



HOUSE OF COMMONS
CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
CANADA

45th PARLIAMENT, 1st SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development

EVIDENCE

NUMBER 007

Tuesday, October 21, 2025

Chair: Ahmed Hussen



Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development

Tuesday, October 21, 2025

• (1110)

[English]

The Chair (Hon. Ahmed Hussen (York South—Weston—Etobicoke, Lib.)): I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number seven of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

Before we continue, I'd like to ask all in-person participants to consult the guidelines written on the cards on the table. These measures are to help prevent audio feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters. You'll also notice a QR code on the card, which links to a short awareness video.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic and please mute yourself when you are not speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and selected the desired channel. I remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the "raise hand" function.

The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can, and we appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, September 23, 2025, the committee is meeting to study the situation in Haiti and Canada's response.

[Translation]

I would now like to welcome our witness for the first hour, His Excellency, Mr. Anthony Dessources, Ambassador of the Republic of Haiti to Canada, who joins us by video conference.

[English]

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with the rounds of questions.

[Translation]

I now invite His Excellency to make his opening statement for five minutes.

Welcome to the committee.

H. E. Anthony Dessources (Ambassador of the Republic of Haiti to Canada, Embassy of the Republic of Haiti): Good morning everyone, members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Thank you for inviting me to appear as part of this study on the situation in Haiti and Canada's response.

My name is Anthony Dessources. I am Haiti's new ambassador to Canada, and I presented my credentials to the Governor General, Ms. Mary Simon, on September 24 of this year.

After consulting with the authorities of my country, I was able to accept the committee's invitation to appear today, Tuesday, October 21, 2025.

On behalf of the Haitian government, I would like to extend my gratitude to Canada for its unwavering support to Haiti in various areas of co-operation, and for the kind hospitality [*Technical difficulty—Editor*].

The Clerk of the Committee (Simon Larouche): Mr. Ambassador, your Internet connection is not strong. The sound keeps cutting out, and we can't hear what you're saying.

Try turning off your camera during your remarks to increase your Internet capacity. It might help with the sound.

H. E. Anthony Dessources: I apologize. Can you hear me now?

• (1115)

The Clerk: No. Your microphone needs to stay on, otherwise we can't proceed. I was suggesting you turn off your camera, but you have to keep your headset on.

H. E. Anthony Dessources: I am really sorry.

I will start again.

Good morning everyone, members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Thank you for inviting me to appear as part of this study on the situation in Haiti and Canada's response.

My name is Anthony Dessources. I am Haiti's new ambassador to Canada, and I presented my credentials to the Governor General, Ms. Mary Simon, on September 24 of this year.

After consulting with the authorities of my country, I was able to accept the committee's invitation to appear today, Tuesday, October 21, 2025.

On behalf of the Haitian government, I would like to extend my gratitude to Canada for its unwavering support to Haiti in various areas of co-operation, and for the kind hospitality it has shown to the Haitian community in Canada. I would also like to take this opportunity to recognize the international community's efforts to help Haiti, especially its involvement in the recurrent Haitian socio-political crisis over the last few years with a view to finding a democratic and sustainable outcome.

Ladies and gentlemen, committee members, previously known as the jewel of the West Indies, Haiti now faces an unbearable situation, making life extremely difficult for the majority of its citizens. Haitian authorities are having a lot of difficulty managing this multidimensional crisis.

First is the security issue, which is proving quite hard to solve. Despite the Haitian government's efforts, with the help of the Multinational Security Support mission—

The Clerk: I am sorry to interrupt, Mr. Ambassador, but the connection is still an issue. The interpreters are unable at this time to interpret your remarks, because of the poor Internet connection.

Give me a moment to discuss the situation with the chair.

[English]

The Chair: Colleagues, we'll suspend for a few minutes. We're hoping to resolve this technical issue.

Thank you.

• (1115) _____ (Pause) _____

• (1120)

• (1125)

[Translation]

The Clerk: Mr. Dessources, I apologize for the situation. Because of a technical issue, we won't be able to proceed. We won't have enough time after your opening remarks for member questions. I will contact you to reschedule at your convenience, so you can join us in person, if that's possible. The committee members are very much looking forward to hearing your views on our study.

Because of the technical issues we've been experiencing, your appearance in this context would not be suitable for committee members.

H. E. Anthony Dessources: That is very unfortunate. I am disappointed not to be able to present. Hopefully, we can do this again.

Goodbye.

• (1125) _____ (Pause) _____

• (1145)

[English]

The Chair: I call the meeting back to order.

I'd like to now welcome our witnesses who are joining us by video conference for the second hour.

From the International Crisis Group, we have Diego Da Rin, analyst, Haiti, Latin America and the Caribbean. We may be joined later by Little Footprints Big Steps' co-founder and executive director, Morgan Wienberg, by video conference. Also, right now, we're being joined by Andréanne Martel, project director of Mission inclusion.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions.

I now begin by inviting Mr. Da Rin to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Diego Da Rin (Analyst, Haiti, Latin America and the Caribbean, International Crisis Group): Thank you for having me and inviting me to join this morning's proceedings. All protocols are observed.

I would like to focus my remarks today on the new possibilities for curbing gun violence opened by the UN Security Council's authorization of a new foreign security mission for Haiti.

In the coming months a window of opportunity may emerge to lay the foundations for lasting peace, but this could also turn into another failed attempt to rein in the growing power of gangs.

Haiti will face two important transitions in the coming months. First, the Kenyan-led security mission will transition into a gang suppression force, but there is little clarity about how this process will be managed. Second, in February 2026, the mandate of the current transitional administration will end, and it will need to be replaced by a new governing structure.

Credible elections cannot take place before the Transitional Presidential Council's term ends. Gangs control much of the two departments where over half of the electorate resides, as well as the main national highways, which would prevent the distribution and centralization of electoral materials. Holding elections amid the wide opposition to Haiti's current leadership will also inevitably trigger a post-electoral crisis, with political groups refusing to recognize the results.

While maintaining the current transitional structure could help preserve some political stability, the government is severely discredited due to corruption scandals and the endless political infighting, which has prevented it from designing and implementing a comprehensive security strategy to enhance coordination among the different security forces operating on the ground.

Consultations to establish a new political arrangement to succeed the transitional government after February have only recently begun and have shown little progress. There is a significant risk that any last-minute agreement will result in a weak governance structure lacking sufficient support, and may be perceived by Haitians as being imposed by the international community.

