



National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

Special Report on the Federal Policing Mandate of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police



Submitted to the Prime Minister on August 14, 2023 pursuant to subsection 21(1) of the
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act
(Revised version pursuant to subsection 21(5) of the NSICOP Act)

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(Revised version pursuant to subsection 21(5) of the NSICOP Act)

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Special Report on the Federal Policing Mandate of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

**The National Security and Intelligence
Committee of Parliamentarians**

**The Honourable David McGuinty, P.C., M.P.
Chair**

**Submitted to the Prime Minister on August 14, 2023
Revised version tabled in Parliament in November 2023**

Revisions

Consistent with subsection 21(2) of the *National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act* (NSICOP Act), the Committee may submit a special report to the Prime Minister and the ministers concerned on any matter related to its mandate. Consistent with subsection 21(5) of the NSICOP Act, the Prime Minister may, after consulting the Chair of the Committee, direct the Committee to submit to him or her a revised version of the report that does not contain information the Prime Minister believes the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or is information that is protected by solicitor-client privilege.

This document is a revised version of the Special Report provided to the Prime Minister on 14 August, 2023. At the time, the document was classified as ‘Secret/Canadian Eyes Only.’ Revisions were made to remove information the disclosure of which the Prime Minister believes would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or which constitutes solicitor-client privilege. Where information could simply be removed without affecting the readability of the document, the Committee noted the removal with three asterisks (***) in the text of this document. Where information could not simply be removed without affecting the readability of the document, the Committee revised the document to summarize the information that was removed. Those sections are marked with three asterisks at the beginning and the end of the summary, and the summary is enclosed by square brackets (see example below).

EXAMPLE: [*** Revised sections are marked with three asterisks at the beginning and the end of the sentence, and the summary is enclosed by square brackets. ***]

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Executive Summary

Five years ago, the Committee decided to study the activities of core security and intelligence organizations that had not been previously subject to dedicated and independent review. While the RCMP has been subject to dedicated and independent review, no external organization had conducted an external review specifically of its Federal Policing mandate. As such, the Committee elected to review the Federal Policing mandate of the RCMP, consistent with subsection 8 (b) of the NSICOP Act. It seeks to explain and examine the Federal Policing mandate's programs, activities, structures, capabilities, authorities and accountabilities.

As one of the core organizations in Canada's national security and intelligence community, the RCMP, through its Federal Policing mandate, is Canada's lead law enforcement organization for investigations relating to national security, transnational and serious organized crime, financial crime and cyber crime. Federal Policing investigates the most serious criminal threats to Canadians and Canadian interests. The complexity of these crimes is increasing due to the digitization of society and transnational nature of crime.

The role of Federal Policing is essential to Canada's national security. It is the only organization capable of conducting investigations of the most significant criminal threats across jurisdictions, both within Canada and abroad (in cooperation with foreign police forces). It is also charged by the federal government with protecting key federal and designated officials, and supporting international operations, such as peacekeeping.

In this review, the Committee found that Federal Policing faces a number of challenges. The Federal Policing mandate is affected by the RCMP's long focus on Contract Policing, which has shaped the RCMP's organizational structure, governance, finances, and human resource and training models. Against this background, Federal Policing has struggled with challenges internal to its program. These include weak governance and prioritization of federal activities and investigations; poor data and data management; an intelligence function misaligned with federal requirements; and recruitment and training models ill-suited to its mandate.

The RCMP clearly recognizes the problems facing its Federal Policing mandate. If fully implemented, its many initiatives in the areas of governance, data, prioritization, intelligence, recruitment and training should improve Federal Policing's ability to fulfill its mandate. However, the Committee believes that more leadership and direction from the federal government is needed, particularly in creating a statutory definition of police independence and in setting out standards and expectations regarding recruitment and training, data and reporting. This will help to ensure that Federal Policing is able to address the highest priority threats to Canadian national security and public safety.

The government has a responsibility to ensure that the various components of its security and intelligence community function effectively. On the basis of its review, the Committee believes that Federal Policing is not and cannot function as effectively as it must to protect Canada and Canadians from the most significant national security and criminal threats. The government must act to ensure it does.

Introduction

1. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is Canada's national police force. It works from coast-to-coast-to-coast at the community, provincial, territorial, and federal levels to prevent crime, enforce the law, investigate offences, keep Canadians and their interests safe, and assist Canadians in emergency situations. RCMP employees work in over 700 detachments and 150 communities and provide policing services in more than 600 Indigenous communities across Canada. Internationally, the RCMP provides specialized training for police officers, conducts international policing activities, including peacekeeping, and shares intelligence and cooperates with partners to support investigations and disrupt and dismantle criminal operations.¹

2. The RCMP conducts this work through three broad mandates. The first and largest mandate is Contract and Indigenous Policing, under which it provides policing services to all provinces and territories, except Ontario and Quebec, and to Indigenous communities, through contracts negotiated between the federal government and the provinces and territories. The RCMP's second mandate is Specialized Policing Services, which provides critical frontline operational support services to the RCMP as a whole and to its partners across law enforcement and criminal justice communities.²

3. The RCMP's third mandate is Federal Policing, the most relevant to national security and intelligence and the subject of this review. Federal Policing is Canada's lead law enforcement organization for investigations relating to national security, transnational and serious organized crime, financial crime and cybercrime. It provides protective services (e.g., to the Prime Minister and other designated officials), conducts international policing activities, and ensures border security. It also manages its own specialized policing and operational services (e.g., an undercover program) in support of investigations. These responsibilities require close contact with a host of law enforcement and intelligence partners, both in Canada and abroad. Federal Policing's mandate and responsibilities, national and international presence, and operational partnerships place it at the centre of the Canadian national security and intelligence community.³ It is the only organization capable of conducting investigations of the most significant criminal threats across jurisdictions, both within Canada and abroad (in cooperation with foreign police forces).

4. This essential role is little known in Canada. Many Canadians associate the RCMP with its red serge or the iconic musical ride and, if they live in rural and semi-urban areas outside of central Canada, as the provincial, territorial or local police force. In Ontario and Quebec, where a significant number of Federal Policing employees work, the RCMP is essentially invisible. Unfortunately, Canadians also know the RCMP through a number of recent class action lawsuits, crises and critical incidents, and recognize that the RCMP faces significant challenges across its organization. These challenges have been detailed over the last decade in a number

¹ Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), "[About the RCMP](#)," Webpage, 2021.

² RCMP, "[Specialized Policing Services](#)," Webpage, 2014.

³ National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP), [Annual Report 2018](#), April 9, 2019.

of important reports, notably on issues of culture, sexual harassment and systemic racism within the RCMP as a whole. These reports included:

- The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence: *Conduct Becoming: Why the Royal Canadian Mounted Police must Transform its Culture* (2013);⁴
- Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, *Report into Workplace Harassment in the RCMP* (2017);⁵
- Sheila Fraser, *Review of four cases of civil litigation against the RCMP on Workplace Harassment* (2017);⁶
- The Honourable Michel Bastarache, *Broken Dreams, Broken Lives: The Devastating Effects of Sexual Harassment On Women in the RCMP* (2020);⁷
- The House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security: *Systemic Racism in Policing in Canada* (2021);⁸ and,
- Mass Casualty Commission report on the April 2020 mass casualty in Nova Scotia (2023).⁹

5. As a key part of the RCMP, Federal Policing shares these challenges. However, Federal Policing also faces specific and distinct problems that, left unaddressed, will undermine its ability to fulfill its essential mandate. Yet, no recent study has focused exclusively on the RCMP Federal Policing mandate. Rather, the mandate has been mentioned in relation to other areas of the RCMP or has been included alongside broader discussions of RCMP governance and management. The reviews of most relevance to Federal Policing were:

- Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 1: Royal Canadian Mounted Police – Contract Policing (2005):¹⁰ While the focus of this audit was Contract Policing, it found that the RCMP fulfilled its contract obligations to the detriment of its Federal Policing activities. It recommended that the RCMP separate the funding, measurement and reporting of contracting services to avoid adverse impacts on other activities.
- Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar (2006):¹¹ This report presented the analysis and recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry into the role of Canadian officials in the U.S. rendition and torture of Canadian Maher Arar. Notably, the report recommended that the RCMP implement additional national security-specific training and periodically review its national security training curricula. It also recommended that the RCMP continue to develop its capacity for intelligence-led policing; establish internal controls for

⁴ Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, [Conduct Becoming: Why the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Must Transform its Culture](#), 2013.

⁵ Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, [Report into Workplace Harassment in the RCMP](#), 2017.

⁶ Sheila Fraser, [Review of Four Cases of Civil Litigation Against the RCMP on Workplace Harassment: Report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness](#), 2017.

⁷ Michel Bastarache, [Broken Dreams Broken Lives: The Devastating Effects of Sexual Harassment on Women in the RCMP](#), 2020.

⁸ House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, [Systemic Racism in Policing in Canada](#), 2021.

⁹ The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, "Turning the Tide Together: Final Report of the Mass Casualty Commission," March 2023. <https://masscasualtycommission.ca/final-report/>.

¹⁰ Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG), [Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons Chapter 1: Royal Canadian Mounted Police – Contract Policing](#), 2005.

¹¹ Commissioner of Inquiry, [Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar](#), 2006.

all national security investigations; maintain centralized oversight of national security investigations; and continue to receive ministerial directives to provide policy guidance of national security investigations.

- Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP: Rebuilding the Trust (2007):¹² Known as the Brown Report, this Task Force reported on restoring public trust in the RCMP following an investigation into the RCMP's management of pension and insurance plans. Notably, the report observed the complexity of the RCMP as an organization and raised the possibility of breaking it up to resolve its structural and governance problems.
- Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy (2010):¹³ This report presented the assessment and recommendations of the commission of inquiry into the investigation of the bombing of Air India Flight 182. The report focused on the security and intelligence system as a whole, but of relevance to RCMP Federal Policing, it recommended the creation of two new positions that would affect the conduct of terrorism investigations: the Director of Terrorism Prosecutions, who would ensure consistency of legal advice to CSIS and the RCMP; and the National Security Witness Protection Coordinator, who would be responsible for witness protection issues in terrorism investigations. The report also focused on the relevant themes of combatting the financing of terrorism, improving information sharing and interdepartmental cooperation, aviation security and improving the relationship between intelligence and evidence in criminal proceedings.
- Office of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 5: National Police Services – Royal Canadian Mounted Police (2011):¹⁴ This audit found that in Fiscal Year 2010-2011, the RCMP internally reallocated funding to National Police Services to make up for shortfalls in these services. This reallocation decreased funding for other programs, notably Federal Policing.

¹² Task Force on Governance and Cultural Change in the RCMP, [Rebuilding the Trust](#), 2007.

¹³ Commissioner of Inquiry, [Air India Flight 182: A Canadian Tragedy](#), 2010.

¹⁴ OAG, [Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons Chapter 5: National Police Services, Royal Canadian Mounted Police](#), 2011.

NSICOP's Review

6. This review complements the previous studies and inquiries by focusing specifically on the RCMP's Federal Policing mandate. The Committee identified three objectives for this review:

- examine the Federal Policing mandate's programs, activities, structures, authorities and accountabilities, including to distinguish them from the RCMP's wider mandate;
- examine the capabilities and results of the mandate's programs and activities, including through data analysis and case studies of how the RCMP prioritizes and conducts federal criminal investigations in areas of national security, complex crimes, and major organized crime; and
- examine the role played by key domestic and international partnerships.

7. The Committee excluded two areas from the scope of its review. The first is the RCMP's administration of the Witness Protection Program. This is an area in which the Committee is not entitled to have information and which, in any event, is not within the scope of this review.¹⁵

8. The Committee also excluded information and detailed activities pertaining to Contract Policing. The RCMP's Contract Policing responsibilities fall outside of the Committee's own mandate for national security and intelligence. That said, the Committee did not ignore Contract Policing, but focused its analysis on the implications of Contract Policing on the Federal Policing mandate.

9. The Committee initiated this review in January 2021 by sending notification letters to the Minister of Public Safety and the Commissioner of the RCMP. In April 2021, NSICOP provided the RCMP with the terms of reference for the review. Between April 2021 and January 2023, the RCMP provided the Committee with documentation (approximately 25,000 pages), covering all aspects of the Federal Policing mandate.¹⁶ NSICOP also met with RCMP officials ten times in the course of the review and met with the Minister of Public Safety in June 2023.

10. The Committee sought input from the public in January 2022, and solicited papers from Canadian and international experts on various aspects of Federal Policing's mandate and on international comparators. In addition, NSICOP's Secretariat had ongoing communication with the RCMP throughout the review process, including several working level briefings. The RCMP was supportive and accommodating throughout the course of this review.

¹⁵ Pursuant to subsections 14 (b) of the NSICOP Act, the Committee is not entitled to have access to information related to information the disclosure of which is described in subsection 11 (1) of the *Witness Protection Program Act*.

¹⁶ The Committee notes that this review was interrupted by the call of the 2021 Federal Election on August 15, 2021, which caused the dissolution of the Committee. A new Committee was appointed on January 22, 2022.

11. This review is divided into seven chapters. In chapter one, the Committee describes the threat environment in which Federal Policing operates. In chapter two, the Committee provides background information on the RCMP and its various mandates, and the authority structure for Federal Policing. In the following chapter, the Committee illustrates trends related to Federal Policing investigations. Chapter four discusses Federal Policing's key partnerships. In chapter five, the Committee turns to accountability and governance. In chapter six, the Committee examines five cross-cutting thematic issues that emerged over the course of the review: finance and human resources; recruitment and training; data; prioritization; and intelligence. The Committee provides its assessment in chapter seven, followed by its conclusion, findings, and recommendations. Throughout the review, the Committee has included case studies to illustrate the types of investigations carried out by Federal Policing.

Chapter 1: Threats and their Implications for Federal Policing

12. The operational environment in which the RCMP conducts its federal policing activities is complex. In particular, two powerful and interrelated trends, globalization and informatization,¹⁷ significantly affect how crime is conducted and investigated. They also shape the major criminal threats facing Canada and its allies. This chapter briefly surveys these issues, discusses major criminal threats, and highlights the implications for the Federal Policing program.

The globalization of crime

13. Many serious criminal threats are global. The same trends that have facilitated faster flows of people, money, information and goods – free trade, deregulation, the exponential growth in transport modalities and exchange – have been a boon to organized crime groups.¹⁸ The vast shipping and parcel delivery industries are used to traffic large volumes of illicit goods across borders.¹⁹ A global “parallel underground financial system” enables a wide range of criminal activities from the illicit drug trade to tax evasion and money laundering.²⁰ The illicit drug trade is Canada’s largest criminal market, and many of these drugs come from outside the country.²¹ One academic study estimated that in 2014, about 8% of the global economy, about \$7.6 trillion USD, was hidden in tax havens around the world.²² The Canada Revenue Agency estimated that in 2014, tax havens deprived the Canadian federal government of as much as \$3 billion in tax revenue.²³ Professional money launderers in Canada launder the proceeds of crimes committed in other countries,²⁴ and they use foreign banks and companies to launder the proceeds of crimes committed in Canada.²⁵ Many other serious criminal threats also have an international dimension: violent extremists are inspired by transnational ideological movements

¹⁷ Informatization is the increased use of information (digital, social) within a society and economy.

¹⁸ Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC), [2022 Public Report on Organized Crime in Canada](#), October 2022; Yvon Durrand and Curt T. Griffiths, “Reflections on the Federal Policing Mandate of the RCMP and the Role of Law Enforcement in National Security and Intelligence,” April 2022, paper prepared for NSICOP; Europol, [Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment \(SOCTA\) 2021](#), December 2021; and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, [The Globalization of Crime: Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment](#), 2010.

¹⁹ CISC, [“2018-19 National Criminal Intelligence Estimate on the Canadian Criminal Marketplace – Illicit Drugs”](#), April 2019.

²⁰ Europol, [Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment \(SOCTA\) 2021](#), December 2021.

²¹ CISC, [2022 Public Report on Organized Crime in Canada](#), October 2022; United States Department of State, [2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control](#), March 2022.

²² A 2015 study estimated that in 2014, about \$7.6 trillion USD was held in tax havens, which accounted for 8% of global gross domestic product (GDP) and deprived governments around the world of an estimated \$190 billion USD in tax revenue. Gabriel Zucman, [La richesse cachée des nations : Enquête sur les paradis fiscaux](#), nouvelle édition augmentée (Les leçons de panama papers), Le Seuil, 2017. Gabriel Zucman, [The Hidden Wealth of Nations: The Scourge of Tax Havens](#), University of Chicago Press, 2015, translated from French by Teresa Lavender Fagan. NSICOP uses Canadian dollars (CAD) except where noted otherwise.

²³ “For the 2014 tax year, the estimated range of [the] federal tax gap related [to] hidden offshore investment was between \$0.8 billion to \$3.0 billion.” Canada Revenue Agency, [“International Tax Gap and Compliance Results for the Federal Personal Income Tax System,”](#) 2018. This was the last year for which we have data, but nothing suggests that things have improved since the referenced report was drafted.

²⁴ “Money laundering is the process used to disguise the source of money or assets derived from criminal activity.” United States Department of State, [2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – Volume II: Money Laundering](#), March 2022; and Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), [Annual Report 2021-22](#), December 2022.

²⁵ Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia (the Cullen Commission), [“Executive Summary,”](#) June 2022.

or attacks in other countries; cybercriminals abroad target Canadian victims, and cybercriminals in Canada target victims elsewhere.

14. Ungoverned spaces and weak state capacity in many parts of the world allow organized crime and terrorist groups to operate with near-impunity. This leads to common-place violence in those countries, and the further decline or replacement of state institutions.²⁶ This has implications for Canada. Humanitarian crises and conflict around the world increase human trafficking and smuggling.²⁷ Instability in certain countries have made it more dangerous for Canadians who travel or work abroad, and Canadians have recently been taken hostage for profit by terrorist groups,²⁸ or have been killed in terrorist incidents abroad.²⁹ Instability in Afghanistan, especially after the withdrawal of the U.S. military in August 2021, has increased the global supply of opium and heroin,³⁰ and may have given international terrorists a safe haven from which to train or plot attacks.³¹ Weak state capacity in South and Central America enabled the record-breaking high levels of cocaine and other drugs produced there in recent years,³² which provide criminals with the opportunity to import higher amounts of drugs to Canada and has led in some instances to illegal migration caused by drug-related violence.

Crime and informatization

15. Digital technologies and the internet have transformed criminality. Criminals are often early adopters of new technology, as they seek the highest financial reward for the smallest risk of prosecution.³³ The proliferation of devices, applications (apps), and data have changed how criminals plan and commit crimes. Developments in smart phone technologies and social media enable criminals to communicate through multiple and varied means while challenging the police to keep up with each new technological innovation. Criminals can easily store information outside Canada in the cloud (networks of computer servers located all over the world), but many cloud or communication service providers in other countries cannot or refuse to disclose certain electronic data directly to Canadian police, or may not be able to do so in ways that support investigations.³⁴ Criminals also use encryption to protect their communications and hinder

²⁶ Public Safety Canada, [2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada](#), 3rd revision, April 2019; and United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, [2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community](#), February 2022.

²⁷ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, [“Humanitarian crises and global conflicts are increasing human trafficking” says leading UN Forum](#),” press release, December 2, 2022.

²⁸ For first-hand accounts, see Robert Fowler, *A Season in Hell: My 130 Days in the Sahara with Al Qaeda*, Harper Perennial, 2012; Amanda Lindout and Sara Corbett, *A House in the Sky: A Memoir*, Scribner, 2013; and Edith Blais, *The Weight of Sand: My 450 Days Held Hostage in the Sahara*, 2021.

²⁹ Between 2013 and 2019, 25 Canadians were killed in terrorism incidents outside Canada. Global News, [“Canadians Killed in Terrorism Incidents Outside Canada. Incidents by location, 2013-2019](#),” June 18, 2019.

³⁰ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, [“Afghanistan opium cultivation in 2022 up by 32 per cent: UNODC survey](#),” press release, November 1, 2022.

³¹ United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, [2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community](#), February 2022.

³² United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, [World Drug Report 2022: Executive summary / Policy implications](#), June 2022.

³³ RCMP, [Cybercrime: An overview of incidents and issues in Canada](#), December 2014; Nate Anderson, *The Internet Police: How crime went online, and the cops followed*, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2014.

³⁴ Europol, [SIRIUS EU Digital Evidence Situation Report 3rd Annual Report 2021](#), December 2021; United States Department of Justice, [Promoting Public Safety, Privacy, and the Rule of Law Around the World: The Purpose and](#)

detection and investigation.³⁵ Many commonly used messaging apps are encrypted by default, and several organized crime groups have used cell phones that are designed to only communicate with other phones on an encrypted and closed network.³⁶ (In August 2022, the Committee launched a framework review of the lawful interception of communications by security and intelligence organizations.)³⁷

16. The internet plays a significant role in crime today. The internet allows criminals to plan, commit, and hide their crimes more easily, and to efficiently buy and sell illicit goods and services on online marketplaces. Many online marketplaces operate on the dark web and accept cryptocurrencies as payment, both factors that complicate investigations. The vast amounts of personal and financial information stored online by companies and businesses are lucrative targets for criminals to steal and sell or to extort victims. During the pandemic, millions of people worked from home and quickly became the targets of cybercrime.³⁸ Criminals also took advantage of the pandemic to spread misinformation about the novel coronavirus and sell fake goods on-line.³⁹

17. The internet is also used to spread misinformation, and plan attacks or unlawful demonstrations. For violent extremists, the internet is a venue for recruitment, facilitation and guidance about methods, tactics and weapons, and a means to meet, spread or amplify misinformation and propagate hate.⁴⁰ In recent years, conspiracy theories propagated online have spurred several Canadians to violent or threatening acts, including an individual who intended to arrest the Prime Minister in part because of a conspiracy theory about the origin of COVID-19.⁴¹ The internet is also used by states for a wide range of malicious activities, some of which are crimes. These states use the internet to spread misinformation, stifle criticism of their regimes, influence Canadian voters and elections, create or amplify discord among Canadians, influence government decision-making, attempt to divide western alliances, and conduct cyber attacks against government systems and, increasingly, private sector and academic intellectual

[Impact of the CLOUD Act](#), white paper, April 2019; and The President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, [Liberty and Security in a Changing World](#), December 2013.

³⁵ United States National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, [Decrypting the Encryption Debate: A Framework for Decision Makers](#), National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2018.

³⁶ United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), ["International Criminal Communication Service Dismantled: Phantom Secure Helped Drug Traffickers, Organized Crime Worldwide,"](#) March 2018. Phantom Secure was based in Canada and the RCMP was involved in the investigation.

³⁷ NSICOP, ["National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians launches review of the Lawful Interception of Communications for Security and Intelligence Activities,"](#) August 18, 2022.

³⁸ CSE, [National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024](#), October 2022; and RCMP, [Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre Annual Report 2021](#), November 2022.

³⁹ Europol, ["Pandemic profiteering: how criminals exploit the COVID-19 crisis,"](#) March 2020; Europol, ["Catching the virus: cybercrime, disinformation and the COVID-19 pandemic,"](#) April 2020; and Catharine Tunney, ["Canada's cyber spies taking down sites as battle against COVID-19 fraud begins: RCMP says fraudsters posed as PHAC and tried to scam credit card details by telling people they had COVID-19,"](#) CBC News, March 23, 2020.

⁴⁰ Public Safety Canada, [2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada](#), 3rd revision, April 2019.

⁴¹ Marc-André Argentino and Amarnath Amarasingam, "They Got It All under Control: QAnon, Conspiracy Theories, and the New Threats to Canadian National Security," Chapter 1 in Leah West, Thomas Juneau, and Amarnath Amarasingam (editors), [Stress Tested: The COVID-19 Pandemic and Canadian National Security](#), Calgary University Press, November 2021.

property.⁴² Industrial control systems, the computer systems that control our electricity grid and various manufacturing processes, are often connected to the internet, which has made them vulnerable to cybercrime and other threats.⁴³

Key threats

18. The key threats investigated by Federal Policing are violent extremism, transnational and serious organized crime, financial crime, foreign interference, espionage, and cybercrime. These threats are not mutually exclusive. For example, violent extremists may buy weapons from organized crime groups, spying may involve remotely gaining unauthorized access to a computer, and some terrorist groups traffic illicit drugs and launder the proceeds.⁴⁴ Police are engaged when a threat activity is believed to constitute a criminal offence, regardless of the identity of the threat actor or their motivation. For example, unauthorized access to a computer system in Canada is contrary to the *Criminal Code* regardless of whether it is done for financial or geopolitical gain, and regardless of whether it was done by a foreign intelligence service abroad or an organized crime group in Canada.⁴⁵ The following surveys the criminal threat environment.

