

## Feedback

### Canadian Aviation Service Difficulty Reports

The following content was published between 1 August 2023 and 31 December 2023. The full accessible version of each article is available on the Feedback [website](#).

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## **Fixed Wing**

### **Bombardier – CL600 2B19 (RJ200ER)**

#### **CRJ100/200 – Fuel Feed System Corrosion and Leaks**

SDR #: 20210112003

#### **Subject:**

While running the auxiliary power unit (APU), maintenance discovered a fuel leak. The investigation determined that the fuel leak was caused by severe corrosion of the APU fuel feed line. Maintenance attempted to rob a replacement fuel line from another aircraft but found that the line was also corroded at the same location. The fuel lines are to be replaced with serviceable parts.


#### **Transport Canada Comments:**

Nine (9) SDRs have been received recently for this issue which includes corroded shrouds, corroded shroud fittings, and corroded and/or leaking fuel lines. All seven (7) of the affected aircraft in the SDRs had been in service for 17 years.

This issue was the subject of an investigation by the manufacturer who concluded that these types of defects present a safety risk that is adequately addressed by existing mitigations. The investigation considered that the issue should be detected during routine operations by the daily walkaround inspections that indicates particular attention should be paid to any evidence of fluid leaks on or around the aircraft. Additionally, these defects can be found through routine maintenance such as the “below-floor” zonal inspections and the recurrent leak test requirements for the affected lines.

However, the area is still known to be susceptible to significant corrosion defects. The Illustrated Parts Manual, Section 28-20-00, Figure 5, shows the area where defects have been found, and the lines, shrouds and fittings in this area that can be affected by corrosion and develop leaks. Removal of the shroud is required to inspect and find the corrosion defects because they originate inside the shroud and on the lines.

Operators should be aware of this issue and the potential defects in this area and consider whether more frequent inspections are indicated for their operation in order to detect excessive corrosion and ensure the integrity of the lines and shrouds.



CSP A-006 - MASTER  
EFFECTIVITY:  
See Effectivity Page 1 of 28-20-00, FIG. 5

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**28-20-00**

FIG. 5  
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Figure 1 – IPC reference showing affected area



Figure 2 – Lines showing corrosion



Figure 3 – Broken lines close-up



Figure 4 – Corroded Tee fitting outside view



Figure 5 – Corroded Tee fitting inside showing corrosion



Figure 6 – Close-up of corroded line break showing extent of corrosion

## **Beech – 1900D**

### **Deice Boot Inflation Failure Caused by Melting of Deice Line**

SDR #: 20230508015

#### **Subject:**


During routine maintenance of the horizontal stabilizer internal inspections, we have found the deice line that runs over top of the logo lights melted and distorted – in one case was melted right through and sealed itself shut not displaying any faults in the cockpit and no inflation of deice boots on tail-let. We have replaced line with superseded Part Number 131823PT6.

#### **Transport Canada Comments:**

According to the submitter, the flight crew did not receive any fault indications. However, it is important to note that in SINGLE or MANUAL mode, the TAIL DEICE annunciator may appear to be illuminated normally, giving a false impression of a normal inflation-deflation cycle to the flight crew. Additionally, the instrument panel pneumatic pressure gauge may seem to indicate normal function even if there is a blockage or restriction in the stabilon, stabilizer, or tail-let deice boot line downstream of the tail pressure switch. Despite this, during surface deice operational checks, any insufficient boot inflation or deflation should be investigated further.



Picture 1 – Melted deice line



Picture 2 – Location of concern above logo light, internal of stabilizer

## Cessna – 750

### Right-Hand (RH) Main Landing Gear Retract Hose Failure

SDR #: 20200908017

#### Subject:


Enroute the aircraft indicated low hydraulic oil system A. As per the checklist procedures the aircraft returned to the departure airport and notified ATC (Air Traffic Control) of issues. The aircraft successfully completed landing at the airport using emergency brakes. The aircraft was towed to the maintenance hangar and discovered that the RH main landing gear retraction hose had burst. The aircraft has now been repaired and is back in service. Hose part number (P/N) S3128A0106-000G manufactured 4q99. This hose is original to this aircraft. No applicable SB (Service Bulletin) or SL (Service Letter) has been found related to this part, and there are no TLMC (Time Limit Maintenance Check) requirements for this hose.