The multinational force authorized, two years ago, the deployment of a multinational mission that would be composed of 2,500 officers, but it has only been able to deploy 1,000 of them. Due to a lack of funding, personnel and equipment, the force has only been able to establish three of the planned 12 bases that were meant to maintain a continuous presence and carry dedicated operations against the gangs in all territories they currently occupy.

The mission operates with less than 30% of its required equipment. Armoured vehicles are not suited to the urban environment in Port-au-Prince and a lack of spare parts has left half of the fleet out of service. Although the force now has two helicopters for medical evacuations, it still lacks air and maritime combat capabilities, which are critical to disrupt supplies to the gangs.

The new security mission's concept was deployed mainly to address the funding shortages and logistical challenges that have limited the foreign force's operational capacity so far. The mission will have a UN support office based in Port-au-Prince, which will be funded through predictable resources coming from the UN's assessed peacekeeping budget. However, the cost of the mission's personnel will still depend on voluntary contributions. At full deployment, this could amount to around \$100 million per year. Without these contributions, the new mission will not be able to reach and sustain its full capacity to achieve its objectives.

It is still unclear how the transition to the new force will unfold. Countries currently participating in the current mission have expressed their intention to remain under the gang suppression force, but it is not yet known whether the currently deployed contingents will be fully integrated into the new structure. In the meantime, voluntary contributions will be needed to pay for the mission's logistics and basic personnel needs to ensure that current personnel remain operational on the ground until the new force is fully deployed. A gap between the outgoing Kenyan-led mission and the incoming gang suppression force must be avoided at all costs as gangs will certainly take advantage of it.

The new force has a more offensive mandate than the previous one, but operations should begin in rather accessible areas to minimize civilian casualties, while disrupting gang supply chains and cutting off the revenue sources. Initial victories in sparsely populated areas, as, for example, regaining control of specific sections of national roads currently held by gangs, would carry symbolic value, build public support and encourage defections within gang ranks.

● (1150)

It is unlikely that the new security force will solve Haiti's security problem by arresting or killing all of the estimated 12,000 gang members—of whom 30% to 50% are minors—nor would such an approach be desirable, as most gang members join these groups at a young age to meet their most basic needs in an environment offering few, if any, alternatives. Haitian authorities have recently launched a program to help minors who want to leave gangs do so

safely, but it currently envisions reaching only a fraction of the estimated number of children involved in these groups.

Haitians should also start exploring when and under what conditions they could contemplate talking with the criminal groups, with the goal of permanently dismantling them. The Haitian state, with international support, should consider what kinds of exit pathways could be offered beyond minors, including for senior gang members willing to disarm and co-operate with authorities.

As Haitian authorities and their international counterparts plan for these two crucial transitions, they must be prepared for the Viv Ansanm gang coalition to step up attacks in an effort to derail them, expand territorial control, target critical infrastructure and attempt to bring down the transitional government again, as they did last year.

Thank you.

● (1155)

The Chair: Thank you very much for your remarks.

We'll go next to Andréanne Martel, project director of Mission inclusion.

You have up to five minutes for your opening remarks.

[*Translation*]

Andréanne Martel (Project Director, Mission inclusion): Thank you for inviting me to appear once again before the committee.

I was invited in 2022 to share my recommendations based on my many years of experience in Haiti, especially in the assessment of humanitarian and rebuilding projects.

I appear today on behalf of my colleagues at Mission inclusion, based in Léogâne, Haiti.

A Canadian organization, Mission inclusion has been in Haiti since 2016, supporting communities in developing successive projects funded by Global Affairs Canada. Our dedicated team of 14 works closely with Haitian women's organizations and civil society members.

My remarks today draw directly on our partners' experience, because despite the current crisis, they continue their essential work. I am here to ensure that their voices and those of the communities they help are heard.

It has been widely documented that during any crisis, women and girls systematically find themselves increasingly vulnerable, exposed to all types of violence. Just between January and July 2025, the gender-based violence in Haiti subcluster reported 6,269 incidents.

Each week, hundreds of acts of sexual violence are perpetrated against women, but almost no one talks about it, and those are only the documented cases. The reality is much worse. In fact, 77% of victims are adults and 14% are girls under 18 years of age. Almost half of incidents are rapes, including 62% that are gang rapes. Gangs use sexual violence as a weapon of war, and three quarters of reported incidents are perpetrated by gang members.

In Haiti, almost 40% of health institutions are closed. Often, women who experience violence don't have access to health care, including emergency contraception and psychological support. Only 25% of rape victims are seen by a health professional within 72 hours. A little more than half of incidents involve internally displaced populations living in other communities or on sites for displaced people.

Although women are very active in resilience-building, they are largely being excluded from decision-making institutions. Haiti's transitional presidential council has nine members, but only one is a woman and she is a non-voting member. This is a violation of the country's constitutional quota of 30%. The sustainable stabilization of Haiti is impossible without security and the protection of women's fundamental rights.

Haitian civil society organizations, like women's organizations, have remained involved despite difficult conditions. Because they are close to communities and know their reality, these organizations can put forward tailored solutions, which is why they are so effective at what they do.

Given that this crisis has been raging for decades, strictly humanitarian approaches are no longer enough. That's why at Mission inclusion, we believe in the inclusive triple nexus approach. It is a mistake to think that stabilization must come before capacity-building or development. Supporting development and cohesion in Haiti will help to stabilize the situation. Our approach revolves around three simultaneous components.

On the humanitarian front, we meet the needs of the population by supporting health services for displaced people and survivors of violence, and by providing psychological support to displaced people and victims of gender-based violence.

On the development front, we sustainably strengthen Haiti's health systems by helping partner institutions provide more, safer and better services in physical and mental health. This includes reproductive rights and sexual health. We also help women's organizations improve their capacity to take action.

On the peace-building front, we support intercommunity dialogue to strengthen social cohesion, prevention and pre-emption in conflict management.

These three components are closely linked. Without safe humanitarian services, there can be no stability. Without strong local institutions, there can be no sustainable development. Without cohesion, humanitarian and economic projects fall apart. Constant integration is key to this type of approach.

Finally, I'd like to make three recommendations.

First, Canada must not only continue to fund Haitian civil society organizations that work in equal partnership with Canadian organi-

zations, but also increase its support for those Haitian organizations.

Second, as I said, protracted crises require the simultaneous integration of humanitarian urgency, development and peace. Strictly humanitarian approaches targeting the short term are no longer enough.

Third, long-term investments are needed and must prioritize the protection of rights, especially women's rights.

