, probably caused by dynamite, damaged the entrance door of the U.S. consulate in Quebec. The consulate had been the target of anti-Vietnam war graffiti a few days earlier.	Perpetrator, motive unclear.
11 September 1968	An Air Canada flight from St. John to Montreal landed at Montreal after a hijacker tried to divert it to Cuba. He was later deported to the U.S.	Unclear whether motive personal or political.
26 August 1969	Two people killed, 11 injured, when a naturalized Canadian hurled a gasoline bomb into the library of the Canadian embassy in Vienna.	Despite revolutionary rhetoric of perpetrator, motives probably more personal than political.
30 October 1969	Arab students took part in a "sit-in" at the Lebanese embassy in Ottawa, to protest Lebanon's treatment of Palestinian guerrillas.	Nonviolent demonstration.
21 February 1970	A Swissair plane crashed as a result of a mid-air bomb explosion. All 47 persons aboard were killed, including 2 Canadians.	Canadian involvement fortuitous and relatively limited.
26 February 1970	Two members of FLQ arrested while preparing to kidnap the Israeli consul in Montreal.	Non-activated conspiracy.
21 June 1970	A plot by 3 FLQ members to kidnap Harrison W. Burgess, the U.S. consul-general in Montreal, was foiled by police in a raid on the group's Laurentians hideout.	Non-activated conspiracy.

B-1

10 September 1970	The departure of a BOAC flight from Toronto to London was delayed as a result of a telephone call which threatened that the plane would be hijacked.	Threat: motive unclear.
11 September 1970	A threat to hijack a Wardair jet flying between Toronto and London resulted in a search of all 183 passengers aboard.	Threat: motive unclear.
15 September 1970	Message threatening sabotage left at Air Canada ticket office in Montreal. Flights delayed but no bomb found. Ransom demanded in note. 8 persons held by police in connection with incident.	Motive possibly personal.
17 September 1970	Sabotage threat directed against an Air Canada plane received in Toronto. The passengers disembarked but no bomb was found.	Threat: motive unclear.
26 November 1970	An anonymous telephone call received by Montreal police warned that a bomb had been placed at the main offices of the U.S. consulate-general. No bomb was found.	Threat: motive unclear
15 December 1970	An Eastern Airlines flight en route Montreal-New York was recalled during flight as a result of a bomb threat. No bomb was found.	Threat: motive unclear
13 April 1971	Midwest Airlines plane en route Dauphin (Man.)-Winnipeg hijacked by 3 youths wishing to go to Yorkton (Sask.).	Included in Mickolus chronology, but probably a purely domestic incident.
26 May 1971	Two youths discharged two smoke-bombs at Montreal's Place Des Arts, where a Soviet group was performing. Leaflets critical of Soviet treatment of Jews were dropped from the balcony.	Minor demonstration.
20 July 1971	A bomb threat was made against an Air Canada jet en route Toronto-Vancouver. The plane was diverted to Milwaukee, but no bomb was found.	Threat: motive unclear.

28 July 1971	An anonymous caller made threats against an Air Canada jet en route Montreal-Miami. A ransom was demanded. The plane was diverted to Raleigh, but no bomb was found.	Motive possibly personal.
2 August 1971	An anonymous call warned of a bomb on a BOAC flight between Montreal and London. The flight was diverted to Denver, but no bomb was found.	Threat: motive unclear.
8 September 1971	An anonymous call in Vancouver warned of a bomb on a CP Air flight and demanded money to specify which one. One man arrested.	Motive possibly personal.
13 November 1971	A self-styled member of the IRA (a Canadian) diverted an Air Canada flight en route Calgary-Toronto to Great Falls. He demanded to be flown to Ireland, as well as $1.5 million. He was overpowered by the crew, and later sentenced to life imprisonment.	Motives seem more likely to have been personal than political. (Hacker says man mentally disturbed).
26 December 1971	An American citizen, apparently wanting to escape prosecution in the U.S., hijacked an Air Canada jet en route Thunder Bay-Toronto to Cuba after allowing the passengers to disembark in Toronto.	Motive possibly personal.
14 January 1972	A man threatened to sabotage an Air Canada flight from Montreal to Barbados if one of the passengers did not repay him some money. The perpetrator was arrested and convicted.	Motive personal.
4 February 1972	Konstantinos Issoghos threatened to blow up a CP Air plane in flight if not paid $200,000. One bomb was found, and Issoghos was arrested.	Motive possibly personal.
5 July 1972	Pacific Southwest Airlines flight en route Sacramento-San Francisco hijacked by two Bulgarians. Canadian passenger killed in gun battle between hijackers and FBI.	Canadian involvement fortuitous and relatively limited.

