



# THE INDIGENOUS COMMUNITY ORIENTATION GUIDE ON AFRICAN SWINE FEVER

Canadian Food Inspection Agency  
Indigenous Science Office



Canadian Food  
Inspection Agency

Agence canadienne  
d'inspection des aliments

Canada



***The Indigenous Community Orientation Guide on African Swine Fever***

Également disponible en français sous le titre :  
*Guide d'orientation à l'intention des communautés autochtones sur la peste porcine africaine*

Published by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA)  
1400 Merivale Road  
Ottawa, ON K1A 0Y9  
[inspection.canada.ca](http://inspection.canada.ca)

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Publication date: March 2025

Catalogue No.: A104-646/2025E-PDF  
ISBN: 978-0-660-76668-3

This document is available in alternative formats upon request.

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## INTRODUCTION ON THE CANADIAN FOOD INSPECTION AGENCY'S (CFIA) DISEASE RESPONSE TO AFRICAN SWINE FEVER (ASF)

The goal of CFIA's disease response strategy to African swine fever (ASF) is to completely remove ASF from both farmed and wild pig populations if ASF is ever introduced in Canada. This approach aligns with both the CFIA's mandate on safeguarding the health of animals, and with Indigenous values on the wellness of animals as a valued component of the farmed and natural environment.

The intent of this guide has multiple functions. The first is to share what the *Federal [Health of Animals Act](#)* and its associated [Regulations](#) are with Indigenous communities. In the event of animal-related emergencies, the CFIA has a responsibility to respond and protect farmed animals from imminent and future risk of disease and harm, while protecting human health (considering the CFIA mandate) from diseases that may be transmitted from animals to humans. The other function of this guide is to begin assessing the implications and impacts these Canadian federal emergency response measures may have on Indigenous communities. The CFIA values Indigenous feedback and inputs on how these response measures may be carried out generally or alternatively to reach the same goal of removing disease agents (or containing disease agents if removal is not possible) from Canada, while ensuring Indigenous community values and perspectives are respected.

The federal *Health of Animals Act* and its associated *Regulations* have a broad range of authority that allows for response to animal disease events by the CFIA in Canada.



Under the *Health of Animals Act and Regulations* a CFIA Inspector may:

- Investigate the **suspicion** of animal disease.
  - CFIA inspectors are given the legal authority to enter a property to investigate.
  - **Note:** This applies to the farm territory, an inspector must obtain consent or a warrant to enter the farmer's dwelling-place or home.
- Impose movement restrictions.
  - If disease is identified and confirmed, CFIA inspectors can restrict the movement of animals and items that may spread the disease.
- Order destruction or depopulation of animals and items.
  - This requires the farmer to destroy all animals/items that could be potentially impacted or spread the identified disease.
- Order disposal of animals and items.
  - Compensation may be awarded for the animals and things ordered destroyed. Disposal costs may also be covered for animals ordered destroyed, as well as certain things ordered destroyed.
- Order cleaning and disinfection.
  - Applies to property, equipment, and any structures suspected of contamination.

These actions are consistent with the international guidelines and standards set by the World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) for controlling animal disease outbreaks.

It is important for stakeholders and our Indigenous partners to understand what Canadian laws provide for and how these provisions drive response actions. While the CFIA's emergency response functions prioritize animal safety, we recognize that these Acts and Regulations must be implemented with consideration for Indigenous value systems when their implementation may affect Indigenous rights.

Aboriginal and Treaty rights may be impacted by response measures captured within the Federal *Health of Animals Act* and its associated regulations. Whether considering trade with the United States or other countries across the world - the standards, requirements, and response actions to the African swine fever disease located throughout this document primarily fall within the responsibility and authority of the CFIA and are exercised consistently to protect animal health and subsequently maintain Canada's reputation and "disease free status" globally since



one positive case of ASF in domestic or wild pigs in Canada **will stop all trade related exports immediately**. The CFIA wishes to work proactively, collaboratively, and cooperatively with the diverse Indigenous Nations and/or communities across Canada to ensure all parties are aware of ASF response measures, and to begin working on potential alternative response measures which still achieve the end-goal of removing the ASF disease agent from Canada, while lessening potential impacts on Aboriginal and Treaty rights.

If you wish to begin the conversation on ASF and its potential impacts to your own Indigenous Nation and/or communities, please first read this ASF Guide in its entirety, record the areas which may adversely impact you and further reach out to your regional Indigenous Liaison (Indigenous Liaison information and email located in the **CFIA Introductory Guide**). The CFIA recognizes that farmers understand the health and well-being of their farmed animals, therefore we are asking for everyone to assist in keeping ASF out of Canada.

## STAGE 1 – SUSPECTED ASF CASE

The current situation in Canada regarding ASF is focused on “awareness and preparedness”. ASF has not yet made its way into Canada, however with the disease spreading rapidly in other areas of the world, we may see cases in Canada very soon. The first stage of disease response is based around the “novel case” (or the first case being identified). There are a few steps to this initial process, and this process changes AFTER the first case confirmation in Canada. This case could appear in farmed or wild pig populations, so reporting sick or dead pig(s) that appear to have died from a disease to CFIA (farmed or wild) is an important first step.

In farmed premises, it is a requirement as well as an important step in early detection to report any observed suspicion of ASF presence to the CFIA since ASF is a reportable disease. As an extension to this requirement, farmers are only eligible to be compensated for live pigs once ASF is confirmed by the CFIA and the farmer has been issued an order to destroy. ASF can have a case fatality rate of up to 100% in domestic pigs and wild boars and can result in death in as short as a 10-day period (this period of time can vary depending on the size of the farm/enclosures and number of pigs). By the time the first pig dies, many, if not all other pigs on the same “contact premises” may have either been exposed or infected with ASF as well.

### 1.01 WHAT HAPPENS IF ASF IS SUSPECTED?

When a suspicion of ASF is reported to the CFIA, the local district office will mobilize a team of CFIA staff to perform the following tasks at the premises where the suspect animals are located.

**Please inform your local CFIA office or your regional Indigenous Liaison of any necessary protocols or permissions needed for federal inspectors/staff to enter your reserve/territory. Additionally, please indicate if any of the actions indicated in this section are in direct contradiction of any cultural values or rights you feel your Nation/community may experience. These actions are intended to be consistently applied across Canada to Canadian farmers for the initial suspect ASF case.**

CFIA will investigate all reported suspect cases and typically performs the following tasks:

- Field epidemiology investigation:
  - Collecting information on the animals and the premises, farmstead, or site of infection:
  - Epidemiology -> deals with the incidence, distribution, and possible control of diseases and other factors relating to health.
- Biocontainment measures:
  - Establish biosecurity zones on-site to prevent the potential spread of disease beyond the premises.