● (1200)

Canada will truly contribute to Haiti's stabilization thanks to the flexible mechanisms and long-term commitment it provides to Haitian civil society organizations and institutions. Without these conditions, every initiative has to start from scratch, and Haitian partners are wearing themselves out trying to rebuild what shouldn't collapse again.

I will end by reminding the committee that now is not the time to let the Haitian population down, nor Haitian women, who will carry the stigma and trauma of these acts of violence for the rest of their lives. There is still time to make a difference and reassert our solidarity by continuing to support them, fighting against impunity and exposing acts of violence. Haitian women and girls are not asking for charity. They want solidarity, dignity and respect. Canada can continue on this path.

Thank you.

The Chair: Ms. Martel, thank you for your presentation.

[*English*]

I'll now open the floor for questions, beginning with MP Kronis for six minutes.

Tamara Kronis (Nanaimo—Ladysmith, CPC): Thank you so much, Mr. Chair.

One of the tragedies of Haiti is that the gangs are eating the next generation, in the sense that 30% to 50% of gang members are minor children, as you've explained. I'm wondering whether you have any insights into what Haiti needs to be able to do to help those minor children exit that gang lifestyle and have a more promising future.

Please, go ahead.

Diego Da Rin: Thank you.

[*Translation*]

To keep the discussion flowing smoothly, I will speak in French.

At the beginning of the year, the Haitian government introduced a program offering minors a way out. This three-party project brings together the government, the civil society organization Volontariat pour le développement d'Haïti and the United Nations Children's Fund, or UNICEF.

UNICEF signed an agreement with the Haitian government to help minors arrested during gang operations, for instance, by providing various services to support their proper reintegration into society.

Last year, before the program was even introduced, UNICEF managed to demobilize and disarm around 140 minors. The goal of this new program, called PREJEUNES, is to establish a systematic approach and a more formal program to give all those minors a way out. It is estimated that between 3,000 and 5,000 minors find themselves in this situation.

For now, the program has two components. One is prevention to counter recruitment, and the other is the demobilization of minors. I think the prevention component is further along, although there are transit sites. The sites provide minors with places to stay right after leaving the gang. I might add that another site is being built in the southern part of the country. The program's planned capacity is limited to a few hundred minors. I don't have the exact numbers, but two months ago, it was 200 or 300 minors.

There are institutions, there's a presidential commission tasked with opening those sites, and there's the institutional infrastructure. Based on what we heard, more international support is needed, because there isn't enough funding to develop a more ambitious program.

• (1205)

[English]

Tamara Kronis: That's where I wanted to go with my question. How effective is it?

[Translation]

Diego Da Rin: The first prevention centre was set up in July. No transit centres for demobilized minors are currently operational. I can't say then whether it's effective or not. Somehow, more actors need to be involved and greater efforts deployed to do this, because there will be two challenges.

First, we need to determine how to physically remove minors from gang strongholds without them getting killed. This is because any gang member who tries to leave or is suspected of wanting to leave is severely punished in various ways by the gangs. This will require some serious thought and, to date, there's no clear answer to the question of how to physically remove minors from these zones.

Second, it's essential to determine what to do once they're placed in the transit centres. These centres are only designed to house minors for a few months. After that, they need to know what will happen to these minors—

[English]

Tamara Kronis: I'm sorry to interrupt you. I just want to make sure I get the second half of this question in before my time runs out.

When you speak about the effectiveness...and I share your concerns that, while the programs exist, it's a question of how effective they're going to be. You spoke about the need to ensure that there's no gap between the MSS and the GSF, yet there is a ceiling on personnel and, on top of that, this program's being funded through voluntary contributions as opposed to assessments at the UN.

I'm wondering if you could weave together this issue of the need to get children extracted from the gangs with the fact that there are programs, but there are going to be personnel restrictions. Could you comment on that before our time runs out?

The Chair: We have time for a very brief response, please.

[Translation]

Diego Da Rin: Under the transition framework, the current mission will only receive funding from contributors to the United Nations peacekeeping budget starting in April.

Funds must therefore be obtained to maintain Kenyan personnel until March. Neither the Multinational Security Support, or MSS, mission nor the Gang Suppression Force, or GSF, have demobilization capabilities. The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, or BINUH, in the review of its mandate in January, could primarily have increased capacity to implement this type of initiative, as it will have more capacity and personnel.

[English]

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We will proceed next to MP Anita Vandenberg, who is joining us by video conference.

You have six minutes. Please proceed.

Anita Vandenberg (Ottawa West—Nepean, Lib.): Thank you.

I want to thank our witnesses for their testimony here today.

The first one I want to follow up with is Mr. Da Rin.

You mentioned in the beginning of your remarks that there is some danger in holding elections too soon if the gangs are still controlling, for instance, the roadways and access to the polls. We've seen in a number of places.... I worked at one point in Bosnia, where the elections were held at a point when the only people with the organizational capacity to fight elections were the warlords, those who had actually caused the conflict and the ultra-nationalists, so they ended up getting democratic legitimacy from the fact that they were able to do that.

I'm also concerned about some of the cuts that have been made to organizations like the National Democratic Institute and others that were doing capacity building. I know there are a few of those.

Could you tell me the impact of that, particularly—and I would like Andréanne to weigh in a little bit—on the pluralism and on women in politics? I know you mentioned the 30%. Before I entered politics, I actually did capacity-building training for women politicians in Haiti. I'm wondering what the possibilities of that would be if the elections were held at a moment when that capacity wasn't there.

• (1210)

[Translation]

Diego Da Rin: At present, in order to hold elections, certain conditions must be met in terms of security, logistics, and a certain degree of political consensus, particularly in Haiti during this transition period. I'm no expert on elections; the experts were the ones telling me this.

None of these three conditions is currently being met in Haiti, particularly those relating to security and political consensus. For several months now, different political actors involved in the transition have been telling us that they won't accept elections organized by the current transitional government. This has been stated by various governments.

However, logistically speaking, some progress has already been made. Work has been done to set up polling stations in departments and municipalities and to train election staff.

Since the beginning of the year, we've recommended that, instead of setting a specific date for the next elections, the government, in collaboration with its international partners, establish and achieve a minimum security threshold. This would allow for a calendar of security objectives to be linked to a calendar of election objectives in three areas: logistics, political consensus and security. This would make it possible to see what the government is and isn't doing to achieve its objectives by a specific deadline.