Date	Incident	Assessment
9 September 1972	After an anonymous phone call to Air France officials in Paris a bomb was found in the washroom of an Air France jet en route Paris-Montreal. The plane landed in Gander, and the bomb – termed a "dud" by CF demolition experts – was dismantled.	Unclear whether motive personal or political.
21 September 1972	A phone caller claimed that an Air Canada jet en route Montreal-Paris was carrying a bomb. No bomb was found, but 4 passengers were injured when evacuating the plane.	Threat: motive unclear.
16 October 1972	Radical Peronists bombed US-owned hotel in Buenos Aires, killing a Canadian tourist.	Canadian involvement fortuitous and relatively limited.
21 November 1972	4 letter bombs sent to Jews in Toronto.	Insufficient information available.
14 December 1972	A Quebecair plane en route Wabush-Montreal was hijacked and forced to shuttle between Montreal and Ottawa.	Motive possibly personal.
4 January 1973	A Pacific Western Airlines plane en route Vancouver-Penticton-Castlegar was hijacked. The hijacker threatened to blow up the plane unless he was paid $2 million and flown to North Vietnam.	Unclear whether motive personal or political.
24 January 1973	Letter bombs sent to Israeli consulates in Canada, Australia, Greece and Chile by Black September.	Source possibly dubious, incident uncorroborated.
25 January 1973	A letter bomb postmarked in Athens was discovered at the postal section at Dorval Airport. It was probably part of a contemporary campaign against Jewish targets.	Insufficient information available.
29 November 1974	A CP Air jet en route Montreal-Vancouver was hijacked by a Canadian citizen demanding to go to Cyprus.	Motive possibly personal.

B-4

25 December 1974	An Air India plane on the Bombay–Beirut–New York run was hijacked out of Beirut by a Czech-born Canadian who demanded a gun and passage to a place of his choice. He tried to force the pilot to put the plane into a sharp dive over the centre of Rome. The hijacker was overpowered by the crew.	Unclear whether motive personal or political.
23 February 1976	Several gunmen took over the Canadian embassy in Beirut, along with 23 hostages. The group surrendered after eight hours. The group's demands centred on the personal problems and grievances of its leader.	Personal motives.
16 July 1977	An Alitalia jet en route New York–Rome made an emergency landing in Halifax after a bomb threat was received. No bomb was found.	Hoax.
1 September 1977	A bomb exploded in a Toronto garage, killing 3 Serbians. Apparently they planned to bomb Yugoslav missions in six or seven Canadian and American cities, as well as the homes of pro-Tito Yugoslavs, in retaliation for the murder in Chicago of an anti-Communist Serbian editor in June.	Non-activated conspiracy.
30 September 1977	A doctor of Yugoslavian origin was shot and killed in Vancouver.	More likely communal feuding than terrorism.
8 January 1978	The Washington–Montreal Amtrak train made an emergency stop in Connecticut after a bomb warning was received. The train was evacuated, but no bomb was found.	Threat: motive unclear.
8 August 1978	The homes of two members of Toronto's Yugoslavian community were bombed.	As likely to be communal feuding as terrorism.
2 October 1978	A TWA plane en route Chicago–Rome was diverted to Montreal after a bomb threat. A search revealed no bomb.	Threat: motive unclear.