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- Implement comprehensive biosecurity procedures to safeguard against further contamination.
  - Diagnostic sampling:
    - Inspectors will examine the animals and select those that will be used for testing.
    - The veterinary inspector will perform a risk determination to clarify the level of risk that ASF may be present on a premises.

The risk determination made by the veterinary inspector based on initial non-laboratory physical observations of the selected animals will determine the assigned level of risk or likelihood that ASF is present. Actions that follow the collection of diagnostic samples from the selected animals can potentially include:

- Initiation of tracing<sup>1</sup> activities for high-risk situations.
- Movement restrictions can be put in place to control movement of animals and things on and off the premises until lab results are available.
  - Quarantines and declarations of infected place are both movement restrictions, and the use of these restrictions usually links directly to the level of risk a site may pose. (e.g. quarantine animals that are tested when the risk determination is a low risk vs. quarantine and a Declaration of Infected Place when there is a high-risk determination.)

Depending on the risk determination associated with the suspicion of an ASF infection, additional steps may be taken to bring in resources to contain and investigate the outbreak further. As part of contingency planning, each CFIA district office prepares a list of pre-identified staff to assist in the initial steps of the investigation.

**If you wish to submit contact information for notices of potential infection within proximity of your Nation/community, please reach out to your local CFIA office or connect with one of the CFIA's regional Indigenous Liaisons. It is also recommended to have community members made aware and ready to assist in responding to ASF if ever it is identified on Indigenous reserves/territories.**

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<sup>1</sup> Traceability is a crucial component of livestock disease management. It's the ability to verify where animals have traveled and when, helping producers and CFIA inspectors know where diseased or at-risk livestock is located.

## 1.02 ASF CASE DEFINITIONS

A “suspect case” is defined as follows:

1. A suid or pig with clinical signs or pathologic lesions (changes in an organ or tissue) that are consistent with the African swine fever virus (ASFV) infection.
2. A suid or pig that is thought to have been exposed by direct or indirect contact to a case of ASFV. This could include a case in domestic or wild pigs or even a case that has been confirmed from another country.
3. A non- negative<sup>2</sup> result obtained from a CFIA-approved screening test performed by an approved laboratory, or a test performed by the National Centre for Foreign Animal Disease (NCFAD) for African swine fever virus, as part of surveillance activities<sup>3</sup> prior to the confirmation of an ASF outbreak.

Please note that if the screening test for ASF is conducted at a network laboratory and it is not a negative result, we refer to it as a non-negative test result. Essentially, this means that the sample could in fact be positive but further action is required to confirm the test result at the NCFAD before we refer to it as a true positive test.

## 1.03 SUSPECT INVESTIGATION – FIELD EPIDEMIOLOGY INVESTIGATION

A Field Epidemiology Investigation is performed to determine the source of the disease and where it may have spread.

Details on the investigative process prior to visiting the premises where the suspect case is located:

- Required information on the owner, animals, and premises location through a phone call is gathered.
- In some cases (with permission), a call is also made to the herd veterinarian to inquire about the general health of the animals. Any further action with regards to the call to the herd veterinarian is at the discretion of the farmer.


Details on the investigative process and information gathering on-site where the suspect case is located:

- The field epidemiology or epi-investigation is one of the first actions to occur in an investigation.

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<sup>2</sup> A non-negative result cannot be officially reported as “positive”.

<sup>3</sup> Surveillance activities may include testing done under the CanSpot ASF surveillance system or to meet national standards for ASF-free compartments. This does not apply to testing conducted because ASF is suspected in a sick pig or as part of outbreak or post-outbreak surveillance activities.

- 
- The field epi investigation collects information about the premises.
  - Information on the animals including their production type, ages, health.
  - Information about the herd of origin, biosecurity practices on the premises, potential risk factors for disease entry onto the premises.
  - Information about the owner, workers, and other people on site.

The producer is advised to prepare information in advance to help guide and support the epidemiological investigation. This information is collected through the **Premise Investigation Questionnaire** (PIQ) and takes 1-2 hours to complete. The PIQ collects information dating back 30 days in the following areas:

- Production records: Information about animal production to assess herd health and trends. This includes:
  - Feed and water intake
  - Mortality records
  - Abortion rates
- Movement records: These records help to identify other premises that may require investigation (referred to as epidemiologically linked or epi-linked premises). This includes movements of:
  - Visitors entering the premises
  - Service providers
  - Animals
  - Animal products or byproducts
  - Anything moving on or off the premises that could be contaminated with ASF
- Site plan: This plan should outline all the buildings and significant areas associated with the animal production system, including:
  - Animal housing
  - Outdoor pastures, if any

- Feed storage locations
- Deadstock areas
- Parking areas
- Manure or slurry disposal areas

All personal information (captured in the definition of "personal information" in the *Privacy Act*) collected by the CFIA will be protected in accordance with the provisions of the *Privacy Act* and will be stored in Personal Information Banks. Government records may be accessible or protected as required under the provisions of the Access to Information Act and the *Privacy Act*. Before collecting personal information from any person, the CFIA reviews use the CFIA's Privacy Notice Statement for Animal Disease Investigations with the interviewee.

**If your Indigenous Nation/community wishes to develop an alternative data sharing agreement, please reach out to your regional Indigenous Liaison. If you already have a data sharing agreement in place with the Government of Canada, please indicate this to the CFIA prior to the CFIA Inspector arriving on-site.**




## 1.04 SUSPECT INVESTIGATION – BIOSECURITY

Biosecurity is the implementation of measures that reduce the risk of the introduction and spread of disease agents; it requires the adoption of a set of attitudes and behaviors by people to reduce risk in all activities involving domestic, captive/exotic, and wild animals and their products.


During a suspect investigation, biosecurity measures will be implemented on the property to adhere to the principles of:

- Bio-exclusion, which is ensuring no disease agents, in this case ASF, are brought onto the property.
- Biocontainment, ensuring no disease agents leave the property.
- Bio-management, preventing the spread of disease within the property.

A series of biosecurity zones (described below) are established on the premises during the investigation.



This diagram illustrates an example of how cold, warm, and hot zones are set up on a premises. A hot to cold zone system is used where hot zones are those areas on the premises most likely to be dirty or infected, such as a barn where the pigs are housed, and a clean or cold zone where there is expected to be no contamination with the ASFV African swine fever virus, such as a parking lot, for example. Any CFIA responders entering the warm or hot zones are required to follow strict biosecurity procedures called containment biosecurity. Containment biosecurity are procedures followed by CFIA staff for contagious foreign animal diseases like ASF. This requires the donning or putting on of appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE). As staff leave each zone, they doff or take off the PPE and follow a disinfection procedure to prevent



any potential transfer of ASF virus off the premises. The district office response team typically have staff dedicated to the biosecurity measures that are implemented on site during an investigation.