For the report we published on the subject in February, we conducted approximately 300 interviews. Very few Haitians told us they wanted elections. Haitians want security.

[English]

Anita Vandenbeld: Madame Martel, can you weigh in on women in politics?

[Translation]

Andréanne Martel: Thank you for the question.

It is indeed extremely disappointing to see the lack of female representation on Haiti's transitional presidential council. We obviously hope that women will be better represented. We know that Haitian civil society, and Haitian female politicians in particular, play an extremely important role. They've been extremely influential at several crucial stages and moments in Haiti's history, particularly in the late 1980s and 1990s. The fact that there's so little female representation is therefore a bit of a setback.

Today, I really wanted to focus on the violence women are experiencing and on the importance of including them, taking them into consideration, and continuing our support through approaches that respond both to their urgent humanitarian needs and to their need for security and the strengthening of their organizations so that they can play their role in civil society, particularly in protecting women.

[English]

Anita Vandenbeld: Thank you very much.

On the violence against women, one of the things I wanted to ask Ms. Wienberg, if she had been here, was about what happens to adolescents and youth in the orphanages—those who are getting recruited. I'm particularly concerned about what you've said about violence against women under 18 and those who might be also facing being forced into transactional sex in order to survive.

What can be done? What has happened to that generation of young women?

[Translation]

Andréanne Martel: Thank you for the question.

We're also extremely concerned about the situation of young women and about the growing number of them who are victims of sexual violence. Women are forced to leave their homes, their families and their schools because of insecurity. Throughout their journey to escape the gang-controlled area, they suffer various forms of violence and discrimination. Women who leave the area are sometimes seen as spies for certain armed gangs, which has the effect of victimizing them again and further marginalizing them. This arouses suspicion. They're subject to a range of discriminatory acts throughout their journey to try to flee and find safety.

What is even more concerning is that, when they find themselves in relocation sites where they should be safe, the number of acts of sexual violence is still extremely high. We therefore question the ability to protect displaced persons from gender-based violence.

• (1215)

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Garon for six minutes.

Jean-Denis Garon (Mirabel, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the witnesses for their interventions.

Ms. Martel, I was very moved by your opening statement on the situation of women and girls in Haiti. My colleagues on the other side of the table felt the same way. We all reacted very strongly to your testimony.

Obviously, you're emphasizing the importance of putting sexual violence and the situation of women and girls at the heart of the discussion on what needs to be done in Haiti.

Do you think that, in general, the international community lacks awareness about this situation at present?

Andréanne Martel: Thank you for the question.

In my opinion, the issue of sexual violence is completely invisible at present. We don't talk about the situation women are facing, the multiple forms of violence they suffer, and the vulnerabilities that exist. So I'd say that there is indeed a lack of awareness in this regard.

Fortunately, there are Haitian civil society organizations, women's organizations, that are extremely strong and diverse. It's important to note that they're present throughout the country and play a frontline role in supporting these women.

That said, not enough is being said about the situation. I worked in Haiti for several years and conducted research there after the earthquake. At the time, between 2010 and 2012, the issue of sexual violence against women was front-page news. Today, no one talks about it. I can't explain it, because the violence is extremely serious at the moment. Remember the figures I shared with you earlier.

I believe then that Canada plays an important role in supporting these organizations by focusing Canadian aid on women through feminist policy. I hope that we'll continue in this direction and that we'll talk more about the situation women are facing.

Jean-Denis Garon: Thank you.

I asked you this question in a specific context. For example, in the 1970s, Canada made a commitment to the United Nations to allocate 0.7% of its gross domestic product, or GDP, to aid in Haiti.

We know that there's also concern about a potential withdrawal of funding for peacekeeping in Haiti by the United States and perhaps also by Canada.

In your opening statement, you spoke of three important pillars for ensuring that your interventions have a lasting impact. These were responding to urgent needs, consolidating peace, and addressing development goals.

When there's so much uncertainty surrounding the funding of peacekeeping forces, for example, do you think that it's precisely these interventions, which can have lasting effects on the health and safety of women and girls, that are most likely to be forgotten?

Andréanne Martel: I'd like to clarify one thing. When you refer to "these interventions," are you referring specifically to peacekeeping interventions or interventions based on the triple nexus approach?

Jean-Denis Garon: I was referring to your interventions and those of humanitarian organizations in general. When there's so much uncertainty surrounding funding, what suffers first?

Andréanne Martel: Thank you for the question.

Obviously, when there's so much uncertainty, it's difficult to seek very long-term solutions, since we don't know whether the partners we support will still be able to operate and whether the gangs will continue to expand their territory and control.

For example, we also used to work in Gressier. This is a neighbourhood located just outside Port-au-Prince. We were supporting organizations there. Unfortunately, since this area is now controlled by gangs, we have had to stop our activities there and focus on Léogâne, which we hope will continue to escape this control.

When there's instability or a lack of confidence, it's clearly difficult. It's hard on the mental health of those on the front lines and who are holding down the fort, so to speak.

It's also difficult for an organization like ours and for the partners we work with to develop any kind of medium or long-term plan and to determine how we can sustain our actions.

Indeed, even if we act in accordance with the three areas I mentioned earlier, the fact remains that if the situation continues to deteriorate and we're unable to make our activities safer, we may no longer be able to access these communities and populations safely at some point in the future.

• (1220)

Jean-Denis Garon: I have approximately one minute left and I'm going to ask a question that people often pose.

Since 2022, Canada has invested approximately \$450 million to support Haiti. Sometimes, some people question whether this aid is useful, because they say they're discouraged to see the situation continue to deteriorate.

What do you say to these people?

Andréanne Martel: Thank you.

I'd like to say that international aid alone cannot compensate for a political and security crisis at the scale Haiti is experiencing.

The question we must ask ourselves is this: What would the situation in Haiti be like without this aid? What would happen if Canada withdrew its humanitarian aid, as the United States did when it abruptly withdrew several programs aimed at strengthening the health care system and providing care? Would we be contributing to further weakening institutions and limiting access to essential services for thousands of people? The answer is obviously yes.

I think we have a very important role to play right now, especially since the Americans have withdrawn their aid. We must maintain our presence. Even if we cannot replace or provide the political solution, the presence of humanitarian aid organizations is essential at this time.

[English]

The Chair: We're out of time.

I'll go next to MP Lianne Rood.

You have five minutes.

Lianne Rood (Middlesex—London, CPC): Thank you, Chair.

Thank you very much, witnesses, for being here.