#### Transport Canada Comments:

Multiple failures of the RH main landing gear retract hose have been reported, including the alternate P/N listed in the Illustrated Parts Catalogue (IPC) P/N AS115-06K0106.

Often, failure will occur during retraction after rotation, or during extension, and accompanied by a Crew Alerting Message (CAS) such as: HYD PUMP FAIL A, or HYD VOLUME LOW A. In one reported case, HYD PTU FAIL CAS message was displayed.

In all cases reported, emergency extension of the gear using the free fall or pneumatic blow-down methods resulted in positive gear down indication and subsequent safe landing. Transport Canada suggests owners, operators, and maintainers pay attention to the age and condition of the RH main landing gear retraction hose. In particular, the section in close proximity to the swage end of the hose assembly as indicated in the picture below.



Picture 1 – Hose assembly failure location

## **Beech – B300**

### **Low Pitch Solenoid and Uncommanded YAW**

SDR #: 20230612012

#### **Subject:**

During the final approach into the airport at 50 feet above ground level (AGL), the flight crew brought both power levers back to idle. A left yaw quickly developed, followed by a rapid drop to the left wing. An attempt to go around and level the wings was unsuccessful, and the left-wing tip contacted the runway surface. The aircraft deviated from the centerline toward the left edge of the runway. The nose dropped, and the aircraft proceeded uncontrolled off the runway and into the snow-covered infield. Once the aircraft came to rest, the flight crew egressed the aircraft.

During the investigation into the incident, the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) beta solenoids were disassembled, and there were signs of corrosion noted. Examination of the beta solenoid brackets found wear markings from their respective roller bearings evident along the working line of contact, from the normal in-flight position to the retracted position when the reversing cable is pulled by the pilot utilizing the power lever. The through-thickness hole on the LH bracket was observed. The location of these worn engine assemblies would make it difficult to observe the wearing marks unless disassembly during routine maintenance in the area was performed.

The beta solenoid could not be ruled out as a cause of the propeller blades progressing below the in-flight low-pitch stop setting. The beta valve could not be ruled out from having experienced a failure that prohibited it from moving freely, thereby allowing the pressure of the engine oil to drive the blades to a pitch below the normal in-flight idle low stop pitch position.

#### **Transport Canada Comments:**

A similar Feedback article was published in Feedback Magazine Issue 1/2004. Since that time, Beech has addressed various factors that may contribute to an inadvertent low-pitch condition. See Beech Communique ME-TP-001, ME-TP-010, and the latest publication of the Aircraft Maintenance Manual.

The following defects have been reported in relation to an inadvertent low-pitch condition:

- Solenoid stuck / plunger corroded
- Linkage hardware too tight
- Linkage hardware worn/corroded
- Pedestal Ground Idle Stop Switch intermittently sticking in the closed position
- Solenoid Bracket poor clamping with reversing cable (reversing cable slippage)
- Solenoid Support Bracket Bearing Wear
- Rigging

Special attention should be given to the functionality of this system to avoid an inflight occurrence during a critical time such as the landing sequence.



Picture 1 – Wear marks observed in the body of the solenoid bracket

## Engines

### **Pratt & Whitney Canada PW123**

#### **Fuel Line Fitting Under-Torqued**

SDR #: 20211129009

#### **Subject:**

On take-off while climbing through 1500 feet, the crew identified a loss of torque on the #2 engine accompanied by a loss in propeller Revolutions Per Minute (RPM). The torque went to zero and the crew secured the engine. The aircraft landing was uneventful. An inspection by maintenance determined the loss of power was caused by a fuel leak at the fuel flow divider fuel inlet tube assembly. The affected fuel line and fittings were inspected, O-rings were replaced on the flow divider transfer tube and the line installed in accordance with the maintenance manual. Engine power runs were completed, and the aircraft was released back to service.