### 1.05 RISK DETERMINATION PROCESS

Once the investigative team have collected the necessary information, they will perform a clinical exam of the herd and then make a risk determination of the likelihood that ASF is present on the premises. The ASF risk determination is based on three main criteria:

1. The investigators must assess the clinical presentation or presence of ASF signs in pigs that have either died or are sick;
2. the risk of ASF introduction and exposure to pigs which looks at the likelihood of both ASF being introduced onto the premises, and then the subsequent exposure to pigs; and
3. the biosecurity procedures on the premises and assesses whether these biosecurity practices may have allowed for the potential introduction of ASF or were possibly compromised allowing entry for the ASF virus.

This risk determination process and decision is made in consultation with operational, policy and science specialists at CFIA (those most familiar with the disease).

### 1.06 RISK DETERMINATION

Whether or not samples are taken, and how sampling is handled depends on the results of the risk determination that was made by the inspector.

- A. A **negligible-risk** determination means there is no evidence or suspicion of ASF on the premises. No samples are collected in this case.
- B. A **low-risk** determination means that ASF is not suspected but will still be ruled out. Samples will be collected and submitted as confirmatory negative submissions to the NCFAD and processed during normal business hours.
- C. A **high-risk** determination means there is a strong suspicion for the presence of ASF on the premises. Samples are in this case submitted directly to the NCFAD lab as a high-risk submission.

In some cases, CFIA staff may drive samples directly to the lab if it's nearby, or even charter an aircraft if needed. High-risk samples are processed immediately, including after hours and on holidays. Samples may also be sent to a local lab that is part of an approved network to receive preliminary results more quickly. While official results must still come from

NCFAD, these early results can be very helpful if there is a delay in sending samples to Winnipeg.

## 1.07 SUSPECT INVESTIGATION – SAMPLE COLLECTION

Blood and tissue samples<sup>4</sup> are collected for any investigation where a **low or high-risk** determination is made. Whenever possible, blood and tissue samples should be collected from the same animal such as when euthanasia is required of a clinically sick animal or if the animal is very recently dead, in which case sometimes blood can be collected.

Tissue samples<sup>5</sup> are collected during the postmortem examinations of up to five animals. Ideally, they should be dead less than 24 hours so that tissues are as fresh as possible. Bone marrow from long bones such as leg bones is the best option for decomposed carcasses as the virus remains in the bone marrow for long periods of time. This is often the best sample option for wild pigs because the carcasses are often not fresh when they are discovered.

The clinical presentation of both African and classical swine fever can be very similar (as well as many other diseases, some even seen quite commonly currently in pigs in Canada), therefore an established sampling plan has been developed by the CFIA called “*The African Swine Fever and Classical Swine Fever Sampling Plan*” to determine the cause of a suspected hemorrhagic disease in swine.

The confirmation of the first infected premises in Canada must be made by the CFIA's laboratory, the NCFAD located in Winnipeg, Manitoba<sup>6</sup>. NCFAD continues to evaluate different sample types suitable for testing in the hopes of easing the difficulty of both blood and tissue sampling in pigs which can be laborious and time consuming for inspectors.

## 1.08 SUSPECT INVESTIGATION – MOVEMENT CONTROL

Initiating movement restrictions is critical to prevent spread of potential disease off the premises if a low or high-risk determination was made for the premises under investigation. One of the first movement restriction actions that should occur if not already done by the producer is the establishment of a restricted entry to the premises. This ideally should be an initiative of the

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<sup>4</sup> Blood samples required include EDTA whole blood and serum from nine animals showing clinical signs and their immediate cohorts.

<sup>5</sup> Tissue samples include tonsil, spleen, lymph nodes, kidney, lung, liver, and brain. If possible pericardial, and parital fluid should also be collected.

<sup>6</sup> It should also be noted that there are five Canadian Animal Health Surveillance Network (CAHSN) Laboratories that are approved to perform ASF testing. They conduct Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) testing and, as of 2024, have added Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay (ELISA) to their scope to better support a disease response effort and to support ASF compartment testing. The CAHSN lab network is an integrated Federal/Provincial University laboratory network with a common information sharing platform to link federal and provincial animal health agencies. These approved laboratories may be used as part of disease screening for suspect cases and will also have the capacity for ASF testing once an ASF outbreak is confirmed in Canada.



producer and part of his farm contingency plan. Essential vehicle entries are restricted to one single entry point for the property to ensure there's no unnecessary traffic coming onto the property. Other movement restrictions that are applied depend on the risk determination made for the premises.

When quarantines are placed on animals or things, no designated animal or thing can be removed from the premises, moved around inside the premises or destroyed without permission from the CFIA.

- A. If a **negligible-risk** determination is made, for example, there is no evidence of ASF, there are typically no additional movement restrictions or actions required on the premises while the CFIA is there doing their investigation.
- B. If a **low-risk** determination is made, for example, there are some clinical signs of ASF, however it is not suspected but cannot be definitively ruled out, an inspector has the authority to order a quarantine on the sampled animals, their cohorts or immediate surrounding animals and any carcasses that are present on the premises until test results become available.
- C. When **high-risk** determinations are made, a quarantine will usually be placed on all animals and carcasses on the premises and movement restrictions for all other things moving on or off the premises are put in place via a declaration of infected place. There is maintenance of the movement restrictions until laboratory results are received.

A quarantine does not prevent anything from coming onto the premises (although this is not recommended). However, a licence issued by an inspector to authorize transportation of a quarantined animal or thing is required to remove animals or things from a premises under quarantine.

In the case of a **high-risk** determination, an inspector may issue a *Declaration of Infected Place* which identifies the geographical site of the premises as being infected. No animals or things listed on the Declaration can be removed from the premises or moved onto the premises without permission from the CFIA. Once a Declaration of Infected Place is issued, CFIA inspectors then issue individual licences which authorize to remove something or bring something on to a premises, where doing so does not result in the spread of disease and is not likely to do so.

## 1.09 PRESUMPTIVE CASE DEFINITION

If the screening test comes back **negative**, all biosecurity and movement restrictions would come off the premises and the investigation is closed.

If, however, the screening test comes back as a **non-negative**, when run by a CAHSN laboratory, or positive, when run by the NCFAD, the presumptive case definition has been reached.



A presumptive case (a likely case) is defined as follows: a suid or pig showing clinical signs or pathologic lesions consistent with (or similar to) ASFV and one of either:

- An epidemiological link to a confirmed ASF case, or a non-negative result from a CFIA approved screening test performed at an approved laboratory or,
- A positive result from the NCFAD for ASF virus in a sample that was collected from that suid (or pig).

Defining a presumptive case is very important because at this stage the CFIA may begin to take control actions on the premises, or they may in some cases wait until full confirmation is received by the NCFAD.


A presumptive case definition is reached much easier after confirmation as we now know the disease is already in the country at this stage. A presumptive case definition can be met with just a non- negative result from a CFIA approved screening test performed at an approved laboratory or by the NCFAD as part of ASF surveillance activities. Essentially, no concurrent clinical signs or epidemiological link is required.