I want to continue a bit on the same topic as my colleague with regard to aid funding.

Specifically, you were talking about humanitarian groups. I'm just curious. Is your group in particular, Madame Martel, receiving funding from the Canadian government currently?

[Translation]

Andréanne Martel: Yes, we're funded by Global Affairs Canada in Haiti.

[English]

Lianne Rood: What share of your budget goes to Haitian staff, partners and institutions?

[Translation]

Andréanne Martel: It's an excellent question.

I don't have the figures on hand, but I could provide them, as we'll be sending you a briefing note after this meeting. I could then ensure to include the percentage allocated to partner organizations.

I'd like to emphasize that, at present, no Canadians are in Haiti as part of our projects. All of our staff are Haitian. All of our activities are carried out through Haitian civil society partners. In particular, we're working with the Ministry of Public Health and Population, or MSPP, in Haiti, which we are helping to consolidate.

We therefore act as a kind of conduit by offering technical support to partners and ensuring that funding is paid directly to Haitian organizations.

[*English*]

Lianne Rood: Thank you very much.

Is there somebody who audits your programs in Haiti? How often would those results be public? Also, what corrective actions do you take when controls fail?

[*Translation*]

Andréanne Martel: As you're no doubt aware, there are strict accountability mechanisms in place for all projects funded by Global Affairs Canada. In our case, these mechanisms include regular quarterly and annual reports, external financial audits, and follow-up visits, when the situation allows. In the case of Haiti, this has not been possible in recent years. There are also measurable outcome indicators.

Among our projects in Haiti, the initiative to improve citizen participation, or PACIT, for which we have submitted all reports to Global Affairs Canada, has been subject to audits and various forms of verification. This project ended this year.

We're now starting a new project focused on sexual and reproductive health, particularly for displaced communities in the Léogâne region. The same mechanisms to ensure accountability to the Canadian government, which funds us, will also apply to this project.

• (1225)

[*English*]

Lianne Rood: Thank you very much.

Just switching gears a bit, how are Haitian civil society and faith groups or local leaders involved in setting priorities? If you could, give us a sense of what percentage of your projects were code-signed with them. How do you approve the changes?

[*Translation*]

Andréanne Martel: We aren't a religious organization, and we haven't designed our projects with religious organizations.

Our partners are secular civil society organizations.

[*English*]

Lianne Rood: Thank you.

I was just asking whether you work at all with Haitian civil society, including faith groups.

With the time I have left, maybe I will quickly switch over and ask the other witness this question.

What are the top three choke points stopping food and medicine from reaching people? Have any specific mechanisms been deployed to clear those choke points?

[*Translation*]

Diego Da Rin: Gangs control the ports, the areas surrounding airports, and the main roads connecting the capital to the rest of the country.

Not only have food imports and supply chains been completely disrupted by the presence of gangs, who impose taxes on the roads, but the transportation of inputs to enable rural development, particularly in the Artibonite department, is also becoming extremely difficult.

Agricultural products are arriving at much higher costs than before, precisely because of these taxes imposed on the roads connecting ports to the areas where these products will be used.

In fact, it's the illegal taxation system set up by gangs, combined with their presence in certain areas, that completely disrupts the food supply chain.

The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Da Rin.

[*English*]

Next, we have MP Rob Oliphant.

You have five minutes.

[*Translation*]

Hon. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank you both for the work you're doing in circumstances that remain extremely challenging.

[*English*]

I'm going to ask Mr. Da Rin a couple of questions.

In February, you said that the transitional government in Haiti has "failed to galvanize the fight against gangs, while donors have provided only limited funding to the Kenya-led security mission." There are two failures, really. There's a failure in the provisional government dealing with the gangs and a failure of the coalition of groups and countries that funded the Kenya-led mission.

I'm trying to dig a little bit into what a gang is. I sometimes worry that I'm using Canadian terminology about gangs in a situation that is completely different. There are paramilitary groups that have regional territory, which are gangs writ large, and even the word seems to be insufficient. I'm looking at terminology. What is a gang? I know we're worried about youth and engagement because of the membership, but what promotes the leadership of the gang? Who benefits from it? What groups in society take advantage of having the gangs have regional control?

Once we have a definition, is the new proposal under UN Resolution 2793 going to work, or are we missing the boat in Canada? Does Canada have to retool the way we think about gangs?

• (1230)

[*Translation*]

Diego Da Rin: Thank you for that question, which is extremely important.

We are in the process of preparing a report on that very issue. What are the gangs in Haiti, and what is the living together coalition, or Viv Ansanm? There's a big debate about whether an armed conflict is taking place in Haiti because there are two determining factors. The first is the intensity of violence, and the second is the organization and hierarchy of groups. We won't get into that debate, but we are explaining the origin of gangs in Haiti.

In Haiti, gangs began to emerge in the late 1990s. Those were groups that rose up in community organizations and poor neighbourhoods. They were instrumentalized, on the one hand, by certain political parties to win elections in the neighbourhoods the gangs dominated and, on the other hand, by economic elites to boycott rival companies, and so on.

After the 2017 departure of the UN mission, which was in Haiti for 14 years, Haitian security forces did not have the capacity to adequately handle the security situation. Those small groups, which had not been dismantled, began to gain power and be instrumentalized by the elites who armed them, gave them funds and guaranteed them impunity. Gradually, they began to diversify their resources and gain independence from their former sponsors.

Today, they are largely financially self-sufficient. Since the Haitian government requested the assistance of a security mission to fight them, they have decided to stop fighting amongst themselves and to create a coalition bringing together all armed groups or gangs in the capital and other regions to fight, united, against local and international security forces. Their goal is to put the brakes on plans to create a force that may be stronger than them and to force the authorities to engage in dialogue. What they want, even if they don't say it very often, is to have a full amnesty for their crimes. That is their goal.

Are those criminal groups? Are they groups with a political agenda? I will say that they are at the border. They are the de facto authorities in the regions they have controlled for years. They are providing food distribution. Recently, they have been trying to show that they are taking their responsibility as an authority a little more seriously. They post videos of them handing out cash, school kits and back-to-school food kits.

They are positioning themselves as political authorities, even though, in the background, they are trying to have a slightly more legitimate image in order to initiate dialogue with the authorities.

[*English*]

Hon. Robert Oliphant: Thank you.

That's very important, because I think we're missing the boat on that. It seems like they are doing what the cartels did in Colombia in the last century—establishing themselves as civil authorities and providing services—so that becomes quite different.