Violent extremism

19. Violent extremism and terrorism remain a threat to national security and public safety. Canada's National Terrorism Threat Level has been 'medium' since early October 2014, which means that a violent act of terrorism could occur.⁴⁶ Between 2001 and June 2021, 62 individuals were charged with terrorism offences under the *Criminal Code*.⁴⁷ While sophisticated attacks have occurred in the past and cannot be discounted, violent extremists and terrorists have most recently acted alone and used more unsophisticated tactics, such as vehicle ramming or knife assaults, to attack people in unsecured public spaces.⁴⁸

20. Federal Policing focuses on the criminal activities of groups or individuals involved in planning or undertaking terrorist activity. The perpetrators are overwhelmingly young men, with 95% of Canadians recruited online to extremist groups being male with an average age of 27. The criminal activity can include threats, attempted attacks, or conspiracies to commit violent

⁴² CSIS, [Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada's Democratic Process](#), July 2021; CSE, [National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024](#), October 2022; and United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, [2022 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community](#), February 2022.

⁴³ CSE, [National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024](#), October 2022; and IBM, [X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2022](#), February 2022.

⁴⁴ Europol, [European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report \(TE-SAT\) 2022](#), July 2022.

⁴⁵ *Criminal Code*, ss. 341.1(1); Craig Forcese and Leah West, *National Security Law*, 2nd edition, Irwin Law, 2021.

⁴⁶ Government of Canada, "[Canada's National Terrorism Threat Levels](#)," webpage, 2018.

⁴⁷ Michael Nesbitt and Harman Nijjar, "[Counting Terrorism Charges and Prosecutions in Canada Part 1: What does the data say?](#), [Table of Canadian Terrorism Cases to Date](#)," A Blog Called Intrepid, June 17, 2021.

⁴⁸ NSICOP, [Annual Report 2020](#), April 12, 2021; and Public Safety Canada, [2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada](#), 3rd revision, April 2019.

acts against people, property, or essential services, where the activity is wholly or partially motivated by an ideological, political or religious cause.⁴⁹

21. Ideologically motivated violent extremists and religiously motivated violent extremists are key extremist threats. Ideologically motivated violent extremism (IMVE) has a long history in Canada.⁵⁰ Individuals motivated by this ideology are driven by a range of influences, such as xenophobia, anti-government views and misogyny.⁵¹ The rise of this violent extremism has been linked in Canada to racism, Islamophobia and antisemitism, and is reflected in the record-breaking number of hate crimes over the past five years.⁵² Ideologically motivated violent extremism itself has increased in recent years.⁵³ Between 2014 and 2021, CSIS reported that individuals motivated at least in part by IMVE “killed 26 people and wounded 40 others on Canadian soil – more than any other form of violent extremism.”⁵⁴ For example, in January 2017 six people were killed when a gunman opened fire inside a mosque in Quebec City. In June 2021 an individual used a pick-up truck to murder four members of a Canadian Muslim family in London, Ontario, and seriously injure the fifth, which made many other Muslims fear for their safety.⁵⁵

22. Religiously motivated violent extremists remain a national security threat. This includes individuals inspired by or aligned with ISIS, al-Qaida or Hizballah, and Canadian-listed terrorist entities. Religiously motivated individuals in Canada finance terrorist groups,⁵⁶ such as the individual arrested in Toronto in December 2022 for allegedly fundraising for Daesh.⁵⁷ In the Sahel and other regions of Africa, groups aligned with Daesh and al-Qaida continue to pose a threat to Canadian individuals and businesses, and to Canadian Armed Forces personnel serving as part of Operation IMPACT.⁵⁸ The Committee recently examined terrorist kidnapping, specifically in the Sahel, as part of its review on the national security and intelligence activities of Global Affairs Canada.⁵⁹

⁴⁹ RCMP, Federal Policing Strategic Plan 2020-2023, 2020.

⁵⁰ Barbara Perry and Ryan Scrivens, *Right-Wing Extremism in Canada*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2019.

⁵¹ CSIS, [CSIS Public Report 2021](#), March 2022.

⁵² Barbara Perry and Ryan Scrivens, *Right-Wing Extremism in Canada*, Palgrave MacMillan, 2019; and Statistics Canada, [“Police-reported hate crime, by type of motivation, Canada,”](#) Table 35-10-0066-01, August 2022.

⁵³ CSIS, [CSIS Public Report 2021](#), March 2022.

⁵⁴ CSIS, [CSIS Public Report 2021](#), March 2022. The other forms of violent extremism are religiously motivated violent extremism (RMVE) and politically motivated violent extremism (PMVE). Since 2019, CSIS has used the term “IMVE” instead of “right-wing extremism.” CSIS, [“Terminology – Words Matter,”](#) April 2020.

⁵⁵ Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, [“Statement from Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Bill Blair on the murder of four Muslim family members in London, Ontario,”](#) June 2021.

⁵⁶ NSICOP, [Annual Report 2020](#), April 12, 2021.

⁵⁷ CBC News, [“Toronto man charged in probe into alleged ISIS fundraising campaigns disguised as humanitarian aid: Accused, 34, was arrested Wednesday under Extradition Act, police tell CBC Toronto,”](#) December 16, 2022.

⁵⁸ NSICOP, [Annual Report 2020](#), April 12, 2021; Public Safety Canada, [2018 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada](#), 3rd revision, April 2019.

⁵⁹ NSICOP, [Special Report on the National Security and Intelligence Activities of Global Affairs Canada](#), 2022.

Transnational and Serious Organized Crime

23. Transnational and serious organized crime remains a pervasive threat to national security, public safety and the integrity of our financial system and economy. Organized crime networks are ruthless in their pursuit of criminal profit by any means necessary, and are responsible for more deaths in Canada than any other security threat.⁶⁰ Organized crime networks engage in a range of interrelated crimes that have significant costs for society, including the trafficking of illicit drugs, weapons, goods and people, and financial crimes such as fraud, illegal gaming and market manipulation.⁶¹ As Europol explains, “document fraud, money laundering and the online trade in illicit goods and services are the engines of organised crime. These cross-cutting criminal threats enable and facilitate most, if not all, other types of serious and organised crime.”⁶² The illicit drug trade remains their most lucrative activity.⁶³ Illicit drugs endanger the health and safety of substance users, and can be lethal. For example, a record-breaking 7,993 Canadians died from the illicit use of opioids in 2021,⁶⁴ supplied in large part by organized crime groups.

24. The threat from organized crime has recently increased in at least two ways. Losses from fraud reported to the RCMP-led Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre in 2021 were the highest ever and represented an increase of 130% since the previous year.⁶⁵ Between 2014 and 2021, homicides linked to organized crime increased by about 124% from 82 to 184, and 2021 had the highest number and highest rate of gang-related homicides since data collection began in 2005.⁶⁶

25. The Committee includes serious and transnational organized crime in its definition of national security. However, most organized crime networks in Canada do not pose a national security threat.⁶⁷ According to the RCMP-led Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC), in 2022 there were over three thousand organized crime groups in Canada, of which 647 warranted an assessment by CISC. Of these 647, the CISC considered 14 to be high-level threats. These 14 groups commit a range of serious crimes, use violence as an integral part of their strategy, maintain associations with other organized crime groups, infiltrate police and security agencies, and work across provincial or national borders. They use sophisticated

⁶⁰ Between 2014 and 2021, there were 26 homicides in Canada linked to ideologically motivated violent extremism. During the same eight-year period, there were 1,134 homicides in Canada with a known or suspected link to organized crime. See CSIS, *CSIS Public Report 2021*, March 2022; and Statistics Canada, “[Number, percentage and rate of gang-related homicide victims](#),” Table 35-10-0075-01, August 2022.

⁶¹ CISC, *2022 Public Report on Organized Crime in Canada*, October 2022; and NSICOP, *Annual Report 2018*, April 9, 2019.

⁶² Europol, *Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (SOCTA) 2021*, December 2021.

⁶³ RCMP, *Federal Policing Annual Report 2021*, November 2022.

⁶⁴ This is the highest since the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) began publishing data in 2016. PHAC, *Apparent Opioid and Stimulant Toxicity Deaths: Surveillance of Opioid- and Stimulant-Related Harms in Canada, January 2016 to June 2022*, December 2022.

⁶⁵ This data underestimates the losses, because it does not include frauds that were reported directly to Canadian police agencies. RCMP, *Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre Annual Report 2021*, November 2022.

⁶⁶ Statistics Canada, *Number, percentage and rate of gang-related homicide victims*, August 2022; and Statistics Canada, *Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2021*, August 2022.

⁶⁷ NSICOP, *Annual Report 2020*, April 12, 2021.

money laundering techniques and legal businesses to facilitate their crimes.⁶⁸ Their associations with each other make them more complex, and thereby harder to investigate, than if their criminal operations were done by a single group from beginning to end.⁶⁹ As the Committee noted in its 2020 annual report, CISC’s “definition of high-level threat groups is consistent with the Committee’s definition of national security threat, which are threats to the security of Canada as defined in the CSIS Act or criminality of national scope or gravity.”⁷⁰

Financial crime

26. Financial crime is a significant and persistent threat to the legitimate economy. Financial crimes undermine the legal economy, rely on corrupt professionals and public officials, and help maintain the global criminal economy. According to a 2022 Europol report, “vast international networks for illicit finance ... rely on offshore tax havens, complex webs of legal business structures and corruption to facilitate a variety of criminal activities including tax evasion, fraud, and money laundering.”⁷¹ Money laundering is a significant financial crime in and of itself, and it is integral to numerous other serious crimes. Between 2001 and 2022, the top three predicate offences related to financial intelligence disclosures made by FINTRAC to law enforcement were illicit drugs (33%), fraud (23%), and human smuggling or trafficking (15%).⁷² A 2022 report by CISC noted that approximately half of the organized crime groups in Canada that launder money do so across borders, including by exploiting weaknesses in various countries’ regulatory regimes.⁷³ The same report also noted that many organized crime groups use sophisticated money laundering techniques including informal value transfer systems, trade-based money laundering, money services business, large-scale real estate investments, or cash-based businesses, including casinos.⁷⁴

27. Two recent public inquiries have shed light on the scale of money laundering in Canada. In 2019, the Expert Panel on Money Laundering in British Columbia Real Estate conservatively estimated the amount of money laundered in Canada from 2011 to 2015, and found that it consistently amounted to approximately 2.1% of gross domestic product (GDP),⁷⁵ or about \$43.5 billion in 2022.⁷⁶ In 2022, the Cullen Commission of Inquiry into Money Laundering in British Columbia reported that professional money launderers “are laundering staggering amounts of illicit funds” in Canada, and that “a single money services business was involved in

⁶⁸ CISC, [2022 Public Report on Organized Crime in Canada](#), October 2022.

⁶⁹ Europol, [Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment \(SOCTA\)](#), December 2021.

⁷⁰ NSICOP, [Annual Report 2020](#), April 12, 2021.

⁷¹ Europol, [Shadow Money: The International Networks of Illicit Finance](#), March 2022.

⁷² This includes the small proportion of financial disclosures not related to money laundering. FINTRAC, [Annual Report 2021-22](#), December 2022.

⁷³ CISC, [2022 Public Report on Organized Crime in Canada](#), October 2022.

⁷⁴ CISC, [2022 Public Report on Organized Crime in Canada](#), October 2022.

⁷⁵ Expert Panel on Money Laundering in British Columbia (BC) Real Estate, [Combating Money Laundering in BC Real Estate](#), March 2019.

⁷⁶ This assumes that the amount of money laundered in Canada as a percentage of GDP was the same in 2022 as it was from 2011 to 2015, which may not be the case. Given this, the figure presented here for 2022 should be considered an order of magnitude estimate. In September 2022, Canada’s GDP was \$2,071,640 million CAD: Statistics Canada, [“Gross domestic product \(GDP\) at basic prices, by industry, monthly \(x 1,000,000\)”](#), Table 36-10-0434-01, December 2022.

laundering upwards of \$220 million per year.”⁷⁷ Between 2001 and 2022, over 84.5% of the disclosures of financial intelligence to FINTRAC were related to money laundering.⁷⁸ The U.S. State Department lists Canada on its short-list of “major money laundering countries,” noting in 2022 that “transnational organized crime groups and professional money launderers are key threat actors” and that “foreign-generated proceeds of crime are laundered in Canada.”⁷⁹

Foreign interference

28. The threat to Canada from foreign interference has increased. Foreign interference erodes trust in our elections and public institutions, and ultimately in our sovereignty. The Committee defined foreign interference as activities involving a foreign state or its proxies using clandestine or deceptive means to influence or manipulate Canadian ethnocultural communities, political parties or government officials.⁸⁰ One expert notes that foreign interference activities are “the output of large bureaucracies,” almost always “contain an element of disinformation,” and are “directed toward an end, usually to weaken the targeted adversary.”⁸¹ As the Committee noted in its 2019 annual report, the Privy Council Office (PCO) and CSIS assess that Canada is a target of foreign interference due to its global standing, robust and diverse economy, large ethnocultural communities, membership in multilateral organizations such as the G7 and NATO, and its close relationship with the United States.⁸² China and Russia are the primary threat actors conducting foreign interference against Canada through traditional (person to person) and cyber means.⁸³ Foreign interference often involves both traditional and cyber activities.

29. In its 2019 review of the federal government’s response to foreign interference, the Committee noted that traditional foreign interference predominantly threatens Canada’s democracy and public institutions.⁸⁴ States target the Canadian public and voters, elected and public officials, interest groups and community organizations, and the media. They do so by persuasion, disinformation, harassment, political donations, corruption and coercion.⁸⁵ Concern over foreign interference continues to increase. In its 2022-23 departmental plan, the RCMP identified its two key national security priorities as terrorism and foreign interference,⁸⁶ and began investigating reports of Chinese ‘police stations’ in 2022.⁸⁷ The Minister of Public Safety

⁷⁷ The Cullen Commission, “[Executive Summary](#),” June 2022.

⁷⁸ FINTRAC, [Annual Report 2021-22](#), December 2022.

⁷⁹ United States Department of State, [2022 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report – Volume II: Money Laundering](#), March 2022. Note: This list also includes the United States and the United Kingdom along with several European states such as Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium.

⁸⁰ NSICOP, [Annual Report 2018](#), April 9, 2019.

⁸¹ Thomas Rid, *Active Measures: The Secret History of Disinformation and Political Warfare*, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2020.

⁸² NSICOP, [Annual Report 2019](#), March 12, 2020. See also CSIS, “[Espionage and Foreign Interference](#),” webpage, 2020, accessed January 2023; and CSIS, [Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process](#), July 2021.

⁸³ CSE, [Cyber Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process: July 2021 Update](#), July 2021; CSIS, [CSIS Public Report 2021](#), March 2022; and NSICOP, [Annual Report 2019](#), March 12, 2020.

⁸⁴ NSICOP, [Annual Report 2019](#), March 12, 2020.

⁸⁵ NSICOP, [Annual Report 2018](#), April 9, 2019. See also CSIS, [CSIS Public Report 2021](#), March 2022; Idil Mussa, “[RCMP investigating Chinese ‘police’ stations in Canada](#),” October 26, 2022; and NSICOP, [Annual Report 2019](#), March 12, 2020.

⁸⁶ The RCMP’s other national security priority for is terrorism. RCMP, “[Departmental Plan 2022-2023](#),” March 2022.

⁸⁷ Idil Mussa, “[RCMP investigating Chinese ‘police’ stations in Canada](#),” October 26, 2022.

also recently noted plans to introduce legislative measures to address the threat.⁸⁸ On March 8, 2023, the Committee launched a review of Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes.

Espionage

30. Espionage is a persistent threat to national security and the economy. State espionage involves foreign intelligence agencies stealing Canadian government or military secrets. Economic espionage involves foreign intelligence agencies or foreign companies stealing intellectual property and trade secrets from Canadian organizations. All espionage involves clandestine and illegal activities.⁸⁹

31. Hostile state actors steal information from Canadian governments and the military using a range of tactics from human source operations to cyber tools. In 2013, a Canadian Navy officer was investigated by the RCMP and convicted of providing information to Russia. According to a 2022 report by the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), the “state-sponsored cyber programs of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea continue to pose the greatest strategic cyber threat to Canada.”⁹⁰

32. While it is not new, economic espionage has received more attention in recent years. Economic espionage threatens Canada’s competitiveness and undermines our economic prosperity. Economic espionage activities are carried out by state or non-state actors. Economic espionage has targeted organizations big and small in almost all sectors of the economy, including biopharma and artificial intelligence.⁹¹ Foreign states or companies steal sensitive trade secrets, data, and technology from companies or researchers, thereby benefiting themselves at Canada’s expense. As a think tank affiliated with the Brookings Institution noted, companies “are no longer simply competing with corporate rivals. They are competing with the nation-states supporting their corporate rivals – nation-states with enormous resources and capabilities and with very little restraint on what they will do to succeed.”⁹²

Cybercrime

33. Cybercrime is a significant threat to the security and economic well-being of Canadians and businesses. The RCMP defines cybercrime as any crime where the internet or information technologies have a substantial role in the offence either as a target or as an instrument.⁹³ Federal Policing prioritizes cyber-enabled criminal activity by organized crime groups of

⁸⁸ Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), “[Canada’s National Security: A Discussion with The Honourable Marco Mendicino](#),” video, June 27, 2022; Global News, “[The West Block – Episode 14, Season 12](#),” December 18, 2022.

⁸⁹ Craig Forcese and Leah West, *National Security Law*, 2nd edition, 2021, Irwin Law; [Security of Information Act](#).

⁹⁰ CSE, [National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024](#), October 2022.

⁹¹ CSIS, “[Remarks by Director David Vigneault to the Centre for International Governance Innovation](#),” February 9, 2021; CSIS, [CSIS Public Report 2021](#), March 2022.

⁹² Bill Priestap and Holden Triplett, “[The Espionage Threat to U.S. Businesses](#),” Lawfare, October 1, 2020.

⁹³ RCMP, [Royal Canadian Mounted Police Cybercrime Strategy](#), December 2015.

networks that are beyond the scope and capability of the local police or police of jurisdiction. In cyber-enabled foreign interference, Federal Policing prioritizes cyber-enabled criminal activity directed by or in support of a foreign state that targets Canadians, Canadian interests, or Canadian critical infrastructure.⁹⁴

34. Cybercriminals victimize individuals and organizations through, for example, identity theft, fraudulent websites or emails (phishing), and scams on social media.⁹⁵ Ransomware is a persistent and disruptive cybercrime threat to businesses, governments, and universities, in part because it hinders an organization's ability to function and carries significant costs.⁹⁶ For example, in 2021 criminals used ransomware to disrupt and extort four health authorities in Newfoundland and Labrador.⁹⁷ Cybercriminals also target organizations of all types to steal intellectual property, trade secrets, and the personal information of customers or employees.⁹⁸

35. Cybercrime has increased in recent years. Between 2017 and 2021, the number of cybercrimes reported to police increased by 152%, from 27,829 to 70,288.⁹⁹ The Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre reported that "2021 saw \$379 million in total reported fraud losses, which is 130% more than observed in 2020" and the highest amount ever reported to the Centre.¹⁰⁰ According to a survey by Statistics Canada, in 2021, Canadian businesses spent \$10 billion on cyber security, and just under one-fifth (18%) of businesses were impacted by a cyber security incident.¹⁰¹ These trends are likely to continue. By 2024, the collective global cost of data breaches could reach \$5 trillion.¹⁰²

36. The cybercrime-as-a-service model, which allows novice cybercriminals to rent easy-to-use cybercrime tools, lowered the barrier for entry to criminals who want to launch malware or denial of service attacks.¹⁰³ The interconnectedness of computer systems among companies over the internet has also led cybercriminals to target the weakest link to gain access to the networks of multiple companies.¹⁰⁴ Criminals use their access to steal intellectual property,

⁹⁴ RCMP, Federal Policing Strategic Plan 2020-2023.

⁹⁵ RCMP, [Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre Annual Report 2021](#), November 2022.

⁹⁶ CSE, [National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024](#), October 2022; IBM, [X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2022](#), February 2022; Ontario Provincial Police, RCMP, U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, "[Project CODA press conference](#)," December 2021; and Statistics Canada, "[Impact of cybercrime on Canadian businesses, 2021](#)," October 2022.

⁹⁷ CBC, "[N.L. officials cagey on source of health-care system disruption](#)," November 2, 2021.

⁹⁸ Europol, [Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment \(IOCTA\) 2021](#), December 2021; and Statistics Canada, "[Impact of cybercrime on Canadian businesses, 2021](#)," October 2022.

⁹⁹ Statistics Canada, "[Police-reported cybercrime, number of incidents and rate per 100,000 population, Canada, provinces, territories, Census Metropolitan Areas and Canadian Forces Military Police](#)," August 2022, Table 35-10-0002-01, accessed December 2022. Statistics Canada defines cybercrime more broadly than the present report. For example, Statistics Canada includes offences related to online child sexual exploitation material.

¹⁰⁰ This data underestimates the losses, because it does not include frauds that were reported directly to Canadian police agencies. RCMP, [Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre Annual Report 2021](#), November 2022.

¹⁰¹ Statistics Canada, "[Impact of cybercrime on Canadian businesses, 2021](#)," October 2022.

¹⁰² RCMP, 2020 Environmental Scan, July 28, 2021.

¹⁰³ Europol, [Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment \(IOCTA\) 2017](#), September 2017.

¹⁰⁴ Europol, [Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment \(IOCTA\) 2021](#), December 2021.

deploy ransomware, or add infected computers to botnets (groups of infected computers) to commit additional cybercrimes.¹⁰⁵

Implications for Federal Policing

37. The complexity of the threat environment imposes significant operational and organizational challenges for Federal Policing. The multi-jurisdictional nature of many crimes requires Federal Policing to collaborate with provincial and local police forces, federal security agencies, its international counterparts, and multinational police organizations such as Europol. Partnerships help to find linkages between crimes, avoid duplication, share the investigative workload, and efficiently use the expertise unique to each partner.

38. The role of digital technologies and the internet in modern crime requires Federal Policing to have a range of technical expertise to analyze large amounts of data from numerous sources. Essentially all major criminal investigations require numerous specialists, such as forensic accountants or data scientists, to collect, assess, analyze, store, and disclose large amounts of information, efficiently and to an evidentiary standard. This is especially true for highly technical crimes, such as money laundering or cybercrime. Modern information technology systems are then required to collect, store, share and analyze information; facilitate the identification of trends and linkages across multiple information technology systems; and facilitate information sharing among Canadian police agencies and federal departments.

39. The complexity of criminal threats also requires specialized expertise to conduct investigations. Detecting and investigating the international flow of illicit funds requires investigators to understand the complexities of international trade agreements and financial regulations in multiple countries, how money launderers commingle illicit and legitimate funds, and financial intelligence disclosures from FINTRAC, which can contain thousands of financial transaction reports.¹⁰⁶ Preventing and investigating IMVE threat actors requires investigators to possess in-depth knowledge of the indicators and complexities of radicalization,¹⁰⁷ and to understand implicated groups and communities. New trends in criminality requires personnel with the expertise and sophistication to join international partners in the employment of novel law enforcement methods.¹⁰⁸ These various requirements create important challenges for Federal Policing in areas as varied as recruitment, training and talent management. The Committee discusses these implications for Federal Policing's ability to fulfill its mandate in its assessment in Chapter 7.

¹⁰⁵ CSE, [National Cyber Threat Assessment 2023-2024](#), October 2022.

¹⁰⁶ FINTRAC, [2021-22 Annual Report](#), December 2022.

¹⁰⁷ Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police and the RCMP, "[Terrorism and violent extremism awareness guide](#)," June 2016.

¹⁰⁸ For example, Europol, [800 criminals arrested in biggest ever law enforcement operation against encrypted communication](#), June 2021.

Chapter 2: Background

Description of the RCMP

40. The RCMP is Canada's national police service. It was established as the North West Mounted Police in 1873 before being amalgamated with the Dominion Police in February 1920. The RCMP continued to grow and evolve. In the 1970s, the activities of the RCMP's Security Service branch were investigated by the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, commonly referred to as the McDonald Commission. The McDonald Commission recommended that the RCMP's domestic intelligence activities be separated into a civilian organization, which led to the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in 1984.¹⁰⁹

41. Today, the RCMP is a large and complex police force with a national footprint. It has a budget of \$6 billion for the 2022-23 Fiscal Year and is comprised of approximately 30,000 employees, including 18,600 uniformed officers and 10,400 civilian staff members and public servants.¹¹⁰ RCMP employees are primarily organized into 15 Divisions, with one Division for each province or territory, a National Division in Ottawa, and a training Division in Regina. The RCMP's National Headquarters are also located in Ottawa. Within the Divisions, the RCMP is spread out over 700 detachments in 150 communities and over 600 Indigenous communities.¹¹¹

42. The RCMP is structured to support three core mandates:

- Contract and Indigenous Policing: Under this mandate, the RCMP provides police services to provinces, territories and municipalities, as well as to Indigenous communities. Contract Policing has a planned operational budget of \$2.7 billion and staff of approximately 18,500 individuals.¹¹²
- Federal Policing: Under this mandate, the RCMP addresses the most serious and complex criminal threats to Canadians and Canadian interests. Federal Policing has a planned operational budget of \$860 million and a staff of approximately 5,000 individuals.¹¹³
- Specialized Policing Services: Under this mandate, the RCMP provides specialized and technical services to Federal Policing investigative units, RCMP contract jurisdictions, and other Canadian law enforcement agencies. For budgeting purposes, it includes National Police Services and has a gross planned budget of \$630 million and a staff of approximately 4,000 individuals.¹¹⁴

¹⁰⁹ Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the RCMP, *Freedom and Security Under the Law Vol 2*, 1981.