## **1.10 IMMEDIATE MEASURES TAKEN WHILE WAITING FOR ASF CONFIRMATION (PRESUMPTIVE CASE)**

Once we have reached the stage of meeting the presumptive case definition for the first or index case of ASF in Canada, the CFIA will initiate immediate further actions while waiting for full confirmation of ASF from the NCFAD.

These actions may include:

1. Possible further diagnostic sampling which may be recommended by the NCFAD Laboratory. The epidemiological investigation will also continue at this point for tracing purposes.
2. There will also be maintenance of on-site movement restrictions and biosecurity zones. The CFIA may also initiate:
  - a. preparedness activities in anticipation of a confirmed case;
  - b. preparation of standing up an Incident Command System (ICS);
    - i. The ICS offers a management system which determines the functions, duties and staff within the overall emergency response. It transforms emergency "confusion" into a well-managed response by identifying "people" as the primary resources and provides critical answers to "Who's in Charge" and "What's my Job". The ICS encourages communications and coordination.

- 
- c. planning of zone implementation; and
  - d. develop a destruction and disposal plan in the event of a possible confirmed case of ASF.
3. Aside from the identified “high-risk premises” (or location where the potential ASF infection was reported), the following actions may also occur elsewhere at this stage:
- a. Movement restrictions on all swine premises located within a 3 km radius of the presumed positive premises may be applied.
  - b. Movement restrictions may also be placed on the epidemiologically linked premises that were identified through the tracing investigations.
    - i. For example, those premises that may have provided or received animals from the suspect premises or have been in contact with the suspect premises in some way.
4. Industry may consider the implementation of a **voluntary stop movement recommendation** at the presumptive positive phase for live animals and possibly carcasses and other swine products and byproducts in an effort to help slow the spread of disease until further disease response measures can be set up by the CFIA. The CFIA will notify industry and provincial animal health stakeholders of a presumptive positive case, while respecting *Privacy Act* requirements which apply to the protection of personal information.

## STAGE 2 – CONFIRMED ASF CASE

In domestic swine, the official confirmation of an index case of ASF in Canada can only be made on samples obtained by the CFIA personnel with tests performed by the NCFAD. Any samples obtained through third parties such as a lab referral that identify ASFV before official confirmation can only be considered presumptive unless otherwise approved by the CFIA.

### 2.01 CONFIRMED ASF CASE DEFINITION

For the official confirmation of the index case (in either domestic/captive or wild/feral swine) of ASFV in Canada, a confirmed case is defined as:

1. A suid from which the ASFV has been isolated and identified by the NCFAD; or
2. Nucleic acid specific to ASFV has been confirmed and sequenced by the NCFAD in samples from a suid showing:
  - a. Clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with ASFV; or
  - b. An epidemiological link to a suspected or confirmed case of ASF; or
  - c. A suspicion of previous exposure to ASFV; or
3. Antibodies specific to ASFV have been identified by the NCFAD in samples from a suid showing:
  - a. Clinical signs or pathological lesions consistent with ASFV; or
  - b. An epidemiological link to a suspected or confirmed case of ASF; or
  - c. A suspicion of previous exposure to ASFV<sup>7</sup>.

In wild pigs, samples may be considered confirmed if collected by other authorized federal or provincial government authorities.

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<sup>7</sup> The very first ASF case in Canada (the index case) must be confirmed by the CFIA. CFIA confirmation is also required when a new population is implicated (for example, wild vs. domestic pigs) or when ASF is found in a new area of the country that is not linked to any existing case.



Changes are made to the confirmed case definition once an outbreak of ASF has been confirmed in Canada (like the presumptive case definition).

- Changes to the ASF confirmed case definition makes confirmed cases easier to establish once we know the ASFV has made its way into Canada.
- Case definitions may need to change during an outbreak as a result of better understanding the behavior of the virus learned through ongoing epidemiological investigations.
- These changes to the case definitions would only be done through consultation and discussion with relevant experts.

## 2.02 DISEASE RESPONSE STRATEGY: ERADICATION

So, what happens if ASF is confirmed in Canada?

Since ASF adversely impacts animal health, the *Health of Animals Act* and its associated *Regulations* provides the CFIA with legislative powers and authority (under CFIA's mandate) to take disease response measures. Animal disease impacts in Canada can also hold detrimental international trade/economic implications.

The ASF disease response strategy is eradication with the goal of returning to Canada's ASF free status as quickly as possible. In any animal disease response, the CFIA's goal is either eradication or control. The CFIA's legislated mandate is to protect animal health, and human health where applicable. This may also help to limit the potentially severe impacts on the Canadian swine industry, supporting industries, and the Canadian economy.

Disease eradication aims to eliminate the pathogenic agent from the domestic swine population and if present, from the wild population. The CFIA only moves to a "control" type of response if eradication attempts are unsuccessful.


## 2.03 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND THE ICS

The CFIA implements an Emergency Management Structure to respond to animal disease events. Like federal emergency responses, most provinces have also adopted an Emergency Management Structure known as the Incident Command System (ICS).

At the local level, the centralized location for managing an incident is called the Incident Command Post, referred to as the Regional Emergency Operations Centre (REOC). The REOC is a physical location where the coordination of information and resources to support the ICS occur; this can be a temporary location or located at an even a more established facility at a higher-level or organization within a jurisdiction.

The National Emergency Operation Centre (NEOC) exists in Ottawa, ON at the CFIA headquarters. Both the NEOC and REOC can be activated in an emergency and is staffed based on a disease response's operational needs.

This incident command structure organizational chart is an example of the structure used for many animal disease events:



Each of the primary management functions is important. The number of roles can expand or contract depending on the size and stage of an outbreak.

These five major management sections are the foundation of the Incident Command (IC) structure. They apply whether you are handling a routine emergency, organizing for a major event, or responding to a disease outbreak or natural disaster. The five sections are:

1. **Command Staff** – The Incident Commander is responsible for all incident or event activity. While other functions may be left unfilled there was always an Incident Commander.
2. **Operations Section** – Responsible for directing the tactical actions to meet incident or in this case disease response objectives.
3. **Planning Section** – Responsible for the collection, evaluation and displaying incident information, maintaining status of resources and preparing the Incident Action Plan and related documentation.

- 
4. **Logistics Section** – Responsible for providing adequate services and support to meet all incident or event needs.
  5. **Finance and Administration Section** – Responsible for keeping track of incident related costs personnel and equipment records and administering procurement contracts associated with the incident or event.

