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THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE

by

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ABSTRACT

This Project Report surveys the issues which are of particular importance in helping policy planners and analysts understand current and future military developments in Ukraine and the region. In addition to covering military developments, the report provides an overview of the geopolitical, socio-economic, and political context of recent events in Ukraine in order to provide insights into the country's perceptions of its national interests and its capacity to implement national policy objectives. The report covers developments up to and including the end of July 1993.

RÉSUMÉ

Ce Rapport de projet offre un survol d'ensemble de l'Ukraine et des facteurs affectant significativement son développement. Il devrait contribuer à la compréhension des développements militaires actuels et futurs en Ukraine et dans son voisinage. Les éléments couverts ne sont pas seulement d'ordre militaire, mais aussi d'ordre géopolitique, socio-économique et politique. Un tel survol permet ainsi de mieux comprendre la perception qu'a l'Ukraine de ses intérêts nationaux et de mesurer la capacité de l'Ukraine à réaliser ses objectifs politiques nationaux. La période couverte va jusqu'à la fin juillet 1993.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study has stressed the centrality of Ukrainian-Russian relations in determining Ukraine's overall development, including the direction of military trends in this new state. In turn, the evolution of Russian-Ukrainian relations will have a very great impact on the stability of Eastern Europe.

Ukraine's policy towards Russia has been, as one would expect in the circumstances, largely reactive in nature. Ukraine has neither the traditions of diplomacy, nor the diplomatic infrastructure, which would allow it to pursue a consistent and sophisticated foreign policy. The relatively low level of socio-political cohesion in Ukrainian society, and strong regional differences in attitudes towards Russia, are also an impediment in this regard.

Russia finds itself in a much stronger position. However, Russia's policy towards Ukraine has been formed in a diplomatic vacuum. It has been based more on the inertia of attitudes based on old stereotypes, and a persistent "superpower" mentality, than on a clear perception of how best to foster Russia's national interests with respect to Ukraine and other independent states which arose on the basis of the former Soviet Union.

There were a few hopeful signs in mid-1993 that Russian-Ukrainian relations were becoming more stable, and Ukrainian President Kravchuk and Russian President Yeltsin have committed themselves to speed up work on a comprehensive political treaty between the two countries. In addition, some Russian statesmen realize that intemperate statements by Russian politicians on reviewing borders and claims to Crimea will only fuel a vicious cycle of nationalist rhetoric.

For example, Russia's Foreign Minister Kozyrev has admitted that such statements provided very ready ammunition for Ukrainian nationalist politicians who wish to hold on to the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory. This was confirmed by the reaction in Ukraine to the Russian parliament's proclamation, in July 1993, that the Crimean port city of Sevastopol was Russian territory.

This declaration may not prove to have a lasting impact on Russian-Ukrainian relations. However, it underlines the way in which the continuing constitutional crisis in Russia, and the unpredictable behaviour of its parliament, can have a chilling impact on Russian-Ukrainian relations. In fact, these relations will assume a fully civilized form only when both countries achieve a moderate level of political and socio-economic stability.

Both countries face tremendous challenges in achieving this goal, and some of these challenges are outlined in this study. Given the variety of problems facing both countries, and the difficulty of effectively dealing with them in conditions of a deteriorating economy and growing social dissatisfaction, they have managed to maintain a surprisingly high level of political stability since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there are numerous threats to the current domestic status quo in Russia and Ukraine. As a result, it is difficult to make effective predictions about the direction of future developments in these two states.

However, it is clear that an important precondition of healthy, stable relations between Russia and Ukraine, in the military as well as other spheres, is a stabilization of the socio-economic situation in both countries and the success of their economic reform programs. A continuing deterioration in this situation would facilitate, in both countries, the rise to power of authoritarian regimes which would be likely to search for external scapegoats to detract attention from local problems.

However, the behaviour and future development of Ukraine and Russia will also be greatly affected by the way in which they pursue certain state-building options. Here the choices both countries have faced in defining their new identities can be portrayed in terms of two different concepts of nationhood and citizenship.

One concept holds that the rights of a country's inhabitants and their national identity should be based on political criteria, and especially citizenship based on residence in the country. This approach, which argues that national identity should not be based on ethnic or linguistic criteria, provides the basis for Ukraine's citizenship policy. In accordance with this policy, Russians in Ukraine who do not speak Ukrainian are still regarded as citizens with all the rights of citizenship. This policy has helped to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts in Ukraine, and it is one of the few states in Eastern Europe which has maintained a high level of ethnic "peace."

The other concept maintains that citizenship should be based partly or largely on ethnic-linguistic criteria. Formally, citizenship in the Russian Federation is not based on such criteria. However, the approach which most Russians, including many Russian politicians, have adopted concerning Crimea and the Russian diaspora in general is largely based on this ethnic-linguistic concept of citizenship. In accordance with this concept, in those regions where Russians (or Russian-speakers) living abroad form a majority (or, in some cases, even a large minority) of the population, they have the right to secede from the country in which they find themselves, and join Russia.

For Russia's neighbours, including Ukraine, the danger inherent in the popularity of this concept in Russia is accentuated by the "legacy of empire" in this country. Namely, there is a continuing (and increasingly vociferous) debate in Russia over whether the lands inhabited by Russians (or Russian-speakers) outside the Russian Federation are part of the "real" Russia, and are fated to be "re-united" with the "homeland." Russia's

President Yeltsin appears to prefer a non-imperial future for Russia, but many senior Russian politicians, including some of Yeltsin's advisors, see a definite continuity between Russia's old hegemonic role in the Soviet Union and Russia's new role in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

The stance of the military will be important in determining the state-building options taken by Russia and Ukraine, and their success. In the conditions of uncertainty which prevail in these countries those in possession of the means of coercion, and in particular the armed forces, are in a position to exert a very great influence on the domestic political process. In the case of Russia, the military's prestige was greatly damaged after some of its senior officers participated in the abortive coup of August 1991, and the leadership of the Russian Armed Forces (RAF) has not shown any signs of wanting to seize political power. However, in 1992-93 the Russian military did not come under a clear and well-defined system of civilian authority. Instead Yeltsin took a number of steps to accommodate the interests of the military, and on occasion he and some of his major opponents even appeared to compete for its favour.

As a result, Russia's military leaders are showing a growing inclination to speak out on national political issues, and have also become increasingly involved in local and regional politics. This has been reflected in the Russian military leadership's stance on the issue of the protection of Russians abroad (in Moldova, the Baltic states, and Abkhazia), on the fate of Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, and the future of the Kurile Islands. On some of these issues the Russian military's actions have pre-empted the normal pattern of foreign policy decision-making, and the military's self-perceived mission appears to be the gradual revival of Russia as a great power.

This substitution of Russian nationalism for Marxism-Leninism as a legimitating ideology for the RAF has helped to provide the Russian military with a sense of mission. However, the growing influence of intolerant forms of Russian nationalism in the ranks of the RAF, and the willingness of its leaders to support a Russian imperial role in the former Soviet Union, has led to great and understandable concern among Russia's neighbours.

Ukraine's military finds itself in a very different situation. The initial steps taken to create the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) were remarkably free of conflict. However, Ukraine's military leadership then faced the task of trying to build a cohesive national army on the basis of an officer corps which was largely non-Ukrainian. Many (if not most) of these officers had a very limited commitment to the defence of the territory on which they happened to be located when Ukraine declared its independence. And although many of the officers who were least interested in serving in the UAF have probably left its ranks, legitimate doubts concerning the loyalty of many of those who continued to serve remain. This helps explain the strong emphasis in Ukraine on inculcating a sense of patriotism among servicemen through the work of the UAF's Social-Psychological Service. It also explains the Ukrainian military leadership's tolerance

of the activities of the Union of Officers of Ukraine, a pressure group representing military officers in Ukraine which supports the idea of a strong patriotic and state-building role for the UAF.

In short, one can regard the formation and development of the UAF as one of the most important "case studies" of the state-building process in Ukraine. Many problems have accompanied this process. Most significantly, dissatisfaction in the ranks of the UAF has grown as the socio-economic status of its servicemen deteriorates. In addition, many of the flaws inherent in the very rapid pace of the restructuring of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory have become increasingly apparent in the last year.

The final results of this massive but relatively peaceful "experiment" in building a new military force on the basis of a large part of the old Soviet Armed Forces will not be known for some time. However, the Ukrainian military is considerably less politicized than the Russian military. In addition, the Union of Officers of Ukraine appears to be indirectly controlled by officials of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence.

Significantly, there are few indications that military officers in Ukraine are prepared to intervene in the political process, or are even interested in doing so. The main exceptions involve some officers serving in the Black Sea Fleet, and certain officers who have decided to engage in open protests to publicize their deteriorating living standards.

As for the deputies who are serving military officers, they have not played a very active role in the Ukrainian Supreme Council, and their presence in the Ukrainian parliament is a result of the anomalies of the old Soviet electoral system. Thus the further consolidation of the UAF will depend on whether the socio-economic situation in Ukraine can be stabilized, and on whether the process of restructuring these forces can proceed in the absence of military conflicts with neighbouring states.

In terms of the external challenges facing Ukraine and its armed forces, military conflicts with Ukraine's western neighbours (Poland, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, and Hungary) are unlikely. However, they cannot be excluded, and could be precipitated either by disputes over borders and the treatment of minorities, or a general political crisis in the region. Such a crisis could be caused, for example, by an expansion of the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

However, a much more concrete security threat has emerged in the east, on the part of Russia and its potential allies among the CIS states which have signed a collective security agreement. The Ukrainian leadership's concerns about this threat are very real. They were reflected in the speed with which it set up the framework for Ukraine's armed forces in the fall of 1991, and quickly subordinated the troops on its territory to Ukraine's jurisdiction.

In 1992-93 Ukraine's concerns were heightened by the Russian military's involvement in combat actions in Moldova and Abkhazia, and frequent statements by Russian politicians on treating the entire geopolitical space of the USSR as a sphere of Russia's vital interests. Other developments of concern to Ukraine's leaders included numerous statements, by senior Russian politicians, in which they put forth claims to Crimea, and indications that Russia could readily use economic pressure to bring a recalcitrant Ukraine "to heel."

All of these developments occurred at a time when Ukraine was heavily preoccupied with the difficult process of state-building which, on the surface, appeared to be quite successful. However, unlike Russia, Ukraine did not inherit a diplomatic and foreign trade infrastructure which allowed it to rapidly emerge onto the world stage. Ukraine also lacked strong diplomatic traditions because of its limited experience of modern statehood. Ukraine was more poorly prepared for independence than even the Baltic states, for independence was achieved much earlier than most Ukrainian politicians had expected, and few preparations for this event had been made.

Nonetheless, the Ukrainian political elite was determined to take full advantage of the "window of opportunity" which emerged after 1991 to establish and entrench Ukraine's sovereignty. However, given current trends in Russia and the historical legacy of Ukrainian-Russian relations, this determination was combined with a strong and persistent fear that Ukraine would be unable to fully break away from Moscow's "embrace" and thus ran the risk of again being relegated to the role of a parochial backwater of Europe. This fear was accentuated by a keen awareness of the country's long history of domination by foreign powers, especially Russia, and its many domestic weaknesses. The latter included not only a wide array of economic problems, but the ambiguous attitudes concerning the country's independence of some of Ukraine's citizens, especially in the country's southern and eastern regions.

These feelings of uncertainty and insecurity were heightened by a strong perception in Ukraine that Western leaders and public opinion had little knowledge of the country and generally considered it to be a quaint but unimportant region on the periphery of Russia. In these circumstances Ukraine's "assets" on the international stage were very limited. This helps explain its leaders' emphasis on building up a strong military by taking advantage of the large volume of Soviet military equipment located on Ukrainian territory when it declared independence. Another reason for this emphasis was a residue of the traditional Soviet mindset, with its emphasis on the importance of possessing a powerful military, among Ukraine's leaders.

Last but not least, the stress on rapidly creating a military force was also the result of the perceived need to quickly subordinate the Soviet troops on Ukrainian soil to a new authority following Ukraine's declaration of independence. Here the lessons of the country's experience during the post-1917 period may have had an impact on Ukrainian decisionmakers. During this turbulent period Ukraine was the site of prolonged and

devastating fratricidal conflict among a variety of contending military groups, including several regional otamany (warlords).

However, the Ukrainian authorities certainly underestimated the costs of maintaining a large and powerful military force, and may well have overestimated the benefits. According to one estimate, almost 20% of Ukraine's state budget is consumed by military-related expenditures (this figure does not include expenditures on conversion). If this estimate is correct, than Ukraine is carrying an enormous military burden at a time when its economy is facing very major difficulties.

Ukraine's leaders would probably argue that no-one can set a price on their country's national security. However, there is little evidence that these leaders have tried to conduct even a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis of military expenditures, and are ready to implement cutbacks in the military budget based on such an analysis.

Assessing the benefits of maintaining a large military establishment in Ukraine is, of course, a more difficult task. However, one reason why Ukraine has not hurried to eliminate all nuclear weapons on its territory is the leadership's fear that, in doing so, it would quickly lose the attention of the West. There is a widespread perception that Ukraine is taken into account by the West only because of the nuclear weapons on its territory. This reasoning may appear simplistic. However, in spite of vigorous claims to the contrary by various foreign officials, the nuclear weapons issue does appear to be the main reason why Ukraine received so much attention from the West in 1993.

If Ukraine is drawn into closer cooperation with various Western states, receives some form of credible security assurances from them, and begins to receive some of the attention and respect which Ukrainian leaders feel it deserves, this may lead to a decrease in their perceived need to maintain a strong military and, in particular, the potential for a nuclear weapons capability. There are some indications that Western states have begun to understand and react to Ukraine's desire for greater attention. Thus a number of foreign dignitaries visited Kiev in June 1993, and a NATO seminar entitled "European Security: The Central European Component" was held in Kiev in early July 1993. In addition, Ukrainian Defence Minister Morozov held a number of important meetings with senior U.S. officials during a visit to Washington in late July 1993. Following his return to Ukraine Morozov expressed great satisfaction over the results of his trip.

However, Ukrainian officials sometimes exaggerate the extent of the Western lack of interest in Ukraine, and tend to ignore or misinterpret some of the reasons for Western concerns about developments in Ukraine. These officials often stress the political stability of Ukraine, and contrast it to the political instability of Russia. However, the relative calm in Ukraine is partly due to the maintenance of the political status quo in local politics, which means that many members of the former communist nomenklatura still wield a great deal of power in the country. In addition, the Ukrainian government has yet to prove that it can come up with an energetic and effective economic reform plan,

and labour unrest and public dissatisfaction caused by deteriorating living standards are growing. The political and economic crises gripping Ukraine in the summer of 1993 have done little to inspire confidence in the future of the country, and one cannot exclude the possibility of the introduction of some form of authoritarian rule in Ukraine.

Ukraine has also shown an inability to clearly and effectively present a case for increased attention and foreign assistance from the West. This is partly due to a lack of foreign policy experience, and a lack of hard currency to support a strong presence abroad. However, in spite of these limitations Ukraine could do much more to gain friends and understanding in the West. In some areas progress is slowly being made, and Ukraine's foreign ministry is beginning to learn from some of its past mistakes. For example, in July 1993 Ukraine was able to mobilize considerable Western support for a condemnation of the Russian parliament's declaration that the Crimean city of Sevastopol was Russian territory.

Ukraine's politicians should resist the temptation to continuously complain about Western attitudes towards Ukraine, and avoid abusing the argument of Russian interference in Ukraine's affairs to explain away the country's domestic difficulties. Ultimately Ukraine's future, and the way it is perceived in the West, will be determined by its leaders' ability to minimize its internal weaknesses, and ensure that it is integrated into a wide range of European and global institutions. If their efforts in this regard are met with understanding and support from the West, Ukraine will gradually solidify its status as a new and potentially valuable member of the European community.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BSF:	Black Sea Fleet
CEESSA:	Central and Eastern European Stability and Security Area
CIS:	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSCE:	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CP:	Communist Party
DMSSR:	Dniester Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic
FSU:	Former Soviet Union
MIC:	Military-Industrial Complex
MOD:	Ministry of Defence
NPT:	Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
R&D:	Research and Development
RAF:	Russian Armed Forces
SAF:	Soviet Armed Forces
SBU:	Sluzhba Bezbeky Ukrainy (Security Service of Ukraine)
UOU:	Union of Officers of Ukraine
UOUD:	Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora
UAF:	Ukrainian Armed Forces
UNSO:	Ukrains'ka National'na Samooborona (Ukrainian People's Self-Defence Forces)
UPA:	Ukrains'ka Povstans'ka Armiia (Ukrainian Insurgent Army)

N.B. Ukraine is a unitary (rather than federal) state. However, it is divided into administrative units called *oblasti* (singular: *oblast*). The term *nomenklatura* refers to members of the former Soviet elite who had to be approved by the Communist Party before they were appointed to their positions.

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This Project Report was prepared under contract by John Jaworsky, Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. It presents his views on a topic of potential interest to the Department. The publication of this Project Report confirms the interest in the topic, but does not necessarily signify endorsement of the paper's content or agreement with its conclusion. Project Reports are published for information purposes and to stimulate discussion.

OTTAWA, CANADA AUGUST 1993

THE MILITARY-STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Prior to the late 1980s most Western observers considered the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to be a peaceful and obedient backwater of the Soviet Union. Interest in this republic gradually grew as the drive for greater autonomy (and eventually independence) gained force in Ukraine. It increased most dramatically however after the abortive coup attempt of August 1991 and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Minsk, on 8 December 1991.

2. Ukraine played a very significant role in the creation of the CIS for on 1 December 1991, in a referendum in which a large percentage (84.2%) of the eligible voting public participated, 90.3% of these voters supported independence for Ukraine.[1] Before this vote most senior Russian politicians had hoped that Ukraine could still be persuaded to join a "renewed union" of some kind. Most of the other former republics had been prepared to sign the latest version of the Union treaty proposed by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the fall of 1991.

3. However, even prior to the referendum on independence it had become clear that Ukraine's President Kravchuk and his domestic supporters were strongly opposed to all talk of a renewed union or to the establishment of structures which could, over time, lead to the recreation of such a union among the Soviet successor states. Thus the agreement

reached in Minsk was a hasty compromise. It was based largely on a perceived need to maintain some form of association among the former republics of the USSR which included Ukraine, the second most important of these former republics.

4. These political developments were accompanied by a series of rapid measures aimed at establishing independent armed forces for Ukraine following the coup attempt of August 1991. This surprised and confused many observers in the West, and also disconcerted the senior commanders of the Soviet Armed Forces (SAF).[2] In the fall of 1991 these commanders were still determined to maintain a unified SAF, and did not appear to take efforts to establish the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) very seriously. However, the Ukrainian leadership accelerated its program for the development of the UAF following the formation of the CIS.

5. This focus on quickly developing an armed force and a distinctive Ukrainian defence policy was part of the overall process of state-building in this new member of the international community. Ukraine has had no experience of independent statehood in modern times with the exception of a brief and chaotic period following the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. In addition, Ukraine possessed only a bogus form of sovereignty in the highly centralized USSR. Thus the idea of an independent Ukrainian state was a novelty not only to Western observers and politicians in Moscow, but to many residents of Ukraine as well.

6. As a result, the process of quickly acquiring the most significant attributes of statehood was given high priority in Ukraine. This included engaging in various forms of diplomatic activity, and gaining membership in a wide range of international organizations. Since establishing and maintaining an independent military capability remains an important component of sovereignty in the international state system, this became a top priority.

7. The high profile of military issues in Ukraine from the fall of 1991 on can also be explained by the presence of large numbers of Soviet military personnel on Ukrainian territory after the August 1991 coup attempt. They could have posed a strong threat to Ukraine's sovereignty if they had not been rapidly subordinated, through clear lines of authority, to the Ukrainian government. In this context the politicians who pushed for Ukraine's independence frequently mention the disastrous consequences of the failure to organize a strong Ukrainian army during the turbulent civil war period of 1918-1920.

8. Since 1991 numerous controversies have surrounded the fate of the assets of the former SAF and the future of the nuclear arms in Ukraine. Western governments and the media have devoted considerable attention to these developments, and the strategic studies community is keenly interested in their implications. It is now clear, for example, that the key to the success (or failure) of the CIS, and one of the most important factors affecting regional security, will be the Russian-Ukrainian relationship. And although relations between Ukraine and Russia are affected by a wide range of factors, issues related to the

establishment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have provoked many of the sharpest disputes between these two states.

9. There is a notable lack of analysis of military developments in Ukraine. However, these developments cannot be fully understood outside of the broader context in which they took place. Thus the first aim of this study is to provide an overview of the geopolitical, socio-economic, and political context of recent events in Ukraine, in order to provide insights into the country's perceptions of its national interests and its capacity to implement national policy objectives. The second aim is to provide an overview of those military issues which are of particular importance in understanding the current and future development of the UAF. Here the focus will be on the relationship between the Ukrainian and Russian/Commonwealth forces, the factors influencing defence policy formulation in Ukraine, and the implications of developments in Ukraine for regional security.

II. GEOPOLITICAL AND ETHNO-DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT

GEOPOLITICS

10. Ukraine has a moderate continental climate, abundant natural resources, and rich soil (chernozem) covering most of its territory. Ukraine also straddles many of the main routes, north of the Black Sea, between Europe and Asia, and this strategic position has left it vulnerable to incursions from both the East and West. This vulnerability is enhanced by a lack of natural geographical boundaries, for as a recent history of Ukraine points out,

> Except for the Carpathian Mountains in the west and the small Crimean range in the south, 95% of Ukraine's territory is a plain that gradually slopes from the elevated, wooded plateau of Galicia, Volhynia, and Podilia in the northwest down to the gently rolling, forested plains on both sides of the Dnieper River and finally to the huge, flat, open steppe that stretches along the Black Sea coast in the south.[3]

11. As a result of its strategic position and rich natural resources, over the centuries the territory of Ukraine has been bitterly contested by its neighbours. In particular, Ukraine was a major arena of conflict in both world wars of this century, during which it suffered great devastation and loss of human life.

12. After World War II Ukraine continued to play a major role in the Soviet Union's military contingency plans. Ukraine was divided into the strategically significant Carpathian, Odessa, and Kiev military districts, and because of its location the Carpathian military district was given a particularly important role as the "policeman" of south-eastern Europe.[4] The SAF troops in Ukraine were considered to be well trained and highly combat-capable, and it is generally assumed that much of the Soviet Union's most advanced weaponry was located in Ukraine.[5]

13. Ukraine's geopolitical position is less significant today than in the immediate postwar period because of the changing nature of modern warfare. However, for most Russians, Ukraine is much more than simply a strategic space and one of Russia's "windows to the West." The dominant trend in Russian political thought has been to consider Ukraine as "Little Russia," part of a larger ("Greater") Russian nation that also includes Belarus.[6]

14. As a result, most Russians feel that "losing" Ukraine means losing part of their heritage and identity. As one Russian commentator noted, "It is doubtful that anyone would dispute that the most painful act in the collapse of the former [Soviet] Union was the separation of Ukraine."[7] Thus even Russian politicians with liberal-democratic credentials have had a great deal of difficulty coming to terms with the reality of the USSR's dissolution and an independent Ukraine.[8] According to a Western correspondent most Russian officials believe that Ukrainian independence is a temporary phenomenon, and that Ukraine (and Belarus) will one day return to "Moscow's embrace."[9]

15. The special affinity which Russians feel for their Ukrainian "younger cousins" explains much of the rancour which has pervaded Russian-Ukrainian relations in recent months, for Ukraine's "defection" from the Russian sphere of influence is seen by many Russians almost as a family betrayal. In turn, most Ukrainian politicians resent not being treated as an equal by their Russian counterparts, whose attitude towards Ukraine is often highly patronizing. Thus Ukraine's leaders have been very reluctant to agree to the creation of any CIS structures which would even remotely represent the recreation of the old centre in a new guise -- in other words, the reimposition of Russian dominance.

16. Russian policies towards Ukraine have assumed particular importance in view of the large Russian minority in Ukraine, and a vociferous campaign in the Russian Federation to defend the rights of all Russians in the former USSR. Thus one of the Ukrainian government's priorities has been to develop a minority policy which will diminish the possibility of ethnic conflicts in Ukraine.

MINORITIES AND MINORITY ISSUES

17. Ukraine is a multinational state, and the percentage of the total population (slightly more than 51.4 million individuals in 1989) identifying itself as Ukrainians has been slowly decreasing over time, from 74.9% in 1970 to 73.6% in 1979, and 72.7% (slightly over 37.4 million individuals) in 1989.[10] At the same time, the percentage of the residents of Ukraine identifying themselves as Russians (by far the largest minority) has slowly increased, from 19.4% in 1970 to 21.1% in 1979, and 22.1% (almost 11.4 million individuals) in 1989.

18. According to the 1989 population census other minorities in Ukraine include Jews (486,000, although it is estimated that, by the end of 1992, only 320,000 remained in Ukraine as a result of emigration);[11] Belarusians (440,000); Moldovans (324,000); Bulgarians (233,000); Poles (219,000); Hungarians (163,000); and Romanians (134,000). These minorities are relatively small; however, in a few cases they are heavily concentrated in territories adjacent to states dominated by fellow countrymen.

19. Thus, although large numbers of Russians can be found throughout most of Ukraine, they are heavily urbanized, and concentrated in the industrial regions of eastern Ukraine bordering on Russia. The Moldovans (culturally Romanians) and Romanians mostly live on territories (the Bessarabian part of Odessa oblast and Chernivtsi oblast) which were once part of Romania, and most of the Hungarians live in the Zakarpats'ka (Transcarpathian) oblast, which belonged to the Czechoslovak Republic in the interwar period and now shares borders with both Slovakia and Hungary. The Polish population is more scattered, but many Poles live in several oblasts of Western Ukraine which were part of interwar Poland.

20. The Ukrainian government's treatment of these and other minorities is of importance for two reasons. First, inter-ethnic conflicts could play a major role in destabilizing the Ukrainian state and increasing inter-state tensions in the region, especially if neighbouring states were to intervene on behalf of their fellow countrymen.

Second, the nature of government policy towards minorities reflects its level of tolerance of pluralism and its commitment to liberal-democratic principles. Thus one of the ways in which the USSR's successor states are being judged by the world community (and especially western states) is in their treatment of minority ethnic groups.

21. The Ukrainian legislature and government have taken a number of steps to reassure ethnic minorities of their legal status and cultural freedom in Ukraine, and to date their record in regard to treatment of minorities has been quite positive. Thus in July 1990, in the legislature's Declaration on the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, a commitment was made to respect the national rights of all the peoples of Ukraine, and the section on citizenship guaranteed equality before the law to all citizens of Ukraine regardless of their ancestry and racial or national identity. In its provisions on cultural development the declaration asserted that: "The Ukrainian SSR [...] guarantees to all nationalities living on the territory of the republic the right to free national and cultural development."[12]

22. This was followed by the establishment in July 1991 of a Committee of Nationalities, attached to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers, which was to monitor the implementation of laws on minority issues and help fulfill the social and cultural needs of Ukraine's national minorities. In November 1991 the Ukrainian parliament unanimously adopted a declaration guaranteeing all citizens equal political, economic, social, and cultural rights. And, finally, a legislative base for Ukraine's minority policy was established on 25 June 1992 when the Ukrainian Supreme Council adopted a law "On National Minorities in Ukraine."

23. All major political parties in Ukraine supported this legislation, which states that the languages of ethnic groups residing compactly in particular territories will have coequal status with Ukrainian.[13] In addition, Ukraine's draft constitution contains numerous provisions guaranteeing the rights of minorities in Ukraine.[14] Most recently, on 26 April 1993, Ukraine's President Kravchuk issued a decree on the creation of a new

Ministry of Nationality Affairs and Migration on the basis of the above-mentioned Committee of Nationalities. To head this ministry Kravchuk appointed a well-respected jurist, Oleksandr Yemets, who had earlier served as Kravchuk's senior advisor on legal-political affairs.

24. Kravchuk and many other senior politicians have repeatedly denounced all forms of xenophobia and ethnic chauvinism (including anti-Semitism) in Ukraine, and have consistently spoken out in favour of a state based on the principle of equal citizenship for all, regardless of their ethnic background. Thus there is no evidence of the use of an "ethnic key" in appointments to senior government positions. The appointment, in November 1992, of Ivan Dziuba as Ukraine's Minister of Culture also bodes well for the treatment of minorities, for he has been a prominent and consistent supporter of extensive rights for national minorities, and a determined opponent of all forms of ethnic intolerance.[15]

25. However, the deterioration of Ukraine's economic situation in 1992 made it difficult for the government to fulfill its commitment to provide financial support for ethnocultural minorities. There is a shortage of teachers qualified to teach many minority languages, and ethnic minorities often have difficulty finding facilities in which they can conduct cultural-educational activities. They also lack the financial resources to publish materials in their native languages, and have often found little understanding and cooperation from officials at the local level.[16] Thus the First All-Ukrainian Conference of National-Cultural Societies of Ukraine, held in February 1993, called for an increase in state funding for minority organizations.[17]

26. There are other grounds for concern in the area of inter-ethnic relations. The relative ethnic harmony which has prevailed to date could be threatened if "Ukrainization" policies (i.e. measures to promote the Ukrainian language and culture to compensate for its neglect in the past) are implemented in a rapid and injudicious fashion. In particular, some critics have warned that the use of crude administrative measures to enforce

Ukrainization will prove to be counterproductive.[18] In addition, the quality of the debate on minority rights in Ukraine has often been degraded by a naive approach to this topic which is reflected in the statements of government officials. They often exclude the very possibility of any conflict between citizens' individual rights and the collective rights of ethnic minorities, although such conflicts are found in all multinational states, including Canada.[19]

27. Last but not least, many non-Ukrainians have voiced concerns about recent attempts by advocates of extremist forms of Ukrainian nationalism (largely based in Western Ukraine) to strengthen and broaden their base of public support.[20] This base is still quite small; however, the circulation of publications with a radical nationalist character and the activities of nationalist paramilitary forces increased in 1992 and 1993. This may lead to the alienation of ethnic minorities, as well as many Russian-speaking Ukrainians, from the cause of an independent Ukrainian state.[21]

28. Nonetheless, a report summarizing developments in the CIS in the last quarter of 1992 concluded that "More than one year after independence Ukraine remains a model of inter-ethnic accord in spite of a very large Russian minority on its territory."[22] In addition, the most recent report of the United States Congress' Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe states that

> Ukraine's treatment of its minorities has been encouraging, and Ukraine, unlike many other former Soviet republics, has been largely untouched by ethnic conflict. To date, inter-ethnic stability has been maintained.[23]

The same report states that "Ukraine has made considerable progress in its pledge to respect CSCE and other international human rights commitments."[24] Thus, at a crucial stage in the state-building process a socio-political climate has been created in Ukraine which has helped to make the expression of xenophobic views unpopular, and this has hampered the growth of extremist nationalist organizations. However, given the deteriorating socio-economic situation in Ukraine, there is no guarantee that these political efforts to ensure inter-ethnic peace will continue to be successful.

29. The three minority groups (i.e. Russians, Jews and Crimean Tatars) which have attracted the greatest attention in recent months are dealt with below. Other minorities will be discussed in the context of Ukraine's relations with their homelands.

30. Russians in Ukraine. In the 1989 census 22.1% of the population of Ukraine identified itself as Russian, and this is by far the largest and most significant minority in Ukraine. The attitudes and political behaviour of this population are of particular importance because of the great interest shown by Russian politicians, and the Russian population at large, in the fate of the Russian diaspora in the former Soviet Union.

31. The Russian minority is heavily concentrated in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, although the only area in which Russians formed a demographic majority (67%) of the population in 1989 was Crimea. Nonetheless, in the past, the Russians in Ukraine (with the exception of the western oblasts) were, in many respects, a "psychological" majority because of tsarist and Soviet policies which provided the Russian population in Ukraine with a full range of Russian-language facilities to satisfy its cultural and educational needs. At the same time, the spheres in which the Ukrainian language was used were gradually narrowed and it was implicitly treated as a rural, "peasant" language.[25] Over time this image of the "inferior" nature of the Ukrainian language and culture was internalized by many Ukrainians, especially in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.[26]

32. As a result, in 1989 59.5% of Ukrainians in Ukraine were fluent in Russian and approximately 12.3% considered Russian their native language, whereas 1.6% of Russians in Ukraine considered Ukrainian their native language, and only 32.8% were fluent in Ukrainian. In addition, over time Russian became the dominant language of government bureaucracy, with the partial exception of western Ukraine.[27]

33. Ukrainian has now become the official state language of Ukraine; however, extensive Russian-language rights have been guaranteed and to date the Ukrainian

government's "Ukrainization" measures have been quite modest. Generally, when concerns about Ukrainization are raised they relate to future rather than current policies. This is illustrated by the very limited changes, to date, in the status and role of the Russian language in the Ukrainian educational system. For example, not a single Ukrainian school has been opened in Crimea, and there are almost no Ukrainian schools in the major urban centres of eastern and southern Ukraine.[28] The activities of overzealous Ukrainian language advocates have been criticized in the press, and some Russians in Western Ukraine have complained that the Russian language is being squeezed out of public usage.[29] However, in January 1993 the Russian ambassador to Ukraine stated that he was not aware of any examples of forced Ukrainization.[30]

34. Nonetheless, even if they are carried out very cautiously, some resistance to Ukrainization measures is inevitable. Thus, in a major survey conducted in May 1992, only 33% of Russian respondents in Ukraine felt that Ukrainian should be the main language of instruction in the school system, although 55% agreed that it should be mandatory as a subject.[31] Another opinion poll showed that 94% of Russians in Kiev felt that Russian should become an official state language.[32] However, concerns about possible discrimination against non-Ukrainians have been partly assuaged by the appointment of a considerable number of non-Ukrainians (primarily Russians) to senior positions in both the central and local governments, as well as in non-governmental institutions.

35. Leadership on this issue has been demonstrated by Ukraine's President Kravchuk, who has consistently spoken out against any expressions of intolerance with respect to Russians in Ukraine, and by Ukraine's Prime Minister Kuchma, who worked for many years in the highly russified city of Dnipropetrovs'k. Kuchma is more comfortable speaking in Russian than in Ukrainian, and has strongly stressed professional competence in his appointments. He has persistently underlined the importance of maintaining good ties with Moscow, and has criticized anti-Russian rhetoric which could affect these relations.