¹¹⁰ RCMP, "[Departmental Plan 2022-2023](#)," 2022.

¹¹¹ RCMP, "[About the RCMP](#)," Webpage, 2021.

¹¹² RCMP, Federal Policing, Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, NSICOP Appearance, December 2, 2022.

¹¹³ RCMP, Federal Policing, Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, NSICOP Appearance, December 2, 2022. These figures exclude employee benefit plans.

¹¹⁴ RCMP, Federal Policing, Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, NSICOP Appearance, December 2, 2022.


The RCMP has a number of internal corporate services to support the mandates listed above, including finance, human resources, policy and planning. These services have a gross planned budget of \$650 million and a staff of approximately 4,000 individuals. (Further financial information on the RCMP and Federal Policing is provided in Chapter 6).

43. The RCMP has a complex system of governance. RCMP National Headquarters is responsible for the overall direction and priorities of the organization as a whole. This allows the RCMP to govern its individual mandates and Divisions, establishing a defined vision for the organization's future, including matters of policy, governance and administration. The RCMP's organizational and governance structure is illustrated below in chart 1.

44. The RCMP's Strategic Priorities were most recently laid out in the RCMP's 2018 plan, *Vision 150 and Beyond: RCMP Strategic Plan*.¹¹⁵ Vision 150 established four pillars for the modernization of the RCMP, including Culture, People, Stewardship and Policing Services. Each of these pillars contains three to four priorities to be achieved between January 2023 and September 2025. For example, under the Culture priority, the RCMP intends to address workplace violence and harassment, while under Policing Services the RCMP intends to modernize its technology for front line officers and support functions and improve information sharing with key partners. Few of these priorities relate to Federal Policing operations.

¹¹⁵ RCMP, [Vision 150 and Beyond: RCMP Strategic Plan](#), 2021.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police



Effective November 22, 2019 (Administrative Reporting)

COs of C, O and National Divisions will report to the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing

COs of B, D, F, L, H, and J Divisions will report to the Deputy Commissioner Contract and Indigenous Policing

CO of M Division will report to the Commanding Officer of E Division

COs of G and V Divisions will report to the Commanding Officer of K Division

The COs of E Division and K Division will continue to report directly to the Commissioner

**Federal Policing and Specialized Policing Services are the focus of this review*

Source: RCMP, Federal Policing, "NSICOP Briefing: Introduction to the RCMP," Deck, May 6, 2022.

Chart 1: RCMP Organizational Chart

Contract and Indigenous Policing

45. Contract and Indigenous Policing is the RCMP's largest mandate. Through Contract Policing, RCMP officers are responsible for front line ('general duty') policing. This means that RCMP offices act as local law enforcement, conducting activities ranging from patrolling and traffic enforcement to investigating homicides. The RCMP provides policing services under contract to all provinces and territories of Canada, except Ontario and Quebec. These agreements cover 75% of the geography of Canada, including much of rural Canada, all of the Canadian North, most indigenous communities and many towns and urban areas in contract provinces.

Specialized Policing Services

46. Specialized Policing Services provides a range of services that supports policing across Canada. Specialized Police Services supports RCMP operations and investigations, including those conducted by Federal Policing, in areas of information technology (e.g., RCMP radios, police technologies and information systems), forensic analysis (e.g., gunshot analysis), and Technical Operations, such as:

- covert surveillance technologies and techniques (for example, intercepting the communications of criminal suspects under judicial warrant);
- physical surveillance of criminal suspects; covert and overt entry services (for example to search a premises); and,
- advanced digital forensics (for example, to obtain data from seized devices).

Specialized Policing Services also provides National Police Services to police and justice organizations across Canada. For example, the RCMP runs the Canadian Police Information Centre, CPIC, a national databased used by police and criminal justice organizations. The RCMP also operates Canada's criminal records database, which houses digital fingerprints taken from crime scenes and criminal records of anyone charged or convicted of a crime in Canada. In addition, the RCMP provides advanced policing training to Canadian police (including the RCMP) at the Canadian Police College. With the exception of some cost recovery models for forensic DNA analysis conducted for provincial and territorial investigations and training provided at the Canadian Police College, Specialized Policing Services is almost entirely funded through federal appropriations.¹¹⁶

Federal Policing

47. Federal Policing is the focus of this review. The RCMP's Federal Policing responsibilities were established in 1920 with the amalgamation of the Royal North-West Mounted Police and the Dominion Police. Today, its responsibilities encompass the most serious and complex criminal threats to the safety and security of Canadians and Canadian interests, including democratic institutions, economic integrity, and physical and cyber infrastructure.¹¹⁷ Through Federal Policing, the RCMP prevents, detects, and investigates national security, cybercrime, and transnational and serious organized crime, including financial crime. Federal Policing also provides protective services to Canadian VIPs and polices Canada's border in between officially designated points of entry. Federal Policing delivers its mandate in every province and territory in Canada and internationally. Of the RCMP's \$6 billion budget, Federal Policing accounts for

¹¹⁶ RCMP, "Speaking Points – Director General, Technical Investigative Services, Specialized Policing Services, NSICOP Presentation," May 20, 2022.

¹¹⁷ RCMP, "[Departmental Plan 2022-2023](#)," 2022.

\$959 million.¹¹⁸ Federal Policing employs approximately 5,000 of the RCMP's approximately 30,000 employees,¹¹⁹ who are dispersed across the country.

48. In support of this broad mandate, Federal Policing is responsible for:

- investigating criminality related to national security, serious and organized crime, and financial crime;
- investigating other serious and complex crimes under the *Criminal Code*, especially those with an inter-provincial or international dimension;
- enforcing federal laws, securing Canada's borders, collecting and operationalizing criminal intelligence, and ensuring the safety of critical infrastructure; and
- ensuring the safety of Internationally Protected Persons and other designated persons, significant national or international events, and designated protective sites as well as providing in-flight security officers on board selected Canadian-registered aircraft.¹²⁰

49. Given the breadth of its mandate, Federal Policing identifies priority areas on a three-year cycle. For the period 2020-2023, these priorities are national security, transnational and serious organized crime, and cybercrime (the priority-setting process is described in greater detail in paragraphs 159-167).¹²¹ Federal Policing dedicates attention and resources to investigations that fall within these priorities and represent a threat to Canada's economic integrity, the integrity of federal government systems or programs, Canada's national security or critical infrastructure. It is responsible for any investigation that is international or inter-jurisdictional with national implications, including border issues. Consistent with the *Security Offences Act*, Federal Policing is also the primary investigative agency for criminal offences arising out of conduct that constitutes a national security threat to Canada, specifically espionage, foreign interference, terrorism and subversion.¹²²

50. The Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing is responsible for the RCMP's Federal mandate. The Deputy is responsible for managing strategic direction, setting strategic priorities, allocating resources, overseeing policy and program development, engaging with the public, compliance and coordination, and in certain circumstances, providing direct control of operations and services. The Deputy Commissioner is also responsible for ensuring that Federal Policing implements governance and accountability in line with Ministerial Direction and RCMP policies.

¹¹⁸ RCMP, Federal Policing, "NSICOP Briefing: Introduction to the RCMP," Deck, May 6, 2022; and RCMP, Federal Policing, Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, NSICOP Appearance, December 2, 2022. These figures exclude employee benefit plans.


¹¹⁹ RCMP, Federal Policing, Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, NSICOP Appearance, December 2, 2022.

¹²⁰ RCMP, "Federal Policing, Federal Policing Strategic Plan 2020-2023," 2020.

¹²¹ RCMP, Federal Policing, Federal Policing Strategic Plan 2020-2023, 2020.

¹²² *Security Offences Act*, para 22. 6(1).

51. There are three main operational business lines within Federal Policing, each of which is managed by a senior official who reports directly to the Deputy Commissioner. Federal Policing Criminal Operations and Federal Policing National Security and Protective Policing are led by respective Assistant Commissioners. Federal Policing Intelligence and International Policing is led by an Executive Director.¹²³ Federal Policing’s organizational structure is illustrated in chart 2 below.



Source: RCMP, Federal Policing, “NSICOP Briefing, Federal Policing Structure and Mandate,” Deck, May 20, 2022.

Chart 2: Federal Policing Organizational Chart

52. Federal Policing’s first operational business line is National Security and Protective Policing. Federal Policing National Security is mandated to prevent, detect, and respond to national security criminal activity. National security criminal investigations are led by one of the RCMP’s six Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) or six National Security Enforcement Sections (NSESs), depending on the location of the investigation.¹²⁴ INSETs are RCMP-led, multi-agency teams comprised of specially trained law enforcement and security and intelligence personnel from the federal, provincial, and municipal levels, whereas NSESs are comprised solely of RCMP employees. These teams collect, share, and analyze information and

¹²³ RCMP, Federal Policing, “NSICOP Briefing, Federal Policing Structure and Mandate,” Deck, May 20, 2022.

¹²⁴ RCMP, Federal Policing, “NSICOP Briefing, Federal Policing Structure and Mandate,” Deck, May 20, 2022.

intelligence regarding threats to national security. The Federal Policing National Security Branch provides central oversight and control of both from the RCMP's national headquarters.¹²⁵

53. Protective Policing is a standalone, unique program within the Federal Policing mandate. Whereas Federal Policing as a whole takes a traditional law enforcement role based on collecting evidence to inform the laying of charges, Protective Policing's sole responsibility is the protection of designated persons.¹²⁶ More specifically, Protective Policing has the mandate to provide protective services (e.g., bodyguards) for designated individuals in Canada and abroad (e.g., the Prime Minister) and mandated government led events across the country. It is also responsible for the Air Carrier program which includes the deployment of in-flight security officers.¹²⁷

54. Federal Policing's second operational program area is Criminal Operations. Federal Policing Criminal Operations focuses on transnational and serious organized crime, border integrity, cybercrime and financial crime. It is also responsible for sensitive international investigations, covert operations, operational information and data science, and the federal Witness Protection Program (these program areas fall outside of the scope of the review and are not described further).¹²⁸

55. For the RCMP, transnational and serious organized crime includes transnational criminal entities, war crimes, illegal drug production and trafficking, firearms smuggling and trafficking, and counterfeit goods. Federal Policing Criminal Operations focuses on the most significant organized criminal groups operating within Canada or threatening Canada and Canadians. Local jurisdictions are unable to respond to the activities of these groups due to their national or international scope, necessitating a federal response.¹²⁹ To respond to the elevated threat of serious organized crime, specialized Federal Serious and Organized Crime (FSOC) units operate within every RCMP division in the country.¹³⁰ Federal Policing Criminal Operations is responsible for providing oversight, guidance, and direction to divisional FSOC units.¹³¹

56. Border Integrity is another area of Federal Policing Criminal Operations responsibility. Together with the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the RCMP is responsible for securing Canada's borders at and between ports of entry from inbound and outbound criminal threats. Federal Policing Criminal Operations' Border Integrity Program focuses on securing the air, water and land that make up the areas between respective ports of entry, and the Arctic. In 2019-2020, the program consisted of 330 personnel, 275 of whom were Regular Members. When a Border Integrity issue arises, Federal Policing will bolster resources from other Federal

¹²⁵ RCMP, "[National Security Criminal Operations Program](#)," Webpage.

¹²⁶ RCMP, Federal Policing, "NSICOP Briefing, Federal Policing Structure and Mandate," Deck, May 20, 2022.

¹²⁷ RCMP, "[Protective Policing](#)," Webpage.

¹²⁸ RCMP, "Speaking Points – Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing Criminal Operations, NSICOP Presentation," May 20, 2022.

¹²⁹ RCMP, "Speaking Points – Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing Criminal Operations, NSICOP Presentation," May 20, 2022.

¹³⁰ RCMP, Federal Policing, "NSICOP Briefing, Federal Policing Structure and Mandate," Deck, May 20, 2022.

¹³¹ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Governance Framework – Federal Policing Criminal Operations: Serious and Organized Crime, Financial Crime, Cybercrime, and Border Integrity," undated.

Policing programs.¹³² The Border Integrity Program collaborates with Canadian, American and other foreign partner law enforcement agencies on its operations.¹³³

57. Federal Policing Criminal Operations is also responsible for responding to cybercrime. Its Cybercrime teams focus on the most serious criminal cyber activity, including that which targets the federal government; threatens Canada's critical infrastructure; uses computer systems to attack or compromise Canadian institutions; is conducted by groups or organizations acting on behalf of foreign states; and threatens key business assets with high economic impact. Federal Policing Criminal Operations Cyber teams work across a variety of operational, intelligence, tactical and program areas. Federal Policing Criminal Operations is responsible for providing oversight of all active cybercrime investigations; deploying Cyber members domestically and abroad; providing intelligence; working with domestic and foreign security and intelligence partners to collaborate on cybercrime threats; and overseeing the development of technical, tactical capability through research and development.¹³⁴

58. In recent years, the RCMP has strengthened its ability to combat cybercrime. In 2015, the RCMP established its first dedicated investigative team to combat high-priority cybercrime in National Division in Ottawa.¹³⁵ Budget 2018 announced additional funding, under the *National Cyber Security Strategy*, for the RCMP to create two additional cybercrime investigative teams in Ontario and Quebec.¹³⁶ More recently, the RCMP's National Cybercrime Coordination Centre reached initial operating capability in 2020, with plans to reach full capability in 2024.¹³⁷

59. Federal Policing Criminal Operations is also responsible for the operational response to financial crime. This includes a broad range of crimes that threaten the economic security and financial integrity of Canada. The Financial Crime team within the Federal Policing Criminal Operations Branch oversees the RCMP's Integrated Market Enforcement Teams (IMETs) and Integrated Money Laundering Investigative Teams (IMLITs).¹³⁸ IMETs are an RCMP-led, joint initiative with partners from Justice Canada, provincial and municipal police forces, security commissions and market regulators. These specialized units detect, investigate and deter capital market fraud.¹³⁹ IMLITs are money laundering investigative teams located in four high-risk divisions across the country: Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. These integrated teams bring together anti-money laundering expertise from the RCMP, municipal and

¹³² RCMP, "Federal Policing Criminal Operations Border integrity PROGRAM," Deck, March 23, 2021.

¹³³ RCMP, "Speaking Points – Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing Criminal Operations, NSICOP Presentation," May 20, 2022.

¹³⁴ RCMP, "Speaking Points – Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing Criminal Operations, NSICOP Presentation," May 20, 2022.

¹³⁵ Canada, "[Advancing Canada's Cyber Security Strategy](#)," Webpage, 2015; RCMP, "[Royal Canadian Mounted Police Cybercrime Strategy](#)," December 2, 2015; RCMP, *Gazette* magazine, Vol. 79, no. 3, "[Many Skills, One Goal : New Investigative Team Takes on Cybercrime](#)," July 4, 2017.

¹³⁶ Canada, "[Budget 2018](#)," 2018.

¹³⁷ RCMP, "[The National Cybercrime Coordination Centre \(NC3\)](#)," Webpage, October 19, 2022.

¹³⁸ RCMP, "Speaking Points – Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing Criminal Operations, NSICOP Presentation," May 20, 2022.

¹³⁹ Public Safety Canada, "[Integrated Market Enforcement Teams](#)," Webpage, 2015.

provincial policing partners, and federal partners such as the Canada Revenue Agency, CBSA, Public Prosecution Service of Canada and the Forensic Account Management Group.¹⁴⁰

60. Intelligence and International Policing is Federal Policing's third operational business line. In this area, Federal Policing is responsible for producing operational and strategic national criminal intelligence, managing an international network of Liaison Officers and analysts deployed overseas, and overseeing Canada's international police peace operations. Across this broad range of responsibilities, Federal Policing conducts intelligence analysis, drafts intelligence products, and deploys analysts overseas.¹⁴¹ We describe Federal Policing's intelligence function in more detail in Chapter 6.

Legal Framework for RCMP Federal Policing

61. Like the rest of the RCMP, RCMP Federal Policing derives its authority from the common law and several statutes, including the RCMP Act, the *Security Offences Act* and the *Criminal Code*. The law related to policing in Canada is complex, and a full survey of it would be outside of the scope of this review. However, the Committee outlines the most important points below.

The RCMP Act

62. The RCMP Act establishes the RCMP as Canada's police service under the control and management of the RCMP Commissioner.¹⁴² It gives the Commissioner a broad mandate to manage the RCMP, including Federal Policing. In turn, the Commissioner receives direction on the management of the RCMP from the Minister of Public Safety, who is ultimately accountable for the RCMP.

63. The RCMP Act also establishes the duty of RCMP officers to preserve peace, prevent crime and apprehend criminals.¹⁴³ These duties are further clarified in the Act's regulations, which specify that RCMP officers are to enforce all acts of Parliament and to render assistance to other Government of Canada departments as directed by the Minister.¹⁴⁴ This makes the RCMP responsible for administering over 270 federal acts on behalf of the Government of Canada.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁰ RCMP, "[RCMP Integrated Money Laundering Investigative Team Charge Money Services Business Owner](#)," Webpage; Government of British Columbia, "[2021 IMLIT Way Forward](#)," 2021.

¹⁴¹ RCMP, "Speaking Points – Executive Director, Federal Policing Intelligence and International Policing, NSICOP Presentation," May 20, 2022.

¹⁴² *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act*, ss.5 (1).

¹⁴³ *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act*, s. 18.

¹⁴⁴ *Royal Canadian Mounted Police Regulations*, s. 14(1).

¹⁴⁵ RCMP, Federal Policing, "NSICOP Briefing: Introduction to the RCMP, RCMP," Deck, May 6, 2022.

The Security Offences Act

64. The *Security Offences Act* designates the RCMP as having primary responsibility for investigating offences that arise out of conduct constituting a threat to the security of Canada within the meaning of the *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act*.¹⁴⁶ These offences include espionage, foreign interference, and terrorism.¹⁴⁷

The Criminal Code

65. The *Criminal Code* generally codifies the criminal law in Canada. It also defines a number of investigative techniques that police officers, including RCMP officers, may use and provides authorizations for their use.

66. There are a wide range of different warrants that police may apply for, depending on the techniques that they will be using or the information they seek to acquire. This can include search warrants, video surveillance authorizations or wiretaps (i.e., the authority to intercept a suspect's communications).¹⁴⁸

67. In the process of applying for these warrants, police must detail before a judge or a justice of the peace the information they seek to acquire. This generally includes who they will be targeting, what they are looking for, the period of time in which the operations will take place and how the activities in question will be carried out. Unlike other agencies in Canada's national security community, police are required to notify suspects of intrusive techniques after they have occurred.¹⁴⁹

68. Finally, the *Criminal Code* contains a justification for the police to break the law, if necessary, during the course of an investigation.¹⁵⁰ For example, such a justification would allow police officers to misrepresent themselves during the course of an investigation in order to operate undercover. The Minister of Public Safety is the official responsible for issuing these designations for the RCMP.

Policing Powers

69. Like all police organizations in Canada, RCMP officers working on federal investigations rely on investigative techniques to collect evidence. Some of these techniques are authorized by the *Criminal Code* and some by the common law. An exhaustive review of the latter authorities would exceed the scope of this review, but common law police powers include powers to search incident to arrest, to detain people for investigative purposes, or to conduct a search in exigent circumstances. However, these powers are not unlimited: when the police rely on these powers,

¹⁴⁶ *Security Offences Act*, ss.6 (1).

¹⁴⁷ *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act*, s.2.

¹⁴⁸ *Criminal Code*, ss. 487 (1) and ss. 185 (1).

¹⁴⁹ *Criminal Code*, ss. 196 (1).


¹⁵⁰ *Criminal Code*, s. 25.1.

they must balance the rights that all Canadians are afforded under the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*.¹⁵¹ Importantly, these powers are also subject to extensive jurisprudence and regular review by the courts.

¹⁵¹ *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, s. 8.

Chapter 3: Federal Investigations: Trends

70. Federal Policing investigates the most serious criminal threats to Canadians and Canadian interests. These investigations involve threats to Canada’s economic integrity, the integrity of federal government systems, national security or critical infrastructure; are international or inter-jurisdictional in scope; or part of horizontal initiatives for which Federal Policing has received specific direction and funding.¹⁵² Federal Policing allocates resources towards its highest priority investigations, referred to as ‘tiered projects’ (see case study 1 below for an example of a tiered project). Tiered projects are initiated through a process that seeks to ensure that investigative resources are allocated to the most important priorities, criminal threats and activities. There are three project tiers, with Tier 1 investigations deemed the highest priority, Tier 2 investigations deemed a priority, and Tier 3 investigations not deemed a priority. Federal Policing conducted 846 tiered projects between 2013 and 2021 (see chart 3 below).



Source: RCMP, SASU, Federal Policing Priorities Overview, January 11 2023. The years 2013, 2014, and 2018 are distorted figures as they include tiering all ongoing investigations at that time.

Chart 3: Count of Major Projects Tiered by Year

¹⁵² RCMP, Federal Policing, “Federal Policing Strategic Plan 2020-2023,” 2020.

Case Study 1: Federal Policing's Investigations of Aaron Driver

On December 8, 2014, the Manitoba chapter of the Islamic Social Services Association informed Federal Policing that Aaron Driver had published posts on social media that appeared supportive of Islamic State ideology. Federal Policing launched an investigation of Mr. Driver on the same day.

On February 20, 2015, the Toronto Star published an interview with Mr. Driver, who expressed support for Islamic State and the 2014 terrorist attacks in Ottawa. Federal Policing met with CSIS officials, ***, to ensure an RCMP interview with him would not conflict with CSIS efforts. This engagement continued ***, with Federal Policing and CSIS officials meeting frequently to share information and to ensure that their work did not overlap or conflict with the work of the other.

Federal Policing investigators interviewed Mr. Driver on March 7, 2015, when he expressed support for Islamic State and its goals. Following the interview, the RCMP's Surveillance Technology Centre conducted covert physical surveillance on Mr. Driver to gather information and evidence and Federal Policing's Tactical Internet Unit monitored Mr. Driver's online activity.

In May 2015, Federal Policing's Integrated National Security Enforcement Team in Ontario notified the National Security Enforcement Section in Manitoba that Mr. Driver was implicated in one of their investigations and they had sufficient grounds to include him in a production order.

On June 4, 2015, Federal Policing investigators in Manitoba arrested Mr. Driver on suspicion of knowingly participating in the activity of a terrorist group. Mr. Driver entered into a peace bond and was released with 19 conditions, including electronic monitoring and reporting. Mr. Driver requested and was granted a variance on these conditions, allowing him to move to London, Ontario.

On February 2, 2016, Mr. Driver signed a peace bond with conditions for a ten-month period. As part of his conditions, he was required to report bi-weekly to a designated RCMP official. He was also banned from acquiring any firearm or explosive substance; applying for a passport; possessing or accessing any cell phone, computer, laptop, or electronic communications device without permission; using social media websites or applications; and communicating with any designated terrorist organization. He was no longer required to wear a monitoring device.

On August 10, 2016, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sent Federal Policing Criminal Operations a screen capture of a video in which an unknown Canadian pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The previous day, the individual in the video had initiated communication with an FBI confidential human source and informed the source of his intention to conduct a suicide attack using an improvised explosive device within the next 72 hours. Federal Policing used the screen capture and other information provided to the confidential human source to establish grounds to suspect that Mr. Driver was the individual in the video.

At this point, Federal Policing began a number of simultaneous processes to protect public safety and confirm the identity of the person in the video. Within two hours, Federal Policing had alerted public transportation service providers and a property management group of the possibility of an attack and informed partners, senior management and RCMP divisions. Federal Policing also conducted voice recognition analysis to determine that Mr. Driver was indeed the individual in the video.

Federal Policing's Ontario Integrated National Security Enforcement Team and London Police Department surveillance teams were deployed to Mr. Driver's last known address in Strathroy, Ontario and his place of work. Multiple units from the RCMP, London Police Service and the Ontario Provincial Police were also deployed to establish perimeters and to support the investigation. Federal Policing led this coordinated, multi-organization team.