The ICS performs and delivers on many responsibilities. Aside from the above-mentioned duties, the ICS also assists and coordinates:

- Deployment of responders for various disease response teams or units including destruction, disposal, diagnostics, epidemiology, movement control, etc.
- Media, communication, procurement of supplies and contracts, and liaison officers for National and international stakeholders. This allows for immediate engagement with industry, the public, and stakeholders.
- Partner agencies and/or Indigenous Nations/communities would be engaged by the ICS (or the CFIA's Regional Indigenous Liaison) and embedded into the structure as needed by the response according to the functions they are filling.

## 2.04 MESSAGING AND COMMUNICATIONS IN AN ASF OUTBREAK

The communication element during an ASF outbreak is critical to promote:

- Awareness about the disease;
- How to prevent and protect against the spread of ASF; and
- Consumer confidence in the food safety of Canadian pork.

The CFIA will provide communication on the status of the outbreak risk factors contact information and disease information on the [CFIA website](#).

The CFIA, stakeholder groups, and (if impacted) Indigenous leaders will help the dissemination of important ASF messages and preventative ASF disease steps by delivering information awareness sessions and media campaigns.

Preventing the spread of African swine fever is everyone's responsibility, even non-farmers. African swine fever is a contagious disease affecting all pigs. This includes commercial pigs, wild pigs and even pet pigs. Things that can be done to help prevent and protect against the spread of African swine fever include:

- DO NOT feed food waste to pigs
- DO NOT throw pork products in the garbage unless they have been fully cooked

- DO clean all farm equipment, footwear and clothing PRIOR to visiting a farm
- DO NOT allow pork products to be brought onto your farm
- DO NOT allow farm access to wild pigs
- DO know where your feed and feed ingredients come from
- KNOW the signs of ASF
- REPORT any suspicious pig illnesses to your vet or the CFIA

## 2.05 WHAT IS ZONING?

Zoning is the most effective disease response tool for the containment and management of eradication measures for a foreign animal disease such as ASF. Zoning defines a geographic area that is established to prevent disease spread from an infected area to areas that are free of disease. Successful zoning is achieved using movement controls and biosecurity, with the primary goal of containing the disease to only a part or parts of the country. Zoning also supports trade by defining disease-free areas recognized by international partners. The CFIA requests zone recognition from trading partners to help reestablish trade from these disease-free areas.

## 2.06 DECLARING THE PRIMARY CONTROL ZONE (PCZ)

Zoning is implemented by the declaration of a PCZ, under the authority of the *Health of Animals Act*. The PCZ is a tool that allows us to:

- Restrict and allow for the safe movement of pigs and their products and byproducts;
- Impose strict biosecurity requirements on a larger scale during an ASF outbreak; and
- Decrease the possibility of spreading the disease agent to non-affected areas of the country.

The PCZ is declared by the federal Minister of Agriculture under the authority of the *Health of Animals Act*. In more recent years, this authority has been delegated to the President of the CFIA to allow for more rapid and targeted responses since numerous control zones may be required. This declaration is not equivalent to Canada declaring a state of emergency under the *Emergencies Act*.


## 2.07 PCZ FACTORS

When PCZ's are set up, various factors help determine the extent of the outbreak and the subsequent PCZ size requirements. Knowledge of routine animal and industry movements, the results of the epidemiological investigation, and considerations of wild animal interactions all contribute to ongoing zoning decisions. This means that both the size and number of PCZ's may be required to change over time, throughout the outbreak.

Generally, a PCZ will have a minimum radius of 10 kilometers from any infected premises. Each PCZ contains two inner zones and are for management purposes to reflect an increasing level of disease risk the closer you get to the infected premises (IP).

The zone details are important as it links to the permissions required to move things. People need to know where they fall within the zone.

The boundaries of a PCZ are often defined by identifiable geographic political or municipal landmarks. For example, rivers, provincial territorial or township, borders, and roadways. PCZ boundaries **are not** determined by the economic or commercial activities within them, as it is important to remember that the primary goal of zoning is disease containment. Divisions within the zone can change over the course of the outbreak as the risk level changes, until the time when the zone is rescinded.



An IP is shown in this diagram by the red dot. The most inner ring (red) is the infected zone (IZ) and extends a minimum of 3 kilometers from any direction from an IP. Surrounding the IZ is the restricted zone (RZ), which is shown here with a yellow ring. It extends from the outer border of the IZ to a minimum distance of 10 km in any direction from an infected premises. The use of a security zone within the primary control zone is situation-dependent and may or may not be used for ASF.


Areas outside the PCZ are referred to as the free zone or disease-free area.

## 2.08 SINGLE OR MULTIPLE INFECTED PREMISES

What can happen when multiple primary control zones are required?

When setting up PCZs, the goal is to have as few as possible and minimize the size of each zone while maintaining effective disease control. The diagram shows an example of a single PCZ around a single infected premises. It is also possible that there may be multiple primary control zones in geographically distinct areas. This would not be unexpected in an outbreak involving commercial swine, where movements often cover vast distances, sometimes across several provinces or territories.

However, it is also possible that numerous small zones will overlap into what looks like a larger primary control zone or that multiple smaller zones would exist near one another.



If there are multiple infected premises close together the primary control zones may overlap creating what functionally looks like one larger zone. You can see examples of both the yellow restricted zones and red infected zones overlapping in some locations.

## 2.09 HOW ZONING PREVENTS DISEASE SPREAD

The main benefit of zoning is that it allows the movements of animals and things that can spread disease to be controlled using permits. These permits define what actions are required – no movement, movement only to certain destinations, or movement allowed with testing and biosecurity measures.

Zoning allows for the control of disease spread through the overarching disease control actions that are required on any premises on which swine are located within the boundaries of a primary control zone. These disease control actions apply to any type of premises including farms,

slaughter and processing facilities, assembly points for pigs and transport fairs auctions, and even properties with pet pigs.

These actions include:

- Raising awareness, which is critical for industry and industry service providers.
- Increased biosecurity standards, strongly recommended on all swine farms during an outbreak.
- CFIA enforcement of additional biosecurity requirements during the movement of pigs and related materials that can spread the virus (including semen, embryos, manure, feed, crops, vehicles, equipment and other things or fomites that may be contaminated with ASF).
  - This is done through a permitting system that imposes conditions to make movements safe.
- Surveillance, to detect cases and monitor disease spread.
- Mandatory reporting of sick or dead pigs.

A zone is not required to conduct surveillance or outreach activities – these efforts also occur outside the zone.

More detail is explained on these actions in Stage 3 – Emergency Response Measures.



## STAGE 3 – EMERGENCY RESPONSE MEASURES

### 3.01 OVERVIEW OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE MEASURES

Further to the implementation of zones, disease eradication measures are also set into motion within a few hours of receiving the official notification of ASF confirmation.

The basic principles used in eradication of ASF are to prevent contact between susceptible animals and the disease agent through the use of movement controls and biosecurity to contain the disease agent to a geographic area. This is carried out by zoning and eradicating sources of the disease agent through depopulation, disposal, and the cleaning and disinfection of infected premises.