36. Thus attempts to mobilize the Russian population of Ukraine for political action along ethnic lines have had a limited impact outside Crimea, and the great majority of the Russian population of Ukraine supported Ukrainian independence in the December 1991 referendum.[33] In a survey conducted in all regions of Ukraine in May 1992, 74% of the Russian respondents favoured maintaining the integrity of Ukraine's borders, while only 11% thought the borders should be reexamined (15% had no opinion or did not respond to the question).[34]

37. Public opinion in the former Soviet Union (FSU) has been quite volatile, and the allegiance of Russians in Ukraine to their country of residence will, to a certain extent, depend on the situation in Russia. Stabilization of the political and economic situation in Ukraine, and political-economic instability in Russia, would ensure the loyalty of most of the Russian population of Ukraine. However, if the reverse takes place much of the Russian population in Ukraine could end up playing the role of a "fifth column" in any Russian-Ukrainian confrontation.[35]

38. In particular, there was growing dissatisfaction with the policies of the Ukrainian government in eastern and southern Ukraine in late 1992 and 1993. It was accompanied by an increase in the activity of organizations calling for greater autonomy for these regions and a federal structure for Ukraine, closer ties with Russia as well as the introduction of dual Ukrainian-Russian citizenship, increased levels of integration within the CIS, and greater privileges for Russian as a second official language in Ukraine.[36]

39. Jews in Ukraine. Given considerable concern in the West about the vigour of antisemitism in Eastern Europe, and the extent to which it is considered an indicator of intolerant, anti-democratic tendencies in a given society, Ukraine's recent record in this regard is quite laudable. It is difficult to assess the level of popular antisemitism, which is still widespread in Ukraine. However, according to one study on antisemitism in the CIS, "Recent research indicates that there is less popular antisemitism in Ukraine than in Russia, Belorussia, the northern Caucasus and Central Asia."[37]

40. In addition, relatively few organizations or publications in Ukraine have been involved in actively spreading anti-Jewish propaganda. This is in clear contrast to the existence of numerous such organizations and publications in Russia and Belorussia,[38] and President Kravchuk, as well as many other respected politicians in Ukraine, have strongly condemned all expressions of anti-Semitism. Kravchuk has encouraged close ties between Ukraine and Israel, and was the first leader of a CIS state to visit Israel in January 1993. In turn Ukraine has hosted a number of senior officials from Israel, including the head of the Israeli parliament.[39]

41. The number of anti-Semitic acts in Ukraine appeared to increase in 1992. This coincided with the greater activity of extremist Ukrainian nationalist organizations, and a growth in the number of publications in Ukraine promoting radical forms of nationalism.[40] This, and the deteriorating socio-economic situation in Ukraine, contributed to the continuing emigration of Jews from Ukraine during 1992.[41] However, because there is still relatively little public anti-Semitism in Ukraine, Jewish emigration from Ukraine has remained constant. In contrast, Jewish emigration from Russia increased considerably in 1992 because of the rapid growth of anti-Semitism in that country.[42]

42. Crimean Tatars. One small but important minority group which has expressed growing grievances concerning its situation in Ukraine is the Crimean Tatars, who were deported en masse from the Crimean peninsula to Soviet Central Asia during World War II. After Stalin's death, and following the political "rehabilitation" of the Crimean Tatars in 1967, many of the deportees and their children attempted to return to Crimea. However, they were prevented from doing so, and until the late 1980s most of the small number who reached Crimea were again forcibly expelled from its territory.[43]

43. A considerable number of Crimean Tatars (some 40,000 in 1991 alone)[44] have returned to their homeland in the last several years, and pressures to resettle have grown as they feel less welcome in Central Asia due to the growth of local nationalism there.[45] On 1 May 1993, 218,000 Crimean Tatars were officially registered as residents of

Crimea, and approximately 50,000 were living there without registration. In all, they represented approximately 10% of the Crimean population, and an additional 42,000 will probably arrive in Crimea by the end of 1993.[46] However, local officials in Crimea have been slow to provide the new settlers with land, housing, and other services, and the Crimean Tatars have complained about various forms of discrimination. They include numerous anti-Tatar articles and commentaries in the Crimean media, and the diversion by local authorities of money which was alloted by the central Ukrainian authorities for their resettlement to other purposes. These complaints appear to be justified.[47]

44. The central Ukrainian government has generally supported Crimean Tatar resettlement in their homeland, and most of the Crimean Tatar leaders have stressed that they see their future in Ukraine. Thus they support Kiev in its disputes with local politicians and separatist forces in Crimea. However, the Crimean Tatars have also demanded national-territorial autonomy within Ukraine. Their leaders, impatient with Kiev's unwillingness to grant such autonomy, have repeatedly called on the Ukrainian authorities to more clearly define their position on this issue.[48]

45. Until recently the Crimean Tatars used only peaceful means to bring attention to their situation. However, after they organized a wave of demonstrations in September 1992 protesting mistreatment by the Crimean authorities, tensions escalated in October 1992. The local security organs used force to break up an illegal Tatar campsite, and the Tatars responded with a violent demonstration before the Crimean parliament.[49]

46. The Ukrainian government has continued to stress its general commitment to the cause of the Crimean Tatars and their resettlement in Crimea. It has, for example, made concessions to the Crimean Tatars by permitting draft deferrals to potential conscripts who recently moved to Crimea and are building dwellings for their families. It has also permitted a certain number of Crimean Tatar conscripts to join construction battalions, stationed in Crimea, which will be involved in similar construction work.[50] However, in some other respects the Ukrainian government has played down its support for the

Crimean Tatar community. This was done to avoid exacerbating relations with the political leaders of Crimea, and contributing to separatist sentiments among its majority Russian population. Thus in October 1992 Ukrainian President Kravchuk and Crimean leader Bagrov jointly condemned the recent use of violence by Crimean Tatars, although they had shown a great deal of patience when faced with the provocative behaviour of the local Crimean authorities.

47. The patience of the Crimean Tatars is now wearing thin. Analysts in Kiev who follow this issue feel that the Crimean Tatar leaders, who tend to be political moderates, will have some difficulty restraining the younger activists in their community who are increasingly advocating the use of violence. The same analysts also express concerns that the Turkish government has come under pressure from members of the Crimean Tatar diaspora community in Turkey to help their countrymen in Crimea. Thus Turkey may begin to show a greater interest in the Crimean situation.[51] There is no clear evidence that the Turkish government is reacting to such pressure. However, Turkey's Prime Minister Demirel has acknowledged that, during the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in 1993, Abkhazian emigres living in Turkey rushed to help their ethnic fellowmen in Abkhazia.[52] Thus the grievances of the Crimean Tatars will not only continue to complicate the already difficult relations between Kiev and the Crimea, but may also exacerbate Ukraine's relations with Turkey.

48. Ukrainians Outside Ukraine. Approximately 9 million individuals of Ukrainian ethnic background live outside Ukraine, and the largest component of this expatriate community (approximately 7 million individuals) is located in other former republics of the USSR. Many diaspora Ukrainians live in compact communities on Ukrainian ethnographic territories in countries bordering on Ukraine. Thus large numbers of Ukrainians are found in the Kuban' and Briansk regions of the Russian Federation as well as in Moldova, and smaller communities are located in the border regions of Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Belarus.

49. Forced resettlement (e.g., from Western Ukraine after World War II) and economic migration have also left their mark on the distribution of Ukrainians in the former USSR, and large numbers are found in all regions of the Russian Federation. According to the 1989 Soviet census 4.36 million Ukrainians lived there, while unofficial estimates give much higher figures.[53] Whatever the estimates, Ukrainians clearly form the largest national minority in Russia, and almost half a million live in the Moscow region alone.[54] Significant numbers of Ukrainians live in Kazakhstan (where they comprise 5% of the population), and smaller numbers are found in all other former Soviet republics. However, to date the Ukrainian minorities in the CIS states have been poorly organized and politically inactive.

50. The Ukrainian government and various public organizations in Ukraine have frequently emphasized the need to maintain close contacts with the "Eastern" (CIS) Ukrainian diaspora. However, there is a lack of both funding and concrete programs to aid these communities.[55] The countries in which they are located have also provided little or no assistance to help them maintain their language and culture, and as a result these diaspora communities face strong assimilatory pressures.

51. Many Ukrainian commentators have critically contrasted the situation of the Ukrainian minority in the Russian Federation with that of the Russian minority in Ukraine. The Russian minority had (and in most of Ukraine still has) access to a wide range of Russian-language cultural, educational, and other facilities. Until recently, they were usually of better quality, and were provided with better funding, than equivalent Ukrainian-language facilities in Ukraine.[56] However, according to a major survey conducted in 1992 a majority (69%) of the Ukrainians in Russia still identified themselves as Ukrainians, although only 36% felt that they were fully fluent in their native language. Twenty-six percent stated that they fully understood but could not speak Ukrainian, 27% stated that they "generally" understood Ukrainian, and 11% stated that they did not know the language. It is interesting to note that 75% of the military personnel in Russia of Ukrainian background who responded to the survey were fluent in Ukrainian.[57]

52. There is no indication that the situation of the Ukrainian minorities in the "Eastern diaspora" will improve in the future. Many of these Ukrainians are interested in returning to Ukraine, especially from regions (e.g., the Caucasus states and Central Asia) where local conflicts have produced numerous refugees.[58] Thus in June 1993 a deputy to the Ukrainian parliament appealed to the government, president, and parliament to facilitate the return to Ukraine of Ukrainians living outside of the country.[59] If large numbers of immigrants or refugees of Ukrainian background were to request resettlement in Ukraine, this would be a heavy burden for the Ukrainian state.[60] Additional problems have arisen in connection with the status of residents of Ukraine who moved to Russia to work there, but intended to eventually move back to Ukraine. The governments of Ukraine and Russia have yet to reach a permanent agreement on issues such as their citizenship status and pension rights.[61]

53. There is at least a theoretical possibility that the interest which some Russian politicians have shown in certain Ukrainian territories could be countered by, for example, Ukrainian claims to the Kuban' region of southern Russia. No serious claims of this kind have been advanced. However, several Ukrainian delegations have visited Ukrainian communities in Kuban' to encourage them to maintain their language and culture.[62] In addition, representatives of Ukrainian cultural associations in the Kuban' region recently appealed to Yeltsin to provide them with the means to preserve and develop their culture.[63]

54. Additional details on the Ukrainian diaspora will be provided in the section of this study on Ukraine's relations with its neighbours. However, on the whole the treatment of the Ukrainian minorities in these states has not yet emerged as a major political issue in Ukraine's foreign policy.

CENTRIFUGAL TRENDS

55. Several movements have promoted some form of autonomy or even secession for certain regions of Ukraine, and these movements have complicated both Ukraine's domestic political situation and its relations with neighbouring states. Thus the Crimean autonomist/separatist movement has provoked serious tensions between Ukraine and Russia, and centrifugal trends in the eastern and southern oblasts of Ukraine could further exacerbate relations between these two states. Another autonomist movement is centred in the Transcarpathian oblast of Western Ukraine.

56. Crimea. Crimea, which was officially transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954, had a Russian ethnic majority in 1989, and only 25.8% of the population at the time consisted of ethnic Ukrainians. Autonomist and separatist sentiments in Crimea increased in parallel with the sovereignty movement in Ukraine in 1990-91, and in September 1991 the Crimean parliament declared the sovereignty of the peninsula, although as a constituent part of Ukraine. A slight majority (54%) of voters in Crimea supported Ukrainian independence in the December 1991 referendum; however, a number of groups which prefer to see the peninsula as part of the Russian Federation attempted to reverse this decision. In particular, the Republican Movement of Crimea was active in gathering the requisite number of signatures needed to hold a Crimean referendum on independence from Ukraine.[64]

57. The referendum was not held; however, on 5 May 1992 the Crimean parliament declared Crimea's independence, and the Ukrainian parliament responded by declaring the independence declaration invalid. It then instructed the Crimean parliament to reverse its decision or face direct presidential rule from Kiev. However, after Crimea backed down Kiev made certain concessions, granting Crimea wide-ranging powers to determine its own foreign economic relations and socio-economic policies.

58. The resulting legislation on the division of powers between Ukraine and Crimea proclaimed the peninsula an autonomous, integral [sic] part of Ukraine, but also stated

that the territory could not be transferred to another state without the consent of the Ukrainian and Crimean parliaments. This peaceful settlement of the Crimean issue was of great importance to Ukraine for Crimean secession could, in theory, have had a domino effect on other regions of Ukraine with large non-Ukrainian populations. Because of this threat, in 1993 Kiev continued to make concessions to mollify the local authorities in Crimea. For example, in June 1993 Kravchuk issued a decree supporting plans for a "free economic zone" in Crimea.[65]

59. However, the Crimean situation has greatly contributed to a deterioration in Ukrainian-Russian relations. In January 1992 Vladimir Lukin, then chairman of the Russian parliament's foreign affairs committee, suggested that in order to pressure Ukraine to give up its claim to the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), Russia should question Ukrainian control over Crimea. This was followed with a resolution by the Russian Supreme Soviet to investigate the circumstances of Crimea's transfer from Russia to Ukraine in 1954. Shortly afterwards, during an unauthorized trip to Crimea in April 1992, Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi aggressively restated Russia's claim to both Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Parliament finally passed a resolution in May 1992 declaring the 1954 transfer of Crimea to have been illegal, and urged that the Crimean issue be settled by means of inter-state negotiations. These acts were promptly condemned by the Ukrainian parliament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs as gross interference in Ukraine's internal affairs.[66]

60. The Crimean issue was not on the agenda during the June 1992 summit meeting between Kravchuk and Yeltsin. This was regarded as a victory for the Ukrainian side, which had insisted that Crimea was not a subject for inter-state discussions. However, in the following months several prominent Russian politicians stated that Russia's territorial claims to Crimea were fully legitimate. At their urging, on 5 December 1992 the Russian Federation's Congress of People's Deputies instructed the Russian Supreme Soviet to raise the issue of the legal status of the Crimean city and Black Sea Fleet port of Sevastopol.[67] This was immediately interpreted in Ukraine as another attempt to link

the controversy over the Black Sea Fleet to the Crimean issue. The situation was further inflamed when, in mid-February 1993, Russia's Vice-President Rutskoi stated that an international court should decide on whether Crimea belongs to Russia or Ukraine.[68]

61. In the meantime, groups opposed to Crimea's inclusion in Ukraine revived their activities in late 1992 and 1993. For example, Russian procommunist forces seeking the restoration of the USSR formed a "Edinstvo" (Unity) bloc in Crimea on 19 February 1993. On the following day the Russian Party of Crimea, which plans to campaign for Crimea to become part of Russia, held its founding conference.[69]

62. The situation in Crimea has also been complicated by the growing activism of its Ukrainian population. It accounts for approximately one-quarter of Crimea's population and, on many indicators, holds views which differ considerably from those of the local Russian population.[70] Another exacerbating factor is the poor state of the Crimean economy. Crimea, and especially Sevastopol, had a privileged status in the former Soviet Union, and the economic deterioration this area has suffered in the last few years has been highly demoralizing for the local population.[71]

63. Tensions over Crimea reached their peak in July 1993, when the Russian parliament declared that Sevastopol was Russian territory. The declaration was condemned by Russian President Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry, as well as a number of foreign states and international institutions. However, it was treated very seriously by the Ukrainian authorities, and it confirmed their worst expectations of Russian behaviour concerning Crimea.

64. In the late summer of 1993 the situation in Crimea was still unstable and unresolved. There have been some calls for a referendum to allow the population of Crimea to finally state its views on Crimea's future. However, if such a referendum were to take place, the Ukrainian authorities would likely disregard its results. Thus the Crimean issue has not been laid to rest, and will continue to exacerbate Russian-Ukrainian

relations as well as negotiations over the eventual disposition of the Black Sea Fleet.

65. Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Ukrainians are in the majority in each oblast of eastern and southern Ukraine with the exception of Crimea. However, in modern times the Ukrainian national movement was weak in these two regions, where significant Russian minorities are found. As a result the Russian language strongly dominates in these areas, especially in the cities, and during this century a large part of the population, including many Ukrainians, has felt only a weak identification with the idea of Ukrainian statehood.[72]

66. Movements calling for various forms of autonomy for southern and eastern Ukraine emerged in 1990, after Ukraine's declaration of sovereignty. The options proposed ranged from various forms of federalism to "special status" for the area of southern Ukraine known during the tsarist period as "New Russia."[73] These movements do not appear to have been very well organized, and during the referendum in December 1991 a large majority of the population in these regions voted for independence.[74]

67. For many (and probably most) of these voters the "yes" vote reflected their hopes that an independent Ukraine would provide them with a better standard of living, and also represented a protest against Moscow's centralized economic policies. For example, in the 1980s Moscow diverted investment away from the mines of the Donbass coal basin in favour of developing new energy sources in Siberia, and concerns over deteriorating conditions in these mines, and the poor living conditions of miners, led to a massive strike action in the Donbass region in 1989.[75]

68. However, the Ukrainian economy performed poorly in 1992. In addition, no bold strategies were proposed to deal with the many problems facing regional economic development in eastern and southern Ukraine, such as severe pollution in the Donbass basin. As a result, there was a revival of movements, in the latter half of 1992, calling for greater autonomy for these regions. Those heading these movements stressed the need

for economic policies tailored to the specific requirements of these regions, and frequently raised complaints about the Ukrainian government's "Ukrainization" plans.[76]

69. However, in mid-1993 the reality in these regions was still such that instruction at all levels of the school system, especially in the cities, was overwhelmingly conducted in Russian. In fact, local bureaucrats often resisted even modest steps to broaden the scope of Ukrainian-language usage. In addition, the Ukrainian government has made it clear that it will tailor Ukrainization measures to suit local circumstances.[77] Thus concerns about the rapid introduction of the Ukrainian language in eastern and southern Ukraine have not, to date, been justified. To some extent they have been manipulated by conservatives reluctant to engage in any significant change, as well as forces trying to gain greater autonomy for these regions, or in favour of some form of union with Russia.

70. Until recently the autonomy movements noted above had difficulty gaining mass support because they were dominated by local officials and politicians associated with the largely discredited "old order." However, the deteriorating economic situation in 1992 led to a revival of "neo-communist" forces, which have begun to rebuild a base of support in this region. They have attempted to blame most of Ukraine's economic difficulties on the current government and its supporters, and have had some success in this regard.[78] In addition, critics of the central government point out that Ukrainian politicians in Kiev have often been insensitive to local grievances. This accusation is partly justified, since the latter are quick to blame discontent in these regions on former Communist Party bureaucrats, or the activity of Russian nationalists. They are much more reluctant to address the serious problems behind many of the grievances.

71. Complaints about Kiev's management of the economy and neglect of local concerns continued to grow in 1993.[79] Thus Eastern Ukraine was the main locus of a major wave of strikes, in early June 1993, which advanced a number of political as well as economic demands. Among the former were general demands for more local autonomy, the introduction of Russian as a second state language, and dual citizenship.

In a few cases there were demands for the transfer of the Donbass region to Russia.[80]

72. By the end of June 1993 these strikes were largely over, after many of the strikers' demands were, at least temporarily, satisfied. However, Ukraine's President Kravchuk has stressed that only certain forms of autonomy, limited largely to the economic sphere, will be granted to this and other regions of Ukraine.[81] The introduction of a federal system of government for Ukraine is not being seriously considered, and Kravchuk and most of his associates continue to support a decentralized but unitary territorial structure for the Ukrainian state.[82]

73. The situation is complicated by the fact that some Russian nationalist politicians and the organizations they represent clearly regard eastern and southern Ukraine as historically Russian territories. For example, Russian Don Cossack organizations have been particularly active in the Luhans'k oblast of eastern Ukraine. Nonetheless, few mainstream Russian politicans have supported claims to these territories as vigorously as they have supported claims to Crimea. One reason for this is the deteriorating state of the industrial infrastructure in this region, the poor (and often dangerous) state of its mining industry, and a wide range of local ecological problems which have severely affected the health of the population. As a result eastern Ukraine is a much less attractive "prize" for Russia than the Crimea.

74. At the local level, however, even a gradual transition to a market-type economy will lead to high unemployment rates in many parts of eastern and southern Ukraine. If the economic situation in Ukraine is not stabilized, and coherent policies to deal with growing unemployment are not put in place, the popularity of these movements for greater regional autonomy, and stronger links with Russia, will increase. Thus various forms of unrest will continue to plague these regions and hinder the nation-building process in Ukraine.

75. Transcarpathia. Transcarpathia (also known as Subcarpathian Rus'), the westernmost oblast of Ukraine, was united with Ukraine in 1945, having been part of Czechoslovakia during the interwar period. The modern Ukrainian national movement was late to develop in this region, and thus a local "Rusyn" (Ruthenian) identity has been retained by certain local residents, some of whom consider the Ruthenians to constitute a separate Slavic nation.[83]

76. The movement for Transcarpathian autonomy gained strength after Ukraine's declaration of independence in August 1991. Thus on 1 December 1991 the population of this province not only endorsed the independence of Ukraine, but also voted in favor of granting their oblast a "special self-governing administrative status."[84] Those who most strongly argued for autonomy were supporters of Rusyn "nationhood," and they received considerable support from members of the former communist party apparatus. This led to a rift between the leaders of the Rusyn movement and the leadership of the Ukrainian community in Transcarpathia.

77. In 1992 the Rusyn movement appeared to have been discredited after several of its leading members were accused of involvement in various forms of corruption. However, in May 1993 the shadow "government" of a "Subcarpathian Republic" (Podkarpats'ka ryspublyka) was formed by the Society of Subcarpathian Rusyns (Obshchestvo Podkarpatskykh Rusynov). Members of this "government" live in both Ukraine and eastern Slovakia, where many Rusyn activists are found; however, it does not seem to have a high level of popular support in the Transcarpathian oblast.[85]

78. Officials in Transcarpathia continue to work towards a form of economic autonomy which will allow it to take advantage of its strategic location in Eastern Europe. However, developments in this region do not appear to pose a threat to the integrity of Ukraine.

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEIGHBOURING STATES

79. Russia -- Domestic Politics. As Russia emerged as a sovereign state in 1990-91, it had to establish a new identity in a region which it had dominated during both the Soviet and tsarist periods. This "identity crisis" was especially marked with respect to working out a new relationship with the other Eastern Slav nations, for both Russian and Soviet historiography had emphasized their supposed unity, and the traditional role of the Russian people as the "elder brother" of the Ukrainians and Belarusians.[86] As noted earlier, many Russian politicians and intellectuals have had great difficulty in coming to terms with their unexpected "loss of empire," and especially the emergence of an independent Ukraine. One example is the statement made by a senior Russian legislator in early 1992: "We would never have proposed the Commonwealth if we had thought it possible that Ukraine might actually become independent. I will never accept Kiev as a foreign city."[87]

80. This attitude has been expressed both in nostalgia for the past, and concern over the future of Russian minorities outside of Russia. It is also evident in the statements (or actions) of numerous Russian politicians which are aimed (or have been perceived, in Ukraine, as aiming) at either the recreation, in some form, of the old Soviet Union, or the re-establishment of Russian hegemony in the region. Many western observers and Russian politicians have argued that concerns about such statements or actions emerging from the "new" Russia are exaggerated or unjustified. However, most observers in Ukraine feel otherwise.

81. The most extreme statements on Russia's future have come from Russian radical nationalist parties and organizations, which have often allied themselves to members of the communist movement who wish to reinstate an administrative-command system in Russia and revive the former Soviet Union.[88] The best-known representative of the radical imperial nationalists is Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the head of the incongruously named Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (LDPSS). He has openly called for a dictatorship in Russia, a return to the country's pre-revolutionary borders, and the clear

primacy of the Russian people within these borders.[89] Thus in December 1992 he stated that if the Baltic states refused to cooperate with Russia, they should be dismembered.[90]

82. The significance of Zhirinovsky and other Russian nationalist radicals has sometimes been exaggerated. However, it should be noted that Zhirinovsky came third in Russia's 1991 presidential elections, receiving over 6 million votes, and he continues to attract substantial audiences during his appearances in Russia.[91] Thus he and other nationalist radicals clearly represent a significant trend in Russian nationalism which has been expressed in a variety of xenophobic publications, often of an anti-Semitic nature.[92] This trend is antireformist, revanchist, and anti-Western in nature, and feeds on conspiracy theories which reflect a strong sense of insecurity among the Russian population.[93]

83. Of greater concern in Ukraine are trends among the centrist forces which, in 1992 and early 1993, were exemplified by the Civic Union. It was formed in June 1992 as a coalition of the "industrial lobby" headed by Volskii, the People's Party of Free Russia headed by Vice-President Rutskoi, and Travkin's Democratic Party of Russia. Chernomyrdin, who replaced the reform-minded Gaidar as Russian prime minister in December 1992, was a representative of the Civic Union, and in early 1993 it was the best-organized political force in Russian politics.[94] Although the Civic Union did not speak with one voice, it favoured high levels of integration within the CIS and regarded all former Soviet republics as part of Russia's sphere of influence. Thus the alternative foreign policy concept prepared by advisors to the Civic Union stressed the basic non-viability of the CIS and the need to create a new confederation.[95]

84. Russian Vice-President Rutskoi, a representative of the Civic Union with strong support in the armed forces, was a powerful spokesman for imperial-minded forces within the Russian leadership in 1992 and 1993. For example, he called for the restoration of Russia's "historical borders" in line with the principle of a "unified and indivisible Russia,"[96] and his minimal goal seemed to be a union of the three East Slavic states

(Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus).[97] As noted earlier, he also made a number of highly provocative statements concerning Russia's claims to Crimea. Thus in late June 1993 Rutskoi called on sailors of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) to reject a Russian-Ukrainian agreement on the fate of the BSF. He also encouraged them to disobey their commander by hoisting the Russian St. Andrew's flag on their ships.[98] By mid-1993 other centrist groupings were emerging as the Civic Union began to fade from the political scene.[99] However, they are likely to adopt a foreign policy stance which is similar to that of the Civic Union.

85. As for the liberal camp, it is poorly organized and has had great difficulty mobilizing mass support.[100] In addition, numerous prominent representatives of the liberal camp have called for levels of integration within the CIS which are unacceptable to most Ukrainian politicians. Many of these individuals have made statements which indicate that, despite their liberal credentials, their attitudes towards Ukraine are in many respects similar to those of the other groups noted above. In fact, several prominent representatives of the liberal trend in Russian politics in the late 1980s have recently begun, in many respects, to side with "national patriotic" forces which have imperialist ambitions. They include Evgenii Ambartsumov, the head of the Russian parliamentary Commmittee on International Affairs and foreign Economic Relations; Oleg Rumiantsev, the executive secretary of the parliamentary Constitutional Commission; and Sergei Stankevich, the presidential political adviser.[101] According to one commentator,

> It has been especially difficult for politicians such as these to accept the secession of Ukraine. In disputes between Russia and Ukraine over the Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, the above-mentioned politicians have consistently sided with nationalist forces.[102]

86. One example is Stankevich's statement, in early July 1993, that Russia's "historical task" is to stabilize itself in its present borders and then conduct a gradual "economic and cultural expansion" into the "near abroad." The ultimate aim of this expansion would be a new kind of union, with Russia at its centre.[103] Another example is provided by various statements made by Anatolii Sobchak, the otherwise liberal mayor

of St. Petersburg. He has strongly criticized Ukraine's drive for independence, and has made several alarmist statements regarding the threats to world peace posed by the creation of the UAF.[104] As for Gennadii Burbulis, Yeltsin's "eminence grise" who played an important role in shaping Russian foreign policy in 1992, he stated in March 1992 that "There is a logic that will bring them [the former Soviet republics] back again to our way. Europe will not take them as they are."[105]

87. On the whole Russia's President Yeltsin has been careful to avoid making statements which would evoke highly negative reactions in Ukraine, and in his meetings with Kravchuk he stressed the need to maintain good relations with Ukraine. However, Yeltsin rarely condemned or even disassociated himself from the provocative statements made by associates such as Vice-President Rutskoi, and in the latter half of 1992 Yeltsin made a number of concessions to the Civic Union which increased its influence in Moscow. Other steps taken by Yeltsin to mollify his critics in the conservative camp included his provocative order to cease the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from the Baltic states.[106] Last but not least, it should be noted that Yeltsin himself is not free of authoritarian tendencies and a tendency to rule by decree.[107]

88. The unpredictability of the political scene in Moscow has been furthered underlined by the controversial behaviour of the Russian parliament and its chairman, Ruslan Khasbulatov. A defender of the old-style apparatchiks (the former communist nomenklatura), in early 1993 he attempted to subordinate the Russian government to a strong parliament, and engaged in a number of sharply-worded attacks on Yeltsin. He strongly supported the view that an important plank of Russian foreign policy should be the defence of the Russian diaspora in all Soviet successor states.[108]

89. To date Yeltsin has shown great skill in manoeuvring among his many opponents. However, his opportunities for further manoeuvring are limited. One major problem is the continuing weakness of the Russian economy in 1993,[109] exacerbated by "flip-flops" in economic policy.[110] This has led to the growing poverty of the population,[111] and

popular resentment has been further inflamed by continuing widespread corruption in state and government organizations.[112] Although to date worker discontent in Russia has not been reflected in widespread strikes, the potential for disruptive labour actions will grow with the rising unemployment which will inevitably accompany economic reforms.[113]

90. Yeltsin's freedom of movement is also restricted by his failure to establish a strong political base, and the continuing political/constitutional crisis in Moscow.[114] These problems have exacerbated the centrifugal trends in the Russian Federation, and have provoked numerous calls for a "strong hand" to preserve the integrity of the country.[115] Representatives of a wide spectrum of political forces in Russia, including many of Yeltsin's advisors, are committed to strengthening the levels of political, economic, and military integration within both the Russian Federation and the CIS. Thus Yeltsin will continue to come under heavy pressure to move in this direction.

91. The relatively high level of approval for Yeltsin in the referendum of 25 April 1993[116] temporarily provided Yeltsin with a certain "breathing space." Yeltsin used this opportunity to begin to solidify his political base and speed up the process of adopting a new constitution for Russia. He also tried to reach a power-sharing deal with Russia's republics and regions that diminishes the threat of disintegration of the Russian Federation.[117] However, Russia continues to be a highly unstable state. One recent study has assessed the factors facilitating and obstructing reform in the post-communist states, and its conclusions regarding Russia are pessimistic. According to the study Russia is the state least capable of overcoming, at least in the near future, the legacies of empire and totalitarianism, and establishing a market-type economy.[118] Thus for many years to come, concerns about instability in Russia will have a major impact on the direction of Ukraine's political and socio-economic development.

92. Russia -- Foreign Policy. Developments in Russia's foreign policy have been of particular concern to Ukraine's leaders, since most discussions of this topic in Russia have consistently stressed that the former Soviet republics should automatically be

considered to be in Russia's sphere of influence. This was expressed, for example, in the introduction, in January 1992, of the term "near abroad" to refer to the former Soviet republics. And Stanislav Stankevich, one of President Yeltsin's senior advisors, has openly argued that Russia should have a "dual" foreign policy for Russia: one for the "near abroad" and one for the "far abroad" (all other states).

93. The implementation of a differentiated foreign policy along these lines was initially resisted by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. He rejected a defensive and reactive approach to foreign policy and emphasized the need for flexibility in Russia's relations with its neighbours. However, he soon came under strong attack by conservative forces both inside and outside the Russian parliament. They argued that he placed too much emphasis on cooperation with the United States and Western Europe, and had not paid enough attention to Russia's traditional allies.[119] The same critics were also pessimistic about the possibility of Russia's rapid integration into the world economy, argued that Russia is facing geopolitical encirclement, and stressed the need to defend the rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in the "near abroad."[120]

94. In a controversial speech on 14 December 1992 to the foreign ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe Kozyrev outlined the implications of a shift to the right in Russian foreign policy. They would include a greater emphasis on ties with Asia, demands that United Nations-sponsored sanctions against Serbia be lifted, and hostility towards any sign of foreign interference in Russian internal affairs. As for the republics of the former USSR, Russia would insist that they join a new federation or confederation, and CSCE norms would not fully apply within its territory.[121]

95. Kozyrev's concerns were justified, for the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, which ended on the day he delivered his speech, demonstrated the Russian legislature's desire to curtail the president's foreign policy prerogatives and its determination to dominate policy-making in this realm.[122] Thus in 1992 and early 1993 pressure grew in Russia for a revision of Yeltsin's Western-oriented foreign policy. In

particular, numerous parliamentarians called on Russia to adopt a tougher stance toward the countries of the "near abroad" and to vigorously defend the rights of Russians and Russian-speakers in neighbouring states.[123]

96. There are a number of indications that, as early as the fall of 1992, Yeltsin was beginning to adopt certain aspects of the conservative foreign policy platform outlined above. This was reflected, for example, in a speech to the Collegium of the Russian Foreign Ministry on 27 October 1992. In the speech he harshly criticized the passive conduct of Russia's foreign policy and called for a more dynamic stance, emphasizing the country's superpower status and vigourously defending its interests.[124] A few months later, in a speech delivered on 28 February 1993 before a Civic Union audience, he stated that international organizations should grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the territories encompassed by the former Soviet Union.[125]

97. On several other occasions in the spring of 1993, Yeltsin and the Russian government continued to express interest in having Russia play a regional peace-keeping role, and receiving international approval for such a role. Kozyrev also supported Yeltsin's plans to encourage greater coordination of the foreign policies of CIS states.[126] Although Russian officials denied that neoimperialist ambitions were behind these proposals, a number of other former Soviet republics (especially Ukraine) saw them as evidence of a long-standing desire to maintain Russia's hegemony in the region.[127]

98. In 1993 there were also increasing signs that Russia would, if necessary, exert economic pressures on Ukraine to influence the latter's domestic policies. Thus, at a press conference on 5 February 1993 the Russian ambassador in Kiev presented a number of demands on Ukraine, including the introduction of dual citizenship for Russians in Ukraine. He also called on Ukraine to begin nuclear disarmament talks without pressing for Western aid, and warned that Russia could stop fuel deliveries to Ukraine if it did not accept Russian proposals for repayment of the external debt of the former Soviet Union.[128]

99. Soon afterwards, on 24 February, a gas industry official stated that supplies of natural gas to Ukraine might be turned off because of payment defaults, although a Ukrainian official maintained that Ukraine had already paid its debts to Russia incurred through 1 March 1993.[129] In June 1993 there was another substantial decrease in the supply of oil from Russia to Ukraine, some oil refineries in Ukraine had to be shut down, and Russia's President Yeltsin stated that the fuel issue "had given a push" to the resolution of the Black Sea Fleet dispute.[130]

100. Ukrainian Prime Minister Kuchma and other Ukrainian officials have repeatedly warned that Ukraine must get used to the idea of paying world prices for oil and gas, and look for other sources of these fuels to reduce their dependence on Russia. However, until the proper infrastructure (e.g., tanker terminals at Black Sea ports) can be built to accept oil and gas from other sources, Ukraine's energy needs will provide Russia with a very significant lever of influence on Ukraine.[131] Even Kuchma, who has consistently advocated close economic ties with Russia, and calm and restraint in Ukraine's relationship with its northern neighbour, has bitterly attacked the way in which Russia's oil and gas policy, and its general economic policy, has been formulated. In his opinion Russia's economic policy toward Ukraine was unfriendly, reflected "absolutely undisguised blackmail," and Ukraine was being robbed because of its weakness.[132]

101. There was a considerable improvement in Russian-Ukrainian economic relations in late June and early July 1993, following a summit meeting between Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk and ensuing negotiations between the Ukrainian and Russian governments.[133] However, difficulties in working out a mutually satisfactory economic relationship between the two states, and the possibility of further economic pressure by Russia on Ukraine, will continue to complicate their efforts to reach an understanding in other areas.