RCMP investigators confirmed Mr. Driver's presence at his residence using electronic verification that his personal phone was active, open source information and recent messages he sent to the FBI's confidential human source, and determined he was preparing to depart. The RCMP's Emergency Response Team were ordered to arrest him.

At one point, Mr. Driver left his house and entered a taxi. The Emergency Response Team moved to arrest him and Mr. Driver detonated an explosive device, injuring the taxi driver. The Emergency Response Team shot Mr. Driver after he failed to comply with its commands and reached for an unknown item. He was pronounced dead at the scene.

The focus of tiered projects

71. Tiered projects fall into one of four categories. The first three relate to Federal Policing's operational priorities of national security, transnational and serious organized crime, and cybercrime. Between 2013 and 2021, these categories accounted for approximately 34% of all tiered projects. The fourth category involves investigations of a variety of offences designated as 'other,' and accounted for approximately 72% of all tiered projects. These four investigative categories are detailed below (see chart 4 after paragraph 78).¹⁵³

72. Between 2013 and 2021, Federal Policing conducted 139 tiered projects related to national security, accounting for 16% of all tiered projects. The three most common offences investigated were participating or contributing to the activity of a terrorist group, leaving Canada to participate in the activity of a terrorist group, and facilitating terrorist activity. The majority of investigations within national security-related tiered projects were Tier 1 (119, or 86%), and the remainder were tier 2. On average, Federal Policing closed or cleared national security investigations within 4.2 years of being reported. Due to their complexity, tiered investigations take an average of 7 times longer than general occurrences to clear.¹⁵⁴

73. In the same period, Federal Policing conducted 100 tiered projects related to transnational and serious organized crime or approximately 12% of all tiered projects. The three most common offences investigated were participation or contribution to the activity of a terrorist group; fraud greater than \$5000; and the importation or exportation of cocaine. Of the 100 projects, 54% (54) were Tier 1, 36% (36) were Tier 2, and 10% (10) were Tier 3. On average,

¹⁵³ Note: Totals vary due to some projects being double counted, falling between categories, or being re-tiered and re-classified in subsequent years. The RCMP does not have a standard methodology for data.

¹⁵⁴ RCMP, Situational Awareness Support Unit, "Federal Policing Priorities Overview," November 4, 2021.

Federal Policing closed or cleared transnational serious organized crime investigations within 3.7 years of being reported.

74. Similarly, Federal Policing conducted 45 tiered projects related to cybercrime, accounting for 5% of all tiered projects. The three most common offences investigated were fraud greater than \$5000; participation or contribution to the activity of a terrorist group; and unauthorized use of a computer. Of the 45 tiered projects in this category, Tier 1 accounted for 60% (27), Tier 2 for 31% (14) and Tier 3 for 9% (4). On average, Federal Policing closed or cleared cybercrime investigations within 4.2 years of being reported.

75. The remainder of the tiered projects, approximately 72% (612), conducted by Federal Policing during this period involved a variety of offences that Federal Policing identifies as 'Other.' These investigations either do not meet the criteria to be considered national security, serious organized crime or cybercrime investigations, or cannot be classified as such due to data quality issues (data quality challenges are described in more detail in paragraphs 146 to 158). The three most common offences investigated within this category were: the trafficking of cocaine; fraud greater than \$5000; and the importation and exportation of cocaine. Of the 612 tiered projects in this category, Tier 1 accounted for 25% (156), Tier 2 for 38% (230) and Tier 3 for 37% (227). On average, Federal Policing closed or cleared investigations marked as 'other' within 2.9 years of being reported. It is noteworthy that the majority of all of Federal Policing's tiered projects fell into this category, as the majority of investigations do not address a federal priority or involve lower-level offences, such as fraud and drug possession.

Tiered investigations

76. Between 2013 and 2021, the number of tiered projects declined from 166 in 2013 to 43 in 2021 (See chart 3 above). Challenges with the accuracy of RCMP data (discussed further in paragraphs 146 to 158) mean that the reported numbers may indicate a general trend, but not its magnitude. The main reasons for this general decline are increased oversight of investigations and improved processes for project submission. This has resulted in a shift in focus towards Tier 1 projects, which are Federal Policing's most complex investigations, and are often more resource intensive than other investigations. During the early stages of the prioritization process (2013-14), divisions submitted proposals for intelligence work or investigations that were still in their infancy; this led to a high number of proposals being prioritized as Tier 3. Thereafter, Federal Policing introduced increased oversight within program areas, forcing divisions to conduct more work on proposed investigations prior to submitting them for prioritization. This led to a significant decline in Tier 3 projects, a relatively consistent number of Tier 1 projects, and a slight decline in Tier 2 projects. In practice, this means that there are fewer tiered projects, but the significant decline in Tier 3 projects allows Federal Policing to dedicate more time and resources towards its Tier 1 and 2 projects.¹⁵⁵ (The

¹⁵⁵ RCMP, SASU, "RCMP Response: (Follow Up questions) SASU Updated Numbers (Friday, January 27)," email, January 27, 2023.


Committee discusses the governance of Federal Policing’s prioritization process in paragraphs 159 to 173).

77. This downward trend held true for investigations related to Federal Policing priorities of national security, transnational and serious organized crime, and those marked ‘Other’ (see chart 4).¹⁵⁶ One reason for this decline was a 2014 shift towards terrorism-related investigations. This shift was prompted by specific high-profile terrorism-related incidents, most notably the 2014 Parliament Hill shooting and the 2014 motor vehicle attack targeting Canadian soldiers in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu. This shift in priority and resources reduced the RCMP’s ability to pursue non-national security investigations. Notably, there was a decrease from 16 tiered transnational and serious organized crime projects in 2014 to 9 in 2015.

78. The number of national security and transnational and serious organized crime projects decreased between 2013 and 2021, while cybercrime projects remained relatively steady. Tiered national security investigations dropped from 19 in 2013 to 12 in 2021. Tiered transnational and serious organized crime investigations dropped from 13 to 6 during the same period. In contrast, between 2013 and 2021, the number of Federal Policing’s cybercrime investigations remained relatively steady, with a sharp increase in 2018 from 5 to 11. The number of ‘other’ investigations also decreased during this period, from 137 in 2013 to 24 in 2021, owing in part to systemic challenges with data.

¹⁵⁶ An explanation of what is categorized as “other” can be found in paragraph 124.

All Divisions Tiered Projects Overview – All Tiers



Source: RCMP, SASU, Additional Information: Federal Policing Priorities Overview, NSICOP Request, January 27, 2023

Chart 4: Count of Major Projects Tiered by Year (by Priority)

Tiered investigations: outcomes

79. Tiered projects may lead to a number of outcomes. First, they may result in criminal or other charges. Across the 225 tiered projects that resulted in a charge from 2013 to 2021, Federal Policing laid a total of 6,158 charges. These can be broken down into the following categories:

- National security:** Federal Policing laid 135 charges in investigations related to national security. The most common charges laid within these investigations were commission of an offence for a terrorist group; participation or contribution to the activity of a terrorist group; leaving Canada to participate in the activity of a terrorist group; facilitating terrorist activity; and conspiring to commit an indictable offence.

- **Transnational and serious organized crime:** Federal Policing laid 920 charges on investigations related to transnational and serious organized crime. The most common charges laid within these investigations were conspiring to commit an indictable offence; committing an offence for a criminal organization; possession of property obtained by crime over \$5000; trafficking of cocaine; and possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.
- **Cybercrime:** Federal Policing laid 283 charges in investigations related to cybercrime. The most common charges laid within these investigations were fraud greater than \$5000; laundering for the proceeds of crime; possession of property obtained by crime over \$5000; unauthorized use of a computer; and identify theft.
- **'Other':** Federal Policing laid 4,820 charges related to 'Other' tiered investigations. The most common charges laid within these investigations were conspiring to commit an indictable offence; using, trafficking, or possessing a forged document; fraud greater than \$5000; trafficking of cocaine; and possession of cocaine for the purposes of trafficking.

80. Second, tiered projects may result in disruption. Disruption is the strategy of delaying, interrupting, or complicating the commission of criminal offences or related activities by individuals or criminal networks. Disruption efforts may be used to avoid harm that could be caused by crimes such as terrorism, or to prevent criminal entities from smuggling illicit goods or trafficking drugs across the border. Examples of disruption activities include drugs and firearms seizures, dismantling of clandestine laboratories, or asset freezing and forfeiture. In some cases, Federal Policing uses disruption to interrupt potential harm to Canadians rather than lay a criminal charge.¹⁵⁷ In other instances, disruption may be a viable option where the RCMP cannot meet the evidentiary threshold to lay charges.

81. Third, some tiered projects may not result in a charge or the disruption of criminal offences. In some of these cases, the RCMP is unable to gather sufficient evidence to lay criminal charges. In other instances, laying a criminal charge or disrupting criminal activity may not be the goal of the project. Of Federal Policing's 846 tiered projects between 2013 and 2021, 132 were not intended to result in charges. These projects may be intelligence or assistance files. Alternatively, they may be criminal in nature, but Federal Policing was not the lead agency for the investigation. For example, foreign partners may request the RCMP to engage in activities, such as a controlled delivery of drugs or money, to gather evidence for a broader investigation.

82. Of the 714 projects intended to result in charges, 255 resulted in charges. The total number of charges laid as a result of Federal Policing's tiered projects had a downward trend from 2013 to 2021. Current performance measures for Federal Policing are based on clearance rate. Each year, a file can be defined as 'cleared by charge or recommended charge,' 'ongoing' (the investigation is incomplete), 'closed' (insufficient evidence to proceed or complainant decides not to proceed), 'unfounded' (upon investigation, an offence did not occur), or 'solved'

¹⁵⁷ RCMP, Federal Policing, [Federal Policing Annual Report 2021](#), 2022.

(non-criminal). These definitions are from the Uniform Crime Reporting Survey which is managed by the Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics. The survey was designed to report on the incidence of crime in Canadian society.¹⁵⁸ This type of performance measure is statistically based and does not include context or provide scope for complex outcomes, such as an increase in public safety from disruption. Federal Policing echoed this point to the Committee. Officials stated that when taken in isolation, Federal Policing's current performance measures do not capture disruption and therefore cannot paint a complete picture of the impact of Federal Policing's work.¹⁵⁹

Tiered investigations: distribution across Canada

83. The most serious criminal investigations are not evenly distributed across Canada. Between 2013 and 2021, four provinces accounted for the majority of tiered investigations: Ontario, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta. Federal Police in Ontario conducted 271 tiered projects; Federal Police in Quebec conducted 89 tiered projects; Federal Police in British Columbia conducted 158 tiered projects; and Federal Police in Alberta conducted 94 tiered projects.¹⁶⁰ By contrast, Federal Police units in Prince Edward Island, Northwest Territories, Yukon, and Nunavut accounted for only 2.5% (21) of all tiered projects.¹⁶¹ Federal Police launched 10 tiered projects in Prince Edward Island; conducted six tiered projects in the Northwest Territories; and conducted five tiered projects in the Yukon. Federal Police did not work on a tiered project between 2013 and 2021 in Nunavut.¹⁶²

Non-tiered work

84. Federal Policing also dedicates time and effort towards activities that do not meet the threshold of tiered projects. These activities may constitute an investigation, but may also involve other police work, such as calls for service and the provision of assistance. Among the primary areas that Federal Policing worked on outside of its tiered projects from 2013-2021 were assistance to Canadian police partners and federal departments or agencies; responding to *Customs Act* offences; completing information files; providing assistance to foreign INTERPOL offices and the general public; developing human sources; working on files related to suspicious persons, vehicles, or property; working on files related to child pornography; and providing VIP security.

¹⁵⁸ RCMP, Royal Canadian Mounted Police: 2021-22 Departmental Results Framework, undated.

¹⁵⁹ RCMP, Federal Policing, Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Prioritization, June 17, 2022.

¹⁶⁰ RCMP, Federal Policing, "NSICOP Briefing: Federal Policing Structure and Mandate," Deck, May 20, 2022. Note: Numbers exclude Peacekeeping and RCMP personnel providing services to Parliamentary Protective Services.

¹⁶¹ RCMP Headquarters launched just two tiered projects between 2013 and 2021. This Division, though, only launches investigations in exceptional circumstances; its role is primarily administrative.

¹⁶² RCMP, SASU, Federal Policing Priorities Overview, January 11, 2023.

Chapter 4: Federal Policing Partnerships

85. Federal Policing works with many partners both domestically and internationally. Its mandate and responsibilities mean that it regularly interacts with allies and international policing organizations, other government departments and agencies, and Canadian police forces and law enforcement. These relationships serve investigative purposes and support public safety and international cooperation.

86. Federal Policing collaborates with partners on all operational, strategic and administrative issues within its purview. Collaboration within the domain of national security includes work related to the terrorist listing regime, ideologically motivated violent extremism, extra-territorial investigations, and elections security. Collaboration with respect to transnational and serious organized crime includes work related to financial crime, illegal firearms, human trafficking, international drug trafficking, border integrity and hardened secure communications. Finally, within the area of cybercrime, collaboration includes work related to botnets, disrupting infrastructure, and ransomware.¹⁶³

International

87. Federal Policing is an active member in international fora such as the Five Eyes, INTERPOL and Europol.¹⁶⁴ Its work with the Five Eyes is the most significant of these three, and is mostly conducted within the Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group (FELEG). This group's membership includes the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Immigration and Customs Enforcement from the United States, the National Crime Agency and the Metropolitan Police from the United Kingdom, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, the Australian Federal Police, and the New Zealand Police.¹⁶⁵ FELEG's role is to facilitate information and intelligence sharing and global criminal investigations. It sets its strategic direction through consensus and its leadership rotates every two years. The current chair of FELEG is the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police.¹⁶⁶

88. Federal Policing participates in a number of FELEG working groups. These include the Criminal Intelligence Advisory Group, which focuses on organized crime and drug-related operations; the Money Laundering Group; the Cyber Crime Working Group, which tries to identify sophisticated cyber criminals and criminal services; and the Technical Working Group, which facilitates the technical exchange of information.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶³ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing Partnerships," Deck, February 3, 2023.

¹⁶⁴ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Partnerships," Briefing to NSICOP, February 3, 2023.

¹⁶⁵ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "FBI Hosts Meeting of International Law Enforcement Group," June 16, 2016. <https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/fbi-hosts-meeting-of-international-law-enforcement-group>.

¹⁶⁶ Australian Federal Police, "Australian Federal Police to Chair Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group," October 26, 2021. <https://www.afp.gov.au/news-media/media-releases/australian-federal-police-chair-five-eyes-law-enforcement-group>.

¹⁶⁷ Federal Bureau of Investigation, "FBI Hosts Meeting of International Law Enforcement Group," June 16, 2016. <https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/fbi-hosts-meeting-of-international-law-enforcement-group>.

89. Federal Policing also maintains international partnerships through its Global Initiatives Program and the International Policing Program. Based at RMCP Headquarters, the Global Initiatives Program deploys, directs and supports 14 criminal intelligence analysts around the world to increase RCMP visibility, reach and influence. While the majority of the analysts are located in Canadian missions in select countries, three are embedded with strategic partners in Washington, D.C. (Drug Enforcement Administration), The Hague, Netherlands (Europol), and Canberra, Australia (Australian Federal Police).¹⁶⁸

90. Through the International Policing Program, Federal Policing assists with building law enforcement capacity abroad. Often, this assistance takes the form of courses that Federal Policing delivers on subjects such as money-laundering investigative techniques, countering violent extremism, cyber fundamentals, child exploitation interviewing techniques, and outlaw motorcycle gangs. These courses have been offered in a range of countries including Mali, the West Bank, Iraq, the Central African Republic, and Haiti.¹⁶⁹ Federal Policing also maintains a host of international partnerships through its International Network, which is housed within the International Policing Program. The Network is comprised of Liaison Officers and civilian analysts overseas who facilitate the sharing of information with foreign law enforcement agencies, with the goal of disrupting transnational crime with a nexus to Canada. More specifically, the International Network: facilitates major Canadian investigative inquiries in foreign countries; develops and maintains the exchange of criminal and national security intelligence between the RCMP and approved foreign authorities; provides assistance to foreign agencies in investigations that affect Canada; and coordinates and assists Canadian police investigators travelling abroad on duty.¹⁷⁰

91. Federal Policing works with INTERPOL and Europol. Participation in INTERPOL allows Federal Policing to exchange information with INTERPOL's 195 member countries and gather information on individuals or crime groups via INTERPOL's enhanced criminal databases. Federal Policing is involved in some INTERPOL-led projects and initiatives, such as an INTERPOL- and Italian-led project to combat 'Ndrangheta, an Italian organized crime group with links to Canada. Federal Policing also participates in Europol. It has dedicated resources posted to Europol to combat migrant smuggling and human trafficking and cybercrime. It also participates in Europol regarding Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Ideologically-Motivated Violent Extremism, war crimes and corruption, and major money laundering files, including those related to cryptocurrency and sanctions emanating from Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Federal Policing assesses that its participation in Europol is of significant benefit, because of the value of the information exchanged and the close working environment.¹⁷¹

92. Finally, Federal Policing maintains relationships with various law enforcement partners around the world. It has over 300 memoranda of understanding with foreign law enforcement

¹⁶⁸ RCMP, Federal Policing, "National Intelligence & Global Initiatives," undated.

¹⁶⁹ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing 2018-2019 Snapshot," February 2020.

¹⁷⁰ RCMP, "Speaking Points – Executive Director, Federal Policing Intelligence and International Policing, NSICOP Presentation," May 20, 2022.

¹⁷¹ RCMP, Federal Policing, "INTERPOL and Europol," NSICOP Request for Information, March 14, 2023.

partners with the goal of developing partnerships and trust, and working towards shared policing objectives.¹⁷²

Domestic

93. Inside of Canada, the RCMP, and Federal Policing in particular, works with a number of partners. The RCMP has memoranda of understanding with many government departments and agencies including: the Department of National Defence, Global Affairs Canada, the Canada Revenue Agency, the Canada Border Services Agency, Health Canada, Transport Canada, Environment and Climate Change Canada, Correctional Service Canada, the Privy Council Office, Parliamentary Protective Service, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission.

94. Many of these relationships involve guidelines for the RCMP to conduct criminal investigations in areas under the jurisdiction of those departments or agencies. The RCMP also participates in a number of governmental working groups and task forces, including the Security and Intelligence Threat to Elections task force. It is also listed as an investigative body under the national security review provisions of the *Investment Canada Act*.

95. One of the most important domestic partnerships Federal Policing has is with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS). CSIS is responsible for investigating threats to the security of Canada and the two organizations often work in parallel on cases related to national security, such as violent extremism and espionage. To facilitate this work, the RCMP and CSIS have developed One Vision, which is a blueprint for deconflicting and information sharing on investigations that involve both organizations. One Vision was originally developed in 2012 and has been updated twice since then. The first update was made after the 2015 legislative changes to the *Criminal Code* and the CSIS Act which permitted CSIS to use threat reduction measures. The current version, One Vision 3.0, was approved in November 2021. It reflects recommendations made in a 2019 independent review of the relationship. Both organizations noted that they needed to “adapt their culture to accept that prosecution is no longer considered to be the ‘gold standard’ of threat mitigation, as there are many threats for which a criminal prosecution is neither appropriate nor the most effective threat management measure.”¹⁷³

96. One Vision has two primary elements: deconfliction and the disclosure of information. The first element of One Vision is deconfliction. CSIS and the RCMP deconflict at the strategic and tactical levels. Strategic deconfliction occurs between the respective headquarters of CSIS and the RCMP. This type of deconfliction occurs in many context, including: parallel investigations, leads, and proposed CSIS threat reduction measures. Tactical deconfliction

¹⁷² RCMP, Federal Policing, “Partnerships,” Briefing to NSICOP, February 3, 2023.

¹⁷³ RCMP and CSIS, “CSIS-RCMP Framework for Cooperation One Vision 3.0,” November 10, 2021.

occurs between CSIS regions and RCMP regional offices. This is done in the context of parallel investigations, CSIS review of RCMP interview lists, and surveillance activities.¹⁷⁴

97. The second element of One Vision is the disclosure of information. CSIS discloses information to the RCMP to support its investigations and within the context of litigation, criminal prosecution or other judicial proceedings.¹⁷⁵ Between 2012 and 2021, CSIS shared information with the RCMP through disclosure and advisory letters. Essentially, a disclosure letter contains an investigative lead that cannot be used as evidence and an advisory letter contains information that the RCMP can use to apply for judicial authorization such as a search warrant. A total of 201 disclosure and 36 advisory letters were sent by CSIS to the RCMP between 2009 and April 2021.¹⁷⁶ One Vision 3.0 replaced these letters with “use letters.” There are six types of use letters and each letter is assigned one of three caveats, which reflect the expectations for handling CSIS’ information.¹⁷⁷

98. In practice, One Vision requires both CSIS and the RCMP to work closely. Once investigations develop, both organizations establish a strategy to coordinate and deconflict. The organizations then hold One Vision meetings where they share information to assist in understanding the threats and actors involved and work towards reaching consensus on how to manage or mitigate the threats.

99. CSIS officials briefed the Committee on the organization’s relationship with Federal Policing on February 3, 2023. They stated that One Vision 3.0 has resulted in many benefits for the CSIS-RCMP partnership. They specifically noted that it has resulted in: enhanced decision-making and reduced operational overlap; timely and prudent legal advice; and increased disclosure of CSIS information. One measure of the success of the CSIS and RCMP relationship is their collaboration in the context of One Vision. Between April 2021 and March 2022, CSIS’ Counter-Terrorism Division and the RCMP engaged in 146 One Vision discussions. This resulted in CSIS issuing 45 Use Letters to the RCMP.¹⁷⁸ This reflects an increase compared to previous years, although many factors could be attributed to this increase, including the COVID-19 pandemic. More data is required to properly assess the efficacy of the new Use Letter regime.¹⁷⁹

100. That said, information sharing is often just the beginning of investigative cooperation. In 2019, Federal Policing proposed a model based on a similar initiative in the United Kingdom to triage information and intelligence and determine which organization – the RCMP or CSIS – is

¹⁷⁴ CSIS, “One Vision – A Sound and Collaborative Approach to Threat Management: Presentation to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP),” Deck, February 3, 2023.

¹⁷⁵ CSIS, “One Vision – A Sound and Collaborative Approach to Threat Management: Presentation to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP),” Deck, February 3, 2023.

¹⁷⁶ RCMP, “SIHU Report AL DL Count 2021-04-26,” May 2021.

¹⁷⁷ RCMP and CSIS, “CSIS-RCMP Framework for Cooperation One Vision 3.0,” November 10, 2021.

¹⁷⁸ CSIS, “One Vision – A Sound and Collaborative Approach to Threat Management: Presentation to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP),” Deck, February 3, 2023.

¹⁷⁹ CSIS, “NSICOP Federal Policing Review - CSIS contextualization of OV stats,” Email, February 21, 2023.

best placed to take the lead.¹⁸⁰ Federal Policing and CSIS both acknowledge that for this initiative to be successful, “there must be a recognition and understanding of each agency’s specific mandate, operating environment, data collection, and retention requirements, each of which are unique. The end desirable is to create a co-located leads triage and management unit that will be able to assess and de-conflict in real time.”¹⁸¹

101. One Vision is not a panacea to longstanding challenges with the CSIS-RCMP relationship. For example, CSIS and the RCMP must still contend with the intelligence-to-evidence dilemma, or the inherent tension between the need to protect sensitive information from disclosure, and the need to rely upon that information to support law enforcement and maintain procedural fairness in criminal proceedings. Other shared challenges include large case loads and a shortage of adequately trained personnel.¹⁸²

102. Beyond these two organizations, the leads initiative would also triage information received from tip lines and from foreign policing organizations such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation.¹⁸³ Once analysed to determine the lead (or if a parallel investigation is warranted), all deconfliction would then occur under the framework of One Vision 3.0.¹⁸⁴

Canadian Law Enforcement

103. Federal Policing also maintains relationships with other police of jurisdiction within Canada. That includes municipal police and two provincial police forces: the Ontario Provincial Police and the Sûreté du Québec.

104. Officials from the Ontario Provincial Police and Sûreté du Québec briefed the Committee on the nature of their partnerships with Federal Policing on February 3, 2023. Their respective forces collaborate with Federal Policing in the areas of national security, protective services, countering major and organized crime, intelligence, investigative support, and Indigenous policing. With respect to national security, the two organizations investigate suspected offences until they meet the threshold for national security, at which point, they transfer the file to the RCMP’s Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) in Ontario or Quebec or conduct parallel investigations. Both organizations are collocated and embedded within RCMP INSETs in their respective provinces as well. Federal Policing also participates in provincial anti-terrorism sections. Regarding organized crime, both organizations work closely with Federal Policing within the Canadian Integrated Response to Organized Crime (CIROC). CIROC is the operational component of the Canadian Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat Organized Crime. It is mandated to coordinate a strategic plan for combatting organized or serious crime

¹⁸⁰ RCMP, “Federal Policing National Security (FPNS) Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the FPNS Leads Unit (Leads),” February 2021.