|		
16 October 1978	A British Airways flight en route Los Angeles-London landed at Frobisher Bay after a bomb threat was received. No bomb was found.	Threat: motive unclear.
13 February 1979	Iranian embassy in Ottawa occupied for several days by members of Montreal-based Confederation of Iranian Students, to demonstrate solidarity with Khomeini revolution.	Occupation condoned by embassy staff, therefore External Affairs ruled students entitled to stay.
27 April 1979	Croatian-owned camera store in Toronto bombed, possibly by Croatian nationalists who objected to goods being imported from Yugoslavia.	More domestic and communal than terrorist in its implications.
2 June 1979	Two Croatians were killed in a bomb blast in a Mississauga home.	Accidental detonation, target unclear.
7-8 September 1979	One Canadian, 6 West Germans killed by unknown assailants in Afghanistan.	Perpetrators' motives un- certain, victims possibly mistaken for Soviet citizens.
5 January 1981	A bomb exploded in a newspaper vending box in Toronto. The incident was unclaimed, but had the hallmarks of an ASALA operation.	Responsibility, and therefore motive, unclear.
7 February 1981	Apparent kidnap attempt by 4 men, one possibly armed with a sub-machine gun, against Guatemalan ambassador in Ottawa. Police acknowledged "the attempt was real and of grave concern". Attempt not accompanied by any threats.	Incident abortive, thus motives, aims unclear.
10-11 March 1981	Threats made against President Reagan's life during his visit to Canada (10-11 March), according to Solicitor General.	Motives, perpetrators unclear.
4 August 1981	About 30 Iranian students briefly occupied the Iranian embassy in Ottawa to protest torture and killings of political prisoners in Iran.	Peaceful protest.

18 May 1982	Canadian-American businessman has home and two cars fire-bombed by ASALA.	Unclear whether incident has international or just intra-communal implications.
July 1982	A series of threats were made against a Canadian ferry, the "Princess Marguerite", while in Puget Sound and en route Seattle-Victoria. Ship returned to Seattle, but no bomb was found. More threats were received when the ferry continued its voyage.	Motives, perpetrators unclear.
14 November 1982	A Toronto demonstration against the Indian government turned violent with rival Sikh factions abusing each other. A policeman was shot and wounded.	Demonstration, violence probably not planned by protest organizers.
7 January 1983	A naturalized Canadian was charged by Japanese police after a bomb threat was made against a Korean jet en route New York-Seoul. The plane was diverted, butno bomb was found.	Motive probably not political
3 September 1984	Three killed, 47 wounded by a bomb at Central Station, Montreal. The bomber was an American angry at the imminent Papal visit to Canada.	Personal motives.
17 March 1985	An explosion, believed to have been caused by a bomb, rocked a building containing the Canadian and Israeli missions in Singapore. No injuries and only slight damage were caused.	Perpetrators, motive, target unclear.
23 June 1985	An Air India jet crashed off Ireland, killing 329 persons aboard, most of them Canadians. The flight originated in Montreal and Toronto. An Indian government enquiry attributed the crash to a suitcase bomb planted by a terrorist.	Perpetrator not established. bomb theory not officially accepted in Canada.

24 November 1985	Two Canadians were among 59 killed in a battle at Valetta Airport between Egyptian security forces and Palestinian (Abu Nidal) hi-jackers of an Egyptair flight.	Canadian involvement fortuitous and relatively limited.
5 January 1986	Olympic Airways jet, en route Athens-New York, was diverted to CFB Goose Bay after anonymous caller told Athens office that Black September had planted a bomb on the plane. No bomb was found. [Note: At this time Abu Nidal/Black September trying to sabotage Jordan-PLO accord, and to disrupt Western tourist trade.]	Hoax
16 January 1986	A man who had convinced authorities of a Libyan plot to plant a bomb aboard a passenger plane bound for the U.S. subsequently admitted to lying. Security had been tightened at 4 Canadian airports.	Hoax
1 March 1986	A Canadian metallurgist working for the Angolan government diamond company was captured by UNITA rebels (along with about 200 other foreigners) when the rebels seized Andrada. The prisoners were escorted to Zaire and released.	Capture of the foreigners probably incidental to seizure of the diamond mine.
1-2 April 1986	The Bahamian vice-consul in Ottawa was held hostage by a man who demanded aid for the homeless in Ontario and to be reunited with a convict friend.	Attack not politically motivated.
28 April 1986	Bomb threat against U.S. embassy, Ottawa.	Probably a hoax.
31 May 1986	Two Montreal Sikhs convicted (December 1986) of conspiring to blow up an Air India plane leaving New York on 31 May (an Indian cabinet minister was aboard).	Non-activated conspiracy.