102. Another issue which has seriously exacerbated relations between Russia and Ukraine is Russia's implicit (and sometimes explicit) claim that it is the sole legitimate

successor state to the Soviet Union. CIS accords recognized Russia as the USSR's successor in terms of its seat on the United Nations Security Council. However, Russia also proceeded (apparently with the West's approval) to claim absolute priority in areas such as disarmament and debt repayment, and quickly took over all former Soviet property. This included gold and hard currency reserves, as well as all property and buildings (e.g., embassies and consulates) abroad.[134] This meant that countries such as Ukraine were, in effect, denied representation abroad because of a lack of hard currency for the rent or purchase of buildings which could serve the needs of Ukrainian diplomacy. As a result, Ukrainian diaspora communities had to provide the appropriate facilities, for no agreement could be reached concerning the disposition of former Soviet assets on foreign territory. Thus on 22 February 1993 Ukraine appealed for external support in protesting Russia's unilateral steps in taking over these assets.[135]

103. In concluding this section, it should be stressed that Russian politicians have yet to find a stable modus vivendi with the other former Soviet republics, and even Yeltsin has been ambivalent about Russia's role vis-a-vis the "near abroad." Moreover, many of his close associates are in favour of a high level of integration within the CIS which would inevitably lead to a renewal of Russian hegemony in the region. Developments in Russian foreign policy, and their implications for Ukraine, will greatly depend on how the domestic political scene continues to unfold in Moscow. However, developments within the Russian military will also have a considerable impact on Russia's domestic politics and foreign policy.

104. Russia -- Military Developments. The Soviet Armed Forces (SAF) were one of the most highly integrated of all Soviet institutions, and their breakup following the formation of the CIS posed an enormous challenge to the SAF's leadership. Initially an attempt was made to maintain the integrity of the SAF as an institution by redesignating the Soviet Ministry of Defence as the central CIS military command, and appointing former Soviet Defence Minister Shaposhnikov commander of the CIS forces. These forces were formally subordinated to the CIS Council of Heads of State. However, the

credibility of the CIS High Command was undermined by the absence of a clear organizational differentiation between this body and the Russian government. This led to the perception, especially in Ukraine, that the CIS command served Russia's interests rather than those of the CIS.[136]

105. While Shaposhnikov and his deputies were more flexible than their predecessors, they failed to understand the logic of political developments in several former republics, especially Ukraine, and their leaders' desire to establish independent security policies and national armies. This meant that attempts to maintain an integrated defence system on the territory of the former Soviet Union were very unlikely to succeed. However, most senior military officials in Moscow had difficulty accepting this new reality.[137]

106. The situation was clarified somewhat when the Russian political leadership decided to create an independent Russian Armed Forces (RAF) in May 1992. However, this move did not resolve all the dilemmas posed by the relationship between the CIS armed forces and the Russian government, since it failed to demarcate the administrative boundaries between the CIS armed forces and the RAF. In fact, in the course of 1992 it became clear that the Russian Defence Ministry had largely replaced the CIS Joint Forces Command in attempting to resolve security issues related not only to Russia but to the CIS as a whole.

107. The pretense of maintaining a unified defence structure on the territory of the CIS was maintained until mid-June 1993. At this time a meeting of CIS defence ministers decided to dissolve the CIS joint military command and replaced it, on a temporary basis, with a downgraded body called the "joint staff for coordinating military cooperation between the states of the Commonwealth."[138] Preceding this development, in early 1993 the Russian Ministry of Defence began to increasingly promote bilateral security relationships with other CIS states rather than using the CIS military command to maintain defence ties in the region.[139]

108. Nonetheless, throughout 1992 Russia's military leadership perceived Russia as the centre of a unified defence system, and had a very unrealistic view of the nature and pace of military-political changes in the CIS. This was underlined by the contents of the draft military doctrine for Russia made public in May 1992. Commenting on this draft doctrine, one analyst noted that

> It is quite clear that the General Staff has only a slender grasp of current realities, both as to Russia's status (assumed still to be a world-class power), the conditions of the CIS, and as to the domestic situation (in terms of economic prospects, ethnic problems and social attitudes). There is a clear danger of military policy moving on a divergent direction from both foreign and domestic policies.[140]

109. However, the radically changed situation in the FSU was reflected, in a rather dramatic fashion, in the draft doctrine's acceptance, in contradiction to internationally accepted norms, of the ill-treatment of Russians abroad as possible grounds for military hostilities.[141] Although the clause dealing with this topic was apparently removed from a later, revised draft,[142] it made a substantial contribution to the fears, among Russia's neighbours, of revanchist sentiments in Moscow.

110. Other developments in the RAF provided ample justification for these fears. The RAF were created at a time when the Communist Party's mechanisms of control over the military had been destroyed and new structures for making and implementing security decisions were still being created. Thus it faced daunting administrative and doctrinal problems in conditions of a deteriorating economy, and growing regional tensions within Russia which often led to misunderstandings with local authorities. In the circumstances a certain politicization of the RAF's high command was inevitable as it vigorously lobbied for increasingly scarce resources.

111. This politicization, and the search for new legitimating values for the military, quickly led to the promotion of a reborn form of Russian nationalism in the RAF. Given the vacuum left by the collapse of Marxism-Leninism as a legitimating ideology this

evolution is understandable. However, many senior officers of the RAF have allied themselves with the more extremist branches of Russian nationalism.[143] According to one survey "national-patriotic forces" are supported by 70% of the Russian officer corps, and one-third favour the re-creation of the USSR.[144]

112. The impact of nationalism on the RAF was heightened during the political crisis in Russia in early 1993. Prior to the April 1993 referendum in Russia the military leadership generally stood behind Russian Defence Minister Grachev, who supported Russian President Yeltsin. However, some of the pre-referendum debates highlighted the divisions within the Russian military and its growing fragmentation.[145] According to one analyst

> It seems clear... that neither the Russian president, nor the leader of the parliament, nor even the current military leadership knows where the army's loyalties lie or what its capabilities are and that none of them, least of all the military leadership, wants to precipitate a confrontation severe enough to find out.[146]

Continuing political instability in Moscow will run the risk of further drawing the Russian military leadership into the political realm. In the aftermath of the April 1993 referendum Russian Defence Minister Grachev restated his earlier position that the armed forces must stand aside from the ongoing political struggle in Moscow.[147] In addition, Yeltsin took a number of steps after the referendum to help ensure the loyalty of senior armed forces personnel.[148] However, Rutskoi's criticism in June 1993 of Yeltsin for failing to address many of the problems faced by the RAF indicates that the struggle for the Russian military's loyalty continues.[149]

113. One important reason why civil-military relations have been relatively peaceful in Russia is Yeltsin's efforts to accommodate the interests of military officers. This has been done by providing them with increasing amounts of money from the state budget, condoning or disregarding their often high-handed behaviour in Moldova and Georgia, and giving them a greater say in the direction of foreign policy.[150] Thus the RAF appear to have preempted the Russian Foreign Ministry's policymaking role in some areas of the

"near abroad," and this has led to great concern in Transcaucasia, the Baltic states, Moldova, and Ukraine.[151] However, accommodating the military has not necessarily mollified its members. According to one estimate, in the spring of 1993 more than two-thirds of RAF officers were opposed to the current political leadership.[152]

114. If Yeltsin changes his accommodationist policy, this may lead to potentially destabilizing civil-military conflict in Russia. If this policy does not change, given the growing strength of nationalist sentiments within the RAF the likelihood of disputes between the UAF and RAF will increase. Certainly, senior military officials of both the RAF and the CIS High Command have continued to strongly argue for greater reintegration within the CIS. Shaposhnikov, for example, has stated that leading Western politicians would prefer to deal with "a single, qualitatively reinvigorated, democratized state or union of states than with a large number of states that lack a certain degree of stability either within or between them."[153] As one commentator has noted,

> [...] Russia's foreign policy toward the "near abroad" has, to a certain extent, been hostage to the unpredictable behaviour of the military. The absence of a formally adopted Russian military doctrine, which is still being elaborated by the Russian Security Council, has contributed to the vulnerable state of Russia's relations with its immediate neighbours, and their distrust of Russia.[154]

115. Poland. In 1992-93 Poland was the scene of considerable political conflict, and was plagued with problems with the transition from a command to a market economy. However, Poland's foreign policy remained stable due to the continuity provided by Foreign Minister Skubiszewski, one of the most popular Polish politicians.[155]

116. Poland's foreign policy has been strongly pro-European, but it has also emphasized cooperation with Poland's immediate neighbours. Initially much of Poland's attention was focussed on improving cooperation with the other countries (Hungary and Czechoslovakia) included in the Visegrad "Triangle" (now a "Quadrangle" following the disintegration of Czechoslovakia). However, Poland moved quickly to establish normal

diplomatic relations with Ukraine when it achieved independence.[156]

117. In 1992 Poland negotiated bilateral agreements on military cooperation with Belarus and Lithuania, and signed a similar agreement with Ukraine in February 1993 during the visit to Ukraine of Poland's Minister of National Defence. However, although the term "strategic partners" was used to describe Poland and Ukraine, the agreements noted above do not imply the formation of a military pact, and were intended to promote various low-level forms of cooperation such as sharing military training facilities and organizing military exchange programs. Poland was also interested in continuing to service its aircraft in Ukraine, which is an important source of spare parts for much of Poland's military equipment.[157]

118. Polish government officials have emphasized the need to achieve a lasting settlement of relations with Russia, and have consistently argued that Russia will remain a major regional power affecting Poland's security. Poland and Russia signed a military cooperation agreement on 7 July 1993,[158] and Poland has avoided taking sides in the disputes between Russia and Ukraine. However, there is considerable concern about the political stability of Poland's eastern neighbours and, as part of the reorganization of Poland's three military districts, troops and equipment are being redeployed to the country's eastern borders.[159] Poland's military doctrine views the East as the most likely source of military threats to Poland, and the country's leaders are also worried about the prospect that regional instability may lead to a cut in supplies of strategic resources from the East, as well as a flood of refugees into Poland.[160]

119. In late 1992 and early 1993 Poland began to move away from its earlier preoccupation with the creation of political and security frameworks for cooperation with the Soviet successor states, and began to emphasize economic relations with these countries. Thus, during Polish Prime Minister Suchocka's visit to Kiev in January 1993 a series of bilateral economic agreements were signed.[161] In addition, shortly before Polish President Walesa visited Kiev in May 1993, a Presidents' Consultative Committee

was created to promote relations between the two countries.[162]

120. Few major controversies have marred Polish-Ukrainian relations. The relatively small and scattered Polish minority in Ukraine has not expressed any significant grievances concerning its treatment. In addition, no serious political forces in Poland have raised claims to the territories which were once part of eastern Poland in the interwar period, and which became part of the Ukrainian SSR as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. More serious grievances have been expressed by representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Poland. The grievances centre on the continuing Polish reluctance to grant the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Poland full legal status, and disputes over the ownership of church property. In addition, Ukrainians in Poland complain of widespread discrimination, and claim (with considerable justification) that they are treated much more poorly than the Polish minority in Ukraine.[163] However, to date these grievances have not significantly affected relations between Poland and Ukraine.

121. Moldova. The population of Moldova, a former Soviet republic strategically located between Ukraine and Romania, consists of approximately 65% Moldovans (i.e. Romanians), 14% Ukrainians, and 13% Russians in 1989. Prior to the USSR's disintegration the influential Moldovan Popular Front had strongly supported the idea of Moldova's eventual unification with Romania. This campaign, and fears that the Moldovan authorities were planning to engage in coercive "Romanianization" policies, led to considerable concern among the republic's non-Moldovan inhabitants following Moldova's declaration of independence in August 1991.

122. However, during 1992 the Moldovan Popular Front became marginalized, and the process continued in 1993.[164] During this period President Mircea Snegur's government began to strongly promote a policy of national consensus. This policy stressed Moldova's independent statehood and territorial integrity, as well as the provision of extensive cultural and administrative autonomy for ethnic minorities.[165] The policy soon gained wide support in Moldova, and recent opinion polls have indicated that support for unification

with Romania has become quite weak.[166] In addition, international human rights observers have confirmed that the official policies of the Moldovan government do not discriminate against minority groups.[167]

123. Nonetheless, shortly before the disintegration of the USSR in December 1991 the self-appointed leaders of Moldova's Russian population on the left bank of the Dniester river (they comprise only 25% of the total population in this region, and approximately 30% of Moldova's total Russian population) proclaimed a "Dniester Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic" (DMSSR). The "Dniester" leaders, who appealed for the restoration of the Soviet Union, created local paramilitary and conventional military units which were armed and trained by Russia's 14th Army based in the area. After a number of skirmishes in the spring and summer of 1992, some of which turned into full-scale battles with Moldovan forces, these units succeeded in establishing full control over the left-bank territories claimed by the DMSSR, as well as some small areas on the Dniester's right bank.[168]

124. In July to September of 1992 Moldovan President Snegur and Russian President Yeltsin signed several agreements which led to a cease-fire and the dispatch of a Russian "peacekeeping" force to the Dniester region. However, this only led to an entrenchment of the status quo, for the Russian 14th Army's controversial actions in Moldova appear to have been authorized by the Russian military hierarchy, and supported or condoned by senior government officials in Moscow. Thus the 14th Army's commander, Lieutenant General Lebed, one of the Russian Defence Minister's former proteges, has made a number of highly provocative statements condemning the Moldovan and Ukrainian governments. For example, he has supported the restoration of the Soviet Union or the creation of a "Greater Russia"; however, his statements have not been disavowed in Moscow and he has not been recalled.[169]

125. There is also no evidence that the Russian government has taken steps to prevent Russian Cossack volunteers from joining the Dniester forces or to hinder the transfer of

arms from the 14th Army to these forces. In fact, throughout 1992 Russia provided the DMSSR with considerable financial support.[170] Talks on the withdrawal of Russian forces from Moldova have bogged down, and controversy remains over proposals to establish Russian military bases in Moldova, the linkage of troop withdrawal to the resolution of the Dniester conflict, and the political future of the Dniester region.[171]

126. In the meantime, the Moldovan government has begun to satisfy many of the cultural needs of its large, mostly rural-based Ukrainian community. This minority has not played an active role in the Dniester conflict, although some misunderstandings have arisen between the Ukrainian communities in Moldova and the breakaway DMSSR.[172] Thus on the whole the Ukrainian government, disturbed by the Russian government's stance on the Dniester separatist movement, has supported the integrity of the Moldovan state. However, in 1992 Ukraine came under increasing pressure to assist the Ukrainian population in the Dniester region. This was especially the case after several Ukrainian nationalist organizations began to organize paramilitary units to fight in defence of their fellow countrymen, although few of these groups actually went into combat.[173]

127. Thus, in the fall of 1992 Ukraine began to support proposals for a confederal Moldovan state, as well as for the right of self-determination of the Dniester region in the event of Moldovan unification with Romania. However, Ukraine's leaders soon returned to a policy of supporting the integrity of Moldova, and improving relations with this small but strategically located neighbour. For example, on 19 February 1993 the Ukrainian and Moldovan defence ministers signed an agreement on military cooperation involving considerable Ukrainian assistance to the Moldovan Armed Forces. At the same time the Ukrainian defence minister stated that Ukraine would be neutral in the case of armed conflicts on Moldovan territory.[174] In the first half of 1993 a number of delegations discussed economic, cultural, and military relations between the two countries, including cooperation between their military-industrial enterprises.[175] Because of these good relations, Moldovan officials have urged more active Ukrainian participation in a political settlement of the Dniester conflict.[176]

128. Ukraine's current policy towards Moldova can be explained largely as a result of concern over Moscow's continued toleration of the statements and activities of Lieutenant General Lebed, and the aggressive behaviour of the DMSSR leaders. In the spring of 1993 the DMSSR security minister "Shevtsov" (his real name is Antiufeev) gave an interview in which he confirmed that the Dniester leaders were attempting to preserve a Soviet-type political system in the DMSSR, with the aim of creating a base for the eventual restoration of a new union along the lines of the USSR.[177]

129. There are reports that, to further this aim, paramilitary personnel from the Dniester region were sent to Abkhazia to join the Abkhaz forces (supported by Russia) fighting against Georgia.[178] Of greater direct relevance to Ukraine were claims, by the Dniester authorities, that they enjoyed considerable support among pro-communist and Russian-oriented forces in southern and eastern Ukraine. Cooperation with these forces is to eventually result in the creation of an autonomous "Novorossiia" (New Russia) region.[179] In the interview noted above "Shevtsov" also confirmed that he and some of his deputies are former OMON or KGB officers who are wanted for trial in Latvia and Estonia for their activities in these former Soviet republics.

130. However, the provocative behaviour of the Dniester leaders is not solely to blame for the continuing turmoil in Moldova, for some Moldovan and Romanian politicians continue to strongly advocate the controversial "reunification" of Moldova with Romania.[180] The minorities in Moldova are also concerned over cases of Russophobia in the local press and the government's plans to promote the greater use of Moldovan.[181] These developments help fuel demands in the Russian media that the "mother country" vigorously defend the Russian minority in Moldova.[182]

131. In June 1993 Moldovan-Russian negotiations on the future of the Dniester region were deadlocked, and were adjourned for several months.[183] Moldovan officials continued to condemn Russian support for the DMSSR, and appealed to international organizations to help settle the conflict.[184] Thus events in this region will continue to pose

a strong threat to the stability of Ukraine's borders in the southwest. The situation will become especially difficult for Ukraine if the DMSSR is successful in its secession attempt, or if the situation there continues to fester. In this case the Moldovans, feeling threatened by aggressive Russian behaviour, could well renew attempts at re-unification with Romania. This in turn would lead to further unrest among the ethnic minorities, including Ukrainians, in Moldova.

132. Romania. Romania has attempted to compensate for the growing instability in the Balkans by improving its ties with other neighbouring states, including Ukraine. However, its relations with Ukraine continue to be plagued by Romanian claims to the regions of southern Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, which have been transferred from one country to another several times in this century.

133. Both of these territories, which were part of Romania during the interwar period, were annexed by the Soviet Union, and became part of the Ukrainian SSR, as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 1940.[185] The Romanian government has not advanced direct territorial demands on Ukraine. However, the potential significance of this territorial issue was underlined by the Romanian parliament's unanimous decision, in June 1991, to strongly condemn the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.

134. In its official statement the Romanian parliament was careful to appeal for a gradual, peaceful elimination of this legacy of WW II, and soon afterwards the Romanian foreign minister called for a policy of "small steps" which would lead to the eventual "evanescence" of Romania's borders with both Bessarabia and northern Bukovina.[186] However, the unofficial rhetoric on this issue has often been very heated, and several right-wing political parties and nationalist organizations in Romania have called for the rapid return of these territories to Romania.

135. Some representatives of the Romanian/Moldovan minority in Ukraine have complained about discriminatory measures imposed by the local authorities in Chernivtsi

oblast, where this minority comprises approximately 20% of the total population and over half of the population in certain districts of the oblast. However, Romanian-speakers in Ukraine have been provided with quite extensive cultural and educational facilities in their native language. For example, 20% of the schools in this oblast provide instruction in Romanian.[187] Thus officials of Rukh and other Ukrainian organizations have accused nationalist organizations in Romania of intentionally stirring up trouble among their countrymen in Ukraine.[188]

136. The controversy over the territories claimed by Ukraine and Romania began to die down in 1992. Diplomatic relations between the two states were established in March of that year, and the visit of a Romanian delegation to Kiev in April 1993 seems to have improved relations between the two countries.[189] However, many Romanian officials insist on keeping the territorial issue open, and it will continue to fester because of the increased representation of right-wing nationalist parties in the Romanian parliament following national elections in the fall of 1992.[190] Radical nationalism appears to be gaining ground among the younger generation in Romania, and the country's difficult economic situation continues to provide fertile soil for extremists on both the left and the right.[191]

137. Romanian-Ukrainian relations may be further complicated by the Romanian government's failure to provide the Ukrainian minority in Romania (approximately 150,000 individuals, although the official 1992 census listed only 67,000) with appropriate cultural and educational facilities.[192] Last but not least, if Romania attempts to aggressively interfere in the situation in Moldova, this will have a great negative impact on Romanian-Ukrainian relations.

138. Hungary. Hungarians have placed a strong emphasis on developing good relations with Ukraine, and Hungarian President Arpad Goncz was the first foreign head of state to visit Ukraine after its declaration of sovereignty on 16 July 1990. In May 1991, during a visit by Ukrainian President Kravchuk to Budapest, the two countries signed a

consular convention and a number of other statements and agreements on bilateral relations, including a declaration guaranteeing the rights of national minorities and supporting the preservation of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identities.[193]

139. Hungary was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with Ukraine in December 1991, and since that time the two countries have maintained wide-ranging contacts. They have agreed on cooperation between their defence ministries and armed forces in areas such as air defence and military education, and military attaches were assigned to each other's capitals in March 1993.[194] During a visit to Ukraine in May 1993 by Hungary's defence minister he was assured that Ukraine's military industry could supply Hungary's military with spare parts, repair its military engineering devices, and cooperate with Hungary's military industry.[195]

140. Security issues were also discussed during Kravchuk's second visit to Budapest, in February 1993. At that time both countries agreed that their security could best be guaranteed through full participation in existing international organizations and fora, especially the CSCE.[196] A few months later Hungary's defence minister stated that good relations with Ukraine were of vital importance to his country's present and future national security.[197] Hungary has not neglected its relations with Russia:[198] however, Hungarian officials have made an explicit commitment to help Ukraine establish closer relations with the West.[199]

141. Hungarians have taken a strong interest in their countrymen living outside of Hungary, and this includes Hungarians living in the Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine (approximately 12.5% of this oblast's population). Representatives of the two countries have met on a regular basis to discuss minority issues, and the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, aided by Hungary, has recently been experiencing a cultural revival.[200] There has been some friction between local Ukrainian or Rusyn (Ruthenian) nationalists and the Hungarian minority; in particular, some members of the minority have expressed a desire for levels of administrative-territorial autonomy which, to date, have been unacceptable

to the Kiev and local authorities in the Transcarpathian oblast. Instead, they have advocated greater cultural autonomy for the Hungarian minority.[201] Hungary has acknowledged that Ukraine treats its Hungarian minority more generously than any other country in Eastern Europe, and that this treatment could serve as an example for other countries with large Hungarian minorities on their territories.[202]

142. Of some concern in Ukraine, however, is the activity of right-wing nationalist forces in Hungary (e.g., the "Hungarian Road" or "National Movement" headed by the radical populist Istvan Csurka), which are finding some support among those sectors of the population who have become the victims of market-oriented reforms.[203] Thus in April 1993 Ukraine's Interior Affairs Minister Evhen Marchuk listed Hungary among those neighbouring countries where revanchist forces were active.[204]

143. Hungarian-Ukrainian relations deteriorated slightly in early May 1993, when fierce debates in the Hungarian parliament temporarily delayed ratification of the Hungarian-Ukrainian state treaty. The treaty guarantees minority rights and states that both sides renounce all territorial claims against each other. Csurka's Hungarian Road movement issued a statement criticizing the treaty, which had already been signed by Ukraine, because it dashed hopes for future border revisions.[205] However, the right-wing forces exemplified by Csurka are still quite weak in Hungary, and both Hungarian and Ukrainian officials are eager to cooperate on both a bilateral basis, and within various regional organizations. Thus Hungary may, in fact, act as a certain "window to the west" for Ukraine.

144. Belarus. In Belarus (former Belorussia) the position of the former communist nomenklatura is very strong in parliament as well as in the government, and the democratic opposition has had little success in breaking its dominance of the political and economic arenas. Belarusian Parliamentary Speaker Shushkevich lost some of his popularity in 1992 and power shifted to the government headed by Kebich, who has strong links to the nomenklatura and is committed to close cooperation with Russia.[206]

This cooperation is very broad, and extends into the military sphere. Thus although Belarus has begun to form its own national armed forces, opposition critics have criticized the army and have expressed doubts about the loyalty of its officer corps, which is dominated by non-Belarusians.[207]

145. Of particular importance was the Belarusian parliament's vote, on 9 April 1993, to approve Belarus's inclusion in a CIS collective security agreement signed by Russia and several other CIS states in May 1992. This approval was strongly supported by the Belarusian government, which continues to call for greater economic integration with Russia and its closest allies in the CIS. The government, in turn, is supported by local defence officials, the military-industrial complex, and the conservatives who dominate the Belarusian political arena. There is also evidence that Moscow has put pressure on Belarus to more vigorously support various forms of integration with Russia, including in the military sphere.[208]

146. Arguing against proposals for collective security, Shushkevich had earlier suggested that Belarus and several other regional actors create a belt of neutral states in Eastern Europe.[209] Shushkevich and members of the national-democratic opposition objected to the vote to approve the collective security agreement, arguing that membership in this pact would jeopardize the principle of Belarus's neutrality and, ultimately, national independence.[210] Thus Shushkevich has insisted that certain provisos to the agreement be adopted, and has also called for a referendum on the agreement. Shushkevich's position has strong public support.[211] However, the issue of the referendum has not been fully resolved, although it will be probably be held in the fall of 1993.[212]

147. In February 1993 the Belarusian parliament ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the START I Treaty.[213] In addition, two agreements were signed with Russia on military cooperation and strategic forces, with the strategic forces (and associated facilities) on Belarusian territory being clearly recognized as belonging to Russia.[214] Thus Russian officials frequently mention Belarus as setting a "good example"

for Ukraine. However, there is also evidence that Ukraine may, in some respects, be setting a "bad example" for Belarus. For example, on 23 June 1993 the foreign minister of Belarus followed Kiev's lead in seeking additional funds from the West to cover the costs of eliminating the nuclear weapons in his country.[215]

148. There are no signs of strong tension in the Ukraine-Belarus relationship. However, Belarus will likely continue to play the role of a "loyal ally" of Russia, and it is unlikely to join Ukraine in seriously opposing Russia's attempts to maintain hegemony in the region.

149. Slovakia. The prospects for an independent Slovakia are not very hopeful. After the partition of Czechoslovakia, and the creation of the new state of Slovakia, this country has had great difficulty reversing the decline in its economy.[216] Slovakia also faced a political crisis in the spring of 1993 after several ministers resigned from the government of Prime Minister Meciar, whose popularity rapidly decreased after indepedence was achieved.[217] In addition, Slovakia had difficulty improving its image abroad as a result of the government's hostility towards the Hungarian minority, as well as attempts to restrict freedom of the media and academic freedom in Slovakia.[218] There has been a deterioration in Czech-Slovak relations, and increasing public dissatisfaction in Slovakia with the country's leadership.[219]

150. A continuation of present trends could lead to instability in Slovakia which would affect all of its neighbours. Some analysts have even proposed that, if the situation in Slovakia continues to deteriorate, the country may end up being partitioned among some of its neighbours, including Ukraine.[220] There have been no signs of any significant friction between Slovakia and Ukraine. However, there is a sizeable Ukrainian/Ruthenian minority in Slovakia (according to the 1989 census there were less than 8,000 Slovaks in Ukraine) and there have been some disputes, in both Ukraine and Slovakia, over the situation and treatment of this minority.[221]

151. Ukraine's President Kravchuk has included Slovakia in his proposal for an informal security alliance among Ukraine and other Central/East European states.[222] However, the direction of the evolution of Slovakia's relations with Ukraine is unclear, and will remain unclear as long as the current instability in Slovakia prevails.

152. Turkey. Turkey is not, of course, one of Ukraine's land neighbours. However, it has been included in this survey because it is one of Ukraine's most important Black Sea neighbours. In 1991 Turkey abandoned its Moscow-oriented foreign policy and began to develop relations with all of the Soviet successor states. In particular, Turkey was one of the main promotors of a project to bring together the countries of the Black Sea region to further develop their cooperation (especially with respect to economic relations), and in June 1992 formal agreements to this end were signed in Istanbul.[223]

153. Both countries are interested in expanding economic cooperation, and Turkey may become an important trade partner for Ukraine. However, a potential problem in relations between these two countries is growing Turkish interest in the situation of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine. There is a large Crimean Tatar diaspora community in Turkey, and although most members of this community are heavily assimilated into Turkish culture, many are bound to have a certain attachment to their homeland.[224]

154. There is little evidence to date that Turkey has taken a strong interest in the current situation of the Crimean Tatars in Ukraine. However, some Russian officials have expressed strong (and probably exaggerated) concerns over Turkish plans for the region. According to two officials of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations,

> Turkey's geopolitical behavior in the Black Sea region is aimed at encouraging the processes of the "Turkization" of the Crimean Peninsula and, in the long range, revising the results of the 18th-century Russo-Turkish wars and, possibly, recovering the Crimea.... Ankara's geopolitical strategy also includes plans for the resettlement in the Crimea of Crimean Tatars living in Turkey... The resettlement of Turkish Crimean Tatars, and Turkish economic expansion, along with a rapid

growth in Turkey's military potential, could fundamentally change the geopolitical situation in the Black Sea zone and adjacent regions.[225]

155. Some officials in Kiev have also expressed concerns about the potential for Turkish interference in Crimea if the situation there continues to deteriorate.[226] An example of the problems that could arise is provided by reports that ethnic Abkhazians from Turkey were involved in combat preparations against Georgia in Abkhazia.[227] There is no evidence that Turkey provided support to these Abkhazians; however, it could get dragged into this and other regional conflicts if substantial numbers of Turkish citizens become entangled in them. An interesting sign of Turkish interest in the Crimean Tatar issue was a recent statement, by Turkey's ambassador to Germany, that the Medzhlis (the representative body of the Crimean Tatars) could regard the Turkish embassy in Germany as its own embassy.[228]

THE CIS AND OTHER REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

156. As noted above, the agreement on the formation of the CIS was a hastily prepared compromise intended largely to ensure that Ukraine would remain within some form of association of the former republics of the USSR. It was, however, a flawed compromise, for the leading representatives of the two major actors in the CIS, Russia and Ukraine, had very different perceptions of the future of this commonwealth. Kravchuk and his associates saw it largely as a transitional tool for getting rid of Gorbachev and peacefully establishing Ukrainian sovereignty. Most Russian politicians, including those from the liberal-democratic camp, saw the CIS as a potential federation or confederation, a decentralized version of the old USSR. According to this vision Russia was to play a leading (and implicitly dominant) role within this new body as the natural "successor state" to the Soviet Union.

157. As a result, to this day the CIS remains a relatively amorphous body, with few mechanisms to ensure that agreements reached by its member states are observed. In the meantime, Ukraine has refused to sign CIS agreements on a collective security pact,

various documents on joint CIS armed forces, and the decision to create an interparliamentary assembly.[229] In 1993 Ukrainian participation in the CIS was primarily motivated by the growing realization that CIS member states must coordinate some of their actions to improve the state of their economies. However, Ukraine remains reluctant to yield any important aspects of its sovereignty to CIS bodies.

158. In the fall of 1992 Ukraine's President Kravchuk strongly criticized those politicians who were anxious to see the formation of a confederation instead of a loosely-structured Commonwealth. Instead, he portrayed the CIS as a body which would eventually turn into an economic association of states along the lines of the European Economic Community. Kravchuk's position was upheld by most of the political parties and organizations in Ukraine. The exception was the Socialist Party of Ukraine (the successor to the Communist Party of Ukraine), which is supported by many conservative deputies in the Ukrainian parliament. It advocates Ukraine's greater integration within the CIS, and signing the Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States. However, a number of centrist or right-wing political organizations of a nationalist or national-democratic orientation have argued that Ukraine should totally withdraw from the CIS.[230]

159. The Charter of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a document defining the legal and organizational foundations of the CIS which was prepared in the course of 1992, was finally approved by seven member states, not including Ukraine, at the CIS summit in Minsk on 22 January 1993. Ukraine's objections centred on the draft charter's references to a common economic and information space, the "spiritual unity" of the peoples of the commonwealth, a joint defence policy and external frontiers, and harmonizing the legislation of member states.[231]

160. Kravchuk has supported the preservation of the CIS, arguing that some form of association among the Soviet successor states should be maintained. In a recent statement on the topic of the CIS Kravchuk repeated the position which was firmly adhered to by Ukraine's representatives in 1993. Namely, a certain level of economic integration is

favoured, but political and military integration will be firmly opposed.[232] This stance runs directly counter to the growing consensus in Russia. According to this consensus the creation, on the basis of the CIS, of a confederal (or even a federal) state, with a unified centre possessing clearly defined rights and functions, is both a plausible and desirable strategic objective of Russian foreign policy.[233]

161. Ukraine, reluctant to become overly entangled in a CIS institutional framework, has been keen to involve itself in other regional organizations. For example, on 14 February 1993 representatives of the border areas of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Ukraine signed an agreement setting up a loosely-structured Carpathian "Euroregion," with the aim of facilitating cooperation among the local border communities of these countries.[234] In June 1992 Ukraine signed the agreement on the formation of a Black Sea cooperation zone, and in July 1993 Ukraine was being considered for membership in the Central European Initiative.[235] Ukraine's initiatives to encourage the formation of a Central-East European security zone covering Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Austria will be discussed at the end of this study.

III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT

SOME ECONOMIC STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

162. Ukraine was a major contributor to the economy of the old Soviet Union. With 17.9% of the Soviet population in 1989, it contributed roughly 16.5% of the Soviet Union's GNP in 1990, about 16% of its industrial production as well as 22.5% of its agricultural production, and roughly 14.6% of its foreign exports.[236] Ukraine has a climate and rich soil which favour agricultural production, and a strategic location which facilitates close trading ties with both Eastern and Western Europe. In addition, it has a strong research and engineering infrastructure as well as a well educated and relatively highly skilled workforce. Thus a 1990 Deutsche Bank study, as well as other studies evaluating Ukraine's economic possibilities, have pointed out that Ukraine has great potential, in the long term, to build a strong economy.[237]

163. More specifically, Ukraine's large industrial sector is dominated by heavy industry and a defence-oriented capital-goods sector. Thus Ukraine accounted for 37.3% of Soviet ferrous metallurgical production in 1985, and is a major producer of heavy machinery. Agriculture and food processing play a very important role in the Ukrainian economy, with a high percentage of its land under cultivation and producing good yields of winter wheat as well as technical and feed crops. In recent years Ukraine provided approximately one-quarter of Soviet grain production and half of its sugar beet output. Thus Ukraine was the least dependent on food imports of all the Soviet republics.[238]

164. However, Ukraine's industrial base was largely the result of substantial investment in the first decades of the Soviet Union, and following World War II Ukraine began to receive decreasing shares of Soviet industrial investment. Thus when Ukraine gained independence much of its industrial infrastructure was outdated, energy-intensive, and heavily polluting. As for agricultural production, it has been negatively affected by the contamination of significant areas of farmland by radiation from the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Other problems include soil deterioration resulting from poor irrigation and farming techniques, overuse of fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, and an aging

agricultural workforce. The costs of dealing with the after-effects of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and the numerous other ecological problems facing Ukraine will prove to be a very heavy drain on the Ukrainian economy.[239]

165. Ukraine was highly integrated into the overall Soviet economy, and was particularly dependent on imports of large volumes of oil and gas, especially from the Russian Federation. Ukraine accounted for close to one-quarter of Soviet coal production, but production of coal has fallen in recent years, and the cost of coal extraction has steadily risen. Thus Ukraine cannot be self-sufficient in energy in the forseeable future.[240] Estimates of the effect of a shift to world market prices on Ukraine's economy vary. Some studies indicate that such a shift would have little effect on Ukraine's trade balances, and might eventually result in a positive foreign trade balance.[241] However, disruptions in economic relations among the former republics badly affected Ukraine, and most commentators are pessimistic about the republic's short-term economic prospects.[242] In particular, Ukraine remains heavily dependent on increasingly expensive oil and gas supplies from Russia.