## **Transport Canada Comments:**

The occurrence summary in the Transportation Safety Board (TSB) daily notification log of this event states that the maintenance personnel determined that an under-torqued fuel line fitting led to the drop in fuel pressure and subsequent engine power loss.

The fuel, oil and electrical systems of engines are normally housed in very cramped and restricted areas of most aircraft and access can be limited at best. Many “B” nuts for fluid lines may not have clearance to attach a torque wrench in a conventional way and a variety of extensions or adapters may have to be used for access. These extensions or adapters may result in an over or under torque situation. The proper torquing of these lines is vital to ensure they remain secure so maintainers are reminded to be vigilant when installing or inspecting these lines and consult manufacturer’s instructions or standard practices such as AC43.13-1B for proper torque calculations if using extensions or adapters.

This aircraft had an uneventful landing however had the fuel leak ignited, it may have been a very different outcome.

## **Pratt & Whitney - CAN, PW306D**

### **Broken Thermocouple Harness**

SDR #: 20220309008


### **Subject:**

While inspecting the internal ignition lead segments to the igniter plugs, during the first 800-hour interval tasks, broken thermocouples were observed through the bypass access panel. Upon further inspection, it was discovered that there were broken probes on each wiring harness of both engines. All four thermocouple wiring harness assemblies (two per engine) required premature replacement at 818.2 hours total time since new.

## **Transport Canada Comments:**

From the photos provided by the service difficulty report submitter, the thermocouple leads seem to have broken close to the thermocouple probe body where the assembly is attached to the engine case. Some discoloration on the thermocouple leads may indicate corrosion and the offset alignment of the lead to the thermocouple probe after breaking suggests stress or fatigue induced during installation.

The root cause of this event is still being investigated by the manufacturer, however, Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) would like to highlight this event for operators of PW306D engines and similar models. If performing inspections in this area or carrying out the 800-hour interval task, pay particular attention to the security and serviceability of the thermocouple harnesses and report any findings through the [Web Service Difficulty Reporting System](#).



Picture 1 – Sheared Thermocouple Lead



Picture 2 – Thermocouple Lead Sheared and Rubbing On Case

## Pratt & Whitney - CAN, PW120A

### Cracked Fuel Drain Line

SDR #: 20220725001

#### Subject:

During a scheduled engine fuel nozzle replacement, the combustion chamber fuel drain line was found cracked.

#### Transport Canada Comments:


Transport Canada would like to inform maintainers and operators of PW120A and similar engine models of this event.

The investigation into the root cause continues, however, corrosion and stress along the weld seam may have been contributing factors.

Please be diligent when inspecting this area and, specifically, this line. Please report any similar findings through the Transport Canada [Web Service Difficulty Reporting System](#).



Picture 1: Broken fuel line



Picture 2: Broken fuel line closeup

## **Teledyne Continental, O-470-R**

### **Teledyne Continental O-470-R Exhaust Valve Springs Broken**

SDR #: 20220825011

#### **Subject:**

The pilot noticed the engine running rough in flight. He returned to base and landed. Upon further investigation, the Aircraft Maintenance Engineer found low compression on the #1 cylinder and both exhaust valve springs broken. He did some research and found a report of another Teledyne Continental engine O-470 with similar problems with valve springs and subsequently decided to replace all the valve springs. At that time, he found another outer spring and 4 inner springs broken and replaced them with springs from a different supplier.

#### **Transport Canada Comments:**

Although the submitter of this event stated that they found reports of other Teledyne Continental engines with broken exhaust valve springs, a search of our service difficulty data base did not find any SDRs submitted with this Parts Manufacture Approval (PMA) part number.

PMA parts are eligible for installation on Canadian aircraft or on an aeronautical product intended for installation on a Canadian aircraft provided that the parts are marked in accordance with the part marking requirements set out by the FAA. The parts must be

accompanied by an authorized release certificate which certifies that the parts conform to the applicable design data approved by the FAA or the Minister and indicates the aeronautical product for which they are eligible.