While waiting for a positive result from the labs, presumptive case actions are conducted which include:

- An epidemiological investigation
- Development of the depopulation and disposal plans for the premises

These actions apply to both the first case (also known as the index case) at the start of an outbreak as well as any newly identified infected premises as the outbreak progresses in anticipation of a positive ASF test result.

Once the premises is confirmed to be positive for ASF, a new set of actions must be conducted. These usually include:

- Evaluating animals and things for compensation, following:
  - [Animal health compensation – what to expect when an animal is ordered destroyed](#)
  - [Compensation for Destroyed Animals and Things Regulations](#)
- Depopulating animals on positive premises;
- Disposing of carcasses and contaminated material;
- Cleaning and disinfecting the premises to eliminate the pathogen; and
- Observing a vacancy period, followed by restocking as part of the recovery process.



Beyond the infected premises, the following actions are also taken:

- Conducting diagnostic sampling on all epi-linked premises that have been identified through the epi-investigations;
- Applying movement controls; and
- Implementing increased surveillance and biosecurity measures.

**These actions apply to any swine premises within the primary control zone even if they are not infected or not epi-linked to an infected premises, as a result of the declaration of a primary control zone.**

It is possible to restrict movements of pigs and their products/byproducts between distinct areas of disease status (infected versus disease-free). This will include restrictions or requirements to be met using permits to avoid exposing animals or equipment to possible sources of infection. The restrictions are based on the risk of ASF spreading from either an infected premises or a potentially unknown source of infection to disease-free areas of the country.

Outbreak surveillance is also an important measure taken during a disease outbreak. This will include all testing that is mandatory for epi-linked premises, monitored premises, as well as any pre-movement testing requirements and surveillance testing performed on swine within and as necessary, outside of the PCZ.

### 3.02 MOVEMENT CONTROL IN THE PCZ

With zoning in place, movement controls in the PCZ are applied on a broader scale (or geographic blanket approach) and are applicable to all premises that may contain pigs within a PCZ. They also apply to all things that can transmit the ASF virus as described in the *PCZ declaration and designation* documents.

The zoning process includes:

1. Declaration of the zone (defines the boundaries)
2. Designation of animals and things to be controlled (that pose a risk of disease spread)
3. Defining the conditions under which things can move

Movement controls take effect immediately once the primary control zone has been declared. When an owner or producer applies to move an animal or designated thing into, out of, within, or through a primary control zone, the request may be:

- Prohibited, if deemed unsafe;
- Allowed without conditions; or

- Conditionally allowed, with special requirements that must be met (such as additional biosecurity measures, disinfection and/or animal testing).

For a movement to occur, it must meet requirements set out by the CFIA. It must not present risk of transmitting the ASF virus and will require the issuance of a permit. There are two types of permits:

1. **Specific Permits:** Can be single or one-time use, or they can be multi-use. The individual movement requested must be assessed by a permit officer to determine if it meets the conditions for a safe movement before a specific permit can be issued.
2. **General Permit:** May also be either single or multi-use. These are issued online, and a record of the movement is captured in case follow up is needed. These permits come with a list of basic biosecurity standards which are expected to be followed.

Delays to producers receiving permits for required movements of animals or things may occur if the importance of the movement is not prioritized (i.e. some movements have to happen first to maintain animal welfare vs some movements can be safely delayed). Industry plays a critical role in this activity to determine where animals need to move, what needs to move immediately, and which movements can wait.

**If you wish to designate a community/Nation representative to work alongside Industry and Canadian Government to establish movement priorities, please reach out to your Regional Indigenous Liaison.**

Animals or products originating from, or slaughtered, or processed within a PCZ generally cannot be exported. These products from healthy animals get marked to be used within Canada only. Animals from infected premises never enter the food chain, even if there is not a food safety concern. It is also important to note that export is also prohibited for pigs or their meat and other byproducts that have transited through a control zone regardless of the conveyance type that is used.

Note: Some exceptions for export apply for commodities that have been treated in a way that deactivates the ASF virus. For example, products that have undergone heat treatments that are considered acceptable internationally for ASF inactivation.

### 3.03 OUTBREAK EPIDEMIOLOGY

An extended epidemiological investigation is conducted throughout the course of an ASF outbreak for each infected premises identified. To fully identify all premises and animals that may be implicated in the disease, these ongoing **epi-investigations** are to figure out where the disease may have spread to or been introduced from. This includes any premises where direct or indirect contact with the infected premises has occurred while ASF could have been present on the premises as well as any nearby premises which could have been infected due to proximity alone.

These premises, as mentioned earlier, are referred to as **epi-linked premises**.

To accomplish this, there is a field epidemiology unit or **epi-team** which is responsible for documenting all the information to create a timeline for the disease throughout the outbreak.

The epi-investigation conducted by the epi-team will describe the occurrence of disease such as the number of animals sick, the number of animals that have died, age of animals affected, production type, etc. They also attempt to identify potential sources of introduction and risk factors for introduction to the premises. They will also assess the potential for spread of disease from that premises.

There are three ways to identify epi-linked premises:

1. Movement tracing, identifying:
  - a. All movements of animals, animal products and byproducts; or
  - b. Anything that may have been contaminated and brought onto or removed from the premises when ASF may have been present.<sup>8</sup>
2. Other significant contacts, including:
  - a. Any type of contact in a multi-site operation;
  - b. Use of shared equipment or personnel that were not initially considered; or
  - c. Suspected presence of wild pigs in the area which may have transmitted disease.
3. Proximity investigation, identifying:
  - a. Any swine premises that would be considered epidemiologically linked due to proximity alone, where the possible transmission of disease may have occurred through such things as vectors (for example, insects).

All identified link premises will be investigated and undergo diagnostic sampling, and the required prioritization of these investigations will be made by the field epi-team. Each epi-linked premises will have a risk determination performed. Any reports of suspicion of ASF or unknown death or illness in pigs is also directed to the field epi-team.

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<sup>8</sup> This time period is known as the tracing period, and for ASF, it is 30 days. Traceability programs such as PigTrace, along with provincial or territorial movement procedures and producer records, will be used to verify movement tracing.

### 3.04 OUTBREAK SURVEILLANCE AND DIAGNOSTICS

Outbreak surveillance is a critical component of an emergency disease response to ensure all infected premises have been identified and the infected premises are contained within the disease control zones or PCZ. Surveillance is done on:

1. Suspect premises where testing will be conducted on sites that are identified by the CFIA;
2. All epi-linked premises or premises that have had contact with the infected premises. These epi-linked premises could be located inside or outside of a PCZ;
3. Surveillance will also be done on monitored premises, which are any pig premise inside a PCZ that are not infected or epi-linked;
4. When movement of live swine is required during an outbreak, premovement testing is conducted. This testing is a form of surveillance and requires a negative ASF test result;
5. Surveillance is conducted on any premises of interest through the outbreak surveillance:
  - a. This may be within or outside of the zone and would include investigations of sick pigs.
  - b. The level of surveillance that is done is not the same on every premises and is linked to the risk of ASF being present.