166. The Ukrainian government engaged in a great deal of rhetoric about the need for economic reform after independence was achieved in December 1991. However, little concrete progress towards substantive economic reforms was made in 1992. A generous interpretation would hold that the conservative Ukrainian government headed by Fokin was preoccupied with the process of state-building. Thus it was anxious to preserve the social consensus which appeared to have been achieved in the fall of 1991, and reluctant to introduce disruptive reforms which could lead to a breakdown in this consensus. Other interpretations stress the incompetence and inertia of the Fokin government as well as the lack of experts, especially economists, who could prepare a competent reform program.[243] However, even the economists who reject the "shock therapy" model for Ukraine's economic development agree that many valuable opportunities to begin the restructuring of the economy were wasted in 1992. Whatever the main reason for the Fokin government's indecision, it basically maintained the status quo in 1992, which saw a

dramatic deterioration in the state of the Ukrainian economy.

167. In 1992 a significant rise in state spending, and dwindling tax revenues, led to a large government budget deficit in Ukraine. It was financed by the issue of a large volume of credits by the Ukrainian government, and dissatisfaction with this policy led the Russian government to stop recognizing Ukrainian-issued credits in the summer of 1992. This in turn provoked Ukraine's departure from the ruble zone in November 1992, which effectively transformed the "temporary" coupons, introduced in April 1992, into an independent currency. However, the breakdown in monetary relations with Russia left Ukrainian enterprises with very large unpaid bills from Russian enterprises, and very little convertible currency in which to conduct essential trade. The result was high rates of inflation, which rose to 50% per month in early 1993, and a collapse in the value of the coupon.[244]

RECENT ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACT

168. In the summer of 1992 the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine led to growing public dissatisfaction. This was eventually reflected in the parliament's replacement, in October 1992, of the discredited Fokin government by a new team headed by Leonid Kuchma.[245] For six years prior to his appointment Kuchma had been the general director of Pivdenmash (the Southern Machine Building Factory), considered the largest military assembly plant in the former USSR. However, he was a "progressive" industrialist, and was supported by the "New Ukraine" political coalition which advocates rapid economic reform.

169. Kuchma has been extremely blunt in assessing the poor shape of the Ukrainian economy, and has repeatedly stressed his commitment to reforms in the face of strong criticism from conservative deputies in the Ukrainian parliament. However, despite his praise in early 1993 for Poland's economic "shock therapy" approach to economic reform, Kuchma has argued that such an approach is inappropriate in Ukraine's present situation. In his opinion the major challenge is simply to prevent a further decline in

production. Thus he has advocated maintaining a strong state presence in the economy, and the use of various administrative "levers" to regulate its development.

170. The general steps Kuchma has taken to stabilize the economic situation in Ukraine have been supported by the country's western advisers as well as the World Bank, which was heavily involved in drawing up the government's reform programme. However, rapidly eliminating credits to Ukraine's industries would lead, in many cases, to their bankruptcy and could destabilize entire cities and regions, in particular in eastern Ukraine. Thus the strategy which has been adopted, at least on paper, is the encouragement of small-scale privatization and the elimination of legal barriers to the registration of new businesses, which are to provide alternative sources of employment. Although state enterprises are to be commercialized, potentially profitable large enterprises are to be supported until they prepare restructuring plans.

171. However, high rates of inflation continued to prevail in 1993, and privatization measures affected only a small percentage of even small-sized enterprises.[246] As of July 1993 the new currency (hryvnia) had not been introduced, and little progress had been made in establishing an effective monetary authority which could effectively control credit emission.[247] In addition, implementation of the government's decrees was opposed by conservative local officials who had established regional "fiefdoms" as central control over their activities was eroded in the last 2-3 years. For example, the slow pace of agricultural reform in Ukraine is largely due to the obstruction of collective farm chairmen, who still reign as semi-feudal "lords" in the countryside.[248] In addition many of these individuals, as well as industrial managers, have become involved in illegal or semi-legal activities, or have taken advantage of their positions to engage in dubious forms of "privatization" to enrich themselves.

172. Although it is difficult to estimate the economic damage caused by various forms of corruption, it is considered to have reached critical levels. For example, in the fall of 1992 Ukraine experienced a debilitating shortage of oil supplies. However, at the

same time large quantities of oil and oil products which had been supplied by Russia were being sold abroad. The financial basis for these deals was, at best, semi-legal, and almost none of the profits reached the national treasury.[249] One of the major planks in the current government's programme is a strong drive against corruption, and few commentators doubt the determination of Kuchma and his closest associates to deal with this problem. However, to date the inefficient and poorly-staffed Ukrainian legal system has proved ineffective in bringing most of those accused of corruption to trial.[250] Involvement in corrupt practices has apparently become so widespread (including some parliamentarians and large numbers of senior government bureaucrats) that it will be difficult to effectively prosecute an anti-corruption campaign.[251]

173. There was no large-scale labour unrest in 1992, although this was largely due to the government's wage concessions to workers in important sectors of the economy, and limited unemployment. However, steep rises in prices, deteriorating social services, and an absence of signs of improvement in the economic situation have led to growing dissatisfaction. It has now spread far beyond pensioners and other underprivileged sectors of the population, and has been greatly fueled by corruption. This is because the growth and great influence of what are popularly called "Mafia structures," and their involvement in privatization of state property, have occurred at a time when increasing numbers of Ukrainian citizens are having great difficulties making ends meet.[252]

174. This resentment was finally expressed in a series of widespread strikes, centred in Eastern Ukraine, which began in early June 1993 and were sparked by a new series of price increases. In addition to economic demands, such as rescinding price hikes, the strikers made a number of political demands, including a referendum on a vote of confidence in the president, prime minister and parliament. After some of their demands were satisfied most of the strikes were called off two weeks after they began.[253] However, the concessions which government negotiators made to settle the strike will make a major contribution to the inflationary spiral in Ukraine.[254] In addition, these concessions will likely contribute to the growth of demands from other sectors of the

work force. Thus labour unrest will continue to be a major problem for Ukraine during the difficult transition period ahead.

175. The cause of reform in Ukraine was aided by the extensive powers which parliament granted to the Kuchma government in the fall of 1992. However this government, like the one which preceded it, lacked experienced personnel who could create an effective plan for Ukraine's emergence from its economic crisis, and effective administrative structures to implement such plans.[255] Thus its reform plans were, in many respects, inconsistent and poorly thought out.[256] The introduction of economic reforms was also hampered by the underdevelopment and inefficiency of Ukraine's banking system.[257]

176. The situation was further complicated by the constant uncertainty over the nature and pace of increases in the price of oil and gas supplied by Russia. Some of this uncertainty was lifted after a certain "thaw" in Russian-Ukrainian relations occured in late June 1993. It is now clear that the transition to world prices for the oil and gas supplied by Russia to Ukraine will continue, with a full transition possible as early as January 1994. Russia will also pay Ukraine world prices for the transit of oil and gas across its territory (e.g., to Western Europe). However, this is unlikely to play a substantial role in alleviating the tremendous shock of world-level fuel prices on the energy-intensive Ukrainian economy.

177. Last but not least, the government's special powers came to an end in May 1993. For several weeks it was unclear who would be responsible for further reform efforts and, as Premier Kuchma pointed out in a number of speeches, Ukraine faced (and continues to face) a major economic crisis.[258] By the end of June 1993 some of the political uncertainty in Kiev had diminished, as President Kravchuk made a number of significant concessions to Premier Kuchma. Kuchma then proposed a series of emergency measures which would prevent the Ukrainian economy from collapsing: they include tougher restrictions on the growth of the money supply, more rapid privatization, closing

loss-making factories, and incentives to attract foreign investment.[259] However, even if these measures are implemented, the short-term prospects for the Ukrainian economy are gloomy.

178. In the medium term, much will depend on whether new markets for Ukrainian goods can be found. To date few products in Ukraine have found buyers abroad, and Western aid and investment in Ukraine has been limited. However, Ukraine has begun to receive considerable technical aid from sources such as the European Economic Community.[260] In addition, in June 1993 the World Bank approved a loan (its first to Ukraine) to help provide the infrastructure for economic reforms. According to a bank representative Ukraine holds promise, but its progress is hampered by a shortage of professionals and the absence of an effective institutional framework to promote reform.[261] This includes the lack of an efficient system for gathering and processing statistics on the economic situation in Ukraine, especially foreign trade activity, and the absence of Ukrainian trade representatives in foreign countries.[262]

179. Thus Ukraine's emergence onto world markets will, at best, be a slow process, and it will need to maintain strong economic links with other former republics of the Soviet Union. This was reflected, in May-June 1993, in Ukraine's increasing willingness to go along with certain forms of economic integration within the CIS. For example, in late May 1993 a meeting of the heads of governments of CIS countries, or their plenipotentiary representatives, resulted in the creation of an intergovernmental council for industry as well as an interstate joint-stock company and corporation.[263]

180. Officials from Russia and some other CIS states stated that these steps would help lay the foundations for a common economic union.[264] Ukraine's leaders have rejected the use of the term "union," and have generally insisted on using the term "integration" to describe the desired nature of economic trends within the CIS. However, by mid-1993 there was a growing consensus that fairly dramatic steps to recreate broken links between Ukrainian and other CIS enterprises (especially in Russia and Belorussia) were

unavoidable. Thus, in late June 1993 the Ukrainian and Russian premiers signed a number of economic cooperation agreements which signalled a new readiness on both sides for economic cooperation. This was then followed, on 10 July 1993, by an agreement in Gorky among the premiers of the three Slavic states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus to maintain "a single economic space." The draft of a full treaty elaborating on this agreement is to be prepared by 1 September 1993.[265]

181. As of mid-July 1993, the future of these agreements is uncertain. The idea of a high level of economic integration with Russia is anathema to many of Ukraine's politicians, who are concerned that economic integration in present conditions would be followed by pressures to accept increasingly restrictive forms of military and political integration. Thus there is bound to be considerable debate in Ukraine concerning the merits and drawbacks of these plans. If they are implemented, then a great deal will depend on whether Ukraine's politicians possess, or can acquire enough legimitacy (and accompanying public support) to allow them to maintain Ukraine's political sovereignty.

IV. POLITICAL CONTEXT

BACKGROUND

182. Ukraine was a relatively isolated "backwater" of the Soviet Union until the late 1980s, and a mass movement for democratic reforms and independence was slower to develop in Ukraine than in the Baltic states. However, such a movement, headed by the socio-political organization "Rukh," gained momentum throughout 1989-90 as Ukraine's conservative Communist Party (CP) leadership gradually lost its credibility. Thus, in elections to Ukraine's parliament (the Supreme Council) in March 1990 the opposition electoral bloc led by Rukh gained one quarter of the parliamentary seats in spite of blatant attempts by the Communist Party to manipulate the elections.[266]

183. In July 1990 the great majority of deputies, including most of the CP members in the new parliament, voted for a declaration of sovereignty. However, a split soon emerged between those CP members who were moving towards a national communist position under the leadership of Leonid Kravchuk, the chairman of the parliament, and more conservative communist deputies who often blocked reformist legislation.[267]

184. The collapse of the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow discredited the conservative wing of the CP in Ukraine, which had supported the coup leaders. However, prior to the coup Kravchuk had begun to make various overtures to Rukh and other national-democratic forces. Thus Ukraine's declaration of independence on 24 August 1991 placed Kravchuk firmly in control of the situation. After he resigned from the CP it was banned, and by portraying himself as a pragmatist who would try to govern on the basis of consensus Kravchuk, with the aid of the state-run media, easily won the contest for president of Ukraine in December 1991 with 61.6% of the votes cast. To this day Kravchuk, who is often portrayed as a wily fox, remains an enigma in some respects. However, he is firmly committed to Ukraine's independence, and appears willing to work with a wide range of political forces as long as they share this commitment.

185. Kravchuk had some success in raising the profile of Ukraine on the international scene, and in diffusing tensions with Russia while opposing attempts to promote higher levels of integration within the CIS. However, he devoted less attention to the domestic political situation, and his emphasis on maintaining domestic stability (as well as simple inertia) meant that he continued to rely heavily on former CP bureaucrats for advice and as candidates for his own staff, important positions in government, and presidential "prefects" in the regions. As Kravchuk and the government headed by Premier Fokin took few initiatives to accelerate the introduction of significant reforms in Ukraine the political as well as economic situation gradually deteriorated throughout 1992. This coincided with the emergence of various divisions among Kravchuk's supporters.

186. Post-independence euphoria and fears of domination by Russia had helped to temporarily rally the national democrats and moderate former communists around the president and the idea of independence in 1992. However Rukh, which had provided the core of the opposition in the Ukrainian parliament prior to December 1991, lost much of its momentum during this period. In particular, divisions developed in Rukh over whether it should support the president in the interests of national accord, or remain in opposition to the president and his government.[268]

187. At the end of 1992, at the Fourth Congress of Rukh, the organization was taken over by the supporters of Chornovil. A former dissident, Rukh activist, and presidential candidate, Chornovil was in favour of "constructive opposition" to Kravchuk, and in February 1993 Rukh was registered as a political party.[269] This led to the exodus of many Rukh members who supported Kravchuk or felt that Rukh should remain a broad "umbrella" organization. Further splits in Rukh occurred over the issue of the organization's stance toward the growth of radical nationalist activity in Western Ukraine, and the personal ambitions of local Rukh activists.[270]

188. One important development on the political scene was the emergence, in January 1992, of a new pro-reform coalition called New Ukraine. It attracted a number of

leading figures in the Ukrainian parliament and government and, unlike most of the other political parties in Ukraine, New Ukraine placed a high priority on promoting a cohesive program of socio-economic reform. Thus it pressed for the rapid introduction of privatisation measures, the development of a market infrastructure, and other measures to promote the growth of a strong middle class of property owners. However New Ukraine, like the other parties in the democratic camp, devoted little attention to building a strong organizational network throughout Ukraine.[271]

189. Growing opposition to the Fokin government led to its replacement in October 1992 by a government headed by Leonid Kuchma. A rather dour deputy from the industrial centre of Dnipropetrovs'k, he had a very low profile in the Ukrainian parliament prior to his appointment. However, he quickly gained the respect of most of the democratic forces in Ukraine because of his candid, direct style and almost brutal honesty concerning the legacy of mismanagement and current difficulties faced by Ukraine. As an individual who made a successful career in heavy industry and the military-industrial complex (MIC), Kuchma has strong managerial skills. He also understands the concerns of those employed by these sectors, which will be greatly affected by market-oriented reforms. At the same time, many of his actions during his first months as premier appear to indicate that he is not a "captive" of the interests represented by his previous working environment, for over time he has become an increasingly vigorous advocate of economic reform. Last but not least, while stressing his commitment to an independent Ukraine, Kuchma also emphasized the need to maintain normal, healthy relations with the Russian Federation. Thus he has favoured renewing many of the mutually beneficial economic ties which were disrupted in the course of 1992.

190. However, the Kuchma government was faced with a large conservative majority in the Ukrainian parliament. This majority had been relatively passive throughout most of 1992, but it managed to slow down, neutralize, or block most reform initiatives during this period. Frustrated by these tactics, the democratic forces temporarily united in the

summer of 1992 and launched a campaign to gather enough signatures (3,000,000) to hold a referendum on the issue of dissolving the legislature and holding new elections.

191. This campaign failed to gather the requisite number of signatures, largely because of growing political apathy of most of the population. Infighting among members of the democratic camp persisted, and they continued to devote little attention to developing coherent socio-economic programs. This contributed to their failure to build a mass political base, and prevented the democratic camp in Ukraine from providing Kuchma's government with the strong, consistent support it required in its first few months of office.

192. This situation, and the continuing decline of the Ukrainian economy, provided a favourable environment for the renewed activity of conservative, anti-reformist political forces which were nostalgic for the "stability" which had prevailed under the centralized command economy. These forces were headed by the Socialist Party, the unofficial successor to the CP of Ukraine, which claimed a membership of 30,000 in May 1993.[272] It began to regroup in the summer of 1992, and launched a campaign to blame the national democrats and reformers for Ukraine's poor socio-economic situation.

193. This simple message found a responsive audience among certain circles in the heavily industrialized areas of eastern and southern Ukraine which will be greatly affected by economic reforms. It thus provided the ammunition for an offensive, directed against Kuchma's reform programme, initiated in late January 1993 by the conservative majority in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. The major demands put forward by these conservatives included: giving priority status to wide-ranging relations with Russia and other CIS states; coordination of economic reforms and legislation with other CIS states; the introduction of dual or CIS citizenship; the introduction of broad regional autonomy, and possibly a federal structure for Ukraine; and the official recognition of Russian as a second official language in Ukraine. Some of these demands were shared by groups of former communists who regrouped in 1993, set up new communist party structures, and called

for full legalization of their activities.[273] In addition, a coalition of left-wing forces which included the Socialist Party was created in late June 1993 under the name of "Trudova Ukraina" (Labour Ukraine).[274]

194. To counter this offensive, most of the democratic forces united in January-February 1993 to form an alliance called the "Anticommunist and Anti-imperial Front of Ukraine."[275] However, it did not prove to be a cohesive or effective organization, and it probably exaggerated the nature of the communist "threat." The former communists who make up the conservative majority in the Ukrainian parliament have definitely impeded the progress of political and socioeconomic reforms. However, their popularity, as well as that of other politicians representing pro-communist tendencies in Ukraine, is very low, and there is considerable dissension in their ranks.[276]

195. Given the weaknesses and amateurism of the democratic forces in Ukraine, and opposition to reforms on the part of the conservative majority in the Ukrainian Supreme Council, Kuchma's government did not have a strong base of support in parliament. However, Kuchma was able to draw on a variety of individuals of a pragmatic bent in putting together his cabinet, and by the spring of 1993 it appeared that he had succeeded in at least temporarily stabilizing a situation which, by the fall of 1992, was becoming increasingly chaotic and unmanageable.

POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND PROSPECTS FOR INTERNAL STABILITY

196. A major political crisis re-emerged in Ukraine in the spring of 1993. One reason for this crisis was the Kuchma government's inability to reverse the decline in the Ukrainian economy. In November 1992 the government had been granted special powers, for six months, to deal with Ukraine's deepening economic crisis. However, during this period the government only began to address the most pressing problems faced by Ukraine. Kuchma's job was further complicated by his lack of experience with government administration, difficulties in putting together a strong reform-minded "team" to implement reforms, and continuing bickering over the appropriate division of powers

among the parliament, president, and government. Last but not least there was continuing confusion, at the local level, over who was responsible for implementing and supervising reform measures.[277]

197. The crisis came to a head when, in May 1993, Kuchma asked that the special powers his cabinet had received in the fall of 1992 be extended and expanded. President Kravchuk then presented the Ukrainian parliament with a different proposal, in accordance with which he would take control of the government and assume responsibility for carrying out reforms in Ukraine. However, none of the proposals which were put forward to resolve this crisis received the two-thirds majority necessary for their passage.[278]

198. In the spring of 1993 the Ukrainian parliament was already a largely discredited institution. Many deputies had been accused of corruption,[279] and few residents of Ukraine felt that the Supreme Council could continue to play an effective political role with its present composition.[280] The political crisis noted above further damaged the Supreme Council's limited credibility, especially since it coincided with a major labour strike in eastern Ukraine. In addition to economic demands, the strike leaders called for regional autonomy for the Donbass and a referendum on public confidence in President Kravchuk and the parliament.[281]

199. Under intense pressure during the strike, the Ukrainian parliament agreed to hold such a referendum on 26 September 1993,[282] although some doubts have expressed concerning its constitutionality, and the extent to which its results will be binding. It initially appeared that a debilitating vacuum of power would persist until this date. In particular, it was uncertain whether Kuchma would continue to work together with Kravchuk. In 1993 Kuchma overtook Kravchuk as Ukraine's most popular politician, and his government was seen as the force most likely to lead Ukraine out of its current crisis.[283] As a result, there were signs of increasing tension between these two individuals, and indications that Kravchuk felt threatened by Kuchma's popularity.[284]

However, at the end of June 1993 the two appeared to reach a compromise. It resulted in Kravchuk liquidating a number of presidential advisory councils which had duplicated the work of government bodies, and Kuchma appeared committed to remaining in office.[285] In fact, he has begun to play an increasingly visible and aggressive role on the Ukrainian political scene.

200. To date, Ukraine has succeeded in remaining an island of political stability in a rather turbulent setting. This is partly due to the absence, as noted above, of serious cases of ethnic conflict. In addition, although the language of political debate in Kiev is often heated and intolerant, one does not find the same level of vituperative mud-slinging that has characterized the political scene in Moscow. The restrained tone of the mass media has contributed to this relative calm, although this is partly due to a high level of state control over radio and television broadcasts, and selective state subsidization of certain newspapers.[286]

201. However, the relative calm in Ukraine in 1992 was largely deceptive, since it was based on the population's naive hopes of improvements in the economic situation following the independence of Ukraine. It was also the result of socio-economic policies which attempted to offend no-one but were marked by incompetence or, at best, by a lack of imagination. By the summer of 1993 the end result of these policies was a high level of political apathy among the population, which was greatly demoralized by deteriorating living standards.

202. The change in the Ukrainian government in the fall of 1992 encouraged hopes that a new, more dynamic and determined team of ministers could stem this deterioration. Confidence in the government was still relatively high in early 1993. However, the Kuchma government was forced to take a number of drastic and unpopular steps to modify imbalances in the economy and slow down inflationary processes. The conservative majority in parliament continues to criticize and impede the implementation of these measures, and it is too early to determine whether (or when) they will be

effective.

203. Few observers have expressed doubts about Kuchma's determination and vigour. He showed a rare ability to realistically assess the situation in which Ukraine finds itself, and in early 1993 some Western economic institutions expressed cautious confidence in the policies his government was pursuing. In addition, there was a growing realization in Ukraine in 1993 that its future as an independent state would be determined by the success or failure of its socio-economic policies. Thus certain other issues were, at least temporarily, placed on the back burner.

204. The relative calm in Ukraine was also due to the fact that Kravchuk concerned himself largely with issues related to Ukraine's foreign relations, with Kuchma focussing on domestic issues. Kuchma succeeded in co-opting a number of prominent reform-minded figures into his administration, and no other politician appeared capable of assembling a team with similar skills and experience. However, this domestic calm is threatened by the serious crisis of authority described above. If the tension between Kravchuk and Kuchma continues, and leads to Kuchma's resignation,[287] this would have a devastating impact on the reform process in Ukraine.

205. Developments in Russia will also have a decisive influence on the reform process in Ukraine. Ukraine's current leadership cannot "insulate" Ukraine from a possible deterioration in the political and socio-economic situation in its largest and most important neighbour. This is due to its almost open borders with Russia, and heavy dependence on Russian oil and gas as well as other natural resource imports. Yeltsin's partial victory in the April 1993 Russian referendum, and the ensuing disorientation of some of the forces most strongly opposed to him, helped to stabilize the situation in Russia. However, almost all commentators agree that Yeltsin must act quickly and decisively to entrench himself and vigourously continue the reform process. If he does not succeed in doing so, or if his reformist policies do not begin to produce visible results in the near future, Ukraine will be faced with a highly unstable neighbour which will constantly be

tempted to interfere in Ukraine's domestic affairs. Nonetheless, a stable Russia does not guarantee stability in Russian-Ukrainian relations since, as noted earlier, even the political moderates in Russia have had difficulty accepting the independence of Ukraine. Thus they will constantly be tempted to play the "Ukrainian card" to appease nationalist sentiments in Russia.

206. Even if the current Ukrainian government remains in office, and succeeds in bringing about some level of socio-economic stability, it will be difficult to maintain this stability. A successful implementation of the measures necessary to slow down and eventually reverse Ukraine's economic decline requires that a wide range of political, socio-economic and occupational groups temporarily lay aside some of their particular interests. Thus the population of Ukraine will have to show great patience over a very indefinite period of time to allow reform measures to work. At the same time, Ukraine's leadership will have to demonstrate great management skills to deal with the multitude of problems facing the country. The true test of this patience and these skills will come when unemployment begins to emerge as a major social issue. If the current reform program is implemented in a consistent fashion, this test will be faced before the end of 1993.

207. In 1993 Ukraine's leaders were increasingly realistic about the nature of the challenges facing the country, and the appropriate means of dealing with them. However, by mid-1993 Kravchuk had lost much of his authority and the Kuchma government's early momentum was largely expended. Thus the healthy development of the domestic political situation in Ukraine now largely depends on whether the current government, or its replacement, can regain some of this momentum. The main requirements for this are a stabilization of the economic situation, the creation of a more efficient administrative system to implement reform measures, and an effective drive against the widespread corruption which has proven to be such a demoralizing force. Otherwise the Ukrainian state will remain, in the short run, weak and ineffectual. This would eventually lead either to the entrenchment of some form of authoritarian rule in Ukraine, or a peripheral

status for Ukraine as a weak state dominated by Russia.

PERCEPTIONS OF UKRAINE'S NATIONAL INTERESTS, AND TRENDS IN FOREIGN POLICY

208. In 1993 Ukraine's Foreign Ministry prepared a document on the basic principles of the country's foreign policy. However, it is a general document which largely consists of "motherhood" clauses on expanding economic cooperation with foreign countries, ensuring the stability of the international situation, preserving Ukraine's territorial integrity, etc. When the document was debated in the Ukrainian parliament in March 1993 several deputies felt that it should provide more specific details on Ukraine's attitudes toward the CIS, and the future of the nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory. In addition, domestic critics have accused Ukraine's foreign policy of lacking clear aims and vigour.[288]

209. However, preparing a detailed foreign policy blueprint would prevent Ukraine's leaders from taking a flexible stance on these and other foreign policy issues. Flexibility is of special importance in view of resources constraints which do not allow Ukraine to conduct an energetic and far-reaching foreign policy. Last but not least it is doubtful whether, in its initial phases, Ukraine's foreign policy could be anything but cautious in view of the country's recent emergence as an independent state, its leadership's lack of foreign policy experience, and the virtual absence of a foreign policy infrastructure in Ukraine.

210. In its first year of independence Ukraine's leaders placed a great deal of emphasis on the process of state-building, which was understandable given the absence of a tradition of modern statehood in Ukraine. Ukraine now possesses almost all of the domestic trappings of statehood, and it is also beginning to receive a considerable amount of attention in the world press. This is due to the growing awareness of the importance of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship for regional stability, and the high profile of nuclear weapons issues in international affairs. As a result, over 200 foreign correspondents are

now stationed in Kiev, and Ukrainian leaders can no longer complain about neglect by the international media.[289]

211. Ukraine's leaders have made strong efforts to have their country recognized as a responsible member of the global community, and have begun to assume some of the responsibilities inherent in such a role. For example, Ukraine readily agreed to send troops to participate in the peace-keeping effort in former Yugoslavia. As a result, in June 1993 United Nations General Secretary Boutros-Ghali encouraged greater Ukrainian participation in peacekeeping activities. Shortly afterwards, Georgia's Parliamentary Chairman Shevardnadze asked Ukrainian President Kravchuk to act as a mediator in settling the conflict in Abkhazia.[290] Ukraine has also adhered to the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia by the United Nations, although this has placed a heavy burden on the country's economy.[291]

212. Despite the largely reactive nature of Ukraine's foreign policy, over time its broad outlines are becoming clearer. First and foremost, from the beginning of its existence as an independent state Ukraine's leadership has stressed its commitment to substantive and meaningful sovereignty for Ukraine. It has therefore consistently rejected efforts to recreate any framework which is even vaguely reminiscent of the old Soviet Union. This strong commitment to sovereignty has led to a certain "touchiness" concerning even symbolic or terminological issues. For example, most of Ukraine's leaders have emphasized the use of the term "integration" rather than "union" to refer to their preferred vision of economic cooperation among CIS countries.

213. However, the reluctance of Ukraine's leaders to sacrifice any element of its sovereignty, even in a symbolic fashion, is not the result of small-minded pettiness. It stems from strong perceptions of a potential threat of regional hegemony by Russia, the overwhelmingly dominant (and domineering) member of the CIS. It also results from a perception that Ukraine will be a very convenient "target" for those Russian politicians who are embittered by the "loss of empire." In addition, there is a clear concern that

Ukraine's interests will be overshadowed because of West's great preoccupation with developments in Russia. This concern was reflected in an appeal, from Ukraine's President Kravchuk to the leaders of the G-7 states, in which they were asked not to overlook Ukraine when discussing aid issues with Russian President Yeltsin in Tokyo in July 1993.[292]

214. There is no indication that these threats will dissipate in the near future, and resisting Russian hegemony in the region will continue to provide an important thrust to Ukraine's foreign policy. Thus Ukrainian politicians continue to stress that relations with Russia should be based on direct bilateral ties, rather than ties mediated through regional organizations such as the CIS. In particular, Ukraine will continue to oppose attempts by Russia to use CIS mechanisms to impose its dominance in the region.

215. This fear of Russian domination has been balanced by the recognition that Ukraine's economy will have to closely interact with that of its CIS (and former CMEA) neighbours. However, it will be difficult to find an appropriate equilibrium between these two considerations. For example, a significant sector of the population in Western Ukraine is firmly opposed to even current levels of economic integration within the CIS. In contrast, public support for increased integration is quite high in eastern Ukraine.[293] The Kuchma government is committed to finding a balance between these interests through various compromises. However, future governments may have difficulty treading this fine line, or may not desire to do so.

216. Until recently Ukraine avoided taking steps which could be interpreted as encouraging forms of regional cooperation aimed at creating a "cordon sanitaire" around Russia. However, in 1993 Ukraine has begun to investigate the possibility of a regional security arrangement among the Central/East European states. Details of this arrangement, to be discussed at the end of this study, are still vague. However, it appears to be aimed at partly filling the security vacuum created by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, since NATO is unlikely to admit any countries from Central/East Europe

into its ranks until at least the end of the century.

217. In addition, Ukraine is hoping to use the good services of neighbouring East European states to facilitate ties with Western Europe and various European organizations. Hungary, for example, has repeatedly stressed that it is willing to act as such an intermediary. In general, as Ukraine develops a more assured and dynamic foreign policy, it is likely to intensify efforts to play a leading role in East/Central Europe, and to take various initiatives in this region to prevent being drawn into an overly great dependence on Russia.

218. Another general trend in the Ukrainian leadership's perception of the world has been been a gradual evaporation of illusions concerning the nature and extent of support Ukraine can expect on the world stage. In fact Ukraine's Prime Minister Kuchma, who had no foreign policy experience prior to attaining office, seemed to have few such illusions even at the beginning of his term of office. However, the "crash course" he received after October 1992 strengthened his conviction that Ukraine must, as much as possible, rely on its own resources, and not rely on foreign good-will. Kuchma's lack of illusions on this score does not mean that he advocates an isolationalist policy of autarchy. However, it has contributed to his increasingly "hard-headed" position concerning the fate of the nuclear weapons located on Ukrainian soil.

219. At the same time there was a downturn in Ukraine's relations with the United States in early 1993. Irritated by what they perceive to be a heavy U.S. emphasis on maintaining strong ties with Russia, and accommodating it while neglecting other former Soviet republics, Ukraine's leaders have become increasingly critical of the United States and its policies in the region. This has been combined with a certain disillusionment concerning the role of the large Ukrainian diaspora in North America. It was once seen as helping to promote Ukraine's relations with countries, such as the United States and Canada, where there are large numbers of citizens of Ukrainian background. However, the impact of this diaspora has not been very significant.

220. Ukraine's politicians have thus devoted considerable attention to improving ties with Western Europe. In particular, Germany has been courted with a proposal that former Soviet Germans who are hoping to return to Germany be encouraged to settle in Ukraine. In this way Ukraine's leaders hope to gain the good will of Germany, which is not eager to receive large numbers of German immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Benefits can also be gained from German funding for the resettlement of these immigrants in Ukraine.[294] Germany has been favourably inclined to such overtures, and Chancellor Kohl stressed, during his visit to Kiev in June 1993, that his country will be even-handed in its relations with Russia and Ukraine.[295] Approximately half of the foreign aid received by Ukraine comes from Germany, which is viewed as a reliable business partner for Ukraine.[296]

221. Last but not least, Ukraine's energy crisis has underlined the weakness of its economy, which is very energy-intensive and highly dependent on natural resources from Russia. During the first few months of Ukraine's independence central issues concerning its economic development were largely ignored, as the country's political elites were preoccupied with entrenching the country's sovereignty. However, there is a growing consensus that developing the economy (or, in view of the present crisis, stabilizing it) must be these elites' priority. If they do not effectively deal with the country's most pressing economic problems, it will be extremely difficult (if not impossible) for them to address other major priorities.

222. Rebuilding the Ukrainian economy is a massive, long-term project, and Ukraine's foreign policy will be increasingly pressed into trying to alleviate some of the major problems in this sphere. For example, in an attempt to ensure a greater diversity of oil and gas suppliers, there were numerous exchanges of officials between Ukraine and oil-exporting countries in the Middle East in late 1992 and early 1993.[297] However, due to a shortage of Black Sea terminals to accept oil shipments, Ukraine will remain heavily dependent on oil supplies from Russia for several years to come.[298]

223. In the absence of economic stability, Ukraine's foreign policy will continue to be highly reactive in the near future, and if the economy continues to deteriorate only authoritarian rule will be able to ensure the integrity and independence of the country. By mid-1993 the growing awareness of the extent of this economic crisis led to a decision to renew certain economic links with Ukraine's neighbours, and especially Russia. However, as pointed out earlier, this decision poses the dilemma that Ukraine may be compelled to sacrifice important elements of its sovereignty during a very sensitive phase in the state-building process.

CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES

224. One of the greatest problems facing Ukraine is the absence of qualified cadres in a wide range of fields necessary for the construction of the infrastructure of an independent state. When Ukraine declared independence it lacked expertise in almost all areas related to the normal functioning of a modern country on the international stage. This included international law, international trade and finances, international mail and telecommunications services, etc. In addition, Ukraine's administrators had become accustomed to functioning within a system that discouraged personal initiative, and their training has not prepared them for the new challenges facing Ukraine. Thus they had to assimilate a whole new set of skills.

225. This is not to say that Ukraine completely lacked talented personnel in a variety of fields, including foreign affairs. However, because of the highly centralized nature of the Soviet state such individuals were frequently siphoned off to Moscow, which, for example, monopolized expertise in international trade. In other cases talented individuals left Ukraine of their own accord because opportunities were limited in what was, in some respects, a rather parochial backwater of the Soviet Union. Only a limited number of these expatriates have been attracted back to Kiev, and it has proved very difficult to train competent personnel, on short notice, for diplomatic postings.

226. Establishing a presence abroad has also been complicated by Ukraine's almost total lack of hard currency. It is needed not only to establish consulates and embassies abroad, but also to allow its diplomats and other representatives to travel to international conferences, participate in international trade shows, etc. For example, a lack of hard currency has seriously affected Ukrainian participation in the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) process. A number of CFE inspection groups have visited Ukraine to monitor its implementation of the conventional arms reduction agreement. However, as of May 1993 Ukraine had not sent any inspection groups to other countries involved in the CFE process because of a lack of finances to cover their costs.[299] Thus there are considerable financial constraints on the number and nature of foreign policy initiatives which can be taken by Ukraine, and even on the extent to which it is represented abroad. This is one reason for the bitterness with which Ukrainian leaders criticized Russia's takeover of all the foreign property of the former Soviet Union following its disintegration.

227. Ukraine's personnel problems have also sorely affected its economic policies. In fact "Ukraine, like most postcolonial states, lacks all the resources, mechanisms, and means required for economic policymaking, or even policymaking in general."[300] This does not explain or excuse all of the grievous mistakes make by Ukraine's leaders in formulating economic policy. However, it is difficult to effectively reform an economy, and negotiate sophisticated international trading arrangements, in the absence of local economists, lawyers, and financial experts with a good understanding of international trade and market-based economic systems.[301]

228. Thus Ukraine's leaders have limited resources to implement many of their policy objectives. However, Ukraine does have very significant resources in one important realm. It inherited, in what represented a very mixed blessing, a disproportionately large portion of the personnel and materiel of the Soviet Armed Forces.

V. THE FORMATION AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE UAF

BACKGROUND

229. Ukraine's declaration of state sovereignty on 16 July 1990 included the following provisions concerning the military:

a. the Ukrainian SSR has the right to establish its own Armed Forces;

b. the Ukrainian SSR determines the terms of military service for citizens of the republic;

c. citizens of the Ukrainian SSR fulfill their military service obligations, as a rule, on the territory of the republic and cannot be deployed, in a military capacity, outside of its borders without the agreement of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR; and

d. the Ukrainian SSR solemnly declares its intention to become, in the future, a permanently neutral state which does not participate in military alliances, and holds to the three non-nuclear principles -- not to accept, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons.[302]

230. In the first 12 months following this declaration little was done to implement the declaration's clauses concerning the military. However, in 1990-91 several newly-emerging political parties began to call for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian military. In turn, some members of the opposition in the parliament argued that the declaration of state sovereignty clearly established the necessary preconditions for creating such a military.[303] In addition, in 1990 the parliament took certain steps to ensure that conscripts from Ukraine not serve against their will outside of Ukraine, especially in areas of severe ethnic conflict.[304]

231. However, the first concrete steps to establish the foundation for the UAF were taken following the abortive coup attempt of August 19-21, 1991. On the same day, 24 August 1991, that Ukraine declared its independence, the parliamentary opposition stressed Ukraine's helpless situation when faced, during the coup, with the possible use of military force, and proposed that an extraordinary session of parliament examine the question of the creation of a national army and the nationalization of all military

enterprises in Ukraine. The chairman of the Ukrainian parliament, Leonid Kravchuk, threw his support behind many of the opposition's propositions, and on 24 August 1991 the Ukrainian parliament resolved:

a. to subordinate all military formations deployed on the republic's territory to the USSR Supreme Soviet;

b. to create a Ukrainian defence ministry; and that

c. the Ukrainian Government must begin to create Ukrainian armed forces, a republican guard, and a subdetachment to protect the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, Cabinet of Ministers, and National Bank.[305]

232. Ukraine's relations with Russia quickly deteriorated immediately following the coup as a result of a controversial statement, by Yeltsin's press secretary, on Russia's right to reconsider its boundaries with neighbouring republics which had declared their independence. Thus, less than a week after the coup Kravchuk, reacting to external pressures as well as growing domestic demands to entrench Ukraine's independence, stated that Ukraine would soon appoint a republican defence minister.

233. In addition, a special commission was established to discuss, with the USSR Defence Ministry, the effective subordination to Ukraine of the troops of the three military districts in Ukraine. On August 29 the Presidium of the Ukrainian parliament approved edicts according to which the border troops, interior troops, and military commissariats on Ukrainian territory were to be transferred to the jurisdiction of Ukraine. Finally, on 3 September 1991 the Ukrainian parliament confirmed the appointment of Defence Minister Konstantin Morozov.[306]

234. Immediately after Morozov's appointment the Presidium of the Ukrainian parliament banned the redeployment of all military formations and educational establishments on the republic's territory or across its borders. It also banned the export of military hardware from Ukraine without proper authorization from the Ukrainian

Cabinet of Ministers. All these moves were harshly criticized by the SAF's leadership. However, in October 1991 the Ukrainian parliament approved, on first reading, a package of draft laws on national defence which called, among other things, for the establishment of the armed forces and national guard of Ukraine.

235. According to this legislation the technical, organizational, and personnel foundations of the armed forces were to be established in 1992, and the entire process of building the UAF was to be completed by 1994-95. On 6 December 1992 these laws were adopted by parliament, and on 12 December 1992 Kravchuk appointed himself commander-in-chief of the UAF. He then signed a decree subordinating all military formations, except for strategic deterrence forces and the nuclear component of the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine, to the Ukrainian president and minister of defence (granted, by the same decree, the power to act as commander of the UAF). Thus by the end of December 1991 Morozov could claim that the legal basis for the UAF had been fully established.[307]

236. At the CIS summit in Minsk on 30 December 1991, which was largely devoted to security policy, an agreement was reached which permitted CIS states to create independent conventional armies. However, it contained a very broad definition of the "strategic forces" which were to remain under the command of the CIS military command. Ukraine's representatives signed this agreement, but its broad definition of the nature of strategic forces was found wanting. Thus Ukraine's MOD decided not to include the Black Sea Fleet and long-range aviation units in this category.[308]

237. Ukraine's MOD took its first practical steps to create an independent Ukrainian military by announcing that on 3 January 1992 all troops stationed in Ukraine would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Ukrainian president. Only troops belonging to the strategic nuclear forces were exempted, and oaths of loyalty to Ukraine were to be immediately administered to all other servicemen and officers on Ukraine's territory. At the same time the force structure of the new armed forces was gradually defined.[309]

CURRENT AND PROJECTED SIZE, STRUCTURE, AND ROLE

238. Estimates of the total number of military personnel in Ukraine when it declared independence have ranged from 500,000 to over 1 million; however, the actual number was probably between 700,000 and 800,000.[310] The armed forces legislation which was put before the Ukrainian parliament in the fall of 1991 proposed that the UAF and the National Guard have a combined total of up to 450,000 personnel. Approximately the same figure was used in the "defence concept" which was placed before Ukraine's parliament in December 1991. It proposed that in the next few years troop strength would gradually be reduced to approximately 400,000-420,000 men.[311]

239. In February 1993 the speaker of the Ukrainian parliament stated that the total number of personnel in the UAF still numbered more than 700,000 men. However, on several occasions in 1993 the figure of 525,000 armed forces personnel has been cited by Defence Minister Morozov.[312] Under a state program to be adopted by parliament, in the course of the next two years the UAF is to be reduced to 400,000 men, and in the following 5-7 years to 200,000-225,000 men. Ukraine is supposed to adhere to the latter figures in accordance with its obligations under the Conventional Forces in Europe agreement.[313]

240. Ukraine inherited the following conventional forces from the USSR: 20 tank and motor-rifle divisions, one air-assault division, a coast-guard division subordinated to the Black Sea Fleet, three artillery divisions, and a large number of special units. Ukraine also retained four tactical air armies (14th Lviv, 17th Kiev, 24th Vinnitsa, and 5th Odessa) and the 46th air army, which is split up between Ukraine and Belarus. In total the air forces in Ukraine include 180 Su-24 strike aircraft, 150 Tu-16, Tu-22 and Tu-22M bombers, 510 tactical and air-defence fighters, 120 reconnaissance and electronic-warfare aircraft, 240 combat-capable MiG-21 trainers, and 525 jet-training aircraft. This represents about a quarter of the former Soviet air holdings west of the Ural mountains.[314] In addition, Ukraine is rich in ammunition stores, and according to one estimate has half the combat reserves of the modern Totchka tactical missiles.[315]

241. The Ukrainian Armed Forces will consist of three services: the ground forces, the air force, and the navy. In addition, Ukraine began to set up its own rocket troops units in November 1992. The old military district structure (the Kiev, Odessa, and Carpathian Military Districts) is being abandoned in 1993, and is being replaced by two commands, a Western and Southern Group as well as an Operational Reserve Group. It is expected that this will permit a certain reduction in the number of administrative personnel.[316]

242. The chief of the UAF's General Staff has indicated that Ukraine's air force will consist of three groups formed by bomber, fighter, and transport regiments. The current army structure is to be abandoned; instead the ground forces will consist of an unspecified number of army corps. They will total 6-7 motor rifle divisions, 7-8 infantry divisions, 6-7 artillery brigades, an unspecified number of tank brigades, and 2-3 aviation brigades.[317] This is part of a plan to introduce a more flexible corps and brigade system in the armed forces.[318] Given the large volume of military hardware in Ukraine, equipping the armed forces should not pose a problem. However, in accordance with the zoning provisions of the CFE treaty these holdings will have to be reduced in the Ukrainian part of the former Odessa military district, and this will complicate the process of balanced force restructuring.[319]

243. The painful process of carving up the Black Sea Fleet will be described in one of the following sections of this study. However, not all cases in which military units were apportioned between Russia and Ukraine involved great acrimony. For example, the process of dividing the old Soviet 98th Airborne Division, which had been deployed in Odessa oblast, was concluded in June 1993 in a "friendly atmosphere". It appears that full accord was reached on the fate of the division's troops, with more than 500 officers and NCOs leaving Ukraine for places of new deployment in Russia.[320]

244. Ukraine's leaders have made a major commitment to maintaining a powerful armed forces structure in Ukraine, and this has been reflected in budget outlays. Detailed figures on Ukraine's military budget are not available. However, according to one

estimate, which does not include expenditures on conversion, general military-related expenditures consumed 19.8% of Ukraine's state budget in 1992.[321]

CONSCRIPTS

245. In May 1992 the Ukrainian parliament passed a law on universal military service, and the call-up age was fixed at 18. The term of service for soldiers, sailors, and NCOs is 18 months (12 months for those with a higher education), and three years for those doing service on a contract. Those draft-age youths whose religious beliefs do not allow them to serve in the military, or to bear arms, can take advantage of alternative service provisions.[322] Deferments are granted to a draft-age youth in the following cases: in certain family situations; because of the youth's poor state of health; if he is studying in a higher education establishment; or if he has been elected as a deputy. In addition, teachers with a higher education receive a deferment while employed in rural schools.[323]

246. Much of the early rhetoric on the need for an independent UAF focussed on the widespread brutalization of conscripts and other social pathologies in the SAF. Thus Ukrainian Defence Minister Morozov and his senior associates have continuously stressed the need to eliminate such problems in the UAF, and have had some success in weeding out their most blatant manifestations. However, the abuse of conscripts has not ceased, and it largely reflects the inertia of old informal practices which were entrenched in the SAF. One disturbing source of new conflicts in the UAF involves misunderstandings among conscripts from various regions of Ukraine; namely, "Westerners" and "Easterners".[324]

247. According to a survey conducted in early 1993, 80% of officers and 60% of soldiers in the UAF considered that brutal hazing practices remained the most significant problem in the armed forces.[325] This continued abuse, together with poor living conditions in the armed forces, has led to a rapid decline in the prestige of military service, and one survey indicated that only one of four potential recruits in Ukraine wanted to serve in the armed forces. This has led to numerous violations of military

discipline, and increased draft evasion as well as desertion from the UAF. Thus on 6 June 1992 the Ukrainian defence minister stated that only 31% of the spring draft plan in Ukraine had been fulfilled.[326] Problems have been caused by the desire of many conscripts to serve close to home,[327] and among the areas with the worst turnout for the draft are Kiev and western Ukraine.[328]

248. As a result, a high proportion of draft-age youth cannot be called up for military service. The main reason is draft deferment for health or educational reasons; in addition, large numbers of youths try to bribe their way out of military service. According to one report from November 1992, every third draftee in Kiev was unable to serve due to poor health. In addition, one out of four draftees in Kiev was evading military service, and 776 had been put on trial for this reason.[329] The situation was no better during the spring of 1993, for in some areas approximately 80% of those called up for service failed to show up.[330] Thus an increasing number of conscripts are orphans, or come from families which lack the influence, or finances, to prevent their sons' conscription. This has affected the quality of conscripts, and according to one source a quarter of the new draftees in early 1993 lacked a secondary education.[331]

OFFICERS

249. Officers in Ukraine. A major problem facing the UAF is the large number of officers living and serving in Ukraine. Military manpower reductions in the next few years are expected to reduce the number of total military personnel to about 200-250,000, and this will lead to a drastic decrease in the size of the officer corps. The high command in Ukraine is trying to implement these reductions gradually and, where possible, by means of retirement and voluntary separation. However, the problem of downsizing is complicated by the fact that only 30-40% of the officers in Ukraine in December 1991 were ethnically Ukrainian. The remainder consisted primarily of Russians, most of whom were born and raised outside Ukraine.[332]

250. When Ukraine assumed control of the armed forces on its territory Kravchuk and other senior Ukrainian officials tried to ensure a peaceful transition of authority by making a commitment to ensure the rights and interests of all officers. They were assured that, regardless of nationality, they would all have equal rights as Ukrainian citizens. However, a number of Ukrainian politicians have complained about the high percentage of Russians in senior positions in the UAF. For example, in August 1992 officials of the Ukrainian Republican Party claimed that of the personnel working at the headquarters of the Ukrainian MOD, 53% were of Russian and only 43% of Ukrainian background. In addition, they claimed that almost 90% of all generals in the UAF were Russians, as were approximately 80% of the officers in the air force.[333]

251. Criticism of this situation also came from the Union of Officers of Ukraine (UOU), a pressure group which has called for the rapid "Ukrainization" of the UAF. UOU leaders have argued that many officers who swore loyalty to Ukraine did so for purely practical reasons (e.g., better living conditions in Ukraine, a reluctance to give up their existing accommodations, etc.), and several surveys have supported this argument. According to one poll, only 37% of officers in the Odessa military district pledged allegiance to Ukraine because they "sincerely wanted to serve it," and 10% indicated that they would betray their pledge "in certain circumstances."[334] Even Defence Minister Morozov was quoted as saying that "a considerable portion of the officer corps swore allegiance to the Ukrainian people out of mercantile considerations."[335]

252. It is implied in some of this criticism that ethnic Russians are less loyal and reliable than ethnic Ukrainians, and thus Morozov has come under heavy pressure to increase the number of ethnic Ukrainians in top positions in the UAF. A number of senior officers of Ukrainian background were appointed to senior positions in the UAF in the summer of 1992, and some officers have complained of a cadre policy favouring ethnic Ukrainians.[336] Senior MOD officials continue to stress that personnel decisions will be based on objective, professional criteria.[337] However, it is inevitable that attempts will be made to gradually reduce the number of Russians in senior positions in the UAF. The

situation is further complicated by pressure, from the UOU and other organizations, for the repatriation of Ukrainian officers serving in other countries. In these circumstances even the most moderate policies promoting the "Ukrainization" of the UAF will provoke considerable dissatisfaction among Russians in the officer corps, who will see themselves as the victims of discrimination.

253. Given Ukraine's current economic crisis, it has been difficult to "buy" the loyalty of the large contingent of officers with a minimal commitment to Ukraine by providing them with large salaries and good living conditions. Thus throughout 1992 and early 1993 there were growing complaints about the lack of appropriate housing for officers and their families, the impact of inflation on officers' salaries, and a deterioration in the level and quality of social services for military professionals.[338]

254. Germany has provided some funding to build housing (4,500 apartments by 1994) for Ukrainian servicemen withdrawn from service in the old Western Group of Forces in Germany.[339] However, this only addresses a small part of existing needs, for in June 1993 it was estimated that 60,000 serving officers and 25,000 officers released into the reserves in Ukraine lacked housing.[340] One survey showed that in the spring of 1993 93% of UAF officers were dissatifisfied with their material circumstances, and 71% were unhappy with their living quarters.[341] In addition, according to the Union of Officers of Ukraine 90% of the officers in Ukraine don't trust the government to fairly allocate housing and deal with the other social problems facing servicemen. Almost 80% of these officers were ready to take drastic action if the socio-economic problems they faced were not resolved, and on 15 June 1993 a public protest meeting was held by officers of the Kiev garrison to publicize their situation.[342]

255. Dissatisfaction with living conditions in Ukraine has been heightened by the fact that, according to one estimate, in late 1992 officers in the Russian Armed Forces received 1.5 times the pay of their counterparts in the UAF.[343] Since that time discrepancies have further increased, and have led to considerable frustration among UAF

officers of the Black Sea Fleet, who serve directly alongside officers from the Russian Armed Forces. Salary equality with Russian military servicemen was one of the demands raised by members of the Kiev garrison during their June 1993 demonstration.[344]

256. Unhappiness with military service has led many of the younger and more enterprising officers to leave the armed forces. For example, between January 1992 and April 1993 more than one thousand officers of the Odessa military district asked to be released from service and 599 of these requests were satisfied. Of the latter, 350 had graduated from military vuzy (institutions of higher military education) in the last two years.[345] Ukraine has also become a target for mercenary recruiting drives. According to a report by the military intelligence branch of the Security Service of Ukraine, in 1993 a number of attempts were made to recruit military professionals with specialized skills for service in several "hot spots" in the Caucasus region.[346]

257. Legislation "On the Social and Legal Defence of Military Personnel and their Families" adopted by the Ukrainian parliament enumerates a variety of measures to improve the living standards of military professionals in Ukraine. However, few of the measures needed for the implementation of this legislation have been put in place.[347] Therefore a special Fund for Social Guarantees for Military Personnel and Veterans was established in late 1992 by a number of organizations including the Committee for the Social Defence of Military Personnel of the Cabinet of Ministers, the UOU, and the Union of Cooperatives. It is supposed to finance in a variety of business-oriented activities aimed at improving the lot of armed forces personnel.[348]

258. Given the economic crisis now affecting Ukraine, a trouble-free "downsizing" of the professional ranks of the UAF will largely depend on a stabilization of the economic situation in Ukraine, and the successful integration of large numbers of officers into civilian life. Steps to encourage such integration include the introduction of day and evening courses in several Ukrainian cities to prepare officers for careers in business, and special retraining courses for military personnel returning to Ukraine from the Western

Group of Forces.

259. Funding for these projects is to be provided by a number of different sources such as the European Community, the Soros (Renaissance) fund, the Association of Commmercial Banks of Ukraine, and the Kiev Association for the Social Defence of Military Personnel. One of the more original proposals was that former officers be retrained to deal with ecological problems,[349] and some of these projects have been quite successful. However, efforts to date have satisfied only part of the need, since approximately 200,000 armed forces personnel will find themselves without jobs in the next few years, and many of them are interested in retraining.

260. Thus the UOU has sharply criticized the absence of a well-formulated government program to reduce the size of the UAF and find employment for surplus officers, as well as the lack of financing for such a program.[350] In addition, it is doubtful whether retraining will necessarily be successful in preparing these officers for useful employment in the civilian sector. A survey conducted in 1993 showed that one in two UAF officers felt totally unprepared for civilian life.[351]

261. The survey noted above also found that two-thirds of the surveyed officers would shun military service if they were choosing a career anew. Thus the prestige of military service has tremendously declined. To ensure satisfactory enrolment levels in military-educational institutions, special privileges have been extended to applicants from rural areas, where military service is still seen as a convenient means of achieving rapid social mobility.[352] In short, the UAF officer corps is showing numerous signs of increasing demoralization, and this will inevitably contribute to political restiveness in its ranks.

262. Officers Outside Ukraine. As many as 200,000 officers from Ukraine currently serve in military units stationed outside Ukraine, mostly in the Russian Federation. In 1992 a large number of these officers expressed a desire to return to Ukraine, largely because of the poor (and sometimes dangerous) living and working conditions in the

regions where they were stationed and, in some cases, discrimination against military personnel of Ukrainian background.

263. Ukrainian Defence Minister Morozov has stated that all officers who are citizens of Ukraine will be given an opportunity to return home, and some concrete efforts were quickly made to assist Ukrainian officers located in "hot spots" marked by violent conflict. For example, a number of special flights were arranged to transfer military personnel and their families from the Caucasus region to Ukraine, and by mid-September 1992 some 4,612 individuals (half the planned number) had reached Ukraine in this fashion.[353]

264. Dissatisfied with the slow pace of such transfers, in the summer of 1992 several representatives of the Ukrainian military "diaspora" created an organization called the Union of Officers of the Ukrainian Diaspora (UOUD). This organization then presented a number of recommendations to the Ukrainian president, parliament, and Ministry of Defence concerning the repatriation of officers to Ukraine.[354] However, given the surplus of military professionals currently located in Ukraine, some senior officers of the Ukrainian MOD have called for strict regulation of the return of diaspora officers to Ukraine.[355] Difficulties in returning to Ukraine, and other indications that their cause was not being vigorously pursued by the Ukrainian MOD, led to a demonstration in Kiev by UOUD representatives in mid-September 1992 which was supported by right-wing nationalist groups such as the Ukrainian National Assembly.[356] Following this event the UOUD continued to claim that its grievances were not being addressed, and further demonstrations to press its demands were held in early 1993.[357]

265. It is estimated that by the spring of 1993 some 12,000 "diaspora" officers had returned to Ukraine and were serving in the UAF. However, poor social security provisions for military personnel, a lack of appropriate housing, and the general economic crisis in Ukraine has led to a dramatic decrease in the number of such officers expressing an interest in moving to Ukraine. In addition, in a growing number of cases no

appropriate positions could be found for officers who had returned to Ukraine and expected to serve in its armed forces.[358] Thus in March 1993 the head of the UOUD stated that this organization would merge with the UOU.[359]

266. The Issue of Corruption. One of the barriers to the creation of an efficient and effective UAF is the extent to which many officers have become involved in corrupt activities. Many of these corrupt practices pre-date the establishment of the UAF, and in the late 1980s the Soviet press was very frank about the way in which military officers often abused their positions for financial gain. However, the period following the breakup of the SAF was particularly disruptive for the military in Ukraine and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, and a considerable number of military officers took advantage of this disruption to enrich themselves. Corrupt activities in the UAF, which parallel the growth of corruption in society at large, are so widespread that they have had a demoralizing effect within the UAF and have contributed to the loss of prestige of the armed forces.

267. Military involvement in corrupt activities includes the use of military planes to illegally transport goods to other former republics, with local businessmen sharing the proceeds of their sales with air force officers, and the unauthorized sale of military property, including light arms. Other criminal acts include the cannibalization of military vehicles for parts which are then sold by officers; the use of bribes to expedite service transfers; and the use of conscripts to build or repair houses and cottages for senior officers.[360] Controlling this corruption was initially hampered by the absence of a full inventory of military property in Ukraine and the country's relatively open borders with other CIS states. Thus the military counterintelligence branch of the Security Service of Ukraine, which claims to have prevented the illegal transfer of a large volume of military property out of Ukraine, cooperated with the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs and MOD in 1992 to prepare such an inventory.[361]

268. Defence Minister Morozov has taken a number of other steps to control corruption in the military and punish its perpetrators. For example, in August 1992 he issued an order "On Measures to Eliminate Abuses of their Rank by Officials of the UAF." However, investigations of such abuses were frequently not followed up or prosecuted properly, and corruption in the military quickly reached such levels that it became difficult to control. Thus in late January 1993 Morozov issued an order on the creation of a Main Control-Revision Inspection Unit within the Ministry of Defence. It is to combat all forms of corruption in the military, and perform regular inspections and audits to detect irregularities in the UAF.[362] It is too early to assess the effectiveness of this unit; however, its activity has led to the punishment of a number of senior officers for their involvement in corrupt activities. They include Major-General Burilkov, the First Deputy Commander of the Army.[363]

VI. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND THE ISSUE OF CONVERSION

SIZE, NATURE, AND CAPABILITIES OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN UKRAINE

269. The economic impact of the Soviet military-industrial complex (MIC) was greatest in the Russian Federation, which had the highest concentration of defence industries in the USSR. However, in almost all production categories Ukraine was the second most important centre of the MIC in the Soviet Union. According to one estimate 20% of recent Soviet defence industry production came from Ukraine, which was an important producer of tanks, missiles, and naval vessels. Ukraine also played an important role in providing the Soviet military with electronics as well as radio and communications equipment.[364] Thus approximately 17% of the the newer electronics-related branches of the Soviet defence complex were located in Ukraine.[365]

270. Ukraine's military industries do not possess a full production cycle for most of their goods, and rely heavily on Russia for rocket fuel, microelectronics, special alloys, etc.[366] However, Ukraine is the only former Soviet republic apart from Russia with a significant production capability in end-product weapons.[367] Its end-product capacities are especially strong in the areas of shipbuilding and production of strategic as well as air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles. Ukraine's shipyards specialize in the production of aircraft carriers, heavy cruisers, torpedo boats, coastal patrol boats, and landing craft. In addition, Ukraine produces approximately 70% of the engines for Russia's helicopters and aircraft.[368]

271. Because of Ukraine's significant capabilities in missile production and other sectors of space-related industry, in March 1992 a National Space Agency was established. In March 1993 the agency's director claimed that Ukraine shared third and fourth place in the world, with France, in terms of the standards of its rocket and space technology. He complained that this potential was not being developed because of poor funding levels and Ukraine's isolation from international space program developments. However, he stated

that a joint French-Ukrainian communications satellite project was being developed.[369] In addition, "Iuzhmash" and other Ukrainian enterprises involved in rocket production have maintained close ties with enterprises in Russia and Kazakhstan.[370]

272. According to Viktor Antonov, who was responsible for Ukraine's Ministry of Machine building, the Military-Industrial Complex, and Conversion until May 1993, this ministry includes enterprises which once belonged to 16 different all-union ministries.[371] Approximately 2.7 million individuals were employed in enterprises supervised by this ministry, and the defence complex included 700 enterprises with more than 1.2 million employees.[372] According to one estimate the republic's defence sector accounted for one-third of the output of machine-building factories, and possessed up to 30% of the capital assets of the machine-building industry.[373]

273. The defence sector share in Ukraine's machine-building industry was especially high in the Mykolaiv and Kherson oblasts, with their large ship-building industries; in the heavily industrialized Dnipropetrovs'k oblast, especially the city of Dnipropetrovs'k; in Kiev oblast, especially the capital city of Kiev; in Crimea; in western Ukraine's L'viv oblast; and in Khmelnitsky oblast. According to one estimate, the defence sector share of the machine-building industry's commodity output and capital assets in Mykolaiv oblast, with its large shipyards, was 80.7%, and 72.2% of the machine-building industry's labour force in this oblast worked for the defence sector.[374]

274. It is estimated that almost 19% of Ukraine's total labour force worked in the defence complex in the mid-1980s.[375] Large numbers of defence workers in Ukraine were found in the shipbuilding centres of southern Ukraine, in Crimea, and in the cities of Kiev, Dnipropetrovs'k, L'viv, and Khmelnyts'kyi.[376] Close to a quarter of the working population of Kiev, Luhans'k, and Kharkiv worked in the defence sector, and half of the working population of Mykolaiv oblast, with its large shipyards, worked for the MIC. Therefore, these areas will be especially hard hit by cutbacks in MIC production.[377] According to one estimate, by June 1992 30% of defence plant employees in Ukraine had

been placed on unpaid vacation leave or laid off, while others were working fewer hours.[378]

275. Moscow's highly centralized control over the MIC was lost following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, as each former republic took over responsibility for the defence industry on its territory. Thus all military enterprises in Ukraine were placed under the authority of Ukrainian ministries in late 1991 and are governed by Ukrainian legislation. Some Ukrainian enterprises still receive military procurement orders from other former republics (especially Russia) and fulfill them under contracts with their governments. However, most Ukrainian-made goods were excluded from the approved lists of Russian Military Industrial Commission enterprises.[379] Thus the destruction of the centralized vertical structure of the MIC, and an abrupt decrease in military orders, led to considerable disarray at the local level. For example, throughout much of 1992 the officials in charge of Ukraine's MIC did not have a full inventory of defence-related industries in Ukraine and their production capabilities.

276. If Ukraine attempts to sell its military products on the international arms market, it is unlikely that it would be more successful than Russia, which has had great difficulty winning new customers (or even retaining old customers) for its arms exports.[380] On the contrary, Ukraine would probably be much less successful than Russia, for in the past Moscow controlled all arms trade with foreign states, and has taken over all of the Soviet Union's contacts in this sensitive sphere. Thus Ukraine lacks links with the international arms market and does not possess the resources necessary to quickly establish such contacts.[381] In addition, in some fields the research and development (R & D) facilities necessary to continually modernize military products are underdeveloped in Ukraine, for in the past they were heavily concentrated in Russia. According to one estimate, although Ukraine possessed approximately 16.7% of defence production enterprises in the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s, it had only 8.6% of the USSR's R & D establishments.[382] For example, although Ukraine possesses large shipyards on the Black Sea, 70% of the R & D establishments of the old Soviet Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry were located

in the single city of Leningrad (now St. Petersburg).[383]

277. In 1993 Ukraine established a council which will deal with the licensing and export of arms, and in June 1993 the former minister responsible for the MIC stated that a special technical committee to deal with arms exports was being created. However, it has proven difficult to create an arms trade infrastructure.[384] In the short term Ukraine could probably only come up with a limited number of clients for its military production, some of whom would likely be of rather dubious reputation. Thus the "Russian" option (using the profits from arms exports to fund conversion) has only limited relevance to Ukraine because of its poor competitive position in the international arms market. In addition, components from other former Soviet republics, and especially Russia, are required for many of the Ukrainian military goods which could potentially be sold abroad.[385]

278. In June 1993 Vasyl' Durdynets', the First Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian parliament, stated that Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers had prepared, in conformity with international practice, a list of all raw materials, finished goods, and technologies in Ukraine which could be used for military purposes. Export of such goods would take place only with special permission, and Ukraine was willing to cooperate with other countries in regulating arms trade activity. However, Durdynets' stated that Ukraine should be treated with respect, as an equal on the international stage, and complained that COCOM and other trade barriers were proving to be very harmful to Ukraine's trade.[386]

279. There is no reliable information on the extent of Ukraine's arms sales activity, but it appears to be limited. In June 1993 Antonov, the former minister responsible for the MIC, complained about a lack of political will and decisiveness to engage in a concerted arms trade effort. As a result, Antonov stated that Ukraine was not a serious participant in the international arms market, although he thought it could play a more significant role in this market in the future.[387] Ukraine appears to have focussed most of its arms trade activity on selling off some of its old weaponry, although Defence Minister Morozov

stated in March 1993 that the sale of such weapons had provided very limited financial returns. In addition, Ukraine has engaged in the barter exchange of spare and assembly parts with some of its East European neighbours.[388] Given the poor prospects for Ukrainian products on the international arms market, a heavy emphasis has been placed on promoting conversion from military to civilian production.

THE PROBLEM OF CONVERSION

280. The first minister in charge of the Ministry of Machine building, the Military-Industrial Complex, and Conversion was Viktor Antonov. A former defence plant manager, he was assigned to head a bloated "superministry" which, in view of the size of the MIC in Ukraine, was faced with very great challenges. However, conversion of military to civilian production did not appear to be a major priority for Ukraine in its first few months, and did not receive much attention in the speeches of senior government officials.[389] Thus no comprehensive plans or budgets for conversion were put forward in early 1992, and Ukraine's defence industries encountered a variety of problems. There was a dramatic reduction in state orders for military goods, and the state-controlled supply and distribution system almost collapsed.[390] In addition, because of Moscow's high degree of control over the MIC until 1991, even a simple inventory of defence-related enterprises and their products was lacking.

281. Ukraine's leaders rejected a "sink or swim" or "shock therapy" form of conversion, which Antonov claimed would have had a devastating impact on Ukrainian industry. Thus a "softer" approach to conversion was adopted which supposedly allowed military industries to take advantage of various opportunities to "restructure" themselves in an organized fashion. Those enterprises which did not take advantage of these opportunities would go bankrupt. Antonov claimed that as a result of this policy conversion was proceeding more successfully in Ukraine than in Russia, and predicted that there would be only 30-50 bankruptcies among military enterprises in 1993.[391]

282. In spite of Antonov's optimism, in 1992 many defence industries were forced to engage in conversion efforts on their own because of the delays in putting forward a clear policy on conversion.[392] However, "spontaneous" conversion of this kind could not enjoy much success because of the limited extent of market reforms in Ukraine. Enterprises belonging to the MIC did not find themselves in a competitive market environment which would have promoted the efficient production of consumer goods. In addition, Ukraine received very little Western aid for conversion, and had very little domestic capital to invest in the expensive conversion effort.[393]

283. According to one source the proportion of products for military needs amounted to only 19% of the total volume of output of the MIC in Ukraine in the spring of 1993. However, there is no clear evidence that conversion in Ukraine has been more successful than in Russia or states, such as Poland or Czechoslovakia, which have engaged in "shock therapy" conversion. In fact, in mid-1993 the former minister responsible for the MIC admitted that, because of a lack of financing for the MIC, a de facto "shock therapy" approach was being applied to this sector.[394] There have been several conversion "success stories"; e.g., the "Olimp" electronics plant.[395] However, they appear to be the exception rather than the rule.