Transport Canada brings this event to the attention of operators and maintainers for awareness of a potential problem with these PMA parts. If you have experienced related problems with these valve springs on this engine model or similar models, we encourage reporting events through your SDR system for trend monitoring and possible continued airworthiness safety actions.



Picture 1 - Broken Inner and Outer Valve Springs

## **Avco Lycoming, O-320-H2AD**

### **Rocker Arm Failure**

SDR #: 20210707007

#### **Subject:**

A student pilot was on a solo flight when they experienced a sudden loss of power and a rough running engine. Troubleshooting and attempting to resolve the issue was unsuccessful and the pilot was unable to maintain altitude. As such, the pilot landed the aircraft in a nearby field. They activated the ELT and completed a mayday call before touching down. Upon initial inspection there was no damage to the aircraft from the landing. The mechanical issue was quickly found to be on the cylinder #4. The intake push rod tube was bent, and the exhaust push rod broke through the rocker arm. There were approximately 240 hours on this engine since overhaul with no significant

maintenance (besides required inspections) completed prior to the failure. Cylinders were new at overhaul.

### **Transport Canada Comments:**

After conducting an investigation, it was found that Lycoming Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) 639 had not been performed at the recommended 50-hour interval following rocker arm replacement during overhaul. To prevent further incidents, Transport Canada Civil Aviation suggests that owners, operators, and maintainers incorporate MSB 639 and continue to file Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) in the event of rocker arm defects.



Picture 1 – Rocker Arm failure at pushrod socket

### **Teledyne Continental, IO-550-F**

#### **Seized Magneto**

SDR #: 20220822019

#### **Subject:**

At approximately 1500 feet indicated, 750 feet Above Ground Level (AGL) the pilot felt a sudden power reduction. The aircraft was put into a decent and a turn was made back towards the area on the lake the aircraft had departed from. The pilot conducted a brief cause check but could not determine the cause of the loss. The aircraft made a safe

landing back on the water. A visual inspection of the aircraft on the dock revealed that the left magneto had separated from the engine. The magneto's case and the engine adapter both showed damage consistent with a sudden seizure of the magneto. No other damage to the engine/aircraft was noted. Both magnetos were replaced with overhauled units and a replacement engine adapter was installed. Aircraft was grounded and flight checked serviceable.

### **Transport Canada Comments:**

Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) has received several similar Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs) which indicate broken magneto mount flanges and/or adapters as well as impulse coupling fractures.

TCCA recommends that maintainers and owners pay particular attention to the flanges and adapters while inspecting the ignition system. SLICK Service Bulletins (SB) SB1-19A and SB2-19A address reports of impulse coupling broken rivets and stop-pins liberating and potentially entering the gear train, which could contribute to seizure of a magneto. The failed magneto in this event appears to still have the pin in place but it is difficult to determine if the rivets were a factor due to the damage.

Transport Canada continues to monitor for these types of failures. Maintainers, owners, and operators of these products are encouraged to continue reporting similar events through TCCA's [Web Service Difficulty Reporting System](#).



Picture 1 – Broken Impulse Coupling



Picture 2 – Broken Magneto Case



Picture 3 – Worn magneto Shaft

# **Rotorcraft**

## **Bell Textron - CAN, 407**

### **Smoke in the Cockpit due to Air Conditioner System Fouling**

SDR #: 20210512006

#### **Subject:**

Smoke in the cockpit with ground power on was reported to Bell. A clamp was found contacting transistor.

#### **Transport Canada Comments:**

The cause of this service difficulty was determined to be a clamp from the Air Comm Corporation air conditioner system fouling with the Bell Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS). The smoke was generated when the hardware that was used to secure the clamp contacted an electrical component of the AFCS. As a result of the Air Comm Corporation investigation, Service Bulletin (SB) 407-221012 was published. The SB provides instructions to resolve the potential fouling condition between the air conditioner system and the AFCS. Transport Canada Civil Aviation would like to raise awareness of this SB to the owners, operators and maintainers of Bell 407 helicopters with an Air Comm Corporation air conditioner system installed along with the AFCS or the provisions for the AFCS.