Surveillance does not always mean diagnostic sampling. It may include such things as clinical examinations (with or without sampling), mandatory reporting of sick or dead animals, monitoring mortality levels and other production parameters, as well as collecting blood, tissues, rope samples.

In previous outbreaks of disease such as avian influenza and bovine tuberculosis, the CFIA has contracted veterinarians and animal health technicians to perform premovement testing and surveillance testing in areas outside of the infected zone.

Diagnostic tests used for surveillance include the real-time PCR test on whole blood, body fluids and tissues, and ELISA which is run on serum. These tests are fast, taking less than a day for results to be received once they arrive at the lab.

As far as laboratory capacity, once ASF is detected in Canada, the CAHSN laboratories approved for ASF testing will be heavily engaged for diagnostic work associated with diagnostic samples collected on premises under investigation. They will also be used for outbreak surveillance testing and premovement testing.

### 3.05 HUMANE DEPOPULATION GUIDELINES

Eradication measures on infected premises begin with removing the source of viral replication. This is done through the depopulation of susceptible ASF animals – pigs. This should be done as soon as possible following confirmation of the infection status of the premises.

- The actions under depopulation are carried out through the *Health of Animals Act* regulatory authority which states that the owner or any person having care or control of an animal may be ordered to dispose of it where the animal is or is suspected of being affected or contaminated by a disease.
- These disease response actions require the depopulation of all swine on the infected premises **regardless of their individual infection status**. Note that the focus here, is depopulation for disease eradication purposes.

The choice of depopulation used from one premises to another will vary depending on such factors as:

- Size of the animals
- Animal handling and restraint available
- Availability of personnel/equipment
- Welfare considerations
- Biocontainment to prevent further contamination of the environment
- Building structure/environment
- Carcass removal and disposal methods
- Worker safety
- Mental health of workers and producers

No single entity (the CFIA, the provinces, territories, industry, Indigenous communities, or Indigenous producers) have the resources to complete this task on their own.

- Industry has a critical role to play in the process as producers have the knowledge expertise and experience to know how to handle their animals and use the available handling facilities better than anyone.
- The CFIA will play an oversight role in industry depopulation efforts to verify that the process is completed in a humane manner, and in accordance with the international standards according to the CFIA approved depopulation plan.

To assist in the development of a depopulation plan for an infected premises there is a catalog of accepted methods for depopulation. You may request a copy from your Regional Indigenous Liaison.

Please indicate to your Regional Indigenous Liaison if any of the actions indicated in this section are in direct contradiction of any cultural values or rights you feel your Nation/community may experience.

### 3.06 DISPOSAL OF DEPOPULATED ANIMALS AND/OR POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED MATERIALS

Following the depopulation of animals, disposal of any infectious material (for example, the animal carcasses as well as anything contaminated with the ASF virus including blood, manure, and germplasm) should be done as soon as possible. Disposal must be accomplished in a manner that prevents transmission of the disease agent or contamination to the environment. The most appropriate disposal option is often different for each premises; therefore, a **disposal plan** must be developed for each infected premises. Considerations such as property location, soil type, water table levels, size of the individual carcasses, total volume of material to be disposed, transportation and biosecurity, logistics, and municipal/provincial/territorial bylaws need to be accounted for.

Further considerations for a disposal plan include:

- **Disposal location** – determining whether disposal will occur on-site, on the infected premises, or offsite. The ASF virus is found in very high levels in blood and tissues, even after death. Whenever possible, it is always recommended to use on farm disposal options to reduce the risk of spreading ASF outside of the infected premises.
- **Biosecurity and environmental issues** – minimizing environmental contamination during disposal activities.
- **Long-term impacts** – assessing potential air or ground contamination, must be assessed and determined in collaboration with the provincial or territorial Ministry of environment and Agriculture. ASF can persist in the environment, adding complexity to disposal options due to the potential contamination of wild pigs.

While there are numerous options for the disposal of depopulated animals and potentially contaminated materials, each poses logistical challenges and is subject to provincial territory regulations. CIA's role in the disposal process is to verify, approve, and oversee the delivery of the disposal plan.

Acceptable disposal options for ASF include:

1. Burial on site, which is a commonly used disposal option. Deep burial is most preferred when it can be done without water or land contamination. This option may not be possible due to environmental restrictions in some areas due to municipal or provincial territorial regulations.

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2. Burial offsite in a landfill may also be considered in some cases. Landfill space may be limited, and it requires an approved landfill with a certificate of approval from the provincial government, willing to accept the infected carcasses and material.
    - a. Biosecure transport to the landfill is logistically challenging, as conveyances must have leak-proof liners and comply with the requirements for transporting dangerous goods.
    - b. Heightened biosecurity measures are required, including the cleaning and disinfection of both the inside and outside of the conveyance for each load, to help prevent the spread of ASF.
  3. Incineration by open air burning or in a chamber is an option but must consider any environmental restrictions by municipal and provincial territorial regulations. The optics of open-air burning is usually publicly unfavorable, and the addition of flammable content is required to open burning to get a proper burn. Incineration in a chamber only works for the disposal of carcasses and products or byproducts. This does not include feed or manure or litter which then become an issue for cleaning and disinfection, or further disposal.
  4. Rendering is an option that has the same transportation requirements as movement of carcasses and material to landfill. There are often capacity limitations and rendering facilities must be willing to accept the infected carcasses and perform all necessary biosecurity requirements. As for incineration in a chamber, the feed and litter need to be dealt with separately.
  5. Composting of pigs, unlike in poultry, tends to be done outdoors as opposed to inside barns. It is a more environmentally viable option in many locations when there is enough land mass available. It does however require knowledgeable staff, specific equipment, and continuous monitoring of the compost to ensure appropriate time temperature requirements are sufficient to inactivate the ASF virus.

### 3.07 CLEANING AND DISINFECTION

Mitigating the risk of further ASF transmission is done by ordering any contaminated place or thing to be cleaned and disinfected (C&D) after depopulation and disposal is complete. Any remaining virus must be eliminated before we can remove the declaration of infected place from an infected premises. **The responsibilities of C&D lie with the owner to complete and fund this task.**

Cleaning and disinfection (C&D) is a multi-step process as outlined in this diagram.



Each step is verified by the CFIA before moving on to the next step. The timeline to complete the C&D process can vary. The size and type of operation or facility such as being indoors or outdoors, and the type of material used in the animal housing, such as concrete and metal which are more easily cleaned and disinfected than wood and dirt floors all play a role in establishing this timeline. It can likely take months for the process of C&D to be completed on any one infected premises and the process of “recovery” is achieved.