284. A Ukrainian parliamentary delegation visited the United States in 1993 to study U.S. experience in the fields of national security and conversion. However, most Ukrainian enterprises which are part of the MIC have had little success in finding Western partners to aid them in their conversion efforts. The areas in which Ukrainian officials see the greatest prospects for cooperation include rocket construction, space equipment, shipbuilding, and aircraft construction (especially heavy cargo aircraft). However, although Ukrainian shipyards have tried to reach agreements with other countries for the production of tankers, hydrofoils, floating docks, etc., they have had little success. Likewise, few Western investors have shown any interest in investing in the gigantic "Iuzhmash" plant which produced many of the Soviet Union's rockets.[396]

VII. DEFENCE POLICY FORMULATION

THE ROLE OF PRESSURE GROUPS

285. The Union of Officers of Ukraine. The most significant non-governmental organization attempting to directly influence military developments in Ukraine is the Union of Officers of Ukraine (UOU). Its origins can be found in the activity of a number of groups and committees, often including military personnel, which began to advocate the creation of a Ukrainian military as early as 1989, and gradually coalesced under the umbrella of Rukh. On 27-28 July 1991 Rukh's Military Collegium sponsored a congress, in Kiev, of military officers who considered themselves citizens of Ukraine, and it ended with the creation of the UOU. It was first headed by Vilen Martirosian, an army colonel of Armenian background who was a member of the Political Council of Rukh and a deputy to the All-Union Supreme Soviet from Ukraine.[397] Although this congress was attended by only 320 delegates, and only half were active officers, the UOU rapidly gained prestige and stature after the failed coup attempt of August 1991 and the ensuing decision to establish the UAF. In fact, soon after he was appointed Minister of Defence Morozov stated that he supported and would cooperate with the UOU,[398] and many of its initial activists have risen to senior positions in the UAF.

286. By the end of 1992 the UOU claimed a membership of approximately 70,000 individuals throughout Ukraine. It consisted primarily of middle-ranking officers, and according to one estimate, in early 1993 85% of UOU members were of Ukrainian background.[399] The UOU has pressed for the rapid consolidation of the UAF, has criticized the heavy representation of Russians at senior command levels in the UAF, and has called for the quick return to Ukraine of Ukrainian officers stationed beyond its borders. In addition, the UOU has opposed rapid moves to rid Ukraine of the nuclear weapons on its territory, and has advocated the greatest possible level of control by Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet.[400]

287. The UOU has provided various forms of assistance to the MOD in accomplishing its goals. For example, it has promoted the greater use of the Ukrainian language and the introduction of Ukrainian military traditions in the UAF. It has also helped to expose the theft and sale of military hardware and other forms of corruption and abuse in the UAF. In fact, in 1992 Martirosian's replacement as chairman of the UOU, Colonel Omel'chenko, was appointed head of the corruption and organized crime department of the military counterintelligence branch of the Security Service of Ukraine. The UOU also aims to promote the social welfare of military personnel, and it has strongly supported the work of the Social-Psychological Service of the UAF. This service, headed by General Muliava, succeeded the Main Political Administration of the old SAF as the department of Ukraine's MOD responsible for the moral, spiritual, and psychological well-being of military personnel. It is also responsible for their patriotic and cultural-educational upbringing.

288. The UOU came under increasing criticism in late 1992 and early 1993. There were accusations of financial mismanagement within the organization, it was attacked for being overly politicized, and a number of original UOU activists quit the organization.[401] It was also accused of launching a "witch-hunt" against senior officers (largely of Russian background) who are not sufficiently devoted to the cause of building the UAF.[402] Even Minister of Defence Morozov has noted that UOU members sometimes act like political commissars, and other commentators have strongly criticized the UOU for its open interference in the work of the Ukrainian MOD.[403]

289. Both Defence Minister Morozov and General Muliava attended the Fourth UOU Congress, held in Kiev on April 10-11, 1993, which attracted some 600 delegates. At this Congress Omelchenko repeated many of his earlier criticisms of military developments. They include the lack of a military doctrine for Ukraine, inadequate financing for the UAF, the slow introduction of the Ukrainian language into its ranks, and the over-representation of Russians in the senior ranks of the UAF.[404] However, Omelchenko himself had been increasingly criticized for his arrogance and careerism, and

for being politically motivated in his accusations of corruption against certain senior officers. Thus the Fourth UOU Congress replaced him with Major General Skypalsky as the new chairman of the UOU.[405] Skypalsky, with a background in intelligence work, is an assistant to Minister of Defence Morozov, and his appointment probably means that the UOU will come under firmer control by the Ukrainian MOD. In fact, it may end up serving as a conduit for certain views, held by some senior personnel in the MOD which, for various reasons, they cannot openly enunciate. In addition, the UOU will probably devote more of its attention to dealing with the socio-economic problems faced by UAF personnel.

290. In the initial stages of Ukrainian statehood the UOU, with its substantial following among younger officers in the UAF, provided Defence Minister Morozov with valuable support for many of his policies. In addition, the UOU is strongly supported by General Muliava, the head of the Social-Psychological Service of the UAF, who feels that it can perform a valuable role in helping to "Ukrainize" the UAF. However, as Ukraine's MOD becomes more firmly established some of the UOU's highly-politicized activities may become a severe liability. Thus the MOD will find it increasingly difficult to continue justifying the ambiguous role of the UOU vis-a-vis the UAF.

291. The IAO and Trade Unions. In the late fall of 1991 an organization called the Independent Association of Officers (IAO) was created as an alternative to the UOU. It supported a campaign, launched by the MOD of the USSR, to retain the loyalty of SAF officers in Ukraine and oppose the formation of the UAF.[406] Little was heard from the IAO after the creation of the CIS. However, on 10 January 1992 Lieutenant Colonel Sergei Starykh, chairman of the IAO's Coordinating Committee, stated that certain air force pilots in Ukraine were considering the unsanctioned transfer of military aircraft from Ukraine to the Russian Federation. He claimed that many pilots resented pressures to swear the oath of allegiance to Ukraine, and that half of the pilots in seven air force units had already refused to take the oath.[407] Nothing further was heard of the IAO.

292. There is no information concerning the formation of other political groups, like the IAO, in the UAF. The emphasis has been on establishing organizations to defend the socio-economic rights of servicemen. On 25 February 1993 the Ukrainian MOD indicated that it opposed, for the time being, the establishment of army trade unions.[408] Nonetheless, on 1 March 1993 a meeting of trade union representatives of Ukrainian servicemen was held, and it resolved to form a congress of trade unions of the UAF and National Guard.[409]

293. This was followed in May 1993 by the creation of a Federation of Trade Unions of Military Servicemen of the Kiev garrison. In June 1993 it was the main organizer of a demonstration by Kiev garrison servicemen protesting their living conditions.[410] It also announced that an all-Ukrainian founding Congress of Trade Unions of Military Servicemen would be held during the summer of 1993. However, the Ministry of Defence continues to oppose the creation of such trade unions until a legal framework for their activities has been established.[411]

294. Paramilitary Groups -- UNSO. The only significant paramilitary group in Ukraine is the Ukrainian People's Self Defence Forces (abbreviated as UNSO in Ukrainian), headed by Dmytro Korchynsky. The UNSO, created in September 1991, is a subdivision of the UNA (Ukrainian National Assembly). The latter includes a number of radical nationalist organizations and is mainly based in Western Ukraine, although the UNSO has strong bases in various regions of Ukraine. The head of the UNA is Yury Shukhevych, the son of a prominent leader of the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army (abbreviated as UPA in Ukrainian), and he is also commander-in-chief of the UNSO.[412]

295. The UNA and the UNSO advocate what they call "pragmatic" nationalism, and see their role as supporting those forces which best serve Ukraine's national interests. Thus, although the UNSO generally supports the idea of an authoritarian state, it is quite flexible in its tactics. It was most prominently active in defence of Ukraine's supposed "national interests" in Moldova, where some of its units claim to have participated in

combat action in defence of the Ukrainian population of the Dniester region. Another focus of its activities is Crimea, where its members have engaged in a variety of provocative actions. Last but not least, UNSO members have acted as "shock troops" promoting the interests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kiev Patriarchate. This church is supported by many Ukrainian nationalists and is favoured by the current Ukrainian leadership in its conflicts with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate.

296. The Ukrainian parliament has prohibited the formation of unofficial paramilitary detachments. However, one UNSO organizer claimed that "the ban only applies to those armed formations which aim at overthrowing the legal authorities, whereas we plan to help the authorities protect Ukraine's freedom."[413] In addition, Korchynsky claims that UNSO members carry weapons only when their units are active outside of Ukraine.[414] In addition to their involvement in the conflict in Moldova in 1992, UNSO units have participated in the recent fighting in Abkhazia, where they have suffered some casualties.[415] Such activities outside Ukraine is seen as providing UNSO members with valuable combat experience.

297. The UNSO sees itself as complementing the work of the armed forces and militia, and it has supported elements in the UAF who are dissatisfied with their wages and living conditions.[416] It also has strong links with certain elements in the Union of Officers of Ukraine. Thus Colonel Sliusarev, one of the deputies of UOU Chairman Skypalsky, has maintained close ties with the UNA and UNSO. Skypalsky has indicated that Sliusarev is to restrict his ties with the latter two organizations. However, Skypalsky has also stated that he is in favour of maintaining a dialogue between the UOU and the UNSO.[417]

298. The UNSO is still a relatively small organization; however, it appears to be highly disciplined. If the political and socio-economic situation in Ukraine continues to deteriorate, it could play a significant role supporting a "strong hand" to bring "order" in Ukraine. To date the state authorities seem to have tolerated the activities of the

UNSO, apparently because it is seen as providing a counterweight to the activity of Russian chauvinist organizations. However, some of the contradictions inherent in the activities of the UNSO are becoming increasingly apparent. For example, in the spring of 1993 members of a militarized detachment of the UNSO agreed to guard the Drohobych oil processing plant together with members of the local police. A rather strange situation developed when several guards belonging to UNSO, which has no legal status, detained several policemen who were involved in the theft of gasoline.[418] One local UNSO leader believes that, in the present conditions of a constitutional crisis and a weakening of the state's administrative levers, the UNSO is helping to fill a certain "law and order" vacuum in Ukrainian society, and as a result has the potential to become a significant political force in Ukraine.[419]

299. The Ukrainian Diaspora. Although their role and impact have been limited, some members of the Ukrainian diaspora in Western Europe and North America have had a certain influence on military developments in Ukraine. Thus a retired major-general who served in the United States Army, Nicholas Krawciw, is an advisor to Ukraine's defence minister. In addition, three United States citizens, including Krawciw, are on the editorial board of Viis'ko Ukrainy (Army of Ukraine). The main armed forces journal published in Ukraine, it has received financial assistance from Ukrainian emigres in a number of countries.[420]

THE EXPERIENCE OF DEFENCE PLANNING

300. Ukraine's political leaders and senior military officials faced a wide range of problems as they attempted to create a foundation for the development of the UAF. The challenges of reducing the size of the officer corps and dealing with corruption in the military were discussed in an earlier section of this study. Other challenges included: creating, from scratch, the framework for an independent military from structures which were intended to serve a very different purpose; introducing and entrenching a new set of military traditions; ensuring the loyalty of officers, many of whom have mixed feelings about the new state they are serving; and establishing normal military relations with

neighbouring states which are also facing great challenges. In these circumstances major problems were inevitable, and they are still present in all of the areas noted above.

301. Information on the structures and hierarchy of decision-making on military-related issues in Ukraine is limited. Among the major "players" are: the Ukrainian parliament, and its Standing Committee on Defence and National Security; the Ministry of Defence; and the National Security Council, which was established in July 1992. The role of the Ukrainian parliament in defence matters has not been clearly defined, and military officials have resisted its attempts to supervise their activities.[421] However Vasyl Durdynets, the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council, frequently speaks out on military and military-related issues, and heads Ukraine's delegation at Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. He has consistently supported the government's military policy, and his calm, measured approach to this and other issues has helped maintain relative peace in the Ukrainian parliament, where he frequently substitutes for its chairman, Ivan Pliushch. The most prominent critic of the government's military policy among the parliamentary deputies is Valery Izmalkov, a military officer who has openly called for the resignation of his direct superior, the Minister of Defence.[422]

302. According to Selivanov, the presidential advisor on national security issues until May 1993, the National Security Council is responsible for predicting the emergence of threats to the country's national interests, and preparing pre-emptive decision options for the president. It also provides prompt analyses of crisis situations and proposals to neutralize, eliminate, or minimize national security threats. The Council meets once a month and consists of senior state officials including the president's national security advisor, the prime minister, the chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine, and the ministers of defence, foreign affairs, internal affairs, public health, and environmental protection.[423]

303. Much of the attention of the National Security Council has been devoted to the

country's domestic problems. Thus, as of December 1992 some of the major issues it had examined included the crime situation, the state of scientific-technological progress, and the epidemiological situation in Ukraine. However, the council faced a number of problems which included developing a full-fledged structure and more effective procedures, improving the quality and variety of information it received, and attracting experienced personnel. According to Selivanov, because of these and other deficiencies in the council's operations it devoted too much of its attention to dealing with current issues rather than addressing long-term problems facing the country.[424]

304. As for the Ukrainian parliament, during the summer of 1992 its Standing Committee on Defence and National Security prepared a package of new laws on military doctrine, the structure, size, and financing of the UAF, civil defence, the legal basis for the declaration of martial law, mobilization orders, etc. In an article published on 22 August 1992 Defence Minister Morozov stated that the main principles of Ukrainian military doctrine were quite firm. This doctrine was to bear a "strictly defensive character," according to the principle of defensive sufficiency. Ukraine, which did not single out any state as a potential enemy, had no territorial claims against any of its neighbours, and its military doctrine was aimed primarily at the preservation of peace and stability in the region.

305. According to Morozov Ukraine, having inherited a powerful military machine with an offensive rather than defensive orientation, was committed to reducing its size in line with its obligations under the CFE agreement. Practical steps to reduce armaments limited by the agreement were being taken, and would continue to be taken, under international supervision. However, radical reductions in the number of military personnel could be carried out only after the "social protection" of discharged officers was ensured. This included the provision of housing, job retraining and job placement, etc. Morozov also restated the position that Ukraine was striving for a nuclear weapon-free status, and would not enter into any military blocs. However, this was not to prevent Ukraine from establishing broad bilateral military contacts, or participating in

certain structures of organizations such as NATO.[425]

306. The text of the proposed new military doctrine was presented, together with an entire package of legislation on defence matters, to the Ukrainian parliament on 28 October 1992. However, this package was not accepted in full and was sent back to the Standing Committee on Defence and Security to be reworked. Critics pointed out that this package did not consider the problem of the economic base for defence policy, and the dilemmas faced by officers from Ukraine who were serving in other countries of the CIS. The defence doctrine was also criticized for being overly passive, insufficiently flexible, and not allowing for bold initiatives. In addition, according to one member of the Standing Committee on Defence and Security, 89 former communist deputies refused to support the draft doctrine until the Union of Officers of Ukraine was banned.[426]

307. A revised and expanded version of Ukraine's military doctrine was submitted to Ukraine's parliament in April 1993; however, it again failed to gain approval.[427] It was criticized for not clearly specifying the status of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Another important topic of discussion was Ukraine's status as a neutral state, with some former communist deputies advocating close defence ties with Russia. This discussion developed into a major controversy when a few deputies, representing the radical nationalist wing in parliament, demanded that the doctrine clearly specify that Russia was Ukraine's primary enemy.[428] More moderate nationalist critics rejected this argument; however, they pointed out that Ukraine's military doctrine should reflect a greater awareness of the main sources of threats to Ukraine's security.[429]

308. According to the head of the Standing Committee on Defence and National Security, delays in the adoption of a military doctrine for Ukraine have hampered the further development of the UAF. He, and other critics, have also complained that discussions to date have devoted far too little attention to a number of crucial components of military doctrine. They include Ukraine's ability to properly finance its armed forces, the military-technical aspects of military doctrine, the way in which Ukraine's MIC can

(or cannot) properly supply the UAF with the equipment it needs, and the nature of the threats to Ukraine's national security.[430]

309. A wide-ranging debate on Ukraine's military doctrine has also been hampered by the very small number of non-governmental research institutions which can provide informed commentary on military issues. One such establishment is the National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS), headed by Serhii Pirozhkov, which is directly responsible to the President of Ukraine. It has been charged with the "elaboration of scientifically grounded global strategies and forecasts of the political, socio-economic, legal and cultural development of Ukraine." It is also responsible for coordinating "all research in these areas undertaken by government and private scientific centers and institutions."[431] Another "think tank" in Kiev is a smaller body, with less ambitious aims, called the International Institute of Global and Regional Security (IIGRS), headed by Dmytro Vydrin.

310. The impact of these bodies on discussions of Ukraine's military doctrine and national security is probably limited. Dmytro Vydrin, the director of the IIGRS, has expressed concern that the professional military dominates decisionmaking in Ukraine's Ministry of Defence and debates on the country's military doctrine. He has suggested that, as a result, the interests of the country's military may gain precedence over Ukraine's many other socio-economic and political priorities. Vydrin has recommended that because of continuing delays with the approval of Ukraine's military doctrine a temporary, "short-term" doctrine be adopted until a new constitution for Ukraine is adopted and the general political situation becomes more stable. Such a move would, in the meantime, allow force restructuring to proceed in a more coherent fashion.[432]

311. A number of major controversies emerged during the initial period of defence planning in Ukraine, when a new framework for an independent military was being established; however, only a few examples will be presented in this study. One controversy emerged when a decision was made in 1992 to reduce the large number of

specialized military vuzy (institutions of higher education) in Ukraine, and to rationalize their operations. Ultimately, 9 military vuzy were created to replace the 34 on Ukrainian territory in 1991.[433] However, the process was extremely disruptive, and led to numerous complaints from the UOU as well as institutions and individuals affected by the reorganization.

312. The most frequent complaint was that the sweeping reorganization was carried out so quickly, and with so little prior planning, that it had a very detrimental effect on the whole system of military education in Ukraine. According to several critics, including leading members of the UOU, the reforms greatly demoralized the instructors and researchers at military vuzy, and their students as well.[434] Finally, the Ukrainian MOD established a military commission to review the progress of the reform of military education. It found that Ukraine's military vuzy were not prepared to start teaching according to the new curriculum in September 1993 because it was incomplete and poorly formulated. In addition, most of the personnel of the UAF's Administration of Military Education did not have the necessary experience to conduct reforms in this sector in an effective manner.[435] However, no steps have been taken to "roll back" any of these reforms, since a reorganization and "downsizing" of the military education system in Ukraine was definitely needed.

313. Another controversial move was the decision to liquidate the Kiev military district and subordinate its military personnel to the Odessa military district. Many officers, supported by members of the Ukrainian parliament's Standing Committee on Defence and National Security, claim that this move was both irrational and highly disruptive. They argue that it is impossible to effectively administer troop units in northern Ukraine from the southern city of Odessa.[436] A similar dispute has arisen over plans to create a unified Aerial Defence Troops structure by amalgamating the Air Force and Air Defence Troops (PVO) in Ukraine.[437] However, some of the opposition to this amalgamation appears to stem from fears that it will result in numerous servicemen losing their jobs.[438] Similar motives, as well as sheer inertia, probably lie behind much of the opposition to other

motives, as well as sheer inertia, probably lie behind much of the opposition to other military reforms in Ukraine.

314. Given the chaotic state of preparations for the establishment of the UAF in the fall of 1991,[439] one could argue that defence planning in the first few months of 1992 went quite smoothly. In fact, the peaceful creation of the UAF on the basis of SAF units located on Ukrainian territory represented one of the few major successes of the Ukrainian government in 1992.[440] However, problems were unavoidable, and the controversy over the fate of military vuzy in Ukraine is characteristic of reactions to the rapid restructuring of the military infrastructure in Ukraine in 1992.

315. In particular, decisionmakers have run into severe problems ensuring that the resources are available to carry out their ambitious plans. For example, it has been very difficult to conduct military exercises and training flights because of a shortage of fuel, and Ukraine's MOD has received only 10% of the military research funds it requested. In addition, UAF personnel are still distributed in Ukraine according to the dictates of Soviet military doctrine. According to the chief of the General Staff of the UAF, the main reason why a redistribution of these personnel has not occurred is a lack of resources, and it will have to take place over a period of several years.[441] The situation is further complicated by the opposition of local authorities to the transfer of UAF personnel to the eastern oblasts of Ukraine.[442]

316. Thus the initial period of relative freedom of action for Ukraine's military planners, which was the result of the high priority placed on establishing a strong military immediately after the country gained independence, is over. Increasingly Ukraine's policies, in this as well as many other areas, will be constricted by a severe shortfall of resources, which will have to be carefully husbanded to maintain the capabilities of the UAF at a credible level.

VIII. THE MILITARY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

317. During the first few months of 1992 there were few signs that the process and methods of building the UAF were encountering any significant political opposition in Ukraine. The appointment of General Morozov as defence minister, and his own personnel appointments, did not provoke any major political controversies. In addition, he and his staff were given considerable freedom in formulating plans to restructure the military forces located in Ukraine. Morozov, who appears to have the strong support of President Kravchuk, was careful not to make any statements which could be interpreted as representing interference in the political process. At the same time, however, he did not shun the media, and appeared to be respected by most Ukrainian journalists because of his calm, measured style and pronouncements.[443]

318. However, in the fall of 1992 criticism of Morozov grew, especially in the Ukrainian parliament. It became quite marked in December 1992, when 155 conservative deputies in the Ukrainian parliament, mostly from eastern and southern Ukraine, signed a statement demanding his resignation. The complaints raised by these deputies include Morozov's inability to sharply reduce corruption in and desertion from the UAF; his failure to appoint a commander and accompanying staff for the ground forces of the UAF, as well as a chief for the General Staff of the UAF; his failure to curb a decline in the combat readiness of the UAF; and the inefficient work of the Commercial Centre of the Ministry of Defence.[444] He has also been accused of encouraging and supporting the activity of the UOU.[445]

319. Accusations that the armed forces were becoming highly politicized were repeated in May 1993 by several parliamentary deputies headed by O. Moroz, the head of the Socialist Party. They argued that the appearance of Defence Minister Morozov at the UOU congress in April 1993 was totally unwarranted, for the congress was conducted in the style of a political meeting. In addition, they listed a number of resolutions passed at the congress which were in direct contradiction to existing legislation on the armed forces.[446]

320. Another major criticism levelled at Morozov was his appointment of Volodymyr Muliava to head the Social-Psychological Service of the UAF, the successor to the Main Political Administration which coordinated all political socialization activities in the old SAF. Muliava has been accused of dictatorial tendencies, artifically speeding up the "Ukrainization" of the UAF, and promoting a radical form of Ukrainian nationalism in its ranks.[447] His service has also been criticized for denigrating the military traditions of the Soviet past, and introducing new traditions which are foreign to many residents of Ukraine, especially Russians and residents of eastern and southern Ukraine.[448] These new traditions include those linked to Ukraine's struggle for independence during the period immediately following 1917, and associated with WW II nationalist paramilitary formations such as the UPA.[449]

321. Some of these criticisms appear contrived. General Morozov has mounted a vigorous campaign to combat corruption in the armed forces. As for delays in appointing personnel to certain senior positions in the UAF, they are probably largely due to the enormous challenges involved in the formation of a brand-new organizational structure for the Ukrainian military. However, the accusation that Morozov has contributed to an over-politicization of the armed forces is partly justified, for he has generally supported the UOU and has therefore associated himself with some of its political demands. Muliava, who also spoke at the most recent UOU congress, has even been accused of being one of its behind-the-scenes organizers. This is quite plausible in view of his participation in other highly partisan political activities.[450]

322. It is difficult to assess the impact of the work of Muliava's controversial Social-Psychological Service, which has been a favorite target of critics of current developments in the UAF. The "Ukrainization" measures promoted by Muliava, and other patriotic activities conducted by this Service, have definitely encountered considerable resistance among certain UAF officers. However, Muliava and his supporters have never denied that the work of the Social-Psychological Service is, in many respects, highly political. They simply argue that such politicization is fully justified, since its aim is to offset the

impact of many years of pro-Soviet propaganda in the SAF. The political socialization effort in the SAF was strongly critical of all forms of "bourgeois nationalism," and of the military traditions which were linked, over the centuries, to the drive for Ukraine's independence. Thus the work of the Social-Psychological Service is seen as guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine by raising the patriotic consciousness of officers and conscripts.[451]

323. To a certain extent such aims are reasonable, and much of the criticism directed at Muliava comes from older officers who are resistant to any changes in military practices. However, Muliava has alienated a number of officers by promoting a rather parochial form of "hurrah-patriotism" in the armed forces. In addition, he is intolerant to criticism and has attacked many of his critics in an intemperate fashion, frequently accusing them of being "anti-Ukrainian."[452] Last but not least, the work of his Service is often conducted, at the local level, by the same political instructors who were responsible for the Marxist-Leninist indoctrination effort in the old SAF. Much of their previous work involved harshly criticizing the traditions which are now in favour in the UAF. Thus some of these instructors have had difficulty "restructuring" their work, and its quality leaves much to be desired.[453]

324. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that dissatisfaction within the military has assumed a subversive character. In particular, there is no evidence of individuals or groups within the armed forces advocating intervention by the military in Ukraine's domestic politics, or of organized support within the military for forces strongly opposed to the present government. There is also no evidence of well-organized pro-Russian factions in the Ukrainian military, although one Russian newspaper reported that a group of officers in Ukraine was discharged in 1992 for planning to set up a pro-Russian "Dunai Cossack" organization.[454] In addition, the highly conservative Russian Officers' Union claims to have representatives in Ukraine.[455]

325. On the first anniversary of the August 1991 coup attempt in the Soviet Union the head of military counterintelligence of the SBU (Sluzhba Bezbeky Ukrainy -- Security Service of Ukraine) stated that most military officers in Ukraine were not interested in "political games".[456] However, he admitted that a considerable number of military officers had set up commercial structures to enrich themselves, or were engaging in other forms of corrupt activities. He also noted that a further deterioration in the economy could play into the hands of officers with political ambitions.[457]

326. Thus the major threat to the stability of civil-military relations in Ukraine appears to be growing discontent among military servicemen stemming from their deteriorating socio-economic status and uncertainty about the future. In fact, a large number of servicemen already appear prepared to engage in drastic actions of some kind if their situation does not improve. This would most likely take the form of demonstrations and other forms of civil disobedience. In addition, corruption within the military is bound to continue flourishing in the present circumstances. Thus if the state of the Ukrainian economy does not improve, and the concerns of military officers are not addressed in a satisfactory fashion, the calm which has characterized civil-military relations in Ukraine could be seriously threatened.[458]

IX. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UAF AND CIS/RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES

THE EVOLUTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP

327. Following the coup attempt of August 1991 the new Soviet military leadership, as well as Soviet President Gorbachev and Russian President Yeltsin, strongly condemned discussions on dividing the Soviet Armed Forces. They stressed the need to maintain a unified armed forces structure for the entire territory of the former USSR. Soviet Defence Minister Shaposhnikov and some of his associates were committed to restructuring the SAF, and made certain efforts to accommodate growing demands from the republics for more control over the armed forces stationed on their territory. They thus proposed certain new organizational structures which would allow the republican governments a greater role in the formulation and implementation of defence policy. However, the establishment of independent national armies was firmly opposed.[459]

328. The unexpected strength of the drive for the full independence of Ukraine, and of Ukrainian determination to establish its own armed forces, kept the SAF command off balance throughout the fall of 1991. Following the establishment of the CIS SAF representatives continued to emphasize the need for a highly unified defence structure. They argued that only such a structure could ensure the security of CIS member states, and did not seem to realize that in some republics, such as Ukraine, it might be irrelevant to their new national security goals.[460]

329. As a result, security policy was the most contentious issue at the CIS Minsk meeting of 30 December 1991. Ultimately an agreement was signed that confirmed the right of each member state to create its own army, and this meeting also established a Council of Defence Ministers (subordinated to the Council of Heads of State) to deal with security matters. However, the debates on military issues in Minsk were so stormy that they almost led to the resignation of Marshal Shaposhnikov, who had been appointed CIS Commander in Chief and was sharply criticized by Ukraine's President Kravchuk for his "backward" policies.[461]

330. Early in 1992 Ukrainian-Russian military relations quickly deteriorated over the issues of the pace of, and conditions under which Ukraine would rid itself of nuclear weapons, and the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. In addition, considerable controversy was generated by Ukraine's rapid moves to administer oaths of loyalty to all military personnel on its territory, with those who refused to take the oath being transferred to their home republics. Last but not least, Russian military officials were dismayed by Ukraine's failure to sign the CIS collective security agreement in May 1992. Ukraine's continuing refusal to engage in collective security arrangements means that on security issues the commonwealth has been split into two groups of states, one led by Moscow and the other by Kiev.

331. During debates on these and other issues senior military officials in Russia and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine, issued statements which were often intemperate and sometimes inflammatory; they certainly did a great deal to poison the atmosphere for the future. This was especially true of statements concerning developments in the Black Sea Fleet (BSF), which appeared to be aimed at influencing the political debate on the future of both the BSF and Crimea. Thus, for example, BSF Admiral Kasatonov acquired a notorious reputation in Ukraine for his open cooperation with pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian forces in Crimea.[462]

332. These strained relations are also reflected in the tone of articles in both the Ukrainian and Russian military press. In the case of Ukraine's Narodna armiia and Viis'ko Ukrainy, many of their articles are characterized by a didactic style which aims at instilling a patriotic mindset in their readers. Few articles in these periodicals have attempted to present Russian-Ukrainian military or political relations in a balanced, even-handed fashion. However, Ukrainian military publications are rarely marked by the intolerance and xenophobia which is frequently found in Russian military publications such as Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal and Mors'koi sbornik. A good example is an article in the latter journal which presents a messianic view of Russia's role in the Black Sea zone, and makes a number of crude and vituperative comments concerning the role of

Ukraine, Turkey, and the Crimean Tatars in this region.[463]

333. There are no indications that relations between the Russian and Ukrainian militaries will improve in the near future. This will especially be the case if nationalism gains ground in the armed forces of both countries. In Ukraine the main nationalist pressure group in the military, the UOU, has lost much of its support in the ranks in recent months. At its most recent congress nationalist rhetoric was more muted than at earlier congresses, and more attention was devoted to the socio-economic concerns of servicemen. In addition, there appeared to be a recognition at this congress that it was important not to alienate the large Russian contingent in the UAF.[464]

334. In contrast, various "patriotic" associations of officers appear to be gaining influence in the Russian Armed Forces. The most influential is the Officers' Union headed by Stanislav Terekhov, a serving officer who has been an outspoken critic of both President Yeltsin and Russian Defence Minister Grachev. Terekhov, who has called for the Soviet empire to be restored, claims to have substantial support in the RAF, and also appears to have considerable support among Yeltsin's opponents in the Russian parliament.[465]

335. However, even those elements in the Russian military who support Yeltsin, or appear loyal to him, continue to support a high level of armed forces integration among the CIS countries, especially Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.[466] On occasion they have defied Yeltsin on this issue, as recent polemics over the BSF have demonstrated.[467]

336. The two main issues of contention in Russian-Ukrainian military relations are the fate of the Black Sea Fleet and the future of the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine. The development of the controversy over these issues has been discussed at length in the Western and Russian/Ukrainian press. In addition, several good overviews of the nuclear weapons controversy have recently appeared.[468] Thus the discussion below will only briefly review developments concerning these issues and focus on some of their broader

implications.

ISSUES OF CONTENTION: THE BLACK SEA FLEET AND THE CRIMEA

337. One of the issues which has severely exacerbated relations between Russia and Ukraine was the latter's post-independence demand that it is entitled to a significant portion of the former USSR's Black Sea Fleet (BSF) stationed on Ukrainian territory. The BSF is a large and, on paper, formidable force, with 54 principal combatant vessels and 246 other vessels (mostly coastal, patrol, mine warfare, and support ships). The BSF also possesses a significant land-based naval aviation component, a naval infantry brigade based at Sevastopol, and a motorized rifle division, responsible for coastal defence, in Simferopol (both cities are in Crimea).[469] However, many commentators have expressed doubts concerning the quality and capabilities of the BSF warships.[470] The BSF is manned by between 70,000 and 100,000 navy personnel, and estimates of the percentage of Ukrainians serving in the BSF in 1991 range from 19-30% for officers, and 30-60% for sailors.[471]

338. The BSF headquarters and the great majority of its ships and aircraft are based in Crimea, and three of the six shipyards of the former Soviet Union that built capital naval ships are located in Ukraine, in Mykolaiv and Kerch. These shipyards were the sole producers of certain types of naval vessels in the Soviet Union. For example, the BSF shipyard in Mykolaiv was the only one capable of building aircraft carriers and "aircraft-carrying" cruisers.[472]

339. The history of the BSF is not particularly illustrious. However, it is regarded as having played a significant role in Russian military history, and this helps explain the insistence of Russian claims to the BSF. Even Yeltsin, as recently as April 1993, referred to "historical justice" to explain why Sevastopol should remain a Russian naval base.[473] In addition, Russian officials have argued that a strong Russian naval presence in the Black Sea continues to be of great strategic importance. One source claims that more than half of Russia's foreign trade passes through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles

straits linking the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and a strong Russian naval force in the Black Sea greatly increases Russia's ability to influence developments in the region.[474]

340. Last but not least, the Crimea has a majority Russian population and most Russians regard it as historically linked to Russia. Crimea was the beloved vacation spot of many Russians in recent decades, and one of the most favoured "playgrounds" of both the tsarist and Soviet elites. In addition, the port of Sevastopol, which was devastated during World War II, was portrayed as a "hero city" in the post-war Soviet media, and thus many Russian citizens appear to have a genuine interest in its fate. Ukrainian historians, in turn, have presented all kinds of historical evidence to back up claims that there was a strong Ukrainian presence in Crimea prior to the absorption of the Crimean khanate by tsarist Russia in the 18th century. It should be noted, however, that in their polemical debates both Russian and Ukrainian scholars have usually downplayed the very important role the Crimean Tatars played in the history of the Crimea.

341. Ukrainian claims to the BSF have also been backed up by historical arguments. Thus scholars have argued that the Ukrainian Cossack Host, which conducted numerous naval raids on Turkish positions in the early 17th century, was active in Black Sea maritime history well before the Russians arrived in the region. In addition, the BSF became a bone of contention between Russia and Ukraine as early as 1917, when many Ukrainian seamen in the tsarist navy supported the Ukrainian independence movement.[475] In addition to these historical arguments, Ukrainian politicians have also put forward a more pragmatic claim. They hold that, given Ukraine's considerable contribution to the development of the FSU's naval forces, it is entitled to a certain proportion of its assets, as least those stationed on Ukrainian territory.[476]

342. In the fall of 1991 Ukraine's initial claims on the BSF were quite modest, and some Ukrainian politicians simply noted that their country should have at least a small naval force. The Ukrainian stance changed after the formation of the CIS, when Kravchuk and other Ukrainian officials began to talk of full control of the BSF.

However, such claims to the BSF were partly undermined when Ukraine signed the Minsk Agreement on Strategic Forces on 30 December 1991.