In our notes, it says that the vast population does not want discussions towards amnesty, but if they are providing civil services, is

that a more complex issue than just saying that the population doesn't want amnesty?

The Chair: Unfortunately, we're way over the time, so I won't be able to—

Hon. Robert Oliphant: Could I ask the witness to provide written material for us or point us to a source with respect to gangs about which we may be naive?

Anything the ICG has, or you have personally, that you could forward to us in writing would be very helpful and we would be very appreciative. Thank you.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Da Rin.

[*Translation*]

Thank you, Mr. Oliphant.

[*English*]

Next, we have MP Garon.

[*Translation*]

Mr. Garon, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

Jean-Denis Garon: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

We were talking about the issue of gangs. I now want to continue the conversation with you, Ms. Martel.

The gang suppression force has replaced the multinational security support mission, or MSSM.

Do you have an opinion on that change? If so, what is it?

In that context, how do you see Canada's current and future roles?

Andréanne Martel: Thank you for the question.

I first want to make it clear that this subject is not really within my area of expertise, and it's not the reason why I was invited.

I would still like to mention that, as a humanitarian organization and an international aid organization, we want or rather expect those missions to facilitate humanitarian access and protect the public, especially women. That's obviously the role of security forces. Our job is really to work with the communities, but to do so in safe spaces as much as possible.

• (1235)

Jean-Denis Garon: Maybe I should clarify my question.

Do you think it will eventually be difficult to reconcile the security and repression considerations, given the whole issue of human rights?

From that perspective, it may also be more consistent with your mission.

Andréanne Martel: In the past, the presence of international military forces has unfortunately not helped protect women and girls in Haiti. On the contrary, cases of sexual violence committed by members of UN forces have been documented. UN troops also introduced cholera in 2010, which certainly left a very bitter memory in the minds of Haitians.

In the current context, this type of force is needed. It's a multidimensional response to a multidimensional crisis. What we want is for that force's objective to be to support the Haitian National Police so that they are properly equipped and able to respond to the situation and protect the public and communities.

To somewhat echo what the other witness mentioned, it is necessary to have a force that is adequately equipped and that helps strengthen the local police.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

[English]

We'll go next to MP Ziad Aboultaif.

You have five minutes.

Ziad Aboultaif (Edmonton Manning, CPC): Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to the witnesses.

The GSF replaces the MSS. It seems like it's the case that we need force to deal with force. To deal with the gangs, we need to show force alongside the suggestions for some diplomacy and other stuff to resolve the issue of this gang group taking over the country.

I'm directing this question to Monsieur Da Rin.

Do you know if Canada has any role in the GSF or in the framework of the GSF?

[Translation]

Diego Da Rin: I don't have much information on that.

This has already been said, and it is public information. So I know that discussions have been held between very high-level authorities representing Canadian and U.S. governments to determine what level of engagement Canada could propose for this new force.

That said, no further details are currently available. I know that discussions are ongoing.

[English]

Ziad Aboultaif: If there's a role for Canada, what do you think that role should be?

[Translation]

Diego Da Rin: I would say that all countries that have the required capacity have the same role to contribute to the new mission through personnel, expertise and funding. It is essential to have a force that is stronger than the gangs to alter the trend and reverse the power relations with them.

In addition, as I mentioned in my speaking notes, resolving the situation in a way that isn't exclusively related to military measures should be considered eventually, since the gangs are based in ex-

remely densely populated neighbourhoods. Houses are often made with very fragile materials that can't withstand intense fighting.

The threat of an imminent incursion should be used as a deterrent to make the gangs stop being combative and decide to co-operate with the authorities.

The problem is that, in order to do that, before the security force is even in place and ready to conduct operations, the entire disarmament, demobilization, justice and accountability structure has to be ready to manage the situation.

• (1240)

[English]

Ziad Aboultaif: Do you believe that there's a—

[Translation]

Diego Da Rin: I'm sorry to interrupt.

Canada could also help plan and explore these non-military options, which could be associated with the mission's military operations.

Thank you.

[English]

Ziad Aboultaif: If the military option were the only option or the best option on the table, do you believe there would be enough public support for such a mission?

[Translation]

Diego Da Rin: Haitians want security of any kind. That could take the form, for example, of a multinational peacekeeping force. That's what I hear from people in the areas most affected by violence, especially in the capital. It's not really the people in Pétionville and the rich neighbourhoods who feel that way.

The people who are most impacted are not thinking so much about how security can be achieved. All they want is to go and buy food without being killed. They want their children to be able to go to school without being raped and to be able to go out a bit at night without being kidnapped. They're looking for some semblance of normalcy.

[English]

Ziad Aboultaif: The situation will not ever improve as long as the gangs are taking over the country. I see from your response that the public is at the desperation level, and there's a will to stand by the GSF to change the status quo. Am I hearing you correctly?

[Translation]

Diego Da Rin: Yes, that's exactly right.

However, at the moment, Haitians are a bit skeptical about the international community's efforts to help them and to restore security. The Haitian government asked for international support in October 2022. The mission was authorized in October 2023. To date, no operation has tried to dismantle a gang.

Haitians are seeing that a lot of discussions are taking place at the international level and that those discussions have not really translated into security support that would really help change the balance of power with the gangs.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

[*English*]

The Chair: We'll go next to MP Bill Blair.

You have five minutes.

Hon. Bill Blair (Scarborough Southwest, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Again, thanks very much to our witnesses for their testimony before us today.

I'd like to step back a bit and make some inquiries with respect to the formation of this new GSF that the Security Council adopted on September 30, just this year. The objectives they've identified in the UN are to include conducting intelligence-led operations to neutralize the gangs, securing critical infrastructure, facilitating humanitarian access and supporting the Haitian National Police and the armed forces.

I note that in some of your previous testimony, for example, the ICG has advocated very strongly for inclusive political engagement, security sector reform and measuring international engagements to avoid repeating past intervention mistakes. I also note that in Ms. Martel's previous testimony before committee, she stressed that the training and arming of police has to go hand in hand with fighting impunity and strengthening the judiciary.

The security sector reform is really the area that I wanted to inquire about with our witnesses.

First of all, I think that just having a stronger police presence, and even the armed military, is necessary, because as long as there's a very dangerous situation on the ground, people will find it difficult to implement reforms and to deliver the humanitarian assistance that is so vitally needed.

How do we balance the humanitarian requirements with our security imperatives? Is simply investing in a stronger law enforcement response, for example, sufficient without a functioning judiciary or prison system? I see that both your organizations have advocated for this in the past. I would very much like your impressions on that issue.