Picture 1 - Hardware from the air conditioning system clamp contacting the electrical component of the AFCS.

## **Bell Textron - USA, 212**

### **Fractured Lug on the Swashplate Inner Ring**

SDR #: 20211005009

#### **Subject:**

Swashplate inner ring part number 204-011-402-021 was found to have one lug broken off. It is evident that the lug was fractured for some time. Bell Helicopter has been notified of this service difficulty report. The subject parts have been placed into quarantine stores.

#### **Transport Canada Comments:**

Bell received reports of cracked or broken lugs on the swashplate inner ring, and to raise awareness, have subsequently published Information Letter (IL) 212-22-74. The IL is addressed to owners and operators of model 204B, 205, 205B, 212 and 412 helicopters. It emphasizes the importance of the scheduled daily and 25-hour inspections (as applicable). The IL also provides a reminder of the importance of the CAUTION notice found in the disassembly instructions of the applicable Maintenance & Overhaul (M&O) or Component Repair & Overhaul (CR&O) manual. The CAUTION is a reminder that a retaining compound was used during the installation process, and that in order to prevent damage to the lug, it must be supported when driving out the bolts. To raise awareness of this service difficulty, Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) encourages the owners and operators of the affected helicopter models to review Bell IL 212-22-74 and to remain vigilant during the inspection and disassembly of the swashplate and support assembly.



Picture 1 – Fractured lug on the Swashplate inner ring

## **Robinson, R44**

### **R44 Loose Tail Rotor Blade Tip**

SDR #: 2022612257152

#### **Subject:**

Tail rotor tip cap debonded and was thrown from tail rotor blade shortly after landing. The bonded area of tail rotor tip cap found to be severely corroded. A tap test of bonded area (as per R44 SL-82) showed no evidence of debonding during last inspection. It was observed during testing that tap test method is not a reliable way to determine tip cap debonding. With the tip cap loosely fitted, the tap test was tried and found no change in sound between this blade and a new blade, despite having no bonding. There was a possible rotor overspeed that may have caused extra stress required to cause separation, however the pilot is unsure if the overspeed had occurred.

#### **Transport Canada Comments:**

Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) has received reports of tail rotor blade tips coming loose. The cause of the loose tip was determined to be a debonding of the tail rotor blade tip due to corrosion. A debonded tip could cause the helicopter to experience severe tail rotor vibrations. RHC has published R44 Service Bulletin SB-112 to provide instructions for a recurring inspection and replacement of affected tail rotor blades. Transport Canada Civil Aviation recommends that R44 series helicopter owners, operator and maintainers review and accomplish SB-112.

## **Head's up**

### **Embraer, ERJ 170 200 SU**

#### **Troubles with the In-Flight Entertainment System (IFE)**

SDR #: 20230310001, 20230410011, 20230410013

#### **Subject:**

While troubleshooting the aircraft cabin entertainment system, after it was reported that all video display units from row 18AC to 27AC were inoperative, light smoke and a burning smell were noted originating from electrical plug 11P3402 at seat 24AC when the system was being powered up. The electrical plug was disconnected, and evidence of arcing was observed. Passenger seat 24AC electrical harness A127012-501 was replaced, but the electrical plug 11P3402 had to be deactivated due to a part shortage. The aircraft is currently operating under a minimum equipment list (MEL) extension. The electrical plug will be replaced when it becomes available. Aircraft time: 37100:48 flight hours and 25340 cycles.

While the aircraft was in for heavy maintenance, the IFE power connector at seat 14FD was found to have arcing and burning damage. The harness for the system and connector were replaced at seat 14FD as per the aircraft wiring diagram manual chapter 44-22-51-4 and the supplemental wiring parts manual 20-21-20. No further action was required. Aircraft time: 39418:52 flight hours and 28117 cycles.