¹⁸¹ RCMP, “RCMP-CSIS Investigative Leads Initiative,” undated.

¹⁸² CSIS, “One Vision – A Sound and Collaborative Approach to Threat Management: Presentation to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP),” Deck, February 3, 2023.

¹⁸³ RCMP, “RCMP-CSIS Investigative Leads Initiative,” undated.

¹⁸⁴ RCMP, “RCMP-CSIS Investigative Leads Initiative,” undated.

through the integration of Canadian police efforts at the municipal, provincial, territorial, and national levels.¹⁸⁵

105. Officials from the Sûreté du Québec and Ontario Provincial Police informed the Committee that they work well with Federal Policing and that these partnerships are mutually beneficial. They stated that deconfliction, communication and intelligence sharing work well and that the organizations' mandates and responsibilities are clear and distinct.¹⁸⁶ Federal Policing shared this view.¹⁸⁷

106. In addition, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police has a number of committees that involve Federal Policing, such as the Organized Crime Committee, the Counter-Terrorism and National Security Committee, and the International Committee.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁵ OPP, Commander of the Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau Remarks, Briefing to NSICOP on Federal Policing Partnerships, February 3, 2023; and SQ, Director of Criminal Investigations Remarks, Briefing to NSICOP on Federal Policing Partnerships, February 3, 2023.

¹⁸⁶ OPP, Commander of the Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau Remarks, Briefing to NSICOP on Federal Policing Partnerships, February 3, 2023; and SQ, Director of Criminal Investigations Remarks, Briefing to NSICOP on Federal Policing Partnerships, February 3, 2023.

¹⁸⁷ RCMP, Federal Policing, Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management remarks, Briefing to NSICOP on Federal Policing Partnerships, February 3, 2023.

¹⁸⁸ Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, <https://www.cacp.ca/committees.html#10>.

Chapter 5: Accountability and Governance

107. Ministerial accountability is a fundamental principle of Canada's Parliamentary system of democracy.¹⁸⁹ The Minister of Public Safety is responsible and accountable for the RCMP, both to the Prime Minister and to Parliament. Under the RCMP Act, the Governor in Council appoints the RCMP Commissioner, who, under the direction of the Minister, has the control and management of the RCMP and all matters connected with it.¹⁹⁰ The Minister is therefore responsible for ensuring the RCMP is effective, accountable and addresses the government's priorities. In answering to Parliament, the Minister must report on the functioning of the RCMP and the use of its authorities.

Police independence

108. That said, Ministerial accountability for the RCMP is different from other government organizations. The core issue is police independence.¹⁹¹ Police independence in Canada is not defined in legislation. Instead, the concept has been defined over time through case law and Commissions of Inquiry, which have discussed the relationship between police and Ministers. In 1981, the Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (the McDonald Commission) recommended that the appropriate Minister should have "full power of direction over the activities of the RCMP, except over the 'quasi-judicial' police powers of investigation, arrest and prosecution."¹⁹² The Commission also noted that control over police by elected representatives was similar to the need to have civilian control of the military.¹⁹³

109. In 1999, the Supreme Court decision in *R. v. Campbell* affirmed police independence in the context of criminal investigations:

A police officer investigating a crime is not acting as a government functionary or an agent of anybody... While for certain purposes the Commissioner of the RCMP reports to the Solicitor General, the Commissioner is not to be considered a servant or agent of the government while engaged in a criminal investigation. The Commissioner is not subject to political direction.¹⁹⁴

¹⁸⁹ "Ministers of the Crown are responsible and accountable to the Prime Minister and Parliament in two fundamental ways: individually, for their performance in carrying out the responsibilities of the portfolio assigned to them by the Prime Minister; and collectively, in support of the Ministry team and decisions of Cabinet." Canada, [Open and Accountable Government](#), 2015.

¹⁹⁰ RCMP Act, ss. 5(1).

¹⁹¹ The Committee is indebted to Professor Kent Roach, who wrote a paper on this issue for the review and briefed the Committee on his findings.

¹⁹² Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Second Report Volume 2, Freedom and Security under the Law*, 1981. Pp 1111.

¹⁹³ Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Second Report Volume 2, Freedom and Security under the Law*, 1981. Pp 1005.

¹⁹⁴ Supreme Court of Canada. *R. v. Campbell*, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 565, April 22, 1999.

The 2006 Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar referenced the *Campbell* decision, noting that the RCMP is accountable to the Minister, who must be informed of its conduct and be answerable to Parliament and the Canadian public.¹⁹⁵

110. More recent decisions reaffirm this perspective. Three appellate court decisions following *Campbell* all noted that police independence should be confined to “law enforcement” and “core law enforcement decisions” such as laying charges.¹⁹⁶ While the Minister of Public Safety may issue direction for the RCMP, the Minister may not interfere in investigations. That said, the Minister may issue direction on priorities and on the administration of the organization. Indeed, as Canadian law scholar Kent Roach argued in a submission to the Committee, “strategic and democratically accountable direction of policing priorities, objectives and policies through Ministerial directions is consistent with police independence.”¹⁹⁷ However, Professor Roach makes a distinction between inappropriate and legitimate direction:

Following *Campbell*, police independence as a common law and constitutional principle and perhaps even a principle of fundamental justice under s.7 [of the *Charter*] does not prevent the government from establishing policing priorities or policies. Such directions would only infringe police independence if they effectively dictated investigations of specific individuals or ended investigations of specific individuals.

The Minister is ultimately responsible for the legitimate direction of police priorities, objectives and policies. As Professor Roach noted before the Committee, “We don’t want a police state in which the government can tell the police to charge and who not to charge, but we don’t want a state where the police operate independent of democracy.”¹⁹⁸

Ministerial Direction to the RCMP

111. The Minister of Public Safety provides direction to the RCMP. In addition to ensuring the appropriate use of its powers, the Minister may provide direction to the Commissioner on the management of the RCMP and all matters connected with it. This allows the Minister to proactively prescribe how the RCMP should function, including its priorities and objectives. This direction has recently taken two forms: Ministerial Directions and Mandate Letters.

112. Ministerial Directions provide policy guidance to the RCMP on specific areas. In the past, these directions have focused on sensitive or particularly important areas, such as information sharing and counterterrorism. The Minister of Public Safety has issued several directives to the RCMP that apply to RCMP Federal Policing:

¹⁹⁵ Commissioner of Inquiry, *Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar*, 2006.

¹⁹⁶ Kent Roach. *Police Independence and the Setting of Priorities for RCMP Federal Policing*, March 2022.

¹⁹⁷ Kent Roach. *Police Independence and the Setting of Priorities for RCMP Federal Policing*, March 2022.

¹⁹⁸ Kent Roach, Presentation to NSICOP, May 2022.

- Ministerial Direction on National Security Investigations in Sensitive Sectors (2003): This directed the RCMP to implement special measures when investigating terrorist offences or activities which have an impact on fundamental institutions in Canadian society, including academia, politics, religion, the media and trade unions.
- Ministerial Direction on National Security Related Arrangements and Cooperation (2003): This established processes for the RCMP to enter into arrangements with foreign security or intelligence organizations for the purposes of investigating terrorist offences or activities.
- Ministerial Direction on National Security Responsibility and Accountability (2003): This outlined the responsibilities of the Minister and the Commissioner related to investigations of terrorist offences or activities.
- Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities (2011): This provided guidance on sharing information with foreign entities relating to terrorist offences or activities.
- Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2019): This required the RCMP to monitor and report on information sharing with foreign partners. It also obligated the RCMP to provide the Minister an annual report on cases where the Direction was engaged, including the number of cases, any restrictions on information sharing arrangements due to concerns about potential mistreatment, and any changes to internal policies and procedures related to this Direction.

113. The Minister also provided the Commissioner with Mandate Letters in 2018 and 2022. In the 2018 letter, the Minister directed the Commissioner to focus on modernizing the RCMP, address harassment and bullying, and advance reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples. The letter contained no specific reference to the RCMP Federal Policing mandate or operations.¹⁹⁹

114. In the 2022 letter, the Minister directed the Commissioner to take action in a number of areas related to the RCMP Federal Policing mandate, including:

- improve the provision of federal and national policing services and supporting the establishment of a dedicated unit to investigate all forms of major financial crime;
- collaborate with other authorities to combat cybercrime, money laundering, human trafficking, child sexual exploitation, ideologically inspired violent extremism, foreign interference and threats to Canada's democratic institutions; and
- improve RCMP recruitment at all levels to better reflect the communities it serves, in particular Indigenous and Black communities, and recruiting more members with the skills necessary to combat sophisticated crimes.

The Minister requested an annual report on the RCMP's progress in achieving these priorities.

115. The Minister of Public Safety's role is to hold the RCMP to account as an elected representative. In turn, the RCMP is accountable to the Minister for its policies and actions.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, *Commissioner's Mandate Letter*, May 7, 2018.

²⁰⁰ The Mass Casualty Commission made the following recommendations in their final report in March 2023:

However, there are only two statutory requirements for the Commissioner to report to the Minister. The first is the *Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act*, which requires the RCMP to report to the Minister on cases of information sharing that trigger a risk of complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities. The second is the *Criminal Code*, which requires the RCMP to report to the Minister through Public Safety on its use of electronic surveillance during investigations.

116. Within the RCMP Act, there is no provision for regular reporting to the Minister. Instead, reporting is determined informally between the Minister and the Commissioner.²⁰¹ In an appearance before the Committee, the Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing stated that the majority of the Minister's engagement on the RCMP focuses on the Contract Policing mandate. When Federal Policing engages with the Minister, it is almost exclusively in the context of providing situational awareness on a major file or investigation. Due to 'police independence,' he stated that the relationship is a "one-way street": Federal Policing briefs the Minister, but the Minister does not provide direction to Federal Policing. There is no engagement between the Minister and Federal Policing on issues such as governance, priorities and organizational direction.²⁰² In contrast, the Policing Service Agreements that the RCMP has with eight provinces and three territories require RCMP divisional commanders to provide detailed annual reports to the contract jurisdictions on objectives and priorities, and separate reporting on financial and human resources planning.²⁰³ In the same vein, CSIS has a statutory requirement to provide reports to the Minister every 12 months with respect to the Service's operational activities during that period.²⁰⁴

Recommendation 87. Recommendation Ministerial Directions to the RCMP Commissioner: The Commission recommends that (a) Federal Parliament should amend section 5(1) of the RCMP Act to provide: The Governor in Council may appoint an officer, to be known as the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, to hold office during pleasure, who, subject to this Act and any written directions of the Minister, is responsible for the control and administration of the Force. (b) The RCMP Act be further amended to include the following provisions: (a) The Minister must cause a copy of any such written direction given to the Commissioner to be: (i) published in the Canada Gazette within eight days of the date of the direction; and (ii) laid before the Senate and the House of Commons within six sitting days of the direction if Parliament is then in session, or, if not, within six sitting days after the commencement of the next session of Parliament. (b) No Ministerial direction may be given to the Commissioner in relation to the appointment, transfer, remuneration, discipline, or termination of a particular person.

Recommendation 88. Recommendation Policies Governing the Roles and Responsibilities of the RCMP and Minister of Public Safety: The Commission recommends that (a) The RCMP and the minister of public safety should adopt complementary written policies that set out their respective roles, responsibilities, and mutual expectations in police / government relations. These policies should adopt the principles and findings on police / government relations outlined in Chapter 10 of Volume 5, Policing, of this Report, including specific provisions on the following issues: (i) police operational responsibilities; (ii) government policy responsibilities; (iii) policy of operations; and (iv) information exchanges between the RCMP and the government. (b) These policies should be posted on the RCMP and the Public Safety Canada websites. The Joint Federal/Provincial Commission into the April 2020 Nova Scotia Mass Casualty, "Turning the Tide Together: Final Report of the Mass Casualty Commission," March 2023.

<https://masscasualtycommission.ca/final-report/>.

²⁰¹ RCMP, Federal Policing, Governance, NSICOP Appearance, October 7, 2022.

²⁰² RCMP, Federal Policing, Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Governance and Transformation, October 7, 2022.

²⁰³ For example, subsection 7.2(c), *Province of British Columbia Provincial Police Service Agreement*, April 1, 2012.

²⁰⁴ CSIS, CSIS Act, Subsection 6(4).

Internal governance

117. Within the RCMP, the senior most governing body is the Senior Executive Committee. This Committee is currently comprised of the Commissioner, the Chief Administrative Officer, the Deputy Commissioners from each of the RCMP's business lines (Contract and Indigenous Policing, Federal Policing, Specialized Police Services), Deputy Commissioners who are the Commanding Officers for British Columbia and Alberta, the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Strategic Policy and External Relations Officer, and the Chief Human Resources Officer.²⁰⁵ While all final authority and decision making for the RCMP rests with the Commissioner, the Committee may provide advice to the Commissioner, deliberate on matters concerning the RCMP or take collective decisions.²⁰⁶

118. Below the Senior Executive Committee is the Senior Management Team. This team is comprised of the Commissioner, SEC members, the remaining Commanding Officers in each Division, and other senior executives based in national headquarters. Generally, the Senior Management Team is responsible for setting the RCMP's strategic priorities, but it may also discuss items brought to its attention, either before they go to the Senior Executive Committee or afterwards for further consideration.²⁰⁷

119. Outside of the RCMP, the Commissioner is provided with external advice from the Management Advisory Board. This Board is comprised of up to 13 members appointed on behalf of the Minister of Public Safety.²⁰⁸ The Board may provide advice and reports to the Commissioner on the management of the RCMP, notably the use of resources, the development of modernization plans and the implementation of policies and management controls to support the operation of the RCMP.²⁰⁹ While the Board considered the status of Federal Policing in November 2019, it is unclear whether it provided advice to the Commissioner thereafter.

120. Federal Policing is led by the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing, who sits on the Senior Executive Committee. Given that the RCMP is Canada's national police force, Federal Policing resources are distributed nationally and have varying reporting chains.²¹⁰ Within Ontario and Quebec, the divisions are comprised exclusively of Federal Policing resources which report directly to the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing. In the other provinces and territories, Federal Policing resources report to a divisional Commanding Officer, who is also responsible

²⁰⁵ RCMP, Directive on Senior Management Responsibilities, Authorities, and Accountability, April 23, 2012.

²⁰⁶ Records of Decision between February 2010 and April 2021 of the Senior Executive Council concerning Federal Policing were provided to the Committee.

²⁰⁷ RCMP, Directive on Senior Management Responsibilities, Authorities, and Accountability, April 23, 2012.

²⁰⁸ RCMP Act, ss.45.19(1).

²⁰⁹ RCMP Act, ss.45.18(2).

²¹⁰ RCMP, Federal Policing, Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Governance and Transformation, October 7, 2022.

for Contract Policing and accountable to both the RCMP Commissioner and to provincial authorities.²¹¹

121. Over the years, Federal Policing has made adjustments to enhance its governance over its resources within divisions, particularly those outside of Ontario and Quebec. In 2017, it implemented the Federal Criminal Operations Officer positions. These Criminal Operations Officers became a link between Federal Policing at Headquarters and Federal Policing personnel in the divisions.²¹² While this change strengthened Federal Policing governance over resources in the provinces and territories, Federal Policing reported that challenges persisted in some areas, including the diversion of federal resources, the alignment of resources against priorities and inconsistencies in Federal Policing operations.²¹³

122. In 2021, the RCMP approved and began implementing its Federal Policing Transformation plan. Among other things, the objective of the plan was to increase the governance and accountability of the Federal Policing program nationally. By changing the reporting structure to have Federal Criminal Operations Officers report to Federal Policing at Headquarters and not through divisional Commanding Officers, Federal Policing sought to have more visibility and authority over its resources to ensure that they are responding to Federal Policing priorities.²¹⁴ Federal Policing also expects to be better able to direct and oversee its investigations nationally. In addition, Federal Policing intends to relocate resources to areas where the majority of Federal Policing investigations are concentrated: Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal.²¹⁵ While the deadline for altering the reporting chain was set for April 2022, delays caused it to be postponed and there is currently no timeline for its implementation. There is no timeline for Federal Policing's geographic redistribution of resources.²¹⁶

²¹¹ RCMP Act, ss.6.1(1).

²¹² RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing Transformation Case for Change and Way Forward," July 2021.

²¹³ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing Transformation Case for Change and Way Forward," July 2021.

²¹⁴ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing Transformation Case for Change and Way Forward," July 2021.

²¹⁵ RCMP, Federal Policing, Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Governance and Transformation, October 7, 2022.

²¹⁶ RCMP, Federal Policing, Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Governance and Transformation, October 7, 2022.

Chapter 6: Thematic Issues

123. Over the course of the review, the Committee found that many of the challenges identified by Federal Policing were consistent across activity areas. For example, data integrity or financial management issues affect all facets of Federal Policing's work. Several common themes emerged throughout the review process. These themes are: finance and human resources; recruitment and training; data; prioritization; and intelligence. In this chapter, the Committee addresses each of these thematic areas in turn.

Finance and Human Resources


Finances

124. The RCMP has a complex financial structure. In Fiscal Year 2022/23, its total budget of \$6 billion is composed of voted and statutory appropriations (\$4.23 billion) and re-spendable revenues (\$1.76 billion) that are mainly from provinces and territories.²¹⁷ The majority of funds (89%) go to RCMP operations in the form of employee pay (65%) and operations and maintenance (24%),²¹⁸ with the rest going to capital spending (4%), grants and contributions and statutory benefits (7%), which are almost entirely devoted to disability pensions for police officers injured on-duty. The RCMP's budget is composed in significant part of Special Purpose Allotments, which is funding that can only be used for specific programs or short-term initiatives and cannot be re-allocated to address other financial pressures. The distribution of funds across the RCMP's four core responsibilities shows that Contract Policing accounts for the majority (57%) of RCMP spending (see chart 5 below).²¹⁹

²¹⁷ The RCMP's Main Estimates may increase in-year through Supplementary Estimates to account for newly approved initiatives and transfers from other government departments. Main Estimates can be considered as RCMP's opening budget in any given year.

²¹⁸ Employee pay includes salary (56%) and employee benefit plans (9%), such as pension plans and dental and health insurance.

²¹⁹ RCMP, RCMP Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, Presentation to NSICOP, December 2, 2022.



Source: RCMP Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, Presentation to the: National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. December 2, 2022.

Chart 5: Composition of RCMP Budget, Fiscal Year 2022/23 and Distribution of Operating Funds among the RCMP’s Four Core Responsibilities.

125. Between Fiscal Years 2016-17 and 2020-21, funding for the RCMP as an organization has increased (see table 1). There are various reasons for these increases, such as new initiatives (e.g., cybercrime investigations units in 2018), but the most significant resulted from a new funding model for Contract Policing, including new incremental funding (2018/19); financial adjustments (in 2019/20 the RCMP was allocated a one-time payment of nearly \$1 billion to address Employee Benefit Plan actuarial adjustments); collective bargaining; pay increases for certain categories of employees; and one-time funding for major events (e.g., the G7). Little of this increase was provided to augment the RCMP’s operational capacity.

126. As with other government departments, the RCMP lapsed money at year end, meaning that it could not spend the funds it was allocated and the money was returned to the fiscal framework. During the same five-year period, the RCMP raised program integrity concerns (meaning that its budget was not sufficient to cover expenses required to fulfill its departmental responsibilities) in the areas of Federal Policing, Specialized Police Services and certain enabling programs, such as recruiting (most of these pressures continue). Although the annual lapses appear significant, the RCMP could not reallocate funds to address its program integrity issues, because the majority of the lapsed funds were located in Special Purpose Allotments.²²⁰ For example, in 2017/18 the RCMP lapsed \$261 million including \$5 million of statutory lapses (not including \$121 million being re-profiled into a future fiscal year), a lapse of over 7% of its total fiscal spending authority. However, of that amount, approximately \$204 million was in

²²⁰ In 2020, the RCMP noted, “RCMP lapses in Public Accounts give the appearance that there is financial flexibility to address financial pressures. However, only a small fraction of these lapses are within the RCMP’s Regular Allotment, which are the only funds that the Commissioner can reallocate at management’s discretion. Funding for Special Purpose Allotments (SPA), which is where significant lapses materialized, cannot be transferred between budget allotments without Cabinet or Parliamentary Authority.” RCMP, NSICOP Request for RCMP Financial Information, August 2022.

Special Purpose Allotments, which were unavailable for reallocation, meaning the RCMP lapsed \$52 million of its total authorities (1.5%). Taking these factors into account, the RCMP has been lapsing between 1-3% of its final spending authorities in recent Fiscal Years, most of which were in Special Purpose Allotments; capital funding for dedicated projects; and, grant funding for disability pensions.

RCMP (all)	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
Authorities	3,306,749,745	3,593 218,945	4,094,866,936	5,045,053,533	4,025,481,830
Spent	3,017,626,084	3,210,983,890	3,789,228,428	4,732,973,923	3,827,365,703
Lapse/Deficit	289,123,661	383,235,055	306,638,508	312,079,610	198,116,127
Re-profiled	0	121,147,476	12,026,723	0	74,787,048
Net Lapse/Deficit	289,123,661	261,087,579	293,611,785	312,079,610	123,329,079

Inclusive of Health Costs, Employee Benefit Plan and other Statutory Vote Items. Source: Public Accounts

Source: RCMP Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, Presentation to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. December 2, 2022.

Table 1: RCMP Spending Authorities and Lapses, 2016-2020.

127. The same pattern has occurred in the Federal Policing program (see table 2). The budget for Federal Policing ('authorities') has remained relatively stable over the past five years. During that period, it has lapsed very few resources and, in many cases, those could not be reallocated because they were found in Special Purpose Allotments or disability pensions (as noted above, a statutory benefit). For example, the lapse of \$111 million in 2018/19 was comprised of unspent funds for providing security to the G7 meeting in Charlevoix, Quebec (\$77 million) and peacekeeping operations (\$17 million).

Federal Policing	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21
Authorities	867,811,976	1,002,406,458	1,069,242,113	1,153,350,350	958,903,137
Spent	842,453,420	910,017,621	955,021,495	1,093,472,764	890,171,085
Lapse/Deficit	25,358,556	92,388,837	114,220,618	59,877,586	68,732,052
Re-profiled	0	82,919,489	2,547,000	0	7,863,779
Net Lapse/Deficit	25,358,556	9,469,348	111,673,618	59,877,586	60,868,273

Inclusive of Health Costs, Employee Benefit Plan and other Statutory Vote Items. Source: Public Accounts

Source: RCMP Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, Presentation to the: National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. December 2, 2022.

Table 2: Federal Policing Spending Authorities and Lapses, 2016-2020

128. That said, two issues are worth noting. First, the full costs of RCMP Contract Policing are not reflected in the Police Service Agreements. This is not a new issue. In 1992, the Auditor

General found that the RCMP was spending an additional \$100 million per year to support its obligations under the Police Service Agreements.²²¹ In its 2017 assessment of the RCMP, KPMG calculated that the RCMP was spending \$668 million in federal funds to fulfill Contract Policing requirements. This spending is not a direct transfer, but rather additional indirect costs for program areas, such as recruiting, training and information management, that support RCMP Contract Policing. Nonetheless, it means resources are not available in other parts of the RCMP, including Federal Policing. As KPMG noted,

Notwithstanding specific pressures, the overall impact of the capacity challenges has largely been a shift of the level of effort from serious and organized crime and financial crimes to focus on high-risk national security threats and protective services.

Notwithstanding this, Canadian crime rates have been declining since 2012 while the RCMP contract presence has continued to grow across Canada.²²²

129. Second, the RCMP's ability to manage its Federal Policing budget has only been possible through the decline in the number of police officers in the program over the same period. Over the eight-year period between 2014-15 and 2021-22, Federal Policing has seen its number of full time employees decline by 485 personnel, most of whom were police officers (this issue is discussed further in paragraphs 135 and 138). The funds associated with these vacancies have been used to maintain investigations and activities in the Federal Policing mandate. As RCMP officials noted in a briefing to the Committee, if the Federal Policing program filled all of its vacancies, it would exceed its budget by at least \$50-80 Million.²²³

Human Resources

130. As of April 1, 2022, the RCMP had approximately 30,000 personnel. The majority of these are Regular Members (approximately 19,580 employees, or 63% of all employees). Contract Policing accounts for approximately 2/3 of the RCMP (approximately 18,400 employees, of all categories), with the remainder distributed among the three other areas: Federal Policing, Specialized Policing Services and Internal Services.