### 3.08 EVALUATION AND COMPENSATION

The owner may be eligible to be compensated for animals or things that were ordered disposed by the CFIA. The pigs will undergo a formal evaluation to determine their market value. Discussions are underway to review market value from the time the outbreak starts. This is because the market value may change significantly from when the index or first case is identified to later in the outbreak. Factors such as sales records and genetic, or bloodlines are considered. Compensation is also provided based on costs incurred and associated with the disposal of the animals specifically.

It is important to note that depopulation can occur prior to a formal evaluation being agreed upon, but the assessment or evaluation of the animals must have been completed prior to their depopulation.

Any animals that die prior to disposal being ordered by the CFIA are not eligible for compensation.

Review the [Compensation for Destroyed Animals Regulations](#) which was amended in 2024.

### 3.09 RECOVERY

Recovery happens at two levels: the individual infected premises and the collective Canadian swine industry level. One positive case of ASF in domestic or wild pigs in Canada will immediately halt all trade-related exports.

Recovery steps can be looked at from the distinct levels of industry which can range from individual infected premises to Canada's swine industry since one positive case of ASF in domestic or wild pigs in Canada **will stop all trade related exports immediately**.

**At the individual premises level**, the objective is to lift movement restrictions, including quarantines and declaration of infected place.

- The recovery process includes a vacancy period, which is the period of time the premises remain empty of animals after C&D and before restocking pigs begins.
  - This time period varies depending on the individual premises factors. In cases where soft ticks are involved in the transmission of ASF, this period could extend to years instead of weeks. However, this situation however is not expected in Canada due to the absence of suitable tick species, the climate, and the management practices of the Canadian swine farmers.
- In some situations, sentinel pigs may be required before restocking. This would be done for example, if a premises cannot be fully cleaned and disinfected to ideal standards.
- Restocking of the premises, if the producer chooses to do so, may occur during the outbreak, but surveillance activities will be required for those animals.

**At the national industry level**, the objective is to regain Canada's ASF-free status and to release international trade restrictions.

- Recovery for the Canadian swine industry involves:
  - Revoking each primary control zone as infected premises within them achieve ASF virus elimination;
  - Conducting post-outbreak surveillance in the vicinity of the previous control zones; and
  - Re-establishing country freedom, in line with the *World Organization of Animal Health Guidelines*, after a minimum 90 days passed since the last infected premises completed the required components of cleaning and disinfection.

- Note: It is possible for country freedom to be achieved prior to all movement restrictions being lifted on individual infected premises.

In either case, the goal is to move to the recovery phase as quickly as possible to eliminate the disease from Canada.

## 4 – ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

In summary, the response to an outbreak of ASF occurs in a chronological matter:

1. The suspicion phase;
2. The investigation phase;
3. The control and eradication measures phase; and
4. The recovery phase.

The time it takes for the full response to unfold depends on many factors, such as:

- How early the disease was originally detected. This is a critical factor in reducing the length of the outbreak.
- The scope of the outbreak or essentially the number of farms infected. One infected farm versus hundreds for example, will change the timeline significantly.
- The involvement of wild pigs. This will extend the timeline.
- The involvement of soft ticks. This would also extend the timeline; however, this is not expected in Canada.
- The time it takes to gather surveillance data. This is critical in order to provide proof of freedom at the recovery phase in order to restore the disease-free status.

### 4.01 COLLABORATION IN AN ASF RESPONSE

The CFIA cannot effectively respond independently to ASF if it were to ever make its way into Canada. There are many other animal health stakeholders who will play critical roles in the disease response:

- **The provincial or territory level**, the provincial and territorial governments engaged in CFIA response as per the provincial, territorial, federal agreements, referred to as FADES agreements (or Foreign Animal Disease Emergency Support agreements);
- **Industry associations** will also have their own emergency management teams that will either be directly engaged by the CFIA or activate their own incident management structures.

- **Veterinary Medical associations** will be called on to help provide communication and education to their veterinarians who in turn will help to educate their clients on how to identify and prevent ASF.
- Several other **federal government departments** would play a role in the ASF response including Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC), Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC), Indigenous Services Canada (ISC), Parks Canada, etc.
- Swine producers and pig owners themselves, academia, wildlife experts and other experts would also be enlisted in an ASF response as required.

## 4.02 ASF RESPONSE IN WILD PIGS

Until now we have talked about the disease response to a case of ASF and domestic pigs, however we also need to consider what may occur if there is a detection of ASF in wild pigs. A wild pig is defined as any pig raised without human supervision or control, and broadly includes any free ranging member of the species *sus scrofa* including feral domestic animals such as domestic pigs, domestic wild boar, potbellied pigs or any hybrid of these that has become free ranging. Any pig found outside the borders of a fence should normally be considered a wild pig. We need to be cognizant of the fact that ASF could start in wild pigs and spread to domestic pigs, or it could start into domestic pigs and spill over into wild populations, in areas where there's wild pigs around.

To start, ASF affecting wild pig or domestic pigs in Canada would also require the declaration of a primary control zone. Further, surveillance activities in both wild and domestic pigs will be required to prevent spill over of disease into the domestic population. Movement controls through permitting, increased biosecurity protocols on proximal swine farms, and surveillance activities on proximal domestic animals would all be required until such time as the disease is eradicated.

One positive case of ASF in domestic or wild pigs in Canada **will stop all trade related exports immediately**. It is important to acknowledge the uniqueness of the ASF situation in the context of the wild pig populations. This requires the CFIA's active involvement cooperating alongside provincial authorities, in a response to the detection of ASF in wild pigs (unlike many other regulated diseases). Any wild pig involvements in an ASF outbreak make Canada's return to ASF-free status very difficult.

Wild pigs impacted by ASF in Canada present a multi-jurisdictional response involving both federal and provincial/territorial authorities. Both Agriculture and Wildlife department or agency involvement makes this a unique response in terms of developing and implementing a response policy.

The CFIA leads ASF policy development, international issues management, and communication coordination. The CFIA has worked with other stakeholders to develop an overarching response policy should ASF come to Canada and be detected in wild pigs. The policy complements the response plan for detection in domestic pigs and extends specific measures to wild



populations<sup>9</sup>. **A response to ASF in wild pigs may have unique impacts on Aboriginal and Treaty rights (for example, hunting).** Additional work with provinces/territories is still needed to collaborate on actual operational plans to implement a response that aligns with the wild pig situation in any specific jurisdiction.

#### **4.03 CONCLUSION**

This concludes the *Overview of CFIA's Disease Response to ASF*. Please contact your regional Indigenous Liaison for inquiries regarding this overview/guide or CFIA's response activities related to ASF. As mentioned above, the Indigenous Liaison information and email located in the **CFIA Introductory Guide**.

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<sup>9</sup> This response policy is separate from wild pig control activities and strategies which have broader environmental objectives.