[*Translation*]

Diego Da Rin: I'll try to be brief.

The Haitian crisis is multidimensional. We have to move on many fronts simultaneously in order to succeed in improving the situation to the point of sustainability.

In very concrete terms, a project was launched to create two specialized judicial divisions. It's not just a tribunal. An entire judicial chain will be created to operate in parallel to the Haitian legal system so that it won't be affected by that system's dysfunction. Those two specialized judicial divisions will specifically address two issues: major corruption cases and mass crimes.

This project, which is in the process of being implemented, relies on the support of the Government of Canada. In fact, it is the Government of Canada that supports this project the most. For the time being, the project has not yet been implemented.

It is extremely important to move this project forward before undertaking slightly more ambitious legal reforms. The specialized justice system would, for the first time, make it possible to convict people who are involved in mass or high corruption crimes.

• (1245)

Andréanne Martel: My answer will be very brief, and it will be along the same lines as Mr. Da Rin's.

Obviously, we can't ensure any development, growth or protection of human rights, particularly concerning women, in a situation of complete impunity, as is currently the case.

The crisis in Haiti is multidimensional, and a multidimensional response must be proposed. An armed force seems necessary to provide that security in a transitional way.

We must also fight impunity through the rule of law, as my colleague said. Reforms to the justice system must be undertaken as soon as possible. In the meantime, the fact remains that violence is committed with complete impunity.

[*English*]

Hon. Bill Blair: Thank you both for your responses.

It leads me to inquire then, what are the appropriate metrics that we and the international community should be applying to Haiti? We are all making fairly significant investments. We're being asked to make even greater investments in the security situation in Haiti. We recognize the humanitarian crisis that exists there and the very significant security challenges that the country faces. What would be the appropriate metrics to measure progress and to measure success?

I think there is one thing we wish to avoid. The ICG recognized the ineffectiveness of previous international interventions in Haiti. If we were thoughtful about how we would measure success at the outset of these new investments, perhaps we would be able to maintain a greater focus on achieving some measure of success for the Haitian people.

The Chair: Unfortunately, there's no time for a response, so we'll have to go to the next round.

We only have 10 minutes left. We won't have a full round, but we will have three members asking questions from all parties.

I'll start with MP Abouttaif for five minutes.

Ziad Abouttaif: Thank you, Chair.

It's very important for the international community to be back in the mission in Haiti. We're talking about 11 million people, half of them are basically near the hunger mode. It's becoming a devastating situation in a small geographic place compared to other missions and other crises around the world.

Of the UN Security Council's 15 members, 12 of them voted in favour of serious measures when it comes to resolving the issue in Haiti. Three members abstained: Russia, Pakistan and China. Would you be able to advise us why these three members abstained and did not support the resolution?

That question is for Mr. Da Rin, please.

[*Translation*]

Diego Da Rin: Thank you very much.

Of course, beyond the international geopolitical conflicts dictating the decisions made at the UN Security Council, some reasons have been brought up, by China, Russia and Pakistan alike.

Because the security mission was facing financial challenges, the Security Council asked the UN Secretary-General last year to propose options to address this issue. He proposed some options in February. Since then, the United States has been drafting resolutions on Haiti at the Security Council, but it took them about six months to start drafting. Afterwards, they wanted the resolution to be adopted after a month of discussions. In the middle of that month, the UN General Assembly high-level week was held, where focus was placed on other issues.

So China and Russia asked to extend the mandate of the multinational security mission until January, but the United States decided to force the vote before the mission's mandate ends in October.

• (1250)

[*English*]

Ziad Aboultaif: Do we know if these three countries, or at least China and Russia, have ever offered any financial support to this mission, regardless of the political disagreement on the resolution?

[*Translation*]

Diego Da Rin: No, China has never contributed financially to the Kenyan-led multinational security mission. In fact, it repeatedly pointed out to the Security Council that, in its opinion, it was the United States that had to do so, as it had committed to funding the mission.

However, the United States has not committed the resources it promised. That's what China and Russia are saying, and China has never provided financial support for that mission.

[*English*]

Ziad Aboultaif: Have I understood correctly from your first answer that China and Russia were questioning the transparency of the contributions and where the mission is focusing, or not?

Diego Da Rin: What China and Russia were mostly asking for was more clarification on, for example, how the force was going to be composed; what the rules of engagement were going to be, as the new force has a more robust mandate than the previous one; how they were going to deal with accountability for possible violations of human rights; and where the money was going to come from. Even if some of the funds that are going to fund this mission will be asset contributions of the UN peacekeeping budget, voluntary contributions are still needed from countries.

They wanted more clarification on how the transition from the previous mission to the new one was going to be done. They want-

ed to have more time to have substantial conversations about that. That's what they were criticizing.

Ziad Aboultaif: Is there any suspicion that Russia and China are playing on the gang side? Is there any chance of that regarding this situation?

Diego Da Rin: There's no evidence to think that. They haven't been engaged in Haiti's situation.

The only thing is that about two and a half years ago, there were reports that the Wagner Group was offering support as contractors for Haiti. It's something where all contractors took the chance, and now there are other contractors doing this work.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

We next go to MP Mona Fortier for five minutes.

[*Translation*]

Hon. Mona Fortier (Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witnesses for being here today.

This study is obviously very important for the committee. The witnesses' contribution today brings us different perspectives, which can help us find potential solutions to propose to our colleagues, including Minister Anand.

As my colleague said, the Canadian government has invested more than \$450 million in humanitarian aid in Haiti since 2022. A few weeks ago, the minister announced \$60 million in assistance to support stabilization efforts in Haiti, including \$40 million for the multinational security support mission, or MSSM, or its successor, and \$20 million for a regional maritime security initiative to combat transnational organized crime in Haiti and the Caribbean.

I'd like to hear your views on what's happening right now. Will our current approach enable us to do anything with the new measures announced by Minister Anand? How can the approach be adjusted, if necessary, to move on to the next stage?

Ms. Martel can answer first; then it will be Mr. Da Rin's turn.

• (1255)

Andréanne Martel: Thank you for the question.

First, it is encouraging to see that Canada's commitment to Haiti is continuing on humanitarian, security and political levels. I would remind you that the effectiveness of the support provided to Haiti isn't limited to the stabilization of the country in the short term. These multiple supports make it possible to keep local institutions alive, and to preserve people's access to care and a whole range of services.