131. The RCMP's model of training and recruitment is oriented towards its Contract Policing obligations under the Police Service Agreements. To fulfill these obligations, the RCMP follows a generalist recruitment and training model capable of producing front line police officers.

132. All police officer recruits to the RCMP must meet a list of qualifications and standards. Applicants must be at least 18 years of age and a Canadian citizen or a permanent resident, be proficient in English or French, possess a valid drivers' license, possess a Canadian high school diploma or equivalent, and meet RCMP standards for health, psychological well-being, vision,

²²¹ Auditor General of Canada, 1992 Report to Parliament, Chapter 22: Royal Canadian Mounted Police Provincial and Municipal Policing, 1993.

²²² KPMG LLP, *Resourcing Review Final Report*, May 2017.

²²³ RCMP, RCMP Financial Structure & Federal Policing Financials, Presentation to NSICOP, December 2, 2022.

hearing and fitness. Applicants must also be willing to carry and use a firearm or any other necessary physical force, attend the RCMP's training academy, relocate anywhere within Canada, work shifts and conform to certain standards, such as dress and comportment.²²⁴

133. On joining the RCMP, Regular Members complete six and a half months of training at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Academy, or Depot, in Saskatchewan. Depot's curriculum is oriented almost entirely to support general duty policing and only summarily discusses the Federal mandate. At Depot, recruits learn foundational policing skills, including:

- 428 hours of Applied Police Sciences, including arrest and investigative procedures, communication skills, and knowledge of relevant legislation, including the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* and the *Criminal Code*;
- 104 hours of Firearm training;
- 94 hours of Police Defensive Tactics;
- 67 hours of Police Driving;
- 45 hours of Operation Conditioning, or physical fitness;
- 38 hours of Drill and Deportment, including marching and equipment care;
- 41 hours in other areas, such as exams; and
- 6 hours on the RCMP's federal mandate, including federal priorities, federal statutes, and issues of organized crime and the role of intelligence.²²⁵

134. The RCMP has struggled in recent years to recruit and train sufficient numbers of police officers. This is due to a number of factors, including a tight labour market and changing job expectations (e.g., fewer people are willing to accept mobility requirements). Nonetheless, the RCMP has managed to cumulatively increase its recruitment of Regular Members by approximately 350 individuals, most of whom were used to fill resource gaps in contract jurisdictions.²²⁶ Changes in the RCMP's number of full-time equivalents, separated by employee classification, are depicted in table 3.

²²⁴ RCMP, "[Qualifications and Standards to Become and RCMP Officer](#)," Webpage, 2020.

²²⁵ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Cadet Training Programs Relevant to Federal Policing, RCMP Depot Division," January 25, 2022.

²²⁶ RCMP, Federal Policing, "RCMP Response to Committee Questions," August 29, 2022.

RCMP Full-Time Equivalents (FTE)									
Employment Type Group	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22
RM	18,270	17,933	18,085	18,152	18,226	18,462	18,866	18,843	18,616
CM	3,661	3,524	3,521	3,521	3,353	3,180	3,030	2,861	2,729
PS	5,622	5,694	5,785	5,846	6,109	6,566	6,953	7,430	7,696
Determinate	1,481	1,002	938	927	1,068	1,047	1,085	1,037	1,084
Grand Total	29,033	28,154	28,330	28,446	28,756	29,254	30,935	30,171	30,125
Year over Year Change		(878)	176	115	311	498	881	236	(46)
Cumulative Change		(878)	(702)	(587)	(276)	222	902	1,138	1,092

Source: RCMP, Response to Committee Questions, August 29, 2022.

Table 3: RCMP Full-Time Equivalents

135. By contrast, Federal Policing is facing a shrinking recruitment pool. Over the last nine years, Federal Policing has seen a cumulative decline of almost 600 Regular Member positions,²²⁷ despite having received funding for an additional 500 positions over the same period.²²⁸ In 2018, Public Safety Canada noted that the RCMP was unable to fulfill its Federal Policing mandate due to its obligations under the Police Services Agreements. It observed that Federal Policing was operating at a 9.4% vacancy rate, compared to a 3.7% vacancy rate in Contract Policing (at the time, Federal Policing represented 23% of the RCMP's total funded Regular Member positions, but accounted for approximately 40% of the RCMP's overall vacancies).²²⁹ In the 2022-23 Fiscal Year, Federal Policing was operating at a 13% vacancy rate for its Regular Members.²³⁰ Changes in Federal Policing personnel are depicted in table 4.

Federal Policing Full-Time Equivalents (FTE)									
Employment Type Group	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22
RM	3,976	3,829	3,634	3,533	3,493	3,526	3,518	3,499	3,390
CM	434	483	486	498	488	480	462	441	417
PS	702	716	695	694	750	813	807	856	869
Determinate	210	110	138	144	171	145	159	158	161
Grand Total	5,322	5,137	4,953	4,869	4,901	4,965	4,945	4,954	4,837
Year over Year Change		(184)	(184)	(84)	33	63	(19)	9	(117)
Cumulative Change		(184)	(369)	(453)	(420)	(357)	(377)	(368)	(485)

Source: RCMP, Response to Committee Questions, August 29, 2022.

Table 4: Federal Policing Full-time Equivalents

²²⁷ Data prior to 2013-14 was not available due to Federal Policing Re-engineering.

²²⁸ RCMP, Federal Policing, Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Recruitment and Training, June 10, 2022.

²²⁹ Public Safety Canada, "Contract Policing Diagnostic", 2018

²³⁰ RCMP, Federal Policing, "RCMP Response to Committee Questions", August 29, 2022.

136. The reason for this gap is two-fold. First, the Police Services Agreements with the provinces and territories legally require the RCMP to maintain (or increase upon request) staffing in contract jurisdictions, regardless of its other priorities. As a consequence, the RCMP's contract obligations take priority when filling personnel gaps. Second, the Federal Policing recruitment model has, until recently, been entirely dependent on the broad recruitment strategies, policies, and campaigns of the RCMP writ large. This has limited Federal Policing's ability to separately recruiting individuals with advanced education or specialized skill sets, particularly in the areas of cyber and financial crime. Federal Policing has been unable to recruit sufficient numbers of officers with the requisite experience and skills to keep up with the demand as Regular Members retire. The Committee turns to the issue of recruiting for Federal policing next.

Federal Policing recruitment and training

137. Federal Policing's approaches to recruitment and training have, until recently, depended on the RCMP's broader strategies, which primarily support its Contract Policing mandate. For the most part, Federal Policing does not recruit directly from RCMP Depot, because the training there focuses almost exclusively on general duty policing and recruits usually lack the experience and knowledge required to work in the Federal mandate.²³¹ Federal investigations require investigators to apply critical thinking and research and analysis skills to complex files concerning the most severe threats to Canada and Canadians.²³² Federal investigative files may require specialized knowledge, take place over several years, and involve coordination with law enforcement partners across multiple jurisdictions, including internationally.²³³ As a result, Federal Policing primarily recruits experienced Regular Members within the broader RCMP. On average, Regular Members join the Federal Policing program after having worked in Contract Policing for 10 years.²³⁴ This experience provides new Federal Policing recruits with knowledge and expertise in complex investigations applicable to Federal Policing.

138. Federal Policing has recently noted that this approach to recruitment does not sufficiently support the Federal mandate.²³⁵ One challenge is simply numbers. As described earlier, the Federal Policing program has seen a steady decline in the numbers of police officers working in the Federal mandate, due to financial pressures and the RCMP's wider staffing challenges. Another challenge is internal. There is no formal recruitment path to transition from one mandate to the other; Regular Members simply indicate that they are interested in joining Federal Policing or apply for positions internally. There is also no developed career path from Contract Policing to Federal Policing; Regular Members transfer at their own preference and

²³¹ Between 2013 and 2022, Federal Policing recruited an average of 29 Depot graduates each year, accounting for 4% of the total number of graduating cadets during this period. RCMP, Federal Policing, "RCMP Response to Committee Questions," August 29, 2022.

²³² RCMP, Federal Policing, "RCMP Response to Committee Questions," August 29, 2022.

²³³ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing Skills Gap and Needs Analysis," 2016.

²³⁴ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing Skills Gap and Needs Analysis," 2016.

²³⁵ RCMP, "Federal Mandate Project Chapeau: Case for Change," June 14, 2017; and RCMP, "Federal Policing Transformation: Case for Change and the Way Forward," July 2021.

often return to the Contract mandate due to the greater number of promotional opportunities.²³⁶ Finally, Federal Policing has struggled to source all the skills, education and experience required to conduct increasingly complex and specialized investigations in the modern criminal threat environment.

139. The Federal Policing program is currently implementing three new initiatives to address its recruiting challenges. The first is the Retired Police Officer Initiative. Launched in 2019, this initiative is meant to bring in existing, pre-trained talent to Federal Policing, and typically involves short-term contracts for recently retired police officers.²³⁷ Federal Policing has hired 10 police officers since the inception of the plan, and has no fixed target for recruitment in the future. The second is the Experienced Police Officer initiative through which the RCMP is seeking to hire individuals from other police forces and the military police.

140. The third and largest initiative is the Civilian Investigators Initiative. The Federal Policing program identified civilian investigators as a possible solution to the shortage of Regular Members. Launched in 2021, the initiative began with a focus on attracting civilians with expertise relevant to cyber or financial crime investigations, with plans to expand to other areas of the Federal mandate thereafter.²³⁸ In such investigations, there is no requirement for certain types of foundational police training (e.g., firearms) and civilians would be trained to write operational plans and judicial authorizations for covert entry or wiretaps. These areas also require specialized training and education, in fields such as computer science and forensic accounting, that civilians may possess (see case study 2 below). The initial goal of the initiative was to hire 35 civilian investigators to work on cyber and financial crime investigations in the four divisions where the majority of federal investigations take place: Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia.²³⁹ Since the plan's inception in 2021, Federal Policing has hired 25 personnel, 13 of whom already worked for the RCMP.²⁴⁰ The Federal Policing program intends to increase the number of Civilian Investigators as a proportion of the Federal Policing workforce to 30% within 10-15 years.²⁴¹

141. Federal Policing recognizes that this initiative may face cultural challenges. Federal Policing noted that Regular Members may not welcome that integration of Civilian Investigators into Federal units, as investigations have traditionally been the role of police officers. Regular Members have also raised concerns that civilian investigators would take away police positions and promotional opportunities.²⁴² The National Police Federation, the union which represents the Regular Members of the RCMP, stated that "the RCMP must have the necessary funding to

²³⁶ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing Skills Gap and Needs Analysis," 2016.

²³⁷ RCMP, "Federal Policing Experienced Police Officer Initiative," 2019.

²³⁸ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing Skills Gap and Needs Analysis," 2016.

²³⁹ RCMP, Federal Policing, remarks by Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management, meeting with NSICOP Secretariat, March 30, 2022.

²⁴⁰ RCMP, Federal Policing, Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Recruitment and Training, June 10, 2022.

²⁴¹ RCMP, Federal Policing, remarks by Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management, meeting with NSICOP Secretariat, March 30, 2022.; RCMP, Federal Policing, Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Recruitment and Training, June 10, 2022.

²⁴² RCMP, Federal Policing, "Project Charter, Civilian Criminal Investigator Project," 2021.

continue training new recruits and developing the skills of seasoned Members... Making policing an attractive career choice is the best way to sustain service standards and to ensure staffing levels are appropriate for the workload at any given time.”²⁴³

142. Federal Policing has also identified the current model of training as ill-suited for current investigative requirements. The RCMP has traditionally relied on Regular Members to develop investigative experience in the field rather than receive it through training.²⁴⁴ Federal Policing augments this experience through specialized training to prepare individuals for federal investigations.²⁴⁵ When a Regular Member joins the Federal Policing program, they are required to take courses in the investigative area where they will be working.²⁴⁶ Additionally, specialized courses are offered when possible. For example, Regular Members working in national security investigations must take a five-day national security investigative course; optional courses include specialized areas of terrorist financing or violent extremism risk assessment.

143. The Federal Policing mandate’s approach to training faces challenges. As of 2021, all Federal Policing training for investigations, intelligence and covert operations was outdated, with programs failing to keep pace with new criminal threats, recommendations from audits and reviews, or changing legislation.²⁴⁷ Moreover, the governance of training is largely dependent on training units in individual provinces, many of which have their own budgets and training priorities. This results in inconsistent training for Federal Policing employees depending on their location in Canada. The RCMP also noted that, “[t]his de-centralized approach results in a duplication of efforts, resourcing challenges, various training budgets, ad-hoc training development and delivery and a lack of national oversight and accountability of the Federal Policing training program at large.”²⁴⁸

144. In response, Federal Policing has considered several solutions to its training challenges. In 2021, Federal Policing developed a proposal for a Federal Policing Training Academy. The proposal would have implemented a more structured approach to training members across the country. Under the proposed approach, trainees would have access to an up-to-date, consistent training curriculum. This curriculum would be designed to build the investigational knowledge and skills required to conduct Federal investigations. Following general training, recruits would be able to take advanced training within their particular areas of specialization (e.g. national security, financial crime, and border enforcement).²⁴⁹ It would have also seen Regular Members recruited directly into Federal Policing and complete all their training at the Academy, rather than at Depot. Similarly, those who entered the program as Experienced Police Officers and

²⁴³ National Police Federation, “Review of Federal Policing Within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Submission to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians,” April 1, 2022.

²⁴⁴ RCMP, Federal Policing, Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing and Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Recruitment and Training, June 10, 2022.

²⁴⁵ In its 2021 Course Catalogue, Federal Policing listed over 175 courses to both Regular Members and civilians, not including training courses available through the Canada School of Public Service or language training. RCMP, Federal Policing, “Federal Policing Course Catalogue,” 2021.

²⁴⁶ RCMP, Federal Policing, “RCMP written response,” July 22, 2022.

²⁴⁷ RCMP, “Federal Policing Training Academy Business Case,” March 1, 2021.

²⁴⁸ RCMP, “Federal Policing Training Academy Business Case,” March 1, 2021.

²⁴⁹ RCMP, “Federal Policing Training Academy Business Case,” March 1, 2021.

Civilian Investigators would have received training at the Academy. This proposal was not approved by the Senior Executive Committee.²⁵⁰

145. Federal Policing is now working to implement a direct entry program through Depot.²⁵¹ This would allow Regular Members, Civilian Investigators and Experienced Police Officers to receive variations of a shortened police training curriculum before completing Federal Policing specific courses and specialized training in areas such as national security or financial crime. The first component of this curriculum, the Federal Policing Investigations Course, was implemented in September 2022. There is no deadline to implement the rest of the curriculum.²⁵²

Case Study 2: Project OROOK

In January 2012, Federal Policing in Ontario launched an investigation of a systematic fraudulent investment scheme (otherwise known as a PONZI Scheme) based on a request from the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, which raised concerns regarding a company and its subsidiary corporation which initiated bankruptcy proceedings, claiming that they owed creditors \$75 million.

Federal Policing identified this investigation as a priority due to the size of the finances involved and assigned a team of three employees to the file, including an investigative team of two Regular Members and a civilian forensic accountant. Other personnel were added as required. In February, RCMP investigators concluded that the company's two directors were listed as the directors and principals of 12 companies, which benefited directly from approximately \$16 million in deposits, loans or transfers.

Over the course of the two-year-long investigation, Federal Policing investigators obtained evidence through business background checks, production orders on approximately 300 financial accounts, and interviews of the senior managers of the company, its account staff and several of its investors. The investigative team was able to trace the misappropriation and laundering of funds across multiple accounts, companies and financial institutions. Ultimately, the director of the company was found guilty of money laundering and fraud in the amount of approximately \$55 million.

The skills of the civilian forensic accountant were critical to the success of this investigation. With this analysis, investigators were able to demonstrate that the company's lending activity was insufficient to sustain the interest rates promised to investors. It also found that funds from new investors were used to pay principal and interest to old investors to perpetuate the fraudulent investment scheme. The RCMP's forensic analysis of the company's business accounts, non-arm's length business accounts, and the directors' personal accounts, also determined that the company's directors laundered investors' funds to their personal accounts.

²⁵⁰ RCMP, Federal Policing, remarks by Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management, Briefing to NSICOP, March 30, 2022.

²⁵¹ RCMP, Federal Policing, Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Recruitment and Training, June 10, 2022.

²⁵² RCMP, Federal Policing, "RCMP Response to NSICOP Questions on Training and Recruitment," July 7, 2022.

Data

146. Data are essential to police operations. The types of data collected can shape perspective and focus on criminal threats. According to Harvard professor Malcolm Sparrow:

The way that data are arranged within data files helps determine the types of analysis that can be performed and the uses to which they can be put. The manner in which information flows around a department largely determines which matters are nominated for attention at different levels and who makes which decisions. ...Properly managed, information systems can serve as a powerful tool in the hands of progressive police executives. They can cut labor costs, improve resource allocation, and increase efficiency and effectiveness of existing operations. They also can help redefine the work, emphasize new values, and facilitate the development of new partnerships.²⁵³

147. Data analysis and reporting enable the monitoring of priorities, resources, expenditures and performance, and support governance and accountability. This is particularly true in an organization with the size and scope of the RCMP.

148. Since 2018, nine separate RCMP internal audits raised data as an area of concern.²⁵⁴ These audits identified three primary challenges: incomplete or absent data, data inaccuracy, and data inconsistency. These challenges contributed to significant problems in performance management, support for decision-making, and oversight. Despite commitments to improve data within the management responses and action plans for these audits, these challenges persist.

Data systems

149. The RCMP has three main electronic records management systems in which policing information is entered and stored. These systems contain operational information on criminal activity and investigations. They are the primary source for intelligence analysis, crime statistics, priority-setting and performance metrics. The first system is PROS, which is used by the majority of RCMP units. The second is Secret PROS (SPROS), which contains all classified material and is the primary database for Federal Policing national security investigations. The

²⁵³ Malcolm K. Sparrow, "[Information Systems and the Development of Policing](#)," A Publication of the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, and the Program in Criminal Justice Policy and Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 1993.

²⁵⁴ RCMP, Horizontal Evaluation of the Canadian Police Arrangement - International Police Peacekeeping and Peace Operations Program (2015-2020), Preliminary Survey of the Federal Policing Major Project Prioritization and Governance Tool (December 2016), Evaluation of the RCMP's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Capability (March 2017), Horizontal Evaluation of the National Anti-Drug Strategy RCMP Component Piece (March 2018), Evaluation of the Beyond the Border Action Plan - Shiprider Program (December 2018), Audit of the Management of Terrorism Peace Bonds (March 2019), Evaluation of the RCMP Counter Technical Intrusion Program (September 2020), Audit of National Standards (July 2021), Audit of Federal Policing Major Project Governance Tools (March 2022).

third is PRIME, which is a databased established and used solely within the RCMP (and other police forces) in British Columbia.

150. These three systems lack interoperability. PROS is run by the RCMP, SPROS is reserved for classified information and is kept separate for security reasons, and PRIME falls under the authority of the government of British Columbia. The RCMP must therefore access and manipulate the data for these three systems to understand and track Federal Policing activities nationally. A unit called the Situational Awareness Support Unit (a team of approximately 20) is responsible for data reporting and analysis.

151. The three systems of the RCMP (PROS, SPROS, and PRIME) have varying criteria and inputs. Each system has its own criteria in its drop-down menus, making records inconsistent across Federal Policing and the RCMP. Neither PROS nor PRIME has codes for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incidents.²⁵⁵ This inconsistency makes it challenging for the Support Unit to link data to Federal Policing priorities. The result is that the Support Unit classifies a large share of Federal Policing tiered projects as “other” when assigning them a priority area. A full 28% of all tiered projects classified as “other” are from British Columbia (E Division) and are attributable to data and access limitations with the PRIME system.²⁵⁶ These inconsistencies undermine Federal Policing’s ability to develop a full picture of the frequency and type of occurrences and investigations.

152. These variances affect how Federal Policing tracks its investigative activities. Each occurrence that is recorded within the data systems is counted as Federal Policing-led when it is primarily responded to by a Federal Policing unit. However, there is no field within the data systems to identify Federal Policing units: these occurrences must be compiled manually.²⁵⁷ This means that there is no ability for Federal Policing to have a snapshot of data to assist in decision-making and prioritization. Without this data, Federal Policing may not be able to identify its highest risks or respond to them.²⁵⁸

153. Data integrity is an ongoing concern for the RCMP. Of the information that is entered into the various data systems, many include incomplete records, outdated reporting, inconsistent use of codes and flags, incorrect data and missing information.²⁵⁹ The RCMP also lacks Quality Assurance teams across divisions.²⁶⁰ With all input at the discretion of the investigating officer and variance between the data systems, inconsistency and a lack of standardization mean that data, an essential element to effective policing, is not reliably available to effectively support operations and decision-making.

154. In 2020, Federal Policing introduced a new business intelligence system to address some of these issues. FOYER is an interface system used by Federal Policing that was designed to fill

²⁵⁵ RCMP, “Evaluation of the RCMP’s Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response Capability,” 2017.

²⁵⁶ RCMP, Situational Awareness Support Unit, “Federal Policing Priorities Overview,” November 4, 2021.

²⁵⁷ RCMP, Situational Awareness Support Unit, “Federal Policing Priorities Overview,” November 4, 2021.

²⁵⁸ RCMP, Situational Awareness Support Unit, “Federal Policing Priorities Overview,” November 4, 2021.

²⁵⁹ RCMP, Situational Awareness Support Unit, “Federal Policing Priorities Overview,” November 4, 2021.

²⁶⁰ RCMP, “NSICOP FP Review – Feedback Tracker,” May 29, 2023.

gaps among the data systems (SPROS, PROS and PRIME). The goal of this system is to increase consistency and the ability of the Situational Awareness Support Unit to properly analyze and report on operational data. It also assists with accountability, as supervisors can see drafts of the standardized forms that populate the data systems. In addition, Federal Policing introduced the Occurrence Triage Aid to ensure that their efforts and resources are directed at the most significant criminal threats. According to the RCMP, the Triage Aid “serves to ensure consistency in decision-making while enabling the collection of previously unavailable data.”²⁶¹

155. Compliance with FOYER and the Occurrence Triage Aid has been low. Federal Policing set full compliance for June 2021, but left the Divisions to set up their own rules around the use of the Triage Aid and FOYER. In early 2021, the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing sent a mandate letter to all divisional Commanding Officers requiring full compliance with these data systems. In March 2022, Quebec (C Division) had the highest rate of compliance at 24%. Ontario (O Division) had a compliance rate of 1% and British Columbia (E Division) had a compliance rate of 0%. In February 2023, Ontario had improved to a compliance rate of 11%; Quebec dropped to 16%, and British Columbia remained at 0%. The overall compliance rate was 3%.²⁶² The Divisions are aware of their non-compliance, as the Situational Awareness Support Unit distributes monthly reports on system usage.²⁶³

156. This creates significant challenges. The RCMP cannot accurately calculate the cost of investigations. The executive of the RCMP does not receive annual reports on operational data and its analysis. The RCMP also has no governance system, such as standardized methods or approaches, for data analytics.²⁶⁴ This data and information gap has knock-on effects for the organization, its governance and accountability. In 2021, the Senior Management Team of the RCMP noted that the RCMP’s data mechanisms and inconsistencies in reporting across Federal Policing “do not support evidence-based decision making.”²⁶⁵ The organization itself has identified ongoing challenges with the collection, interpretation and presentation of data, making it difficult to accurately assess the RCMP’s impact on criminal activity.²⁶⁶

157. Executive decisions regarding resource placement are also affected. In January 2019, the RCMP created a Federal Policing accountability framework. Federal Policing decided that “evidence-based decision-making and operational priorities will determine where resources are deployed” and that corporate management systems for HR and finance would be maintained and updated regularly.²⁶⁷ To do this, the accountability framework placed responsibility for tracking and reporting of the Federal Policing program’s workload and resources on the

²⁶¹RCMP, “FP FOYER: OTA User Guide,” April 2020.

²⁶² RCMP, “FP Occurrence Triage Aid Overview,” April 2023.

²⁶³ RCMP, Situational Awareness Support Unit, Remarks by SASU Officials, Meeting with NSICOP Secretariat, March 2022.

²⁶⁴ RCMP, Situational Awareness Support Unit, Remarks by SASU Officials, Meeting with NSICOP Secretariat, March 2022.

²⁶⁵ RCMP, “Federal Mandate Project Governance and Footprint Options for Consideration (SMT DISCUSSION DRAFT),” June 14, 2017.

²⁶⁶ RCMP, “RCMP Anti-Money Laundering Strategy,” 10 November 2015.