13 August 1986	U.S. embassy, Ottawa, evacuated following a bomb threat.	Probably a hoax.
4-5 September 1986	Abu Nidal terrorists seize Pan Am jet at Karachi Airport, along with nearly 400 hostages, including 7 Canadians. Several of the Canadians were injured when gunfire broke out on the plane (altogether 19 killed, 127 wounded in battle).	Canadian involvement fortuitous and relatively limited.
9 October 1986	A CP Air flight en route Amsterdam-Toronto was diverted to Montréal after the airline received a bomb threat. The plane was evacuated, but no bomb was found.	Hoax.
14 November 1986	Several unarmed Armenians briefly occupied Air Canada's Paris and Lyon offices to protest life sentences passed on 3 Armenians convicted of the Ottawa embassy attack.	Nonviolent protests.
28 February 1987	An Air Canada jet en route Toronto-Vancouver was forced to return to Toronto after a bomb threat.	Motive, perpetrator unclear.
3 August 1987	Guatemalan authorities claimed to have uncovered a rebel plot to seize the Canadian and three other embassies on the eve of the Central American peace summit in Guatemala.	Non-activated conspiracy.
c. 24 October 1987	3 Montréal-area men charged after explosive device found on Vermont side of Canada-United States border.	Incident abortive, motives unclear.

GRAPHICAL SUMMARY,
CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST INCIDENTS AFFECTING CANADA,
1968-1987

Internal Groups

3.85%
11.54%
11.54%
73.08%

Emigre
Nat-Auto
Sub-Revolt
Other

External Groups

8.33%
16.67%
8.33%
8.33%
25.00%
33.33%

Emigre
Nat-Auto
Revolution
Sub-Revolt
Environmental
Guerrilla

C-1

Targets Attacked by Internal Groups

6.25%
6.25%
6.25%
3.12%

Diplomatic
Government
Business
Transportation
Other

78.12%

Targets Attacked by External Groups

21.43%
28.57%

14.29%

Government
Military
Business
Transportation
Other

7.14%

28.57%

Tactics Employed by Internal Groups

12.50%

3.12%

3.12%

15.62%

53.12%

12.50%

Legend:
- Bombing
- Assassination
- Assault
- Kidnapping
- Barr-Hostage
- Threat

Tactics Employed by External Groups

7.14%

42.86%

50.0%

Legend:
- Bombing
- Kidnapping
- Hijacking

C-3

SUMMARY OF CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM INCIDENTS AFFECTING CANADA, 1968-1987

GROUP	BOMBING		KIDNAP		ASSASSI-NATION		ASSAULT		BARRICADE		HIJACK		THREAT	
	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT	INT	EXT
EMIGRÉ	D7 B1 T1	G2	–	–	D3 O1	–	D5	–	D1	–	–	–	–	–
NATIONALIST-AUTONOMIST	D2	–	D1	O2 B2	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
REVOLUTIONARY	–	O1 G1	–	M1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
SUB-REVOLUTIONARY	D2 G1	B1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
ENVIRONMENTAL	–	G1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
GUERRILLA	–	–	–	B1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
OTHER	D1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNASSIGNED	D2	T1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	T1	D1 B1 O1 T1	–

LEGEND: Int – Internal   M – Military Targets
         Ext – External   B – Business Targets
         D – Diplomatic Targets   T – Transportation Targets
         G – Government Targets   O – Other Targets

ANNUAL SUMMARY,
CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM INCIDENTS AFFECTING
CANADA, 1968-1987

Year	Internal	External	Total
1968	1	1	2
1969	2	0	2
1970	1	1	2
1971	3	0	3
1972	4	2	6
1973	0	0	0
1974	2	0	2
1975	0	0	0
1976	1	1	2
1977	1	0	1
1978	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0
1980	2	0	2
1981	1	0	1
1982	4	2	6
1983	0	3	3
1984	2	0	2
1985	2	1	3
1986	6	2	8
1987	0	1	1
	32	14	46