343. This agreement broadly defined all but ground forces as part of the strategic forces which were to remain under united CIS command. Thus Russian and CIS officials held that by signing it Ukraine had renounced its claims to the BSF. To back up this case a variety of arguments were presented to emphasize the strategic nature of the BSF. They included the presence of tactical nuclear weapons on its ships and planes, and its important role in defending the CIS from a strategic maritime sector. However, Ukrainian officials argued that talk of the BSF's strategic role was greatly exaggerated, and pointed out that it was to be denuclearized in the first half of 1992.[477]

344. The debate over the fate of the BSF entered another phase with President Yeltsin's decree, on 16 March 1992, creating a Russian Defence Ministry. This meant that the issue of Ukrainian-Russian rivalry over the BSF was no longer camouflaged by the issue of its supposed subordination to the CIS joint armed forces. In addition, at an early stage of this rivalry the debate over the BSF was linked to the Ukrainian-Russian dispute over the fate of the Crimea. The linkage was made obvious in mid-January 1992 when the Russian ambassador to the United States, Vladimir Lukin, recommended that the Crimea be used as a "bargaining chip" in the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over the BSF. Shortly afterwards, in February 1992, the Russian parliament passed a resolution on forming a committee to examine the constitutionality of the 1954 decision transferring control of the Crimea from Russia to Ukraine. On the same day it passed another resolution calling for a unified BSF.[478]

345. Tensions continued to rise in April 1992, when Kravchuk's decree providing for the formation of a Ukrainian navy on the basis of the BSF on Ukrainian territory was followed by Yeltsin's decree placing the entire fleet under Russia's jurisdiction.[479] However, this "war of decrees" was soon suspended and it was agreed that the dispute over the BSF was to be resolved through negotiations. They ended when Yeltsin and

Kravchuk met in Dagomys on 23 June 1992. The agreement they reached called for an end to unilateral actions concerning the BSF while negotiations on creating separate Ukrainian and Russian navies, on the basis of the BSF, were taking place.[480]

346. However, the decision to split the BSF was opposed by the Russian military, including Defence Minister Grachev, and the Dagomys agreement itself was ambiguous. It did not specify what kind of "unilateral" acts were banned, and this led to a number of bitter disputes between the Russian and Ukrainian militaries. For example, representatives of the Ukrainian MOD continued administering loyalty oaths to sailors and officers of the BSF although Admiral Kasatonov, the BSF commander, argued that this should be permitted only after separate fleets were formed.[481] Ukrainian officials were also accused of attempting to "Ukrainize" the BSF by demanding that all conscripts for the BSF come from Ukraine,[482] and of preventing, or hindering, the transit across Ukrainian territory of conscripts from Russia bound for Crimea.[483] The situation was further exacerbated by a case of mutiny when a rebellious crew, primarily of Ukrainian background, claimed that they had been persecuted by the mainly Russian fleet command. They then raised the Ukrainian flag on their BSF frigate and left their home port in Crimea for Odessa.[484]

347. For the Ukrainian side, a major stumbling block in negotiations was Russian claims not only to warships, but also to BSF land installations on Ukrainian territory.[485] In addition, Kasatonov and his associates were accused of persecuting sailors and officers who had pledged allegiance to Ukraine, illegally bringing personnel from Russia into Crimea, and forcing citizens of Ukraine to take an oath of allegiance to the CIS. Kasatonov was also accused of being involved in the illegal transfer of military property to Russia, and other forms of corruption.[486] Most significantly, he was accused of cooperating with forces in Crimea, especially the RDK, which were strongly pro-Russian and bitterly anti-Ukrainian.[487]

348. Some contentious issues were addressed at another Kravchuk-Yeltsin summit meeting, in Yalta in August 1992. It was decided that the BSF was to be immediately removed from CIS jurisdiction and directly subordinated to the Ukrainian and Russian presidents, who would then appoint a temporary joint command. By the end of 1995 the fleet was to be divided, and during the transition period equal numbers of Russian and Ukrainian citizens would serve in the BSF, which was to be jointly financed.[488]

349. However, there continued to be no clear guidelines on how, and according to what schedule, the BSF was to be divided. Ukrainian officials argued that the fleet was to be divided gradually, culminating in a full division by 1996, while Russian officials argued that the fleet was to remain united until this date. This debate was accompanied by a new stream of accusations and counter-accusations between Ukrainian and Russian politicians and defence ministries concerning various alleged infractions of the Yalta agreement.

350. There was no notable improvement in the situation after Baltin replaced Kasatonov in January 1993 as BSF Commander and the BSF was placed under temporary joint command pending negotiations over its final division. Baltin appeared to be an appropriate choice for this position as he was considered more cool-headed than Kasatonov, and less inclined to meddle in local Crimean politics. However the polemics continued, demonstrating that the personalities of individual actors in the conflict were of secondary importance. It became clear that the summit participants had put aside many important issues, and avoided making difficult decisions on the mechanics of dividing the BSF.[489]

351. Negotiations stalled in the spring of 1993 when disputes arose over the conditions under which the Russian navy would have access to port facilities and other installations in Crimea (especially Sevastopol). Another major issue of contention was the financing of the fleet. This is a clear indicator of the extent to which the BSF dispute has become highly politicized, for both sides have issued completely contradictory statements concerning the source of funding for the fleet.[490]

352. Tensions came to a peak in May 1993, when the St. Andrew's flag (the Russian naval ensign) was raised by the crews on a large number of support ships of the BSF. The situation further escalated when Ukraine's defence minister responded to this act by stating that all ships flying the St. Andrew's flag would be compelled to leave Ukrainian waters.[491]

353. Some Ukrainian sources claimed that the flag-raising incident was instigated by "outside forces," namely Russian nationalists in Crimea and Russia. The UOU, for example, accused Moscow of being directly responsible for the confrontation over the BSF, and called for decisive actions to bring an end to the dispute.[492] However, the flag-raising incident appears to have been a largely spontaneous protest by crew members against the low salaries paid to Ukrainian citizens serving in the BSF, and the large discrepancy between these salaries and those of Russian navy personnel.[493]

354. Even the commander of the Ukrainian navy acknowledged that in the spring of 1993 Russian servicemen in the BSF received approximately twice the wages of their Ukrainian counterparts.[494] Thus a large number of BSF officers clearly preferred to serve under Russian jurisdiction, and they were supported in their protest by some Sevastopol residents. Many of the latter felt abandoned after years of living, next to a prestigious military base, in a "closed" city which used to have preferential access to foodstuffs and other supplies. As Sevastopol lost this privileged status and its economic problems grew, many of its inhabitants tended to blame these problems on the Ukrainian authorities in Kiev.[495]

355. In what now appeared to be a standard pattern of reacting to BSF crises, Kravchuk and Yeltsin met again near Moscow on 17 June 1993 to work out a new compromise. The agreement they signed confirmed that the BSF would be split, and financed, on a fifty-fifty basis, and specified that its division was to begin in September 1993 rather than at the end of 1995. The agreement called for a division of both vessels and shore facilities, and suggested that the Russian portion of the fleet would be based in Ukraine

until at least the end of the transition period. Fleet personnel were to be paid according to a uniform pay scale.[496]

356. However, many problems remained. For example, the mechanism for splitting up the BSF was not specified in the agreement, and it was unclear whether there would be a Russian naval presence in Crimea after 1995. In addition, the issues of dual citizenship for Russian servicemen living in Ukraine, and specific arrangements for the financing of the BSF, were to be addressed in separate documents. Thus this agreement, like the earlier ones dealing with the BSF, remained vague in many respects.

357. An inter-state commission was to work out the details of the agreement, to be submitted to both parliaments for ratification. However, there is no guarantee that such ratification will be forthcoming without, at a minimum, very fierce debates in both Russia and Ukraine. Given the growing rancour over the fate of the BSF, there is bound to be great controversy in both countries over the mechanics of its division.[497]

358. Of particular concern is the extent to which military officials have been speaking out on the BSF issue, and have attempted to influence its resolution. For example, prior to the Yeltsin-Kravchuk summit on 17 June 1993 Ukrainian Defence Minister Morozov and the UOU strongly criticized the idea of leasing Ukrainian territory to Russia.[498] Within the BSF itself, on 23 June 1993 an assembly of officers of BSF air arm denounced the summit agreement. This assembly, as well as the BSF commander and another gathering of BSF officers, advocate a unified fleet.[499] In addition, both Russian Defence Minister Grachev and Marshal Shaposhnikov criticized the most recent BSF agreement. They, as well as BSF commander Admiral Baltin and many senior officers of the BSF, continue to support the idea of a united fleet, or feel that Ukraine should receive much less than half of it.[500]The culminating act in this drama came on 9 July 1993 when Russia's parliament, by an overwhelming vote, pronounced that the BSF should remain "single, united and glorious," and claimed Sevastopol as Russian territory.[501]

359. Several criticisms can be levelled at the way in which Ukraine approached the issue of the future of the BSF. First of all, in the initial period of the formation of the UAF there was a gradual escalation of the Ukrainian leadership's demands for a portion of the Black Sea Fleet. In the course of this escalation Ukraine's representatives modified some of the early commitments they made concerning the future of the SAF, and thus appeared to act in a rash and irresponsible fashion. In addition, Ukraine's leaders either miscalculated the possible reactions to their claims in Crimea and Russia, or rashly decided that it would be easy to deal with the fallout from these reactions. As one commentary has noted,

> Kiev's timing was terrible: claiming the fleet while soldiers were being asked to swear loyalty and the Republic Movement of the Crimea was talking of separation played into the hands of Yeltsin's archconservative opponents, who linked all three issues, ascribed intensely emotional overtones to them, and, as a result, both reduced Yeltsin's political maneuverability and confronted Ukrainian policymakers with the possibility that their claims on the fleet could generate official Russian claims on the Crimea.[502]

360. These failings can largely be attributed to the inexperience of Ukraine's politicians in conducting foreign policy, and a rather naive optimism about the future which lasted for several months following Ukraine's independence. In addition, Ukraine's claim to a large part of the BSF was probably triggered by Russia's aggressive moves, immediately following the collapse of the USSR, to establish itself as the only fully legimitimate successor state to the Soviet Union. Ukraine's politicians resented what they saw as a "power grab" which provided Russia with, among others, immediate access to the Soviet Union's foreign property and other assets. The only significant Soviet "power" assets which Ukraine could appropriate were the military resources on its territory, and since the main base of the BSF was found on Ukrainian territory it must have appeared to be "fair game."

361. However, reaching a settlement of the BSF dispute has been tremendously complicated by continuing Russian claims to Crimea, or parts of Crimea such as

Sevastopol. The Russian parliament's declaration that Sevastopol is a Russian city is, of course, nonsensical, and does not have any juridical basis under international law. In addition, in mid-1993 the Russian parliament was a largely discredited institution and many of its actions were largely irrelevant. However, the ultimate aims pursued by the Russian parliament are not shared by radical nationalist organizations alone. They are held by senior politicians such as Vice-President Rutskoi, many senior military officers, and a significant portion of the Russian public. President Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry have disassociated themselves from the Russian parliament's declaration, and have downplayed its importance. However, they will have difficulty ignoring the large constituency which shares the sentiments expressed in this declaration.

362. Because of the persistence of these territorial claims to Crimea, Ukrainian leaders are determined not to set a precedent by making any kind of territorial concessions. This explains the Ukrainian reluctance to lease part of Crimea to Russia for use as a naval base, although Ukraine's Premier Kuchma has spoken out in favour of such an arrangement. In short, given the way in which the fate of the BSF has become linked to Russian territorial claims to Crimea, and the extent to which this whole complex of issues has become highly politicized, tensions in this region will continue. In turn, they have contributed a great deal to hardening pro-nuclear sentiments in Ukraine.

ISSUES OF CONTENTION: NUCLEAR WEAPONS

363. Several potential nuclear risks emerged during and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. First and foremost was the risk of nuclear proliferation in the USSR's successor states, for they were in a position to exercise a nuclear option by trying to gain control of the nuclear weapons on their territories. Strategic nuclear weapons had been deployed in four republics of the USSR: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and both intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic nuclear bombers, as well as a large number of tactical nuclear weapons, were located in Ukraine. Most estimates of the number of strategic nuclear warheads in Ukraine when it became independent yield a total of between 1,500 and 1,800 warheads. This means that Ukraine currently possesses the

third largest number of strategic warheads of any country in the world.[503]

364. Because of widespread concerns that the security of nuclear weapons could be compromised as the Soviet Union collapsed, Western governments (in particular, the United States) and the Russian government agreed in the fall of 1991 that their interests would be best served by withdrawing all Soviet nuclear weapons back to Russia. These weapons were to be securely stored there and ultimately destroyed if this was specified by arms control arrangements, while the other Soviet successor states would be encouraged to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This agreement was facilitated by the assumption that Russia was to be the sole legitimate heir of the USSR's nuclear weapons programme.

365. In its Declaration of State Sovereignty on 16 July 1990 the Ukrainian parliament declared its intention to see Ukraine become a neutral state which would not accept, manufacture, or acquire nuclear weapons. Immediately after the creation of the CIS a number of western states made it clear that they expected Ukraine to adhere to this commitment. Thus representatives of the United States clearly stated that their country supported a single and unified system of control over nuclear weapons in the FSU. NATO, in turn, issued a statement underlining its expectation that first, "Ukraine will commit itself to a non-nuclear policy and adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty," and second, that it will "commit itself to abide by and implement all other arms control and disarmament agreements signed by the Soviet Union."[504]

366. Following the creation of the CIS Ukraine's President Kravchuk restated Ukraine's commitment to denuclearization, promised to observe the arms control commitments of the Soviet Union, and reached an agreement with Russia on the withdrawal, by July 1992, of all tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia, where they were to be dismantled. In addition Ukraine agreed to a unified command for nuclear weapons, although it was unclear what this meant in practice.

367. At the second CIS summit held on 30 December 1991 an "Agreement on Nuclear Strategic Forces" was signed which created a "Combined Strategic Forces Command" and noted that decisions on the use of nuclear weapons would be made by the president of Russia in agreement with the leaders of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, the other CIS states with nuclear weapons on their territories. In addition, Ukraine made a commitment to rid itself of all nuclear weapons by the end of 1994.

368. The removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine proceeded smoothly in the early part of 1992. However, in March 1992 Ukrainian President Kravchuk announced that the withdrawal of these weapons had been suspended since Ukraine had not been involved in and had not received assurances about plans for their storage and destruction. The withdrawal was resumed following renewed pressure on Kiev from the United States, and it was completed by early May 1992. However, the controversy reflected concerns which were being voiced by increasing numbers of Ukrainian politicians. They included growing unease over the unsettled political situation in Russia as well as the imperial mindset of many Russian politicians, and the conviction that Ukraine was not gaining any concrete benefits from its renunciation of nuclear weapons.

369. After the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine strategic nuclear weapons, and ratification of the START I agreement, moved to the top of the denuclearization agenda. As already noted, Russian and American negotiators preferred to regard Russia as the sole inheritor of the Soviet Union's role as party to the START I agreement. However this arrangement was unacceptable to the other three "nuclear" republics and especially Ukraine, for it gave Russia full control over the nuclear weapons installations on their territories. Ukraine's representatives argued that this represented an infringement of the country's sovereignty.

370. Thus in May 1992 an agreement was reached on a protocol to the START I Treaty which made Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus parties to the treaty in return for their pledges to join the NPT as non-weapons states. On 23 May 1992, at a conference in

Lisbon, the protocol was signed by Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which thereby became parties to START I and pledged to ratify it. Ukraine argued that its accession to the Lisbon protocol placed strategic withdrawals within the context of START I's seven-year implementation timetable, and thus pulled back from its earlier commitment to rid itself of all nuclear weapons before the end of 1994. Nonetheless, it appeared that a framework had been found which would allow START I ratification and facilitate further reductions in nuclear weapons.

371. The issue of Ukraine's ratification of the START I agreement gained special urgency when the START II treaty was signed by President Bush and Russia's President Yeltsin on 3 January 1993. START II, which is yet to be ratified by the Russian parliament, cannot be implemented without full ratification of START I, and Russia refuses to implement START I before Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan sign the NPT. However, unlike Belarus, Ukraine insisted on a strict interpretation of its earlier decision to subordinate all troops on its territory to Ukrainian control. It thus demanded "administrative control" over the nuclear weapons in Ukraine, which meant that those guarding and maintaining these weapons were to be subordinated to Kiev. In addition, although Ukrainian officials continued to stress their commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons, they indicated that the satisfaction of certain conditions would greatly facilitate the Ukrainian parliament's ratification of START I.

372. First, Ukraine requested guarantees, from the leading nuclear states, of its national security. In particular, Ukraine sought guarantees that nuclear weapons, especially those which it was to transfer to Russia, would never be directed against Ukraine. Ukrainian officials argue that such guarantees are warranted since, by renouncing the nuclear arms on its territory, Ukraine would be the first country in the world to voluntarily deprive itself of a nuclear weapons capability.

373. Second, Ukraine requested economic assistance to destroy and dismantle its nuclear weapons. After Ukrainian Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasiuk visited Washington

in January 1993 the United States offered Ukraine $175 million for this purpose if it ratified START I. However, Ukrainian officials argue that this is far too small an amount, and have called for much greater assistance.

374. Third, Ukraine requested compensation for the nuclear material contained in the warheads to be dismantled. Ukrainian spokesmen have argued that this material should not simply be given away, for it could be reprocessed for use in nuclear power plants or sold to foreign buyers.

375. Ukraine's President Kravchuk has frequently restated his commitment to a nuclear weapons-free status for Ukraine, but has also consistently supported the position outlined above. He and his supporters have argued that the Ukrainian parliament is fully entitled to fully debate all provisions of the START I treaty, and their implications for Ukraine, without being pressured to sign it as quickly as possible.

376. Both Russian and U.S. officials quickly lost patience with Ukraine's alleged prevarication, and criticized its leaders for breaking their earlier promises on denuclearization. Occasionally claims were made that Ukraine was using delaying tactics until it could covertly develop a full nuclear weapons capability.[505] More frequently, Ukraine's leaders were accused of trying to extort additional financial assistance from the West by slowing down (and possibly derailing) the START process.

377. Kiev has been rightly accused of sending mixed signals to the West on the fate of its nuclear weapons, for its behaviour in 1992 was inconsistent and often appeared irresponsible. Ukraine's leaders have, at a minimum, engaged in a highly "creative" interpretation of their early commitments on denuclearization. In addition, it is clear that there is growing support in Ukraine for the maintenance of a nuclear weapons capability. However, it is unlikely that Ukraine's MIC is currently working on a covert nuclear weapons program, for in the country's present circumstances it would be extremely difficult to conceal the appropriate preparations. As for the politicians who have

expressed strong support for the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability, they do not have a strong popular base of support and it is highly unlikely that they will be in a position to gain political power. The moderates who have leaned towards acquiring at least a temporary nuclear weapons capability (until the political situation in the region stabilizes, and other means of ensuring national security are more solidly entrenched) have a stronger base of public support. However, they have not demonstrated the political resolve, and determination to impose a heavy economic burden on the population, which would be necessary to acquire and maintain a permanent nuclear weapons capability.

378. Thus the "extortion" scenario is more plausible. If nothing else, the tremendous amount of press coverage generated by Western concerns over Ukraine's nuclear weapons potential has supplied the country's leaders with clear evidence that the nuclear weapons on its territory provide it with an important "bargaining chip" in the international arena. However, it is a great oversimplification to portray Ukraine as "bargaining" solely or even largely for financial compensation. The "bargaining" is much more serious, for it represents an attempt to demonstrate to the West that the question of national security is of paramount importance to Ukraine. As one commentator has noted,

> Unless the West provides the militarily impotent non-Russian states, especially Ukraine, with minimal security assurances, unless it allays their fears of being swallowed up by Russia, they will have no choice but to give priority to their immediate survival, with all the deleterious consequences that such concern may have for peace, economic reform, and democracy.[506]

Thus maintaining a certain level of concern in the West over the issue of nuclear weapons in Ukraine has been in the country's national interests in view of widespread fears of potential threats from Russia, and the absence of substantive guarantees of its security. It was also a means of gaining publicity from a Western world which was heavily preoccupied with developments in only one Soviet successor state, Russia.

379. However, much of the West's initial reaction to Ukraine's behaviour proved to be counter-productive, for it was marked by a poor understanding of Ukraine's strategic environment as well as the nature of threats to its sovereignty. In addition, Western comments on the situation in Ukraine were often expressed in a patronizing style which was greatly resented by Ukrainian politicians. Last but not least, the implied threat of sanctions against Ukraine if it failed to cooperate on this issue was not very effective in view of the fact that the United States was already perceived, in Ukraine, to be greatly favouring Russia as the primary destination for the aid being provided to the former Soviet republics.

380. In May 1993 the Ukrainian parliament decided to again postpone formal consideration of START I. This postponement was reportedly motivated by a desire to determine whether a new constitution was to be adopted in Russia, since the nature of such a constitution was perceived as having an impact on Ukrainian security.[507] If this is the case, it underlines the extent to which Ukraine's policy concerning its nuclear status is determined by concerns over the direction of trends in the Russian Federation.

381. In May-June 1993 there were a number of indications that the West was beginning to demonstrate a better understanding of Ukraine's security concerns, and was considering a more creative approach to the Russian-Ukrainian nuclear weapons dispute. During this period Ukraine was visited by U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for the CIS Strobe Talbott, U.S. Secretary of Defence Les Aspin, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. During his visit, in a symbolic but nonetheless important statement, Kohl assured the Ukrainian leadership that Germany would not favour Russia over Ukraine, and made a point of stressing the importance of German-Ukrainian relations.[508] Of particular interest was a proposal advanced by Aspin to help defuse tensions between Moscow and Kiev. According to the proposal the nuclear warheads based in Ukraine would be held in storage, under the control of an international commission, pending their elimination. After Russia and Ukraine agreed on dividing the proceeds from the planned U.S. purchase of the fissile material in each warhead, the weapons would be dismantled in

Moscow.[509]

382. Ukraine's Defence Minister Morozov welcomed the American proposal. However, Russian Defence Minister Grachev made some contradictory statements on whether he would accept any mediating role for the United States in the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over nuclear weapons. In addition, he rejected Aspin's concrete proposal described above, arguing that if Ukraine stockpiled nuclear weapons on its territory it would become a de facto nuclear state.[510] However, apart from any practical virtues it possessed, the U.S. proposal was symbolically important in that it reflected a more flexible policy towards Ukraine on the part of the U.S. administration.

383. Some additional progress on the nuclear arms issue was also made during a meeting between presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk on 17 June 1993. The meeting was called primarily to deal with growing tensions in Crimea over unrest in the Black Sea Fleet. However, according to the joint communique issued at the end of the meeting, Yeltsin

> reaffirmed Russia's willingness -- prior to Ukraine's ratification of the Start I treaty and accession to the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons -- to give Ukraine security guarantees, which will take effect after the Ukrainian Parliament ratifies these documents.[511]

By indicating that Russia would provide security guarantees prior to Ukraine's ratification of the START I treaty and accession to the NPT, this statement went only slightly further than earlier statements on Russian security guarantees. However, it came at a crucial point in the debate in Ukraine on the Start I treaty, and therefore gave a helpful push to speed up its ratification by the Ukrainian parliament.

384. These positive developments have occurred at a time when pro-nuclear weapon sentiments appear to be growing in both the Ukrainian parliament and among the Ukrainian public. In addition, Ukraine is now passing through a phase of acute political and socio-economic crises which is combined with great concern over Russian claims to Crimea. Thus, in late July 1993, the nature and timing of the resolution of the Russian-

Ukrainian nuclear weapons dispute was still unclear.

385. It should be emphasized that even if Ukraine fully ratifies START I, this will still leave a number of complex issues to be resolved. For example, negotiations between Russia and Ukraine on the mechanics of the removal and destruction of the nuclear weapons located in Ukraine would inevitably be both lengthy and complicated.

X. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

386. Ukraine, like other states, can guarantee its national security against external threats in one of two fashions. First, it can rely on its armed forces and other means of coercion. Second, national security, in the traditional sense of the term, can be ensured by participating in military organizations that possess both the political will and military means to provide a reliable defence and deter potential aggressors. Ukraine will definitely maintain a substantial conventional military, and one cannot exclude the possibility that Ukraine's current or future leaders will attempt to develop a viable nuclear deterrent. However, Ukraine has also begun to devote a great deal of attention to greater involvement in regional security arrangements.

387. To date Ukraine's leadership has consistently held to the principle of non-membership in blocs, as proclaimed in the original declaration on Ukraine's sovereignty. However, in 1993 Ukraine's leaders began to move away from the idea of permanent neutrality by taking certain initiatives to help shape a new European system of collective security. In particular, Ukrainian officials took steps to encourage the formation of a Central and Eastern European Stability and Security Area (CEESSA) which would, at its widest, cover Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, the Baltic states, Moldova, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and possibly Austria. The "Baltic-Black Sea Zone" is another term which has been used to refer to this area.

388. Ukraine's steps in this direction have been motivated largely by continuing doubts about the political stability of Russia. Ukraine's leaders, with some justification, feel that few Russians fully accept the legitimacy of Ukraine as an independent state. Even Yeltsin has stated that he is in favour of confederal relations within the CIS. Kozyrev, Russia's foreign minister, also upholds the idea of a confederation, or even federation, among the CIS states, although he acknowledges that Russia has to take existing realities into account.[512] Thus Russia's leadership continues to see the CIS as a tightly integrated structure held together by various coordinating bodies, with Russia playing a special role in the Commonwealth. In addition, there is a clear perception in Kiev that the West has

failed to understand the geopolitical reality in which Ukraine is situated.[513]

389. Ukraine's interest in regional security cooperation was first reflected in the signing of a series of military cooperation agreements with neighbouring states such as Poland, Hungary, and Moldova. Then, in late February 1993, the idea of creating a "zone of stability and security" in Central/Eastern Europe was broached by Kravchuk at meetings in Budapest with senior Hungarian politicians.

390. On 28 April 1993 Ukraine made a proposal, at a CSCE meeting in Prague, that a new, loose regional security group including the Baltic States, Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, as well as the East European states and Austria, be created.[514] Shortly afterwards Ukraine participated in a meeting, held in Riga, Latvia, on 3 May 1993, which included the defence ministers of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and Moldova as well as representatives from Belarus, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The participants discussed common problems of defence and security, and the need to maintain regular contacts among these countries.[515]

391. Although initially it was proposed that this security zone would include Russia, later discussions excluded Russia from consideration. However, Ukrainian foreign ministry officials specified that there was no intention of creating a new bloc structure similar to the old Warsaw Pact, or of establishing a "cordon sanitaire" around Russia.[516] The proposal placed the issue of regional (or subregional) security within the framework of overall European security, and envisaged clear interconnections with NATO.[517] By the early summer of 1993 discussions on this topic had been held with representatives of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Moldova, and Romania. However, much of the reaction has been lukewarm or negative.

392. The Czech Republic's deputy foreign minister and defence minister rejected the Ukrainian proposal, stressing that full NATO membership was the major security goal of their country.[518] Hungary's defence minister has argued that the existing security

structures in Europe provide the most certain guarantees for his country, and other Hungarian officials have argued that any steps which might alienate Moscow, and help mobilize right-wing nationalists in Russia, should be avoided.[519] Romania's ministers of defence and foreign affairs have also indicated a preference for the existing European security system,[520] and even Moldova favours the creation of a European collective security system under CSCE auspices based on the structures of NATO.[521]

393. Poland's President Walesa had shown, as early as April 1992, some interest in the concept of a regional security zone, which he dubbed "NATO 2." However, after his visit to Ukraine in May 1993 Walesa stated that "it would not be a good thing if we were to set up new structures, proposing new solutions which would divide us."[522] In addition, Poland's foreign minister argued that Walesa's concept envisages closer ties with NATO than the Ukrainian proposal. He stressed the need for a single security system for Europe, and advocated that Poland strive for the strongest possible links with NATO and the Western European Union.[523]

394. Poland's defence minister also opposes the "NATO-2" idea and, although he feels that there is a certain logic to Ukraine's proposal, considers it to be overly vague.[524] Thus most of the potential members of the CEESSA have shown a clear preference for full integration with the West, and eventual membership in NATO. In addition to the reasons stated above, another probable reason for their reluctance to seriously consider the CEESSA is concern about Ukraine's stability, and fears that they could become involved in a Russian-Ukrainian confrontation.

395. As for NATO and its member countries, they appear to have shown little interest in the Ukrainian regional security proposal. It has been discussed with a few French officials such as Foreign Minister Juppé and Chief of Staff Admiral Lanxade.[525] However, French interest in the proposal is probably due to France's reluctance to consider an expansion in the membership of NATO.[526]

396. However, the idea of a regional security zone may become more attractive, for there are many barriers to the full elaboration of a new European collective security system. They include NATO concerns that Eastern/Central Europe is a security nightmare for which NATO should not assume any responsibility, technical issues such as the problems of standardization of weapons and force structures, and a lack of consensus among current NATO members on the need to expand this organization. In 1993 NATO officials began to show more consistent interest in the idea of integrating the states of Central and Eastern Europe into a new collective security framework. However, it may take as much as ten to fifteen years before these countries could join a NATO-managed European security framework.[527]

397. In the meantime, it is unlikely that NATO can offer any formal security guarantees to the East-Central European states or use other measures to help resolve the region's most pressing security problems. Thus Hungarian commentators, for example, have expressed doubts about NATO's effectiveness in view of its inability to deal with the Yugoslav crisis.[528] In addition, various forms of regional cooperation will become more popular if the process of integrating the East-Central European countries into the European Community is not pursued in an energetic fashion.[529] Last but not least, plans for a regional security zone may be more acceptable to Russia than an expansion of NATO. For example, on 2 July 1993 the chairman of the Russian parliament's Defence and Security Committee stated that the inclusion of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in NATO would be tantamount to creating a "cordon sanitaire" around Russia.[530]

398. In addition, even if NATO decides to move decisively in response to East/Central European desires for NATO membership, it is doubtful whether it will be able to keep pace with the very rapid pace of events in Western Europe's troublesome "back yard." Thus, depending on the nature and pace of NATO responses to developments in East/Central Europe, a security arrangement along the lines proposed by Ukraine may still find support. In particular, it would most likely find favour among those countries which are currently least eligible for NATO membership.

XI. PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

399. This study has stressed the centrality of Ukrainian-Russian relations in determining Ukraine's overall development, including the direction of military trends in this new state. In turn, the evolution of Russian-Ukrainian relations will have a very great impact on the stability of Eastern Europe. However, Ukrainian-Russian relations have developed in a rather haphazard fashion.

400. Ukraine's policy towards Russia has been, as one would expect in the circumstances, largely reactive in nature. Ukraine has neither the traditions of diplomacy, nor the diplomatic infrastructure, which would facilitate pursuing a consistent and sophisticated foreign policy. The relatively low level of socio-political cohesion in Ukrainian society, and strong regional differences in attitudes towards Russia, are also an impediment in this regard.

401. Russia finds itself in a much stronger position. However, Russia's policy towards Ukraine has been formed in a diplomatic vacuum. It has been based more on the inertia of attitudes based on old stereotypes, and a persistent "superpower" mentality, than on a clear perception of how best to foster Russia's national interests with respect to Ukraine and other countries of the "near abroad."[531]

402. There were a few hopeful signs in mid-1993 that Russian-Ukrainian relations were becoming more stable. Thus in early May 1993 Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin, on a tour of CIS countries, met with Ukrainian President Kravchuk in Kiev and stated afterwards that for Russia good relations with Ukraine were one of its greatest priorities.[532] At the meeting on 17 June 1993 which was called to discuss the fate of the Black Sea Fleet, Ukrainian President Kravchuk and Russian President Yeltsin also committed themselves to intensify work on a comprehensive political treaty between the two countries; accelerate the process of reaching an agreement on dual citizenship; cooperate in solving fuel and energy questions on mutually beneficial terms; and draft an agreement on jointly selling off shares in Ukrainian and Russian enterprises. Kravchuk

claimed that the summit meeting marked a new stage in relations between the two countries.[533] Following a meeting with Ukrainian President Kravchuk on 24 June 1993, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Shokhin stated that agreements had been reached on a number of economic issues including a free trade agreement and the extension of credits to Ukraine.[534]

403. In addition, some Russian statesmen realize that intemperate statements by Russian politicians on reviewing borders and claims to Crimea will only fuel a vicious cycle of nationalist rhetoric. Thus in the fall of 1992 Foreign Minister Kozyrev admitted that such statements provided very ready ammunition for Ukrainian nationalist politicians who wish to hold on to the nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory.[535] This was confirmed by the reaction in Ukraine to the Russian parliament's proclamation, in July 1993, that the Crimean city of Sevastopol was Russian territory.

404. This declaration may not prove to have a lasting impact on Russian-Ukrainian relations. However, it underlines the way in which the constitutional crisis in Russia, and the unpredictable behaviour of its parliament, can have a chilling impact on Russian-Ukrainian relations. In fact, these relations will assume a fully civilized form only when both countries achieve a moderate level of political and socio-economic stability.

405. Both countries face tremendous challenges in achieving this goal; they have been outlined in this study and many other studies. Given the variety of these challenges, and the difficulty of effectively dealing with them in conditions of a deteriorating economy and growing social dissatisfaction, these countries have managed to maintain a surprisingly high level of political stability since the disintegration of the USSR. Nonetheless, there are numerous threats to the current domestic status quo in Russia and Ukraine, and almost all analysts are unanimous in stressing the difficulty of making effective predictions about the direction of future developments in these two states.

406. However, it is clear that an important precondition of healthy, stable relations between Russia and Ukraine, in the military as well as other spheres, is a stabilization of the socio-economic situation in both countries and the success of their economic reform programs. A continuing deterioration in this situation would facilitate, in both countries, the rise to power of authoritarian regimes which would be likely to search for external scapegoats to detract attention from local problems.

407. However, the behaviour and future development of Ukraine and Russia will also be greatly affected by the way in which they pursue certain state-building options. Here the choices both countries have faced in defining their new identities can be portrayed in terms of two different concepts of nationhood and citizenship.

408. One concept holds that the rights of a country's inhabitants and their national identity should be based on political criteria, and especially citizenship based on residence in the country. This approach, which argues that national identity should not be based on ethnic or linguistic criteria, provides the basis for Ukraine's citizenship policy. In accordance with this policy, Russians in Ukraine who do not speak Ukrainian are still regarded as citizens with all the rights of citizenship.