²⁶⁷ RCMP, Federal Policing, “Federal Mandate Accountability Framework,” January 2019.

divisions. The Federal Criminal Operations officers were directed to provide regular performance reports, including “consistent and comparable data” to inform decision-making.²⁶⁸ These changes were not always well-received. According to a 2019 consultation report on Federal Policing Criminal Operations,

Overlapping responsibilities with Divisions can create tension when Divisions get the impression that they are not trusted to make their own decisions, based on budget and priorities, without NHQ intervention.²⁶⁹

158. These tensions undermined Federal Policing’s efforts to deploy and track resources accurately. The report added that pushback from Divisions made it “very difficult to exercise the kind of oversight that the new Governance Framework stipulates.”²⁷⁰

Prioritization

159. Federal Policing must address a dynamic criminal landscape with finite resources. To do so, it employs a prioritization process designed to allocate funding and personnel to operational files of the highest importance. This process involves multiple stages.

160. The first stage of the prioritization process is the setting of strategic priorities. The Federal Policing program adopted a Federal Priority Setting Framework in 2016 to align its resource output and effort with the criminal threat environment by focusing on the most serious threats to Canada and Canadians.²⁷¹ The framework is intended to allow Federal Policing to optimize resources; to enhance governance, oversight and situational awareness at Federal Policing National Headquarters; to increase results and evidence-based policy and decision-making; and to enhance accountability and reporting structures.²⁷² Federal Policing sets its strategic priorities on a three-year cycle.²⁷³

161. The Federal Policing Strategic Policy Branch (Strategic Policy) is responsible for managing the priority setting cycle and preparing an overview of the national and international criminal threat environments to inform the priority setting process.²⁷⁴ In completing this overview, Strategic Policy relies on internal, external and international sources of information. These include the Federal budget, Ministerial mandate letters, intelligence and information shared by domestic security and intelligence partners, completed and ongoing RCMP

²⁶⁸ RCMP, Federal Policing, “Federal Mandate Accountability Framework,” January 2019.

²⁶⁹ RCMP, Federal Policing, “Roles and Responsibilities of FPCO Analysts and Reviewers: Consultation Report,” 2019.

²⁷⁰ RCMP, Federal Policing, “Roles and Responsibilities of FPCO Analysts and Reviewers: Consultation Report,” 2019.


²⁷¹ RCMP, Federal Policing, Strategic Policy, “Federal Policing Crime Threat Picture to 2018,” 2018.

²⁷² RCMP, “National Priority Setting Framework,” Deck, June 9, 2016.

²⁷³ RCMP, Federal Policing, “Federal Policing Strategic Plan 2020-2023,” 2020.

²⁷⁴ RCMP, Federal Policing, Strategic Policy, “Federal Policing Crime Threat Picture to 2018,” 2018.

investigations,²⁷⁵ reports by the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, and allied information.²⁷⁶ Federal Policing’s strategic priorities are then set by the National Integrated Operations Council, which is chaired by an Assistant Commissioner or Director General from one of the RCMP’s operational business lines, and attended by all Federal Criminal Operations Officers and senior officials from various parts of Federal Policing.²⁷⁷



Source: RCMP, Federal Policing, “Federal Mandate Accountability Framework,” January 2019.

Chart 6: The Federal Policing Prioritization Process

162. As noted earlier, Federal Policing’s priorities for 2020-2023 are national security, transnational and serious organized crime, and cybercrime. Within each of these priority areas, Federal Policing has identified key target areas. For national security, the focus is on terrorism and foreign interference. For transnational and serious organized crime, it is organized crime, money laundering and border integrity. For cybercrime, it is foreign influenced cybercrime and cyber-enabled criminal activity conducted by transnational serious organized crime actors.²⁷⁸

163. Federal Policing’s priority-setting process is flexible by design, allowing the program to adapt to short-term changes in the threat environment. For example, during the most recent strategic priority window (2020-2023), Federal Policing shifted some of its focus from religiously-motivated violent extremism to ideologically-motivated violent extremism due to the increasing prevalence of the latter.²⁷⁹ Strategic priorities are also designed to give Federal Policing a degree of flexibility in exceptional circumstances (e.g., Federal Policing may conduct a non-priority investigation if another police force of jurisdiction has a conflict of interest in a file).²⁸⁰

²⁷⁵ RCMP, Federal Policing, Strategic Policy, “Federal Policing Crime Threat Picture to 2018,” 2018; RCMP, Federal Policing, RCMP Officials, NSICOP Appearance on Prioritization, June 17, 2022.

²⁷⁶ RCMP, Federal Policing, RCMP Officials, NSICOP Appearance on Prioritization, June 17, 2022. The Five Eyes are Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States.

²⁷⁷ RCMP, “National Integrated Operations Council Terms of Reference,” January 2021.

²⁷⁸ RCMP, Federal Policing, “Federal Policing Strategic Plan 2020-2023,” 2020.

²⁷⁹ RCMP, Federal Policing, RCMP Officials, NSICOP Appearance on Prioritization, June 17, 2022.

²⁸⁰ RCMP, Federal Policing, “Federal Policing Strategic Plan 2020-2023,” 2020.

164. The tiering of major projects is the second stage of the prioritization process. The tiering process is designed to rank major divisional projects across the country according to a national perspective of the criminal threat. The Federal Policing Criminal Operations Branch is responsible for tiering divisional projects. In ranking these projects, it considers a number of factors, including Federal Policing’s strategic priorities.²⁸¹

165. Federal Policing employs a structured approach to assigning tier levels to major projects. First, Divisions must complete and submit the Major Project Prioritization and Governance Tool (Prioritization Tool) form. Federal Policing developed the Prioritization Tool in 2013 to better align its resources with the most important criminal threats. The Prioritization Tool includes a number of standardized questions to assess the overall profile and priority of a project,²⁸² including strategic relevance, targets, specialized investigative techniques, investigational objective and expected outcome, resource requirements, and Federal Policing’s Scope of Service (see below).²⁸³ The Scope of Service refers to three elements that are of specific relevance to Federal Investigations. Investigations, operations, and probes *must* include at least one Scope of Service element – even if it relates to a broader strategic priority – to be considered a major Federal project and enter the tiering process.²⁸⁴ The Scope of Service elements are:

Threats to:	Scope:	Horizontal initiatives:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Canada’s economic integrity; - The integrity of federal government systems or programs; - National security; or - Critical infrastructure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - International; - Inter-jurisdictional with national implications; or - Canada/US border 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Horizontal initiatives for which Federal Policing has received specific direction and funding²⁸⁵

166. Divisions then submit the results of the Prioritization Tool to Federal Policing at National Headquarters.²⁸⁶ The Prioritization Committee is responsible for tiering Federal Policing’s major projects. It is chaired by the Director General of the Federal Policing Criminal Operations Branch, and its membership includes a senior official from each of Federal Policing’s thematic investigative areas (e.g., Serious and Organized Crime) and may include representatives from other relevant areas within Federal Policing (e.g., Covert Operations). The Prioritization Committee meets as needed or at the call of the Chair. Members vote on the initial tier level of a project, on adjustments to a pre-established tier level, and on whether to reject a proposed

²⁸¹ Federal Policing defines “major projects” as “investigations, operations, or probes which score in one or more of the Scope of Service Elements in the Prioritization tool; or incur cost beyond the unit commander’s delegated authority; and/or require authorization from National Headquarters for the use of specialized investigative techniques.” RCMP, Federal Policing, “Prioritization and Governance of Major Projects Tool User Guide,” January 2020.

²⁸² RCMP, “Audit of Federal Policing Major Project Governance Tools: Final Report,” March 2022.

²⁸³ RCMP, Federal Policing, “National Prioritization Process, Infoweb Prioritization,” April 2019.

²⁸⁴ RCMP, Federal Revisions to the Federal Policing Major Protection Prioritization Tool, undated.

²⁸⁵ RCMP, Federal Policing, “Federal Policing Strategic Plan 2020-2023,” 2020.

²⁸⁶ RCMP, “Audit of Federal Policing Major Project Governance Tools: Final Report,” March 2022.

tiered project. This is done on a consensus basis with the Chair holding a veto.²⁸⁷ Lead investigators of tiered projects are invited to present their file to the Prioritization Committee to ensure that tiering decisions take their subject matter expertise into account.²⁸⁸

167. The Prioritization Committee assigns tiers to major projects across the country. Each tier designates the importance and reporting requirements for the divisional investigative team conducting the project. Federal Policing's project tiers are:

- Tier 1: projects deemed a top priority requiring significant oversight and direction from National Headquarters. Reporting requirements are at the discretion of the Prioritization Committee, but Divisions typically report to National Headquarters every 14 days.
- Tier 2: projects deemed a priority requiring some level of oversight and direction from National Headquarters. Reporting requirements are at the discretion of the Prioritization Committee, but Divisions typically report to National Headquarters every 28 days.
- Tier 3: projects not deemed a priority. Reporting requirements are at the discretion of the Prioritization Committee.²⁸⁹

168. Federal Policing at Headquarters relies on two main sources of data for overseeing Federal Policing activities. The first dataset is known as the Projects and Prioritization Dashboard. The Situational Awareness Support Unit maintains this centralized database of tiered projects, and uses it to produce monthly reports on all tiered major projects. It shares these reports with Federal Policing's Senior Executive Committee. A separate Federal Policing Assessment Unit maintains the second dataset, known as the Project Stat Sheet, to consolidate information on projects submitted for prioritization.

169. Resource allocation is one of the main outcomes of the prioritization process. Federal Policing assigns greater focus and resources to higher tier investigative projects. On an annual basis, Federal Policing engages in a 'resource reset' process, where the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing issues direction to the Federal Criminal Operations Officers and commanding officers to shift their resource footprint to align with federal priorities. The Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing provides a mandate letter to each Federal Criminal Operations Officer annually, which describes budgetary restrictions, operational priorities and expectations. The Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing and the Federal Criminal Operations Officers from each division discuss progress in these areas on a quarterly basis and Federal Policing Headquarters shifts divisions' resources to focus on higher priority investigative areas.²⁹⁰

170. There are four significant challenges with the current prioritization process. The first is divisional discretion. While Divisions must complete a Prioritization Tool for every major project, the Federal Criminal Operations officers within their Divisions maintain discretion regarding

²⁸⁷ RCMP, "RCMP Federal Policing NHQ Standing Committee on Major Project Prioritization and Governance Terms of Reference," Undated.

²⁸⁸ RCMP, Federal Policing, RCMP Officials, NSICOP Appearance on Prioritization, June 17, 2022.

²⁸⁹ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Prioritization and Governance of Major Projects Tool User Guide," January 2020.

²⁹⁰ RCMP, Federal Policing, RCMP Officials, NSICOP Appearance on Prioritization, June 17, 2022.

when to submit a project for prioritization.²⁹¹ In some cases, they decide not to submit investigations for tiering until they are at an advanced stage,²⁹² or if an earlier investigations was rejected for tiering, they may nevertheless continue to work on the investigation.²⁹³ In practice, this means that Divisions work on what they deem to be Divisional priorities without submitting them to Federal Policing, even when they are fully within the Federal Scope of Service. It also means that the Prioritization Committee reviews new projects without an understanding of current investigations and expenditures in the Divisions. Consequently, Federal Policing is not fully aware of the number or type of major projects advanced at any given time, limiting its ability to track major projects across Canada or to direct resources to the highest threats from a national perspective.²⁹⁴

171. The second challenge with prioritization is governance. As noted above, respective tiers impose reporting requirements on Divisions. However, there are no standardized methods for this reporting. There is no centralized tracking of this reporting and an internal audit found that, on the cases it examined, Divisions submitted reporting on time in only 43% of tiered projects.²⁹⁵ This further impedes Federal Policing's ability to govern its own investigations. These challenges are not new. A 2016 internal survey of prioritization compared divisional and national listings of major projects and identified a number of discrepancies. The survey recommended that "[m]anagement should consider improving its monitoring and reporting activities and identify the potential causes for such discrepancies to exist."²⁹⁶

172. The third challenge is the continued control of federal resources by Divisions. As the RCMP noted, "Divisions are responsible for managing both their investigative resources and their priorities in conjunction with their business line at [National Headquarters] and the Federal Policing priorities."²⁹⁷ This means that while the Federal Policing program sets priorities and assigns tiers to major projects, it does not automatically determine what investigations Federal personnel conduct nor the level of resources assigned to tiered investigations in the Divisions.²⁹⁸

173. The fourth challenge with prioritization is data integrity. As noted above, Federal Policing relies on two sources of data to oversee Federal investigations (the Projects and Prioritization Dashboard and the Project Stat Sheet). There are significant discrepancies between the number of tiered projects listed in the two documents, which is mainly due to a lack of data input controls and inconsistent quality review.²⁹⁹ As a result, senior executive are not receiving a clear, consistent picture of tiered projects across the country. Without proper compliance and standardization, the reporting used by officials within the Federal Policing program to make

²⁹¹ RCMP, "RCMP Federal Policing NHQ Standing Committee on Major Project Prioritization and Governance Terms of Reference," Undated.

²⁹² RCMP, "Audit of Federal Policing Major Project Governance Tools: Final Report," March 2022.

²⁹³ RCMP, "Audit of Federal Policing Major Project Governance Tools: Final Report," March 2022.

²⁹⁴ RCMP, "Audit of Federal Policing Major Project Governance Tools: Final Report," March 2022.

²⁹⁵ RCMP, "Audit of Federal Policing Major Project Governance Tools: Final Report," March 2022.

²⁹⁶ RCMP, "Preliminary Survey of the Federal Policing Major Project Prioritization and Governance Tool: Final Report," December 2016.

²⁹⁷ RCMP, Federal Policing, "National Prioritization Process, Infoweb Prioritization," May 2021.

²⁹⁸ RCMP, Federal Policing, "National Prioritization Process, Infoweb Prioritization," May 2021.

²⁹⁹ RCMP, "Audit of Federal Policing Major Project Governance Tools: Final Report," March 2022.

decisions risks being inaccurate, inconsistent or incomplete.³⁰⁰ This makes it difficult for the RCMP to assure itself, the Minister, and the public that it is addressing the highest threats to Canada and Canadians.

Intelligence

174. The RCMP describes its function as “intelligence-led policing.” According to the RCMP, “[i]ntelligence-led policing acknowledges that research, analysis and evidence-based decision making are critical to effective and efficient policing. Using data and intelligence helps us identify patterns and linkages that assist in solving investigations and predicting and preventing future crime.”³⁰¹ Federal Policing is responsible for most intelligence functions and resources in the RCMP, both domestic and international.

175. The RCMP identifies three kinds of intelligence: tactical, operational and strategic. Tactical intelligence supports investigations through, for example, identifying suspects and conducting surveillance. Operational intelligence involves information from different investigations and divisions to identify emerging trends in criminality. Strategic intelligence identifies trends and threats at a national and international level and is used by senior executives for decision-making on policies, priorities and plans.³⁰²

176. Intelligence within the RCMP has gone through many changes in recent years. The latest realignment was undertaken to address gaps in governance which have “prevented the optimization of criminal intelligence services across the RCMP and prevented anything close to true intelligence-led policing from materializing structurally across the Force.”³⁰³ This resulted in the creation of a governance framework in 2019 for all intelligence within the RCMP and a more clearly defined structure.

177. Within the RCMP, the Director General National Intelligence is responsible for the delivery of the Federal Policing National Intelligence Program. The Director General National Intelligence reports to the Executive Director/Assistant Commissioner of Federal Policing Intelligence and International Policing. Although the Director General National Intelligence is functionally accountable through Federal Policing, the distribution of intelligence resources throughout the RCMP mean that their responsibilities span across the RCMP’s mandates and extend into Divisions. Of the 532 intelligence personnel in the RCMP, approximately 90 (17%) report to the Director General National Intelligence.³⁰⁴

178. The Federal Policing National Intelligence Program is comprised of three sections: the Strategic Intelligence Directorate, the Operational Intelligence Analysis Group and the

³⁰⁰ RCMP, “Audit of Federal Policing Major Project Governance Tools: Final Report,” March 2022.

³⁰¹ RCMP, “[Service Delivery Model](#),” July 2020.

³⁰² RCMP, “The RCMP Intelligence Landscape: An Overview of Key Roles, Responsibilities, Relationships and Functions,” June 2022.

³⁰³ RCMP, “A Governing Framework for Intelligence,” August 2019.

³⁰⁴ RCMP, Director General National Intelligence, NSICOP Appearance, November 18, 2022.

Intelligence Support Group. The first two focus on intelligence analysis at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and include areas of examination such as ideologically motivated criminality, cybercrime and economic integrity.³⁰⁵ The Operational Intelligence Directorate is also responsible for the Global Initiatives Program. Based at RCMP Headquarters, this program is responsible for 14 criminal intelligence analysts deployed internationally. While most of these analysts are based in Canadian missions, three are embedded with strategic partners in Washington (Drug Enforcement Administration), the Hague (Europol), and Canberra (Australian Federal Police).³⁰⁶ Their presence in “key locations and embedded with critical partners is essential to Federal Policing National Intelligence’s mandate to provide strategic and operational criminal intelligence reporting on emerging global criminal threats as well as to identify targeting opportunities for investigation and disruption.”³⁰⁷

179. The third section, the Intelligence Support Group, is responsible for governance and standardization and all other areas that fall under the Federal Policing National Intelligence Program. This Group houses the Intelligence Standards and Program Development unit, which is responsible for establishing and maintaining a professional criminal intelligence program within the RCMP. This unit works to ensure that all intelligence functions, including staffing, quality assurance, evaluation and training, are governed by standardized policies, guidelines and methodologies.³⁰⁸

180. In 2019, the RCMP implemented a new governance framework for intelligence to make it more centralized. While most intelligence resources are located within divisions, intelligence analysts responsible for tactical, operational and strategic intelligence now fall under the authority of a Division Intelligence Officer within each division.³⁰⁹ Previously, some divisions did not have a Divisional Intelligence Officer so intelligence personnel were managed by investigative units.³¹⁰ With the new framework, in most Divisions,³¹¹ the Divisional Intelligence Officer is now responsible for both the intelligence function and the fiscal control of intelligence activities at the divisional level.

181. The RCMP is also the steward of the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC). CISC was founded in 1970 to connect the criminal intelligence community at all levels: municipal, provincial and federal. The mandate of CISC is to “lead the strategic and operational intelligence initiatives to combat organized crime and serious crimes related to it in Canada and help ensure the timely production and exchange of criminal information and intelligence among the law enforcement community, in support of the Canadian Law Enforcement Strategy on Organized Crime.”³¹² It produces an annual National Threat Assessment on Organized and Serious Crime

³⁰⁵ RCMP, “Federal Policing National Intelligence Function at National Headquarters,” January 2022.

³⁰⁶ RCMP, “Global Initiatives Annual Report 2020”, undated.

³⁰⁷ RCMP, “Global Initiatives Annual Report 2020”, undated.

³⁰⁸ RCMP, “Federal Policing National Intelligence Function at National Headquarters,” January 2022.

³⁰⁹ RCMP, “A Governing Framework for Intelligence,” August 2019.

³¹⁰ RCMP, “A Governing Framework for Intelligence,” August 2019.

³¹¹ The only exception is E Division (British Columbia).

³¹² Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, “Criminal Intelligence Service Canada: Constitution,” March 2014.

in Canada, which is used to set priorities and to detect, disrupt and prevent serious and organized crime in Canada.

182. The intelligence function within the Federal Policing program faces a number of challenges which limit its effectiveness. The first challenge is that it has long been a decentralized function within the RCMP. In 2019, the RCMP noted that,

Intelligence activities across RCMP mandates within National Headquarters currently have limited national oversight and governance. Federal Policing priorities are currently set through operational governance with no independent process to set intelligence priorities. This results in confusing enforcement priorities with intelligence priorities, which are distinct and serve a different purpose.”³¹³

As a result, intelligence resources of Federal Policing are managed at the Divisional level by authorities who report to both Federal Policing and to provincial and territorial authorities. While the creation of the strategic framework for intelligence in 2018 and the governance framework in 2019 have addressed some issues,³¹⁴ primarily around standardization and professionalization, gaps persist. As the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing stated to the Committee, he currently has very little visibility over intelligence resources in the divisions and he believes they are used primarily on provincial and territorial priorities.³¹⁵

183. The second challenge arises as a consequences of problems with Federal Policing data. Intelligence is used to develop leads, identify trends and set priorities. As noted earlier, the RCMP has a number of information management and data integrity issues. If information is incomplete, incorrect, or inaccessible, it undermines the production and quality of the intelligence used by the RCMP. Other challenges arise with the use of PRIME, a proprietary system of the government of British Columbia. Although an investigation may have been identified as a tiered priority, Federal investigators in British Columbia will often continue to populate PRIME as their primary operational database despite a requirement to use the Federal classified database (SPROS).³¹⁶ Because access to PRIME is controlled, intelligence analysts at RCMP headquarters may be unable to produce analysis and advice on short notice and on time-sensitive investigations as they await approval; this in turn limits the information available to senior decision-makers. Finally, some investigative units keep operational data on stand-alone systems or personal hard drives, preventing intelligence analysts and planners from accessing data relevant to their work.³¹⁷ While the FOYER interface was created to mitigate challenges such as these (paragraph 154), compliance has been very low and problems persist.

³¹³ RCMP, “A Governing Framework for Intelligence,” August 2019.

³¹⁴ RCMP, “A Governing Framework for Intelligence,” August 2019.

³¹⁵ RCMP, Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing, NSICOP Appearance, October 7, 2022.

³¹⁶ RCMP, Situational Awareness Support Unit, Discussion with NSICOP Secretariat, March 2022.

³¹⁷ RCMP, “Audit of Intelligence Coordination & Sharing: Final Report,” July 2012; RCMP, Executive Director, Intelligence and International Policing, NSICOP Appearance, November 18, 2022.

184. The third challenge is that the intelligence function lacks a centralized repository. Intelligence assessments and reports are held in a variety of systems across the RCMP and are not accessible to other analysts. The Federal Policing program noted:

With governance challenges and criminal intelligence products being stored in a myriad of different locations across operational and divisional boundaries, it makes it difficult to consolidate all available criminal intelligence knowledge into one centralized system, and use that system to support structured and unstructured research and analysis techniques.³¹⁸

This undermines the ability of intelligence analysts to make connections between investigations nationally and can cause duplication of effort.

185. Finally, the RCMP struggles with the role that intelligence should play in the organization. As RCMP officials noted in 2022, “the RCMP does not have a culture of intelligence, meaning that it is often not seen as a tool to assist decision-makers, but rather meant to directly assist investigators and other front-line law enforcement (i.e., that it becomes evidence).”³¹⁹

186. The Committee addresses intelligence issues in its Assessment.

³¹⁸ RCMP, Written Response to NSICOP Request for Additional Information: IM/IT and Intelligence, December 2022.

³¹⁹ RCMP, Written Response to NSICOP Request for Additional Information: IM/IT and Intelligence, December 2022.

Other horizontal studies of relevance

[*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] Two other studies have highlighted some of the challenges identified in this report, notably the lack of appropriate training and inadequate information technologies, and the importance of recognizing disruption as a viable means of countering threats in certain areas. The first of these studies was a joint RCMP and CSIS study of the U.K.'s counter-terrorism model. Conducted in 2018, this review sought to derive observations, lessons learned and recommendations to assist in the reshaping of the Canadian counter-terrorism model, with specific focus on CSIS and the RCMP. Of note, the study made observations with respect to investigative training for Canadian counter-terrorism professionals, case management tools and the use of disruption as a means of mitigating threats. The study made recommendations in some of these areas.³²⁰

The second study, known as the Operational Improvement Review, was an independent review conducted by defence attorney Anil Kapoor, who was previously appointed Commission Counsel to the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. Mr. Kapoor conducted the review between May 2018 and March 2019 at the behest of the RCMP Commissioner and the Director of CSIS. The review assessed the RCMP-CSIS relationship in national security criminal investigations and made 76 recommendations. While the review did not assess the technical capabilities of the RCMP, it stressed that the RCMP did not have a single workable, searchable database in the national security realm. It also recommended that Federal Policing National Security and the RCMP's Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams must accept that a criminal prosecution is not the "gold standard" in national security investigations. Instead, it suggested that relying on a range of tools, including disruption, allows organizations to be nimble in their respective approaches to upholding public safety.³²¹

³²⁰ CSIS and RCMP, *Midnight Horizon: UK Embed Report: Intelligence Enabling Evidence*, 2019.

³²¹ Anil Kapoor, *Operational Improvement Review Final Report: Modernizing the Canadian National Security Response*, 2019.