International Terrorism Events Affecting Canada, 1968-1987

CIA/STATE DEPARTMENT STATISTICS
OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ATTACKS, 1968-1985

International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-80

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Kidnapping	1	6	43	30	16	45	43	57	34	40	39	30	17
Barricade-hostage	1	0	8	1	4	13	13	16	6	11	19	16	31
Letter bombing	3	4	5	1	306	58	18	5	15	17	12	23	3
Incendiary bombing	12	25	56	46	22	47	48	42	119	110	128	53	45
Explosive bombing	79	115	119	129	148	168	274	232	216	210	235	219	227
Armed attacks	12	13	8	9	13	16	31	21	21	21	40	22	51
Hijacking	3	12	24	10	16	7	10	5	6	9	6	29	36
Assassination	7	12	22	13	16	25	16	23	53	33	54	61	107
Sabotage	1	2	0	4	4	3	4	1	2	0	0	3	0
Exotic pollution	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	17	3	1
Threat	12	12	61	53	77	132	32	34	81	67	234	96	117
Theft, break-in	3	7	22	10	5	3	10	8	6	2	13	4	14
Conspiracy	4	4	7	2	3	21	14	9	7	6	16	13	15
Hoax	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	5	48
Other actions	0	0	4	8	8	3	9	10	7	11	17	20	20
Sniping	3	2	7	3	6	4	3	10	18	12	17	44	23
Shootout with police	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	3	6	0	0	3
Arms smuggling	1	0	2	4	4	16	3	1	3	7	3	16	2
Total	142	214	391	324	648	564	528	475	599	562	850	657	760

International Terrorist Incidents, 1981

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East/ North Africa	Asia	Pacific	Unknown	Total
Kidnapping	0	10	6	0	1	5	0	0	0	22
Barricade- hostage	3	13	12	0	1	3	0	0	0	32
Bombing[1]	12	25	89	1	9	33	1	0	0	170
Armed attacks	0	7	2	0	1	15	0	0	0	25
Hijacking[2]	4	9	2	8	1	3	5	0	0	32
Assassination[3]	2	7	30	4	3	20	3	1	0	70
Sabotage	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Exotic pollution	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Bombing (minor)	12	33	52	2	6	13	4	0	0	122
Threat	15	18	15	6	6	7	6	0	0	73
Theft, break-in	1	4	5	0	0	2	1	0	0	13
Hoax	34	17	18	3	1	6	5	1	0	85
Other[4]	5	12	17	1	3	22	2	0	1	63
Total	88	156	249	25	32	129	27	2	1	709

1. Bombings where damage or casualties, or where a group claimed responsibility

2. Hijackings of air, sea, or land transport.

3. Includes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by name.

4. Includes conspiracy, and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms smuggling.

Regional Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1982, by Type of Event

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Africa	Middle East	Asia	Pacific	Other	Total
Total	**61**	**172**	**343**	**16**	**18**	**122**	**53**	**5**	**4**	**794**
Kidnaping	0	12	1	0	5	10	3	0	0	31
Barricade-hostage	0	7	10	0	0	1	0	0	0	18
Bombing	24	58	203	3	3	28	15	3	0	337
Armed attack	0	4	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	7
Hijacking	4	5	0	7	1	6	7	0	0	30
Assassination [a]	5	2	21	1	6	6	4	1	0	46
Sniping	2	7	6	0	0	6	0	0	1	22
Threat, hoax	23	67	89	4	1	55	22	1	1	263
Other	3	10	12	1	2	8	2	0	2	40

[a] Includes attempts.

Number of incidents

International Terrorist Incidents, 1983

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East	Asia/ Pacific	Total
Total	**12**	**128**	**186**	**4**	**17**	**114**	**39**	**500**
Kidnaping		11	5		9	12	3	**40**
Barricade-hostage	1	20	9	1		1	3	**35**
Bombing	9	56	96	2	8	78	13	**262** [a]
Armed attack	1	17	20	1		19	10	**68** [b]
Hijacking		1	2			3		**6**
Arson	1	11	29				8	**49**
Other		12	25			1	2	**40**

[a] Includes three assassination incidents.
[b] Includes 36 assassination incidents.