While aircraft was in for heavy maintenance, all the left-hand smart video display units (SVDU) up to and including seat 18AC were reported blank. Wiring metered and found no ground present at plug J3 as per wiring manual chapter 44-22-51-04. In addition, found wires WM041-00015-24WH and W041-00015-24BI shorted. Connector 1P3403 at seat 2A was disassembled and found burnt internally. The connector at seat 2A was replaced as per the wiring manual chapter 44-22-51-04 and the supplemental wiring parts manual. Transformer Rectifier Unit was replaced. An operational test of the systems was carried out. Aircraft time: 39418:52 flight hours and 28117 cycles.

### **Transport Canada Comments:**


Recently there has been an increased number of SDRs submitted relating to IFE system on certain aircraft. The IFE system, while not essential for flight, can be essential for an enjoyable travel experience.

As a result of the IFE system not being essential, it is sometimes neglected. The system is also located in the cabin, where plenty of abuse can occur. The wiring required to provide the IFE system can contain high voltage and can provide the risk of an in-flight incident, such as fire or smoke in the cabin.


Operators are asked to remember the importance of the IFE system wiring even though it is not the most important system on the aircraft.



Picture 1 – IFE wiring cannon plug with burnt connections



Picture 2 – Close-up of plug with burnt pins



Picture 3 – Plug disassembled, and wire found severed



Picture 4 – Close-up of charred pins

### **Suspected Unapproved Parts (SUP)**

In Canada, SUPs are reported in accordance with section 571.13 of the standard of the Canadian Aviation Regulation (CAR).

When you suspect an unapproved part, the SUP report can be submitted on the SDR form or through the [Web Service Difficulty Reporting System](#)

To view the most recently published Suspected Unapproved Parts, click [here](#) or go to this website <https://tc.canada.ca/en/aviation/aircraft-airworthiness/continuing-airworthiness/feedback-canadian-aviation-service-difficulty-reports/suspected-unapproved-parts-sup>

### **FAA Unapproved Parts Notifications (UPN)**

Unapproved Parts Notifications are published by: FAA, AIR-140, P.O. Box 26460, Oklahoma City, OK 73125. They are posted on the Internet at:

<https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/programs/sups/upn/>

To view the most recently published FAA Unapproved Parts Notifications (UPN), click [here](#) or go to this website <http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/certification/faa-unapproved-parts-notifications.html>

### **FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins (SAIB)**

A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) SAIB is an information tool that alerts, educates, and makes recommendations to the general aviation community. It is non-regulatory information and guidance that does not meet the criteria for an Airworthiness Directive (AD). They are posted on the Internet at:

<https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/SAIB/>

To view the most recently published FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletins (SAIB), click [here](#) or go to this website

<http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/certification/faa-special-airworthiness-information-bulletins.html>

### **EASA Safety Information Bulletins (SIB)**

A European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) SIB is an information tool that alerts, educates, and makes recommendations to the general aviation community. It is non-regulatory information and guidance that does not meet the criteria for an Airworthiness Directive (AD). They are posted on the Internet at: <https://ad.easa.europa.eu/sib-docs/page-1>

To view the most recently published EASA Safety Information Bulletins (SIB), click [here](#) or go to this website <http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/certification/easa-safety-information-bulletin.html>

### **Equipment Airworthiness Directives (AD)**

Transport Canada (TC) endeavors to send copies of new Airworthiness Directives (ADs), which are applicable in Canada to the registered owners of the affected products. Equipment/appliance ADs are often only distributed to our regional offices because the owners of aircraft affected by this type of AD are not generally known.

Aircraft Maintenance Engineers (AMEs) and operators of the affected products are encouraged to obtain further information or a copy of the ADs from their regional TC office, their local Transport Canada Centre (TCC), their Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), or from the [Civil Aviation AD](#) website.

To view the most recently published Equipment Airworthiness Directives (AD), click [here](#) or go to this website <http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/certification/equipment-airworthiness-directives.html>

**Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs)**

Service Difficulty Reports are submitted by Aircraft Maintenance Engineers (AMEs), owners, operators and other sources to report problems, defects or occurrences that affect aircraft airworthiness in Canada.

To view the most recently published Service Difficulty Reports (SDRs), click [here](#) or go to this website <http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/civilaviation/certification/service-difficulty-reports.html>