Chapter 7: The Committee's Assessment

187. The role of Federal Policing is essential to Canada's national security. Many of its responsibilities are prescribed in federal statutes, including, for the Committee's purposes, most critically in the area of national security. It is the only organization capable of conducting investigations of the most significant criminal threats across jurisdictions, both within Canada and abroad (in cooperation with a foreign police force). It is also charged by the federal government with protecting key federal and designated officials, supporting international operations, such as peace-keeping, and maintaining specific policing relationships, such as INTERPOL.

188. In the course of its review, the Committee identified several challenges faced by Federal Policing that risk having an impact on its essential role in countering threats to Canada's national security or investigating serious and major organized crime. These will be outlined below.

External challenges: structural features of the organization

189. The first challenge to Federal Policing's ability to most effectively fulfil its mandate stems from structural features of the RCMP, and the preponderance of the Contract Policing portion of the organization, which has consequences in several areas. The Committee did not review the RCMP's organizational structure as a whole or assess the relative merits of engagement in Contract Policing. This would have been beyond the Committee's mandate. However, in the context of this review, it could not ignore certain undesirable effects created by the coexistence of both mandates.

190. Contract Policing accounts for close to 60% of the RCMP's total budget and personnel (Federal Policing accounts for 18%). The relative weight of Contract Policing within the RCMP has consequences in several areas. First, Federal Policing is only one of many priorities for the Commissioner, for the Minister of Public Safety and for Parliament. Indeed, as we have noted several times in this report, no external review of the RCMP has exclusively addressed the efficacy of the Federal mandate. This suggests that as a result, problems unique to the Federal mandate have not received the attention required to address them.

191. Second, Federal resources may be used in support of the Contract mandate, without the opposite necessarily being true. Some of this happens through weak governance. As we discuss further below, Federal Policing does not exert sufficient governance over its own national investigations to prevent divisions from using federal resources to pursue lower priorities or provincial priorities, nor does it fully control important investigative support activities, most notably intelligence resources but also various technical services, such as digital forensics. In monetary terms, the loss of resources is caused by RCMP corporate and support functions, such as recruitment, training and information management, devoting more time and effort to supporting Contract Policing than are accounted for through the Police Service Agreements.

The RCMP could not quantify the financial loss to Federal resources in the first area (governance), but a 2017 study by an external contractor estimated the loss in the second area as significant: \$668 million annually in indirect costs that support RCMP Contract Policing.³²² Moreover, the agreements with provinces and territories require additional funding for Contract Policing be provided within 12 months of a provincial or territorial request. That funding is often initially taken out of Federal resources until permanent funding can be realized, further complicating financial challenges.³²³ Together, these financial issues have resulted in funding gaps for Federal Policing, National Police Services (such as labs), and enabling programs such as recruiting.³²⁴

192. Third, the RCMP's obligation under the Police Service Agreements to fulfill provincial and territorial requirements for new or vacant Regular Member positions means that human resource requirements for Contract Policing often take priority over Federal Policing. As a consequence, Federal Policing has a higher rate of vacancies, most notably for Regular Members, than other operational areas.

Internal challenges: governance and prioritization

193. The second major challenge to Federal Policing's ability to fulfill its mandate is the governance and prioritization of its national activities and investigations. Federal Policing personnel and resources are located across the country, but control and accountability of those assets differs significantly. The two largest Federal Policing units, in Ontario and Quebec, report directly to the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing, while all other units report through the divisional Commanding Officers who are accountable to both the RCMP Commissioner and to provincial or territorial authorities. In short, the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing is responsible for managing Federal Policing activities without full authority to do so. The creation in 2017 of the Federal Policing Criminal Operations Officers was meant to strengthen Federal Policing's control over its personnel and resources. While the Federal Policing program reports that it is better able to allocate resources to the highest federal priorities and shift them as required, divisions retain significant control over their own investigative resources, including Federal resources. Further improvements are unlikely to take full effect until the implementation of the new reporting chain, where all Federal Policing units report directly to the Deputy Commissioner, a change delayed from 2022 with no timeframe for implementation.

194. Similar problems arise in Federal Policing's ability to prioritize its investigations. While Federal Policing has implemented measures to better identify priorities and govern investigations, divisions retain significant discretion in the Federal Policing prioritization process, undermining the ability of the Federal Policing program to track ongoing investigations and expenditures, or to redirect resources to higher priorities. These issues are exacerbated by a lack of standardized reporting and poor compliance with reporting obligations to Headquarters

³²² KPMG LLP, *Resourcing Review Final Report*, May 2017.

³²³ RCMP, Acting Director General, Financial Management, Deputy Chief Financial Officer, NSICOP Appearance, December 2, 2022.

³²⁴ RCMP, Federal Policing, "NSICOP Request for Financial Information," August 2022.

(we discuss this in more detail below). Finally, Federal Policing has sought several times in the past decade to move Federal personnel out of areas where there are few priority federal investigations, such as in northern and eastern Canada, to where there are many such investigations, in Canada's most populated provinces and urban areas. This has yet to occur. As a result, Federal Policing resources in non-priority areas are most likely not working on priority federal investigations.

Internal challenges: data, prioritization and intelligence

195. The third significant challenge arises in the related areas of data, prioritization and intelligence. We start with data and data management. The RCMP stated that "law enforcement is all about information and data management."³²⁵ That said, the Committee observed a lack of consistent data across Federal Policing, low levels of compliance with data population and reporting, reliance on stand-alone systems in what should be an integrated workforce, a lack of an interoperable data or records management system, and the absence of data reporting to the executive to aid decision-making. As recently as 2017, KPMG noted, "[t]he existence of multiple systems of record combined with a lack of modern information management tools and practices limit the needed business intelligence to support Federal Policing to plan and understand the impact of changing priorities."³²⁶ Technical and procedural reforms implemented since then have yet to take hold. Notably, the introduction of a key interface system (FOYER) and the Deputy Commissioner's direction to Federal units to use it, have not substantially changed the organization's ability to gather and analyze data or to properly prioritize investigations and support organizational decision-making.

196. As a result, Federal Policing does not have an accurate picture on where it spends its resources. The organization does not know, and cannot know, if Federal Policing resources are in fact being spent on Federal Policing priorities and activities within divisions. This makes it challenging for the Federal Policing program to employ evidence-based decision-making and to reallocate resources when priorities shift. These same challenges with data affect Federal Policing's ability to prioritize investigations. Inconsistencies in functionality across data systems (PROS, SPROS and PRIME) and limitations to accessing data undermine the program's ability to identify priorities (e.g., linking the frequency and types of reported 'occurrences' with investigations) or to oversee them when assigned an appropriate tier, and may result in investigations being misidentified or improperly prioritized. These gaps in turn risk undermining Federal Policing's oversight and accountability for its operations.

197. Intelligence is based on access to information and the ability to aggregate, analyze and distribute it to support decisions. Intelligence is essential for Federal Policing operations. The RCMP acknowledges that "in an increasingly complex and evolving criminal landscape, the RCMP intelligence function plays a critical role in addressing Federal Policing priorities in the areas of National Security, Transnational and Serious Organized Crime (TSOC) and

³²⁵ Briefing on Training and Recruitment, March 30, 2022.

³²⁶ Resourcing Review Final Report, KPMG LLP, May 2017.

Cybercrime.”³²⁷ However, the same data challenges that hamper governance and prioritization – that is, information is often dispersed, inconsistent, incomplete, incorrect or inaccessible – affects the quality and effectiveness of Federal Policing intelligence units and the products they produce. This undermines decision-making at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Issues with data are compounded by problems with accountability, governance and human resources. Within the RCMP, less than 20% of intelligence analysts and personnel report through the Director General National Intelligence. As a result, the Committee is not confident that Federal Policing is receiving or assessing the intelligence it needs to set priorities and conduct operations.

Internal challenges: recruitment and training

198. The fourth major challenge is the steady decline in the number of Federal Policing personnel, particularly police officers, over the last eight years, and there is no information to suggest that this trend will change in the foreseeable future. In part, this is due to finances: Federal Policing is managing its budget through the attrition of personnel. This permits Federal Policing to support its current operations, but provides no flexibility to hire new employees. The decline in personnel is also due, in part, to difficulties in recruiting appropriate personnel.

199. Federal Policing faces important challenges in addressing its unique requirements for recruitment and training. The model that the RCMP uses, which emphasizes foundational policing and peace officer skills, is arguably well-suited for front-line, general duty policing, but is insufficient to meet Federal Policing requirements. These increasingly require specialized skills and educational credentials. In the area of recruitment, the RCMP as an organization struggles to attract sufficient applicants to staff its vacant positions, due to a shrinking labour pool and changing social expectations about work. The personnel it does recruit are mostly used to fill vacant and new positions in the provinces and territories; they do not typically fill Federal positions. As a result, Federal Policing has not been able to hire and retain sufficient employees, particularly police officers, to meet its own requirements. In the area of training, the Federal Policing program for its employees is outdated and inconsistent, and does not adequately prepare personnel to investigate threats in the modern criminal context.

³²⁷ RCMP, “The RCMP Intelligence Landscape: An Overview of Key Roles, Responsibilities, Relationships and Functions,” June 2022.

Federal Policing's transformation plan

200. The Federal Policing program has not been complacent in the face of these problems and senior RCMP leadership is aware of these challenges. Building on work over the last five years, Federal Policing has started the implementation of a Transformation Plan to address these many challenges. In brief, the Plan focuses on four areas:

- **Mandate:** providing greater clarity to Federal Policing priority areas, Scope of Service elements, and the activities of intelligence, prevention, and enforcement, including adjusting performance metrics to better align with Federal Policing objectives and activities;
- **Governance:** ensuring more centralized oversight, reporting and accountability structures for Federal Policing, including changing reporting lines for Federal Policing personnel in Contract Divisions so that they report directly to Headquarters;
- **Human resources and finance:** creating Federal-specific recruitment and training, including for civilian investigators and experienced officers from other police forces, developing Federal Policing-specific career paths, and adjusting the deployment of Federal Policing personnel (concentrating resources in six major urban centres); and,
- **Data:** developing a single point of access to data containing operational, performance, finance and human resource information, and a set of analytical tools connected to that repository.³²⁸

These changes should support Federal Policing's initiatives, introduced in 2019, to centralize and better govern its intelligence function.

201. As we have discussed at various points in this review, elements of this Plan are already being implemented. The RCMP reports that in some areas, such as governance, Federal Policing now exerts greater control over resources in the divisions and can better reallocate funds to new priorities. Similarly, key governance initiatives, such as Federal resources reporting directly to the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing, should increase governance and accountability by making all Federal Policing resources answerable to National Headquarters instead of to the divisions; however, these changes have been delayed or postponed. In other areas of reform, such as data, we have seen significant reticence to comply with central direction (the rate of compliance in many divisions hovers near zero), and are partially dependent on other areas of the RCMP for full implementation.

202. Federal Policing's efforts to change its models of recruitment and training are particularly important. As discussed in this report, Federal Policing has created two recruiting initiatives to address its inability to recruit sufficient numbers of personnel to replenish its ranks. The first, the Experienced Police Officer initiative, is a long-overdue means of bringing police officers from

³²⁸ RCMP, Federal Policing, "Federal Policing Transformation Case for Change and Way Forward," July 2021 RCMP, Federal Policing, Executive Director of Federal Policing Strategic Management remarks, NSICOP Appearance on Information Management and Information Technology and Intelligence, November 18, 2022.

other organizations directly into various ranks of the RCMP. Among other things, the initiative should bring new perspectives and talent into the organization. That said, Federal Police has hired very few experienced officers to date and has no target for doing so. These gaps will need to be addressed quickly if the initiative is to have any significant effect.

203. The second recruiting initiative is aimed at attracting civilians to be criminal investigators. If managed well, this initiative offers important opportunities to attract a diverse workforce with relatively rare talents, skills and educational credentials, which should strengthen Federal Policing's ability to address complex and sophisticated threats under its mandate. However, the Committee is concerned that the number of civilians being sought (30% of the Federal workforce) and the timeframe for implementation (10-15 years) is too aspirational in the absence of a clear plan with interim targets. Moreover, the Committee is concerned that Federal Policing is underestimating the challenges associated with integrating significant numbers of civilians into units and areas that have been long-occupied by police officers.

204. Federal Policing has also sought to change the way it trains its employees to better equip them to fulfill its mandate. Its proposal to create a dedicated Federal Policing Training Academy did not progress beyond the planning stage. Federal Policing then started a specific training program for Federal Policing employees, including those recruited through the two initiatives noted above, at the RCMP training facility. While the Committee recognizes the importance of consistent and specialized training, it is concerned that Federal Policing has no timeline to fully implement this training.

205. Finally, the Committee notes a glaring gap in this Plan: new finances. The Plan clearly recognizes that a significant source of the challenges facing Federal Policing are internal: the relative weight of Contract Policing within the organization; a decline of experienced personnel in the Federal Policing program; poor governance over investigations and intelligence functions; inconsistent prioritization; insufficient recruitment and training programs; and problems with data integrity and integration. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Federal Policing can rebuild its personnel strength and implement a plan of this magnitude without targeted and ongoing investments.

Federal Policing reform: the government must act

206. In short, the RCMP clearly recognizes the problems facing its Federal Policing mandate. If fully implemented, its many initiatives in the areas of governance, data, prioritization, intelligence, recruitment and training should improve Federal Policing's ability to fulfill its mandate. However, the Committee is concerned that the impetus to maintain the status quo is strong: the preponderance of the Contract policing mandate within the RCMP, the lack of political direction specific to Federal Policing, the complexity of the problems facing the organization, and the frequent crisis-nature of contract and federal policing issues all provide powerful disincentives for significant reform. The RCMP cannot do it alone.

207. The Minister of Public Safety must take a greater role. Specifically, the Minister should provide direction to the RCMP in each of the major areas where the government wishes to see reform. As outlined at paragraphs 108 to 110, while the principle of police independence precludes the Minister from providing direction in the narrow area of police investigations, arrest and charges, it would not forestall direction in broader areas of institutional reform and government priorities. This would be an important step to strengthening democratic accountability for Federal Policing. At a minimum, the Committee believes that Ministerial direction should include governance, financial controls, and recruiting and training; clear interim and final objectives; the Minister's expectations in all of areas of direction; and annual reporting requirements, similar to those in reports provided to the Minister by CSIS. The Minister's direction should be updated regularly to ensure it remains relevant with changing circumstances. This would be both a powerful signal of political will and an important mechanism to strengthen the Minister's accountability for the RCMP.

208. There is also the issue of finances. The Committee believes that the government should put in place stronger measures to ensure Federal resources are spent on Federal priorities; while not simple, this should be possible through changes to the RCMP's current financial framework. As importantly, the government needs to determine whether further resources for the Federal Policing program are required. The Committee reiterates that the RCMP is the only organization capable of performing a number of essential federal roles and responsibilities, yet Federal Policing faces significant challenges in its ability to do so. Federal Policing's current finances do not have the flexibility to address those challenges. That means that it will either have to maintain a sub-optimal status quo (the current number of Federal employees focus on a limited number of priorities), seek government direction on areas where it should refocus resources (meaning some areas will see a reduction in attention), or seek new resources to rebuild its ability to conduct priority investigations. This is not a decision to be left to the RCMP: it is one that the government should make as part of providing clarity to the RCMP about the role that it expects Federal Policing to play across Canada.

209. Concurrent with the areas for improvement listed above, the government should consider whether the objectives of Federal Policing transformation – appropriate resourcing and the ability to deploy such resources to achieve Federal Policing objectives – require changes to the organizational structure of the RCMP. There are a range of possibilities. More autonomy within the RCMP may allow Federal Policing to address its most significant challenges and focus on its primary mandate, while still taking advantage of operational benefits, such as information sharing and established partnerships, and synergies that arise from common corporate services, such as human resources and finance. A relevant recent example is the government's creation of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, part of the Communications Security Establishment. Alternatively, or iteratively, it may be time for Canada to consider a stand-alone federal policing organization.³²⁹ In any case, most of the reforms currently being implemented by the RCMP seek to carve out its federal responsibilities and operations from the wider

³²⁹ See *Police Act*, s. 70. Of note, the Sûreté du Québec can provide services corresponding to a level higher than the level required of a municipal police force, unless the Minister of Public Security authorizes the municipal police force to provide the services corresponding to other levels determined by the Minister.

organization. However, the Committee believes that many of the most critical changes will benefit from clear direction from the federal government. The only part of the RCMP for which the federal government is solely responsible is Federal Policing: it must clarify that the mandate is a priority and that it supports reforms in this area.

210. To the extent that structural changes are implemented, the government should be mindful of whether those changes will affect the operational relationship between Federal and Contract Policing. In such a case, the government should assess the applicability of other policing models (for example, in Québec, respective municipal police forces provide services in relation to population size with surge capacity in the event that additional services are needed). In designing any structural changes, the federal government should also engage with provinces, territories, and Indigenous communities to ensure that any changes made to Federal Policing are fully understood and their implementation coordinated.

Conclusion

211. Five years ago, the Committee decided to study the activities of core security and intelligence organizations that had not been previously subject to dedicated and independent review. In addition to building its own knowledge of these organizations, the Committee sought through its reports to strengthen the accountability of responsible ministers, improve the efficacy of individual organizations, and build greater transparency around activities that have been little-explored or conducted in secret. The Committee's review of the RCMP Federal Policing mandate is a continuation of that work; while the RCMP has been subject to dedicated and independent review, there has not been an external review specifically of its Federal Policing mandate.

212. The mandate of Federal Policing is unique. It is the only national organization in Canada responsible for enforcing all federal laws and for investigating the most serious and complex criminal threats to Canadians and Canadian interests. Its mandate is also broad. Federal Policing fulfills its responsibilities across Canada and internationally, provides services to the federal government in a number of critical areas, and works with federal, provincial and territorial organizations to meet common objectives.

213. Federal Policing suffers from a number of important challenges that undermine its ability to fulfill its essential role in the security and intelligence community. We discussed these challenges in our assessment and summarize them here. The Federal Policing mandate is affected by the RCMP's long focus on Contract Policing, which has shaped the RCMP's organizational structure, governance, finances, and human resource and training models. Against this background, Federal Policing has struggled with challenges internal to its program. These include weak governance and prioritization of federal activities and investigations; inadequate data and data management; an intelligence function misaligned with federal requirements; and a recruitment and training model ill-suited to its mandate. Over the last several years, Federal Policing has initiated reforms to address deficiencies in most of these areas; however, most are still in their infancy and could easily be hollowed out by a tendency towards the status quo, an institutional bias common to most organizations.

214. The government should take a clear role in driving change. It should identify that Federal Policing, an exclusive federal responsibility, is a priority and that reform is essential. The Minister of Public Safety should provide clear and ongoing direction in each of the areas where Federal Policing faces challenges in fulfilling its mandate, and in doing so set objectives and reporting requirements on results. If the government believes that providing such direction requires greater clarity in the area of police independence, it should consider amendments to the RCMP Act. The government should also put in place measures to protect Federal Policing finances and ensure effective governance, and consider what further investments may be required to build a modern and fit-for-purpose organization. Finally, the government should determine to what extent Federal Policing benefits from administrative synergies of being embedded in a single organization and to what extent the Federal Policing mandate should be independent from the wider responsibilities of the RCMP.

215. The government has a responsibility to ensure that the various components of its security and intelligence community function effectively to protect Canadians and Canadian Interests. On the basis of its review, the Committee does not believe that Federal Policing is as effective, efficient, flexible or accountable as it needs to be to protect Canada and Canadians from the most significant national security and criminal threats. The government must act to ensure it is.

Findings

216. The Committee makes the following findings:

- F1. Federal Policing is an essential component of Canada's security and intelligence community. It has a unique and broad mandate that includes investigating threats to national security and transnational and serious organized crime, protecting key federal and designated officials, supporting international operations, such as peace-keeping, and maintaining key policing relationships, both among our allies and with international institutions. (Paragraphs 47 to 60)
- F2. Federal Policing's ability to manage its budget and maintain operations has only been possible as a result of unfilled vacancies in the program since 2016. Federal budgetary resources also are consistently displaced to fund other organizational priorities, primarily Contract Policing. (Paragraphs 129 and 136)
- F3. Federal Policing's approaches to recruitment and training do not sufficiently support the Federal mandate. Federal Policing has struggled to source all the skills, education and experience required to conduct increasingly complex and specialized investigations in the modern criminal threat environment. (Paragraphs 137 to 145)
- F4. Federal Policing lacks effective and consistent direction over federal investigative units throughout the country. Federal Policing's Prioritization Committee reviews new projects without an understanding of current investigations and expenditures in all Divisions, limiting Federal Policing's ability to track major projects or to direct resources to the highest threats from a national perspective. (Paragraphs 157 and 170 to 173)
- F5. Federal Policing's problems with data integrity and information management undermine effective decision-making and support to operations. The RCMP has an ineffective governance system which lacks standardized methods or approaches for data analytics. Of the information that is entered into the various data systems, many include incomplete records, outdated reporting, inconsistencies, incorrect data and missing information. Moreover, compliance among Federal Policing units throughout the country with direction to address these problems is near zero. This undermines Federal Policing's ability to prioritize its work, attribute actual costs to investigations, and enable its intelligence units to make linkages among investigations or identify emerging issues. (Paragraphs 153 to 158)
- F6. Federal Policing does not have performance measures that account for success outside of charges laid. Federal Policing investigations are complex and can involve assistance or other activities that do not have arrest or charges as a goal. Current measures do not include relevant context or provide enough scope for complex outcomes. (Paragraphs 81, 82 and 173)
- F7. The RCMP recognizes the problems facing its Federal Policing mandate. The RCMP cannot effect the necessary changes alone. The Minister must take a greater role with respect to issues such as governance, priorities, and organizational direction. (Paragraph 116)

Recommendations

217. The Committee makes the following recommendations:

- R1 The Minister of Public Safety provide clear and regular direction to the RCMP to strengthen Federal Policing, including in areas of governance; financial controls; human resources, recruiting and training; and information management. In each of these areas, this direction should include the Minister's expectations, clear interim and final objectives, and clear performance measures.
- R2 The Government recognize that Federal Policing resources are insufficient to fulfil its various mandates and put in place measures to ensure Federal resources are appropriated fully to Federal priorities.
- R3 The Government ensure that Federal Policing has the sufficient level of autonomy to fulfill its mandates and implement any organizational changes necessary to do so.
- R4 As part of its deliberations, the Government consider amendments to the RCMP Act, including to define police independence and provide reporting obligations for the Federal Policing mandate (similar to the CSIS Act).
- R5 Federal Policing develop appropriate performance measures that better reflect the complexity of its operations and outcomes. These measures should be fully supported internally by data collection, analysis and reporting.

Annex A: List of Witnesses

Public Safety Canada

- Minister of Public Safety
- Associate Deputy Minister

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

- Commissioner, RCMP
- Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing
- Chief Financial Officer
- Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing, National Security and Protective Policing
- Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing Criminal Operations
- (Acting) Assistant Commissioner, Federal Policing National Security and Protective Policing
- Executive Director, Federal Policing Strategic Management
- Executive Director, Intelligence and International Policing
- Director General, Serious Organized Crime and Border Integrity, Federal Policing
- Director General, Technical Investigative Services, Specialized Policing
- (Acting) Director General, Financial Management, Deputy Chief Financial Officer
- (Acting) Director General, Federal Policing National Security
- (Acting) Director General, National Intelligence
- Director, National Security External Reviews and Compliance, Federal Policing
- Review Manager, National Security External Reviews and Compliance, Federal Policing
- Senior Analyst, National Security External Reviews and Compliance, Federal Policing

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

- Director General, Litigation and Disclosure
- Chief, Litigation and Disclosure
- Head, External Review

Ontario Provincial Police

- Bureau Commander, Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau

Sûreté du Québec

- Director, Criminal Investigations Branch

Academics

- Kent Roach

NSICOP's Secretariat commissioned papers from the following individuals in the context of this review:

- John Coyne
- Curt T. Griffiths and Yvon Dandurand

- Saskia Hufnagel
- Elaine N. Lammert
- Kent Roach

NSICOP received submissions to a targeted call for papers from:

- International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group
- National Police Federation

Annex B: List of Abbreviations

CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CBSA	Canada Border Services Agency
CIROC	Canadian Integrated Response to Organized Crime
CISC	Criminal Intelligence Service Canada
CSE	Communications Security Establishment
CSIS	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FELEG	Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group
FSOC	Federal Serious and Organized Crime unit
G7	Group of Seven, consisting of Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union
GDP	Gross domestic product
IMET	Integrated Market Enforcement Team
IMLIT	Integrated Money Laundering Investigative Team
IMVE	Ideologically motivated violent extremism
INSET	Integrated National Security Enforcement Team
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSES	National Security Enforcement Section
NSICOP	National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians
PCO	Privy Council Office
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
TSOC	Transnational and Serious Organized Crime