To address some of the comments that were made earlier, Canada's contributions are having a real impact and making a difference. By continuing to demonstrate our commitment, we are going in the right direction. We have been supporting Haitian society for decades. I'm thinking, for example, of specific situations, such as natural disasters. Canadian aid is having a real impact, and it's well recognized in Haiti.

Hon. Mona Fortier: Mr. Da Rin, the floor is yours.

Diego Da Rin: In terms of how we can measure the success of international interventions in Haiti, the priority right now is definitely security. If we manage to secure the main seaports, the airport and the main roadways, it starts to become a security success.

Second, it is necessary not only to completely dismantle the gangs, but also to reestablish the authority of public institutions in the neighbourhoods. This can be done through police and military intervention, but also by providing services. There must be schools, hospitals and water supplies. Today, about 60% of the Haitian population doesn't have access to drinking water.

If we manage to reopen 60% of the 1,600 schools that are currently closed, as well as the hospitals that are closed, we'll be able to measure the progress and success of international interventions.

In addition, as in all conflicts, but particularly in Haiti, security and violence are closely linked to politics, so it's essential to decisively sever the ties between the elites and the gangs. International sanctions can contribute to this, but there must also be convictions.

As a last resort, it's very important that government revenues be able to increase. To do so, the Haitian government must also receive support to collect taxes within its borders a little more efficiently than it does today.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Mr. Garon, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

Jean-Denis Garon: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My understanding is that the Gang Suppression Force will now be funded by voluntary contributions from states rather than through a regular budget or fixed contributions from the United Nations.

Could this be of concern to us for the long-term sustainability and funding of the Gang Suppression Force?

Furthermore, could this create an imbalance if one partner—we won't name names—ends up pulling out, which could lead to a domino effect of successive withdrawals?

Ms. Martel and Mr. Da Rin, can you give me more details about this type of funding and the risks it poses to the Gang Suppression Force?

Also, given the current international political context, are there other solutions?

• (1300)

Andréanne Martel: I'll be brief.

As we've seen in the past year, when a major player decides to pull out, it does indeed have an impact on the entire ecosystem and on other major donors.

At present, we need long-term support in Haiti, not short-term support, which would depend on the uncertainties caused by the various governments.

Diego Da Rin: As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the main reason for reviewing the funding model for security through international aid was to resolve the mission's financial problem.

There are two types of funding for the new mission. Staff salaries and other benefits, such as training, must be covered by voluntary contributions.

Based on our calculations, the salaries and other benefits of 5,500 people will cost approximately \$6 million for one year. These costs are much lower than for the current mission. Kenya has estimated that the total deployment of the new mission will cost \$600 million per year. The costs associated with the logistics of this mission will be supported by a UN mission support office and funded through the UN peacekeeping budget, which is supported by mandatory contributions.

The funds will be channelled through the UN support office, which will allow for much more predictable funding for this mission.

The Chair: Thank you very much for your testimony and your participation in this study.

This concludes the meeting.

[*English*]

Is it the will of the committee to adjourn the meeting?

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Thank you very much.

Published under the authority of the Speaker of
the House of Commons

SPEAKER'S PERMISSION

The proceedings of the House of Commons and its committees are hereby made available to provide greater public access. The parliamentary privilege of the House of Commons to control the publication and broadcast of the proceedings of the House of Commons and its committees is nonetheless reserved. All copyrights therein are also reserved.

Reproduction of the proceedings of the House of Commons and its committees, in whole or in part and in any medium, is hereby permitted provided that the reproduction is accurate and is not presented as official. This permission does not extend to reproduction, distribution or use for commercial purpose of financial gain. Reproduction or use outside this permission or without authorization may be treated as copyright infringement in accordance with the Copyright Act. Authorization may be obtained on written application to the Office of the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Reproduction in accordance with this permission does not constitute publication under the authority of the House of Commons. The absolute privilege that applies to the proceedings of the House of Commons does not extend to these permitted reproductions. Where a reproduction includes briefs to a committee of the House of Commons, authorization for reproduction may be required from the authors in accordance with the Copyright Act.

Nothing in this permission abrogates or derogates from the privileges, powers, immunities and rights of the House of Commons and its committees. For greater certainty, this permission does not affect the prohibition against impeaching or questioning the proceedings of the House of Commons in courts or otherwise. The House of Commons retains the right and privilege to find users in contempt of Parliament if a reproduction or use is not in accordance with this permission.

Also available on the House of Commons website at the following address: <https://www.ourcommons.ca>

Publié en conformité de l'autorité
du Président de la Chambre des communes

PERMISSION DU PRÉSIDENT

Les délibérations de la Chambre des communes et de ses comités sont mises à la disposition du public pour mieux le renseigner. La Chambre conserve néanmoins son privilège parlementaire de contrôler la publication et la diffusion des délibérations et elle possède tous les droits d'auteur sur celles-ci.

Il est permis de reproduire les délibérations de la Chambre et de ses comités, en tout ou en partie, sur n'importe quel support, pourvu que la reproduction soit exacte et qu'elle ne soit pas présentée comme version officielle. Il n'est toutefois pas permis de reproduire, de distribuer ou d'utiliser les délibérations à des fins commerciales visant la réalisation d'un profit financier. Toute reproduction ou utilisation non permise ou non formellement autorisée peut être considérée comme une violation du droit d'auteur aux termes de la Loi sur le droit d'auteur. Une autorisation formelle peut être obtenue sur présentation d'une demande écrite au Bureau du Président de la Chambre des communes.

La reproduction conforme à la présente permission ne constitue pas une publication sous l'autorité de la Chambre. Le privilège absolu qui s'applique aux délibérations de la Chambre ne s'étend pas aux reproductions permises. Lorsqu'une reproduction comprend des mémoires présentés à un comité de la Chambre, il peut être nécessaire d'obtenir de leurs auteurs l'autorisation de les reproduire, conformément à la Loi sur le droit d'auteur.

La présente permission ne porte pas atteinte aux privilèges, pouvoirs, immunités et droits de la Chambre et de ses comités. Il est entendu que cette permission ne touche pas l'interdiction de contester ou de mettre en cause les délibérations de la Chambre devant les tribunaux ou autrement. La Chambre conserve le droit et le privilège de déclarer l'utilisateur coupable d'outrage au Parlement lorsque la reproduction ou l'utilisation n'est pas conforme à la présente permission.

Aussi disponible sur le site Web de la Chambre des communes à l'adresse suivante :
<https://www.noscommunes.ca>