409. The other concept maintains that citizenship should be based partly or largely on ethnic-linguistic criteria. Formally, citizenship in the Russian Federation is not based on such criteria. However, the approach which most Russians, including many Russian politicians, have adopted concerning Crimea and the Russian diaspora in general is largely based on this ethnic-linguistic concept of citizenship. This concept

> sees Russians living in countries other than Russia as living abroad, as foreigners in those countries, even if they enjoy the citizenship of those countries. Furthermore, it holds that when those Russians living in a foreign country form a compact group, and constitute a majority in a region or a locality, they have the right to join Russia -- together with their territory -- thereby seceding from the state that they are citizens of, but consider foreign.[536]

For Russia's neighbours, including Ukraine, the danger inherent in the popularity of this

concept in Russia is accentuated by the "legacy of empire" in this country. Namely, there is a continuing (and increasingly vociferous) debate in Russia over whether the lands inhabited by Russians (or Russian-speakers) outside the Russian Federation are part of the "real" Russia, and are fated to be "re-united" with the "homeland." Russia's President Yeltsin appears to prefer a non-imperial future for Russia, but many senior Russian politicians, including some of Yeltsin's advisors (e.g., Stankevich), see a definite continuity between Russia's hegemonic role in the USSR and Russia's new role in the CIS.

410. The stance of the military will be important in determining the state-building options taken by Russia and Ukraine, and their success. In the conditions of uncertainty which prevail in these countries those in possession of the means of coercion, and in particular the armed forces, are in a position to exert a very great influence on the domestic political process. In the case of Russia, the military's prestige was greatly damaged after some of its senior officers participated in the abortive coup of August 1991, and the leadership of the RAF has not shown any signs of wanting to seize political power. However, in 1992-93 the Russian military did not come under a clear and well-defined system of civilian authority. Instead Yeltsin took a number of steps to accommodate the interests of the military, and on occasion he and some of his major opponents even appeared to compete for its favour.

411. As a result, Russia's military leaders are showing a growing inclination to speak out on national political issues, and have also become increasingly involved in local and regional politics. This has been reflected in the Russian military leadership's stance on the issue of the protection of Russians abroad (in Moldova, the Baltic states, and Abkhazia), on the fate of Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet, and the future of the Kurile Islands. On some of these issues the Russian military's actions have pre-empted the normal pattern of foreign policy decision-making, and the military's self-perceived mission appears to be the gradual revival of Russia as a great power. This substitution of Russian nationalism for Marxism-Leninism as a legimitating ideology for the RAF has

helped to provide the Russian military with a sense of mission. However, the growing influence of radical forms of Russian nationalism in the ranks of the RAF, and the willingness of its leaders to support a Russian imperial role in the former USSR, has led to great and understandable concern among Russia's neighbours.[537]

412. Ukraine's military finds itself in a very different situation. The initial steps taken to create the Ukrainian Armed Forces were remarkably free of conflict. However, Ukraine's military leadership then faced the daunting task of trying to build a cohesive national army on the basis of an officer corps which was largely non-Ukrainian. Many (if not most) of these officers had a very limited commitment to the defence of the territory on which they happened to be located when Ukraine declared its independence. And although many of the officers who were least interested in serving in the UAF have probably left its ranks, legitimate doubts concerning the loyalty of many of those who continued to serve remain. This helps explain the strong emphasis in Ukraine on inculcating a sense of patriotism among servicemen through the work of the UAF's Social-Psychological Service. It also explains the Ukrainian military leadership's tolerance of the activities of the Union of Officers of Ukraine, which supports the idea of a strong patriotic and state-building role for the UAF.

413. In short, one can regard the formation and development of the UAF as one of the most important "case studies" of the state-building process in Ukraine. This report has described some of the problems which have accompanied this process. Most significantly, dissatisfaction in the ranks of the UAF has grown as the socio-economic status of its servicemen deteriorates. In addition, many of the flaws inherent in the rapid pace of the restructuring of the armed forces on Ukrainian territory have become increasingly apparent in the last year.

414. The final results of this relatively peaceful "experiment" in building a new military force on the basis of a large part of the old SAF will not be known for some time. However, the Ukrainian military is considerably less politicized than the Russian military.

In addition, the Union of Officers of Ukraine, the main "pressure group" representing military officers in Ukraine, appears to be indirectly controlled by officials of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence. Significantly, there are few indications that military officers in Ukraine are prepared to intervene in the political process. The main exceptions involve some officers serving in the Black Sea Fleet, and officers who have decided to engage in open protests to publicize their deteriorating living standards. As for the deputies who are serving military officers, they have not played a very active role in the Ukrainian Supreme Council, and their presence in the Ukrainian parliament is a result of the anomalies of the old Soviet electoral system. Thus the further consolidation of the UAF will depend on whether the socio-economic situation in Ukraine can be stabilized, and on whether the process of restructuring these forces can proceed in the absence of military conflicts with neighbouring states.

415. In terms of the external challenges facing Ukraine and its armed forces, military conflicts with Ukraine's western neighbours (Poland, Romania, Moldova, Slovakia, and Hungary) are unlikely. However, they cannot be excluded, and could be precipitated either by disputes over borders and the treatment of minorities, or a general political crisis in the region. Such a crisis could be caused, for example, by an expansion of the current conflict in the former Yugoslavia. However, a much more concrete security threat has emerged in the east, on the part of Russia and its potential allies among the CIS states which have signed a collective security agreement.

416. The Ukrainian leadership's concerns about this threat are very real. They were reflected in the speed with which it set up the framework for Ukraine's armed forces in the fall of 1991, and quickly subordinated the troops on its territory to Ukraine's jurisdiction. In 1992-93 Ukraine's concerns were heightened by the Russian military's involvement in combat actions in Moldova and Abkhazia, and frequent statements by Russian politicians on treating the entire geopolitical space of the USSR as a sphere of Russia's vital interests. Other worrying developments included numerous statements, by senior Russian politicians, in which they put forth claims to Crimea, and indications that

Russia could readily use economic pressure to bring a recalcitrant Ukraine "to heel."

417. All of these developments occurred at a time when Ukraine was heavily preoccupied with the difficult process of state-building which, on the surface, appeared to be quite successful. However, unlike Russia, Ukraine did not inherit a diplomatic and foreign trade infrastructure which allowed it to rapidly emerge onto the world stage. Ukraine also lacked strong diplomatic traditions because of its limited experience of modern statehood. In fact, Ukraine was more poorly prepared for independence than even the Baltic states, for independence was achieved much earlier than most Ukrainian politicians had expected, and few preparations for this event had been made.

418. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian political elite was determined to take full advantage of the "window of opportunity" which emerged after 1991 to establish and entrench Ukraine's sovereignty. However, given current trends in Russia and the historical legacy of Ukrainian-Russian relations, this determination was combined with a strong and persistent fear that Ukraine would be unable to fully break away from Moscow's "embrace" and thus ran the risk of again being relegated to the role of a parochial backwater of Europe. This fear was accentuated by a keen awareness of the country's long history of domination by foreign powers, especially Russia, and its many domestic weaknesses. The latter included not only a wide array of economic problems, but the ambiguous attitudes concerning the country's independence of some of Ukraine's citizens, especially in the country's southern and eastern regions.

419. These feelings of uncertainty and insecurity were heightened by a strong perception in Ukraine that Western leaders and public opinion had little knowledge of the country and generally considered it to be a quaint but unimportant region on the periphery of Russia. In these circumstances Ukraine's "assets" on the international stage were very limited. This helps explain its leaders' emphasis on building up a strong military by taking advantage of the large volume of Soviet military equipment located on Ukrainian territory when it declared independence. Another reason for this emphasis was a residue

of the traditional Soviet mindset, with its emphasis on the importance of possessing a powerful military, among Ukraine's leaders. Last but not least, the stress on rapidly creating a military force was also a result of the perceived need to quickly subordinate the Soviet troops on Ukrainian soil to a new authority following Ukraine's declaration of independence. Here the lessons of Ukraine's experience during the post-1917 period may have had an impact on Ukrainian decisionmakers. During this turbulent period Ukraine was the site of prolonged and devastating fratricidal conflict among a variety of contending military groups, including several regional otamany (warlords).

420. However, the Ukrainian authorities certainly underestimated the costs of maintaining a large and powerful military force, and may well have overestimated the benefits. According to one estimate, almost 20% of Ukraine's state budget is consumed by military-related expenditures (this figure does not include expenditures on conversion). If this estimate, published in an organ of the Ukrainian MOD, is correct, than Ukraine is carrying an enormous military burden at a time when its economy is faced with very major difficulties. Ukraine's leaders would probably argue that no-one can set a price on their country's national security. However, there is little evidence that these leaders have tried to conduct even a rudimentary cost-benefit analysis of military expenditures, and are ready to implement cutbacks in the military budget based on such an analysis.

421. Assessing the benefits of maintaining a large military establishment in Ukraine is, of course, a more difficult task. However, one reason why Ukraine has not hurried to eliminate all nuclear weapons on its territory is its fear that, in doing so, it would quickly lose the attention of the West. As one of the most insightful commentators on the Ukrainian political scene has noted,

> The United States and Western Europe have already more than once demonstrated an amazing ability to see in place of the USSR only one of its former republics. In Kiev, they simply fear that Ukraine will be taken into account only as long as there are nuclear weapons on the territory of the republic.[538]

This reasoning may appear simplistic. However, in spite of vigorous claims to the

contrary by various foreign officials, the nuclear weapons issue does appear to be the main reason why Ukraine received so much attention from the West in 1993.

422. If Ukraine is drawn into closer cooperation with various Western states, receives some form of credible security assurances from them, and begins to receive some of the attention and respect which Ukrainian leaders feel it deserves, this may lead to a decrease in their perceived need to maintain a strong military and, in particular, the potential for a nuclear weapons capability. There are some indications that Western states have begun to understand and react to Ukraine's desire for greater attention. Thus a number of foreign dignitaries visited Kiev in June 1993, and a NATO seminar entitled "European Security: The Central European Component" was held in Kiev in early July 1993. In addition, Ukrainian Defence Minister Morozov held a number of important meetings with senior U.S. officials during a visit to Washington in late July 1993. During the visit a defence cooperation agreement was signed which provided for exchanges between high-level military officials and the provision of U.S. military expertise to Ukraine. Following his return to Ukraine Morozov expressed great satisfaction over the results of his trip.[539]

423. However, Ukrainian officials sometimes exaggerate the extent of the Western lack of interest in Ukraine, and tend to ignore or misinterpret some of the reasons for Western concerns about developments in Ukraine. These officials often stress the political stability of Ukraine, and contrast it to the political instability of Russia. However, the relative calm in Ukraine is partly due to the maintenance of the political status quo in local politics, which means that many members of the former communist nomenklatura still wield a great deal of power in the country. In addition, the Ukrainian government has yet to prove that it can come up with an energetic and effective economic reform plan, and labour unrest and public dissatisfaction caused by deteriorating living standards are growing. The political and economic crises gripping Ukraine in the summer of 1993 have done little to inspire confidence in the future of the country, and one cannot exclude the possibility of the introduction of some form of authoritarian rule in Ukraine.

424. Ukraine has also shown an inability to clearly and effectively present a case for increased attention and foreign assistance from the West. This is partly due to a lack of foreign policy experience, and a lack of hard currency to support a strong presence abroad. However, in spite of these limitations Ukraine could do much more to gain friends and understanding in the West. In some areas progress is slowly being made, and Ukraine's foreign ministry is beginning to learn from some of its past mistakes. For example, in July 1993 Ukraine was able to mobilize considerable Western support for a condemnation of the Russian parliament's declaration that the Crimean city of Sevastopol was Russian territory.

425. Thus Ukraine's politicians should resist the temptation to continuously complain about Western attitudes towards Ukraine, and avoid abusing the argument of Russian interference in Ukraine's affairs to explain away the country's domestic difficulties. Ultimately Ukraine's future, and the way it is perceived in the West, will be determined by its leaders' ability to minimize its internal weaknesses, and ensure that it is integrated into a wide range of European and global institutions. If its efforts in this direction are met with understanding and support from the West, Ukraine will gradually solidify its status as a new and potentially valuable member of the European community.

NOTES

1. For details on the referendum, see Peter J. Potichnyj, "The Referendum and Presidential Elections in Ukraine," Canadian Slavonic Papers 33 (June 1991): 123-138.

2. On military developments in Ukraine prior to mid-November 1991, see John Jaworsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism and the Future of the Soviet Armed Forces," revised version of a paper delivered at the 3rd Bedford Colloquium on Soviet Military-Political Affairs, 15 August 1991, Bedford, Nova Scotia.

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4. Hugh Farindon, Strategic Geography: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Superpowers, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 80.

5. Stephen Foye, "The Ukrainian Armed Forces: Prospects and Problems," RFE/RL Research Report (henceforth abbreviated as RFE/RL) 1, No. 26, 26 June 1992, p. 56; Krasnaia zvezda, 7 March 1992 and 13 January 1993; and Nezavisimaia gazeta, 8 June 1993, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Central Eurasia (henceforth abbreviated as FBIS-SOV)-93-109, 9 June 1993, p. 43. Ukrainian officials do not always share this positive assessment of the quality of the equipment located in Ukraine, according to Brigitte Sauerwein, "Rich in Arms, Poor in Tradition: The Ukrainian Armed Forces," International Defense Review 26, No. 4, 1993, p. 317.

6. Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine, The (Former) Center, Russia, and 'Russia'," Studies in Comparative Communism 25 (March 1992): 32.

7. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 23 April 1992, cited by Roman Solchanyk in "Ukraine and Russia: The Politics of Independence," RFE/RL 1, No. 19, 8 May 1992, p. 13. See also Solchanyk's "Back to the USSR?" The Harriman Institute Forum 6, No. 3 (November 1992): 6-7.

8. Vera Tolz and Elizabeth Teague, "Russian Intellectuals Adjust to Loss of Empire," RFE/RL 1, No. 8, 21 February 1992, pp. 4-8.

9. New York Times, 6 September 1992.

10. All census statistics used in this study are based on Ministerstvo Statystyky Ukrainy, Natsional'nyi sklad naselennia Ukrainy, Chastyna I (Kiev: n.p., 1991).

11. Nasha Respublika, 10 December 1992.

12. Literaturna Ukraina, 19 July 1990.

13. For the text of this legislation see Holos Ukrainy, 16 July 1992.

14. For analyses of the draft constitution of Ukraine see Ukrainian Weekly, 6 September 1992, 20 September 1992, and 15 November 1992. The full text of the draft was published in Holos Ukrainy, 17 July 1992.

15. See, for example, Dziuba's presentation delivered at the international conference on "Problems of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations," held in Kiev 7-9 June 1991, in the special issue of Svit, No. 3-4, 1991, p. 1.

16. Kievskie vedomosti, 26 December 1992; and Holos Ukrainy, 24 February 1993.

17. Khreshchatyk, 24 February 1993; and Holos Ukrainy, 24 February 1993.

18. Rabochaia gazeta, 13 January 1993; and Kul'tura i zhyttia, 26 June 1993.

19. Vechirnii Kyiv, 10 February 1993.

20. See, in particular, the articles in recent issues of the following nationalist publications: Natsionalist, Neskorena natsiia, and Ukrains'ki obrii.

21. On the potential threat posed by ultra-nationalist organizations, which have begun to search for scapegoats for Ukraine's domestic problems, see the interview with Ievhen Marchuk, head of the Security Service of Ukraine, in Uriadovyi kur'ier, 25 March 1993. A survey of Ukrainian nationalist organizations is provided in the article by Kulyk in Suchasnist' No. 3, 1993, pp. 150-167.

22. The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Commonwealth of Independent States No. 4, 1992, p. 43.

23. Staff of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union (Washington: n.p., January 1993), p. 60.

24. Ibid., p. 50.

25. Roman Solchanyk, "Language Politics in the Ukraine," in Sociolinguistic Perspectives on Soviet National Languages, ed. Isabelle T. Kreindler (Berlin: Mouton, 1985), pp. 57-105.

26. The significance of this "Little Russian" inferiority complex is assessed in "Little Russianism and the Ukrainian-Russian Relationship: An Interview with Mykola Ryabchuk," in Ukraine: From Chernobyl' to Sovereignty: A Collection of Interviews, ed. Roman Solchanyk (Edmonton: Can. Inst. of Ukr. Studies Press, 1992), pp. 19-30.

27. Solchanyk, "Language Politics...," pp. 87-92.

28. Roman Solchanyk, "The Politics of Language in Ukraine," RFE/RL 2, No. 10, 5 March 1993, pp. 1-4.

29. See, for example, Kul'tura i zhyttia, 6 February 1993 and 26 June 1993.

30. Solchanyk, "The Politics of Language," p. 1.

31. Jaroslaw Martyniuk, "Attitudes toward Language in Ukraine," RFE/RL 1, No. 37, 18 September 1992, pp. 69-70.

32. Solchanyk, "The Politics of Language," p. 3.

33. Potichnyj, "The Referendum..." p. 131.

34. Jaroslaw Martyniuk, "Roundup: Attitudes toward Ukraine's Borders," RFE/RL 1, No. 35, 4 September 1992, pp. 66-67.

35. The growing activism of the Russian diaspora throughout the former USSR was reflected in the formation, in March 1993, of the Congress of Russian Communities. See Kommersant-Daily, 31 March 1993, and Rabochaia tribuna, 6 April 1993.

36. See, for example, the article on the activities of the "Rus'" Society in Zaporizhzhia in Robitnycha hazeta, 3 March 1993.

37. Alexander Benifand and Tanya Basok, "Antisemitism and the Collapse of the Former Soviet Union," Soviet Refugee Monitor 1 (February 1992): 17.

38. Ibid., p. 18. On the activities of the Pamiat' ("Memory") organization in Russia see the special (Fall 1991) issue of Nationalities Papers.

39. See the reports in Holos Ukrainy, 16 and 23 June 1993.

40. Vechirnii Kyiv, 18 February 1993.

41. Nasha Respublika, 10 December 1992.

42. Peter Brodsky, "Are Russian Jews in Danger?" Commentary, May 1993, pp. 37-38.

43. For further background information see Edward Allworth, ed., Tatars of the Crimea: Their Struggle for Survival (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988).

44. Moscow Interfax, 13 October 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-199, 14 October 1992, p. 39.

45. Holos Ukrainy, 31 July 1992.

46. Ukraina moloda, 28 May 1993. For earlier estimates of the Crimean Tatar population, see Pravda Ukrainy, 21 November 1992; and Demokratychna Ukraina, 5 May 1993.

47. Kyivs'kyi visnyk, 18 December 1992. For a useful collection of documents and newspaper articles concerning the Crimean Tatars and their grievances see "Pro Kryms'kotatars'ku Problemu," Pres-Biuleten' Narodnoi Rady No. 18, May 1992.

48. Ian Bremmer, "Ethnic Issues in Crimea," RFE/RL 2, No. 18, 30 April 1993, p. 25-26.

49. Ibid., p. 25.

50. Post-Postup, 24-30 November 1992. However, one Crimean Tatar representative has complained that only a small number of conscript-age youths have been granted such deferrals. See Pravda Ukrainy, 5 February 1993.

51. Information based on interviews conducted in Kiev in December 1992.

52. See the interview with Demirel in Novoe vremia No. 13, March 1993, p. 24.

53. See, for example, the discussion in Nezavisimaia gazeta, translated in Vechirnii Kyiv, 2 June 1993.

54. Oleksandr Hrushevs'kyi and Tetiana Kutkovets', Ukraintsi v Rosii (Moscow: Fond "Obshchestvennoe mnenie," 1992), pp. 8-9.

55. On recent initiatives to aid the Ukrainian minority in Tadzhikistan, see Vechernii Kiev, 29 January 1993.

56. On the difficult situation of Ukrainians in the far south-eastern regions of the Russian Federation see, for example, Za vil'nu Ukrainu, 25 July 1992. See also the regular reports on the "Eastern diaspora" in the newspaper Visti z Ukrainy.

57. Hrushevs'kyi and Kutkovets', Ukraintsi v Rosii, pp. 8, 17-19.

58. Ibid., pp. 25-26; and Svit pro Ukrainu, 7 April 1993.

59. Khreshchatyk, 16 June 1993.

60. Visti z Ukrainy, 16-22 July 1992.

61. Izvestiia, 27 April 1993.

62. Ukrainian Weekly, 9 August 1992.

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64. Roman Solchanyk, "The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Simferopol," RFE/RL 1, No.33, 21 August 1992, pp. 13-14.

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66. Roman Solchanyk, "The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Moscow," RFE/RL 1, No. 40, 9 October, 1992, pp. 9 - 10.

67. Rabochaia gazeta, 15 December 1992; and Pravda Ukrainy, 11 December 1992.

68. RFE/RL Daily Report, 19 February 1993, p. 5.

69. RFE/RL Daily Report, 23 February 1993.

70. Bremmer, "Ethnic Issues in Crimea," pp. 26-27. On the First Congress of Ukrainians of Sevastopol, see Holos Ukrainy, 1 June 1993.

71. Izvestiia, 8 April 1993.

72. For a brief history of southern Ukraine see V. Serhiichuk, "Etnichni mezhi i kordony Ukrainy: pivden'," Nauka i suspil'stvo, No. 3-4 (March-April 1993): 10-17.

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80. RFE/RL Daily Report, 11 June 1993. See also the reports on the strike in FBIS-SOV-93-110, 10 June 1993, pp. 44-46, and FBIS-SOV-93-111, 11 June 1993, pp. 54-56.

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92. For a list of such publications see Peter Brodsky, "Are Russian Jews in Danger?" Commentary, May 1993, p. 38.

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100. On the difficulties involved in creating a coalition of liberal and centrist political forces in Russia see Carla Thorson, "A Loss of Direction for Russia's Movement for Democratic Reforms," RFE/RL 2, No. 10, 5 March 1993, pp. 11-14.

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316. Ibid.; and Moshes, "Tri armii...," p.19.

317. Ibid.

318. Kievskie vedomosti, 17 June 1993.

319. Ibid.

320. See the report carried on Radio Ukraine, 8 June 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-109, 9 June 1993, p. 63.

321. Oleksandr Honcharenko, Oleh Bodruk, Eduard Lysytsin, and Nina Maslova-Lysychkina, "Kontseptsiia natsional'noi bezpeky Ukrainy: problemy i perspektyvy rozbudovy," Viis'ko Ukrainy No. 5 (March 1993): 9.

322. The full text of this law is found in Narodna armiia, 12 May 1992.

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324. Vechirnii Kyiv, 19 December, 1992.

325. Kievskie vedomosti, 25 May 1993; and Nasha respublika, 30 April 1993.

326. For recent data on draft evasion see Kievskie vedomosti, 11 May and 22 June 1993. See also Narodna armiia, 29 and 31 October 1993.

327. Narodna armiia, 1 October 1992.

328. Foye, "The Ukrainian Armed Forces...," p. 58. See also Molod' Ukrainy, 1 June 1993.

329. Khreshchatyk, 26 November 1992.

330. Literaturna Ukraina, 1 July 1993; Kievskie vedomosti, 24 April 1993; and Pravda Ukrainy, 13 May 1993.

331. Kyivs'kyi visnyk, 21 January 1993.

332. Foye, "Civilian-Military Tension in Ukraine," p. 62.

333. Molod' Ukrainy, 21 August 1992.

334. Molod' Ukrainy, 6 August 1992. See also Foye, "Civilian-Military Tension," p. 63.

335. Kiev Television, 25 January 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-015, 26 January 1993, p. 55.

336. On the appointments, see the Ukrinform report, 5 June 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-110, 8 June 1992, pp. 44-45. For an official response to criticism of "Ukrainization" of the UAF see Narodna armiia, 2 June 1992.

337. Narodna armiia, 2 June 1992; and Holos Ukrainy, 1 December 1992.

338. Kyivs'kyi visnyk, 21 January 1993.

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340. Holos Ukrainy, 29 June 1993; and Pravda Ukrainy, 22 May 1993.

341. Kievskie vedomosti, 25 May 1993.

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346. Ukrainian Radio-1, 22 May 1993, in Ukraine Today, No. 193, 24 May 1993; and Kievskie vedomosti, 4 May 1993.

347. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 12 February 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-029, 16 February 1993, p. 47. See also Sauerwein, "Rich in Arms...," p. 318.

348. Kievskie vedomost, 29 December 1992.

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351. Kievskie vedomosti, 25 May 1993.

352. Kievskie vedomosti, 12 June 1993.

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355. Literaturna Ukraina, 23 July 1992.

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413. Cited in Kuzio, "Ukrainian Paramilitaries," p. 540.

414. Visti z Ukrainy, 29 April - 5 May 1993.

415. Radio Ukraine, 2 August 1993; and the report carried by UNIAN, 24 July 1993, translated in FBIS-SOV-93-142, 27 July 1993, p. 50.

416. Kievskie vedomosti, 17 June 1993.

417. Kievskie vedomosti, 15 May 1993.

418. See Myroslav Marynovych's report on developments in Halychyna (western Ukraine), dated 14 July 1993, sent to the author by the Ukrainian-American Human Rights Bureau in Kiev, pp. 1-2.

419. Ibid., p. 2.

420. Members of the journal's editorial board are listed across from the journal's title page. The journal (6 issues had appeared by the end of May 1993) regularly acknowledges donations from supporters abroad.

421. Foye, "Civilian-Military Tension," p. 61.

422. Kievskie vedomosti, 20 January 1993.

423. See the interview with Selivanov in Narodna armiia, 4 December 1992.

424. Ibid.

425. Holos Ukrainy, 26 and 27 August 1992.

426. See the interview with Lemish in Narodna hazeta, No. 16, April 1993.

427. Svoboda, 24 April 1993; and Demokratychna Ukraina, 30 April 1993.

428. Moshes, "Tri armii...," p. 19.

429. Samostiina Ukraina, 26 May 1993.

430. Demokratychna Ukraina, 30 April 1993; and Respublika, 24-30 April 1993.

431. Text of the decree on the formation of the NISS, provided to the author by the director of the NISS.

432. See the commentary by Vydrin in Respublika, 24-30 April 1993.

433. See the report carried by Itar-Tass, translated in FBIS-SOV-92-148, 31 July 1992, p. 42; and Narodna armiia, 13 November 1992.

434. See the commentaries in Nezavisimost', 3 February 1993; Ukraina moloda, 28 May 1993; Pravda Ukrainy, 26 November 1992; and Molod' Ukrainy, 7 May 1993.

435. Kievskie vedomosti, 5 June 1993; and Pravda Ukrainy, 6 May 1993.

436. Demokratychna Ukraina, 30 April 1993.

437. Robitnycha hazeta, 13 April 1993.

438. Holos Ukrainy, 8 July 1993.

439. For example, during the author's visit to Kiev in December 1991 much of the organizational work connected with the establishment of a body to replace the Main Political Administration of the old SAF was conducted from the private apartment of its eventual head, Volodymyr Muliava.

440. Moshes, "Tri armii...," p. 19.

441. Kievskie vedomosti, 17 June 1993; and Vechirnii Kyiv, 7 April 1993.

442. See the interview with a member of the Ukrainian parliament's Standing Committee on Defence and National Security in Narodna hazeta, No. 16, April 1993.

443. Kievskie vedomosti, 23 March 1993.

444. See the interview with Valerii Izmalkov, an officer and parliamentary deputy who was one of the initiators of the statement calling for Morozov's resignation, in Kievskie vedomosti, 20 January 1993. Members of the UOU have frequently spoken out in defence of Morozov. See, for example, Molod' Ukrainy, 19 November 1992.

445. Vechirnii Kyiv, 6 February 1993.

446. Pravda Ukrainy, 12 May 1993.

447. See Kievskie vedomosti, 24 November 1992; and Vechirnii Kyiv, 6 February 1993. On plans to broaden the use of the Ukrainian language in the UAF see Vechirnii Kyiv, 9 and 20 April 1993.

448. Vechirnii Kyiv, 22 November 1992 and 30 January 1993; Narodna armiia, 3 December 1992; and Molod' Ukrainy, 19 November 1992.

449. These and other aspects of Ukraine's military traditions, going back to the Cossack period, have been given a great deal of publicity in military publications such as Viis'ko Ukrainy and Narodna armiia, as well as in a wide range of general periodicals.

450. Pravda Ukrainy, 12 May 1993; and Vechirnii Kyiv, 30 January and 29 May 1993.

451. Vechirnii Kyiv, 8 April 1993. For a criticism of attacks on Muliava's Service, see Vechirnii Kyiv, 19 December 1992.

452. Vechirnii Kyiv, 29 May 1993.

453. These observations are based on the author's conversations, with journalists who cover military affairs, in Kiev, May 1993.

454. Pravda, 25 September 1992.

455. Stephen Foye, "The Defense Ministry and the New Military 'Opposition'," RFE/RL 2, No. 20, 14 May 1993, p. 70.

456. Kyivs'ka pravda, 18 August 1992.

457. Ibid.

458. See Foye, "Civilian-Military Tension," p. 66.

459. Jaworsky, "Ukrainian Nationalism...," pp. 19-20.

460. Stephen Foye, "CIS: Kiev and Moscow Clash over Armed Forces," RFE/RL 1, No. 3, 17 January 1992, p. 2.

461. Stephen Foye, "The Soviet Legacy," RFE/RL 2, No. 25, 18 June 1993, pp. 3-4.

462. See the examples presented in Narodna armiia, 22 September 1992.

463. See the article by N.A. Narochnitskaia in Morskoi sbornik, No. 10, 1992, translated in JPRS-UMA-93-006, 24 February 1993, pp. 27-28.

464. See, for example, the interview with the new UOU chairman in Kievskie vedomosti, 15 May 1993.

465. On the Officers' Union and recent developments in the RAF see Foye, "The Defense Ministry...," pp. 70-72.

466. See, for example, Shaposhnikov's plans to continue working towards greater military integration in the CIS in Izvestiia, 17 June 1993.

467. See, for example, RFE/RL Daily Report, 5 July 1993.

468. See in particular the special issue, on "Negotiating Nuclear Disarmament," of RFE/RL Research Report 2, No. 8, 19 February 1993; the debate (the case for and against a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent) on the pages of Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 50-80; and Taras Kuzio, "Nuclear Weapons and Military Policy in Independent Ukraine," The Harriman Institute Forum Vol. 6 No. 9 (May 1993).

469. John W. R. Lepingwell, "The Black Sea Fleet Agreement: Progress or Empty Promises?" RFE/RL 2, No. 28, 9 July 1993, p. 49.

470. See, for example, Douglas L. Clarke, "Rusting Fleet Renews Debate on Navy's Mission," RFE/RL 2, No. 25, 18 June 1993, p. 29; and The Globe and Mail, 9 July 1993.

471. Douglas L. Clarke, "The Saga of the Black Sea Fleet," RFE/RL 1, No. 4, 24 January 1992, p. 45; and Lepingwell, "The Black Sea Fleet Agreement...," p. 49.

472. Clarke, "Rusting Fleet...," p. 30.

473. See the interview with Yeltsin in Argumenty i fakty No. 16, April 1993.

474. Nezavisimaia gazeta, 5 May 1993, translated in FBIS-USR-93-068, 1 June 1993, pp. 107-108; and Krasnaia zvezda, 24 December 1992.

475. For historical background on the Ukrainian presence on the Black Sea see the collection of documents in Viis'ko Ukrainy, No. 5 (March 1993): 66-86; and Ukrains'kyi ohliadach, February 1992.

476. Holos Ukrainy, 18 July 1992.

477. Douglas L. Clarke, "The Battle for the Black Sea Fleet," RFE/RL 1, No. 5, 31 January 1992, pp. 53-55; and Stephen Foye, "Kiev and Moscow Clash over Armed Forces," RFE/RL 1, No. 3, 17 January 1992.

478. Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia: The Politics of Independence," RFE/RL 1, No. 19, 8 May 1992, pp. 15-16; and "The Crimean Imbroglio: Kiev and Moscow," RFE/RL 1, No. 40, 9 October 1992, pp. 7-8.

479. Roman Solchanyk, "Ukraine and Russia: The Politics of Independence," p. 15.

480. Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian-Russian Summit at Dagomys," RFE/RL 1, No. 30, 24 July 1992, p. 38.

481. Holos Ukrainy, 1 August 1992.

482. Itar-Tass, 23 July 1992, in Ukraine Today, No. 234, 23 July 1992, p. 13.

483. Respublika No. 3, 4-10 July 1992.

484. This event was heavily covered in both the Ukrainian and Russian press. See, for example, Holos Ukrainy, 24 and 25 July 1992, and Izvestiia, 23 July 1992. See also Lepingwell, "The Black Sea Fleet...," p. 50.

536. Roman Szporluk, "The National Question," in Timothy Colton and Robert Legvold, eds., After the Soviet Union: From Empire to Nation (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), p. 100.

537. For some recent commentaries on trends in the Russian military see John Erickson, "Fallen from Grace: The New Russian Military," World Policy Journal 10 (Summer 1993): 19-24; and George Breslauer et al., "One Year After the Collapse of the USSR: A Panel of Specialists," Post-Soviet Affairs 8, No. 4 (1992): pp. 316 and 318-322.

538. Article by Vitalii Portnikov in Nezavisimaia gazeta, 11 January 1993, translated in FBIS-USR-93-010, 29 January 1993, p. 56.

539. Itar-Tass, 27 July 1993, in FBIS-SOV-93-142, 27 July 1993, p. 48; RFE/RL Daily Report, 29 July 1993; and Radio Ukraine, 2 August 1993. On the change of tone in the U.S. administration's treatment of Ukraine see Svit pro Ukrainu, 16 and 30 June 1993.

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THIS PROJECT REPORT SURVEYS THE ISSUES WHICH ARE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN HELPING POLICY PLANNERS AND ANALYSTS UNDERSTAND CURRENT AND FUTURE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN UKRAINE AND THE REGION. IN ADDITION TO COVERING MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS, THE REPORT PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF THE GEOPOLITICAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CONTEXT OF RECENT EVENTS IN UKRAINE IN ORDER TO PROVIDE INSIGHTS INTO THE COUNTRY'S PERCEPTIONS OF ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ITS CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES. THE REPORT COVERS DEVELOPMENTS UP TO AND INCLUDING THE END OF JULY 1993.

CE RAPPORT DE PROJET OFFRE UN SURVOL D'ENSEMBLE DE L'UKRAINE ET DES FACTEURS AFFECTANT SIGNIFICATIVEMENT SON DEVELOPPEMENT. IL DEVRAIT CONTRIBUER A LA COMPREHENSION DES DEVELOPPEMENTS ACTUELS ET FUTURS EN UKRAINE ET DANS SON VOISINAGE. LES ELEMENTS COUVERTS NE SONT PAS SEULEMENT D'ORDRE MILITAIRE, MAIS AUSSI D'ORDRE GEOPOLITIQUE, ECONOMIQUE, SOCIAL ET POLITIQUE. UN TEL SURVOL PERMET AINSI DE MIEUX COMPRENDRE LA PERCEPTION QU'A L'UKRAINE DE SES INTERETS NATIONAUX ET DE MESURER LA CAPACITE DE L'UKRAINE A REALISER SES OBJECTIFS POLITIQUES NATIONAUX/ LA PERIODE COUVERTE VA JUSQU'A LA FIN JUILLET 1993.

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