F-3

International Terrorist Incidents, 1984

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Middle East	Sub-Saharan Africa	Asia/ Pacific	Total
Total	**5**	**81**	**232**	**1**	**205**	**45**	**28**	**597**
Armed attack	1	18	41	1	62	12	4	139
Armed occupation and barricade			2					2
Arson		3	39		14		1	57
Bombing	3	47	124		103	13	12	302
Hostagetaking and barricade		4			1		1	6
Kidnaping		5	2		16	17	6	46
Skyjacking		1	2		4	1	2	10
Other	1	3	22		5	2	2	35

International Terrorist Incidents, 1985

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Middle East	Sub-Saharan Africa	Asia/ Pacific	Total
Total	**4**	**119**	**218**	**2**	**357**	**41**	**41**	**782**
Armed attack		13	45		67	9	7	141
Arson	1	7	29		62	1	2	102
Bombing	2	76	129	2	160	9	21	399
Hostagetaking and barricade	1		1					2
Kidnaping		14			44	21	8	87
Nonaerial hijacking			1					1
Skyjacking			4		2			6
Other		9	9		22	1	3	44

Sources:

Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980, p. 8 (1968-80).
Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981, pp.2-3.
Patterns of International Terrorism: 1982, p. 8.
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983, p. 6.
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1984, p. 18.
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1985, p. 28.

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)

1. ORIGINATOR (the name and address of the organization preparing the document. Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Establishment sponsoring a contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in section B.) OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS OTTAWA, ONTARIO K1A OK2	2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION (overall security classification of the document. including special warning terms if applicable) UNCLASSIFIED

3. TITLE (the complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S,C,R or U) in parentheses after the title.)

COMTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON
                    CANADA (U)

4. AUTHORS (Last name, first name, middle initial. If military, show rank, e.g. Doe, Maj. John E.)

KELLETT, N. Anthony

5. DATE OF PUBLICATION (month and year of publication of document) FEBRUARY 1988	6a. NO. OF PAGES (total containing information. Include Annexes, Appendices, etc.)	6b. NO. OF REFS (total cited in document) 513

7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (the category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.)

FINAL REPORT

8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (the name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development. Include the address.) OPERATIONAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ESTABLISHMENT
          NATIONAL DEFENCE HEADQUARTERS
          OTTAWA, ONTARIO K1A OK2

9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable research and development project or grant number under which the document was written. Please specify whether project or grant) 45704	9b. CONTRACT NO. (if appropriate, the applicable number under which the document was written)

10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (the official document number by which the document is identified by the originating activity. This number must be unique to this document.) ORAE Report No. 100	10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NOS. (Any other numbers which may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor)

11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification)

(X) Unlimited distribution
( ) Distribution limited to defence departments and defence contractors; further distribution only as approved
( ) Distribution limited to defence departments and Canadian defence contractors; further distribution only as approved
( ) Distribution limited to government departments and agencies; further distribution only as approved
( ) Distribution limited to defence departments; further distribution only as approved
( ) Other (please specify):

12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in 11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.)

13. ABSTRACT (a brief and factual 'summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph (unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is bilingual).

Abstract

This report updates one published in 1981 (ORAE Report R78). Both examine trends in international terrorism, with particular reference to Canada.

This report is divided into four main parts. Part I outlines the background of the study and the methodology used in it (definitions, data bases, and so on). Part II illustrates trends in international terrorism around the world, notably with regard to terrorist groups, objectives, tactics, and targets, and outlines the potential for high-technology terrorism. Part III deals with Canada, and examines both domestic and international terrorism, again with emphasis on groups, tactics, and targets. This part is based on a chronology of terrorist incidents affecting Canada from 1968 to 1987. Although this report is intended as a threat analysis, Part IV puts the threat in context by examining governmental responses (in Canada and elsewhere) to international terrorism.

As a comparative study, this report details interesting similarities and differences between international terrorism in Canada and elsewhere in the world. Generally speaking, Canada follows global patterns in terms of tactics, but diverges from them with regard to group involvement and targeting. Within Canada international terrorism largely takes the form of emigre attacks upon the diplomatic community. The report concludes that existing patterns will probably persist, with some reduction in the frequency of incidents and a slightly increased tendency to issue-oriented and external attacks.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible, keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus. e.g. Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, CANADA
TERRORIST GROUPS
TERRORIST TACTICS
TERRORIST TARGETS
TRENDS